Foundations of Mechanics

D.

c Hestenes 1998. (Originally published as Chapter 9 in the first edition of New Foundations for
Classical Mechanics, 1986.)

Foundations of Mechanics

Now that we have become familiar with the content and applications of mechanics, we are prepared
to examine its conceptual foundations systematically. This calls for an explicit formulation and
analysis of all presuppositions of the theory. It goes beyond a mere statement of Newton’s laws to
an analysis of the status of laws in a theory and nature of scientific theories in general. This kind
of study belongs to the philosophy of science, but it is no mere academic exercise. The profound
revolutions in physics due to Newton and Emstein were changes in the conceptual foundations
resulting from careful analysis. So it takes a study of foundations to fully understand the evolution
of physics, or, if the facts demand, to instigate a new revolution. Improvements in the foundations
are truly revolutionary, because they are so rare and their repercussions are so extensive, bearing
on every application of the theory.
Newton’s original formulation of mechanics nearly 300 years ago is followed with little change in
most mechanics books even today. Nevertheless, it is not entirely satisfactory for several reasons.
First, it is incomplete in the sense that not all major assumptions of the theory are explicitly
spelled out. Second, in the last century Newtonian theory has undergone profound modifications
and extensions which should be taken into account. To begin with, Einstein’s Theory of Relativity
has revolutionized the scientific concepts of space and time. We now know that any adequate
formulation of space and time has empirical content with testable consequences. So a clear and
explicit formulation of these concepts is scientifically as essential to Newtonian mechanics as it is to
relativity theory. Pedagogically, it is needed to help students distinguish between their own vague
intuitions of space and time and an objective scientific formulation of these concepts. Fortunately,
the formulation can be designed so a small change in the concept of simultaneity generates a smooth
transition from Newtonian mechanics to relativistic mechanics.
Another big change in mechanics since Newton has been brought about by the development of the
field concept. Even introductory physics courses move rapidly from interactions between particles
to interactions of particles with electric and magnetic fields. We need a formulation of Newton’s
laws which readily accomodates this profound theoretical change. We need to provide for a smooth
transition from pure particle mechanics to the classical theory of fields and particles.
A modern formulation of mechanics should also incorporate profound changes in the concept of
a theory which have evolved since Newton. Today it is widely recognized that physics is concerned
with constructing and testing mathematical models of physical systems. Thus, the concept of a
mathematical model is central to the modern conception of a scientific theory. Yet physics textbooks
scarcely mention models, let alone explain that mathematical modeling is the essential core of the
scientific method.
2 Foundations of Mechanics
1. Models and Theories

Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our
eyes – I mean the Universe – but we cannot understand it if we do
not first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is
written. This book is written in the mathematical language, and the
symbols are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without
whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without
which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth.∗
— Galileo Galilei
This magnificent passage is the capstone of Galileo’s great intellectual achievements. It is the first
incisive formulation of a philosophical viewpoint which played a crucial role in the development of
modern science. This viewpoint has been so thoroughly assimilated into modern science that most
scientists take it for granted without recognizing that a profound issue is involved. On the other
hand, it is still debated endlessly in philosophical circles, where it is called scientific realism. The
importance that Galileo himself attached to the above passage is clear from his order that it be
placed at the head of his collected works.
Scientific realism must be distinguished from the naive realism of common sense. The presumption
common to all forms of realism is that a “real world” of things exists independently of any person
to observe them. According to common sense, things in the real world are just as we see them;
they are known to us directly through experience, provided the senses are operating properly so the
view is not distorted. But, as Galileo puts it, scientific realism holds that the real world is known
only indirectly; it is merely posed to us through the senses as a cipher, so to know real things we
must decode the messages of experience. Moreover, the code can be broken only by recognizing
that geometrical properties of things are primary, and we can know them only conceptually by
representing them mathematically.
Galileo’s profound scientific realism evolved from long contemplation and a variety of astute
observations. Throughout his writings Galileo was occupied with an analysis of experience to
distinguish the “primary properties” essential to real objects from “secondary properties” which
depend on the mode of human sensation. The analysis was continued by Descartes and Boyle
among others, and it was a crucial preliminary to Newton’s definitive formulation of mechanics in
the Principia, from which all reference to secondary properties was banished. This decisive step
severed psychology cleanly from physics, enabling physics to progress without being distracted by
the complexities of subjective experience. It is the basis today for such distinctions as between the
perceived color of light (a secondary property) and the frequency of light (a primary property),
or the pitch of a tone and its frequency. The properties ascribed to objects by physics, such as
mass, velocity, force and frequency, are very different from the directly perceived properties of
things. Physical properties are primary properties which can be represented as quantities. Thus,
the distinction between primary and secondary properties was a crucial preliminary to developing
a mathematical theory of the real world.
In this chapter we adopt a modern version of scientific realism, which holds that objective knowl-
edge about the real world is obtained by developing validated mathematical models to represent
real objects. Scientific realism maintains a sharp distinction between a physical thing and its model,
between the real world of physical things and the mental world of concepts. One should realize,
however, that this dualism is only methodological. It by no means requires that the physical and
mental worlds exist independently of one another. It is entirely compatible with an explanation of
mental phenomena in terms of physical brain states. Indeed, the distinction between primary and
∗
Translation from p. 67 of E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science,
Routledge and Kegen Paul LTD, London (1932). Burtt gives a historical account of the origins of
scientific realism.
Models and Theories 3
secondary properties opens the possibility of explaining secondary properties in terms of primary
properties. But this is an issue for neuropsychology to investigate. What matters here is that sci-
entific realism holds that a clear distinction between physical things and their models can be made
and must be maintained against the contrary tendencies of natural language which is infected with
naive realism.
Scientific realism has been vigorously challenged recently by physicists and philosophers who hold
that it is incompatible with quantum mechanics. They claim that quantum mechanics does not
allow a sharp separation between the state of a real object and an observer’s knowledge of that
state. We cannot get involved in that debate here. Suffice it to say that the issue has not been
resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned physicists. Without further apology, in this chapter we
strive for a sharply formulated theory of scientific knowledge from the viewpoint of scientific realism.
Models
The term “model” is often used in the scientific literature with only a vague meaning. To sharpen
the concept of model, we need terminology which expresses clear distinctions and specifications. We
assume that a model is a conceptual representation of a real object. The represented object is said
to be a referent of the model. A model may have more than one referent. For example, a model
of the hydrogen atom has all hydrogen atoms for referents, while a model of the solar system has
a single referent. The set of all referents of a model is called its reference class. If its reference
class is empty. a model is said to be fictitious. An assignment of a particular referent or reference
class to a given model is called a factual interpretation of the model, or a physical interpretation if
the model belongs to physics. A single model may be given many different factual interpretations,
especially in a mature science like physics. For example, the one-dimensional harmonic oscillator
may be interpreted as a model for such diverse objects as an elastic solid, a pendulum, a diatomic
molecule or an atom.
We are concerned here with mathematical models, though much of our discussion applies more
generally. A mathematical model has four components:
(1) A set of names for the object and agents that interact with it, as well as for any parts of the
object represented in the model.
(2) A set ot descriptive variables (or descriptors) representing properties of the object.
(3) Equations of the model, describing its structure and time evolution.
(4) An interpretation relating the descriptive variables to properties of objects in the reference class
of the model.
Each of these components needs some explication.

Numerals are often used as object names; thus, we may speak of “particle 1” and “particle 2.”
Descriptive variables are functions of the object names, since each descriptor represents a property
of a particular object. For example, the velocity descriptor vk for the kth object in a system is an
explicit function of the object name k. Often, however, the dependence of descriptors on object
name is tacitly understood, as when we write v for the velocity of some object.
There are three types of descriptors: object variables, state variables and interaction variables.
Object variables represent intrinsic properties of the object. For example, mass and charge
are object variables for a material particle, while moment of inertia and specifications of size and
shape are object variables for a rigid body. The object variables have fixed values for a particular
object, but they have different values for different objects, so they are indeed variables from a general
modeling perspective.
State variables represent intrinsic properties with values which may vary with time. For exam-
ple, position and velocity are state variables for a particle. A descriptor regarded as a state variable
in one model may be regarded as an object variable in another model. Mass, for example, is a state
variable in a model that allows it to change, though it is usually constant in particle models. Thus,
object variables can be regarded as state variables with constant values.
An interaction variable represents the interaction of some external object (called an agent)
with the object being modeled. The basic interaction variable in mechanics is the force vector;
work, potential energy and torque are alternative interaction variables.
Different kinds of property can be distinguished by characteristics of their representations as
descriptive variables. A property is said to be quantitative if it can be represented by mathemat-
ical quantities, such as elements of the Geometric Algebra. Otherwise it is said to be qualitative.
Physics is concerned with a particular set of quantitative properties called physical properties. The
corresponding descriptors are called physical variables or physical quantities. The equations of a
mathematical model describe relations among quantitative properties. Equations determining the
time evolution of the state variables are called dynamical equations, or equations of motion in me-
chanics. In a mature scientific theory, the equations are derived from laws of the theory. Otherwise,
they must be assumed as hypotheses subject to verification.
It is common practice in the literature to say that a particular dynamical equation constitutes
a mathematical model. This should be recognized as a loose use of language, for an equation
represents nothing unless its variables are given factual interpretations.
The interpretation of a model is specified by a set of attribute functions for its properties. The
set of objects with a given property is called the scope or reference class of that property. The
attribute function for a property assigns particular values of the descriptive variable to objects in its
reference class. When specific numerical values are assigned to certain variables, these variables are
said to be instantiated. As examples of instantiation in particle mechanics, we have the assignment
of a particular mass to a particle or particular initial conditions for its trajectory.
When, for specific instantiations, the equations of a model are sufficient to determine specific
values for all its descriptors, the model is said to be a specific model. A specific model can thus
describe a particular object under particular circumstances.
Theory
Evidently we have tacitly employed a theory of some sort in specifying the general characteristics of
a model. A vaguely defined theory of this sort is frequently called Systems Theory in the scientific
literature; although it is seldom formulated in the generality we need here. We may regard Systems
Theory as a theory of theories, or more specifically, a general theory of mathematical models. Thus,
Systems Theory specifies the characteristics of models common to all scientific theories. Consider,
for example, the distinction between state variables and interaction variables in a model. That
distinction was first sharply drawn in mechanics. But, as other theories developed, many people
noticed that the distinction has a wider significance if the concepts of state and interaction are
suitably generalized. Based on this distinction, Systems Theory goes on to describe how complex
objects can be modeled as systems of interacting parts. Thus, it provides a general theory of
structure and composition of objects of any kind. This too is a generalization of concepts developed
in physics. A complete development of Systems Theory will not be attempted here. However, the
general characterization of a scientific theory, to which we now turn, may be regarded as part of
Systems Theory.
A scientific theory can be regarded as a system of design principles for modeling real
objects. The theory consists of:
I. A framework of generic and specific laws charcterizing the descriptive variables of the theory.
II. A semantic base of correspondence rules relating the descriptive variables to properties of
real objects.
III. A superstructure of definitions, conventions and theorems to facilitate modeling in a variety
of situations.
Models and Theories 5
The mathematical language used to formulate a theory is usually taken for granted. However, it
should be recognized that most of the mathematics used in physics was developed to meet the theo-
retical needs of physics. In Chapter 1 of NFCM, we saw that this is true of the real number system
and its generalization to Geometric Algebra. Moreover, differential equations were first invented
to formulate dynamical laws of physics. The moral is that the symbolic calculus (mathematics)
employed by a scientific theory should be tailored to the theory, not the other way around.
The key concept in a scientific theory is the concept of a scientific law, so it should be explicated
carefully. A scientfic law is a relation or system of relations among descriptive variables presumed
to represent an objective relation or pattern among the corresponding properties. If the relation is
among physical variables, it is called a physical law. Most physical laws are formulated as math-
ematical equations. Scientific realism maintains that it is important to distinguish between a law
and the objective pattern it represents, because the latter is an unchanging property of the real
world while the former may be changed when we understand the world better. Moreover, a law
may be true or false or approximately true, but the property pattern it is presumed to represent
just “is”. To qualify as a law, a relation among descriptive variables must represent a property
which is universal in the sense that its scope is not limited to a finite number of objects, and it
must be corroborated in some empirical domain by scientific methods. A proposed law which has
not been experimentally tested and confirmed is called a hypothesis. Thus, a law is a corroborated
hypothesis.
There are several types of law. The generic laws of a theory define the basic descriptive variables
of the theory. The generic laws of Classical Mechanics fall into two groups: (a) The Zeroth Law,
which defines the concepts of position, motion and composition of bodies, and (b) Dynamical Laws
(Newton’s Laws), which implicitly define the concepts of mass and force. The Zeroth Law is so
general that it belongs to every physical theory; indeed, it is presumed (tacitly at least) in every
scientific theory. The Dynamical Laws apply only to material objects. In Sections 2 and 3, these
laws will be formulated and discussed in detail.
The specific laws of a theory specify relations among the descriptive variables defined by the
generic laws. As a rule they apply only to special circumstances, whereas the generic laws are
presumed to hold in every application of the theory. The specific laws of Classical Mechanics are
interaction laws such as Coulomb’s Law, Newton’s Law of Gravitation and Stokes’ Law of fluid
friction.
Taking the Zeroth Law for granted, the other basic laws of any scientific theory can be classified
into dynamical laws, which determine the time evolution of state variables, and interaction laws,
which interrelate the state variables of different objects.
The basic laws of a theory are included in the theory by assumption. The superstructure of the
theory also contains derived laws, such Galileo’s law of falling bodies. As a rule, the scope of a basic
law is much wider than the scope of a derived law.
We must be clear about what it means to say that concepts like motion and mass are defined
by generic laws. All sorts of unnecessary difficulties are caused by a sloppy or inadequate concept
of definition, so it will be worth our while to explicate the concept. The purpose of a definition is
to establish the meaning of a concept (or the term (symbol) which designates it) by specifying its
relation to other concepts (terms). When this has been done, we say that the concept (term) is
well-defined. There are two ways to do it, yielding two kinds of definition: explicit and implicit.
A concept is defined explicitly by expressing it in terms of other concepts. This is the conventional
notion of definition, used, for example, in defining the kinetic energy K by the equation K = mv 2 /2.
A concept (term) is defined implicitly by a set of axioms which relate to it other concepts (terms).
Thus, the concept of “point” is defined by the axioms of geometry which specify its relations to other
points, lines and planes. Similarly the concept of “vector” is defined implicitly by specifying how
to add and multiply vectors. In each case axioms define concepts by specifying relations. Axioms
are set apart from other statements or equations by accepting them as definitions, so they need not
be proved. Nevertheless, terms like “point” and “vector” introduced by axioms are commonly said
to be “undefined terms.” This is a misleading expression that ought to be discarded. Novices often
interpret it in the sense of “ill-defined” or “obscure.” At least they find it unnecessarily mysterious.
Evidently it conflicts with established usage of the term “well-defined.” It would be better to say that
“some terms in a theory must be defined implicitly” rather than “some terms must be undefined.”
Generic laws are axioms defining basic descriptive variables. Our definition of model might have
given the impression that descriptive variables can be defined independently of any laws. But why
are descriptive variables scalar- or vector-valued, that is what makes them quantitative? It will
be seen that this is a consequence of the Zeroth Law, which introduces geometrical attributes into
every physical theory. The generic laws of space and time are usually taken for granted, so they are
seldom mentioned in the formulation of a model. They are essential, nevertheless. A variable which
is undefined by laws is completely nondescript; it is no more than a name. To be definite concepts,
descriptive variables must be well-defined by laws.
Newton’s Laws are sometimes called axioms. That invites confusion between the purely mathe-
matical concept of an axiom and the factual concept of a law. A law is an axiom, but the converse
is not true. A physical law is an axiom with a physical interpretation.
The correspondence rules of a theory determine factual interpretations for its descriptive variables
and laws, and so for models designed with it. They include operational procedures for measure-
ment, that is, the assignment of particular values for the descriptors of particular objects. Thus,
they determine attribute functions relating descriptors to the properties they represent. The corre-
spondence rules are not independent of physical laws; rather they are specified in accordance with
the laws. For example, any operational procedure for measuring length must be consistent with
the Euclidean properties of physical space, as specified by the Zeroth Law. Moreover, the laws of
physics often enable us to measure the same physical quantity in many different ways, so the results
of measurement must be independent of the particular procedure employed.
A correspondence rule for measuring a physical quantity is often called an “operational definition.”
But this is an abuse of language, confusing the concepts of definition and measurement A definition,
whether explicit or implicit, relates concepts to concepts, not concepts to things. Mario Bunge has
suggested that the term “operational definition” be replaced by “operational referition,” since it is
concerned with the semantic concept of reference; it relates a descriptor (a concept) to its referents
(things).
The set of real objects which can be modeled with a theory is called the reference class of the
theory. The reference class of Classical Mechanics is enormous. The set of all material bodies. Yet
the generic laws of Mechanics model a very small number of properties. The theory asserts that
these are properties that all bodies have in common, so we call them basic properties. The fact
that the generic laws describe only basic properties does not mean that other properties cannot be
described by the theory. A composite body has new properties not possessed by its parts which
emerge when it is assembled. They are called emergent properties. This challenges theory to
explain emergent properties in terms of basic properties. Indeed, it challenges physicists to explain
all physical properties of matter—geometrical, mechanical, electrical, thermodynamic, optical—in
terms of a small number of basic properties. This grand challenge has long been a major motivation
for research.
The emergent geometrical properties of size and shape can be explained in terms of basic prop-
erties by the Zeroth Law, which incorporates the physical content of Greek geometry. Geometry
can be regarded as the theory of size and shape. This may be obvious, but it is far from trivial, as
witnessed by the whole field of architectural design. The Kinetic Theory of Gases is a subtheory
of Mechanics which explains temperature as an emergent property. The problem of explaining all
thermodynamic properties as emergent from physical properties of molecules is so complex that a
separate theory, Statistical Mechanics, has been developed to handle it. More specialized theories
like Plasma Physics, Solid State Physics and Theoretical Chemistry are also concerned with explain-
ing emergent properties. All these theories are founded on Classical Mechanics as well as Quantum
Mechanics.
The Zeroth Law of Physics 7
Having discussed the general features of models and theories, let us turn now to a formulation of
generic laws for Classical Mechanics.
2. The Zeroth Law of Physics
Everyone has well-developed notions of space and time abstracted from personal experience. Per-
ceptual categories of space and time are essential for sorting out sensory data. However, perceptual
space and time must sharply be distinguished from the concepts of physical space and time. The
former is a modus operandi of the human brain — the proper study of psychology, psychophysics and
neuroscience. It provides an intuitive base for the physical concepts. But the concepts of physical
space and time are objective rather than intuitive. Intuitive concepts are subjective, which is to
say that they vary from person to person; whereas objective concepts are the same for everyone.
Objectivity is achieved in science by providing concepts with explicit mathematical definitions and
factual interpretations in terms of rules which might be applied by anyone, or by a computer for
that matter. Of course, everyone’s conception of space and time combines intuitive and objective
components. But only the objective component will concern us here.
Objective concepts evolve with changes in their definitions and interpretations. Since Newton’s
day two major improvements in the concepts of space and time have evolved which should be
incorporated into the foundations of mechanics. First, we have learned to distinguish between
mathematical and physical geometries. Scientific realism regards physical geometry as a feature of
the real world which we model with a mathematical geometry. Thus, our model geometries should
be subjected to empirical tests. In Newton’s day no one had conceived of an alternative to Euclidean
geometry or the idea of testing it, though, of course, it had been subjected to many crude informal
tests when employed in architectural design and construction. Alternatives to Euclidean geometry
were first conceived by mathematicians in the nineteenth century, but none was incorporated into
a viable physical theory until Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity in the twentieth century.
We shall formulate a Euclidean model of physical geometry, since that is appropriate for classical
mechanics. But we aim to do it in a way which makes its “physical content” explicit, and allows for
easy generalization to “relativistic theories.”
The second major improvement in concepts of space and time is due mainly to Einstein. He
recognized that the concept of distant simultaneity is an essential part of the time concept which
had not previously been explicitly defined in classical physics. Rather, physicists had unwittingly
adopted an implicit concept of simultaneity which was inconsistent with ideas of causality and
experimental fact. By supplying an appropriate definition of distant simultaneity and analyzing its
consequences, Einstein created his Special Theory of Relativity. Thus, the Special Theory is best
regarded as a completion of classical physics with a full elucidation of the time concept.
The change instituted by Einstein in the classical time concept appears to be comparatively
small, but its consequences are immense. It implies that space and time are relative concepts which
cannot be defined independently of one another and do not correspond to unique features of the real
world. It implies that the real physical geometry is a non-Euclidean geometry of a 4-dimensional
entity space-time, with respect to which the separate concepts of space and time only describe the
viewpoint of a particular observer. Thus, a small change in the time concept has profoundly altered
the physicists’ conception of reality.
The Special Theory of Relativity is discussed in the second edition of NFCM. Here we will
be content with preparing the way for a smooth transition to the modern spacetime concept by
elucidating the classical concepts of space and time. We begin with the concept of space.
The problem of providing the concept of space with a precise mathematical formulation has been
solved to nearly everyone’s satisfaction. But physicists are still far from agreement on the physical
status of space. Is space a thing or a property of things? Or is it a property of the human mind,
a “category of the understanding,” as the philosopher Immanual Kant proposed? Every kind of
answer can be found in the literature. This attests to widespread confusion about the conceptual
foundations of physics. Confusion is perpetuated by an outmoded concept of space which infects our
natural language. Thus, we speak of physical objects in space as if space were a container with an
existence independent of its contents. The literature shows that physicists are not immune to this
infection, but a cure can be achieved by a careful conceptual analysis. The source of the infection is
easy to identify. The natural language was developed to describe features of perceptual experience,
which it can do with remarkable fidelity. The brain does, indeed, contain a sensorium, a carrier of
perceptions which exists independently of its contents. This is reflected in perceptual experience
and so in the natural language. Thus, a cure for confusion about the nature of space begins with a
clear distinction between the perceptual space of subjective experience and the objective concept of
physical space. The complete cure requires a rigorous formulation of the physical concept in perfect
accord with experimental practice.
To ascertain a suitable physical interpretation for the concept of space, we must examine the role
of geometry in experimental practice. We note that every measurement of distance determines a
relation between two objects. Every measurement of position determines a relation between one
object and some other object or system of objects. In accordance with the standpoint of scientific
realism, we regard such measured relations as representations of real properties of real objects.
These are mutual (or shared) properties relating one object to another. We call them geometrical
properties. We are now prepared for an explicit formulation of physical space as a system of relations
among physical objects.
To begin with, we recognize two kinds of objects, particles and bodies which are composed of
particles. Given a body R called a reference frame, each particle has a geometrical property called
its position with respect to R. We characterize this property indirectly by introducing the concept of
Position Space, or Relative Space, if you prefer. For each reference frame R, a position space
P is defined by the following postulates:
A. P is a 3-dimensional Euclidean space.
B. The position (with respect to R) of any particle can be represented as a point in P.
The first postulate specifies the mathematical structure of a position space while the second postu-
late supplies it with a physical interpretation. Thus, the postulates define a physical law, for the
mathematical structure implies geometrical relations among the positions of distinct particles. Let
us call it the Law of Spatial Order.
Notice that this law asserts that every particle has a property called position and it specifies
properties of this property. But it does not tell us how to measure position. Measurement is
a separate matter, since it entails correspondence rules as well as laws. In actual practice the
reference frame is often fictitious, though it is related indirectly to a physical body. Our discussion
is simplified by feigning that the reference frame is always a real body.
We turn now to the problem of formulating the scientific concept of time. We begin with the
idea that time is a measure of motion, and motion is change of position with respect to a given
reference frame. The concept of time embraces two distinct relations: temporal order and distant
simultaneity. To keep this clear we introduce each relation with a separate postulate.
First we formulate the Law of Temporal Order:
The motion of any particle with respect to a given reference frame can be repre-
sented as an orbit in position space.
This postulate has a semantic component as well as a mathematical one. It presumes that each
particle has a property called motion and attributes a mathematical structure to that property
by associating it with an orbit in position space. Recall that an orbit is a continuous, oriented
curve. Thus, a particle’s orbit in position space represents an ordered sequence of positions. We
call this order a temporal order, so we have attributed a distinct temporal order to the motion of
The Zeroth Law of Physics 9
each particle.
To define a physical time scale as a measure of motion, we select a moving particle which we call
a particle clock. We refer to each successive position of this particle as an instant. We define the
time interval ∆t between two instants by
∆s = c∆t ,
where c is a positive numerical constant and ∆s is the arclength of the clock’s orbit between the
two instants. Our measure of time is thus related to the measure of distance in position space.
To use this time scale as a measure for the motions of other particles, we need to relate the
motions of particles at different places. The necessary relation can be introduced by postulating the
Law of Simultaneity:
At every instant, each particle has a unique position.
This postulate determines a correspondence between the points on the orbit of any particle and
points on the orbit of a clock. Therefore, every particle orbit can be parametrized by a time
parameter defined on the orbit of a particle clock.
Note that this postulate does not tell us how to determine the position of a given particle at any
instant. That is a problem for the theory of measurement.
So far our laws permit orbits which are nondifferentiable at isolated points or even at every point.
These possibilities will be eliminated by Newton’s laws which require differentiable orbits. We
include in the class of allowable orbits, orbits which consist of a single point during some interval.
A particle with such an orbit is said to be at rest with respect to the given reference frame during
that interval. Of course, we require that the particles composing the reference frame itself be at
rest with respect to each other, so the reference frame can be regarded as a rigid body.
Note that the speed of a particle is just a comparison of the particle’s displacement to the dis-
placement of a particle clock. The speed of the particle clock has the constant value c = ∆s/∆t,
so the clock moves uniformly by definition. In principle, we can use any moving particle as a clock,
but the dynamical laws we introduce later suggest a preferred choice. It is sometimes asserted that
a periodic process is needed to define a clock. But any moving particle automatically defines a
periodic process, because it moves successively over spatial intervals of equal length. It should be
evident that any real clock can be accurately modeled as a particle clock. By regarding the particle
clock as the fundamental kind of clock, we make clear in the foundations of physics that the scientific
concept of time is based on an objective comparison of motions.
We now have definite formulations of space and time, so we can define a reference system as a
representation x for the possible position of any particle at each time t in some time interval. Each
reference system presumes the selection of a particular reference frame and particle clock, so x is to
be interpreted as a point in the position space of that frame. Also, a reference system presumes the
selection of a particular origin for time and space and particular choices for the units of distance and
time, so each position and time is assigned a definite numerical value. The term “reference system”
is sometimes construed as a system of procedures for constructing a numerical representation of
space and time.
After we have formulated our dynamical laws, it will be clear that certain reference systems
called inertial systems have a special status. Then it will be necessary to supplement our Law of
Simultaneity with a postulate that relates simultaneous events in different inertial systems. That
is the critical postulate that distinguishes Newtonian theory from Special Relativity, but we defer
discussion of it until we are prepared to handle it completely. It is mentioned now, because our
formulation of space and time will not be complete until such a postulate is made.
It is convenient to summarize and generalize our postulates with a single law statement, the
Zeroth (or Spatiotemporal ) Law of Physics:
Every real object has a continuous history in space and time.

To explicate this law, we assert that it has four major components:

1. The Law of Spatial Order.
2. The Law of Temporal Order.
3. The Law of Simultaneity.
4. The Generic Law of Composition.
The Generic Law of Composition asserts:
The properties of any real object can be represented mathematically by the values
of a state function defined on the position and time variables of a given reference
system.
A Specific Law of Composition imposes some condition on the nature of the state function for a
particular object or class of objects. The successive values of the state function as a function of
time describes the history of the object. The Zeroth Law does not specify the history of any object;
dynamical laws determining the state function are needed for that. But it does assert that every
object has a history.
In classical physics, every model of a real object is one of three kinds: particle, body or field. Each
model is distinguished by a particular state function. We have already specified the state function
for a particle, namely, the function x = x(t) for its orbit in position space. A material particle
also has a property called mass, so a complete state function must specify any time variation of the
mass.
A body is an extended object, which is to say that more than one point in Position Space is required
to specify its location. We have modeled bodies as systems of particles. In this case, the location
of a body is the set of positions of its particles, and its history is the set of particle histories.
Alternatively, a material body (or material medium) can be modeled as a spatially continuous object
which does not have a unique decomposition into particles.
A field is also an extended object, but its state function as well as its physical interpretation is
quite different from that of a body. Let us note here that the Classical Theory of Fields asserts the
existence of real objects called electric fields, each of which can be represented by a vector-valued
state function E(x, t). The Zeroth Law applies to Quantum Mechanics as well as classical physics,
but the state functions for particles are different.
The Zeroth Law is the most universal of all scientific laws. It asserts that every real thing that
ever existed or will exist has definite spatiotemporal properties, that is, definite spatiotemporal
relations to every other real thing. Some aspect of the Zeroth Law is presumed in every scientific
theory and investigation.
Other scientists can take the Zeroth Law for granted, but physicists are responsible for refining
its formulation and testing its consequences. The present formulation has been designed for com-
patibility with the Special Theory of Relativity, and it can be directly generalized to the “curved
spacetime” of the General Theory of Relativity. The mathematical structure attributed to space
and time in our formulation is widely accepted by physicists, but the physical interpretation is con-
troversial. We have adopted a relational view, interpreting space and time as a system of relations
among real objects. But some physicists prefer a material view, interpreting spacetime as a primal
material out of which all things are composed, so that objects can be regarded as local variations
in the properties of spacetime. Thus, the material view interchanges the objects and properties of
the relational view. Is there a definite empirical distinction between these two interpretations so we
can decide on one over the other? That is a profound question which will not be easily answered.
At least both interpretations are consistent with scientific realism.
Generic Laws and Principles of Particle Mechanics 11
3. Generic Laws and Principles of Particle Mechanics
The spatiotemporal properties of real objects are described by the Zeroth Law. To produce a
complete physical theory, the Zeroth Law must be supplemented by a set of dynamical laws which
describe the nature and effect of interactions between objects. In Particle Mechanics the interaction
property is represented by force functions. A set of generic laws implicitly define the concepts of
mass and force and assign them a physical interpretation. To produce a specific model of interacting
particles, the generic laws must be supplemented by specific force laws which specify definite force
functions.
Our formulation of the general theory consists of four generic laws, one hypothesis and three
generic principles. Let us present them all at once, and then comment on each one separately. Of
course, our formulation presumes the Zeroth Law, so the notions of particle, time, position, velocity
and acceleration are all well-defined. In addition, the formulation is presumed to hold only for a
certain kind of reference system called an inertial system, which is implicitly defined by the First
Law. Now we are ready.
First Law (Law of Inertia):
In an inertial system, every free particle has a constant velocity. A particle is said to
be free if the total force on it vanishes.
Second Law (Law of Causality)

The total force exerted on a particle by other objects at any specified time can be
represented by a vector f such that
f = ma ,
where a is the particle’s acceleration and m is a positive scalar constant called the mass of the
particle.
Third Law (Law of Reciprocity):

To the force exerted by any object on a particle there corresponds an equal and
opposite force exerted by the particle on that object.
Fourth Law (Superposition Law):
The total force f due to several objects acting simultaneously on a particle is equal
to the vector sum of the forces fk due to each object acting independently, that is

f= fk .
k
To relate formulations of the laws in different inertial systems, we adopt the

Hypothesis of Absolute Simultaneity:
Local events which are simultaneous in one inertial system are simultaneous in every inertial
system.
A local event is defined as a change in the position or velocity of a particle.
Specific force laws need not be regarded as part of the general theory. However, they are restricted
in form by generic principles. The principles function as laws when force functions are unknown.
In particular, they sharpen the general concept of force defined by the generic laws. However, when
we have specific force laws that satisfy the principles, the principles are superfluous. For this reason
we do not call them laws. In Section 3-1 we introduced The Principle of Analyticity. Two other
principles are important:
The Principle of Local Interaction:
The force on a particle at any time is a unique function of particle position and position time
derivatives; it is independent of the particle’s past or future history.
The Principle of Relativity:
The laws of mechanics have the same functional form in all inertial systems.
Comments on the First Law

The First Law implicitly defines a time scale for an inertial system. For it requires that displacements
of the system’s particle clock are proportional to displacements of a free particle. This amounts to
requiring that equal intervals of time be defined by equal displacements of a free particle. Thus,
the motion of a free particle determines the time scale for an inertial system up to a multiplicative
constant. This fundamental kind of scale is called an inertial time scale.
Besides determining a time scale, the First Law associates straight lines in an inertial system
with free particle motion. So within an inertial system, the deviation of any particle from uniform
motion in a straight line can be attributed to the action of other objects in accordance with the
Second Law. The First Law defines an inertial system implicitly by specifying a physically-grounded
criterion which distinguishes it from noninertial reference systems. It tells us that an inertial frame
can be identified in principle by examining the motion of free particles. In practice, such a procedure
is usually impossible. For inertial frames do not occur naturally, so most measurements are done
with respect to an accelerated reference frame. And free particles are not usually available for
experiments either. Such practical difficulties should not be construed as casting doubt on the
utility of the First Law. Rather, they pose the experimentalist with the problem of distinguishing
real forces, due to the interaction of objects, from pseudoforces, due to the acceleration of his
reference frame. He needs the First Law to make such a distinction, but he needs the other Laws
as well.
The First Law is evidently not independent of the other Laws, because they are needed to define
what is meant by “free particles.”
Comments on the Second Law

The formula f = ma by itself is frequently presented as a complete statement of the Second Law.
Although such a formula is an acceptable mathematical axiom, a law statement should include a
physical interpretation of the mathematical terms it employs. Of course, an interpretation for f
could be supplied by a separate postulate, but it is best included in the Second Law since that is
where f first appears in the theory.
Thus, our formulation asserts that f represents a physical property called “force” which a particle
shares with other objects. The vector f itself is commonly referred to as “the force on a particle,”
so f serves also as a name for the property it represents. The term “objects” in our law statement
is presumed to be defined previously by the Laws of Composition as part of the Zeroth Law. As
said before, we recognize three kinds of objects: particles, bodies and fields, and this reduces to
two basic kinds if bodies are modeled as systems of particles. To produce a pure particle theory,
one need only replace the word object with the word particle in all our law statements. But our
formulation generalizes particle theory by allowing interactions with fields. Indeed, in a pure field
theory particles never interact directly, but only through the intermediary of a field. In that case the
term “object” in our law statements should always be interpreted as “field,” and we need additional
laws to fully describe the properties of fields.
It is often claimed that f = ma is a definition of force. On the contrary, an explicit definition
of force is impossible. Rather, the complete set of generic laws is required to define f implicitly
by specifying the common characteristics of all forces. The equation f = ma represents only one
characteristic of force. It relates the general property of interaction to the general spatiotemporal
property of motion. The f represents the action of the universe on a particle while the ma represents
the particle’s response with a change in its state of motion. This provides us with a physical
interpretation of mass as a measure of the strength of a particle’s response to a given force. No
other definition or interpretation of mass is needed in the theory.
Comments on the Third Law

For two interacting particles, the Third Law can be written
f12 = −f21 ,
where f12 is the force of particle 2 on particle 1. This is called the weak form on the Third law in
Section 6-1 of NFCM. One readily verifies that this relation is satisfied by Newton’s gravitational
force law and the similar Law of Coulomb. However, it fails for direct magnetic interactions between
charged particles (see Exercise 5).
This failure of the Third Law for a force law of such great physical importance raises a serious
problem of determining precisely under what conditions the Third Law can be expected to hold and
what is responsible for its failure. The problem is best addressed by considering the Third Law in
a different form. For a 2-particle system, the Second Law gives us
dp1 dp2
= f12 and = −f21 ,
dt dt
where p1 and p1 are momenta of the particles. So the Third Law can be written
dp1
= −f21 .
dt
Thus, the Third Law can be interpreted as a Law of Momentum Exchange. Hence a failure of the
Third Law would be a failure of momentum conservation. Today, physicists regard the Law of
Momentum Conservation as more fundamental than Newton’s Laws because it holds in Quantum
Mechanics as well as Classical Mechanics with no known exception. Any apparent violation of
momentum conservation prompts the question: “What happened to the missing momentum?” On
several occasions attempts to answer this question have led to the discovery of new physical objects,
of which the elementary particle called the neutrino is a spectacular example.
Classical Field Theory accounts for the apparent failure of magnetic interactions to satisfy momen-
tum conservation by attributing momentum to the electromagnetic field. We are not prepared for
a quantitative discussion of this matter using Field Theory, so we must be content with qualitative
remarks. Electromagnetic Field Theory allows a particle to interact only with fields at the position
of the particle. This extends our stated Principle of Local Interaction to include field variables.
It precludes the possibility of instantaneous interparticle interactions except as an approximation.
Rather, the interaction between particles is indirect with the field as intermediary. It proceeds by a
transfer of momentum from one particle to the field; then the field transports some of the momentum
at the speed of light to the position of the second particle where it can be transferred from field to
particle, while the rest of the momentum may travel freely as electromagnetic radiation. The point
to be made here is that the Third Law is completely consistent with Field Theory if we extend the
Principle of Local Interaction and interpret the “object” in the law statement as a field. Physicists
do not ordinarily speak of “a force exerted by a particle on a field” as in the law statement. But this
just means “rate of momentum transfer from particle to field,” which is a conventional expression.
For a unified view of physics, particle mechanics should be regarded as an approximation to

Classical Field Theory. In this approximation, then, the Third Law can be applied to particles
acting instantaneously at a distance, as in Newton’s theory of gravitation.
Comments on the Fourth Law
This Law is sometimes regarded as part of the Second Law, but it deserves an independent formu-
lation to emphasize its importance. It helps us “divide and conquer” in mechanics by allowing us to
decompose complex forces into simpler parts for separate analysis, just as the Law of Composition
allows us to decompose extended bodies into particles. Conversely. it allows us to lump a great
many forces into a single force to be analyzed as a unit. In a word, the Third and Fourth Laws are
the main mathematical tools for assembling and disassembling interactions.
Comments on Absolute Simultaneity
The Hypothesis of Absolute Simultaneity is best regarded as a supplement to the First Law. It
implies that an inertial time scale set up in one inertial system can be employed in any other inertial
system, so one time scale suffices for all inertial systems. This is equivalent to Newton’s assumption
that there exists a unique absolute time variable that can be employed in any reference system.
Absolute simultaneity is called a hypothesis rather than a law here, because it is now known to be
empirically false, though it is approximately true in a large empirical domain. Explicit formulation
of this hypothesis, which is implicit in Newtonian theory, shows us exactly where Relativity differs
from Classical Mechanics. Einstein replaced absolute simultaneity with the
Law of Light Propagation:

The speed of light is constant with all inertial systems.
With this law we can use an idealized light pulse or photon to construct a model particle clock, a
photon clock. The photon clock establishes an inertial time scale which is the same for all inertial
systems and uniquely relates the time scale to the distance scale. Moreover, the Law of Simul-
taneity which we introduced as part of the Zeroth Law can now be reduced to a mere definition
of simultaneity. All this leads to a conceptual fusion of space and time into a unified concept of
spacetime. The mathematical formulation and analysis of these ideas using geometric algebra will be
developed in the second edition of NFCM. It should be mentioned here that the Light Propagation
Law requires a small but significant alteration of the Second Law because it modifies the concept
of time. But no other changes in the laws are needed to give us relativistic mechanics.
Comments on the Local Interaction Principle
The Principle of Local Interaction is implicit in every treatment of mechanics, yet it has not been
singled out peviously as a postulate of the general theory. It is essential if we are to conclude
from the generic laws that specific forces determine definite differential equations for particle orbits.
And our aim is to formulate the general presumptions of mechanics as explicitly and completely as
possible.
Our formulation of Local Interaction allows the force to be a function of time derivatives of the
position vector to any order. As a rule, the velocity is the only time derivative to appear in a
specific force law. But there is an exception of great theoretical importance, namely, the radiative
reaction force due to the reaction of electromagnetic radiation on a particle emitting it. This force
law depends on the third time derivative of position. However, this is not the place to study it.
We have already noted the close relation of Local Interaction to the Third Law. In a pure particle
theory we can combine these postulates to draw conclusions about the functional form of the two
particle force. Thus, for a force that depends only on position and velocity we find
f12 = f [x1 (f ), v1 , (t), x2 (f ), v2 , (t)] = −f [x2 (f ), v2 , (t), x1 (f ), v1 , (t)] . (4.1)
The Relativity Principle restricts the function form still further. This significantly restricts the force
laws to be considered in a pure particle theory.
Comments on the Relativity Principle

The effect of a change in reference system on the equations of motion for a particle is discussed
in Section 5-5 of NFCM. Here we will merely comment on its general theoretical implications in
accordance with the Relativity Principle. We saw that the most general transformation of position
vectors relating one inertial system to another has the form
x → x = R† (x + a + u(t + t0 ))R , (4.2)
where R is a unitary spinor and a, u and t are constants. This transformation is a composite of
a space translation, a Galilean transformation, a time translation and a rigid rotation. It maps a
particle orbit x = x(t) onto an orbit x = x (t ) = x (t + t0 ). Differentiation therefore gives the
general velocity addition theorem
ẋ → ẋ = R† (ẋ + u)R . (4.3)
Another differentiation gives us the transformation of the Causality Law,
.. ..
x = f → mx = f , (4.4)
showing that its form is unchanged, as required by the Relativity Principle, provided the force
undergoes the induced transformation
f → f = R† f R . (4.5)
The Relativity Principle requires more, however. It requires that the functional form of the force
law must be preserved by the transformation (4.2). In particular, the two particle force law (4.1)
must be of the more restricted form
f12 = f [x1 − x2 , ẋ1 − ẋ2 ] ; (4.6)
it must depend only on the relative position x1 − x2 to be form invariant under translations,
and on the relative velocity ẋ1 − ẋ2 to be invariant under Galilean transformations. Moreover,
invariance under time translations implies that f cannot be an explicit function of time. To be even
more specific, if f12 is an algebraic function of x1 − x2 and ẋ1 − ẋ2 , then (4.5) is automatically a
consequence of (4.2) and (4.3). This is, indeed, characteristic of the most fundamental force laws
we have considered.
Clearly the Relativity Principle is an important modeling principle. It tells us that our models
should be independent of our chosen (inertial) reference system, so interactions should be functions
only of relative positions and velocities. We have interpreted the transformation (4.2) as a passive
change in descriptive variables without altering the state of motion of any object. Alternatively, for
t0 = 0, we can regard (4.2) as a change in description due to an active rigid displacement and boost
in velocity of a single reference body (or frame). If our models are to be unaffected by such a shift
of the reference body, as required by the Relativity Principle, we conclude that the reference body
must not be interacting with real objects. In other words, the reference body must be regarded
theoretically as fictitious. Of course, real objects are needed as reference bodies in experiments. So
the Relativity Principle serves as a guide to the idealizations required for a theoretical description
of experiments.
Another profound implication of the Relativity Principle is found by interpreting (4.2) as a trans-
formation with respect to a single reference system. The transformation (4.2) maps any orbit
x = x(t) onto an orbit x = x (t + t0 ) at a different time and place. According to the Relativity
Principle, these orbits describe physically equivalent (or congruent) processes. Thus, the Relativity
Principle can be regarded as a general congruence law, providing a precise criterion for the equiva-
lence of different physical processes at different places and times. This makes it possible to compare
results of different experiments performed at different places and times. Thus, the Relativity Prin-
ciple provides a theoretical basis for the reproducibility and predictability of physical results.
It should be noted that the Relativity Principle is a semantic principle, because it is concerned
with the interpretation of descriptive variables, that is, with the relation of models to their referents.
It is appropriate to regard the Relativity Principle as a “congruence law,” because it describes an
equivalence relation under rigid transformations in space and time, so it generalizes the notion of
congruence from elementary geometry. This geometrical character of the Relativity Principle shows
that it should be grouped together with the Zeroth and First Laws. These three laws together
determine the model of space and time used in classical mechanics, and they must all be modified
to characterize the model of space-time proposed in Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.
Comments on the Theoretical Structure of Mechanics
We have completed our formulation of the generic laws and principles of Particle Mechanics. These
laws and principles compose an axiom system from which all results of the theory can, in principle,
be derived as theorems. We say “in principle” because no one has bothered to develop the theory
as an orderly system of theorems and proofs based on well-defined axioms. A major reason for
this has been the lack of a complete and appropriate set of axioms. Under the influence of recent
mathematical fashion, some authors have developed axiomatic formulations of mechanics using set
theory. But set theory is not the right mathematical tool, because it is too general. Consequently,
theorems and proofs in this approach are inordinately unwieldy. Geometric algebra is a better tool,
because it was designed for the geometrical job. And our formulation of the axioms conforms well
to physical practice.
Of course, we have already derived the results of major interest in mechanics in an informal way,
so there is no point to embarking on a formal development here. However, it is worth pointing
out that formalization of mechanics should have some advantages. It can be expected to clarify
the structure of the theory, eliminate unnecessary redundancy and make results more accessible for
applications. On the other hand, it must be recognized that the organization of mechanics should
be dictated by physical rather than mathematical considerations. For the purpose of theory is to
make specific models.
4. Modeling Processes
Scientific knowledge is of two kinds, factual and procedural. The factual knowledge consists of
theories, models, and empirical data interpreted (to some degree) by models in accordance with
theory. A theory is to be regarded as factual, rather than hypothetical, because the laws of the
theory have been corroborated, though theories differ in range of application and corroboration.
The procedural knowledge of science consists of strategies, tactics and techniques for developing,
validating, and utilizing factual knowledge. It is commonly referred to under the rubric of scientific
method . The structure of factual knowledge has been explicated in our general discussion of models
and theories and our detailed analysis of classical mechanics. Our aim in this section is to explicate
the structure of procedural scientific knowledge. The subject is complex, so we cannot hope to
Modeling Processes 17
produce much more than an outline. We will do well to identify organizing principles which give
the subject some coherence.
The key to an explication of scientific method is recognizing that the central activity of scientists
is the development and validation of mathematical models. Thus we need to analyze the processes of
mathematical modeling. We can distinguish two types of modeling process: model development and
model deployment. The first is concerned primarily with theoretical aspects of modeling, while the
second is concerned with empirical aspects. Theoretical and empirical aspects are often interrelated,
so the distinction between development and deployment is a matter of emphasis rather than sharp
separation. Let us proceed to a discussion of each process in turn.
Model Development
A model is a surrogate object; it depicts or portrays a real object by representing its properties.
The properties of a real object are known only through their representation in a model; they are
never experienced directly. Moreover, our knowledge of any real object is always incomplete. Every
model is an idealization or partial representation of its referent, which is to say that some but not
all properties are represented in the model. Nevertheless, physicists strive to construct complete
models of the most elementary constituents of matter, such as electrons. (These are the only objects
that might be simple enough to model in all detail — but that is pure speculation).
Deliberate idealization is a method of simplification. A model which fails to represent known prop-
erties of its referent is often useful when those properties are regarded as irrelevant or uninteresting.
Thus, we model the Earth as a particle when concerned with its motion in the solar system.
The method of deliberate idealization generalizes to the method of successive refinements, which
is one of the major modeling strategies in science. Beginning with a simple model, a sequence of
increasingly complex models is constructed by successively incorporating additional attributes to
represent the object with increasing detail. Thus, the simple particle model of the Earth is refined by
modeling it as a rigid body to describe its rotation, further refined by modeling it as an elastic solid
to account for the effects of tidal forces; then it may be assigned a model atmosphere and molten
core to account for its thermal properties. The modeling is never finished, as any geophysicist or
climatologist can attest.
The process of developing a mathematical model can be analyzed into four essential stages: (I)
Description, (II) Formulation, (III) Ramification, and (IV) Validation. The stages are implemented
consecutively, though backtracking to revise the results of an earlier stage is not uncommon. The
entire model development process is outlined schematically in Figure 4.1 to indicate the kind of
information processing in each stage. The figure can be regarded as the outline of a modeling
strategy as well as a description of the modeling process. Moreover, it can be regarded as a problem
solving strategy, since, by and large, physics problems are solved by developing models.
The modeling strategy outlined in Figure 4.1 is sufficiently general to apply to any branch of
physics, indeed, to any branch of science. Therefore it can be regarded as a general scientific
method. However, the implementation of each stage in a particular model is theory-specific, that is,
the tactical details in modeling vary from theory to theory. To understand how the strategy applies
to mechanics, we need to elaborate on the details of each modeling stage.
(I) The Description Stage begins with a choice of objects and properties to be modeled. The
theory to be used in modeling depends on the kinds of property to be modeled — physical, chemical
or biological, for example. When an appropriate theory has been chosen, the theory provides a
system of principles which constrain and direct the modeling process.
Object description is the first step in modeling. The object description begins with a decision on
the type of model to be developed. For example, a given solid object could be modeled either as
a material particle, or as a rigid body. Mechanics provides subtheories to facilitate the modeling
of objects of each type. Complex objects are modeled as composite systems of interacting parts,
for example, a system of particles or rigid bodies. In that case, the object description must specify
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
I Description Stage
..
Object Description
Type
. Composition
Object Variables
..
Process Description
Reference System
State Variables
..
Interaction Description
Type and Agent
Interaction Variables
II Formulation Stage
Dynamical Laws Interaction Laws
.. Model Object
Descriptive Variables
.. Equations of Change
Equations of Constraint
Boundary Conditions
III Ramification Stage
..
Ramified Model
Emergent Properties
Processes
IV Validation Stage
Figure 4.1.
the composition of the system and the model type of each part. Each part can then be modeled
separately, and the model for the whole system is determined by the way the interacting parts are
assembled.
In a process description the state variables of the model are specified. The state variables may
be either basic or derived. Basic variables are defined implicitly by the generic laws (including the
Zeroth Law). Derived variables must be defined explicitly in terms of basic variables. In mechanics,
position and velocity are basic variables, while momentum, kinetic energy and angular momentum
are derived variables. A process description necessarily employs the Zeroth Law, so some reference
system must be adopted, even if it is not mentioned explicitly.
A process is defined as the time evolution of some set of state variables. Motion is the basic
process in mechanics. The energy conservation law makes it convenient, sometimes, to consider the
process of energy flow independently of the objects processing the energy. In such a case, one is
modeling a process rather than an object. A process model omits reference to objects underlying the
process.
Graphical or diagrammatic methods are often useful in a process description. As a rule, only a
qualitative graph of the process can be made in the description stage of modeling; although a few
points, such as initial and final states may be specified completely. A quantitative graph is usually
possible in the ramification stage of modeling.
An interaction description specifies the interaction type and agent for all interactions in the model,
along with appropriate interaction variables, basic or derived. This includes internal interactions
among the parts of a composite system, as well as interactions with external agents. The interaction
description must be coordinated with the process description; a consistent set of variables must be
chosen, and any changes in interactions between different stages of the process must be indicated.
In mechanics, for example, use of kinetic energy as a state variable calls for use of potential energy
and work as interaction variables. And the description of interactions differs in the processes of
projectile motion and collision.
To sum up, the descriptive stage produces complete lists of object names and descriptive variables
for the model and supplies the model with a physical interpretation by providing referential meanings
for the variables.
(II) In The Formulation Stage, the laws of dynamics and interaction are applied to get definite
equations of change for the state variables. Within a given theory, the appropriate choice of laws
depends on the type of model and descriptive variables, as is clear in examples from mechanics. In
a particle model, Newton’s Second Law is the dynamical law relating basic descriptive variables,
but conservation laws for energy, momentum and angular momentum may be more appropriate
when derived variables are used. For a system of particles with interactions described by equations
of constraint, we have seen that Lagrange’s equation is the most convenient dynamical law. In a
rigid body model, we employ separate dynamical laws for translational and rotational motion of the
body. These laws belong to the superstructure of mechanics, being derived from the basic laws and
the definition of a rigid body. The derivation is a special exercise in model formulation which can
be carried out once and for all. The results can then be applied directly to the formulation of any
rigid body model.
Besides equations of change, a model may include equations of constraint (as indicated in Figure
4.1). The equations of constraint in a model are functional relations among descriptive variables
(rather than differential equations). There are many different kinds, including the so-called Consti-
tutive Relations or Equations of State, such as the ideal gas law (P V = nRT ) in thermodynamics
and fluid mechanics.
Implementation of the formulation stage produces an abstract model object consisting of the set
of descriptive variables and equations of change and constraint sufficient to determine values of
the state variables. The adjective “abstract” signifies that in an abstract model the descriptive
variables are detached from the referential meanings determined in the descriptive stage. Thus, the
descriptive variables in an abstract model describe nothing in particular. The adjective “descriptive”
remains appropriate, however, because in principle a descriptive variable can always be interpreted
by associating it with a referent.
An abstract model does not represent a particular object. A model of a particular object con-
sists of an abstract model together with an interpretation of its descriptive variables; in brief, a
concrete model is an interpreted abstract model. The detachment of an abstract model from any
physical interpretation is a step of major scientific and psychological importance. For the abstract
model takes on a theoretical life of its own which can be studied apart from the complexities of
a real physical situation. This process of model abstraction is crucial to scientific understanding.
Paradoxically, physical insight into a given physical situation is achieved by sharply separating the
perceived situation from its conceptual representation, that is, by constructing an abstract model.
The physicist uses the same abstract model of a particle subject to a constant force to represent
many different physical situations, such as a falling body or a body sliding on a rough surface. Thus,
the model abstraction process enables the physicist to recognize common elements in different phys-
ical situations. Undoubtedly, it plays a role in the discovery of general physical laws from ad hoc
models constructed wthout the help of general laws.
(III) In The Ramification Stage the special properties and implications of the abstract model
are worked out. The equations of change are solved to determine trajectories of the state variables
with various initial conditions; the time dependence of significant derived descriptors, such as energy,
is determined; results may be represented graphically as well as analytically to facilitate analysis.
Let us refer to a model object together with one or more of its main ramifications as a ramified
model.
The ramification process is largely mathematical, but the analysis of results is just as important.
Especially important is the identification of emergent properties in composite systems, such as
resonances, stabilities and instabilities.
A large part of this book has been devoted to ramifications. We were able to work out ramifications
of the gravitational two body problem at length, because the equations of motion can be solved
exactly. On the other hand, we found that the ramifications of the gravitational three body problem
are only partially known.
(IV) The Validation Stage is concerned with evaluating the ramified model by comparing it
with some real object-in-situation which it is supposed to describe. This may range from a simple
check on the reasonableness of numerical results to a full-blown experiment test. Validation is a
model deployment process, so we will see it in perspective as we analyze model deployment.
Model Deployment
Model deployment is the process of matching a ramified model to a specific empirical situation.
The result is a concrete model that represents objects and/or processes in that situation. We
say, then, that the situation has been modeled by the scientific theory from which the model was
developed. The match of the model to the situation is a correspondence between the values of
descriptive variables in the model and properties of objects in the situation. The correspondence
is established by measurement procedures, including the so-called operational referitions for the
variables measured. Measurement involves error and uncertainty, so the match of model to situation
must be characterized by some measure for “goodness of fit” and criteria for an adequate match
must be set up. These issues are handled by a theory of measurement, which can be regarded as
one part of a general theory of model dcployment. We mention measurement here only to indicate
how it fits into modeling theory.
Different kinds of model deployment can be classified according to different purposes they sub-
serve. A model may be deployed for the purposes of scientific explanation, prediction or design.
Indeed, we say that an empirical phenomenon can be explained scientifically if and only if it can be
adequately modeled by a scientific theory. Scientific predictions are generated by process models
which relate the values of property variables at different times. Scientific design involves the devel-
opment of models to be deployed as plans for the construction of physical systems with specified
properties. The assertion that scientific explanation is a kind of model deployment deserves some
further comment, since scientific explanation is not ordinarily characterized that way. There are
two common kinds of scientific explanation: causal and inferential. A causal explanation of an event
A is supplied by identifying its cause, consisting of agents and conditions sufficient to produce A.
An inferential explanation of A is supplied by identifying a mechanism (or law) which accounts for
A. Each kind of explanation employs one of the essential ingredients of a model. Thus they employ
partial models and should be regarded as partial explanations only. A complete explanation requires
a complete model.
Empirical tests of a scientific theory are variants of the three major kinds of model deployment
we have just discussed. A theory can be tested only indirectly by testing for the empirical adequacy
of models developed from the theory. A particular hypothesis can be tested only as part of a theory
which is sufficient for the design of testable models and only against an alternative hypothesis which
is a candidate to replace it. A test is made by comparing the adequacies of models generated with
the alternative hypotheses.
This discussion of model deployment was necessarily brief, because a systematic theory of deploy-
ment processes is yet to be developed. The subject is complex, but the concept of model deployment
appears to be the thread needed to tie up a lot of loose ends in the methodology of science.
Exercises
1. Does the Zeroth Law imply the existence of a unique physical entity which we might identify as
physical space?
2. Are space and time objectively real in the sense that they exist independently of any human
mind?
3. Develop an explicit formulation of a Law of Molecular Composition, providing suitable definitions
for the key terms, and carefully distinguishing between mathematical structure and physical
interpretation. Discuss the scope and validity of the law.
4. Design a thought experiment for determining if a given reference system is an inertial system.
5. According to the Biot-Savart Law, a moving particle with charge q, produces a magnetic field
q v1 × (x − x1 )
B(x, t) = ,
c |x − x1 |3
where c is a constant, x1 = x1 (t), and v1 = v1 (t) is the velocity of the particle. Examine the
magnetic interaction between two charged particles and show that the Law of Reciprocity is
not satisfied. How is this result affected by including electric interactions? Evaluate the rate at
which this two particle system transfers momentum to the electromagnetic field. What if one
particle is initially at rest?
6. Suppose that during all of recorded history the earth was surrounded by a dense cloud cover
so that the sun, moon and stars could not be seen. Suppose also that Newtonian mechanics
had developed in spite of this handicap. Explain how earthbound physicists could nevertheless
detect the rotation of the earth and the orbital motion about the sun and thus separate the
associated pseudoforces from real forces.
7. Examine the change in form of the Second Law induced by changing to a time variable which
is an arbitrary monotonic function of inertial time.
8. Discuss the change in form of equations of motion when transformed from an inertial system to
an accelerated reference system.
9. Discuss the following assertion by J. L. Synge:
“It is futile to ask whether nature is ultimately discrete or continuous, for ‘discrete’ and ‘continuous’ are
categories of the understanding, not properties of nature.”
10. Make a thorough critique of Eisenbud’s influential article on mechanics (below), comparing it
in detail with the formulation of mechanics in this chapter. Note how the concept of defini-
tion is used. Carefully distinguish between explicit and implicit definitions, interpretations,
correspondence rules and measurements.
L. Eisenbud, ‘On the Classical Laws of Motion,’ Am. J. Phys. 26, 144–159 (1958).

Foundations of Mechanics

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D.

1. Models and Theories

Each of these components needs some explication.

2. The Zeroth Law of Physics

Every real object has a continuous history in space and time.

To explicate this law, we assert that it has four major components:

3. Generic Laws and Principles of Particle Mechanics

Second Law (Law of Causality)

Third Law (Law of Reciprocity):

To relate formulations of the laws in diﬀerent inertial systems, we adopt the

Comments on the First Law

Comments on the Second Law

Comments on the Third Law

For a uniﬁed view of physics, particle mechanics should be regarded as an approximation to

Comments on the Fourth Law

Comments on Absolute Simultaneity

Law of Light Propagation:

Comments on the Local Interaction Principle

f12 = f [x1 (f ), v1 , (t), x2 (f ), v2 , (t)] = −f [x2 (f ), v2 , (t), x1 (f ), v1 , (t)] . (4.1)

Comments on the Relativity Principle

x → x = R† (x + a + u(t + t0 ))R , (4.2)

f12 = f [x1 − x2 , ẋ1 − ẋ2 ] ; (4.6)

Comments on the Theoretical Structure of Mechanics

Dynamical Laws Interaction Laws

III Ramification Stage

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