Thinking with and against Hannah Arendt

Author(s): CLAUDE LEFORT

Source: Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 2, Hannah Arendt's "The Origins of Totalitarianism":
Fifty Years Later (SUMMER 2002), pp. 447-459
Published by: The New School
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Thinkingwith
and against
HannahArendt / BY CLAUDE LEFORT

1 would liketoproposea fewcriticalremarks concerning Han-

nah Arendt'sconceptionof the foundationof the totalitarian
system as she presenteditin thethirdpartof TheOrigins ofTotal-
[Link] the late seventies, whenI read thisgreatwork,I
wasfilledwithadmiration forand feltveryclose to thethought
[Link] 1956,theSovietregime,whichI had previously
denouncedas the rule of a statebureaucracyover the prole-
tariat,revealeditselfto be a newformof [Link]-
doxically,I discoveredits totalitariannatureafterreadingthe
famousreportKhrushchev issuedat theCentralCommittee that
-
year thatis, at a timewhenArendtclaimedto have observed
the beginningof the end of totalitariangovernment in the
[Link] notmerelyanecdotal,sinceterror, or
more exactlymassterror, -
is forArendt but not for me the -
maincriterion oftotalitarianism. However, Arendt'sdescription
of a new kind of regime,whichshe claimed was "unprece-
dented,"was a profoundinsightinto the phenomenaof both
Nazismand communism.
I continueto thinkthatArendtbroughtto lightan essential
characteristicof a totalitariansystemwhenshe perceivedin it a
dominationfromwithin. "Totalitarianism,"she writes,"is never
contentto rulebyexternalmeans,namely, throughthestateand
a machinery ofviolence.. . . Thanksto itspeculiarideologyand
the ruleassignedto the ideologyin the apparatusof coercion,
totalitarianismhas discovered a meansofdominating and terror-

SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Summer2002)

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448 SOCIAL RESEARCH

[Link] thissense,it eliminatesthe

distancebetweentherulersand theruled."
The questionto be answeredis thefollowing: How can domi-
nationbe exercisedfromwithin? Assumingthatideologydoes
playan important role, one mustclarifythe meaningof this
[Link]-
tigation ofNazismand communism, I wouldliketointroducethe
distinction betweenarguments developedin themainsectionof
thethirdpartofArendt'sbook,namely, thethreechaptersofits
firsteditionand thefourthchapter, whichArendtlateradded in
order to replace what she referredto as "the inconclusive
remarks" thathad beforefunctioned as a [Link] new
chapter, entitled"Ideologyand Terror,"tendsto resolvethediffi-
cultiesArendthad previously [Link] forthisreasonthat
I insiston itsimportance.

I willnowpresenta shortoverview ofthefirststageofArendt's

interpretationin whichshe minimizes therole playedbypropa-
the
ganda, importance of which had been stronglyemphasizedby
politicalscientists.
According to Arendt, propaganda was essen-
addressed
tially to foreign [Link] argued that themasses
did not takeliterallythe speechesof the [Link]
addressedto theelitewas moreefficacious. But thisclaimdoes
not accountfortheadhesionof the massesto the [Link]-
thermore, indoctrination impliesa sortofdomination fromout-
[Link], whileinsisting on theroleof theideology, reduces
itsdoctrinalcontentto a minimum. Eventually,the readerdis-
coversthatforArendtthemainmeansoftotalitarian domination
is"organization."In fact,wealreadyknowthatthesuccessoftotal-
itarianmovements residesin theircapacityto organizeindividu-
alswhohadbeenatomizedand isolatedinbourgeoissociety. I will
leaveasideherodd argument thatStalinhad toatomizetheRuss-

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 449

ian people to make possiblethe projectof totalorganization.

Arendtclaims that totalitarianism in powerholds the people
together because ofits to
ability organizesociety. Farfromaccord-
ing anyreal importanceto Marxistor Leninisttheory, she pre-
sentsthemas [Link] evengoesso faras to saythatthetrue
goal of totalitarianism "is not persuasion,but organization, the
accumulationof powerwithoutthe possessionof the meansof
[Link] thispurpose,theoriginality of ideologicalcontent
can only be consideredan unnecessaryobstacle."Elsewhere
Arendtarguesthatit is "notthe passingsuccessesof demagogy
thatwinthemasses,butratheritis thevisiblereality and powerof
livingorganization." Accordingto her,the notionof ideology
tendstobe negligible. Asforracism, itis "realizedeverydayin the
functioning ofa
hierarchy politicalorganization"; and as tosocial-
ism,"thefunctioning oftheComintern is moreconvincing than
anyargument or mereideologycan everbe."As examplesofthe
lackofsignificance grantedto ideology, Arendtpointsto theper-
sistenceof boththe mythof theJewishconspiracy(whenmost
Jewshad alreadybeen exterminated) and themythof theTrot-
skyist conspiracy(whenithad alreadybeen defeated).
Arendt'sinsistence on organization isjustified: totalitarian
rule
gives credence to the idea thatall things can be organized in soci-
[Link] thissense,the image of a big machine imposesitself, and
itis significantthatin theSovietUnion,one ofthemainfigures
oftheenemyofthepeoplewasthe"saboteur." Nonetheless, orga-
nizationdoes not accountforthe processof identification that
men and womenmakewiththe leader,or forthefeelingsthey
haveof beingincludedin a community, be it thecommunity of
the Partyor the community of "thepeople as One." Curiously,
Arendtdoes payattentionto thisphenomenonin manyplaces:
forexample,afterunderscoring the role of organization, she
makesreference to thefamousspeechthatHitlergaveto theS.A.
in whichhe said:"Allthatyouare,youare throughme; all thatI
am,I am through youalone."

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450 SOCIAL RESEARCH

Myargument is thatthenotionoforganization has nothingto

do withthe attemptto integratethe rulerand the ruled into
"One"[Link] makea distinction betweenorganiza-
tionand incorporation. Organization impliestheidea ofa suppos-
edlyrationalsociety, whereasincorporation refersto thenotion
ofa collective body and appeals to a programofa socialprophy-
[Link] theone side,thefigureoftheenemyis thesaboteur; on
theotherside,itis thefigureoftheparasite, thevermin.
As I haveindicated,thechapter"Ideologyand Terror"opensa
new wayto investigate the specificity of totalitarianism.
Here
Arendtadoptsa morephilosophical approach to the phenome-
nonbyquestioning thestatusoflawand byrethinking themean-
[Link] is no longercontentwithmerelysayingthat
totalitarian government is unprecedented. Instead,her claimis
thatithas "explodedtheveryalternative on whichall definitions
oftheessenceofgovernment havebeen basedin politicalphilos-
ophy;thatis, thealternative betweenlawfuland lawlessgovern-
ment,betweenarbitrary and legitimate power."She observesthat
one is confronted witha kindofgovernment quitedifferentfrom
those on which philosophers,fromAristotlethroughMon-
tesquieu,[Link] writesthatthe
totalitarian regime"defiesall positivelawsincludingthosethatit
has established. Butit does notoperatewithouttheguidanceof
law,nor is it arbitrary forit claimsto obeystrictly and unequivo-
callythoselawsof Natureor of Historyfromwhichall positive
lawshavebeensupposedtospring." Thensheadds:"itis themon-
strousclaimoftotalitarian rulethatfarfrombeinglawlessitgoes
to thesourceof authority, fromwhichall positivelawsreceived
theirultimatelegitimation." When speakingof totalitarian law
Arendtdoes not referto the speechof the rulers,but suggests
thattherulersthemselves submitto thesupremeauthority ofthe
lawor do whattheydo in obedienceto [Link] claimsthat
"totalitarian lawfulness executesthelawofHistory or ofNature"
without translating itintostandards ofrightorwrongforindivid-
ual behavior, and thatin contrast withanyconstitutional regime

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 45 1

it does notneed a consensus [Link] see thatArendtretainsthe

idea putforward in thefirst chapterofherbookwhereshewrote
that"totalitarianism effacesor masksthedistancebetweenrulers
and ruled."
My pointis: How can Historyor Natureimposeitselfas an
unconditionalauthority? Accordingto Arendt,Historyand
Natureare conceivedas movement. The lawofHistory or Nature
is a law of movement so thatwhenmen obeythe law theyare
takenup intothismovement. Thereis no longera transcendence
and
oflaw, consequently there isno longera discrepancy between
thesupremelawand [Link] wordsto
bringto lightthetransformations createdbythetotalitarian sys-
[Link] speaksof an "embodiment of law intomen"or of an
"identification of man and law."Nonetheless, she mustaccount
fortheoriginsof thenewnotionof movement. She claimsthat
this new concept is related to the "tremendousintellectual
change"thatoccurredin themiddleofthenineteenth century, a
change that consisted in interpreting as a
everything being stage
in a [Link] forher it is in accordancewithbothMarxist
and Darwinistideologythat totalitarian government elevates
movement to thestatusofa law,and in so doingdisclosesitsvery
[Link] government, byincorporating themove-
mentofHistory or themovement ofNature,undertakes to elim-
inateforever themembersofthedecliningclassesor anyhuman
beingsitdeemsunfitto [Link], Arendtargues,executesthe
lawofmovement bytransforming intoa lawofkilling.
itself
Totalitarian government thusdoes not need a principlethat
wouldguidethebehaviorofindividuals. Whereas"virtue" is nec-
in a
essary republic, "honor" in an aristocratic
regime, "fear"
and
in tyranny, in the totalitarian systemevenfearbecomesuseless,
sinceone neverknowsthereasonwhyshe or he couldbe treated
as an [Link] theotherhand,everyone oughtto be prepared
to assumeboththeroleof exécuterand [Link]
"two-sided preparation," Arendtsays,is effected [Link]
wehavealreadynoted,in thefirst chaptersofherbooksheargues

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452 SOCIAL RESEARCH

thatthecontentof ideologyis not important; nowhowevershe

takesseriously both Marxismand Darwinism. In both of these
doctrines she detectsa logicalconstruction
thatrevealstheiride-
ological meaning independentof their doctrinalcontent.
Although theydidnotdrawfromthenotionofa lawofHistory or
Naturethe imperative thatmen become theirexecutors,these
lawsnonetheless"bearthe seeds of totalitarian ideology"since
theyalready disclosethe essence of which
ideology is "thelogicof
an idea."

Let us briefly recallthe threecharacteristics of an ideology.

First,it impliestheclaimof a totalexplanationof thehistorical
process,withthetendency toexplainnotwhatis butwhatbecomes-,
second,itis impervious toanyobjectionsdrawnfromexperience;
third, it starts from an axiomatically accepted premiseand
deduceseverything else fromthispremise,whichis to saythatit
proceedswitha consistency thatexistsnowherein therealmof
reality.
It is significant thatArendtwritesthat"whatfitstheidea into
thisnewroleis itsownlogic,thatis,a movement whichis thecon-
sequenceoftheidea itselfand needsno outsidefactorto setitin
motion."She adds, "the movementof Historyand the logical
processofthenotionare supposedto correspondto each other,
so thatwhatever happens,happensaccordingto thelogicof an
idea."WhatArendtsuggests is that"thelawofmovement" is both
a lawofHistory or Natureand also "a lawof thinking." She sug-
geststhatthe totalitarian regimecorresponds to a newregime of
thinking. It is notan exaggeration to concludethat ideologybears
the markof "an intellectualterrorism" wherebywe are con-
fronted witha wayof thinking that all thearguments
eliminates
thatwouldcontradict theidea- similartoa wayofgoverning that
consists ofeliminating all actualor potentialenemies.

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 453

I wantto claimthatthereis a gap betweenintellectual and

politicalterrorism, sinceideologyin itselfhas no powerto trans-
[Link] one explaintheshift fromone totheother?
Arendt'sansweris disappointing. Accordingto her,each totali-
tarianleaderwasattachedtohisrespective ideologyand accepted
itwithdeadlyseriousness. One tookpridein hissupremegiftfor
"ice-coldreasoning"(Hitler),and theotherpridedhimself in the
"mercilessness ofhisdialectics"(Stalin).Arendtgoes on to write
that"thestringent logicality thatpermeates thewholestructure of
totalitarianmovement and government wasexclusively thework
ofHitlerand Stalin."Unexpectedly wesee herethesuddenintru-
sionoftheold theoryofthe"greatmen"in History.
Let me emphasizethattheArendtian notionofideologyis not
[Link] requiredbythelawof
movement in orderto prepareeveryone to playtheroleofboth
executioner andvictim; latersheclaimsthatthelawofmovement
is [Link] thoughArendttendsto pre-
sentthelawof movement as ifit blindedmen and forcedthem
intounendingterror, it is clearthatshe does notbelievein this
law. Thus we expect thatshe will argue thatcommunismor
Nazismis guidedbya [Link] at the
foundation ofa newkindofstate,she shouldhaveadmittedthat
itis invokedtojustify thepoliticallineoftheparty, especially the
terror,just as the creation of a new world and a new man is
invokedin theserviceoftotaldomination.
Whydoes Arendtinsiston thenotionofmovement to suchan
extentthatit becomesmorepowerfulthanthepoliticalactors?
Thisquestionseemsto me to be tightly linkedto anotherques-
tion:Whydoes Arendtabstainfromanyreference to therole of
theparty? Assuming thatthetotalitarian regimeexhibitsa "mon-
strouspretension togo backto thesourceofauthority," one must
indicatetheorganin whichthisauthority is [Link] a totali-
tarianregimepowerresidesin the [Link] party, however, is
not the mainorganization in the socialfield;ratherit presents
itselfas aboveall byreasonofitsmonstrous pretension to be an

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454 SOCIAL RESEARCH

emanationofthepeopleand also thatwhichcausesthepeopleto

be a unity,a peopleas One.
Itscontrolextendstoall sectorsofactivity. Wecertainly areenti-
tledto saythatit setseverything in motion,thatit createsnew
organizations, and thatitestablishes theobjectives oftheirdevel-
opment. Yet these various appearances of movement do notmask
thepermanency ofthestructure and thespiritoftheparty. The
is
partyitself not takenintothe movement, sinceno eventcan
alteritsnature,despitethe internalstruggles and the capitula-
tionsofwhichit is thetheater. The partyis a bodyclosedin on
itself,it is not localizable in space and [Link] Orwellso bril-
liantlynoted,theparty hasan immortal body,a mysticalbodycon-
nectedwithitsreal organs,whichare itsvisiblehierarchy. This
is
strangephenomenon certainly more strikingin a communist
regime than in a fascist
one, which is a signthatcommunism goes
further in achievingthetotalitarian [Link] theSovietUnion,
the partysucceededin establishing a set of microbodies - from
tradeunionsto associations -
ofanykind in whichthepatternof
a substantial community, carriedout by strictcontroloverthe
behaviorofindividuals, is reproducedso thatno independent or
spontaneous actionwouldbe possible.

Bymakingmovement the essentialfeatureof the totalitarian

system,Arendtwantsto reduce the notionof movementto a
processconceivedoffromitsbeginningas orientated towardan
end, such that at each step one has to go forwardin onlyone
[Link] doingthisshe does notsee whatis maskedbyher
conceptoftheideologyofmovement. The ideologyofmovement
attempts todenythathistory is open tounpredictableevents;this
ideologymakesimpossible anychangein thestyleofexistence, in
orinwaysofthinking.
socialrelationships, Whilearguingthatthe
destructionofpositivelawsis at theserviceoftheproductionof

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 455

"One Man of giganticdimension," Arendtignoresthe factthat

"theOne" is thefigureofimmobility. Inasmuchas totalitarian ide-
ologies claim to have found thesolution to all ofthe conflictsthat
havetornthemodernworldapart,conflicts thatin previoustimes
werethesourceof all change,itwouldseem thattheregimein
whichmovement is celebratedeffects itselfunderthe signof a
refusalofhistory.
WhenArendtdenouncesso vehemently "thereignof move-
ment,"her denunciationaims not onlyat totalitarian regimes
and theunderlying ideologiesthatarosein thenineteenth cen-
tury,but also the new mode of temporality that is characteristic
of [Link] critiqueof thefrenziedmove-
mentthatrevealsitsnaturein terror, I see her critiqueof the
modernfaithin progress,especiallythe faithin technological
and scientific [Link] Arendt'sthought,even beforethe
adventoftotalitarian ideology,theveryidea ofhistory had taken
on a [Link] her,history, as ithad been con-
ceivedbytheAncients,no longerconsistedof the narrationof
greatdeeds and [Link] claimsthatin modernity therealm
ofaction,thatis,whatever escapedthenecessity imposedbythe
lifeprocesses,became incomprehensible. As a result,political
thoughtdisappeared.
Whilereading"Ideologyand Terror,"one should pay close
attention to thepassageinwhichArendtremindsus oftheclassic
[Link] saysthattraditionally theregimeoflawwas
at theserviceofstability in faceofthebiologicalfactofbirththat
introduces [Link] protecting thecommunity
fromdisturbances thatoccuras a consequenceof [Link]
writes,"Positive lawsin constitutionalgovernment aredesignedto
erect boundariesand establishchannels of communication
betweenmen,whosecommunity iscontinually endangeredbythe
newmenbornin [Link] newbirtha newbeginning is born
into the world.A newworldhas potentially come intobeing."
Thisargument seemsto me to be derivedfroma tripleabstrac-
[Link],Arendtomitsthat,as soon as one is born,one is taken

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456 SOCIAL RESEARCH

intoa network ofrelationships thatbearthemarkofa particular

[Link],lawisreducedtothefunction ofstabilizing
a nat-
uralevent,as thoughitwasnotconstitutive ofhumancoexistence
as [Link],admitting as she does thatlawsare changeablein
consequenceofparticular circumstances amountsonlyto taking
into accountdiscreteactions,therebyignoringthe gestation of
newsocial relationships,newwaysof thinking, newrepresenta-
tionsof whatis good or evil,of whatisjust or unjust,rightor
wrong,also realor imaginary, possibleor impossible:a gestation
thatoperatesin the thickness of the social underthejuridico-
surface.
political This tripleabstractionpermits Arendtto elude
thequestionofhistory.

All possibilitiesare not enclosedin the alternative between

necessity orcontingency, anonymous [Link] sense
ofhistory thatbeginswithmodernity shouldnotbe confused with
thebeliefin a myth [Link],itproceedsfromtheview
thathistory is irreversible.
Arendtrightly rejectsthe idea that
movement has a worthin itself,
theidea thathenceforth "every-
is
thing possible." Nonetheless,she goes so faras to conflate two
different phenomena: on the one in
side,themovement which
themotoris definite and theeffectsarestrictly
controlled so as to
excludeanyspontaneity ofmenand submitall sectorsofactivity
to thesamenorms;on theotherside,themovement thatis char-
acteristicof democraticsocietiesdue to the limitation of state
power, the breakdown ofthe traditional
hierarchy, and the diffu-
sion of individual freedoms and thedifferentiation betweenthe
juridical,economic,and [Link] is thislatter
political,
kindofmovement thatTocquevillediscovered inAmerica,a rest-
lessmovement towhichArendtdoes notgiveconsideration.
Regarding regimeoflawin theSovietUnion,itis clearthat
the
forArendtthereis a completedestruction ofanylegality as a con-

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 457

sequenceof thefullaffirmation of the law of history. Thus she

failsto observethe SovietUnion'sendeavorto elaboratea new
framework [Link] islinkedtothat
ofterror. In theyearsthatfollowedtheOctoberRevolution, ter-
rorwasexercisednotonlyagainsttheenemiesoftheRevolution:
all the partiesthathad participated in the revolutionary move-
ment were eliminated,includingMensheviks,revolutionary
socialists,
anarchists,workers' committees, youthmovements, and
feminist movements. At the same timethe tradeunionswere
made subjectto the rulingpartyand freedomof the presswas
[Link] 1918,Leninlaunchedtheslogan"TheParty
above everything" - whichis to say,above the [Link]
decreedbyLenintocleartheRussianlandofanyharmful insects.
Considering the Leninist one
terror, mightsay that it developed
in accordancewiththedescription thatArendtmakesofa fren-
zied movement [Link], lateron thepur-
suitofterrorrequiredjuridicalmeansforinstitutionalization. In
1924 a penal code was elaboratedand thenmodifiedin 1928.
Thiscode continuedtobe applieduntiltheKhrushchev era,so it
was in effectforapproximately 30 [Link] famousArticle58
(concerningthevariousviolationsof law) bearsthemarkof an
extraordinary combination ofthelawfuland thearbitrary.
Ratherthan denouncingthe destruction of law,we should
speak of its perversion. Althoughthe Sovietregimedispensed
witha consensus juris, Arendtrightly
as underlines, it soughtto
makeitself consistentbymeansoftheappearanceoflegality. One
wouldbe wrongto reducethisnewcode toan instrumental func-
tionthatdidnotaffect thecharacteristics oftheregime;ratherits
production wasessentialin orderto constitute a newsocialorder.
On theone handitpermitted theassignment ofa numberofcivil
servantswiththespecialchargeofadministrating justice,whichis
tosay,regulating terror. it the
Meanwhile, provided regimewitha
gridthrough whichcrimesweresubjectto definite sanctions;the
commissars wereallowedtoestablish, infacttofabricate, a dossier
corresponding to each case. Henceforth, these commissars felt

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458 SOCIAL RESEARCH

themselves to be carrying on a [Link] administrationofjus-

ticeparticipated in [Link]
observesthatthe elaborationof the penal code coincidedwith
theformation ofa bureaucratic state.
On theotherhand,theaccusedwereenmeshedin a bureau-
craticnetwork. Each personwhowasarrested becamea supposed
culpritwhowasobligedto plead guilty, and moreover to collabo-
ratewiththe examiningmagistrate bygivingproofof his guilt.
The repertory of crimestookintoaccountnot onlyactionsbut
intentions or supposedintentions; theabstainingofdoingsome-
thing in a particularcircumstance; the failureto denounce a
guiltyperson,and so forth. The code gavetheimageofa people
entirelysubmitted [Link] I havealreadynoted,
to an arbitrary
arbitrarinessgoes hand in hand witha fantastic
[Link]
wasnothingofthiskindin theNazi system.

IfI haveinsistedon thefeatures ofthetreatment ofthelawin

the SovietUnion,it is to contrasta communist regimewitha
democratic one. Thejudicialproceduresderivefromtheprinci-
ples of a [Link] a democratic regime,theadministration of
the
justiceimplies presumption of innocence and the right a
to
defense;a debateon the factsand on the authenticity of testi-
monies;theroleofa judge whoseauthority is beyondtheprose-
cutionand thecounsel,an authority independent, in principle,
[Link] tosaythatjusticeis administered
in thenameofa Third. Thismodelis in accordancewitha society
thatmakesa place forthe plurality interests
of conflicting and
opinions,and thatadmitsan ultimateauthority thathas been
[Link] Thirdmarks the intrusionof thelawinto
socialrelationships. does notdetachitselffromthe
Itslegitimacy
guarantee of thefreedoms of movement, expression,and infor-
[Link] characteristic of the communist regimeis the

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THINKING WITH AND AGAINST ARENDT 459

absenceof [Link] thepartyis aboveeverything, thenthat

also meansthatnothing is outside the party- thatis, outside the
state,ofwhichthepartyis theincarnation. Consequently, thereis
in theadministration ofjusticeno neutral [Link] relationship
betweentheaccuserand theaccusedis a dual relationship; the
Thirdis foreclosedsincetheaccuserspeaksin thename of the
[Link] relationship derivesfroma logicof incorporation.
Moreover, thedualrelationship demandstobe reproducedin the
accusedsubject,whohastoidentify himself [Link]-
denunciation oftheaccusedreachesitshighestpointwhenhe or
sheisa communist. The Moscowtrials, in particular,illustratethis
[Link], itis reproducedin theinnumerable dia-
logues between a commissar and an accused. Solzhenitsyn writes,
"Always the same repeated
leitmotif in endless variations. You and
me, we are communists." He adds, "What would you do if you
werein myplace?"It is forthisreasonthatI spokeofa perversion
ofthelaw.
HannahArendtwaswellawareof the unprecedented phenome-
non thattotalitarianism constituted. Nevertheless, in searching
foritsorigin,eitherin theideologiesand thenewconceptionof
historythatappearedin thenineteenth century, or in theprocess
oftheatomization ofindividuals thatlentitselftotheatomization
ofmassesin thebeginningof thetwentieth century, she did not
pay attentionto thenew structure of the social,particularlyin the
[Link] denouncedthemythoftheOne withoutcon-
sideringtheschemeofa newsymbolic [Link] thereason
whyshe has notmeasuredtheabyssthatseparatestwoformsof
society:totalitarianism
and moderndemocracy.

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