have seen; and that being so, history will not deny that he made the best of a bad bargain.
The war between Russia and Turkey ended with the treaty of San Stephano, by which the empire of Turkey in Europe was effaced, and a new state, the mere tool of Russia, was to stretch from the Danube to the Ægean. Beaconsfield instantly demanded that the treaty should be submitted to the other European powers. The refusal of Russia brought the English fleet to the Dardanelles, and a division of our Indian army to Malta. Then at last Russia submitted to the inevitable. The congress assembled at Berlin, and Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury went out as the English plenipotentiaries. The object of this country was to bar the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean, either by the northern or the southern route, either by Bulgaria or by Asia Minor. The treaty of Berlin and the Anglo-Turkish convention combined were supposed to have effected these objects. And when the plenipotentiaries returned to London on 15 May 1878, bringing 'peace with honour,' the popularity of Beaconsfield reached its culminating point. This was allowed by Mr. Gladstone himself in the eloquent tribute which he paid to a deceased rival. But Beaconsfield lived to show himself even greater in adversity than he had been in prosperity, and by the dignity with which he bore the loss of power to win even more admiration and respect than he had ever known when he possessed it.
In view of quite recent circumstances it may be well to point out that, as the main object of the treaty of Berlin was to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, so one of the best means of effecting that object was thought to lie in the constitution of a strong and independent state between the Adriatic and the Black Sea. But though the materials for such a barrier might ultimately be found in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Roumelia, they did not exist in 1878; and what Beaconsfield designed by the provisional settlement then effected was to place the people in a position to develope them. To this end it was necessary to loose these provinces from the grasp of Russia, to protect them in the cultivation of their internal resources, to encourage them in the accumulation of wealth, and, generally, to gain time for those habits and instincts to mature themselves which are essential to permanent independence. It was hoped that by the treaty of Berlin these ends would be attained, and that the conception itself is worthy of a great statesman is surely not to be disputed.
Beaconsfield's policy on the Eastern question was constantly ascribed by his enemies to his 'Semitic instincts,' which were suppposed to taint all his views of the relations between Turkey and her christian subjects. But they could know little of Beaconsfield who supposed that his Semitic instincts led him to any partiality for the Turks. On the contrary, he always describes them in 'Tancred' as the great oppressors of the Arabs, with whom lay his real sympathies, and as a tribe of semi-barbarous conquerors, who, with many of the virtues of a dominant race to recommend them, were without any true civilisation, literature, or science. When he said in the House of Commons that he did not much believe in the stories of the Turks torturing their prisoners, as they generally had a much more expeditious mode of disposing of them, he was simply stating that to give quarter to rebels was not one of the Turkish traditions; and for this, forsooth, he was accused of 'flippancy' in dealing with a grave subject. This charge, however, was scarcely so absurd as the suggestion made in some quarters that his summons of Indian troops to Malta was a precedent for bringing them to England and overthrowing our liberties by force! The lawyers in both houses of parliament got up long debates on the technical construction of the statute by which the English and Indian armies were amalgamated, and it was contended by the oppposition that this employment of the Indian army was a direct breach of it. The case was argued with equal ability on behalf of the government; but the people of England took a broader view, deciding, on the principle of salus populi suprema lex, that government was justified by circumstances, and were not sorry perhaps at the same time to discover that they were a greater military power than they had supposed.
Beaconsfield's policy in India was based on the principle of material guarantees. He did not think it safe to trust entirely to moral ones: to friendships, which are dependent upon interests, or to interests which are necessarily fluctuating with every movement of the world around us. Especially was this true in his opinion of Indian states and rulers. There are those who think that the contingent benefits of insurance are not worth the certain cost, and there is an influential school of foreign policy in England which inculcates this belief. To this it is sufficient to say that Beaconsfield was diametrically opposed. The occupation of Cyprus, predicted, by the bye, in 'Tancred,' the retention of Candahar, and the scheme of the 'scientific frontier,' show that he cherished the traditions of Pitt. Canning, and Palmerston, who desired England to be a great empire
