I tweeted that I thought this particular photo displayed, so to speak, a certain inferiority complex that needed to be overcompensated.
Galia Todorova (@galiato) immediately noticed that if you put this picture in “Google’s similar images” search, it returns a number of hilariously “similar images”, probably the most appropriate is this one.
You can try the Google search yourself by clicking the link in Galia’s tweet below:
At 11.20 am CET today they published what they allege is a list of “mandatory” questions, sent by the Kremlin to journalists (one would presume Russian ones), to be asked during Putin’s visit to Vienna, and possibly immediately after it.
As we know Putin has just landed in Vienna for finalize talks with Austria on the South Stream gas project. Following are the questions.
Obviously, the Kremlin may now “cancel” the order, but it will be curious to watch if some journos don’t get the message in time and still ask the requested question verbatim.
Question 1 ….BINGO >> QUESTION WAS ASKED
” Gazprom and OMV of Austria just signed an agreement for the constructino of South Stream, about the necessity for which you have spoken on many occasions. Yet, within the EU there are serious contraditions between the other participants in the project : Serbia seems to be reaffirming its commitment; Bulgaria is awaiting approval of Brussels. Where is the guarantee that the “South Stream” will not fall prey to political pressure? After all, now Yatsenyuk is threatening to “freeze the stream”, handing over 49% of the Ukrainian GTS’s to Western investors?”
Question 2
“Many have the distinct feeling that the Ukrainian side deliberately delayed the recent gas talks, to allow them time to pump into storage as much as possible free fuel. How will we get our debts back? And how can we bypass Ukraine in European transit shipments, if Kiev will begin again its stealing of gas in the fall?”
Question 3
“In the conversation with Poroshenko you made a number of comments on his so-called “peace plan.” Do you think that this plan still has merit? What items from it could you support?”
Question 4
“During the visit, you will visit the monument to soldiers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front that liberated Vienna during World War II. Austrians treat with respect not only the monuments, but also the graves of Soviet soldiers – unfortunately, against the barbaric treatment of the same monuments in the former Soviet republics. How do you feel about such a revision of history and destruction of historical memory, which has become commonplace in many European countries?”
Anonymous International (Russia) end their leak with the tongue-in-cheek:
“We could also publish Putin’s play-by-play agenda for his Vienna trip, but knowing his proclivity for being late, it will not be of much use to anyone”
Please follow the conferences/interviews if you have time, and let us know if you find improbable coincidences 🙂
Even though I wrote an exhaustive series on Girkin, there seems to some confusion (based on my review of Reddit discussions on the topic) about the his real background and whether or not he did work for the FSB (he did), or participated in the wars he said he did (he did).
I am attaching a full dossier on Girkin, which I had not published until now, in order to not to interfere with the international criminal investigation on him. Please note that it does not include the latest events, such as for instance the arrest of Olga Kulygina 10 days ago.
Next in our series of excerpts from the confidential analytical reports is a segment from the week of May 25th, focusing on that week’s trip by essentially the whole Russian government to Crimea.
Before reading this short report, I would like to remind you of something I wrote about last month. A leading Russian economist, whom I met in Moscow in April, shared his views that Putin is trying to bring as many Russian government members and oligarchs into the “sanctions list”, in order for him to be sure they would never betray him and “flee” with their capital. In return, he was going to offer them “stealing opportunities in the new territories like there’s no tomorrow”.
Curiously, this same thesis is being presented in the following confidential report, written on June 2nd.
* * *
“On the sudden descent of the entire Government of the Russian Federation into Crimea and its causes”
“According to experts, last week the majority of the members of Russian Government arrived in Crimea. First of all, Dmitry Medvedev flew to Crimea on May 23 evening and stayed there until May 26, combining recreation and work. Experts note that the Prime Minister trip to Crimea was politically motivated. Putin decided to send a signal to the newly elected president of Ukraine Poroshenko that no concessions are possible on this issue, as a matter of principle.
For this reason, it was necessary that on the very day of the presidential elections in Ukraine, the second person of the state was in”occupied” Crimea. At the same time, the Russian President remained in Sochi.
On Monday, when Poroshenko received congratulations on his election as President and made a statement of intent to return Crimea into the Ukraine, more half of the members of the Government of the Russian Federation arrived to meet Dmitry Medvedev in the (Crimean) Republic: deputy chairmen Shuvalov, O. Golodets, A. Dvorkovich, Dmitry Kozak, D. Rogozin, Yuri Trutnev, Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsov, Ministrer of Education Dmitry Livanov, Emergency Situations Minister Vladimir Puchkov, Russian Finance Minister A. Siluanov, Minister of Health of the Russian Federation Vladimir Skvortsov, the head of the Ministry of Transport M. Sokolov, head of the Ministry of Labor M. Topilin.
However, this was not the end of it. Experts report that the President of the Russian Federation ordered to accelerate the integration of socio-economic systems of the Crimea into Russia and accomplish this prior to the September elections.
* * *
Experts report that the officials of the Government of the Russian Federation met the increased work-load without enthusiasm and did not like the need to solve real problems relatingto Crimea. In addition, they fear that regular trips to the Crimea and actively participating in projects in the republic may lead to their inclusion in the list of those for which the West imposed sanctions. In the White House, some high-ranking officials informally complain that Russian President is doing everything to “entangle” as many members of the Russian government in the the Crimean topic (and generally in the “Ukrainian crisis”).
Against this background, the only activity is shown by Dmitry Kozak, who is trying to put under his full control all development funds allocated to the republic, especially on infrastructure projects, attempting to turnCrimea in fact nto a second Olympic construction. In order to create conditions for laundering the money of the “St. Petersburg group”, he insists on the active of foreign companiesparticipation in various investment and infrastructure projects. Since no Western company is ready to directly participate in such projects (due to the Internationally disputed status of Crimea), he has to rely on the involvement of Chinese capital, as well as possibly Turkish. Meanwhile, the plan is to spark interest amongstWestern companies in various gray schemes, which are easy to implement on unrecognized territories, especially if the act through the intermediary role of offshore subsidiaries.
According to our experts, while in Crimea, officials were more eager to discuss political, rather than economic developments. In particular, they discussed theversion of events leading to the release of Russian journalists from LifeNews, which is informally spread by [Medvedev press-attache] Natalia Timakova, as well as the signing of the Eurasia Union contract in Astana
Regarding the release of the journalists, the main reason that prompted the President to take decisive action and send to Kiev a mixed team of high-ranking representatives of the Chechen and Russian security forces, was the fact that there were advanced negotiations between OSCE reps and the Ukrainian authorities. When it was reported to Putin that the Ukrainian authorities were ready to release the journalists, and that such release would present in a positive light the OSCE, against the background that the Russian President had not taken sufficient efforts to free Russian citizens, it was decided to rush Kadyrov with a special mission to Kiev. In order to make the Ukrainian authorities more accommodating in the negotiations, a mobile group of Chechen militants penetrated the border into the East of the country, and took captive several significant ATO members from amongst the leaders of Ukrainian punitive battalions.”
In a sign of back-peddling on his escalating rhetoric against the “Motherland that betrays us” (by not sending troops to Ukraine), Girkin praised Putin. Almost.
Last night Girkin chose his old buddy’s Marat Musin’s website, anna-news.info, to publish a statement that goes, more or less, like this:
“I am concerned about the growing attempts by patriotic/military circles in Russia to portray me as a super-hero. I am not a super-hero, it’s just that my enemy is incompetent. Don’t attack Putin for being a coward, as he started the revolution from the top, by invading Crimea. Don’t use me to promote internal dissent in Russia. And anyway, in times of war, no one can express disagreement, as that is treason.”
What lies behind this change of heart from someone whose lifelong ambition has been to be recognized as a hero?
To understand the context, I must note that more and more Russians of anti-Kremlin views have been pointing out the growing schism between Putin and the Girkin team. In this Facebook post, for instance, former deputy PM and opposition figure Boris Nemtsov points out the fact that Girkin is no longer given airtime on Putin-controlled TV media, possibly because Putin is afraid that upon his (and the militants) return to Russia, they might want to go after the Russian establishment (a thesis that I ventured back in May).
It is clear that Putin is sitting on the fence about providing direct military help to the militants. Initially, Girkin tried to guilt Putin into sending him reinforcements. Then, he started blackmailing him, by issuing statements such as “if Russia doesn’t send troops now, history won’t forgive the betrayal“.
It seemed none of these approaches worked, and might have even backfired, if Nemtsov’s observation is any indication. So it appears Girkin has launched a shrewd damage-control initiative: to appease Putin by presenting himself as a non-contender for (even a small portion) of the limelight that Putin doesn’t like to share.
There is room for only one hero, Girkin says, sheepishly.
Here is the next installment from the Analytical Reports prepared, allegedly, for use by the Kremlin. This excerpt is from the report covering events in the week of May 19-25.
As discussed in the previous posts, this leak came from the Russian hackers group calling themselves “Anonymous International – Russia”. In addition to my earlier qualifications about the degree of reliability of the content, I would like to add that (a) I am more and more convinced that the leaked documents are technically authentic, and (b) I am more and more certain that they contain largely incompetent fantasies of “experts” who are earning a living providing conspiratorial analyses to one or another Russian government (or Duma) structure. This does not mean, however, that some of the (thus far unknown) facts referenced are not true, and should be used for cross-checking from other sources.
Many of the comments (especially on Reddit) seem to question the authenticity of the documents simply because the content often makes no sense. Suffice it to say that the actual, observed beliefs of many of the top government officials in Russia (and alleged target readers) make even less sense. In this context, I invite you to seek out and watch on YouTube any of the videotaped economic and political somniloquy by Putin adviser, and current Chairman of the Duma’s Economic Policy Committee, Yevgeniy Fedorov.
On the politics of the Russian Federation in relation to addressing the South East
Experts report that on the back of his visit to China, Putin decided to “soft surrender” South-East of Ukraine in exchange for an agreement with the leadership of Germany and representatives of Poroshenko on the transit gas to Europe, and a commitment by Ukraine to pay its gas debt.
Notable in this respect are some of the efforts made in this direction by Putin proxiesin Russia’s shadow policy on Ukraine. First, “emissaries” of the former head of the presidential administration of Pres. Kuchma, V. Medvedchuk (who is also a close friend of Pres. Putin and represents his personal interests in Ukraine) organized talks with Poroshenko on the terms on which Russia would deny further support to the separatist movement in the south-east of Ukraine. According to experts, to create favorable conditions for such negotiations, the Russian side has made a number of “conciliatory gestures”. On March 19th all accounts of the Roshen corporation in Russian banks had been arrested, and as a result the production of confectionery in the Lipetzk plants was suspended, and so was the construction works for the third plant in the Lipetzk region. However, a month later the work of these plants was resumed, without any public attention being drawn to the fact.
I continue the publication of translated excerpts from the leaked weekly analytical reports on current political and economic developments, prepared for use by the Kremlin’s administration.
Please read the disclaimers and caveats from my initial publication on the leaks before continuing.
The current installment focuses on Putin’s May visit to China, and is highly recommended for anyone wishing to understand the way Russia sees the geopolitical relevance o the Ukraine crisis. It also possibly discloses some confidential information on the actual dealings between Russia and China.
Apologies for the sometimes clumsy structure of the translation, but I believe it is all comprehensible.
On the intrigue around Putin’s visit to China and what it actually achieved
The central event of last week was the long-awaited visit of the President of the Russian Federation to China, during which he finally signed a 30-year contract to supply gas to the Far East.The media and expert community intensively discussed the question of the relationship between the visit to China and the Ukrainian crisis, due to which the Russian Federation has undergone sanctions.
A common interpretation of this event is the view that the signing of the gas agreement with China was a response to Western sanctions and the possible consequence curtailing economic relations with European countries, followed by a change in foreign policy to the East. Other actively disseminated opinion is that the signed contract with China is rather not lucrative to RF, since the price implicit in it (formula driven and not made public) is on the verge of being loss-making for Russia.
Experts believe that these interpretations are generally incorrect. Commenting on these opinions, and generally on this event, our experts noted the following non-public details and facts:
The Russian chapter of the “Anonymous International” (ethical) hackers society came to light a few months ago, and their first notable hack was the 3.5 GB mailbox of Col. Igor Girkin. It was only via this hack that we could find conclusive evidence that (a) Girkin was indeed a KGB/FSB colonel, and (b) that his wartime activities in Ukraine are sponsored by oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.
Over the past couple of months the Russian Anonymous have leaked about a dozen other documents, including the correspondence of companies hiring internet trolls to defend Kremlin’s agenda around the world, but also docs relating to internal Russian corruption and politics.
A couple of days ago, Anonymous published an incredible leak. It was a series of analytical reports from the April-June period of this year, produced for Putin’s administration. In total, these reports number hundreds of pages, and I have only gone through 1/4 of of them. One thing that I would like to share immediately is an assessment of the May 2 tragedy in Odessa, as analyzed by Kremlin’s “experts”
But let’s start with a couple of disclaimers. Anything that is “leaked” needs to be assessed for credibility, and that’s not a straight-forward task. There is no “digital signature” that can confirm the authenticity in one easy step. So authentication is always circumstantial.
First, we should look at the credibility of previous leaks from the same source. The Girkin email leaks is not only huge, to the point of being “unfakeable”, but also it is incredibly consistent with all other – independent – sources of information on Girkin. In one word: I vouch for the authenticity of the emails leaks, as my statistics education gives me comfort they are unfakeable.
Second, the internal consistency of these current leaks is intact. They have all the signs of reports, outsourced by the Russian government for assessing local and global events from Russian perspective. Every government gets those, and Occam’s Razor suggests that the chances of someone faking hundreds of pages of internally consistent reports is less likely – by a huge order – than a capable hacking organization getting hold of the real reports.
Last, the fact that these reports are – in all probability – authentic – says nothing about the reliability of their content. Any analytical report is written with an eye to pleasing the employer, and we should keep that in mind when assessing the content matter. It is exactly this bias, however, that makes the excerpt on Odessa even more (shockingly) important to read. In other words: a top-secret report to the Kremlin that does NOT say that the Odessa tragedy was caused by pro-European Ukrainians settting pro-Russian Ukrainians on fire, is more likely to be truthful than a report saying the opposite.
That said, I leave the conclusions to your own assessment (which I would love to hear in the “Reply” section below).
Top Secret
Weekly Report on Analytical Political-Economic Processes
Period: 19-25 May
pages 31-32
“By the latest expert assessments, the bloody events in Odessa were the result of clashes between several Ukrainian political-economic groups for the redistribution of influence in this town…
…
According to our experts, in the May 2nd events in Odessa, the following entities took part: (1) a group of soccer fans, controlled by Igor Kolomoisky; (2) members of the Maidan self-defense forces, controlled by A. Parubiy (independent player, yet loyal to Poroshenko), (3) members of U.S. private security forces; and (4) agents-provocateurs controlled by Alexander Dubov.
It was exactly the latter who were dressed as pro-Russian activists with the appropriate insignia, including fan badges of the Kharkiv “Mettalurg” soccer team (owned by the fugitive businessman from the Yanukovich family, S. Kurchenko).
Initially the plan was only for clashes between the fighters of A. Dubov and A. Parubiy, in order to show who is in charge of the city. The problem was that Timoshenko’s team was not informed that A. Parubiy was planning its own operation, having coordinated it with Kolomoisky, and in this connection had arrived personally in the city.
According to our experts’ latest data, in the Trade Union House there was a laboratory for production of narcotics. (Odessa is an important step in the drug-trafficking route from Kosovo and Albania into Europe).
It was exactly traces of these chemicals that were found in the course of the investigation, and are currently only referred to as “chloroforms”. In the experts’ opinion, on May 2nd there had been a planned destruction of said drugs laboratory, in the framework of the struggle for control over the Odessa port and the drug traffic channels (it has historically been controlled by the infamous Odessa O.C. figure V. Alperin, who has close ties to Ukraine’s SBU and, tangentially, to the UDAR party).
The experts suppose that the team in charge of destruction of the laboratory did not anticipate that – as a result of the clashes in town – people from [pro-Russian protesters] Kulikov Field would be ushered into the building. As a result, the extermination team were forced to exterminate all witnesses. The majority of witnesses died in the building’s basements, and exactly their corpses – by various estimates, approximately 50 persons – were secretly taken out of the building (later these were announced as missing without trace).
By our experts’ opinion, it was exactly as a result of the wish to hide the existence of a narcotic laboratory in the Trade Union House that the strange initiative was started to build up an insurmountable concrete fence around the building. The purpose of this construction was to permit the definitive elimination of all evidence of the laboratory, prior to admitting international experts into the building.
The experts note that immediately after the tragedy in the Trade Union House, Yulia Timoshenko arrived in Odessa to assess “the political and economic losses”, and in the night of 3rd to 4th of May, there was a raid on the 7th Kilometer Market, which, according to our sources was organized by [then head of Odessa police] D. Fuchedji. On the day after the raid he was removed from office and replaced by I. Katerinchuk, and later, with the assistance of Yulia Timoshenko, he defected to Transnistria and later into Russia, from where he presented compromising statements about the events of May 2 in Odessa.”
I have uploaded the complete weekly analytical report here – feel free to investigate and provide your own opinions (in Russian)
This post does not tell a new story, but I thought I would make it more accessible to non-Russian speakers.
Here is another surreal example of how Moscow didn’t interfere, nor steer, separatists in Ukraine.
The video you are about to watch was taped in the first days of April 2014. It was shot in the office of Yevgeny Fedorov, inside the building of the Russian Duma.
Federov is a Russian MP, and not just a regular one. Today he is the Chairman of the Duma’s Committee on Economic Policy, and in the past he was adviser to Putin. He was also part of the Russian negotiation team that met with NATO in the early stage of the conflict. In this photo, Federov is just walking out of the meeting with Anders Rasmussen.
So, based on this short intro and the picture above, I think you will agree with me that Evgeny Fedorov is, pretty much, a Russian official.
Now, please take 2 minutes to watch this excerpt from a nearly one hour video, used for training purposes by the Russian expansionist movement “National Liberation Organization” (subtitles in English)
The chick on the right who takes notes on her iPhone (or plays Roshen-Candy-Crusher) is one Maria Katanosova. Maria is a Donetsk native, and was apparently an intern in Crimean Technology at Yevgeny Fedorov’s School of Secession.
What is Maria’s fate after her training?
On April 15th, less than two weeks after the training video was posted, articles in Russian and Eastern-Ukraine online media showed a photo-shoot of Maria Katanasova, claiming that she is Donetsk’s choice for Chief Prosecutor. In other words: Donetsk’s answer to Crimean-Japanese phenomenon Niasha Miasha
If you want to see the full photo-shoot (and you should), follow this link and scroll down.
Whenever Maria is not organizing referenda or posing for the Chief-Prosecutor, she is tweeting about how great Syrian leader Assad is:
I guess what I am trying to say is, why can’t we just trust Russia to become stronger and take over the world?
As I tweeted late last night, Olga Kulygina has been captured by the Ukrainian special services, while trying to import three trucks overloaded with weapons via the border from Russia into Lugansk.
People who have not read my epos on the Orthodox Crusaders might wonder why that is so remarkable. The long answer is: read the story.
The short answer is: Olga Kulygina is by far the biggest catch the SBU has had thus far. All previous Russian saboteurs, weapons donkeys, cash couriers and facilitators caught thus far, pale in comparison to her. Why is that so?
For one thing, she was caught trying to smuggle the largest cache of weapons ever caught in a single batch. Her shipment was three trucks full of AK-47, RPGs and self-propelled anti-airplane rocket launchers. With the rockets thereto, as a bonus. She was also carrying two large bags of cash. How does one hope to smuggle that mini-battalion the border, one might ask. Easy – by bribing corrupt and demotivated Ukrainian border guards. This wasn’t their lucky day, though – the SBU had intercepted a logistical-arrangements phone call, and they knew someone was going to meet someone from Moscow – but they had no clue whom and with what.
But all of that that’s the least remarkable thing about the lady who showed up and got caught. Olga Kulygina, a professor of strategic management at the Moscow State Economic University, by day, and an exporter of Russian mercenaries to Syria by night, is a PhD in Biotechnology. She is also an author of numerous handbooks on (fighting) financial crime, such as “Methods to observe illicit export of capital” (in her case pretty easy: you just spot two bags of cash). Okay, not your everyday arms smuggler, indeed. But still that’s NOT what makes her most remarkable.
What does make her remarkable is that she is extremely close – emotionally – to three of the key players in the invasion of Ukraine. First, she is as close as it gets to her boss: Marat Musin, the head of the Strategic Department at her university, and her co-author on a number of books. More importantly, Marat has been her mentor and friend (at least) since 1993, when he was one of the ideologues of the anti-Western putsch in Russia, while she carried an AK47 to the streets to fight against the traitor Yeltsin. Musin is one of the ideologues of today’s invasion into Ukraine, and a denier of the Ukrainian national identity and statehood, too. Oh, Marat was also Assad’s direct partner for the export of Russian mercenaries to Syria in 2012 and 2013.
Second bond: she is close friends with Alexander Boroday, the prime-minister of the non-existent Donetsk People’s Republic and Russian political strategist. Boroday and Kulygina fought together in the secession war of Transnistria in 1992, and both tried to overthrow the government in October 1993. Here they reminisce, sweetly, about their failed putsch attempt.
But most remarkably, Olga has been best friends with Igor Girkin, the brooding, cross-era-dressing Defense Minister of said non-existent Republic, and retired FSB operative. Girkin fought hand to hand with Olga in Transnistria, they started a relationship that only got stronger over time. Olga was by far the most frequent correspondent of Girkin’s during the 2009-2014 period, based on my analysis of over 3.5 GB of hacked emails. She was also the only person he confided in, and who knew his inner most world, including his travails with women, evil colleagues and psychiatrists.
It is not surprising, therefore, that when Olga – risking her career, freedom, and life – got caught while bringing Girkin the arms and cash he desperately needs, Girkin freaked out. Have you noticed his dooms-day stare in his latest video appeals, too suicidal even for his standards?
Just imagine the chagrin he is going through. Immediately after her capture, Two SBU sources confirm to me that Girkin – via his hatchet-man Bezzler (also known by his codename “Demon”) proposed to the head of the SBU a “hostage swap”. In exchange for “the release of some woman you are holding”, he said, pretending he didn’t know who SBU had captured, Girkin was willing to free 5 hostages. When this offer was passed over by the SBU, he raised the stakes to 10 (!) hostages, in exchange for “a woman”. There was, reportedly, very high pressure on the SBU to agree to this offer and release her; including from the highest of places. Yet, some of the President’s advisers felt there was something fishy here, and that she was more important than they might have earlier thought. So they just kept her.
Girkin, totally freaked out, ordered Bezler to retaliate by shooting – on camera – two policemen that were part of the original swap offer (later it turned out the shooting had been staged).
It seems that they had good reason to panic. Not only because of old love and friendship. But because after a few days of steely silence, Olga started cooperating with the security services. And the stuff she knows…well, let’s say it will keep Putin (but mostly Malofeev) awake for a long while.
What does that all mean about the war?
For one thing, if the SBU play their card well (and a good start would be to read my blog, otherwise they would have known whom they caught), they can exchange her not for 10 hostages, but for something much more valuable. For example, for Girkin. Yes, that sounds crazy, but as @Vieta_Rusanova correctly tweeted, Igor Girkin has a split personality and is living (now) the life of his in-game persona, Col. Strelkov. And Strelkov is a hero. Strelkov would trade places with the dame of his life. Even if this means the end of his freedom. But especially if it seems like that might be a good deal given the alternatives, which are – well, the death of him, sooner or later. And he would go down in history as the hero we wanted to be.
But there’s another scenario. I wouldn’t be shocked if in the next few days, Putin – knowing the level of exposure via Olga’s testimony – simply jumps the bandwagon and arrests Kulygina’s co-conspirators, say Marat Musin and – bang – Konstantin Malofeev. This way he would disown the mercenary war and blame it on extreme left-wingers and rogue oligarchs with their own agenda.
Which way it will go – we are bound to find out in the next few days. And we should be happy with either outcome.
In a sign of back-peddling on his escalating rhetoric against the “Motherland that betrays us” (by not sending troops to Ukraine), Girkin praised Putin. Almost.
et with NATO in the early stage of the conflict. In this photo, Federov is just walking out of the meeting with Anders Rasmussen.
If you want to see the full photo-shoot (and you should), 
Christo's blog 