Plaintiffs-Appellees,: Nos. 10-16696 in The United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Case: 10-16696 09/24/2010 Page: 1 of 41 ID: 7487151 DktEntry: 63

Nos. 10-16696

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
KRISTIN PERRY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, et al.,
Defendants,
and
DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al.,
Defendants-Intervenors-Appellants
_________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL CASE NO. 09-cv-2292 VRW (Honorable Vaughn R. Walker)
_________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS AND REVERSAL
_________________________________
JOHN C. EASTMAN, Cal. Bar No. 193726

ANTHONY T. CASO, Cal. Bar No. 88561
KAREN J. LUGO, Cal. Bar No. 241268
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
c/o Chapman University School of Law
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
Telephone: (714) 628-2500
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence

Corporate Disclosure Statement
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, the undersigned states that
amicus curiae, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, is not a corporation that
issues stock or has a parent corporation that issues stock.
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL

JURISPRUDENCE
John C. Eastman
By: /s/ John C. Eastman________
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................................................................1
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................................2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................9
ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................10
I. The Initiative Proponents Have Standing to Defend Proposition 8,
Both as Agents of the State and in Their Own Right. ................................... 10
A. The Principal Purpose of the Initiative Power Is To Allow The
People To Act Directly, When Their Government Officials Will Not. ... 10
B. California Law Authorizes Proponents of Initiatives to Stand in as
“Agents of the State” to Defend Their Initiative, At Least When
Government Officials Will Not, Thereby Providing Them Standing
in Federal Court for Article III Purposes. ................................................ 13
C. California Law Recognizes a Fundamental Right of Citizens to
Propose Initiatives, and this Right Becomes A Particularized Interest
for Citizens Who Serve as an Initiative’s Official Proponents. ............... 22
II. Imperial County and Its Officials Were Entitled to Intervene as of
Right under Rule 24(a). Their Parallel Appeal Therefore Provides an
Alternative Ground for Jurisdiction By This Court To Hear
Proponents’ Appeal. ...................................................................................... 24
III. The District Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction By Ignoring (and
therefore Effectively Overruling) Governing Precedent of the
Supreme Court and of This Court, and by Issuing a Broad Injunction,
Without a Class Action Certification, Purportedly Binding
Everywhere in California, Even With Respect to Non-Parties. .................... 27
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................30
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................32
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi,

8 Cal.4th 216, 878 P.2d 566 (Cal. 1994) ..............................................................15
Adams v. Howerton,
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) ..............................................................................28
Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) ..............................................................................................29
Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
11 Cal.4th 1243, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995) ........................................................15
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
520 U.S. 43 (1997) ............................................................................. 13, 19, 20, 21
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com.,
21 Cal.4th 352, 981 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1999) ............................................................17
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore,
557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) ......................................................................................12
Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) ..............................................................................................27
Brosnahan v. Brown,
651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982) ......................................................................................10
Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo,
41 Cal.3d 810, 718 P.2d 68 (Cal.1986) ................................................... 14, 18, 23
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian,
48 Cal.3d 805, 683 P.2d 1150 (Cal.1989) ............................................................15
Carsten v. Psychology Examing Com.,
614 P.2d 276 (1980)..............................................................................................17
Citizens for Jobs and the Economy v. County of Orange,
94 Cal.App.4th 1311 (Cal. App. 4.Dist. 2002) .................................. 16, 17, 18, 24
City of Westminster v. County of Orange,
204 Cal.App.3d 623 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1988) ........................................................15
iv
Community Health Assn. v. Board of Supervisors,

146 Cal.App.3d 990 (Cal.App. 1.Dist. 1983) .......................................................15
Costa v. Superior Court,
128 P.3d 675 (Cal., 2006) .....................................................................................22
Diamond v. Charles,
476 U.S. 54 (1986) ............................................................................. 15, 18, 22, 23
Doe v. Brennan,
414 U.S. 1096 (1973) ............................................................................................28
Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist.,
324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) ..............................................................................28
Greif v. Dullea,
66 Cal.App.2d 986 (1944) ....................................................................................16
Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332 (1975) ....................................................................................... 28, 29
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................28
Hollingsworth v. Perry,
130 S. Ct. 705 (2010) ..............................................................................................6
Holmes v. California Army Nat’l Guard,
124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) ..............................................................................28
In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) ........................................................................................3
Independent Energy Producers Ass’n v. McPherson,
136 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2006) ......................................................................................23
Karcher v. May,
484 U.S. 72 (1987) ................................................................................... 18, 20, 21
Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) ..............................................................................................28
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,
131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) ..............................................................................21
v
Lee v. American Nat. Ins. Co.,

260 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................16
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco,
95 P.3d 459 (2004)........................................................................................... 3, 24
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..............................................................................................17
Martin v. Smith,
176 Cal.App.2d 115 (Cal.App. 1959) ...................................................................13
Meinhold v. United States DOD,
34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................28
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.,
402 U.S. 936 (1971) ................................................................................................2
Murphy v. Ramsey,
114 U.S. 15 (1885) ..................................................................................................2
People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino,
36 Cal.3d 476, 683 P.2d 1150 (Cal.1984) ............................................................15
People v. Kelly,
222 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2010) ......................................................................................11
Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents,
587 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2009) ..............................................................................5, 6
Philips v. Perry,
106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) ..............................................................................28
Prete v. Bradbury,
438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................21
Raven v. Deukmejian,
52 Cal.3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) ...........................................................13
Reycraft v. Lee,
177 Cal.App.4th 1211 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2009) ....................................................16
Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) ..............................................................................................28
vi
Sanchez v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008) ..............................................................................21
Sierra Club v. EPA,
995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) ....................................................................... 25, 26
Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727 (1972) ..............................................................................................23
Simac Design, Inc. v. Alciati,
92 Cal.App.3d 146 (Cal.App.1.Dist.1979) ................................................... passim
Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone v. Superior Court,
189 Cal.App.3d 167 (Cal.App.1.Dist.1987) .................................................. 22, 23
Strauss v. Horton,
207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) ..........................................................................................4
Suntharalinkam v. Keisler,
506 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................10
The Don't Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) ....................... 19, 20
United States v. Oregon,
745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.1984) .................................................................................26
Valdes v. Cory,
139 Cal. App. 3d 773 (1983) ................................................................................25
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................28
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
118 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ................................................................21
Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English,
119 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................21
Yniguez v. State of Arizona, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991), ultimately
dismissed as moot on other grounds sub nom. Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) ........................................................ passim
vii
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazelton Research, Inc.,

395 U.S. 100 (1969)............................................................................................................. 29
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions
A.B. 849 .....................................................................................................................3

Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 389 ......................................................................................19
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1086 ....................................................................................20
Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.5 ("Proposition 8") ........................................................ passim
Cal. Const. art. 2, § 1................................................................................................29
Cal. Const. art. 2, § 8......................................................................................... 27, 28
Cal. Const. art. 2, § 10(c) .................................................................................... 3, 12
Cal. Const. art. 3, § 3.5................................................................................ 30, 31, 37
Cal. Const. art. 5, §10.................................................................................................8
Cal. Family Code § 300 .............................................................................................3
Cal. Family Code § 308 .............................................................................................3
Cal. Family Code § 308.5 ......................................................................................3, 4
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12512 ...........................................................................................4
U.S. Const., art. III ........................................................................................... passim
viii
Other Authorities
“Lawmakers Urge Governor to Appeal Prop 8 Ruling,” Associated Press

(Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/01/national/
main6827966.shtml.................................................................................................7
Brief for Respondents In Opposition to the Judgment, Arizonans for Official
English v. State of Arizona, No. 95-974, at 25 (Oct. Term 1995) ........................20
Brief of Appellee the United States of America to Dismiss or Affirm, The
Don't Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, No. 82-1445 (Oct. Term, 1982) ..............20
Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative: Shaping
California's Fourth Branch of Government (2nd. ed. 2008) ......................... 11, 12
Manheim, Karl & Howard, Edward P., A Structural Theory of the Initiative
Power in California, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1165 (1998) ......................................11
Mowry, George, The California Progressives (1951) .............................................12
Olin, Spencer C., Jr., California's Prodigal Sons (1968) ........................................12
Piott, Steven, Giving Voters a Voice: The Origins of the Initiative and
Referendum in America (2003) ...................................................................... 11, 12
ix
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
This brief of Amicus Curiae is filed pursuant to F.R.A.P. Rule 29(a) with the
consent of all parties to the case.
The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence (“CCJ”) was founded in 1999 as
the public interest law arm of the Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesman-
ship and Political Philosophy, the mission of which is to restore the principles of
the American founding to their rightful and preeminent authority in our national
life. The CCJ advances that mission through strategic litigation and the filing of
amicus curiae briefs in cases of constitutional significance, including cases such as
this in which the very right of the sovereign people to retain the centuries-old defi-
nition of marriage as a cornerstone of civil society, in the face of government offi-
cials holding a different personal view, is at stake. The CCJ has previously ap-
peared as counsel or as amicus curiae before the Supreme Court of the United
States and this and other courts in cases involving the authority of the people, as
the ultimate sovereign, to direct and control the actions of their agents, the elected
officials of government, through written constitutions, including United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Amodei v. Nevada State Senate, 99 Fed.Appx. 90
(9th Cir. 2004); Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Legislature of the State of Cali-
fornia, No. S170071 (Cal. 2009).
1
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
More than a century ago, faced with an unresponsive government beholden
to special interests, the People of California amended their state constitution to
grant themselves a power to adopt statutory or constitutional provisions directly by
initiative rather than through the agency of their elected officials, as a mechanism
to guarantee that the policy decisions of the People could not be thwarted by recal-
citrant governmental officials.
Over the past decade, the People of California have engaged in an epic battle
over the very definition of marriage, a bedrock institution that has long been rec-
ognized as “one of the cornerstones of our civilized society.” Meltzer v. C. Buck
LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 936, 957 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.); see also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (describing marriage,
“the union for life of one man and one woman,” as “the sure foundation of all that
is stable and noble in our civilization”).
The battle has pitted the majority of the People of California against every
branch of their state government. In 1994, the Legislature added Section 308 to its
Family Code, mandating that marriages contracted in other states would be recog-
nized as valid in California if they were valid in the state where performed. As
other states (or their state courts) started moving toward recognizing same-sex
marriages, it became clear that Section 308 would require California to recognize
2
those marriages, even though another provision of California law, Family Code
Section 300, specifically limited marriage to “a man and a woman.” This concern
was foreclosed by the People at the March 2000 Election with the passage of Prop-
osition 22, a statutory initiative adopted by a 61% to 39% majority that provided:
“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”
Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5.
In 2005, however, the Legislature passed a bill in direct violation of Proposi-
tion 22, A.B. 849, which would have eliminated the gender requirement found in
Family Code Section 300. That bill was vetoed by the Governor as a violation of
the state constitutional requirement that the Legislature cannot repeal statutory in-
itiatives adopted by the people. Cal. Const. art. 2, § 10(c).
Meanwhile, a local elected official, the Mayor of San Francisco, took it upon
himself to issue marriage licenses in direct violation of Proposition 22. Although
the California Supreme Court rebuffed that blatant disregard of the law, Lockyer v.
City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (2004), it ultimately ruled that
Proposition 22 was unconstitutional under the state constitution. In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).
The People responded immediately, placing another initiative on the ballot at
the first opportunity, and in November 2008, Proposition 8 was adopted as a con-
stitutional amendment, effectively overturning the decision of the California Su-
3
preme Court. That initiative was immediately challenged as a supposed unconsti-
tutional revision of the state constitution rather than a valid constitutional amend-
ment. The Attorney General of the State, an opponent of Proposition 8 during the
election, not only refused to defend the initiative in court, but affirmatively argued
that it was unconstitutional, despite his statutory duty to “defend all causes to
which the State . . . is a party.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12512. As a result, the high
court of the state allowed Proponents of the Initiative to intervene in order to pro-
vide the defense of the Initiative that the governmental defendants would not, re-
cognizing Proponents’ preferred status under California law (the Court simulta-
neously denied a motion to intervene by other supporters of Proposition 8 who
were not official Proponents of the measure) and specifically authorizing them to
respond to the Court’s Order to Show Cause that it issued to the governmental de-
fendants. ER1617. Persuaded by the Proponents’ arguments, the California Su-
preme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a valid amendment to the state constitution.
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).
Another group of plaintiffs, supported by many of the same organizations
that had just lost in Strauss, then filed this action in federal court, naming as defen-
dants several government officials: the same Attorney General who had previously
refused to defend the initiative in state court, the Governor, two health officials and
two county clerks, none of whom offered any defense to the lawsuit.
4
Despite governing precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court as well as this
Court, the Attorney General again refused to defend the Initiative, as this Court has
already recognized, instead agreeing with Plaintiffs’ contention that the Proposi-
tion was unconstitutional. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587
F.3d 947, 949 (2009). Indeed, circumstantial evidence from the district court pro-
ceedings below strongly suggests that the Attorney General was actively colluding
with Plaintiffs to undermine the defense of the Initiative, see Motion to Realign at
4-5 (Dkt. #216), and the District Court even directed him to “work together in pre-
senting facts pertaining to the affected governmental interests” with San Francisco,
whose motion to intervene as a Plaintiff was granted by the District Court. 8/9/09
Hearing Tr. at 56 (Dkt.#162); 8/9/09 Minute Order at 2 (Dkt.#160).
Not surprisingly, given the Attorney General’s antipathy toward the Proposi-
tion it was his duty to defend, the Proponents of the Initiative moved for, and were
granted, Intervenor-Defendant status. ER 204-213. In granting the motion, the
District Court expressly noted, without objection from any of the parties, his un-
derstanding that “under California law … proponents of initiative measures have
the standing to … defend an enactment that is brought into law by the initiative
process” and that intervention was “substantially justified in this case, particularly
where the authorities, the [governmental] defendants who ordinarily would defend
the proposition or the enactment that is being challenged here, are taking the posi-
5
tion that, in fact, it is constitutionally infirmed (sic).” 7/2/09 Hearing Tr. at 8:13-
17 (ER202) (emphasis added); see also Perry, 587 F.3d, at 949-950 (Proponents
allowed to Intervene “so that they could defend the constitutionality of Prop. 8”
when the government defendants would not).
But the District Court denied a motion by the County of Imperial, the Im-
perial County Board of Supervisors, and the Imperial County Deputy Clerk to In-
tervene as governmental party defendants willing to defend the Initiative, holding
its ruling on the motion for more than eight months until it issued its opinion on the
merits and without once in its order of denial taking note of the fact that it had pre-
viously granted the motion by the City and County San Francisco County to inter-
vene as a party plaintiff or that two other County clerks were already named de-
fendants in the case, albeit ones who were offering no defense. Order Denying In-
tervention (Dkt.#709).
After what can only be described as a show trial—the Chief Judge of the
District Court, who presided, was even chastised by the Supreme Court of the
United States for attempting to broadcast the trial in violation of existing court
rules, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 715 (2010)—the District Court on
August 4, 2010, issued a 136-page opinion that purported to contain numerous
findings of fact ostensibly discrediting all of the oral testimony while simply ignor-
ing the extensive documentary and historical evidence supporting the rationality of
6
Proposition 8, and articulating conclusions of law that likewise simply ignored
binding precedent of the Supreme Court and this Court, as well as persuasive au-
thority from every other state and federal appellate court to have considered the is-
sues presented by the case. On the same day, the District Court issued its Order
denying the long-languishing Motion to Intervene by Imperial County, and ordered
responses to a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal that had been filed by Intervenor-
Defendant Proponents of the Initiative the day before. Not only the Plaintiffs, but
the governmental Defendants, opposed the motion for a stay pending appeal. The
district court denied the motion for a stay, holding that there was little likelihood of
success on the merits of the appeal, in part because it was questionable whether
this Court would even have jurisdiction to consider the appeal absent an appeal by
the named governmental defendants, who were all actively siding with Plaintiffs.
ER 3-13 (Dkt.#727).
Finally, despite concerted efforts by the People of California1 to have De-
fendants—their elected Governor and Attorney General and even their Lieutenant
Governor while serving as Acting Governor (see Cal. Const. art. 5, §10)—file a
notice of appeal to guarantee that this Court had jurisdiction to consider whether
the decision by the District Court invalidating a solemn act of the sovereign people

1
See,
e.g., “Lawmakers Urge Governor to Appeal Prop 8 Ruling,” Associated Press
(Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/01/national/
main6827966.shtml.
7
of California was erroneous, none of the governmental defendants filed a notice of
appeal within the 30-day window specified by F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(A).
In granting the motion for a stay pending appeal by the Initiative Proponents,
Intervenor-Defendants below, this Court ordered briefing on whether the Interve-
nor-Defendants had standing to pursue the appeal. The issue can be re-
characterized as follows: Does California law provide authority, cognizeable in
the federal courts for purpose of establishing Article III standing, for Proponents of
an Initiative to defend their exercise of the initiative power so that an elected offi-
cial personally opposed to the initiative cannot effectively veto a duly-approved
initiative by refusing to defend it? Similarly, in the parallel appeal brought by Im-
perial County, the issue can be presented as follows: Can a district court shield its
judgment from appellate court review by denying intervenor status to governmen-
tal entities willing to offer a defense of an initiative duly enacted by the People of
the State, even while granting intervenor status to a similarly-situated governmen-
tal entity who intervened in order to join in the attack on the constitutionality of the
initiative?
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Initiative Proponents have standing to defend on appeal the Initiative they
authored, both as agents of the state of California and on their own behalf to pro-
tect the fundamental right to Initiative afforded to them under California Law.
Similarly, the County of Imperial, its Board of Supervisors and its County
Deputy Clerk, all had a right under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) to inter-
vene in the litigation below. The denial by the district court of their motion to in-
tervene as of right was erroneous and must be reversed; then, as governmental In-
tervenor-Defendants, they, too, clearly have standing to appeal the decision below,
providing an alternative basis for this Court’s jurisdiction to consider the appeal by
Proponents.
On the merits, the district court below vastly exceeded its authority in nu-
merous ways. Most substantially, it held that Proposition 8, which defines mar-
riage as between one man and one woman, violated the federal Due Process and
Equal Protection rights of same-sex couples despite binding authority of the Su-
preme Court to the contrary.
The decision of the district court must therefore be reversed.
9
ARGUMENT
It is hard to read the procedural history set out above without the phrase,
“manipulation of the judicial process,” coming forcefully to mind. As Chief Judge
Kozinski recently noted, the courts must be particularly sensitive to efforts by par-
ties to withdraw a case from consideration “in order to manipulate the judicial
process to its advantage.” Suntharalinkam v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 822, 830 (9th Cir.
2007) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). All the more must the appellate courts be con-
cerned lest a district court’s apparently contradictory actions—granting San Fran-
cisco’s motion to intervene as a Plaintiff while denying Imperial’s motion to inter-
vene as a Defendant—be viewed by the citizenry as a manipulative attempt to
shield a district court decision from appellate scrutiny. Happily, for the reasons set
out below, this Court need not, for lack of jurisdiction, abide that apparent manipu-
lation of the judicial process.
I. The Initiative Proponents Have Standing to Defend Proposition 8, Both

as Agents of the State and in Their Own Right.
A. The Principal Purpose of the Initiative Power Is To Allow The

People To Act Directly, When Their Government Officials Will Not.
The initiative power in California is central to ensuring that the government
is responsive to its citizens, and is “one of the most precious rights of [California’s]
democratic process.” Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 289 (Cal. 1982). Initia-
tives are designed to circumvent unresponsive government officials who wield the
10
power to create law. Initiative proponents, therefore, retain a power that is supe-
rior to that of the State legislature. Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Struc-
tural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1165, 1195
(1998). For example, the legislature may not repeal or amend an initiative statute
unless the enactment permits it, Cal. Const. art. 2, § 10(c), a prohibition that no
other state carries to such lengths as California, People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186, 200
(Cal. 2010).
To fully understand the importance of the initiative power in California, it is
helpful to review why it was adopted. Starting in the late 19th century, Califor-
nians grew frustrated at the unresponsive, corrupt nature of their legislature. Spe-
cial interests essentially governed the state. See Center for Governmental Studies,
Democracy by Initiative: Shaping California's Fourth Branch of Government 3
(2nd. ed. 2008) (“Democracy by Initiative”). There was an “ever increasing public
dissatisfaction with machine-controlled politics at the state and local levels. Rep-
resentative government seemed unresponsive to the popular will, and legislative
decisions seemed biased in favor of special interests.” Steven Piott, Giving Voters
a Voice: The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in America 148 (2003).
Voters were searching for a way to regain control. Id.
The initiative movement actually began in the cities of San Francisco and
Los Angeles. Organized citizen groups succeeded in passing city charters that
11
gave voters the right to propose city ordinances and future charter amendments.
Piott, supra at 151; George Mowry, The California Progressives 39 (1951). Suc-
cess at the local level spurred action at the state level, but the state legislature re-
mained unresponsive. Piott, supra at 163; Mowry, supra at 56-57. That changed
when the initiative movement swept Governor Hiram Johnson into office in 1910,
and he immediately proposed legislation intending to “‘return the government to
the people’ and to give them honest public service untarnished by corruption and
corporate influence.” Spencer C. Olin, Jr., California's Prodigal Sons 35 (1968).
Pressed by the Governor, the Legislature put before voters a reform package that
consisted of Proposition 7 (the initiative power), Proposition 4 (granting women
the right to vote), and Proposition 8 (providing for the recall of government offi-
cials). “It gave citizens the techniques to check the influence of special interest
groups, alter the state’s political agenda and public policies and remove unrespon-
sive or corrupt officeholders.” Democracy by Initiative at 42. This reform pack-
age satisfied the demand of the people of California to directly control government
when elected representatives become unresponsive to their needs.
“Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government ultimately re-
sides in the people, the amendment speaks of initiative and referendum, not as a
right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them.” Associated Home
Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976) (Tobriner, J.). It is
12
“the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people,” id. (quoting
Martin v. Smith, 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117 (Cal.App. 1959), “and to prevent any
action which would improperly annul that right,” Martin, 176 Cal.App.2d at 117.
In short, as Justice Stanley Mosk has noted, the initiative process “is in essence a
legislative battering ram which may be used to tear through the exasperating tangle
of the traditional legislative procedure and strike directly toward the desired end.”
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 357, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
Given the importance of the initiative in the California constitutional
scheme, it is not surprising that California law confers special authority on the
official proponents of initiatives to defend their initiatives against legal challenge.
For the reasons set out in subsections B and C below, that special authority is more
than sufficient to confer Article III standing on the official Proponents of Proposi-
tion 8, so that they can continue to provide here on appeal the defense of the Initia-
tive they sponsored, as they did as Intervenor-Defendants in the court below.
B. California Law Authorizes Proponents of Initiatives to Stand in as

“Agents of the State” to Defend Their Initiative, At Least When
Government Officials Will Not, Thereby Providing Them Standing
in Federal Court for Article III Purposes.
Relying in part on dicta in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Ari-
zonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997), the district court
13
below questioned whether the Official Proponents of Proposition 8 would have
standing to pursue an appeal on their own, absent participation in the appeal by one
of the governmental defendants. 8/12/10 Order at 5-6 (Dkt.#727) (ER7-8). Yet in
the identical circumstance where a governmental defendant who had opposed an
Initiative refused to file an appeal from a district court judgment holding the initia-
tive unconstitutional, governing precedent in this Circuit holds that initiative pro-
ponents do have standing to defend their own initiatives. Yniguez v. State of Ari-
zona, 939 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1991), ultimately dismissed as moot on other
grounds sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
Even reading the tea leaves of Justice Ginsburg’s dicta in the decision much later
in the procedural posture of the same case, dismissing the action on other grounds
as moot, this Court’s holding that initiative proponents do have standing to defend
their own initiative is particularly applicable to California initiative proponents,
given the preferred place that California law gives to them.
The California Supreme Court has expressly noted that because a govern-
mental entity might not defend a citizen-enacted initiative “with vigor if it has un-
derlying opposition” to the initiative, courts “should allow intervention by propo-
nents of the initiative.” Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal.3d
810, 822, 718 P.2d 68 (Cal.1986). Indeed, failure to do so “may well be an abuse
of discretion.” Id. Following this governing authority, California courts have rou-
14
tinely permitted initiative proponents to intervene in defense of the initiatives they
sponsored. See, e.g., 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 8 Cal.4th 216, 241, 878
P.2d 566 (Cal. 1994); Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1250,
906 P.2d 1112 (Cal. 1995); City of Westminster v. County of Orange, 204
Cal.App.3d 623, 626 (Cal.App.4.Dist. 1988); People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County
of Mendocino, 36 Cal.3d 476, 480, 683 P.2d 1150 (Cal.1984); Community Health
Assn. v. Board of Supervisors, 146 Cal.App.3d 990, 992 (Cal.App. 1.Dist. 1983);
cf. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.3d 805, 683 P.2d 1150 (Cal.1989) (in-
itiative supporters appeared as real parties in interest to defend against constitu-
tional challenge).
Although the test for intervention is not identical to that for standing, there
are “substantial similarities between the two,” and “the added interest necessary to
confer Article III standing—a particularized injury that distinguishes [initiative
proponents] from ‘concerned bystanders,’” Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 731 (quoting Di-
amond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986), has been recognized by California
courts, which have allowed intervener initiative proponents to unilaterally pursue
appeals when the government defendants would not.
In one recent case, the California Court of Appeal treated the initiative pro-
ponent as potentially an “indispensible person,” and allowed him to appeal from a
trial court decision invalidating the initiative he sponsored when the governmental
15
defendant, who had joined with plaintiffs in challenging portions of the initiative,
did not. Citizens for Jobs and the Economy v. County of Orange, 94 Cal.App.4th
1311, 1321-22 (Cal. App. 4.Dist. 2002) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 389, “Joind-
er as party, conditions; indispensable person, factors . . . .”). In another, the propo-
nent of a local initiative was held to be an “aggrieved party” that could file a mo-
tion to vacate a writ of mandate issued in conflict with the initiative it supported
and appeal from the denial of its motion as well as the judgment, even though the
City defendant did not appeal and even though the proponent of the initiative was
not a party to the trial court proceeding. Simac Design, Inc. v. Alciati, 92
Cal.App.3d 146, 151-53 (Cal.App.1.Dist.1979); cf. Greif v. Dullea, 66 Cal.App.2d
986, 993 (1944) (“A party in interest, but not of record, who accepts complete con-
trol in the conduct of a case, but suddenly is confronted with his lack of legal ca-
pacity to take an appeal, is an aggrieved party”).
To be sure, state courts can recognize a broader standing than is permitted in
federal court under Article III, Lee v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 999-
1000 (9th Cir. 2001); Reycraft v. Lee, 177 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1217 (Cal.App. 4
Dist. 2009), but California has not done so here. Instead, its relevant standing rules
parallel those applied by the federal courts under Article III. “To have standing to
seek a writ of mandate,”—one of the procedures used to obtain appellate court re-
view—“a party must be ‘beneficially interested’ (Code Civ. Proc. § 1086), i.e.,
16
have ‘some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or
protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at large.’”
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., 21
Cal.4th 352, 361-62, 981 P.2d 499 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Carsten v. Psychology Ex-
aming Com., 614 P.2d 276 (1980)). The California Supreme Court noted that this
standard “is equivalent to the federal ‘injury in fact’ test, which requires a party to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has suffered ‘an invasion of a le-
gally protected interest that is ‘(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 362; see also Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Thus, the relevant California standing
requirements are interpreted as equivalent to Article III standing in federal courts.
That the California courts recognize standing for Initiative Proponents to unilate-
rally pursue appeals, Citizens for Jobs, 94 Cal.App.4th at 1322; Simac Design, 92
Cal.App.3d at 153, using a test “equivalent” to that used by federal courts to de-
termine Article III standing, Associated Builders and Contractors, 21 Cal.4th 362,
should be dispositive.
It is not surprising that California law gives such a preferred position to in-
itiative proponents, given the “precious right” status of the initiative power and the
concern about unresponsive government that motivated its adoption. In the present
case, the Governor and Attorney General have both refused to defend Proposition
17
8, as was their duty. Absent defense by the Initiative Proponents, the potential for
mischief by elected officials bent on nullifying an initiative that they did not like is
not hypothetical or speculative, but very real. The California courts have recog-
nized this potential harm, and ruled that in such instances initiative proponents are
to be allowed to intervene and given standing to pursue an appeal even absent ap-
peal by the governmental defendants. Camarillo, 41 Cal.3d, at 822; Citizens for
Jobs, 94 Cal.App.4th, at 1321-22; Simac Design, 92 Cal.App.3d, at 151-53.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Yniguez. After carefully review-
ing the Supreme Court’s decisions that had denied intervenor standing on appeal,
this Court concluded quite persuasively that the case of initiative proponents was
different. The initiative proponents were not merely “private citizen[s]” like the
private physician intervenor in Diamond who was simply interested in seeing the
state’s abortion law enforced. Rather, “[a]s the principal sponsors, . . . their rela-
tionship to [the Initiative was] closely analogous to the relationship of a state legis-
lature to a state statute.” Yniguez, 939 F.2d, at 732.
This Court then reviewed Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987), a case in-
volving legislator standing. The Supreme Court held in Karcher that the legisla-
tors who had intervened in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Leg-
islature, to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the Attorney General of
the state would not do so, no longer had standing to pursue an appeal “on behalf of
18
the legislature” once they had lost their leadership positions. Karcher, 484 U.S., at
81. “But in arriving at that decision,” this Court noted in Yniguez, “the [Supreme]
Court clearly indicated that jurisdiction had been proper in the district court and the
court of appeals so long as the legislators held office, notwithstanding the fact that
the Attorney General had declined to defend the suit.” Yniguez, 939 F.2d, at 732.
This Court went on to hold that because the principal sponsors of an initiative
“stan[d] in an analogous position to a state legislature,” and “have a strong interest
in the vitality of a provision of a state constitution which they proposed and for
which they vigorously campaigned,” they had standing to pursue the appeal even
after the governmental defendants declined to do so. Id., at 733.
Justice Ginsburg’s obiter dicta in Arizonans for Official English, expressing
“grave doubts” about whether the initiative proponents had standing to pursue the
appeal, is, well, dicta. Justice Ginsburg cited the summary dismissal in The Don't
Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company of Chicago, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (“DBWC”), but the summary dismis-
sal in that case was “triggered by the Solicitor General’s argument [in an amicus
curiae brief filed by the United States] that ‘where the State has litigated the validi-
ty of its law and decided to acquiesce in a holding that it is unconstitutional, it is
not the prerogative of private citizens to revive the law through further litigation,
even if they might benefit in an abstract way by doing so.’” Brief of Appellee the
19
United States of America to Dismiss or Affirm, The Don't Bankrupt Washington
Committee v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago,
No. 82-1445 (Oct. Term, 1982) (cited in Brief for Respondents In Opposition to
the Judgment, Arizonans for Official English v. State of Arizona, No. 95-974, at 25
(Oct. Term 1995) (emphasis added)).
It does not appear that the DBWC Court was ever presented with, much less
considered, the argument that led Judge Reinhardt to hold in Yniquez that Initiative
Proponents do have standing, namely, that initiative proponents are not merely
“private citizens,” but “[a]s the principal sponsors, . . . their relationship to [the In-
itiative was] closely analogous to the relationship of a state legislature to a state
statute.” Yniguez, 939 F.2d, at 732. Neither does it appear that the DBWC Court
was presented with, or considered, a state statutory scheme giving special rights to
initiative proponents, or specific holdings by state courts, much like those found
sufficient to confer standing in Karcher, that allow official proponents to defend
their initiatives when government officials will not, such as exist in California. See
Simac Design, 92 Cal.App.3d, at 151-53. As Karcher and even Justice Ginsburg’s
dicta in Arizonans makes clear, those things matter greatly to the Article III analy-
sis. Karcher, 484 U.S., at 82 (holding that because the New Jersey Supreme Court
had previously granted intervenor status to legislative leaders to intervene on be-
half of the legislature, the appearance by the legislative leaders as intervenors in
20
the trial and appellate courts below obviated the need to “vacate the judgments be-
low for lack of a proper defendant-appellant”); Arizonans, 520 U.S., at 65 (citing
Karcher and apparently recognizing that state law appointing initiative sponsors to
intervene as agents of the people—as California law clearly does—would provide
the necessary Article III standing that Arizona initiative proponents may have
lacked).
In any event, Justice Ginsburg’s “grave doubt” was clearly dicta. See Arizo-
nans for Official English, 520 U.S., at 66 (“we need not definitively resolve the is-
sue”). Judge Reinhardt’s 1991 opinion in Yniguez was not vacated. See Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 118 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (order by
the en banc court vacating only the 1995 judgment of the en banc court following
remand from the Supreme Court); Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 119
F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 1997) (order by the original panel remanding to the district court
with instructions to dismiss, but without ordering that the 1991 opinion be va-
cated); but see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d
1297, 1305 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (mistakenly stating that the 1991 decision, rather
than the 1995 decision, was vacated); Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 n.8
(9th Cir. 2006) (same). The 1991 panel decision, and its reasoning, therefore re-
mains the law of this Circuit, binding on other panels. See Sanchez v. Mukasey,
521 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008). Initiative proponents “stan[d] in an analog-
21
ous position to a state legislature” and therefore have standing to appeal as “agents
of the people.”
C. California Law Recognizes a Fundamental Right of Citizens to Pro-

pose Initiatives, and this Right Becomes A Particularized Interest for
Citizens Who Serve as an Initiative’s Official Proponents.
The holding of the 1991 Yniguez decision that initiative proponents do have
standing to pursue an appeal is further bolstered here by the fact that California law
recognizes a “fundamental right of the people to propose statutory or constitutional
changes through the initiative process.” Costa v. Superior Court, 128 P.3d 675,
686 (Cal., 2006). The California Constitution describes two facets of the initiative
power: 1) “the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the
Constitution”; “and” 2) the power of electors “to adopt or reject” those proposed
statutes and constitutional amendments. Cal. Const. art. 2, § 8. Initiative propo-
nents, parties that actually exercise the first part of that authority, thus have an in-
terest distinct from the entire body of electors who adopt or reject their handiwork.
In other words, initiative proponents in California have a “sufficient beneficial in-
terest” and a “special interest to be … preserved or protected over and above the
interest held in common with the public at large.” Sonoma County Nuclear Free
Zone v. Superior Court, 189 Cal.App.3d 167, 175 (Cal.App.1.Dist.1987).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond is not to the contrary. There, the
Court stated that since “the State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the
22
State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club v. Morton, [405 U.S.
727, 740 (1972)], in defending the standards embodied in that code.” Diamond,
476 U.S., at 65. But as the initiative provisions of the California Constitution
make clear, the power to “create a legal code” in California does not rest exclusive-
ly with the State or its legislature. The people, as the ultimate sovereign, have re-
tained the right to “create a legal code” for themselves. They have retained the
power to “propose” statutes and constitutional amendments, and the power “to
adopt or reject” them. Cal. Const. art. 2, § 8.
The Diamond Court specifically noted that the “legislature, of course, has
the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing. In
such a case, the requirements of Article III may be met.” Diamond, 476 U.S., at 65
n.17. Necessarily, then, because “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,”
Cal. Const. art. 2, § 1, the people have the power to create new interests sufficient
to confer standing, and the people of California have done so here. Proponents of
initiatives have a “sufficient beneficial interest” in their own right for Article III
standing. Sonoma County Nuclear Free Zone, 189 Cal.App.3d, at 175. That’s
why California courts “should allow intervention by proponents of the initiative,”
Camarillo., 41 Cal.3d, at 822, why initiative proponents are frequently treated as
“real parties in interest,” e.g., Independent Energy Producers Ass’n v. McPherson,
136 P.3d 178, 180 (Cal. 2006); Senate of the State of California v. Jones, 988 P.2d
23
1089, 1091 (Cal. 1999), and why such intervenors have specifically been allowed
to unilaterally appeal from adverse judgments, Citizens for Jobs, 94 Cal.App.4th,
at 1321-22; Simac Design, 92 Cal.App.3d, at 151-53.
II. Imperial County and Its Officials Were Entitled to Intervene as of

Right under Rule 24(a). Their Parallel Appeal Therefore Provides
an Alternative Ground for Jurisdiction By This Court To Hear Pro-
ponents’ Appeal.
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a district
court to grant intervention on a timely motion of any party that claims an interest in
the action “and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest.” The district court de-
nied the motion to intervene by Imperial County, its Board of Supervisors, and its
Deputy County Clerk (“Imperial County”), on the ground that their duties were
merely “ministerial.”
Under California law, local administrative agencies and their executive offi-
cials are required to follow duly enacted statutes and state constitutional provi-
sions. Lockyer, 95 P.3d, at 485 (2004). Administrative officials have no power to
refuse to enforce a state law unless and until an appellate court has ruled the sta-
tute or constitutional provision unconstitutional. Cal. Const. art. 3, § 3.5 (emphasis
added). The ministerial duty to issue marriage licenses in this case is a duty pur-
suant to statute and state constitution—not executive fiat of the Governor and At-
torney General. See Lockyer, 95 P.3d, at 488-89. Neither the Governor nor the At-
24
torney General are given the authority under California law to alter the terms of ei-
ther state statute or the state constitution. The lower court may be able to compel
the Governor and the Attorney General to issue such an edict and could enforce
that order against the Governor and Attorney General, but nothing in state law im-
poses a ministerial duty on Imperial County to follow such an edict. See Cal.
Const. art. 3, §3.5; Valdes v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 773, 780 (1983) (Constitu-
tional officers are under a constitutional duty to comply with state law “unless and
until an appellate court declares them unconstitutional”).
We are left then with a lower court judgment that seeks to alter the legal du-
ties of county officials who were not parties to the action. This Court encountered
a similar situation in Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993). In that
case, Sierra Club sued the Environmental Protection Agency seeking to change the
terms of a permit issued to the City of Phoenix. 995 F.2d, at 1480. Phoenix sought
to intervene and this Court was called on to decide whether the city had a protecta-
ble interest. Id., at 1481. This Court had little trouble in finding a protectable in-
terest since the action sought to alter the permits held by the city.
In addition to the city’s “property interest” in its permit and wastewater
treatment facility, the Court noted that the litigation also sought to impose new
regulatory responsibilities on the city. Id., at 1486. A judgment for the Sierra Club
in the case would have led to the creation of a list of impaired waters that would
25
have in turn obligated the city to implement “control strategies.” Those require-
ments would have been mandatory under the federal law at issue in the case. The
fact that the city would have had no discretion to ignore those legal obligations did
not suffice to exclude it from the litigation because “an adjudication on these issues
could ‘result in practical impairment of the [City's] interests.’” Id.
It was also of no moment that the city’s interest in its permit was not “pro-
tected” by the environmental laws at issue. “[T]he issue is participation in a law-
suit, not the outcome.” Id., at 1483. As this Court noted, “[o]ur adversary process
requires that we hear from both sides before the interests of one side are impaired
by a judgment.” Id.
The adversarial process has taken a beating in this action. The nominal state
defendants refused to defend this action and in any event had no authority to alter
the legal requirements for county clerks who were not made parties. A county that
favored the plaintiffs’ position was granted intervention to challenge the California
Constitution, but Imperial County was denied intervention because it sought to de-
fend its obligations under the state constitution. Imperial County has the right to
intervene in this action not only to protect the interests of its voters, see United
States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir.1984), but also because the judgment
in the case seeks to impose legal obligations directly on the county and its deputy
clerk, Sierra Club, 995 F.3d, at 1486.
26
Imperial County has appealed from the district court’s orders denying it in-
tervention and on the merits. Once the order denying Imperial County’s motion to
intervene is reversed, Imperial County’s own parallel appeal on the merits will
provide this Court with ample jurisdiction, in the alternative, to consider Propo-
nents’ own appeal.
III. The District Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction By Ignoring (and there-
fore Effectively Overruling) Governing Precedent of the Supreme
Court and of This Court, and by Issuing a Broad Injunction, With-
out a Class Action Certification, Purportedly Binding Everywhere in
California, Even With Respect to Non-Parties.
On the merits, the district court below vastly exceeded its authority in nu-
merous ways. Most substantially, it held that Proposition 8, which defines mar-
riage as between one man and one woman, violated the federal Due Process and
Equal Protection rights of same-sex couples despite binding authority of the Su-
preme Court to the contrary, which it completely ignored. In Baker v. Nelson, a
case pressing the identical claims at issue here, namely, that denial of a marriage
license to a same-sex couple violated federal due process and equal protection re-
quirements, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the Minnesota Supreme
Court “for want of substantial federal question.” 409 U.S. 810 (1972). That is a
decision on the merits, and “lower courts are bound by [it] ‘until such time as the
27
[Supreme] Court informs (them) that (they) are not.” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332, 344-45 (1975) (quoting Doe v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 1096 (1973)).
The district court also ignored—did not even cite—binding authority from
this Court to the same effect. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.
1982). And by holding that strict scrutiny applies, and even while purporting to
apply rational basis review but actually applying heightened scrutiny, the district
court also ignored precedent from both the Supreme Court and this Court subject-
ing sexual orientation classifications merely to rational basis review. See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996); id., at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The Court evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’ . . . is the governing standard”);
Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008); Flores v. Morgan
Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003); Holmes v. California
Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d
1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997); Meinhold v. United States DOD, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478
(9th Cir. 1994); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
Even if those precedents might be viewed as implicitly having been called
into question by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, cf. Lawrence v. Tex-
as, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)—a position that no federal appellate court has taken—it is
most assuredly the prerogative of the Supreme Court, not a district court, to make
28
that determination. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); see also Hicks,
422 U.S., at 344-45 (recognizing that even when “doctrinal developments” may
have called into question a summary dismissal’s holding of no substantial federal
question, the lower courts are still bound by the summary decision until the Su-
preme Court tells them otherwise).
Finally, the district court vastly exceeded its jurisdictional authority by
granting a state-wide injunction, purportedly requiring county clerks in all 58
counties of the state to grant a marriage license to any same-sex couple that seeks
one, where the two same-sex couples who brought this litigation did not seek class-
action certification, and where only two county clerks were named as defendants
and one other was allowed to join—as an Intervenor-Plaintiff ! None of the other
fifty-five county clerk offices in the state were parties to the litigation, and one—
Imperial County’s—was affirmatively denied Intervenor status by the district
court. The non-parties cannot be bound by the District Court’s injunction absent a
determination that they are “in active concert” with the parties, made in a proceed-
ing in which the non-parties were allowed to participate. Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazelton Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 112 (1969). And it is likewise highly ques-
tionable whether the district court’s order that the named defendants direct non-
parties to comply with the injunction can be binding on the non-parties, particular-
ly in light of an express provision in the California Constitution specifically bar-
29
ring government officials in California from refusing to comply with California
law “unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute is un-
constitutional.” Cal. Const. art. 3, § 3.5.
CONCLUSION
This Court should recognize that it has jurisdiction to consider this appeal
because, under California law, initiative proponents have standing to defend the
initiatives they sponsored. On the merits, the District Court’s decision holding that
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional should be reversed.
Date: September 24, 2010 Respectfully submitted,

JURISPRUDENCE
John C. Eastman
Anthony T. Caso
Karen J. Lugo

30
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned certifies under Rule 32(a)(7)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, that the attached amicus brief is
proportionally spaced, has a type face of 14 points or more and, pursuant to the
word count feature of the word processing program used to prepare this brief, con-
tains 6,860 words, exclusive of the matters that may be omitted under Rule
32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
Dated: September 24, 2010

JURISPRUDENCE
John C. Eastman
By: /s/ John C. Eastman

31
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 24, 2010, I caused the foregoing document to be
electronically transmitted to the Clerk’s Office using the Appellate CM/ECF Sys-
tem for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to all registered
CM/ECF participants and parties hereto. Service is accomplished thru the Appel-
late CM/ECF system.

JURISPRUDENCE
John C. Eastman

32

Plaintiffs-Appellees,: Nos. 10-16696 in The United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Plaintiffs-Appellees,: Nos. 10-16696 in The United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Plaintiffs-Appellees,: Nos. 10-16696 in The United States Court of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case: 10-16696 09/24/2010 Page: 1 of 41 ID: 7487151 DktEntry: 63

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ON APPEAL FROM UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

JOHN C. EASTMAN, Cal. Bar No. 193726

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence

Corporate Disclosure Statement

CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL

By: /s/ John C. Eastman________

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi,

Community Health Assn. v. Board of Supervisors,

Lee v. American Nat. Ins. Co.,

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazelton Research, Inc.,

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

A.B. 849 .....................................................................................................................3

“Lawmakers Urge Governor to Appeal Prop 8 Ruling,” Associated Press

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

consent of all parties to the case.

The Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence (“CCJ”) was founded in 1999 as

amicus curiae briefs in cases of constitutional significance, including cases such as

nition of marriage as a cornerstone of civil society, in the face of government offi-

officials of government, through written constitutions, including United States v.

fornia, No. S170071 (Cal. 2009).

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

More than a century ago, faced with an unresponsive government beholden

to special interests, the People of California amended their state constitution to

grant themselves a power to adopt statutory or constitutional provisions directly by

citrant governmental officials.

ognized as “one of the cornerstones of our civilized society.” Meltzer v. C. Buck

is stable and noble in our civilization”).

“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”

Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5.

In 2005, however, the Legislature passed a bill in direct violation of Proposi-

itiatives adopted by the people. Cal. Const. art. 2, § 10(c).

himself to issue marriage licenses in direct violation of Proposition 22. Although

Proposition 22 was unconstitutional under the state constitution. In re Marriage

Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008).

The People responded immediately, placing another initiative on the ballot at

stitutional amendment, effectively overturning the decision of the California Su-

preme Court. That initiative was immediately challenged as a supposed unconsti-

neously denied a motion to intervene by other supporters of Proposition 8 who

fendants. ER1617. Persuaded by the Proponents’ arguments, the California Su-

preme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a valid amendment to the state constitution.

Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009).

Another group of plaintiffs, supported by many of the same organizations

tion was unconstitutional. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587

Hearing Tr. at 56 (Dkt.#162); 8/9/09 Minute Order at 2 (Dkt.#160).

granted, Intervenor-Defendant status. ER 204-213. In granting the motion, the

derstanding that “under California law … proponents of initiative measures have

when the government defendants would not).

tervene as governmental party defendants willing to defend the Initiative, holding

August 4, 2010, issued a 136-page opinion that purported to contain numerous

Proposition 8, and articulating conclusions of law that likewise simply ignored

denying the long-languishing Motion to Intervene by Imperial County, and ordered

Finally, despite concerted efforts by the People of California1 to have De-

of California was erroneous, none of the governmental defendants filed a notice of

appeal within the 30-day window specified by F.R.A.P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Intervenor-Defendants below, this Court ordered briefing on whether the Interve-