Chinese workers of CPEC projects are often targeted by Balochistan separatists
Originally published on Global Voices
Pakistan held its number one position in the 2024 iteration of The China Index, which measures the influence of the PRC across the Globe. Screenshot from the China Index Site. Fair use.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a USD 62 billion infrastructure and energy development project which launched in 2015, has become a source of conflict and tension, particularly in the Balochistan province in Southern Pakistan. Despite its ambitious economic goals, the project faces persistent security challenges and has generated resentment in some local communities, leading to violence.
Chinese nationals have been targeted, including the November 2024 Karachi airport attack and a shooting at a Karachi facility employing foreign workers. These incidents highlight deep-rooted grievances over perceived resource exploitation in the region, enforced disappearances, community neglect, and exclusion from decision-making processes.
The China Index 2024 examined China's influence in 98 countries and ranked Pakistan as the country that is most exposed to China's influence globally.
The CPEC Roadway Network. Image via the Government of Pakistan. Public Domain.
CPEC hailed as a progress
The Pakistani government is advancing the CPEC, a 3,000 kilometer Chinese infrastructure project, which includes developing a deep-water port at Gwadar and establishing a road and rail network connecting it to Xinjiang, China. As a part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this would provide a shortcut via the Gwadar port, boosting trade between Europe, the Middle East and China. The project also aims to address electricity shortages and help shift the economy from an agriculture-based to an industrial structure. However, the persistent violence has hampered progress and raised concerns about its long-term survival.
Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province, is making strides in employment. Initiatives like #BUITEMS Job Fair and NIC #Quetta are unlocking opportunities, while #CPEC projects such as Gwadar Port and Quetta-Zhob Road have created 10,000 local jobs. Growth in agriculture,… pic.twitter.com/2G2NCAUqcQ
— The Balochistan Diaries (TBD) (@BalochDiaries) January 11, 2025
Security challenges and violent resistance
Pakistan has become particularly perilous for Chinese nationals over the last year, with 14 incidents which took 20 lives. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a major ethnonationalist militant group in the province, has been a regular offender. The BLA has long advocated autonomy for Balochistan, hoping to resolve issues over political marginalisation, economic exploitation, and a desire for greater control over local resources. These rebel actions have intensified as part of a larger battle against perceived Pakistani governmental tyranny and enforced disappearances. The government’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances reports 2,752 active cases in the province as of January 2024, while Pakistan’s government maintains that only about 50 people are missing.
The assaults against Chinese workers are connected to the BLA's hostility to China's engagement in Balochistan's development projects, notably the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which locals believe is increasing their political and economic marginalisation.
Despite promises of infrastructural development, reports from The Express Tribune and The Diplomat indicate that the CPEC has not benefitted the region's socio-economic dynamics. An October 2024 World Bank Report indicates that, while CPEC seeks to improve infrastructure in Balochistan, it has mostly expedited resource exploitation and delivered little benefit to neighbouring residents.
Activist Ambreen Baloch posted on X (formerly Twitter)
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (#CPEC) is often viewed as a pathway to development, yet it primarily serves the interests of #China‘s elite. In #Balochistan, locals face marginalization despite abundant mineral wealth, as benefits bypass them. pic.twitter.com/dlrAj0bjkL
— Ambreen Baloch (@baloch_ambreen) January 14, 2025
This unrest, fuelled by a combination of local grievances and wider national and international concerns, has caused instability in the region, which has hurt foreign investment.
According to a 2024 Balochistan Human Rights Commission report, Chinese corporations prioritise resource exploitation, environmental damage, and money over people's lives, while the Pakistani authorities continued to promote Chinese interests.
Mineral deposits in rocks in arid Balochistan. Image by Rinam Fatima via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0.
As Pakistan gets closer to China with the help of the CPEC initiatives, other regional countries, like India, are getting worried, and they are wary of China's growing influence in South Asia. A paper by researcher Zeus Hans Mendez (2020) describes how regional animosities are enabling militant activities in Balochistan.
Many in Balochistan commemorate the anniversary of mass graves discovered in the Khuzdar district in 2014 on January 25, and this year's event was marred by Internet shutdown and other government repressions.
Journalist Basam Baloch posted on X about the shutdown:
A peaceful rally is going to be held in #Dalbandin just few to unite, raise awareness among the Baloch, where relatives of the forcibly disappeared Families are also present, but even then the guilty #Pakistan has shut down internet service #BalochGenocideRemembranceDay pic.twitter.com/blQKQevmyc
— بشام بلوچ (@Basham1Baloch) January 25, 2025
China worried about their workers
Chinese authorities have frequently criticised the security of their staff and projects in Pakistan. After the Karachi attack in November 2024, the Chinese Foreign Ministry voiced concern with Pakistan's security, heightening diplomatic tensions as China advocates for more security measures. Although Pakistan has enhanced security around CPEC significant points, these measures were not enough to avoid the violence, indicating the glaring weakness in Pakistan's security apparatus. Because of Pakistan’s internal socio-security issues and the local situation, even with a long-standing cooperation with China, it is difficult for the country to secure the living and investments of its own people as well as foreigners. This situation demoralises the international investors and in turn puts doubts on Pakistan’s capability to maintain internal stability in such a complex and growing environment.
Journalist Asad Ali Toor highlighted on X:
Wang Shengjie, #China’s political secretary to Pakistan, voiced unusually candid criticism of #Pakistan,
“If the security is not improved, who would come and work in this environment? There is hatred against the Chinese in Gwadar and #Balochistan,” he said https://t.co/BibFAIV2Ao— Asad Ali Toor (@AsadAToor) January 26, 2025
The future of CPEC
The people of the Balochistan region have been generally politically disenchanted and economically deprived for a long time. Sadly, for most of the Baloch people, the implementation of CPEC projects has only amplified a sense of marginalisation. According to a 2024 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, people of Balochistan are sceptical of CPEC and do not find that they are getting the true value of the economic outcomes of the project.
Academics Hong Zhang and Ammar A. Malik highlighted in a paper published in the Georgetown Journal of International Affiars in December 2024, that Pakistan and China should adopt a more open approach to advance CPEC. Acknowledging past shortcomings in Pakistan's security can help rebuild trust and foster dialogue. They also opined that expanding coordination mechanisms to include input from local stakeholders and experts is essential for fostering local ownership.
]]>The police seem to keep arresting the wrong people
Originally published on Global Voices
A road sign at the entrance to Khanibodom. Screenshot from the video “Канибадам мой город часть 1″ from You Frame‘s YouTube channel. Fair use.
In 2024, residents of Khanibodom, a small town in Tajikistan’s northern Sughd province, lived under constant fear of being murdered in their own houses. A total of seven incidents took place throughout the year when a group of criminals murdered and robbed entire families and attempted to stage them as family conflicts.
On December 21, shortly after two new cases, authorities announced arresting four suspects, but the residents were not yet relieved. Previously, the police had arrested two other suspects and sentenced one to 20 years and the other to life in prison, but the killings carried on, undermining public trust in law enforcement.
Here is a YouTube video about the most recent arrests of suspects.
By the end of 2024, a total of 23 people from seven families, including eight children, were killed. The first crime occurred from March 28 to 29 in a settlement named after Komil Yermatov near Khanibodom.
Mukhiddin Sharifov, 65, was found hanged at his home. His wife, daughter-in-law, and two grandsons were also found dead after having been strangled. The initial theory was that Sharifov was responsible, but it was quickly debunked after the authorities found out that all the money and gold in the house was stolen.
What followed were nine months of nightmare for the residents of Khanibodom and its nearby areas. After the second murder in April, which resulted in the death of 70-year-old Muzaffar Urmonov and his wife Inoyat, the police arrested Urmonov’s 66-year-old brother Sharifjon Ashurov. On December 12, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison despite pleading innocent. Ashurov’s arrest did not stop the killings though.
On the night from May 28 to 29, two separate families in the neighboring Zhahonzeb and Sanzhidzor villages near Khanibodom were killed with only three children in Sanzhidzor escaping that fate. The crimes were pinned on Marat Satorov, who worked as a security guard at a local school. In November, the court found him guilty and sentenced to a lifelong imprisonment. Satorov’s arrest also did not stop the killings, and two more families were murdered in December in a manner similar to the previous cases, creating doubt that the actual serial killers were ever arrested.
Adding to the hysteria and fear was the way the authorities have been handling the communication part of the investigation. The first official press release from the Interior Ministry on the murder cases came only in August and did not do much to alleviate worries and instill trust in the police’s ability to guarantee security. Deputy Minister of the Interior Abdurahman Alamshozoda stated that the murder cases were “ordinary,” not “sensational,” and at least two murders were family conflicts.
The second official statement from the authorities came on December 18, when the Sughd governor Rajabboy Ahmadzoda met with the public to assure that “specialists and investigators from various departments are working closely together to solve crimes and punish criminals as quickly as possible.”
Three days later, on December 21, the Prosecutor General’s Office shared that four suspects, all residents of Khanibodom and nearby settlements, had been arrested, revealing their names and ages. Allegedly, three of them had previously served prison sentences, though it was not clear for what crimes. Family members and neighbors of the suspects have denied the allegations, casting a doubt over the investigation’s effectiveness.
Here is a YouTube video with the suspects’ relatives denying the allegations.
The previous two arrests did not bear any fruit. Torture by the law-enforcement agencies remains widespread in Tajikistan, according to Amnesty International. Thus, given the growing public demand, there is a chance that the previous two and these four suspects were and will be tortured to confess.
Meanwhile, Khanibodom residents are coping by either temporarily leaving the town to live with relatives in other regions or forming patrol units to keep themselves safe. Their best bet right now is to hope that the Tajik police has actually caught those who have been terrorizing them for the last ten months.
]]>In Latin America, Peru is lagging behind on same-sex unions. Why is that?
Originally published on Global Voices
Photo by Tatiana Saavedra under Canva content license.
It was a surprise for the LGBTQ+ community in Peru when, on November 20, a Peruvian congress committee approved a bill that would legalize civil unions in the country. The ruling must now be debated again in the full congress, although there is no specific date for its discussion yet.
Peru is one of only three countries in South America that have not approved any legal mechanism for same-sex unions. Peru's laggardness demonstrates the strength of an organized anti-rights movement, but this draft bill reactivates the demands of a community still seeking recognition of its rights.
The bill, proposed by conservative right-wing congress members Martha Moyano (Fuerza Popular) and Alejandro Cavero (Avanza País), would grant same-sex couples rights such as joint property ownership, priority in medical decisions, prison visitation rights, and inclusion in a partner's pension. However, significant claims such as changing marital status or adoption are not considered.
Congressman Cavero, who is openly gay, stated on his X account that this is “a fundamental advance in defending individual freedom, equality before the law, and the rights of millions of Peruvians to build their own life project.” However, the LGBTQ+ community in Peru has received this news with some caution.
For Renato Velásquez, executive director of the LGBTQ+ rights NGO Presente, the law represents progress in recognizing rights, but “the bill contains nuances that end up being discriminatory when compared to marriage.” A civil union creates differentiated treatment for LGBTQ+ people and so perpetuates the stigma against same-sex couples.
In this line, the Ombudsman's Office of Peru stated that this bill was not viable because “it does not conform to international standards in protecting LGTBI people.” Back in 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion that urged states to recognize same-sex marriage as a human right.
Unprotected families
There are around 39,000 same-sex parent families in Peru, which would remain in limbo even if the law is passed, as parents would still be unable, for example, to share legal custody of their children. Mabel Aguilar, president of the Association of Same-Sex and Diverse Families of Peru, states that “while this may be a step forward in some respects, it leaves behind families with children who already exist and remain unprotected.”
Due to the lack of political will to legislate in favor of same-sex couples, the LGBTQ+ community has sought other ways to assert its rights through the judicial system. For example, in 2023, a court in Lima ruled in favor of a lawsuit filed by a lesbian couple. It ordered the National Registry of Identification and Civil Status (Reniec) to recognize their marriage, which was performed in Argentina.
The conservative machinery responds
Compared to other countries in the region, Peru has fallen far behind in granting rights and protections to vulnerable populations. Not only has same-sex marriage been neglected, but other social struggles, such as abortion rights, have also been left out of public debate. “We are the result of a very powerful anti-rights wave,” says Velásquez of Presente.
For Rodrigo Gil, a researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies, one factor explaining this situation is the consolidation of a well-organized conservative movement, composed of various actors, including the most conservative elements of the Catholic Church, different evangelical churches, and even secular actors who oppose what they perceive as a “progressive establishment” seeking to impose societal changes contrary to their ideology. “It is a broad and diverse ecosystem of pro-family, pro-life, and anti-establishment forces that we are now seeing in full mobilization,” Gil tells me.
Over the past decade, this movement has organized multiple marches against so-called “gender ideology.” Additionally, it has established a strong presence in public debate and secured political representation in key institutions such as Congress. This political representation is led by Renovación Popular, an ultraconservative party headed by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga, who, following the Justice Commission’s approval of the civil union bill, called on his supporters to march “for the life and family of Peruvians.”
This march, held on December 7, was part of a coordinated and unified response — a strategy often employed by the conservative movement in Peru. The movement has shown strong mobilization capabilities and influence over discussions on social media, where anonymous accounts spread conspiracy theories and homophobic rhetoric. For example, the Agence France-Presse (AFP) reported the presence of social media posts spreading misinformation about the alleged approval of a same-sex marriage law and attacking lawmakers who voted in favor of the bill. “It’s a machinery, an anti-rights, anti-democracy, totalitarian, and authoritarian movement with many resources and allies not only in Peru but also internationally,” explains Velásquez.
The most visible arm of this movement is its media apparatus, which includes television channels, radio stations, newspapers, and digital media. “The conservative movement’s ability to infiltrate media spaces, particularly after the pandemic, has been truly impressive,” says Gil.
The organization of this conservative movement has coincided with a progressive sector that has been relatively ineffective in mobilizing around issues such as same-sex marriage. Progressives have lost ground to this anti-rights wave. “It’s a double dynamic,” explains Rodrigo Gil. “On one hand, you have a very strong conservative movement gaining ground, and on the other, a progressive movement that once made significant advances but is now stalled and unable to react.”
The community demands to be heard
Despite all the obstacles the bill has faced in reaching the full congress, the chances of it being approved by a conservative legislature remain quite low. For Mabel Aguilar, “it is important for politicians to understand that this is not about left- or right-wing positions; it is about legislating in favor of people’s rights.” Renato Velásquez acknowledges that while there is certainly hope within the LGBTQ+ community regarding this bill, there is also “the disappointment that, in the end, we are still being discriminated against.”
]]>One mayor is being accused of involvement in a corruption scandal related to public tenders
Originally published on Global Voices
Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul Provincial Instagram account. Used with permission.
On January 13, 2025, Istanbul Besiktas Mayor Rıza Akpolat was detained in Balikesir province on the grounds of being involved in a corruption scandal related to public tenders. Akpolat is a member of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and is the second CHP mayor to face arrest recently. On October 30, 2024, Esenyurt Mayor Prof. Dr. Ahmet Özer was arrested on charges of “membership in a terrorist organization.”
As part of the investigation, 47 individuals were subject to arrest warrants. The allegations included bribery, tender rigging, and money laundering. Police also detained the brother of the deputy minister of the interior, Ahmet Aktaş, as part of the investigation but released him later, sowing doubt over the transparency of the investigation and the alleged claims. The CHP refutes allegations, calling them unlawful and a political setup.
Following Akpolat’s arrest, his duties as a mayor were suspended in what the ministry of the interior said was a “temporary measure.” Akpolat has been the Besiktas mayor since 2019 and was re-elected during local elections in March 2024.
On January 17, a protest took place outside the Besiktas municipality, where party supporters gathered to denounce the detention of the mayor and the ongoing targeted campaign against the CHP.
Screenshot from the video “CHP'den ‘Beşiktaş Halk Buluşması’ #CANLI” on the Gazete Duvar YouTube channel. Fair use.
Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, and Özgür Çelik, the CHP Istanbul provincial chair, wrote on X the arrest was unlawful, expressing support for Akpolat and promising to continue monitoring the legal process.
Speaking to the supporters gathered outside the municipality during a night vigil, Imamoğlu was quoted as saying, “The issue is not just Esenyurt or Besiktas. The issue is, of course, much larger. It is the approach of an authoritarian mindset, a way of walking a path influenced by an authoritarian perspective.”
Turkey experts agree. In an interview with Turkey Recap, Berk Esen, the associate professor of political science at Istanbul's Sabanci University, said the most recent detention was “clearly politically-charged” with “possible repercussions for İmamoğlu.” It was only a matter of time before Esen’s projections would hold true. On January 20, an investigation was launched against the Istanbul mayor for allegedly “threatening” Istanbul prosecutor Akın Gürlek and his family. The alleged threat relates to a comment İmamoğlu made during a panel on law and politicization of the judiciary in Turkey.
The popular mayor is already facing a potential political ban as a result of another ongoing case against him for allegedly insulting public officials in a speech he made after he won Istanbul's municipal election in 2019. The higher appeals court must uphold the verdict, but until then, İmamoğlu remains Istanbul's mayor. He secured a victory in recent local elections, keeping his seat as the Istanbul mayor for another four-year term.
Akpolat’s arrest is the most recent example of the increasing pressure on the opposition from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), since the municipal elections of March 2024, in which the ruling party suffered significant losses. While the dominant target has often been the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM, formerly HDP, Turkey's main pro-Kurdish Party), Turkey’s third-largest political party, the recent arrests targeting CHP mayors indicate the ruling party is determined to clean up critics ahead of next round of general elections. It isn’t just arrests but also defamation lawsuits filed against the CHP officials. In November 2024, President Erdoğan filed a defamation lawsuit against CHP leader Özgür Özel and Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu seeking TRY 1 million (USD 28,000) in damages from each on the grounds that both have insulted the president.
Akpolat’s defense in court
In his defense, Akpolat said he was not aware of the tender processes and had delegated authority to his colleagues to manage those affairs.
Legally, mayors do not have the signing authority in tender processes, a fact that was raised in the case against Akpolat. As such, it raises questions about the validity of the charges. The release of the deputy interior minister’s brother also raised questions and concerns about unequal treatment and political influence in the judiciary.
Meanwhile, police also arrested Mertcan Üreten, CHP’s municipal council member in Manisa’s Yunusemre district municipality, on January 21 and questioned Cem Aydın, the head of CHP’s youth branch, on January 20. Aydın has been barred from leaving the country.
In the midst of the ongoing political tension, the CHP has vowed to adopt a firmer stance, particularly targeting corruption within the AKP-run municipalities. Adding salt to the wound was a remark made by President Erdoğan on January 17 in which he said “the biggest of the radish is still in the sack,” meaning that more (revelations, actions) are yet to come. Özel interpreted the remark as a thinly veiled threat.
Seasoned journalist Fatih Altayli explained on his YouTube channel that, under normal circumstances where there is separation of powers and an independent judiciary, these remarks would not even see the light of day. However, in a country where no such thing exists, this remark was completely unjust. If there is a case of corruption, then all parties involved, including AKP-run former and current municipalities, should be investigated, explained Altayli.
Graft and corruption within the ranks of the ruling party and its municipalities have long been a subject of criticism by opposition politicians, civil society groups and international observers — especially when AKP’s rise to popularity was made on a platform of clean governance and anti-corruption. Yet over the 20 years since the ruling party has been in power, numerous allegations of misuse of public funds, nepotism and lack of transparency have marred the party’s reputation. None of the allegations that reached local courts were fully investigated. Journalists and media reporting on ongoing trials were met with court decisions to block access to the related stories.
Why now?
The political spat is taking place at a time when the government is struggling to stabilize the economy and declining public support. In addition to arrests, intimidation, trustee appointments, and defamation suits, the ruling party has also been trying to shut down some of the social projects developed and run by the CHP-led municipalities.
Among these projects are the social assistance programs which have provided aid to some 11.2 million citizens, low-cost municipal kitchens and free daycare centers. The CHP-led municipalities have also invested in transforming forlorn structures for public use, including turning a landfill in Luleburgaz into a green space and restoring multiple historical buildings as museums or public spaces. In November 2024, the ruling government attempted to shut down daycare centers, arguing that these centers should be operated by the ministry of education.
According to one recent survey, the CHP is gaining momentum against the AKP. The opposition had already called for an early presidential election in 2024. Some analysts reason it may happen before the end of 2025, while others say this scenario is unrealistic. Normally, the next round of presidential elections is scheduled for 2028. President Erdoğan has recently confirmed his interest in running again, even though that would require changing the constitution because the president’s current term should be his last as per the country’s constitution. Another option is an early election.
Some Turkey experts predict a far gloomier scenario. According to director of the Turkey program at the Middle East Institute, Gönül Tol, “Down the line, it may look like Russia, where only the opponents who are approved by the regime will be running in elections. Down the line, we're looking at that.”
]]>The fall of the Assad regime ignited a wave of destruction against its symbols, from statues in Tartus to Hafez al-Assad's tomb in Qardaha
Originally published on Global Voices
A visual memory Hafez Assad no more in Syria. Image by Rami Alhames, made on Canva Pro.
Residents of the town of Deir Atiyah, 88 kilometres north of the capital Damascus, toppled the statue of former President Hafez al-Assad, located on one of the town's hills. It is the largest of many statues of Hafez al-Assad erected in Syria by the regime over five decades.
On the morning of December 8, 2024, with the fall of the Assad regime and the escape of deposed president Bashar al-Assad to Russia, videos spread on social media showing residents of the town located in the Qalamoun Mountains heading to the “statue hill” as it is known, in order to topple the statue using heavy machinery.
Why Deir Atiya?
At the heart of Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power was Mohamed Deeb Daboul (known as Abu Saleem), a close confidant and office secretary of the late Syrian president since the late 1960s.
Daboul was born in the city of Deir Atiyah in 1935, before becoming director of Hafez al-Assad's office, when the latter briefly assumed the position of prime minister and minister of defence after the success of his coup against President Noureddine al-Atassi in November 1970.
Daboul’s influence within the Ba’ath Party and the Syrian government cannot be overstated. As one of Assad’s earliest and most trusted aides, he played a pivotal role in consolidating the president’s authority during a period of intense political volatility.
Behind the scenes, Daboul orchestrated key decisions that safeguarded the regime against both internal and external threats. When Bashar Assad succeeded his father, Daboul continued to serve as a crucial figure within the administration. Drawing on his vast experience, he helped guide the younger Assad through the complexities of governance and international relations.
Abu Saleem Daboul’s death in 2021 marked the end of an era for Syria’s political elite. To some, he was a patriot who ensured stability in a turbulent region; to others, he symbolized the authoritarianism that suppressed dissent and stifled progress. It is noteworthy that his son, Salim Daboul is one of the businessmen included in the Caesar Act sanctions.
Symbols of the regime falling
Since December 8, 2024, many videos have been posted on social media showing the destruction of several symbols of the old regime, aside from the biggest statue in Syria. Within the first two weeks, Hazfez al-Assad's tomb was also burned in his hometown Qardaha, while more of his statues were taken down in Tartus, a coastal city with an Alawite majority, in Jaramana, a suburb of Damascus, on the local square in Hama, and by Damascus university students in the Syrian capital, who toppled the statue of the late Syrian president, before standing on it and dragging it through the streets of the city.
The weapons of dictatorships
Statue of Hafez Assad in Aleppo, Krokodyl, CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Dictators and authoritarian regimes frequently erect numerous statues and monuments as instruments of propaganda to project power, establish legitimacy, and reinforce their dominance over society.
According to Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, modern dictators survive by cooptation, censorship, propaganda, and repression, therefore, these statues serve as constant reminders of the leader's authority, embedding their presence into the daily lives of citizens and fostering a cult of personality.
]]>According to the exit poll, he had 87.6 percent, and according to the Central Election Commission, 86.8 percent of the vote.
Originally published on Global Voices
The two dictators, Lukashenka and Putin, go way back. Alyaksandr Lukashenka with Vladimir Putin during a news conference in 2002. Image by Presidential Press and Information Office, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY 4.0.
Alyaksandr Lukashenka “won” the recent elections in Belarus with 86.82 percent of the vote, the Central Election Commission reported on January 27, 2025. The turnout, as stated, exceeded 85.7 percent.
This is Lukashenka's seventh term; he has ruled Belarus for more than 30 years. In the neighboring European Union, however, he is not recognized as a legitimate president.
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos issued a statement about elections in Belarus:
Today’s sham election in Belarus has been neither free, nor fair. The people of Belarus deserve a real say in who governs their country. The relentless and unprecedented repression of human rights, restrictions to political participation and access to independent media in Belarus, have deprived the electoral process of any legitimacy.
As an independent Belarusian media Zerkalo writes, according to political science experts, the most noticeable “adjustment” in the election results done by the Central Election Commission in Belarus this year, was reducing Lukashenka's results. According to the exit poll, he had 87.6 percent, and according to the Central Election Commission, 86.8 percent of the vote.
Experts, according to opposition media outlet Belsat, which works from Poland, have stated that the politician did not dare to “beat” the result of Vladimir Putin, who, according to the Central Election Commission there, received 87.28 percent of the votes in the elections last year, which also became a record in Russia.
[Alexander] Lukashenko’s record result is compensation for the psychological trauma of 2020, when, according to an unofficial alternative count, he was surpassed thanks to a powerful protest vote by then housewife Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.
This is how political observer of the Pozirk agency Alexander Klaskovsky commented on the result of the “elections.”
“He still did not dare to surpass his ‘big brother’, but came close to his result: Vladimir Putin, according to the official version, gained 87.28% in last year’s elections,” notes Klaskovsky.
In Belarus, there were no organized protests during the so-called elections due to severe selective repressions that the government has been conducting, especially after the protests during elections 2020. However, there were several small scale protest actions abroad.
The security forces of Belarus allegedly identified 365 participants in protests abroad during the elections on January 26, the Investigative Committee of Belarus claims. People are being threatened with the confiscation of their property and that of their relatives.
“Despite the increased secrecy measures, 365 people who took part in gatherings in different cities have been identified out of the total number of participants (581 people). Among them: Wroclaw – 11, Warsaw – 203, Bialystok – 18, Vilnius – 29, New York – 39, Prague – 11 and others,” says Sergei Kabakovich, head of the information and public relations department of the central office of the Investigative Committee of Belarus.
Those who are noticed by the security forces are promised criminal cases and property confiscation.
“They are checking whether they have property and real estate on the territory of Belarus, including those registered to other people,” says Kabakovich.
Earlier, Lukashenka threatened those who were going to take part in protests abroad, and noted that their relatives and friends live in Belarus “You will simply set these people up,” he said.
Politically motivated repressions in Belarus continue at a large scale. Human rights center Vyasna counts 1245 political prisoners in the country today.
]]>Small island states rely on the loss and damage funds to assist vulnerable communities
Originally published on Global Voices
“Rise for climate to build a fossil-free world’ action in Port Vila, Vanuatu in September 2018. Photo from Flickr account of 350.org. CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
Several Pacific leaders and institutions have expressed concern over the withdrawal of the United States of America from the Paris Agreement and what it means for the future of global climate action.
US President Donald Trump signed the order after his inauguration, which would stop the US government’s contribution to the loss and damage funds under the agreement signed in 2015. As of 2024, the US covered about 22 percent of the budget for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC ) for 2024–2025, totaling about USD 7.5 million.
Trump also withdrew the US from the climate treaty during his first term in 2017, but his successor reversed this decision in 2021. The landmark Paris Agreement binds 196 nations to work together toward bringing the global temperature down to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
According to the October 2024 report from the United Nations Environmental Programme, global greenhouse gas emissions continued to increase in 2023, with wealthy countries like the US producing around 77 percent of all emissions. In comparison, Pacific island nations account for just 0.02 percent of global emissions.
Despite this gap, Pacific nations are more prone to the harsh impacts of climate change, such as severe cyclones, rising sea levels, land degradation, and more. These disasters have displaced communities, destroyed livelihoods, undermined local economies, and created significant social strife in many countries.
Asked during a panel at the World Economic Forum annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, about Trump’s executive order, Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape reminded the US to consider its “moral responsibility”:
While it is not my place to advise the government of America, it is prudent that the biggest holder of carbon footprint takes the greater responsibility (because) much of the burden is being borne by those of us with the least carbon footprint.
There is a moral responsibility by each global leader to think from the global perspective instead of from their own national-interest perspective.
Evidence shows that we are at a tipping point, almost reaching the end of earth’s sustainability level. If this planet sinks, we all sink with it. There is no second Earth.
Vanuatu Attorney General Arnold Loughman called Trump’s action a “troubling precedent” and “bad behavior” that would have grave consequences in the region. He warned that the US government's withdrawal from the agreement would severely affect international climate financing.
These funds are essential for building resilience and supporting adaptation strategies. Losing this support could severely hinder ongoing and future projects aimed at protecting our vulnerable ecosystems and communities.
Vanuatu was among the countries that submitted a petition to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) urging the United Nations body to issue an opinion about the obligation of states to address global warming under international laws and the penalties for the failure to act.
Fiji Prime Minister and former Minister for Climate Change Sitiveni Rabuka said that Pacific nations are now rethinking their climate action plans.
It will force us to rethink our position, some of us have been worrying, thinking about how the West particularly those closer to cooperation partners in the Pacific such as Australia and New Zealand.
We try to comply with the demand for protocols about carbon emission.
We have been with the rest of the world encouraging those that have been extracting or exporting fossil fuel to scale down.
His minister for environment and climate change told the media that the government has already written a letter urging Trump to reconsider his decision.
In a Facebook post, New Zealand’s former Minister for Pacific Peoples, Aupito William Sio, believes that the withdrawal of the US will allow China to expand its influence in multilateral institutions.
…guess who'll step up big time to take their place as a leading force for global multilateral organizations? — it will be China!
…when the great USA withdraws from these global organizations and doesn’t want to pay their fees etc. it just means, China can now go about providing a global leadership role in these organizations without any interference from the USA. If you can’t count on your traditional allies and partners like the USA who else will step up big time in supporting small island states like the Pacific?
In an editorial, Samoa Observer called out Trump for dismissing the devastating impact of climate change.
For Trump, climate change is a hoax, for Pacific nations like Samoa, it is a reality we are living in. Maybe the Los Angeles fires and the hurricanes last year are not enough for one of the world’s richest men to realise that it is not a hoax.
A former Fiji minister posted on X that Pacific residents will continue to fight for a climate-resilient future.
President Trump has today signed an executive order for USA’s withdrawal from the Paris (Climate) Treaty. Our commitment to fighting for a climate resilient future for all Fijians and Pacific Islanders will not be diminished by this.
— Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (@AiyazSKFiji) January 21, 2025
Perhaps Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr. should extend another invitation to Trump to snorkel in the waters of the Pacific and witness the degradation of the ecosystem caused by climate change. In December 2024, Surangel Whipps Jr told the media about his proposal to invite Trump to the next meeting of Pacific leaders.
I would very much like to bring [Trump] to Palau if he can. That would be a fantastic opportunity to take him snorkelling and see the impacts. See the islands that are disappearing because of sea level rise, see the taro swamps that are being invaded.
The decision is also causing waves in the US, where several politicians and environmental advocates are pushing back on Trump's decision. US Billionaire Michael Bloomberg has also announced he will step in to personally fund the Paris Climate Agreement, matching the amount the US has withdrawn.
]]>‘A coat of arms is a story stitched from emblems. […] A clumsily edited story, it is shaping up to be!’
Originally published on Global Voices
Image of a tenor steelpan via Canva Pro. The proposed update to Trinidad and Tobago's coat of arms includes the representation of a tenor pan to replace Columbus's three ships.
After much public discussion about the role of statuary, iconography and other visible aspects of the Caribbean's shared colonial past — the presence of which, to many, continues to whitewash the accuracy of the historical narrative — Trinidad and Tobago's government has decided to make changes to the country's coat of arms.
Those changes involve replacing the images of Christopher Columbus's three ships with one of the steelpan, the country's newly minted national instrument. Designed in 1962, the year of Trinidad and Tobago's independence from Britain, by a committee that included respected artist Carlyle Chang and Carnival designer George Bailey, the national emblem was meant to incorporate colonial and Indigenous elements of the country's history. At the top — called the crest — is a golden ship's wheel in front of a coconut tree, which had traditionally appeared as the central image on the seals of British Colonial Tobago. The helm, meanwhile — a gold helmet representing the then queen — crowns off the shield on which the three ships in question appear.
On January 13, through the National Emblems of Trinidad and Tobago (Regulation) (Amendment) Bill, 2025, there was parliamentary approval for the proposed modification, giving legal effect for the change. However, while stakeholders from Pan Trinbago were hailing the move as “a defining moment for our nation,” once the new design was released, local artists, writers, and graphic designers began to weigh in.
First off the blocks was illustrator Raj Ra, who was “flabbergasted” at the fact that “the artist who did this used digital tools on a traditional piece.” He pointed out that the techniques used on the original coat of arms included hatching, pencil shading and highlighting but “no soft blending of the brush.”
“Because they are two different mediums,” he continued, “the steelpan kind of pushes itself forward and it kinds of feels like you're not watching one piece.” For the updated design to have worked, he suggested, the techniques used in the original needed to be replicated. “And,” he quipped at the end of his video, “don't get me started on the pan sticks.”
On her blog, graphic designer Ayrid Chandler put in her “two cents” worth. She began by clarifying the prevailing narrative of how the coat of arms came to be designed in the first place: “When Trinidad and Tobago gained independence in 1962, Carlisle Chang was ‘hired’ to draw/design our coat of arms. This is a British tradition as we were under the British rule at the time. His sketch was then sent to London to be properly illustrated by a heraldic artist in the style of all other coat[s] of arms. He was not paid for this job and it was done by him alone within a short period of time, although it was meant to be the work of an independence committee. This is what we’ve used for the past 60+ years to represent our government and ministries and our country.”
She also questioned the process surrounding the redesign. The artist charged with the redesign was local jeweller Gillian Bishop — “and [two] months later,” Chandler said, “we are presented with what is meant to be our new coat of arms. […] To say I’m disappointed is an understatement. […] I also have an issue with our country not understanding the importance of our identity and not going about the process the right way. Our national identity isn’t something that should be rushed. And it’s definitely not as simple as removing some ships and adding a newly appointed national instrument.”
Citing the coats of arms of countries like Haiti and Mexico, which “do a great job of reflecting the identity of their country and their post colonial selves,” Chandler posited that if the intent of the change, as stated by Prime Minister Keith Rowley, was to remove “the colonial vestiges embedded in our constitution,” then “a lot of additional elements need addressing.”
Meanwhile, Minister of Tourism, Culture and the Arts Randall Mitchell repudiated criticism of the updated coat of arms, defending Bishop's “artistic expression” and saying, “The majority of people are in favour of it.” To this, graphic designer Marlon Darbeau posted on his Instagram account:
View this post on Instagram
“A Coat of Arms,” Darbeau clarified, “is not a piece of ‘Art’ subject to individual taste and therefore does not merely exist for pleasure or entertainment. It is the identity of a nation — a symbol meant to distinguish us, encapsulate our values, and reflect our aspirations… Together we aspire, together we achieve. […] This process is not about whether people ‘like it’; it's about defining who we are and clearly expressing those values through the Coat of Arms, as well as all related communication materials with the steelpan as a key element in the broader narrative.”
He added that the process should also have involved “conducting research, which would have included gathering insights from stakeholder interviews and auditing the global Coat of Arms’ visual landscape,” and testing the design.
Meanwhile, writer Kevin Jared Hosein offered his own point of view: “A coat of arms is a story stitched from emblems. The ships are part of this particular one's story. The ships, the hills, it is why this island is called Trinidad. But I'm not here to debate erasure of history […] Focus on story, and you would see how this would've benefited from a full top-down redesign to incorporate the pan motif. Why even stop at the pan then, with the colonial helmet still sitting so ostentatiously? Just a thought – imagine this same helmet and mantle crushed at the feet of our national birds, plumage and all. Without the ships, what is the purpose of the wheel, the hills, the waves on the channel? A clumsily edited story, it is shaping up to be!”
The aesthetic of the revised coat of arms also failed to impress Hosein, and as for the goal of removing the vestiges of colonialism, he argued, “It is not. It is a halfway dream, suspended between intention and inaction. No, this was never about colonial vestiges. Will the coat of arms become like a tree at the top of a politically charged nature hike? Before you leave, take out your knife and etch onto it, _______ WAS HERE. Then below it, _______ WAS HERE TOO. And on, and on. It remains true, for many nations, that a coat of arms is as much a burden as it is a boast.”
In support of this point, Hosein turned the discussion back to the original artist, Carlisle Chang, and his destroyed masterpiece: “Today, in Piarco Airport's arrivals hall stands a replica of a fascinating mural, The Inherent Nobility of Man. You'd know it by the indigenous winged man. Carlisle Chang did the original. Chang also co-designed the coat of arms. Both tell a story; colonial, anti-colonial, almost like two sides of a coin. The original mural was put up in 1962. In 1976, the Government allowed it to be destroyed. In interviews, Chang seems too morose to elaborate.[…]
“Of course, we don't know the jeweller's brief (as a professional, she would know how to decline a job), and this was not her only submission, she claims. In fact, no one yet knows who approved this iteration, not even she. This is the fault of many. All themselves captains in the distant haze. The jeweller has now proclaimed that she does not care about the public she was designing for. She will one day die. The anonymous person or committee in the Office of the Prime Minister who selected this version will one day die. […] The President that facilitates its assent will one day die. The rest of us might very well be stuck with this for decades.”
Contemporary artist Christopher Cozier posted visual examples — the latest iteration of the coat of arms among them — of “the acts of vandalism prosecuted on our behalf over and over,” while Facebook user Ismail Barton summed up the whole debacle this way: “Supposedly, the drive behind it was to push forward decolonisation. That's a necessary and good thing. However, the way they went about it doesn't feel like decolonisation. A design made by one person, hand-picked by the PM's inner circle, and thrust upon the rest of us with no take-backs doesn't feel very liberating. What could have been a beautiful moment in our history has instead become yet another reminder that while our colonial ‘masters’ may have gone, their system of subjugation remains very much intact.”
]]>Experts are concerned that underneath the guise of reforms lie politically motivated intentions
Originally published on Global Voices
Students marching against the foreign agents law in May 2024. Photo: Mariam Nikuradze/OC Media, used with permission
This article was first published on OC Media on January 21, 2025. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement.
In its latest move to curb freedom of expression and assembly, the ruling Georgian Dream party has vowed to reform universities’ four-year undergraduate studies programs. The reforms announced at a government meeting on January 20, 2025, by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, will be led by a special government commission. Commentators, however, are concerned that underneath the guise of reforms are politically motivated intentions and that the ruling government is more keen on forcing Georgian universities to be under its control. The country has been marred by months-long pro-European and anti-government protests in which, in addition to thousands of protesters, universities have also taken an active role.
Since November 2024, when the government announced its decision to suspend the country's EU accession process, students have joined the street protests and have organized actions on campuses across the country. Previously, universities, students, and academics were actively involved in protests against the controversial foreign agents law. Some professors have expressed dissent in various forms, including open letters addressed to the government to change course. As such, the government has accused the academics, as well as the students, of being linked to the former government under the Unity-National Movement party, which is reviled by Georgian Dream.
One of the educational establishments targeted is Tbilisi State University (TSU), but the university has had both camps: those in favor of the government and those who have been vocal in their criticism of the state. In May 2024, during protests against the foreign agents law, Prime Minister Kobakhidze said on the public broadcaster that a large number of TSU professors were “selected based on political affiliation and lack sufficient qualifications.” He also mentioned the need for a “qualitative transformation” of the system and promised that one of the main priorities after the 2024 elections would be education reform.
In 2023, Kobakhidze accused some members of the TSU management of appointing academic staff favored by the Georgian Dream's predecessor, the UNM government. The prime minister also said that he, himself, was expelled from TSU in 2010 for criticizing the constitutional amendments at the time. This, according to Kobakhidze, was a political decision.
Another university targeted was the Ilia State University (ISU), known as one of the progressive universities in Georgia. In May 2024, it was among the very few that sided with the students and refused to sign a statement issued by 38 universities in response to a strike initiated by students from across 30 universities in protest against the foreign agent law. The ISU was reprimanded. Consequently, in October 2024, Georgia’s education ministry withheld full accreditation from the ISU, granting it only conditional authorisation with a final decision to be made after a year-long monitoring.
Controversially, Kobakhidze went as far as to suggest to students that rather than taking to the streets, they should get on the “right track,” calling on male students to “take wives” and for female students to “get married and reproduce.”
Beyond proposed university reforms
Universities are the latest targets of the ruling Georgian Dream. Earlier in January, Georgia’s interior ministry ordered the expulsion of 25 foreign nationals who had allegedly participated in anti-government protests in November and December 2024. Also in January, the Research Center of the Georgian Parliament was shut down after several employees signed a public statement against the government's withdrawal from the EU accession process.
Since the last week of December 2024, many more public servants have been dismissed, according to reporting by Civil.ge. The dismissed employees had all participated in protests in support of Georgia’s European integration, criticized the ruling party's decision to abandon the country’s EU path and the police violence against citizens. Speaking of the mass dismissals, Kobakhidze alluded to the purges as a “self-cleanse.”
When scores of workers walked out on a national strike day, they were subject to physical attacks by “titushki,” a group of often-masked men assumed to be working for the government. Since the protests began, titushki have frequently attacked protesters, government critics, and journalists.
While the crimes committed by titushki have gone unnoticed, protesters detained during the ongoing protests have been tried or are currently on trial in local courts, facing lengthy jail times and administrative detentions.
Journalists have not been spared. On January 12, the founder and director of the independent newspaper Batumelebi and the online outlet Netgazeti Mzia Amaghlobeli, was remanded in custody for allegedly assaulting a police officer. But the crackdown on independent media has been going on for a while as documented in this piece by seasoned journalist and co-founder of OC Media, Mariam Nikuradze. This includes a new code of conduct for journalists and halting journalists’ parliamentary accreditation. “If we survive the foreign agent law, as long as Georgian Dream stays in power, we will not have an easy ride: other laws to silence media are sure to follow,” wrote Nikuradze.
“The scale of the crackdown on the media since November 28, following the ruling Georgian Dream party’s decision to halt Georgia’s negotiation talks with the EU, has been unprecedented,” read a joint letter, signed in December 2024 by a group of international media freedom and rights watch groups. The letter highlighted the cases of more than 90 media workers who were subject to physical attacks, verbal abuse and other forms of police violence while covering the pro-EU demonstrations.
This brutal crackdown on the media in Georgia is not an isolated incident but part of a rapid deterioration of press freedom and of targeted violence and impunity for crimes against journalists. Despite repeated appeals to the Special Investigation Service, crimes against journalists remain largely uninvestigated, perpetuating a culture of impunity.
Civil.ge has been keeping an up-to-date “Chronicle of Repression” documenting cases of arrests, detentions, violence and more.
On January 22, the European parliament discussed Georgia’s deteriorating political situation — one the latest examples of international concern over the situation in the country. The discussion was opened by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner. In addition to calling on the government to change course and engage in a constructive dialogue with all domestic stakeholders, Brunner repeated the European Union's position, which is in agreement with Georgia's civil society.
On January 16, leading members of the European Parliament issued a statement expressing concern and condemning ongoing violence. The statement came shortly after former prime minister Giorgi Gakharia and the leader of the opposition political party For Georgia were physically attacked. “This is yet another example of the escalating violence orchestrated by the Georgian Dream and its allies against peaceful protesters and dissidents,” read the statement.
On December 27, 2024 the US State Department sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder of Georgian Dream, “for undermining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia.” UK Member of Parliament James MacCleary hopes the UK parliament will follow suit. He introduced an Early Day Motion (EDM) calling for potential sanctions on Ivanishvili on January 14, 2025.
The same day, the European People’s Party's (EPP) political council, in an emergency resolution called on all the members of the EPP to “refrain from recognizing the self-proclaimed regime of the Georgian Dream as a legitimate government of Georgia; cease invitations for all official visits and participation of Georgian Dream officials in international fora; not recognize Georgian Dream credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) so as to not render legitimacy.”
]]>Saydnaya Prison is a place of unimaginable suffering, yet the stories of survival and resilience are as powerful as the horrors within its walls
Originally published on Global Voices
‘Woman searching through cells at Sednaya Prison.’ The prison has been opened to the public. Photo: Telegram via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Saydnaya Prison, a notorious detention facility located just outside of Damascus, Syria, has become a symbol of human rights abuses and the horrors of Syria's ongoing civil war. For years, it has been a place where thousands of Syrians, from political dissidents to ordinary civilians, have faced unimaginable torture, inhumane treatment, and death. Prisoners who survived often tell stories of resilience and survival, each uniquely painful, each equally compelling. Here are four such stories that shed light on the terrifying realities of life within the walls of Saydnaya.
The blind sniper
One of the strangest stories to emerge from Saydnaya Prison is that of the blind sniper: a civilian swept into the prison system due to tenuous connections with an anti-regime group.
In an interview with Al-Marsad Newspaper, a former Syrian prisoner recounted the tale of a blind man detained in Saydnaya Prison, on charges of being “a sniper for the opposition.”
“We were in prison, and suddenly they opened the door and brought in a blind man,” the former prisoner recalls in the interview. “We spoke to him and asked if he had been taken to the judge. He told us, ‘When I went before the judge, he asked me when I had lost my sight. I told him I was born blind. The judge replied: “It’s written in your charge that you’re a sniper. I can’t do anything for you. Go with God.”’”
The blind prisoner, originally from Aleppo, endured severe suffering during his time in Saydnaya. According to the former detainee, many prisoners from Aleppo who were incarcerated between 2016 and 2017 faced extreme hardships, with most dying in the notorious prison.
Below is the interview video posted on X by the user @hamza7674522671
— حمزة (@hamza7674522671) December 14, 2024
The salt rooms
One of the most grotesque practices at Saydnaya was the use of “salt rooms” — halls for storing corpses that the regime began using during the years of conflict after 2011, with the increasing number of deaths inside the prison. Some of the testimonies of former detainees were published by Agence France-Presse in 2022. The Association of Detainees and the Missing in Saydnaya Prison says that the prison administration resorted to the salt rooms because there are not enough refrigerators to store the bodies of detainees who die there almost daily from torture.
Here is a video by TRT World about the salt rooms in Saydnaya prison.
Prisoners who were not executed but merely left in these rooms often had to bear witness in silence as the remains of their fellow detainees deteriorated. The practice was aimed not only at preserving the bodies but also at crushing the souls of the living, ensuring they understood the fate awaiting them.
In additional research and interviews with former inmates, AFP found that at least two such salt rooms were created inside Saydnaya.
For one man, this experience became a constant reminder of the cruelty of the regime. He would recount how he and other prisoners would stare at the preserved bodies, knowing that at any moment, they could be the next to be mummified in the salt. It was a horrific form of psychological warfare — the salt rooms were not just a way of preserving bodies; they were a manifestation of the regime's utter disregard for human life.
Mazen Hamada: The forgotten activist
Mazen al-Hamada’s story is one of sacrifice and activism in the face of brutal oppression. A former student and an outspoken critic of the regime, Mazen became one of the many Syrians detained under suspicion of being a dissenter. His story, however, is one that exemplifies the many ways the Syrian government sought to crush any opposition.
The 46-year-old activist from Deir ez-Zor was imprisoned and tortured for more than a year and a half for participating in anti-government protests. After being exiled from Syria, he became an asylum seeker in the Netherlands, where he publicly testified to the abuse he suffered. In 2020, Hamada became the victim of enforced disappearance when he was arrested by Syrian intelligence at the airport upon his return to Syria.
A video from TRT World about the case of Mazen Al Hamada as part of a series of videos titled “Horrors of Syrian Prisons.
Yet despite the torture, the beatings, and the fear of execution, Mazen’s spirit remained unbroken. His resilience became a symbol of the Syrian people’s collective will to resist oppression. He even wrote secret notes of encouragement, passed along by other prisoners, reminding them that their cause was just and that they must survive to one day fight again.
His body was found in Saydnaya Prison on December 8, 2024, during the fall of the Assad regime. His funeral, held on December 12, was attended by thousands of Syrians; he has since been hailed as a martyr and a symbol of the Syrian opposition.
‘I lost my kidney’
One of the more surreal stories of Saydnaya is that of a Christian official who was arrested after being accused of dissent. His story was published by Lebanese Aljadeed TV.
In the interview, George Elias Nader, a reserve officer, explains how he was imprisoned after refusing to follow orders to fire on peaceful demonstrators, including children in Hama. He explains that he could not bring himself to harm innocent civilians, particularly children, which led to accusations of treason and anti-government sympathies. Arrested and taken to a military branch, George endured a year of relentless torture and neglect, both physically and mentally. He describes being beaten, having his teeth pulled, and living in an environment where prisoners were treated as expendable tools. Despite his suffering, he was given no explanation for his imprisonment or the brutal treatment he faced.
During his captivity, George was subjected to deceptive medical procedures. A doctor claimed he needed a health check, and after being taken to a facility, he was injected with an unknown substance. When he regained consciousness, he realized he had undergone surgery and discovered that one of his kidneys had been removed without his consent. The aftermath of the operation left him in immense pain and further compounded the physical and emotional toll of his imprisonment. He notes that in the eyes of the regime, prisoners like him—regardless of faith or identity—were seen as less than human, mere victims of a brutal system.
Here is an interview of George Elias Nader by Al Jadeed News.
Saydnaya Prison is a place of unimaginable suffering, where countless individuals have endured torture, humiliation, and death. Yet, the stories of survival and resilience are just as powerful as the horrors that occurred within its walls. Each of these individuals, among other untold stories, represents the unbreakable will of those who refused to be silenced by the regime. Their stories are the stories of Syria’s struggle for freedom and justice.
]]>Of the four children hit by a police vehicle, only one has so far survived but remains in critical condition
Originally published on Global Voices
In Azerbaijan's administrative district of Imishli (İmişli), scores of residents have been detained, internet speed throttled, and, according to reports by local media, all entry and exit points to the town are under heavy control by internal troops dispatched to the area. This followed a protest in reaction to an accident reported on January 18, in which four schoolchildren were struck by a police car following a collision with a civilian car.
At the time of writing this story, three of the children — schoolgirls Zumrud Miraliyeva, Mahbuba Alizada and Ayan Mammadova — have died. In footage shared by the local media, scores of residents surrounded the police car, dismantling it. They then marched to the local police department. The ministry of the interior issued arrest warrants on hooliganism charges. The ministry also released a video of the accident, which significantly slowed down the speed of the police car. A criminal investigation was opened against the driver of the civilian car, but so far, no measures have been taken against the officer behind the wheel of the police car. These actions were criticized by the opposition activists and the public.
“I have lost my sunshine. Everyone was always so pleased with my Ayan. She was loved by her teachers, she was an excellent student,” said Taleh Mammadov, the father of 11-year-old Ayan Mammadova, who died immediately as a result of the fatal accident. He was talking to Abzas Media in a video interview. The child's injuries were so severe that the relative who went to the morgue could hardly recognize her. Out of the four children hit, only one has thus far survived, but he remains in critical condition.
Mammadov also told Abzas Media that the internet and mobile communication were down, leaving residents unable to access the internet, make phone calls, or send text messages. He said the police car was speeding on the road where the accident happened and demanded that perpetrators be found and punished, even though nothing could replace his daughter's loss.
Some people compared the protests with previous regional actions, such as the most recent one in the village of Soyudlu in 2023, in Ganja in 2018, and Ismayilli in 2013, to name a few. What all of these protests had in common was residents’ frustrations with the arbitrariness of local authorities and their policies. They were also violently suppressed, with scores of residents facing arrests and detentions.
Arrests and detentions
In Imishli, some 100 residents have reportedly faced arrests. While many have been released, at least 14 people are facing criminal charges of hooliganism and have been sent into a three-month pretrial detention. Several others received administrative detentions, reported Meydan TV. Separately, the police arrested the 17-year-old driver of the civilian car and have charged him on several counts, including driving without a license, violating traffic rules, causing the death of now-three children, and fleeing the accident scene. “The entrance and exit to the city are under police control,” said one resident who spoke to OC Media on condition of anonymity, adding that the number of dispatched police officers outnumbered the local residents.
Speaking about arrests of local residents, the leader of the opposition Popular Front Party, Ali Karimli, said that by arresting these men, the state was threatening its own people. “They have really divided the people into their people and the rest. They are openly telling the people that if they dare to hit even a dismantled car that belongs to the state, it constitutes a heavier crime than our school-children getting killed,” wrote Karimli on Facebook.
Another member of the Popular Front Party, Seymur Hezi, told Meydan TV there was nothing surprising in the way residents responded to the news of the accident. “In a country where people have no trust in the justice system, their anger is this high,” Hezi told the outlet.
Nasimi Mammadli, a political commentator, shared Hezi's views, adding in an interview with Turan News Agency, “Citizens understand that the majority of the problems they face are due to poor governance. In the districts, there is administrative arbitrariness, lawlessness, unemployment, poverty, social inequality, and a deep chasm between the authorities and the general population.”
In an interview with local media, the mother of one of the children who was killed called on all responsible government institutions to release all those who have been detained so that “my baby can rest in peace.”
Internet throttling
Residents first noticed internet throttling following the accident. It is unclear whether access has been fully restored at the time of writing this article. Among those detained, however, were the residents and members of political opposition parties who shared information about the developments via social media problems.
Qulu Mammadli, a member of the local branch of the opposition Popular Front Party, was summoned by the authorities on January 19. In an interview with OC Media, Mammadli said that after posting about the internal troops entering the town in the afternoon, he was forced to go in for questioning, and he was also forced to remove the video footage he shared on Facebook earlier that day. Other party members, including Sarvan Ahmadov, were also briefly detained, questioned and forced to remove social media posts, according to reporting by Meydan TV.
A member of the opposition Musavat party, Alikram Khurshidov, was handed a 10-day administrative detention over his social media posts about the accident.
Residents who were involved in dismantling the police car and yelled “resign” slogans were treated worse, reported local service for Radio Liberty. Residents who spoke to Azadliq Radio said several were hospitalized as a result of sustained injuries at the police station. While there has been no official comment on the allegations of torture and ill-treatment by the police, previously documented cases of torture leave little room to doubt the residents’ accounts.
The government of Azerbaijan has throttled internet access before and has deployed an arsenal of surveillance technology to keep tabs on its citizens. An annual report on internet freedoms by Freedom House ranked the country “not free” in its most recent country report.
Some officials accused the opposition of politicizing the accident. In an interview with pravda.az, member of the parliament Siyavush Novruzov said, “It was in the character of the radical opposition to politicize the road accident in Imishli.” Another member of the parliament, Elman Nasirov, defended Azerbaijani police saying in an interview with pravda.az: “I address all those anti-Azerbaijani elements. Never forget, Azerbaijani police always fulfilled its obligations with honor, and served to protect the territorial integrity and the country's security.”
As for the police officer who was in the car at the time of the accident, no measures have been publicly announced, and the ministry of the interior has not shared any information about the identity of the officer.
]]>The junta suffered huge military losses in 2024. Will the trend continue this year?
Originally published on Global Voices
Chin Brotherhood troops after seizing Matupi in Myanmar. Photo by Chin Brotherhood. Source: The Irrawaddy, content partner of Global Voices
This article was originally published on January 7, 2025, on The Irrawaddy, an independent news website in Myanmar that has been exiled in Thailand since the military coup in 2021. An edited version is republished on Global Voices as part of a content-sharing agreement.
There will be a change in 2025. This is what analysts are reporting from Myanmar citizens both inside and outside the war-torn country, which has been in a state of turmoil since the military seized power in a coup in February 2021. Will a new federal democratic nation or a failed, disintegrated, and fractured Myanmar emerge from the conflict?
Indeed, it is difficult to gauge where the country is headed in 2025 other than to expect that it will slide further into darkness and economic hardship with the spread of armed conflict to central Myanmar.
So, what changes will come? Political analysts say that major political events could take place. Here are events on the horizon in 2025 that may influence the fate of the nation.
Election
Will this year bring an election? Or political negotiations? Or bloodshed? Activists and watermelons (junta soldiers spying for the pro-democracy movement) inside the armed forces say they are determined to see the removal of regime leader Min Aung Hlaing. If this is the case, who will do so? The ethnic armed opposition is striving to end the military dictatorship. Powerful ethnic armies and insurgent groups are maneuvering to advance their agendas and have so far achieved many military victories as well as territorial gains.
Will we see the fall of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, before Armed Forces Day on March 27? Victorious ethnic leaders announcing autonomous regions in Rakhine, Chin, and Kachin?
If so, we might see the implosion of the military and the fall of the State Administration Council (SAC). What about the release of detained government leaders, including detained former President Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now 80? If not, might we see her secret burial in an unknown place? Or, more optimistically, will we see the convening of a major political convention to draw up a road map ahead of an election? Then what about the intervention of neighbours, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led “peacekeeping forces” endorsed by China?
The junta has vowed to hold the election according to an arbitrary timeline, and China said it would back the vote. Many in the opposition have dismissed the election, and critics doubt it can be held under current circumstances. The opposition has rejected the election since it won’t be free, fair, or inclusive, serving merely to extend military rule. Acting as a counterpoint to this are the opposition forces, including the National Unity Government (NUG), seeking to demonstrate that they are united and offer a credible alternative to the regime. Instead of seeking recognition, the NUG should continue to build support among ethnic alliances and demonstrate that it is a viable alternative to the junta.
Military junta losing ground
In 2024, Myanmar military forces witnessed significant losses despite pessimistic analyses from experts on Myanmar. The military’s Northeast Command in Shan State, adjacent to China, and its Western Command in Rakhine State, bordering Bangladesh, were captured by resistance forces, with senior military officers and thousands of soldiers either killed or surrendering, along with substantial quantities of ammunition, weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, and tanks.
The military’s Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs), once feared and admired when they served under former dictator General Ne Win against ethnic insurgents and Burmese communists, faced humiliating defeats in the last two years in Shan, Kachin, Kayah, and Rakhine states.
Thus, the regime has relied heavily on its air force. Now, the regime is deeply dependent on China to halt the offensive and to contain the war and ethnic armed organizations based along the China-Myanmar border.
In any case, the good news is the military is in a state of decline; it is weak and shrinking. The military has seen a wave of desertions, defeats, low morale, and loss of dignity. With rising resentment in the ranks, opposition figures speculate regime leaders could face assassination or overthrow.
It is important to note that most of the Burman population has shown no sign of regret or sorrow over the losses and major defeats experienced by Myanmar’s armed forces, which they once respected. Rather, they are experiencing schadenfreude — something unprecedented in the modern history of Myanmar’s armed forces. The opposition, whether Burman or ethnic armed groups fighting the regime, enjoy public support. Indeed, this is a watershed moment for the Myanmar military.
Myanmar’s economic outlook remains bleak. According to the World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor, Myanmar’s GDP is expected to contract by one percent in the fiscal year ending March 2025, a downward revision from the previous projection of modest growth. Due to the coup and forced conscription, Myanmar also suffered from brain drain as many young people sought to leave the country.
When it comes to natural disasters (or pandemics), Myanmar is ill-prepared for an increasingly worsening climate. It is one of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries, according to reports from the World Bank, United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM), and researchers.
Neighbors’ nightmare
China, India, Bangladesh, and Thailand are getting restless about Myanmar’s deteriorating situation. Thailand and other neighbors are extremely concerned with border security, increasing drug production and transnational cybercrimes, as well as the flow of refugees and growing exile communities. So, aside from the toothless ASEAN, who will intervene in the Myanmar crisis? China? India? Thailand? China, the most influential external actor in Myanmar, has officially backed the election and is keeping its options open as the situation remains volatile and unpredictable.
Unlike the US, China has serious geopolitical strategic interests in Myanmar, particularly around maintaining access to the Indian Ocean. Beijing wants to bring an end to the Myanmar crisis, but on its own terms and in a way that serves these interests.
Some analysts think China wants to see leadership change in the military (but not the collapse of the military) to end the reign of commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing. Perhaps China thinks the election may pave the way for Min Aung Hlaing to depart from politics. Or is he preparing to leave? The generals believe they should be the ones running the country, and thus, they will not depart easily unless they are forced out or find a durable political compromise.
Bangladesh will not see any chance to repatriate Rohingya refugees in 2025. Now, the Myanmar regime is recruiting Rohingya to counter the rising Arakan Army (the AA, an ethno-nationalist group), which controls almost the entire Rakhine State. The United League of Arakan, the political wing of the AA, has expressed a commitment to establishing an autonomous region in Rakhine.
How will Bangladesh respond to the AA’s consolidation of Rakhine State? What about Muslim extremists? Both Myanmar and Bangladesh are fragile states, and Myanmar’s disintegration will only deepen tension and conflict between the two countries.
In any case, at the end of the day, political negotiation will be the key, but the fighting will not end quickly, as Burman opposition and ethnic armies know that their continued military success will give them more political leverage in future negotiations.
Happy ending?
Last but not least, we would like to congratulate the people of Myanmar; they are the heroes who have kept faith and hope alive in this revolution as it prepares to enter its fifth year.
We all are living in depressing times, and we are exhausted, but many in Myanmar hope that the murderous regime will be toppled soon or that some miracle will occur to make them disappear.
However unstable the world, Myanmar citizens deserve attention and applause for their perseverance, resilience and fighting spirit! They refuse to accept the return of military rule and the status quo.
]]>Teachers, students, and parents are at a loss
Originally published on Global Voices
Image celebrating the 30th anniversary of Sapat schools in Kyrgyzstan with the text in Kyrgyz that translates as “Quality education – stable future.” Screenshot from the video “Эл аралык “Сапат” билим берүү мекемесине 30 жыл” from Sapat Official‘s YouTube channel. Fair use.
On December 31, 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy head of the cabinet of ministers, Edil Baisalov, announced the handover of the Sapat educational institutions to the Turkish Maarif Foundation. The handover was a major victory for the Turkish authorities, who have been pressuring the Kyrgyz government to close these schools or surrender them to Turkey's ownership and management since 2016.
This foreign policy was pursued after the failed coup in Turkey, which was blamed on the so-called FETÖ (Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organisation), also known as the Gulen or Hizmet movement, led by now deceased Fethullah Gulen. According to the Turkish government, Sapat schools were funded and led by FETÖ members and posed significant security threats to Turkey and Kyrgyzstan.
Thus, a network of 11 primary and 16 secondary schools spread across the country's seven regions and one university located in the capital, Bishkek, came under new management. This was a shock to everyone associated with the schools, including leadership, teachers, students, and parents, who were informed of the decision only after it had been made.
A step-by-step process
In its immediate reaction published on December 31, Sapat stated that it would appeal the decision in court within the framework of national and international law. However, on January 2, it shared handing over all the educational institutions to Maarif and noted that from that point onwards the new ownership would bear legal responsibility for its work.
Here is a Facebook post with Sapat's initial reaction to the handover, including its intentions to file a case in court and call for school employees to remain calm and carry on the study process without disruptions.
The head scratching aspect of the handover was that it was made during an ongoing court process over the ownership of Sapat schools with the next hearing scheduled on January 21. The Ministry of Education has filed a case requesting the court to remove an undisclosed Kyrgyz national with the initials A.S. from the list of founders, which would make the ministry the sole entity on that list. This would allow the ministry to make decisions over the fate of these schools unilaterally.
Previously, the authorities removed two other founders. One of them, Orhan İnandı, was removed from the list of founders by a court decision after his kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan and jailing in Turkey. The other founder allegedly gave up his founder status voluntarily. In retrospect, it is clear that the last remaining founder was the only thing stopping the ministry from handing the Sapat schools over to Maarif.
Temporary compromise
In 2017, the Turkish government demanded that Kyrgyzstan shut down all the educational institutions owned and managed by Sapat due to its alleged ties with FETÖ. The Kyrgyz government refused, but made the concession of adding the Ministry of Education to the list of founders and promising to insert greater oversight over the organization.
Additionally, as part of the concessions, the authorities rebranded the schools from Sebat to Sapat (the Kyrgyz word for quality) to reflect local ownership and control. Seemingly, a compromise was reached, but it was only for the time being.
In 2018, Turkish Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Cengiz Kamil Fırat raised this issue again by asking that all the Sapat educational institutions in Kyrgyzstan be transferred to Turkey because they were built and maintained over the years by the Turkish taxpayers and government. Fırat stated that Maarif should take over these schools and manage them as Turkey’s official representatives.
These statements were made following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Kyrgyzstan in 2018, in the course of which the two sides agreed to open Maarif schools in Kyrgyzstan as alternatives to Sapat schools. The first and only Maarif school was opened in Bishkek in September 2021.
All these agreements were undermined by the coup that took place in Bishkek in October 2020 that brought in the new political regime, which has proven more amenable to Turkish demands. In June 2021, Orhan İnandı, who served as the long time director of Sapat, was abducted in Bishkek and went missing for several days.
Here is a YouTube video about the abduction of Orhan İnandı.
Later the news emerged that he was arrested by Turkish agents and taken to Turkey, despite having a Kyrgyz passport. Kyrgyzstan’s president Sadyr Japarov blamed the local law enforcement for allowing the kidnapping operation to take place and promised to return İnandı to his family in Kyrgyzstan. However, in 2023, İnandı was sentenced to 21 years in prison on terrorism related charges.
Uncertain future
It is unclear what will become of Sapat schools under the new management. Sapat has operated in Kyrgyzstan since 1992. Its schools are available in every region of the country and offer world-class primary and secondary education in English and local languages. The quality of education is similar across all institutions without a gap between the capital and the periphery, which is rare for Kyrgyzstan.
Over the years its schools have become prestigious and synonymous with academic excellence, discipline, and success based on the results of its students in national and international Olympiads, and the further accomplishments of its alumni. For example, in 2024, 13 of 58 students with the highest scores in university entrance exams were Sapat alumni. In his meeting with the students from Sapat schools, Japarov noted that 90 percent of the students with the highest scores on these exams are Sapat alumni.
Here is a YouTube video about Sapat alumni.
It is yet unclear whether Maarif will manage to uphold the price and quality of education, despite its promises to do so and the ministry’s claim that Maarif will create better conditions for students. Thus far it has been reported that 28 teachers — mainly foreigners who teach science subjects — have left the Sapat schools, and more plan to do so at the end of the academic year in May.
Parents have been complaining that the handover has created a shortage of teachers at the schools and some science classes are being substituted with additional physical education classes. Additionally, a Sapat program called Umut (a Kyrgyz word for hope) that helped students prepare for international Olympiads and university entrance exams was suspended following the handover.
Maarif representatives have promised to attract investments to expand the existing school network, introduce modern educational technologies, and create new opportunities for students. In the short term, it plans to invest USD 2.5 million to upgrade the material and technical base of schools, repair buildings, improve the quality of the educational process, and attract foreign teachers.
It took Sapat over 30 years of continuous excellence to earn nationwide recognition as the best secondary school in Kyrgyzstan. Now it is up to Maarif to uphold and raise that level of excellence, a task the new management will have to prove it can fulfill.
]]>Shortly after the news hit the public, authorities turned to the usual blame game, with a media gag order leaving citizens in the dark.
Originally published on Global Voices
Screenshot taken from the video “Drone video shows fire at a Turkish ski resort hotel | REUTERS” from the scene of the fire, on the Reuters YouTube channel. Fair use.
It was meant to be a vacation for many of those who perished in a fire that broke out at a skiing resort on January 21. It is a two-week school holiday in Turkey, hence there were many families among hotel guests. As of January 24, the death toll had reached 78 people (including entire families and approximately 20 children), while 51 were reportedly injured to varying degrees. It took 36 hours to complete search and rescue operations. In total 12 people have been detained, among them the owner of the hotel, Deputy Mayor of Bolu Sedat Gülener and Acting Fire Department Chief Kenan Coşkun. Shortly after the news hit the public, authorities turned to the usual blame game, with a media gag order, citing it as preventive measure against misinformation, while leaving citizens in the dark.
The 12-story Grand Kartal Hotel is one of the ski resort hotels in the province of Bolu. The wooden building is 26 year old. At the time of the fire 234 people were staying at the hotel. Guests who witnessed the tragedy first hand said they did not hear fire alarms go off or sprinklers turn on when the fire started.
According to the Minister of Culture and Tourism Nuri Ersoy, the hotel had a fire competence certificate issued by the fire department in 2021 and 2024 but the latter was refuted by the Bolu Mayor Tanju Ozcan, who said the fire department had not issued a positive report since 2007.
Kartalkaya, where the fire broke out, falls outside the Bolu municipality jurisdiction. Because of that the licensing of tourist facilities in Kartalkaya is carried out by the Bolu Provincial Special Administration. Businesses with a “tourism operation certificate” are licensed by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. While this explained the back and forth between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Bolu municipality it was a report by journalist Ismayil Saymaz that settled the matter of accountability. Speaking to Halk TV in an interview, Saymaz revealed how Bolu Municipality sent inspectors on December 16, 2024 after receiving a request from the Grand Kartal Hotel dated December 12, 2024. The inspection report indicated seven deficiencies, including unsuitable two emergency exit doors and fire exits, a defective alarm system, insufficient electrical equipment and fire extinguishing equipment, as well as a lack of smoke detectors.
Saymaz also shared a second request sent by the hotel to the municipality requesting the withdrawal of the previous request, which was then approved by the municipality. It is unclear whether municipality informed the Ministry of Culture and Tourism but, following the leak, the deputy mayor and the head of the fire department were detained. Even though, according to a directive regulating tourism facilities, the responsibility to regularly inspect hotels and ensure they meet safety standards lies with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
The consequences
Speaking to the BBC, one of the survivors of the fire, Atakan Yelkovan, said there was no alarm and it was his wife who smelled the smoke. Other survivors confirmed in interviews with the media that they did not hear any alarms going off and felt lucky they were able to escape.
Other survivors said they also did not see any fire escapes. “My husband had to jump down from a ledge because he couldn’t find the fire escape. I’ve stayed at this hotel before, and I’ve never seen a fire escape,” said survivor Eylem Şentürk in an interview with journalists. A member of hotel staff, Neçirvan Öner, corroborated this, telling journalists the fire escape “was not proper” and that “there were no fire extinguishers on the floors.”
Dr. Mustafa Bilge, an expert in fire suppression systems, emphasized in an interview with Global Voices that the hotel lacked critical fire safety measures, which contributed to the tragic loss of lives.
Fire escape doors must be capable of withstanding fire for 90 minutes and should only open from the inside. Moreover, kitchen ventilation hoods must be equipped with specialized fire suppression systems. The building should have been equipped with a fire sprinkler system, smoke detectors, fire exits throughout the premises, and stairwell pressurization systems to facilitate safe evacuation. These systems, which should have been centrally controlled by a fire alarm panel, were absent, leaving occupants vulnerable during the fire.
The regulation on the Fire Protection of Buildings states that buildings that fall under the category of hotels and guesthouses with more than 200 beds and higher than two floors are obligated to install sprinkler systems. The hotel where the fire broke out had a capacity for 350 beds, had 161 rooms, and was 12 floors high. The sprinkler systems for buildings in this and similar categories were made obligatory in 2008. And, according to health and safety regulations, inspections of such equipment must be carried out once a year.
“However, there is a significant gap in defining who is responsible for conducting fire system tests, under what standards these tests should be performed, and how compliance certificates should be issued,” explained Dr. Mustafa Bilge. He also called for urgent regulations aligning with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards. He also recommended establishing dedicated fire department units for testing and inspection, and ensuring fire personnel receive training and certification from local expert organizations such as the Turkish Fire Protection and Education Foundation (TÜYAK), the Mechanical Contractors Association (MTMD), and the Turkish Society of HVAC (heat, ventilation, and air conditioning) and Sanitary Engineers (TTMD).
Other experts who spoke to the media explained that, given the death toll, the likelihood of the hotel having properly functioning warning, detection and extinguishing system was slim. In an interview with the BBC, the head of the Turkish Fire Protection and Education Foundation said “the fire system either did not exist or was not designed in accordance with the standards.”
“It is obvious that adequate fire safety measures were not taken in the facility,” read a statement from the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB).
But all of these observations were already identified in that inspection on December 16, 2024.
According to reporting by Bianet, the hotel is located in a ski resort where three other hotels are located. However, there was no dedicated fire department in the area and the nearest fire station was 28.5 kilometers away. The distance, as well as weather conditions, delayed the response.
In search of accountability
Visiting Bolu on January 23, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promised accountability, but critics of the government say in a country where no government official has taken accountability for any of the tragedies this too will soon be forgotten.
“Each time, there is a tragedy, we witness the same thing over again. No responsible person is found, no punishment is given, nor are we told what will get fixed. This isn't destiny, this is lack of control, incompetence, injustice, and greed,” shared popular Instagram account Turkish Dictionary. In another post on Instagram, the same account demanded “resignation and trial of those responsible and all hotels complete safety review.”
A graphic designer Mahir Akkoyun known as Mahirgra on social media platforms wrote:
The negligence and irresponsibility arising as a result of political decisions have once again shown that human life has no value in this country. In a country where those responsible can never be fully held accountable, this cycle of disaster will continue as long as there is no accountability.
News platform Fayn Studio listed a chronology of tragic events from 2003 until 2025, where lives were lost like the Soma mine killing 301 mine workers, 2016 fire at a girls’ dormitory in Adana killing 14, or the 2018 train accident in Chorlu, killing 25, or the devastating February 2023 earthquake in which over 53 thousand people died as per official data. The chronology was titled “tens of tragedies which could have been avoided, zero resignations.” “Just like after every tragedy we are going to look for those responsible. While those whose real job is to do this will wait for the news agenda to change and the subject be forgotten,” wrote the editorial team in a post shared on their Instagram page.
Turks have been accustomed to tragedies and stories shaking them to the core, just as they are accustomed to seeing no responsibility taken by any of the government officials at any time.
]]>The draft Cyber Security Ordinance 2024 has come under fire due to definitional ambiguity and other concerns
Originally published on Global Voices
Bangladesh flag and parliament building, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Image from Flickr by Gary Todd. Public Domain.
This article by Samaya Anjum and Andras Csontos originally appeared on nonprofit media Tech Policy Press. An edited version is published below with permission.
On December 24, 2025, the Council of Advisors of Bangladesh’s Interim Government approved the draft Cyber Security Ordinance 2024, bringing an anticlimactic end to a highly anticipated reform. The draft ordinance will replace the authoritarian Cyber Security Act 2023 and is currently in the final stages before its promulgation as law by the president. While the final version of the ordinance is as yet unpublished, copies of it have been circulated internally among selective stakeholder groups, and a general sense of discontent is already on the rise.
The proposed ordinance has been criticized for largely mimicking the broad scope and criminal liability regime of its predecessors, the Cyber Security Act (CSA) 2023 and the Digital Security Act (DSA) 2018. Both laws were passed under the recently ousted Awami League (AL) regime and had become central tools for state repression and surveillance for nearly five years. The draft has also come under fire due to the definitional ambiguity surrounding categories of restricted speech, broad police investigatory powers, as well as the authorization of a new government agency (the National Cyber Security Agency) to moderate content under provisions similar to those which enabled the Bangladesh Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (BTRC) to arbitrarily order content restriction and removal in the past.
Nevertheless, members of the interim government claim to have achieved major successes with the Cyber Security Ordinance, one of which is the introduction of a new “right” to uninterrupted internet access as part of the definition of “cyber security.” The “right” was instituted in response to popular demand in the aftermath of the Monsoon Revolution in Bangladesh.
Between July and August of last year, the AL-led government weaponized a series of internet shutdowns to carry out large-scale killings and human rights violations, revealing to the public the significance of internet shutdowns as a threat to a free society. It also exposed how the former regime had systematically centralized control over national digital infrastructure over the last decade to exercise absolute unaccountable power, which enabled it to arbitrarily and extralegally order network shutdowns. Over 34 shutdowns have been documented since 2012, and we are aware of evidence that suggests they were disproportionately ordered by the authorities through phone calls and WhatsApp messages, including in July and August last year, which may have helped conceal responsibility for such orders.
Once promulgated, the new ordinance will confirm whether the interim government is genuinely committed to protecting the people of Bangladesh against future abuses of internet shutdowns. At this stage, however, the “right” to uninterrupted internet access in the draft ordinance appears to have little legal force, nor is it accompanied by an institutional framework that can oversee and ensure respect for democratic accountability in the context of Bangladesh.
What is the proposed ‘right’ and what legal impact could it have?
The new “right” appears only once in the draft ordinance. This is in the definitions section (s. 2), specifically under the definition of the phrase “cyber security,” which stipulates, in part, that for the purposes of the ordinance, cybersecurity “shall … include the right of citizens to access the internet at all times.” However, the definitions section of a law has no independent legal effect. A definition gains legal force only when the term defined is used in a provision that creates a binding legal rule. Importantly, it is the definition as a whole that becomes effective in this way. In the present case, the “right” is combined with all the other (technical) elements listed in the definition to establish the legal meaning of “cyber security.” That meaning is what is then applied in whatever way the use of the term determines.
This conditional legal effect is far too weak to create a proper right in law, which is why definitions sections are almost never used in cases like this. Usually, a substantive provision of a law establishes a right and defines its content and holder, if the idea is to achieve the goal by establishing a duty for the state. The draft ordinance’s definition is, put bluntly, not a real legal right in any meaningful sense of the word.
What is its actual legal impact, then? This hinges entirely on the use of the term “cyber security” elsewhere in the ordinance, and the picture that emerges from those provisions is one of the minor improvements at best, which are far from certain to come about.
The area in which the “right” might make the greatest difference concerns the National Cyber Security Council, a body of ministers, senior civil servants and intelligence officials that the draft ordinance establishes and vests with a broad policy-making role.
Some of the powers of the council include the authority to “determin[e] inter-institutional policies for ensuring cyber security” (s. 13(2)(গ)) and “provid[e] necessary directions for redressing cyber security threats” (s. 13(2)(ক)). Any policy or direction under these sections in which the council attempts to obstruct the public’s internet access is thereby unlawful, as is any action taken to carry it out, because such an act cannot possibly “redress threats against” or “ensure” cybersecurity given the fact that the latter “include[s] … the right of citizens to access the internet at all times.” This creates an unambiguous prohibition on internet shutdowns, so theoretically the council should never attempt to breach it. Still, the recent history of Bangladesh shows clear evidence of executive overreach of digital communications.
Over the course of its 16-year tenure, the AL government strategically consolidated control over private and multinational providers of internet and telecommunications services and curtailed the independence of the national telecom regulator as a statutory body. This enabled politicians and security officials to directly and arbitrarily order network shutdowns, as was the case in July 2024. A lack of due process or oversight previously obstructed legal accountability, and this is unlikely to change with the draft ordinance, which reinforces — and institutionalizes — the very structures that enabled the abuse of power, this time with the council as its centerpiece.
Nevertheless, if the council does abuse its powers to obstruct internet access, its action could potentially be challenged in the courts. This is by no means an easy course, but it is a feasible one. Cases could be brought by virtually anyone as a public-interest litigant. As outlined above, the language of the ordinance is very clear: these powers cannot be used to deny internet access, and no good-faith judge could interpret them otherwise.
These sections are, however, only one source of government power, and beyond them, the influence of the “right” becomes much weaker and entirely dependent on judicial interpretation. It has the greatest chance of becoming relevant if a government attempts to use its power to make regulations to obstruct internet access. There is no state power to shut down or slow down the internet under Bangladeshi law (the AL did not bother with formal legality), but a government hostile to digital rights might want to create one in the future. It could look to do so through s. 49 of the Cyber Security Ordinance, since this law will regulate the field as a whole. The “right” to internet access could, then, be invoked to challenge any resulting regulation as violating the ordinance on which it is based. This is because s. 49 stipulates that the power to make regulations is granted “[f]or achieving the objectives of this Ordinance.” The preamble lists “ensuring cyber security” as one of the ordinance’s main objectives, and “cyber security” has to be read as including the “right.” A strong argument can be made that a regulation that obstructs internet access would not be “made for achieving the objectives of [the] Ordinance” and, therefore, could not be made using the s. 49 power. However, whether such an argument succeeds depends on the assessment of the judge(s) before whom any such case comes.
Outside the confines of the ordinance itself, the “right” essentially vanishes. A government could sidestep s. 49 and use a power to make regulations under another law to give itself shutdown powers. The regulations would only have to comply with the law under which they are made and with the constitution. The “right” in the ordinance would be all but irrelevant; at best, it could play a minor persuasive role in court arguments about the general trend of Bangladeshi law. Finally, the “right” would be completely irrelevant if any new ordinance of the president or act of parliament departs from it and restricts internet access.
The continued necessity of reform
The interim government’s proposed “right,” then, is not a significant positive achievement within an otherwise faulty reform. In the ways explained above, s. 2(1)(ভ) does or could bring some minor positive changes. But it is not a real right and not a serious attempt to prevent internet shutdowns from ever recurring. This aspect of the draft 0rdinance is exactly the same as its overall pattern — an unaccountable security state is allowed to remain in place and to hold vast powers over citizens, while minor changes obscure this essential fact. The people of Bangladesh will not have a real, practically effective right to access the internet at all times, until and unless genuine reform takes place. Such a reform will need to address the core of the problem — the power of the state in the digital sphere must decrease enormously, and its approach to digital issues must be fundamentally transformed from draconian obsession with control to reasonable regulation of the public sphere of a free society.
]]>