Nicomachean Ethics

Man

Soul
Body

Function Function Function

Nutritive Sensitive Thoughtful

Moral Virtues: Intellectual Virtues:

The mean term, The more the better.

balance between two
equal extremes.

Happiness
Happiness.

There is indeed a certain number of goals, and we intend to achieve some of them, not by
themselves; but in view of other purposes; for example, money, flutes, and generally everything that
they are instruments; since this is the case, it is evident that not all ends are perfect ends. But the
supreme good constitutes, in some way, a perfect end. Although the unique and absolutely
the perfect one we are looking for. If there are several purposes, then it would be the most perfect of
all. Now then: we assert that what we seek for its own sake is more perfect than what is
it seeks for another purpose; and the good that is not chosen except in view of another is not as desirable as
the goods that are considered both means and ends. And speaking absolutely, the perfect good is the
which must always be possessed by oneself and not for a reason external to oneself. This good seems to be, in
First of all, happiness. We seek it, indeed, always for its own sake and never for any other reason.
alien to herself. Honors, pleasure, thought, and all kinds of virtues are not enough for us.
try to reach them by themselves..., but we also seek them in the pursuit of happiness, because
we imagine that we will achieve this through your means. While no one desires happiness for
the advantages or benefits we have just mentioned are neither, in one word, by anything that is external to
herself. Now then: evidently this characteristic of happiness has its origin in the
fact that she is entirely self-sufficient. The supreme good, indeed, according to the
common opinion, it is self-sufficient.

Happiness in man: a function proper to the activity of the soul

Nevertheless, perhaps, even if we agree that happiness is the supreme good, it is still desired.
to have some clarifications or complementary precisions. It would quickly reach a
conclusion, realizing what is the proper act of man. For the flute player,
for the sculptor, for all types of craftsmen, in a word, for all those who practice a
They work and engage in an activity; good and perfection seemingly reside in the same work.
Evidently, the same happens in man, if there is any act that is his own. Will there be,
Well, I must admit that the craftsman and the shoemaker have a particular activity and a job.
specific, and man will not have it and Nature will have made it inactive? Or just like the
eye, the foot, the hand, in one word, all parts of the body have, evidently, a
function to fulfill, is it necessary to accept for man also an activity, in addition to those that
Did we just indicate? What could this be? Because, with evidence, life is common to man and
to the plants; and we seek what specifically characterizes them. Therefore, we must set aside the
nutrition and growth. Then came sentient life; but this, without a doubt, also belongs
to the horse, to the ox, and to every living being. There remains only one active life, peculiar to the endowed being
reason.

Happiness consists in the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.

But we still have to distinguish in it (in reason) two parts: one that obeys, so to speak, to the
reason, and another that possesses reason and is dedicated to thought Given that it is presented this way, it is
I need to consider her in her activity, as that is where she shows the most superiority. Yes,
Well, the peculiarity of man is the activity of the soul, partially or totally in accordance with reason;
if we assert that this function is inherent to the nature of the virtuous man, just as when
talks about the good citarist and the notable citarist, and this happens in all circumstances, having
consider the superiority that, coming from virtue or merit, crowns the act, so that
the good citarist plays the cithara, and the outstanding citarist plays the cithara very well; if that is the case,
we assume that the peculiar thing about man is a way of life, that this way of life is the
activity of the soul, accompanied by reasonable actions, and that in the perfect man everything is done.
according to the good and the beautiful or honest, realizing each of these acts perfectly, according to their
peculiar virtue. Under these conditions, the proper good of man is the activity of the soul, in
conformity with virtue; and if the virtues are numerous, according to which is the best and most perfect.

About moral virtues

And since what we are investigating is human goodness, let us begin by establishing that the
the soul has two parts that participate in reason, but both do not participate in reason
same way, but one participates in it having the natural ability to give orders, and the
another with the natural ability to obey and listen.

We have said, for example, that the soul involves a part that is endowed with reason and a part that lacks it.
of her... Now then: the part that lacks reason implies in turn a part that, apparently,
it belongs to all living beings, including plants; I am referring to the principle of nutrition and the
growth or development. Indeed, this power of the soul can be attributed to all beings.
living beings, including embryos, an activity that is also found in beings that have reached their
full development; at least it can be admitted with greater reason than any other. The virtue that
according to common opinion, this faculty belongs to the realm of almost all beings and not.
it has nothing specifically human...

But there is yet another power of the soul that seems to be devoid of reason, despite participating in
she in some degree. Well, in the moderate or sober man and in the intemperate, we take notice of
the reason, that is to say, from the part of the soul endowed with reason. But, according to common sentiment, one perceives
also a kind of instinct that repulses reason, combats it, and confronts it...

Thus, the private part of reason seems to be double as well. The part common to men and to
plants do not participate in it in any degree, while concupiscence, turned entirely towards
desire is not absolutely strange to her, to the extent that it is docile and submissive to her.

Each part of the soul corresponds to a modality of virtue.

Goodness has two forms: moral virtue and intellectual virtue or excellence; we praise, in
effect, not only on the just one, but also on the intelligent and wise... And since the
virtues or intellectual excellences involve reason, those forms of goodness belong to the
rational part, which, because it has reason, has dominion over the soul; while the virtues
morals correspond to the part that is irrational, but which by nature is capable of following the
rational part; to establish, in effect, the moral qualities of a man, we do not say that it is
wise or intelligent, but rather benevolent and bold or brave.

Classification of virtues

Namely: the soul, as we usually say, is divided into two parts, the one we call irrational and the one that
we call rational. In the rational part lie prudence, shrewdness, and presence of mind, the
wisdom, training or education, memory and other things of the same kind. And in the part
irrational what we call virtues: temperance, justice, courage and all those,
rooted in character, they are worthy or deserving of praise. For them, in fact, we are judged.
worthy of praise; while no one is praised for those that correspond to the rational part
of the soul. On the other hand, neither is the irrational part of the soul praised, but only insofar as it is suitable.
to subordinate itself to the rational part and as it currently subordinates itself to it.

Notion and nature of moral virtue.

Since the soul contains only passions, capacities for action, and acquired dispositions,
Virtue must belong to one of these three classes. I call passions to concupiscence, anger, the
miedo, la temeridad, la envidia, la alegría, la amistad, el odio, la añoranza, la emulación, la piedad;
in one word: everything that is accompanied by pleasure or pain. I call abilities to our
possibilities of experiencing these passions; for example, what makes us prone to feel the
anger, hatred or pity. The dispositions, finally, place us with respect to the passions in a
happy or unhappy position; for example, regarding anger, if one lets oneself be carried away too much by it
or too little, we find ourselves in a bad disposition; if we let ourselves be carried away by it
Moderately, we are in good and happy dispositions; the same can be said for others.
cases.

It must be said that every virtue, according to the quality that it is perfection, is what produces this.
perfection and the one that provides, better than anything, the expected result. For example, the virtue of
The eye exercises the eye and fulfills its mission in a satisfactory manner; thanks to the virtue of
Eye, we see perfectly. Likewise, the virtue of the horse makes it a good horse.
suitable for the race, capable of carrying its rider and able to withstand the clash with the enemy. If
this has value for all things, the virtue of man will be a disposition susceptible of
to make him a good and honest man, capable of performing the function that is characteristic of him.

The golden mean.

I speak of moral virtue, which is the one related to passions and human actions, which
they connote excess, deficiency, or just the right amount. For example, the feelings of fear, of
self-confidence, of lust, of anger, of piety, in a word, of pleasure or pain,
they can affect us either too much or too little, and in both cases defectively. But
if we experience these feelings at the right moment, for satisfying reasons,
regarding people who deserve them, for convenient ends and under suitable conditions, we
we will maintain an excellent middle ground, which is characteristic of virtue; of the same
In actions, there are excesses, defects, and middle terms.

Thus, virtue is related to actions, as it is to passions. In it, the excess is

a fault and defect provoke reproach; on the contrary, the mean achieves praise
and success, a double fruit characteristic of virtue. Virtue is, therefore, a kind of mean, already
that the proposed goal is a balance between two extremes. … For these reasons, then, the
Excess and defect are signs of vice, while the mean characterizes virtue.