Sat, May 18, 2024 page8

• Vigilance needed in Taiwan Strait

  • By Cathy Fang Lin Tzu-yao 林子堯
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  On Monday, president-elect William Lai (賴清德) is to deliver his inaugural address. Regardless of his position on Taiwan’s sovereignty — be it moderate or assertive — it is anticipated that China, which regards Lai as a “staunch separatist,” would express strong dissatisfaction. However, focusing solely on the inauguration day itself might overlook the bigger picture. It is important to remain vigilant before and after the event.

  To gauge the response and red lines of the incoming Lai administration, as well as to test how substantial the US’ rock-solid support for Taiwan is, China might instigate conflicts or even military operations against Taiwan’s outlying islands.

  Two plans could be on the table: Plan A, which targets Matsu and Kinmen, might provoke a strong response from Taiwan, but less from the international community.

  Plan B, which involves actions against Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島), could potentially provoke more neighboring countries, but leave Taiwan and other partners with fewer options. Whichever plan China moves on depends on the cost-benefit analysis from its perspective.

  The recent unveiling of Taiwan’s new national security team indicates the new administration’s desire to maintain continuity with President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) national security team. However, the appointment of civilian Wellington Koo (顧立雄) as minister of defense has sparked debate. Concerns have been raised about the appropriateness of a civilian heading the military, a situation further complicated by historically tense civil-military relations.

  One piece missing from those discussions is that Koo’s appointment could potentially heighten the risk of military action against Taiwan. As the second defense minister from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Koo is the first to be labeled by China as a “diehard separatist.” This represents a significant departure from his predecessors, who were seen to be opposed to Taiwanese independence.

  From Beijing’s perspective, this transitional phase might provide an opportunity to “throw a curveball near the edge,” using military actions that blur the line between “gray zone” activities and armed conflict, to test Taiwan’s response during the administrative transition.

  Outlying islands under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China (ROC) government, such as Taiping Island, Kinmen and Matsu, possess common and unique characteristics, including substantial defensive challenges due to their distance from Taiwan proper. Despite receiving limited international attention, losing these territories would deeply affect the Taiwanese public.

  However, differences emerge when comparing Taiping Island with Matsu and Kinmen. These differences are driven by the varying levels of domestic and international awareness, the psychological connection these islands have with Taiwanese, the geopolitical value each island holds and the diverse stakeholders involved in the South China Sea territorial disputes.

  Concerning the Taiping Island dispute, the International Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines during the South China Sea case in 2016, and also demoted the status of Taiping Island to a “reef.” This verdict elicited strong criticism from China. Meanwhile, Taiwan, maintaining the “11-dash line” claim (originating from the territorial claims of the ROC before 1949), aligns more with China’s stance. Ironically, this stance is opposed by the US, Japan and most European countries, which support the Philippines.

  In the event of a military conflict over Taiping Island, China would be likely to categorize it as an internal dispute. The US’ support for the 2016 ruling could put it in an awkward position regarding the aid of military personnel stationed on Taiping Island. Such an unclear situation could provide China with an opportunity to engage in military action. However, considering the escalating tensions in the South China Sea recently, China might deem the timing unsuitable for a forceful takeover, as it would exacerbate an already fraught geopolitical situation. Given the increasing regional awareness, a forceful takeover of Itu Aba, claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, could galvanize not only neighboring countries and the US, but also other stakeholders in the area, leading to a heightened state of vigilance.

  However, if China conducts military action against Taiping Island, it does not necessarily mean it would lead to wider armed conflict.

  After the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan was forced by Germany, Russia and France to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula. Similarly, diplomatic negotiations could be initiated by the US or Japan, pressuring China to abandon its occupation of Taiping Island and maintain the “status quo” in the South China Sea.

  Another aspect to consider is China’s ongoing efforts to promote a “united front” narrative that Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) government aligned with the Chinese Communist Party’s stance on the South China Sea. If the US interferes in China’s occupation of Taiping Island, it might provoke a response from the anti-US and pro-China factions within Taiwan. It could also further intensify anti-US sentiment among the pro-China faction. This is a crucial concern that warrants serious attention.

  China has long sought control over Kinmen and Matsu. However, it has not seized these islands, not due to inability, but because it has chosen not to, or sees no need.

  The legislators and county commissioners of Kinmen and Lienchiang (Matsu), traditionally aligned with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), maintain strong ties with China, which has cultivated these connections with economic incentives instead of resorting to forcible unification. Nevertheless, history shows that these areas often become the primary targets during heightened tensions.

  In 1958, Mao Zedong’s (毛澤東) People’s Liberation Army tested the reliability and validity of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, which had left it ambiguous on whether it covered Taiwan’s outlying islands apart from the Pescadores, during the 823 Artillery Battle, also known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

  Now, 45 years after the Taiwan Relations Act came into effect, and with the US Congress passing several laws to support Taiwan’s defense, China might view this as another opportune moment to test the US’ backing of Taiwan. China could potentially seize part of the territories of Kinmen and Matsu and declare to the international community that these areas, as part of Fujian Province, rightfully belong to it. This is another potential military strategy that Beijing might consider against Taiwan.

  It might seem counterintuitive to present such a striking scenario, especially when the US and China appear to be “managing” their competition. Many experts rule out the possibility of China launching military campaigns against Taiwan before the US presidential election in November, and say that Beijing would adopt a wait-and-see approach. However, conflicts often arise from impulsive decisions made by unassailable leaders, as evidenced by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

  With the new DPP administration about to begin, China might fabricate pretexts to launch an attack to undermine the confidence of Taiwan’s military and civilians. This situation requires not only Taiwan’s vigilance, but also increased attention from the international community to ensure that potential threats are not overlooked.

  Cathy Fang is a policy analyst at the Project 2049 Institute and a research associate at the Armitage International, L.C. Lin Tzu-yao is from Kaohsiung and holds a master’s degree from National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of National Development, majoring in China studies and cross-strait relations.
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