Sociality and Justice: Toward Social Phenomenology

Introduction[1]

In modernity, people began to identify themselves through their belonging in society striving to go beyond provincial borders and following a new sense of cosmopolitanism, i.e., of universality. They aspired to find the general essence of all people on the planet and to spread this kind of humanity amongst humankind. Modernity allowed efforts to be directed firstly at establishing what it is that applies to everyone. In modern philosophy, the basic social relation was expressed by the formula the individual and society, ignoring the intermediary role of communities and the irreducible diversity of individuals. In postmodernity this main opposition between individual and society remains, but efforts are being made to restore the rights of particular community, groups, and individuals which in previous epochs were ignored or renounced in the name of the protection of the totality.

Zygmunt Bauman explains that the freedom of the universal man in modernity was understood by replacing the colourful diversity of parishioners, family and other local people with citizens. The citizen is a person with attributes which are bestowed upon him or her by a sole and undisputed authority, acting in the name of the united and sovereign nation-state. The postulate of human essence as a universality of reason corresponded with the ambitions and actions of the modern nation-state in its battle mediating between localised authority figures and individuals whom it wished to subdue. This was a battle against local customs, labelling them superstitions; local languages, calling them dialects; local markets, describing them as anti-competitive, and, local regulations which were linked to primitivism of the tradition. All had to concede and subordinate themselves to the common currency of centralized government. The rule of state power spread across all subjects of the territory within its jurisdiction.[2] Of course, the legitimacy of a modern state is conferred with reference to reason and declared universal. So reason itself becomes identical to and identifiable with the state's interest; in turn, becoming indistinguishable with the interest of what Pierre Bourdieu calls state nobility.

However, to recognize only those directives that can stand the test of universality is a task doomed to fail. Universality means ex-territoriality and ex-temporality implying a rejection time and place related to particular claims which, by virtue of their limitations, come into conflict with each other and also with the proclaimed universal interest:

While promoting ostensibly universal, yet by necessity home-grown and home-bound standards, the polity finds itself opposed and resisted in the name of the selfsame principle of universalism which enlightens and/or ennobles its purpose. Promotion of universal standards then looks suspiciously like suppression of human nature and tends to be censured as intolerance.[3]

Universality (or civilization, where civilization is understood as the pursuit of the ideal of universality) protects itself through its self-empowerment and by alienating those who were not sufficiently universalised (civilized) by exercising pressure and coercion upon them. When standards of universalization were already adopted, and the mandated central authority felt unchallenged, it began to introduce different policies, allowing the inclusion and recognition of the previously unrecognized and excluded. Usually this was implemented, and is still implemented today, through techniques of integration and/or of pluralisation. The principle of universality, which until then was being promoted by overcoming many difficulties and obstacles and demoting the various local and particular differences, began to be seen as a principle of totalitarianism where the state forcibly unifies, homogenizes and excludes.[4] It was believed that these totalitarian tendencies could be corrected by embracing ethnic or cultural diversity and perhaps even replacing them with more pluralism in all spheres of public life. Pluralism, however, despite of any tolerance and respect for diversity which it can bring, as a negation of unity, is only a reaction, led, perhaps under protest, by the discourse which privileges totality. Pluralisation opposes totalitarianism by presupposing it. Diversification and recognition of differences take place against a backdrop of universalisation and usually establishes a second, reflexive level of discourse, which cannot take place without recognition of totality, embedded in its foundation.

Pointedly, modernity proclaims the inclusion of all people into a presupposed citizenship and the equality of all citizens within the state. This is done by neutralizing differences. Many see the hidden roots of this neutralization in the tendency of the market to give quantified expression to qualitative characteristics through valuation. Qualitative differences are reduced to their monetary equivalence so that the natural movement of capital leads to homogenization, depersonalization, unification etc.[5] Nevertheless, although this tendency is maintained today (due to the logic of capital), a critique of homogenization has arisen proclaiming that general rules and laws which apply equally to all, as suggested in early modernity, do not sufficiently take into account individual or group characteristics. It is evident that differences are of utmost importance first of all for the marketing. In a globalizing world, the politics and culture of differences are in opposition to the culture and politics of unification and strive to replace them. In reality, however, as Bauman stresses, globalization processes go hand in hand with those of localization.[6]

As globalisation develops, the first indications to seize the attention of analysts are the openness of identity and the fluidity of the whole. Individuals and groups are understood as identification-processes and not as something pre-given or determined by static individual and/or group features which units them formally in a closed substantial whole. They are grasped rather as temporary identifications, constructed and relatively mobile. Indeed, contemporary communities, unlike earlier ones, are based on pluralism as their own immanent principle to a much greater degree than before. Nowadays societies are multi-racial, multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, etc. In such an environment of pluralisation, fragmentation, hybridization, universality as a symbol of humanity and human rights, if not entirely obsolete, is not sufficient on its own.

Formal justice which classifies particular cases under an universal law, is already unsatisfactory.[7] In debates on the topics of universality and particularity, of formal equality and special rights, two different concepts prevail, often rendering mutually exclusive interpretations of the problem: (1) from the liberal perspective, according to which the citizen is an autonomous person whose rights and obligations are guaranteed and realised through public institutions and, (2) on the other hand, from the communitarian perspective, defining citizens through their membership in the community and their attitudes towards its values. In both cases, the relation between the individual and society remains, and what has to be negotiated is how the particularity and universality of individuals and different groups can be reconciled in favour of their joint participation in the whole of society.

In this work social relation is perceived not as a connection between the individual and society (as this relation was habitually articulated and society was thought, and still is thought, as a totality stretching far beyond the individual), but is seen primarily as a relation of one individual to another. This does not mean that group and inter-group relations are ignored. Rather, we begin at the premise that the individual in concreto enters into relations with other individuals, and only then is connected in abstracto (i.e. through principle, by law, through the general notions, standards, norms) and therefore, indirectly, to social institutions, community, society and humanity as a whole.

This book will discuss an approach where the main relation is the interpersonal connection and in order to understand the whole, we proceed from intersubjectivity. The ultimate goal is not the understanding of the totality or of the individual within totality, but one's own responsibility for the Other as the primary human attitude toward him—on the base of it is composed totality. The whole is placed at the service of the Other (not of man in general, but the Other in its uniqueness); however, this service is always personalized as the totality itself cannot respond and act; always the individuals respond to other individuals, think and act. However, the I and the Other are not equal and intersubjectivity is not a reciprocal nor symmetrical relation. To quote Levinas, I always have one more responsibility than the Other. The responsibility for the Other is constitutive for my Self, while the responsibility of the Other for me is his own business. Totality, the state, society and community, obtain and update their meaning if the I, which embodies them as individualized society (a famous phrase of Pierre Bourdieu) behaves responsibly towards the Other. However, what does behaving responsibly mean? This is a topic discussed throughout the text. For sure, goodness, responsibility and sociality represent the very selflessness of the relation to the Other wherein the loss of my identity and the achievement of a new one as a process of self-identification is a side effect of the communication. We can nevertheless state that it is due to one's responsibility that the Other has the opportunity to become a Self too (as in relation to the Third one). Only with the appearance of the Third do reflection and knowledge of relations emerge, followed by their institutionalization and transformation into possible values for everyone.

Notwithstanding, all institutions and mechanisms of society are products of technology and namely as such are subordinated to the people. We support the thesis that the state machine, and any other public organisation, must be personalized in order to work. In the totality of society the I is exactly such a personalization, a subject bearing on his shoulders all the credentials, knowledge, competences etc. bestowed upon him by institutionalization. Still, for the I to be an I, it must use all the resources at its disposal to respond to others. The resources in any situation are utilised not just to take care of myself, i.e. of my own needs, interests, preferences, etc., but first of all to address to the needs of the Other. These resources are provided by society as a whole.

The human relationship between the Other and I begins with speech but before its beginning I hear the call from the Other (albeit a silent one). The I responds to this call not only with words, but above all with deeds. Words motivate actions and give meaning to practices that henceforth also matter for the Third and for each and every-one-else.

The advantages and disadvantages of social and political discourse in a pluralistic society are explicated and observed in the continuous debate between liberals and communitarians. The starting point for this work, however, is the notion that diversity as a philosophical category together with the principle of pluralism, become meaningful because of their implicit or/and explicit opposition to unity and totality. Pluralism's standing is fuelled by the criticism of the whole and, as such, is the negation of identity, of the principle, and of universality. Yet in its quality of negation and reaction, pluralism is a prisoner to this same principle. Pluralism cannot go beyond the framework set out by the boundaries of the whole and remains in the shadow of the concept of totality.

Departing from primarily empirical observations, both communitarians and liberals recognize that the universalist point of view ignores particularity and diversity of differences and is both illusory and utopian, leading to unattainable imaginings; such an universalism is also unjust—a finding that helps both communitarian and liberal critical pathos unfold. People inevitably examine emerging problems and participate in the course of events, influenced by their life-experience as well as by their perception of social reality. According to Bourdieu, their story is the unconscious which appears in public as different habitual practices. These differences are not only the result of a clash of interests and the employment of different tactics of self-defence, but are also the product of their socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds which determines different perceptions and understanding of public relations and order as well as differing motivations of their thought and (in)action. When preference is given to particular differences, we can easily fall into the trap of fragmentation. In fragmentation and heterogeneity, with even greater force than in unification, we find the exclusion of individuals and groups defined as different by empowered some private interests, claiming, however, to be common and even universal. In a pluralised society, people are not forced to improve, develop, elevate, perfect themselves according to some universal standard in the attempt to catch up with the more improved, developed and perfected groups and societies, but are left to be what they are. A large number of these groups, however, are factually in the position of being the weaker, marginalized, suffering from deprivations, often repressed and without the right to voice their opinion and therefore also lacking many other rights. Pluralized, fragmented and atomized social environments immediately benefit powerful groups (as is clearly seen for example in disputes over the minority rights). Both concepts of citizenship, liberal and communitarian, insist that it is necessary to take into account the individual and/or group needs and desires to meet our moral obligation to arrange group and individual interests in accordance with the common good making sure that everyone is provided with the opportunity for participation. As Bourdieu critically notes, monopoly over the universal continues to gain supporters and to legitimize itself with the values of neutrality and universal recognition. Hence the age-long issue of monopolization of the right to speak on behalf of a group and of the privileged perspective appears. Even when the emphasis is not put on the common goal, but placed instead on differences, where everyone contributes precisely according to their particularity to the shared work, the shared meaning is constituted by the commonality of them all. If we resign from the common, it is not clear how the principle of justice could be conceptualized and implemented. Inevitably the question arises whether, how and why people should be treated differently and conversely, the question of whether, how and why people should be put under a common denominator. This work is not a rejection of the categories of whole, total, private, single, similarity, difference, equality, etc., but rather, it is an attempt to present a different logic of relations between them. This seems more appropriate in articulating social constructions and opens other opportunities for discourse in the field of social and political philosophy.

In this text, we will show as a weakness the conceptions of both communitarians and liberals in their attempts to define social bonds as unifications or oppositions inside a presupposed totality. Within this totality the individuals or groups are preconceived as monads, but open to conversing with one another. Their conversation is always mediated by the common language. Social coherence is perceived firstly as belonging to a type based on shared characteristics, i.e. a relation to others with whom one feels affiliated or the same, unlike the others in respect of whom we emphasize our essential difference. These distinctive similarities or differences as a sign of solidarity or conflict make people recognize each other or group together. The essentialist approach is hence maintained even when insisting that group affiliation is a matter of free choice (liberalism) or interactive recognition (communitarianism). It could be argued that the alternative to the essentialist approach is to be sought by identifying individuals and groups being in a network of relations of responsibilities and not in their definition as substances according to a principle (such as repeatability, universality, law, similarity, etc.). The premise that essence is not predetermined and insurmountable, but acquired and transient because of the roles we perform or, perhaps, as the task of self-constitution that everyone sets, does not break with the substantialist or essentialist approach. Inevitably, in the process of ongoing self-constitution and self-assertion, people are free (although their freedom is limited) to determine the group to which they belong and therefore the qualities they possess, but this kind of self-identification presupposes, without explanation, preserving the opposition between mine and other, own and other, my rights versus yours. This also leads to the issue of identification through ownership (own and other's), and thus participation in the creation of or/and in the division of totality. Hence even if human essence is not facticity, but openness, there is a new conflict in addition to that of the universal/particular, i.e. whole and part—the problem of the otherness and mineness. Thus a categorization of our relations and interactions comes forth which, to a certain extent, is more fundamental than the division between universal/particular or common/individual. Both in theory and in practice, the universal/particular division involves separation of mine from the other's. Inside the totality, even when it is in the process of its becoming, alienation from the mine-ness and the difficulties in integrating the other-ness (to accept and assimilate otherness or at least recognize, tolerate or ignore it) impede communication and interaction. From a philosophical perspective it seems the category of otherness" is the one that creates problems.

Both communitarians and liberals define otherness in relation to the principle (the norm, the majority, law, etc.) or through mutual commensurability (which also presupposes a priori common standard, common measurement unit etc., even when one of the comparable entities is used as such and is imposed on the others). The starting point is the law of identity and after experiencing the peripetia of the play with otherness, there is a return to it. As others have been originally excluded from the class of the same, it is very difficult to find the way back to cohesion and inclusion in an extended community (whether a community of representation, recognition or common practices). This simply shows that neither liberals nor defenders of community have cut the umbilical cord with early modern ways of thinking. Such a conclusion applies both to those who today consciously uphold the continuation of the project of modernity and to those who relentlessly oppose it. The reflex of absorption of the alterity and its integration into the whole, with which the Self is identified (as a part or as an outsider), has been preserved in many even to this day. It emerged in modernity's discourse and reached its profound justification in Hegelian philosophy where the Other is assimilated, based on the identity of opposites (differences), as it occurred and still occurs de facto in society. Those who oppose such an assimilation reach at most neutrality towards otherness, tolerance to others and eventually indifference to differences. Today, on the one hand, diversity is promoted and encouraged, yet on the other hand, due to the preliminary opposition of viewpoints, new attempts are being made to collectivize differences by uniting them into a cohesive whole by fusing horizons. This is attempted through dialogue, consensus, demand for tolerance, monitoring of human rights, recognition, etc. Well, sometimes people with a pretention to be open-minded tend to abandon cohesion which for them is not obligatory: let differences remain differences and others remain others, let us rejoice in diversity and enjoy variety, but on one condition—differences should not create problems for us and must obey the universal law and the constitution adopted in the name of all.

Serious philosophical criticism of universality stems not from the attack of totalitarianism, as is usual in the field of politics, but rather from elsewhere, i.e. from ethical considerations. As summarized by Bauman, the fact of the matter is that moral impulses and restrictions were neutralized in modernity and perceived as irrelevant[8], hence men and women were given the opportunity to perform inhumane deeds without ever feeling inhumane. After a review of the literature on these topics it could be concluded that by challenging modern ideals in terms of the antinomies attained in postmodernity, most philosophers' and theorists' attention hovers mainly around ethical issues.

We try to defend herein a new understanding of primary sociality, and hence of primary community based on the responsibility of the I in relation to the Other and not on the affiliation of individuals to the whole. The I is in the process of identification through the responsibilities it undertakes. This presupposes a new conception of subjectivity and freedom as well of the protection of human rights, based not on our group or individual selfishness, but above all on the responsibility for the rights of the Other, which is the authentic concern for him. It is not about responsibility which is sought after by virtue of reflection and court proceedings, when acts have already been performed (e.g. judicially), but rather about the sensitivity and the preliminary consideration of what my deeds would mean to others in my relationship with them.[9] Some may argue, and rightly so, that this is the Kantian approach to universalization, which requires the maxim of my behaviour to comply in advance with the others so that it becomes an universal law for everyone's actions. There is, however, an essential difference: for Kant the Self is the starting point, while in our proposed approach we start with the Other and thereby follow Levinas. Clearly, such a perspective cannot be sustained unless we rethink our conceptions of communication and dialogue, justice and law, morality and citizenship. It is important to understand this change in perspective, which can be summed up in the words of Levinas as we is not the plural of I, because the Other is not another I for me; the Other is I only for himself. He exists by himself, is significant for himself and is not just the bearer of the significance that I attribute to him. The Other is not perceived as negativity—as enemy, rival, boundary, barrier to the freedom of the Self; on the contrary—he is perceived as positivity. What does this mean? What constitutes the positivity of the Other with his otherness is a topic at the centre of the entire analysis at hand. Even in this foreword we could state that the positivity of otherness is not evaluated in accordance with the possibilities it opens for me, i.e. is not assessed in the light of instrumental thinking in which the Other is reduced to his usefulness for my Self. It is also necessary to rethink the concept of community in disagreement with what is already assumed in philosophy:

1.               Community is not made up of the multiplication of transcendental subjects whose only commonality is the fact that each one is constituted as self-consciousness through I think which is accompanies all my ideas and representations;

2.               In a community we do not treat the Other with respect for the sake of some abstract humanism, i.e. according to the universal law (Kant's imperative), but in view of his empirical or historical presence in all his particularity and moreover—in all his singularity. In early modern philosophy and German idealism the Other's particularity is the boundary of mine;

3.               Community is not the universal substance-subject, i.e., that which has historically become whole, wherein self-consciousness is the distinction that is not actually distinction, as any difference is created by the absolute subject to distinguish itself from itself (Hegel).

These forms of understanding of community and human co-existence are being opposed by both liberals and communitarians, starting from the empirical differences to find a theoretical, moral and/or legal basis to reconcile them. Both liberals and communitarians want to see in the Other a partner despite him being my frontier and, in fact, namely because the Other is my frontier. Let's remind ourselves that albeit interpreted differently nowadays, reconciliation is the last chord since Hegel's philosophical symphony. But even as per the noblest and most generous motivation towards the Other, when efforts are focused mainly on ensuring the recognition of his otherness, liberals and communitarians put the Other at best on my level, beside me, next to me, shoulder to shoulder with me (which of course is not below or after me). Unfortunately, in these efforts their ultimate refuge is egalitarianism. Liberals and communitarians believe that to achieve equal opportunities for the individual and group autonomy respectively, differences should be reduced to mutual recognition. The thought of the Other being superior to me (or us) is not allowed, because it almost instinctively identifies with a relationship of domination and subordination. Conversely, in this work we maintain Levinas' conception that the Other is one to whom my existence is in service (even when I do not want this consciously) and that this kind of attitude is not slavery to, but responsibility for, the Other. This is the way in which the existence of the Self, who is for the Other acquires a social dimension. The I becomes Self due to its answers to others. Only in this manner can sociality transcend naturality and sense can transcend non-sense. Here the Other is Transcendence, but

[the] Other is not transcendent because he will be free as I am; on the contrary his freedom is a superiority that comes from his very transcendence. … he overflows absolutely every idea I can have for him.[10]

The freedom of the Other is not a limitation on my freedom as in the interpretation of community as a formal centralized entity. In the social whole, according to the usual individualistic-atomistic conception, the individual has