GOTTSCHALK , LOUIS. (1464). Understanding history = & primer of istoricgl_ oe » New York A.A, KinopFs tat] CHAPTER IIT WHAT ARE “HISTORY” AND “HISTORICAL SOURCES”? The Meaning of “History” ‘Tux Exist word history is derived from the Greck noun leropic, meaning learning. Asused by the Greek philosopher Aristotle, history meant a systematic ac- count of a set of natural phenomena, whether or not chronological ordering was a factor in the account; and that usage, though rare, still prevails in English in the phrase natural history. In the course of time, however, the equivalent Latin word scientia (English, scierice) came to be used more regularly to designate non-chronological systematic accounts of natural phe- nomena; and the word histary wat reserved usually for accounts of phenomena (especially human af- fairs) in chronological order. By its most common definition, the word history now means “the past of mankind.” Compare the Ger- man word for history — Geschichte, which is derived from geschehen, meaning to happen. Geschichte is that which kas happened. This meaning of the word history is often encountered in such overworked phrases as “all history teaches” or “the lessons of his- toy.” — “TE requires only a moment's reflection to recognize that in this sense history cannot be reconstructed. ‘The past of mankind for the most part is beyond rePacers 2 UNDERSTANDING HISTORY call, Even those who are blessed with the best mem- oties cannot re-create theit own past, since in the life of all men there must be events, persons, words, thoughts, places, and fancies that made no impression at all at the time they occurred, or have since been forgotten. A fortiori, the experience of a generation Jong dead, most of whom left no records or whose records, if they exist, have never been disturbed by ‘he historian’s touch, is beyond the possibility of total ‘fecollection, The reconstruction of the total_past of mankind, althongh itis the goal_of historians, thus ~ gbecomes a_goal tl know full_well_is ain- ible “Objectivity” and “Subjectivity” smetimnes objects like ruins, parchments, and coins undue ana Ui pan Otseanie tc al story are derived from testimony and therefore aie facts o therefore aie facts of meaning, They cannot be seen, fell, tasted, heard, or nell Shey. nay Be said to be symbolic or repre- sentative of something that once was real, but they have SOON realty of their own. In other words, they exist only in the observer's or historian’s mind (and thus may be called “subjective”). To be studied objectively (that is, with the intention of acquiring detached and truthful knowledge independent of one's personal reactions), a thing must first be an_ab- have an dependent existence le ind. Recollections, however, do not have existence outside the human mind; and most of his- tory is based upon recollections — that is, written or spoken testimony. “gustony” AND “‘sustonicaL sources” 43 A vulgar prejudice exists against “subjective” knowl. edge as inferior to “objective” knowledge, largely be cause the word “subjective” has also come to mean “illusory” or “based upon personal considerations,” and hence either “untrue” or “biased.” Knowledge may be acquired, however, by an impartial and judi- cially detached investigation of mental images, pro- cesses, concepts, and precepts that are one or more steps removed from objective reality. Impartiality and “objectivity,” to be sure, may be more difficult to ob- tain from such data, and hence conclusions based upon them may be more debatable; but such data and conclusions, if true, aze not necessarily inferior to other kinds of knowledge per se. The word subjec- tive is not _used here to imply disparagement_of any tion of special kinds of safeguards against error, Fiebees Artifacts as Sources of History “77 Only where relies of human happenings can bé found—a potshérd, a coin, a rain, a_manuscript, a book, a portrait, a stamp, a piece of wreckage, a strand of hair, or other archeological or anthropologicat ie- mains —do we have objects other than words that the historian can study. These objects, however, are never the happenings or the events themselves. If attic facts, they are the results of events; if written docu- iments, they may be the results or the records of events Whether artifacts or documents, they are raw ma- terials out of which history may be written, To be sure, certain historical truths can be derived immediately from such materials. The historian can oi“ UNDERSTANDING HISTORY discover that a piece of pottery was handwrought, that a building was made of moztared brick, that a manu- seript was written in a cursive hand, that a painting was done in oils, that sanitary plumbing was known in an old city, and many other such data from direct observation of artifacts surviving from the past, But ° such fats, important though they aie age BOLT sence oF the study of history. The historian deals with the dynamic or genetic (the becoming) as well as the static (the being or the become) and he aims at being interpretative (explaining why and how things hap- pened and were interrelated) as well as_descriptive (telling what happened, when and where, and who took part). Besides, such descriptive data as can be derived directly and immediately from surviving arti- facts are only a small part of the periods to which they belong. A historical context can be given fo tern aby if they can Be placed in a human setting. That human ‘beings Tived in the brick building with sanitary plumb- ing, ate out of the handwrought pottery, and admired the oil painting that were mentioned above might perhaps easily be inferred. But the inference may just as easily be mistaken, for the building might have been a stable, the piece of pottery might have been fiom a roof-tile, the painting might have been a hidden-away relic with no admirers whatsoever; and an infinity of other suppositions is possible, Without further evidence the human context of these artifacts can never be recaptured with any degree of certainty. “gistoRY” AND “HISTORICAL souRcES” 45 Historical Knowledge Limited by Incompleteness of the Records Unfortunately, for most of the past we not only have no further evidence of the human setting in which to place surviving artifacts; we do not even have the artifacts. Most human affairs happen with- out leaving vestiges or records of any kind behind them. The past, having happened, has perished for- ever with only occasional traces. To begin with, al- though the absolute number of historical writings is staggering, only a small part of what happened in the past was ever observed. A moment's reflection is suffi- cient to establish that fact. How much, for example, of what you do, say, or think is ever observed by any- one (including yourself)? Multiply your unobserved actions, thoughts, words, and physiological processes by 2,000,000,000, and you will get a rough estimate of the amount of unobserved luppenings that go on in the world all the time. And only a part of what was observed in the past was remembered by those who observed it; onlya part of what was remembered Sarecortet a_part_of what was recorded has survived; only a part of what has survived has come to the historians’ attention; only a part_of what has come to their attention is credible; only-a_part-of what is credible has been grasped; and only a part of what hhas_been_grasped_can be expounded or narrated by the_historian. The whole history of the past (what has been called history-as-actuality) can be known to him only through the surviving record of it (history-as- record), and most of history-as-record is only the sur-Sates 46 UNDERSTANDING HISTORY viving part of the recorded part of the remembered att of the observed part of that whole. Even when the record of the past is derived directly from archeo- logical or anthropological remains, they are yet only the scholars’ selected parts of the discovered parts of the chance survivals from the total past. In so far as the historian has an external object to study it is not the perished history that actually hap- pened (history-asactuality) but the surviving records of what happened (history-as-record). History can be told only from history-as-record; and history as told (spoken-or-written-history) is only the historians’ ex- Pressed part of the understood part of the credible Patt of the discovered part of history-as-record, Before the past is set forth by the historian, iti likely to have gone through eight separate steps at each of which Some of it has been lost; and there is no guarantee that what remains is the most important, the largest, the most valuable, the most representative, or the most enduring part. In other words the “object” that the historian studies is not only incomplete; itis markedly variable as records are lost or rediscovered. History as the Subjective Process of Re-creation From this probably inadequate remainder the his torian must do what he can to restore the total past of mankind, He has no way of doing it but in terms of his own experience, That experience, however, has taught him (1) that yesterday was different from to- day in some ways as well as the same as today in “qustory” AND “‘iisroricat sources” 47 others, and (2) that his own experience is both like and unlike other men’s, It is not alone his own mem- ories interpreted in the light of his own experience that he must try to apply to the understanding of historical survivals; it i the memories of many other people as well. But one’s own memories are abstract images, not realities, and one’s reconstructions of ‘others’ memories, even when reinforced by contem- porary records and relics, are likely to be even more abstract. Thus the utmost the historian can grasp of history-asactuality, no matter how real it may have seemed while it was happening, can be nothing more than a mental image or a series of mental images based upon an application of his own experience, real and vicarious, to part of a part of a part of a part of a part of a part of a part of a part of a vanished whole. Tn short, the historian’s aim is verisimilitude with regard to a perished past—a subjective process — rather than experimental certainty with regard to an objective reality. He tries to get as close an approxima- tion to the truth“abont_the_past_as constant _comrec- tion of his mental images will allow, at the same time recognizing that that truth has in fact eluded hi forever. Here is the essential difference between the study of man’s past and of man’s physical environ- ment. Physics, for example, has an extrinsic and whole object to study —the physical universe—that does not change because the physicist is studying it, no matter how much his understanding of it may change; history has only detached and scattered objects to study (documents and relics) that do not togetherRae 8 UNDERSTANDING HISTORY make up the total object that the historian is study- ing — the past of mankind —and that object, having largely disappeared, exists only in as far as his always incomplete and frequently changing understanding of it can re-create it. Some of the natural scientists, such as geologists and paleozoologists, in so far as the objects they study are traces from a perished past, greatly resemble historians in this regard, but differ from them, on the other hand, in so far as historians have to deal with human testimony as well as physical traces. ‘Once the historian understands his predicament, his task is simplified. His responsibility shifts from the obligation to acquire a complete knowledge of thecntecoverble past by iacana of the sarviving ev dence to that aE eereatag a veisimilir image of ig a verisimilar image of as much of the past as the evidence makes recoverable. ‘The Tatter task is the easier one. For the historian history becomes only that part of the human past which can be meaningfully reconstructed from the available records and from inferences regarding their Setting. Historical Method and Historiography Defined ‘The process of critically examining and_analyzing the records and survivals of the past is here called ‘Historical method. The imaginative reconstruction of the past from the data derived by that process is called historiography (the writing of history). By means ol historical method and historiography (both of which are frequently grouped together simply as historical “uistory” AND “sisroRrcaL sources” 49 method)? the historian endeavors to reconstruct as uch of the past of mankind as he can. Even in this Jimited effort, however, the historian is handicapped. He rarely can tell the story even of a part of the past “as it actually oceurzed,” although the great Ger- man historian Leopold von Ranke enjoined him to do so, because in addition to the probable incomplete- ness of the zecords, he is faced with the inadequacy of the human imagination and of human speech for such an “actual” re-creation. But he can endeavor, to use a geometrician’s phrase, to approach the actual past “as a limit.” For the past conceived of as something that “actually occurred” places obvious limits upon the kinds of record and of imagination that he may use, He must be sure that his records really come from the past and are in fact what they seem to_be and that his imagination is directed toward re-creation arid not creation. These limits distinguish history from fiction, poetzy, drama, and tantasy. Imagination in Historiography The historian is not permitted to imagine things that could not reasonably have happened, For certain purposes that we shall later examine he may imagine * Some confusion aries from the we of the term itovzst rethod by practitioners in other dips (econamics’ and the ‘ology especially) to mean the application of historical data and iMlus- trations to tele problems. Tk il simplify ove discussion to restrict {he tum lg the method by wich ions fetinony aarzd ‘Sc enthentie and -relible Has ‘Courses by Ristorians ia “historical sielied?” Towever, generally indude not only instaction in such nals but also the syuthesteng of such date into eeliable historical ‘xpoitions and narcalives.50 things that might have happened. But he is frequently required to imagine things that must have happened. For the exercise of the imagination in history it is impossible to lay down rules except very general ones. It is a platitude that the historian who knows con- temporary life best_will_nnderstand_past_life_hest. Since the human mentality has not changed notice- 4 ably in historic times, present generations can under- stand past generations in terms of their own experi- \ ence. Those historians can make the best analogies and contrasts who have -the greatest awareness of possible analogies and contrasts — that is, the widest i range of experience, imagination, wisdom, and knowl- edge. Unfortunately, no platitude tells how to acquire a wide range of those desizable qualities and knowl- edge or how to transfer them to an understanding of the past. For they are not accumulated alone by pre- cept or example, industry and prayer, though all of : these may help. And so historiography,* the syrthesiz- ; ing of historical data into narrative or expositions by writing history books and articles or delivering history lectures, is not easily made the subject of rules and ; regulations. Some room must be left for native talent i and inspiration, and pethaps that is a good thing. But since precepts and examples may help, an effort willl be made (see especially Chapters VII-XII) to set forth a few of them, [UNDERSTANDING HISTORY + Confusion arses ere too from the fact that itoring is sometimes used to mean the citical exrmination of story books already waite, 3, for example, in elle coures on *hitor ogaphy.” “wastory” AND “HISTORICAL soURcES” 51 History of Historical Method Historical method, however, not only can be made the subject of rules and regulations; for over two thou: sand years it has been. Thucydides, who in the fifth century 8.6. wrote his famous history of the Pelopon- nesian War, conscientiously told _his readers how he gathered his materials and what tests he used to sepa- rate_truth ftom fiction. Even when he invented speeches to put into the mouths of contemporaries, he tried to make them as like the originals as ais sources of knowledge permitted. He hoped to conform both to the spirit of the speaker and the letter of the speech; but since stenographic reports were nat avail- able, he had sometimes to supply the speaker's words, “expressed as T thought he would be likely to express them,” * Since Thucydides’ day, many historians have writ- ten, briefly or at Iongth, upon historical method. Out- standing examples are Lucian, Ibn Khaldun, Bodin, Mably, Voltaire, and Kanke, though sometimes their studies have dealt with the scope rather than the tech- niques of history. With Exnst Bernheim’s Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphiloso- phie (1st ed., Leipzig, 1889), the modern and mere academic discussion of the subject may be said to have begun. Since Bernheim’s exposition a number of other textbooks have been published. Although none of them surpass his masterpiece, peculiar merits in- tended for patticular kinds of readers are found in © Thucydides Tronslated into English by Benjamin Jowett, T (Oxford, 2900), 26 (BK. I 22).52 UNDERSTANDING HISTORY : some. Notable examples are the Langlois and Seigno- ! ‘bos volume for Frenchmen; the Johnson and the Nevins volumes for Americans; the Harsin and the Kent booklets for younger students; and the Wolf, the Hockett, and the Bloch and Renouvin books for i students of specialized fields of history. In_all of these works and literally dozens of others i like them there i a stiking degree of unanimity te- | carding the methods of historical analysis. For our purposes these methods will be considered under four | tel hes (2) the selection of a subject for investiga ‘ tion; (2) the ‘collection of probable sources of in- andy formation on that subject; (3) the examination of those_s¢ for genuineness (either in whole or in tae eee ihaoben ‘the sources (or pais GF sources) proved genu- ‘The synthesis of the particulars thus derived is je Cachistoriography, about which there is less unanimity ad among the textbooks. For purposes of clarity we shall an elehave to treat analysis and syathesis as if they were ‘ gnu discrete processes, but we shall see that at various oo stages they cannot be entirely sepatated, Sources ‘The historian's problems in choosing a subject and collecting information upon it (the latter sometimes i dignified by the Greek name of heuristics) will be dis | cussed in Chapter IV. Historical heuristics do not dif- i fer essentially from any other bibliographical exercise in So far as printed Books are concemed. The historian, however, has to_use many materials that are not in a books. Where these are archeological, epigtaphical, “gastory” AND “HISTORICAL souxcEs” 53 ‘or numismatical materials, he has to depend largely on museums. Where they are official records, he may have to search for them in archives, courthouses, gavem- mental libraries, ete. Where they are private papers not available in official collections, he may have to hunt among the papers of business houses, the muni- ment rooms of ancient castles, the prized possessions of autograph collectors, the records of parish churches, ete, Having some subject in mind, with more or less definite delimitation of the persons, areas, times, and functions (ie., the economic, political, intellectual, diplomatic, or other occupational aspects) involved, he looks for materials that may have some bearing upon those persons in that area at that time functicn- ing in that fashion. These materials are his sources. ‘The more precise his delimitations of persons, area, time, and function, the more relevant his sources are likely to be (see Chapter X). The Distinction between Primary and Other Original Sources ‘Written and oral sources are divided into two kinds: primary and secondary. A primary source is the testi- mony of an eyewitness, or of a witness by any other of the senses, or of a. mechan a which was present phone — that is, of one wh¢ at Bie events of which he or it tells (hereafter called simply eyewitness). A secondary source isthe testi. ‘mony of anyone who is not an eyewitness — that is, of one who Was Ti6t present at the.« fw tells. A primary source must thus have been produced by a contemporary of the events it narrates. 1 rr