Eastern European energy crisis could spell trouble

Immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe entered an energy crisis. European countries scrambled to diversify away from Russian energy sources. The crisis caused mass inflation across the continent and drastically increased heating and electricity costs for Europeans. However, after resilience, tenacity and billions of euros in new investments, Europe has made significant progress, but it has not been able to move completely away from Russian energy.
Now, almost three years later, a new energy crisis is developing in Eastern Europe, and it is not getting the attention it deserves. This month, Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova essentially under Russian control, stopped receiving Russian gas. This development is already affecting the rest of Moldova and could potentially impact the broader Eastern European region.
To understand the current energy crisis in Moldova, one must look at recent history. Many might find it surprising that, even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Gazprom, the Russian state energy company, continued to send natural gas to Eastern Europe through Ukrainian territory. Most of this gas ended up in Hungary, Slovakia and Austria, but some also flowed into the Russian-backed Transnistria region of Moldova.
While it may seem unusual for Ukraine to allow Russian gas to transit its territory, there were straightforward reasons for doing so. The EU was slow to find alternatives for Eastern European countries dependent on Russian gas and pressured Kyiv to allow gas transit. Meanwhile, Ukraine received billions of dollars in transit fees from Gazprom, which were critical for its war-torn economy. In light of economic sanctions after the invasion, Gazprom needed all the customers it could get, even if it meant relying on Ukraine for transit.
However, by last summer, President Volodymyr Zelensky recognized the absurdity of this arrangement and announced that Ukraine would not renew its transit contract with Gazprom. It expired at the end of 2024. This marked the first clear sign of an impending energy crisis in Eastern Europe in 2025. At the EU and Ukraine’s behest, Azerbaijan engaged Russia in talks to secure a deal to allow Baku to export gas to Europe via Ukraine’s pipelines. Despite progress, this deal was never finalized. By December, both Moldovan and local Transnistrian de facto authorities had declared states of emergency. Now, they are in the early days of an energy crisis.
The Kremlin has long used its energy resources as a hybrid weapon against Moldova. In 2006, Gazprom dramatically increased prices for Moldova, which had a negative impact on the economy. Again, in 2009, 2014, 2021 and 2022, Russia either cut or threatened to cut gas to Moldova for political reasons. Direct Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have also triggered massive blackouts in several Moldovan cities.

Transnistrian authorities have already implemented rolling blackouts and switched their main power plant from gas to coal.

Luke Coffey

Moldova’s Western allies have worked to counteract Russia’s energy pressure campaign. As poor weather and inflation gripped the region in winter 2022, the EU provided hundreds of millions of euros in emergency support, while Romania supplied electricity to replace that lost due to the Russian bombing of Ukrainian power plants. By October 2023, Moldova announced it would no longer purchase gas from Gazprom.
Despite these measures, Moldova remains indirectly dependent on Russian gas. Transnistria received free Russian gas supplies transiting Ukraine en route to the breakaway territory. Transnistrian authorities then used this gas at the Russian-owned Cuciurgan power plant to generate electricity, which they sold — cheaply within Transnistria and at higher prices to the rest of Moldova. Electricity sales were a major source of revenue for Transnistria, creating mutual dependency: Moldova relied on Transnistrian electricity and Transnistria relied on Moldovan payments.
Further complicating matters, the regional Soviet-era power grid forces even Romania-generated electricity to pass through Ukraine and Transnistria before reaching Moldova. To address this vulnerability, Moldova is constructing modern power lines directly with Romania, but these are not slated for completion until later this year.
In the meantime, Moldova’s energy outlook is grim. Transnistrian authorities have already implemented rolling blackouts and switched their main power plant from gas to coal. However, coal reserves are expected to last only until the end of February. Additionally, Transnistria is now only producing enough electricity for its own needs, leaving the rest of Moldova without supplemental energy. Although this energy crisis is currently confined to a small sliver of Moldova, it has the potential to escalate and impact the broader region.
If Transnistria’s economy collapses due to a lack of revenue from electricity sales and reduced industrial activity, there is concern about a mass exodus of Transnistrians into Moldova proper. Such an influx could place enormous strain on Moldova’s already overstretched public services. If Moldova cannot manage the influx, refugees are likely to move into Romania, creating additional challenges for that country. This concern is not unfounded, as many Transnistrians hold multiple passports, including Moldovan, Romanian, Russian and Ukrainian.
This situation could have been avoided and there is plenty of blame to go round. While it is understandable that Ukraine does not want Russian gas transiting its territory given Moscow’s ongoing invasion, the EU has been slow to prepare for the expected crisis. Meanwhile, Russia could have continued exporting gas to Transnistria via other routes, such as the TurkStream pipeline through Bulgaria and Romania into Moldova, but the Kremlin chose not to. Moldovan authorities have stated they would not block Russian gas transit to Transnistria, prioritizing the well-being of citizens in the breakaway region. However, Moscow has used alleged Moldovan debts to Gazprom as a pretext for halting supplies.
The more likely explanation is that Moscow sees an energy crisis in Moldova as a means to weaken its pro-European government ahead of critical parliamentary elections this year. Once again, energy is being wielded as a tool of foreign policy, leaving ordinary people to suffer the consequences.

• Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey