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Matthew Ridgway

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Matthew Ridgway in 1949

General Matthew Bunker Ridgway (March 3, 1895 – July 26, 1993) was a senior officer in the United States Army, who served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (1952–1953) and the 19th Chief of Staff of the United States Army (1953–1955). Although he saw no combat service in World War I, he was intensively involved in World War II, where he was the first Commanding officer (CG) of the 82nd "All American" Airborne Division, leading it in action in Sicily, Italy and Normandy, before taking command of the newly formed XVIII Airborne Corps in August 1944. He held the latter post until the end of the war in mid-1945, commanding the corps in the Battle of the Bulge, Operation Varsity and the Western Allied invasion of Germany. Ridgway held several major commands after World War II and was most famous for resurrecting the United Nations (UN) war effort during the Korean War. Several historians have credited Ridgway for turning the war around in favor of the UN side. He retired from military service in 1955.

Quotes

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  • I've seen some pretty damned bloody engagements myself. You don't pile bodies up in a wall at all. It reminds me of one marine who said to the sergeant, "Sergeant, you used the word 'hordes,' attacking in 'hordes.' How many platoons does it take to make a horde?" In other words, while the Chinese, and the North Koreans to an even greater extent, attacked with a fanaticism which was hard for us to understand attacks in the face of our superior firepower which no American commander would have countenanced for a moment the bodies still would be scattered according to their approach. You don't build a wall of bodies. Maybe you did in a medieval city when you were trying to breach a wall or something.
  • Well, as you look back with the hindsight of thirty years, I think that a farsighted statesman could have seen that this little sliver of land, the Korean peninsula, off the great Asian land mass, was of great strategic importance. It had been fought over already by Russia, China, Japan, and the Korean forces. And given the known conduct of the leadership of the Soviet Union, it was clear that an attempt might be made to regain control. The Russian forces had been in there up to 1904 and 1905 when the Russo-Japanese War took place. It's a very strategic little area there. It would become a threat to Japan by whichever great power controlled it. So I would say again that I would think that farsighted statesmen should have seen this thing coming and had they seen it then they would have been inclined to reverse the policy of only lightly arming the South Korean forces, but they didn't.
  • Well, we want to do everything with welfare and everything else ahead of the primary responsibility of government which is to govern and to protect the people. It's a long, long step ahead there, but once you've lost that national independence, you never regain it. We never have come very close to it but we almost did in our revolutionary period in gaining our independence. Our leadership for many years was willing to take a chance on not spending the money and making the effort to rebuild our military forces, in favor of diverting the funds to other purposes. You couldn't get the money out of the Congress, and I don't think the presidents of the United States after Truman made any great effort to do it. They went along with the general feeling to which the Congress was completely responsive.
  • Well, we like to sign a check and say that the bill is paid, you see; then we realize that the payment's going to come later and be more painful still. We like to think that when we sign an agreement, the other party is going to keep it. We keep our part but the Russians have no intention of keeping it, none whatever. Duplicity, secrecy, and every form of deceit is in- grained in their working methods and their handling of peoples. They've always been that way when I say always, I mean about two or three hundred years at least.
  • It seems to me, Mr. President, that in this particular time that all of history points to the harsh fact that until we are much nearer this goal of a peaceful world to which you inspiringly lead, that we must maintain this Army in which you have such an abiding faith as a strong clement in the defense of this Nation. As I turn over my duties to the splendid officer who succeeds me, I have absolute confidence, Mr. President, that if ever our security or our liberty are threatened, that this magnificent Army of ours will valiantly play its ultimately decisive role in those defenses.
  • Throughout my two years as Chief of Staff, I felt I was being called upon to tear down, rather than build up, the ultimately decisive element in a properly proportioned fighting force on which the world could rest its hope for maintaining the peace or, if the catastrophe of war came, for enforcing its will upon those who broke that peace.
  • I publicly protested the adoption of the volunteer Army, now a demonstrated failure and perhaps a disaster. I publicly deplored the dismantling of Selective Service and the admission of women into our service academies. Every one of those actions is now looming as potentially detrimental to the esprit and effectiveness of our armed forces -- a blow at discipline, without which no military unit is worth its keep.

Excerpts from the article Leadership in Military Review (1966)

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  • While recognizing that there are many principles, or truths. Pertaining to the exercise of leadership, and while firmly believing that powers of leadership can be greatly increased in any individual through knowledge of these principles and practice in their application, I still think the variables of human nature combined with those of combat, and to a lesser degree with those in peacetime training, make the exercise of leadership far more of an art than science.
  • There is, of course, a great deal of bad leadership as well as of good. It, too, deserves study so that its pitfalls may be avoided. But in general, I believe bad leadership is the result either of violation of basic principles, or the lack or failure to develop one or more of the qualities of good leadership. In any event, I want to speak now of the good type of military leadership with some specific reference later to combat leadership of large units the division, corps, and army. The chief ingredients of leadership, as I have known it to be exercised by those whose careers I have studied, or under whose command I was privileged to serve, are three. I call them the three C's: character, courage, and competence.
  • Character is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests. It is the prime element for which every profession, every corporation, every industry searches in evaluating a member of its organization. With it, the full worth of an individual can be developed. Without it--particularly in the military profession-failure in peace, disaster in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both will result.
  • We often use this word "character" carelessly. There are those of notoriously evil character, as well as those of an exemplary one. Yet in its usual acceptation it stands for those magnificent traits which placed George Washington first among his country-men and, in fact, made him the Father of his Country-the unanimous choice for our first Presidency. It stands for the time-honored code of the officer corps. It stands for self-discipline, loyalty, readiness to accept responsibility, and willingness to admit mistakes. It stands for selflessness, modesty, humility, willingness to sacrifice when necessary, and, in my opinion, for faith in God. Let me illustrate.
  • Only those who have disciplined themselves can exact disciplined performance from others. When the chips are down, when privation mounts and the casualty rate rises, when the crisis at hand, which commander, I ask, receives the better response? Is it the one who has failed to share the rough going with his troops, who is rarely seen in the zone of aimed fire, and who expects much and gives little? Or is it the one whose every thought is for the welfare of his men, consistent with the accomplishment of his mission; who does not ask them to do what he has not already done and stands ready to do again when necessary; who with his men has shared short rations, the physical discomforts and rigors of campaign, and will be found at the crises of action where the issues are to be decided?
  • Examples of physical courage are neither confined to combat nor limited to a stouthearted few, but are common throughout the world among men and women of every color, creed, race, and age, in peace as well as in war. However, examples of moral courage are less well known. They can be considered as proof of true greatness of soul. Where the individual has not measured up, he has generally failed fortune's bid to fame.
  • The military services deal harshly, as they should, with failure to carry out orders in battle. The commander present on the scene is entitled to full, instant, and enthusiastic execution by subordinates. Yet when faced with different situations from those anticipated, as well as in the transition from plans to orders, there sometimes comes the challenge to one's conscience, the compelling urge to op- pose foolhardy operations before it is too late, before the orders are issued and lives are needlessly thrown.
  • Physical fitness comes under competence, the third of my three basic ingredients of leadership. It plays a great part. My own earlier training at Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning, Fort Sam Houston with the 2d Division, with the 33d Infantry in the Panama area, and with the airborne paid off in battle-first as a division, then as a corps, and, finally, as an army commander. Because of strenuous and unremitting physical training, I was able to keep up with the best of my troops in the hottest sec- tors and the toughest terrain and cli- mate. Let me mention briefly what I think the standards should be for commanders of large units. The division commander should have the physical endurance, stamina, and reserves of his best infantry battalion commanders, because that is where he belongs- with them a good part of the time; the corps commander, those of his infantry regimental commanders; and the army commander just about the same. And remember this, since no one can predict today when you may be thrown into combat, perhaps within hours of deplaning in an overseas theater-as happened to thousands in Korea, and as I have no doubt to many in Vietnam-you will have no time to get in shape. You must be in shape all the time.
  • There is another element in battlefield leadership which I want to mention and illustrate. It is a cardinal responsibility of a commander to foresee insofar as possible where and when crises affecting his command are likely to occur. It starts with his initial estimate of the situation—a continuing mental process from the moment of entering the combat zone until hie unit is pulled out of the line. Ask yourself these questions. What are the enemy capabilities? What shall I do, or what could I do, if he should exercise that one of his capabilities which would be most dangerous to me, or most likely to interfere with the accomplishment of my mission?
  • As commander of a division or smaller unit, there will rarely be more than one crisis, one really critical situation facing you at any one time. The commander belongs right at that spot, not at some rear command post. He should be there before the crisis erupts, if possible. If it is not possible, then he should get there aa soon as he can after it develops. Once there, then by personal observation of terrain, enemy fire, reactions, and attitudes of his own commanders on the spot—by his eyes, ears, brain, nose, and his sixth sense gets the best possible picture of what is happening and can best exercise hie troop leadership and the full authority of his command. He can start help of every kind to his hard-pressed subordinates. He can urge higher commander to provide additional fire support, artillery, air, other infantry weapons, and, in the future, perhaps, nuclear strikes.
  • No other means will provide the commander with what his personal perceptions can provide, if he is present at the critical time and place, He can personally intervene, if he thinks that necessary, but only to the extent that such intervention will be helpful and not interfere with his subordinates. He is in a position to make instant decisions, to defend, withdraw, attack, exploit, or pursue.
  • If, at this time, he is at some rear command post, he will have to rely on reports from others, and time will be lost, perhaps just those precious moments which spell the difference between success and failure. Notwithstanding the console capabilities of future television in combat, I still believe what I have said is true. In any event, keep tide time factor ever in mind. It is the one irretrievable, irretrievable, priceless element in war.
  • The occasion for the relief of commanders may regrettably arise. If it does, there are three points to consider: If your decision is based on personal knowledge and observation, or on secondhand information? What will the effect be on the command concerned? Are you relieving a commander whose men think highly of him-even with affection-regardless of professional competence? And, finally, have you a better man available? Every man is entitled to go into battle with the best chance of survival your forethought as a leader can provide. What best helps you discharge this responsibility? Sharing things with your men; to be always in the toughest spots; always where the crisis is, or seems most likely to develop; always thinking of what help you can give your commanders who are executing your orders; doing your utmost to see that the best in rations, shelter, first aid, and evacuation facilities are available; being generous with praise, swift and fair with punishment when you have the facts, intolerant of demonstrated failure in leadership on which lives depend, yet making full allowances for human weaknesses and the stresses and strains of battle on individuals.
  • The qualities of a leader are not limited to commanders. The requirement for leadership are just as essential in the staff officer, and in some respects more exacting, since he does not have that ultimate authority which can be used when necessary and must rely even more than his commander on his own strength of character, his tact and persuasion in carrying out his duties. Between the commander and his chief of staff in a division or larger unit there should be thorough mutual respect, understanding, and confidence with no official secrets between them. Together they form a single dual personality, and the instructions issuing from the chief of staff must have the same weight and authority as those of the commander himself
  • Closely akin to the relationship with staff officers is keeping in close personal touch with your principal subordinate commanders in the division, with your brigade and separate battalion commanders; in the corps, with your division commanders, their chiefs of staff, and ae many of the commanders of attached corps units as you can; and in the army, with corps and division commander and their chiefs of staff. There is always time for these visits; administrative work can be done at night, by day you belong with your troops.
  • No matter how sound a tactical plan may be, the chances of successful execution will be greatly increased if you have first secured the willing acceptance by commander responsible for execution of the missions you plan to assign them. Ensure that they receive notice of your decision and the principal details of your plan as approved in ample time to permit them and their subordinates to make their necessary reconnaissance and issue their orders.
  • I hold that leadership is not a science, but an art. It conceives an ideal, states it as an objective, and then seeks actively and earnestly to attain it, everlastingly persevering, because the records of war are full of successes coming to those leaders who stuck it out just a little longer than their opponents.
  • Remember there are many others on your team, and be inwardly humble. Every man’s life is equally precious, although all are at the disposal of our country, and the contribution each makes in battle is of equal potential value.

Quotes about Matthew Ridgway

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