What Is "Sociology of Law"?

Authors(s): N. S. Timasheff
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Sep., 1937), pp. 225-235
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769025
Accessed: 27-03-2016 13:12 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
American Journal of Sociology

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"?

N. S. TIMASHEFF

ABSTRACT

The sociology of law, a new science, studies human behavior in society in so far as it

is determined by commonly recognized ethico-legal norms, and in so far as it influences

them. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, studies the norms as such, from three main

points of view: analytical or positive, historical, and theoretical. Other attempts to

delimit the field of sociology of law, such as those of H. Rolin, W. Schoenfeld, H. U.

Kantorowicz, J. Kraft, I. Kornfeld, E. Ehrlich, H. Kelsen, Max Weber, B. Horvath,

L. Petrajitsky, C. Lombroso, M. Rumpf, and others, are of some value, although not

altogether satisfactory. The studies of psychologists, anthropologists, philosophers of

law, and jurists permit the formulation of a sociological definition of law as a complex

instrument of social co-ordination synthesizing ethical conviction and political power.

Since olden times, law has been the object of a science called

"jurisprudence." This science has had a glorious record, numbering

in its annals many famous names and immortal treatises. It is a

many-branched science, which has developed into a network of nu-

merous special sciences called "civil law," "criminal law," "constitu-

tional law," and so forth. Is there room in this field for still another

science, that of "sociology of law"? Or is "sociology of law" only a

new name for a science known for centuries?

Yes, there is room. No, it is not a new name for an old science.

Law is, of course, the center of interest for both; but the points of

view are quite different and therefore also the knowledge gained

by them.

Law is a cultural force. Its function is that of imposing norms of

conduct or patterns of social behavior on the individual will. It is

the aim of jurisprudence to study these norms. This study may be

carried out with regard to norms in force in a certain country at a

given time. Each single norm has to be explained and elucidated:

for very often they appear in forms far from clear. Different norms

have to be brought into correlation with one another: for their true

meaning appears only by comparison and contrast. Classifying them

and working them into precise systems forms another task of juris-

prudence. Finally, the norms of conduct included in law are some-

times not directly expressed, but only indirectly mentioned in other

norms; therefore true juridical discoveries are possible. Such are the

225

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

226 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

tasks of positive or analytical jurisprudence. They are, of course,

arduous but attractive tasks.

The concrete norms of conduct forming law may be also studied

from the historical point of view. Instead of describing in detail the

norms applied today in a certain country, we may analyze the grad-

ual development of the principal norms within certain periods in a

given country. Such a study is undertaken by historical jurispru-

dence.

In both analytical and historical jurisprudence the comparative

method may be applied: legal norms are studied with regard to a

group of countries the social structures of which present or presented

some similitude. This is the task of comparative jurisprudence.

Finally, the structure of the legal norms presents, at all times and

places, some unchangeable features which may be considered as be-

longing to the very essence of law. Studying this unchangeable form

of the patterns, their natural elements, is the task of theoretical

jurisprudence.

In all these cases the norms of conduct as such remain the object

of study. This is, in spite of the opinion of many scientists,' a study

of actuality, and not a study belonging to the domain of evaluation

-for the social patterns of behavior included in law actually exist,

forming a part of culture. Rules of evaluation are the objects of

jurisprudence, but in their relation to actuality. Finding out the

logical interdependence between various individual norms is the

main task of this science; logical analysis is therefore its chief

method.

There is' another actuality, closely related to these norms, but not

studied in jurisprudence. This is human behavior in society, in so

far as it is determined by these norms and in so far as it determines

these norms or patterns of behavior.

In general, legal norms actually determine human behavior in

society: the triumph of law is the rule, its defeat in a concrete case

an exception. Why is this so? What is the force of law? How does

law determine human behavior in society? What are the conditions

for the efficacy or nonefficacy of legal norms-in other words, of

I For instance, H. Kelsen, Derjuristische und der soziologische Staatsbegriff (Tuibingen,

I022).

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"? 227

adjusting or not adjusting human behavior to the particular social

patterns of behavior forming law? This is the first group of questions

which stand outside the true domain of jurisprudence and which

form the first field for the sociological investigation of law.

On the other hand, the legal norms or social patterns of behavior

are creations of human will, of the corporate will of social groups.

What are the forces determining the creation, the transformation,

and the destruction of the juridical patterns of behavior? This is a

second group of questions related to law, but standing outside the

true domain of jurisprudence and forming another field for the so-

ciological investigation of law. Chains of human actions and reac-

tions must be searched for, chains in which legal norms and con-

figurations of human behavior determined by these norms play alter-

nately the roles corresponding to the active and the passive voices

of verbs.

When such chains of action have been discovered and accurately

described, a third task may be undertaken: that of establishing cor-

relations, causal or logico-meaningful,2 between changes in law and

changes in other social phenomena, as well as between certain legal

structures and certain social structures. Searching for such correla-

tions without an accurate knowledge of law as an actual social phe-

nomenon would be a hopeless enterprise. The absence of precise

causal knowledge of many social phenomena is one of the reasons

why the study of social correlations results in rather negative or in-

determinate statements.3 Especially in criminology, where knowl-

edge of the factors correlated with crime is essential, the idea is some-

times expressed that, without a scientific knowledge of legal behavior

and of its factors, scientific statements concerning the genesis of

crime are almost impossible.

Human behavior in society, in so far as it is related to law, is the

object of the new science, called "sociology of law." Causal investi-

gation is its chief method.

Other delimitations between jurisprudence and the sociology of

law have been proposed. It is not an easy task to make an adequate

2 P. A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York, I937), Vol. I, chap. i.

3 P. A. Sorokin, Contemporary Sociological Theories (New York, and London I928),

pp. 279, 326, 403, 422, 598, and passim.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

228 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

survey of them, for many authors when writing on the sociology of

law do not explain their viewpoints on this subject4 or else call in-

vestigations with quite different aims "sociology of law."5

H. U. Kantorowicz gives a correct, but too narrow, definition of

the sociology of law: it is to be an investigation of social life in its

relation to law, especially the investigation of correlations between

law and other social domains-economics, politics, techniques, art,

religion, etc.6 According to J. Kraft the sociology of law should study

the laws which determine the legal institutions in society.7

For I. Kornfeld8 and E. Ehrlich9 the objects of the sociology of

law are actual rules of social life in their opposition to the norms in-

cluded in law. These rules, according to Ehrlich, are related to a

certain number of facts of law (Tatsachen des Rechts), especially hab-

it, domination, possession, contract, and inheritance, which exist be-

fore the law and form the basis of the total economic and social

structure of humanity.

In his brilliant reviews of both books H. Kelsen has shown that,

when interpreted in such terms, sociology of law becomes general

sociology or social science in its totality-for actual rules of social

life are the main object of their study.'0 On the other hand, later

events have already proved the fallacy of Ehrlich's cardinal axiom:

in communist society contracts and wills do not belong to the basic

social institutions and are replaced by other ones.

4H. Rolin, Prolfgome'nes d la science du droit (Brussels, I91 i), which presents an in-

genious attempt to construct a sociology of law by means of analyzing the individual

juridical experience.

5 Cf. W. Schoenfeld, (Schriften der KRnigsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft, IV [19271,

32), for whom the sociology of law is the theory of cognition related to legal history.

6-"Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie," in Verhandlungen des ersten deutschen Sozio-

logentages (Tiubingen, i9II).

7 "Rechtssoziologie," in Vierkandt's Handwdrterbuch der Soziologie (Stuttgart, 1931),

p. 467.

8 Soziale Machtverkdltnisse. Grundziige einer allgemeinen Lehre vom positiven Rechte

auf soziologischer Grundlage (Wien, 9 i9I).

9 Grundlegung einer Soziologie des Rechts (Munich, I9I3). The English translation

has just been published by the Harvard University Press.

'O"Zur Soziologie des Rechts," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik,

XXXIV (1912), 60I-14; "Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie," ibid., XXXIX

(1915), 839-76.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"? 229

According to Max Weber, sociology-especially sociology of law-

has the task of studying and explaining human conduct from the

causal point of view; conduct is for him human behavior if and in so

far as the actors endow it with subjective meaning. On the con-

trary, the objective or the true meaning of human attitudes is the

domain of investigation for jurisprudence, as well as for logic, ethics,

and aesthetics.II This delimitation of both scientific domains is un-

satisfactory, for it limits the sociology of law to the study of con-

scious conduct, whereas acting according to the law is frequently

carried out by means of conditioned reflexes: certain words, ges-

tures and symbols produce "legal responses" without any subjective

interpretation. Were such cases outside the domain of the sociology

of law, this science would not be able to discover continuous chains

of human actions and reactions and to relate the observed facts with

each other.

According to B. Horvath, author of the most recent systematic

study in the sociology of law, the objects of this science are "juridical

rules of evaluation in their relation to actuality" (Sollen zu Sein).12

This would mean that jurisprudence, on the contrary, should study

legal norms without any relation to actuality. This is surely an er-

roneous opinion-the first task of a student in jurisprudence is to

investigate whether the norms he studies are in force (that is, are

related to actuality). The study of purely personal or imagined

norms does not belong to the domain of science.13

On the other hand, it might be remarked that the domain claimed

for the sociology of law is already being occupied by jurisprudence

This is an undeniable fact. The sociological trend in jurisprudence is

gaining more and more power.'4 The unexpected conversion of the

leader of the "formalists," Professor Hans Kelsen, was stressed dur-

II "Grundriss der Sozialokonomie" (III. Abteilung) in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

(Tuibingen, 1925), pp. I-2.

12 B. Horvath, Rechtssoziologie (Berlin, 1934), pp. 66-76.

I3 The opposite opinion, expressed by L. Petrajitsky (Theory of Law and of State, in

Russian [2d ed.; Petrograd, i909], I, io6-7 and passim) , forms the weakest point in his

very original study of law as an actual phenomenon.

'4 A brilliant survey of the sociological trend in jurisprudence is made by R. Pound,

"The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review, XXV

(1911-12), 489-5I6.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

230 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

ing one of the last congresses of the Institut International de Philo-

sophie de Droit et de Sociologie Juridique.'5

But the sociological approach forms necessarily only a kind of

adjunct to the analytical, historical, comparative, or theoretical

study of legal norms: for it is impossible to construct a system of

knowledge which would, in an accurate way, combine the formal

study of norms and the causal study of human behavior related to

these norms. Such a study needs a place by the side of jurisprudence,

but not within jurisprudence.

Very instructive, from this point of view, is the recent history of

the science of criminal law. C. Lombroso's revolutionary accomplish-

mentsI6 resulted in attempts to rebuild this science completely, to

replace the formal study of patterns of prohibited behavior described

in criminal statutes by a causal study of crime and the effects of

punishment, and later in attempts to combine both points of view

into one system. All attempts of the latter kind were a complete

failure, and today a resolute separation is again prevailing-there

is a science of criminal law, studying in an analytical, historical, or

comparative way the patterns of prohibited behavior, and another

science called criminology, studying actual human behavior in so far

as it is related to crime and punishment.'7 Both should, of course,

occupy definite and honorable places on the general map of scientific

knowledge.

The content of the sociology of law depends on the structure of

the social phenomenon called law. This is a complex, secondary phe-

nomenon. Two primary social phenomena, those of ethics and of

power, are united in it. Norms of conduct imposed upon the indi-

vidual will are included not only in law, but also in morals and cus-

tom; morals, custom, and law are the ethical forces, together form-

ing ethics. On the other hand, the strength of law, the juridical pres-

sure on human behavior, may be considered as the display of the

is H. Kelsen, "L'Ame et le droit," Annuaire de l'Institut International de Philosophie

de Droit et de Sociologie Juridique (I935), pp. 6o-8o; "Discussion du rapport de H.

Kelsen," ibid., pp. 8I-82.

i6 C. Lombroso, L'Uomo delinquente (Ist ed., I876).

I7 In spite of this conclusive experience, M. Rumpf proposes to include the sociology

of law in a "total" jurisprudence. ("Was ist Rechtssoziologie?" Archiv fur zivilistische

Praxis [19241, pp. 36-51.)

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"? 23 I

social energy concentrated in organized social power. But the dis-

play of this energy is not peculiar to law: social power may domi-

nate over indivriduals by means of law as well as outside law, form-

ing in that case despotical rule.'8 Social power may act without any

connection with ethics, just as ethics may exist without any con-

nection with social power. Therefore the notions of ethics and power

are not two co-ordinated or subordinated notions. They may be

considered as two circles which cross each other. The overlapping

section is law.'9

Were a sociology of ethics and a sociology of power already in

existence, the sociology of law might be based upon the results of

these sciences and be limited to the study of the joint action of ethics

and of power, of ethics supported by power, or of power limited by

ethics. But neither of these sciences yet exists. Therefore the so-

ciology of law has to begin by studying, from the causal point of

view, the phenomenon of ethics, to continue by studying, from the

same point of view, the phenomenon of power, and to conclude by

an analysis of the complex phenomenon formed by the joint action

of both.

What are the materials to be used and the methods to be applied

when constructing a scientific theory of law as of an actual social

phenomenon?

In the first place, important material may be collected by means

of observation, which may be of two types. The first is introspection,

i.e., accurate subsequent analysis of one's state of consciousness in

so far as it is related to law (acting according to law, acting against

the law, acting with the intent of transforming law, reaction produced

by another's acting in accordance with or against law). A prominent

representative of the theoretical trend in jurisprudence, Professor G.

Gurvitch, insists in his latest work on the necessity of studying the

specific actuality presented by law and of beginning this study with

the analysis of the "immediate juridical experience." This experience

is given in acts of legislators, of authorities, of electors, of persons

i8 R. von Stammler, Recht und Wilkiir (Halle, I895); Die Lehre vom richtigen Rechte

(2d ed.; Halle, I926).

'9 For a more detailed exposition of the relation of law to ethics and to power see my

article, "Le Droit, l'6thique, le pouvoir," Archives de philosophie du droit et de sociologie

juridique (I936), Nos. I-2.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

232 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

contracting settlements, of persons taking part in the juridical life

of corporate bodies-only this interpretation gives to these acts the

character of being related to law. But this type of experience is, ac-

cording to his opinion, veiled in the minds of the actors by too much

reflection and conceptual formulation. Gradual reduction and "in-

version" have to be applied in order to gain the needed knowledge.20

This is, I may add, a method analogous to that applied by Freud's

school when investigating subconscious psychic currents.

The second type of observation studies human behavior deter-

mined by law or relative to law. Material collected by those pursuing

the sociological trend in jurisprudence may be very useful in so far

as it shows how rigid legal formulas are transformed in actual life,

or how (for example) unjust or antiquated laws are avoided. For

jurisprudence with this sociological tendency the transformed norms

are the objects of study, replacing the dead rules included in written

law.21 For the sociology of law-not the transformed norms of con-

duct, but the fact of their transformation-is interesting, and thus

creates an incentive for studying, in general, the process of modifying

patterns of written law by means of conflicts with other social phe-

nomena and structures. The sociology of law does not have to be

limited by data of such a type. Direct and special observation may

also be applied in order to investigate such problems as, for instance,

the role of conditioned reflexes in securing the triumph of law. The

idea that social control, especially control by means of law, is based

upon conditioned reflexes, is sometimes expressed in social psychol-

ogy.22 But there is no precise study of how this control is effected,

and which are the unconditioned reflexes forming the basis of the

conditioned. I. Pavlov suggests especially the study of the reflexes

of freedom and submission.23

Experiment has to join observation. Introspective experiments

20 G. Gurvitch, L'Exp6rience juridique et la philosophie pluraliste du droit (Paris,

I935), pp. I3, 63-

21 For instance, Ehrlich, op. cit., pp. 298, 396.

22 F. H. Allport, Social Psychology, passim.

23 Twenty-five Years of Objective Study of the Higher Nervous Activity of Animals

(Leningrad, I925), pp. 306-8 (Eng. trans., I928); cf. also Conditioned Reflexes (Eng.

trans., I927), pp. 395-96, and K. Platonow, Hypnosis and Suggestion (Kharkow, I925),

pp. 4I-42 (in Russian).

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"? 233

are proposed by Professor L. Petrajitsky. According to him, juridi-

cal or (in general) ethical impulses may be successfully studied, ap-

plying the methods of contradiction and of teasing; impulses increase

in force if attempts are made to hinder their normal running, or if

rapid changes of the situation occur, alternately decreasing and in-

creasing the chances for realizing the impulses. In such cases these

impulses, which are almost imperceptible when they develop in a

normal way, become dominating and therefore may be described

with great accuracy.24

Experiments by means of tests are also possible. J. Piaget25 and

I. Caruso26 have applied an ingenious system of tests in order to study

the growth of the retributive emotion in children. Their point of

view was that of morals rather than law, but, in spite of this, their

results are of great help when studying the "immediate juridical

experience." On the other hand it would be very useful to apply the

same method in order to investigate the juridical mentality of adults.

Such questions as the survival of the primitive revenge mentality,

or the role of the retributive emotion as one of the roots of criminal

law even today,27 or the relative force of norms of conduct belonging

to the domains of law, morals, and custom, could be studied in a

large number of different situations.

Just as pathology gives valuable data when studying biology, so

psychopathology when studying psychology. Criminology, the study

of abnormal behavior in human society, or of not adapting the indi-

vidual will to social patterns, may, together with the sociology of

revolutions, give a great number of valuable insights in constructing

the sociology of law. The sociology of law and criminology must each

assist the other.

Data collected by observation and by experiments of the above-

24 Petrajitsky, op. cit., p. 5.

25 Le Jugement moral des enfants (Paris, I93I).

26 La Notion de la responsabilite et de la justice immanente chez l'enfant. (This book is

to appear next year in Louvain. The author kindly gave me permission to use his

manuscript.)

27 The question of whether the retributive emotion plays and ought to play a part in

modem criminal law was amply debated during the preparation of a new criminal code

for Germany. The best work concerning the above-mentioned question is that of E

Beling, Die Vergeltung und ikre Bedeutung fur das Strafrecht (Leipzig, I908).

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

234 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

mentioned types, and by using the results of criminological research,

refer to the conduct of modern civilized men. In order to control the

general validity of the data obtained in these ways, the data of eth-

nology and of historical jurisprudence have to be included, as well

as data of child psychology.28 Of course, these data should not be

given an exaggerated place in the system-the sociology of law

should not become a theory of primitive law, just as sociology in

general should not be merely a science of primitive human behavior.

As with criminology, the support of the sociology of law on the

one hand and of ethnology and historical jurisprudence on the other

hand must be a mutual one.

The sociology of law is the only science which might discover ob-

jective and not purely subjective and conjectural limits for the phe-

nomenon of law; the limit is given by differences in social interac-

tion. In law the "equal interaction" forming the essence of the recog-

nition of norms by group members is combined with an "unequal

interaction" related to power.29

The absence of such considerations often hinders authors from

putting correctly the problems of primitive or of historical jurispru-

dence. For instance, when trying to prove that law already existed

at very early stages of social evolution, B. Malinowski invokes the

fact that there were already rules "conceived and acted upon as

binding obligations."130 But custom and social morals (in opposition

to personal moral conviction) are also binding, endowed with social

pressure, and therefore the existence of compulsory rules is insuffi-

cient to prove the existence of law. Further, according to A. S.

Diamond, "among the tribes, which have not yet evolved courts

.... we may observe .... settled rules of conduct as to marriage

and inheritance and perhaps property, and these might well be de-

scribed as law."'3 Why? For these rules "are in the direct line of the

history of law." On the contrary, the legal character of other rules,

which were in force together with that named above, but later on

28 Petrajitsky (op. cit., pp. 95-99) makes very ingenious remarks concerning the im-

portance of studying children at play as an aid in understanding the growth of the

juridical mentality.

29 Cf. my above-quoted article, "Le Droit, l'Nthique, le pouvoir."

30 B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London, I926), p. i5.

3I A. S. Diamond, Primitive Law (London and New York, I935), p. 2I9.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

WVHAT IS "SOCIOLOGY OF LAW"? 235

disappeared, is denied.32 In other words, the author separates early

rules into two classes from the viewpoint of their later fate. The lack

of any actual criterion for legal rules is obvious.

Last but not least, brilliant remarks of sociological character have

been made by philosophers of law, historians of law, and students of

positive law. These remarks in their totality are not able to replace

sociology of law; for, made without any relation to a general socio-

logical system, sometimes without knowing that sociology may exist

or in conscious opposition to any sociology, especially to sociology of

law, these remarks have almost without exception been conjectures

rather than scientific theories. But it is not the task of the sociology

of law to replace, but only to complete, the points of view of analyti-

cal, historical, comparative, and theoretical jurisprudence. Every

attempt to construct a sociology of law without possessing sufficient

knowledge in jurisprudence would be a failure.

There is room for a new science of the sociology of law; there are

sufficient materials and methods to help us gain new knowledge; and

there exist already brilliant attempts to solve the problem of the

sociology of law. Continuing these efforts is an important task, not

only from the theoretical but also from the practical point of view.

For the sociology of law might become a basis for an applied science

of legislation. And, in opposition to the belief of Savigny and the

other founders of the historical school of jurisprudence, our time is

called to a more rational settlement of human relations by means of

consciously elaborated legislation.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

32 Op. cit., pp. I9T-92.

This content downloaded from 103.231.241.233 on Sun, 27 Mar 2016 13:12:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms