Having spent much of my government career in the nuclear weapons community, I’ve watched with fascination as Donald Trump has called for the development and deployment of what he refers to as an “Iron Dome” missile defense shield to protect the whole of the United States. This is not some passing fancy, but something he brings up repeatedly, something that mattered enough for him to insist on its inclusion in this year’s Republican platform.
The incoming president’s reasoning, simply enough, is that if other countries can have such protection, then why can’t we? We are, after all, still the most scientifically capable nation on earth, at least when we set our minds to it. For what it’s worth, I think he’s absolutely right, and I think that this should be a major national security priority for the Trump presidency.
Is it feasible?
There have been, of course, many commentators who’ve observed, sometimes pungently, that it can’t work for us, that its radar coverage and missile response times are optimized for tiny Israel and cannot be scaled up to cover a continent-spanning nation. This seems to me a “strawman” argument. Trump clearly has something more in mind, a broadly-based research and development program for a system — or, more likely, a system of systems — capable of working on a much grander scale.
It’s reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), ridiculed in its time by pundits with the “Star Wars” tag, but in retrospect viewed more positively. However limited in number, we do have anti-missile defense systems in place that would never have existed if these pundits had won the day. We may not be able to stop an all-out missile attack from Russia or China, but the systems in place might well suffice against the lesser capabilities of Kim Jong Un’s North Korean regime — and that’s nothing trivial. Nor, at a tactical level, would we have the capability demonstrated by U.S. warships in the Red Sea to swat down repeated Houthi missile attacks.
At the same time, both the “Iron Dome” and our efforts to protect Red Sea shipping demonstrate that relying on missiles to destroy missiles is likely to become a technological dead end. If nothing else, anti-missile missiles, intended to hit small, fast-moving targets, require an expensive level of technical sophistication. Using them to shoot down cheaper, dumber missiles designed only to hit large objects — container ships, for example, or factories — is, in the long run, a losing proposition.
The experts I’m following these days seem focused more on, first, improving the sensor coverage that any large-scale system would require. With the overall improvement in space-based systems, this seems less a technical challenge than one of commitment of resources. Second, instead of relying on missiles to shoot down missiles, we should ramp up our focus on alternative weapons, perhaps lasers, or rail guns, or even non-nuclear EMP devices. Researching my upcoming novel, I’ve been quite overwhelmed by the progress that’s been made in the latter area, much of it in the realm of anti-drone systems, but potentially scalable to counter missiles.
Make no mistake, there’s nothing currently available that could be used to create an “Iron Dome”-like capability for the U.S. But tomorrow, with sufficiently focused and supported research, well, we might just surprise ourselves. After all, not so long ago the notion of recapturing space boosters and reusing them was dismissed as a technological pipe dream. Maybe while he’s getting us to Mars, Elon Musk might spare some thought to protecting us here on Earth.
Why does the U.S. need an “Iron Dome”?
But my purpose today is less about the “how” of creating something akin to an “Iron Dome” system to protect the U.S. and more about the “why.” Why should we devote significant resources, speculatively, to developing the capability Trump wants? The answer lies in the increasingly unstable nuclear deterrence environment, and the need to restore confidence in the U.S. nuclear “umbrella.”
The Ukraine war, and particularly Vladimir Putin’s insistent nuclear saber-rattling, has highlighted the extent to which, in Herman Kahn’s classic formulation, the “unthinkable” has become “thinkable” once again. In the bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War, a “balance of terror” kept nuclear weapons largely off the table. From Korea to Cuba to Berlin and Vietnam, neither the U.S. nor the Soviets wished to push confrontation to the point of inviting a nuclear response.
Now we’re not so sure, and, more importantly, both our allies and the various rogue actors now find themselves looking at nuclear scenarios other than the Cold War’s MAD, or “Mutually Assured Destruction.” North Korea’s increased support for Putin’s war in Ukraine quite likely has come in exchange for technical assistance to improve the range and accuracy of its own nuclear-tipped missiles. Even as its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza are defanged, Iran continues its covert pursuit of a nuclear capability —and here again, their support for Russia may yield nuclear program dividends. And China, with its rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, lurks in the background. (RELATED: North Korea Is in the Fight)
This, in turn, has led U.S. friends and allies to reconsider the desirability of obtaining nuclear weapons — even Japan and Sweden, historically opposed to acquiring nuclear weapons, may now view things differently. Not for nothing do many Ukrainians regret that they gave up a huge nuclear arsenal in return for security assurances from the U.S., the U.K., and Russia. The entire nuclear non-proliferation edifice depended on faith in the U.S. willingness to put its nuclear muscle in the service of protecting NATO or Japan or South Korea. (READ MORE: Nuclear Weapons and US Allies)
No one believes in our assurances of protection any longer, despite pious words to the contrary. The distinction drawn between Ukraine and our “NATO allies” became (under Joe Biden) a polite fiction. We weren’t obligated to protect Ukraine, but of course we would spring into action if Putin invaded Poland or Estonia or any other NATO country, and, if Putin threatened nuclear escalation, then we’d escalate right back. R-i-i-i-ght! Of course, we would. No doubt about it. One can argue that Biden allowed himself to be too readily buffaloed by Putin’s nuclear threats, but one can’t object to the notion that Kansas City would never be risked to protect Kiev.
It may well be the case that our nuclear arsenal still suffices to keep Russia from emptying its silos against us, which begs the question of why would they do so? Even in the days of “advancing world Communism,” it was hard to see what the Soviets might gain from reducing the continental United States to a nuclear wasteland and inviting the same destruction upon themselves. But we couldn’t dismiss the threat, and nor could they. Today the very uncertainty that has been introduced, regardless of the source, means that the vectors for a nuclear exchange have become much more complicated.
Nuclear non-proliferation always depended more on U.S. steadfastness than it did upon speeches and handshakes at U.N.-sponsored shindigs. Restoring non-proliferation depends on recreating the belief that the U.S. cannot be trifled with, that rogue nuclear actors had best be prepared to face dire consequences if they messed with us or our friends.
Back in the day, the “Star Wars” critics argued that its goals were impossible and that, even if they could be achieved, the result would be to destroy the strategic balance of forces and destabilize the world. Instead, it forced Gorbachev to the realization that the Soviet Union lacked the resources to compete, a realization that led to the conference table, to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was the strategic pivot around which the Cold War was finally won. Those who ridiculed Ronald Reagan found themselves served a dish of crow, even if some refused petulantly to eat it.
It may well be that Trump’s proposed “Iron Dome” for the U.S. is beyond realization. It may be that it can only yield a temporary advantage, that potential adversaries will eventually find a way around it. But it also offers immense promise, not only the promise of protection for all Americans but also a restored freedom of strategic action for America in the world.
Let’s give it a chance.
James H. McGee worked for nearly four decades as a national security and counter-terrorism professional. Since retiring, he’s begun a second career as a thriller writer. His recent novel is Letter of Reprisal.
