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Treaty of Paris (1259)

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For other treaties of Paris, see Treaty of Paris (disambiguation).

The Treaty of Paris (1259) was a peace agreement between England and France that concluded decades of territorial conflict. It followed a long history of tensions dating back to the Norman Conquest and intensified by King John’s loss of Normandy in 1204 and his successors’ failed attempts to recover those lands. Pressured by military defeats, internal unrest, and King Louis IX’s desire for continental stability before the launch of the Seventh Crusade, both kingdoms entered negotiations.[1] The treaty marked a significant turning point but left several issues unresolved, setting the stage for future disputes.

Background

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This era held monumental significance in certain regions, particularly in Paris, which was considered “scarcely inferior to Rome” and recognized as one of the most important cities in Europe. Paris’ role as the seat of Europe’s oldest university, established to study God’s dealings with mankind, reinforced its cultures and intellectual importance. This focus on Paris also draws connections to Britain's own centers of learning and power, such as Oxford, Canterbury, York, Lincoln, and Ely. These locations highlight broader issues of the time; issues that shaped the larger European framework, including political sovereignty, economic wealth, and England's cultural integration into the wider European scene.[2]

Treaty of Paris and the Medieval State

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The Treaty of Paris exhibits a unique form of legislation in the 13th century in the shift of power it delivers between the kingdoms of England and France. The basic terms of the treaty and the reasoning behind the issues presented in it can be seen in the formation of the state within the two kingdoms. Focusing on the state as a whole in both England and France allows for an in depth look into why both kingdoms made the decisions that they did under the treaty. Along with perhaps the rooted desires of both kings from their experiences with the state.

The formation of the state within England saw its most vital transformation in wake of the Norman Conquest in 1066. In the fallout of the conquest, the previously fragmented provinces within England vanished with William the Conqueror installing a French Oriented ruling class which would take shape over the next two centuries.[3] By the time Henry III came into power, the isolated provinces had each adopted their own customs, and with Henry having the final say in terms of authority, it became increasingly difficult for Henry to meet the demands of each province. This case of lack of authority by Henry can be seen within the Treaty of Paris in the lands that he renounced due to his inability to keep them in line within his kingdom. Along with his innate desire to expand his empire, after the Norman invasion made it ever the more difficult to introduce newer kingdoms into England.

           France and the state relate in a way in contrast with England. The state within France operated under a system where each province had their own customs and law, but this was widely accepted by Louis IX. To keep his kingdom in check Louis installed officials from Paris into each province to keep their governmental systems in check. This allowed Louis’ kingdom to have multiple different customs, but all still placed Louis as the head of each of them. Within the Treaty of Paris, Louis was able to assert this final authority in the lands he would eventually reclaim as he had the ability to keep those lands under a defined order. The strengthening of royal authority within France especially in the 13th century was the catalyst for Louis IX and France to inevitably walk away from the Treaty of Paris in a better state than England.

Before the Treaty of Paris

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Anglo-French tensions originated with the Norman Conquest in 1066, when the English monarch also became a vassal to the French crown for lands held in France. This dual role created a complex and often unstable relationship.[4] Tensions escalated in the early 13th century when King John of England lost Normandy in 1204 after military defeats and the controversial death of his nephew Arthur of Brittany. This loss greatly weakened England’s position on the Continent.[5]

A temporary pause in hostilities followed the Treaty of Lambeth in 1217, which ended the First Barons’ War and confirmed English control over limited territories like Gascony and the Channel Islands.[6] However, disputes over feudal rights and land claims continued to strain relations.[7]

When Henry III came to power, he aimed to reclaim lost Angevin territories but failed to do so. His most significant attempt, the Saintonge War of 1242, ended in defeat at the Battle of Taillebourg, making further military campaigns unrealistic.[8] At the same time, Henry faced growing unrest at home, as barons became increasingly dissatisfied with taxation and the crown’s mismanagement of foreign affairs. Figures like Simon de Montfort began advocating for constitutional reform and limitations on royal power.[9]

King Louis IX of France, meanwhile, sought peace for his own strategic reasons.[10] A devout Christian, he was preparing for the Seventh Crusade and wanted to avoid distractions in Europe. For both monarchs, a negotiated settlement became preferable to continued warfare.[11]

Feudal dynamics further complicated matters. Even if Henry III retained territories like Gascony, he held them as a vassal of the French king; A relationship many in England viewed as humiliating. This feudal subordination remained a source of tension even after the treaty was signed.[12]

In the years immediately preceding the treaty, Henry also pursued claims in Sicily in an effort to secure a crown for his son, Edmund. This ambition placed additional strain on royal finances and increased the urgency for peace with France. The treaty was thus shaped not only by long standing geopolitical rivalry but also by more immediate financial and political pressures on both sides.

Ratification of the Treaty of Paris by Henry III, 13 October 1259.
Archives Nationales (France).
The English Angevin Empire and France after the 1259 Treaty of Paris.

Historical context

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The Norman Conquest of England in 1066 by William the Conqueror, Duke of Normandy, created an awkward situation whereby the kings of England were sovereign over some of their territory but bound by homage to the kings of France for other rich and well-populated lands on the Continent. William attempted to separate the two areas between his heirs, but subsequent fighting and inheritance not only reunited England and Normandy but greatly expanded English territory within France. King John's refusal to answer Philip II of France for the apparent murder of his teenage nephew Arthur gave Philip a pretext for recovering Normandy in 1204. In 1202 Philip Augustus led the French invasion of Normandy, during which Philip retook the lands possessed by King John and declared them confiscate.[13] In the years following the invasion, a number of military campaigns were followed out by the English, with the goal to retain the lands taken from them by Philip. The aftermath would lead to France retaining a majority of the land they had taken during the Invasion of Normandy while also causing the English front in Normandy to diminish in size. In 1217 after years of combat between England and France, the Treaty of Lambeth would be signed by Henry III and Louis IX which would give control of the Channel Islands of Normandy back to the English.[14]

In the years leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Henry made several attempts at acquiring lands to increase the size and power of the English kingdom. Sicily was at the forefront of Henry’s desires, as he wished to reward it to his son Edmund to bolster future English expansion. A large reason behind Henry signing the treaty was to secure Sicily for Edmund, an act which would only weaken the position of Henry and his reputation among his kingdom.[15] The desire to acquire Sicily was not one met by Henry’s advisors, who avidly advised Henry to focus on other efforts such as peace with France, before trying to acquire Sicily.[16] Henry’s willingness to acquire Sicily at any cost was the catalyst for his agreement in signing the treaty. It would also be the reasoning behind the eventual decline in the dynamic relations between England and France.

Terms of Treaty

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The Treaty of Paris ushered in an era of peace between England and France, after decades of conflict stemming back to 1202 with the French Invasion of Normandy. The treaty itself served ultimately as a set of guarantees between the two kingdoms, the largest of which was a mutual forgiveness between each other for actions committed against one another in the previous decades. Both Henry and Louis made the promise to uphold the treaties agreements and to ensure those promises were being held roughly every ten years.[17] Among other agreements made in the treaty, Louis pledged to provide the funds for a force of five hundred knights for up to two years which was to follow the direct orders of King Henry. This act of generosity showed off not only the vast wealth of Louis, but also perhaps served a way to pay off the previous lands conquered by his predecessors. The payment of five hundred knights also worked to benefit both Louis and Henry, as his wish was that the knights would be used for God’s service, but Louis also understood the knights would greatly benefit King Henry’s ordeals.[18]

Under the treaty, Henry acknowledged the loss of the Duchy of Normandy. Henry agreed to renounce control of Maine, Anjou, Touruaine and Poitou, which had also been lost under the reign of King John, but Henry remained Duke of Aquitaine as a vassal to Louis. In exchange, Louis withdrew his support for English rebels. He also ceded to Henry the bishoprics and cities of Limoges, Cahors, and Périgueux and was to pay an annual rent for his continued occupation of Agenais. Louis also ceded the regions of Agenais, Saintonge, and Quercy over to Henry, which would help bolster the English rule in Gascony.

By rule of the treaty, Louis recognized Henry's direct rule over the Duchy of Aquitaine so long as Henry paid a liege homage to the King of France.[19] Under this rule of homage, Henry was unable to offer any form of aid to those deemed as enemies of the King of France, causing a ripple between previous alliances forged by Henry. Despite Henry signing off on the treaty with the act of homage in mind, those within the Duchy of Aquitaine greatly opposed the treaty due to the sovereignty Louis was given over the duchy. Mostly in part to the concept of inalienability, which in regard to the Middle Ages specified that a king could not order his subjects to abide under a new ruler without their given consent.[20] Under the order of the treaty, the King of France could exercise complete legal jurisdiction over the duchy allowing for those in the duchy to take their legal disputes to the Paris Parlement. An act which would only lead to increased conflicts between the two kingdoms due to the frequent overlapping of the two systems of government.[21]

Despite acknowledging the loss of Normandy, the treaty separately held that "islands (if any) which the King of England should hold" would be retained by him "as peer of France and Duke of Aquitaine". Along with subsequent English denunciations of their French vassalage, this formed the basis of the special situation of the Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, and some smaller islands), which have been held directly by the English Crown without formal incorporation into the Kingdom of England or its successor states.

Aftermath

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The treaty was questioned as soon as it was passed by barons and the French alike and had its fair share of backlash.[22] The agreement continued the trend of English kings submitting land to the French in desperation for support in response to repeated rebellions, a trend that started with Henry III’s father in the Magna Carta which would only result in more war with the French and barons. The treaty was meant to end the long conflict between the French and English once and for all for Henry III to have allies against his rebellious barons.[23] This, however, did not formally end the conflict with the French, some historians even arguing it led to the Hundred Years War.[24]

Furthermore, it wasn't long after the Treaty of Paris was signed that Henry III attempted to retain his power. In the Parliament Prohibited document, Henry III, to the archbishop of Canterbury, expressed that without the king's consent or without his presence, Parliament could not be held.[25] This was in response to the Oxford Parliament (1258), which requested the king to make decisions according to the order of the Barons.

Mise of Amiens

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However, that’s not to say The Treaty of Paris didn’t come with its benefits for Henry III. In 1264, a settlement was given by Louis IX in favor of the king known as the Mise of Amiens. When the barons agreed to meet with Louis IX after repeated rejection of their meetings by Henry III, they agreed to abide by whatever his decision was in relation to the Provisions of Oxford. Louis ruled unquestionably in favor of the king as the result of their current allyship brought about by The Treaty of Paris, declaring that the barons had committed treason, and thus, had to leave the government the way it was pre-1258. This, however, would lead to The Second Barons’ War as the barons fought to keep the provisions. Scholar M.T Clanchy argues this may have been the result of the Treaty of Paris, or perhaps Louis IX noticing that his monarchy is being challenged by these provisions as well.[26]

Simon de Montfort

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Shortly after the Treaty of Amiens, various barons came to accept Louis’ decision, but Simon de Montfort, the 6th Earl of Leiceisteer and one of the seven magnates who forced Henry to sign the Provisions, was unrelenting. Simon was popular among barons for his piousness and his connections to many different groups of barons across England, as well as his support for “native” barons over foreigners to be in positions of power, became a figurehead against Henry's refusal to submit to the reforms.[27]

           Simon had already left the country for France after a peace talk had been agreed between the reformers and Henry, in 1263 that would only reduce the Provisions’ authority.[28] However, backed by three royalties’ divisions and justified by a frustration with perceived traitorous foreigners working for Henry III, Montfort would return in The Battle of Lewes, in Sussex, where he would corner Henry III, leading to the Mise of Lewes. The king was to remove all “traitors” from his council, to pardon the barons for their rebellion after the Mise of Amiens, and to restore their lands and goods. It also demanded the freeing of prisoners captured at Northampton and the ransoming of royalists, leading to the capture of Henry III and his son Edward.[29]

Simon de Montfort, along with his son Henry, only continued to lead a rebellion against Henry III due to his resistance to the Provisions of Oxford until his death at the hands of Edward I in the Battle of Evesham.[30] Shortly after this battle, while in captivity of his rebellious barons, Henry III passed the Dictum of Kenilworth, in 1265, a pronouncement that claimed anyone who lost their land in war would have it returned after the fact. Modern historians argue that, while this was indeed a way to end the conflict between Henry III and his Barons, it also was made to show Henry III still had the power to give and take away from his Barons, even when in captivity.[31]

See also

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  • Dictum of Kenilworth[32]
  • Provisions of Oxford[34]

[1] Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Daedalus 147, (The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences 2018), 15–24.

[2] Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Ambitions Realized and Thwarted (c. 1150-c.1250),” A Short History of The Middle Ages, (University of Toronto Press 2023), 220.  

[3] Carpenter D.A., “The Pershore ‘Flores Historiarum’: An Unrecognized Chronicle from the Period of Reform and Rebellion in England, 1258-65,” The English Historical Review 127, (Oxford University Press 2012), 529.

References

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  1. ^ Saul, Nigel (1994). England in Europe: 1066-1453. A history today book. London: Collins & Brown. ISBN 978-1-85585-155-9.
  2. ^ "Nigel Saul, ed., England in Europe, 1066–1453. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. Pp. 180 plus 22 black-and-white illustrations; maps, genealogical charts". Speculum. 70 (04): 989. October 1995. doi:10.1017/s0038713400151863. ISSN 0038-7134.
  3. ^ Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, (Princeton University Press, 1970), 36.
  4. ^ Daniel Power, The Treaty of Paris (1259) and the Aristocracy of England and Normandy, (Boydell and Brewer, 2011).
  5. ^ Micheal Jones, Between France and England: Politics, Power and Society in the Late Medieval Brittany, (Taylor & Francis, 2024).
  6. ^ Beverly J. Smith, The Treaty of Lambeth 1217, (The English Historical Review 94, 1979): 562-79.
  7. ^ Feudal Society in Medieval France: Documents form the Country of Champagne, (University of Pennsylvania, 31993).
  8. ^ David Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (University of California Press, 1990), 59.
  9. ^ Nicholas Vincent, Henry III: The Pacific King (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 221–224.
  10. ^ J. R. Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 92–95.
  11. ^ Nicholas Vincent, Henry III: The Pacific King (Cambridge University Press, 2020), 221–224.
  12. ^ Robert C. Stacey, "The Age of Henry III," in The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval England, ed. Nigel Saul (Oxford University Press, 1997), 117–120.
  13. ^ Alexander, Kelleher. “The Kings Other Islands of the Sea’: The Channel Islands in the Plantagenet Realm, 1254-1341.” History 107, no. 376 (2022): 458.
  14. ^ Alexander, Kelleher. “The Kings Other Islands of the Sea’: The Channel Islands in the Plantagenet Realm, 1254-1341.” History 107, no. 376 (2022): 459.
  15. ^ Alexander Kelleher, “The King's Other Islands of the Sea’: The Channel Islands in the Plantagenet Realm, 1254-1341,” History 107, no. 376 (2022): 468.
  16. ^ Jordan, William C. A Tale of Two Monasteries: Westminster and Saint-Denis in the Thirteenth Century. (Princeton Univ. Press, 2009), 51.
  17. ^ William Chester Jordan, A Tale of Two Monasteries: Westminster and Saint-Denis in the Thirteenth Century (Princeton Univ. Press), 61.
  18. ^ William Chester Jordan, A Tale of Two Monasteries: Westminster and Saint-Denis in the Thirteenth Century (Princeton Univ. Press), 61.
  19. ^ Alexander Kelleher, “The King's Other Islands of the Sea’: The Channel Islands in the Plantagenet Realm, 1254-1341,” History 107 no. 376 (2022): 469-470.
  20. ^ Theodor Meron, “The Authority to Make Treaties in the Late Middle Ages,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 1 (1995): 5, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2203887.
  21. ^ Alexander Kelleher, “The King's Other Islands of the Sea’: The Channel Islands in the Plantagenet Realm, 1254-1341,” History 107 no. 376 (2022): 469-470.
  22. ^ Hersch Lauterpacht, Volume 20 of International Law Reports, (Cambridge University Press, 1957), 130, ISBN 0-521-46365-3.
  23. ^ David Carpenter, “The Meetings of Kings Henry III and Louis IX,” Thirteenth Century England, X: Proceedings of the Durham Conference (Bury St. Edmunds: St. Edmundsbury Press, 2003), 17-18.  
  24. ^ Perroy, Édouard (1959). The Hundred Years War (First English edition. Trans. W. B. Wells. ed.). London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 61.
  25. ^ Henry of Winchester, "Parliament Prohibited, 1260", The National Archives, 2025.
  26. ^ Clanchy, M T. 2014. England and Its Rulers, 1066-1307. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 279.
  27. ^ A, CARPENTER D. “Simon de Montfort: The First Leader of a Political Movement in English History.” History, vol. 76, no. 246, 1991, pp. 3–23.
  28. ^ John Robert Maddicott. Simon de Montfort. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 216.
  29. ^ John Robert Maddicott. Simon de Montfort. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 271-273.
  30. ^ Stephen Bennett, “The Battle of Evesham (1265): Edward Longshanks’ First Victory on the Battlefield,” Medieval Warfare, (Karwansaray BV 2012), 42–46; Arnald FitzThedmar, “Battle of Evesham, 1265”, The National Archives, 2025.
  31. ^ Benjamin L. Wild, "Reasserting Medieval Kingship: King Henry III and The Dictum of Kenilworth," (New York: The Boydell Press 2016), 243.
  32. ^ Francis Fukuyama, “The Last English Civil War,” Daedalus 147, (The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences 2018), 15–24.
  33. ^ Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Ambitions Realized and Thwarted (c. 1150-c.1250),” A Short History of The Middle Ages, (University of Toronto Press 2023), 220.  
  34. ^ Carpenter D.A., “The Pershore ‘Flores Historiarum’: An Unrecognized Chronicle from the Period of Reform and Rebellion in England, 1258-65,” The English Historical Review 127, (Oxford University Press 2012), 529.
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