A Grand Illusion?: An Essay on Europe

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A GRAND ILLUSION?

TONY JUDT

A GRAND ILLUSION?

AN ESSAY ON EUROPE

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS

New York and Londor

www.nyupress.org

© 2011 by the Estate of Tony Judt

All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Judt, Tony.

A grand illusion? : an essay on Europe / Tony Judt.

p. cm. Includes index.

Originally published in New York by Hill and Wang, 1996.

ISBN 978-0-8147-4358-4 (pb : alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-8147-4359-1 (e-book)

1. Europe—Politics and government—20th century. 2. Europe—Economic

integration. I. Title.

D443. J83 2011

940. 5—dc20      2010051534

New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper,

and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability.

We strive to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials

to the greatest extent possible in publishing our books.

Manufactured in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Preface

1 A GRAND ILLUSION

2 EASTERN APPROACHES

3 GOODBYE TO ALL THAT?

Afterword

Index

PREFACE

THIS BOOK is based on lectures I gave at the Johns Hopkins Center in Bologna in May 1995, under the auspices of The New York Review of Books and Hill and Wang. I should like to thank the director of the Center, Professor Robert Evans, for his hospitality, and Professor Pietro Corsi, editor of La Rivista dei Libri, for helping to organize and sponsor the series. The lively discussions that followed the lectures were most helpful, and I hope that in what follows it will be clear how much I have learned from them. The original idea for the book came out of conversations with Robert Silvers and Elisabeth Sifton, and I am especially grateful to them both for their suggestions and their encouragement.

More than an occasional piece, but much less than a history, this book is really an attempt to address three contemporary questions: What are the prospects for the European Union? If they are not wholly rosy, why is that? And how much does it, in any event, matter whether a united Europe may or may not come about? The cast of the questions, and the answers I shall propose, may seem to mark me as a Euro-skeptic, the more so because I am British—by nationality if not by residence. Against that charge I should like to plead a preemptive innocence. I am enthusiastically European; no informed person could seriously wish to return to the embattled, mutually antagonistic circle of suspicious and introverted nations that was the European continent in the quite recent past. Whatever moves us away from that Europe is good, and the further the better.

But it is one thing to think an outcome desirable, quite another to suppose it possible. And it is my contention in this essay that a truly united Europe is sufficiently unlikely for it to be unwise and self-defeating to insist upon it. I am thus, I suppose, a Euro-pessimist. Unlike Jean Monnet, the founder of the European Community, I don’t believe that it is prudent, or possible, to exorcise history, at any rate beyond moderate limits, and my essay thus concludes with a plea for the partial reinstatement, or relegitimation, of nation-states. For the same reasons I have tried to argue that whether or not the future of formerly Communist states in Eastern Europe ought to lie within a fully integrated Europe, the fact is that this may not come to pass; it might therefore be the better part of wisdom to stop promising otherwise.

The argument of this book, and its tone, are much influenced by the fact that it was written in Austria. The prospects for Europe, and its coming difficulties, look a little different in the center of the continent than they do on the western fringe, where most of the institutions of European union are to be found. The imperial inheritance and contemporary provinciality of central Europe, the overwhelming presence of Germany, the proximity of former Yugoslavia, and the ease with which one may cross the ancient east-west divide and see just how very different the two Europes still are, all contribute to a more clouded prospect for union than the one that beckons farther north or west. I am thus especially grateful to New York University for granting me sabbatical leave and to the Institut für die Wissen-schaften vom Menschen and its director, Professor Krzystof Michalski, for generously inviting me to spend it as their guest in Vienna.

Vienna, January 1996

A GRAND ILLUSION?

1

A GRAND ILLUSION

THE EUROPEAN Coal and Steel Community was born in 1951 from an idea conceived by Jean Monnet and proposed by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in May 1950. In 1958 it became the European Economic Community, popularly referred to as the Europe of Six (France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries). This prosperous, far-western Europe then took in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland to become the Europe of Nine, after which it grew larger still and became the Europe of Twelve with the addition in the 1980s of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The most recent members—Austria, Sweden, and Finland—bring its number to fifteen. When people refer to possible future adherents they now quite simply and unblushingly speak of a country—Slovenia, Poland—joining Europe.

This curious locution shows how much Europe today is not so much a place as an idea, a peaceful, prosperous, international community of shared interests and collaborating parts; a Europe of the mind, of human rights, of the free movement of goods, ideas, and persons, of ever-greater cooperation and unity. The emergence of this hyper-real Europe, more European than the continent itself, an inward and future projection of all the higher values of the ancient civilization but shorn of its darker qualities, cannot be attributed just to the imprisonment of Europe’s other, eastern, half under Communism. After all, not only the people’s democracies stood apart from this new Europe but also Switzerland, Norway, and (until recently) Austria and Sweden, exemplars of many of the social and civic virtues that Europeans have been seeking to embody in their new institutions. If we are to understand the sources—and, as I shall argue, the limitations and perhaps the risks—of this Europe now held before us as guide and promise, we must go back to a moment in the recent past when the prospects for any kind of Europe looked particularly grim.

It is an understandable mistake to suppose, in retrospect, that postwar Western Europe was rebuilt by idealists for a united continent. Such people unquestionably existed, belonging to organizations like the European Unity Movement of 1947. But they had no discernible real-world impact. In a curious way it was British leaders, who were to play no active role in the actual construction of European unity in the years to come, who had the most to say on the subject of a unified continent: in October 1942 Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted to Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, that it would be a measureless disaster if Russian bolshevism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient states of Europe. Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European family may act unitedly as one, under a Council of Europe.¹ There certainly was an idealist mood in 1945 across the liberated lands of continental Europe, but the goals of most of its spokesmen were domestic: change and reform at home, along lines set down by the various coalitions that had come together during the war to form resistance movements against Nazi occupation. Well into the 1950s it was uncommon to find intellectuals or politicians in Europe interested primarily in the future of a united continent rather than in the politics of their own country.

If it was not idealism that drove Europeans in those years, nor was it the manifest imperatives of historical destiny. Very little in the postwar years suggested a natural or inevitable coming together of the survivors of Hitler’s war. In 1944 the American journalist Janet Flanner, in one of her regular dispatches for The New Yorker, foresaw rather the opposite: a coming era of intra-European competition for scarce resources among desperate nations. That the states of Western Europe would need to cooperate in some way was of course obvious; but the extent and the forms of that cooperation were not inscribed in the mere fact of postwar exhaustion and collective destitution. And many possible forms of cooperation, economic ones in particular, had nothing idealistic about them and carried no implications of future unity.

Indeed, the idea of pooling economic interests to overcome common problems was far from new. A United States of Europe had even been proposed by some in the mid-nineteenth century (it was advocated by Le Moniteur, a newspaper of the French Second Republic, in February 1848). There were various proposals to model an economic federation of Europe along Swiss cantonal lines. Zollvereins—customs unions—were another popular theme in nineteenth-century discussions; there were proposals to extend the German customs union, established in 1834, to include the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and even the Habsburg lands, though these proposals got nowhere.

The subject of trade agreements attracted renewed attention after World War I, when the breakup of empires and the resulting disruption of production units and trade patterns made the need for cartels and trading pacts seem urgent, as did the depreciation of currencies and depression of prices that marked the early 1920s (there was also more than a hint of anti-Americanism, a fear of U.S. competition; this would continue to favor and to haunt intra-European trade agreements to the present day). The best known of the resulting agreements was the International Steel Cartel signed in September 1926 and covering Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Saarland (then still separated from Germany under the terms of the Versailles Treaty). It was joined by Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary a year later. Renounced by German producers in 1929, it was abandoned two years later at the height of the