The contracts module contains the core solidity files that back Vector's security onchain.
Do not modify these contracts unless you know exactly what you are doing.
Contents:
- Differences from EVM contracts
- Developing and Running Tests
- Contracts CLI
- Contract Architecture
- Principles and Assumptions
- Commitments
- ChannelFactory and CREATE2
- Dispute Flow
- Transfers
- Depositing and Withdrawing
- Security
There are several modifications and differences to be noted between this module and the evm-compatible contracts module:
- No
SELFBALANCE
opcode, so we have to use a forkedCreate2
open zeppelin contract and modify theCMCDeposit
andLibAsset
to require the deposit isn't ether by asset id. - The
getCreate2MultisigAddress
offchain helper does not compute the same address as theChannelFactory
contract. (NOTE: thegetChannelAddress
on theChannelFactory
does return the correct address). - The changes to add gas buffer to the
ethService
have been removed. - All the ether based tests were removed or reworked to use tokens.
- The
"hardhat-deploy"
plugin does not work with the OVM, so the hardhat tasks were not tested against the ovm. NOTE:hre.[ethers/l2ethers].getContract
/deployments.fixture
also fails due to this issue.
In ~/ovm-contracts
(root), run:
npm install
to install all dependenciesnpm run build
to build package + compile contractsnpm run test
to run the tests
There are a few command line functions that allow you to easily deploy and interact with the contracts:
Powered by hardhat-deploy
. Checks deployed contracts are up to date, and redeploys them if needed for a given chain. Will pull current addresses, and update information if needed, from the saved info in contracts/deployments
a
/address-book
: the address book path. Default is./address-book.json
m
/mnemonic
: the mnemonic used to deploy the contracts (accounts[0]
will be the deployer and owner of theTransferRegistry
). Default is thevector
default dev mnemonic:candy maple cake sugar pudding cream honey rich smooth crumble sweet treat
p
/eth-provider
: the provider url. Default ishttp://localhost:8545
.s
/silent
: a boolean indicating whether the command should execute with or without logs. Default is false.
From the ~/vector/modules/contracts
directory:
hardhat deploy
Adds a new transfer definition to the TransferRegistry
.
t
/transfer-name
: the name of the transfer to add (should be in theaddress-book
). Default isHashlockTransfer
a
/address-book
: the address book path. Default is./address-book.json
m
/mnemonic
: the mnemonic used to add registry (accounts[0]
should be the deployer and owner of theTransferRegistry
). Default is thevector
default dev mnemonic:candy maple cake sugar pudding cream honey rich smooth crumble sweet treat
p
/eth-provider
: the provider url. Default ishttp://localhost:8545
.s
/silent
: a boolean indicating whether the command should execute with or without logs. Default is false.
From the ~/vector/modules/contracts
directory:
dist/cli.js registerTransfer --address-book=/data/address-book.json --eth-provider "http://localhost:8545"
Displays the accounts used for contract testing, as well as current and recommended balance. Useful if testing contracts against a remote chain.
m
/mnemonic
: the mnemonic used to run the tests. Default is thevector
default dev mnemonic:candy maple cake sugar pudding cream honey rich smooth crumble sweet treat
From the ~/vector/modules/contracts
directory:
dist/cli.js display --mnemonic "candy maple cake sugar pudding cream honey rich smooth crumble sweet treat"
The contracts are structured as follows:
- ChannelMastercopy is the primary contract used by Vector channels. It contains logic to handle depositing/withdrawing as well as to adjudicate a channel dispute. To save on the gas cost of repeatedly deploying the contract, we structure this contract as a singleton "Mastercopy" and deploy proxies per-channel.
- ChannelFactory is a factory contract that deploys channel proxies to deterministically-generated addresses using the CREATE2 Ethereum opcode.
- TransferDefinitions are conditional-transfer-specific logic that are used by both the offchain protocol and the onchain adjudicator to determine the outcome of a given transfer.
To simplify the implementation and support the required feature set, the contracts adopt the following principles/assumptions:
- Channels only have two participants,
alice
andbob
. They are set and signed into the initial channel state when setting up the channel. - Every channel update is accompanied by a single corresponding commitment. This commitment is a
CoreChannelState
that is signed by both channel participants. - Depositing into a channel is asymmetric --
alice
deposits by calling adepositAlice
function. The responder simply sends funds to the contract. (This allows for very powerful end-user experiences). - Updating the balance of the channel happens by
create
-ing andresolve
-ing conditional transfers. Creating a transfer generates aCoreTransferState
which gets hashed and added to themerkleRoot
within the signedCoreChannelState
for that update. Resolving a transfer removes the hash from themerkleRoot
.- The consequence of this is that a channel can have an arbitrary number of unresolved transfers without changing anything about how the channel is disputed.
- Transfers can only be resolved by the receiver of that transfer.
- Transfers are generalized: any arbitrary conditionality can be attached to a
resolve
update. This happens through atransferDefinition
, apure
orview
contract of the following interface which outputs a final balance post-transfer:
struct RegisteredTransfer {
string name;
address definition;
string stateEncoding;
string resolverEncoding;
}
interface ITransferDefinition {
// Validates the initial state of the transfer.
// Called by validator.ts during `create` updates.
function create(bytes calldata encodedBalance, bytes calldata)
external
view
returns (bool);
// Performs a state transition to resolve a transfer and returns final balances.
// Called by validator.ts during `resolve` updates.
function resolve(
bytes calldata encodedBalance,
bytes calldata,
bytes calldata
) external view returns (Balance memory);
// Returns encodings, name, and address of the transfer definition so the protocol
// can be unopinionated about the transfers
function getRegistryInformation()
external
view
returns (RegisteredTransfer memory);
}
- Transfers are single-turn: they follow a strict
create
->resolve
flow. However, because they are generalized, it is possible to construct transfers with many intermediary states so long as those states are independently resolveable (i.e. so long as at any point the receiver of the transfer canresolve
to get a final balance). - Withdrawing from the channel happens by constructing a mutually signed commitment to execute an arbitrary transaction from the contract. This can happen trustlessly using
create
andresolve
. - Disputing a channel/transfer happens in two phases: (1)
consensus
phase which sets the latest state onchain (by callingdisputeChannel
), (2)defund
phase which allows users to withdraw disputed channel or transfer funds (by callingdefundChannel()
ordisputeTransfer()
/defundTransfer()
, respectively. - After the dispute ends, the onchain channel contract resumes a "happy" state. This means both parties can continue signing commitments at a higher nonce and resume normal channel operations. They also retain the ability to dispute again in case further offchain coordination cannot be reached.
The core purpose of any state channel protocol is to produce one or more commitments that represent a user's ability to remove funds from a two of two onchain multisig in the event offchain coordination breaks down. This means commitments are the primary interface between the onchain contracts (which manage rare channel failure cases i.e. disputes) and the offchain protocol (used 99% of the time).
There are two types of commitments in Vector:
ChannelCommitment
: a signature on theCoreChannelState
, which ensures the channel and every unresolved transfer in a channel is disputableWithdrawCommitment
: a signature on the data used in cooperative withdrawals from the multisig
A new ChannelCommitment
is generated for every channel state that increments the nonce
, ensuring the latest state may always be safely disputed.
struct Balance {
uint256[2] amount; // [alice, bob] in channel, [initiator, responder] in transfer
address payable[2] to; // [alice, bob] in channel, [initiator, responder] in transfer
}
struct CoreChannelState {
address channelAddress;
address alice; // High fidelity participant
address bob; // Low fidelity participant
address[] assetIds;
Balance[] balances; // Ordered by assetId
uint256[] processedDepositsA; // Ordered by assetId
uint256[] processedDepositsB; // Ordered by assetId
uint256[] defundNonces; // Ordered by assetId
uint256 timeout;
uint256 nonce;
bytes32 merkleRoot; // Tree is made of hashes of unresolved transfers
}
Despite not being a "real" commitment, the CoreTransferState
is a part of the merkle root in the channel state. Thus it's security is enforced using both peers' signatures on the above.
struct CoreTransferState {
address channelAddress;
bytes32 transferId;
address transferDefinition;
address initiator;
address responder;
address assetId;
Balance balance;
uint256 transferTimeout;
bytes32 initialStateHash;
}
A new WithdrawCommitment
is generated whenever a Withdraw
transfer is resolved, and are the signatures of both channel participants on the WithdrawData
, or the data needed to execute the cooperative withdrawal from the channel multisig:
struct WithdrawData {
address channelAddress;
address assetId;
address payable recipient;
uint256 amount;
uint256 nonce;
address callTo;
bytes callData;
}
Once a withdrawal is resolved, the balance to be withdrawn is removed from the CoreChannelState
, and the commitment may be submitted to chain at any point to remove funds from the channel multisig. See the withdraw writeup for more details on this process.
Vector uses a proxy pattern and the CREATE2 opcode to optimize onboarding UX for new channels. This means that participants can derive a channelAddress
deterministically and independently as part of setting up a channel (and, in Bob's case, depositing to it). At some point later (decoupled from onboarding flow), either participant can then call ChannelFactory.createChannel
to deploy their channel proxy.
To properly protect against replay attacks across chains or discrete networks, the channelAddress
MUST be globally unique. We additionally include channelAddress
as part of the channel state, and as a part of the derivation for transferId
to properly domain-separate signed calldata as well.
Deriving channelAddress
uses the following CREATE2 salt:
function generateSalt(address alice, address bob)
internal
view
returns (bytes32)
{
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(alice, bob, getChainId()));
}
where the chainId
is either pulled from the opcode directly, or initialized with the deployment of the ChannelFactory
. The optional setting of the chainId
on construction is used to cover the edgecases where chains do not properly implement the chainId
opcode (i.e. ganache
).
The dispute flow works as follows:
- A party calls
disputeChannel()
passing in their latest state. This begins theconsensus
phase of the dispute game. The counterparty has the ability to respond with a higher-nonced state within the phase. Note that for now we just wait out the entire phase, but it would be possible to implement a shortcut where if both parties submit updates then the phase can be skipped.- Also note that once a dispute has been initiated, the channel should be considered halted. Neither party should make or accept offchain updates during this time.
- After the consensus phase is complete, the latest state of the channel is available onchain, including the latest
merkleRoot
of all active transfers. Then, thedefund
phase of the dispute game begins. - During the
defund
phase, either party may calldefundChannel()
to withdraw all assets from the channel (for both parties). - It is also possible for either party to dispute transfers directly during the
defund
phase. The process for this looks somewhat similar to disputing channels. First, parties calldisputeTransfer()
which starts a timeout window within which the transfer state must be finalized.disputeTransfer()
checks that the hash of the passed in transfer state is a part of the merkle root checkpointed onchain during the channelconsensus
phase.- Note that the merkle root is updated to include transfer state during the
create
channel op (where balances are locked into the transfer), and then is updated again to remove the transfer state during theresolve
channel op (where balances are reintroduced to the core channel state). This means that a disputed transfer can only ever be in it's initial state, which keeps things really simple. See the protocol writeup for more information.
- Note that the merkle root is updated to include transfer state during the
- Once a transfer is in dispute, the transfer resolver can resolve it manually onchain using
defundTransfer
anytime before the transfer dispute window expires. This will call theTransferDefinition
to get an updated set of balances, and then send those balances to both parties onchain. If no transfer resolver is available, or the transfer dispute window has elapsed, thedefundTransfer
can be called (this time by anyone) to pay out the initial balances of the transfer viaexit
on theVectorChannel
contract.
Transfer definitions hold the logic governing the conditional transfer onchain. All transfers that are supported by the Vector protocol must be added to the TransferRegistry
. The registry allows the protocol to be unopinonated about the transfer logic -- to add a new supported transfer, you must simply add it to the registry.
Instead of having turn-takers as seen in other state channel protocols (i.e. magmo
, counterfactual
), transfers in Vector are designed to be short-lived and immediately resolve
-able. All transfer definitions implement the following functions:
getRegistryInformation
: Returns the address, encodings, and name of the definition. This function is what allows the protocol to remain unopionated about transfer definitions, while still being able to dispute and defund transfers.create
: Returns abool
indiciating whether or not the transfer's created state is valid. This function is called during offchain execution, and ensures all transfers added to the channel'smerkleRoot
are valid.resolve
: Returns the finalbalance
of the transfer to be incoporated back into the channel state based on the providedresolver
. Only the transfer responder can callresolve
, ensuring the transfer initiator cannot defund a transfer that is owed to the responder.
Once a transfer is resolved, it is immediately removed from the merkleRoot
and can no longer be disputed.
As mentioned above, funding a channel is asymmetric. The initiator of a channel (as determined by alice
), must deposit using the depositAlice
function in the channel contract. The responder of a channel (bob
) can deposit simply by sending funds to the channel address.
Calling depositAlice
increments the totalDepositsAlice
by the amount that Alice deposits for a given assetId. We can get this value offchain or in the adjudicator by calling the totalDepositsAlice
getter. We can also get totalDepositsBob
the same way -- the contract calculates using the following identity:
getBalance(assetId) + _totalWithdrawn[assetId] - _totalDepositedAlice[assetId];
Note that because this is an identity, we do not use SafeMath. We explicitly want these values to wrap around in the event of an over/undeflow.
Offchain, we track the processedDepositsA
and processedDepositsB
. Thus, we can calculate any pending deposits (that need to be reconciled with the offchain balance) as totalDepositsAlice.sub(processedDepositsA)
. We do the same onchain in the event of a dispute when calling defundChannel()
.
The above pattern has a few highly desireable UX consequences:
- Bob can fund the channel simply by sending funds to the channel address (works out of the box with any on/offramp, exchange, or defi system).
- Alice and Bob require no upfront coordination to make a deposit. i.e. the offchain process of adding funds to the channel is entirely decoupled from actually sending the tx onchain.
- Alice and Bob can both make many deposits onchain in parallel, reconciling part or all of their pending deposits offchain without introducing any trust assumptions.
Withdrawing works a bit differently:
A withdraw from the channel is done by locking up some funds in a transfer and "burning" them, conditionally upon a withdraw commitment being generated from the channel. Once a commitment is generated, one or both parties always have the ability to put it onchain to get their funds. Because of this, we consider offchain that the withdraw was completed even if it wasn't actually submitted to chain. Note that, in the event of a dispute, both parties MUST submit any pending withdraw commitments to chain to properly receive their remaining funds.
These contracts were audited in Dec 2020 -- a report is publicly available here.