TURKEY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Fifty years after the Treaty of Rome, signed on the 25th March 1957, the
European project is following an uncertain road. In this difficult context,
what are the consequences of Turkey´ s accession for the future of the
Union?
1. Probably the most critical feature of the current European Union (EU) is the
uncertainty about the course of the European project. What is the ultimate goal of
integration? A large market with a single currency, or a political and military world
power? A federal Europe, or a confederation of sovereign States? There is another
relevant feature, not so obvious, but nowadays lacking the stable and implicit
compromise of the first decades of European integration. Until now/Traditionally, the EU
has worked based on a political and financial balance between “large” and
“small/medium” countries, between net givers and net takers to the European budget.
This balance functions more or less like this: the large countries (the obvious cases being
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy) have great influence over political
decisions - which can be seen this in the qualified majorities in the Council (related
directly, since the Treaty of Nice, to the population of each country,). On the other hand,
a significant portion of the small/medium countries are the traditional beneficiaries of the
Structural Funds (e.g. Greece, Portugal, etc. and after the enlargements of 2004 and 2007
almost all of the twelve new Member-States). Putting it in another way and in the crude
language of realpolitk: he who pays (the benefits of the others) has the (political) power
to decide.
2. It was in this context, characterized by a major enlargement of the EU, the greatest in
its history, and by a world in turmoil after the 11th September and Iraq war, that the issue
of Turkish accession appeared. Many arguments have been used to point out the benefits
of Turkey’s accession to the EU: i) the strategic advantages of a large country placed in
an important geopolitical region; ii) issues of energy supply (oil and natural gas); iii)
access to a market of more than 70 million consumers; iv) a cheap and abundant young
workforce; v) the means to avoid a possible “conflict of civilizations”. Let’s analyse these
arguments. First, the strategic advantages. What is undeniable is the geopolitical
relevance of Turkey. Of course, this relevance has been the fundamental reason behind
Turkish membership of NATO since the 50s. But the question now is: what strategic
gain does its EU membership bring? A more credible Common Foreign and Security
Policy? Yet, can we believe that the EU, with near 30 members, may obtain the necessary
consensus in order to implement this policy when in the past, with a relatively small and
homogeneous composition, this was not possible? Further, unless there are very positive
developments in Middle East affairs, the foreseeable “gains” include a number of new
neighbours; one a country with nuclear ambitions (Iran), another a country raged by
sectarian violence (Iraq) and a third country (Syria) which has been trying to destabilize
Lebanon. Secondly, regarding the argument of the advantages related with the supply of
oil and natural gas. Here it is important to remember that Turkey is not a major producer
or supplier of energy. Thus, if the argument is to have members with significant energy
resources the logical solution would be the accession of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan or
Russia... If the problem is the movement of energy supplies (pipelines from the Caspian
Sea cross Turkish territory to the shores of the Mediterranean sea), we must remember
that the country is already connected by an integration agreement, in the form of a
customs union, with the EU. Moreover, Turkey is also militarily connected with NATO,
whose members include a great number of EU countries. It is not clear why neither
solutions work anymore. Concerning the third argument, a market with more than 70
million consumers, it does not consider the impact of the customs union agreement which
was implemented in the middle 90s. This agreement has already opened the doors of the
Turkish market to European enterprises and vice versa. Now the fourth argument related
to the need for a workforce for the European economy. If what is needed is a qualified
workforce, countries like Ukraine or Russia have people with better qualifications, and if
there is indeed the need for a cheap workforce, then everyday there are people from the
Maghreb or North African countries trying to come into the EU. Why not let them come
in and work? Lastly, the argument of the advantages that Turkish membership would
bring to avoid a “conflict of civilizations”. I must say that this idea is based on an
essentialist vision of civilizations and is a simplistic one. Islam is complex and
heterogeneous – the Sunnis and Shias are only one facet of this reality – and its marked
by important religious divisions (between orthodox Islam and the “heretical sects”,
Druzes, Alevis, Alawis, etc.) ethnic ones (Arabs, Persians, Kurds, etc.). It’s naive to
think that Turkey’s accession to the EU will appease the Muslim World. Furthermore,
there is a real risk of the importation of Turkish rivalries. An example of this problem:
neither Shia countries like Iran, nor Sunni Arab countries like Saudi Arabia will accept
Turkish primacy.
3. The common arguments, apparently convincing, that are heard in a small country on
the edge of Europe like Portugal are fragile. We must remember that Turkey is already
integrated in a Euro-Atlantic framework (the customs union and NATO). In fact,
whatever advantages there may be are mitigated with strategic risks. Moreover, Turkish
integration into Europe is seen by countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands or
Austria as unfavourable in terms of political decision-making, and in the financial cost to
the support and in future of the European project. All this goes beyond the problem of
Cypriot access to Turkish ports and airports denied by Turkey (and the reunification of
Cyprus) discussed at the end of 2006. We are seeing the first round of a long diplomatic
game. The strategy of both sides is to blame the other side for the break up of
negotiations. On the Turkish side the strategy is also to profit from the divisions in
Europe and to play with the Europeans’ guilty feelings. Ultimately, there is an
unavoidable question of realpolitik: nobody can see the EU working well in a model
where the countries who support the burden of the European budget (Germany, France
and others) lose political power in the decision-making process, to the most important
beneficiary of financial aid (Turkey).
José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes
