6.11 Nibbedhika Pariyaya S A6.63 Piya PDF
6.11 Nibbedhika Pariyaya S A6.63 Piya PDF
6.11 Nibbedhika Pariyaya S A6.63 Piya PDF
1 Sutta highlights
1.1 This popular sutta is often quoted in the Commentaries.1 It is a summary of the whole Teaching as the
Way in six parallel methods, each with six steps: sensual desire, feelings, perceptions, mental influxes,
karma, and suffering —each to be understood by its definition, diversity (of manifestation), result, cessa-
tion and the way to its cessation. It is a sort of extended “noble truth” formula [§13].
In fact, each of analytical schemes of the six defilements (sensual desire, etc) is built on the structure
of the 4 noble truths with the additional factors of “diversity” and of “result.” The Aṅguttara Comment-
ary glosses “diversity” as “various causes” (vemattatā ti nānā,kāraṇaṁ, AA 3:406). In other words, it
serves as an elaboration of the 2nd noble truth, the various internal or subjective causes of dukkha.
“Result” (vipāka), on the other hand, shows the external or objective causes of dukkha.
1.2 The Aṅguttara Commentary takes pariyāya here to mean “cause” (kāraṇa), that is, a means of pene-
trating (that is, destroying) the defilements: “It is called ‘penetrative’ (nibbedhika) because it penetrates
the mass of greed, etc, which had never before been penetrated or cleaved.” (AA 3:223)
The highlight of the exposition is found in these two remarkable lines of the sutta’s only verse:
This essentially means that the real world is not what we think of it: it is our mind that we have to deal
with without blaming the world (as evil, etc). We tend to project our preconceived minds onto the
world. Our daily existence tends to be autopiloted by the shadows of our past or by the mirages of the
future.
1.3 The list of spiritual methods listed here ends with the one dealing with suffering. This last method is
related to the one given in the Upanisā Sutta (S 12.23) that applies the causal method of analysis, or
what I call “the extended pāmojja formula,” thus:2
1
UA 176; DhsA 369 f; etc.
2
For the better known “pāmujja formula,” see (Ānanda) Subha S (D 10,2.14), SD 40a.13 & Bhikkhuṇī Vāsaka S (S
47.10,7/5:156), SD 24.2.
3
“Faith,” saddhā. There are 2 kinds of faith (saddhā): (1) “rootless faith” (amūlaka,saddhā), baseless or irrational
faith, blind faith. (M 2:170); (2) “faith with a good cause” (ākāravati,saddhā), faith founded on seeing (M 47,16/-
1:320,8), SD 35.6; (M 60,4/1:401,23), SD 35.5; also called avecca-p,pasāda (S 12.41,11/2:69), SD 3.3. “Wise faith” is
syn with (2). Amūlaka = “not seen, not heard, not suspected” (V 2:243 3:163 & Comy). Further, see SD 10.4 (2.2).
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
1.4 The Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta closes on a very positive note, dropping a broad hint that we can
work our way out of suffering with a clear mind:
… there is one who although overwhelmed by suffering, his mind overcome by suffering, but is
one who searches outside, asking, ‘Who knows a way or two to end this suffering?’
The result of suffering, bhikshus, is either confusion or search, I say! (A 6.63.13e/3:416)
1.5 Prayudh Payutto, in his Dependent Origination: The Buddhist Law of Conditionality, briefly discusses
the main point of this sutta (1994:94 f).
2.1.1 The key line, kāmā bhikkhave veditabbā [§3] and the term kāmā thereafter, have their difficulties.
The canonical commentary, Mahā Niddesa, says that kāma here may refer to “sensuality as defilement”
(kilesa,kāma) or to “the sensual object or object of desire” (vatthu,kāma),4 that is, either to subjective
sensuality (arising in the mind: kāma-c,chanda, kāma,rāga, etc) or to objective defilement (arising through
any of the 5 physical senses, that is, as the “objects of sensual desires,” kāma,gua) (Nm 2).5 [2.2.1]
2.1.2 Technically, when two or more senses are applicable, we should either use a “pregnant” word (that
covers or suggests all the intended senses) or apply some kind of “amplified translation” that reflects the
polysemy. Or, they should at least be some kind of note informing us of this polysemy or the Pali word’s
difficulty.6
2.2.1.1 The suttas, as noted in the commentaries, such as the Mahā Niddesa (Nm 1 f), uses the word
kāma in at least 2 important senses—as subjective defilement and as objective “external” sense-objects
[2.1.1]. Both these senses are found in the Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) Sutta, but none of them are used poly-
semously, that is, each usage is monosemous (has a single sense). Both usages of kāma are found in “the
kāma verse” [§3.4], where kāmo in line a+c means “desire” as a defilement (kilesa,kāma), but in line b,
4
On kāma as subjective “desire as defilement” (kilesa,kāma) and objective “desire as object” (vatthu,kāma), see
SD 38.4 (3.1.2); SD 41.4 (2.3.1).
5
See SD 32.2 (1.2.2) The 2 kinds of sensuality; also BDict: kāma.
6
On Pali polysemy, see SD 1.1 (4.4.5); SD 10.16 (1.3.1-1.3.2).
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“sensual pleasures” (kāmā) are simply sense-objects (as vatthu,kāma). In the rest of the Sutta (that is, the
prose sections), kāma has the sense of “desire” (as a defilement).
2.2.1.2 The Sutta Nipāta Commentary (the Param’attha Jotika II), in fact, glosses kāma as “objects
of pleasure that are considered to be states (or “things”) that are agreeable, pleasant, beautiful, etc, in
the 3 worlds (the sense-world, the form world and the formless world)” (kāman’ti manāpa,piya,rūp’ādi,-
te.bhūmika,dhamma,saṅkhataṁ vatthu.kāmaṁ, SnA 512,25). Notice here that these states or “things”
are simply said to be enticing, but without specific mention that they are defiling or not. This fact will
become clear and significant as we examine the “kāma verse” in some detail below. [2.2.2]
2.2.2.1 The kāma verse [§3.4] contains the key teaching and also the versification of the prose
teaching of the Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) Sutta [§3.4]. The same verse—without line a—recurs in the Na
Santi Sutta (S 1.34 = S 103).7
While the Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) Sutta teaching elaborates on our own thinking or intention, and
mastering them, the Na Santi Sutta stresses on the nature of the world. Note how each line of the verse
flows naturally from line a into b; line c into d. Finally, line e points to what we should do.
(2) This verse is an example of Pali polysemy [2.1.2], where a word—here kāma—has more than one
sense, all of which apply simultaneously or whose sense depends on the context. The verse plays upon
the double meaning of kāma, stressing that our goodness depends on our mind, and that purity and
liberation is to be achieved by overcoming the defilement of sensuality instead of being overwhelmed
by our clinging to pleasurable objects.11 [2.3]
2.2.2.2 [Line a] “The thought of lust is a person’s desire” (saṅkappa,rāgo purisassa kāmo):
(1) Saṅkappa,raga means “thought or intention” (saṅkappa) of “lust”(rāga). The Aṅguttara Com-
mentary on the Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) Sutta glosses saṅkappa,rāga as “lust arisen by way of thought (or
7
S 1.34/1:22 = S 103 (SD 42.6).
8
S 103 na te.
9
“Diversely beautiful,” citra, has a broad range of meanings: 1 (mfn) (i) bright, bright-coloured, decorated, many-
coloured; extraordinary, wonderful; (ii) variegated, speckled; (iii) various, different, manifold. 2 (n) a kind of bird
(the speckled cuckoo?). 3 (n) (i) something brilliant or diverse or extraordinary; (ii) a painting, a picture. See DP for
details.
10
“So here the wise” (ath’ettha dhīrā’ti atha etesu ārammaṇesu paṇḍitā chanda,rāgaṃ vinayanti, “here then
the wise removes lust and desire in the sense-objects,” SA 1:63). In other words, “here” refers to our minds.
11
See also SD 3.2. (1.2.2.3).
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
intention)” (saṅkappa,vasena uppanna,rāgo) (AA 3:407,5). The Saṁyutta Commentary on the Na Santi
Sutta similarly glosses it as “intentional lust” (saṅkappita,rāga) (SA 1:63,3). The “Ancient Subcomment-
ary” (Porāṇa Ṭīkā) on the Saṁyutta Commentary (Sār’attha-p,pakāsinī) adds it is “lust towards objects
thought about as being beautiful, etc” (subh’ādi,vasena saṅkappita,vatthumhi rāgo, SAṬ:Be 1:106).
(2) Two other verses—Dh 339 and Tha 760—and their commentaries help us to better understand
the significance of the kāma verse [§3.4].
translated as:
(3) Note that Dh 339d = Tha 760d, and that Dh 339c and Tha 760c have the same sense. All the 3
verses centre on craving (taṇhā) in the phrase, saṅkappa,raga … “thoughts caught on lust” (§3.4ac = Dh
339d = Tha 760d), that is, it is our mental that defines the morality or immorality of our deeds. The 36
streams (cha-t,tiṁsati sotā) refer to the 18 “internal” courses of craving (taṇhā,vicarita) and the 18
“external” courses of craving.12 “Internal” (ajjhattik’upādāya) refers to one’s own sense-faculties over the
3 periods of time (past, present, future), and “external” (bāhir’upādāya) refers to those of others over
time.13
(4) The Saṁyutta Commentary summarizes the import of the kāma verse [§3.4] as follows: “Here the
sensual object (vatthu,kāma) is rejected; it is the sensual defilement (kilesa,kāma) that is called sensuality
(kāma)” (evam ettha vatthu,kāmaṁ parikkhipitvā kilesa,kāmo kāmo’ti vutto, SA 1:63,4). This Commentary
then quotes the Pasūra Sutta (Sn 4.8 = 824-834) citing 3 embedded verses (that is, verse not found in the
actual Sutta).14
2.2.2.3 [Line b] “There are no sensual pleasures in the diversely beautiful in the world” (n’ete [S
103, na te] kāmā yāni citrāni loke):
12
DhA 4:48,13-49,11.
13
See D 3:243,14; M 3:32,3, 216,2 f; A 2:212,9 = Vbh 392,20; A 5:52,31; Khp 4.6 (qu at DhsA 46,12); Vbh 79,27.
See Kāma,bhū S 1 (S 41.5/4:292), SD 71.9, where “stream” (sotā) = “craving” (taṇhā). (Vicarita) Taṇhā S (A 4.199/-
2:211 f), SD 16.2, lists the 36 streams in similar structure but in reference to craving arising from self-views, which
are explained in Vibhaṅga (Vbh 392-400).
14
SA 1:63,8-21 ad S; SnA 539,20-24.
15
See DP for details.
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(2) The Aṅguttara Commentary glosses citra as “diverse and exquisite sense-objects” (citrānîti citra,-
vicitr’ārammaṇāni)16 (AA 3:407). Hence, citra refers to the countless possible manifestations of things,
states and events that occur in the external world. It refers to “things,” such as the mountains, rivers, the
sun, the wind; and to the kind of things that we see, hear or notice around us or that we have. There are
“states,” such as other people and beings, how they appear to us, how they feel, and so on. Then, there
are “events” we experience: we see forms, smell odours, taste food, touch tactile objects and feel the air
and so on, and notice thoughts about such states, things and events—which we generally call our “expe-
riences.” That’s all they really are—experiences—until we start to “value-add” them. [2.2.2.4]
2.2.2.4 [line c] “The thought of lust is a person’s desire” (saṅkappa,rāgo purisassa kāmo):
(1) This line is a repetition of line a. Notice that this same line appearing as line a is basically theoret-
ical: it simply tells us about how the Buddha teaches what craving (taṇhā) is—basically, it is a thought.
Here—in line b—the line is repeated. If we are mindful enough, we realize that it is our own thought. It is
no more “theoretical,” but our own experience.
(2) The deeper we understand this, we clearer we see how our sufferings arise, whether as physical
pain or as mental pain. However, real insight only arises when we are able to see and understand how we
are composed and conditioned by the 5 aggregates: form, feeling, perception, formations and conscious-
ness—how we cling to them. We can call this clinging (upādāna) the “will to live,” which is so ingrained
and tenacious in us that we never really know that it is working.
(3) Early Buddhism speaks of a conscious mind, which entails a preconscious dimension,17 that
aspect of the mind which precedes our acts, moralizing it with our intention (cetanā), making them “kar-
mic formations” (saṅkhārā). The opening twin verses of the Dhammapada (Dh 1-2) famously declares
how “the mind” (our intention) is behind all our conscious actions.18 If there is clinging behind our act, it
is effectively unwholesome. “Clinging” here is a shorthand for the 3 unwholesome roots: greed (or lust),
hate and delusion.
2.2.2.5 [Line d] “The diversely beautiful in the world remain just as they are” (tiṭṭhanti citrāni
tath’eva loke):
(1) As we have noted [2.2.2.3(2)], citra refers to “diverse and exquisite sense-objects.” This refers to
our experience of the “external” world in a non-technical (that is, general) sense. It is helpful to distin-
guish here two kinds of “external” objects: physical objects and mental objects. The unawakened person,
as a rule, sees only “mental images” (ārammaṇa) or “formations” (saṅkhārā) of the physical world.
(2) In the case of the Buddha and the arhats, their minds, too, “form” images of the physical world.
However, such a formation (abstract singular saṅkhāra) is a kind of “photo-perfect” vision of what is
really out there. In other words, unlike the unawakened (who tend to project their preconstructed
images onto the world outside), the arhats see things as they really are. Hence, the arhats do not cling to
any sense-objects, since they know them to be impermanent, unsatisfactory and without any essence
(non-self).
16
In the suttas, ārammaṇa has a non-technical or general sense of “support” (Sn 945c, 506c, 1069c), or “basis”
for rebirth (Sn 474c), for consciousness (S 2:65,16 f; 3:53,21+25, 55,16 +21). In Abhidhamma, later works and
comys, it tends to be a tt for “sense-object” (Vbh 319,18 f, 332,20) or “meditation object” (Vism 3.102, 23.10).
17
On the preconscious, see SD 17.8b esp (1.1.2; 2.2); SD 7.10 (3.3).
18
See 8.3 (3).
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
(3) The arhats, including the Buddha, are able to respond wholesomely towards any kind of sense-
stimuli (including mental stimuli, that is, thoughts) because they are overcome all self-views, which
means that they are free from craving and clinging. They experience a sense-object on the body level,
just the way we do. Such experiences, as it were, remains on the body level without affecting the arhat’s
mind, as explained in the Sall’atthena Sutta (S 36.6).19
The arhat’s mind is lust-free; hence, he is without desire for anything, even “the diversely beautiful in
the world.” He is the true renunciant” he has removed all desire for the world, and has left the world
where it is. He may be in the world—for our benefit—but he is no more of the world. He does not identi-
fy himself with the world (atam,mayatā).20
In short, the arhats only enjoy the objects (vatthu,kāma) without any defiling desires (kilesa,kāma).
2.2.2.6 [Line e] “So here the wise remove desire (for them)” (ath’ettha dhīrā vinayanti chandan’ti):
(1) The Commentary, explaining the phrase “so here the wise,” says, “Here then the wise removes
lust and desire in the sense-objects” (ath’ettha dhīrā’ti atha etesu ārammaṇesu paṇḍitā chanda,rāgaṃ
vinayanti, SA 1:63). In other words, “here” refers to “in the mind.” The problem is not with the world—
“there are no sensual pleasures in the diversely beautiful in the world,” it is our mind that is filled with
desire: “The thought of lust is a person’s desire.” Hence, we need to remove desire for the world.
(2) Now that we have examined all the lines of the “kāma verse,” we can better understand what its
preceding prose line—one of the most enigmatic statements in the early canon—means, when the Bud-
dha declares: “These are not sensual objects, but in the noble discipline, they are called ‘the cords of
sensual pleasures.” [§3.3]
In the suttas, sense-objects (kāmā) are called “the cords of sensual pleasure” (kāma,guṇa) because
we make them so in our minds. We “desire” (kāmeti) them; we accumulate them: we make a “pile” and
proliferation (guṇa) of them—so that they become a “cord” (guṇa) that binds and plays with us. When
the enemy is named, it is known—we are in a better position to defend, strengthen and free ourselves.21
— — —
19
S 36.6,7-11 (SD 5.5); SD 48.9 (6.2.5); SD 51.14 (3.2.3).
20
See Atam,mayatā, SD 19.13.
21
See Kāma,guṇa S (S 45.176/5:60). Further see Mine: The nature of craving, SD 19.3 (1.2).
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A 6.2.1.9 Aṅguttara Nikāya 6, Chakka Nipāta 2, Dutiya Paṇṇāsaka 1, Mahā Vagga 9
Synopsis
2 “And what, bhikshus, is this Dharma exposition on penetrating insight?
22
See n on §3.
23
“Origin,” nidāna,sambhavo. I follow Comy: nidānam eva sambhavo (AA 3:406).
24
See UA 176; DhsA 369 = DhsA:PR 292; Abhs:SR 476.
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
Sensual desires
3 (1) Sensual desires (kāmā),25 bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of sensual desires should be known.
The diversity of sensual desires should be known.
The result of sensual desires [411] should be known.
The cessation of sensual desires should be known.
The way to the cessation of sensual desires should be known.
—so it is said, but in what connection is this said?
25
“Sensual desires,” kāmā. The Pali reads: Kāmā bhikkhave veditabbā. On the difficulty of tr kāma here, see (2).
26
Cakkhu,viññeyyā rūpā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piya,rūpā kāmûpasaṁhitā rajanīyā. The usual tr we see have the
disjunctive “that are” before “desirable” throughout, implying that only “desirable, etc” sense-objects are meant.
However, when the adjs iṭṭhā, etc, follow the noun rather than precede it in all the 6 sentences, they function as a
nexus (connector), ie, they qualify the respective nouns, and emphasizing them: see A K Warder, Introduction to
Pali, 2nd ed, 1974:61. This tr also refutes the wrong view that in dhyana (said to be “detached from sensual pleas-
ures,” vivicc’eva kāmehi, D 22,21/2:313 f, M 141,31/3:252), “neutral feelings” still remain. This view is curious be-
cause it is clear that in the 1st dhyana, there are “zest and joy” (pīti,sukha), which make it impossible for any neu-
tral feeling to be felt at that time: see Mahā Nidāna S (D 15), which says that only one feeling (pleasant, painful, or
neutral) is experienced at a time (D 15,28/2:66), SD 5.17. (I thank Sylvester LAM Cheng Poh of Singapore for draw-
ing my attention to this interesting point.)
27
Api ca kho bhikkhave n’ete kāmā, kāma,guā nam’ete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti. This is an enigmatic statement
whose meaning is clarified in the verse that follows; see foll n. The apparent confusion in terminology is only appar-
ent when we understand the nature of polysemy of Pali terms [2.1.2]: SD 1.1 (4.4.5); SD 10.16 (1.3.1-1.3.2). On the
“cords of sensual desire” (kāma,guṇa), see Kāma,guṇa S (S 35.117), SD 88.6, & Kāma-c,chanda, SD 32.2 (2.3).
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3.428
Saṅkappa,rāgo purisassa kāmo The thought of lust29 is a person’s desire:30
n’ete kāmā yāni citrāni loke there are no sensual pleasures in the diversely beautiful31 in the world.
saṅkappa,rāgo purisassa kāmo The thought of lust is a person’s desire.
tiṭṭhanti citrāni tath’eva loke The diversely beautiful32 in the world remain just as they are.
ath’ettha dhīrā vinayanti chandan’ti So here33 the wise remove desire (for them).34 [2.2.2]
4.3 And what, bhikshus, is the result of sensual desires (kāmānaṁ vipāko)?
Bhikshus, one having sensual desires is reborn as an individual into this or that existence depending
on what constitutes merit or on what constitutes demerit.36
—This, bhikshus, is called the result of sensual desires.
28
This verse recurs as S 104 in Na Santi S (S 1.34,6/1:22), SD 42.6, except for line a which is omitted and which
reads na te for n’ete). The A 6.63 verse is qu at Kvu 370; NmA 1:12. Comys however qu the verse S 104: SA 1:632,
which attr it to comy on Pasūra S, Sn 830 (or one of its verses): SnA 2:539; AA 2:41. Cf Tha 674.
29
On saṅkappa,rāga, “thought of lust” or “lustful intention,” see (2.2.2.4).
30
Saṅkappa,rāgo purisassa kāmo. Be Ce Ee Se all give the same 5-line stanza. It recurs in Na Santi S (S 1.34), SD
42.6 without line a. Here [§3.4] the stress is in our own thinking or intention, while in S 1.34, it is on the nature of
the world. Note how line a flows into b, and line c into d. Line e points to what should be done.
31
“Diversely beautiful,” citra [2.2.2.3].
32
Note that “the diversely beautiful” (citrāni) is plural.
33
“So here the wise” (ath’ettha dhīrā’ti atha etesu ārammaṇesu paṇḍitā chanda,rāgaṃ vinayanti, “here then
the wise removes lust and desire in the sense-objects,” SA 1:63). In other words, “here” refers to our minds.
34
On the verse’s significance, see (2.2.2.1(2)).
35
“Contact,” phassa. Comy: “Contact arisen simultaneously” (sahajāta,phasso) (AA 3:406), ie, the coming toget-
her of consciousness and the sense-object through the sense-faculty: the “triangle of experience” or “perceptual
triad.”
36
Yaṁ kho bhikkhave kāmayamāno [vl kamaṁ vediyamāno] tajjaṁ tajjaṁ attabhāvaṁ abhinibbatteti puñña,-
bhāgiyaṁ vā apuñña,bhāgiyaṁ vā.
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right livelihood,
right effort,
right concentration,
right mindfulness.
4.5 Bhikshus, when the noble disciple knows sensual desires thus,
when he knows the source for the arising of sensual desires thus,
when he knows the diversity of sensual desires thus,
when he knows the result of sensual desires thus,
when he knows the cessation of sensual desires thus,
when he knows the way to the cessation of sensual desires thus,
that noble disciple knows this holy life of penetrating insight37 as the cessation of sensual desires.38
4.6 Sensual desires, bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of sensual desires should be known;
The diversity of sensual desires should be known;
The result of sensual desires should be known;
The cessation of sensual desires should be known;
The way to the cessation of sensual desires should be known.
—So it is said: it is in this connection that this is said.
Feelings
5 (2) Feelings (vedanā), bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of feelings should be known.
The diversity of feelings should be known.
The result of feelings should be known.
The cessation of feelings should be known.
The way to the cessation of feelings should be known.
—So it is said, but in what connection is this said?
37
“Holy life of penetrating insight,” nibbedhikhaṁ brahmacāriyaṁ. Comy: The holy life here is the supramun-
dane path (streamwinning, etc).
38
“Cessation of sensual desires,” kāma,nirodha.
39
“Neutral feelings,” ie, feelings that are neither painful or pleasurable. “Feeling” (vedanā) here has the sense of
“experience,” as when we say “I feel good” or “I feel nothing.” As such it makes sense here to say “neutral feeling.”
On how ignorance arises from neutral feelings, see Sall’atthena S (S 36.6,8.5), SD 5.5.
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40
Cf the feelings as defined in Satipaṭṭhāna S (M 10,32/1:59), SD 13.3.
41
S’āmisaṁ sukhaṁ vedanaṁ. S’āmisa = sa-āmisa, “sensual,” lit “with flesh” thus connoting some sense of the
carnal, ie, connected to the pleasures of the 5 senses (kāma,guṇā) (S 4:235, 236).
42
Nirāmisaṁ sukhaṁ vedanaṁ. Here nirāmisa means “non-sensual,” “non-carnal” or “spiritual,” which accord-
ing to Comy refers to the 6 joyful feelings connected with the sense-doors, but not dependent on sense-desire (MA
1:279). In Saḷ’āyatana,vibhaṅga S (M 137), s’āmisa and nirāmisa refer to the household life and to the renounced
life respectively. Elsewhere, as in Suddhika Nirāmisa S (S 36.29), nirāmisa pīti, nirāmisa sukha and nirāmisā upek-
khā are experienced in the dhyanas (S 36.29,8-15/4:236 f). See D 2:298; M 1:59; S 4:235, 236 (x2); A 1:81, 3:412;
Pm 2:233. See also Sue Hamilton, Identity and Experience, 1996:43 f.
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Perception
7 (3) Perception (saññā), bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of perceptions should be known;
The diversity of perceptions should be known;
The result of perceptions should be known;
The cessation of perceptions should be known;
The way to the cessation of perceptions should be known.
—So it is said, but in what connection is this said?
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Mental influxes
9 (4) The mental influxes (āsava), bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of mental influxes should be known;
The diversity of mental influxes should be known;
The result of mental influxes should be known;
The cessation of mental influxes should be known;
The way to the cessation of mental influxes should be known.
—So it is said, but in what connection is this said?
9.2 Bhikshus, there are these 3 kinds of mental influxes:43
The mental influxes of sensuality. kām’āsava
The mental influxes of existence. bhav’āsava
The mental influxes of ignorance. avijj’āsava
10 And what, bhikshus, is the source for the arising of mental influxes?
Ignorance, bhikshus, is the source for the arising of mental influxes.44
43
“Three kinds of mental influxes” (D 33/3:216; M 2/1:55, 9/3:41; S 4:256=5:56=189; A 3.59/3:414, 67, 6.63; Vbh
347). A later formula adds a fourth mental influx, that of “view” (diṭṭh’āsava) as the 3rd influx (V 3:5; D 2:81 = 84; A
1:241; Vbh 373). The 4 mental influxes are also known as “floods” (ogha, D 3:230; UA 362) and as “yokes” (yoga, D
3:230, 276; A 2:10).
44
Sammā,diṭṭhi S (M 9) says that mental influxes (incl ignorance) are the cause of ignorance (M 9,67/ 1:54), and
ignorance is the cause of mental influxes (M 9.70/1:55). Comy explains that this conditioning of ignorance by
ignorance should be understood to mean that the ignorance in any existence is conditioned by the existence in the
preceding existence. “Having shown this, (it follows that) no point of ignorance can be discovered, and as such this
cyclic existence (saṁsāra) has no discernible beginning.” (MA 1:224). See Ñāṇamoli (tr) 1991:22, 67.
45
U Comy gives this as an example of influxes in terms of the 5 realms, summarized thus: (1) karmic defilement
(kamma,kilesa) (Pāsādika S, D 29,22; Pāda Doṇa S, A 4.36,4); (2) defilements present and of future states (V 3:21,-
19); (3) sense-desires, existence and ignorance (Ti Āsava S, S 38.8); (4) Abhidhamma: these 2 + views [below]; (5)
conducive to the 5 realms (Nibbedhika (Pariyāya) S, A 6.63,10.2); (6) to be abandoned through the 6 sense-
restraints (Chakka Āsava S, A 6.58); (7) abandoned in 7 ways (Sabb’āsava S, M 2,4). (UA 176 f).
46
Pitti,visāya, also tr as “realm of the departed. See Jāṇussoṇī S (A 10.177), SD 2.6
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
10.5 Bhikshus, when the noble disciple knows mental influxes thus,
when he knows the source for the arising of mental influxes thus,
when he knows the diversity of mental influxes thus,
when he knows the result of mental influxes thus,
when he knows the cessation of mental influxes thus,
when he knows the way to the cessation of mental influxes thus,
that noble disciple knows this holy life of penetrating insight as the cessation of mental influxes. [415]
Karma
11 (5) Karma (kamma), bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of karma should be known;
The diversity of karma should be known;
The result of karma should be known;
The cessation of karma should be known;
The way to the cessation of karma should be known.
—So it is said, but in what connection is this said?
11.2 Bhikshus, intention is karma, I say! Having intended, one creates karma through the body,
through speech, and through the mind.47
47
As at Kvu 392. This famous statement is often misunderstood. “The Buddha’s utterance does not establish a
mathematical equivalence between cetanā and kamma, such that every instance of volition must be considered
kamma. As the second part of his statement shows, his words mean that cetanā is the decisive factor in action,
that which motivates action and confers upon action the ethical significance intrinsic to the idea of kamma. This
implies that the ethical evaluation of a deed is to be based on the cetanā from which it springs, so that a deed has
no kammic efficacy apart from the cetanā to which it gives expression. The statement does not imply that cetanā
(in the non-arahant) is always and invariably kamma.” (Bodhi 1998:§23/p25 digital ed). Cf Cetanā Ss 1-3 (S 12.38/-
2:65-67), SD 7.6abc.
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48
I’ve taken “karma” as an uncountable noun here. Alt tr: “karmic acts.”
49
“That would be experienced,” vedanīyaṁ¸ participle of fut passive of vidati or vindati, “he knows” (DPL), but
better, foll PED, as vediyati, “he feels, experiences” (S 4:114; A 1:249, 4:382).
50
“3 kinds of karmic results,” see (Kamma) Nidāna S (A 3.33/1:134-136) on causes and kinds of karma. See Mahā
Kamma Vibhaṅga S (M 136.17-21) tr in Sutta Discovery series 2004. See also Visuddhi,magga where these 3 types
of karma are respectively named as diṭṭha,dhamma vedanīya kamma, upapajja,vedanīya kamma and apara,pariyā-
ya vedanīya kamma—and a fourth, ahosi kamma, lapsed or ineffectual karma (Vism 19.14/601). The first two kinds
of karma may be without karmic result if the circumstances required for their ripening are missing, or because of
the presence of a stronger counteractive karma; as such, they are called ahosi,kamma: cf Loṇa,phala S (A 3.99/-
1:249-253), SD 3.5. See Vism:Ñ 19.14/696 n2.
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SD 6.11 A 6.63/3:410-416 • Nibbedhika Pariyāya Sutta
Suffering
13 (6) Suffering (dukkha), bhikshus, should be known;
The source for the arising of suffering should be known;
The diversity of suffering should be known;
The result of suffering should be known;
The cessation of suffering should be known;
The way to the cessation of suffering should be known.
13.2 —So it is said, but in what connection is this said?
Birth is suffering,
decay51 is suffering,
disease is suffering,52
death is suffering;
grief, lamentation, physical pain, mental pain and despair are suffering;
to be with the unpleasant is suffering;
to be without the pleasant is suffering;
not to get what one desires is suffering;
—in short, the 5 aggregates of clinging53 are suffering.
13.3 And what, bhikshus, is the source for the arising of suffering?
Craving (taṇhā), bhikshus is the source for the arising of suffering.
51
jarā, old age, aging.
52
Only here & in the Vinaya version; not mentioned in Comys.
53
pañc’upadāna-k,khandha, namely, form, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness (S 3:47; Vbh 1).
54
Cf Comy which notes that “the eternalist view” (sassata dassana) is of little fault but slow to fade away (appa,-
sāvajjaṁ dandha,virāgaṁ) (MA 3:206).
55
Cf Comy which notes that “the annihilationist view” (uccheda dassana) is of great fault but quick to fade away
(mahā,sāvajjaṁ khippa,virāgaṁ) (MA 3:206).
56
This is clearly an allusion to Kisā Gotamī and her dead child: SD 43.2d.
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— evaṁ —
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