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The document discusses theories of justification, specifically foundationalism and coherentism, and their associated problems, including fallibilism and skepticism. Foundationalism posits that justified beliefs rest on basic, non-inferential beliefs, while coherentism argues that beliefs are justified within a network of mutually supportive beliefs. It also addresses global skepticism through various arguments and responses, emphasizing the contextual nature of knowledge and justification in specific domains such as religion and morality.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
14 views13 pages

Pages 216 To 225

The document discusses theories of justification, specifically foundationalism and coherentism, and their associated problems, including fallibilism and skepticism. Foundationalism posits that justified beliefs rest on basic, non-inferential beliefs, while coherentism argues that beliefs are justified within a network of mutually supportive beliefs. It also addresses global skepticism through various arguments and responses, emphasizing the contextual nature of knowledge and justification in specific domains such as religion and morality.

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mthalanesonto09
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Theories and problems of justification

Pages 216 - 225

Theories
• Foundationalism
• Coherentism

Problems
• Fallibilism
Theory of justification:
Foundationalism
“Foundationalism is the view that all justified beliefs ultimately Examples:
rest on a set of foundational, basic beliefs.”
Basic belief: Memory is reliable (infer to……)
“But what justifies basic beliefs? If basic beliefs function so as to
justify other beliefs, then they too must be justified. If the Basic belief: The method of science gives accurate scientific
foundation is not justified, then none of the beliefs that rest on it information (infer to…..)
are justified. According to foundationalism, the beliefs that make Basic belief: Non-material or non-physical beings exist (infer
up the foundation are justified beliefs, but they are justified to…..)
noninferential beliefs. Foundational beliefs must be non-
inferential (not based on inference) because if they were Basic belief: All beings/objects/phenomena are material or
inferential, they would get their justification from another source, physical (infer to…..)
and they would no longer be foundational. Foundational beliefs Basic belief: Rules of mathematics work (infer to….)
are supposed to be where the justification stops.”
Inferred belief 2
Basic belief: We would not be able to speak about anything,
or to think about anything, if those things did not have
some existence (infer to…..)
Descarte’s basic belief: Descartes thought that whatever a
Linear Inferred belief 1 subject can clearly and distinctly conceive of in their mind,
they can take to be true because God would not allow them
to be fooled (infer to…..)
Basic belief Problem: How to justify basic beliefs, if not inferred?
Theory of justification:
Coherentism
Coherentism is the view that a belief is Example (all these propositions/beliefs have equal status in
the web):
justified if it is embedded in a network Proposition 1 (no, this is not the base, there is no base): All
of coherent, mutually supported beliefs. beings/objects/phenomena are material or physical
Proposition 2: Scientific evidence says all phenomena that can
“…a subject’s justification for individual be known must be material or physical
beliefs, taken alone, is not that strong. Proposition 3: Sense data of material or physical phenomena
can be compared, person to person
But when those beliefs are situated in a Proposition 4: Non-material and non-physical phenomena
system of many mutually supporting have still not been verified
beliefs, the justification grows stronger. Proposition 5: Rational procedures in science like
mathematical workings, all refer to natural laws, which are
Justification emerges from the structure laws about physical or material reality
of a belief system (BonJour 1985).”
Problem 1: It can become circular (circularity) e.g. moral
Non-linear belief systems
Problem 2: Webs can become isolated – not connected to
reality (isolationism) e.g. the materialism of science
Problems with justification:
Fallibilism
Sources of justification: All of these can be faulty (fallibilism)
1. Memory 1. Remembering a crime scene
2. Inference (deduction and induction)
2. Brain argument
3. Testimony
3. Only I was violated (but in fact, they
4. Perception
were treated the same as everyone
Q: Can we be ‘direct realists’? else)
Q: Are you a realist about
4. Broken pencil, mirage
• Ancestors
A: “While direct realism holds that one
• God
can directly perceive the external world,
• Moral facts it still cannot guarantee that beliefs
• Chairs, tables, fish about it are true, for both hallucinations
• Biological race and illusions are still possible.”
Skepticism
Global skepticism
• The dream argument
• The evil demon argument
• Putnam’s brain in a vat argument
Responses to global skepticism
• Moore
• Contextualism
Local/specific domains skepticism
Global skepticism
General structure of all global skepticism arguments:
(SH: skeptical hypothesis)

1. If I cannot rule out the possibility of SH, then I cannot be justified in


believing that P.
2. I cannot rule out the possibility of SH (or called a defeater).
3. Therefore, I cannot be justified in believing that P.
The dream argument – Zhaung
Zhou
Zhaung Zhou (c. 369–286 BCE)
puts forward the possibility that
all of what we take to be
conscious experience is actually a
dream. And if we are dreaming,
then all our beliefs about the
external world are false because
those beliefs take for granted that
our current experience is real.
The evil demon argument –
Rene Descartes
Descartes argued that because dreams often incorporate
experiences we have in real life, it is impossible to
distinguish between dreaming and waking life (Descartes
2008). But Descartes eventually concludes that even if he
could be dreaming, there are still some beliefs he can
know, specifically arithmetic. Even in dreams, 1 + 1 = 2,
and a square will always have four sides. And so,
Descartes devises an even stronger skeptical hypothesis:
what if we are being tricked by an evil demon?
1. If I cannot rule out the possibility that an evil demon is
tricking me, then I do not have any knowledge of the
external world.
2. I cannot rule out the possibility that an evil demon is
tricking me.
3. Therefore, I do not have knowledge of the external
world.
The brain in a vat argument –
Hilary Putnam
The result is a seamless experience of
consciousness between yesterday and
today. When you woke this morning, your
life seemed to proceed without disruption.
Can you prove that you are not a brain in a
vat? No, you cannot. The scenario
stipulates that your experience will seem
exactly the same whether you are a brain
in a vat or not. Other, similar skeptical
scenarios are easy to come up with.
Consider the possibility that you are caught
in a virtual reality world or that you are
trapped in the Matrix.
Responses to global skepticism
To overcome global skepticism counter arguments
are needed
Moore (common sense) “Here is one hand, and here is
Note to class: I have changed this another.”
argument
Here is the argument’s structure:
1. If I cannot confirm a SH, then I
am be justified in believing that P.
2. I cannot confirm a SH (skeptical
hypothesis)
3. Therefore, I am justified in
believing that P
Responses to global skepticism
To overcome global skepticism counter arguments
are needed
Contextualism (also common sense)
Contextualism is the view that the truth of knowledge
attributions depends on the context. Contextualism is a
theory about knowledge and justification. When we
attribute knowledge to a subject S, the truth of the
knowledge claim depends on the context that S is in. The
context of S determines the level of justification needed for
a true belief to count as knowledge. Contextualism comes
from the observation that the level of confidence needed
for justification changes depending on what the belief is as
well as its the purpose and its importance, among other
things. We expect a high degree of justification from
physicians when they diagnose disease but less justification
from friends recalling the title of a movie because there’s
much more at stake in medical diagnoses.
Specific domains skepticism
A common form of local skepticism focuses on religious belief, specifically knowledge of the
existence of God. Another form of local skepticism concerns the ability to ever have moral
knowledge. Skepticism in these domains does not entail that there is no God or that all moral claims
are false. Rather, skepticism means that we can never be sufficiently justified in believing that there
is a God or that moral claims are true. We simply can never know either way whether, for example,
God exists.
Realism vs skepticism about
specific domains
Sources of justification:
Llllllll
1. Memory
2. Inference (deduction and
induction)
3. Testimony
4. Perception
Q: Can we be ‘direct realists’? To be a
realist about X you cannot skeptical
about X’s existence.
Q: Are you a realist about
• Ancestors
• God
• Moral facts
• Chairs, tables, fish
• Biological race

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