Difference Between Verification

and Falsification
Karl Popper (in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery_1934)
developed the idea that the demarcation between empirical
statements, which was mostly taken to be scientific statements, and
metaphysical statements was based on the idea of falsification. Popper
was speaking out, or presenting, a different criterion to differentiate
between empirical statements and metaphysical statements.

“The problem of induction arises from an apparent contradiction

between the basic empiricist requirement (only experience can decide
the truth or falsity of a scientific statement) and Hume’s insight into
the logical impermissibility of inductive decision (there is no empirical
justification of universal statements).
This contradiction exists only if we assume that empirical statements
must be empirically “fully decidable”, that is, that experience
must be able to decide not only their falsity, but also their
truth.
The contradiction is resolved once “partially decidable” empirical
statements are admitted: Universal empirical statements are
empirically falsifiable; they can be defeated by experience.”

The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of

Knowledge
Verification meant that empirical statements, or scientific
statements, are those that it is possible be decided to be true or false
by experience. You can fully decide that the statement is true because
experience has shown the statement is true. Like experience can show
that “this apple is red in color”, so too can experience show the
statement that “all apples in the refrigerator are red in color”. The
refrigerator is in a specific place, at a specific time, and logically
possible to see if all the apples in the refrigeration are red in color. It
can be opened and found that all the apples are red in color, or that all
but one of the apples in the refrigerator are red in color, like one can
be yellow. Thus, it is both logically possible to empirically verify the
statement or empirically falsify the statement. It is logically possible to
either show it is true or show it is false.

However, the statement that “all apples in refrigerators are red in

color” is logically impossible to empirically verify. This is because
this universal statement applies to all times and all places, while
the previous universal statement applies to a specific time and
specific place.

Thus, this universal statement cannot be verified, but it can still be

empirically falsified. You might not be able to check all the
refrigerators that will, or have, existed in all places or all times, but
those that you have observed have the empirical possibility of showing
the statement to be false.

You might not be able to check all refrigerators in all places and times,
but finding a specific refrigerator that has a yellow apple, shows that
all refrigerators, in all times and place, do not have all red apples in
them. One case has been found to run counter to the universal claim.
Thus, we learn that some refrigerators have only red apples in color
and some refrigerators have yellow apples in color.

The point becomes that science can introduce whatever

universal statement it wants, so long as it is logically possible to make
one empirical observation to show it is false. We do not have to show
that what it introduces is true by experience, just that it can make
predictions that are logically possible to show false by experience.

Let us imagine that there is a person who walks amongst us, and this
person knows all the laws of nature. Let us also assume that it is a
trickster (Fraud) like Loki (is considered a fraud god) . It mixes some
truth with some falsity, knowingly. It decides to come up with a
falsifiable statement, which means that it is not fully decidable, i.e. it
is partially decidable. It knows that this universal statement is false,
but it still makes predictions that are possible to be shown false by
experience. This being that is like Loki knows that all attempted
experiments to show that statement is false by experience will fail,
which means it passes every single experimental test that can be
presented. You would be justified in accepting a false
statement because you cannot show it is true but you
can show it is false.

Falsifiability is a standard of evaluation of scientific theories and

hypotheses that was introduced by the philosopher of science Karl
Popper in his book The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934). He
proposed it as the cornerstone of a solution to both the problem of
induction and the problem of demarcation. You sent Falsification” is to
be understood as the refutation of statements, and in contrast,
“verification” refers to statements that are shown to be true. The goal
of science is to create knowledge by identifying true statements as
true (verified) and false statements as false (falsified). You sent Modus
Ponens Modus Tollens It is bright and sunny today. I will not wear
my sunglasses. Therefore, I will wear my sunglasses. Therefore, it is
not bright and sunny today. You sent Modus Ponens & Modus Tollens:
It is bright and sunny today. I will not wear my sunglasses.
Therefore, I will wear my sunglasses. Therefore, it is not bright and
sunny today. You sent Disjunctive Syllogisms Here's an example:
Premise 1: Either my pet is a dog, or my pet is a cat. Premise 2: My
pet is not a cat. Conclusion: Therefore, my pet is a dog.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Popper, Hume, Induction,

Falsifiability, and Science
Posted by allzermalmer on September 30, 2012

Here are some interesting things from Karl Popper on Falsification and
Induction, or Hume on Induction.

“we merely have to realize that our ‘adoption’ of scientific theories can
only be tentative; that they always are and will remain guesses or
conjectures or hypotheses. They are put forward, of course, in the
hope of hitting upon the truth, even though they miss it more often
than not. They may be true or false. They may be tested by
observation (it is the main task of science to make these tests more
and more severe), and rejected if they do not pass…Indeed, we can do
no more with a proposed law than test it: it is no use pretending that
we have established universal theories, or justified them, or made
them probably, by observation. We just have not done so, and cannot
do so. We cannot give any positive reasons for them. They remain
guesses or conjectures- though well tested ones.” Realism and the Aim
of Science

Now someone might wonder how we cannot give any positive reasons
for establishing the universal theories, or justified them, or made them
probable, by all the observations that confirm its predictions on tests.
This comes from what Popper takes to be Hume’s problem of
induction.

“[Hume] tried to show that any inductive inference- any reasoning

from singular and observable cases (and their repeated occurrence) to
anything like regularities or laws- must be invalid. Any such inference,
he tried to show, could not een be approximately or partially valid. It
could not even be a probable inference: it must, rather, be completely
baseless, and must always remain so, however great the number of
the observed instances might be. Thus he tried to show that we cannot
validly reason from the known to the unknown, or from what has been
experienced to what has not been experienced (and thus, for example,
from the past to the future): no matter how often the sun has been
observed regularly to rise and set, even the greatest number of
observed instances does not constitute what I have called a positive
reason for the regularity, or the law, of the sun’s rising and setting.
Thus it can neither establish this law nor make it probable.” Realism
and the Aim of Science

I think it should be pointed out, Hume did bring up that the basic idea
of induction was that “we suppose, but are never able to prove, that
there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have
had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our
discovery.” Induction is also done in other ways besides going from
particular statements to universal statements.

[I.] Move form particular statement to particular statement.

In 1997 the Chicago Bulls beat the Utah Jazz in the NBA Finals. In
1998 the Chicago Bulls beat the Utah Jazz in the NBA Finals. Thus, the
Chicago Bulls will win against the Utah Jazz the next time they play in
the NBA Finals.

[II.] Move from general statement to general statement.

All NFL teams made tons of money this year. Thus, all NFL
teams will make tons of money next year.

[III.] Move from general statement to particular statement.

All NFL teams made tons of money this year. Thus, the
Ravens will make tons of money next year.

[IV.] Move from particular statement to general statement.

This crow is black. Thus, all crows are black.

Each of these, though, follow what Hume points out for Induction.
They are going from the known to the unknown, which does not have
to include the future or past.Hume also says that the only thing that
can take us from the known to the unknown is causality, or a
necessary connection between two events to form a necessary causal
relation. But Hume already pointed out that this relation is not found
by experience. So Hume comes to the conclusion that since the
necessary relation between cause and effect or continuation of that
relationship, is not shown by experience nor demonstrative, or that
the principle of induction is not known by experience or demonstrative,
but that they are creations of the human imagination that cannot be
shown to be true based on experience or reason, and any justification
of them will either rely on an infinite regress or circular reasoning. So
they cannot be proven to be true.

This would mean that when science proposes either a causal

connection, or what will happen in the future, or what happens
beneath sensible qualities, cannot be proved by experience to be true ,
or by reason to be true, or even held to be probably true. IOW, we are
not justified in proposing things beyond what is known, since they
cannot be shown to be true or probably true. So scientific hypotheses
are unjustified and cannot be shown to be true or probably true, or
natural laws cannot be shown to be true or probably true or justified.

Popper comes along and tries to save science, in some way. But you
notice where his position eventually leads as well. He admits with
Hume that we cannot demonstrate the truth of a scientific hypothesis
or explanation; we cannot show by experiment the truth of a scientific
hypothesis or explanation; we cannot show that a scientific hypothesis
or explanation is probably true. All we can do is show if they are false.
We can give negative reasons to a scientific hypothesis or explanation
by it failing its severe experimental/observational tests. This is
because it follows the demonstrative inference of modus tollens and
disjunctive syllogism, so we can demonstrate that a scientific
hypothesis or explanation is false.

So falsifiability, or refutabilty, can show you only that a scientific

hypothesis or explanation is false. Refutability cannot demonstrate that
the hypothesis or explanation is true, or has been shown by
experience to be true, or is probably true. It can only tell you that it
may be true, and it has not failed any of its tests so far. It doesn’t
even appears to care if something is true, only that it can be shown to
be false.

And here are Hume on what Induction is, or relies on.

“that which we have had no experience, must resemble those which

we have had experience, and nature continues uniformly the
same.” Treatise of Human Nature: Book I (Of the Understanding), Part
III (Of Knowledge & Probability), Sect.VI.Of the Inference from the
Impression to the Idea
“probability is founded on the presumpition of a resemblances betweixt
those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which
we have had none…” Treatise of Human Nature: Book I (Of the
Understanding), Part III (Of Knowledge & Probability), Sect.VI.Of the
Inference from the Impression to the Idea
“Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate
connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has
informed us of their constant conjunction, it is impossible for us to
satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we should extend that experience
beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our
observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must
be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had
experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.”
Treatise of Human Nature: Book I (Of the Understanding), Part III (Of
Knowledge & Probability), Sect.VI.Of the Inference from the
Impression to the Idea
“we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they
have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which
we have experienced, will follow from them.” An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding: Section IV. Sceptical Doubts Concerning the
Operations of the Understanding, Part II
“all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we
discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to
expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from
such objects.” An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: Section
IV. Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding,
Part II
“From causes which appear similar we expect similar effects. This is
the sum of all our experimental conclusions.” An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding: Section IV. Sceptical Doubts Concerning the
Operations of the Understanding, Part II