‘The following text has been taken from Robert Stecker's Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (2 Ed), 2010 and has been granted permission by the author for use In ARTS 1 (GE). CHAPTER FIVE What Is Art? Perhaps you have a handmade piece of furniture passed down from gen- eration to generation You have always admired it It is beautiful. But is it a work of art? What about a lovely bowl you recently encountered at a japanese restaurant, or, for that matter, the beautifully presented meal? ‘When you visit museums and art galleries featuring contemporary works, you might wonder ‘whether some of the items you encounter are artworks. Or, if you take that for granted you may still be puzzled why many items are considered art. The question, "What is art?" is commonly asked when attempting to find conditions, necessary or sulfcient, that make an item an artwork. That is, the goal is normaly to find a principle for classifying all artworks together while distinguishing them from all nonartworks, Sometimes the goal is set higher. Some look for a “real” definition in terms of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for being an artwork We will see later in the chapter that several promising approaches to answering this question do not meet this more stringent requirement, This project is often identified as trying to “define” something a property (being art, being an artwork), a concept (art, artwork), a word (' explore the relation between the classificatory project and the attempt to define the items just mentioned. In the mean time, | will often call proposals to answer “What is art” questions “definitions” as a convenient shorthand throughout the chapter. Who Cares What Art Ist Why are classificatory principles philosophically interesting? Why should we care what artis? One preeminent reason is the permanently puzzling nature of avant-garde art. From impressionist paintings to piles of dust and unmade beds recently exhibited in galleries, such works, in their time, puzzled, and sometimes enraged, critics and viewers. Are these items art (if they all are) merely because they are pus forward by an artist, placed in a setting such as a gallery, or is there something more to being art that needs to be identified? Can something be put forward in this way, but fail to be an artwork? Avant-garde art of the past one hundred years has made the nature of art increasingly puzzling because it has progressively stripped works of the tradi- tional traits by which we recognize them as art, while expanding the category of objects capable of art status, With regard to new categories, examples are legion, Found art has added unworked objects chosen by the artist, which are often ordinary artifacts like bottle racks and bicycle wheels. Earth, bricks, and scraps of cloth are materials of now famous recent works, With regard to the stripping away of traditional traits, the same is true. In some works—ahich, in addition to found art, include aleatoric art where the final product,is left to chance—the contribution of the artist is minimized. In some works, form seems to disappear asin lint strewn on a gallery floor. Many works attempt to eliminate aesthetic properties. Robert Morris issued a notarized statement withdrawing all aesthetic qualities ‘rom a metal construction that bore the poetic ttle Litanies, Sometimes this stripping away is pursued because artists themselves have taken an interest in the nature of art, Hence anyone cognizant of the art ‘world can hardly avoid the question: what is art? These aspects of recent art history reflect underlying issues that have always been with us. Why Go all the civerse objects that are artworks fall under the concept art, while other similar items fail to do so? Why do some talismans and ceramic vessels but not others, some buildings but not others, some essays but not others, paintings in galleries but not most paintings on billboards, fall Under the concept? Why are wine, food, cigars, and various skilful entertainments such as sitcoms and action movies excluded? Finally, there is an issue concerning choice among art concepts. The fact is that there is not just one concept of art. Current concept or concepts have a number of historical predecessors. One of the earliest isis expressed by the ancient Greek word techne, which refers to any skiled activity and its prod- ucts. We still sometimes use "art" in this sense, as when we call cooking and all manner of crafts “art.” We aso use “art” in a much narrower way than the one in which we are interested, where ft refers exclusively to the visual arts The concept of fine art that came fully into use in the eighteenth century comes closer to the concept we are attempting to understand in this chapter. This concept includes the five major arts: poetry, painting, sculpture, music, and architecture, It is less clear what else it includes and how it compares to the related but different category of decorative art, which emerged around the same time. The philosophy of art surely is concerned with fine art, but | am inclined to think ‘we are working with a broader concept that includes more than what eighteenth-century thinkers thought of as fine art. This con- cept either gradually evolved from the eighteenth-century version or possibly predates it Our concept countenances the multiplication of art forms, 2 vast broadening of objects capable of achieving art status, the stripping away of traits necessary for achieving that status, Not all artis representational. Not all aspires to beauty or sublimity. Art need rnot be made only to be contem- plated for its own sake. The fact that an item serves some useful function does not cisqualify it as art in this broader sense, Further, we no longer think of the artist exclusively as a genius set apart from normal humanity as the eighteenth century did. We now think in more democratic terms, We also distinguish less sharply between fine and popular or folk art In addition to these features, which reflect relatively recent development in the art world, our classificatory practice recognizes as art ites from Europe and the Middle East stretching back at least to the most ancient civilizations, but quite plausibly even further to Paleolithic cave paintings and artifacts. ft also recognizes as art, and in equal measure, items from non-Western cul- tures, (For a contrary view see Shiner 2001.) If we are to affirm that these classes of items are art in the same sense as are post-cighteenth-century items produced in western cuftures, we must consider ‘two possibilities. One is that the eighteenth-century concept of fine artis itself flexible enough tocover these items from earler times and cifferent cultures. If we take this option, we mustn't take cighteenth-century characterizations of fine art as the final word in defining the concept. Rather these characterizations point to @ con- cept that is better defined from a later vantage point, a point supported by the fact that the best way to characterize fine art has been constantly con- tested from the start, The second option isto affirm that there is @ concept of art of much broader application than the eighteenth-century conception. It apples to all these items but not to just any artifact produced with ski People attracted to this possibilty disagree among themselves whether this concept pre- or post-dates the eighteenth-century one, but they agree that it applies widely to artifacts created in the distant past up to the present day (see See S, Davies 2000, Dutton 2000, and Lopes 2007 for a defense of dif ferent version of this view) For all of these reasons, there is a real challenge to attempt to pin down the relevant current concept of art Hitorical Background Something should be said about the historical roots, not of the concept of art, but of the attempt by philosophers to define art. It is sometimes supposed that the earliest definitions of art are to be found in the writings of ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. In fact, one won't find, in these writers, a definition of art, in the sense of an item belonging to the fine arts or of art in its current sense, if that departs from the concept of the fine arts, What is true is that they wrote about such things as poetry, painting, music, and architecture, which came to be classified as fine arts, and saw some com- mon threads among them that did not apply to other artifacts produced with skill Plato was very interested in the fact that poetry, lke painting, was a representation or imitation (mimesis) of various objects and features of the world, inclucing human beings and their actions, and that it had a powerful effect on the emotions. Aristotle also emphasized the idea of poetry as imita- tion and characterized other arts, such as music, in those terms. ‘This way of thinking of the arts wielded enormous influence in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, and so when the concept of the fine arts solidified, the first definitions of art were cast in terms of representation, by such important figures as Hutcheson, Bateaux, and Kant. It is not necessary to set out the exact content of all of these definitions here, since in the later period in which we are interested, they were superseded by other approaches. Of these earlier definitions, Kant’s definition is the one that has had truly lasting influence, Fine art, according to Kant, is one of two “aesthetic arts,” arts of representation where “the feeling of pleasure is what is immediately in view.” The end of agreeable art is pleasurable sensation. The pleasure af- forded by the representations of fine art, in contrast, is “one of reflection,” which is to say that it arises from the exercise of our imaginative and cogni- tive powers, Fine art is “a mode of representation which is intrinsically inal... and has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers in the interest of social communication” (Kant 1952, 165-66). Elements of this conception survived even after the idea that the essence of art is representa- tion was abandoned. One is a series of contrasts between (fine) art, properly understood, and entertainment (agreeable art), Art makes moredemands on the intellect but offers deeper satisfactions. Art is “intrinsically final” that is, appreciated for its own sake. Art has some essential connection with communication. ‘The struggle to replace the idea that artis representation takes place in the nineteenth century. This occurs on many fronts, just as did the formation of the concept of the fine arts a century earlier, Artistic movements such as romanticism, impressionism, and art-for-art’s-sake challenge ideals associated with the exclusive concern with representation and direct attention to other aspects of art, such as the expression of the artist and the experience of the audience. Debates among critics in response to these movements raise questions about the boundaries of art. The invention of photography challenges the representational ideal in panting, atleast if that's regarded as the increasingly accurate, lifelke depiction of what we see. The increasing prestige of purely instrumental music provides at least one clear example of nonrepresentational art For some, such music provides a new paradigm captured by Walter Pater’s claim that all the arts aspire to the condition of music. In response to allthis, new definitions of art appear, especially, ex- pression ‘theories, formalist theories, and aesthetic theories ‘What all these theories have in common with one another, as with representationalism, is that they identify a single valuable property or function of art, and assert that it is this property that qualifies something as art. Such theories dominate the attempt to define art right through the middle of the twentieth century. Akhough they now no longer dominate, they are still regularly put forward. Expression, formalist, and aesthetic theories have been the most important. and influential examples. Each deserves attention in some detail ‘Art as Expression The ostensible difference between expression and representation is that while the latter looks outward and attempts to represent nature, society, and human form and action, the former looks inward in an attempt to convey moods, emotions, or attitudes. We seem to find instances of expressive art where representation is de-emphasized or absent. It is very common to think of instrumental music, or at least many pieces of music, in these terms. As the visual arts moved ‘toward greater abstraction, they too often seem to de-emphasize, or abandon, representation for the sake of expression, One can even extend this to literature, which pursued expresshst goals from the advent of romantic poetry through the invention of “stream of consciousness” and other techniques to express interiority. So it might seem that one could find art without representation but not without expression, This might encourage the thought, independently encouraged by various romantic and expressivist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that even ‘when ex- pression and representation co-occur, the real business of art is expression Space permits the examination of only one specific proposal to define art in terms of expression. The defiition comes from Collingwood's Principles of Art (1938). Collingwood defines art primarily as an activity: that of clarifying an emotion, by which he means identifying the emotion one is feeling not merely as a general type, such as anger or remorse, but with as much particularity as possible, Collingwood does not deny that one can rephrase this definition in terms of a work of art rather than an activity, but he believes the work exists primarily in the minds of artist andaudience, rather than in one of the more usual artistic media, He seems to think that the job of ‘the medium it to enable the communication of emotion to the audience who share the same emotions. The definition has wellknown problems. First, even if expressiveness, in some sense, is a ‘widespread phenomenon in the arts itis far to0 narrowly circumscribed by Collingwood, He prescribes a certain process by which a work of art must come about, whereas it is in fact @ contingent matter whether works are created in the way he recognizes. Not unexpectedly, the definition rules out many items normally accepted as artworks, including some of the greatest in the western tradition, such as the plays of Shakespeare, which by Collingwood's standards are entertainment rather than art. The definition assumes that the emotion expressed in a work is always the artist’s emotion, but itis not at all clear why a work cannot express, or be expressive of, an emotion not felt by the artist when creating the work. In recent years, the idea that art expresses an actual person's emotion has given way to the idea that artis expressive of emotion in virtue of possessing expressive properties, such as the property of being sad, joyful, or anxious, however those properties are analyzed. Such properties can be perceived in the work and their presence in a work does not require any specific process of creation, Formalism, Developing alongside expression theories of art were formalist theories. If one stops thinking that artis all about representation, a natural further thought is that what artis all about is form rather ‘than representational content. This thought gained support from various developments in the arts during the period of high modernism, a long, exciting period roughly between 1880 and 1960, ‘Though many art forms contain modernist masterpieces, the work of painters were the paradigm and inspiration for many of the most influential formalist theories. Cezanne in particular was the daring of the early formalsts, Cive Bell (1914) and Roger Fry (1956). Cezanne’s paintings contain perfectly traditional representational subjects—landscape, portraiture, stl fe —but his innovations could be seen as formal with virtually no concern to express anything inner other than Cezanne’s eye making features of visual realty salient, These innovations involved the use of a wide-ranging palette, a handling of line, and an interest in the three-dimensional geometry of his subjects, which give his figures a “solidity” not found in his impressionist predecessors, while at the same time “flattening” the planes of the pictorial surface, Taking such formal features as the raison d'etre for these paintings became the typical formalist strategy for understanding the increasingly abstract, ‘works of twentieth-century modernism, as well as for reconceiving the history of art. Like the other simple functionalist theories under discussion here, formalism is not just an attempt to define art. It is @ philosophical theory of art in the sense that it also attempts to identify the value of art, and what needs to be understood in order to appreciate an artwork. A formalist attempt to define art faces several initial tasks. They all have to do with figuring out how to deploy the notion of form in a definition. One can't just say art is form or artis what has form, because everything has form in some sense. Thus, the fist task is to identify a relevant sense of “form” or, in other words, to identify which properties give a work form in the chosen sense.Second, if objects other than artworks can have form in this same sense, one has to find something special about the way artworks possess such form, The best known and most explicit formalist definition of art belongs to Clive Bell. According to Bell, artis what has significant form, Significant form is form that imbues what possesses it with a special sort of value that consists in the affect produced in those who perceive it. Bell calls the affect "the aesthetic emotion” though, as Carol Gould (1994) has pointed out, ths is probably a misnomer since what he has in mind is more likely a postive, pleasurable reaction to a perceptual experience. Thus, Bell claims that what's special about form in artis that its valuable in a special way. However, Bell's claims about significant form are not very illuminating until we know what he means by form. Unfortunately, he is remarkably cavalier in answering this question. Being primarily concerned with the v- sual arts, he sometimes suggests that the building blocks of form are line and color combined in a certain way. But this does not adequately describe his examples, which include Sta, Sophia (a building), the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bows, Chinese carpets, and the masterpieces of Poussin, Perhaps even three-cimensional works such as buildings, bowls, and sculptures in some abstract sense are "buil” out of line and color. A more straightforward way to itemize the formal properties of a bow would be color, three-dimensional shape, and the patterns if any, that mark its surfaces. Notice that every three-dimensional object has formal properties so characterized, and those that have significant form are a subclass of those that have form. Essentially the same is true in the cases of buildings andi sculptures, though these are typically far more complex in having enany parts or subforms that interact with each other and with a wider environment, But a similar complexity can be found in many three-dimensional objects both manufactured and natural In the case of pictures in general, anc paintings in particular, which is the sort of visual at in which Bell was most interested, speaking of form as aris- ing from line and color is, if anything, even less illuminating because all sorts of its properties, including the representational properties, so arse. Further, this definition gives no indication of the complexity of the concept as it ap- plies to a two- dimensional medium capable of depicting three dimensions, The fact is that the form of a painting includes, but is hardly confined to, the two-dimensional array of lines and color patches that mark its surface, As Malcolm Budd (1995) has pointed out in one of the most sensitive treat- ments of the topic, form also includes the way objects, abstractly conceived, are lid out in the represented three-dimensional space of a work and the in- teraction of these two- and three-dimensional aspects. For example, formal- ists when discussing particular paintings, often refer to the volume a group of figures fils in the represented three-dimensional space of the picture. They regard this as a formal feature of a painting even though itis part of the representational content and stands in some relation to the two-dimensional design of the picture IF we can pin down the sense of form as it applies across various art media, can we then go on to assert that something is an artwork just in case it has significant form? Bell's definition hinges not just on his ability to identity form but also significant form, and many have questioned whether he is able to do this in a noncirculer fashion. His most explicit attempts on this score are plainlycircular or empty involving the interdefinition of two technical terms, significant form being what and only what produces the aesthetic emotion, and the aesthetic emotion being what is produced by and only by significant form. Others (Goulk, 1995), however, have claimed that a substantive understanding of when form i significant can be recovered from formalist descriations of artworks purportedly in possession of it. Even if Bell can successfully identify significant form, his definition is not satisfactory. It misfires in a number of respects that are typical of the simple functionalist approach. Firs, it rules out the possibilty of bad art since significant form is always something to be valued highly, Perhaps there can be degrees of it, but It is not something that can occur to a very small degree unless one can say that a work has negligible significant form, Second, it displays the common vice of picking out cone important property for which we value art, while ignoring others at the cost of excluding not just bad works but many great works. Thus someone who defines art as significant form has litle Use for artists lke Breughel whose paintings, many of which teem with vast numbers of tiny human figures, give a rich sense of many aspects of hu- man life but lack art's defining feature as Bell would understand it Perhaps there is a better way to deploy the notion of form or formal value in a definition of art This is a possibilty that, whatever its merits, has gone largely unexplored. Instead, those who remain attached to the simple functionalist model turn to an akernative approach using a more flexible concept, that of the aesthetic. Let us now turn to this new approach. Aesthetic Definitions The concept of the aesthetic is both ambiguous and contested, as was made plain in chapters 3 on aesthetic experience and 4 on aesthetic properties. For our purposes, we can stipulate that the aesthetic refers in the first in- stance to experience valied (valuable) for its own sake that results from close attention to the sensuous features of an object or to an imaginary world it projects. Aesthetic properties of objects are those that have in- herent value in virtue of the aesthetic experience they afford. Aesthetic interest is an interest in such experiences and properties. Aesthetic defin- tions—attempts to define art in terms of such experiences, properties, or interest—have been, with only afew exceptions, the definitions of choice among those pursuing the simple functionalist project during the last thirty years. The brief exposition above of definitions of art in terms of representa tional, expressive, and formal value suggests why this is the case. Each of the previous attempts to define art attempt to do so by picking out a valuable feature of art and claiming that all and only things that have that feature are art works. One of the objections to each of the definitions was that they excluded works of art, and ones possessing considerable value, but not in virtue of the feature preferred by the definition, Hence such definitions are not extensionally adequate By contrast, aesthetic definitions seem, at first glance, to be free of this problem. Form and representation can both afford intrinsicaly valuable ex- perience, and typically, such experience does not exclude one aspect in favor of the other. The same is true for the experience affordedby the expressive properties of works, All such experience can be regarded under the umbrella of aesthetic experience Aesthetic definitions of art are numerous and new ones are constantly on offer. | mention here a few of the better known or better constructed definitions. ‘An artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest (Beardsley 1983) ‘Awork of artis an artifact, which under standard conditions provides its perciplent with aesthetic experience (Schlesinger 1979). ‘An “artwork’ is any creative arrangement of one or more media whose principal function is to communicate a significant aesthetic object (Lind 1992), Despite the fact that the notion of the aesthetic better serves the simple functionalist than the notions of representation, expression, or form, such definitions are stil far from satisfactory. To bring this out, consider two basic requirements on the definition of any kind (class, property, concept) K: that it provide necessary conditions for belonging to (being. falling under) K; that they provide sufficient conditions for belonging to (being, falling under) K. To be an artwork, is it necessary that it either provide aesthetic experience or even be made with the intention that it satisfy an interest in such experience? Many have thought not. Those who deny it are impressed with art movements like Dadaism, conceptual art, and performance art. These move- ments are concerned, in one way or another, with conveying ideas seemingly stripped of aesthetic interest Dadaist works, such as Duchamp’s ready-mades, appear to be precisely aimed at questioning the necessary connection between art and the aesthetic by selecting objects with little or no aesthetic interest, such as urinals, snow shovels, and bottle racks, Some instances of performance art appear to be based on the premise that politcal ideas can be conveyed more effectively without the veneer of aesthetic interest. Some conceptual works seem to forgo or sideline sensory embodiment entirely Defenders of aesthetic definitions take two approaches to replying to this objection, Some (Beardsley 1983) attempt to deny that the apparent coun- terexamples are artworks, but this seems to be a losing battle as the number of ostensible counterexamples increase and gain critical and popular accep- tance as artworks, What has recently come to be the more common tack in replying to the objection is to claim that the apparent counterexamples do have aesthetic properties (Lind 1992). The ready-mades, for example, have such properties on more than one level. Simply regarded as objects, they have features that to a greater or lesser degree reward contemplation. As artworks, they powerfully express Duchamp's ironic posture toward art. Can we deploy the notion of the aesthetic to provide a sufficient condi- tion for being an artwork? As the previous paragraph already begins to sug- gest, any abject has the potential to be of aesthetic interest, and so providing aesthetic experience is hardly unique to art, Bearcsley's definition rules out natural objects, since they are not made with the requisite intention, but itseems to inchide many artifacts that may not be artworks, but are made with aesthetically pleasing features, There are three ways a defender of esthetic definitions of art might try to cope with the pervasiveness of the aesthetic outside of art per se. One way is to redefine what counts as art as any artifact with aesthetic interest (Zangwill 2000, suggests this approach). The problem with this move is that it just changes the subject from an attempt to figure out why we classify objects as art to a mere stipulation that something is art fits an aesthetic object. A definition that includes doughnut boxes, ceiling fans, and toasters, even when not put forward as ready-mades, is simply not a definition of art in a sense others have attempted to capture, Second, one can attempt to rule out nonart artifacts by claiming that artworks have a “significant” aesthetic interest that distinguishes them from the “mere” aesthetic interest possessed by other artifacts (see Lind 1992), But this line is equally unlikely to suc- ceed. The more one requires such “significance,” the less tkely itis that all artworks will possess it, for we have seen that many recent works are not pri- marily concerned with creating a rich aesthetic experience. The last strategy is to claim that, despite intuitions to the contrary, aesthetic experience is something that is elther uniquely or primarily provided by art. This strategy faces the daunting task of specifying an experience common to all artworks and that art uniquely or primarily provides, but without making essential reference to the concept of art, Though some, such as Beardsley (1969), have attempted such a specication, the consensus is that no proposal has been successful Antlessentlallsm Although aesthetic definitions of art continue to have adherents, the domi- nant trend since the 1950s has been to reject simple functionalism—as we can call any view that claims that art can be defined in terms of a single func- tion. This rejection began with the more sweeping thought that all attempts to define art are misguided because necessary and sufficient conditions do not exist capable of supporting a real definition of art. The most influential proponents of this antiessentialism were Morris Weitz (1956) and Paul Ziff (1953). Guided by Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, they claim that it was atypical for ordinary language empirical concepts to operate on the basis of such conditions, Rather, as Weitz put it, most such concepts were “open- meaning that the criteria by which we apply the concept do not determine its application in every possible situation, While the concept of art is by no means unique in being open-textured for Weitz and Ziff, the concept still stands apart from many other empirical concepts in one respect. For many empirical concepts, open texture merely creates a theoretical possibilty that situations may arise in which criteria no longer guide us, and 2 new decision is needed whether the concept applies. Weitz and Ziff conceived of art as requiring such decisions on a regular basis as new art movements continually create novel works, This novelty provides a constant source of counterexamples to simple functionalist definitions. Instead of being classified by necessary and sufficient conditions, Weitz and Ziff claimed that works are classified as art in virtue of “family resem- blances.” or sets of similarities based on multiple paradigms, Thus, one work is art in virtue of one set of similarities to other works, while another is art in virtue of a different set of similarities. An ahernative approach, also Witt- gensteinian inspirt, is that artis a cluster concept (see Gaut 2000), This means that we can discern several different sets of properties the possession of any one such set suffices for an object to achieve art status. No setis by aself necessary for such status. Each of these suggestions, while proposing that the concept of artis best captured by something other than a definition, in fact lays the ground for new approaches to defining art. The famly resemblance view claims that the concept of artis formed by a network of similarities. But which cones ac- complish this? if none are specified then the view is empty, since everything bears a similarity to everything else. Infact, Ziff suggests that the relevant domain of similarities is social or functional in nature, though in the case of the latter, not in the way simple functionalists had hoped for. As for the clis- ter concept view, if the set of conditions sufficient for being an artwork are finite and enumerabl, itis already equivalent to a definition of art, namely, a disjunctive definition. ‘While attempting to demonstrate that art cannot be defined, antiessentialsm actually resulted in a whole new crop of defini tions, most of which look completely different from their simple functionalist predecessors and rivals Danto and Dickle In a highly influential article, Maurice Mandelbaum (1965) was among the first to point out that the appeal to family resemblance does not preclude, but rather invites, definition. It may be true that when we look at the resem- bling features within a literal family, we may find no one exhibited Ikeness that they all have in common. However, Mandelbaum observes, family re- semblance is no more satisfactorily explicated in terms of an open ended set of similarities differentially shared amnong the family’s members, for people outside the family may also possess the exhibited features without thereby bearing a family resemblance to the original set of people, Rather, what is needed to capture the idea of family resemblance is a nonexhibited relation, namely, that of resemblance among those with a common ancestry. Without proposing a specific definition, Mandelbaum suggested that in attempting to define art we may il n the gap left to us by the family resemblance view by appealing to some nonexhibited relational property—perhaps one involving intention, use, or origin, ‘Among the first to explore the possibilty of defining art in these terms, and certainly the most influential proponents of this approach, were Arthur Danto and George Dickie, In part because both cast their thoughts about art in terms of "the art world,” and in part because Danto was not explicit about his proposed definition, for some time it was thought that they were advanc- ing similar definitions of art. However, itis now understood that each were developing quite different theories, Danto’s being historical and functional, Dickie's being radically nonfunctional and institutional In some early papers (1964, 1973), Danto outlines desiderata to which a definition of art must conform without yet setting forth a definition that satisfactorily meets the desiderata. The first point, illustrated by the ready- mades as well as such works as Warhol's Brillo Boxes, is that art and nonart can be perceptually indistinguishable and so cannot be marked off from each other by“exhibited” properties, (A corollary to this is that one artwork can- not always be distinguished from another by appeal to exhibited properties) Second, an artwork always exists in an art historical context, and this is a crucial condition for it to be art. Art historical context relates a ven work to the history of art. It also provices an “an atmosphere of artistic theory,” art being “the kind of thing that depends for its existence on theories” (1981, 135). Third, "Nothing is an artwork without an interpretation which con- stitutes i as such” (1981, 135). Every work of art is about something, but equally invariably expresses an attitude toward the work's subject or a “way of seeing" that subject. An interpretation, then, tells us what the work is about and how its seen by its maker, and further expresses the artists intention, Danto's most important work in the philosophy of art and his most sus- tained attempt to discern the essence of artis the book, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981). However, it was left to commentators to fashion an explicitly stated definition of art from this material. The best statement, and one endorsed by Danto, is provided by Noel Carroll (1993, 80) as follows: X is a ‘work of art if and only if (a) X has 2 subject (b) about which X projects an attitude or point of view (6) by means of rhetorical (usually metaphori- cal) ellipsis, (d) which ellipsis requires audience participation to fil in what is missing (interpretation), (@) where both the work and the interpretation require an art-historical context. To a considerable extent, this definition follows the pattern of traditional simple functionalist definitions of art, Basically, conditions (a) and (b) give to art the function of projecting a point of view or attitude of the artist about a subject, and this puts it in the broad class of attempts to define art in terms of expression. That this function is accomplished in a special way (¢), and requires a certain response from the audience (d) are not uncommon features of expression theories. f anything sets Danto’s definition apart from other simple functionalist proposal, itis the last concition (e) that requires that a work and its interpretation stand in a historical relation to other artworks. leis ths last feature that has made Danto’s definition influential, but itis not clear that it helps very much to save it from the fate of other simple functionalist definitions. Many believe that there are works of art that fail to meet all of the frst four conditions, Aren't many works of music, architec- ture, or ceramics, and even some abstract or decorative painting, examples of works of art, which are yet about nothing? George Dickie's art world is different from Danto’s, Rather than consist- ing in historically related works, styles, and theories, itis an institution. In attempting to define art in terms of an institution, Dickie abandons not only the attempt to offer a definition in terms of exhibited features but in terms of functions of any sort. Dickie originally conceived of this institution as one that exists to confer an official status, even if it does so through informel pro- cedures. Increasingly, however, he came to view it differently, as one geared to the production of a class of artifacts and to their presentation to a publi ‘As might be guessed from his changing understanding of the institution of art, Dickie has proposed ‘two distinct institutional definitions of art, the second being based on his own rejection of the first.Both, however, have re- ceived a great deal of attention and exercised considerable influence, so each deserves some discussion here. The first definition goes as follows: Something is a work of art if and only if (1) it's an artifact, and (2) a set of aspects of which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of the art world (1974). Notice that the status conferred that makes some artifact an artwork is not the status of being art {at least not straightforwardly that), but of being a candidate for appreciation, and this status is conferred on a set of aspects of the item rather ‘than on the item itself. Dicke's definition does not tell us who in the art world typically confers status. One might think it would be people like critic, art gallery owners, or museum directors, because they are the ones who select and make salient to a broader public the work for appreciation, However, Dick's commentary on the definition makes clear that he thinks artists are the exclusive agents of status conferral, Since con- ferring would seem to be an action, one might wonder what an artist does to bring it about. It can't just be making something with properties capable of being considered for appreciation, Stephen Davies (1991, 85) has suggested that conferral consists in someone with the appropriate authority making, or putting forward, such an object For many, the crucial idea that makes this definition of art institutional is that being an artwork consists of possessing a status conferred on it by someone with the authority to do so. However, this is precisely the idea that Dickie eventually rejected. Rightly or wrongly, he came to view status conferral as implying a formal process, but no such process need occur, nor, typically, does it occur, in bringing artworks into existence. Dickie's second definition of artis part of a set of five definitions that pres- ent the “leanest possible description of the essential framework of art.” 1. Anartist is a person who participates with understanding in making a work of art, 2. Awork of artis an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public. 3. A publics a set of persons whose members are prepared in some degree to understand an object that is presented to them. 4. The art world is the totalty of all art world systems. 5. An art world system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an art world public, (1984, 80-81) The basic idea here is that the status of being art is not something that is conferred by some agent's authority but instead derives from a work being properly situated in a system of relations, Preeminent in this system is the relation of the work to the artist and to an art world public. tis the work's being created by the artist against the “background of the artworld” (1984, 12) that establishes ft as an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public, namely, an artwork.IF we abstract from the particulars of Dickie's two definitions, one can discern a common strategy that gives rise to a set of common problems, In both definitions, Dickle set out 2 structure that Is shared with other institutions or practices beyond the “art world.” Conferral of status occurs in many settings, and even the conferral of the status of candidate of appreciation frequently occurs outside the art world (whether or not it occurs within it). For example, an “official” tourist brochure issued by a tourism board confers the status of candidate for appreciation on some particular place. So does of- ficial recognition that a building is “historical.” (Remember that Dickie self consciouly refuses to say what kind of appreciation is conferred by agents of the art world.) Even advertising might be thought to confer such status, as is certainly its alm, How does Dickie's first definition distinguish these confer- rals of candidacy for appreciation from art-making conferrals? Only by refer- ring to the art world, that is, gesturing toward art forms and their making, distribution, and presentation, without explaining what marks these off from other status- conferring practices. Similarly, regarding the second defrition, there are many artifact production and presentations systems outside the art world, Wherever a product is produces for consumers, there's such a system, How does Dickie distinguish art world systems from other artifact presenta- tion systems? He does so only by naming the art world systems “art world systems,” namely, gesturing toward the relevant systems without explaining what marks them off. This strategy gives rise to the problems of circularity and incompleteness (see Walton 1977, Levinson 1987, Davies 1991, Stecker 1986, 1997), Dickie acknowledges that his definitions are circular, but denies this is a problem. It is clearly a problem, however, when a definition is insufficiently informative to mark off the extension of what itis attempting to define. Because Dickie's definitions simply gesture toward the art world without marking it off fram similar systems, itis incomplete because of its lack of informativeness. Dickie (1989) replies that, ultimately, itis arbitrary whether a system is part of the art world or not, but such a claim seems to be an ‘admission that the defini tion cannot be completed.Historical Approaches Others have proposed that the situation is not as hopeless as Dickie (inad- vertentl) suggests Kendall Wakon was among the first to suggest that the art world systems that Dickie gestures toward might be defined historicaly (1977). Walton suggests that the art world consists of a limited number of proto-systems plus other systems that develop historically from these in a certain manner (1977, 98). Dickie (1984, 76) has pointed out that this leaves unsettled the issue of why the proto-systems belong to the art world in the first place, and has expressed the belie that no real explanation is possible, This assessment may be overhasty. One possible place to look for the set of original proto-systems would be the formation of the system of the fine arts in the eighteenth century with poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, and music (possibly confined to vocal music) being the paradigmatic proto-art forms Surely, there is an explanation of why these forms composed an im- portant category at this time such as a common functional property, or, it may itself be historical. A residual problem with this approach is whether it accounts forall items classified as artworks, The view appears to imply that ‘0 be art itis necessary and sufficient that it belong to an art form or art sys- tem, but not everyone ‘would accept both parts of that claim (Levinson 1979, Stecker 1997). The view, even rehabilitated along quasi-historical lines, may also fallto account for artworks and art forms from non-western and earlier western cultures that are conceptually but not historically inked in the right way to the eighteenth-century prototypes Stephen Davies is the most important defender of the institutional ap- proach since Dickie. Davies does not actually offer a definition of art, but rather sketches lines along which it shoukd develop, First, it should, he be- lieves, reinstate the idea that the art world is structured according to roles defined by the authority they give to those who occupy them. Art status is conferred on works by artists in virtue of the authority of the role they occupy. Second, art world institutions should be understood historically. Davies's discussion of the historical roots of art has come to focus more on individual artworks than on art world systems. Consider very early artworks, Did such ‘works exist in an institutional setting? If so, what gave rise to these institutions? Surely, it was even earlier works around which the institutions grew. Davies intially attempted to give an institutional analysis to cases like this as well as cases of isolated artists whose work was disconnected from art institutions as we know them (1991). His current view, however, is that the earliest art, the prototypes from which art and its institutions arose, are to be understood functionally. Such items are art because their aesthetic value Is essential to their function. Once art institutions become established, art developed in ways that no longer required an aesthetic, or any other, func: tion (Davies 19972, 2000). In addition to attempts to historicize the institutional approach to defin- ing art, a number of philosophers have explored other forms of historical definition. Jerrold Levinson has proposed ‘that itis historical relation that holds among the intentions of artists and prior artworks that is definitive of art (1979, 1989, 1993). James Carney claims that the relation is one holding among historically evolving styles (1991, 1994), while Noel Carroll, though not offering a definition, has put forward the suggestion that art is identified by historical narratives which link later works toearlier ones (1994). | have proposed that artis defined in terms of historically evolving functions (1997), Levinson's proposal is one of the best worked out and most carefully defended theories. He believes that “an artworks a thing that has been seri ously intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e, regard in any way preexisting artworks are or were correctly regarded” (1989, 21). (One wants to know more about what its to intend a thing for regard: as-2-work-ofart, and why this core aspect of Levinson's definition does not make it as tightly circular as Dickies. It turns out there can be two relevant types of intentions. In the case of the “intrinsic” type, one intends a ‘work for a complex of regards for features found in earlier artworks without having any specific artwork, genre, movement, or tradition in mind, One might intend it for regard for its form, expressiveness, or verisimiltude. Alternatively, there is the “relational” type of intention, in which tone intends an object for regard as some particular artwork, genre, and so forth. is or was correctly regarded. When one fils in these possible regards, in theory one eliminates the expression "as-2- work-ofart.” which is the basis of Levinson's defense against the charge of circularity As with some other historical accounts (such as Carey's and Carroll's), Levinson's main idea is ‘that something is a work of art because of a relation it bears to earlier artworks, which are in turn art because of a relation they bear to still earlier works, and so on, Once this is clear, it becomes obvious that as one moves back along the relational chain one will come across artworks for which there are none earlier. These earliest artworks have come to be called “first art.” We need a separate account of what makes first artworks art, and 2 reason for thinking that this separate account won't serve to explain why all artworks are art, obviating the need for a historical approach, Davies now gives an essentially functional account of first art in his historicized institu tional approach (1997a, 2000), and would claim this won't explain why all artworks are art because within an art institution, objects can acquire art status while lacking the original function of art. Levinson prefers to avoid this straightforwardly functionalist approach to first art. For him, what makes something first artis that itis “the ukimate causal source and intentional reference of later activities we take as para- digmatically ar.” Furthermore, first art aims at “many of the same effects and values, that later, paradigmatic art has enshrined” (1993, 421). These remarks come close to a functional approach similar to Davies but substitute causal and intentional relations to functions for direct reference to the func- tions themselves. ‘There are 2 number of objections to Levinson’s definition, Against taking it asa sufficient condition for being art, various examples have been offered where the requisite intention is purportedly present, but the item in question is arguably not an artwork In 1915, Duchamp attempted to transform the Woolworth Building into a ready-made. He was not successful, but not for lack of an appropriate intention (Carey 1994). A forger of a Rembrandt self-portrait may intend that his work be regarded in many ways as the original is correctly regarded without thereby creating another artwork (Sartwell 1990, 157). There are also objections to the claim that the definition provides a necessary condition for being art, There can be objects that achieve func- tional success as art. in that they reward a complex set of intvinsic regards, but lack the required intention, Theymay spring from an artistic intention based on a misunderstanding of earlier works or a utilitarian intention that adventitiously results in an object with artistically valuable properties. For example, Cone might set out to just to make a vessel that holds water and end up with a remarkably beautiful pot. Levinson has replied to all of these criticisms (see Levinson 1990, 1993). Duchamp failed because he lacked the relevant “proprietary right" to the building. The forger does not create an artwork because, though he intends the forgery for many regards correctly applied to the Rembrandt, they are not correctly applied to his own painting, Levinson seems to admit that there can be art that lacks the intentions he ordinarily requires for arthood, but holds that this points to further, less central, senses of art, However, itis not clear that these replies are completely satisfactory. The “proprietary right" condition looks rather ad hoc, especially since it does not hold in general. Art made from stolen materials may put in question an artist's “ownership” of a work, but not its art status (as Noel Carroll has previously pointed out). The forger may not be able to make all the regards that are applicable to a Rembrandt, applicable to his own painting (eg, being an example of sev. enteenth-century painting), but can make many others applicable (expertly exhibting the chiaroscuro technique), So i's plausible that the forger can muster a sufficiently robust set of regards that correctly apply to his own work. This would imply that the forgery is an artwork, according to historical intentionalism, Even if the replies work, they, along with the above remarks on first art, add new conditions to, and hence considerably complicate, Levinson's original cefiniion. Sometimes, too many qualifications can killa proposal by, as it were, suffocation. (There are a number of other objections ‘0 the intentional-historical definition. For a summary of and response to these, see Levinson 2002. For a critical discussion of historical definitions in general, see Stecker 1997a, 87-109.) Historical Functlonalism At a number of junctures it appears that Levinson might have achieved a simpler definition by appealing directly to functions or regards rather than intentions, Historical functionals formulates a definition of art that ap- peals more directly to a historically evolving set of functions, without com pletely dispensing with a reference to artistic intentions (Stecker 1997; see Graves 1998 for a similer view). This approach does not define art exolicitly in terms of a historical relation linking the art of one time with the art of an earlier time. Rather the definition proceeds by reference to art forms and functions that exist at a gven time, Historical functionalism assumes that these forms and functions evolve over time. At any given time, art has a finite set of functions that range from genre specific values to those wide- spread representational, expressive, formal, and aesthetic values enshrined in the simple functional definitions considered earlier, The functions of art at a given time are to be identified through an understanding of the art forms central to that time. However, that does not mean that items that don't belong to a central art form are never art According to this view, almost anything can be art, but artifacts outside the central art forms have. to meet a higher standard, This motivates a cisjunctive definition of art: an item is an artwork at time t, where tis not earlier than the time at which the item is mad, if and only if (a) its in oneof the central art forms at t and is made with the intention of futfling a function art has at t, or (©) itis an artifact that achieves excellence in fuliling such a function. With this definition too there are various problems. The appearance of circularity is handled in much the same way as with Levinson’s definition: eliminating reference to art by enumerating central forms and functions, However, this requires that some account of these items be provided, What makes something a central art form? How are genuine functions of art dis- tinguished from accidental functions (eg, using sculptures as a doorstops or paintings for insulation) and extrinsic functions (eg, using art as an invest- ment)? Finally, there are things that appear to fuffll functions of art to a high degree, but no one would call them artworks. Suppose there was a pill tat induced a fine aesthetic experience, The pil is not a work of art even though it appears to fulfil a function of art with excellence. The last problem is most easily handled, Aesthetic experience isn't just any pleasurable sensuous experience. It requires attention to an actual object and its properties. A pill that mimicked an aesthetic experience, say by in- ducing a hallucinatory experience that felt tke one that is aesthetic, would not actually create the real thing, Alternatively, it might make us particu- larly receptive to such experiences, but then itis an aid to, not an object of, those experiences. ‘What makes something a genuine art function? Let me suggest three routes to identifying these. First, art functions are normally tied to the experience of the work. The value of insulation, a door stop, of an investment can all be completely grasped without even encountering the object that possesses these properties. Typically, if not invariably, an art function cannot be ap- preciated without such an encounter. A work's capacity to provide aesthetic experience, to move an audience, even to enlighten, is realized when we are intimately involved with the work, Even works that have minimal aesthetic payoffs, like the previously mentioned ready-maces, have to be encountered at least in photographs to be fully appreciated, because part of their power asa source of questions about the nature of art derives from the full realization of their aesthetically trivial nature. Second, common knowledge provides a great deal of information about art functions. We know that much art is concerned with such things as representation, expression, and the discovery of forms suitable to the artistic project being carried out. In fact, we have much more detailed knowledge than that. We bring this knowledge to attempts to define art. As long as it is nontendentious, its avalable for the identification of artistic functions. Finally, when it does become controversial whether something is an artistic function, we appeal to historical connections between the pur- ported artistic function and recognized ones, Thus, itis easy to see how the project Proust pursues in his great novel, In Search of Lost Time, of giving “Iteral and metaphorical expression to the nuances of seff-consciousness and memory” (Stock 2000, 437), arises from a more general function of the novel to provide psychological insight, or to explore the first-person point of view.‘The last issue that needs to be addressed is what makes something a central art form at a given time. The answer to this question might be different in different eras. However, whatever the details, the answer is at its core, inst- tutional. Items within central art forms are standardly subject 10 certain sorts of treatment. The specific treatment depends on the art institutions of the day and the culture. Currently, this would involve being sulbject to specific modes of presentation to a public, to certain sorts of critical appraisal and audience appreciation, and to a historical connectedness to earlier items Unfortunately, this proposal for identifying central art forms invites an objection to historical functionalism. Return one last time to Duchamp's ready-mades. They were artworks when they first appeared, but did they belong to a central art form? One might well be inclined to say no, in that ready-mades were a new art form that had no time to become “central” In the twentieth century such new forms were constantly coming into exis- tence, though usually standing in some relation to a recognized art form: papier colle derives from painting, ready-maces from sculpture, happenings from drama. So perhaps we can get away with an emendation, Instead of talking exclusively about central art forms in the first disjunct of the defink- tion, we need to also include others recognizable as art forms through their derivation from the central ones. Consensus and Skepticlsm ‘The historicst views discussed in the previous two sections suggest that a consensus is developing about how art should be defined (see Stecker 2000, Matravers 2000), Though each at frst appears to represent a different ap- proach (institutional intentional, functional), the similarities among. these views are more striking than the differences, All accept Danto’s view that art must be defined historically, and all, in the end, are committed to a defini tion that consists of a disjunction of sufficient conditions rather than a set of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient (so-called real definitions). Further, unlike simple functionalist definitions, these defintions do not form the kernel of a larger, normatively aimed theory of art, but are compatible with many different theories. In particular, these definitions, lke Dickie's definitions, distinguish an understanding of what art is from a conception of the value of art. In fact, the disjunctive character of recent definitions sug- gests that there is no one value or function essential to art, Whatever the extent of this consensus, it excludes two parties to the de- bate. One is those who are stil interested in pursuing a simple functionalist definition, typically in terms of aesthetic experience or properties (see An- derson 2000, Zangwill 2000). The other comprises those who are skeptical of the possiblity of any definition of art (Tilghman 1984, Novitz 1996). Enough has been said about aesthetic definitions, but, before conclud- ing this chapter, more should be said about contemporary skepticism and its sources. | have just said that the current institutional and historical ap- proaches to this issue can be viewed as denying that there is a set of essentialproperties that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for an item to be an artwork. Nothing Ike the following is the case (pace simple func- tionalisr): artworks are artifacts (genus) intended to provide a significant aesthetic experience (species). However, the skeptic takes this a step further by claiming that if there is no essence, there is no definition at all—not even one containing a disjunc- tion of sufficient conditions. Let me suggest three different motives underly- ing this skepticism. One motive is that all the disagreement about ‘what art is indicates that no answer—no defintion—will ever receive total acceptance. Although probably correct, it is indecisive regarding the main issue. A view doesn't have to receive Unanimous support in order to be true. Further, if what was sald at the beginning of this section is correct, a degree of agree- ment, imperfect and partial though it be, has been achieved, There can be an alternative explanation for the lack of complete agreement, and one will be mentioned below. For now, we can just point out that lack of agreement in philosophy is hardly peculiar to attempts at definition. It is the norm regard: ing any philosophical project. If one despairs because of a lack of agreement, one ought to despair about philosophy, and much else besides ‘A second motive to skepticism about a definition of art turns on a revi- sionist view about concepts. According to a view currently popular in cogni- tve science, concepts are not picked out by definitions, but by prototypes. A prototype is a set of statistically significant features of instances of a given kind. Prototypes are derived from exemplars: items that are typical examples of a kind, perhaps ones that might be pointed out in learning situations, where the concept is acquired. Actually, this can only be part of the story about concepts. Prototypes at best pick out prototypical members of the kind in question. (Let's shelve a possible worry about how typical members of a kind are identified as members of that kind in the first place) Part of having a concept is to be able to extend it to nonprototypical members, which are extremely numerous given the way prototypes are formed. So really a concept is a prototype and a method of extension (prototypes +, for short). (See Dean 2003 for skepticism about defining art based on prototype theory.) This view raises two questions: are concepts really prototypes +? If they are, does this really rule ut definitions? | doubt that concepts are prototypes, while admitting we might have prototypes. IF concepts were prototypes, there would be far more fragmentation of concepts than there is. Consider the concept bird, a common example used by prototype theorists, Suburbanites would have a prototypes perhaps based on the features of robins, sparrows, and finches, whereas people ‘who lve near the ocean would have one based on features of gulls, turns, and cormorants, Chickens and ostriches would be birds by extension, except for neople living on farms raising one or the other species. People living in Southeast Asian cities would have a different concept based on the mynah, But none of this seems to be the case, Even small chikiren have no problem classifying chickens and even ostriches and emus as birds. People do not think that birdhood comes in degrees so that sparrows are really birds, but herons are only sort of birds. Prototype theory gets our bird-classificatory practice completely wrong (for another critique, see Fodor 1998, 88— 108).However, suppose that these objections are misplaced, and concepts (or some of them) are based Con prototypes. Suppose further that art's such a concept. Does that mean that a definition of art is ruled out? No. itis true that a prototype is not a definition, nor can a definition be derived from it. This is because it does not pick out the whole class of items faling under the relevant concept ‘The features in the suburbanite prototype for bird en- tall neither that ostriches are or are not birds. However, we saw above that concepts should not be identified with prototypes even f they are based on prototypes. Concepts would at least have to be prototypes +. Once we add the "+", namely, the method for extending the prototype, its not clear that we don’t have the materials needed for a definition, To put the matter in an- other way, recall the family resemblance view of the mid-twentieth-century skeptics. The problem with this view is thet, ifthe type of resemblance Used in classification is left unspecified, then nothing is excluded from the clas- sification, while if the resemblance is narrowed to speciic respects, we have the material for 2 definition of art. Exactly the same situation occurs with prototype theory, which is also based on relevant resemblance, though this time it isto the prototype. The last cause for skepticism is also based on the idea that what we are try- ing to define is the concept of art. The claim this time is, not that concepts have a particular structure that rules out that they are defrition, but rather that the concept of art has become fragmented. There just isn't one thing to define anymore, There is no one concept to capture. People have different conceptions of art because art is not one thing, There can, perhaps, be mis- taken conceptions, but there is not one concept that all correct conceptions have to conform to, This thought is intriguing because it raises important questions about what would have to be true for there to be a single concept of art. One proponent of the “no single concept” view is Alan Goldman, He appears to base his view on the purported fact that the art world is fragmented into various different circles of artists, of critics, and of ordinary art appreciators, and as one goes from circle to circle at all levels one finds no common core of agreement about what is art. Thus, he conchides, since there is no agreement among experts (artists and critics), and there is no agreement in ordinary use, there is no common concept, (Rather, we would have a concept of art relative to a circle) The premises of this argument are very far from obvious, First, such claims tend to be based on rough and ready impressions rather than painstaking ef- forts to sort out where agreement exists and where it doesn’, Second, much of the data on which impressions are based concerns judgments about par- ticular works, and differences in such judgments have many causes only one of which is a difference in one's art-concept. They can also be based on the way works are perceived or understood, personal biases, lack of familiarity or overfamillarity or boredom with a particular art movement. Third, the judg- ments that are relevant to the conclusion of this argument are classificatory judgments about candidate artworks. But it is well known that judgments that an item is or is not art are often issued to praise or disparage a given artwork, not to classify it.Let an individual's conception of art be the totality of his or her beliefs rele- vant to classifying something as art or not art. A grain of truth contained in this argument is that it is false that conceptions of art are uniform across incividu- als. However, ths, in ise, is not a very interesting ‘ruth, For one thing it is probably true of individual conceptions of most objects of thought. For another, many individual conceptions of art are prereflective, insufficiently informed, and biased, and lack of uniformity among conceptions is, at least in part, due to such factors. Individual conceptions, like other beliefs, can be evaluated against various desiderata, and ought to be revised to the extent that they fall to meet these. An adequate conception is one that satisfies all the desiderata, What's more, an adequate conception ought to be well informed (about the history of art forms, for example), unbiased, and reflective (in the sense of taking into account implication of one's view and recognizing other well-known views) It ought to be consistent and not viciously circular. It ought to be able to cover the generally agreed on extension of “art and handle difficult cases in plausible ways, It ought to make the judgment that something is art corrigible. One can argue about what exactly a Ist of desiderata should or should not contain, but it should be intially easier to reach agreement here than on individual con- ceptions of art, The important issue, in deciding whether the concept of art is fragmented, is whether there is more than one adequate conception of art. The more adequate conceptions there are, and the more dverse these conceptions are, the more fragmented (relativzed) the concept. For reasons already given, if there are different adequate conceptions of art, they willbe expressed Using a common core of ideas so they will all roughly be in the same ballpark. The conclusion | ‘think we should draw from these reflections is that there is a degree of vagueness about the concept of art, but not that there is serious fragmentation of the concept, Perhaps itis possible that there is more than one adequate conception of art due to this vagueness. However, far from being special to art, this is true of many of our concepts Al this suggests that, for the project of defining art, both extreme pessimism (skepticism fed on despair of making progress in this arena) and overly buoyant optimism (supposing there is @ definition that reveals the essence of art) are misplaced. What we can reasonably hope to do is suggest ways of making sense of a practice which is not so uniform as to yield an essence of art and not so shot through with inconsistency as to resist any attempt to make sense of it. By doing 80, we become clearer about our individual con- ceptions of art, can examine them against various desiderata for adequately defining art, and perhaps extend the commen ground in our various indi- vidual conceptions. Summary In this chapter we have examined many proposals for classifying individual pieces as artworks and distinguishing them from nonartworks. There are three groups of proposals. First, simple functionalist proposals identify one valuable property that many artworks share, and claim that this is the defin- ing feature, the essence, of art. Whether representation, expression, form, or the aesthetic is put forward as the relevant property, simple functionalsm is never able to cover the whole extension of art, struggles to accommodate bad art, and to exclude all instances of nonart Hence, there are always fairly straightforward counterexamples to any simple functionalistdefinition, Second, there are proposals derived from the view that our classificatory practice Is best captured by something other than a definition: by similarity to various paradigms (famly resemblance), by clusters of properties forming several sufficient conditions, by prototypes. This view is more plausible than simple functionalism, However, it struggles with two problems. On the cone hand it has a tendency to underspecify artistic practice. For example, fam ily resemblance views often leave undetermined the specific resemblance relevant to art classification, and prototype theories often leave out the extension principles needed to cover atypical members of a class. On the other hand, when this deficiency is remedied, these views elther begin to look Ike or at least suggest definitions, Third, there are relational definitions comprising the institutional and historical views that dominated the last thirty years of the twentieth century. The view recommended here—histori- cal functionalsm— comes from this cass as does the partial consensus about how art should be defined, based on features common to various relational definitions. However, one point that emerges from our reflections is that the concept of artis a vague concept, and this means that any proposed defin: tion either has to capture this vagueness or be considered to some extent an idealization of the actual concept. In realty, both of these features are probably true of the relational views we considered—they have some of the vagueness, yet are idealzations, of the concept of art in play in the early twenty-first century. Questions 1. Consider the following list: painting, poetry, architecture, movies, rap music, furniture, jewely, 00d, cigars. Which items on the Ist are art forms? Which items contain art- works within their category? Did your answer to the first question differ from your answer to the second? 2, Which statement is more likely truc? a Since the concept of art came into use in the eighteenth century, art making also began at this time. b. Art has been made as long if not longer as there have been human civilzations. Could both be true? 3. Having read this chapter, do you think there is a good answer to the question: what is art? Would the answer consist in a definition of art? Further Reading Anderson, James. 2000. “Aesthetic Concepts of Art." In Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 65-92. A defense of an aesthetic definition of art Beardsley, Monroe, 1983. “An Aesthetic Definition of Art.” In What Is Art, ed. Hugh Curtler. NY: Haven Publications, 15-29, A famous attempt to define art in terms of the aesthetic,Bell, Clive, 1914, Art, London: Chatto and Windus, Classic defense of formalism, Carney, lames, 1991. “The Style Theory of Art.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 273-89. 1994, "Defining Art Externally.” British Journal of Aesthetics 34:114-23. Two statements Of the style-historical definition of art Carroll, Noel. 1993. “Essence, Expression, and History: Arthur Danto's Philosophy of Art” In Danto and His Critics, ed. Mark Rollins. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 79-106. The best attempt to construct a definition of art from Danto’s writings 1994, “Identifying Art.” In Institutions of Art: Reconsiderations of George Dickie's Philosophy, ed. Robert Yanal. University Park, PA Penn State Press, 3-38, A historical procedure for identifying at. ed. 2000. Theories of Art Today. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Excellent collection of essays on contemporary attempts to define art Collingwood, R, G, 1938, Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Classic statement of the expression theory of art Danto, Arthur. 1964. "The Artworkd” journal of Philosophy, 61:571-84. An early attempt to conceive art historically. . 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- versity Press. Danto’s most developed work on the nature of art. Davies, Stephen. 1991, Definitions of Art Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, An important overview of the debate on the definition of art that defends an institu tional view. Dickie, George. 1974. Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca, NY: Cor- nell University Press, Best source of Dickies carly institutional definition of art. 1984, The Art Circle, New York: Haven Publications, Best source for the later institutional defintion, Gaut, Berys. 2000, "Art’ as a Cluster Concept.” In Theories of Art Today, ed. Noel Carroll, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 25-44. Just what the title says, Levinson, Jerrold, 1979. "Defining Art Historically.” British Journal of Aesthetics, 19:232-50, Defends the best-known version of the historical definition of art. Mandelbaum, Maurice. 1965. "Family Resemblances and Generalization Concer- ing the Arts” American Philosophical Quarterly, 2219-28, Raised important doubts about anti-essentialism, Stecker, Robert. 1986, “The End of an Institutional Definition of Art.” British Journalof Aesthetics, 26:124-32. Critique of Dickie’ ater institutional definition, . 1997. Artworks: Definition, Meaning, Value. University Park: Penn State Press. Defends historical functionals and provides @ wide ranging critique of alterna- tives. Walton, Kendall, 1977, "Review of Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis, Philosophical Review, 86:97-101. Criticism of Dickie's earlier institutional view. Weitz, Morris. 1956, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15:27-35, Classic source of antiessentialism.The following article “Art and Polltics” by Alice Gullermo, has been taken from Pananaw: Phitppine Journal of Visual Arts (Vol 1), NCCA 1997. No copyright Infringement Is intended, Feople should actively ENSAGE In various orn : ol pdiitical engagement to gain greater : over their lives. tone of the thorniest subjects in aesthetics has been the relationship of art and politics. But the controversy that surrounds it fact, rooted in the central prececupation of traditional Western aesthetics with beauty, particularly as defined in classical idealist canons. Plato's concept of beauty as ideal form, Kant’s approach to art as “disinterested” contemplation unrelated to practical affairs, Matthew Amold’s aesthetic values of “sweetness and light,” the New Criticism of the Chicago Schoo!’s emphasis oon the text in itsel—all influential theories that have shaped much thinking in aesthetics—have effected the conceptual separation af art and polities Added to this is the commonly-held narrow view of poli- tics as consisting mainly of the self-interested maneuvers of cormupt politicians so that the artist would do well to dissoci- ate himself from it, rather than the larger view of pol powerful determining influence in society and that thus people should actively engage in various forms of political engage- ‘ment to gain greater control over their lives. But even during the heyday of the academies with their canons of classical beauty, there were already artists who ‘moved away from ideal form. Refusing to settle into a gentee! beauux-arts complacency and pressured by the mamentons ics asa political events of their time, they gave art a new power by engaging in contemporary human issues, ALICE G. GUILLERMOWith the highly mmunicative Hust of the new Politica art, artists wer concerned to reach a ralpet pu lic. outsi ie the institutions o} museums an galleries. ital thinking tay, advances formalism, this ime a in which the signifier in decidable” inthe “nt sof national ent are undermined. Everything is sheer reflecting surface and simulacrum without gem ine emotional depth of historical dimension. Likewise, h historical sense breeds elec ticism and pastiche in the ats and cue. The sense of the political fades away and with the rlinguishing of one's role in the body politic and in social transforma on, the ruling cates acquire unchallenged power 1 ths follows that i such a situation, art loses its cogntive value and becomes a mere dsp ious novelty aired at the marke Ie alo goer withou eaying that, in such context, at off hermetically all avenues of fo the human world, HE this mood i, as Fe Jameson sid, the “ul tural logic of ate capitalism” of which it isthe super ding the Philippines, specificities of our material conitions—our neo- counires of the Thied We colonial and bourgeois comprador economy that re ‘mains mired in feudalism cannot give tse such ideo Wis a this point then that « wide divergence occurs botwoen the advanced ist counties of Europe ane the US and mest n the non-Western part of‘the word. For inthe cas ofthe ater, the people's sense ofthe political subject as agent of change i cena to thei transformative projet. Without this strong sense here wow eno wil oun st domination in economics and ont to be a daily fact of ie, one has wi 1m place of the sense of moral flare endemic in the West there is instead apolitical vigor in non-Western secletie that drive towards the eeating ofa fre, jut, and humane future. Is in thee countries tha politcal art retains important place. Thi i evident inthe con- temporary art not only ofthe Philippines, but also of the other Asian countries, most notably Indonesia and “Thailand Im the Philipines, political art since the 19th cen tury has manifested a vigorous oppositional, if not rev Iutionary character. Rizal's novels for instance as bil lant satires exposing soca ils are eminent 19th cen tury examples of ant-colonal erature. tn the early American period, theater, as in the seditious sarsulas o nme the principal and highly paps lar medium of politica arto the extent tha the Ameti~ ‘can colonial government banned their performance In our time, a sizeable body of protest art was pro duced daring the Marcos dictatorship It wasin the mid "6 thatthe ground for politcal art was aid down by & young crop of excellent artists among them Ren Cabrera, ani Malena, and Jaime de Carman. With the expres slonists Ang Kiukok and Onib Olmedo, they opened up "ich artistic resources for the later political artists, including the socal realists Since the "6, Filipino artists have taken up numer. ous seio- politcal sues, a number of them of contin lng relevance, such as militarization, imperialism, erony Palitical art has given rise eae questions, lems, i ei amon ese @ relation of form content. "ep, PABLO BAERS SATUS TER CONTRADICTIONS 1983, of, 1022 Poorer AMD BRB E55 1990, lon amar. 1525 by 183lations suchas torture and detention of protester, tbe large national debt, wasteful government spending, ol price hikes high prices of basic commodities, ete While the people's struggle has had its gains: the Mare dictatorship was topped bya popular uprising and the US military bases in Clark Feld and Subic have been dismantled, many social and politcal sues con- tinue to engage the people in struggle For many artists these constitute the subject matter of their a. Form and content Political art however, has given rise 10 questions, problems and debutes Among thse isthe relation of form and content, the question of realism and style, exper mentation in form, artistic freedom, the relation to tradi an indigenous culture the wae of indigenous material the publi of politcal art and its venue Because ofthe strong communicative character of political rt in its engagement i sock isues and in its rive for social change, the question ofthe relation of form and content i often posed, Such gestion olen suggest an implicit theoretical rivalry between form and content a fo which of them should have the upp hand, But the traditional dichotomy no longer holds. In non- formalist semiotics, the signifier, which are the work's atrial aspects ae tightly linked tothe signifies which ace their non-material contents, and mitic sign, be it a pinting ora ext, relates hac ttt referent i the real wor “Ths the visual wrk’s materia elements, suchas ine, coor, texture, ton, shape, spatial composition, as well 4s medium and technique have themselves meaning, conveying oF signifying pent whic realize in their interactive relationships out of which the work is elie. ‘The meaning-conv ng potential of the Material signifirs derives from human psychophysical exper ence and from a society's cultural codes. in politcal art, the semiotic approach requires the development of @een intellectual and emotional sensitivity to the sign Of the work for it to gain fll expressive impact and power. Tle question of style also often comes to the fore. AS in contemporary arin general, whatever the figurative style, the primary artistic concern is expressiveness rather than beauty in the clasical sense. While poli ‘al artis largely associated with the social realists who have worked consistemly with protest themes, social realism in itself is mot one dentable syle but an ot Realm, which i sed on the close observation of reality 0 thal the defects an imperfection of th ub Ject ae ot spared is only one style under soil rea ism or polite art in genera Expresonim,surealism,cubiom, a well as highl individual sylesintheirexpresive aspect can altrve in pola rt. Thus rom a study of their sys, the reli amon the social realists are Antipas Delotavo and Renato abulan. The workof bgar Fernandez has highly ym tole and utopian or vonary cnt, inthe sense of envisioning the supe ofthe fata, an aopect which i incu to ring out in realism inthe srt sense Inpolical at here ha oben search for gu ratve ses that are chert the eseneof'he tthe rmases, and the exploited victims ofthe unjust jtem. This can be sen in the work of Brena Fajardo wo erives he furan frm pre-dern Tart cards and inthe ntisnelear printer of Oflia Galvez Tega ino combines medieval and pop imagery Beyond the stereotype The urgent and warm-blooded vitality of political subject mater an inspite expeientation in ste form, snd medi. The challenge for arts as been tocreate sthentic, and powerful works thet rise significant, above banal stereotype and plain didacticiom. For instance, in the Philippines and abroad, there have been esful works of political art in multimedia, highly su PAA Pine OL OFLA‘stallations and performance art These later forms, stl the dmensknal space ai have te range ‘of greater physical accessibility: exhibited or performed utdoors they invite interaction an public patcpaion a3 street theater Catage and assemblage usually in combination with ining ve proven tobe hight sce the hands fa mimber of artist, among ther Nel Doorcon, Jose ence seriesofcollage-pintngs and experimented with vari ‘ously shaped panel joined together inorder fo junta Pot diferent images fo the viewer to syhesiz. Tence Ruiz has done seeoticlly-ich assemblages with each stgniying element cule from the detritus ofthe daly urban struggle for survival Likewise, melda Cjpe- Bradaya in her paint: colge has chosen elements that beara strong cultural and historical resonance, espe cially those which evoke the Filipino womans domestic andsoca environment inorder io sugest soca eharge of which she is both witness and agent. “The current rend in the use of indigenous materials 4s primarily based, not so much on thie accessibility and interesting pial qualities of color, fone, and tex ture, but on their meaning-conveying potential as signifies of concepts, values, emotions shared cultural sociation and memories Lakes, the familiarity ofthese indigenous and ver. nation of the nd lmeld Calpe: Enda, Doloricon dd a ‘macular materials breaks down the a viewer and contributes tothe sense ofa holistic envi- ronment where people, nature, and art interact ina dy- namic unity. However, when an urban artist incorporates indig- enous symbols and artifacts that belong toa particular ethnic group, he must pay special regan to the cultural sensitivities ofthe people and to evoke its specific cul tural and political dimension in his work. Political art addresses itself to different publics in Philippine society: the urban and the rural as well as the diferent classes and sectors, However, the goal of politcal art isto reach a wider bli the large masses ofthe people terest wider ‘eld ope discourse ana action. cause ofthis artists of politcal hemeshave honed thee sills in dierent forms, sch as pins, posters cdtocal cartoons, trations, coms, assemblages, installations performance rt, andhave worked in mul Aime. Ariss have developed thee versatility, not con fing themssves tol painting and sculpture, but is voring «ihr and mae wri st practi ‘With this th venue of politcal rt not confine to suseums and galleries but seks allemativ and pops- Jar ves such as campuses, churches, and parks Folia at snencumbered by models and restrc- tve syste canons can truly flourish asa vil oppo sina, no eolutionary, force in sot in he pro- cess of charg, and in political ra its best, inva artists can also find full creative and human fulfilment COPYRIGHT WARNING“This Is the preface of “Art and Soclety’ by Alce Gullermo. No copyright infringement Is Intended. PREFACE, ART AND SOCIETY Allce G, Gulllermo ‘Art as discussed in this book covers the wide range of human artistic expressions~from oil painting to basket weaving, from shamanistic chants to contemporary pop. While the art object is contemplated and experienced visually andlor aurally, its understanding and appreciation include taking account of the conditions and processes of its production within a social context and, therefore, aso, Sits socal meanings and effects Because art is situated within society and history, its proper study is oriented towards clear objectives: to foster the independent and critical faculties, involving the heightening of the capacity to discern strategies; to distinguish and evaluate aesthetic and cultural positions in the light of our needs and interests; to privilege the Filpino point of view in art and cultural studies, thereby, contributing to the development of our national culture and art, At the same time, we do not lose sight of the international perspective which includes contributions, influences, as well as the interaction of forces and interests from within and without, The study also foregrounds discourses, cukural and artistic expressions and forms which in terms of class, gender, ethnicity, and race have been hitherto marginalized by the dominant canons and discourses. The following may be considered as the basic premises: First of all artis a signifying practice which is grounded in society and history, As such, art has its own specfiity--that is, the elements of art, forms, media, techniques, styles--which distinguishes it from other fields. As found in works of art, these make up the signs consisting of signifies (material data) and signfieds (concepts) which in their relation to one another in the visual work or text produce meaning Traditionally, one might easly say that this constitutes the formal aspect of the work. However, and here is the difference from the traditional approach, the elements of art and its other material aspects are regarded as signs that have a meaning-conveying potential (deriving both from human psychophysical experiences and cultural codes) which becomes realized in the entire relations of the work, since the material aspects or signers are intimately tied up with the conceptual aspects which are the signifieds. A merit of this approach is that it makes a more solid {grounding for the study and interpretation of the art of the Philippines and other countries. Such an approach finds a common ground for interpretations on the universal plane, that is, human psychophysical experiences which are universally shared, and the national or local plane, that is, the cultural codes shared by members of a particular societyIt is not, however, the case that in the semiotic approach one seeks to arrive at a unified and seamless meaning at all times, For it is possible that a work of art may reveal contradictions that reflect underlying ideological tensions. Or dominant discourse may reveal gaps and fissures in a symptomatic reading, it is through these gaps and fissures, the silences and Unsaids or the “unconscious of the work’ that contrary elements break through. In this case, the viewerlcritic does not make haste to reconcile or absorb these contradictions into a structuralistfunctionalst whole. ‘As Eagleton writes, the task of the critic is not to gloss over contradictions but to foreground them’ in order to show the work as a charged terrain of contention. complex relation between work and viewerireader, one does rot find a single unilateral thread of meaning but one finds a rich polyphonic text on cifferent planes and diferent voices. Meaning then is not the essential kernel that discloses itself after one throws away the husk which is the form. We refer instead to the work's "horizon of meaning” following Eagleton, which takes into account the vatious possible meanings that operate within the problematic of the work. surface of the work's Second, and again this is how one differs from the formalist approach, the work of art as sign is viewed in the dialogic situation of the work and its viewer. In this semiotic approach, its necessary to emphasize that the work of art is seen not as a closed hermetic text but as an open work in ‘hich the signs are referred back to their referents in the real world, For lke language, we affirm art, t00, exists in a dialogic situation in which an exchange takes place between the work and the viewerlistener. Thus, the visual text is not purely sef-referential-and here we choose to differ from the theoreticians of the “infinite play of signifiers" and the postmodernist proponents of the pure surface texture-rather, one chooses to forestall the formalist closure of the work by ing it as visual sign and text in its grounding in the real world, Furthermore, the concern tobring out the worldviews and ideologies of a work does not end there but proceeds to investigate how these ideas, values, narratives, discourses, worldviews have a bearing on our lives and interests, and our social context as a whole, and as to whether or not they enhance our humanity and further the goals of freedom and justice, Another implication here is that one moves beyond the original artwork-and-historical-background approach because now the work is shown to be profoundly imbricated in its socio-historical context, and thus the relation of work and context is not merely mechanical or incidental--a point ‘Which has a bearing on the teaching of art history. ‘The work of art as human construct and the result of the process. By this we mean that artis not "the natural reflection of the world it delineates nor the spontaneous expression of the author's the concept of construct basically involves is the demystfication of the

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