Petitionor Copy-Reviewed
Petitionor Copy-Reviewed
Petitionor Copy-Reviewed
CONTENTS
LIST OF AABBREVATIONS………………………………………………………………… 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………….5
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………………6
STATEMENT OF ISSUES…….………………………………………………………………..8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………………9
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED…………………………………………………………………...10
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE
HIGH COURT OF BROOMLAND?…………………………..………………………10
1.1 This Hon'ble Court has a constitutional duty to entertain the instant petition………10
1.2 Writ petition is maintainable when there is infringement of fundamental rights……11
1.3 The writ is independent of the existing alternative remedies………………………..11
LIST OF AABBREVIATIONS
& And
Anr. Another
Govt. Government
Ors. Others
Hon’ble Honorable
i.e. That is
Ltd. Limited
v. Versus
Art. Article
IT Information Technology
All. Allahabad
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
1. The Constitution of India, 1950
2. The Information Technology Act, 2000
CASES
1. Haryana State Industrial Corporation v. Cork Mfg. Co. A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 56
2. UdaiBhan Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors A.I.R. 1974 All. 202
3. Haji Suleman Yusuf Bhat v Custodian of Evacuee Property A.I.R. 1954 Madh. B 173
4. Shivram Poddar v. ITO A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 10
5. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998)8 S.C.C. 1 (11)
6. The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors v. Mrs. Chandrima Das &Ors. (2000)2 S.C.C. 465
7. Himmatlal v. State of M.P. (1954) S.C.R. 1122
8. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N (1994)6 S.C.C. 632
9. PUCL v. U.O.I. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568
10. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. 1963 A.I.R. 1295
11. Maneka Gandhi v U.O.I. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597
BOOKS REFERRED
LEGAL DATABASES
1. Case Mine
2. Indian Kanoon
3. SCC Online
4. Manupatra
5. westlaw
6. lexis NexisAIR
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble High Court of Broomland has the jurisdiction in this matter under Article 226 of the
Constitution of Sindhia, 19501.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III and for any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person
may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government
or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is
made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order;
and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such
order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel
1
226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation
to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government,
within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part
III and for any other purpose
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person
may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government
or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is
made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order;
and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such
order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel
of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it
is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the
High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High
Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as
the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32
of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it
is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the
High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High
Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as
the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the
Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32
Statement of Facts
USP of Funbook and ChatOn was their end-to-end encryption technology that guaranteed the
privacy of contents shared by users.
8.ChatOn and Funbook revised the user policy where under 50 or more user complain about the
content of any post uploaded or shared on such social media, the same will be immediately
removed also ensured that any video which has graphic content was blurred and an express
consent from the user is taken before such video is played.
9.Post this incident, a video of a Sindhu women being raped by a group of man wearing religious
Jeruslam lockets went viral on Funbook and ChatOn (video 2) with “Sindhia belongs to Jerustan”
this created riots and violence in the state of Broomland.
10.Lady unnamed and Neutral Sindhia (the “Petitioners”) made a written request to the Grievance
officer of Funbook stating that the said videos should be urgently taken down and any further
parts pertaining to the same should be automatically blocked. Also, that the user account posting
the same should be deactivated as this fall under the category of hate speech and violate the right
of privacy of lady unnamed. However, despite repeated request from the petitioners Funbook
declined to take down the said videos and related contents because as per Funbook policy 50
people had to complain for Funbook to take down any content from its platform. Also provided
documentary evidence of the fact that they have complied with all the legal requirements under
the Information Technology Act 2000 and have processed her complaint.
11.“Department of Information Technology”, State of Broomland (DIT) refused to entertain the
request of the Petitioners to blacklist Funbook and ChatOn on the ground that it did not have
enough information, however issued a show caused notice to Funbook demanding detailed report
of the incident.
12. DIT said that any form of the regulation of the contents of the Funbook and ChatOn without
reasonable justification would tantamount to violation of freedom of speech of the citizen of
Sindhia.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The petitioner has placed before this Hon’ble High Court the following issues for
consideration:
Issue 1
Issue 2
Issue 3
Summary of Arguments
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION FILED BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT
OF BROOMLAND IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is maintainable. Firstly, there
is a Constitutional obligation on the Court to protect fundamental rights. Secondly, fundamental
rights were infringed under Article 14, and 21 and therefore the writ will be maintainable on this
regard. Thirdly, the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by filing suit in civil court
would not oust the petitioner from filing the writ petition as fundamental rights have been
infringed.
The regulations of the contents of Funbook and ChatOn would not amount to violation of
Freedom of Speech but the regulations of Funbook and ChatOn have indirectly given rise to
religious riots by not removing the said videos.
Advance Arguments
2
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India (Nagpur: LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa, Vol. 6, 8th ed., 2012) p. 6719
3
A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 56
4
A.I.R. 1974 All. 202
5
A.I.R. 1954 Madh. B 173
6
A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 10
court chooses to opt out of convenience and discretion.”7 In the case of Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks8, the Hon’ble Court held that, “under special circumstances the High
Court may grant writ remedies to a Petitioner even with the existence of an alternative remedy.”
In the case of The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors v. Mrs. Chandrima Das &Ors. 9, the Hon’ble
Court held that, “where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation
of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available
under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law.”
In another case of Himmatlal v. State of M.P.10 the Hon’ble Court held that, “the existence of an
alternative remedy is no ground for refusing writ, where there has been a contravention of
fundamental right.”
(keep in the compendium a recent judgment if possible)
7
JUSTICE B L HANSARIA’S, WRIT JURSIDICTION (3 ed. 2005)
8
(1998)8 S.C.C. 1 (11)
9
(2000)2 S.C.C. 465
10
(1954) S.C.R. 1122
11
Section 2(f) of G.S.R. 780 (E).— In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (y) of sub-section (2) of section 87, read with sub-section (2) of
section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)
Section 69(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Rule 412 of the Information
Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of
Information) Rules, 2009, which enables government agencies to intercept personal information
of citizens under certain conditions.
Government of Sindhia shall direct ‘rRespondent 1’ under section 69(3) of the IT Act, 2000 that:
The subscriber or intermediary or any person in-charge of the computer resource shall, when
called upon by any agency referred to in sub-section (1), extend all facilities and technical
assistance to– (a) provide access to or secure access to the computer resource generating,
transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or (b) intercept, monitor, or decrypt the
information, as the case may be; or (c) provide information stored in computer resource. Also if
it fails to assist the agency as referred to in sub-section (3) shall be punished with imprisonment
for the term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine 69(4).
Department of Information Technology of Broomland ‘Respondent 2’ fails to act upon the plea
of Petitioners for blocking for public access of videos. Section 69A of the said act provides the
power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer
resource.–
(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers especially authorized by it in this behalf
is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient to do so, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of
India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order
or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it
may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order,
direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause
to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or
hosted in any computer resource.
(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be
carried out shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be
punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to
fine.
2.2 There has been violation of Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the constitution
The Preamble of the Constitution says that “assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity
and integrity of the Nation” which signifies that privacy of the citizens is utmost important and it
is obligatory duty of the State to provide safeguard related to the privacy of citizens.
Privacy is a very wide term denoting confidentiality for information relating to oneself and his
family and this has been recognised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to be an integral part of “right
to life and personal liberty” granted under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. However the
12
The competent authority may authorize an agency of the Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt information generated, transmitted
received or stored in any computer resource for the purpose specified in sub-section (1) of section 69 of the Act.
definition of “privacy” as provided in Information Technology Act, 2000 is very narrow. The use
of word privacy in the rules is very ambiguous in relation with as to what exactly would be
covered under the term 'privacy'.
As per Section 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 the term privacy has been
restricted to the images of private areas of a person.
66E13 Punishment for violation of privacy: Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures,
publishes or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under
circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both.
The right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental right under the Constitution. It is guaranteed
under the right to life (Article 21) of the Constitution. Article 21 of the Constitution
provides, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law." Courts have interpreted the right to privacy as implicit in the right
to life. In R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N14 and PUCL v. U.O.I.15 the courts observed that the right
to privacy is an essential ingredient of the right to life.
But, if we look at Article 21 of the Constitution of India as interpreted In R. Rajagopal v State of
Tamil Nadu16 popularly known as “Auto Shanker case”, the Supreme Court has expressly held“
the “right to privacy”, or the right to be let alone is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
A citizen has a right to safeguard that privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation,
motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything
concerning the above matters without his consent whether truthful or otherwise and whether
laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right of the person concerned and
would be liable in action for damages. However, position might differ if he voluntarily puts into
controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.”
In PUCL v. UOI17, which is popularly known as the wire-tapping case, the question before the
court was whether wire-tapping was an infringement of a citizen’s right to privacy. The court
held that an infringement on the right to privacy would depend on the facts and circumstances of
a case. It observed that, "telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life.
Right to privacy would certainly include telephone-conversation in the privacy of one's home or
13
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section– (a) “transmit” means to electronically send a visual image with the
intent that it be viewed by a person or persons; (b) “capture”, with respect to an image, means to videotape,
photograph, film or record by any means; (c) “private area” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic
area, buttocks or female breast; (d) “publishes” means reproduction in the printed or electronic form and making it
available for public; (e) “under circumstances violating privacy” means circumstances in which a person can have a
reasonable expectation that–(i) he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of his
private area was being captured; or(ii) any part of his or her private area would not be visible to the public,
regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.
14
(1994)6 S.C.C. 632
15
A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 568
16
Cit. 14.
17
Cit. 15.
office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is
permitted under the procedure established by law." It further observed that the right to privacy
also derives from Article 19 for "when a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right
to freedom of speech and expression."
In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.18, where police surveillance was being challenged on account of
violation of the right to privacy, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that domiciliary night
visits were violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the personal liberty of an
individual.
The court, therefore, has interpreted the right to privacy not as an absolute right, but as a limited
right to be considered on a case to case basis. It is the exceptions to the right to privacy, like
‘public interest’, that are of particular interest to this paper.
The object of Article 21 is to prevent encroachments upon personal liberty by the Executive save
in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof. Prior to the decision in
1978 in Maneka Gandhi v U.O.I. case, 19Article 21 was construed narrowly only as a guarantee
against Executive action unsupported by law 20. But Maneka Gandhi’s case opened up a new
dimension and laid down that it imposed a limitation upon law-making as well 21, that while
prescribing procedure for depriving a person of his life (including livelihood) or personal liberty
it must prescribe a procedure which is reasonable, fair and just22.
connect the cases with the facts of the case
2.3 To curb spreading of hate speech and blasphemous contents which trigger riots and
violence in the country
Due to digital revolution these social media platforms are being misused by politically motivated
and rightwing groups, spreading hate speech and blasphemous contents which trigger riots and
violence in the country Sindhia. In order to curb violence and riots in the country Government
need to intervene and direct these social media platforms to co-operate with them and provide
them with data regarding the spreading of videos through there platforms.
The term Blasphemous has not been defined under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The
closest definition that we can refer to is from Indian Penal Code under Section 295 (A) and that
is -295A. Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by
insulting its religion or religious beliefs. — Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of any class of [citizens of India], [by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to [three years], or with fine, or with both.
18
1963 A.I.R. 1295
19
A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597
20
1950 S.C.R. 88
21
(1981)1 S.C.C. 608
22
Cit. 21.
Also referring section 153A of IPC which prohibits promoting enmity between different groups
on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial
to maintenance of harmony.(1) Whoever
(a) By words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,
promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place or birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes
or communities, or
(b) Commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquility, 2[or]
(c) Organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity intending that the
participants in such activity shall use or be trained to use criminal force or violence of knowing it
to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence or knowing it to be likely that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to
use criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste
or community and such activity for any reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or
alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community,
Shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Funbook Private Limited had not co-operated with the Government by providing data regarding
the spreading of Video 1 through ChatOn and Funbook on the grounds that the privacy of the
users was utmost important to them. This action of respondent 1 violate section 69A which grant
power to the Central Government to issue directions to block public access of any information
through any computer resource on similar grounds.
“(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officers specially authorised by it in
this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of
sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the
commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions
of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of
the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked
for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or
hosted in any computer resource. (2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which
such blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be
prescribed. (3) the intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-
section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven
years and also be liable to fine”
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to declare
that:
1. The said videos contain content which are not appropriate and should be immediately
removed from the said social media platforms.
2. There has been violation of Right to Privacy of the Lady Unnamed and so she should be
paid compensation.
3. There has been negligence on the part of rRespondent no. 1 in not removing the videos
and so it should be held liable for the losses incurred to the lady unnamed.
Pass any other order/orders that may deem fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience. (not necessary to put in a point)
And for this act of kindness the petitioner as is duty bound shall forever pray.
Sd-
Respectfully Submitted
Counsel for the Petitioners