Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy
The events of 9/11 also made it impossible for Islamabad to continue its
*
The writer is Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science,
University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
During his official visit to Kabul on December 4, 2010, Syed Yousuf Raza
Gilani, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, said that Pakistan had always wanted
a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. The destinies of the people of
Pakistan and Afghanistan were deeply interlinked. Pakistan had been aspiring
closer economic and commercial ties with the resource-rich Central Asian States
and had plans for establishment of energy and trade corridors with them. But all
of them invariably depended on a peaceful Afghanistan.2
Similarly, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, during his
visit to Brussels (Belgium), made it clear that Pakistan has a traditional stand on
Afghanistan and that is the well-being of
the people of Afghanistan. He said, ―We The events of 9/11 and the
cannot wish for Afghanistan anything global “war on terror” not
that we don’t wish for Pakistan.‖3 only changed the
Pakistan is making a significant fundamental fabric of
contribution to the socio-economic Pakistan’s foreign policy,
development of Afghanistan as peace and but also complicated
prosperity of the two countries could Pakistan’s diplomatic stance
only be ensured through their economic
on the Kashmir dispute. The
progress.
new situation made it
Change in Kashmir policy difficult for Pakistan to
provide diplomatic and
The events of 9/11 and the global moral support to Kashmiri
―war on terror‖ not only changed the indigenous freedom
fundamental fabric of Pakistan’s foreign movement as the
policy, but also complicated Pakistan’s circumstances provided
diplomatic stance on the Kashmir India an opportunity to
dispute. The new situation made it project it as “Islamic
difficult for Pakistan to provide militancy” and to gain
diplomatic and moral support to sympathies of the
Kashmiri indigenous freedom movement international community.
as the circumstances provided India an
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Our main concerns are they [USA] can be hurt and harmed. And they can also
devastate our main power, our main cause, Kashmir … They are to see what the
intentions of our neighboring countries are. They [India] have offered all their
military facilities to the United States. Very conveniently, they [India] have
offered their logistic support and all their facilities to America. They want that
America should come and side them and they want Pakistan to be declared a
terrorist State, and thus damage our Kashmir cause. 4
Similarly, Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani also stated, ―Pakistan
remains firmly committed to its principled stance on Jammu and Kashmir, based
on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.‖7 On another occasion, he
stated that ―the just struggles of people for self-determination and liberation from
colonial or foreign occupation cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism.‖8
Thus, Pakistan acted according to the U.S. desire and also maintained its
traditional stand that ―Kashmir problem needs to be resolved through dialogue
and peaceful means in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people and
the UN resolutions.‖9 Pakistan also urged the international community, especially
the U.S., to play an active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute for the sake of
durable peace and harmony in the region.
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
Siachen, Sir Creek, Kishanganga Dam and above all the core issue of Kashmir
have remained unsettled to date. On top of it all, the situation is alarming because
of the presence of nuclear weapons in both the countries.
Their relations received a serious blow after the suicide attack on Indian
parliament in December 2001; and got further worsened after the Mumbai
carnage in November 2008. India referred to the Mumbai attack as ―India’s 9/11‖
and described the city as a hub of commercial and entertainment activities and a
symbol of modern India.10 New Delhi blamed Pakistan for the terror incidents
and was ready to attack Pakistan, but Islamabad denied the charges and matched
India’s military moves.11
Tensions between the two countries were defused with the help of the
international community, particularly the U.S, as hostilities between the two
countries could have had a negative impact on Pakistan’s efforts in the war on
terror. Demands were also made that Pakistan should stop supporting groups
operating in Kashmir like the Lashkar-e- Taiba (LET). Pakistan assured India
that it would extend full cooperation to unearth the Mumbai conspiracy, but that
also did not stop India from severing the ongoing dialogue process with Pakistan.
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On September 16, 2001, Islamabad announced that it would join the global
coalition against terror20 Three days later, Musharraf addressed the nation and
explained the country’s position by saying:
This support provided by Pakistan played a critical role in the success of the
OEF. Furthermore, it is also pertinent to highlight that Pakistan captured more
terrorists and committed and lost more troops than any other nation in the
world.24
Pakistan has been actively involved in international affairs both within and
beyond the South Asian region. The country has continued its partnership with
the United States and the industrialized Western world based on strategic
affinities and common interests in economic and trade affairs.
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
India, being a largest democracy in the world ,is taking full advantage of its
image in the world and is on the path to economic development, whereas
Pakistan has repeatedly seen long years of political unrest and military takeover,
thereby discouraging foreign investors.
Pakistan’s diplomatic and moral support to Taliban has badly damaged its
global image and its own multi-cultural society. The violence began when
Taliban introduced strict interpretation of Islam and propagated that America
and the West is the root cause of all evil. Following the 9/11 incidents, elements
with similar views gained ground in Pakistan that resulted in increased
militancy in society with suicide blasts becoming almost a routine matter for
the people in Pakistan. The brutal acts of Taliban not only brought a bad name
to the country but also tarnished the image of Islam.
Their nefarious and immoral activities have led many to believe that Islam
is a religion of intolerance, militancy and terrorism. As Rahul Bedi has written
in Asia Times, ―Due to the activities of Taliban and militants, it has led
increasing numbers of Western people to link Islam with fundamentalism,
extremism, and terrorism.‖26 Pakistan is struggling with its limited resources to
restore peace and security in the country not only because the international
community wants it to take on the militants, but also because these elements are
bent upon destroying the social fabric of the country and impose their ideas and
way of life on the people of Pakistan. These efforts by Pakistan have been
acknowledged by the international community which has helped in improving
Pakistan’s image across the world.
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In the early years of 2000, Pakistan was close to an economic default. The
country had been subjected to a wide range of U.S. sanctions under the Pressler,
Glenn and Symington Amendments to Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance
Act. The military coup of General Musharaf in 1999 also limited all economic
and military assistance to Pakistan.27 According to the World Bank, Pakistan was
in a ―position of extreme vulnerability‖ due to its immense debt and was
categorized as a low-income economy which failed to maintain the development
growth and progress.28
From 1998 to 2001, foreign exchange reserves were not sufficient and
financial indiscipline was downgraded.29 It also pointed out that Pakistan had
severe economic shortcomings, notably its failing education system, growing
inequality between the rich and the poor, faltering public infrastructure and lack
of investment in private and public sector including research and development.
However, the events of 9/11 bailed-out Pakistan from political and economic
difficulties. In response to Islamabad’s cooperation to the U.S.-led war on terror,
the Bush administration waived sanctions under the authority of Brownback II
and awarded around $18 billion tangible economic and military aid including
$11.5 billion as military assistance.30 The U.S. administration provided
legitimacy to General Musharraf’s military regime and Washington showed
willingness to reschedule Pakistan’s outstanding $400 million debt.31 It also
supported loan rescheduling for Pakistan by various financial institutions,
including the World Bank, IMF and ADB, and helped alleviate Pakistan’s $38
billion foreign debts.
The Barak Obama administration in its latest annual budget has approved
$1.6 billion in military assistance (2009) and about $1.4 billion (2010) as civilian
assistance.35
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
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world will create new opportunities for economic growth and hopefully the
benefits of globalization will offset any costs. Globalization will also increase
prosperity through trade, aid, investment and technological change and as a result
employment opportunities will enrich society.
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
To fight terrorism
U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, also praised the ―valuable‖ Pakistani
cooperation in fighting extremism and said that Pakistani leadership has
―recognized that standing firm against the threat was important for the country’s
future.‖ She further said: ―The horrific events of September 11 have required a
broad-based, long-term strategic support from Pakistan and the civilian
government in Islamabad has contributed more meaningfully towards the
unprecedented global effort to prevent terrorism.‖45
In an interview with CNN, President Zardari said: ―Pakistan and the United
States will together root out and bring to justice those who use terrorism to
damage both countries’ relations. We need no convincing that the killers and
their accomplices are trying to pervert Islam to use it for justifying their appalling
crimes.‖46
Pointing out that terrorism was posing a serious threat to the social fabric of
Pakistan, Prime Minister Gilani declared: ―War against terrorism is our own war
because threat of terrorism to Pakistan’s national interest is most acute; it has
jeopardized the country’s stability and solidarity‖.47 The then Foreign Minister
Shah Mahmood Qureshi also stated that Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism
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and is not allowing and would not allow anyone to use its land against
any country.48
While praising Pakistan’s efforts in the war against terror, The Wall Street
Journal advised Washington: ―Pakistan is facing blowback of the international
effort to contain terrorism in the globe, but the U.S. and its Western allies must
have to realize that Pakistan alone cannot defeat terrorism and concrete results
are also not possible without active support and assistance to Pakistan.‖49 The
Mutahidda Ulema Council of Pakistan comprising different factions of Islam
condemned the militant acts at home and abroad, issued a fatwa against a
deformed concept of jihad and the use of suicide-bombing in Pakistan, described
Taliban’s acts as counter to the teachings of the divine religion and opposed to
the message of Islam.50 In this regard, capacity-building of the security
institutions in Pakistan will be important as mentioned by Leon Hadar: ―It is
necessary to strengthen Islamabad’s counter-terrorism capacity because without
that it is hard to achieve objectives.‖51
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
Commitment to Non-Proliferation
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also supporting the principle of equal and legitimate security for all. Pakistan has
a logical stand for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons, and is firmly against the proliferation of such weapons and their means
of delivery. The country firmly supports international non-proliferation efforts.
For this purpose, Pakistan has suggested that the international non-proliferation
mechanism should be constantly improved and proliferation issues should be
dealt with through dialogue and international cooperation. The fundamental
purpose of non-proliferation is to safeguard and promote international and
regional peace and security, and non-proliferation measures should be
meaningful.
Pakistan supports the United Nations to play its due role in the area of non-
proliferation and has signed all international treaties and joined all the relevant
international organizations. The country joined the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in 1957 and voluntarily placed its civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan was the country which asked the United
Nations General Assembly to declare South Asia nuclear weapon-free zone.52 It
ratified the International Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1997 and also ratified Amended Protocol 11 of the
Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, which regulates the use of
landmines.53
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
Since the War on Terror has started, the U.S. and Western media has initiated
psychological warfare against Pakistan’s nuclear programme and its nuclear
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan that he established extensive illicit nuclear supplier
network in the 1990s55 and provided nuclear enrichment technology to Iran,
Libya, and North Korea. They also express the fear that Pakistan’s nuclear assets
will fall into the hands of extremists. Pakistan’s policy makers have continued
their struggle to counter Western propaganda against its nuclear programme and
have introduced multilayered, foolproof system of internal monitoring.
Besides, Islamabad has over the past initiated many advanced security
mechanisms, from tightened physical safety to technical controls on the nuclear
weapons. This fact has been recognized by the international regulatory
authorities and they have acknowledged the efficacy of Pakistan’s
comprehensive command-and-control structure, which has made the country’s
nuclear assets impervious to any internal or external threat.56
The National Assembly separately adopted the Nuclear Export Control Bill
on October 5, 2004 with the purpose of preventing the proliferation of sensitive
technologies in accordance with UNSCR Resolution No. 1540.57 Pakistan also
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prepared the Nuclear Security Action Plan and joined the IAEA’s Illicit
Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) information system, and showed its willingness to
share data on seizures with the Agency.
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
would help promote greater understanding with and shared interests in the region.
For this purpose, Islamabad is strengthening counter-terrorism links with the
neighbouring countries and using its established network of bilateral counter-
terrorism experience to help others detect threats and prevent further terrorist
attacks.
In this context, the international community has only limited influence over
the seemingly intractable tensions between nuclear-armed neighbours whereas, a
stable relationship is important for the success of the war against terrorism.
However, Pakistan has already done a lot and could do more but Pakistan’s
responsibility is confined to ensuring that its territory is not being used by Al-
Qaeda or Taliban against any other country. Let it be absolutely clear that
Pakistan cannot afford to alienate its own people to --- the United States.
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Pakistan is also an active member of NAM which represents the voice and
political and economic interests of the developing world. At the NAM forum,
Pakistan has helped the evolution of consensus on disarmament and arms control
issues and the United Nations reform process. Pakistan is also a member of
SAARC because it provides a useful framework to its eight member states
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka) collectively to promote peace, stability, cooperation, and progress in
South Asia. At all SAARC gatherings, Pakistan has advocated its conviction that
a peaceful and secure environment in the region is indispensable for the
promotion of economic development, progress and prosperity. Pakistan believes
that SAARC would receive a tremendous boost if the underlying causes of
tension are removed. At the 10th SAARC Summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in July
1998, and at the 16th Summit held at Thimphu, Bhutan, in 2010, Pakistan
launched a Peace, Security and Development Initiatives which essentially
underscored the need for promoting a regional process on security and
cooperation.62
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey are the founding members of the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), the successor organization of the Regional
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
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countries. Pakistan believes that the new international order can surely safeguard
world peace and promote common development and human progress in the
world. Furthermore, developing countries have the view that advanced countries
have to rebalance the unbalanced world economic system, especially in Asia and
Africa where debt crisis has badly damaged economies of many countries.
Furthermore, it must be based on equality and mutual benefit of all the peace
loving countries and peoples. Yousaf RazaGilani, former Prime Minister of
Pakistan, explicitly pointed out that ―it is imperative to build a new international
economic order with the aim of putting an end to economic hegemony of some
countries, and the new international economic order should be based on equality
and should meet the needs of the countries with different systems and different
levels of development.‖64
Thus, the new world economic system should meet the fundamental interest
of people of all countries of the world as it is the need of the time and the urgent
desire of all nations. In this regard, Pakistan has played an active role. As a
member and Chairman of Group of 77, Pakistan has supported the Northern-
South dialogue as a means of creating a more just and equitable international
economic order, through joint efforts of the developed and developing nations. In
order to overcome the economic crisis affecting the developing countries, it is
imperative to bring about rationality and equity in international economic
relations, particularly in the international monetary and trade systems and also in
technological and industrial cooperation.
Since joining the United Nations, Pakistan has made constant efforts to
strengthen the UN’s role in safeguarding regional and global peace and
promotion of socio-economic development and human security in the world. The
country is also playing a constructive role in accordance with its commitment to
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
the principles and purposes of the UN charter. Pakistan, like many others
countries, seeks to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the United
Nations and has supported efforts for reform in the UN but also has serious
reservations regarding enlargement of the Security Council.65 Pakistan and a
group of like-minded countries were successful in moving a resolution adopted
through consensus in the UN General Assembly at its 53rd session, which called
for the support of two-thirds of the UN membership for any decision relating to
the expansion and reform of the Security Council.66
After the end of the Cold War, the international system has radically changed
which carries an important consequence for international security. This change
has proved to be a watershed with regard to United Nations because nations have
tended to reorient and redefine the world organization in a new strategic
environment. Many UN members are
demanding restructuring of the United The UCP has logical stand
Nations and asking for a more powerful that permanent
General Assembly as compare to Security
membership for only some
Council. In this regard, Pakistan has the
logical perception that the nature and individual states would
intensity of the new millennium desires deny the opportunity for
reforms in the world body because without equitable representation to
global cooperation, peace and stability other countries of the
would be meaningless. Moreover, the world and the matter can
reforms for UN and for stronger General be resolved through an
Assembly would better serve the interests acceptable formula with
of its members and particularly the increase in non-permanent
interests of the weak and small states. members and rotation can
provide the means for such
However, Pakistan has rejected the
equitable representation
idea of expansion in the UN Security
67
Council and has supported a Uniting for for all the countries.
68
Consensus Group (UCP) that opposes
new permanent members in the UN Security Council. Pakistan also has strongly
advocated expansion in the non-permanent category. The UCP has logical stand
that permanent membership for only some individual states would deny the
opportunity for equitable representation to other countries of the world and the
matter can be resolved through an acceptable formula with increase in non-
permanent members and rotation can provide the means for such equitable
representation for all the countries.69 Such rotation, combined with regional
representation, may also offer possibilities for a fuller representation of member
countries of various groups of states.
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Raza Hayat Hiraj, Pakistan’s Minister of State, has also cleared Pakistan’s
position during the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly on the question
of equitable representation and an increase in membership of the Security
Council. He said, ―Pakistan firmly believes that objectives of reform and
expansion of the Security Council should be to promote greater democracy, and
participation, and transparency, and accountability, in the work of the Security
Council.‖73 Many experts and practitioners believe that there is neither a
comprehensible criterion nor a definitive logic in the UN Charter for permanent
members without veto power in the Security Council, and in the absence of veto
power the addition of permanent members would undermine the leverage of the
non-permanent members to keep the veto power in check.
Conclusion
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Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
In this context, a soft policy has not only significantly reduced the U.S.
pressure but in turn also covered Pakistan’s desperate economic and military
needs by avoiding the country to become a possible victim of global isolation.
The new policy considerably warmed U.S.-Pakistan ties and secured the
country’s economic and strategic interests vis-à-vis sovereignty and territorial
integrity. It appeals, furthermore, to the imperialist rhetoric about Islam and on
the regional front; it has resulted in less friction with neighbouring countries like
India, Afghanistan and Iran. On the global front, the U.S. and Pakistan both are
moving towards greater strategic cooperation against terrorism and both are
engaged to establish durable permanent relations. They are gradually in the
process of taking measures to reduce the level of trust deficit between the two
unequal powers.
It has, in this writer’s view, proved that the change in the foreign policy has
served the security interests of Pakistan because Islamabad is effectively
involved in curbing terrorist threats. Pakistan will continue following the soft
policy option because it has restricted India’s influence in Washington. Pakistan
will also remain a cornerstone of the Western world and strategic interest of the
latter lies in cooperation with Pakistan, not in fanciful attempts to contain it.
However, Pakistan must remember that its political honeymoon with the U.S. is
for short time and not for a blissful long duration.
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7
―Gilani seeks meaningful dialogue on Kashmir‖ The News (Rawalpindi), February 6,
2011.
8
―Kashmir: The Victim of Global War on Terror‖, The Washington Post, February 13,
2011; and see Dawn (Islamabad), February 14, 2002.
9
Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani’s address to the joint session of AJK-LA and
Kashmir Council on February 4, 2011 at Muzaffarabad. Ibid, February 5, 2011.
10
Angel Rabasa, Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, The Lessons of Mumbai
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 1-6.
11
Ramesh Thakur, ―India’s Moves and the Pakistani Puzzl‖, Global Brief, February 18,
2011.
12
See Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s interview with India’s CNN-IBN television
channel on 28 January 2010 and see also Dawn (Islamabad), January 29, 2010.
13
George W. Bush, address to a Joint Session of Congress following 9/11 attacks,
September 20, 2001; see more detail in Washington Post (Washington D.C.),
September 21, 2001.
14
Walter LaFeber, ―The Bush Doctrine,‖ Diplomatic History, vol. 26, no. 4 (2002), pp.
543–58.
15
Ibid.
16
Liam Collins, ―US Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11: A Case Study in
Coercive Diplomacy‖, Washington, DC: Forum of International Diplomacy, 2008, p.
5.
17
John F Burns, ―A Nation Challenged: The Ambassador; U.S. Envoy to Pakistan
Thrust into Limelight,‖ The New York Times (New York), November 24, 2001.
18
See ―Address by the President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf to the nation on
19 September 2001‖; and also see Dawn (Islamabad), September 20, 2001.
19
Barbara Slavin and Bill Nichols, ―US Pressures Pakistan’s leaders to help bring in
bin Laden‖, USA Today, September 14, 2001, p. A4.
20
Liam Collins, ―United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11: A Case
Study in Coercive Diplomacy‖, May 16, 2008, pp. 5-8; and see also Robert G.
Wirsing, ―Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to US Security Policies‖,
Asian Affairs, An American Review (Summer 2003), p. 70.
21
See details in President Pervaz Mushrraf’s address to the nation on 19 September
2001. See Dawn, September 20, 2001; and also see The Nation (Islamabad),
September 20, 2001.
22
Touqir Hussain, ―US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond‖,
Washington: US Institute of Peace, (Autumn 2005), p. 5.
23
Christine Fair, ―The Counter Terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and
India‖, RAND Publication, 2004, p. 15.
24
Ibid, pp. 15-27.
25
Abdul Hafeez Shaikh (Finance Minister of Pakistan) Press Conference, See Dawn
(Islamabad), November 16, 2010.
26
Rahul Bedi, ―Taliban ideology lives on in India‖, Asia Times (Hong Kong),
December 12, 2001.
182
Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
27
Touqir Hussain, ―US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond‖,
Washington: US Institute of Peace, (Autumn 2005), pp. 2-6.
28
See the World Bank Annual Report 2008-2009, ―Survey on Pakistan Economy‖,
Washington, DC: The World Bank Publications, 2010, pp. 34-67.
29
See State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports 1998-1999 and 2000-2001, Islamabad:
State Bank of Pakistan Press, 2000, and 2002, pp, 23-43 and pp. 18-37.
30
See Deccan Herald, February 6, 2011 and also see The Times of India, February 23,
2010.
31
Ibid.
32
―US Special Assistance to Pakistan‖, The New York Times (New York), October 27,
2001.
33
See ―Doubts Engulf an American Aid Plan for Pakistan,‖ Dawn (Islamabad), April
23, 2002; Indian Express (New Delhi), March 28, 2007 and New York Times (New
York), December 25, 2007; ―US Aid Failing to Reach Target,‖ BBC News
(London), May 16, 2008.
34
C. Raja Mohan, ―US military aid to Pakistan: Managing a troubled alliance‖ Indian
Express (New Delhi), March 28, 2007.
35
Susan B. Epstein, ―US Aid to Pakistan After 9/11‖, The New York Times (New
York), February 6, 2011 and see Anwar Iqbal, ―Hillary urges rich Pakistanis to pay
more tax‖, Dawn (Islamabad), February 8, 2011.
36
―Pakistan got $18bn aid from US since 2001‖, See The Times of India (Mumbai),
February 23, 2010.
37
The architects of the Pakistan aid bill — Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Richard
Lugar (R-Ind.) and Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.). See more details The
Washington Post (Washington DC), August 24, 2010.
38
See the Prime Minister’s Speech in the National Defence University, Islamabad, The
News (Rawalpindi), December 13, 2010.
39
Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain,
France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, pp. 11-43.
40
See Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani’s address to the Scientists and
Engineers at Khushab Nuclear Complex on February 19, 2010, and see The Nation
(Islamabad), February 20, 2010.
41
Yousuf Raza Gilani, ―Pakistan to maintain minimum credible deterrence‖, See Daily
Times (Lahore), 3 February 2010 and see also The Hindustan Times (New Delhi),
February 2, 2010.
42
―Statements by Muslim Leaders of the World on September 11, 200 1
Tragedy‖, The New York Times (New York), September 28, 2001; and see
http://www.islam101.com/terror/sept11/index.htm
43
See Shaykh Hamza Yusuf, ―The worst enemies of Islam are from within", Q-News
(Europe’s largest Muslim magazine), June 8, 2010; and see also Seasonsali,
http://seasonsali.blogspot.com
44
―Pakistani soil not to be used by terrorists‖, President Asif Ali Zardari. See Dawn
(Islamabad), September 13, 2008.
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Strategic Studies
45
Hillary Clinton’s (the US Secretary of State) interview to BBC English programme
on February 19, 2010; and see also Daily Times (Lahore), February 18 & 20, 2010.
46
―Pak-US unity to step up the campaign against militants‖, The New York Times (New
York), February 9, 2009.
47
―Gilani urges global community to help Pakistan against terrorism‖, The News
(Rawalpindi), February 16, 2011; and see also Dawn (Islamabad), February 16,
2011.
48
―Pakistan itself a victim of terrorism‖, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Times of India
(Mumbai), June 17, 2009; and see also ―Terrorism is bleeding wound for Pakistan‖,
The Nation (Islamabad), June 18, 2009.
49
―Pakistan cannot stand alone‖, Wall Street Journal (New York), October 26, 2010.
50
―Suicide bombing un-Islamic, only state can declare jihad‖, Fatwa: Muttahida Ulema
Council demands parliament formulate its policy on anti-terror war. See Daily Times
(Lahore), October 16, 2008; and see also The Frontier Post (Lahore), May 7, 2010.
51
Leon T. Hadar, ―Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism: Strategic Ally or
Unreliable Client?‖, Policy Analysis, no. 436 May 8, 2002, pp. 23-29.
52
Two months later, the UN General Assembly approved the Pakistani proposal by a
vote of 82-2, with India and Bhutan voting against it. See The New York Times (New
York), September 18, 1974 and November 21, 1974.
53
Seymour M. Hersh, ―Defending the Arsenal: In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear
warheads be kept safe?‖ The New Yorker (New York), November 16, 2009; Yayan
GH Mulyana, ―Developing nuclear safety and security‖, Maria Sultan, ―Safety and
security of Pakistan's nuclear assets‖, Dawn (Islamabad), October 2, 1997; and
David Sanger, ―So, What About Those Nukes?‖ The New York Times (New York),
November 11, 2007.
54
―Pakistan and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty‖, see IRNA, February 13, 2004; and
also see ―Pakistan blocked negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty‖, The
Nation (Islamabad), February 19, 2011.
55
Jim Walsh, ―Multilateral Non-proliferation Regimes, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Technologies and the War on Terrorism‖, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February
12, 2002, pp. 6-19.
56
See Imran Gardezi, ―Pakistan’s Stabilizing Arsenal‖, Foreign Affairs (July/August
2010).
57
The United Nations Permanent Mission in Pakistan had sent note verbal
S/AC.44/2007/1 to the Chairman United Nations Security Committee regarding
Pakistan's role in prevention of nuclear proliferation and Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The document was to be released on June 3, 2008 while it was released
on August 3, 2010. The UNSC Committee was established pursuant to resolution
1540 (2004) for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and WMDs. See Dawn
(Islamabad), October 6, 2004; October 6, 2004; and June 4, 2008.
58
―UN Report on Arms Control and Disarmament‖, See Dawn (Islamabad), October 9,
2005.
184
Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives in the post-September 11, 2001 era
59
―Pakistan’s position on Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Toxin
Weapons‖, see The News (Rawalpindi), August 11, 2008.
60
Zulfqar Khan, (Visiting Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute-IPRI)
―Pakistan’s Non-Proliferation Policy‖, www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/
Zulfiqar_pakistans_non-proliferation_policy.pdf; and see also more detail in Ken
Berry, ―How Safe Are Pakistan’s Nuclear Facilities?‖ EastWest Institute Policy
Paper 2/2008, February 2008, http://www.ewi.info/pdf/SecurityPakistan.pdf
61
Ramneek Mohan, ―India Must Facilitate Pakistan to Fight against Terrorism‖, Dawn
(Islamabad), July 6, 2009.
62
Address by Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani at the Sixteeth SAARC Summit
at Thimphu (Bhutan), 28 April 2010. See The News (Rawalpindi), 30 April 2010.
63
Rizwan Zeb, ―Pakistan’s Bid for SCO Membership: Prospects and Pitfalls‖, Central
Asia Caucasus Analyst, (July 26, 2006), p. 52.
64
―Pakistan proposed changes in New International Economic Order‖, see Prime
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s speech at the 15the NAM Summit in Sharm el
Sheikh, Egypt in 2009, The Nation (Islamabad), July 16, 2009.
65
Japan, Germany, India and Brazil are aspiring to become the new permanent
members in an expanded UNSC.
66
See Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 53rd session: UN
reform: measures and proposals; strengthening of the UN system A/53/PV.101-
GA/9561- A/53/L.77, June 8, 1999.
67
The Security Council, which is entrusted with maintaining international peace and
security, is composed of 15 members, five veto-wielding permanent members,
Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States, and 10 non-permanent
members that are elected for a two-year term.
68
Uniting for Consensus Group (UCG) is a movement that developed in the 1990
against the opposition of possible expansion of the United Nations Security Council.
The leaders are Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and Argentina. In February 2011, it was
reported that the group’s membership has increased with new member countries such
as Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey.
69
See Munir Akram, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United Nations, addresses to the
UN General Assembly on November 14, 2007; and see details in The Nation
(Islamabad), November 15, 2007.
70
Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Pakistan Ambassador to the UN, in a closed-door session
of the General Assembly mentioned to the committee members. See The Nation
(Islamabad), June 18, 2010.
71
Ibid.
72
See Sixty-fourth UN General Assembly GA/10887 Plenary 45th & 46th Meetings
Report. New York: Department of Public Information News and Media Division
2009, pp. 2-13; and see also ―Pakistan’s Proposal for Security Council Reforms‖,
The Express Tribune (Islamabad), November 12, 2010.
73
Raza Hayat Hiraj, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Information Technology
Parliamentary Affairs, Law, Justice and Human Rights, address to the UN General
Assembly, The Nation (Islamabad), October 18, 2003.
185