When Hitler invaded France in 1940, the conventional wisdom was that the French had the best military in Europe. This was despite Germany’s crushing victory over Poland and several other powers considered to be second rate by most military observers. The disastrous rout of the French army along with its British allies came as a devastating surprise to the free world. Although there is no consensus about a single factor underlying the French failure, most historians seem to agree that there were several contributing causes. Unfortunately, all of them seem to be present in American society and its military today. As Mark Twain supposedly said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
The points of intersection between France in 1940 and the United States in the first quarter of this century are disturbing. At the strategic level, France in in the 1930s was as deeply divided between the left and the right as America is today. The extreme Left favored Soviet Communism; the far Right admired what Hitler had done to Germany and Mussolini to Italy — it wanted to take France in a fascist direction. Most on the left and right were not quite as extreme, but this split drove everything, including military strategy, doctrine, and training.
The second strategic driver was the horrific casualty count of World War II, which impacted France much more than Germany, as the latter had started and ended World War I with an advantage in population. Casualty avoidance in war dictated French strategy almost as much as it drives Americans today.
Those two factors heavily influenced French operational and tactical art — or lack thereof — in the 1940 campaign. The French mindset was defensive and reactive, and the country put too much faith in technology. French tanks, aircraft, and artillery were generally superior to that of the Germans but were not used in an integrated manner, as was the case with the German Blitzkrieg. The French reliance on the Maginot Line to protect its eastern flank was understandable given the horrific casualties of World War I, but it reflected an unhealthy operational mindset of always reacting to what the Germans did. This might have been acceptable if the Nazis were one only step ahead of French decision making, but the Nazis were generally two moves ahead. The French simply could not keep up the pace. (WATCH: Your Data Isn’t Private — Even If You’re in the Military)
Today, the United States puts undue emphasis on a technological advantage that grows more tenuous every year. It is one thing to let the other fellow start the conflict, but the U.S. is devoid of the capability to quickly counterpunch. If China invades Taiwan, America will lack the amphibious and pre-positioned shipping to reinforce or to launch an amphibious operation to retake any terrain gained by the Chinese in a timely manner. This defensive mindset has even infected the Marine Corps, once considered the most aggressive of our services. The current USMC operational concept for the South China Sea is a naval version of the Maginot Line that will neither deter the Chinese from attacking Taiwan nor contribute to its defense should such an attack occur.
Another operational disadvantage that the French were burdened with was a cumbersome system of command and control called “deliberate battle,” which allowed for no initiative on the part of commanders below the army level. This might have been acceptable if the Germans had done what the French expected and conducted a mechanized version of the 1914 Schlieffen plan from the north through the low countries. When the Germans put their main effort from the east through the supposedly impenetrable Ardennes Forest skirting the Maginot defenses, the French reaction was sluggish.
Huge staffs at the army group, army, and corps levels also contributed the French inability to gain the initiative. Today’s high-level American staffs are even larger than their French counterparts of 1940. Although the Americans claim to practice maneuver warfare, nothing like that exists above the regimental level. We have a top-down command and control system that largely depends upon using airborne sensors to locate targets for precision strikes. It is attrition warfare at its finest.
At the tactical level, the Germans were generally tougher, better trained, and far more ready for combat than their French counterparts. Some French units, such as the professional colonial troops and foreign Legion, fought magnificently, but overall combat performance was abysmal. French political schisms caused politicians to pander to the draftee soldiers, who represented a considerable voting bloc. Draftees served shorter terms than their German counterparts, and training was cut back drastically. The image of French soldiers basking under sunlamps in Maginot line forts during the 1930s has become emblematic of the level of readiness when the real shooting started. American readiness in 2024 is a mere ghost of the superbly trained troops of Desert Storm or the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. Decades of emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion over combat readiness have taken their toll. Few young Americans are willing to serve under senior officers who are obviously tokens or “firsts” due to gender and racial promotion preferences among senior government leaders. Recruiting standards across the board are being lowered, but even that is not getting adequate volunteers. We are probably not yet at the low point of Robert McNamara’s Vietnam-era Project 100,000, but we are heading in that direction. (RELATED: Joint Force Quarterly Enters Wokeland)
Most, veterans of my acquaintance — and I am one of them — no longer encourage young relatives and friends to pursue military service, fearing that they will be indoctrinated with the same leftist pap that permeates our colleges and universities today. Unfortunately, real military reform usually only comes in the wake of defeat. The Germans learned from losing following World War I while the French winners became complacent. The miserable performance of our senior military leadership in the last days of Afghanistan should have been a wake-up call, but it obviously was not. I sincerely hope that the American public realizes the danger of its rotting military before some adversary does it for us.
Gary Anderson retired as the chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He served as a special adviser to the deputy secretary of defense from 2003-05 and served as a civilian adviser in Iraq and Afghanistan.
