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1 JON W. DAVIDSON (SBN 89301)

[email protected]
2 TARA BORELLI (SBN 216961)
[email protected]
3 PETER C. RENN (SBN 247633)
[email protected]
4 LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.
3325 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1300
5 Los Angeles, CA 90010
T: (213) 382-7600/F: (213) 351-6050
6
ALAN L. SCHLOSSER (SBN 49957)
7 [email protected]
ELIZABETH O. GILL (SBN 218311)
8 [email protected]
ACLU FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
9 39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
10 T: (415) 621-2493/F: (415) 255-8437

11 SHANNON P. MINTER (SBN 168907)

[email protected]
12 CHRISTOPHER F. STOLL (SBN 179046)
[email protected]
13 ILONA M. TURNER (SBN 256219)
[email protected]
14 NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS
870 Market Street, Suite 370
15 San Francisco, CA 94102
T: (415) 392-6257/F: (415) 392-8442
16

17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

18 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

19 KRISTIN M. PERRY, et al., CASE NO. 09-CV-2292 JW

20 Plaintiffs,
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE LAMBDA
and LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
21 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, FUND, INC., ACLU FOUNDATION OF
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, NATIONAL
22 Plaintiff-Intervenor, CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, AND
v. EQUALITY CALIFORNIA IN OPPOSITION
23 TO PROPONENTS’ MOTION TO VACATE
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al., JUDGMENT
24
Defendants,
25 and Judge: Chief Judge Ware
Courtroom: Courtroom 5, 17th Floor
26 PROPOSITION 8 OFFICIAL PROPONENTS
DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al.,
27
Defendant-Intervenors.
28

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................... i

4 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................................... ii

5 I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
6 II. ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 2
7
A. Rulings on Broad Constitutional Questions Affect Large Segments of the Public
8 and Therefore Cannot Constitute a Basis For Recusal. .................................................... 2

9 B. Recusal on the Basis of Sexual Orientation Is Neither Required Nor Permitted ............. 4
10
1. Exclusion on the Basis of a Same-Sex Relationship Is the Same as Exclusion
11 on the Basis of Sexual Orientation. .............................................................................. 4

12 2. Sexual Orientation Is Unrelated to One’s Ability to Judge Impartially. ...................... 6

13 3. Recusal Based on Sexual Orientation Undermines, Rather Than Promotes,

Public Confidence in an Unbiased Judiciary. .............................................................. 7
14

15 III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 8

16

17

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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
CASES 
3 Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell
4 418 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) .................................................................................................. 1, 5
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic
5
506 U.S. 263 (1993) ........................................................................................................................ 5
6 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez
7 561 U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) ................................................................................................ 5
In re Houston
8
745 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1984)........................................................................................................... 2
9 Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ.
10 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001)........................................................................................................... 3
Johnson v. California
11
543 U.S. 499 (2005) ........................................................................................................................ 3
12 Kaufman v. McCaughtry
13 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005)........................................................................................................... 3
Lawrence v. Texas
14
539 U.S. 558 (2003) ........................................................................................................................ 4
15 Li v. Oregon
16 338 Ore. 376 (2004) ........................................................................................................................ 6
MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc.
17
138 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1998) .............................................................................................................. 5
18 Melendres v. Arpaio
19 No. CV-07-2513-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069 (D. Ariz. Jul. 15, 2009)......... 3, 4, 5
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan
20
458 U.S. 718 (1982) ........................................................................................................................ 3
21 Ortiz v. Stewart
22 149 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1998)....................................................................................................... 2, 6
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542
23
388 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ................................................................................................... 4
24 Perry v. Schwarzenegger
25 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ............................................................................................ 3
Singer v. Wadman
26
745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984)......................................................................................................... 5
27 United States v. Alabama
28 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987)....................................................................................................... 2

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1 United States v. El-Gabrowny

844 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) .............................................................................................. 5, 6
2
United States v. Holland
3 519 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2008)........................................................................................................... 6
4 Wallace v. Jaffree
472 U.S. 38 (1985) .......................................................................................................................... 3
5

6 STATUTES

7 28 U.S.C. § 453 ..................................................................................................................................... 6

8 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) ................................................................................................................................ 2
9 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4)............................................................................................................................ 2
10
OTHER AUTHORITIES
11
Biskupic, Joan, Amid Debate Over Rights, Number of Gay Judges Rising, USA Today,
12
Oct. 17, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-17-
13 gay-judges_x.htm (last visited May 9, 2011) .................................................................................. 7

14 Carlton, Jr., Alfred P., Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American Bar Association
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary 12 (July 2003) ........................................................... 7
15
Chen, Edward M., The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1109
16
(2003) .............................................................................................................................................. 8
17
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader, Human Rights Hero: Tribute to Constance Baker Motley, Human
18 Rights Magazine, Fall 2005, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/irr_hr_Fall
19 05_bakermotley.html (last visited May 10, 2011) .......................................................................... 1
20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

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1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Proponents’ motion is part of an ugly history of attempts to disqualify federal judges on the

3 basis of their personal characteristics. In a famous 1975 case alleging sex discrimination against a

4 law firm, Judge Constance Baker Motley was accused of “‘strongly identif[ying] with those who

5 suffered discrimination in employment because of sex or race’” on account of her work as a civil

6 rights advocate prior to joining the federal bench. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1,

7 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Judge Motley rightly refused to recuse herself, and as Supreme Court Justice

8 Ruth Bader Ginsberg has explained:

9 Constance Baker Motley was engaged in the civil rights struggle as a

principal member of Thurgood Marshall’s NAACP Legal Defense and
10 Educational Fund team. She helped write briefs in Brown v. Board of Education
and follow-on school desegregation cases. She represented James Meredith in his
11 successful effort to gain admission to the University of Mississippi and was
counsel to Charlayne Hunter-Gault in her similarly successful effort to gain
12 admission to the University of Georgia. She argued ten cases before the United
States Supreme Court, winning nine. . . .
13
Among the many cases over which she presided, in the mid-1970s, she
14 was assigned to adjudicate Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, a Title VII gender-
discrimination class action against several of New York’s most prestigious firms.
15 In the course of that litigation, she was asked by defense counsel to recuse herself
because she was a woman and, before her elevation to the bench, a woman
16 lawyer. She declined to do so, explaining politely but firmly:
‘If background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, sufficient
17 for removal, no judge on this court could hear this case, or many others, by virtue
of the fact that all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished law
18 firm or public service backgrounds.’
19 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Human Rights Hero: Tribute to Constance Baker Motley, Human
20 Rights Magazine, Fall 2005, available at
21 http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human rights magazine home/irr hr Fall05 bakermotley.
22 html (last visited May 10, 2011) (quoting Blank, 418 F. Supp. at 4).
23 Having lost after a trial on the constitutionality of Proposition 8, Proponents now try
24 essentially the same tack. They ask for a do-over because—in their own words—it “must be
25 presumed” that a male judge who was in a committed relationship with another man could not
26 approach the case with the same unbiased judgment that they believe a heterosexual judge would
27 bring to bear. Proponents’ motion to vacate the judgment is a transparent attempt to deflect attention
28 from the merits of this case and shift it onto an irrelevant sideshow regarding Chief Judge Walker’s

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1 sexual orientation. Chief Judge Walker’s sexual orientation provides no basis for recusal in this case.

2 First, rulings on broad constitutional questions routinely affect large segments of the public at large,

3 and the fact that judges are part of the public does not warrant their recusal. Second, a rule that

4 requires the disqualification of judges in same-sex relationships effectively amounts to the

5 disqualification of lesbian and gay judges. The notion that a gay judge could not fairly preside over

6 this case is incorrect, offensive, and damaging to the credibility of the judiciary itself, and should be

7 rejected. Proponents’ motion should therefore be denied.

8 II. ARGUMENT
9
A. Rulings on Broad Constitutional Questions Affect Large Segments of the Public and
10 Therefore Cannot Constitute a Basis For Recusal.

11 By design, constitutional rights belong to everyone, and a ruling by a judge will often affect

12 large segments of the public, and may even affect rights that judges along with others might exercise.

13 But that does not constitute a disqualifying interest for purposes of recusal nor create a circumstance

14 where a judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) & (b)(4). It is

15 often the case that a judge is called upon to decide issues that could directly or indirectly affect that

16 judge along with large segments of the public, whether the issues concern the right to freedom of

17 speech, the right to free exercise of religion, the right against unlawful search and seizure, the right to

18 bear arms, or, as here, the right to be free from governmental discrimination and the fundamental

19 right to marry. The fact that a pending case involves important constitutional rights in which broad

20 groups or all citizens share an interest has never been held sufficient to require recusal. See, e.g., In

21 re Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 930 (5th Cir. 1984) (“an interest which a judge has in common with many

22 others in a public matter is not sufficient to disqualify him”) (quoting 48A C.J.S. Judges § 123

23 (1981)) (judge was not disqualified from hearing a voting rights case where the judge was a member

24 of the class affected); United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1987) (refusing to

25 disqualify judge from hearing a race discrimination case involving public universities in Alabama

26 even though the judge’s children were in the class affected by the ruling). Central to the functioning

27 of the judicial system is “the general presumption that judges are unbiased and honest.” Ortiz v.

28 Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 938 (9th Cir. 1998). That presumption applies with equal force when,

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1 because of the broad nature of the rights at issue or the facial unconstitutionality of a broadly

2 applicable law, all judges may be affected or potentially affected by a case.

3 While this case is of unquestionable importance to lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, the

4 legal rights at stake in it are universally applicable. To illustrate: one of the key questions raised by

5 this case concerns the proper standard of review required by the Equal Protection Clause of the

6 Fourteenth Amendment for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Perry v.

7 Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Because all individuals have a sexual

8 orientation, a pronouncement on the proper standard of review for sexual orientation-based

9 classifications necessarily affects all individuals—whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, or heterosexual.

10 That is, the constitutional right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation

11 protects gay and non-gay people alike, see, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001)

12 (addressing equal protection claim asserted by heterosexual employee), just as the right to be free

13 from race discrimination protects persons of all races, see, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499

14 (2005), the right to be free of sex discrimination protects both men and women, see, e.g., Mississippi

15 Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982), and the rights protected by the Free Exercise

16 Clause protect people of all religions or of no religion, see, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-

17 53 (1985); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (atheism is a religion for

18 purposes of Free Exercise Clause).

19 If the recusal statute were interpreted to require recusal on the basis of race, sex, religion,

20 sexual orientation, or any other personal characteristic as to which governmental discrimination is

21 prohibited, the result would be intolerable and would itself violate equal protection. See Melendres v.

22 Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-MHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, at *26 (D. Ariz. Jul. 15, 2009)

23 (“the idea that an Hispanic judge should never preside over a controversial case concerning alleged

24 acts of racial profiling committed against Hispanics is repugnant to the notion that all parties are

25 equal before the law”). For example, in a case that raised the question of whether women should

26 have the right to vote, it would be unthinkable to suggest that a judge would have a duty to recuse

27 herself for the sole reason that she is a woman. That would be true even though it is obvious that the

28 injunctive relief ordered in such a case might have a more direct impact upon female judges rather

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1 than on male judges. “[T]he absolute consequence and thrust of [a contrary] rationale would amount

2 to, in practice, a double standard within the federal judiciary.” Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542,

3 388 F. Supp. 163, 165 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Higginbotham, J.) (denying race-based recusal motion in

4 employment case alleging racial discrimination because “[t]o suggest that black judges should be so

5 disqualified would be analogous to suggesting that the slave masters were right when, during tragic

6 hours for this nation, they argued that only they, but not the slaves, could evaluate the harshness or

7 justness of the system”).

8 There is similarly no requirement to recuse based on whether a judge is more or less likely to

9 exercise a fundamental right or liberty interest that is at issue in a case. Female judges of

10 reproductive age have no duty to recuse themselves from cases involving reproductive freedom or to

11 disclose their pregnancy status. And surely a judge ruling on the constitutionality of a statue

12 criminalizing consensual sodomy has no responsibility to disclose or disclaim anything about his or

13 her intimate relationships or private conduct. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003)

14 (declaring all laws prohibiting consensual sodomy facially invalid, including those in nine states

15 outlawing both different-sex and same-sex conduct). Although judges must disclose certain types of

16 information (such as financial interests, or a significant relationship to the parties themselves) in

17 order to discharge their duties without the appearance of a conflict, that does not permit “an

18 untethered expansion of the recusal statute to the point where a litigant can engage in a broad based

19 fishing expedition to dig up potentially disqualifying ‘interests’ that a judge may be accused of

20 having in a particular case.” Melendres, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, at *26.

21 B. Recusal on the Basis of Sexual Orientation Is Neither Required Nor Permitted.

22 1. Exclusion on the Basis of a Same-Sex Relationship Amounts to Exclusion on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation.
23

24 Proponents appear to recognize that sexual orientation is not an appropriate basis for recusal.

25 Mot. at 5 (“we are not suggesting that a gay or lesbian judge could not sit on this case”) (emphasis in

26 original). Rather, the discovery that has now purportedly shaken their confidence in the fairness of

27 the district court proceedings is not simply that Chief Judge Walker has said that he is gay—to which

28 they supposedly have no objection—but that, according to their motion, he has been in a ten-year

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1 relationship with a man. But that alleged distinction defies common sense: if sexual orientation is

2 not a basis for recusal, then neither is an intimate relationship with a person of the same sex, which is

3 the essential way in which a gay person’s sexual orientation is expressed. The Supreme Court has

4 expressly recognized that its “decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in

5 this context.” See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010)

6 (finding no difference between a policy of discriminating against lesbian and gay individuals and a

7 policy of discriminating against individuals engaged in “unrepentant homosexual conduct”); see also

8 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (“A tax on wearing yarmulkes

9 is a tax on Jews.”).1

10 Proponents’ motion is therefore indistinguishable from the many other recusal motions that

11 have been historically levied against judges based on their personal characteristics, and that have

12 been rejected as thinly-veiled accusations of bias based on those characteristics. As noted above,

13 Judge Motley confronted a recusal motion in a sex discrimination case. Blank, 418 F. Supp. at 4.

14 Similar recusal motions have been filed based on a judge’s race. See, e.g., Local Union 542, 388 F.

15 Supp. at 157 (denying recusal motion in race discrimination case based on speech delivered by judge

16 to Association for Study of Afro-American Life and History); MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group

17 Equipment Financing, Inc., 138 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming Rule 11 sanctions against attorney

18 who brought recusal motion based on district judge’s involvement in Asian-American organizations);

19 Melendres, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, at *26 (denying recusal motion that “could easily be

20 interpreted as an argument that this Court’s alleged bias somehow flows from her racial heritage”).

21 The same is true for recusal motions based on a judge’s religion. See United States v. El-Gabrowny,

22 844 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying recusal motion based on judge’s Orthodox

23 Judaism); Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of recusal motion

24
1 Despite their attempt to disclaim such a categorical result, the logical conclusion of Proponents’
25
reasoning can only be that all lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, as a class, would necessarily be
26 disqualified from presiding over this action. Proponents assert that a disqualifying interest is
triggered whenever a judge determines that he or she “might desire[] to marry” a person of the same
27 sex. Mot. at 3. Thus, recusal would be required of even an unpartnered lesbian or gay judge with no
romantic prospects on the horizon, but who might someday wish to marry a person of the same sex.
28

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1 where district judge was Mormon and lawsuit involved “theocratic power structure in Utah”). As in

2 El-Gabrowny, “[t]he objection here is not based on race or sex or the Mormon religion, but the

3 motion in this case is in all relevant ways the same as the motions in those cases; it is the same rancid

4 wine in a different bottle.” 844 F. Supp. at 957.

5 2. Sexual Orientation Is Unrelated to One’s Ability to Judge Impartially.

6 All of these historical recusal motions share a common and fatal flaw: the belief that a

7 judge’s personal characteristic clouds his or her ability to render a fair and impartial decision. While

8 every federal judge comes to the bench with a particular sexual orientation—as well as a particular

9 race, sex, religious viewpoint, and socioeconomic status—every judge also takes an oath to

10 “faithfully and impartially discharge and perform [their] duties” and to “administer justice without

11 respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.” 28 U.S.C. § 453. Lesbian, gay,

12 and bisexual judges are entitled to the same presumption of impartiality that all other judges enjoy.

13 Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 938. Indeed, for that reason, any lesbian, gay, or bisexual judge who had been

14 randomly assigned to hear this case would have an affirmative obligation not to recuse on the basis of

15 his or her sexual orientation—as would be true for a heterosexual judge. United States v. Holland,

16 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (“in the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse himself, ‘a judge

17 should participate in the cases assigned’”).

18 It is incorrect—and deeply offensive—to suggest that a judge’s sexual orientation would

19 determine how he or she would rule in a case involving claims of sexual orientation discrimination,

20 just as it would be offensive as to suggest that a judge’s race or sex would determine how he or she

21 would rule in a case alleging race or gender discrimination. This clearly is not the case. For

22 example, in 2004, an openly-gay justice on the Oregon Supreme Court voted to deny marriage to

23 same-sex couples asserting rights under the state constitution. See Li v. Oregon, 338 Ore. 376

24 (2004); Joan Biskupic, Amid Debate Over Rights, Number of Gay Judges Rising, USA Today, Oct.

25 17, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-10-17-gay-judges x.htm

26 (last visited May 9, 2011) (noting that the justice at issue considered and rejected the notion that he

27 had a duty to recuse himself from the case on the basis of his sexual orientation). Simply put, there is

28 no reason to believe that gay jurists will be unable to rule fairly and reject arguments made on behalf

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1 of gay people when they believe that that is what the law requires, just as members of all minority

2 and majority groups are able to do when considering claims made by members of populations to

3 which they belong.

4 3. Recusal Based on Sexual Orientation Undermines, Rather Than Promotes,

Public Confidence in an Unbiased Judiciary.
5

6 Although Proponents’ motion is meritless, it is not costless. First, by placing Chief Judge

7 Walker’s sexual orientation at issue, Proponents seek to cast doubt on the impartiality of all lesbian,

8 gay, and bisexual judges. This harm is one-sided, because the thrust of the motion is that it would be

9 impossible for a heterosexual judge to be biased in this case on the basis of his or her sexual

10 orientation, whereas the same purportedly cannot be said of a gay judge. Second, the broader

11 proposition advanced by the motion is that any personal characteristic of a judge may be relevant to

12 whether he or she can render a fair and impartial decision, which damages the credibility of every

13 judge and therefore undermines public confidence in the judiciary as a whole. Third, to the extent

14 that members of minority groups are more likely to experience discrimination and seek redress for

15 those harms in court, judges of minority groups will be targeted for unwarranted recusal motions far

16 more often than other judges. As shown above, history has already proven that to be true.

17 Judicial diversity encourages public confidence in the judiciary, and efforts to require the

18 recusal of judges based on sexual orientation would ultimately impair public confidence by

19 undermining that diversity. See Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the American

20 Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, at 12 (July 2003), available at

21 http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.authcheckdam.pdf

22 ("We are becoming a more and more diverse people. Our judiciary . . . should reflect the diversity of

23 the society in which we live. If they do not, the legitimacy of the courts and the judicial system will

24 be called into question with increasing frequency.”). As then U.S. Magistrate (and now District)

25 Court Judge Edward M. Chen explained, “The case for diversity is especially compelling for the

26 judiciary. It is the business of the courts, after all, to dispense justice fairly and administer the laws

27 equally. It is the branch of government ultimately charged with safeguarding constitutional rights,

28 particularly protecting the rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities against encroachment by

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1 the majority. How can the public have confidence and trust in such an institution if it is segregated –

2 if the communities it is supposed to protect are excluded from its ranks?” The Judiciary, Diversity,

3 and Justice for All, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1109, 1117 (2003). A judicial system that would countenance the

4 forced recusal of a judge based on his or her sexual orientation—or race, sex, or any other protected

5 characteristic—is not one in which the public could reasonably have confidence.

6 III. CONCLUSION

7 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully request that this Court deny Proponents’ motion

8 to vacate the judgment.

9
Dated: May 13, 2011 Respectfully submitted,
10
JON W. DAVIDSON
11 TARA BORELLI
PETER C. RENN
12 Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.
13 ALAN L. SCHLOSSER
ELIZABETH O. GILL
14 ACLU Foundation of Northern California
15 SHANNON P. MINTER
CHRISTOPHER F. STOLL
16 ILONA M. TURNER
National Center For Lesbian Rights
17
By: __/s/ Peter Renn_________
18
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and
19 Education Fund, Inc., ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, National Center for Lesbian Rights, and
20 Equality California
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

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