Richardson Vs LCSD
Richardson Vs LCSD
Richardson Vs LCSD
COLUMBIA DIVISION
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)
and through their undersigned counsel, who hereby complains against Defendants named above
and alleges and avers before this Honorable Court, demanding a trial by jury on all claims, states
as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action for money damages and declaratory relief brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1988, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under the law of
the State of South Carolina, against Bryan Jay Koon (Koon hereafter) and Lexington County
2. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Koon and LCSD blocked their personal Facebook
accounts from being able to make public comment on or send messages to the LCSD’s official
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Facebook page. Plaintiffs allege that the constitutional violation was committed as a result of the
policies and customs of the LCSD and that Koon is liable under the theory of viewpoint
discrimination.
3. This Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Plaintiffs’ cause of
action arising under the Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pursuant to
4. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina because
the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in South Carolina. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
PARTIES
Lexington County, South Carolina. Eddie Richardson is a retired law enforcement officer from
6. Plaintiff Amanda Richardson is an adult citizen and resident of Lexington County, South
7. The Defendant Bryan Jay Koon is, upon information and belief, a citizen of the United
States, State of South Carolina, and a resident of Lexington County. At all times relevant hereto,
Koon was the elected Sheriff of Lexington County and therefore is the head of LCSD and is a
“person” as that term is defined in relation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He is sued herein for his acts
indistinguishable from the County of Lexington County, State of South Carolina, that is
statutorily liable, both directly and vicariously, for the acts of the individual Defendant and the
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damages to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the South Carolina State Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code § 15-
78-10 et seq., and which is also liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983 for the damages
suffered by the Plaintiffs due to its supervisory indifference and/or tacit authorization of the
BACKGROUND
9. Defendant Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department maintains a social media site on Facebook
called “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department” under the assigned handle1 “@lcsd.fb” over
which it exercises complete control. Defendants use their Facebook page to provide information
to the public about different projects, news stories, criminal arrests, pictures, videos, and they
10. Defendants’ Facebook page is the official “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department”
Facebook page. It contains the physical address, phone number, and website address for the
LCSD.
11. Defendants manage the LCSD Facebook page with the ability to post to the page, edit
information, change its own posts, delete its own posts, delete visitor posts and comments, hide
comments, and control citizen communication altogether by blocking users from interacting with
its page.
12. Defendants often use the comments section of its posts to engage with Lexington County
1
Usernames and user IDs (or handles) are a part of Facebook public profiles, which help
Facebook users find other users or pages on Facebook. A “handle” is the web address for the
profile or Page (example: https://www.facebook.com/lcsd.fb/)
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13. Furthermore, Defendant uses its official Facebook page as a tool of governance to hold
back and forth conversations with the citizens it serves and solicits tips – when necessary – to
14. Plaintiff Eddie Richardson was a law enforcement officer with the South Carolina
Highway Patrol for 5-years while simultaneously contracting with the U.S. Marshals.
15. Afterwards, Plaintiff worked for LCSD for 7-years while simultaneously contracting for
the Town of Pelion Police Department and the University of South Carolina.
16. On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff, then Deputy Richardson with the LCSD, approached a
suspected burglar in a stolen small sedan. While approaching the vehicle, the suspect suddenly
drove right at Deputy Richardson and violently struck him with the car. Injured, Deputy
Richardson was still able to shoot and kill the suspect. Unfortunately, Plaintiff suffered severe
injuries to his spine and hip and was medically retired from his career in law enforcement.
17. Plaintiff is now an outspoken advocate for injured law enforcement officers as a member
of “The Wounded Blue” and a majority of his advocacy is shared on social media platforms such
as Facebook.
18. Plaintiff Amanda Richardson is Eddie Richardson’s spouse and worked in healthcare
until she left employment to care for her husband after his injuries.
19. During October 2017 – over a year after his line-of-duty injury and after Lexington
County cancelled his health insurance for his injuries – Plaintiff Eddie Richardson was
interviewed by The State Newspaper and WISTV news agencies. The interviews referenced the
denial of healthcare benefits related to his injuries as a Lexington County Sheriff’s Deputy.
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20. On or around October 25, 2017, Defendant Sheriff and Sheriff’s Department made a
Facebook post on its official Facebook page presenting details of a $500 sign-on bonus to
21. On or around October 25, 2017, Plaintiff Eddie Richardson commented on the
Defendants’ “incentive post” that, “That’s a great idea. But it would be a good idea to instead of
doing bonuses, put the money into a fund to take care of wounded officers.” The precise content
of Plaintiff Eddie Richardson’s comment, however, is unknown because Defendant Sheriff and
22. Simultaneously2 or soon after Plaintiff made this comment, Defendant also blocked3
Plaintiff’s personal Facebook profile preventing him from further interacting on the Defendant’s
Facebook page.
23. Afterwards, Plaintiff Amanda Richardson commented on the same post made by
Defendant Sheriff and LCSD that Defendants should not be blocking users, especially her
husband, from their Facebook page. The precise content of Plaintiff Amanda Richardson’s
comment, however, is unknown because Defendant also deleted her comment and banned her
24. While blocked, Plaintiffs are able to read and share content posted on the Defendant
Facebook page; however, Plaintiff’s cannot like, comment on, send private messages, or interact
2
Administrators of public Facebook pages have several options to control posts. These options
include but are not limited to (1) Copy (2) Hide, (3) Delete, (4) Ban From Page and Delete
Comment, or (5) Moderate Comments.
3
A block or ban on a public Facebook Page means the user is still able to share content from the
Page to other places on Facebook; however, the user no longer may publish to the Page, like, or
comment on the Page's posts, message the Page, or like the Page.
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25. As a direct and proximate result of the acts of the Defendants, Plaintiffs suffered the
26. Defendants opened a forum for public speech and a digital space for the exchange of
ideas, opinions and thoughts by creating the “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department” Facebook
page.
27. Defendant’s creation of the Facebook page “Lexington County Sheriff’s Department”
forum of speech.
28. Plaintiffs did not leave a comment that reflected foul language, threats, obscene
comments, or other unacceptable comments. Instead, Plaintiffs disagreed with the conduct of the
Defendants.
29. The actions of the Defendants violated the following clearly established and well-settled
30. With deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs to be free from retaliation for
exercising their First Amendment protections, Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD have
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conduct;
31. It is the deliberately indifferent custom, habit, practice and/or policy of Defendant Koon
and Defendant LCSD to permit retaliation against individuals for exercising First Amendment
Protections, as well as to fail to supervise and to train employees in the constitutional protections
of individuals.
32. At all relevant times, Defendant Koon was acting under color of law and under color of
authority as the head of Defendant LCSD in the U.S. state of South Carolina, county of
Lexington.
33. At all relevant times, Defendant LCSD was acting under color of law and under color of
COUNT I
34. Plaintiffs restate and reavers all foregoing paragraphs as if restated here verbatim.
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of
any state or territory or the District of Columbia subjects or causes to be subjected any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and law
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other appropriate
proceeding for redress . . .
36. Plaintiffs in this action are citizens of the United States and Defendant Koon is a person
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37. Defendant Koon was, at all times relevant, a policymaker for the LCSD and in that
capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the same at all times
relevant hereto, was acting under the color of state law in his capacity as the elected Sheriff and
his acts or omissions were conducted within the scope of his official duties or employment.
38. At the time of the complained of event, Plaintiffs had the clearly established
constitutional protections to be free from retaliation for the exercise of protected speech.
39. Any reasonable elected official such as Defendant Koon knew or should have known of
this right at the time of the complained of conduct as it was clearly established at that time.
40. Plaintiffs exercised their constitutionally protected right to question the conduct of the
41. Retaliatory animus for Plaintiffs’ exercise of their constitutionally protected right to
question the conduct of government programs controlled by Defendant Koon was a substantially
42. The actions taken against Plaintiffs in retaliation for their protected conduct would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct on the
43. Defendant Koon blocked Plaintiffs as a means of retaliation for Plaintiffs’ protected
speech. He is therefore liable for violating the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment protections.
44. Defendant Koon is not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
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COUNT II
45. Plaintiffs restate and reavers all foregoing paragraphs as if restated here verbatim.
46. At the time of the complained of event, Plaintiffs had the clearly established
constitutional protections to be free from retaliation for the exercise of protected speech.
47. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD knew or should have known of these rights at the
time of the complained of conduct as they were clearly established at that time.
48. Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for the complained of conduct.
49. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD were, at all times relevant, policymakers for the
LCSD and in that capacity established policies, procedures, customs, and/or practices for the
same.
50. These Defendants developed and maintained policies, procedures, customs, and/or
were moving forces behind and proximately caused the violations of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional
protections and federal rights as set forth herein and in the other claims, resulted from a
conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various available
alternatives.
51. Defendant Koon and Defendant LCSD have developed and maintained long-standing,
department-wide customs, policies, procedures, practices, and/or failed to properly train and/or
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52. The deliberately indifferent training and supervision provided by Defendant Koon and
Defendant LCSD resulted from a conscious or deliberate choice to follow a course of action
from among various alternatives available to Defendants and were moving forces in the
d. Issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting all Defendants and all those acting in
concert with them from blocking users without procedural due process on their
official government social media platforms;
e. Issue a permanent injunction prohibiting all Defendants and all those acting in
concert with them from blocking users without procedural due process on their
official government social media platforms;
f. Award Plaintiff reasonable fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and any
other applicable provisions of law; and
g. Award such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Plaintiff demands a jury trial, pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
Respectfully submitted,
s/Thomas M. Fernandez
Thomas M. Fernandez, FED ID #12984
Fernandez Law LLC
477 Whispering Breeze Lane
Summerville, South Carolina 29486
(843) 580-6045
[email protected]
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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