ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WRITTEN REPORT ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

GROUP 9
TOPIC: AMMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL

SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. EDEN BRION

SUBMITTED BY:

ABUYO, JAN CEDRIK S.

DOROJA, PATRICIA AGATHA MAY
ENRIQUEZ, MARK ANGELO S.
NEJUDNE, A-JONAH MAY A.
PUSPUS, EDEN P.

Amendment
How laws are amended
Power to Amend
The legislature has the authority to amend, subject to constitutional
requirements, any existing law.
Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact, alter and repeal laws.
The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the
law, has no authority to amend or change the law, such authority being the
exclusive to the legislature.

How amendment effected

Amendment the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute
which survives in its amended form.
The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of an amendatory act
modifying or altering some provisions of a statute either expressly or impliedly.
Sample Case:
Grande vs. Antonio
G.R. No. 206248 : February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil
Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for
the United States with her two children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the
entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their
respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation
of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right and
immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the
persons and custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of
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the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant
of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil
Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth, and
record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody to their
mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed
to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition
made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction
with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the
children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: The petition is partially granted

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of
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the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a
notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his children's surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must
be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his
surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children

Express amendment done by providing in the amendatory act that specific

sections or provisions of a statute be amended as recited therein or as common
indicated, to read as follows.
Example:
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10741]
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 220 AND
222 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 220 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
Art. 220. National Labor Relations Commission. There shall be a National
Labor Relations Commission which shall be attached to the Department of Labor
and Employment solely for program and policy coordination, composed of a
Chairman and twenty-three (23) members.
Eight (8) members each shall be chosen only from among the nominees of the
workers and employers organizations, respectively. The Chairman and the seven
(7) remaining members shall come from the public sector, with the latter to be
chosen preferably from among the incumbent labor arbiters.
Upon assumption into office, the members nominated by the workers and
employers organizations shall divest themselves of any affiliation with or interest
in the federation or association to which they belong.
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The Commission may sit en banc or in eight (8) divisions, each composed of
three (3) members. The Commission shall sit en banc only for purposes of
promulgating rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of
cases before any of its divisions and regional branches and formulating policies
affecting its administration and operations. The Commission shall exercise its
adjudicatory and all other powers, functions and duties through its divisions. Of
the eight (8) divisions, the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth divisions
shall handle cases coming from the National Capital Region and other parts of
Luzon, and the seventh and eighth divisions, cases from the Visayas and
Mindanao, respectively: Provided, That the Commission sitting en banc may, on
temporary or emergency basis, allow cases within the jurisdiction of any division
to be heard and decided by any other division whose docket allows the additional
workload and such transfer will not expose litigants to unnecessary additional
expense. The divisions of the Commission shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over cases within then respective territorial jurisdiction.
(Approved by President Aquino on January 12, 2016)

Amendment by implication
Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject, in the
absence of a clear inconsistency.
Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is shown by a
statement in the later act that any provision of law that is inconsistent therewith is
modified accordingly.
Implied Amendment- when a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject
as the later may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the
latter in which event, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to the extent
of repugnancy.
Sample Cases and its Legal Doctrines
Quimpo v. Mendoza
Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings
be paid on or before the specified date, subject to penalty of a percentage of
the whole amount of tax in case of delayed payment, is amended by
authorizing payment of the tax in four equal installments to become due on or
before specified dates.
The penalty provision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the
penalty for late payment of an installment under the later law will be collected
and computed only on the installment that became due and unpaid, and not
on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old statute.
Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed
payment in four installments.
People v. Macatanda
A statute punishing an act which is also a crime under the RPC provides a
penalty as prescribed in the said Code, such statute is not a special law but
an amendment by implication.

When amendment takes effect

15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of
general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after such
publication.
Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights
After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to
all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were
contracted under the prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be
governed by the law before its amendment.
Not applied retroactively so as to nullify such rights.
HOW AMENDMENT IS CONSTRUED, GENERALLY:

A statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole. An amended

act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a
new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead. In
other words, the amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally
enacted in its amended form. The amendment becomes a part of the original
statute as if it had always been contained therein.
So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended
to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are
retained either literally or substantially are regarded as a continuation of the
existing law and not as a new enactment.
For instance, where a statute which provides that it shall be in force for a period
of two (2) years from its approval is amended by another statute which provides
that it shall be in force for a period of four (4) years after its approval, the four (4)
years is to be counted from the date the original statute was approved and not
from the date the amendatory act was enacted.
In the Case of Estrada vs. Caseda (G.R. No. L- 1560)
Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 - An Act to Penalize Speculation or Rents
of Buildings Destined for Dwelling Purposes (which was approved October 15,
1945) provides that "This Act shall be in force for a period of two years after its
approval."
However, on Republic Act No. 66 (which was approved on October 18, 1946),
amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows:
Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval."
Question: When did this four-year period commence to run? Is it on October 14,
1945 or on October 18,1946.
Answer: October 14,1945

An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been

repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its
stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the
adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended
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form. The amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been
contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of contractual
relations between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of
the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning
and effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that
are existing statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such
portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or substantially, are regarded
as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment. (59 C. J., 1096,
1097.)
In accordance with this rule, the provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14
of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date
of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus
construed expired on October 15, 1949.

The amendment to a section of an act should be read in connection with other

sections as if all had been enacted on the same statute, and, as far as possible,
effect should be given to all of them in furtherance of the general design of the
act.
The provisions of the original act which are not affected by the amendment and
those portions of the section amended which are repealed in the amendment
remain in force, while those parts of the section amended which are omitted in
the amendment are deemed repealed. In other words, where the amendment
leaves certain portions of an act unchanged, such portions are continued in
force, with the same meaning and effect they have before the amendment.
EFFECT OF NULLITY OF PRIOR OR AMENDATORY ACT:

An invalid or unconstitutional law does not in legal contemplation, generally

speaking, exist. Hence, where a statute which has been amended is invalid,
nothing in effect has been amended.
The amendatory act, if complete by itself, will be considered as an original or
independent act.
On the other hand, where the amendatory act is declared unconstitutional, it is as
if the amendment did not exist, and the original statute before the attempted
amendment remains unaffected and in force.
~REVISION & CODIFICATIONS~
In General
Purpose of codification: To restate the existing laws into one statute and simply
complicated provisions, and make the laws on the subject easily found.

Problem of codification: In the course of revision or codification, new provisions

are inserted, some old provisions are omitted, the phraseology is changed, and
sections are rearranged. It involves what meaning or significance to attach to
these changes.
~CONSTRUCTION TO HARMONIZE DIFFERENT PROVISIONS~

The Presumption: Author has maintained a consisted philosophy.

-The different provisions of a revised statute or code must be read and construed
together

Rule: A code enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and is to be

considered as such and not as a series disconnected articles or provisions.

Example: (Application of harmonizing different provisions)

G.R. No. 183517

PITC v. COA

Facts: With the issuance of PD 1071, otherwise known as the Revised Charter
of the Philippine International Trading Corporation, then President Marcos issued
EO 756, authorizing the reorganization of PITC. Eligia Romero, an officer of
PITC, opted to retire under Republic Act No. 1616 and received a total
of P286,780.00 as gratuity benefits for services rendered from 1955 to
1983. Immediately re-hired on contractual basis, it appears that said employee
remained in the service of petitioner until her compulsory retirement on April 27,
2000. In receipt of retirement benefits in the total sum of P1,013,952.00 for the
period July 1, 1955 to April 27, 2000, net of the P286,780.00 gratuity benefits she
received in 1983, Ms. Romero filed a July 16, 2001 request, seeking from
petitioner payment of retirement differentials on the strength of Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 756. Said provision states that any officer or employee who
retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be entitled to one month
pay for every year of service computed at highest salary received including
allowances, in addition to the other benefits provided by law, regardless of any
provision of law or regulations to the contrary.
COA Assistant Commissioner and General Counsel Raquel R. Habitan issued
the first assailed ruling denying Ms. Romeros claim for retirement differentials in
order noting that the Reserve for Retirement Gratuity and Commutation of Leave
Credits of petitioners employees did not include allowances outside of the basic
salary, and ruled that Executive Order No. 756 was a special law issued only for
the specific purpose of reorganizing petitioner corporation. Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 756 was determined to be intended for employees retired, separated
or resigned in connection with petitioners reorganization and was not meant to be
a permanent retirement scheme for its employees.
ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 756 is an additional alternative to existing
general retirement laws and/or an exception to the prohibition against separate or
supplementary insurance retirement or pension plans
HELD: NO The petition is without merit. It is a rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts,
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Because the
law must not be read in truncated parts, its provisions must be read in relation to
the whole law. The statute's clauses and phrases must not, consequently, be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Consistent with the fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be taken into consideration in order
to ascertain its meaning.
Application (Here is the whole provision):
SECTION 6. Exemption from OCPC. In recognition of the special nature of its
operations, the Corporation shall continue to be exempt from the application of

the rules and regulations of the Office of the Compensation and Position
Classification or any other similar agencies that may be established hereafter as
provided under Presidential Decree No. 1071. Likewise, any officer or
employee who retires, resigns, or is separated from the service shall be
entitled to one month pay for every year of service computed at highest
salary received including all allowances, in addition to the other benefits
provided by law, regardless of any provision of law or regulations to the
contrary; Provided, That the employee shall have served in the Corporation
continuously for at least two years: Provided, further, That in case of separated
employees, the separation or dismissal is not due to conviction for any offense
the penalty for which includes forfeiture of benefits: and Provided, finally, That in
the commutation of leave credits earned, the employees who resigned, retired or
is separated shall be entitled to the full payment therefor computed with all the
allowances then being enjoyed at the time of resignation, retirement of
separation regardless of any restriction or limitation provided for in other laws,
rules or regulations
Section 4 (1) of Executive Order No. 756 specifically authorized petitioners Board
of Directors to reorganize the structure of the Corporation, in accordance with its
expanded role in the development of Philippine trade, with such officers and
employees as may be needed and determine their competitive salaries and
reasonable allowances and other benefits to effectively carry out its powers and
functions. For this purpose, Section 6 of the same law provides as follows:

~EFFECTS OF OMISSION OF WORDS, PHRASES, PROVISIONS IN THE

REVISED LAW~
What is omitted is deemed repealed: All provisions of the old laws that are
omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repeal unless that law
provided otherwise. The revision or codification is intended to be a complete
enactment on the subject and expression of the whole law, which thereby
indicates the intention on the part of the legislature to repeal those provisions of
the old laws that are not reproduced in the revised law.
It is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself.
When both intent and scope clearly indicates the idea of a repeal, then all parts
and provision of the prior law are omitted from the revised law are deemed
repeal. A subsequent statute repeals a prior law if the subsequent revises the
whole subject matter of the prior law.
However, the change in phraseology in the revised statute or code from the
former law does not, in itself, imply that it was the intention of the lawmakers to
amend or change the construction of the old laws. For it is a well-settled rule that
in the revision of statutes, neither alteration in phraseology nor omission or
addition of words in the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the
construction of the former laws.
Example:
G.R. No. 166735
DELFINO V. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL INC.
FACTS:

It is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
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Decision of the Office of the President, and the Resolution dated 11 August 2000,
reinstating the grant to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc. of a Locational
Clearance and a Certificate of Locational Viability (CLV) for its expansion as a
four-storey, forty-bed capacity hospital.
St. James Hospital was established as a two-storey, ten-bed capacity hospital in
Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision in Santa Rosa, Laguna. In 1994, it applied for a
permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its
hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution. HLURB issued a
temporary clearance for the expansion of said hospital. Said issuance was
challenged by the petitioners, residents of Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision, on the
ground that the proposed expansion is in violation of the provisions of the 1981
Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance.
On 11 December 1995, Resolution No. 811 approved the 1991 Comprehensive
Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the
Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna. Under the new Zoning Ordinance, hospitals
are now excluded from the list of viable institutions within the residential zone of
Santa Rosa, Laguna. On 16 May 1996, petitioners filed before the HLURB
Regional Office No. IV a letter-complaint and against Dr. Santiago for continuing
with the expansion project despite the invalidation of the CLV.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed capacity medical institution may be permitted under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance.
in order to settle the present controversy, it is essential that we determine the
effect of the enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance with respect to the
proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital in view of the deletion therein of
the phrase hospitals with not more than ten capacity from those enumerated as
allowable uses in a residential zone as contained in Section 2, Article VI of the
1981 Zoning Ordinance.
Section 2, Article VI of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance Reads:
SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR URBAN CORE ZONE. This zone shall be
devoted to various settlement activities that are residential and commercial, or
institutional in character, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1.
In the Residential Sector, only the following uses shall be allowed:
a)
All types of dwelling units (one-family detached, two-family detached, onefamily semi-detached, two-family semi-detached and multi-family of not more
than 5 doors)
b)
Home occupation, or the practice of ones profession or occupation, such as
tailoring, dressmaking, banking, and like provided that:
b.1. Not more than five (5) outside assistants or helpers shall be employed;
b.2. The use of the dwelling unit for the home occupation shall be clearly
incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its occupants;
b.3. As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside appearance of
the building or premises;
b.4. No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation which
creates noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference or outside
the dwelling unit if conducted in a place other than a single-family residence. In
the case of electrical interference, no equipment or process shall be used which
creates visual or audible interference in any radio or television receiver or causes
fluctuation in line voltage off the premises.
a)
Elementary schools
b)
High Schools and vocational schools
c)
Chapels, churches, and other place of worship
d)
Clinics, hospitals with not more than ten (10) capacity
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e)
Drugstores
f) Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and fowls
provided:
1. That they are only for family consumption
2. No undue noise shall be created
3. No foul smell shall be emitted
4. Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality
g)
Boarding House
h)
Parks and playground
i)
Barangay tanod stations
j)
Neighborhood assembly hall
k)
Recreation centers

On the other hand, Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance reads:

SECTION 2. REGULATIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL ZONE. This zone shall be

devoted to various settlements, activities that are residential, commercial, and
institutional in character and other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and
maintenance of ecological balance of the municipality, subject to the following
terms and conditions:
The following uses shall be allowed:
1.
Single detached family dwellings
2.
Semi-detached family dwelling
3.
Two detached family dwelling
4.
Two semi-detached family dwelling
5.
Multi-family dwelling with not more than five (5) families residing
6.
Residential Subdivision Projects
7.
Home occupation for the practice of ones profession or for engaging an inhouse business such as dressmaking, tailoring, baking, running a sari-sari store
and the like, provided that:
7.1.
Only members of the family residing within the premises shall be
engaged in such home occupation;
7.2.
Maximum of five (5) outside helpers or assistants shall be employed;
7.3.
The use of the dwelling unit for home occupation shall be clearly
incidental and subordinate to its use for residential purpose by its occupants and
for the conduct of the home occupation, not more than twenty-five (25%) percent
of the floor area of the dwelling unit shall be used;
7.4.
As much as possible there shall be no change in the outside
appearance of the building premises;
7.5.
No home occupation shall be conducted in any accessory building;
7.6.
No traffic shall be generated by such home occupation in greater
volume than would normally be expected in a residential neighborhood and any
need for parking generated by the conduct of such home occupation shall be met
off the street and in a place other than in a required front yard;
7.7.
No equipment or process shall be used in such home occupation
which created noise, vibration, glare, fumes, odors, or electrical interference
detectable to the normal sense off the lot, if the occupation is conducted in a
single family residence or outside the dwelling unit if conducted in a place other
than a single-family-residence. In the case of electrical interference, no
equipment or process shall be used which created visual or audible interference
in any radio or television receiver or causes fluctuation in line voltage off the
premises.

11

8.
Backyard gardens and raising of pigs, poultry and other animals and fowls
provided:
8.1.
That they are only for family consumption;
8.2.
No undue noise shall be created;
8.3.
No foul smell shall be emitted; and
8.4.
Other sanitary requirements enforced in the municipality are complied
with.
9.
Barangay Tanod Stations.
10. Police outposts.[9]

The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981
Zoning Ordinance. This intent to repeal is manifested in the very wordings of the
1991 Zoning Ordinance. The complete title of said Ordinance, An Ordinance
Adopting a Comprehensive Zoning Regulation for the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Laguna and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment
Thereof. And for the Repeal of all Ordinances in Conflict Therewith, as well
as the Repealing Clause of the same Ordinance which states that all other
ordinances, rules or regulations that are in conflict with the provisions of this
ordinance are hereby repealed, clearly express the intent of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Santa Rosa, Laguna, to repeal any enactment that is inconsistent with
the new Ordinance. The inclusion of this general repealing provision in the
Ordinance predicated the intended repeal under the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.

Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a

thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore,
with the omission of the phrase hospital with not more than ten capacity in the
new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage
to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative
body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a
residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James
Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance. Thus, it is concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a
non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

HELD: Yes, The Decision of the Court of is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new Decision entered:
-Prohibiting the proposed expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey,
forty-bed capacity hospital, the proposed expansion being illegal under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance.
~CONTINUATION OF EXISTING LAWS~
Rule: A codification should be construed as a continuation of the existing laws.
Presumption: The codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly
existed
The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute does not operate to change
the operation, effect or meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of such
nature as to manifest clearly a legislative intent to change the former law.
Example: (Applying Effects of omission of words & Continuation of existing
laws)
MECANO vs.COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992
FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account
of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of
which he is claiming from the COA.
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In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for

his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699
of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:

Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in

performance of duty. When a person in the service of the national government
of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the
performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound,
the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of
disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of
the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees
of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first
against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of
some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize
the payment of the necessary hospital fees.

Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice.

Finding petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment
of petitioners claim.

However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to

Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to
the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No.
73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the
Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.

Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano
occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice
Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court if he so desires. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section

699 of the RAC

HELD: NO The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby

ordered to give due course to petitioners claim for benefits
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The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a

subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly
repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and
specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended
to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an
express repeal; all others are implied repeals

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of

whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with
the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new
Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or

designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, this latter
situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, and the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears
clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago. There can also be no such conflict because the
provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not
been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by

implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.

Repeal
Prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws:
-

Irrepealable laws deprive the succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best

senses carte blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu.

This promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and dissuades dynamic
democratic impetus that may be responsive at times.

Legislative cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws

except when so restrained. Every legislative may modify or abolish the acts past
by itself or its predecessors (Duarte v. Dade).

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Case:

City of Davao v. RTC, G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005

Petitioner claims that the tax exemption granted by the P.D. 1146 to GSIS, making
the GSIS not subject to realty taxes was effectively withdrawn upon the enactment of
Sections 193 and 294 of the Local Government Code.

Ruling:
By rendering effective the amendatory act of P.D 1146, Sec. 33, would be giving
sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind
subsequent legislators to a particular mode of repeal, and precise effect of limiting
the powers of congress.
Total Repeal
A statute which has been totally repealed is rendered revoked completely.

Partial Repeal
-

It leaves the unaffected portions of the statute in force.

Portion/s not affected by the repeal continue to exist.

Express Repeal
-

It is declared in its repealing clause that a particular and specific law, identified
by its number of title is repealed.

Example:

Article 254 of the Family Code exemplifies an express repeal.

Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of the Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles
17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amendedare hereby
repealed.
Implied Repeal
-

There is irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the new and old
laws.

There is no specific express repealing clause.

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Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise the later act shall be
construed as a continuation and not a substitute.

Example:
any provision of law, order, rule or regulation inconsistent with the provisions of the
law is hereby repealed or modified accordingly signals implied repeal

Two categories of an Implied Repeal:

1. Irreconcilable consistency
-

Takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect without nullifying the other.

It is necessary that the object of the two statutes are the same.

Legal Maxim: Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant Later law repeals
the prior law.

Case:
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835, June 22, 2005
Section 2, RA. No. 1379 (June 18, 1955)
It was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
before the then Courts of First Instance (RTC).
P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 (June 11, 1978)
Grants the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor exclusive jurisdiction
over forfeiture.
2. Intended as a substitute
-

If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act.

Case:
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank

Ruling:
A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied
repeal is present in this case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations
Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of Securities Market, Issue,
Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt," is a regulation governing the servicing
and redemption of public debt, including the issue, inscription, registration, transfer,
payment and replacement of bonds and securities representing the public debt. On
16

the other hand, CB Circular No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations
Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is the governing regulation
on matters (i) involving certificate of indebtedness issued by the Central Bank itself
and (ii) which are similarly covered by CB Circular No. 28.

General law does not repeal special law

-

Legal Maxim: generalia specialibus non derogant general law does not nullify
a specific or special law.

General law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the
same subject, Unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the
later general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law.

Special law constitutes as an exception to the general law whenever the

legislature failed to indicate in an unmistakable term its intent to repeal or modify
the prior special act.

Special law prevails over general law

-

The legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the
particular case.

Case:
Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
Before the renewal of the petitioners passport, the surname that she used was that
of his husband. Upon the renewal of her passport she requested her surname to be
reverted to her maiden name, even though her marriage was still subsisting. Her
request was denied by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and contested that use of
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs cited the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, while the petitioner argued that it was in conflict with
Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her
maiden name upon marriage.

Ruling:
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239
which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over
the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of
surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails
over a general law.
It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to the extent of any necessary
repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the latter (special
law) will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage.

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