This is the last of four reports on Germany in crisis. The preceding parts of this series are here, here, and here.
DRESDEN—When Friedrich Merz is formally named Germany’s next chancellor on May 6, it will be a significant event and a nonevent all at once. The war-mongering Merz will lead the Federal Republic down a path we — joining what seems a majority of German voters — must all oppose.
Merz, pouncing immediately after the much-watched elections in February, has already made the nation’s future direction clear. The date we need to think about is not May 6. It is March 18, when a vote in the Bundestag confirmed what was by then bitterly evident: Germany’s postwar democracy is failing; a sequestered elite in Berlin now proposes to set the nation’s course irrespective of voters’ preferences.
March 18, a Tuesday, was the day the German parliament removed a constitutional limit on government debt. This marked more, far more, than an adjustment in Germany’s famously austere fiscal regime. It was the day lawmakers approved, in effect if not on paper, new defense spending of €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion). This was the day the Federal Republic voted to remilitarize. It was the day those purporting to lead Germany decisively repudiated a political tradition worth defending and determined to return to another tradition — one the nation seems, regrettably, never able to leave entirely behind.
The particulars of the 512 to 206 vote are plain enough. The law on federal borrowing, in place since the 2008 financial crisis, is very strict: It limits debt to 0.35% of GDP — roughly a tenth of what the European Union allows members. But Berlin has been restive within this limit for years. It was an internecine fight over the “debt brake,” as it is called, that caused the collapse last autumn of the none-too-sturdy coalition led by the wayward Olaf Scholz. The Bundestag vote removes the brake on public borrowing allocated to military spending above 1% of GDP. As is widely acknowledged, this formula implies that expenditures could exceed the €1 trillion commonly cited.
While the Germans have been near to neurotic about official debt since the hyperinflation of the Weimar days a century ago, the Bundestag has voted Germany past this paranoia in favor of another one. The nation’s neoliberal “centrists” — who now declare themselves very other than the center of anything — have just told Germans, Europeans, and the rest of the world that Germany will now drop the Social Democratic standard the nation has long held high in the service of a wartime economy with its very own military-industrial complex.
It is well to understand this as a political disaster whose import extends far beyond the Federal Republic. Indeed, it appears to mark the end of an era across the West. And it is a blow to anyone entertaining hope that we might achieve an orderly world beyond the rules-based disorder that now blights humanity.
The authors of this transformation are those parties that have negotiated a new coalition in the weeks since the Bundestag vote: Merz’s Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union, the CDU’s traditional partner, will enter into an odd-but-not-so-odd alliance with the Social Democrats, the SPD. The Grünen also voted for expanded military spending, but the Greens, along with the SPD, were roundly discredited in the elections of Feb. 23 and will not serve in the new government. I have met not a single German who will miss them.
All of these parties carry on incessantly about the authoritarianism of their opponents — this as they join to inflict an era of centrist authoritarianism on Germany’s 83 million people. They are more or less hostile to prevailing concerns among voters — the questions that moved the percentages in favor of the opposition in the elections. These include the Scholz government’s calamitous management of the economy, a too-liberal immigration policy (which has hit the former East German states hardest), Berlin’s undue deference to Brussels technocrats, Germany’s participation in America’s proxy war in Ukraine and, not least, the severe breach in Germany’s relations with the Russian Federation.
Russophobia has been evident for years among Berlin’s governing elites — if not in the business class and elsewhere. This, too, now takes a turn in the most wrong direction. There is only one argument, too obvious to name, for rearming a nation that has famously restricted its military profile for the past eight decades. Merz rushed through the March 18 vote with uninhibited crudity — evidently to preclude substantive debate. He will now lead a government of compulsively anti–Russian ideologues who will tilt Germany disturbingly in the direction of the aggressions of the two world wars and the divisive hawkery of the Cold War decades.
This is now on paper. After weeks of negotiation, the conservative CDU and the nominally-but-no-longer Social-Democratic Party, the SPD, made public their coalition agreement on April 9. Here is an extract from the section headed “Foreign and defense policy”:
Our security is under greater threat today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The greatest and most direct threat comes from Russia, which is now in its fourth year of waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine in violation of international law and is continuing to arm itself on a massive scale. Vladimir Putin’s quest for power is directed against the rules-based international order….
We will create all the conditions necessary for the Bundeswehr to be able to fully perform the task of national and alliance defense. Our aim is for the Bundeswehr to make a key contribution to NATO’s deterrence and defense capability and to become a role model among our allies….
We will provide Ukraine with comprehensive support so that it can effectively defend itself against the Russian aggressor and assert itself in negotiations….
There is some code in this passage, easily enough legible. The new coalition is preparing the German public, along with the rest of the world, for the deployment of German troops abroad for the first time since World War II. As noted in the first piece in this series, the Bundeswehr began moving an armored brigade into Lithuania on April 1, a week before the coalition disclosed the terms of its accord. This is the front end of the new German military posture: There is likely to be much more of this to come.
There is also the notion of Germany as a role model for the rest of Europe. This comes straight from Merz’s side of the coalition, in my read, given his ambition to carry not only Germany’s banner but also the Continent’s. There is, indeed, a power vacuum in Europe, made more evident since the Trump administration signaled its lapsing interest in the security umbrella under which the United States has long allowed Europeans to shelter. Merz and his new political partners are right about this.