The ceasefire that went into effect in the early hours of November 27, 2024, must mark the beginning of the effort to break Iran’s grip on Lebanon. It should create new prospects for Israel’s northern neighbor, while further weakening the regime in Tehran. Achieving this will requires three main and complementary avenues of action for Israel to be pursued in coordination with interested partners – namely, the United States and key regional players such as Saudi Arabia – that will need to be pursued in the immediate and intermediate future:
- Firm response to any Hezbollah infringements and zero tolerance to breaches of the agreed restrictions on deployment south of the Litani River.
- Active yet discreet engagement with various political players in Lebanon, aimed at reshaping the internal balance of power and reducing Hezbollah’s grip on power (while considering the need to accommodate the position gained by the Shi’a community).
- Leveraging a potential reassessment of American relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin to drive a wedge between Moscow’s interests in Syria – focused on preserving President Bashar Assad’s survival, currently once again under threat – and those of Iran, which seeks to use Syrian soil to act against Israel and secure access to the Mediterranean. This strategy should aim to block avenues of military re-supply to Hezbollah.
The Beginning, Not the End
Israel’s willingness to accept a ceasefire – before the IDF had a chance to fully destroy Hezbollah’s forces in Lebanon – reflected the realization that other priorities (above all, preparing for what may turn out to be the necessary effort to destroy Iran’s nuclear project) must take precedence. At the same time, the decision was also rooted in the realization that the ultimate goal in Lebanon, namely, ensuring that Iran can no longer use the country at will as a platform from which to attack Israel, can be achieved through other means.
Given the severe losses that Hezbollah suffered in the later stages of the fighting, it is both possible and necessary to envisage a strategy that would weaken it even further. The evident effort by the organization to “celebrate a victory” indicates that many Lebanese realize that the opposite is true: facing the steady degradation of its capabilities, Hezbollah broke off the fighting without any linkage to the situation in Gaza. Even more so than in 2006 –when Hassan Nasrallah admitted that had he known the outcome, he would not have provoked Israel’s response – the attempt to describe the organization’s survival as a victory sounds hollow. Hezbollah has been driven out of the border area, thousands of its fighters were killed, many others maimed and captured, and a high proportion of its military resources destroyed or captured.
This has created the conditions for Israel to achieve, over time, not only the officially declared goal of enabling the return of internally displaced people to the northern border areas, but also the broader goal of bringing about a new strategic reality: one which would serve the interests of Israel, other regional and international partners, and indeed the Lebanese themselves – and at the same time, would deprive Iran of what was once considered its most effective tool against Israel.
No Tolerance for Infringements
The IDF has already begun to implement a strict policy of enforcing the letter and spirit of the ceasefire terms, backed by the American position as conveyed in a crucial side letter. Swift reaction and retaliation are being used to restore deterrence, and reverse the patterns of past years, during which Israel often shrugged off Hezbollah provocations, including the presence of Hezbollah tents on sovereign Israel territory.
This is largely the belated lesson of October 7. For years, Israel tolerated infringements by Hamas. But even more so, this is the result of what was revealed as the IDF moved into Lebanon and discovered the huge arsenals and tunnel systems of Hezbollah, built right under the noses of UNIFIL’s “peacekeepers.” To allow this to happen again would constitute a dangerous betrayal of the residents of the north, who feel – with good reason – that they could have easily fallen prey to a massive incursion, potentially more devastating than what was visited upon the towns and villages bordering Gaza.
Only the IDF can be fully relied upon to deliver such necessary swift and decisive reactions. This is the bitter conclusion from the utter failure of UNIFIL to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 (the latter being the result of the active involvement of the Israeli government of the day that sought to end the Second Lebanon War in 2006). No UN force can be trusted to act against Israel’s enemies, whether in Lebanon or in the context of future agreements with the Palestinians. The weaknesses of these forces together with the institutional bias of the UN against Israel ensure that past malpractices are bound to repeat themselves. Nor can the Lebanese Armed Forces, with many Hezbollah sympathizers in their ranks, be expected to act against the organization at this stage: for this to happen much would need to change in the internal balance of Lebanese domestic politics.
Changing the Rules of the Lebanese Game
Over time, such a change, however, is not impossible. The remarkable volume and vehemence of courageous comments made by many in Lebanon, who abhor what Hezbollah has done to their country, points to the possibility of a different future. In relative terms, Hezbollah is now significantly weaker compared to the institutions of the state, which it easily defeated in May 2008, but may find to be less vulnerable in the future). Once other forces in Lebanon shake of their persistent fears and work to elect an effective president and shift the parliamentary balance (which has already begun to tilt against Hezbollah’s coalition), a process could be set in motion leading to implementation of UNSCR 1559 and the loosening of Iran’s grip on the country.
Israel’s policy during the war was to concentrate on Hezbollah as the enemy, not on Lebanon as a state. Many in Israel – and certainly the distraught leaders of northern communities that came under constant fire – saw this as a mistake and called for strikes on Lebanese national infrastructure to enhance Israeli deterrence and force an end to the attacks on their towns and villages. But the Israeli approach may nevertheless prove to have been the right choice as it signaled Israel’s interest in isolating Hezbollah and to target after what some of its internal enemies describe as the “Iranian occupation” of Lebanon.
These enemies and critics include key elements of the Maronite community (despite former President Aoun’s cooperation with Hezbollah when he held power), always wary of the manner in which radicals, whether leftists or Islamists, dragged the country into the abyss; many Suni leaders and members of their faith, who cannot forgive Hezbollah for its brutal role repressing the Syrian Sunni majority on behalf of the Assad regime; the Druze, led by Walid Jumblatt, who can see where the wind is blowing and have begun to distance themselves from their cooperation with Hezbollah; and apparently a significant number of Shi’ites, who gradually realize that they are the ultimate victims of what Iran has dragged them into.
All this creates opportunities for action – which by necessity must be discreet, patient and multifaceted, informed by detailed intelligence and sensitive to the extreme complexity of Lebanese society and politics. These actions must take into account that the gains in power and influence made by the Shi’a in Lebanon in the last two generations cannot and should not be reversed, even if Hezbollah should no longer be viewed as their agency. In any case, this is not a mission for Israel alone and requires close cooperation with the relevant players in the next American administration, as well as regional players who share Israel’s interest in weakening Iran’s position.
Among these regional players, the UAE – and even more so, Saudi Arabia – are the most significant. Steering Lebanon onto a different course will require extensive investment in developing alternatives to the country’s dependence on Iranian largesse funneled through Hezbollah. With severe sanctions looming if Iran does not change course dramatically on the nuclear issue, Tehran’s ability to dedicate resources to sustaining Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon may be curtailed – creating further opportunities for the Saudis and their like-minded partners to offer incentives to those who would distance themselves from Iran.
The Russian Angle
Meanwhile, as already indicated during ceasefire negotiations, another factor may facilitate further isolation of Hezbollah and effectively disrupt its lines of supply. While Russia and Iran have both cooperated in saving Assad’s regime in Syria – and continue to do so in the face of the resumed rebel offensive in Aleppo – their interests do not fully cohere, creating another opportunity for (diplomatic) action.
Putin’s purpose, in deploying a significant air force contingent to help the Assad regime survive in 2015 (and since) was to demonstrate that Russia – unlike Obama’s America – stands by its clients, even if they are tainted with the mass slaughter of their own subjects. However, Russia’s goal is Assad’s survival; whereas Iran’s purpose in helping Assad is to turn Syria into an effective launch pad for attacks against Israel –a strategy that if followed through to its logical conclusion is bound to put Assad’s survival at risk. Thus, Israel was able to sustain a de-confliction channel with the Russian commanders in Syria; and the Russians have an active interest in restraining Iran’s use of Syrian territory.
If indeed, as seems likely, the Trump Administration seeks a reset of the broken-down relationship with Moscow, utilizing Russia’s hold on Assad to induce him to end the use of Syria as a conduit for arms, munitions, training and militia forces supporting Hezbollah should feature prominently on the agenda along with the closure of border crossings between Syria and Lebanon through which much of Hezbollah’s supplies have flowed over the years. In conjunction with the other avenues of action outlined above, this could help shift the balance of power.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Press Wire
