Creativity and Insight - A Review of EEG, ERP - Anotado PDF

Psychological Bulletin

2010, Vol. 136, No. 5, 822 848

2010 American Psychological Association

0033-2909/10/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0019749
A Review of EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging Studies of

Creativity and Insight
Arne Dietrich and Riam Kanso
American University of Beirut
Creativity is a cornerstone of what makes us human, yet the neural mechanisms underlying creative
thinking are poorly understood. A recent surge of interest into the neural underpinnings of creative
behavior has produced a banquet of data that is tantalizing but, considered as a whole, deeply
self-contradictory. We review the emerging literature and take stock of several long-standing theories and
widely held beliefs about creativity. A total of 72 experiments, reported in 63 articles, make up the core
of the review. They broadly fall into 3 categories: divergent thinking, artistic creativity, and insight.
Electroencephalographic studies of divergent thinking yield highly variegated results. Neuroimaging
studies of this paradigm also indicate no reliable changes above and beyond diffuse prefrontal activation.
These findings call into question the usefulness of the divergent thinking construct in the search for the
neural basis of creativity. A similarly inconclusive picture emerges for studies of artistic performance,
except that this paradigm also often yields activation of motor and temporoparietal regions. Neuroelectric
and imaging studies of insight are more consistent, reflecting changes in anterior cingulate cortex and
prefrontal areas. Taken together, creative thinking does not appear to critically depend on any single
mental process or brain region, and it is not especially associated with right brains, defocused attention,
low arousal, or alpha synchronization, as sometimes hypothesized. To make creativity tractable in the
brain, it must be further subdivided into different types that can be meaningfully associated with specific
neurocognitive processes.
Keywords: art, divergent thinking, music, right brain, prefrontal cortex
shove him/her into the nearest brain scanner, and tell him/her:
Now, please be creative! The same, one might think, holds for
insights. An insight is so capricious, such a slippery thing to catch
in flagrante, that it appears almost deliberately designed to defy
empirical inquiry. To most neuroscientists, the prospect of looking
for creativity in the brain must seem like trying to nail jelly to the
wall.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the experimental study of
creativity did not develop over the past 50 years like other areas of
the psychological sciencesthat is, relentlessly forward and upward. To clarify, there has been, no doubt, considerable progress in
many areas of creativity research. Through surveys, case studies,
historical records, or personality inventories, psychologists have
amassed a large database about the creative process, from the traits
and habits of individual geniuses to general patterns common to
the career trajectories of all creators (e.g., Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 2003). Laboratory-based research on creativity, however, the
mainstay of nearly all other domains in psychology, did not proliferate in the same way.
Early experimental work by Gestalt psychologists on insight
aside (e.g., Wertheimer, 1945), creativity research is commonly
said to have begun with Joy Paul Guilfords farewell address as
president of the American Psychological Association in 1950. In
this article, Guilford (1950) called for the study of creativity and
backed his call to arms with a proposal on how to go about doing
so, via the concept of divergent thinking.
The idea of divergent thinking, defined as the ability to generate
multiple solutions to an open-ended problem (Guilford, 1967), was
quickly taken up because it represented a method to bring a
hitherto intractable problem into the folds of empirical science.
Creativity is the fountainhead of human civilizations. All

progress and innovation depend on our ability to change existing
thinking patterns, break with the present, and build something new.
Given the central importance of this most extraordinary capacity of
the human mind, one would think that the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of creative thinking are the subject of intense
research efforts in the behavioral and brain sciences. To study
creative ideas, and how and where they arise in the brain, is to
approach a defining element of what makes us human. Furthermore, by identifying the basic principles of our ingenuity, researchers might be able to enhance this process in the future, with
potentially enormous benefits for society.
There are several reasons why neuroscientists did not tackle
creativity with the same kind of resolve as they did, say, with
attention, memory, or intelligence. The most important of these is
surely the problem of finding a way to study the creative process,
especially its neural basis, in the laboratory under tightly controlled conditions. Clearly, one cannot simply take a volunteer,
Arne Dietrich and Riam Kanso, Department of Social and Behavioral

Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.
Riam Kanso is now at the Department of Experimental Psychology, St.
Johns College, University of Oxford, Oxford, England.
We are indebted greatly to Hilde Haider for advice. Thanks also to
Fidaa Chehayeb, Patrick Lewtas, Narayanan Srinivasan, and Joanne Rechdan for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Arne
Dietrich, Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, American University of Beirut, Beirut 1107-2020, Lebanon. E-mail: arne.dietrich@
aub.edu.lb
822
CREATIVITY REVIEW
Several standardized psychometric instruments of creativity were

subsequently developed. The most popular of these tools, to this
very day, include Torrances (1974) Torrance Test of Creative
Thinking, which is based on divergent thinking, and Mednicks
(1962) Remote Associates Test, which is based on the related
construct of associative hierarchies. A prototypical example of a
divergent thinking task is the Alternative Uses Test (Guilford,
1967), which asks participants to generate alternative uses for, say,
a brick or an automobile tire. The dependent variables of divergent
thinking tasks, such as the Alternative Uses Test, are ideational
fluency (i.e., the number of ideas), flexibility (i.e., the number of
different types or categories of ideas), and novelty (or uniqueness/
originality) of the ideas. Whereas ideational fluency and flexibility are
variables that can simply be counted, the third variable, novelty, is
commonly assessed with the so-called consensual method (Amabile,
1983), in which nave judges rate the originality of the answers.
By tentatively distinguishing creative from noncreative (convergent, in this case) information processing, the construct of divergent thinking was an attempt to get an initial grip on the problem.
In many ways, it was the kick start creativity research needed to
get underway. However, from this rather promising beginning, in
a development that even Guilford did not intend, this idea morphed
from a first crack at this hard-to-pin down phenomenon into the
standard conception of creativity, dominating theoretical and empirical work ever since. Once established, tests of divergent thinking became, for the sake of convenience, tests of creativity; and
findings using these scales were often discussed, without badly
needed qualifying remarks, as if applicable to creativity in general.
This practice of accepting divergent thinking as proxy for creative thinking has been strongly criticized (Dietrich, 2007b; Ward,
Smith, & Finke, 1999). The problem is two-fold. First, it is obvious
at a moments reflectionand certainly was to Guilford himself
that creativity can just as well be the result of a convergent process.
What would we otherwise make of Edisons assembly line, nearly
algorithmic approach to inventing; Bachs methodical way of
composing hundreds of cantatas; the imaginative ways in which
National Aeronautics and Space Administration engineers solved
the problems of the otherwise doomed Apollo 11 mission; or the
countless creative solutions generated by systematically eliminating alternative possibilities?
This critique raises the following, rather obvious question:
What, exactly, is it about divergent thinking that is creative? That
divergent thinking can also generate nonnovel outcomesand
convergent thinking novel onesrenders it incapable of identifying the fundamental processes, cognitive or neural, that make
information processing creative. In addition, divergent thinking is
a compound construct. Because it consists of various different, and
separate, mental processes, it cannot isolate the cognitive elements
that turn ordinary thinking into creative thinking. This composite
nature makes the construct all but intractable with current neuroimaging tools.
This critique extends, without modification, to proposals of
component stages of creativity. Take, for instance, the introspective hunch, first expressed by Wallas (1926), that the creative
process consists of four stages: preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. It should be obvious that stages such as
preparation or verification (a) are also at work during normal,
noncreative thinking and (b) are compound constructs that lack a
coherent theoretical notion as to the individual cognitive processes
823
they require. Despite these drawbacks, and perhaps because of a

lack of alternatives, tests of divergent thinking, such as the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking and Remote Associates Test, are
the most widely used methods for assessing creativity. More than
half of all experiments reviewed in the present study exploit this
paradigm.
There are, however, other avenues. In their search for the neural
correlates of creativity, investigators have also made use of entirely different kinds of tasks. These tasks do not share a common
underlying rationale but can perhaps best be categorized as neuroscientific studies on musical and artistic performance. One of the
most remarkable features about the experiments fitting this broad
paradigm is the innovative way in which the subject of creativity
is approached. This alternative approach has had important yet
underappreciated consequences for our understanding of the neural
basis of creativity, particularly in terms of slowing the ever-present
danger of treating creativity as a monolithic entity (Dietrich,
2007b). This problem arises most prominently in the divergent
thinking literature, in which it is not uncommon for investigators
to effectively equate divergent thinking with creativity and, on the
basis of this sleight of hand, draw conclusions about creativity per
se. Investigations of musical and artistic processes, such as free
jazz composition, imagining a painting, or drawing an abstract
concept, reveal that several of the theoretical distinctions that have
dominated the field to datefor example, divergent versus convergent thinking, right versus left brain processing, and focused
versus defocused attentionare too simplistic.
A third domain has also been invoked to help uncover the
mechanisms underlying creative thinking: insight. Insight events
are rightfully a subfield of creativity because the first step toward
a finished creative product is, more often than not, a creative
insight. Insight tasks are more narrowly defined than those of the
other two domains, and they help reveal the full measure of how
complex, varied, and multistep the neural mechanisms of creativity
must be.
The current study reviews, for the first time, the entire literature
that relates creativity to brain activity. The main goal is to take
stock of several long-standing theories and widely held beliefs
about creativity by evaluating their claims against the extant evidence. To do this properly, we adopted an approach that is theoretically neutralthat is, we assessed each theory on its own merit
rather than from a competing conceptual perspective. There are
two advantages to this method. First, there exists no sound, theoretical framework on the neural basis of creative thinking that we
could use to guide the present review. Absent such a unifying
framework, it is probably best to adopt a bottom-up, data-driven
approach to reviewing the literature. Second, a theory should be
evaluated against its own claims. There are many competing
theories in the field, each with its own assumptions and a priori
notions about creativity. Examining one theory by using the standards of another is not likely to yield unbiased assessments.
By reviewing the field, we hope to show that creativity, in all its
forms, simply cannot be captured with any of the relatively coarse
theoretical proposals currently in circulation, such as alpha synchrony, prefrontal activation, or low arousal. Conjectures such as
these have survived, we believe, because the field is heavily
fragmented. This fragmentation sets up a situation that permits
isolated theories to be maintained by selectively citing those studies that support them, whereas there exist just as many data against
DIETRICH AND KANSO
824
them. Only through systematically reviewing the evidence for

different conceptions of creativity, we hold, can the temptation to
appraise creativity as a single, simple mental process or brain
region be overcome.
The Search Strategy

We reviewed neuroimaging and neuroelectric studies designed
to investigate creativity and insight. The search strategy, along
with the inclusion and exclusion criteria, was as follows. We
attained all articles published in English claiming to investigate
creativity and insight in conjunction with direct measures of brain
activity, including (a) neuroimaging techniquesfunctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography
(PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), and
near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS)and (b) neuroelectric techniques electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials
(ERP). Specifically, we searched the Web of Science, PubMed, PsycINFO, and other databases with Boolean operators using the following keywords: creative, creativity, insight, innovation, drawing, music, designing, divergent thinking, art, and problem solving along with
EEG, ERP, fMRI, SPECT, MRI, PET, NIRS, and imaging.
This search yielded a large set of 1,910 articles that was then
pruned using a consensual process according to the following selection criteria: If authors did not, even in passing, associate their work
with creativity or insightful problem solving in the title or abstract, or
did not (in the case of musical perception) examine behavioral expression, the study was excluded. We readily excluded, on the basis of
this rule, over 90% of the initial selection of articles on art, music, and
cognitive performance. However, as would be expected, borderline
cases immediately presented themselves. For instance, we identified a
large number of brain studies reporting on domains that are manifestly
relevant to creative thinking, such as metaphorical reasoning, mental
imagery, perceptual restructuring, the perception of music, or various
processes involved in cognitive flexibilityset-shifting, planning,
inhibition of existing knowledge, counterfactual thinking, or perseverance, to name prominent examples. Again, unless there was specific mention in the title or abstract of the keywords creativity,
creative thinking, hypothesis generation, aha effect, Eureka experience, novel ideas, original ideas, innovation, insight problem-solving,
or insight, we excluded these references. Similarly, we eliminated all
studies from the initial set of articles that did not actually utilize
neuroimaging techniques but based conclusions about the neural
mechanism of creativity on brain abnormalities (such as dementia,
stroke, or schizophrenia), pharmacological intervention (such as the
use of ephedrine or lorazepam), or psychological disorders (such as
bipolar disorder or the savant syndrome of autism). The reference lists
of the final set of articles were also cross-checked for any additional
articles that were then subjected to the same selection procedure.
Placing primacy on self-classification can, of course, be criticized. One could argue, for instance, that some studies included in
the core set may actually involve little or no creativity, whereas
other excluded studies on, say, mental imagery demonstratively
do. However, we felt that such subjective judgments on our part
would open the door to an indefensible slippery slope.
Using the above criteria, we gathered what we believe is a
comprehensive list of brain imaging studies on creativity. In total,
72 experiments reported in 63 articles published until February
2010 were included in the review. Conspicuously, all but five of
these 63 articles were published after 2000, a striking testament to

the sudden popularity of this research topic and to the recent
development of some of the brain imaging strategies under review.
We sorted articles into the three broad categories: (a) studies using
the paradigm of divergent thinking, (b) studies investigating the
cognition of art and music, and (c) studies looking at insight
events. Other psychological research traditions developmental,
social, historiometric or even cognitivefeature many other approaches to creativity, but they have not made direct contact with
neuroscientific paradigms and, as such, are beyond the scope of
this article. We refer the reader to other reviews for this body of
work (i.e., Runco, 2004).
Divergent Thinking
EEG and Divergent Thinking
EEG is a noninvasive measure of electrical brain activity. It is a
record of electric field potentials, represented as changes in potential
difference between different points on the scalp, which arise primarily
from excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials. Although the
EEG signal has been used for decades to limn the neurophysiological
changes that accompany mental processes, it was not used to study
aspects of creativity until the late 1990s, save for three reports by
Martindale and colleagues (Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale
& Hines, 1975; Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello, 1984).
Several EEG parameters are relevant to this review. EEG data are
reported in frequency ranges. At the low end of the scale is delta
activity, which is a regular, low-amplitude wave of 15 Hz. This
frequency band reflects a low neuronal firing rate and is mostly
associated with deep sleep. Theta activity is a medium-amplitude,
medium-frequency rhythm of 5 8 Hz. A person exhibiting this
rhythm reports feeling drowsy. Alpha activity is a fairly regular
pattern between 8 and 12 Hz. The alpha band is prominent when a
person is minimally arousedawake but relaxed. Beta activity, which
is an irregular pattern between 12 and 30 Hz, occurs mostly during
alertness and active thinking. Finally, there is the gamma rhythm,
which represents oscillations around the 40 Hz mark that are associated with the binding of perceptual information. Changes to the EEG
records are reported in terms of power and synchrony. EEG power is
obtained by doing spectral analysis; it reflects the frequency content in
an electrode. EEG synchrony is a reflection of how the signals from
different electrodes are related to each other. Power changes in timelocked events are known as event-related synchronization (ERS) and
event-related desynchronization (ERD; Pfurtscheller & Lopes da
Silva, 1999). Synchrony is used to indicate synchronous activity
between pairs of electrodes that is independent of spectral power or
amplitude.
ERP is EEG recorded in response to external stimuli. Stimuluslocked ERPs are usually much smaller in amplitude than EEG and are
described in terms of their characteristic scalp distribution, polarity,
and latency. The ERP record yields several components that provide
information about different cognitive processes. The prominent P300,
for instance, is a positive deflection occurring 300 ms after stimulus
presentation; it is thought to reflect attentional resource allocation and
cognitive processing speed. The N200, on the other hand, is a negative
deflection 200 ms post stimulus onset and may reflect response
inhibition. In creativity research, only insight studies have thus far
made use of this technique.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
The first part of Table 1 summarizes the findings from EEG

creativity studies using the divergent thinking paradigm. To date, no
ERP studies have been published in this domain of creativity research.
An initial scan of this literature is sufficient to see the challenge of
distilling the existing data into any sound conclusions. The findings
from different studies are difficult to compare because (a) investigators have used a host of divergent thinking tests, including original
measures that have not been replicated and for which standardization
and validation data are lacking; (b) these divergent thinking tasks, as
diverse as they already are, are then compared with a number of
different control conditions; and (c) only a small fraction of the studies
in this category use high-density EEG. These limitations should be
kept in mind as conclusions are drawn from these data.
The data are summarized, for the sake of consistency, according to
categories dominant in the EEG literature (see Table 1). This yields
three main themes: (a) laterality, (b) changes to the alpha band, and (c)
changes to all other frequencies.
The idea that creativity is a function, primarily or exclusively, of
the right brain is surely the most popular theory on the neural basis of
creativity in the wider public. However, duly sharpened versions
of this idea have been seriously entertained in neuroscience as well
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). EEG
studies on divergent thinking do not confirm this contention. There
are a few studies that can be recruited to support a special role for the
right hemisphere in divergent thinking (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009,
Experiment 1; Fink & Neubauer 2006b; Grabner, Fink, & Neubauer,
2007; Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000a; Martindale & Hines, 1975; Martindale et al., 1984; Razumnikova, 2004). It should be noted, however,
that the authors responsible for three of the seven articles cited above
do not themselves interpret their data in this manner (Fink, Grabner,
et al., 2009), and they do not believe the data should be used for this
purpose (Fink, personal communication, March 10, 2008). Whereas
only one study could possibly be drafted to claim the opposite, a
left-brain theory of creativity as it were (Razumnikova, 2007), the
majority of the investigations (14 in total), including those from
authors cited above for possibly supporting right-brain dominance,
lend no support to the right-brain theory (Bazanova & Aftanas, 2008;
Danko, Shemyakina, Nagornova, & Starchenko, 2009; Fink, Grabner,
Benedek, & Neubauer, 2006; Fink & Neubauer 2006a; Jausovec,
2000; Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000b; Jin, Kwon, Jeong, Kwon, & Shin,
2006; Krug, Mlle, Dodt, Fehm, & Born, 2003; Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Mlle, Marshall, Wolf, Fehm, & Born, 1999; Razumnikova, 2004, 2005; Razumnikova, Volf, & Tarasova, 2009; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007). In sum, the EEG data on divergent thinking
fail to substantiate the notion of lateralization in creativity for either
cerebral hemisphere.
Another focus of interest in this literature is the alpha band because
increases in power or synchrony at this frequency range have previously been taken to indicate low cortical arousal and defocused
attention, two theoretical guideposts of empirical research (Martindale, 1999; Mendelsohn, 1976). This interpretation of alpha enhancement was primarily based on the understanding that alpha ERS
reflects cortical deactivation (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 1999),
whereas ERD reflects cortical activation (Klimesch, 1999). Both
interpretations have recently been revised, however (Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007), which increases the challenge of understanding the functional meaning of EEG data. In addition, work on the
alpha rhythm has also exposed the need to distinguish different
subbands of this frequency because lower and upper alpha respond
825
differently, and at times in an opposing manner, to certain task

parameters. Whereas low alpha appears to respond to various basic
types of attentional demands, such as alertness and vigilance, higher
alpha responds selectively to more specific task demands, primarily
semantic memory processes (Klimesch et al., 2007).
Changes to alpha beyond that obtained in control tasks are indeed
often observed when participants work on divergent thinking tests.
The direction of this change, however, is not uniform. For frontal
alpha, for instance, some investigators have reported increases in
synchrony associated with divergent thinking (Fink et al., 2006; Fink,
Grabner, et al., 2009; Grabner et al., 2007; Jausovec, 2000; Razumnikova, 2004), although others have reported decreases (Jausovec &
Jausovec, 2000b; Razumnikova, 2005, 2007; Razumnikova et al.,
2009). This pattern also holds for power: Some investigations have
shown increased alpha power at frontal sites (Bazanova & Aftanas,
2008; Fink & Neubauer, 2006a, 2006b; Jausovec, 2000; Krug et al.,
2003; Martindale & Hines, 1975; Martindale et al., 1984), others
either have not reported significant increases (Martindale & Hasenfus,
1978) or have demonstrated the exact oppositethat is, divergent
thinking is associated with higher theta, delta, and beta power but not
alpha power (Danko et al., 2009; Mlle et al., 1999; Razumnikova,
2004, 2005, 2007; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007).
Examining the data in terms of subbands does not clarify the
picture. Although several older studies have not reported lower alpha
separate from higher, many have implicated both bands (e.g., Fink,
Grabner, et al., 2009; Jausovec, 2000; Razumnikova, 2005, 2007).
Overall, however, slightly more studies have reported effects for
lower alpha (Fink et al., 2006; Fink & Neubauer, 2006a; Grabner et
al., 2007; Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000b; Razumnikova, 2007; Razumnikova et al., 2009) than upper alpha. What is most noticeable,
however, is the lack of consistent creativity-related changes reported
to frontal alpha in a majority of EEG divergent thinking studies. The
lack of consistency across studies at this site, which holds in fact for
all frequency bands, is surprising in light of the fact that neuroimaging
studies of divergent thinking consistently implicate the prefrontal
cortex.
The picture is similar for alpha at temporal or parietal sites. For
synchrony, there are data showing increases (Fink & Neubauer
2006a), especially for the originality score (Fink, Grabner, et al.,
2009), as well as decreases (Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000b; Razumnikova, 2007; Razumnikova et al., 2009; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007),
with the vast majority of studies indicating no consistent change.
Again, the lack of significant results in the majority of studies, along
with the inconclusiveness of the data that does exist, is difficult to
reconcile with the neuroimaging literature.
The data on all other frequency bands follow the same trend: They
are spotty and contradictory. For the beta frequency, for instance,
decreases in power have been described in all cortical areas (Krug et
al., 2003; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007), but there are also studies that
have described increases (Danko et al., 2009; Razumnikova, 2005,
2007). Some studies have found increases in beta ERS associated with
divergent thinking at both frontal and parietal sites (Mlle et al., 1999;
Razumnikova, 2004, 2005, 2007; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007).
Overall, however, the single most common finding in this literature is
the absence of significant changes to the beta frequency. Studies have
also implicated other frequency bands, such as theta or delta, but such
individual reports are infrequent and, at any rate, are rarely corroborated by a second study. Finally, there are no reports of consistent
DIETRICH AND KANSO
826
Table 1
Summary of Creativity Studies Using the Divergent Thinking Paradigm
Study
Martindale & Hines

(1975)
Martindale &
Hasenfus (1978)
32
Method
EEG
12 and 32 EEG
Martindale et al.
(1984),
Experiment 1
24
EEG
Martindale et al.
(1984),
Experiment 2
38
EEG
Mlle et al. (1999)
30
EEG
Jausovec (2000),
Experiment 1
49
EEG
Type of creativity tests
Type of design
Studies using EEG methods

DTT: RAT, AUT;
Within-task comparison and
CTT: IQ test
between-task comparison
Creative inspiration and Covariate (RAT, AUT),

elaboration;
within-task comparison and
Experiment 1:
Creative story
writing; Experiment
2: random vs.
fantasy speech
Speech types:
Covariate (RAT, AUT),
(a) random words,
(b) sentences that are
coherent but
unrelated to next,
(c) a meaningful
story (fantasy
speech)
Creating fantasy stories Covariate (RAT, AUT),
in response to Cards
1 and 11 of the
TAT; inspirational
stage (thinking of a
plot) and an
elaboration stage
(writing the plot
down)
DTT: (a) AUT,
Between-task comparison and
(b) unique
task vs. rest
consequences of a
hypothetical
situation, (c) think of
funny similarities
between two
pictures,
(d) unfinished
pictures and what
they could represent;
CTT: four different
tasks
CTT: (a) changing the

parking fee and
frequency of bus
departures and
(b) the plan-a-day
problem with
different constraints
Covariate (IQ and TTCT) and

task vs. rest
Main findings
High scorers on the AUT had

higher basal alpha; high scorers
on the RAT had the highest
percentage of alpha during tests
of creativity and lowest during
IQ test. Creativity was ssociated
with low cortical activation.
In two experiments, higher scorers
had higher alpha indices during
creative inspiration than during
creative elaboration, which was
not found for less creative
participants. There was no
correlation between creativity
and basal EEG alpha.
Higher scorers on the AUT and
RAT had increased alpha indices
(more time in alpha) over the
right hemisphere. There was
hemispheric asymmetry during
creative activity.
Higher scorers on the AUT and
RAT showed higher lefthemispheric alpha amplitudes
compared with the right
hemisphere, whereas low scorers
showed the opposite pattern.
Creativity was related to
hemispheric asymmetry.
Higher theta, delta, and beta power
on DTT compared with CTT or
rest. DTT increased the
dimensional complexity over
frontal, central, and parietal
areas compared with CTT and
over central, parietal, and
occipital areas compared with
rest. Alpha power was highest
during mental relaxation.
Dimensional complexity was
greater for DTT, which could be
the result of the concurrent
activation of a greater number of
independently oscillating
processing units.
Highly intelligent participants had
higher alpha power in frontal
and central sites and more
cooperation between brain areas.
Highly creative S had higher
cooperation between brain areas
mainly in frontal areas. EEG
was more influenced by IQ than
by creativity.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
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Table 1 (continued)
Study
Jausovec (2000),
Experiment 2
Method
48
EEG
Jausovec & Jausovec

(2000a)
115
EEG
Jausovec & Jausovec

(2000b),
Experiment 2
30
EEG
Razumnikova (2000)
36
EEG
Krug et al. (2003)
24
EEG
Type of design
DTT: verbal(a) name Covariate (IQ and TTCT) and

things making noise,
task vs. rest
(b) AUT, (c) ways in
which radio and
telephone are alike;
figuralunfinished
pictures and what
they could be; a
dialectic task: write a
text describing
reason of war
between fictional
states
Main findings
Highly creative participants

displayed higher alpha power in
frontal areas for DTT. Creative
participants also showed more
coherence between brain areas
in frontal and parietal sites,
whereas gifted ones showed
greater decoupling of brain areas
when solving ill-defined
problems, especially in LH.
Creativity and intelligence were
posited to be different abilities
that also differed in neurological
activity.
DTT: verbal(a) name Covariate (IQ and TTCT) and Only weak correlations emerged
things that make
task vs. rest (open and
between resting EEG and
noise, (b) AU for an
closed eyes)
creativity scores; correlations
automobile tire, (c)
with IQ scores were even less
all ways in which
pronounced. There were some
radio and telephone
correlations between coherence
are alike; figural
and both creativity and IQ with
unfinished pictures
open eyes; these were mainly
and what they could
negative and distributed over
be; WAIS IQ test
RH. Creativity showed less
cooperation between brain areas,
whereas intelligence showed
more.
Same as Jausovec
Between-task comparison and Power differences were mainly
(2000), Experiment 2
task vs. rest
related to the form of problem
presentation (figural/verbal).
Coherence was related to the
level of creativity. Figural DTT
showed highest ERD in lower
alpha, especially between left
temporal and frontal sites in LH
and between frontal, temporal.
and parietal sites in RH.
Creativity required broader
cooperation between brain areas.
DTT: how to measure Within-task comparison, and
CTT and DTT induced
the length of
task vs. rest
desynchronization in the alpha
hundreds of
band. Theta power decreases
poisonous snakes in
and coherence increases in beta
the zoo; CTT:
for DTT. Each mode of
mental arithmetic
thinking, CTT and DTT, showed
different EEG patterns.
DTT: unique
Covariate (menopausal women: For placebo, CTT showed lower
consequences of a
placebo estrogen and
alpha activity, and DTT showed
hypothetical
testosterone), between-task
lower beta power at central and
situation; CTT:
comparison, and task vs. rest
parietal leads. Estrogen impaired
logical thinking and
DTT, enhanced CTT, and was
mental arithmetic
accompanied by less
dimensional complexity over
right posterior regions.
Testosterone effects were
opposite: They increased performance and dimensional
complexity. Estrogen induced a
shift from a divergent to a
convergent mode of processing.
(table continues)
DIETRICH AND KANSO
828
Table 1 (continued)
Study
Method
Razumnikova (2004)
63
EEG
Same as Razumnikova
(2000)
Razumnikova (2005)
39
EEG
DTT: LFT, SAT, RAT
Jin et al. (2006)
50
EEG
(a) Lee & Jeongs

(2002) test of
creative thinking and
(b) the quail egg
(hypothesis
generation) task: find
a tentative
explanation for why
20 eggs from the
same quail have
surface differences
Fink et al. (2006)
30
EEG
DTT: Unusual
problems requiring
creative solutions
(a) Insight task, (b)
utopian situations,
and (c) the AUT;
CTT: WE Task
Fink & Neubauer

(2006a)
31
EEG
DTT: Unusual
problems requiring
creative solutions
(a) Insight task and
(b) utopian situations
Type of design
Main findings
Covariate (gender), within-task RH coherence increased in good

performers and decreased for
bad performers. DTT was
associated with more cortical
activity in RH for both genders.
Men were characterized by
greater hemispheric
specialization and more
pronounced inhibition of LH on
RH.
Covariate (gender), within-task Compared with rest and SAT, the
RAT showed increased
coherence in Theta 1 and Beta 2
as well as increases for Beta 2
power. Originality was
positively correlated with
intrahemispheric coherence of
the Beta 2 rhythm in LH; the
time needed for RAT was
negatively correlated with
interhemispheric coherence in
posterior cortex. Both LH and
RH contributed to creativity.
Covariate (nongifted vs. gifted Gifted children showed increased
students) and within-task
amount of transmitted
comparison
information between different
time series values between the
left temporal and central,
between the left temporal and
parietal, and between the left
central and parietal sites while
generating scientific hypotheses.
High-ability participants
developed strategies that made
relatively greater use of parietal
regions; low-ability participants
relied more on frontal regions.
Covariate (2 weeks DTT
The training group had (a) higher
training), between-task
originality sores for DTT and
worse scores for the CTT, (b)
higher alpha ERS, and (c)
higher power increases in
anterior cortices and in right
temporal and parietal sites.
Divergent thinking was linked to
low alpha power, which could
reflect hypofrontality needed to
produce novel ideas.
Covariate (verbal IQ and
Creativity was accompanied by
gender) and task vs. rest
increases in alpha power. Higher
originality was associated with a
stronger task-related alpha ERS
in posterior (particularly
centroparietal) cortices. This was
moderated by verbal IQ and
gender. More alpha power in
anterior regions reflected
hypofrontality; the frontal brain
must be downregulated to
produce creative ideas.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
829
Table 1 (continued)
Study
Method
Type of design
Fink & Neubauer

(2006b)
34
EEG
Same as Fink et al.

(2006)
Covariate (extra/introversion),
between-task comparison,
and task vs. rest
Razumnikova (2007)
39
EEG
DTT: RAT, SAT

task vs. rest
Shemyakina &
Danko (2007)
30
EEG
DTT: possible
definitions differing
task vs. rest
in meaning of (a)
emotionally positive,
(b) negative, and (c)
neutral nouns
Grabner et al. (2007)
26
EEG
DTT: unusual
situations that need
task vs. rest
an explanation taken
from the TTCT
Bazanova & Aftanas

(2008)
98
EEG
DDT: TTCT nonverbal Within-task comparison and

task vs. rest
Fink, Grabner, et al.

(2009),
Experiment 1
25
EEG
DDT: (a) AUT, (b)

invent names
belonging to
abbreviations; CTT:
(c) Think of
characteristics of
normal objects, (d)
WE Task
Razumnikova et al.
(2009)
53
EEG
DTT: to give original

solution to one
task vs. rest
figural and to one
verbal task; CTT:
same tasks but S was
to give any solution

task vs. rest
Main findings
Extraversion was not correlated
with originality. Extraverts
producing highly original ideas
had the highest alpha power,
whereas introverts with less
original ideas had the lowest.
EEG alpha activity was stronger
in RH. Extraverts who were
highly original had lowest level
of cortical arousal, and vice
versa.
The RAT showed higher power
and coherence in beta, increased
theta power at frontal sites, and
increased alpha ERDs over
posterior and prefrontal leads.
Originality was positively
correlated with more coherence
focused in the fronto-parietal
regions of both hemispheres in
beta and in left parietotemporal
loci for Alpha 1.
The creative task without
emotional induction led to a
local decrease in beta power in
the left frontotemporal area and
a coherence decrease in most
cortical zones. Emotional
induction had a much stronger
effect on the state of the cortex
than the creative task did.
More original ideas elicited a
stronger alpha ERS and higher
phase coupling in RH.
Originality was indexed in lower
alpha.
The maximum alpha activity peak
frequency was not significantly
correlated with creativity score.
Originality showed a trend with
lowest values for individual
alpha peak frequencies.
For AUT, there was strong alpha
ERS in frontal regions, and high
originality was associated with
alpha ERS in posterior brain
regions, especially in RH. Low
originality showed no
hemispheric differences.
Creative cognition was
associated with frontal alpha
synchronization.
There was higher activation in RH,
but that effect was independent
of gender, test, and creative
instruction. Desynchronization
of Alpha 1, 2 and Beta 2
rhythms. Some changes to
specific frequency were task
dependent.
(table continues)
DIETRICH AND KANSO
830
Table 1 (continued)
Study
Method
Danko et al. (2009)
27
EEG
Carlsson et al.
(2000)
24
Right CBF 133-Xe
Goel & Vartanian

(2005)
13
fMRI
fMRI
30
NIRS
Howard-Jones et al.
(2005)
Folley & Park

(2005)

DTT: a creative task
(overcoming a
stereotype); CTT: a
memory task
Type of design
task vs. rest
Main findings
The creative task produced a
marked increase in EEG power
in the Beta 2 and gamma bands.
Induction had a much stronger
effect on the cortex than the
creative task.
Studies using neuroimaging methods

CFT: (a) automatic
Covariate (CFT), within-task
Bilateral frontal increases
speechcount out
(especially anterior frontal) were
loud, (b) verbal
found for highly creative people,
fluency tasksay
and right decreases were found
words beginning
for low creative ones; no
with a specific letter,
consistent asymmetry was
and (c) AUT; also,
found; negative correlation
the WAIS
between performance on (c) and
blood flow in superior frontal
regions; highly creative people
did not perform better on (c).
DDT: match
Mixed design: prior assignment For DTT, there was activation in
problems22 match
to DDT or CTT condition
left DLPFC (BA 46) and right
configurations to be
and between-task
VLPFC (BA 47) in general; for
rearranged into other
comparison
correct solutions, activation
pattern by removing
occurred in left middle frontal
matches; start state
gyrus (BA 9) and the left frontal
was designed to
pole (BA 10); DTT and CTT
obstruct lateral
activated the right occipital
transformations
gyrus. A bilateral frontal system
towards end state;
was found to underwrite
CTT: same task but
hypothesis generation involving
end state is already
set-shift transformations,
known
especially in the right VLPFC
(BA 47).
Semantic divergence
Between-task comparison and For (c), there was increased
and creative story
task vs. rest
prefrontal activity, including
generation; sets of
bilateral medial frontal gyrus
three words, (a) half
and left ACC, and activation of
bore no relation to
visual cortices; for (a), there was
each other, (b) the
increased activity in ventral
other half did;
areas of the ACC and in the
instructions were to
frontal medial gyrus. Left PFC
(c) be creative or
activity was linked to sentence
(d) be uncreative
completion and word
association, and the right PFC
was linked to divergent semantic
processing.
DTT: A modified
Covariate (schizophrenics,
Schizotypes had higher DTT
picture version of the
schizotypes, and healthy),
scores and showed greater
RATparticipants
reliance on right PFC activity;
had to make
there was no difference between
associations between
schizophrenics and controls,
a target object and 8
either in DTT performance or in
other pictures; CTT:
prefrontal activation. Creativity
a matching colors
recruited the PFC bilaterally; but
task
enhanced performance,
especially novelty, was related
to right PFC activity.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
831
Table 1 (continued)
Study
Method
Chavez-Eakle et al.
(2007)
12
SPECT (99mTc-ECD)
Sieborger et al.
(2007)
21
Blom et al. (2008)
13
Hori et al. (2008)
27
Hansen et al. (2008)
12
Jung, Gasparovic, et
al. (2009)
37
Jung, Segall, et al.

(2009)
65
Type of design
Main findings
DDT: name all possible Covariate (TTCT Figural Form High scorers showed increased
unusual uses for
B, gender), within-task
CBF in right precentral gyrus
everyday objects
(BA 6), right cerebellum, left
frontal gyrus (BA 6, 10, and
47), right frontal rectal gyrus
(BA 11), left orbital frontal
gyrus (BA 47), left temporal
gyrus (BA 20 and 38), and
bilateral inferior parietal lobule
(BA 40). A bilateral distributed
system was involved in highly
creative performance.
fMRI
Finding pragmatic links Between-task comparison and For (a), more activity occurred in
between (a)
task vs. rest
frontoparietal regions; for (b),
incoherent vs. (b)
increased activation was found
unrelated sentences;
in the fusiform gyri. The time
creativity was
course of the signal change in
needed for
frontomedial regions showed
incoherent sentences
that all conditions engaged this
brain region to an equal degree.
PET (11C) raclopride DTT: subsample of the Within-task comparison and
There was a positive correlation
(11C) FLB 457
inventiveness battery
task vs. rest
between DTT and D2 binding
of the Berliner
potential in left sensorimotor
Intelligenz Struktur
striatum; there was an inverse
Test
correlation between DTT and
D2 binding potential in right
posterior thalamus. A limited
level of dopaminergic
hyperactivity was interpreted as
promoting creativity.
NIRS
DTT: LFT
Covariate (SPQ) and withinThe high SPQ group showed larger
task comparison
right PFC activation. A potential
confound could be that the high
SPQ group had a significantly
higher mean age. Schizotypal
traits were found to be related to
right prefrontal laterality.
fMRI
Creative metaphors or Covariate (IQ), between-task
For (a), there was bilateral activity
analogies: (a) 30
comparison and task vs. rest
of anterior frontal and posterior
fluid letter string
cortices, and the left middle
items (if abc abd,
superior frontal gyrus (BA 46/9)
then pqqrrr?); four
showed a linear relationship
answer choices
between IQ and BOLD change.
differing in
High IQ and analogizing were
analogical depth and
correlated, especially when
number of
incorporating elements of
transformation; (b)
creativity through adaptive
control task: perfectreorganization and restructuring
match letter string
of novel information.
item
MRI: DTI
DTT: five different
Tissue volume as a function of Tissue volume in occipital and
tasks of creativity,
test scores
frontal cortices as well as
all compiled into one
thalamus inversely predicted
creativity index
creative functioning. There was
a possible role of frontal
downregulation in creative
capacity.
MRI: proton
DTT: (a) AUT, (b) free Covariate (gender) and within- Women had higher creativity
spectostropy
drawing, (c) four
task comparison
scores and lower NAA in right
line drawing, all
anterior and posterior gray
compiled into a
matter compared with men; for
single creativity
both genders, bilateral anterior
index
NAA was inversely related to
creativity.
(table continues)
DIETRICH AND KANSO
832
Table 1 (continued)
Study
Method
Fink, Grabner, et al.

(2009),
Experiment 2
21
fMRI
Gibson et al. (2009),

Experiment 2
20 and 15 NIRS
Moore et al. (2009)
21
MRI

DDT: (a) AUT, (b)
invent names
belonging to
abbreviations; CTT:
(c) think of
characteristics of
normal objects, (d)
WE Task
Type of design
Main findings

task vs. rest
All tasks elicited similar brain

activation in all cortices as well
as the cerebellum, except for
bilateral occipital and cerebellar
activation. Most brain areas
showed mostly LH activation;
strongest and most widespread
activity in all tasks was in the
left frontal lobe, including SMA
and ACC; also activated were
hippocampusfor (a) and (c)
and left thalamusfor (a) and
(d). Frontal activity was
associated with task performance.
DTT: A modified
Covariate (musicians vs.
No differences emerged between
AUT; participants
nonmusicians) and withinmusicians and nonmusicians in
decided which
task comparison
or between the tasks. There was
objects in the array
a prefrontal increase in
could be used with a
musicians during the DTT
target stimulus; CTT:
compared with the CTT.
color categorization
Creative people were
characterized by enhanced
divergent thinking, via increased
frontal cortical activity.
DTT: TTCT
Tissue volume as a function of TTCT scores correlated negatively
test scores
with the size of the corpus
callosum volume. No
hemsphereic differences
emerged.
Note. ACC anterior cingulate cortex; AUT Alternative Uses Task; BA Brodmanns area; BOLD blood oxygenation level dependent;
CBF cerebral blood flow; CFT Creative Functioning Test; CTT Convergent Thinking Task; D2 Dopamine 2 receptor; DLPFC
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DTI diffusion tensor imaging; DTT Divergent Thinking Task; EEG electroencephalography; ERD
event-related desynchronization; ERS event-related synchronization; fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging; HC high-creative group;
LC low-creative group; LFT Letter Fluency Test; LH left hemisphere; NAA N-acetylaspartate; NIRS near-infrared spectroscopy; PET
positron emission tomography; PFC prefrontal cortex; RAT Remote Associates Test; RH right hemisphere; S subjects; SAT Simple
Associates Task; SMA supplementary motor area; SPECT single photon emission computed tomography; SPQ Schizotypal Personality
Questionnaire; TAT Thematic Apperception Test; TTCT Torrance Test of Creative Thinking; VLPFC ventrolateral prefrontal cortex;
WAIS Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; WE Word End.
changes to the gamma range, which is also surprising because such

reports do exist for the artistic creativity domain.
Given this overall hit-and-miss pattern of EEG results for the
divergent thinking paradigm, delving deeply into the possible
functional meaning of creativity-related EEG changes is challenging, to say the least. Anyone wishing to attempt this speculative
exercise would have to, as a first measure, explain away most of
the existing evidence, as there are as many, if not more, data
against any position one cares to take. Alternatively, a more
in-depth understanding of the cognitive processes underlying a
particular divergent thinking task could go a long way in disentangling the contradictory data. The real hope for the future of this
endeavor undoubtedly lies in such an approach.
Brain Imaging and Divergent Thinking

Unlike the EEG data, which are highly variegated, neuroimaging data using the divergent thinking paradigm reveal more
consistency. There are 14 studies in the brain imaging category,
which are also summarized in Table 1. These data are ordered
broadly into four themes, which center on possible neural loci

for divergent thinking effects. In addition to (a) laterality, we
examine the evidence for the involvement of (b) the prefrontal
cortex, (c) temporoparietal regions, and (d) all other brain
structures.
On the issue of hemispheric differences, the neuroimaging studies amplify the EEG data. With the possible exception of two studies
implicating the right prefrontal cortex (Folley & Park, 2005; HowardJones, Blakemore, Samuel, Rummers, & Claxton, 2005), none of the
other 12 studies in this group can be viewed as supporting a dominant
role for the right hemisphere, in part or whole (Blom et al., 2008;
Carlsson, Wendt, & Risberg, 2000; Chavez-Eakle, Graf-Guerrero,
Garcia-Reyna, Vaugier, & Cruz-Fuentes, 2007; Fink, Grabner, et
al., 2009, Experiment 2; Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009; Goel &
Vartanian, 2005; Hansen, Azzopardi, Matthews, & Geake, 2008; Hori
et al., 2008; Jung, Gasparovic, et al., 2009; Jung, Segall, et al., 2009;
Moore et al., 2009; Sieborger, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2007). One
study, in fact, even suggested that creativity, as measured by divergent
thinking, may involve heightened activation in the left hemisphere.
Fink, Grabner, et al. (2009) wrote the following:
CREATIVITY REVIEW
The finding of lower right angular and supramarginal activity in the
AU [alternative uses] task stands in contrast to studies emphasizing
the role of right hemispheric cortices in creative information processing . . . to our knowledge there is no direct evidence that it is
especially the right-hemispheric temporo-parietal regions that need to
be strongly activated during creative idea generation . . . . [R]ather the
contrary seems to hold true. (p. 744)
In sum, the evidence from neuroimaging experiments demonstrates that divergent thinking is not associated with hemispheric
specialization.
For those neuroimaging studies measuring functional aspects of
brain activityfMRI, PET, or NIRSactivation of prefrontal
regions is consistently reported (Carlsson et al., 2000; ChavezEakle et al., 2007; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Folley & Park, 2005;
Gibson et al., 2009; Goel & Vartanian, 2005; Hansen et al., 2008;
Hori et al., 2008; Howard-Jones et al., 2005; Sieborger et al.,
2007). Such findings are expectable, as divergent thinking tests
engage, presumably, working memory and executive attention.
What is much less clear is which prefrontal cortices are involved.
Although some studies have reported diffuse prefrontal activation
patterns (Carlsson et al., 2000; Folley & Park, 2005; Gibson et al.,
2009; Hori et al., 2008; Sieborger et al., 2007), others have pointed
to specific regions. For instance, regarding the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47), Goel and Vartanian (2005) reported rightsided activation, whereas Chavez-Eakle et al. (2007) reported
left-sided activation. For the frontal gyrus (BA 9) and frontal pole
(BA 10), four studies reported increases on the left side (ChavezEakle et al., 2007; Goel & Vartanian, 2005; Hansen et al., 2008;
Howard-Jones et al., 2005). Chavez-Eakle et al. (2007) also found
increased activation in the right premotor region (BA 6) and right
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 11). There are also reports of
activation in the left anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Howard-Jones et al., 2005), left dorsolateral
prefrontal area (BA 46), and supplementary motor area (Fink,
Grabner, et al., 2009).
Such a medley of cortical areas might be expected. First, divergent thinking is a composite, and tests based on this idea require a
host of different, and quite separate, cognitive processes. This
problem does not disappear by dividing creativity into component
stages that are equally complex in terms of their constituent mental
processes. Furthermore, each study uses a different rendering of
the open-ended question concept, ranging from remote associations in a semantic network to alternative uses for an automobile
tire; such findings are then compared with a variety of different
control tasks that also consist of a multitude of different mental
processes. The most sensible conclusion from these data is that
divergent thinking is not neuroanatomically detectable as a standalone, independent entity. Rather, it appears to involve the same
brain regions that also handle the normal, noncreative information
traffic associated with a given task, a notion that has already been
made on theoretical grounds (Dietrich, 2004a). Divergent thinking,
then, is not a different or separate mode of thinking for which there
is a specific set of processes or brain regions. Rather, it is broadly
distributed (Dietrich, 2007a).
There are also several reports implicating parietal (ChavezEakle et al., 2007; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Hansen et al., 2008;
Jung, Gasparovic, et al., 2009; Sieborger et al., 2007) and temporal
(Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Jung,
Gasparovic, et al., 2009) regions of the cerebral cortex in divergent
833
thinking. Upon closer inspection, however, these findings do not

coalesce into a coherent view either. Added to the fact that each
represents a minority report, these studies show individualistic and
diffuse activation patterns within this swath of tissue. Finally, a
number of other brain structures, both cortical and subcortical,
have been suggested to play a role in divergent thinking. There are
reports for visual areas (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Howard-Jones
et al., 2005; Jung, Segall, et al., 2009), the thalamus (Blom et al.,
2008; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Jung, Segall, et al., 2009), the
striatum (Blom et al., 2008), the hippocampus (Fink, Grabner, et
al., 2009), the anterior cingulate gyrus (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009;
Howard-Jones et al., 2005), the cerebellum (Chavez-Eakle et al.,
2007; Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009), and the corpus callosum (Jung,
Gasparovic, et al., 2009; Moore et al., 2009). Yet, such findings are
scattered and, for each brain structure, are not supported by the
overwhelming majority of studies.
Interim Conclusion on Divergent Thinking

There is surprisingly little overlap between the EEG and the
neuroimaging literature regarding implications for the neural basis
of creativity. With the exception of a single article using a combined EEG and fMRI approach (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009),
theoretical discussions make little contact with one another. Notions such as lateralitythe right brain, specificallylow arousal,
defocused attention, or personality traits have strongly influenced
the rationale and setup of EEG experiments and have led, in that
domain, to several biases for which results are reported and for
how they are interpreted with respect to creativity. This becomes
vividly clear in light of the fact that these ideas, with the exception
of hemispheric specialization, play only a minor role in the neuroimaging literature on creativity. For instance, the idea that low
arousal is linked to creativity hardly ever gets a mention in neuroimaging research, presumably because relative deactivations,
which would be needed to support such a claim, are rarely reported. Instead, results from neuroimaging experiments are commonly tied to the functional and anatomical characteristics of a
given brain structure. Such discussion is not found in regard to
EEG data because the poor spatial resolution of this tool makes
such deduction speculative. Despite this fragmentation, we draw
four broad conclusions from the existing data.
First, both EEG and neuroimaging experiments fail to support
the notion that divergent thinking, and by extension creativity, is
linked to the right brain or to the left brain, for that matter. There
is also no evidence to support the more cautious idea that specific
substages of divergent thinking show a laterality effect. Divergent
thinking, at any stage, entails cooperation among many different
cerebral areas and involves both hemispheres.
Second, the data simply do not support a special role of any
anatomical locus in divergent thinking (with the exception of the
prefrontal cortices). For each brain structure, the single most
visible fact is that the majority of studies do not find activation. In
other words, in discussing the possible involvement of any brain
region in creativity (e.g., the cerebellum; see Vandervert, Schimpf,
& Liu, 2007), we must ask ourselves, first and foremost, why these
individual results are, overwhelmingly, not replicated by other
studies. One could possibly argue that this is due to the use of
different divergent thinking tests. However, this raises another,
much bigger problem. If, indeed, slightly varying implementations
834
DIETRICH AND KANSO
of the divergent thinking paradigm, which all supposedly exploit

the same conceptproblems with no definitive, single solution
make such a huge difference in terms of brain activity, large
enough to cause activation in brain structures as massive as the
hippocampus (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009), striatum (Blom et al.,
2008), or cerebellum (Chavez-Eakle et al., 2007; Fink, Grabner, et
al., 2009) on some test versions but not in others, how useful is the
concept of divergent thinking, and the psychometric tests based on
it, as a tool in the search for the neuroanatomical basis of creativity? It is likely that future research will identify specific brain areas
for the creative processes, but this endeavor will require a more
fine-grained division of creativity into different types or processes
that are informed by cognitive neuroscience. Creativity, as a general construct, does not seem to be localizable.
Third, a similar conclusion emerges for theories based on specific mental processes, such as low arousal or defocused attention.
The weight of the evidence simply does not bear them out. Added
to this is the issue that the functional meaning of increased alpha
synchronization on which the low-arousal hypothesis reststhat
is, alpha ERS reflects cortical idlingis no longer current. This
idling interpretation has been turned nearly on its head in the past
decade by studies showing that it occurs in participants who
withhold or control the execution of a response (Klimesch, 1999;
Klimesch et al., 2007). ERS is functionally related to active information processing and may reflect top-down inhibitory processes.
Desynchronization, on the other hand, occurs because different
neural networks start to oscillate at different frequencies and with
different phases. It is thus indicative of active cognitive processing. If ERS plays an active, inhibitory role, the occurrence of ERD
may indicate a gradual release of that inhibition or, in short, the
emergence of spreading activation (Klimesch et al., 2007). Applied
to divergent thinking, ERS could be seen as the result of top-down
inhibitory processes that keep out interfering activity from brain
areas not directly involved in the performance of the task. This
new interpretation, to be clear, is the opposite of the idea of
defocused attention and low arousal because it supposes that ERS
is a marker of enhanced concentration and alertness.
There could well be certain types of creative thinking that are
facilitated by low cortical arousal or a more global focus of
attention but not creativity as a whole. Overall, (a) most EEG
studies do not show alpha enhancement; (b) the current understanding of the functional meaning of ERS does not allow for that
interpretation even for those studies that do show these effects; (c)
most neuroimaging studies show widespread cortical activation;
andmoving to a different paradigm(d) some pharmacological
evidence shows that arousal has either no effect on creativity
(Beversdorf, Hughes, Steinberg, Lewis, & Heilman, 1999) or,
indeed, has the opposite effect (see Blom et al., 2008, who reported
that dopaminergic hyperactivity promotes creativity).
Fourth, the data do permit the conclusion that the prefrontal
cortex plays a key role in divergent thinking. Beyond this rather
general statement, however, it is not possible to be more specific.
We cannot identify the areas of the prefrontal cortex that are
involved, and we do not know the functional role each may play in
the generation and evaluation of ideational combinations. We
examine this issue again in the section on artistic creativity, as
additional data from that domain seem to suggest one critical
functional division for the prefrontal cortex with respect to creativity.
Finally, the validity and reliability of divergent thinking tasks

must be focused on directly, especially in the context of neuroscientific studies. The possibility that divergent thinking tests simply
represent an odd mental ability test requiring perhaps some extra
mental effort and attention could explain the diffuse prefrontal
activation. Yet, how relevant are these tasks to real-world creativity? Can we really expect to identify the Michelangelos and Curies
of tomorrow by how many innovative uses they can come up with
for a brick? As for reliability, the many different cognitive processes tapped by divergent thinking measures introduce a high
degree of variability (see Dietrich, 2007b; Ward et al., 1999). It
appears that such tests may be too crude a measuring device to
make creativity tractable in the brain. Better psychometric instruments, along with a standardized set of control tasks, are mandatory.
Art and Music

EEG and Artistic Creativity
There are comparably fewer studies that examine creativity in
the domain of music, dancing, and painting. For EEG, our search
strategy identified seven experiments, all but two of them reported
in three articles by Bhattacharya, Petsche, and their colleagues
(Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche, Kaplan, von Stein,
& Filz, 1997). Neuroimaging studies are similarly sparse, with five
experiments using fMRI and one using PET. Still, these investigations contribute to our understanding of the neural basis of
creativity by solidifying and clarifying some of the findings from
divergent thinking studies. Table 2 summarizes these data.
One outstanding characteristic of all studies in this group is the
innovative way in which the subject of creativity is approached,
with emphasis on ecological validity. Theoretical discussion in
these articles is wide-ranging, including themes of mental imagery,
perceptual organization, designing, and response selection for musical composition or free improvisation. Perhaps not surprisingly,
additional brain structures come into play that did not feature in
divergent thinking studies, such as motor areas, somatosensory
areas, and cortical regions concerned with spatial or auditory
perception (see Table 2).
In a series of EEG experiments, Bhattacharya, Petsche, and their
colleagues examined the contribution of a variety of cognitive
processes manifestly involved in artistic creativity. To that end,
they devised a number of novel tasks, such as mentally composing
music, visualizing an abstract concept, looking at a painting, and
imagining a previously shown drawing. Three experiments (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment
1) used a between-subjects design that separated artists from
nonartists; one used experts only (Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment
2); and one used novices only (Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment 3).
In addition to these studies, there is an older experiment by
Martindale et al. (1984) that also used the novice-versus-expert
approach. To summarize findings, we organize the data along
similar lines to the divergent thinking researchthat is, we first
scrutinize the evidence with respect to laterality and then focus on
the changes to the various EEG frequency bands for each of the
different tasks.
Parallel to divergent thinking, the EEG data do not show a trend
toward hemispheric specialization. Although there is some indica-
CREATIVITY REVIEW
835
Table 2
Summary of Creativity Studies Using Tasks Related to Music or Painting
Study
Method
Type of design
Martindale et al.
(1984),
Experiment 3
21
EEG
Petsche et al.
(1997),
Experiment 1
38 women, half
artists
EEG
Mentally composing a
drawing: (a) contemplate a
painting, (b) silent reading
for distraction, (c)
memorizing a painting,
and (d) mentally creating
your own painting
Covariate (nonartists vs.

artists) and task vs.
rest
Petsche et al.
(1997),
Experiment 2
7 male
composers
EEG
Composing music: after (a)

listening to music of
different styles,
participants (b) mentally
composed their own
during EEG and later
wrote it down
Abstract mentation: (a)
visualize an abstract
concept and sketch it later
and (b) create a story with
10 words previously selfchosen and memorized
Between-task
comparison and task
vs. rest
Studies using EEG methods

Drawing a cows vertebra
Covariate (art vs. nonart
placed at an angle of 24
majors), between-task
in. (60.96 cm) from the S;
comparison, and task
reading was used as a
vs. rest
control task
Petsche et al.
(1997),
Experiment 3
38
EEG
Covariate (gender) and

task vs. rest
Bhattacharya &
Petsche
(2002)
20 women, half
artists
EEG
(a) looking at paintings

(perception) and (b)
imagining the previously
shown painting (mental
imagery); for distraction,
there were periods of rest
and newspaper reading
Covariate (nonartist vs.

artist), between-task
vs. rest
Bhattacharya &
Petsche
(2005)
19 women, 9
artists
EEG
Mentally composing a
drawing of their own
choice while looking at a
white wall; after EEG,
they had to sketch it
Covariate (nonartists vs.

artists) and task vs.
rest
Main findings
Both controls and art majors exhibited

greater right-hemispheric alpha
amplitudes during reading, but this
asymmetry was greater (in the
opposite direction) for artists. There
was a link between artistic
creativity and hemispheric
asymmetry.
There were decreases in alpha for all
tasks; this effect was larger for
artists. There were alpha coherence
decreases for (a) and (c), which
was larger for RH. For (d), alpha
coherence increased, mostly in
posterior brain regions. Artists and
nonartists did not differ for (d).
When perception was involved, a
larger area of cortex was engaged,
and there were more decreases in
Alpha 2 than in Alpha 1.
Compared with rest, coherence
patterns differed for 6 out of 7
composers for (a) and (b), but all
showed individualistic patterns. No
EEG measure in the Alpha 2 band
indexed common creative activities
underlying the composing of music.
For (a), men had Alpha 1 coherence
decreases and increases across the
midline in Alpha 2; women had
Alpha 1 coherence decreases across
frontal regions and increases in
Alpha 2 in left fronto-parietal
regions. For (b), there were
dramatic long-distance coherence
increases in LH in women,
especially in delta and theta.
Creativity was associated with
strong decreases in frontal regions
and involved both hemispheres.
For artists, there was enhanced phase
synchrony in beta and gamma for
(a) and enhanced delta for (b); there
was strongly decreased alpha
synchrony for (a) and (b); RH had
higher synchrony in artists.
Synchrony in beta and gamma
reflected better binding ability and
in delta reflected higher
involvement of long-term visual
memory.
Compared with rest, artists had
greater delta synchronization, and
nonartists had greater beta and
gamma synchronization, mostly in
frontal sites. Compared with
nonartists, artists had greater delta
band synchronization and alpha
desynchronization. RH had higher
synchrony in artists. Higher delta
synchrony reflected the involvement
of extensive top-down processing.
(table continues)
DIETRICH AND KANSO
836
Table 2 (continued)
Study
Method
Type of design
Fink, Graif, &

Neubauer
(2009)
32, 15 dancers
EEG
(a) mentally perform a

creative dance, (b)
mentally perform a waltz,
and (c) the AUT
Solso (2001)
2, a portrait
artist and a
control
fMRI
Brown et al.
(2006)
10 amateur
musicians
PET
(a) listen to incomplete novel

melodies and generate, by
vocally using da, an
appropriate phrase to
complete it and (b) listen
to novel sentence
fragments and generate
semantically and
syntactically appropriate
phrases to complete it
Between-task
comparison and task
vs. rest
Bengtsson et al.
(2007)
11 concert
pianists
fMRI
Musical pieces had to be (a)

improvised or (b)
reproduced on the basis of
prior presented sequences
Between-task
comparison and task
vs. rest
Covariate (nondancers
vs. dancers),
between-task
comparison

Participants had to (a) copy
Covariate (expert vs.
six portraits of faces and
novice), between-task
(b) six geometric figures
vs. rest
Main findings
Compared with novices, dancers had
stronger LH alpha ERS in posterior
brain regions for the AUT and
stronger bilateral alpha ERS for the
creative dance. No differences
existed for imaging the waltz.
For the artist, there were increases in

right middle frontal areas. For both,
there was activation in the right
posterior parietal, especially
fusiform gyrus, although this was
less for the artist. The artist (N
1) might have been be more
efficient in processing facial
features, engaging in more abstract
representation.
For (a), bilateral activation in SMA
(BA 6), pre-SMA, primary motor
cortex (BA 4), lateral premotor
cortex (BA6), frontal operculum
(BA 44/45), anterior insula,
auditory cortices (BA 41, 22), and
superior temporal pole (BA 22/38),
thalamus, basal ganglia, midbrain,
pons, and posterior cerebellum. For
(b), activation in pre-SMA,
sensorimotor cortex (BA 3, 4),
premotor cortex (BA 6), frontal
operculum (BA 44/45), superior
frontal gyrus (BA 8, 9), cingulated
motor area (BA 24/32), ACC,
anterior insula, parietal cortex (BA
39), auditory cortices (BA 41, 22),
middle temporal gyrus (BA 21),
hippocampus, ventral temporal pole
(BA 38), thalamus, basal ganglia,
posterior cerebellum, and midbrain.
This was more left-lateralized in
sensorimotor areas. Both tasks
showed dramatic deactivation in
parieto-occipital areas.
For (a), higher BOLD signal for right
DLPFC, pre-SMA, dorsal premotor
cortex, left posterior STG, fusiform
gyrus, and middle occipital gyrus;
no decreases reported. These areas
reflected neural processes in the
generation of new musical material
during improvisation; DLPFC and
pre-SMA were involved in the
creative aspects or free selection of
a response.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
837
Table 2 (continued)
Study
Method
Type of design
Limb & Braun

(2008)
6 jazz pianists
fMRI
Improvisation of novel
melodic, harmonic, and
rhythmic music; four types
of pieces required:
rehearsed vs. improvised
across low vs. high
complexity: (a) ScaleControl, (b) ScaleImprovisation, (c) JazzControl, (d) JazzImprovisation
Between-task
comparison and task
vs. rest
Berkowitz &
Ansari (2008)
12 trained
pianists
fMRI
Spontaneous musical performance: pianists were asked

to improvise; four
conditions varying in
constraints on note choice
(melodic freedom) and
rhythm (rhythmic freedom)
Between-task
comparison and task
vs. rest
Kowatari et al.
(2009)
40, half design

majors
fMRI
Artistic creativity: (a) design

a new pen while looking
at samples during scanning
and draw the designs
afterwards and (b)
counting (control task)
Covariate (expert vs.

novice), between-task
vs. rest
Main findings
For improvisation, widespread
deactivation in almost all areas of
the PFC, except for selective
activity in the frontal polar cortex
(BA 10); broad increases in
neocortical sensorimotor areas,
including middle temporal gyrus
(STG), inferior temporal cortex,
fusiform gyrus, occipital and
parietal regions, as well as
premotor cortex, SMA, and primary
motor cortex; activation also
occurred in ACC and lateral
cerebellar hemisphere; widespread
attenuation of activity in limbic and
paralimbic regions with selective
deactivations in amygdala,
entorhinal cortex, temporal pole,
posterior cortex, parahippocampal
gyri, hippocampus, and
hypothalamus. Activations during
improvisation were matched by
deactivations during control tasks.
Increases for rhythmic (temporal) and
melodic (ordinal) sequences in
premotor cortex areas, rostral
cingulate zone, posterior ACC,
inferior frontal gyrus, left
sensorimotor cortex, some parietal
areas, and the cerebellum. Common
activation suggested that invention
and selection of novel motor
sequences, whether melodic or
rhythmic, engaged similar areas.
Activated regions for novices and
experts: right inferior frontal gyrus,
prefrontal cortex (parts of BA 8, 9,
44, and 45), occipital cortex (BA
37), right inferior parietal cortex
(BA 19), inferior temporal cortex
(BA 21, 22), and hippocampus; NS
differences between the groups,
except for ACC activation in
novices. A trend for experts existed
for right prefrontal and parietal
increases and LH decreases, which
was bilateral for novices.
Professional training facilitated
right PFC dominance for design
creativity by decreasing left PFC
activity via inhibitory control.
Stronger suppression was associated
with greater design originality.
Note. ACC anterior cingulate cortex; AUT Alternative Uses Task; BA Brodmanns area; BOLD blood oxygenation level dependent; DLPFC
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; EEG electroencephalography; ERS event-related synchronization; fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging;
LH left hemisphere; PET positron emission tomography; PFC Prefrontal cortex; RH right hemisphere; S subjects; SMA supplementary
motor area; STG superior temporal gyrus.
tion that artists exhibit comparatively greater alpha power (Fink,

Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Martindale et al., 1984), as well as beta
and gamma synchrony in the right hemisphere on some tasks
(Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment 1), data also exist implicating both hemispheres in creativity
(Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009; Petsche et al., 1997, Experiments
2 and 3).
For perceptual tasks, such as looking at paintings, compared

with nonartists, artists show alpha ERD in frontal regions (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005; Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment
3) and posterior regions (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002; Petsche et
al., 1997, Experiment 1). Again, these changes are generally reported for both alpha subbands. These findings of creativityrelated alpha ERDs are contrary to those showing alpha ERS in
838
DIETRICH AND KANSO
divergent thinking for frontal (Fink et al., 2006; Fink, Grabner, et

al., 2009; Grabner et al., 2007; Jausovec, 2000) and posterior
(Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009; Fink & Neubauer 2006a; Martindale
& Hines, 1975) sites. Artists also exhibit higher phase synchrony
in the beta and gamma bands (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002),
which the authors have suggested might indicate enhanced binding
ability. Such increases in beta ERS have also been reported for
divergent thinking by some studies (Mlle et al., 1999; Razumnikova, 2005, 2007; Shemyakina & Danko, 2007). Also, perceptual
tasks tend to involve a larger swath of the cortex than mental
imagery tasks, which are reviewed next.
During mental imagery, the EEG also reveals alpha desynchronization for frontal (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002; Petsche et al.,
1997, Experiment 3) and posterior (Petsche et al., 1997, Experiment 1) regions. Contrary these findings, however, Fink, Graif,
and Neubauer (2009) reported alpha ERS for creative dance imagery. Increases in synchrony were found in the delta band (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002). The results are similar for mentally
composing a drawing, a task presumably heavily dependent on
mental imagery. Here artists show the same pattern: ERD in alpha
and ERS in delta (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2005). The alpha
desynchronization in these two tasks is in contrast to much of the
divergent thinking paradigm and to the alpha ERS found by Fink,
Graif, and Neubauer (2009). As for the increases in delta synchronization in both studies (Bhattacharya & Petsche, 2002, 2005), the
authors have argued that this effect reflects the involvement of
visual art memory and extensive top-down processing.
Two studies do not fit this trend. One is the above-mentioned
report by Fink, Graif, and Neubauer (2009); the other is that of
Petsche et al. (1997, Experiment 1). In the latter, participants were
asked to mentally create their own painting, a task very similar to
those generating alpha ERD. Findings indicated increases in alpha
ERS for both artists and nonartists compared with rest. That
experts and novices did not differ in this task, on any EEG index,
is puzzling, as one would expect these two populations to approach
the task of mentally creating a painting differently, given the likely
outcome differences in quality if they were to execute it.
It may be instructive to directly compare the results of one task
reported by Petsche et al. (1997, Experiment 3) with those in the
divergent thinking literature, because in this task participants were
asked to create a story using 10 self-chosen words, similar to some
divergent thinking tasks (see Jausovec, 2000, Experiment 2; Jausovec & Jausovec, 2000b; Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale
et al., 1984). The main finding is that women have long-distance
coherence increases in the left hemisphere in delta and theta, a set
of results not reported by any divergent thinking study.
Brain Imaging and Artistic Creativity

The neuroimaging literature devoted to this topic is also sparse
and, with the exception of one quasi case study (Solso, 2001), has
all been published quite recently. The studies in this group are also
difficult to integrate into a coherent picture on the neural mechanisms of creativity, in part because they, too, do not make extensive contact to the rest of creativity research. We group them in
terms of findings regarding (a) laterality, (b) prefrontal cortex
function, and (c) other brain areas.
For laterality, all six studies corroborate the conclusion that
creativity requires multiregional, interhemispheric interactions and
should thus not be ascribed to one particular hemisphere. Given the

data, artistic creativity is not a function of the right hemisphere.
The inspection of data on the prefrontal cortex yields a highly
interesting observation that possibly harbors an important clue as
to the role of the prefrontal cortex in creativity. Five studies
reported activation in various areas of the prefrontal cortex, including premotor and supplementary motor areas (both parts of
BA 6), motor cortex (BA 4), areas of the frontal gyrus (BA 8 and
9), frontal operculum (BA 44/45), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(BA 46), and ACC (Bengtsson, Csikszentmihalyi, & Ullen, 2007;
Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Brown, Martinez, & Parsons, 2006;
Kowatari et al., 2009; Solso, 2001). None of these studies reported
significant decreases. The main finding of the sixth study is quite
dissimilar: Widespread prefrontal decreases in almost all areas of
the prefrontal cortex were found, except for selective activity in the
middle frontal polar cortex (BA 10; Limb & Braun, 2008). At first
glance, nothing in this study appears to shed light on such diametrically opposed results. Like the other three music investigations
(Bengtsson et al., 2007; Berkowitz & Ansari, 2008; Brown et al.,
2006), Limb and Braun (2008) investigated improvisation of novel
and melodic musical sequences and used trained musicians.
Significant changes to neural activity related to creative processes are also reported for other brain structures. Activation was
found to occur in several temporoparietal areas (Bengtsson et al.,
2007; Brown et al., 2006; Limb & Braun, 2008; Kowatari et al.,
2009), the fusiform gyrus (Bengtsson et al., 2007; Limb & Braun,
2008), several visual cortices (Bengtsson et al., 2007; Limb &
Braun, 2008; Kowatari et al., 2009), thalamus (Brown et al., 2006),
basal ganglia (Brown et al., 2006), hippocampus (Brown et al.,
2006; Kowatari et al., 2009), cerebellum (Brown et al., 2006; Limb
& Braun, 2008), midbrain and pons (Brown et al., 2006), and ACC
(Limb & Braun, 2008), especially for novices (Kowatari et al.,
2009). Also, Limb and Braun (2008) reported deactivations over a
wide limbic and paralimbic area, such as the hippocampus, amygdala, entorhinal cortex, hypothalamus, parahippocampal gyrus,
and even parts of parietal and occipital cortex. This finding should
open investigators to the possibility that creativity can also be
linked to deactivations.
Interim Conclusion on Artistic Creativity

Findings from this group of studies underscore and broaden
many conclusions from the divergent thinking literature. They
highlight that no single brain area is necessary or sufficient for
creativity or any of its component stages. This statement holds not
only for lateralization but also for theories emphasizing the role of
other brain regions, such as the temporoparietal region or the
cerebellum. It might be stated that creativity is everywhere.
Studies in this section also suggest that the role of the prefrontal
cortex in creative thinking is not of the yea-or-nay kind. On one
side, there is a good deal of evidence supporting the idea that
prefrontal activation facilitates creativity. On the flipside, there is
a roughly equal amount of evidence supporting the exact opposite,
that prefrontal deactivation facilitates creativity. This dichotomy
appears to hold for both neuroimaging and EEG studies. It may be
the case that there are different types of creativity, some that
depend on prefrontal engagement and some that benefit from
prefrontal disengagement. Whereas a mental ability as extraordinary as creativity would appear to be associated with activation of
CREATIVITY REVIEW
the highest cognitive functions, creativity may also be associated

with a state of hypofrontality (Dietrich, 2004a, 2004b). One suggestion along these lines is found in a careful reading of Limb and
Braun (2008), who found deactivations in prefrontal regions of
musicians in the context of a familiar environment conducive to a
flow experience. To do this, they used a custom-built, real keyboard, on which well-learned melodic stringslicks, as they are
known among jazz musicians could be played implicitly without
interference from less efficient explicit processes (Dienes & Perner, 1999). As a consequence, participants could perhaps afford
more readily to downregulate any metacognitive, supervising processes, which, in turn, resulted in more intuitive and creative
musical playing.
In contrast, the three other music studies reviewed above all
required some sort of mental transformation of these licks; presumably, that participants could not afford downregulating higher
order, executive processes. In Bengtsson et al.s (2007) study,
improvised strings had to be memorized and reproduced later; in
Brown et al.s (2006) experiment, incomplete melodies had to be
finished vocally by using the syllable da; and in Berkowitz and
Ansaris (2008) study, musical notes were coded by letters (i.e., an
ascending sequence would be CDEFG). All of these would require, at the very least, attentional resources and working memory
processes that would be expected to engender prefrontal activations. In short, people can be creative in several ways. It may well
be that sometime creativity results from trying really hardthink
Thomas Edison but at other times it may flourish under conditions of not trying at all (Dietrich, 2007a).
Insight
EEG, ERP, and Insight
To date, five EEG and six ERP experiments have been published on insight. There exist also nine neuroimaging studies, two
using PET and seven using fMRI. Table 3 outlines all 20 studies.
This domain of creativity research has also utilized many novel
tasks, which is not surprising given that the target here is what
must be one of the most elusive of mental events, the so-called
aha effect (also termed a Eureka experience). The drawback of
this array of testing tools is, naturally, variability, which complicates the business of comparing brain activity across studies.
Compared with other creativity domains, insight investigations
emphasize different theoretical themes, such as conflict resolution
and the role played by the ACC.
The field of insightful problem solving has spawned a neuroanatomically upgraded variant of the right-brain theory. According
to this theory, the right temporoparietal regions, and the superior
temporal gyrus (STG) in particular, are hypothesized to mediate
coarse semantic coding and in doing so facilitate the formation of
remote associations (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; JungBeeman et al., 2004). However, the EEG and ERP data reviewed
here do not support the notion of hemispheric differences. Although there are several studies that point to a special role of the
right STG for insight events (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et
al., 2008; Qiu, Luo, Wu, & Zhang, 2006; Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya, 2008), there are more studies that do not support this
contention (Danko, Starchenko, & Bechtereva, 2003; Kounios et
al., 2006; Lang et al., 2006; Lavric, Forstmeier, & Rippon, 2000;
839
Mai, Luo, Wu, & Luo, 2004; Qiu et al., 2008a, 2008b). There is
even one study that contradicts it by implicating the left hemisphere, albeit again the STG (Qiu et al., 2008a). This conclusion
holds not only for the insight event itself but also for the substages
of problem solving, as most studies fail to report selective right
brain activity for these periods as well. Again, Qiu et al. (2008a)
even reported left dominance for the early stages when coarse
semantic coding purportedly occurs.
One consistent finding of insight EEG studies is a decrease in
alpha power. This pattern is reported for frontal (Kounios et al.,
2008, 2006; Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya, 2008), parietal (Danko et
al., 2003; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004), and temporal (Kounios et al.,
2008, 2006) sites, especially during restructuring (Sandkuhler &
Bhattacharya, 2008). How these alpha power decreases fit with the
prefrontal and temporoparietal activation detected in many insightrelated neuroimaging studies is not clear at present. Given that
combined EEG and fMRI studies have shown that increases in
alpha power are related to decreases in cortical blood flow (Goldman, Stern, Engel, & Cohen, 2002; Sadato et al., 1998), these two
sets of results would seem to run counter to each other.
The response of other frequency bands to insight reflects variegated results. For instance, there are general gamma and beta
power increases associated with insight in some studies (Kounios
et al., 2008; Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya, 2008), yet there are also
gamma power decreases, especially at left anterior temporal and
inferior frontal leads (Kounios et al., 2008). In addition, Danko et
al. (2003) reported widespread coherence decreases in all frequency bands, especially over the frontal cortexa finding not
corroborated by any other study.
Remote associates problems might constitute a particular type of
insight task that engages the STGa finding that would not be
surprising given the role of this area in language processing. In
addition to three EEG studies (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios
et al., 2008; Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya, 2008), there are two ERP
studies that implicate the STG, although one of them described a
positive ERP deflection (Qiu et al., 2008a) and the other a negative
one (Qiu et al., 2006) for this location. The cause for these
opposing ERP results may lie in a slight variation of the test
procedure. In Qiu et al. (2006), participants were given the correct
solution for problems they did not solve and were then asked
whether the answer provided by the investigators elicited an aha
effect. On the other hand, Qiu et al. (2008a) required participants
to find the solution on their own; this discovery of the solution
counted as an aha event. The difference, in short, was that insight
was a passive process in the former but an active one in the latter.
In any event, the STG does not appear to be involved in insight
events using other paradigms, such as implicit learning (Lang et
al., 2006), Guilfords match problems (Lavric et al., 2000), or
solutions to Japanese riddles (Mai et al., 2004).
ERP studies also typically detect ACC activity during the occurrence of an insight. Several studies have reported a more
negative deflection, which occurs at different latencies for different studies: N320 for Qiu et al. (2006), N380 for Mai et al. (2004),
and N1500 N2000 for Qiu et al. (2008a). Conversely, a fourth
study (Qiu et al., 2008b), which used the same Qiu et al. (2006)
procedure, reported a positive deflection. The ACC is thought to
be involved in breaking the impasse that marks the critical step of
an insight problem.
DIETRICH AND KANSO
840
Table 3
Summary of Insight Studies
Study
Method
Type of insight problem
Type of design
Lavric et al. (2000)
20
EEG/ERP
Danko et al. (2003)
30
EEG
IT: link a difficult sequence

of 12 words from different
semantic fields with other
words; CT: choose 5
examples belonging to a
given word category (easy
sequences)
(a) covariate (nonactors

vs. actors), (b)
between-task
comparison, and (c)
task vs. rest
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004),

Experiment 2
19
EEG
Problems triggering aha 50%

of the time: on 3 words
(e.g. back, clip, wall),
generate a solution (paper)
to form compound words
with all (paperclip,
paperback, wallpaper); aha
was self-reported
Within-task comparison
(aha, no aha, time-out)
and task vs. rest
Mai et al. (2004)
14
EEG/ERP
Consider riddles to which

solution was presented
after an interval;
participants then indicated
whether solution matched
the one they thought of; if
yes, it was classified as
no-aha; if not, the
presentation is said to elicit
an aha; aha was selfreported
(aha vs. no aha) and
task vs. rest
Qiu et al. (2006)
130
ERP
Chinese logogriphs: a
character is transformed by
changing strokes to alter its
deep meaning; (a) easy
riddles followed by a
correct answer consistent
with participants thinking
(no-aha) or (b) difficult
riddles followed by a
correct answer that broke a
mental set (aha)
(aha, no aha, not
comprehended) and
task vs. rest
Studies using EEG or ERP methods

IT: (a) the candle and (b) the
Between-task comparison
two-strings problem; CT:
and task vs. rest
Wasons selection task
(analytical); both were
done while doing a
working memory task
(count auditory stimuli)
Main findings
Counting disrupted CT but not IT. Peak

and time-window average P300 more
frontal for CT. Two factors in the P3
range (frontal and broad leftlateralized) distinguished CT from
IT. Creative (insight) problem
solving was less systematic, using
less planning and requiring less
working memory.
Compared with rest, IT and CT
decreased alpha power in right
parietal and left fontal areas; higher
spectral power in delta and theta for
temporal areas. Lower coherence for
IT in all frequency bands in right
prefrontal areas. Alpha ERS
decreased in parietal and frontal
areas, whereas it increased in
temporal areas for insight tasks.
Results were similar to patterns
revealed in noninsight strategy
creative tasks.
Burst of gamma activity associated with
correct insight solutions at ca. 0.3 s
before response at anterior right
temporal sites; no difference between
insight and noninsight in LH. Burst
of alpha power associated with
insight solutions over right posterior
parietal cortex. The gamma insight
effect reflected the sudden transition
of solution-related processing from
an unconscious to a conscious state.
Aha answers elicited a more negative
ERP deflection from 250500 ms
after onset of the answer with a
maximum amplitude over the central
site and a peak latency of 380 ms
(N380). Maps of the difference
showed strong activity and current
density in the frontocentral region,
which was localized in the ACC. The
N380 reflected an aha effect, and the
ACC may be involved in the
breaking of mental sets.
For (b) and (c), a more negative ERP
deflection was present. Maps of this
difference showed strong activity at
central posterior sites, especially right
temporoparietal areas. The N320 for
aha was near the ACC and the
thalamus. Aha and uncomprehended
answer elicited a more negative
component. The N320 may embody
the central locale of cognitive
conflict that resolves familiar and
new ways of thinking.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
841
Table 3 (continued)
Study
Method
Type of design
Lang et al. (2006)
26
EEG/ERP
Insight during implicit

learning; NRT contains a
hidden rule; participants
who gain insight into that
rule solve problems much
faster via a short cut
(solvers vs.
nonsolvers)
Kounios et al. (2006),

Experiment 1
19
EEG
Same as Jung-Beeman et al.

(2004)
and task vs. rest
Kounios et al. (2008)
26
EEG
A series of four- or five-letter

anagrams, each of which
had one solution only
and task vs. rest
Qiu et al. (2008a)
18
ERP
Same as Qiu et al. (2006),

except that participant
found solutions on their
own
(aha, no aha, not
comprehended) and
task vs. rest
Qiu et al. (2008b)
18
ERP
Same as Qiu et al. (2006)
(aha, no aha, not
comprehended) and
task vs. rest
Sandkuhler & Bhattacharya

(2008)
21
EEG

(2004), except that
participants indicated (a)
finding the solution or (b)
facing an impasse, which
then prompted a hint;
participants self-rated
degree of (c) restructuring
and (d) suddenness of
solution
Main findings
Six of 26 participants gained insight.
They had several larger ERP indexes
from the outset: slow positive wave,
frontocentral P3a, anterior N1 to
digits triggering the critical repeating
responses, and P3b to digit for the
immediately repeating response.
Participants who gain insight may be
distinguished beforehand by their
individual characteristics. Their
explicit knowledge was based on
processing that differed from implicit
learning from the very beginning.
Compared with time out, insight was
associated with less alpha power in
midfrontal cortex and left anterior
temporal cortex, and noninsight was
associated with decreased alpha over
the occipital cortex. Compared with
noninsight, insight showed less alpha
power in midfrontal, temporal,
somatosensory, and right inferior
frontal cortex, whereas noninsight
showed less alpha power over
posterior cortices.
Insight strategy was associated with
greater alpha, beta, and gamma
power at right inferior frontal and
anterior temporal sites and greater
power for low insight at right dorsal
frontal (alpha) and left occipital and
parietal sites (Beta 2 and gamma).
Creativity recruited RH association
areas involved in semantic processing
more than noncreative cognition.
Successful solutions elicited a more
positive ERP deflection from 200 to
600 ms after stimulus onset. From
1,500 to 2,000 ms, successful
solutions elicited a more negative
deflection. P200P600 was localized
in the left superior temporal gyrus
and posterior cortices. The N1500
N2000 occurred stronger over left
frontal areas, which was localized in
the ACC. The ACC was critical in
breaking mental set and the forming
of new associations.
Successful logogriphs elicited a more
positive ERP deflection. The source
analysis implicated the ACC and the
right parahippocampal gyrus. The ACC
was linked to the initial stages of insight
onset, an early warning system in the
breaking of a mental set.
Increased upper alpha in right temporal
regions for trials with high restructuring,
decreased alpha power in right prefrontal
area. Gamma power effect reflects
selective attention and processes for
emergence of spontaneous new solutions.
Alpha effect was related to weak,
unconscious processing of the solution in
the right temporal area. With the hint,
activity intensified and reached
awareness.
(table continues)
DIETRICH AND KANSO
842
Table 3 (continued)
Study
Method
Rose et al. (2002)
10
fMRI
Luo & Niki (2002)
fMRI
Starchenko et al. (2003)
PET
Bechtereva et al. (2004)
34
PET
Luo et al. (2004)
13
fMRI
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004),

Experiment 1
12
fMRI
Type of design

A different version of the
NRT (Lang et al., 2006);
(Half 1 vs. Half 2) and
(a) first half in a trial was
task vs. rest
compared with performance on (b) the second
half
Japanese riddles (e.g., the

thing that can move heavy
logs, but not move a small
nailriver); if not solved,
answers were given, and
an aha effect was elicited
The same IT and CT tasks as
Danko et al. (2003), plus a
third CT: read out loud a
sequence of words
(aha vs. no aha) and
task vs. rest
Between-task comparison
and task vs. rest
IT: 12 nouns in a matrix(a) Covariate (type of selffill the gaps between the
reported strategy:
words using logical
insight vs. successive
associations, (b) list items
in pilot study) and
aloud, (c) just reading; CT:
between-task
16 words arranged in a 4
comparison
4 matrixcreate a story
with words from (a)
different semantic areas,
(b) one semantic area, (c)
changing word forms, or
(d) memorizing the words
Pairs of
ambiguous/incomprehensible
(aha, no aha, difficult,
sentences followed by
not understandable)
solution cues defined as (a)
and task vs. rest
aha, (b) non-aha, (c)
difficult cues, and (d) not
understandable; aha
occurred when the solution
cue evoked a sudden
understanding; aha was
self-reported
(2004), Experiment 2
and task vs. rest
Main findings
Decreases of RT across sessions, which

were larger for Half 2. Improvements
in applying explicit rule were
accompanied by activation in the
basal ganglia and cerebellum, which
was also positively related to performance; for the hidden rule, there was
activation in the MTL for Half 2
only. In bilateral superior parietal
cortex, activation increased
minimally for Half 2 and decreased
for undetermined inputs in Half 1.
Violating the hidden rule showed
greater responses in right VLPFC. S
became increasingly sensitive for the
hidden structure, albeit implicitly.
This engaged the basal ganglia and
cerebellum and was outside
awareness, but violation of hidden
rule activated the VLPFC.
Right hippocampus and large areas of
the cortex were activated during an
insight event. The hippocampus was
involved in the neural network
subserving the insight process of
problem solving.
An insight strategy selectively activated
the left supramarginal (BA 40) and
the ACC (BA 32); task complexity is
mostly reflected in activation of
frontal areas (BA 8, 10, 47).
For IT, participants using an insight
strategy showed most activation in
superior occipital gyrus (BA 19),
temporal gyrus (BA 21, 22, 38),
angular gyrus (BA 39), precuneus
(BA 7), many frontal areas (BA 8,6,
11, 44, 45, 46, 47), parietal regions
(BA 40), and the ACC. Strategies in
creative thinking were related to
activation in temporoparietal regions,
especially BA 39 and 40.
Compared with non-aha, ACC and the
left lateral PFC were activated during
aha reactions and difficult solution.
There was no difference in these
ACCs between aha and difficulty.
The highest activation was for
difficult solution in the lateral PFC.
Both areas contributed to conflict
detection and breaking mental
impasses.
Insight solutions were associated with
greater activity in the RH anterior
STG. There was no significant
frontal cortex insight effect. Solving
verbal insight problems required an
additional cortical component, the
RH STG.
CREATIVITY REVIEW
843
Table 3 (continued)
Study
Method
Rose et al. (2005)
18
fMRI
Kounios et al. (2006),

Experiment 2
25
Aziz-Zadeh et al. (2009)
12
Type of design
Main findings
Similar to Rose et al (2005)

but with blocks in which
only the explicit rule
applied
(Half 1 vs. Half 2) and
task vs. rest
fMRI

(2004)
and task vs. rest
fMRI
Difficult anagrams from

Novick & Sherman (2003)
classified as (a) insight or
(b) search; this
classification is based on
self-report and time
(insight more and search
less than 4 s)
(insight vs. search) and
task vs. rest
Right VLPFC and left MTL structures

(which showed a violation effect in
Rose et al., 2002) did not reach
significance in this study. Both brain
areas, however, showed activation for
rule violation. Implicit learning can
result in unconscious expectancies,
and the violation of these
expectancies are thought to be
detected by right VLPFC and left
MTL areas.
Insight solution was preceded by
increased activity in anterior and
posterior ACC as well as posterior
STG activation. For noninsight
preparation, there was a trend for
activation in left middle and inferior
occipital cortex. Insight involved
medial frontal areas associated with
cognitive control and temporal areas
associated with semantic processing.
(a) vs. rest: activation in premotor
cortex, SMA, occipital cortex, insula,
and tegmentum; (b) vs. rest:
activation in superior frontal sulcus
and left insula; (a) vs. (b): Activation
in right insula, Brocas area (left BA
45), angular gyrus, right PFC (BA
10, 46), ACC, pons, and right
temporal pole. Solving anagrams
activated distributed networks,
including frontal language areas in
RH and LH. For insight, right PFC,
midbrain, and ACC were involved.
The main difference to search was
not a shift from left to right
activation but of bilateral activity.
Right ventral PFC played a role in
evaluating insight problems rather
than problem solving itself.
Note. ACC anterior cingulate cortex; BA Brodmanns area; CC cingulate cortex; CT Control Task; EEG electroencephalography; ERP
event-related potential; ERS event-related synchronization; fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging; IT Insight Task; LH left hemisphere;
MTL medial temporal lobe; NRT Number Reduction Task; PET positron emission tomography; PFC prefrontal cortex; RH right hemisphere;
RT reaction time; S subjects; STG superior temporal gyrus; VLPFC ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
In sum, EEG studies suggest that insight is associated with alpha

power decreases. Also, ERP studies suggest that (a) the STG is
important for some testing paradigms, but not others, and that (b)
the ACC plays a critical role in the insight process. Further
research needs to show whether, and for what type of insight
problem, these trends hold.
Brain Imaging and Insight

Neuroimaging studies on insight are summarized on the basis of
the trends identified in the neuroelectric data. After examining the
literature for hemispheric differences, we explore the possible role
of prefrontal regions, the ACC, and other brain regions, including
the temporoparietal cortices.
A review of insight neuroimaging studies provides no support
for right-brain dominance. One study concluded that aha effects
correlate with activity in the right cortexthe right STG, more
precisely (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004)whereas another can be

interpreted to provide evidence to the contrary, namely activity in
left prefrontal regions (Luo, Niki, & Philips, 2004). The majority
of studies reveal bilateral activation patterns associated with insight events (Aziz-Zadeh, Kaplan, & Iacoboni, 2009; Bechtereva
et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Luo & Niki, 2002; Rose, Haider,
Weiller, & Buchel, 2002, 2005; Starchenko, Bechtereva, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2003). Most neuroimaging data, such as the
EEG/ERP data, can also be examined for the early states of insight
problem solving, as it is here that coarse semantic coding is
thought to play a key role in the formation of remote associations.
Again, the majority of studies do not bear this out. For instance,
two PET studies (Bechtereva et al., 2004; Starchenko et al., 2003)
reported bilateral activation patterns in a verbal task in which a
search strategy can be contrasted with an insight one. Bilateral
activation is also reported in another study using verbal stimuli:
anagrams (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009).
844
DIETRICH AND KANSO
An entirely different approach to insight problems is taken by

Rose et al. (2002, 2005), who utilized an implicit learning paradigm. The interesting advantage of this paradigm is that it allows
for a trial-by-trial analysis of the problem-solving process. Participants are presented with numerical problems that all contain the
same underlying, hidden regularity, which, if detected, provides a
short-cut to the solution. An insight into the hidden rule is revealed
by a shift in strategy from implicit to explicit processing by the
participant, which causes a sudden, large drop in the reaction time.
This permits the researchers to pinpoint the exact moment an
insight occurs in the mind, as well as to monitor preparatory
stages, without relying on the participants verbal report. Using
this paradigm, fMRI did not reveal any laterality effects at any
stage of the task. Taken together with the neuroelectric data, the
idea that the right hemisphere, or any part of it, is more important
at any stage of the insight process than the left has received no
support.
Activation of various prefrontal regions often accompanies insightful problem solving (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Bechtereva et
al., 2004; Luo & Niki, 2002; Rose et al., 2002, 2005). Still, a
number of studies have not reported significant insight effects for
frontal areas (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Luo
et al., 2004; Starchenko et al., 2003). The matter is made more
complex by the fact that different studies locate the aha event in
different prefrontal areas. Whereas Luo et al. (2004) honed in on
left lateral regions, others have emphasized the role of right ventral
regions (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Rose et al., 2002, 2005), and still
others have emphasized that a diffuse bilateral activation is responsible (Bechtereva et al., 2004). In addition, it has been suggested that this prefrontal activation might simply be a function of
task difficulty rather than the insight process itself (Luo et al.,
2004; Starchenko et al., 2003). Compared with non-aha phenomena, Luo et al. (2004) reported that difficult solutions activate
prefrontal areas just as much as aha events do. In other words,
insight does not contribute to prefrontal activity above and beyond
difficulty level. Because few studies controlled for the possibility
that insight problems might simply be more difficult than those
that do not, it remains to be seen whether there is indeed a selective
prefrontal insight effect.
The anterior cingulate gyrus has been a major focus of interest
in this field, and several studies show positive correlations with
insight in this region (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Bechtereva et al.,
2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2004; Starchenko et al.,
2003). There are exceptions, however (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004;
Luo & Niki, 2002; Rose et al., 2002, 2005). Overall, on the basis
of neuroelectric and neuroimaging data, there appears to be converging evidence that many insight events are accompanied by
ACC activity.
Neural activity associated with insight is also reported for several other brain regions, chiefly among them are temporoparietal
areas (Bechtereva et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2006; Starchenko et
al., 2003), especially the STG (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Authors
of these studies often stress the importance of these cortical regions over frontal areas in insightful problem solving. Still, as in
other areas under review, the evidence is not uniform. Other brain
regions showing selective activity for insight events are, for instance, visual cortices (Bechtereva et al., 2004) and the hippocampus (Luo & Niki, 2002). Finally, there are also no reports of
significant deactivations in this group of studies.
Interim Conclusion on Insight

Research on the neural basis of insight reflects greater consistency than research on either divergent thinking or artistic creativity. Although an integrated model of the neural generator of the
aha experience has yet to be proposed, the data show several
tendencies that could be the basis for such a model. First, Eureka
experiences are not, in general, accompanied by right hemispheric
dominance; this conclusion also holds for component states of
insightful problem solving. Second, EEG data show that insight is
associated with alpha power decreases. This finding, however,
remains difficult to interpret, as such an effect should correlate
with a decreased blood oxygenation level dependent signal. Functional MRI research, however, has not detected such decreases.
Thus, simplistic explanations of complex mental events, as insight
experiences are likely to be, are often defeated when data from
different methods are integrated. Third, the STG appears to play
some role in the successful solution of insight problems that
require verbal associations, by perhaps making remote associations
in a semantic network that might eventually trigger a solution path.
Fourth, the ACC is activated by insight problems. This region
appears to be important in detecting cognitive conflict and initiating processes that lead to the breaking of the mental mindset that
keeps one stuck in the wrong solution space. Fifth, the role of
prefrontal areas is not clear. With a somewhat even split between
studies implicating prefrontal regions and those that do not, further
research is need to see whether, and to what extent, the prefrontal
cortex mediates Eureka experiences. It is quite possible that both
prefrontal activation and deactivation are again at work here, each
associated with its own types of insight experience.
We contend that careful attention to a few methodological issues
could account for some of the variability in the data and shed more
light on the few trends that exist in the insight literature. For one
thing, the field would greatly benefit if insight-related tasks are
subjected to validation trials, preferably prior to their use with
neuroimaging tools. Second, even if a task manifestly does require
an insight strategy, what passes for an insight differs substantially
from study to study. Self-report is used, but in two different ways:
passive (participants cannot solve certain problems but then report
an aha experience when investigators provide the correct solution)
or active (the participant successfully solves a difficult problem).
The importance of this distinction is indicated by the above-noted
difference in the findings from Qiu et al. (2006) versus Qiu et al.
(2008a). Yet, an entirely different method to determine the occurrence of insight does away with the necessity of a self-report
altogether (Haider & Rose, 2007), via reaction-time data, which
reveal the participants discovery of a short-cut solution via discovery of hidden regularities in the problems presented. It is
difficult to imagine that implicit learning paradigms using these
different types of insight experiences would yield parallel patterns
of brain activation.
General Discussion
The literature on the neural basis of creativity is, especially for
its small size, surprisingly fragmented. This fragmentation is perhaps most readily seen in a citation count. Of the 63 articles we
collated here, we could not find a single one that makes reference
to even half of them. This observation even holds true for any of
CREATIVITY REVIEW
the three individual domains of creativity: divergent thinking (N

34 articles), artistic creativity (N 11), and insight (N 21). This
observation also holds true for the two types of general recording
methods: neuroelectric (N 37) and brain imaging (N 29).
The most forthright conclusion that can be taken away from the
present review is that not a single currently circulating notion on
the possible neural mechanisms underlying creative thinking survives close scrutiny. Indeed, the data are so highly variegated that
even weak trends are difficult to make out. This conclusion holds
equally for the literature as a whole as it does for each of its three
subdomains. One effect of the fragmentation is that this fact has
not been fully appreciated. For nearly every proposal on the neural
underpinning of creativity one cares to press, there is as much
evidence for as there is against it, yet one would not suspect this
from a casual reading of the literature. The problem likely arises
because empirical studies often refer to only those prior results
from the same subdomain and recording methodology that tend to
support the rationale of the reported experiments. This gives the
impression that studies in this field are based on a solid background when, in fact, this is an artifact of selective reporting of the
existing data.
The most adverse effect of this fragmentation is seen in the lack
of progress in the theoretical discussion permeating the field. The
fact that there is always enough evidence to maintain any theoretical position has led to the unusual situation that few theories as to
the neural basis of creativity have been discarded. Advances in
science depend on falsification, a process that eventually forces us
to either abandon or revise our conceptions of how things work.
There is little indication that this process has taken place here.
Ideas first proposed in the 1960s and 1970slaterality, divergent
thinking, low arousal, remote associations, or defocused attentionare still those, and in essentially the same form, that drive
current research efforts. It is ironic that no other area of psychology has seen so much perseverance.
Accordingly, the following conclusions can be drawn about
creativity as a whole. First, creativity, or any alleged stage of it, is
not particularly associated with the right brain or any part of the
right brain. This is not a new deduction. It had been made even
before the overwhelming majority of the experiments reviewed in
this study had appeared. Katz (1997, p. 224), for instance, already
lamented the simplistic argument that the essential aspect of
creativity resides in the right hemisphere and recommended that
the claim that creativity is located in the right hemisphere
should be dispelled with at once. The present review fully amplifies this conclusion.
Second, this conclusion can be broadened to include any phrenological supposition on creativity. We can state, in short, that
creativity is not particularly associated with any single brain region, the prefrontal cortex excluded. For the prefrontal cortex, the
issue is a difficult one, as it is evidently not involved in creativity
in a simplistic yes-or-no fashion. With EEG studies revealing in all
frequency bands both increases and decreases for both power and
synchrony, as well as brain imaging studies reporting both activations and deactivations, the main conclusion is quite general: Tasks
purportedly involving creative cognition induce changes in prefrontal activity.
This is, however, already more than we can say about other
brain structures. The evidence shows that for any brain region,
there is always a majority of studies that does not report changes
845
in activity there. We must conclude, in other words, that creativity

is not localized or, perhaps more accurately, given the current
neuroimaging capabilities and the theoretical resolution with
which the issue is seen, not localizable.
The same fate is met by proposals that posit a specific neurocognitive process for the whole of creativity, be it low arousal,
defocused attention, or alpha synchronization. The weight of the
evidence simply does not support them. Indeed, any such exercise
in category formation of what is and what is not supposed to be
linked to creativity is likely doomed to failure if it is applied to all
of creativity. This may also the case for the link between creativity
and psychological disorders (such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or autism), neurological diseases, or altered state of consciousness (such as sleep or meditation). Despite case reports and anecdotes, the evidentiary basis for such claims is lacking (see Dietrich,
2007b).
To avoid misunderstandings of our concluding argument, we do
not suggest that any of the above proposals on the neural basis of
creativity is wholly wrong. Some of the conclusions are based on
collating the data into yes and no categories (i.e., does or does not
activate a given brain area), which could carry a risk of missing
subtle behavioral cues. Some types of creativity might indeed be
associated with, say, low arousal or alpha synchronization. Overall, however, the evidence reviewed in this study illustrates that
every one of these proposals fails when generalized to creativity as
a whole. Although this is readily acknowledged in the field, results
from individual studies continue to be framed in terms of creativity
in general. This is partly a matter of language using the word
creativity without circumscribing it, for instance but it is also
partly a matter of conceptual confusion. Creativity, or any of its
stages, is routinely treated as if it is a single entity, possessing at
best several different aspects and therefore comprising a limited
set of fundamental processes or brain structures underlying it. This
is likely to be a fallacy. It is hard to believe that creative behavior,
in all its manifestations, from carrying out exquisitely choreographed dance moves, to scientific discovery, constructing poems,
and coming up with ingenious ideas of what to do with a brick,
engages a common set of brain areas or depends on a limited set
of mental processes.
The problem comes into focus when it is compared with an
analogous situation in mainstream cognitive neuroscience. Researchers there also do not attempt to look for the neural mechanisms of thinking; they investigate attention, working memory, or
perception. Creativity research must do the same and look at
individual processes. Only when the amorphous concept of creativity is subdivided into different types or component processes
broadly along the lines of known neurocognitive processes might
it become tractable with neuroimaging tools.
Investigating when, and under which conditions, theoretical
concepts such as defocused attention or divergent thinking are, and
are not, associated with creativity, is likely to disentangle a great
deal of the existing data that are, as it stands now, selfcontradictory. To take a concrete example, Jin et al. (2006) investigated scientific creativity (hypothesis testing) and found that less
gifted children used more of their prefrontal cortex, whereas more
gifted children revealed less activation, presumably because they
were able to use their cognitive resources better. The more-isbetter versus less-is-better conceptions underling brain activation
DIETRICH AND KANSO
846
research continue to be a puzzle, on the basis of task parameters,

sample definitions, and underlying conceptual models.
In another example, Lavric et al. (2000) used the candle problem, a traditional divergent thinking task, to study insight events
and found that creativity is associated with a less frontal and less
left-lateralized P300. The authors interpretation was that creative
problem solving is less systematic, employs less planning, and
needs less working memory (Lavric et al., 2000, p. 1617). This
explanation is at odds with 20 or so other insight and/or divergent
thinking studies that found prefrontal enhancement correlated with
creativity and, on the basis of this finding, argued the diametrically
opposing position, that is, creativity critically depends on more
systematic planning, working memory, response selection, and the
suppression of stereotypical responses.
In EEG studies, increased synchrony is understood as an indicator of more cooperation between brain areas and, by extension,
as a marker of more efficient information transfer or sensory
binding. Yet, studies that report decreases in synchrony associated
with creativity do not claim that creative information processing is
inefficient, which would be, of course, the logical conclusion if
this understanding is applied in a consequent manner. Instead, an
entirely different explanation is often provided: conflict resolution
or remote association formation, for instance. Clearly, accurate
theorizing requires more compelling data.
The current theoretical discourse is self-contradictory only if the
ideas that creativity is a monolithic entity and that there is only one
way in which the brain generates creative outcomes are held onto.
Once we fully commit to the idea that there are likely a multitude
of processes and brain regions involved in the computation of
ideational combinations, we can better constrain our theoretical
notions. The present review demonstrates the need for current
models on the neural basis of creativity to be developed further. As
they are now, they do not yield predictions precise enough for
falsification.
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Received March 31, 2009

Revision received March 22, 2010
Accepted March 29, 2010

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Psychological Bulletin

2010, Vol. 136, No. 5, 822 848

2010 American Psychological Association

A Review of EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging Studies of

Creativity is the fountainhead of human civilizations. All

Arne Dietrich and Riam Kanso, Department of Social and Behavioral

Several standardized psychometric instruments of creativity were

they require. Despite these drawbacks, and perhaps because of a

DIETRICH AND KANSO

them. Only through systematically reviewing the evidence for

The Search Strategy

these 63 articles were published after 2000, a striking testament to

The first part of Table 1 summarizes the findings from EEG

differently, and at times in an opposing manner, to certain task

DIETRICH AND KANSO

Martindale & Hines

Mlle et al. (1999)

Type of creativity tests

Studies using EEG methods

Creative inspiration and Covariate (RAT, AUT),

CTT: (a) changing the

Covariate (IQ and TTCT) and

High scorers on the AUT had

Jausovec & Jausovec

Jausovec & Jausovec

Krug et al. (2003)

Type of creativity tests

DTT: verbal(a) name Covariate (IQ and TTCT) and

Highly creative participants

DIETRICH AND KANSO

Type of creativity tests

DTT: LFT, SAT, RAT

Jin et al. (2006)

(a) Lee & Jeongs

Fink et al. (2006)

Fink & Neubauer

Covariate (gender), within-task RH coherence increased in good

Type of creativity tests

Fink & Neubauer

Same as Fink et al.

DTT: RAT, SAT

Within-task comparison and

Grabner et al. (2007)

Bazanova & Aftanas

DDT: TTCT nonverbal Within-task comparison and

Fink, Grabner, et al.

DDT: (a) AUT, (b)

DTT: to give original

Between-task comparison and

DIETRICH AND KANSO

Danko et al. (2009)

Right CBF 133-Xe

Goel & Vartanian

Folley & Park

Type of creativity tests

Studies using neuroimaging methods

Blom et al. (2008)

Hori et al. (2008)

Hansen et al. (2008)