Foreign fighters and their jihadist ideologies: the shadow of extremism behind Syria’s new leader

This is the second part of a two-part series on the fears of Syrian minorities after the fall of the Assad regime. Read part one here.

The foreign fighters in the HTS alliance come from a variety of backgrounds: Chechens, Uighurs, Uzbeks, Afghans, Albanians – and even French nationals. These non-Syrian militants operate either within their own groups, which are aligned with HTS, or are embedded directly within its ranks. HTS itself has been designated as a terrorist organisation by both the US and EU.

Al-Sharaa started his career in the early 2000s with al Qaeda in Iraq, a group that once declared “all-out war” on Shia Muslims in Iraq. He formed the al-Nusra Front in Syria in 2012 and broke with al Qaeda in 2016 to establish HTS. He has since sought to project a more moderate image, renouncing global jihad in favour of focusing on overthrowing the Syrian regime, and purging extremists fighters from HTS ranks. But many foreign jihadists remain in the HTS camp and participated in the group’s final campaign against the Assad regime, and some have ignored or openly contradicted Al-Jolani’s orders for tolerance in their own communications, including videos and messages on Telegram channels. Their hostility is particularly directed at Syria’s Shia Alawite community, which comprises roughly 10 percent of the country’s population.

'Foreign Fighters Are Highly Ideological'

While they are relatively small in number, these foreign groups serve as the backbone of HTS's military operations, according to Broderick McDonald, a leading expert on jihadist groups in Syria. The foreign brigades, which typically range in size from a few dozen to several hundred fighters, play a decisive role on the battlefield.

“In many ways, these foreign fighters are the ‘Red Brigades’ of HTS. They operate as the group’s elite units, receiving superior training, better equipment, and higher pay. But their primary motivation isn’t financial – it’s ideological. Whether they are Iraqis, Afghans, Uighurs, or Chechens, these foreign fighters are deeply committed to their beliefs. They travel from one conflict zone to another, and their allies consistently benefit from their combat experience.”

Thousands of foreign fighters remain in Syria

Although the total number of foreign jihadists in Syria has dwindled compared with the early years of the conflict, McDonald estimates that “a few thousand” still remain. Among the most prominent of these groups is the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a faction made up of jihadist Uighurs, members of China’s Muslim minority fighting for an Islamic state in Xinjiang province.

TIP maintains a direct connection to al Qaeda, with the United Nations reporting that “Abdul Haq”, the Uighur group’s leader, is a member of Al-Qaeda’s executive council. During Syria’s civil war, TIP fighters gained notoriety for their involvement in destroying Christian churches and carrying out attacks against Christian communities in rebel-held parts of Idlib province.

Thomas Pierret, a French researcher and expert on Islamic militant networks, says the Uighurs of the TIP are the most prominent group of foreign fighters in the alliance.

There are a dozen foreign fighter groups operating under the military command of HTS. The biggest of them is made up of Uighurs, a group called the Turkistan Islamic Party. They are Chinese nationals. There are several hundred of them.

There are also other, smaller groups, of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Albanians for instance, that sometimes consist of only a few dozen fighters. Additionally, some foreign fighters have joined the ranks of the mainstream HTS as individuals, not part of a foreign group. In total, we are talking about relatively few foreign fighters, just a few thousand compared with tens of thousands of foreign volunteers in the mid-2010s.

Since arriving in Syria in 2012, these foreign fighters have established and maintained connections with global jihadist networks. Some have been connected with high-profile incidents abroad. The Chechen-descended killer of French schoolteacher Samuel Paty in 2020 had reportedly been in contact with two foreign jihadists in Syria.

Foreign fighters’ global links and recent filtering efforts

Pierret continues:

Numbers of foreign fighters are down because HTS has been doing a purge over the last few years. They’ve been ejecting foreigners who don’t follow their political orientation, those who refuse to renounce the idea of global jihad, or who might prepare acts of terrorism from regions controlled by HTS. Some of those who refused to follow HTS policy were placed in detention, or under house arrest, or in any case disarmed. There are units that have been disbanded, notably a Chechen organisation that was dismantled a few years ago. Some foreign fighters have been pushed out, such as a Chechen commander who left Idlib with his followers and went to Ukraine to fight against the Russians alongside the Ukrainian army, because they were no longer welcome at HTS.

Afghans of HTS

The HTS itself harbours dozens of Afghan jihadists in its ranks. Hardened by decades of civil war in Afghanistan, they publish openly anti-Shia beliefs on their Telegram channel. While fighting in Syria under the command of Al-Sharaa, they published a video on December 3 in which they staged a  “bay’ah”, or oath of allegiance, to the leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hibatullah Akhundzada, via a phone call.

Ansar al-Tawhid and French jihadists

Another group currently cooperating with HTS is Ansar al-Tawhid, which is predominantly made up of Syrian fighters but also includes foreign jihadists, including French nationals. The group’s origins can be traced back to the Islamic State group, and its members continue to espouse extremist ideologies despite their alignment with HTS.

Jihadist rhetoric and the annihilation of Syria’s Shia minority

The roots of hostility toward Syria’s Shia population can, in part, be attributed to the decades-long rule of the Alawite Assad family and its dominance over the Syrian military, coupled with the strong alliance between Damascus and the Shia regime in Iran. However, the animosity its affiliated jihadist factions toward Shia communities extends beyond political or military grievances.

For Sunni jihadist extremists, Shia Muslims are considered “kafir” ("unbelievers") or “fasiq” ("venial sinners"). They are also derogatorily labeled “Rafidas” – a term used to accuse them of rejecting “the true faith”. These ideological labels have historically served as justification for violence and systemic persecution by groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State group.

This rhetoric has been adopted by some foreign fighters affiliated with HTS, translating into threats and abuse, provoking fear among Syrian Shia communities. While summary executions have been reported, the language of annihilation remains disturbingly common in jihadist discourse. Videos disseminated on HTS-affiliated Telegram channels provide evidence of this.

In a video posted on December 4, an Afghan HTS fighter stands over the charred remains of Syrian army soldiers killed in a battle. Speaking in Dari, the fighter refers to the victims as “kafir” and “Rafida” who must be destroyed by the “mujahidin”. 

These declarations are not limited to anti-Shia sentiment. Other videos show jihadists pledging to “liberate”  Jerusalem and promising Palestinians in Gaza: “We are on our way.” Such statements highlight the ideological gap between al-Sharaa’s local focus on liberating Syria from the Assad regime, and the global jihadist ambitions of many foreign fighters under his command.

Control amid extremist voices

Despite the presence of these extreme voices among HTS’s foreign soldiers, experts suggest that al-Sharaa has thus far maintained control over them. Pierret explains:

Al-Jolani (Al-Sharaa) seems capable of keeping these factions in line, at least for now. It’s largely a matter of power dynamics. With relatively small numbers of foreign fighters – far fewer than at the height of the war – their influence within HTS remains limited.

Turkish-Kurd conflict deepens Syria’s fragmentation

While HTS continues to consolidate power in parts of Syria, the country remains deeply divided. Control is split between HTS, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), which joined HTS in its latest campaign against the Assad regime, and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are supported by the United States.

Kurdish separatists in Turkey, Syria and Iraq are Turkey’s bitter adversaries, and the Turkey-Kurdish rivalry has fueled violence in the latest campaign. Videos have surfaced showing members of the Turkish-backed SNA forces, HTS allies, engaging in the torture, humiliation and execution of Syrian Kurds, including fighters of the American-backed SDF. The tensions highlight the deepening fragmentation of Syria’s political and military landscape.