Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence

Supplements
to
Vigiliae Christianae
Texts and Studies of
Early Christian Life and Language

Editors
J. den Boeft – B.D. Ehrman – J. van Oort
D.T. Runia – C. Scholten – J.C.M. van Winden

VOLUME 116

The titles published in this series are listed at [Link]/vcs

Augustine and the Functions
of Concupiscence

By
Timo Nisula

LEIDEN • BOSTON
2012
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nisula, Timo.
Augustine and the functions of concupiscence / by Timo Nisula.
p. cm. – (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, ISSN 0920-623X ; v. 116)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-23168-9 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-90-04-23344-7 (e-book)
1. Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. 2. Lust–Religious aspects–Christianity. I. Title.

BR65.A9N57 2012
233'.4–dc23
2012024322

This publication has been typeset in the multilingual “Brill” typeface. With over 5,100 characters
covering Latin, IPA, Greek, and Cyrillic, this typeface is especially suitable for use in the
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ISSN 0920-623X
ISBN 978 90 04 23168 9 (hardback)
ISBN 978 90 04 23344 7 (e-book)

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To Kirsi
CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. The Task of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. The Sources of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Lines of Research on Concupiscentia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5. Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2. The Language of Desire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.1. Roman Literature and Libido, Cupiditas, Concupisco . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1.1. Historical Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.2. Philosophical Writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2. Latin Christian Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3. Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.1. Some Lexical Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.2. Augustine’s Semantic Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3. Synonymy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3.4. Textual Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3. Paradise and Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

3.1. Probing for the Connection between Divine Punishment and
Concupiscentia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2. Stabilizing Reciprocal Punishment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1. Disobedience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2.2. Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.2.3. Rhetorical Aesthetics of Punitive Concupiscence . . . . . . . 107
3.3. Defending Divine Punishment and Divine Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3.1. Starting the Defence—nupt. et conc. and c. ep. Pel. . . . . . . 113
3.3.2. An Escalating Conflict—c. Iul. and c. Iul. imp. . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
viii contents

4. The Root and Matrix of Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

4.1. Cupiditas and Caritas—An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.2. Cupiditas As the Root of All Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.3. Triple Concupiscentia As the Matrix of Sin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

5. Concupiscentia and Philosophical Traditions of Emotions . . . . . . . . . 193

5.1. Emotions, Libido and Anti-Manichaean Apology (388–396) . . . 200
5.2. Continuities and Interludes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.2.1. Affective Confessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
5.2.2. Contra Faustum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
5.2.3. De Trinitate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
5.3. Critical Reflections—De Ciuitate Dei and the Debate with
Julian of Aeclanum (410–430) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
5.3.1. De Ciuitate Dei 9 and 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
5.3.2. Critical Encounters with Philosophy, Emotions, and
Christian Psychology in the Debate with Julian of
Aeclanum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
5.4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

6. Grace and Renewal—The Domestication of Concupiscentia . . . . . . . 267

6.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
6.2. Disavowing Concupiscentia—Vague Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
6.3. Inuictissima Cupiditas—In Search of the Effects of Grace . . . . . . 278
6.4. Relocating Concupiscentia—The First Phase of the Pelagian
Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
6.5. Encountering Caricatures—The Second Phase of the
Pelagian Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
6.5.1. Resistibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
6.5.2. Interiority in Christian Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
6.5.3. Real Effects of Baptism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
6.5.4. Romans 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
6.6. Last Meanderings with Julian—Resistibility and Necessity . . . . 340
6.6.1. Resistibility and the Real Effects of Baptism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
6.6.2. Romans 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
6.6.3. Christ As a Model for Renewal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
6.7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350

7. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
contents ix

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
1. Augustine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
2. Other Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
3. Translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
Index of Modern Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Index of Subjects and Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Index of Ancient Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402
PREFACE

Augustine claims in his preface to de doctrina christiana that learning,

indeed knowing, is social. The claim has been verified through my personal
experience during the writing of this book. Many people have inspired,
helped, taught and encouraged me in different ways during the long process
of creating this book. To these people I owe my deep gratitude.
Professor Risto Saarinen has been the supervisor of my dissertation and
has gone through several phases of the manuscript. His interest, encourage-
ment, and judgment have been of enormous value during all the stages of
my work. I extend my heartfelt gratitude for his unfailing patience, enthu-
siasm and motivation.
The progress in learning and writing with Augustine started in 1999 with
my master’s thesis on concupiscentia. Professor Tuomo Mannermaa and the
Reverend †Simo Kiviranta offered their gentle advice and encouraged me
to start exploring the topic.
From early days on, Adjunct Professor Sammeli Juntunen has offerred
his honest and invaluable judgment, and he has commented on the book in
its various forms. His example and passionately intellectual way of working
with theological texts have made a lasting impression on me.
Professor Simo Knuuttila has made useful suggestions, questions and
pertinent remarks on several occasions. I also thank him for allowing me to
conduct my work in the History of Mind and the Philosophical Psychology,
Morality and Politics Research Units.
In 2003, I had the priviledge of visiting Professor Josef Lössl at Cardiff
University. His kind reception and searching questions were of indispens-
able value then. The greater was my enthusiasm and gratitude for his efforts
as the preliminary examiner of my dissertation. The diligence and care of
Adjunct Professor Toivo Holopainen crucially improved this book, as well.
Pauli Annala, Gunnar af Hällström, †Heikki Kotila, Martti Mäkinen, Mat-
ti Rissanen, Heli Tissari, Reijo Työrinoja and Olli-Pekka Vainio have in dif-
ferent ways helped in the inception and continuation of this work. Professor
Gerard O’Daly also kindly offered his advice in the initial stages of writing.
Adjunct Professor Erkki Koskenniemi has shown steadfast confidence in
my completing this project, even when I have been ready to give up. It is
safe to say that without his nearly unrealistic optimism and support, the
work would have never seen daylight.
xii preface

Discussions with Augustinian scholars in international conferences in

Chicago and Oxford have given courage to keep on in the solitude of Augus-
tine’s texts and voice. I am grateful to Professors Michael Cameron, Carol
Harrison and Mathijs Lamberigts for their support, comments and ques-
tions. I would like to especially thank Marleen Verschoren, for her critical
comments and questions on the topic. Likewise, I stand in deep gratitude to
Professor Johannes van Oort, and his suggestions especially on Manichaean
topics. I also thank him and the editorial board members of Vigiliae Chris-
tianae Supplements for accepting this book in the series. Mattie Kuiper from
E.J. Brill generously helped in preparing this book for publication.
Kate Moore has done an enormous job in editing my English into a
readable form, showing admirable patience towards impossible deadlines.
Any errors and mistakes that may have been added to the text after her
language revision are my own.
In addition to being part of The Philosophical Psychology, Morality and
Politics Research Unit (PMP), the work has also been financed by grants
from the Alfred Kordelin Foundation and the Emil Aaltonen Foundation.
The Chancellor of the University of Helsinki, and the Rector of the Univer-
sity of Helsinki have funded visits abroad and awarded a dissertation com-
pletion grant. The grant of the Research Institute of the Evangelical Church
of Finland covered expenses in acquiring indispensable research tools and
literature. Moreover, The Lutheran Evangelical Association of Finland has
been generous in understanding and support for my leaves of absence for
academic purposes. I acknowledge all these institutions with gratitude.
A great many friends and relatives outside academic circles have been
of enormous support, joy and relief during the hardships due to this book.
I thank my parents, Marianne and Pekka Nisula for their prayers. My sons
Otso and Rauno have illuminated my Augustinian writing chamber by their
presence, and convinced me of the real order of things.
This book is dedicated to my wife Kirsi, rarissimae avi. She has shown me
the objective reality of beauty, reason and love.

Timo Nisula
ABBREVIATIONS

AA Augustiniana.
ACW Ancient Christian Writers.
Ages Augustine through the Ages, An Encyclopedia (ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald).
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
AH Augustin Handbuch (hrsg. Volker Henning Drecoll). Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
AL Augustinus-Lexikon. Basel: Schwabe. 1986–.
AM Augustinus Magister I–III.
ANRW Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur
Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.
1972–.
AS Augustinian Studies.
Aug Augustinianum.
AU Augustinus.
BA Bibliothèque Augustinienne. Les œuvres de saint Augustin. Paris: Insti-
tut d’études augustiniennes. 1949–.
BETL Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium.
BSELK Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. (7. Aufl.)
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht. 1976.
CAG2 Corpus Augustinianum Gissense 2. Basel: Schwabe. 2004.
CLCLT-5 The CETEDOC Library of Christian Latin texts.
DR Downside Review.
FC Fathers of the Church.
JECS Journal of Early Christian Studies.
JRE Journal of Religious Ethics.
JRS Journal of Roman Studies.
JTS Journal of Theological Studies.
LXX Septuaginta.
NHMS Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies.
OLD Oxford Latin Dictionary (ed. P. Glare). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1982.
RACh Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum.
REAug Revue d’études augustiniennes.
RechAug Recherches Augustiniennes.
SLAG Schriften der Luther-Agricola Gesellschaft.
SP Studia Patristica.
SVF Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (ed. Johannes von Arnim). Leipzig: B.G.
Teubner. 1903.
ThPh Theologie und Philosophie.
TLL Thesaurus Linguae Latinae.
TU Texte und Untersuchungen.
xiv abbreviations

TWNT Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.

VC Vigiliae Christianae.
VCS Vigiliae Christianae Supplementa.
ZKG Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie.
ZNW Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft.
ZRG Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte.
WUNT Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament.
chapter one

INTRODUCTION

haec est namque poena inoboedienti homini reddita in semetipso, ut ei

uicissim non oboediatur nec a semetipso.
c. adu. leg. 1, 18

in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas

est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet
omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.
s. Denis 14, 2

uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbatio-

nibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos
non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam ueri-
tatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues
sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum uiuentes
metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas
omnes affectiones rectas habent.
ciu. 14, 9

ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis
concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de
apostolo dementis est credere.
c. Iul. 6, 70

1.1. The Task of the Study

Augustine’s insights into evil desire became an immediate source of con-

troversy during his lifetime and they have remained controversial to this
day. Particularly during the past two or three decades, a great number of
scholars have paid attention to those of Augustine’s views that are related
to concupiscentia. These views include not only such themes as original sin,
baptism, and renewal, but also sex, sexual desire and gender. Furthermore,
on the ecumenical front, the subject of concupiscentia has kept doctrinal
2 chapter one

negotiators busy during the 1990s.1 On a more general cultural level, Augus-
tine’s assessments of sexuality have been a rich quarry for those inclined to
consider him to be the major representative of a repressive, ascetic Christian
culture. From a scholarly angle, assessments of the Manichaean influence
on Augustine’s conceptions of sin in general and of concupiscentia in par-
ticular, have revived since the days of Albert Bruckner. Concupiscentia has
thus indeed proved to be a matter of contention.
While controversies always tend to call for attention and study, they
may also often obscure the original questions by framing them in terms of
problems that were not part of the mindset in which they were originally
presented. This study is an attempt to present a general view of Augustine’s
concept of evil desire, and the uses or functions that he attributes to this con-
cept in his thought. In this respect, the goal of this study is to present, as
fully and as completely as possible Augustine’s own emphases on this topic;
to identify the relevant points in his analysis of concupiscentia; to analyse
the contexts in which he chose to think and develop his notion of it; and
finally, to seek to evaluate these contexts and to form a judgment of their
comparative importance to Augustine’s thought. This leads us to the cen-
tral proposition of this study. Rather than analyse the sources and origins
of Augustine’s notion of concupiscentia, this study is more interested in the
question of how and for what purposes Augustine uses the notion itself.2
Hence, the aim of this study is to describe the varying functions of concupis-
centia. The basic conviction for such a quest arises from what one may call
the hermeneutics of goodwill: concupiscentia is not disconnected from and
irrelevant to Augustine’s larger theological overview but, as will be shown in
this study, concupiscentia was closely connected to his view of God’s justice,
to the general explanations of sin and evil, to apologetic concerns connected
to the philosophical traditions of virtues and emotions, and finally, to divine
grace and its effects on baptised Christians. Therefore, it is only reasonable

1 For the historical disagreement surrounding this issue, see e.g. Melanchthon, Apol. II,

38, and his reliance on Augustine’s authority. For the discussions between the Pontifical
Council for Promoting Christian Unity and the Lutheran World Federation, see Rytkönen &
Saarinen 2007. In short, the Lutheran position adheres to Luther’s formulation of the baptised
Christian as simul iustus et peccator, and consequently supports a stronger emphasis on
the sinful status of concupiscentia. On the contrary, the Roman Catholic position maintains
the importance of Augustine’s formulations of the weaker status of concupiscentia during
renewal.
2 Cf. O’Keefe & Reno (2005, 32) on Didymus’ Neoplatonism: “[T]he point is not where he

got the idea. What matters is how it is used.”

introduction 3

to suggest that these attachments be approached systematically, searching

for the theological purposes in which Augustine uses concupiscentia in
different contexts.
To formulate the task in this way entails certain implications that should
be explicated here. First, to formulate a general understanding of what
Augustine meant by concupiscentia implies that the choice of the sources
will focus to a degree on certain representative texts. A close reading of every
passage that mentions concupiscentia (with relevant cognates) is not possi-
ble in the scope of this study.3 However, the advantages of this approach
are equally obvious: instead of focusing only on, for instance, the discus-
sions in ciu. 9 and 14, or on the explosive and repetitive debate with Julian,
this study seeks to offer a balanced and broader picture of concupiscentia in
Augustine’s works, and of how it is linked to certain other central theological
concepts.4 Secondly, this study is consciously concerned with Augustine’s
own way of describing and using the concept of concupiscentia; that is to say,
it is not possible here to analyse other detailed expressions of, for instance,
the corresponding ideas by Julian of Aeclanum than what they are relevant
to Augustine’s own position.

1.2. The Sources of the Study

As noted above, this study charts the functions of concupiscentia during

the span of Augustine’s entire oeuvre. Thus, in principle, nothing has been
excluded from the source material that is available. In practice, however,
Augustine’s discussions of topics that are both related to and relevant to
the concept have, of course, resulted in certain works being central and
deserving further attention.5 The debates with the Manichaeans and Pela-
gians, and the works composed at that time, naturally carry more weight in
this study than the works related to, for example, the Donatist controversy.
The sheer quantity of the works related to the debates with the Pelagian
positions, surpasses the volume of discussions on the relevant topics in the

3 To wit: the occurrences of the three terms, treated more or less synonymous in this

study, are as follows: concupiscentia 1,760 occurrences (and the verb concupisco 1,312 occur-
rences), cupiditas 1,180 occurrences, and libido 983 occurrences. The wealth of material thus
calls for prioritisation.
4 The abbreviations for Augustine’s work are taken from the Augustinus-Lexikon (Basel

1986–). For a comprehensive list of the abbreviations, see Bibliography.

5 For the list of the sources, given in conventional chronological order, see pp. 361–364.
4 chapter one

390s. Deliberate attention has therefore been paid to maintain the balance
between the earlier and later works in order to avoid a distorted perspective
that would work in favour of the later extensive polemics, which would
be at the expense of the earlier formulations. Another choice of emphasis,
again stemming from practice rather than principle, concerns Augustine’s
letters and sermons. These have been treated in this study as secondary
source material that provides additional evidence to support the findings
in the works composed for doctrinal, polemical and exegetical purposes.
Occasionally, as in the case of ep. Io. tr., the material from sermons has also
been included in the primary discussion.

1.3. Lines of Research on Concupiscentia

Augustine and his insights into evil desire have been studied and debated
extensively. However, concupiscentia (with cognates) has often been ana-
lysed from detailed and limited perspectives, whereby the state of research
seems to be rather fragmented and suffering from atomisation. Some impor-
tant studies are presented here and are categorised into four distinct ‘tradi-
tions’ or ‘lines’ of research.6

1. Due to the later significance attributed to the Roman Catholic and Protes-
tant doctrines of original sin, Augustine’s conception of concupiscentia has
been an object of what could be called a tradition of confessionally or ecu-
menically committed research. From such a standpoint, Augustine’s views
on concupiscentia have sometimes been qualified by later theological for-
mulations and systematizations. For example, in the 1950s, Charles Boyer
and François-Joseph Thonnard debated on a detail concerning the concepts
of ignorantia and difficultas in lib. arb., but the debate was also related to
the methodological issues of whether Augustine should be interpreted ‘sys-
tematically’ (for instance, as part of Roman Catholic doctrinal tradition)
or ‘historically’ (that is, in terms of his own historical context). Thonnard
argued for the latter view, which has, for understandable reasons, prevailed.7

6 The ‘lines’ described here are heuristic, paedagogical devices and do not claim actual

dependencies between individual contributions or schools of thought; they will illustrate

the most important positions adopted on concupiscentia in recent decades, while also docu-
menting the surprisingly open and fragmented state of research.
7 Boyer 1954a; 1954b; Thonnard 1959. See, however, Lössl 2002, 204 n. 9 on Thonnard’s

1965 article on Julian’s Aristotelism: “[Thonnard’s] fundamental point that Julian’s thought
introduction 5

From a more neutral and historically accurate standpoint, Augustine’s

concupiscentia may be scrutinised explicitly because of its history of recep-
tion in the different ecclesial traditions even today, as has been done by
Christoph Markschies in 2001. Markschies is interested in how Augustine
analyses concupiscentia in conjunction with baptism, and surveys briefly
the Pelagian debates in this respect. In the last section of his article, he then
considers Martin Luther’s reception of Augustine’s views of concupiscentia,

can only be ‘properly’ evaluated from an Augustinian point of view is questionable. It

assumes that Augustine’s is a kind of standard Christian position against which Julian’s has
to be measured.” Cf. also DeSimone 1980, 214: “Augustine’s complete, over-all teaching on
concupiscence is basically sound, and his very phrases on concupiscence were enshrined
in the Decree on Original sin issued by the Council of Trent.” Staffner 1957 is an attempt to
understand Augustine’s concept of original sin (“das Wesen der Erbsünde”) by consulting
the formulations made in the Councils of Orange and Trent. Likewise, Mausbach (1929, i,
222–241) provides a systematic presentation of cupiditas as the “substance” (Wesen) of sin,
both in grave forms (“schwere Sünde”) and venial (“lässliche Sünde”) forms, while admit-
ting that the division may not yet be fully developed in Augustine’s own works: “Diese Lehre
[…] gab der Entwicklung Richtlinien […] Es scheint bisweilen, als kenne Augustin noch
andere Klassen von Sünden zwischen beiden.” Mausbach 1929, i, 239. Mausbach (1929, ii,
170–207) discusses concupiscentia and its relation to guilt (reatus) separately, arguing against
the Protestant views of Seeberg and Harnack: concupiscentia, while being an element of the
original sin, is detached from ‘guilt’ (reatus) at the moment of baptism and cannot there-
after be sin. “Die ‘concupiscentia cum reatu’ macht nach Augustin das Ganze der Erbsünde
aus; das Formelle in diesem Ganzen, dasjenige, wodurch das vitium originale zum peccatum
originale wird und mit dessen Wegfall jede wirkliche Sünde völlig schwindet, ist der reatus.”
Mausbach 1929, ii, 189. The formulations of Thomas Aquinas (formal and material causes of
sin being priuatio iustitiae and concupiscentia), the debate around Jansenius and the posi-
tions of Reformation and the Council of Trent lead Mausbach to a detailed discussion of
the exact connection between reatus and concupiscentia in Augustine. Mausbach 1929, ii,
196, 198–207. For other confessionally committed positions, where the later developments
and questions more or less define what we should expect from Augustine, and where the
“substance (das Wesen)” of original sin plays an important part, see e.g. Seeberg 1923, 509
(“Danach also ist die Concupiscenz Strafe und als Strafe der Möglichkeitsgrund neuer Sün-
den, die aber durch die Zustimmung des Willens erst verwirklicht werden […] und dann
neue Strafen herbeiführen. Somit wäre also die Concupiscenz als solche nie Sünde, son-
dern nur Folge der Sünde und damit zugleich der Möglichkeitsgrund von Sünde […] Nun
wird aber diese in sich geschlossene Betrachtungsweise dadurch modifiziert, dass Augustin
die Concupiscenz selbst zum Träger des reatus macht […] also lehrt, die Concupiscenz
werde dem Kinde zur Sünde und damit zur Schuld angerechnet […]. Im ersteren Fall ist
die Concupiscenz die Folge der Anrechnung der Schuld, im zweiten Fall ist die Anrech-
nung der Schuld die Folge der Concupiscenz”); Anrup 1943; Trapè 1954; Gross 1954; 1960,
328–331 (see especially p. 375: “dass die Kirche wesentliche Teile der zeit- und ortsbedingten
Erbsündentheologie Augustins zur Würde von Dogmen, d.i. absoluten, ewig gültigen und
unveränderlichen Glaubenssätzen, erhob, hat sie weder der Menschheit noch sich selber
einen Dienst erwiesen.”); Thonnard 1964 (responding to Gross with “une optique thomiste,”
p. 374).
6 chapter one

and his transformation of these views in his own thought. Markschies is

convinced that the differences between Augustine and Luther should not
be exaggerated.8 Markschies concludes by suggesting that the differences
between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran positions are two different ways
of reading the common Augustinian heritage.9

2. The second line of research on Augustine’s views on evil desire could be

referred to as source-oriented genetical research. Here scholars have made
an effort to identify the parallels, sources and genetic lines of influence that
might have contributed to Augustine’s concept of concupiscentia.
For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, scholars connected to the Ital-
ian school of the history of religions adopted a comparative approach in
analysing concupiscentia. The title of Pier Franco Beatrice’s study, Tradux
peccati: Alle fonti della dottrina agostiniana del peccato originale (1978), de-
scribes well the standpoint of the comparative religious studies in this
school: the goal of the work was to demonstrate how a marginal Jewish-
Christian Encratite tradition had influenced Augustine’s ideas of sexual
desire.10 Beatrice’s work is characterised by exploring the parallel ways in
which the rather divergent systems of belief all treat sexual desire as being
inherently evil, and by a significant trust in the weight of evidence such
parallels have in the history of theology.11 Giulia Sfameni Gasparro has
drawn similar conclusions in her research, despite harbouring reservations
about Beatrice’s positions.12 Furthermore, an idealistic notion of the com-
mon ‘motivations’ of ‘protologies’ and ‘tradition of enkrateia’ influenced
both Beatrice and Sfameni Gasparro.13
A more specific line of inquiry has been pursued by observing the alle-
gations by Julian of Aeclanum against Augustine’s residual Manichaeism.14
Thus, parallel to a more general interest in the Manichaean studies of
recent decades, Augustine’s notion of concupiscentia (carnis) has also called

8 Markschies 2001, 106: “Damit rücken aber—trotz aller Differenzen—Augustinus und

Luther doch näher zusammen.”

9 Markschies 2001, 108: “zwei unterschiedliche Arten […] das gemeinsame augustinische

Erbe zu lesen.”
10 Beatrice 1978, 310.
11 For a critical, even hostile reception of the study, see Trapè 1979, DeSimone 1980.
12 Sfameni Gasparro 1985a; 1985b; 1985c (cf. her note in 1985c, 160 n. 18 for reservations).
13 For these motivations, see Bianchi 1985 and 1989.
14 van Oort 1994; 1999, 199–207, 212–229, 351–352; 2010a; Coyle 2009, 307–328, and Eddy

2009 can be used as surveys for this approach.

introduction 7

for comparisons with the Manichaean views of sexuality.15 In his studies

from 1987, 1989 and 1994, Johannes van Oort noted the parallels between
Manichaean mythology and Augustine’s thought, including Augustine’s
way of treating concupiscentia carnis. Van Oort has analysed inter alia the
characterisation of motus inordinatus, which is often connected to the no-
tion of concupiscentia in Augustine. According to van Oort, it is likely that
motus inordinatus follows an authentic Manichaean tradition of ἀτακτὸς κί-
νησις.16 This particular parallel has since significantly influenced the assess-
ments of Augustine’s Manichaeism and concupiscentia.17
In 1986, Elizabeth Clark published her influential essay on Augustine’s
Manichaean residue by analysing sexual reproduction as tainted by the evil
of concupiscentia carnis. Clark examines how Augustine treats the ‘biolog-
ical’ explanation for the propagation of sin, and Clark does this by not-
ing similarities between the Manichaean foundation myths of the archons’
seduction, which resulted in a mixture of good and evil substances in the
very act of human reproduction, and how Augustine combines the human
seed and the propagation of evil. In general, Clark’s article amplifies and
summarises the arguments made by Julian against Augustine.18
During the past two decades, the approach of van Oort and Clark has
attracted several other scholars. Apart from the general evaluations of
the subject by Rudolph (2001),19 Coyle (2009),20 Eddy (2009),21 and BeDuhn

15 The idea of Manichaean influences being in Augustine is by no means new. This has

been advocated in varying forms by Bruckner 1897; Alfaric 1918; Adam 1952; 1958; Gross 1960,
372; Geerlings 1972 (especially on concupiscentia). For recent studies and discussions on how
and to what degree the Manichaean doctrines influenced Augustine, see e.g. Coyle 2009, 251–
263, 307–328; van Oort 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 2011; BeDuhn 2010.
16 See van Oort 1987. According to van Oort, the converging points in Augustine’s and

Mani’s teachings on sexual desire are: 1) a highly negative way of speaking of concupiscentia
carnis 2) the punitive character of sinful concupiscentia 3) the description of concupiscentia
as a ‘random motion.’ Especially the third notion of motus immoderatus or inordinatus has
won acceptance among scholars. An exclusively Manichaean authorship for this phrase has
been doubted by Tarsicius van Bavel in 1993, and cited and approved by Verschoren 2002,
231–232.
17 van Oort 1989.
18 Clark’s position was reviewed by Fredriksen 1988b.
19 On concupiscentia in particular, Rudolph 2001, 10–11.
20 On concupiscentia in particular, Coyle 2009, 325–326, relying on Geerlings 1972; van

Oort 1987, 1989; and Clark 1986.

21 On concupiscentia in particular, Eddy 2009, 333–336, again, building on Clark 1986; van

Oort 1986, 1989.

8 chapter one

(2010),22 there have been more detailed studies by Geoffrey Harrison and
Jason BeDuhn (2001) and by Mathijs Lamberigts (2001). Harrison and
BeDuhn’s study analyses an interesting Manichaean document, epistula ad
Menoch, while Lamberigts’s study examines Julian of Aeclanum’s assess-
ment of Augustine’s Manichaeism. These studies contribute both indirectly
and directly to the problem of the Manichaean influence on Augustine’s
concept of concupiscentia carnis. Harrison and BeDuhn’s article argues in
great detail for the authenticity of a Manichaean text attributed to Mani.
The text, ep. Men., provides several intriguing parallels between Mani and
Augustine, common strategies to deal with concupiscentia carnis, and a
common interest in certain verses of Paul.23 In addition, while Mathijs Lam-
berigts emphasises that many of Julian’s accusations of Augustine Mani-
chaeism are based on polemical rhetoric and on an inability (or unwilling-
ness) to discern between the fundamental differences in the Manichaean
and Augustinian notions of evil, he also claims that “parallels at the level of
concupiscentia carnis are […] striking, given that Augustine’s motus inordi-
natus is also—and particularly—found in Manichaean sources.”24

3. Augustine’s thoughts on evil desire have been studied in a more narrow

historical context. This historically oriented line of research is sometimes
linked to an interest in the history of the so-called Pelagian movement.25 An
influential scholar in Pelagian studies, Gerald Bonner, published an article
in 1962 on the terminology of libido and concupiscentia, attempting to sit-
uate Augustine’s linguistic and stylistic choices in a definite North-African
context.26 This geographical emphasis was continued in his article on the

22 BeDuhn 2010 is the first part of a planned trilogy on Augustine and his Manichaean

legacy. See e.g. BeDuhn 2010, 83–96, for a discussion of human nature and salvation according
to the Manichaean teaching.
23 Cf. here Verschoren’s (2002, 240) concluding statement on Lee’s (1996) quest for Mani-

chaean parallels in Augustine: “Could (part of) the common root looked for between Augus-
tine and the Manichees not simply be Paul?.”
24 Lamberigts 2001, 135. Once more cf. van Oort 1987, 1989.
25 Sometimes, as in the case of Gross 1960 or Flasch 1995, historical accounts are con-

nected to the strong emphasis of showing how Augustine violently breaks with the previous
traditions of Christian anthropology, or even with his own earlier, more “optimistic” views
on sin, grace and moral responsibility.
26 Bonner 1962. This geographical focus is adopted on a more ambitious level in Bonner

1967, which is an attempt to depict Augustine’s anti-Pelagian reactions as a “doctrine du

péché originel dans toute sa rigueur africaine” (Bonner 1967, 116). See also Bonner’s articles
on concupiscentia and cupiditas in AL.
introduction 9

Fall and on original sin in 1967.27 During the past two decades, a considerable
amount of research has been conducted on Augustine’s aristocratic neme-
sis, Julian of Aeclanum. This research combines an ambition for a detailed
and accurate picture of Pelagianism in general and of Julian’s person and
theology in particular, with notions that can be interpreted as a rehabilita-
tion of the variegated group of theologians that was opposed to Augustine’s
determined interpretations of grace and human responsibility. Otto Wer-
melinger’s study in 1975 has been a crucial general contribution to the dis-
cussion of the historical development of the Pelagian crisis.28 Important rep-
resentatives of the historical research conducted on Pelagianism today are
Mathijs Lamberigts and Josef Lössl.29 Lamberigts’s articles on Augustine’s
position on sexuality and their modern critics (1997, 2000), on Julian’s alle-
gations of Augustine’s Manichaean tendencies (2001), and on Julian’s own
position on concupiscence, all relate directly to the topic of this study. The
articles by Marleen Verschoren can also be included in this line of research.
Verschoren has studied the appearance of concupiscentia in Augustine’s
early works as well as the role of Romans 7 in the debate between Augus-
tine and Julian.30

4. In what could be labelled as philosophically oriented research, Augustine’s

views on concupiscentia are explored in the larger context of the history
of philosophy, both as transferring and transforming the ancient classical
traditions regarding the emotions and their moral status, or as a philosopher
of the will, with corollary topics.31
Richard Sorabji (2000) suggests that Augustine played a crucial role in
the transformation of the clear Stoic distinction between the preparatory
stages of emotion and the emotions proper. Sorabji argues that Augustine’s
contribution was to muddle this distinction and to adopt a position on
emotions that endorsed metriopatheia. Sorabji also includes a discussion
on the debate between Augustine and Julian on sexual desire, concluding

27 Bonner’s thesis is questioned by Yates 2001.

28 Wermelinger 1975.
29 For Julian’s doctrine of creation and moral responsibility, see Lamberigts 1988; on

the diverging views of Augustine and Julian concerning the figure and role of Adam, see
Lamberigts 1990. For a good introduction to the rehabilitation of Pelagianism, see Lamberigts
2008b with literature. On Julian in general, see Lamberigts 1999 and especially the massive
study by Lössl 2001.
30 Verschoren 2002, 2004.
31 For general studies on Augustine as a philosopher, see also Kirwan 1989; O’Daly 1987;

Rist 1994.
10 chapter one

that Julian’s critique was not satisfyingly answered by Augustine. Sorabji

claims that “Julian won the philosophical, but Augustine the political, bat-
tle,” regretting the fact that the Augustinian position prevailed in Christian
doctrine over the “Pelagian view.”32
Simo Knuuttila’s description (2004) emphasises Augustine’s Platonic un-
derstanding of the soul and emotions. According to Knuuttila’s account,
concupiscentia is an example of how Adam and Eve’s Fall rendered the emo-
tions somewhat autonomous. Moreover, Knuuttila maintains that Augus-
tine regards the first phases of temptation as an “initial emotion” that should
be stifled at the start, rather than as Stoically conceived preparatory move-
ments.33
More recently, Jörn Müller (2009) has published an extensive study on
the history of akrasia.34 In a comprehensive chapter dealing with Augus-
tine’s development of the concept of the will, Müller occasionally reflects on
the fine adjustments and changes in the history of philosophy that Augus-
tine introduced. Müller studies Augustine’s role in assigning the will a more
independent role than it possessed in the preceding intellectualistic ancient
tradition: to Müller, certain features in Augustine’s thought paved the way
for later voluntaristic approaches. Nonetheless, Müller argues that Augus-
tine’s own position between these options is somewhat synthetic: the will
is oriented according to ultimately ordered and reasoned principles.35 In his
analysis of Augustine’s early works, Müller examines the manner in which
Augustine develops his conception of the will in the context of Romans 7,
connecting Augustine’s polarity of the evaluative forms of will (cupiditas vs.
caritas) to the disjunction of the ego presented in Romans 7.36 Müller notes
how Augustine identifies concupiscentia by adopting an expanded concept
of ‘habit’ (consuetudo, hexis) that comprises not only a hardened habit as
personal evil actions, but also a ‘punitive habit,’ originating from the choices
made by our human ancestors in Paradise.37 Müller also notes how Augus-

32
Sorabji 2000, 416–417.
33
Knuuttila 2004, 170–172.
34 Müller covers partly the same discussions as Saarinen 1994.
35 Müller 2009, 306, 308: “Es ist dieses dezisionistische Wollen, das Augustinus den Ruf

eingetragen hat, der Begründer eines ‘modernen’ Willensbegriffs zu sein.” See also Müller
2009, 339, and his excellent discussion of Augustine’s description of the first evil action, 345–
355. See also MacDonald 1999. For a caveat in using Augustine as a starting point for later
developments, see Lössl 2003, who opts for an intellectualist representation of Augustine’s
philosophy of mind.
36 Müller 2009, 315–317.
37 Müller 2009, 318–319.
introduction 11

tine’s strong notion of grace affects his way of treating the concupiscentia
in a person sub gratia.38 Ultimately, Müller passes a negative judgment on
the philosophical value of Augustine’s doctrine of grace in connection with
liberum arbitrium (and implicitly with concupiscentia).39

1.4. Methodological Considerations

This study combines both a historical and a systematic approach. These

approaches affect the structure of the work, and they both define the basic
assumptions of the work.
The predilection for historical consideration is displayed by a modest
interest in development. Thus, each chapter follows a chronological order,
proceeding from the early works to later accounts.40 The issues of chronol-
ogy and development have long been an established and important con-
vention in Augustinian scholarship, but there are different motivations
for maintaining this convention, and these range from a rather neutral
position of acknowledging Augustine’s progressive way of thinking, to the
more critical stance of suggesting a serious contradiction or incoherence of
thought, or a breaking with earlier (and perhaps better) traditions.41 This
study subscribes to a moderate position: while acknowledging the indis-
putable changes in Augustine’s reflections concerning concupiscentia and
related matters, discontinuities are not pursued for their own sake. Rather,
each chapter implies both constancy and development.
The systematic analysis of concupiscentia structures this study so that
the suggested functions are considered separately in each chapter. This

38 Müller 2009, 336: “Sündigen im Sinne der Zustimmung des Willens zu der concupiscen-

tia carnalis ist also weiterhin möglich, aber eben nicht mehr unausweichlich,” 345.
39 Müller 2009, 361: “Hier zeigen sich dann übrigens auch die philosophisch ruinösen Kon-

sequenzen der späteren Gnadenlehre von Augustinus deutlich: Denn wenn dem Menschen
seine guten voluntates durch die göttliche gratia praeveniens et operans eingegeben werden,
er also in sittlicher Hinsicht keinerlei Initiative (und auch keine Möglichkeit der Ablehnung)
hat, stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern man hier überhaupt noch von seinem Wollen bzw. Han-
deln sprechen kann. […] Zumindest als Philosoph vermag man hier der Rede von indi-
vidueller Freiheit und Verantwortlichkeit keinen substanziellen Sinn mehr abzugewinnen—
weder in libertarischer noch in kompatibilistischer Perspektive.”
40 In chronology I follow a reasonable consensus in the dating of the works in question.

Where a conventional consensus is under dispute, it has been duly noted in the footnotes.
Conventional lists of chronology can be found in e.g. Ages, xliii–il; AH 250–261.
41 Each convention naturally has its disputants. In this case, Harrison S. 2006 and Har-

rison C. 2006 have acutely emphasised the basically continuous features of Augustine’s
thought.
12 chapter one

structure facilitates the contemplation of Augustine’s own, textually imma-

nent conceptions of the meaning and place of evil desire within his thinking.
This type of systematic approach does not, however, imply that for Augus-
tine these functions would have been distinctly separate and disconnected.
On the contrary, more than one function may appear in the context of the
individual discussions and extracts of texts. One must, therefore, remember
that the functions distinguished in connection with concupiscentia involve
a certain amount of pedagogy or heuristics; thus, important texts such as
ciu. 14 appear repeatedly in the following chapters, as they have relevance
to many different functions of concupiscentia.
Combining the historical perspective with the systematic analysis of
functions has advantages that could not be achieved by excluding one at
the expense of other. An ahistorical, purely systematic treatment of Augus-
tine can no longer be easily imagined.42 Again, an exclusively historical
or chronological account of the occurrence of concupiscentia would risk
becoming a dense and unanalytical paraphrase of the host of discussions in
which concupiscentia (with cognates) appears. The limitations of combin-
ing the two are equally obvious: the reader will need patience towards the
repetition which unavoidably ensues when the distinguishable functions
and their temporal development in the works of one author are explored.
Finally, it is important to remark on the terminology of the concept
of ‘evil desire.’43 An entire chapter of this study is assigned to examining
the relation between three different words that Augustine seems to use
rather synonymously (these are concupiscentia, cupiditas, and libido). As
will be demonstrated, Augustine is aware of the semantic problems con-
cerning these words. Nonetheless, there appears to be no good grounds
for treating these separately, with seriously diverging semantic connota-
tions.

42 Cf. Hanby’s (2003, 3) account of the history of the Augustinian view of the self, and

his methodological point of departure: “I synthesize the De Trinitate and then allow that
synthesis to interpret other Augustinian texts, including those written prior to De Trinitate.”
For Hanby, this represents a “constructive appropriation” (ibid., p. 4). Couenhoven’s (2005)
short article claims to have “clarified what concupiscence actually is” (pp. 372–376), in a way
that sketches the various elements of original sin in Augustine’s works, and pays only slight
attention to the historical and theological contexts in which the term occurs.
43 Other options are ‘sinful longing,’ ‘fleshly lust,’ ‘concupiscence,’ or even ‘passion,’ to

name but a few of the attempts to translate the original Latin terms. In this study, words such
as ‘concupiscence’ and ‘evil desire’ combined with the original Latin terms (concupiscentia
being prevalent) will be used, as varying signs relating to the same concept.
introduction 13

1.5. Outline of the Study

This work begins, as has been mentioned, with a review of Augustine’s ter-
minology of evil desire from a lexical and semantic point of view. A general
overview of the occurrences of the negatively connoted words for ‘desire’
in Latin literature precedes a corresponding examination of Augustine’s
works. This lexical overview is divided into two parts; the first part is a
survey of the words used for ‘desire’ in the pagan Latin literature, primar-
ily in the fields of historiography and philosophy and the second part is
a review of the usages of the Christian Latin authors. As for Augustine,
we will first focus on his own reflections and distinctions on the three
cognate words denoting evil desire. Consequently, the relative synonymy
of these words will be explored, followed by a mapping of the varying
textual contexts in which the terms seem to appear and to which they
are attached. The goals of this linguistically oriented, introductory chap-
ter are rather modest: it will be argued that despite certain preferences
in the uses of the words, a sufficient degree of synonymy reigns so as to
allow an analysis of the concept without tightly discriminating between the
terms.
The study then proceeds to the properly theological analysis. This will
be conducted in four chapters, each examining a distinct function of evil
desire in Augustine’s thought. The chapters follow each other in a theo-
logically relevant order: Chapters 3 and 4 argue for the fundamentally the-
ological character of evil desire as being both a punishment and a cause
for evil actions. Chapter 5 then explains how the philosophical traditions
of emotions became auxiliary tools in Augustine’s theological programme
concerning concupiscentia. Finally, Chapter 6 connects concupiscentia to
Augustine’s views of grace and Christian renewal.
Accordingly, Chapter 3 contains a description of how Augustine formu-
lates his view of concupiscentia as a reciprocal punishment for Adam and
Eve’s disobedience to God in Paradise. This chapter opens with Augustine’s
early attempts to depict the effects of Adam’s defective choice, and then
links these attempts to the problems concerning the relation of divine pun-
ishment and divine justice. We will then see how Augustine gradually advo-
cates the role of concupiscentia as the most fitting psychological punish-
ment for what he describes as essentially a theological crime of lèse-majesté.
This chapter will close by examining the searing critique against Augustine
by Julian—this critique is useful at least in pinpointing the theological com-
mitments that concupiscentia, even in its overtly sexual manifestations, had
in Augustine’s thought.
14 chapter one

In Chapter 4, we will explore the function of evil desire as a fundamental

cause for individual sinful acts. This function appears in Augustine’s thought
as an opposite form of love (predominately denoted by the word cupiditas).
It will be argued that the function was formed both parallel to, and in answer
to, Manichaean views on concupiscentia. Consequently, Chapter 4 will fol-
low this line of thought and highlight two formally distinct but functionally
similar images, namely, the image of evil desire as the ‘root’ (radix) of all
evil, and the formula of threefold desire (triplex cupiditas), a scheme based
on 1Jn 2, 16 (‘the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, the pride in riches’).
Chapter 5 will approach concupiscentia in conjunction with the tradi-
tional philosophical positions on emotions. It will be argued that Augustine
was well aware of these traditions from the outset of his literary career, and
that they had an obvious influence on his explanation of the psychological
processes in connection with concupiscentia. However, as these influences
seem to be acknowledged rather well in the modern research on the his-
tory of philosophy, the problem will be considered further: we will explore
how and why Augustine eventually deviated from the traditional analyses
of the emergence of emotions, particularly concerning concupiscentia, and
how this deviation became part of his theological apology. Indeed, it will be
argued that apologetic motivations were part of this function of concupis-
centia even in Augustine’s earlier works, and they became more reflective
and detailed in his final debates with Julian of Aeclanum, a theologian with
a considerably high level of philosophical education.
Finally, Chapter 6 will offer an account of the function of concupiscentia
as the sparring partner of a baptised Christian. How did Augustine con-
ceive of the difference in status of concupiscentia between those who were
not undergoing the process of Christian renewal and those who were? In
other words, how did Augustine develop the notion of concupiscentia as a
part of every human being, including baptised Christians? These questions
will also be addressed in light of Augustine’s interpretation of Romans 7, as
this scriptural source text was constantly used to highlight the borders of
Christian renewal, and Augustine’s changing readings of the text are now
well charted. The final chapter argues that the function of concupiscentia
in Christian renewal underwent what here is referred to as a process of
‘domestication’: the black-and-white tones of ‘invincible evil desire’ of the
works of the 390s become softer shades of grey in later works, when Augus-
tine starts to introduce concupiscentia more realistically into the life of a
renewed Christian.
The final evaluations of the relative importance and status of the func-
tions thus charted will be carried out in brief in the concluding Chapter 7.
chapter two

THE LANGUAGE OF DESIRE

uitam beatam concupiscere et desiderare sectari, omnium hominum esse

arbitror
s. 150, 4

hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas uel concupiscentia

dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi
ciu. 14, 7
In this Chapter, I shall discuss the three most common words for the nega-
tively connotated desire in Augustine’s works, namely the terms concupis-
centia-concupisco, cupiditas and libido. A short survey in the lexical history
of the words will be provided, and after that, questions pertaining to the
degree of synonymy and varying contexts in which these words are used,
shall be addressed. No comprehensive lexical analyses are pursued here, but
only a rough outline of Augustine’s terminology in the matter.
The standard treatises on lexical and semantic notions in the Augustinian
concept of evil desire still remain those of Gerald Bonner.1 Bonner has

1 Bonner 1962, 1986–1994, 1996–2002, 2002, 398–401. There are, of course, other positions

to the semantics of the three words of desire. They are mostly of very general character,
or noting a detail of the word uses in the Augustinian corpus. See the remarks of e.g.
Brachtendorf 1997, 306 n. 52 (who notes the relative paucity of the word concupiscentia in
ciu.), and Cipriani 2010, who treats the word in a “general sense” as synonymous to cupiditas
and concupiscentia, but suggests then a “stricter sense,” by which libido refers to the desire for
pleasure connected with the five bodily senses, and in “still stricter sense” may also denote a
desire for sexual pleasure (Cipriani 2010, 981). The three words are handled as synonyms by
e.g. Burnell 1999; Harrison C. 2000, 95. Schlabach (1998, 65–66, n. 26 and 30, 31) is ambiguous,
positing on the one hand “subtle distinctions,” on the other hand he admits that the word
choice depends mostly on metrical factors and on source texts. Lamberigts 2000 reconstructs
different forms of concupiscentia (c. bona, c. naturalis and c. carnis), and refers to Bonner’s
articles (2000, 189, 191); see also Lamberigts 1997, 155 n. 19 and 157–158, where he suggests
for concupiscentia carnis a translation: “sinful longing.” For other references to Bonner, see
Markus 1990b, 258; Schlabach 1998, 59. As Lawless (2000, 251) points out, concupiscentia
remains hard to translate in English: “A recent translation of De nuptiis et concupiscentiis
[sic!], for example, as Marriage and Desire, is misleading and frankly, inept. Like desiderium
and cupido, concupiscentia is a word with a distinctively biblical and Augustinian coloration.
The English ‘desire’ does not reflect its many resonances.” Markus (1990a, 60) prefers “lust
16 chapter two

stressed the non-sexual facets of the concept more or less consistently. His
basic assumptions concerning the semantics and the uses of the words in
his 1962 article are the following:
1. Libido and concupiscentia are interchangeable when they are used to
describe sexual desire.
2. If any other lust is meant, libido has the clear prevalence, sometimes
supplemented by cupiditas. The importance of libido dominandi in ciu.
is stressed, and its debt to Sallust is noted.
3. Libido is classical Latin. Concupiscentia is a Christian technical term,
used exclusively by Christian writers, and mostly with a sexual conno-
tation.
Bonner also makes short surveys of both words in the preceding Latin liter-
ature, and attempts to show that libido has a wider range of meaning than
the exclusively Christian word of concupiscentia. Bonner provides examples
of the various uses of libido from Lucretius, Sallust, Livy, Cicero, Tacitus and
concludes that for Classical Latin authors, this word lacks “strongly sexual
overtones” which it has for Augustine.2 In the Augustinus-Lexikon articles,
the following modifications and additions are made:
4. Biblical Latin directed Augustine to use the word concupiscentia in
both a positive and a negative sense, although the negative meaning
prevails. Such ambivalence is due to the “African tradition” (i.e. Ter-
tullian and Cyprian) that Augustine follows.3
5. Concupiscentia as such is not limited to sexual desire: it also has “wider
implications” in human sinful behaviour (correcting (3) above). Sexual
desire is one, but not the only manifestation of concupiscentia.

of the flesh.” See, again, TeSelle 2001, 322, who opts for using “desire”: “Augustine is much
criticized for his concern about desire (it sounds especially awful when it goes under the
name of ‘concupiscence’ ”). Finally, Lössl (2008, xlii) suggests “‘carnal,’ or ‘evil,’ ‘hankering.’”
2 Bonner uses the form libido carnalis.
3 For a detailed criticism of this assertion, see Yates 2001, who investigates both Cyprian

and Tertullian focusing on their use of concupiscentia. According to Yates, the two pre-
Augustinian writers cannot be shown to have influenced Augustine in any profound way
(p. 56). If any preference is to be given, it belongs to Tertullian.
Concerning the emergence of concupiscentia in Africa, see also Mohrmann 1965, 103–
106. Mohrmann notes that in the old Latin translation of Clem. Rom. ep. ad Corinth. (28, 1;
30,1), the word epithumia is translated by voluntas instead of concupiscentia. This translation
originates from the second century ce, and in all probability, from Rome. Mohrmann 1965,
103–106. However, in a few decades, it is concupiscentia that is found in the biblical quotations
of Tertullian on the other side of the Mediterranean.
the language of desire 17

6. Cupiditas is, despite its occurrence in a few biblical passages, a classical

Latin word that carries various meanings. It is more general than the
sexually restricted libido (correcting (2) above).
7. The connection of cupiditas to the Stoic tetrachord of emotions is
stressed as well as its opposition to Christian love.
8. In spite of (6), cupiditas can also have sexual connotations.
The arguments show that the three words of desire are interrelated in a
complicated way within Augustine’s own texts, and within the previous
history of Latin literature and language. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to determine the ‘general’ or fixed meanings for words that seem to be
very flexibly interchangeable, especially when, as in the case of Augustine,
they are in frequent use and occur in highly varying contexts. Based on
Bonner’s arguments, the safest choice to pick would be to conclude that
all of the three words have a more general connotation, and that all of
them have some special connotations and that all of them can mean sexual
desire. Obviously, this would not be of much use for a reader of Augustine
who would like to know what a particular desire in a particular context
means. More often than not, qualifications such as ‘usually,’ ‘generally,’
‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ (frequently used by Bonner) are a way of saying
that the semantic edges of the words denoting evil desire are not sharp, but
blurred.4
What follows is an attempt to broaden the focus of Bonner’s concise
articles. While the scope of the present study does not allow a thorough
semantic analysis of the word groups, nor a detailed study of the historical
developments in their use, I will nevertheless try to give representative
examples of Augustine’s own reflections on the matter and of his use of the
terms concerned. The word cupiditas has been included here, but the words
cupido and cupidus are only incidentally noted due to their low occurrences
in Augustine’s writings.5 The word group libido includes a small number of
adjectives and a few adverbs. The major difference to Bonner’s approach is

4 For the semantic edges in the prototype theory in the field of the study of semantic

changes, see Geeraerts 1997, 10–23. That a given word has blurred semantic edges can be
roughly outlined according to the prototype theory as following: the word occurs very often
in the context X, but it is quite normal to also use it in the context Y, and the word seems
to be used a couple of times even in the context Z. For some reason, the word never occurs
in the context Q. The contexts would be subjectively labelled to contain certain qualities or
categories.
5 The words Cupido and cupido yield only 30 hits in a search (CAG2) over Augustine’s

oeuvre, whereas the adjective cupidus occurs 78 times.

18 chapter two

that the word group concupisc- is not limited to the noun, as the verbal forms
are included as well. While Bonner’s omission may be excused by appealing
to the imbalance created in comparing two nouns (cupiditas, libido) with
the verbal forms of concupiscere, such an omission distorts the image of
the development of the senses of the entire word group. Concupiscentia as
a noun is not a purely Augustinian or Christian neologism, but a handy
reformulation of an existing Latin verb that is frequently used even by
Cicero. While there are many examples of hypercorrect loan translations
(calque) in the Old Latin Bible, it would be quite natural to assume that
concupiscentia as a noun was formed likewise, as a formal equivalent of the
Greek ἐπιθυµία, which it normally translates as (the prefix con- denoting
intensity). Obviously, however, Augustine was not restricted to the Old
Latin translations of the Bible in his use of the word group of concupiscentia-
concupisco.6
Some deliberate omissions have been made. For example, the words
desiderium and uoluptas are left aside in the following considerations, not
because they would not have impact on the concept of evil desire, but
because of the vast material they would produce in the works of Augustine
alone. In addition, the semantic field of these words seems to diverge from
the group concupiscentia, cupiditas, libido in various ways; thus, desiderium
denotes a large and general spectrum of wishes and volitions (cf. appetitus),
while uoluptas is more related to the meanings of ‘pleasure,’ or ‘enjoyment.’
Together with the three nouns of evil desire, these words would then open
an overwhelming set of other closely related lexemes that would definitely
fall beyond the scope of this study.7

6 Against Bonner 1962; 1986, 1114. For the practice and examples of calque in Old Latin

Gospels, see Burton 2000, 129–136. In his classification concupiscentia would represent both
a case of a “matching word” and a “calque proper.”
7 Cf. Mohrmann 1961, 26. As a rule, uoluptas appears as an object of concupiscentia

(carnis) as in uera rel. 70 concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae amatores significat; conf. 6,
22 uictus libidine talis uoluptatis; c. Faust. 22, 31; 22, 48 concupiscentia percipiendae uoluptatis;
nupt. et conc. 1, 5 sed isto bono male utitur qui bestialiter utitur, ut sit eius intentio in uoluptate
libidinis, non in uoluntate propaginis (note the figura here!); c. ep. Pel. 1, 35 illa carnalis
concupiscentia, cuius motus ad postremam, quae uos multum delectat, peruenit uoluptatem; c.
Iul. imp. 4, 28 ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam uoluptatem genitalium
dicamus aestuare; en. Ps. 118, 1, 1 se miserum putat, cum ad suae concupiscentiae uoluptatem
laetitiamque non peruenit. See also uera rel. 69 seruiunt enim cupiditati triplici uel uoluptatis
uel excellentiae uel spectaculi; Io. eu. tr. 15, 16.
Sometimes the edge becomes somewhat blurred, however, as in cases like conf. 10, 55
uoluptas pulchra, canora, suauia, sapida, lenia sectatur; or in the parataxis of c. Faust. 22, 47
flagrantia concupiscentiae carnalis et sordidae uoluptatis; and gr. et pecc. or. 2, 43. See also
the language of desire 19

2.1. Roman Literature and Libido, Cupiditas, Concupisco

This section will shed light on the use of the vocabulary of evil desire in
pagan classical literature.8 Obviously, again, a systematic treatment of all
instances would be beyond the purposes of this study, and the main objec-
tive of this section is to provide only a general background for later devel-
opments in the semantics of the vocabulary. I shall focus on historical and
philosophical writing, the genres with which Augustine was most familiar.9
As both concupisco and cupiditas were mostly unsuitable for poetic texts
for metrical reasons, this naturally makes libido the most popular word of
the three in poetry.10 Furthermore, the use of the vocabulary in science and

en. Ps. 8, 13, where uoluptas, together with curiositas and superbia appears as one of the triplex
concupiscentia (1 Jn 2, 16). Similarly in s. 284, 5.
In the debate with Julian, uoluptas and concupiscentia seem to be more closely attached
together, for Julian seeks legitimacy for created emotions such as pleasure and (sexual)
desire, whereas Augustine is keen to point out irrational and corrupted features of both. See
c. Iul. 3, 28; 4, 64–65; 4, 71; 5, 39–40. In Iul. c. Iul. imp. 1, 71 Julian treats the terms as virtually
synonymous: naturalem esse omnium sensuum uoluptatem testimonio uniuersitatis docemus.
hanc autem uoluptatem concupiscentiam ante peccatum in paradiso fuisse res illa declarat,
quia ad delictum uia per concupiscentiam fuit, quae cum pomi decore oculos incitasset, spem
etiam iucundi irritauit saporis; Iul. c. Iul. imp. 3, 167 Iul. et quamuis iam pro concupiscentia uel
uoluptate carnis, quae etiam libido dicitur. In his response, Augustine uses only concupiscentia
carnis and libido. See also Iul. c. Iul. imp. 5, 11 ipsa ergo […] uirilitas […] uis a me uoluptatis et
concupiscentiae nominata est.
In Cic. Tusc. 4, 7, 16; 4, 9, 20 uoluptas appears as a synonym for one of the four generic
emotions of the Stoic theory, i.e. laetitia. Augustine follows this distinction e.g. in ciu. 14,
15 uoluptatem uero praecedit appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupiditas eius,
sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit generale
uocabulum omnis cupiditatis. See also c. Iul. 3, 48 where the goal of Epicurean ethics is seen
in uoluptas: Epicureus […] ille totum hominis bonum in corporis posuit uoluptate.
Concerning desiderium, see e.g. Gn. litt. 10, 12, 20, where the word appears to be a neutral
or a positive desire for ‘spiritual’ or divine things: sed tamen carnem sine anima concupiscere
nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. ac per hoc ipsius concupiscentiae
carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. ex utroque enim fit:
ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod sine illa carnalis
delectatio non sentitur. For some other occasions, see the instances in sections 2.3.2. and 2.3.4.
8 Augustine’s classical readings have been studied e.g. by Hagendahl 1967 and O’Donnell

1980.
9 Of course, libido was also consolidated in certain set phrases, such as ex libidine quid-

quid facere or venire in libidinem, or it was connected idiomatically to certain verbs and
adjectives (e.g. flagrare). I shall not focus on these idioms and phrases. See Catull. 17; Cic.
inv. 2, 45, 131; Cluent. 12; Hor. carm. 1, 25; Plin. nat. 14, 140; Tac. ann. 3, 54, 1; 6, 16, 2; hist. 2, 31, 1;
Suet. gramm. 23, 5; Sen. ira 1, 17.
10 Thus, cupiditas occurs very rarely in Plautus and Terence, whereas cupido, of course, is

used in the poetry of the Early Empire (Ovid, Horace). Again, libido is used by Catull, Horace,
Ovid, and by Martial and Juvenal but not once by Virgil. One could claim that, in view of
20 chapter two

medical writing seems to be rather limited. For example, in Pliny the Elder,
libido denotes the period when animals are in heat or sexual potency that
various herbs either increase or decrease.11 Again, in Celsus, libido seems
always to denote simply ‘sexual intercourse.’ On the other hand, the major-
ity of instances of cupiditas in Celsus refer to ‘appetite,’ and never to sexual
desire. The few occurrences of concupisco in Celsus relate to sexual or ali-
mentary objects (concubitus, aqua, vinum, and cibum). In Pliny the Elder,
the verb has no sexual connotations.

2.1.1. Historical Writing

Libido and luxuria are popular targets in the historiography of the Late
Republic as well as in the flourishing Empire.12 One could speak of a lit-
erary topos: authors such as Livy, Sallust, Tacitus and Suetonius use libido
frequently in their condemnations of sinister historical figures: the charac-
ter descriptions of these villains are composed of vice lists in which libido
is a regular member.13 Furthermore, the vocabulary of desire is in active
use in Sallust’s descriptions of moral degeneration—lubido has a higher
prevalence than cupiditas, undoubtedly for stylistical reasons.14 In Sueto-
nius’ vitae Caesarum, the emperors can be divided into two groups accord-
ing to their position to the libido: the good emperors coerce economic and
sexual libidines, whereas the bad ones do not hesitate to cast themselves
into the most unusual and shameful sexual libidines.15

Martial’s subject matter, these words are used rather surprisingly seldom; concupisco, for
instance, occurs only a couple of times, and never in sexual context.
11 See e.g. Plin. nat. 26, 95; 26, 99.
12 In addition to Livy’s moral code, cf. the use of C. Nepos: libido always occurs with luxus.
13 Tacitus’ account of Seianus is very typical: Tac. ann. 4, 1, 3: iuxta adulatio et superbia;

palam compositus pudor, intus summa apiscendi libido, eiusque causa modo largitio et luxus,
saepius industria ac vigilantia. Cf. the introduction of Tigellinus in Tac. ann. 14, 51, 3, and the
last moments of Messalina in Tac. ann. 11, 37, 4, animo per libidines corrupto nihil honestum
inerat. Suetonius continues the tradition in his description of Nero (Suet. Nero 26, 1): petu-
lantiam, libidinem, luxuriam, auaritiam, crudelitatem sensim quidem primo et occulte et uelut
iuuenili errore exercuit.
14 For the use of cupiditas, cupido and lubido in Sallust, see Syme 1964, 269, 305–312. The

pseudo-Sallustian invective, epistulae ad Caesarem senem, shows differences in the use of

the words, ibid., 328–328: “prone as Sallust is to ‘lubido’ (at least 36 instances), he nowhere
descends to ‘malae lubidines.’ Indeed, he nowhere attaches an adjective to ‘lubidines.’ Not an
attractive locution, therefore. And, for other reasons, a doubt will arise about ‘bona lubido’
(II. 13.6).”
15 See the characterisations of Vespasian (11, 1) and Domitianus (22, 1). According to Lewis

1991, 3637, there is a distinction in Suetonius’ vitae between the sexual affairs under pudicitia
and libidines, the latter denoting heterosexual behaviour.
the language of desire 21

In Livy’s introduction to ab urbe condita, the moral programme that

includes the reproach of libido, is clearly dictated: the recent economical
growth of Rome has led to greed (avaritia) and varying pleasures (volup-
tates), which in turn have created a need (desiderium) to corrupt everything
with luxurious living (luxus) and licentious lifestyle (libido).16
Thus, it is clear that Livy does not always bother to nominate the libidines
by clarifying attributes: it is evident that libido is used in negative contexts
in the majority of cases, where licentious sexual behaviour, material greed
or other arbitrary (and thus morally reproachable) acts are reported.17 For
example, if sexual desire is violent or otherwise criminal, it is denoted with
the word libido.18
Because libido is often connected to greed (avaritia), sex or, more gener-
ally, to a dissolute style of living, it represents a certain kind of hubris, and
is thus the opposite of modesty and temperance.19 Reporting of distur-
bances in Britain, Tacitus forms a phrase where the two words of desire
cannot be easily distinguished from each other: nihil iam cupiditati, nihil
libidini exceptum.20 Again, apologising for the German custom of poly-
gamy, he excludes libido from the motives of such marital behaviour; the
real reason, says Tacitus, lies in the traditional custom of local nobility.21
Both cupiditas and libido denote excessive and intemperate greed. Very

16 Liv. praef. 11–12 ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit, aut nulla umquam res

publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, nec in quam civitatem tam serae
avaritia luxuriaque inmigraverint, nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoniae honos
fuerit: adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat; nuper divitiae avaritiam et
abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique omnia
invexere.
17 Liv. 3, 50, 7; 28, 24, 9. Libido is not limited to masculine sexuality. See Tac. ann. 2, 85, 1;

13, 30, 2.
18 Liv. 3, 44, 1 Ap. Claudium virginis plebeiae stuprandae libido cepit. Cf. Bonner 1962, 306

on the rape of Lucretia: “the point here, of course, is that it is a mala libido, which implies that
libido, in itself, is not necessarily evil, and so has to be qualified to fit these circumstances.” An
overwhelming majority of occurrences of libido in Livy appears, however, without negative
qualifications, although the context clearly compels us to interpret the libido as negatively
connotated. The passage that Bonner quotes is in fact the only instance, where the attribute
mala is used in Livy. For another illuminating example of the sexual libido in Livy, see 39, 8,
6; see also Tac. ann. 13, 44, 3.
19 Liv. 30, 14, 5: atqui nulla earum uirtus est propter quas tibi appetendus uisus sim qua

ego aeque ac temperantia et continentia libidinum gloriatus fuerim; 24, 5, 5: sequebantur con-
temptus omnium hominum, superbae aures, contumeliosa dicta […] libidines novae, inhumana
crudelitas. See also 29, 9, 11. Tac. ann. 16, 32, 3; hist. 1, 7, 2.
20 Tac. Agr. 15, 2.
21 Tac. Germ. 18, 1.
22 chapter two

occasionally, Tacitus also mentions a desire for revenge or an appetite for

unusual foods.22
Some remarks on omissions could be made as well. Sallust only uses
cupiditas three times and concupisco twice. By contrast, Caesar never uses
libido, though he uses cupiditas alongside with constructions with cupidus,
nor does he use concupisco.
In Livy, cupiditas is typically used with the genitive objectives indicating
material goods, authority or some action, usually reproachable in their
context, including an erotic context.23 The cupiditates are restrained by
laws,24 and the word is frequently used in a pejorative context, sometimes
with an additional attribute,25 although a desire ‘to see the people and gods
of Rome’ is also possible.26 Caesar’s use of cupiditas is rather similar.27
Compared to the nouns cupiditas and libido, the verb concupisco is quite
rare in the historical writings of the Late Republic and the Early Empire. In
fact, Sallust uses the verb only twice.28 In both instances, the object of the
action refers to economics, and the word appears in a pejorative context.
Likewise, Livy uses this verb extremely rarely (twice). One of these instances
denotes a desire for wealth (fortuna), the other a strong wish (tribunos
plebis concupistis).29 In Cornelius Nepos, the verb denotes more than once a
strong, excessive wish to attain a goal that is impossible to achieve.30 On the
other hand, there are occurrences in Cicero that speak for a very flexible
and indetermined use of concupisco: the verb denotes strong wishes (and
neutral in connotations), and desires for wealth, power or reputation. It is
interesting to note that the verb is not used once in the sexual contexts
by the historical writers mentioned above, nor does it have particularly
sexual connotations for Cicero either. A similar characterisation would suit
Tacitus’s use of concupisco as well.31

22 Tac. ann. 12, 20, 1 libido vindictae; hist. 2, 62, 1 epularum foeda et inexplebilis libido; 4, 42,

4 libido sanguinis; 4, 49, 3 adulandi libidine.

23 Liv. 6, 20, 5 regni; 6, 6, 1 agri; 5, 5, 2 ulciscendi; 28, 43, 5 gloriae; 1, 9, 16 cupiditate atque

amore.
24 Liv. 34, 4, 8.
25 Liv. 7, 9, 4 prava.
26 Liv. 42, 11, 3.
27 Caes. civ. 3, 74, 2 pugnandi; Gall. 1, 2, 1 regni; 1, 41, 1 belli gerendi; 6, 22, 3 pecuniae; 7, 50,

4 gloriae.
28 Sall. Catil. 2, 1; 5, 4; 21, 4 and 11, 3; 55, 33. In their context, both words refer to material or

economical lust, and ‘greed’ would be a good English equivalent.

29 Liv. 1, 56, 7; 3, 67, 7.
30 Nep. Con. 5, 1; Eum. 2, 3; Att. 13, 4.
31 A strong wish (hist. 4, 73, 3; Agr. 21, 2), in a pejorative context (ann. 16, 21, 1 Nero virtutem

ipsam exscindere concupivit), and sexual desire (ann. 14, 20, 5).
the language of desire 23

Based on notions above, following generalisations can be made:

1. Libido and cupiditas are used frequently by the historical writers of the
Late Republic and the Early Empire. These words are used in moral
condemnations of communities or individuals. They do not need pejo-
rative attributes in order to have negative connotations; on the con-
trary, libido (lubido) seems to have such connotations independently.
2. Generally speaking, the words are used in two categories, to describe
either excessive sexual needs or lusts, or desires for economic wealth,
possession of land or ‘luxuries,’ which are all in opposition to ‘tradi-
tional’ Roman austerity and frugality.
3. The verb concupisco is rarely used and occurs even more rarely in
sexual contexts.

2.1.2. Philosophical Writing

A large source for occurrences of libido, cupiditas and concupisco in Roman
literature are the philosophically coloured moral treatises. The words in
these texts are often reflected upon, and situated into a certain conceptual
context: in the case of libido (and cupiditas as well) this context is, obvi-
ously, the theory of emotions. The main authors in this respect are Cicero,
Seneca and (from Augustine’s viewpoint) Apuleius. Cicero is the most inter-
esting case, as he was an important link in translating the key concepts of
Hellenistic philosophy into Latin. Again, the different genres used by Cicero
make him a special case as well: for example, he uses the term libido in his
forensic speeches in the same way as the historical writers.32
In the philosophical treatises, libido is one of the irrational movements
of the soul. Its relation to the nearly synonymous cupiditas is loose. For
instance, sometimes libido refers to a subspecies of the general cupiditas;33

32 For instance, the Verrine speeches abound in libidines, cf. Verr. 3, 207; 5, 32; 5, 85.

Verrine libido comes sometimes near to arbitrariness, see Verr. 3, 77; 82 and especially Verr.
3, 220. In fam. 9, 16, 3 libido is likewise contrasted with voluntas. A mean sexual innuendo is
to be read in Cic. Phil. 2, 45 nemo umquam puer emptus libidinis causa tam fuit in domini
potestate quam tu in Curionis. A more philosophically coloured use of language is not, of
course, limited exclusively to Cicero’s philosophical treatises, as can be seen from leg. agr.
2, 55: o perturbatam rationem, o libidinem refrenandam, o consilia dissoluta atque perdita!
33 fin. 1, 18, 59 quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis

animi morbis impediri necesse est! animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates inmensae et inanes
divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. An interesting remark
about the connotations of the words concerning evil desire is found in a rhetorical treatise
by Cicero (inv. 1, 23, 32): nam genus est omnium nimirum libidinum cupiditas, eius autem
24 chapter two

whereas in some other cases, the words are used in an interchangeable

way.34
In Tusculanae disputationes, the same philosophical concept exhibits dif-
ferent nuances with different terms; thus, cupiditas is connected to money,
and libido more generally to sensual pleasures.35
Thus, both cupiditas and libido stand in opposition to the qualities of
a good man (vir bonus).36 The word ‘fault’ (peccatum) occurs in the same
context with libido and other emotions in fin. 3, 9, 32, where libido is viewed
as a basic intention, deemed to be faulty even with no exterior results.37
Sometimes libido occurs in a positive context, as in off. 1, 17, 54, where Cicero
speaks of the libido procreandi as an element of a social bond (societas)
between all living creatures.38 Another interesting context of libido is to be
found in rep. 6, 29, 136, where bodily and lustful pleasures are opposed to
the laws of the gods and men.39

generis sine dubio pars est avaritia. The words libido, cupiditas and avaritia are organised
here as a scheme: cupiditas is a general category for all excessive libidines, of which avaritia
is one. What remains unclear is, whether Cicero’s scheme here reflects a genuine semantic
nuance, or is constructed artificially for the purpose of clarifying a rhetorical fault. In any
case, the example shows that in addition to its more technical meanings in philosophical
treatises, the vocabulary of desire seems to have served as a cliché of moral reproach in the
forensic discourse. Libido and cupiditas occur in Rhet. Her. (2, 2, 3) as motives for a crime.
This categorisation is similar to Cicero’s.
34 Tusc. 3, 11, 24 nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id

est praeter modum elata laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas,
quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non
obtemperans,—ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur,
ut duo reliqua, metus et aegritudo, malorum. See also Tusc. 4, 15, 34: adpetitione nimia, quam
tum cupiditatem tum libidinem dicimus; 4, 6, 12: quae autem ratione adversante incitata est
vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur; 4, 26, 57:
quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? See also Verr. 1,
78.
35 Tusc. 3, 2, 4.
36 Lael. 19.
37 fin. 3, 9, 32 nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae

sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. Note,
however, that the text in the Reynolds’s edition is here bracketed. Annas & Woolf 2001, 75:
“The paragraph […] has no relevance to the context.”
38 Columella speaks of this kind of libido in a somewhat more technical sense in e.g. rus.

8, 2.
39 rep. 6, 29, 136 namque eorum animi qui se corporis voluptatibus dediderunt, earumque

se quasi ministros praebuerunt, inpulsuque libidinum voluptatibus oboedientium deorum et

hominum iura violaverunt, corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam volutantur, nec hunc in
locum nisi multis exagitati saeculis revertuntur. Cf. prov. 24, where Clodius’ libido violates
religio and pudicitia, the “two most holy things.”
the language of desire 25

Concerning the word concupisco, the picture is twofold: on the one hand,
this verb appears in the context of the theory of emotions: many instances
of this are to be found in Tusculanae disputationes.40 Here this verb is used
to designate one of the four Stoic generic emotions. All three words may
appear close to each other, referring to the same concept.41 On the other
hand, concupisco may as well denote a strong, intensive wish in Cicero’s use,
with no condemning connotations.42
Seneca uses the vocabulary of desire in the context of moral philosophy,
as would be expected. Libido is used less than cupiditas, and it has often very
concrete and sexual overtones,43 with lust (libido) said to be an addictive
force.44 At the same time, libido is listed as one of the natural, albeit tedious
and futile, functions of human living.45
Cupiditas, however, seems to be the standard word for ἐπιθυµία in de
ira, where Seneca classifies hate as a subcategory of desire.46 The differing
nuances of Seneca’s vocabulary can be neatly seen in a passage from conso-
latio ad Helviam:
si avaritia dimisit, vehementissima generis humani pestis, moram tibi ambi-
tio non faciet; si ultimum diem non quasi poenam, sed quasi naturae legem
aspicis, ex quo pectore metum mortis eieceris, in id nullius rei timor audebit

40 Tusc. 3, 9, 19 nam si irascitur, etiam concupiscit; proprium est enim irati cupere, a quo

laesus videatur, ei quam maxumum dolorem inurere. qui autem id concupierit, eum necesse est,
si id consecutus sit, magno opere laetari; 4, 6, 12; 5, 7, 17; ac. 1, 38 condolescere et concupiscere
et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent, hic
omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem.
41 Tusc. 4, 11, 24 haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt,

eaque oriuntur ex libidine et laetitia. nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo
ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas
et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli inveterata
non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; similiterque ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas,
ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam quae Graece φιλογυνία dicitur, ceterique similiter morbi
aegrotationesque nascuntur. The word also has a sexual meaning. See also Tusc. 4, 32, 68
turpes sunt, qui ecferunt se laetitia tum cum fruuntur Veneriis voluptatibus, sic flagitiosi, qui
eas inflammato animo concupiscunt.
42 nat. deor. 1, 22; off. 1, 19, 64.
43 See, for example, benef. 7, 2, 2; 7, 26, 4.
44 epist. 124, 3 atqui inprobamus gulae ac libidini addictos et contemnimus illos, qui nihil

viriliter ausuri sunt doloris metu.

45 epist. 77, 6 cogita, quamdiu iam idem facias: cibus, somnus, libido, per hunc circulum

curritur.
46 Thus, for instance, in ira 1, 3, 3, where the Stoic tradition (nostra) is stated as following:

Aristotelis finitio non multum a nostra abest: ait enim iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi.
For Seneca’s references to Aristotle, see Fillion-Lahille 1984, 203–210.
26 chapter two

intrare; si cogitas libidinem non voluptatis causa homini datam, sed propa-
gandi generis, quem non violaverit hoc secretum et infixum visceribus ipsis
exitium, omnis alia cupiditas intactum praeteribit.47
Here libido is used as a special, sexual case of desire, whereas cupiditas
denotes generally all disturbing wishes and appetites. Again, cupiditas oc-
curs in contexts where Seneca presents the Stoic tradition of emotions
(perturbationes), and where it is typically accompanied by fear (metus).48
Together with the attribute ‘blind’ (caeca), cupiditas aims at wealth, dignity
or power.49 In accordance with the Stoic view, cupiditas is at hand if one’s
natural needs are driven to excess.50 Furthermore, the verb concupisco is
used by Seneca in the context of emotions to denote the action of cupiditas:
Saepe enim noxia concupiscimus, nec dispicere, quam perniciosa sunt, licet,
quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum inpetus
ille flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos mal-
orum munerum auctores.51
In Seneca, the verb concupisco refers to such excessive desires that go over
the limits of necessary bodily needs.52 Thus, the verb is used in connection
with desiring money or sex.53 On the other hand, Seneca also uses the verb
in more neutral contexts, to denote a strong, even positive wish, as when he
addresses Nero, who has strongly desired (concupisti) blamelessness.54
Moving closer to Augustine in time and space, a word may be said of
Apuleius, who uses libido in two very distinct ways. In his philosophical
treatises, Apuleius uses libido and libidinosus in the context of the Platonic
theory of emotions on the desiring part of the soul.55 If reason does not
control the desiring and spirited parts of the soul, these begin to control

47 dial. 12, 13, 2.

48 ira 1, 8, 6. Or timor in 1, 10, 1 and in epist. 101, 8: ex hac autem indigentia timor nascitur et
cupiditas futuri exedens animum. See also benef. 2, 14, 1; epist. 117, 25.
49 dial. 11, 9, 5; epist. 7, 7.
50 dial. 12, 11, 4; benef. 7, 10, 3; epist. 16, 9. Cf. clem. 2, 1, 4.
51 benef. 2, 14, 1. See also ira 1, 3, 2.
52 dial. 12, 10, 2 corporis exigua desideria sunt: frigus summoveri volt, alimentis famem ac

sitim extinguere; quidquid extra concupiscitur, vitiis, non usibus laboratur. Cf. Tert. anim. 38,
3.
53 epist. 89, 6 quomodo multum inter avaritiam et pecuniam interest, cum illa cupiat, haec

concupiscatur, sic inter philosophiam et sapientiam; ira 2, 28, 7 is qui nullius non uxorem
concupiscit et satis iustas causas putat amandi, quod aliena est, idem uxorem suam aspici non
vult.
54 clem. 1, 1, 5.
55 Apul. Plat. 2, 4 quod accidere censebat, cum optima et rationabilis portio et quae etiam

imperitare ceteris debet, servit aliis, illae vero vitiorum ducatrices, iracundia et libido, ratione
sub iugum missa dominantur. See also Plat. 2, 6.
the language of desire 27

one’s life in a tyrannical fashion and subsequently lead one to believe that
only the bodily reality matters.56 The same applies for cupiditas, which is
used in de Platone et eius dogmate, as a standard technical term for pars
ἐπιθυµητικόν, together with the closely related cupido.57
In Metamorphoses, however, these philosophical connotations of libido
seem to be absent. Nearly all the occurrences of the libid- group refer to
sexual desire.58 Moreover, cupiditas does not occur at all in this work, while
cupido (often personified) is, of course, a crucial factor in love affairs.59
Compared to these two nouns, the verb concupisco lies somewhat apart and
is used infrequently. Furthermore, its usage is highly varied: one can desire
(concupiscere) riches,60 friendship,61 and even the ‘greatest good,’62 but also
a pretty girl or a donkey’s blood.63
Again, the following generalisations can be made based on Cicero, Seneca
and Apuleius:
1. All three words (the nouns libido, cupiditas and the verb concupisco)
are used in the context of the theories of emotions, either to denote
the Platonic desiring part of the soul or one of the four generic Stoic
emotions.
2. Especially the term libido has strong sexual connotations and while
these connotations are not totally absent from the verb concupisco,
this verb is either used in a rather general manner to denote strong

56 Apul. Plat. 2, 13 necessitudinum et liberorum amor naturae congruus est, ille alius abhor-

rens ab humanitatis clementia, qui vulgo amor dicitur, est appetitus ardens, cuius instinctu per
libidinem capti amatores corporum in eo quod viderint totum hominem putant; Plat. 2, 15 tyran-
nidis genus ex luxuriosa et plena libidinis vita, quae ex infinitis et diversis et illicitis voluptatibus
conflata mente tota dominatur.
57 Apul. Plat. 1, 18 tripertitam animam idem dicit: primam eius rationabilem esse partem,

aliam excandescentiam vel irritabilitatem, tertiam appetitus; eandem cupiditatem possumus

nuncupare. Apul. Plat. 2, 6 tertia pars mentis est cupidinum et desideriorum, cui necessario
abstinentia comes est. See also Apul. Plat. 2, 4; 2, 15; 2, 21.
58 Apul. met. 2, 10; 2, 11; 2, 16; 2, 17; 2, 22; 3, 14; 3, 20; 7, 21; 8, 29; 9, 23; 10, 21.
59 See e.g. Apul. met. 6, 24; 8, 22; 10, 2. In Gellius’ noctes Atticae, a similar kind of difference

may be suggested between libido and cupiditas: libido is used in varying contexts from sexual
desire to gluttony and to other physical bodily needs, while cupiditas is used only twice, both
times in the context of the theory of emotions. Gell. 15, 2, 2 vini libidine; 19, 2, 3 libidines in cibos
atque in Venerem prodigae; 19, 4, 3 libido urinae; 15, 2, 5 adfectionum cupiditatumque errores;
19, 12, 3 adfectionibus istis animi, quas παθῆ appellabat […] cupiditatis. Concupisco does not
belong to Gellius’ vocabulary.
60 apol. 102.
61 flor. 17.
62 Plat. 2, 2.
63 met. 4, 23; 8, 28.
28 chapter two

desires, being sometimes morally condemned due to their excessive

character, or sometimes only referring to intensive wishes.
3. Being part of the philosophical vocabulary of emotions, cupiditas is
also connected more concretely to money and riches; thereby ap-
proaching the meaning ‘greed.’

2.2. Latin Christian Literature

This section offers an analysis of three Latin Christian writers and their uses
of the word groups concerning desire. Whereas Tertullian and Cyprian were
historical authorities for Augustine,64 and he read enthusiastically especially
Cyprian, Ambrose was partly a contemporary writer to Augustine.65 In the
following concise outline, the focus will be primarily on the use of concu-
piscentia and concupisco, but something will also be said of cupiditas and
libido. As the sheer number of occurrences of these two words in Cyprian,
Tertullian and Ambrose varies drastically in comparison to each other, it is
not possible to draw definite conclusions on their influence on Augustine.66
The first occurrences of the noun concupiscentia are found in the writ-
ings of Tertullian, who uses it rather frequently, and more or less according
to the senses that the verbal stem had in the previous Latin literature. Con-
cupiscentia seems to be condemnable as such, without any other negative
attributes.67 For example, the soul is weakened by “lusts and desire.”68 More-

64 Yates (2001) limits his study to a few instances in Tertullian and Cyprian and their use

of concupiscentia.
65 Obviously, I do not claim that all these three authors had equal importance for Augus-

tine. One only has to take a look at the frequencies that the CAG2 lists for the quotations of
these authors: compared to the importance of Cyprian and Ambrose, Tertullian seems to be
a marginal character. This, however, may be explained by the ambivalent status of Tertullian
as, at least partly, a heterodox author.
66 Thus, Tertullian gets 105 hits in the CLCLT-5 with the concup-stem, whereas Cyprian

gets only 31, but even together, these two African authors cannot compete with Ambrose
(195 hits). Cf. Bonner 1962; 1986, and Yates 2001, who disagree on the question of whether
Tertullian and Cyprian have had a significant influence on Augustine. Although Yates (2001,
39–40, 56) remains skeptical on how to assess this influence, he prefers the contribution of
Tertullian to Cyprian. Both Bonner and Yates ignore Ambrose in their studies.
Statistically, Jerome seems to have preferred the noun libido to both cupiditas and concu-
piscentia. A search in the CLCLT results in 257 occurences of libido, but only 60 occurences
of cupidus/cupido/cupiditas and 64 occurences of concupiscentia. Most of the occurrences of
libido can be found in sexual contexts.
67 Cf. the use in e.g. spect. 14, anim. 40, 2–4, idol. 23, 3.
68 apol. 17, 4–5 libidinibus et concupiscentia evigorata.
the language of desire 29

over, a “weak faith” always tends to strive for the secular joys of concupiscen-
tia.69 The spiritual foes of the Christian also are characterised by malice and
by all kinds of concupiscentia.70 In a pointed statement, Tertullian claims
that all sins are due to idolatry and concupiscentia saeculi.71
In contrast to the preceding Latin authors and their use of concupisco,
the majority of the occurrences of concupiscentia in Tertullian appear in
a negative sexual context. Tertullian’s reproaches of sexual desire often
combine the gaze of the eye and concupiscentia as the first precondition to
the act of adultery, as in Mt 6. “What could be a more perfect way to check
adultery or even to reject the secret lust of the eyes?”72 While the hands
are apt to steal, the eyes thus are an instrument of adultery.73 In a more
mixed tone, Tertullian describes the temptations of the widow and how they
emerge from carnalis concupiscentia.74 Tertullian exhorts to humiliate the
desire of the flesh by the spiritual affect of self-control, thus annulling these
earthly and unstable wishes by eternal goods.75
However, Tertullian admits that there are many kinds of worldly desires
(concupiscentiae saeculi): one can have lust for money, social distinction,
gluttony, sex (libido) or glory and last but not least, for pleasures (including
those that are derived from compulsive gambling and exciting spectacles).76
These distinctions serve mainly rhetorical purposes, but at least they show
that Tertullian did not narrow himself to reproach only sexual desires.
Tertullian also uses libido when speaking of the vast array of harmful desires
in general (generaliter nominatae).

69 uxor. 2, 8, 2.
70 adv. Marc. 3, 14, 3 hostes spiritales nequitiae et concupiscentiae omnis.
71 idol. 1, 1. Waszink & van Winden 1987, 78: “The inclusion of all other sins in idolatry is a

consequence drawn by Tertullian himself, an extreme consequence such as he likes to draw.”

72 apol. 45, 3 quid perfectius, prohibere adulterium, an etiam ab oculorum solitaria concu-

piscentia arcere? See also apol. 46, 11, paenit. 3, 13, anim. 38, 2–3; 40, 4, castit. 9, 1–3; 13, 4, idol.
2, 3; virg. vel. 7, 2, pudic. 6. In spect. 2 Tertullian distinguishes between different kinds of evil
acts or errors in human constitution. The eyes are accompanied with desire, and the geni-
tals with shamefulness, neque enim oculos ad concupiscentiam sumpsimus—et genitalia ad
excessus impudicitiae.
73 paenit. 6, 19.
74 uxor. 1, 4, 3.
75 uxor. 1, 4, 5.
76 spect. 14 nam sicut pecuniae vel dignitatis vel gulae vel libidinis vel gloriae, ita et voluptatis

concupiscentia est; species autem voluptatis etiam spectacula […] opinor, generaliter nomi-
natae concupiscentiae continent in se et voluptates, aeque generaliter intellectae voluptates
specialiter et in spectacula disseruntur. See cult. fem. 1, 9: concupiscentia habendi. In anim.
38, 3, Tertullian claims that the only created and thus good concupiscentia is appetite.
30 chapter two

Elsewhere Tertullian explains concupiscentia to be the reason for exces-

sive greed and ambition. In this case, concupiscentia is a “corrupted passion
of the soul” (vitiosa animi passio).77 This means that the philosophical con-
nections of the word are quite familiar to Tertullian. A particularly inter-
esting case of incorporating biblical narratives to traditional philosophical
doctrines is made in de anima, where Tertullian quotes his Old Latin Bible
translation which regularly uses concupisco and concupiscentia.78 Thus, for
Tertullian, Jesus says (Lk 22, 15) that “with desire I have desired to eat this
passover with you” (concupiscentia concupii pascha edere vobiscum).79 This
verse is an amalgam of Semitic and Greek idioms, and the Latin translation
is literal to the extreme.80 The argument continues with another quotation
from 1Tim 3, 1 (si quis episcopatum concupiscit, bonum opus concupiscit).81
Tertullian is clearly aware of the negative philosophical connotation of the
concupisc- stem, and he takes some trouble to arrange the biblical material
to form a coherent stance with the common idea of the irrational character
of the emotions. Tertullian agrees with the Platonic tripartition (indigna-
tivum, concupiscentivum,82 rationale) of the soul, and even claims that the
same kind of tripartition may be found in the person of Christ and his
actions, but only in a modified way.83 Tertullian notes that in Christ the sub-
rational movements of the soul occurred according to perfect rationality.

77 cult. fem. 1, 9.
78 anim. 16. As a rule, Tertullian’s Old Latin Bible translated Greek ἐπιθυµία with concupis-
centia, see adv. Marc. 3, 14, 3; 3, 18, 5; 4, 40, 1; anim. 40, 2–4, idol. 2, 3, pudic. 6; 17, 2. Old Latin
translations seem to have favoured full and massive nouns. Rönsch 1875, 471. Barnes conjec-
tures (1971, 29) that de anima reflects knowledge of Soranus’ lost work on the same subject
(Περὶ ψυχῆς).
79 adv. Marc. 4, 40 1. In Greek, the verse runs as following: ἐπιθυµίᾳ ἐπεθύµησα τοῦτο το

πάσχα φαγεῖν µεθ´ ὑµῶν.

80 See also adv. Marc. 4, 40, 1.
81 anim. 16, 3–6. 1 Tim 3, 1 ἔι τις ἐπισκοπῆς ὀρέγεται, καλοῦ ἔργου ἐπιθυµεῖ.
82 This rare word was later used by Jerome in an identical meaning. In his explanation

to Ezek. 1, 10, Jerome modifies the Platonic image of the charioteer to correspond to the
creatures of the biblical text: the bull, “which is entangled with the works of earth,” means
lust, licentiousness and all kinds of desire for pleasures (concupiscentivum, ἐπιθυµητικόν).
83 In adv. Marc. 4, 40, 3 Tertullian takes another approach: when Christ desires to eat

the passover with his disciples, he is not desiring any “alien property,” but something which
already belongs to him, in other words, is part of his nature: his own body. This discussion
concerns Christ’s true humanity and human emotions. Professus itaque se concupiscentia
concupisse edere pascha ut suum—indignum enim, ut quid alienum concupisceret deus—
acceptum panem et distributum discipulis corpus suum illum fecit hoc est corpus meum dicen-
do. See also adv. Marc. 1, 25, 4–5. For Tertullian’s vocabulary on emotions and divine apatheia
in general, see Braun 1962, 62–65.
the language of desire 31

In the same way, it is perfectly justified for a Christian to feel desire, for
example for the episcopate, if this happens on rational grounds and with
a rational desire (rationalem concupiscentiam ostendit). While mostly the
emotions of anger and desire are to be condemned on the basis of their
irrationality, it could happen that they can be turned to good use or altered
altogether into something virtuous and rational (non semper ex inrationali
censenda sunt).
The sphere of libido84 in Tertullian is diverse and obviously covers sexual
desires (mostly connected to extramarital sexual conduct),85 but the word
also denotes arbitrariness and whimsical licence.86 The traditional attach-
ment to luxury is present as well.87 Furthermore, sometimes an emphasis
on irreligiosity and impiety appears side-by-side with libido.88 Compared
to concupisc-stem and libido, cupiditas is rare in Tertullian’s corpus.89 It is
largely confined to denote greed with objects such as gold, mamona and
profit in general;90 and with a verbal objective, adquirendi.91 Tertullian also
quotes 1Tim 6, 10 twice.92
A clear majority of the few occurrences of the concupisc- stem in Cyprian
are from Bible quotations; 1Jn 2, 16 is quoted four times.93 Thus, it is not
surprising that the flesh and the world are joined with concupiscentia in
other passages as well.94 The objects of concupiscentia vary from food to
killing people.95 In ep. 55, 27, Cyprian mentions a desire (concupiscentia) to
act against God.96 The word cupiditas in Cyprian is used to denote a strong
and intensive wish, sometimes in a positive context,97 but more often as
reproachable greed.98 A Bible quotation much used later by Augustine (1 Tim

84 There are about a hundred occurrences in CLCLT-5.

85 E.g. mart. 4, 2; nat. 1, 16; anim. 27, 4; resurr. 61.
86 E.g. nat. 1, 10; spect. 21, bapt. 12.
87 E.g. nat. 1, 16; pudic. 14; 17.
88 E.g. apol. 22, 6 adspiratio daemonum; spect. 10 ista daemonia conspirata; anim. 49, 2.
89 Only 18 hits in CLCLT-5.
90 E.g. nat. 2, 14; cult. fem. 1, 1.
91 uxor. 1, 5, 4.
92 patient. 7; idolol. 11.
93 testim. 3, 11; hab. virg. 7; domin. orat. 14; mortal. 24.
94 hab. virg. 4; 6; 22; domin. orat. 16.
95 testim. 3, 60; 61; patient. 10.
96 epist. 55, 27, 2 neque enim mala facta de sancto spiritu ueniunt sed de aduersarii instinctu

et de inmundo spiritu natae concupiscentiae contra deum facere et diabolo seruire conpellunt.
97 laps. 2; mort. 26; epist. 14, 1, 2; 63, 8, 4.
98 Fort. 7; Demetr. 11; eleem. 13; 22; epist. 65, 3, 1.
32 chapter two

6, 10), occurs four times in Cyprian.99 Cyprian uses libido, again, mostly in a
sexual context and in lists of vices.100 The term libido is also used to describe
the motivation of the audience during gladiatorial shows.101
In general, Ambrose uses concupiscentia with negative connotations. In
lists of vices, for instance, concupiscentia is classified as an evil disease (lan-
guor malus) or a fetter (vinculum) of the human nature.102 On the other hand,
Ambrose notes the ambiguity of the biblical passages that use concupis-
centia as a translation for ἐπιθυµία: the word occurs both in positive and
negative senses.103 However, the preference for using concupiscence nega-
tively is supported by the majority of cases in Ambrose himself, for he uses
concupiscentia without further clarifications nearly always in negative con-
texts.104
A great part of Ambrose’s notions of concupiscentia appear in the context
of passions or emotions.105 The flesh (caro) is the reason for the corrup-
tion of the soul, and is, in a way, the province of pleasures. Bad emotions
then emerge in the flesh, and flood out everywhere.106 As a consequence, the
control of the mind has been conquered by the storms and winds of the pas-
sions.107 In fact, concupiscentia may even take a leading role in introducing

99testim. 3, 61; laps. 12; 19; eleem. 10.

100 E.g. ad Donat. 9–10; hab. virg. 18–19; epist. 55, 26, 2; 65, 2, 3; lists of vices in mortal. 4;
Demetr. 9–10; patient. 20.
101 ad Donat. 7 ut libidinem crudelium luminum sanguis oblectet.
102 in psalm. 118 serm. 8, 42 vinculum; in psalm. 1, 28, 5 malus languor. Both metaphors are

used by Augustine.
103 in psalm. 37, 38, 3 iuxta hos ego versiculos concupiscentiam possumus accipere magis

quam desiderium; ἐπιθυµίαν enim Graecus posuit, concupiscentia autem et desiderium ἐπιθυµία
dicitur, sed concupiscentia et de bono et malo dicitur: concupivit et defecit anima mea in atria
domini pro bono, in lege autem aliter: nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non
concupisces, utique pro malo. The psalm runs in LXX 37, 10 κύριε, ἐναντίον σου πᾶσα ἡ ἐπιθυµία
µου. The original meaning is the exact opposite of Ambrose’s reading. Against this distinction,
cf. an example of a synonymous use of desidero and concupisco: adhuc in hoc febrienti corpore
constitutus, in hoc concupiscenti, in hoc terrena adhuc desideranti. in psalm. 118 serm. 8, 12.
104 For biblical quotations of instances of concupiscentia, see e.g. in psalm. 118 serm. 11, 28;

serm. 13, 27; serm. 16, 12; fid. 3, 1.

105 The philosophical sense of concupiscentia is often used later in Jerome, as well (e.g. in

his interpretation of Rom 7). To Jerome, the noun represents all disturbing emotions of the
soul (epist. 121, 8 nos autem per concupiscentiam omnes perturbationes animae significatas
putamus, quibus maeremus et dolemus, timemus et concupiscimus). For Jerome’s view on
emotions, see Canellis 2000.
106 Noe 5, 12: velut a fonte prorumpunt concupiscentiarum malarumque passionum flumina

lateque exundant. See also Noe 10, 34.

107 The image of seafaring neatly joins together the story of Noah and the traditional

philosophical similes (gubernator!). Cf. also Iac. 1, 6, 24; 8, 36; 4 Macc 7, 1–3; 15, 31–32. Cicero
uses the image in Tusc. 1, 49, 118.
the language of desire 33

other emotions to the human soul.108 Furthermore, emotions and concupis-

centia are joined in a lengthy passage in de Iacob, which is heavily indebted
to its source text in Fourth Maccabees. This treatise also includes frequent
quotations from Romans 7.109
The general picture of emotions in Iac. 1, 1, 1–1, 2, 5 is similar to that of
4 Macc. Thus, Ambrose lists the four main emotions as desire (concupiscen-
tia), joy (gratulatio), fear (timor) and sorrow (tristitia).110 Perfectly in line
with 4Macc is also the emphasis on the irrationality of the passions in gen-
eral, and of concupiscentia in particular. The irrationality of concupiscentia
is exemplified by David’s desire for water in 2 Sam 23, 13–17. Reason and
desire are opposite factors and both resist each other. The cure for the irra-
tional desire is rationabiliter paratus.111 David extinguishes his desire by the
consolation of the “word,” that is, “reason.”112 In this case, Ambrose also uses
the word cupiditas to denote this inappropriate irrational desire.113
Concupiscentia appears in the numerous philosophically coloured pas-
sages of de Isaac as well. It is seen as a form to the bodily matter of sin.114
The term concupiscentia also appears in a modified image of the charioteer.

108 fid. 2, 11.

109 For Plotinian influences in this work see Courcelle 1950a, 106–138; 1950b and the line of
research he has inspired: e.g. Solignac 1956a; Hadot 1956, Madec 1974, 61–71. Recently, Colish
(2005) has taken an opposite view and has stressed the Stoic influences in Ambrose and his
treatises on the patriarchs. For the influence of 4 Macc in Latin Christian authors, see Klauck
1989, 674–675.
110 Iac. 1, 2, 5 passionum autem velut duces sunt naturales delectatio et dolor, quas secun-

tur ceterae. Illae enim conplectuntur universas, quarum utraque non solum corporis, sed etiam
secundum animam passiones sunt. et quia diximus subesse his alias passiones, ante delecta-
tionem concupiscentia, post delectationem gratulatio est; ante dolorem autem est timor, post
dolorem tristitia, commotio autem animi communis passio et delectationis et doloris est.
111 Iac. 1, 1, 3.
112 The words verbi consolatione are a poor translation for 4Macc 3, 17–18. Did Ambrose

read λογισµός as verbum? Such is the way he reads Philo’s λόγος (see Madec 1974, 57–58). Cf.
however Iac. 1, 2, 6: haec est igitur rectae rationis tractatio, quam Graeci λογισµόν nuncupant,
qua mens sapientiae intenta solidatur.
113 Iac. 1, 1, 4; 1, 2, 8 See also parad. 6, 34 on the subject of the four main emotions. At the

moment of the Fall, Adam and Eve had these movements in their soul, and the first sin was
committed by cupiditas, ira and formido; primo fuerat cupiditas auctor erroris, ut ipsa ederet,
sequentisque fuit causa peccati.
114 See e.g. the highly interesting Isaac 7, 60: materialia autem vitia animae obumbrant

gratiam. Ignorantia et concupiscentia animae sunt aegritudines, sed ad speciem quam ad

materiem magis referuntur. Materia est caro, species est ignorantia et concupiscentia. Cur
igitur caro accusatur, cum tantae sint in specie labes? Quia nihil species potest sine materia.
Denique nihil species securis sine materia facit. Quid enim esset concupiscentia, nisi eam caro
inflammaret? Friget in senibus, pueris quoque, quia in his corpus infirmum est: ardet in adoles-
centibus, quibus vis corporis fervet. Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt; non enim sunt mala nisi quae
34 chapter two

So Ambrose denotes the desiring member of the Platonic tripartition of the

soul and one element of the Stoic tetrachord with all of the three nouns
available.115
Ambrose’s use of libido is strictly traditional. Libido appears in set phrases
that stress the burning character of lust (libido enim velut festuca est, cito
accenditur, propere consumitur, ep. 68, 13) together with ardor,116 flamma,117
fervor,118 ignis,119 or the derivatives of urere, flammare, fervere; practically
all of these occurrences appear in sexual contexts (concubitus occurs as
the object as well): a particularly expressive phrase connects the neighing
(adhinnire) of horses to the libido.120 Again, a typical and traditional trait of
Ambrose’s style is to connect libido with luxuria.121 Idiomatic constructions
of gerunds are somewhat rare, but still extant.122 Last but not least, libido
occurs in lists of distorted emotions.123
In his use of cupiditas, Ambrose offers no surprises. In a rather gen-
eral sense, cupiditas represents a large spectrum of worldly desires with
attributes such as terrena, mundana or saecularis.124 The objects of cupiditas
vary from money to food and from glory to illicit sex.125 Cupiditas appears
often together with greed (avaritia) and rich people (divites).126 Like libido,

privantur bonis. For evil as deprivation see Courcelle 1950b, 31–32, 48–49. Colish (2005, 78–
79) offers a clarifying interpretation of the passage, but overlooks the Plotinian affinities and
quotations (Plot. 1, 1, 4). See also e.g. Plot. En. 1, 8, 8, in which the “evil desires” (τὰς ἐπιθυµίας
τὰς πονηράς) are mentioned, perhaps in connection with Plat. Tim. 86b–c. But in Plotinus,
the soul is not involved with any kind of maladies, whereas in Ambrose, concupiscentia is a
malady of the soul. Hadot 1956, 206.
115 Isaac 8, 65. Cf. bon. mort. 5, 16. See also in psalm 118 serm. 2, 35 ergo anima currus est dei,

ut ira eius et libido et timor et omnes saeculares concupiscentiae refrenetur. Madec 1974, 121,
supposes that the Platonic image of chariots and horses has been delivered to Ambrose by
Origen. Ambrose speaks only of “philosophers” (Isaac 8, 67).
116 E.g. hex. 5, 7, 19; Abr. 1, 4, 24; Hel. 9, 30; in psalm. 1, 29, 2; off. 1, 4, 14.
117 E.g. Noe 11, 38; bon. mort. 3, 9; paenit. 1, 14; epist. 7, 10.
118 E.g. hex. 5, 7, 19.
119 E.g. Hel. 19, 69; paenit. 1, 14; epist. 3, 8.
120 Abr. 2, 7, 43; in psalm. 36, 32, 2; exhort. virg. 7, 48; obit. Theod. 51. For the word and its

use in pagan and Christian authors, see Courcelle 1968.

121 epist. 14, 26 luxuria igitur mater libidinis est. See also e.g. Noe 14, 49; patr. 3, 12; off. 1, 5,

17; epist. 27, 16.

122 E.g. hex. 5, 10, 30 generandi; hex. 5, 15, 52 dominandi; hex. 6, 9, 71 vorandi; Noe 9, 28

epulandi.
123 E.g. hex. 1, 8, 31; bon. mort. 5, 16; off. 1, 47, 229. epist. 7, 31.
124 E.g. hex. 3, 12, 52; Noe 18, 64; fug. saec. 1, 1; off. 1, 50, 246.
125 E.g. hex. 3, 12, 50 pecunia vel potentia; hex. 6, 9, 71 cibus; Noe 33, 125 honor; bon. mort. 7,

28 lucrum; off. 1, 49, 241 aurum; fid. 5, 17 adulterandi.

126 E.g. Abr. 1, 3, 12; Iob 1, 3, 9; Nab. 1, 2; 12, 52; epist. 10, 8; Cain et Ab. 2, 9, 31; Noe 29, 113.
the language of desire 35

Ambrose uses cupiditas to denote one of the standard emotions;127 but

unlike libido, cupiditas may occasionally also denote a desire for something
positive, usually divina cognitio.128 Cupiditas also seems to be something hot:
it is burning, flaming and blazing in people.129

2.3. Augustine

2.3.1. Some Lexical Remarks

Of the three nouns concupiscentia, cupiditas and libido, the first is by far
the most frequent in Augustine’s works.130 Together with the verb concu-
pisco, it may be said to be Augustine’s standard word stem for evil desire.131
Adjective forms (concupiscentialis, concupiscibilis) and adverbs (concupis-
centialiter) are very rare.132 In addition, there is only one occurrence of the
verb cupisco.133 It is no surprise that the distribution of concupiscentia is
uneven in Augustine’s works. This word is used more in the period 410–430
during the Pelagian crisis than in the earlier period.134 Conversely, the use
of libido seems to decrease in time.135 It is difficult to tell whether the less
classical word begins to take the tasks that libido has in the earlier works
(especially in the meaning of sexual desire). Both libido and cupiditas work
in verbal constructions such as libido/cupiditas ulciscendi, libido/cupiditas
dominandi, libido/cupiditas uindicandi, and even libido/cupiditas concum-
bendi in a way that concupiscentia never would. On the other hand, the

127 E.g. hex. 1, 8, 31; parad. 6, 34; Noe 15, 51; bon. mort. 12, 55; Iac. 1, 1, 3–4; epist. 7, 31.
128 E.g. Noe 25, 93; Ioseph 4, 19 vera scientia; in psalm. 118, serm. 3, 33 bona cupiditas.
129 E.g. Noe 10, 34; 15, 53; Abr. 2, 4, 13; 2, 9, 67; Nab. 2, 26; in psalm 45, 9, 1; epist. 57, 3.
130 The frequence analysis of CAG2 gives 1760 hits for concupiscentia, 1180 hits for cupiditas

and 983 hits for libido. These figures include Bible quotations.
131 The frequence analysis of concupisco in CAG2 gives 1312 hits. Cf. this to the 998 hits

of the standard, wide-ranging cupio which has not been included in the present analysis
because of its more neutral connotations compared to those of the terms concupiscentia,
libido, and cupiditas.
132 Nine hits of concupiscentialis, four of concupiscentialiter and two of concupiscibilis.
133 mus. 4, 5 deum uidere qui cupiscit, bonusque uiuit, hic uidebit.
134 The highest hits/expected hits ratios are to be found in such works as cont., nupt. et

conc., c. Iul., c. Iul. imp. and perf. iust. High ratios also occur in some works written in the
earlier period (e.g. Simpl. or exp. prop. Rm.) but this is due to the large number of the biblical
quotations of Rom 7 or Gal 5, 17. On the other hand, the ratio is rather low in such substantial
works as ciu. or trin.
135 See the hits/expected hits ratios in CAG2 for libido, again very high in later works suiting

the theme (nupt. et conc., c. Iul, c. Iul. imp.), but now also in lib. arb., c. Faust., conf. and ciu.
36 chapter two

genitive object of a noun is used regularly in connection with all three

words (e.g. concupiscentia carnis, libido uoluptatis, cupiditas auri). Again,
concupisco is rarely used absolutely.136
Much of the favour of concupisco and concupiscentia is explained by their
overwhelming prevalence in Augustine’s Latin Bible translations. There are
only seven Bible quotations of the four different passages that use cupidi-
tas;137 and three quotations of the two different passages use libido.138 While
the Bible quotations of the passages that include concupiscentia or concu-
pisco are very common, it is difficult to define any absolute figures of these
quotations, partly owing to the difficulty of determining what actually a
Bible quotation is in Augustine.139 The earliest quotations of the biblical
occurrences of concupiscentia are in mus. and Gn. adu. Man.140 Other, sim-
ilarly crucial passages that contain either the verb or the noun are Rom
13, 14 (“put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh,
to gratify its desires”),141 Gal 5, 17 (“For what the flesh desires is opposed
to the Spirit, and what the Spirit desires is opposed to the flesh”),142 Rom
7, 8 (“sin, seizing an opportunity in the commandment, produced in me all
kinds of covetousness”), and Jas 1, 14 (“one is tempted by one’s own desire,
being lured and enticed by it”).143 The more a single passage is quoted, the
more its form varies: thus, for instance, Gal 5, 17 occurs at least in 15 different
variations. The standard word for concupiscentia/concupisco in the original

136 conf. 3, 5 ausus sum etiam in celebritate sollemnitatum tuarum intra parietes ecclesiae

tuae concupiscere.
137 1 Tim 6, 10; 1 Thess 2, 5–7; 1 Cor 10, 6 and Num 11, 4.
138 Col 3, 4–6; 1 Pet 4, 3.
139 Thus, for instance, loose allusions to the Ten Commandments or Gal 5, 17 abound, both

representing various forms of concupisco.

140 mus. 6, 44; Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31 quoting 1 Jn 2, 16 and Gal 5, 24 respectively. The

quotations of 1 Jn 2, 16 usually have concupiscentia, but in ep. Io. tr. the word is desiderium.
Thiele 1958, 40.
141 See conf. 8, 12.
142 The first time in c. Fort. 21.
143 A list of all quoted passages follows, roughly ordered in terms of frequency: Gal 5, 17;

Rom 7, 7–8; 1 Jn 1, 15–16; Phil 1, 23; Rom 1, 28; Jas 1, 14; Gal 5, 24; Ps 45, 12; Mt 5, 28; Rom 13, 9–10;
Rom 13, 14; Jn 8, 56; Gal 5, 16; Rom 1, 24; Jas 1, 15; Ps 119, 20; 1Pet 1, 12; Acts 20, 33; Jas 4, 3; Lk 22,
15; 2 Pet 3, 3; Num 11, 4; Ps 62, 11; 1 Cor 10, 6–7; Ps 84, 3; Ps 106, 14. Yates (2001) goes the other way
round and surveys the variants that are used for Greek epithumia (and hedone) in Old Latin
translations. Yates’s findings are a useful caveat against too straightforward generalisations
of how particular biblical lexemes and their translations influenced Christian writers, such as
Augustine. Yates 2001, 43: “These resources [Beuron Vetus Latina and Petrus Sabatier’s Bible]
revealed that in addition to concupiscentia, libido and their derived forms, the translators or
the various Latin versions employed no less than 10 terms, either alone or in some form of
circumlocution, to communicate the […] concepts.”
the language of desire 37

Greek seems to be ἐπιθυµία/ἐπιθυµέω.144 A rather exceptional (or mistaken?)

translation in Augustine’s Latin Bible is Jn 8, 56 (concupiuit for the original
ἠγαλλιάσατο).

2.3.2. Augustine’s Semantic Reflections

Having a way with words Augustine shows an awareness of the connota-
tions that the vocabulary of desire has. Thus, Augustine sometimes makes
notions of the words he uses. While these notions may sometimes be rhetor-
ical lipservice, owing to Augustine’s interest in explaining e.g. certain pas-
sages of the Bible in a certain way, they are also valuable material in pointing
out the possible subtle differences in the colouring of the words concerned.
In addition, one has to pay attention to the various contexts in which Augus-
tine uses his vocabulary of desire: a minute analysis of each context in each
of the occurrences would shed light on the connotations of each word.
While such an analysis falls outside the scope of this study, some general
suggestions are made below.
Augustine occasionally clarifies his word usage concerning desire by
noting the inherent negative connotation of the word in question. Thus,
explaining Psalm 118 (119), he claims that it is crucial to reveal the object
of a positive desire; otherwise, concupiscentia “can be understood only as
evil desire.” Therefore, the psalmist had to add the object ‘wisdom’ in using
the word of a positive desire.145 In fact, Augustine explains, ‘good concupis-
centia’ is only a metonym for the right kind of love (dilectio).146 Perhaps it is

144 Augustine is aware of the Greek word in nupt. et conc. 2, 55, where different translations

are compared: quod enim Graecus habet: ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυµίας, alii latine interpretati sunt: in
morbo desiderii uel concupiscentiae, alii uero: in passione concupiscentiae, uel si quo alio modo
in aliis atque aliis codicibus inuenitur. Note Augustine’s fluctuation between desiderium and
concupiscentia!
145 en. Ps. 118, 8, 3 et multa alia reperiuntur bonae concupiscentiae testimonia. sed hoc sane

interest, quod non tacetur quid concupiscatur, quando bona commemoratur concupiscentia;
cum autem non additur quidconcupiscatur, sed sola ponitur, nonnisi mala intellegitur. sicut
in hoc quod commemoraui: concupiscentia itaque sapientiae deducit ad regnum [Wis 6, 21];
si non adderet sapientiae, nullo modo diceret: concupiscentia perducit ad regnum. at uero
apostolus quod posuit: concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: non concupisces [Rom 7,
7]; non utique addidit cuius rei concupiscentiam, uel quid non concupisces; certum est enim
non intellegi, cum ita dicitur, nisi malam, concupiscentiam. For an analogical case concerning
the word ‘spiritus,’ see Simpl. 2, 1, 5. Cf. Nygren 1953, 494, who claims that cupiditas and caritas
are in principle interchangeable and need a clarifying object to point out their moral quality.
Obviously, this is not the case.
146 en. Ps. 118, 8, 4 quid est ista concupiscentia, nisi bona dilectio? An interesting exception to

this generalisation is to be found in ep. 6*, 3–5 quis catholicus dicat diabolicae operationis esse
38 chapter two

useful to note also the fact that while the Bible text uses the verb concupisco,
Augustine quickly proceeds to consider the noun and its negative connota-
tions.
A similar argument can be found in ciu. 14, 7 where various kinds of
positive desires are listed, based on different biblical passages.147 Again,
Augustine repeats his understanding of the connotation of the words for
‘desire’:
It is, however, an established usage that, when we employ the words cupiditas
or concupiscentia without adding what it is that is desired, they signify ‘desire’
in a bad sense.148 [transl. Dyson]
Accordingly, Augustine insists in c. Iul. imp. that concupiscentia carnis (or
oculorum) in the Bible cannot have the same ambiguity as the word mundus,
which sometimes denotes the physical composition of heaven and earth
and its people, and sometimes refers to the sinful humankind disobeying
God.149 Later on in the same work Augustine says that concupiscentia, espe-
cially with a specific “fleshly” attribute, is always to be understood as evil.150
Concerning the term libido, Augustine makes further clarifications in ciu.
14, 15–16. At first, libido is connected to the discussion of emotional func-
tions, where Augustine loosely mentions libido to be a common term for
all desires (generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis).151 Augustine continues
by listing various kinds of desire according to their objects. Some of these

concupiscentiam nuptiarum […] ex hoc errore concupiscentiam nuptiarum, hoc est concupis-
centiam pudicitiae coniugalis, concupiscentiam legitime propagandae prolis, concupiscentiam
uinculi socialis, quod uterque inter se sexus obstringitur, non discernunt a concupiscentia car-
nis. For an interesting comparison in Clement of Alexandria and his terminology of various
desires, see Hunter 1992, 99–100: while the word epithumia is reserved for negative contexts,
“[Clement] defines marriage as ‘the orexis for procreation.’”
147 Phil 1, 23; Ps 119, 20; Wis 6, 21.
148 ciu. 14, 7 hoc tamen loquendi obtinuit consuetudo, ut, si cupiditas uel concupiscentia

dicatur nec addatur cuius rei sit, non nisi in malo possit intellegi. Cf. nupt. et conc. 2, 23.
O’Donnell notes (1992, II, 74, 89) that cupiditas and libido never occur in conf. in a positive
sense.
149 c. Iul. imp. 4, 18 sicut ergo nunc in bono, nunc in malo legitur mundus: sic lege, si potes,

aliquando in bono positam concupiscentiam carnis, uel concupiscentiam oculorum: sed sic non
inuenies, sicut nec superbiam uitae, quod illis duobus malis additum est tertium.
150 c. Iul. imp. 4, 67: non uis eam carnis concupiscentiam nominare: nosti enim laude eius

offendi eos, qui hoc nomen in scripturis sanctis non nisi in rei malae significatione legerunt. Of
course, these statements about concupiscentia have been made in a debate.
151 ciu. 14, 15 uoluptatem uero praecedit appetitus quidam, qui sentitur in carne quasi cupid-

itas eius, sicut fames et sitis et ea, quae in genitalibus usitatius libido nominatur, cum hoc sit
generale uocabulum omnis cupiditatis.
the language of desire 39

lusts have their “proper names”; thus, for example, the lust for revenge is
properly called anger (ira) and the lust for money is greed (auaritia).152
However, some of the various lusts do not have a proper name at all (quarum
nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent).153 But
when libido is mentioned without further attributes, so Augustine, one often
comes to think of that particular desire by which the obscene body parts are
excited.154 As a technical term, libido can thus be applied to all imaginable
desires. As a word, it has, however, a connotation of its own, namely sexual.
This semantic consideration is in line with a similar, more vague charac-
terisation in c. Iul., where Augustine holds that calor genitalis, libido and car-
nis concupiscentia denote the same thing, with an additional notion of the
difference between standard Latin and the biblical language: “Holy Scrip-
ture uses the word carnis concupiscentia of libido.”155
These definitions are not, however, of permanent character when it
comes to polemics, and thus not to be taken at their face value. Later in
the dispute with Julian, Augustine rephrases his position on how to employ
the vocabulary of desire. Julian accuses Augustine of reading the biblical
phrase ‘concupiscentia carnis’ always in a sexual context.156 But Augustine
now vehemently denies this: concupiscentia carnis is involved in all sense
perceptions, not only in sexual pleasure.157 The broader meaning of lust is
already stated in a similar way in cont.: moderation and self-control should
concern not only sexual desires, but all behaviour: thus also concupiscentia

152 See Cic. Tusc. 3, 5, 11; 4, 19, 44.

153 ciu. 14, 15 est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae
auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido gloriandi, quae iac-
tantia nuncupatur. sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum nonnullae habent etiam uocabula
propria, quaedam uero non habent, quis enim facile dixerit, quid uocetur libido dominandi,
quam tamen plurimum ualere in tyrannorum animis etiam ciuilia bella testantur?
154 ciu. 14, 16 cum igitur sint multarum libidines rerum, tamen, cum libido dicitur neque cuius

rei libido sit additur, non fere adsolet animo occurrere nisi illa, qua obscenae partes corporis
excitantur. Bonner 1962, 304.
155 c. Iul. 4, 8 appellas etiam calorem genitalem, quia pudet appellare libidinem, siue, sicut

eam diuinus sermo appellare consueuit, carnis concupiscentiam. sic ergo loquere et dic: si
posset carnis concupiscentia mala esse naturaliter, exstirpanda erat, non componenda. sic
enim possunt, qui Latine sciunt, tardiores intellegere quid loquaris.
156 Iulian. c. Iul. imp. 4, 27–28 hic tamen necessario exigo, quibus tibi somniis reuelatum sit,

ut nomine concupiscentiae, coeuntium libidinem indicatam putares […] hac quippe concupis-
centia carnis nullum absolute genitalium tenetur indicium. Likewise Bonner 1962, 304.
157 c. Iul. imp. 4, 28 ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam uoluptatem

genitalium dicamus aestuare. prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum con-
cupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur: et quoniam si non aduersus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala
pertrahit, malum esse conuincitur.
40 chapter two

or cupiditas should be better understood as a desire that is not limited to

sexual or bodily transgressions, but concerns e.g. “enmities, strife, jealousy,
and also anger” (cf. Gal 5, 20). In this passage, Augustine uses all three words
indiscriminately.158
Thus, Augustine’s own concerns appear in an ambivalent light. On the
one hand, the vocabulary of desire seems to have inherent negative conno-
tations, and in the case of libido, the baggage is even more detailed as being
of sexual character. On the other hand, Augustine approves of such word
usage, where the vocabulary of desire stays sufficiently general without
being limited to bodily or sexual characterisations. One wonders whether
the negative connotations reflect the standard colourings of the vocabulary,
whereas more general application of these words constitutes a more con-
scious effort by Augustine to expand the theological sphere of the words.
Such conscious expansions can be seen particularly in Augustine’s con-
siderations of words denoting central concepts in his thinking, e.g. in the
case of ‘love’ and its relation to ‘will’:
Only if it is true love does it deserve to be called love, otherwise it is covetous-
ness; and thus covetous people are said improperly to love, and those who
love are said improperly to covet.159 [transl. Hill]
According to Augustine’s theology, only a renewed will can be said to love
in the proper meaning of the word (of love that is directed to God for His
sake), whereas love that turns away to seek happiness from the created

158 cont. 28 omnibus prorsus delectationibus concupiscentiae, quae aduersantur delecta-

tioni sapientiae, cohercendis atque sanandis inuigilat officium continentiae. unde angustius
eam sine dubitatione metiuntur, qui solas libidines corporis cohibere definiunt; melius pro-
fecto illi, qui non addunt corporis, sed generaliter libidinem siue cupiditatem regendam dicunt
ad continentiam pertinere. quae cupiditas in uitio ponitur nec tantum est corporis, uerum et
animi. etenim si corporis cupiditas est in fornicationibus et ebrietatibus, numquid inimicitiae,
contentiones, aemulationes, postremo animositates in corporis uoluptatibus, ac non potius in
animi motibus et perturbationibus exercentur? The general character of continentia has been
stressed by Hunter 1994. See also Zumkeller 1986. Cf. ciu. 14, 2.
159 trin. 8, 10 ea quippe dilectio dicenda quae uera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita

cupidi abusiue dicuntur diligere quemadmodum cupere abusiue dicuntur qui diligunt. Cf.
trin. 11, 5 et si tam uiolenta est ut possit uocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam ceterum
corpus animantis uehementer afficit. See also the linguistic notions in c. Faust. 22, 18 and
ciu. 14, 7 concerning emotions, and the word usage of amor and dilectio. See, however, s.
Lambot 2 cupiditatem dico amorem peccandi, quia est cupiditas nonnumquam quae appellatur
in bono. item caritatem dico amorem recte uiuendi quia aliquando et caritas appellatur in
malo. propterea uolui definire quid dixerim. concupiscunt regnum caelorum fideles. cari inter
se dicuntur etiam latrones […] sed amor mali uocatur cupiditas, amor boni caritas. Here
Augustine seems to wish to define the nature of love and lust more carefully, and to explain
which words are used for which motive.
the language of desire 41

goods instead of their Creator, should properly be called ‘desire.’ Sometimes

Augustine seems to be rather precise in his word usage, as in a sermon
on Ps 141, where he distinguishes between two kinds of emotions, fear and
desire, which may be used for good or for evil. While fear is straightforwardly
denoted with the word timor in both cases, the word choice of desire is more
careful. The desire that leads to eternal life is desiderium, whereas cupiditas
is the one at the Devil’s use.160
What seems to be typical of Augustine’s approach, however, is revealed
in retr. Here Augustine returns to some of his earlier definitions of sin, will
and evil desire that he had made in duab. an. In retrospect, some of the
statements of duab. an. proved to be useful tools in the hands of the Pelagian
polemists, and Augustine wants to demonstrate the coherent nature of his
teachings on sin. What interests us at the moment, is the way he expresses
his flexibility in what words should be used for the perverse will, or the
poena peccati that sways human love to turn away from God.
If someone says that this covetousness (cupiditatem) is vitiated will, serving
sin, I do not disagree. One should not argue about the words, if the things
remain clear.161
Thus, although it would be erroneous to say that Augustine is not interested
in making distinctions between the words he uses for desire, it is perhaps
more to the point to claim that these distinctions often have an ad hoc
character.162 As for the concept of desire, Augustine does not see any point

160 en. Ps. 141, 4 quid est autem claudere ostium? hoc ostium tamquam duas habet ualuas:

cupiditatis, et timoris. aut cupis aliquid terrenum, et hac intrat; aut times aliquid terrenum,
et hac intrat. timoris ergo et cupiditatis ianuam claude contra diabolum, aperi ad Christum.
quomodo ipsas ualuas aperis ad Christum? cupiendo regnum caelorum, timendo ignem gehen-
narum. per cupiditatem saeculi diabolus intrat, per desiderium uitae aeternae Christus intrat;
per timorem poenarum temporalium diabolus intrat, per timorem ignis aeterni Christus intrat.
161 retr. 1, 15, 4 itemque definitio peccati qua diximus: peccatum est uoluntas retinendi uel

consequendi quod iustitia uetat et unde liberum est abstinere [duab. an. 15], propterea uerum
est, quia id definitum est quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. nam
quando tale est ut idem sit et poena peccati, quantum est quod ualet uoluntas sub dominante
cupiditate, nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxilium? in tantum enim libera est, in quantum liberata
est, et in tantum appellatur uoluntas; alioquin tota cupiditas quam uoluntas proprie nuncu-
panda est, quae non est, sicut Manichei desipiunt, alienae naturae additamentum, sed nostrae
uitium a quo non sanatur nisi gratia saluatoris. quod si quisquam dicit etiam ipsam cupidi-
tatem nihil esse aliud quam uoluntatem, sed uitiosam peccatoque seruientem, non resistendum
est nec de uerbis, cum res constet, controuersia facienda. etiam sic enim ostenditur sine uolun-
tate nullum esse peccatum siue in opere siue in origine.
162 See e.g. en. Ps. 118, 8, 4, where Augustine discusses the difference between desiderium

and concupiscentia by applying his idea of fruitio to the latter. Desiderium refers, according
to Augustine, to things that one does not possess yet, whereas concupiscentia can also be felt
42 chapter two

in using clear-cut terms that can be per se distinguished from each other,
and his explicit statements on the connotations of the words seem to be
more often than not defined by the situation. Put succinctly, Augustine
states, “One should not argue about the words.” The potential differences in
the connotations should therefore be found out through a careful analysis
of a given occurrence and its near context. As this is beyond the scope of
this study, a more general approach of the textual contexts is made below.
Before that, however, let us turn to the issue of the synonymy of the terms
in question.

2.3.3. Synonymy
Augustine’s own explicit claims of synonymy concerning the value of the
lexemes of desire are rare. More often, presumed synonymy has to be in-
duced from the sentence, in which, for example, applicable rhetorical de-
vices are used (for instance, anaphora, parallelism etc.). Some simple exam-
ples are mentioned here, mainly in order to indicate that the words denoting
the concept overlap in meaning, and can be used interchangeably, at least
in some contexts. On each occasion, a pair of words is treated in the light of
texts that attest for synonymy; furthermore, the documented occurrences
against synonymy will also be presented. A more thorough and detailed
analysis could presumably show instances where a term such as cupiditas
could not be replaced with libido, or concupiscentia with libido without sig-
nificantly altering the original meaning. The examples given in this section
have been chosen from different periods in Augustine’s writings.

Concupiscentia-libido
c. Faust. 20, 6
puellas pulchras et pueros proponi dicitis, quorum formosissimis corporibus
inardescant principes tenebrarum, ad feminas masculi et ad masculos femi-
nae, ut in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum
tamquam de taetris sordidisque conpedibus dei uestri membra soluantur.

of things already possessed; an aliud est concupiscere, aliud desiderare? non quod non sit con-
cupiscentia desiderium, sed quia non omnis concupiscentia desiderium est […] concupiscuntur
enim et quae habentur, et quae non habentur; nam concupiscendo fruitur homo rebus quas
habet; desiderando autem, absentia concupiscit. This subtle trick facilitates Augustine’s task
of explaining the peculiar wording in the biblical source text (concupiuit anima mea deside-
rare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore). Quite a few of Augustine’s semantic considerations
on the vocabulary of desire are dictated by his exegetical exigencies, and not by disinterested
linguistic curiosity.
the language of desire 43

conf. 3, 1
uenam igitur amicitiae coinquinabam sordibus concupiscentiae candorem-
que eius obnubilabam de tartaro libidinis.

b. coniug. 3
ex malo libidinis aliquid boni faciat copulatio coniugalis, deinde quia reprim-
itur et quodam modo uerecundius aestuat concupiscentia carnis, quam tem-
perat parentalis affectus.

c. Iul. 4, 8
appellas etiam calorem genitalem, quia pudet appellare libidinem, siue, sicut
eam diuinus sermo appellare consueuit, carnis concupiscentiam.

c. Iul. imp. 4, 33
et nunc quando iam concupiscentiam carnis et libidinem nominas, ne de tuae
susceptae nomine erubescere dicaris, plus erubescere times, et errare non
times.
All of these examples occur in the context of sexual desire. The words con-
cupiscentia (carnis) and libido are constantly used in anaphoric and parallel
structures. Both words carry “fiery” or “excited” attributes (flagrans, inhians,
calor), and they are referred to as shameful or opposed to continence.163 The
famous passage of conf. is laden with emotional expressions and colour-
ful metaphors (tartarus libidinis, sordes concupiscentiae) in order to stress
the contrast between pure (“shiny”) friendship and impure, reproachable
desires.164
In opposition, there are cases where the words seemingly denote differ-
ent things. One is a list of vices in s. 9, 10.
sic auaritia, sic libido, sic odium, concupiscentia, luxuria, sic nugacitas spec-
taculorum, febres sunt animae tuae. debes illas odisse cum medico.
However, the list appears here as a rhetorical device (enumeratio); therefore,
one should perhaps be careful in trying to find from it any sophisticated
differences of meaning. The following instance is more interesting:

163 Flagrans is a traditional attribute to sexual desire.

164 Cic. Lael. 19 pictures the ideal of Roman friendship as opposed to lowly desires: ita
vivunt ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequalitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas
libido audacia, sintque magna constantia ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos ut
habiti sunt sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur quantum homines possunt, naturam
optimam bene vivendi ducem.
44 chapter two

et ideo apostolos, quia homines erant et corpus, quod corrumpitur et adgra-

uat animam, in huius uitae mortalitate portabant, absit ut dicamus, sicut
iste calumniatur, semper inmoderata libidine fuisse pollutos [Iulian. A. c. ep.
Pel.], sed dicimus a consensione prauarum libidinum liberos, de concupis-
centia tamen carnis, quam moderando frenabant, tanta humilitate et pietate
gemuisse, ut optarent eam non habere potius quam domare.165
Augustine actually seems to distinguish between the “raw and immoderate
lusts” and a “basic fleshly desire.” The Apostles surely were free of the
first kind of desires, but Augustine admits that they were in some way
susceptible to concupiscentia carnis. Perhaps it would not be quite out of
line to point out that the “wicked lusts” (prauae libidines) have an overt,
exclusively sexual colouring, while “fleshly concupiscence” (concupiscentia
carnis) represents the basis of all sensual desires.166

Concupiscentia-cupiditas
c. Faust. 22, 61
at illa, quae socerum fefellit, non carnis eius concupiscentia nec meretriciae
mercedis cupiditate peccauit, sed ex ipso sanguine prolem requirens.

pat. 17, 14
quanto ergo maior est in sanctis caritas dei, tanto magis pro eo quod diligitur,
et quanto maior est in peccatoribus cupiditas mundi, tanto magis pro eo,
quod concupiscitur, omnia tolerantur.

grat. Christ. 20, 21

sed cupiditas hominis, quae uitium est, hominem habet auctorem uel homi-
nis deceptorem, non hominis creatorem; ipsa est enim concupiscentia carnis
et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex patre, sed ex
mundo est.

165 c. ep. Pel. 1, 24.

166 Cf. en. Ps. 57, 19 qui autem illam concupiscentiam, cum qua de peccati propagine natus
est, contemnit uincere, et multas adhuc excitat exseritque libidines, difficulter eas superat, et
aduersus se ipse diuisus, igne proprio concrematur. Concupiscentia is a fundamental inherited
desire from which the single libidines arise. A similar idea can be derived from s. Mai 12, 4
uis calcare omnes cupiditates concupiscentiae? uitam aeternam desidera, quam promittit deus.
Note the use of desiderare for a positive desire. See also s. 9, 13 est enim bellum quod secum agit
homo, dimicans contra concupiscentias malas, frenans auaritiam, elidens superbiam, suffocans
ambitionem, trucidans libidinem.
the language of desire 45

In these three examples concupiscentia and cupiditas appear in near con-

texts to each other. In the first text passage, the behaviour of Tamar is
defended in a way that points out a subtle difference in the usage of the
words: while “fleshly concupiscence” (carnis concupiscentia) refers here to
sexual desire, “lust for meretricious reward” (mercedis cupiditas) denotes
another kind of desire, pointing rather to money or some other material
goods. The second example represents a case where two opposite motiva-
tions of caritas and cupiditas are juxtaposed. The actions of the former are
denoted by the verb diligere, while the latter motivation acts by concupis-
cere. A negatively connotated desire in this case seems to be treated on a
very general level and certainly with no particular reference to sexuality. In
this respect, the case is similar in the third text sample, where Augustine
parallels cupiditas with the Johannine triple concupiscentia (1 Jn 2, 16): con-
cupiscentia along with cupiditas are treated as synonyms, denoting a general
disability to act in accordance with God’s will and instead aiming at worldly
satisfaction.

Cupiditas-libido
lib. arb. 1, 9
scisne etiam istam libidinem alio nomine cupiditatem uocari?

uera rel. 78
nam cum ipsa ducit, nos autem sequimur, cupiditas illa et libido, nos uero
temeritas et stultitia nuncupamur.

qu. 7, 17, 4
quod autem ait: ne multiplicentur in te bestiae ferae [Ex 23, 29], mirum si non
bestiales quodam modo cupiditates et libidines intellegi uoluit, quae solent
de repentino successu terrenae felicitatis existere.

c. Iul. 4, 35
quando autem male utitur homo membris bonis, nisi quando consentit eis
quae in nobis habitant cupiditatibus malis? in quibus libido prae ceteris
turpis est, cui nisi resistatur, horrenda immunda committit.
In the first three examples, the two words are equivalent in a straightfor-
ward manner. Evil desire here is treated in a very general way, as the basic
motivation to prefer earthly goods to God. In the first example, Augustine
explicitly claims that the words are synonymous. In the following two exam-
ples, the repetition of the synonym fulfils an explanatory, defining function.
46 chapter two

The one example that rather stands apart from the others is the last sam-
ple, taken from the polemics against Julian of Aeclanum, where Augus-
tine clearly treats the libido as a subcategory of evil desires (cupiditates
malae).

Concupiscentia-libido-cupiditas
c. Iul. 2, 20
tu ergo melius honoras nuptias, quarum dignitatem tanquam omnino irre-
prehensibili uolutabro carnalis concupiscentiae decoloras: an ille, qui cum
dicat, non solum licitum, sed etiam bonum coniugium sanctamque copulam,
tamen cessante libidinis uoluptate, tempora orandi ab apostolo praescripta
commemorat; […] omne connubii bonum pensans non cupiditate carnis, sed
fide potius castitatis; non morbo passionis, sed foedere coniunctionis; non
uoluptate libidinis, sed uoluntate propaginis?

cont. 28
omnibus prorsus delectationibus concupiscentiae, quae aduersantur delecta-
tioni sapientiae, cohercendis atque sanandis inuigilat officium continentiae.
unde angustius eam sine dubitatione metiuntur, qui solas libidines corporis
cohibere definiunt; melius profecto illi, qui non addunt corporis, sed gen-
eraliter libidinem siue cupiditatem regendam dicunt ad continentiam per-
tinere.
Some passages contain all three nouns in near context.167 In the first sam-
ple, Augustine uses the three words in the same meaning, denoting illicit
sexual desire, in connection to original sin and to married sexual rela-
tions. Desire is identified with a “sickness of passion” (morbus passionis)
and opposed to e.g. the “will to procreate” (uoluntas propaginis). All three
words have ‘fleshly’ attributes (carnis, carnalis, uoluptas).168 However, all
three words in the second sample are synonymously used on a more gen-
eral level, as being the forces against which one should fight with conti-
nence. Augustine explicitly opens the narrower concept of libido (l. cor-
poris), and seems to explain it by adding the word cupiditas (generaliter,
siue).

167 See e.g. conf. 2, 2; c. Iul. 6, 41; cont. 6; pat. 4–6; c. Iul. imp. 1, 71; 4, 52–53; s. 75, 5–6. Many

of these instances concern sexual desire.

168 In Julian’s use (in the passages that Augustine cites), cupiditas is used rarely and never

in an exclusively sexual context; sexual desire is denoted in Julian by concupiscentia and

libido.
the language of desire 47

2.3.4. Textual Contexts

While the above samples show how generally speaking Augustine is able to
use the three words for evil desire as being synonymous or nearly synony-
mous, it remains to be shown what kind of words are used in more detailed
contexts.169 In this section some examples will be given of how the three dif-
ferent words behave in various contexts. Does Augustine use all of them in
every context? Could the relative frequencies of the particular words in par-
ticular contexts be characterised in some way?
In order to illuminate Augustine’s use of different words in varying con-
texts, I have selected a few general categories to represent these contexts.
These categories range from the more formal to those in which the actual
object of desire is present. The categorisation does not imply that a word
in a given context would have only one clearly determined connotation;
on the contrary, the context where a given word occurs may represent fea-
tures of other categories as well. Even these summary categories will effi-
ciently illustrate Augustine’s multiple and flexible use of his vocabulary of
desire.

Disturbed Emotions
(a) Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31
haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi
ueritatique consentiunt […] si autem non consentiunt, nihilominus dum neg-
ligenter geruntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum, et faciunt uitam miser-
rimam; et uocantur perturbationes, et libidines, et concupiscentiae malae.

(b) an. quant. 23, 42

si enim me rogares quid pateretur aegrotans, aegritudinem responderem;
quid cupiens, cupiditatem; quid metuens, metum; quid gaudens, gaudium.

(c) mend. 10
quis autem dixerit integrum animum esse mentientis? etenim libido quoque
ipsa recte definitur adpetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia
praeponuntur.

(d) qu. eu. 1, 47

cupiditati autem uoluptatis opponitur timor doloris.

169 By ‘context’ in this section I refer simply to the near textual context of two to three

preceding and following sentences.

48 chapter two

(e) Io. eu. tr. 60, 3

turbetur plane animus christianus, non miseria, sed misericordia; timeat
ne pereant homines christo, contristetur cum perit aliquis christo; concu-
piscat adquiri homines christo, laetetur cum adquiruntur homines christo;
timeat et sibi ne pereat christo, contristetur peregrinari se a christo; con-
cupiscat regnare cum christo, laetetur dum sperat se regnaturum esse cum
christo.

(f) ciu. 14, 3

omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timo-
rem, laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque uitiorum
uolens intellegi ex corpore accidere subiungat […] tamen aliter se habet fides
nostra.

(g) c. Iul. 2, 12
boni equi sunt quatuor, prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia: mali equi,
iracundia, concupiscentia, timor, iniquitas.

(h) c. Iul. 6, 53
illi philosophi locutione tropica mihi uidentur uitiosam partem animi appel-
lasse libidinem, in qua parte est uitium quod uocatur libido, sicut appellatur
domus pro eis qui sunt in domo.
When a word of desire appears in an emotional context, it is usually part
of a list of other emotions, such as fear, pain, pleasure, etc., and sometimes
the word is opposed to main virtues (b, d, f, g). Occasionally, the word may
also denote the desiring part of the soul in the Platonic sense (h).170 Some
words and terms that are customarily connected with emotions appear in
philosophical discourse. From the examples above, the words and terms
representing such terminology are uita tranquilla, consentire, motus animi,
perturbationes (a), pati, adpetitus animi (c), turbari (e), pars animi (h). Some-
times the context is determined by the author Augustine quotes, as in (f),
where Augustine refers to Virgil, or (g), which is a direct quotation from
Ambrose. In (h), the authority of the philosophers is appealed to, and the
Neoplatonistic view of the parts of the soul (uitiosa pars libido) is mentioned,
and in this case, with a notion of peculiar language use (tropical). In con-
text (f), Augustine disagrees with the opinion he is referring to, and in (g),
he approves it. From these examples it can be noted that all three terms can
be used in this context without further qualifications: concupiscentia and

170 Cf. op. mon. 40 quod ergo est in uno homine mens et concupiscentia.
the language of desire 49

concupisco, libido and cupiditas may all be used to denote the emotion, the
desiring part of the soul or its action.

The Opposite of Love

(a) mor. 1, 41
nisi uero amatores auri, amatores laudis, amatores feminarum, amatoribus
suis deus sinet esse fortiores; cum ille non amor, sed congruentius cupiditas
uel libido nominetur.

(b) lib. arb. 3, 17

haec autem auaritia cupiditas est, cupiditas porro inproba uoluntas est.

(c) doctr. chr. 3, 10

caritatem uoco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque
proximo propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad fruendum se et
proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum.

(d) diu. qu. 35

est enim et turpis amor, quo animus se ipso inferiora sectatur, quae magis
proprie cupiditas dicitur, omnium scilicet malorum radix.

(e) spir. et litt. 6

si quisquam multa quae scripta sunt in cantico canticorum carnaliter accipiat
non ad luminosae caritatis fructum, sed ad libidinosae cupiditatis adfectum

(f) spir. et litt. 6

sed ubi sanctus non adiuuat spiritus inspirans pro concupiscentia mala con-
cupiscentiam bonam, hoc est caritatem diffundens in cordibus nostris, pro-
fecto illa lex quamuis bona auget prohibendo desiderium malum, sicut aquae
impetus, si in eam partem non cesset influere, uehementior fit obice obposito,
cuius molem cum euicerit maiore cumulo praecipitatus uiolentius per prona
prouoluitur.

(g) pat. 14
itaque illa terrena est, ista caelestis, illa animalis, ista spiritalis, illa diabolica,
ista deifica, quoniam concupiscentia, qua fit, ut peccantes omnia pertinaciter
patiantur, ex mundo est; caritas autem, qua fit, ut recte uiuentes omnia
fortiter patiantur, ex deo est.

(h) en. Ps. 9, 15

pes animae recte intellegitur amor; qui cum prauus est, uocatur cupiditas aut
libido; cum autem rectus, dilectio uel caritas.
50 chapter two

To Augustine, love is a will directed to God, and vice versa. The opposite
of love is self-centred desire. The sentences above reflect a very constant
trait in Augustine’s use of the words of desire. As can be seen, all of the
three words can be used in this context (a)(f)(g), but the most usual of them
is cupiditas. Love and will are in this context called amor, dilectio, caritas,
the latter occurring often with cupiditas; no doubt due to the rhythmical
parallelity of the word pair.
These examples also include many defining remarks. For example, desire
is a perverted version of the right love. It is is turpis, prava, improba
(b)(d)(h). Furthermore, desire is often mentioned in terms of direction
or relation. Whereas the right love aims ‘outside,’ perverse desire returns
‘inside.’ The opposite of love yearns for inferior things, whereas the right will
aims for higher, heavenly and divine realities (c)(d)(g).171 Desire prefers cor-
poreal or any created things or persons to God (c)(g). Thus, no clear objects
of desire in the context of the opposite of love can be given, and Augustine
usually provides only some examples of the goals that perverse love aims
at: money, glory or one’s regard of oneself (amor sui) (a). The context does
not even exclude sexual connotations of the opposite of love, as is shown
by (e).172 The context also tends to attract biblical allusions, as in (d)(1 Tim
6, 10), or in (g) (1Jn 2, 16).

Laudable Desire
(a) en. Ps. 85, 8
inuoca deum tamquam deum, ama deum tamquam deum; illo melius nihil
est; ipsum desidera, ipsum concupisce.

(b) en. Ps. 110, 9

pro deliciis autem omnibus huius saeculi, quales uel expertus es, uel augere ac
multiplicare cogitando potes, immortalium deliciarum matrem concupisce
sapientiam; sed: initium sapientiae, timor domini.

171 As in en. Ps. 31, 2, 5 amor dei, amor proximi, caritas dicitur; amor mundi, amor huius

saeculi, cupiditas dicitur. O’Donovan (1980) has analysed the images of love in Augustine’s
theology. See also Pétré 1948.
172 Cf. s. 51,21 et multos nouimus fratres nostros fructificantes in gratia, in nomine Christi

ex consensu ab inuicem continere concupiscentiam carnis, non autem continere ab inuicem

caritatem coniugalem.
the language of desire 51

(c) en Ps. 101, 2, 10

merito sic misit deus famulum suum Moysen. quaesiuit enim nomen mit-
tentis se; quaesiuit, et audiuit, nec desertum est desiderium concupiscentiae
bonae.

(d) en. Ps. 118, 8, 3

concupiuit anima mea desiderare iustificationes tuas in omni tempore [Ps
118, 20] laudabilis est ista concupiscentia, non damnabilis. non de hac dictum
est: non concupisces [Ex 20, 17], sed de illa qua caro concupiscit aduersus spir-
itum. de hac autem bona concupiscentia qua concupiscit spiritus aduersus
carnem, quaere ubi scriptum sit; et inuenies: concupiscentia itaque sapien-
tiae deducit ad regnum [Sap 6, 21]: et multa alia reperiuntur bonae concupis-
centiae testimonia. sed hoc sane interest, quod non tacetur quid concupis-
catur, quando bona commemoratur concupiscentia; cum autem non additur
quid concupiscatur, sed sola ponitur, nonnisi mala intellegitur.

(e) Io. eu. tr. 14, 12

domine, ostende nobis patrem, et sufficit nobis [Io 14, 8]. tamquam dicerent:
iam nouimus te, et benedicimus te, quia nouimus te; gratias enim tibi agimus,
quia ostendisti te nobis; sed patrem nondum nouimus; propterea cor nostrum
ardet, satagit concupiscentia quadam sancta uidendi patris tui qui te misit;
ipsum nobis ostende, et nihil amplius a te desiderabimus; sufficit enim nobis
cum ille fuerit demonstratus, quo maior esse nemo potest. bona concupis-
centia, bonum desiderium; sed paruus intellectus.

(f) spir. litt. 6

sed ubi sanctus non adiuuat spiritus inspirans pro concupiscentia mala con-
cupiscentiam bonam, hoc est caritatem diffundens in cordibus nostris.

(g) c. Iul. 5, 63
nos dicimus illud esse contra uoluntatem, ut caro concupiscat aduersus spir-
itum; non illud, ut spiritus aduersus carnem. per quam concupiscentiam
bonam fit, ut nisi causa generandi non utantur coniuges carnis libidine.

(h) c. Iul. 5, 29
non enim potest quae bona est desiderare quod malum est, aut negandum
est bonae aliquod bonum. fiat itaque totum quod desiderat libido bona, ne
ipse sit malus qui resistit bono.

(i) c. ep. Pel. 2, 21

proinde cupiditas boni non homini a domino esset, si bonum non esset;
si autem bonum est, non nisi ab illo nobis est, qui summe atque incom-
mutabiliter bonus est. quid est enim boni cupiditas nisi caritas.
52 chapter two

Augustine’s notions of a positive or a ‘laudable desire’ have received

considerable attention. As Bonner points out, this context seems to be
mainly dictated by Augustine’s Latin Bible translation, and Augustine often
backs his considerations concerning positive desire with a Bible quota-
tion.173 Thus, it is no coincidence that many of the above samples are derived
from biblical interpretations. Tellingly, Augustine usually explains his ex-
ceptional use of a given word of desire by adding a clarifying object; oth-
erwise, as he notes, desire has to be read as evil (d). While unquestion-
ably the most usual word of the three in Bible is concupiscentia, it is more
than natural that the word for ‘laudable desire’ usually is concupiscentia
(d)(e)(g). Occasionally, however, cupiditas is also mentioned (i); but in
this sample, the phrase is taken from a Pelagian text.174 Again, the only
instance, of libido bona is strongly ironic, referring sarcastically to Julian’s
views. In addition, there seems to be a tendency to use concupisco in a
more neutral, or even in an appreciative sense, than the noun, as is done
in (a)(b).
‘Laudable desire’ is always connected to the right ‘love’ (caritas, dilectio):
it aims at God, God’s wisdom and his presence. To desire in a laudable
manner, is to yearn for God and his will.

Sexual Desire
(a) c. Faust. 20, 6
in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum tam-
quam de taetris sordidisque conpedibus dei uestri membra soluantur.

(b) c. Iul. imp. 6, 22

concupiscentia porro carnis, per quam iactus carnalium seminum prouo-
catur, aut nulla in Adam fuit ante peccatum, aut in illo uitiata est per pec-
catum.

(c) ciu. 14, 16

atque ita mirum in modum non solum generandi uoluntati, uerum etiam
lasciuiendi libidini libido non seruit, et cum tota plerumque menti cohibenti
aduersetur, nonnumquam et aduersus se ipsa diuiditur commotoque animo
in commouendo corpore se ipsa non sequitur.

173 See e.g. en. Ps. 118, 8, 3; ciu. 14, 7, where Wis 6, 21 and Gal 5, 17 are quoted.
174 Iulian. A. c. ep. Pel. 2, 17.
the language of desire 53

(d) en. Ps. 136, 9

si libido scortantium et meretricantium haberet quietem et securitatem, si
non timeret famem in domo sua qui clamat ut pantomimi uestiantur; si
haec omnia sine labe, sine perturbatione aliqua fluerent […] felicia essent
tempora.

(e) b. uid. 10
unde et sanctae mulieres accendebantur non cupiditate concumbendi, sed
pietate pariendi.

(f) ciu. 1, 19
intuens enim in duorum corporum commixtione unius inquinatissimam
cupiditatem, alterius castissimam uoluntatem, et non quid coniunctione
membrorum, sed quid animorum diuersitate ageretur.
There is no disputing the fact that both libido and concupiscentia denote
sexual desire in Augustine’s vocabulary.175 They usually appear with the
attributes of carnis or carnalis (b). In this denotation, the most colour-
ful attributes are commonly used, ranging from verbs and participial con-
structions (flagrare, inhiare, adhinnire) to strong adjectives (turpis, inqui-
na) (a)(c)(f) and to characterising genitives, for example scortantium (d).
Though somewhat rarer in this context, cupiditas occurs as well (e)(f). None
of the words appear in this context with a positive evaluation.

Greed—Food, Money and Property

(a) s. 278, 5
imperat fidem, imperat continentiam, temperantiam, sobrietatem; refrenat
concupiscentiam auaritiae.

(b) s. 207, 2
uideas enim quosdam pro usitato uino, inusitatos liquores exquirere, et alio-
rum expressione pomorum, quod ex uua sibi denegant, multo suauius com-
pensare; cibos extra carnes multiplici uarietate ac iucunditate conquirere; et
suauitates quas alio tempore consectari pudet, huic tempori quasi opportune
colligere: ut uidelicet obseruatio quadragesimae non sit ueterum concupis-
centiarum repressio, sed nouarum deliciarum occasio.

175 For an interesting case of concupisco used intransitively in a sexual context, see conf. 3,
5.
54 chapter two

(c) s. Wilm. 13, 6

non concupiscas: noli transire ante uillam alienam, et suspirare, quia bona
est. rem proximi tui non concupiscas.

(d) mor. 2, 51
quae igitur ratio est uel potius amentia, de numero electorum hominem
pellere, qui forte carnem ualetudinis causa, nulla cupiditate gustauerit, si
autem piperata tubera uoraciter edere concupierit, immodestiae tantum sit
forte deprehendere, non autem ut corruptorem damnare signaculi?

(e) s. 32, 14
promittit deus fraudem non facientibus sempiterna regna caelorum. uincit te
cupiditas ad pecuniam.

(f) s. Lambot. 4
mendici enim cupiditatem satiant pauci nummi, auari hominis cupiditatem
nec totus mundus.

(g) ciu. 14, 6

est igitur libido ulciscendi, quae ira dicitur; est libido habendi pecuniam, quae
auaritia; est libido quomodocumque uincendi, quae peruicacia; est libido glo-
riandi, quae iactantia nuncupatur. sunt multae uariaeque libidines, quarum
nonnullae habent etiam uocabula propria, quaedam uero non habent.

(h) c. Iul. 4, 66
sicut auri decus aliter laudat religiosus, aliter auarus: iste, cum pietate uene-
randi creatorem, ille, cum libidine possidendi creaturam.

(i) c. Iul. 4, 67
cum ergo natura quodam modo poscit supplementa quae desunt, non uoca-
tur libido, sed fames aut sitis: cum uero suppleta necessitate amor edendi
animum sollicitat, iam libido est, iam malum est, cui cedendum non est, sed
resistendum.
The vocabulary of desire in this context covers a wide range of attitudes aim-
ing at material satisfaction through the possession of riches (divitiae, aurum,
argentum, pecunia, possidere), food (cibus, edere, gustare), or some other
kind of property. Again, the words denoting ‘greed’ (auarus, auaritia) are
usually found in this context.176 While cupiditas seems to be the most tradi-

176 Note that many of the text samples are derived from sermons. See Schindler 1986, 496–
497.
the language of desire 55

tional choice to denote the ‘greedy’ connotations of desire,177 concupiscentia

and concupisco also appear in this context.178 The appearence of libido, on
the other hand, seems to be most forced in this context, as can be seen from
the text samples above: these rare occurrences of libido denoting desire or
greed for food or money either show Augustine composing artificial lists of
various kinds of libidines (g), or him trying to find analogies of the other
immodest libidines than the sexual one (h)(i).

Power and Credit

(a) ciu. 5, 12
ueteres igitur primique romani, quantum eorum docet et commendat his-
toria, quamuis ut aliae gentes excepta una populi hebraeorum deos falsos
colerent et non deo uictimas, sed daemoniis immolarent, tamen ‘laudis auidi,
pecuniae liberales erant, gloriam ingentem, diuitias honestas uolebant’; hanc
ardentissime dilexerunt, propter hanc uiuere uoluerunt, pro hac emori non
dubitauerunt; ceteras cupiditates huius unius ingenti cupiditate presserunt.

(b) ciu. 5, 19
quisquis autem sine cupiditate gloriae, qua ueretur homo bene iudicantibus
displicere, dominari atque imperare desiderat, etiam per apertissima scelera
quaerit plerumque obtinere quod diligit. proinde qui gloriam concupiscit,
aut uera uia nititur aut certe, dolis atque fallaciis contendit [Sall. Catil. 11, 3],
uolens bonus uideri esse, quod non est.

(c) ep. 185, 42

in huius ergo compagem corporis ueniant et labores suos non dominandi
cupiditate sed bene utendi pietate possideant.

(d) en. Ps. 102, 6

si uelles esse in aliquo sublimi honore in hac terra; ducatum, proconsulatum,
praefecturam si concupisceres, numquid continuo posses ut uelles?

(e) ciu. 3, 14
libido ista dominandi magnis malis agitat et conterit humanum genus.
The theme of fame and earthly power is extensively treated in ciu. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the vocabulary of desire concerning glory and power
is employed there. Both cupiditas and libido appear in the gerund phrases

177 Cf. TLL s.v. cupiditas.

178 Also qu. eu. 2, 18 generale ieiunium non a concupiscentia ciborum tantum, sed ab omni
laetitia temporalium delectationum.
56 chapter two

(c)(e).179 However, concupiscentia seems not to appear as a noun in this

context. On the other hand, there are occurrences of concupisco that refer
to the will to power (d), or to fame (b).

Triple Desire
(a) uera rel. 38
uerumtamen quamquam in hac rerum extremitate miseri iaceant, ut uitia sua
sibi dominari patiantur uel libidine uel superbia uel curiositate damnati uel
duobus horum uel omnibus, quamdiu sunt in hoc stadio uitae humanae, licet
eis congredi et uincere, si prius credant, quod intellegere nondum ualent, et
non diligant mundum, quoniam omne, quod in mundo est, sicut diuinitus
dictum est, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio
saeculi […] hoc modo tria illa notata sunt, nam concupiscentia carnis uolup-
tatis infimae amatores significat, concupiscentia oculorum curiosos, ambitio
saeculi superbos.

(b) qu. eu. 1, 47

sicut temptatio cupiditatis trina est, ita et temtatio timoris trina est. cupiditati
quae in curiositate est opponitur timor mortis; sicut enim in illa cognoscen-
darum rerum est auiditas, ita in ista metus amittendae talis notitiae […]
cupiditati uero honorum uel laudis opponitur timor ignominiae et contu-
meliarum.

(c) conf. 10, 35

praeter enim concupiscentiam carnis, quae inest in delectatione omnium
sensuum et uoluptatum, cui seruientes depereunt qui longe se faciunt a te,
inest animae per eosdem sensus corporis quaedam non se oblectandi in
carne, sed experiendi per carnem uana et curiosa cupiditas nomine cogni-
tionis et scientiae palliata […] quae quoniam in appetitu noscendi est, oculi
autem sunt ad noscendum in sensibus principes, concupiscentia oculorum
eloquio diuino appellata est.

(d) ep. Io. tr. 2, 14

tria sunt ista, et nihil inuenis unde temptetur cupiditas humana nisi aut
desiderium carnis aut desiderium oculorum aut ambitionem saeculi.

(e) grat. Christ. 20, 21

sed cupiditas hominis, quae uitium est, hominem habet auctorem uel homi-
nis deceptorem, non hominis creatorem; ipsa est enim concupiscentia carnis

179 Most of the libido dominandi-phrases derive from ciu.; the phrase occurs in a quotation

of Sallust (Catil. 2, 2) in ciu. 3, 14.

the language of desire 57

et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex patre, sed ex

mundo est.
Augustine uses the scheme of the tripartite desire more often in his earlier
works. It is based on his reading of 1Jn 2, 16; sometimes this passage is
explicitly quoted in this connection. While it is clear that in this context,
the vocabulary of desire does not have any distinct profile in its contents,
the clearcut form of the category serves as an example of Augustine’s flexible
manner in using varying words even in a rather schematic context.180 Again,
triple concupiscence is not just a routine biblical quotation or allusion to
bolster an argument, but a more profound way to treat human sinful action.
In conf. this scheme even plays a crucial role in the structure of the entire
work.181
Text sample (a) offers an interesting example of word choice. The bibli-
cal text has concupiscentia-concupiscentia-ambitio. Augustine refers to this
chain as divinitus dictum, but uses libido-curiositas-superbia. In other pas-
sages, cupiditas is also present, often referred to as triplex or trina, as in (b).
In this context, the word of the source text (concupiscentia), and Augustine’s
interpretative term (cupiditas) seem to have a near identical value. Whereas
libido and desiderium occur marginally, libido is never the inclusive term for
all three desires but only denotes the fleshly part of the threefold desire.

2.4. Conclusion

Based on the above observations, some general conclusions can be drawn.

While libido and cupiditas arise from the Latin classical literature, denoting
reproachable sexual lust or greed for material welfare (luxuria), the verb
concupisco has its roots in the Latin prose tradition as well. This verb occurs
in the philosophical context, denoting the excessive emotion of desire; or
more generally, it refers to a strong, intensive wish. The senses are some-
what constant in Latin Christian literature, where the traditional phrases
and contexts for libido and cupiditas are preserved, added with the bibli-
cal neologism of the noun concupiscentia. The new noun seems to share
many features with its more classical counterparts; especially the discourse
of emotions is prone to have concupisco/concupisentia in Tertullian and
Ambrose.

180 There have been conflicting opinions on the question of the origins of the scheme. See

Chapter 4 in this study.

181 See Chapter 4.
58 chapter two

Concerning Augustine, it may be concluded that he uses the three stan-

dard nouns for evil desire flexibly with no static, fixed and detailed differ-
ences in the meaning. In many instances, all of the three nouns could be
used, and strict limitations are rare; however, in some instances, Augustine
clearly prefers one noun to the others. Thus, libido is never used in those
cases where Augustine wants to note the existence of a ‘positive desire.’
However, none of the words seem to have a single primary sense, and none
of the words can be reduced to represent a single context, e.g. a sexual one.
Though no detailed analysis has been possible in the scope of this study,
the case seems sufficient enough: it would not be reasonable to conduct
an analysis of Augustine’s concept of evil desire by limiting the study to
occurrences of one term only.182 Therefore, concupiscentia would run the
risk of appearing in a distorted image if libido and cupiditas were completely
left out of the picture. It is natural, however, that while Augustine clearly
used concupiscentia more and more towards the end of his career, this word
will have a primary place in the analyses of the following chapters. The
linguistic basis for the present analysis has thus been established and it is
now time to move on to a more theological approach.

182 The remark of Pollmann (1996, 58 n. 99) concerning ratio = regula and clementia =

misericordia is quite relevant here: “Ähnliches findet sich generell in der Antike, der eine
einheitliche Nomenklatur über weite Strecken fremd war.”
chapter three

PARADISE AND PUNISHMENT

haec est namque poena inoboedienti homini reddita in semetipso, ut ei

uicissim non oboediatur nec a semetipso.
c. adu. leg. 1, 18

ipse iudicat occultissimo quidem iudicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimo.
nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse aliorum peccatorum
gr. et lib. arb. 41
Augustine’s vision of divine grace, fully exposed in Simpl., had corollar-
ies in his way of conceiving how the human will should be seen as being
morally responsible. As early as from 390s onwards, Augustine felt dis-
satisfaction with a simply individualistic solution to the questions con-
cerning evil, human will and moral responsibility. As we will see, Augus-
tine expanded the individual human will to be somehow responsible for
a communal, hereditary strain of will that finds its origin in the properly
freely willed decisions of Adam and Eve. This solution, of course, raised yet
other difficulties. For instance, how is it conceivable that another individual
causes such a strong and invincible perversion of the will for the whole of
humankind? If we are held responsible, and therefore punishable, for the
actions of our ancestors in Paradise, what are the implications for the con-
cept of divine justice?
This chapter presents Augustine’s argumentation on concupiscentia as
a divine punishment which God gave to humankind for the first sin of
Adam and Eve. It is Augustine’s deeply held conviction that our bodily
and emotional disorder in the form of concupiscentia has deep roots in the
history of humankind and in the choices of its first representatives. The
basic elements for a neatly balanced and reciprocal view of an original
‘theological’ disobedience corresponding to a present ‘psychological’ and
bodily disorder were already established in Augustine’s earlier expositions
on Paradise, the human will and divine retribution. A full-blown description
of this reciprocity was given during the early years of the fifth century, to
be finally challenged by Augustine’s sharpest theological critic, Julian of
Aeclanum. This development is traced in this chapter.
60 chapter three

Why focus on concupiscentia particularly as a punishment (poena)? It

would be sufficient to point out that this is what Augustine seems to claim
again and again. Corrupt sexual (and other bodily) desires are not an iso-
lated phenomenon in the present state of the human constitution: they
have meaning and reference in a larger context. For Augustine, this context
is anchored in Paradise, Adam and Eve, in obedience to God the Creator,
and indeed in divine justice and divine nature themselves. While the last
decades of scholarship on Augustine’s views on concupiscentia have shed
considerable light on his notions of human sexuality, it seems that certain
sides of Augustine’s own concerns have been overlooked.1 For Augustine fre-

1 Augustine’s views on sex and sexual desire have inspired a multitude of scholarly con-
tributions in the past decades. A mere sample of these contributions also shows the diver-
sity of angles and attitudes that can be taken to this issue. Gross (1954, 778) acknowledges
Augustine’s theological construction concerning the origins of concupiscentia, but stresses
forcefully Augustine’s morally flawed outcome: “In diesem Mythos von der Entstehung der
Konkupiszenz ist ausschliesslich vom Geschlechtstreib die Rede.” See also ibid., 787, “Die
Verketzerung des Geschlechtstriebes als einer verdammenswerten Erbschuld ist vielleicht
das verhängnisvollste Vermächtnis, das Augustin der Kirche gemacht hat.” Cipriani (1974)
ponders on the philosophical preconditions of Augustine’s sexual ethics, emphasising the
influence of Neoplatonism (see also Alexander 1975, 207, who ends with a broader claim:
“Augustine’s interpretation of sexuality was an attempt to satisfy both the biblical doctrine
of creation and platonic philosophy”). Miles (1979, 41–77) provides a developmental account
of Augustine’s views on the body, sex and sexual desire, stressing the social dimensions of his
discussions of libido and concupiscentia carnis, and then ending with a rather positive judg-
ment of Augustine’s theology of asceticism. Kelly’s (1983) longish article starts with a wish to
distill a “human” essence in Augustine’s theology from the “taint” of concupiscence (see ibid.,
p. 82) but ends with a moral condemnation: “Augustine attacks the sexual goodness of cre-
ation itself” (p. 110). Clark 1986a is an influential study of possible Manichaean influences in
Augustine’s explanations of how sin is transmitted through biological reproduction (Schep-
pard 1996 is a thin contribution to the same theme). Clark (1986b) charts two distinct lines of
thought in Augustine’s works concerning the “essence” of marriage and the role of sex: a line
that Clark (1986b, 140, 162) calls “companionate,” and a line that she labels “physical.” Clark
endorses the first view, lamenting the fact that the second overshadowed it in the subsequent
Catholic teaching. Brown’s (1988) comprehensive study on Christian ascetic movement in
the Early Church has been influential as well. Brown takes Augustine to represent a moderate
position compared with certain other Christian authors, and notes the social and theolog-
ical dimensions of concupiscentia (1988, 404). Twelve years later, in the second edition to
his epoch-making biography of Augustine, Brown emphasises perhaps even more strongly
Augustine’s rich, moderate and considered views on sexuality even in the debate with Julian
of Aeclanum, in contrast to “widespread modern notions on the topic” (Brown 2000, 500–502,
here Brown refers to the popular exposition of Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for Heaven:
the Catholic Church and Sexuality, London 1990, calling it a “travesty,” Brown 2000, 518n69).
Markus (1990, 60–62) takes a similar direction in locating Augustine’s views on sexuality into
the larger context of his views on “man’s estrangement from God” (p. 61). Instead of mod-
eration, however, Markus uses the term “Christian mediocrity” of Augustine’s sexual and
marital ethics as contrasted to the more radical ideas of e.g. Jerome and Ambrose. Hunter
paradise and punishment 61

quently treats concupiscentia as being a result of certain causes, revealed

in the Christian Scripture. Furthermore, what seems for a modern eye to
be a severe or even odd prejudice against sexual behaviour and pleasure
should be seen as an inseparable part of Augustine’s more general theolog-
ical insights into original sin, disobedience to God and divine justice.2 In

(1994) also emphasises Augustine’s moderation in the question, and stresses sexual desire as
only a subcategory of Augustine’s general and complex doctrine of sin. O’Connell (1994) is
an essay following the outline of conf., and commenting loosely on various themes of sex-
uality in Augustine, ending in a conviction that Augustine’s thinking on sex was mainly
influenced by the philosophical source texts mentioned in conf. (i.e. Cicero and Plotinus).
Rist (1994, 321–327) compares Augustine’s and Julian’s arguments about sexual desire. Rist
argues that both represent some kind of a failure in their positions: Augustine in his inability
to explain how a quality of the soul (concupiscentia carnis and/or original sin) is transmit-
ted biologically to the next generation, and Julian in his emphasis of libido being an issue
concerning only the body. Schneider (2000) can, again, be taken as a representative of the
Schuldfrage-tradition (cf. Brown 2000, 502): his general treatise on Ambrose, Augustine and a
lesser-known elegiac poet Maximianus acknowledges Augustine’s affirmations of the body as
part of the good created order, but ends up in characterizing the Christian authors as consid-
ering bodily beauty as “dämonisch.” Many of the above-mentioned scholars mention Pagels
(1988a) as an influential misrepresentation of Augustine’s views of sexuality. So does also
Lamberigts (2000), whose article is a richly documented call for balanced and realistic eval-
uation of Augustine’s theologically rooted descriptions of sex and sexual desire. He prefers
(somewhat sarcastically, it seems) Julian’s intellectual courage to criticize Augustine’s views
of concupiscentia to the modern criticisms (Lamberigts 2000, 176–177), and then offers per-
taining observations on Augustine’s actual arguments during the anti-Julian debate: First,
Augustine did not invent his suspicion towards sinful desire from thin air, but he had a firm
biblical and Christian tradition to back such a suspicion (p. 180). Secondly, Augustine’s views
of concupiscentia carnis were ultimately a result from highly theological concerns, and not
limited to a persecutory attitude towards bodily sexual needs (p. 181). Lamberigts (2000, 184–
185) also emphasises important qualifications in Augustine’s views on sexual desire. That
is, Augustine consistently attached the question of rational (or irrational) purpose to sex-
ual intercourse. According to Lamberigts (2000, 184), this emphasis proves “incorrect […] to
suggest that, for Augustine, the very experience of a sexual impulse was already a sin.” Yet
another important observation made by Lamberigts (2000, 185) is Augustine’s conviction of
the resistibility of concupiscentia and its correct role in the Christian progress. This convic-
tion should, according to Lamberigts, teach us that “we ought to situate the concupiscentia
carnis in a theological-ethical context.” Finally, Lamberigts (2000, 186–188) points out the evi-
dent fact that, for Augustine, sexual intercourse in a legitimate context (i.e. marriage) was a
created good, and even in situations in which its rational purpose was not sought after, it was
only seen as a daily, trifle sin, not “something terrible.” Some of Lamberigts’ (2000) points are
elaborated and developed further in this study, particularly in Chapter 3 (the theological con-
text of concupiscentia) and in Chapter 6 (the resistibility of concupiscentia during Christian
progress).
2 Appeals to Augustine’s personal experiences in this area are more or less discarded in

this study. Cf. Miles 1994, 17: “A.’s sexual experience led to his despair over the possibility
of a sexuality that did not inevitably entail compulsiveness and exploitation”; similarly,
although in a cruder form, Miethe (1982, 198–199) appeals to Augustine’s personal experi-
62 chapter three

other words, Augustine’s suspicion towards sexual desire appears to be have

been a result of more general, theological and scriptural factors (be they
persuasive or not).3 To Augustine, concupiscentia was very much connected
to central theological themes such as the will, human suffering and evil in
general, divine punishment, divine justice, and rationality of obedience.4
The deliberate approach followed in this chapter concerning Augustine’s
ideas on sex is, instead of speculating on Augustine’s personal experiences,
or the possible or even probable influences from various (and as the guess-
work goes, usually Manichaean) sources, to focus on the theological con-
texts in which he constantly situated concupiscentia and the conceptual
connections he makes between concupiscentia, obedience, justice and Par-
adise.
Such an approach offers us a set of important questions. For example,
how exactly has Augustine described the reciprocity of concupiscentia in
relation to a primal act of disobedience in Paradise? Furthermore, what kind
of obedience did God demand from Adam and Eve? Another important
question is: in what kind of disobedience did their fall result? And finally,
why was the corresponding divine punishment just and good, i.e., what
kinds of reasons does Augustine offer for divine justice in connection with
concupiscentia, conceived as God’s punishment?
This chapter proceeds in a loose chronological order. We will first look at
Augustine’s initial attempts to sketch the way the actions in Paradise may
have affected the present condition of humanity. It is suggested that the
elements of obedience, disobedience and punishment are present in Augus-
tine’s thoughts as early as in the 390s. The second part contains an outline
of Augustine’s mature and complete picture of concupiscentia as pointing

ences in explaining his “great pessimism about the nature of man” and sexual desire. See
also Weidenaar 1995, 71 (“he was merely describing reality as he understood it from his own
experience, as he was wont to do”) and Lancel 2002, 422–423: “Against Julian’s naturalism
and optimism he [sc. Augustine] set the daily findings of his experience as a man and pastor
[…] Because he had lived nearly fifteen years with Adeodatus’ mother in a sexual relationship
[…] Augustine knew what he was talking about when he attacked sexuality.” Chadwick (2009,
161) represents Julian’s criticism deriving from Augustine’s person as well.
3 Solignac 1956, 374–375.
4 Wilpert (1954) locates Augustine into the traditions of biblical and “Greek” influences.

Augustine’s suspicion against sexual desire should be seen as a “hostility towards the body”
that was inspired by “Hellenismus” (Wilpert 1954, 76–77). Cf. Hendrikx 1954, who claims
that the very connection between concupiscentia and original sin is a result of Augustine’s
“biblisch-altkirchlichen Denkart” as opposed to Platonistic inclinations. See Markus 1990a,
61, for a concise and correct sketch of concupiscentia carnis and its theological connections.
paradise and punishment 63

to the first act of proud disobedience in Paradise: the disorder of the soul
and the body in the form of concupiscentia in our present state thus repre-
sents for Augustine the primal idolatry carved in flesh. In the third part we
will encounter Augustine in defence of his view of reciprocal, punitive con-
cupiscentia. In the debate with Julian, Augustine was challenged to account
for the way he had connected concupiscentia with divine justice and obedi-
ence. Is concupiscentia, in fact, a reasonable and just punishment?

3.1. Probing for the Connection between

Divine Punishment and Concupiscentia

Augustine composed his first concise commentary on Genesis, de Genesi

aduersus Manicheos, after his return from Italy in 388. In that work, Augus-
tine encountered the same Manichaean Bible criticism he had previously
shared by the instrument of allegorical interpretation.5 Gn. adu. Man. 1 treats
the creation of the natural world verse by verse and deals with the various
points of Manichaean criticism. In Gn. adu. Man. 2, Augustine turns to more
anthropological themes, as the creation stories focus on the creation of man
(2, 1, 1 incipit de homine diligentius narrari). Augustine’s approach is thor-
oughly figurative: the present human condition, as he understands it, is used
to explain what happened in the Creation and the Fall of the first human
beings.6 Augustine’s message is clear: earthly desires are to be avoided, and
one should seek to rise above the earth in “spiritual joy.”7 The soul’s place is
“in the middle” (in medio […] rerum), just as the tree of life was in the mid-
dle of Paradise.8 Corporeal matters are below the soul, and the only thing
above the immaterial soul is God (natura dei).9 In this ideal state, the soul

5 The influence of Ambrose in the use of allegorical reading seems here to be indis-

putable. Lancel 2002, 134.

6 Happiness (beatitudo), signified by the “name of Paradise,” consists of spiritual and

intellectual wisdom (sapientia). Human happiness is located east of Eden, which Augustine
interprets as a figure of immortal and intellectual delights. Gn. adu. Man. 2, 9, 12. All the trees
and foods of Paradise are for Augustine “spiritual” and “food of the soul.” See Teske 1992, 182.
7 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 9, 12 non inuolui atque obrui terrenarum cupiditatum implicamentis.
8 Cf. Plot. En. 3, 2, 8 ἐν µέσῳ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων.
9 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 9, 12 Et ideo lignum dinoscentiae boni et mali dicitur, quia si anima,

quae debet in ea quae anteriora sunt se intendere, id est in deum, et ea quae posteriora sunt
obliuisci, id est corporeas uoluptates, ad seipsam deserto deo conuersa fuerit et sua potentia
tamquam sine deo frui uoluerit, intumescet superbia, “quod est initium omnis peccati.” Et cum
hoc eius peccatum poena fuerit consecuta, experiendo discet, quid intersit inter bonum quod
deseruit et malum quo cecidit. Gn. adu. Man. 2, 9, 12 “ligno” autem “scientiae boni et mali”
64 chapter three

looks upon God and overlooks bodily pleasures. This state of affairs can be
described by the concept of ‘middleness.’ The tree of good and evil knowl-
edge symbolizes the soul’s position in the ordered universe. By remaining
in its created position, the soul remains whole (integer).
But in the Fall, the soul turned away from God, and fell in love with its
own power. All sin originates in pride (superbia) that manifests itself both
in falling away from God, and in the illusory desire to have a self-sustained
being.10 The evil lies in the breaking of the ideal integrity of the soul, and to
shock this state of unity by division is the primal, greatest evil imaginable,
here projected into the biblical Paradise in Augustine’s exegesis. What is
worth mentioning is that Augustine does think that such an evil deserved
a subsequent punishment (poena consecuta), somehow relating to the lost
unity of the soul. At first, Augustine does not elaborate on the quality of
this punishment, but shortly thereafter, in Gn. adu. Man. 2, 19, 29, poena
is discussed in connection with the curse that God lays on Eve. Human
mortality seems to be too evident and simple a solution to cover the whole
range of divine punishments, and Augustine therefore considers poena to be
also the painstaking effort which every soul is going to make when turning
away from “fleshly pleasures” to “better ways of life” (nulla abstinentia fit
a voluptate carnali, quae non habet in exordio dolorem, donec in meliorem
partem consuetudo flectatur). To be exact, Augustine does not pinpoint evil
desire as representing a divine punishment for the cardinal sin of Adam
and Eve; in fact, concupiscentia does not here have any explicit role as a
consequence of the Fall.11 The original punishment seems to be conceived
on a general level as consisting of mortality and death: this is represented,
for instance by the clothes which God gives to Adam and Eve after their
Fall. They signify the bodily and mortal constitution of our present bodies,
in opposition to the original spiritual and “simple bodies” (Gn. adu. Man.
2, 21, 32).12

ipsa item medietas animae et ordinata integritas significatur. For the Neoplatonic concept
of ontological medietas, see Theiler 1970, 555; O’Daly 1987, 38–40.
10 The Plotinian affinities of the concept ‘pride’ are clear, as shown by numerous scholars.

Plot. En. 5, 1, 1: ἀρχή […] τοῦ κακοῦ ἡ τόλµα καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι
δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. τῳ δὴ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἐπειδήπερ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσθαι. See also Gn. adu. Man. 2, 15, 22;
2, 21, 32; 2, 25, 38; 2, 26, 39. For the Neoplatonic themes of Augustine and pride, see Schaffner
1959, 227–228; O’Connell 1968, 173–174; Torchia 1987; Procopé 1987, 316–317. Pride plays an
essential role also in the motif of triplex cupiditas. See Chapter 4.
11 See Verschoren 2002, 219: “Augustine does not go so far as to say that we inherit sin (or

any form of concupiscence).”

12 For a discussion of supralapsarian corporeality and Gnostic influences, see Sfameni

Gasparro 1985.
paradise and punishment 65

This first commentary on Genesis by Augustine also touches upon the

subject of obedience. However, the soul’s obedience refers here, as a rule, to
the ordered human constitution: the lower part of the soul should obey the
higher, rational part of the soul. Moreover, disobedience to God’s absolute
authority and commandment as such does not play a significant role in
Augustine’s rudimentary attempts to sketch the Genesis narrative.13 It is
true that God’s prohibition, having a very particular form, is mentioned in
a fleeting remark, but this prohibition is depicted entirely in the service of
illuminating the soul’s position towards the intellectual and bodily entities,
the soul being “in the middle” and striving for intelligible happiness while
rejecting “earthly pleasures.” Augustine strongly rejects the Manichaean
interpretation of an envious (invidus) God along with the typically Gnostic
tradition of inverted roles, in which Christ is seen as the figure of the
serpent (Gn. adu. Man. 2, 26, 40), but not a word is said of why God gave
His prohibition of to not touch the tree of good and evil knowledge, and
why the first human beings (i.e. the soul) were not able in the end to act
according to that prohibition.14 As we will see in Chapter 5, Adam and Eve’s
fall is explained in psychological terms, and no theological connotations
of disobedience are made with concupiscentia, as leading to, affecting, or
following as a punishment for Adam and Eve’s act of contempt against God’s
commandment.15

13 Torchia (1987, 72) interprets Gn. adu. Man. 2, 15, 22 as representing “a refusal to submit

oneself to Divine authority.” This submission is, however, less of an authoritative character
than of the soul’s realizing its medietas, i.e. its correct state in the universal order of being.
hoc est ergo quod persuasum est, ut suam potestatem nimis amarent, et cum esse deo pares
uolunt, illa medietate, per quam deo subiecti erant et corpora subiecta habebant, tamquam
fructu arboris constitutae in medio paradisi male uterentur, id est contra legem dei, atque
ita quod acceperant amitterent, dum id quod non acceperant usurpare uoluerunt. non enim
accepit hominis natura, ut per suam potestatem deo non regente beata sit, quia nullo regente
per suam potestatem beatus esse solus deus potest.
14 Unless it is supposed that the created soul had a defect in some way from the beginning,

but this is not, of course, an option for Augustine. Rist 1994, 104–108. For the tradition of
“envious God,” see Raveaux 1987, 64–65.
15 In mor., preceding the composing of Gn. adu. Man., Augustine had already mentioned

cupiditates as a force preventing the soul’s participation in happy life (beata uita). Such a
sin of the soul, that is, cupiditas, is “signified quite plainly in the Old Testament—in the
transgression of the first man in paradise.” The force and direction of the argument here
starts from the immanent state of the soul, and the Genesis story “signifies,” or works as
a helpful mirror for the present soul now struggling against its evil inclinations. mor. 1, 36
munus enim eius est in coercendis sedandisque cupiditatibus, quibus inhiamus in ea quae nos
auertunt a legibus dei et a fructu bonitatis eius, quod est, ut breui explicem, beata uita. ibi
enim est fides ueri, cuius contemplatione perfruentes eique penitus adhaerentes procul dubio
66 chapter three

During the first half of the 390s Augustine was still occupied with devel-
oping his notions of a just divine punishment originating from Paradise.
While the connection of concupiscentia into these insights was, if not non-
existent, at least very thinly conceived, it is useful to examine two central
works of 390s, de uera religione and de libero arbitrio, and their way of sketch-
ing the punitive state of the soul and the will as resulting from actions
taken in the Garden of Eden. These works were written at approximately
the same time; that is, shortly before and shortly after Augustine’s ordina-
tion.
Just before his ordination, towards end of 390, Augustine composed a
concise, systematic work, de uera religione, which he assigned to his still
Manichaean friend Romanianus. The first part of this work is an outline of
Christian doctrine, and the second part is a more philosophically oriented
discussion of the truths of faith.16 In uera rel. 38, Augustine once more
situates the events that took place in Paradise into his newly-found frame
of Neoplatonic ontology: the Fall of “the first human beings” (primi homines,
Augustine does not use the proper names of Adam and Eve in uera rel.) is to
be thought of as a fall from eternal goods to temporal goods, from plenitude
to deficiency, and from security to infirmity.17 Such a fall is also defined as
the first evil of the rational soul, and Augustine then says this evil to be a
“will to do things that are forbidden by the highest and innermost truth.”18
The idea of obedience is thus present in Augustine’s mind as he depicts the
events of Paradise, or the ideal state of the soul. He even formulates, albeit in
all brevity, an idea which will receive more importance in his future works:
[F]rom the tree which was touched contrary to the prohibition came the
power to distinguish between good and evil. When the soul has become
involved in its sin, it learns, by paying the penalty, the difference between

beati sumus; inde autem decidentes magnis erroribus doloribusque implicantur. namque, ut ait
apostolus, radix est omnium malorum cupiditas, quam quidam sequentes, naufragauerunt a
fide et inseruerunt se doloribus multis. quod peccatum animae in ueteri testamento satis aperte
bene intellegentibus, in ipsius hominis qui erat in paradiso praeuaricatione signatur.
16 For the work in general, see van Fleteren 1976; 1994; 1999; Fuhrer 2007. For the relation

of faith and reason in uera rel., see Lössl 1993.

17 uera rel. 38: ab aeternis ad temporalia, a copiosis ad egena, a firmitate ad infirma. See

also uera rel. 23, in which the events of Paradise are implicitly present, although Augustine’s
interpretation moves on a very general level, et propter ipsum peccatum, quod amatur,
fit corruptibile, ut fluendo deserat amatorem suum, quia et ille hoc amando deseruit deum.
praecepta enim eius neglexit dicentis: hoc manduca et hoc noli. trahitur ergo ad poenas, quia
diligendo inferiora in egestate uoluptatum suarum et in doloribus apud inferos ordinatur.
18 uera rel. 38 uitium primum animae rationalis uoluntas ea faciendi, quae uetat summa et

intima ueritas.
paradise and punishment 67

the precept it refused to obey and the sin which it committed. In this way it
learns by suffering to know the evil it did not learn to know by avoiding it.
By making comparison between its former and its present state it loves more
earnestly the good which it loved too little, as is seen from its failure to obey.19
[transl. Burleigh]
Once the soul was bound to its sin by breaking the divine commandment, it
learned the difference between good and evil by way of immediately expe-
riencing the (divine) punishments: the evil knowledge (dinoscentia) which
the name of the tree had predicted, in fact indicated the punishments (poe-
nae) of the transgression. Thus, Augustine concludes, all evil in the world
consists either of the soul’s own actions (quod fecit) or of the punishment
of ‘difficulty’ (difficultas), which the soul deserved by the Fall.20 This is illus-
trated by a convenient picture of a fact and a consequence, in which a man
throws himself into water and will consequently drown in it.21
Augustine’s explicit anti-Manichaean stance in uera rel. can be seen
in the way he emphasises sin as being a voluntary event. One important
corollary of the voluntary character of sin is clearly visible in this work, and it
is the emphasis of just punishment. If sin is, in its core and origins a properly
voluntary action, it must be punished by a divine and just judgment. The
two, sin (peccatum) and punishment (poena), go hand in hand if and only if
sin is conceived as a voluntary act.22
But in uera rel., as in Gn adu. Man., the punishment or punishments
deserved by sin are considered to be a variety of different and manifold
distresses on humankind. Augustine sees this punishment revealed in both
bodily (e.g. bodily weaknesses, imbecillosum corpus) and mental pains (e.g.
anguish, dolor), and ultimately in bodily death (mors).23 These human suf-
ferings, Augustine insists upon pointing out, are not arbitrary events, but

19 uera rel. 38 contingit ex illa arbore, quae contra uetitum tacta est, dinoscentia boni et

mali, quia cum suo peccato anima fuerit implicata, luendo poenas discit, quid intersit inter prae-
ceptum quod custodire noluit, et peccatum quod fecit, atque hoc modo malum quod cauendo
non didicit, discit sentiendo et bonum quod obtemperando minus diligebat, ardentius diligit
comparando.
20 uera rel. 39.
21 The series of images Augustine presents here is also designed to show the non-substan-

tiality of evil.
22 After hinting at the events of Paradise and the punishments deserved by the actions

taken there in uera rel. 23, Augustine chrystallizes his maxim: Et hoc est totum quod dicitur
malum, id est peccatum et poena peccati. See also uera rel. 25 on the process of the restitution
of mental and bodily stability. In this process, the two go hand in hand, as well: ablato ergo
peccato auferetur poena peccati. See also uera rel. 44.
23 uera rel. 29. See also uera rel. 48 peccato mortalitatem meruerunt.
68 chapter three

the just and meaningful penalties for a misguided and evil use of one’s
autonomous will. Opposing the Manichaean, radically dualistic and mate-
rialistic view of evil, Augustine stresses that sin is not an involuntary event
that could only be said to occur or happen in us without our own doing, as
for instance, in being induced by fever.24 On the contrary, sin is a result of
the free choice of the will, and therefore it is appropriate that it should be
punished.25 The first, spontaneous defect of the will was that of the Devil.
Then He persuaded the first humans to give their free, voluntary consent
(uoluntate consensit) to sin. Augustine insists on the difference between
necessity and free voluntary action based on a free choice of the will. For if
we sin by necessity, there cannot be something called sin, and all reproach
and admonition would be useless, and consequently, “all religious order
and Christian law” would be void. As its starting point, this argument takes
Augustine’s notion of punishment: if sin were not voluntary, the punish-
ments of humankind would be unjust (recte iniusta poena uideretur, uera rel.
27–28).26 Later on in uera rel., however, Augustine wishes for some reason
to qualify the difference between sin and the punishment of sin by discern-
ing between them as a voluntary (uoluntarius) defective movement from
the “highest being” and an “involuntary (non uoluntarius) pain” as following
this defect.27

24 uera rel. 27 tamquam febris inuitum occuparet. Inuitus here clearly refers to purely

involuntary circumstances, as in ‘not willed’ or ‘without the contribution of the will.’ For an
analysis of Augustine’s use of the term with the connotation of ‘reluctant’ or ‘half-willed,’ see
Saarinen 1994, 20–43.
25 uera rel. 27 nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit uoluntarium.
26 uera rel. 27 si non uoluntate male faciamus, nemo obiurgandus omnino aut monendus

est. In the course of argument, Augustine stresses the voluntariness of sin to the extent that
his later Pelagian adversaries could appeal to this text for their support. Thus, when writing
a retractatio (retr. 1, 13, 5) to this passage, Augustine is in trouble to explain what exactly he
did mean by ‘voluntary’ sins. According to Augustine in the time of retr., voluntariness refers
strictly and exclusively to the first humans, who used their will wrongly. In a strained way,
one could call the sin with which human babies are born voluntary as well, because their
sin is inherited from Adam and Eve. et illud quod in paruulis dicitur originale peccatum, cum
adhuc non utantur arbitrio uoluntatis, non absurde uocatur etiam uoluntarium, quia ex prima
hominis mala uoluntate contractum factum est quodammodo hereditarium. Augustine thinks
that sins (peccata) that are said to be committed involuntarily (non uoluntaria), because
they are done in ignorance or by coercion are, to be exact, not done completely without
one’s willing. Of these kinds of involuntary sins Augustine mentions, by way of an example,
concupiscentia.
27 uera rel. 76 non sit malum nisi peccatum et poena peccati, hoc est defectus uoluntarius a

summa essentia et labor in ultima non uoluntarius, quod alio modo sic dici potest: Libertas a
iustitia et seruitus sub peccato. See also diu. qu. 24.
paradise and punishment 69

It is noteworthy that in uera rel. Augustine wishes to characterise the

quality of these justly deserved punishments. Despite being a sign of God’s
justice, they are also designed to direct man’s attention to immutable goods.
According to Augustine God has so ordained it that even the hardships of
this life, as signs of divine punishments (diuina supplicia), are not unbear-
able or immoderately severe. Instead, they may work as incitements to car-
dinal virtues. While God thus punishes justly, he is not a merciless judge.28
This concern, already present in uera rel., demonstrates how Augustine
wishes to support his view of human sufferings and the invalid state of the
will as being divine punishments with arguments which explain the reasons
and usefulness of poenae. Ergo, God is not a cold-hearted judge, and even his
punishments are clement and useful.29
Similar positions are taken in the equally explicitly anti-Manichaean
contra Fortunatum. All evil is either sin or punishment.30 The free choice of
the will is a precondition of sin (c. Fort. 15–16, 20), and eventually goes back
to God’s nature, who creates goodness and distributes justice. Augustine’s
example of an evil act committed by necessity, or compulsion, introduces
the question of justice in the form of a human judge (iudex), who cannot
consider something to be a crime when it is committed under compulsion.31
In de libero arbitrio 3 Augustine once more turns to the concept of pun-
ishment.32 Previously, in lib. arb. 1, 22, Evodius and Augustine had agreed
that if the rational mind of the sage would abandon virtuous life, it would
really deserve a punishment in the form of disturbed emotions.33 In lib. arb.

28 uera rel. 29 quamquam iusta uindicta peccati sit, plus tamen clementiae domini quam

seueritatis ostendit. est iustitiae pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans, ut, quoniam
bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine poenarum erudiamur.
29 See also exp. Gal. 50.
30 c. Fort. 15 duo sint genera malorum, peccatum et poena peccati.
31 c. Fort. 20 peccata, ut dixi, nisi libera uoluntas esset in nobis, peccata non essent. Si uis

enim uerbi causa ligaretur ab aliquo ceteris membris et de manu eius falsum scriberetur sine
eius propria uoluntate, quaero, si hoc iudici patefieret, possit hunc hominem falsitatis crimine
condemnare?
32 For a clear and concise overview of the tangled argumentation in the three books of lib.

arb., see Lössl 1995. Lössl, along with the majority of scholars, assumes a strong developing
tendency in the progress of the work. Simon Harrison (2006) and Carol Harrison (2006) have
argued for a much more consistent and uniform content. Lib. arb. has given rise to various
scholarly discussions on the status of the will, sin and human condition in the fallen state. See
O’Connell 1970; Alflatt 1974, 1975; Babcock 1988, 1993; Wetzel 1992, 86–88; Djuth 1993; Madec
1994. Robert O’Connell (1991) reacted against Malcolm Alflatt’s interpretations of involuntary
sin in lib. arb. rather late; his vitriolic response to Alflatt’s theses shows, if not anything else,
at least the pivotal position of lib. arb. in Augustine’s oeuvre.
33 See Chapter 5. Babcock (1988, 39) links the descriptions of punitive desire in lib. arb. 1

and lib. arb. 3 tightly together.

70 chapter three

3, while still maintaining the properly voluntary status of sin, Augustine

refers repeatedly to the first voluntary defect of the first human beings that
affected a permanent punitive state on humankind. This punitive state may
also be said to be ‘voluntary,’ although in a restricted meaning. The original
moral agency of Adam and Eve was free and genuinely voluntary, because
the first human beings were able to will good, or to will to act according
to God’s commandments.34 When their will turned into temporal goods, it
immediately caused a permanent flaw in human moral capabilities, caus-
ing all human wills to be habitually bound with a weakness and proneness
to act according to base and temporal desires. The consequence was, as it
were, an amputation of the original, genuinely free will.
Despite all this, Augustine still allows himself to refer to the sins of fallen
humankind as being ‘voluntary’ as well. To stretch the concept uoluntarius
this way naturally causes troubles for a sharply drawn difference between
cause and effect, or between voluntary sin and involuntary punishment. In
lib. arb. 3, Augustine painstakingly attempts to explain why it is possible
to maintain that fallen human beings sin voluntarily in conditions that are
clearly involuntary.35 In lib. arb. 3, Augustine develops his views on ‘diffi-
culty,’ which he also incorporates in other works from the same period. By
difficultas, Augustine means the slowness and weakness of the will in doing
good, and in juxtaposition to ignorantia, which represents the intellectual
confusion of finding out and knowing what is good. In shedding light on
what he means by difficultas, Augustine uses the biblical evidence of Rom
7 and Gal 5, 17, and their remarks on concupiscentia. The present punitive
state of humankind for the actions taken in Paradise has thus found its con-
nection to concupiscentia in Augustine’s mind. In addition, whatever the
exact nature of our state of will now, after the Fall, by the end of lib. arb.,
it has become clear to Augustine that the chances of human autonomy in
achieving the highest good have become almost nonexistent.
Let us now turn to examine more closely Augustine’s arguments for
the just character of poena. The first of these arguments may be referred
to as the argument of beauty. In lib. arb. 3, 26, Augustine ponders on the
difference between sin and its punishment. First of all, they are, of course,

34 In the end of lib. arb. 3, Augustine qualifies the primeval state of will by claiming that

Adam and Eve’s will was an intermediate good, “rational” but not yet “wise.” lib. arb. 3, 71–73.
35 One of the options is to speak of people voluntarily persisting in their perversity instead

of accepting divine aid for their helpless state. Thus, the will is able to regain its high
position that it had before the Fall by “humble repentance” (lib. arb. 3, 15 penitendi humilitate
altitudinem suam recipit).
paradise and punishment 71

not substances (naturae), but ‘states’ in substance (adfectiones naturarum),

one being voluntary, and the other being punitive. A sinful voluntary act
is something shameful, or deformed (turpis) that makes ugly the order of
the universe. Accordingly, it deserves a punishment that gives its order
back—the shamefulness of sin is refurbished by the punishment.36 Even the
punitive conditions that seem to us to diminish the realms of good are, in
fact, contributing to the universal beauty of the cosmos. The (aesthetically
conceived) order of the universe thus serves now as a justification for the
divine punishments that the present humankind is suffering from.37 Indeed,
in lib. arb. 3, Augustine is rather preoccupied with arguments that can
be mustered for God punishing the sinners in a just manner. The human
condition is rendered as that of a debtor to God. This means that human
beings owe to God either good deeds or a just punishment (3, 43–44). The
original debt consists of God’s gift, which is free will and its ability to do
good. If the will commits good deeds, it pays God back His gift. But if it
fails to use His gift correctly, it nonetheless pays Him back by suffering the
just punishment that God has inflicted. Once more, Augustine here stresses
that the beautiful order of the universe works as a guarantee for each evil
act to be punished. “The beauty of the universe may not be disfigured even
for an instant by having the ugliness of sin without the beauty of a just
punishment.”38
As mentioned above, another important emphasis in Augustine’s objec-
tive to argue for the just character of the present human state of punish-
ments is to hold out the voluntariness of sin, and hence responsibility for
it.
What then is the relation of God’s just punishment to man’s voluntary
sinning? If Augustine were to limit himself to personal responsibility for sin,
it would perhaps be fair enough to admit that whatever we suffer against
our wills from our own wrongdoings that have been committed freely and
voluntarily, can be described as ‘voluntary.’ In lib. arb. 3, 46, Augustine
responds in a way that actually seems close to his later reading of his own
text in retractationes: that the just character of an involuntary punishment
lies in the sin that was originally committed voluntarily.

36 In the following lines, Augustine seems to think that the soul’s bodily existence rep-

resents its punishment. lib. arb. 3, 27 quid […] tam infimum in rebus quam corpus omne
terrenum? hanc tamen corruptibilem carnem etiam peccatrix anima sic ornat ut ei speciem
decentissimam praebeat motumque uitalem.
37 lib. arb. 3, 26. For ordo and its aesthetic connotations, see Harrison C. 1992, 104–110.
38 lib. arb. 3, 44 ne uel puncto temporis uniuersalis pulchritudo turpetur, ut sit in ea peccati

dedecus sine decore uindictae.

72 chapter three

If he suffers justly, his sin is not in suffering against his will, but in his having
sinned by such wilful action that he now suffers a just punishment against his
will.39 [transl. Russell]
There is a tension, however, more and more present with this account, for
Augustine is increasingly tending to narrow down the space for a properly
voluntary sin. This process of narrowing down our chances to commit a vol-
untary sin is carried on by Augustine’s extended analysis of human punitive
conditions. This analysis is rather suddenly introduced in lib. arb. 3, 51. In
the preceding lines, Augustine has strongly stressed that the will is the sole
and ultimate cause for sin, and therefore sin can occur only under condi-
tions that may be characterised as voluntary. Again, to suffer a punishment
for one’s voluntary sins does not bear the mark of necessity or compulsion.
We suffer, in a way, in a voluntarily manner.40 At this point, Augustine feels
he needs to make certain clarifications of the character of the human puni-
tive state. He proceeds by introducing a twofold classification of the divine
punishment for the Fall, namely ‘ignorance’ (ignorantia) and ‘difficulty’ (dif-
ficultas). ‘Ignorance’ is an intellectual or cognitive failure to discern between
true and false, especially in morals (3, 53 quid nobis esset faciendum).41 ‘Diffi-
culty’ is the akratic feature of not having the powers to resist “lustful deeds”
(libidinosis operibus). This can be called concupiscentia (or libido) as well
(3, 53).42 Augustine seems to attach these terminological variants (especially
concupiscentia) to the biblical source text in Paul (Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17):43
And yet there are things done even from ignorance which are condemned and
judged as deserving of correction, as we read on the authority of the Sacred
Writers […] Actions performed of necessity are blameworthy when a man has

39 lib. arb. 3, 46 nam si iuste patitur, non in eo peccat quod patitur inuitus, sed in eo peccauit

quod ita fecit uolens ut quod nollet iure pateretur.

40 Evodius agrees (lib. arb. 3, 46): “it is altogether impossible to impute our sins rightly to

our Creator.”
41 Cf. carnis prudentia in Augustine’s interpretation of Rom in diu. qu. 66, 6 and exp. prop.

Rm. 48–49.
42 Strictly speaking, in lib. arb. 3, 53, Augustine plays the role of his imaginary adversary

and puts these words into his mouth: carnalis concupiscentiae nescio qua necessitate non
ualeremus. The previous biblical quotations (Rom 7, Gal 5, 17) show, however, that the actual
wording is not at stake here, but the question of necessity (necessitas) and the possibility
to resist sin (non ualeremus). For ignorantia, see Fuhrer 2006, 491–495. For difficultas, see
Kienzler 1996–2002, 425–428. According to Kienzler (ibid., 426) the word pair appears in
other works only “sporadically.”
43 The Pauline passages appear here for the first time in lib. arb., coinciding with, or

following, Augustine’s exegetical interest in Paul. See Chapter 6 on Augustine’s way of using
Rom 7 in connection with concupiscentia.
paradise and punishment 73

the will to do right and cannot do so. Hence the words of the Apostle: “For the
good which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, I do”; and, “To will is
present with me, but to accomplish that which is good, I find not”; and, “The
flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these things
are contrary one to another, so that you do not what things you will.” But these
things are all the lot of men who spring from the time of man’s condemnation
to death; for if this is not a punishment for man, but is something natural, then
there is no sin.44 [transl. Russell]
The presence of punitive ignorance on the one hand, or the disability to
discern what is true and morally commendable, and the weakness of the will
on the other hand, that causes us to not obtain what we may partly discern
to be right, has made Augustine to limit the human possibilities to achieve
virtue in a drastic way. The possibility to sin voluntarily has been narrowed
down to Adam and Eve (3, 53).45 This single properly voluntary sin and its
consequences have been stretched to cover all humankind. Thus, from lib.
arb. 3, 53 onwards, Augustine gathers more arguments to show that, in a
way, we can be said to be justly answerable for our punitive state and for all
sins committed in this state. First, we can easily be blamed personally for not
seeking God’s aid for our plight.46 If the soul stubbornly rejects healing, it can
be said to sin voluntarily, i.e. to remain voluntarily in its involuntary state of
sinning.47 Yet, Augustine adds that one can also consider the punishments
as an extended kind of voluntarity. In brief, punitive states can be seen as
sins in a transferred meaning, for their origin is in the free choice of the
will:

44 lib. arb. 3, 51 et tamen etiam per ignorantiam facta quaedam inprobantur et corrigenda

iudicantur, sicut in diuinis auctoritatibus legimus […] sunt etiam necessitate facta inprobanda,
ubi uult homo recte facere et non potest. nam unde sunt illae uoces: non enim, quod uolo facio
bonum, sed quod odi malum, hoc ago; et illud: uelle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum
non inuenio; et illud: caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; haec enim
inuicem aduersantur, ut non ea quae uultis faciatis? sed haec omnia hominum sunt ex illa
mortis damnatione uenientium; nam si non est ista poena hominis sed natura, nulla ista peccata
sunt.
45 Cf. Rist 1967, 133–134, on Plot. En. 3, 2, 7: “[I]t is evident that it is not a pre-natal choice

which is in question. The choice is one made by a man with a moral problem in the course
of his natural life.” See also Rist 1967, 135.
46 lib. arb. 3, 53 non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod inuitus ignoras, sed quod neglegis quaere

quod ignoras, neque illud quod uulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod uolentem sanare
contemnis; ista tua propria peccata sunt. See also the fault of the pre-existent souls in lib. arb.
3, 58.
47 This stubborn attitude can be called pride. lib. arb. 3, 29 superbiam, cuius persuasione

deiectus est et quo uno uitio misericordia medicina respuitur.

74 chapter three

Wrong actions done by anyone from ignorance and the inability to perform
good acts that he wants to, are called sins for the very reason that they have
their origin in the first sin, which was voluntary, and it is this previous sin
which has merited these consequent ones.48 [transl. Russell]
With these claims Augustine is able to conclude that there is a great qual-
itative difference between the will in Paradise and the will in the present
state of humankind. Only in Adam and Eve was the will properly free, and
therefore capable of making free choices between good and evil:
When we speak of the will’s freedom to do what is right, we are speaking, of
course, of that freedom with which man was created.49 [transl. Russell]
Augustine’s analysis of the origins and cure for the punitive states of igno-
rantia and difficultas proceeds further with two convictions: first, people are
to be held responsible for these states, if not for any other reasons, at least
for the fact that they are capable of seeking or rejecting divine aid for their
plight. Second, the twofold punitive states form the basic reason for Augus-
tine’s query of the origin for individual souls. In presenting his famous four
optional models (lib. arb. 3, 56–59), Augustine is in the end rather pragmatic:
there is no point in finding out one’s origin, if one’s destination remains
unclear (lib. arb. 3, 61). So sin is there to be reconciled and healed, whatever
its origin and character.50 If there is no outcome from the punitive condi-
tions of ignorance and difficulty, they are analysed in vain.51 Indeed, the

48 lib. arb. 3, 54 dicuntur peccata quia de peccato illo liberae uoluntatis originem ducuntur;

illud enim praecedens meruit ista sequentia. Cf. the statements made in diu. qu. 67, 3. To
illustrate this point Augustine construes an analogy: it is a legitimate way to name various
languages as ‘tongues’ for they are a product of the homonymous muscle moving in our
mouths.
49 lib. arb. 3, 52 cum autem de libera uoluntate recte faciendi loquimur, de illa scilicet in qua

homo factus est loquimus. Adam was originally destined to a gradual perfection of rational
wisdom. A will that was able to choose between both good and evil was a sign for a “middle”
position of the first humans. See Lössl 1995, 352–353.
50 Lössl 1995, 350: “Er denkt pragmatisch: Solange er sein Ziel (das Heil der Seele) kenne,

sei es ihm egal, auf welchen Grundlagen er es erreiche, wenn er es nur erreiche. Die philoso-
phischen Grundlagenfragen verlieren dabei ihre Schärfe. Der Übergang zu den theologischen
Lösungsversuchen ist nahtlos.” There is no need to represent the four models in detail here.
For a debate on the hypothesis of soul’s pre-existence, see O’Connell 1963; 1980; O’Daly 1974;
1983; 1987, 199–202.
51 See e.g. the allusions (labor, error) to both in lib. arb. 3, 61 nec prodesset aliquid illa siue

memoria siue coniectura inchoatae uitae si de ipso deo qui unus laborum animae finis est aliter
quam dignum est opinatus in scopulos erroris inruerem. For a moment, Augustine also plays
with the idea of ignorance and difficulty being natural states of the human condition, but
soon rejects such an approach, ending with the option that they are punishments and debts
meted out by God (lib. arb. 3, 70).
paradise and punishment 75

punishments as such spur the human body-soul composite to search and

plead for God’s effective aid in order to be finally relieved of these punish-
ments. Consider, for example, the following passage:
One part of it [i.e. the soul], the higher, has gone ahead to perceive the good
of a righteous act, but another part, the more sluggish and carnal element, is
not brought into conformity with this view. Hence the soul is prompted by
this very difficulty to beg Him for help in making progress, from whom it sees
it owes its start.52 [transl. Russell]
In the final pages of lib. arb. 3, Augustine concludes that the “souls suffer
punishment for their sins and do so without detriment to the majesty of
God’s nature […] these sins must be imputed to the will alone and we need
look no further for the cause of sin.”53 Augustine has effectively affirmed
that Adam was responsible for the first voluntary sin and was the one who
caused the punitive conditions of ignorantia and difficultas for humankind.
The person of Adam and his radically extended identity, touching all indi-
vidual souls, therefore enables Augustine to move on to suggest that our
punishments (concupiscentia, ignorantia, difficultas) involve some kind of
a personal commitment, although in a transferred sense, and can thus be
called sins.54
The architecture of arguments in lib. arb. 3 is designed to show how all
sins are voluntary and thus punishable from the divine point of view. Hand-
in-hand with this occupation goes Augustine’s concern to show how the
punishments are fully and unquestionably just.

52 lib. arb. 3, 65.

53 lib. arb. 3, 63 appareat integerrima […] maiestate et substantia creatoris supplicia pec-
catorum suorum animas luere. quae peccata […] non nisi propriae uoluntati earum tribuenda
sunt nec ulla ulterior peccatorum causa quaerenda.
54 Such trails of thought had already been suggested in c. Fort., on which the focus

of scholarship has, in this respect, been. C. Fort. precedes lib. arb. 3 but seems to offer a
similar picture of involuntary sins as the one depicted here. See Alflatt 1974, 118–134. Babcock
(1988) remains uninterested in the exact consequences that the limitation of “proper” (i.e.
voluntary) sin has for the concept of sin in the present human state. Instead, he proceeds in
the frame of the original moral agency; what caused Adam and Eve to sin? However, Babcock
rightly criticizes (1988, 39–40, 51n12) Alflatt’s excessively punctual view on the crucial shift
in diffusing the boundary between the purely voluntary sins and involuntary consequences
of original sin. Wetzel (1992, 98) suggests that by excluding voluntary sin from the fallen
world, Augustine refocuses “his attention on involuntary sin” and begins “to elaborate his
psychology of fallenness.” In Wetzel’s view, this elaboration finds its culmination in ciu. 9 and
14, that is, very much later than the failed attempts in the 390s to explain human motivational
conflict.
76 chapter three

In addition to the aesthetic order of the universe and the voluntary char-
acter of sin, God’s own nature as indisputable justice also guarantees the
justice of the punitive states of the humankind. Because God is just, His
punishments are consequently also just. In an interesting passage that antic-
ipates future debates with Julian, Augustine builds up a chain of argument,
starting with two axiomatic claims about God (God is omnipotent and just,
dubitare dementis est) and punishment (humankind is suffering from one,
poenam esse nemo ambigit). The only other possibility Augustine is play-
ing with seems to resemble the Manichaean suggestion of an inferior evil
deity, torturing humankind with unjust punishments (iniusta poena crucia-
ret). This possibility is ruled out by a variation of the argument of Nebridius:
God’s omnipotence cannot suffer from loss or ignorance so that an inferior
force could secretly or violently take hold of what belongs to God only. There-
fore, the punishment is justly inflicted upon humankind.55
In a short overview on Augustine’s works from the 390s, we have seen
how he establishes the fundamentals for a later detailed view of concupis-
cence being a sharply reciprocate punishment for the original act of Adam
and Eve’s disobedience in Paradise. In these early works, Augustine already
suggests that obedience and disobedience played an essential role in the
life of the first human beings; however, these concepts, seen as attitudes
towards God, seem to be, above all, formed by Augustine’s general insights
concerning the universal order and the soul’s place in the middle of creation,
below God and above bodily creation. Augustine is clearly convinced of the
dire consequences earned by the ancestors in Paradise, and is equally keen
to stress that God, as a just creator, had to punish their actions. The detailed
form of this punishment, however, is under development in Augustine’s
thoughts. It involves mortality, bodily suffering, intellectual deterioration,
above all in a moral context. And as we have seen in lib. arb. 3, Augustine
draws a connection between the original Fall and the confused present state
of the will as being reluctant, or even unable to act according to God’s good
will. Furthermore, Augustine is concerned already in these works with the
just character of divine punitive measures; the question of justice is never

55 lib. arb. 3, 51 omnis autem poena si iusta est peccati poena est et supplicium nominatur;

si autem iniusta poena est, quoniam poenam esse nemo ambigit, iniusto aliquo dominante
homini imposita est; porro quia de omnipotentia dei et iustitia dubitare dementis est, iusta haec
poena est et pro peccato aliquo penditur. non enim quisquam iniustus dominator aut subripere
hominem potuit uelut ignoranti deo aut extorquere inuito tamquam inualidiori uel terrendo
uel confligendo, ut hominem iniusta poena cruciaret. relinquitur ergo ut haec poena iusta de
damnatione hominis ueniat
paradise and punishment 77

far from his soundings on the Fall, punishment and the involuntary states
of the soul.
In the early period of Augustine’s works, the basic framework was thus
laid for concupiscentia as a punishment of primal sin. The idea of an involun-
tary evil being connected to the will and voluntary actions of Adam comes
to the fore in these interpretations. In the following years, Augustine tried
to develop this claim further, sharpening the image of the reciprocal pun-
ishment of the original evil turn of the will.

3.2. Stabilizing Reciprocal Punishment

As we have seen, Augustine began to formulate his view of a divine pun-

ishment already in his early works. Thus, the anti-Manichaean emphasis
of the voluntary character of all sins was gradually joined by another con-
cern. This concern was Augustine’s growing awareness of a sin that had been
committed by the ancestors of the present humankind in a distant past; this
sin had been punished with certain involuntary states of the soul and was
still affecting the human condition. Augustine limited the properly free and
unhindered choice of will into Paradise and the first created human beings;
after their Fall, all humankind was punished, and owing to the original state
of free will, according to Augustine, the punishment may be characterised as
mirroring divine justice. According to this line of thought, all human beings
can be justly said to have a part in Adam and Eve’s disobedient act against
God and His commandment, and thus a divinely ordered punishment is
equally just in its afflictions upon humankind.
The concept of divine justice seems to move in similar lines both in
Augustine’s way of interpreting how the human personhood in its present
state can be responsible, and thus liable to be punished, for another indi-
vidual’s sin, and in his developing understanding of divine grace.56 In the
texts from the middle period of Augustine’s career, he works at stabilizing
the idea of primal disobedience that received a just punishment of

56 Note e.g. the way in which Augustine refers to the hereditary original sin as naturale

peccatum, as opposed to the voluntary sins that result from earthly cupiditas, in adn. Iob. 16
terra ne operiat super sanguinem carnis meae [Iob 16,18]: id est, ne, si inmunda fuerit oratio mea
optando terrena, accedat cumulus terrae super uinculum mortalitatis: quod significauit nomine
sanguinis, id est, ne cupiditate terrena maioribus calamitatibus uoluntarii peccati operiar, quod
est illud naturale peccatum de condicione mortali. For the careless connection between natura
and peccatum, see e.g. retr. 1, 15, 6.
78 chapter three

concupiscentia. We will also witness how the causes and order of this pun-
ishment ultimately remain hidden in God; while in Simpl. Augustine
reached his final uncompromising view of divine grace as a hidden and
unquestionable force in its operations and choices for who will be saved
and who will not, his view of the exact ways of divine punishment, originat-
ing from the Fall and reaching all present human beings, reflects an equally
hidden process by human standards. This can be seen in a choice of brief
remarks made in the works Augustine composed around the end of the 4th
century.
By the time Augustine came to write de diuersis quaestionibus ad Simpli-
cianum, he had already made crucial modifications to his view of the free
choice of the will, as noted above.57 This relatively short work, written as a
response to Simplicianus of Milan on problems concerning Rom 7 and Rom
9, has commonly been acknowledged to represent a “veritable revolution in
his theology.”58 In the course of composing Simpl., Augustine depicts the cri-
teria of grace and election in a radically theocentric way.59 This work ends
with the well-known praise to God whose decisions remain unfathomable
to the human standards of reason and justice:
[E]lection is verily hidden, and cannot be known by us who must regard all
men as parts of one lump. If, however, some are able to know it, I confess
my own weakness. […] “Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid.” […]
Only let us believe if we cannot grasp it, that he who made and fashioned
the whole creation, spiritual and corporeal, disposes of all things by number,
weight and measure. But his judgments are inscrutable and his ways past

57 Neatly put in Simpl. 1, 2, 21: liberum uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est

quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato quid ualet? To assure the reader of the mere existence
of liberum arbitrium in this way is a telling sign of its weakened status.
58 Wetzel 1999, 798.
59 A larger scale hostile interpretation has been Flasch 1990 (19952), preceded by Flasch

1980. While Flasch’s work has, directly or indirectly, inspired continuing research in Augus-
tine’s theology of grace, its more far-reaching suggestions have rightly been corrected. See
already Flasch 1980, 203–207: “Gott […] wird ein Ungeheuer […] ‘Gerechtigkeit’ ist Grausam-
keit, diese ‘Gnade’ Willkür.” For reviews of Flasch 1990, see e.g. Ring 1991; 1994; Lössl 1997,
90–94, who also aims his criticism at Ring 1994; Drecoll 1999, 240–250; Harrison C. 2006,
and finally Löhr 2008, a critical and partly appreciative evaluation of Flasch’s enterprise.
Löhr accepts Flasch’s challenge to view Augustine’s doctrine of original sin and grace from a
“historical” context (as opposed to a “theological” or “dogmatic” context), but remains skep-
tical of Flasch’s premises about Augustine’s influence in his own times. What is more, Löhr
emphasises Augustine’s doctrine of grace as a legitimate continuation of ancient philosoph-
ical therapies, and not as a revolutionary break from ancient philosophical discourses of
happy life. See Chapters 5 and 6.
paradise and punishment 79

finding out. Let us say Halleluia and praise him together in song; and let us
not say, What is this? or, Why is that? All things have been created each in its
own time.60 [transl. Burleigh]
Concupiscence as a punishment for a primeval sin appears in a brief notion
in Simpl.61 In a kind of postscript to the question of the election of Jacob and
Esau in Romans 9, Augustine shortly treats six verses from Sirach (Simpl.
1, 2, 20), where the theme of clay and the potter appears in a similarly deter-
ministic context as in Paul’s letter to Romans. The “lump” of sinners consists
of humankind, which is bound to tradux peccati and poena mortalitatis.
Here the original constitution of man as soul and body is contrasted with
the fallen human condition in which the punishment of concupiscentia car-
nalis, resulting from the first sin of Adam and Eve, rules over humankind.
But carnal concupiscence now reigns as a result of the penalty of sin, and has
thrown the whole human race into confusion, making of it one lump in which
the original guilt remains throughout.62 [transl. Burleigh]
In the previous question on Romans 7, Augustine had loosely connected
concupiscentia to the fallen state of the will in the stage of sub lege, and dis-
cerned this state from the original nature of humanity. Instead, the inability
to achieve perfection in a virtuous life is now due to the “punishment for

60 Simpl. 1, 2, 22 certe ita occulta est haec electio, ut in eadem consparsione nobis prorsus

apparere non possit. aut si apparet quibusdam, ego in hac re infirmitatem meam fateor […]
numquid iniquitas est apud deum? absit [Rom 9,14]. […] credamus tantum, et si capere non
ualemus, quoniam qui uniuersam creaturam et spiritalem et corporalem fecit et condidit, omnia
in numero et pondere et mensura disponit. sed inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles
uiae eius. dicamus alleluia et conlaudemus canticum et non dicamus: quid hoc aut quid hoc?
Fredriksen 1995 has pointed out that the notion of the inscrutability of God’s justice in both
his election of the saved and his judgment upon those who will be damned appear in full
force in Simpl., and remain an important part of Augustine’s thought thereafter. But as we
will see, the ultimate inscrutability of divine justice does not hinder Augustine from backing
it by diverse arguments.
61 Note also Simpl. 2, 6, where Augustine says that evil spirits have a “weakness of their

evil desires and punishments.” They cannot participate into God’s wisdom intrinsecus due to
this fallen condition, but they can make notions of God acting in his creatures forinsecus, and
thus they have a possibility for e.g. predicting future events. The devil thus has a “weakness
of evil desires” (infirmitas concupiscentiarum et poenarum suarum) that has a direct effect on
his intellectual capabilities.
62 Simpl. 1, 2, 20 sed concupiscentia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum

genus humanum tamquam totam et unam consparsionem originali reatu in omnia permanente
confuderat. Guilt (reatus) is here for the first time explicitly connected with concupiscentia:
evil desire accounts for a universal guilt that will plunge all humankind into the same lump
of the damned. Baptism does not yet, however, play any part in this report. For the effects of
grace and baptism on concupiscentia, see Chapter 6.
80 chapter three

the crime” (delicti poena). This punishment is characterised as “mortality,”

which in turn has come to resemble a “second nature” in present humanity.
The “chain of mortality” and the “weight of habit” thus strengthen concu-
piscence, so that a person living sub lege is not able to reach perfection in
doing good.63
In the works composed shortly after Simpl., Augustine holds fast to the
ideas of the deserved and just nature of punishment for the original sin
committed by Adam, and its concrete effects on human will. However, the
features of harmony and reciprocity and the exact form of this punishment
are still described in rather vague and impressionistic turns of phrases.
In writing his confessiones, Augustine recalls his liberation from the Man-
ichaean concept of sin and evil, while at the same time he was at loss to
explain in which way his sin was voluntary and in which way it was not.
This recollection of a baffled mind is linked to the time briefly preceding his
conversion (ca. 385/6), but Augustine had not abandoned these themes at
the time of writing conf.:64
I directed my mind to understand what I was being told, namely that the
free choice of the will is the reason why we do wrong and suffer your just
judgment, but I could not get a clear grasp of it […] when I willed or did
not will something, I was utterly certain that none other than myself was
willing or not willing. That there lay the cause of my sin I was now coming
to recognize. I saw that when I acted against my wishes, I was passive rather
than active; and this condition I judged to be not guilt but a punishment (non
culpam, sed poenam esse iudicabam) […] since I conceived you to be just, it
was not unjust that I was chastised. But again I said: […] Why then have I the
power to will evil and to reject good? Is it to provide a reason why it is just for
me to undergo punishments (ut esset, cur iuste poenas luerem)?65
[transl. Chadwick]

63 Simpl. 1, 1, 11. For the interpretation of Rom 7 and concupiscentia, see Chapter 6.
64 Thus, a description of wavering Augustine in conf., does not, of course, infer a wavering
writer; however, the question of poena and its ways in the soul seem to be for Augustine a
region yet to be charted at the turn of the century. O’Donnell 1992, II, 391–392: “The middle
time is the time of paradox, and many of the perplexities to which A. gives voice, and to
which he does not give satisfactory monovalent solutions (e.g. the dilemma of grace versus
freedom: by ‘satisfactory’ I mean a solution that would remove an issue from further debate
among his heirs) are themselves reflections of this time of paradox in which Augustine saw
himself living. […] Where at the outset (e.g. at the time of which he writes here), satisfactory
monovalent solutions were certainly what he sought, by the time at which he writes here a
fruitful ‘disenchantment’ has supervened.”
65 conf. 7, 5 liberum uoluntatis arbitrium causam esse ut male faceremus et rectum iudi-

cium tuum ut pateremur et eam liquidam cernere non ualebam […] cum aliquid uellem aut
nollem, non alium quam me uelle ac nolle certissimus eram et ibi esse causa peccati mei […]
paradise and punishment 81

In this representation of his youthful attempts to draw the demarca-

tion line between personal responsibility and passive, punitive states, all
efforts end in aporia (his cogitationibus deprimebar iterum et suffocabar).
It is noteworthy, however, that the question of punishment and justice is
once more an essential part of Augustine’s (recollected and reconstructed)
memories of how he tried to conceive of sin, free will and of his abilities to
do good.
Conf. does not explore the relation between concupiscentia and Adam
and Eve’s fall in any profound way as such, and there are only a few sug-
gestive comments on poena and its form as concupiscentia to be found in
this work.66 Yet, in conf. 8, Augustine reflects on his insuperable difficulties
in overcoming his “old will,” which is entangled in concupiscentia and con-
suetudo.67 Augustine first seems to think of voluntariness in terms of his own
responsibility by consenting to create the habit of sexual desire. Thus, the
punishment of his traumatised will is also perfectly just (peccantem iusta
poena sequeretur).68
However, Augustine’s previous work on the obstacles of a morally free
will characterises his recollections in conf. 8. Therefore, for Augustine, a
straightforwardly immanent solution of consuetudo as explaining the force
of bad inclinations remains inadequate in its explanatory force.69 As a result,
he inevitably links the “half-wounded” state of his will to a primeval fall
of his ancestors. Questioning himself on the problem of the divided will,
Augustine alludes to the punishment (poena) that was due to the freely
willed sin of Adam:

quod autem inuitus facerem, pati me potius quam facere uidebam et id non culpam, sed poe-
nam esse iudicabam. The passive character of poena is also mentioned in c. Adim. 26, where
the distinction between peccatum and poena appears as well.
66 See e.g. conf. 2, 2, where Augustine reprehends his youthful years driven by erotic

desires, and then concludes such a state to be a life in “chains of mortality.” These chains have
been deserved by Augustine’s own proud soul (obsurdueram stridore catenae mortalitatis
meae, poena superbiae animae meae).
67 Much of what Augustine has to say about concupiscentia in conf. concerns its function

in Christian renewal, for which see Chapter 6; the presence and interpretation of Rom 7,
and the classification to an ‘old will’ and ‘new will’ seem to govern Augustine’s thoughts in
connection with concupiscentia in this work. For consuetudo in Augustine, see Prendiville
1972; Zumkeller 1986b; Wetzel 2000.
68 conf. 8, 11 sed tamen consuetudo aduersus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam uolens

quo nollem perueneram. et quis iure contradiceret, cum peccantem iusta poena sequeretur?
69 For consuetudo and its role in Augustine’s works in 390s, see Zumkeller 1986b, 1255–

1256; Wetzel 2000.

82 chapter three

What is the cause of this monstrous situation? Why is it the case? May
your mercy illuminate me as I ask if perhaps an answer can be found in
the hidden punishments (latebrae poenarum) and the secret tribulations
(tenebrosissimae contritiones) that befall the sons of Adam?70
[transl. Chadwick]
Once again, Augustine forcefully emphasises the occult character of the
divine punishment upon humanity. The overall context of these famous
pages of conf. is contrived to create an effect of puzzlement and confusion;
perhaps this is partly due to the simple reason that Augustine had not yet
fully formulated his views on the subject, and partly due to the analogy that
Augustine uses in post-Simplician works between the workings of grace and
the workings of the debt of sin.71 In conf. 8, these ways of sin are described as
causing a serious division of the will. The cause of his inability to will whole-
heartedly is partly himself, and partly the “sin which dwells in” him:
[T]he self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwill-
ing. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in
conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came
about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an
alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind (poenam meae).
And so it was “not I” that brought this about “but sin which dwelt in me,” sin
resulting from the punishment of a more freely chosen sin (supplicio liberioris
peccati), because I was a son of Adam.72 [transl. Chadwick]
Being sub lege, Augustine is bound by the punitive sin that inhabits him: for
his “new will,” he may say that this happens against his will (inuitus) but
from the viewpoint of his full identity as a sinful human being, he has to
confess a responsibility in his “own mind” for a sin chosen “more freely” by
Adam.73

70 conf. 8, 21 unde hoc monstrum? et quare istuc? luceat misericordia tua, et interrogem,

si forte mihi respondere possint latebrae poenarum hominum et tenebrosissimae contritiones

filiorum Adam.
71 O’Donnell (1992, III, 48) opts for the first explanation: “the words of the text are both

those that A. might have uttered at the time (in his interior monologue) and those that A. at
the time of conf. utters in perplexity.”
72 conf. 8, 22 ego eram, qui uolebam, ego, qui nolebam; ego eram. nec plene uolebam nec

plene nolebam. ideo mecum contendebam et dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me inuito
quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. et ideo non
iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum [Rom 7,17] de supplicio liberioris
peccati, quia eram filius Adam.
73 The emphasis on responsibility is, of course, also due to the Manichaean explanation of

the phenomenon of ‘two wills’ to which Augustine devotes some time refuting in conf. 8, 23–
24. Despite the divisions and all the talk of numerous wills (by Paul and Augustine himself,
paradise and punishment 83

While Contra Faustum, Augustine’s major anti-Manichaean work seems

equally to have few specified considerations of concupiscentia as a divine
punishment, Augustine here affirms many of his previous positions in his
general remarks on punishment for Adam and Eve’s first evil volition.74
Thus, Augustine repeats his stance of sin and responsibility: the concept of
sin implies both that sin is by definition voluntary and that it deserves pun-
ishment. Augustine also takes up the twofold plight he had described in lib.
arb., namely that of ignorance and difficulty (for which Augustine uses here
the word infirmitas), which should be conceived of as divine punishments.
Again, Augustine is keen to point out that it is impossible to trace the exact
“order” of these punishments. In other words, human intellectual capacities
fail when confronted by the task of giving a satisfactory account of how an
individual movement of the will in Paradise has managed to contaminate
all humanity to affect all human moral understanding and motivation. The
allusion to Simpl. and its positions of unfathomable grace and election, hid-
den in God’s decisions in this remark of c. Faust. is quite clear:
Now both justice and injustice, to be acts at all, must be voluntary; otherwise,
there can be no just rewards or punishments […] The ignorance and infirmity
which prevent a man from knowing his duty, or from doing all he wishes to
do, belong to God’s secret penal arrangement (ex occulto poenarum ordine
uenit), and to His unfathomable judgments (inscrutabilibus iudiciis dei), for
with Him there is no iniquity.75 [transl. Stothert]

conf. 8, 21, ideo sunt duae uoluntates), the will remains a single entity expressing its conflicting
volitions under a single identity, ego eram qui uolebam, ego qui nolebam, ego eram. For the
role of will in conf. 8, see O’Donnell 1992, III, 30–31.
74 For the date of the work and identity of Faustus, see Decret 1970, 51–70. See also Wurst

2001; 2007. Some of the points made already in the debate against Fortunatus (in 392) are
meticulously recycled in c. Faust. Thus, the relation between the first sin and death as its
punishment is clarified by the example of the transferred meanings of the words ‘tongue’
(lingua) and ‘hand’ (manus). c. Faust. 14, 3–4 mors hominis ex poena peccati est: unde et
ipsa peccatum dicitur, non quia peccat homo, dum moritur, sed quia ex peccato factum est,
ut moriatur; sicut alio modo dicitur lingua proprie caro, quae intra dentes sub palato mouetur,
et alio modo dicitur lingua, quod per linguam fit; secundum quem modum dicitur alia lingua
graeca, alia latina. et manus alio modo dicitur ipsum proprie corporis membrum […] et alio
modo manus dicitur scriptura, quae fit per manum […] sic et peccatum non tantum ipsum opus
malum, quod poena dignum est, sed etiam mors, quae peccato facta est, peccatum appellatum
est. illud itaque peccatum, quo reus esset mortis, non commisit Christus; illud autem alterum,
id est mortem, quae peccato inflicta est humanae naturae, suscepit pro nobis […] maledictum
est omne peccatum, siue ipsum, quod fit, ut sequatur subplicium, siue ipsum subplicium, quod
alio modo uocatur peccatum, quia fit ex peccato.
75 c. Faust. 22, 78 siue autem iniquitas siue iustitia, nisi esset in uoluntate, non esset in potes-

tate. porro si in potestate non esset, nullum praemium, nulla poena iusta esset […] ignorantia
84 chapter three

The mystery of divine election is then paralleled with another: how and to
whom will the heritage of Adam, the punitive mortality of the body (ex hac
poena corpus corrumpitur) and the movements of the soul in the present
state of humanity, be either a constructive challenge to temperance or a
source of corruption to evil?76 Just as the workings of grace lie hidden in
God’s thoughts so is the ultimate basis for the justice of divine punishment
to the offspring of Adam hidden from human intellect. The causes for divine
election are occultae, and likewise the chain of punishment is occultus.77
What is clearly known and sure (certum), is that only divine grace is able to
free those who suffer from divine punishment. Moreover, the distribution of
grace and judgment, i.e. God’s choice between who shall be saved and who
shall not, happens by hidden, but perfectly just causes (occultis fit causis,
iustis tamen). Augustine concludes that due to God’s hidden influence,
similar movements of the human soul may be conceived as both corrupting
others and as benefiting others.
That Augustine conceived divine grace and divine punishment as ana-
logical in their hiddenness also becomes clear from de natura boni. The
post-Simplician awe in face of God’s hidden decision in the already famil-
iar form of Rom 11, 33 is connected, once more, both to divine election and
divine punishment.78

uero et infirmitas, ut uel nesciat homo, quid uelle debeat, uel non omne, quod uoluerit, possit, ex
occulto poenarum ordine uenit et illis inscrutabilibus iudiciis dei, apud quem non est iniquitas.
See also c. Faust. 13, 11.
76 c. Faust. 22, 78 proditum est enim nobis peccatum Adam fideli eloquio dei; et quia in

illo omnes moriuntur, et quia per illum peccatum intrauit in hunc mundum et per peccatum
mors, ueraciter scriptum est. et quia ex hac poena corpus corrumpitur et adgrauat animam
et deprimit terrena habitatio sensum multa cogitantem, uerissimum nobisque notissimum est,
et quia de hac iusta poena non liberat nisi misericors gratia, certum est. et hinc apostolus
gemebundus exclamat: infelix ego homo! quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia
dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum [Rom 7, 24]. sed quae sit distributio iudicantis et
miserantis dei, cur alius sic, alius autem sic, occultis fit causis, iustis tamen. non tamen ideo
nescimus omnia ista iudicio aut misericordia dei fieri, licet in abdito positis mensuris et numeris
et ponderibus, quibus omnia disponuntur a deo creatore omnium, quae naturaliter sunt, nec
auctore, sed tamen ordinatore etiam peccatorum, ut ea, quae peccata non essent, nisi contra
naturam essent, sic iudicentur et ordinentur, ne uniuersitatis naturam turbare uel turpare
permittantur, meritorum suorum locis et condicionibus deputata. quae cum ita sint et cum per
hoc secretum iudiciorum dei motusque humanarum uoluntatum eisdem prosperitatibus alii
corrumpantur, alii temperanter utantur, et eisdem aduersitatibus alii deficiant, alii proficiant.
77 “Hidden justice” (occulta iustitia) is, of course, not limited to the sense of inferiorated

moral capacities in Augustine. Cf. c. Faust. 12, 44 on Jews and their excaecatio.
78 nat. b. 31 item quia cuique culpae qualis et quanta poena debeatur, diuini iudicii est, non

humani, sic scriptum est: o altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae dei! quam inscrutabilia
sunt iudicia eius et inuestigabiles uiae eius! item quia bonitate dei donantur peccata conuersis.
paradise and punishment 85

The critical role of obedience and disobedience in picturing the drama

of Adam and Eve in Paradise reappears in nat. b., witnessing to Augus-
tine’s continuing fascination with the themes he had previously found to
be essential, albeit in germinal mode, in his first expositions on Genesis.
The disobedient volition of Adam and Eve (uolentes in peccatis) deserved
a just punishment, manifesting itself in involuntary conditions (nolentes in
poenis). A permanent state of ordered obedience to God (sub domino deo)
would have ended in incorruptible beauty, claims Augustine, again accentu-
ating the aesthetic, ordered nature of obedience. However, the punishment
given by God also discloses order, and thereby justice as well.79 As in previ-
ous works, Augustine is prone to emphasise the close connection of poena to
obedience, order and justice. But once more, he does not elaborate in detail
when depicting a punishment that would fit neatly with these pregnant the-
ological concepts: what is clear once again about poena, nonetheless, is its
debilitating effect on the will.80
These motifs found a more comprehensive appearance in Augustine’s
larger interpretations of Genesis of the early fifth century. The central con-
cepts of obedience, justice and order, or harmony, maintained their place
in Augustine’s thoughts of the events that took place in Paradise. However,
yet another piece found its way forcefully into this puzzle. The presence
of concupiscentia as a fitting, just and reciprocal punishment permeates
Augustine’s later depictions of the Fall in such a systematic and ubiqui-
tous way that it clearly fulfilled a role it seemed destined to have. Even
Augustine’s musings about the occult and mysterious ways of the deserved

79 nat. b. 7 creaturis autem praestantissimis, hoc est rationalibus spiritibus, hoc praestitit

deus, ut si nolint, corrumpi non possint, id est, si oboedientiam conseruauerint sub domino
deo suo ac sic incorruptibili pulchritudini eius adhaeserint; si autem oboedientiam conseruare
noluerint, quoniam uolentes corrumpuntur in peccatis, nolentes corrumpantur in poenis. tale
quippe bonum est deus, ut nemini eum deserenti bene sit; et in rebus a deo factis tam magnum
bonum est natura rationalis, ut nullum sit bonum, quo beata sit, nisi deus. peccantes igitur in
suppliciis ordinantur: quae ordinatio quia eorum naturae non competit, ideo poena est; sed
quia culpae competit, ideo iustitia est; nat. b. 35 ad hoc enim et prohibuerat, ut ostenderet
animae rationalis naturam non in sua potestate, sed deo subditam esse debere et ordinem suae
salutis per oboedientiam custodire, per inoboedientiam corrumpere. hinc et arborem, quam
tangi uetuit, sic appellauit dinoscentiae boni et mali [Gn 2,9], quia cum eam contra uetitum
tetigisset, experiretur poenam peccati et eo modo dinosceret, quid interesset inter oboedientiae
bonum et inoboedientiae malum. See also nat. b. 37.
80 Cf. the concise and chrystallised expression in c. Sec. 19 cum uero eum contumaci

inoboedientia deserit, per suum liberum arbitrium peccatis se inuoluit, per illius autem iustum
iudicium subplicio misera efficitur; et hoc est totum malum, partim quod iniuste facit, partim
quod iuste patitur.
86 chapter three

punishments upon humanity seem to be somewhat overshadowed by this

new invention.
Augustine was left dissatisfied with his exegesis on Genesis 1–3. During
the 390s he had tried a literal approach to the text, but this attempt had
failed.81 A full literal interpretation had to wait for a prolonged effort that he
initiated in the early years of 400s and extended to 415.82 This work is known
as de Genesi ad litteram. Books 1–5 describe the six days of creation. Books 6–
11 focus on the creation of Adam and Eve, their state of happiness, the Devil
and the serpent, and the Fall. The last book presents Apostle Paul’s vision of
Paradise (2Cor 12, 2–4). According to Augustine’s own announcement, his
approach in the interpretation is now emphatically literal (8, 1, 1–2, 5), as
opposed to his earlier work against the Manichaeans.83
In Gn. litt. 8, 3, 6–13, 30, Augustine discusses the disobedience of Adam
and Eve in Paradise. God planted two real trees in Paradise: the tree of life,
and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (lignum scientiae dinoscendi
bonum et malum).84 This being stated, the connection of the latter tree to
virtuous life and to the emergence of evil is made straightaway. For the
first human beings, the tree of good and evil knowledge was a practice

81 The work is known as de Genesi ad litteram liber unus inperfectus. Augustine started

writing it in 393. See retr. 1, 18 in scripturis exponendis tirocinium meum sub tanta sarcina mole
succubuit. The work came unexpectedly into Augustine’s hands when he was writing retr. As
the commentary interrupts in Gen 1, 26, nothing is said of the trees of Paradise and the Fall.
For a brief introduction to Augustine’s progress with the Creation accounts, see Teske 1999b.
82 Augustine composed his work in varying intervals, and the flow of the argument is

somewhat repetitious; e.g. the literal approach and its usefulness is repeatedly argued in the
beginning of several books, see e.g. 8, 1, 2–4; 11, 1, 2. The work was in all probability finished in
415. The first nine books, however, were very likely finished by 412, or even 410, the remaining
books Gn. litt. 10–12 date from 412–415, before ciu. 14, on which see O’Daly 1999, 34–35. Agaësse
& Solignac 1972, 25–31; Teske 1999c, 376. This traditional dating is followed here. Cf. however,
the view advocated by Hombert (2000, 137–188) that a large part of the work was written only
after the Pelagian debate had commenced. Hombert (2000, 187 n. 374) thinks that, among
many other things, the similar ideas on libido between Gn. litt. 9 and gr. et pecc. or. 2, 39 point
to a later date of composition than is usually thought.
83 In Gn. litt. 8, 2, 5 Augustine claims that even at the time that he wrote Gn. adu. Man., he

had not “despaired of the possibility” that all the events could be explained as literal as well.
For the fluctuating lines between ‘literal’ and ‘allegorical,’ see now Lössl 2004.
84 Their physical reality, however, does not exclude “deeper” meanings. God wanted to

put “mysteries of spiritual things in a bodily form” into Paradise. The tree of life is thus a
sacramentum to Adam and Eve, signifying God’s Wisdom (sapientia). Gn. litt. 8, 4, 8. In its
“sacramental” reality, the tree of life provided Adam and Eve with special nutrition that gave
them constant physical health. Gn. litt. 8, 5, 9–11. Despite the new emphasis on the concrete
quality of the trees, Augustine has no interest in speculating which kind of fruit grew from
the lignum scientiae. Leder 1961, 180–182.
paradise and punishment 87

in virtuous living. It is important to note that the tree of good and evil
knowledge had incessantly bothered Augustine, and he thought of it “again
and again” (mihi etiam atque etiam consideranti).85
It was proper that man, placed in a state of dependence upon the Lord God,
should be given some prohibition, so that obedience would be the virtue by
which he would please his Lord. I can truthfully say that this is the only
virtue of every rational creature who lives his life under God’s rule, and that
the fundamental and greatest vice is the overweening pride by which one
wishes to have independence to his own ruin, and the name of this vice is
disobedience. There would not, therefore, be any way for a man to realize and
feel that he was subject to the Lord unless he was given some command.86
[transl. Taylor, italics mine]
There are some interesting implications in this passage. The most acute of
these is the stress on obedience and disobedience. Augustine claims that in
order to be in God’s dominion, man had (oportebat) to be prohibited from
something. The somewhat random character of the prohibition is clearly
pointed out by Augustine’s language (alicunde, aliquid iuberetur).87 There

85 Gn. litt. 8, 6, 12.

86 Gn. litt. 8, 6, 12 oportebat autem, ut homo sub domino deo positus alicunde prohiberetur,
ut ei promerendi dominum suum uirtus esset ipsa oboedientia, quam possum uerissime dicere
solam esse uirtutem omni creaturae rationali agenti sub dei potestate, primumque esse et
maximum uitium tumoris ad ruinam sua potestate uelle uti, cuius uitii nomen est inoboedientia.
non esset ergo, unde se homo dominum habere cogitaret atque sentiret, nisi ei aliquid iuberetur.
87 Obedience had already appeared in such a light e.g. in s. Dolbeau 2. The sermon dates

very probably from January in 404 (Dolbeau 1996, 55–60), thus very likely preceding the
passages on oboedientia in Gn. litt. 8. Augustine had been speaking to the Carthaginian con-
gregation attending to the service on the eve of St. Vincent’s Day. People had behaved in a
disorderly manner, not complying with the preacher’s wishes. Although not a riot, the distur-
bance had aggrieved Augustine so much that he had left the pulpit and his parish standing.
The next morning, Augustine gave a solemn sermon on the subject of obedience, beginning
from the very trees of Paradise. God had to give some prohibition, to show domination (ali-
cunde, aliquid). But God’s domination is different from what we think: He does not need
anything nor does our subservience add to His power, ille nec nobis contemnentibus minor
est, nec nobis seruientibus maior est, s. Dolbeau 2, 7. His domination and prohibition teach
us obedience; therefore, they are useful (cui dominatur, est utilis). What is more, Christ also
showed obedience, and not only to the Father, but even to sinful men as well, showing thus
an example which all Christians should follow, for “obedience is the daughter of love,” filia
caritatis oboedientia est (s. Dolbeau 2, 12). Cf. also b. coniug. 32 oboedientia: quam uirtutem
tamquam radicalem atque, ut dici solet, matricem et plane generalem. uirg. 42 quid tam gener-
aliter maximeque praecipitur quam oboedientia, qua custodiuntur mandata dei? In s. Dolbeau
2, Augustine takes for granted that not all coercive social power structures result from sin,
but love. Cf. Markus 1988, 197–210; Ruokanen 1993, 107–108 on ciu. In this respect, I do not
find it anachronistic to refer to some of Augustine’s narrations on obedience as emphasis-
ing the arbitrariness of God’s will: it is the view, albeit useful, or perhaps even intelligible, of
88 chapter three

was no obvious reason for this prohibition other than that of teaching
obedience to Adam and Eve.88 “Adam was prohibited from the tree, which
in itself was not harmful. His good was to keep that decree intact, and
his evil was the transgression of the command.”89 As a consequence, the
tree and the prohibition mark God’s dominion over men. By thinking and
seeing the tree, Adam and Eve thought and felt God’s superiority. The ideal
of unconditional obedience seems to permeate Augustine’s account even
to the detail and is repeated in every turn. Thus, the instruction to “till and
keep” entails obedience to God. The first human beings had to obey God in
whatever He commanded, so that they would not lose that lovely place.90
They “kept” or guarded (custodire) themselves like the fields of Paradise;
in parallel to their domination of the earth, Adam and Eve were in God’s
dominion. To till and keep was to adhere to God in every instant; indeed,
it was God that was the ultimate one to guarantee human happiness, for
even Adam and Eve were not able to be righteous or eternally happy (iustus
beatusque) by themselves owing to their mutable nature. Man simply could
not be secure (tutus) “on his own.” Again, God is called dominus only after
He gives the commandment to Adam and Eve: from this it can be induced
that it is necessary for the human beings to have a dominus and to live
in subordination so that they may achieve and conserve their final, ideal
existence in God.
From a divine point of view, therefore, obedience seems after all to be
neither blind nor arbitrary.91 Domination or subordination is emphasised,
not because God would be in need of servile puppets, but for the reason
that He is thinking of the best interest of Adam and Eve. To obey is useful
(utilis)—but only as an afterthought. If one only “obeys and serves” Gods
commandments, there is a possibility of finally understanding them (tunc
forte uidendum, Gn. litt. 8, 13, 30). However, the utility of absolute obedience

the Superior one that is to be obeyed, whatever He tells one to do. For a different generaliz-
ing view, based on material from conf., see Schlabach 1994, 304–305. See also Garnsey (1998,
474–476) for the metaphor of slavery and its theological potential in s. Dolbeau 2.
88 This may have sounded odd to the ear of a non-Christian hearer. Frank 1974, 398: “im

Raum der griech.-röm. Antike der Gehorsam als in sich ethisch wertvolle Tat (als Unterwer-
fung des eigenen Willens unter einen fordernde Autorität, unabhängig von der Einsichtigkeit
der Forderung) nicht eigentlich gekannt ist.”
89 Gn. litt. 8, 13, 28 ab eo ligno, quod malum non erat, prohibitus est, ut ipsa per se praecepti

conseruatio bonum illi esset et transgressio malum. The fruit as such (natura) were not
poisonous. Gn. litt. 8, 13, 29.
90 Gn. litt. 8, 10, 23.
91 Gn. litt. 8, 11, 24.
paradise and punishment 89

cannot be calculated at the precise moment of facing the commandment.

So no reasons can be expected from God for having prohibited the fruit from
the tree of good and evil knowledge. Mere disobedience (sola inoboedientia)
earns the guilt of sin. Augustine thus eventually rejects all suggestions that
would offer an evident reason for this prohibition. The only possibility is
that God wanted to show the absolute value of obedience, as opposed to the
absolute harmfulness of disobedience, detached from all understandable
arguments.92 The ways of God in His decrees and judgments are still unfath-
omable and beyond human scrutiny. In this emphasis, Augustine seems to
be coherent to his earlier, briefer notions of the hidden ways of election and
punishment.
The name of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil also indicated
what God had in mind when planting it into Paradise: it stresses the crucial
virtue of obedience. The first human beings simply had to be obedient; oth-
erwise, they would indeed come to know the difference between good and
evil. The good would be the stable realization of not breaking God’s absolute
prohibition (and as a result, a constant life in happiness). In opposition, the
knowledge of evil would be realized in bearing the consequences of God’s
threatening words of prohibition.93 The name of the tree works thus as a

92 Gn. litt. 8, 13, 30. quare prohibitum est, nisi ut ipsius per se bonum oboedientiae et ipsius
per se malum inoboedientiae monstraretur? […] quid aliud quam dei uoluntas adtenderetur?
quid aliud quam dei uoluntas amaretur? quid aliud quam dei uoluntas humanae uoluntati
praeponeretur? dominus quidem cur iusserit, uiderit; faciendum est a seruiente quod iussit et
tunc forte uidendum est a promerente, cur iusserit. sed tamen, ut causam iussionis huius non
diutius requiramus, si haec ipsa magna est utilitas homini, quod deo seruit, iubendo deus utile
facit quidquid iubere uoluerit, de quo metuendum non est, ne iubere quod inutile est possit.
The voluntaristic strain in this passage is strong. According to Chappell (1995, 154–175),
Augustine’s view of the will seems in general to have a rationalistic preference. For obedience
and voluntarism in Judeo-Christian tradition in general, and in Augustine in particular, see
Bourke 1970; Frank 1974; Dihle 1982, 1–19, 123–132; O’Daly 1987, 6. Dihle has been criticised
for emphasising Augustine’s ‘voluntarism’ too much. Kahn 1988, 236–238; Saarinen 1994, 21–
23; Chappell 1995, 199–201; Schlabach 1998. See also Knuuttila 1999, 206–207. Lössl 2003 is
an argument for Augustine’s intellectualism (p. 54 “fundamentally an intellectualist”). Cf.
Müller 2009, 365, see especially his remarks on the first evil volitions in angels and human
beings in Paradise (ibid., 370, 378): although Müller is cautious in subscribing Augustine to
later divisions in this respect, he notes that a thoroughly ‘intellectualistic’ approach would
fall short in explaining how a perfectly informed and intact soul would choose to do evil. I
think that this may also be one of the reasons why the relationship between God and Adam
is depicted in terms of obedience and subordination; the first sin is a failure in obedience,
not of intellect. See also the remarks of Colish (1990, 163) on natural laws.
93 In Gn. litt. 8, 14, 31 malum is said to be known or felt (sentiremus) only by experience,

for there would, of course, be no evil unless we committed it. Before the Fall, Adam and Eve
knew (intellegere) evil only indirectly, or “theoretically” (8, 16, 34–35).
90 chapter three

kind of a trap, or better, as a prophecy indicating God’s foreknowledge of

what will be the outcome of the prohibition (ex ipsa re nomen impositum
est, quae illo contra uetitum tacto fuerat secutura).94
In addition to these strongly theological considerations of obedience as
the first virtue and disobedience as the primary sin, Augustine proceeds to
chart the events that took place at the moment of the Fall and after the
Fall. In Gn. litt. 9, he deals with Gen 2, 18–24 and the ways of procreation
before and after the Fall. In the first case, Augustine sketches a picture
where Adam and Eve, serving God “in justice and obedience” (iuste […]
oboedienter […] si iuste omnes oboedienterque uiuerent) would have had
biological children in a bodily way, but without the “restless heat of sexual
desire and pain of the birth pangs” (sine ardore libidinis, sine labore ac
dolore pariendi).95 However, a change into an entirely spiritual reality after
a certain number of people would have been born this way did not take
place. Instead, Adam and Eve’s disobedience turned this vision into mere
speculation, and humanity received the punishment of—death (potuit hoc
fieri, si non praecepti transgressio mortis supplicium mereretur).96 While the
context here would be most appropriate for Augustine to apply the idea of
the reciprocal disobedience of concupiscentia, he does not do so.97 Instead,
the account in Gn. litt. 9, 10, 16–11, 19, based on Rom 7, 22–25, is focused on
death (mors) as the deserved punishment for the first transgression. This
account shares many things in common with Augustine’s later depictions
of concupiscentia, which he composed after Gn. litt. 9. When Adam and
Eve broke God’s prohibition, they were infected with a ‘lethal virus’ that
‘mutated’ their ability to have command over their bodies, for instance,
in the moment of conception and giving birth. However, this deadly and
poisonous force in our bodies can be resisted first, by God’s grace, and
second, by obedience and submission to God.98

94 Cf. Gn. litt. 8, 15, 33.

95 Cf. his earlier view in Gn. adu. Man. 1, 19, 30.
96 Gn. litt. 9, 3, 6. An earlier parallel for this account is Gn. litt. 3, 21, 33, where even

concupiscentia is mentioned, but the weight of punishment is there, too, on death (mors).
97 A similar case of argumentum e silentio can also be made of s. Dolbeau 2 (ca. 404). While

the sermon treats the themes of obedience, disobedience and Adam’s role in showing first
the former, then the latter, the consequent punishment is only said to be death. s. Dolbeau
2, 7 illa arbore experiretur quid interesset inter oboedientiae bonum et inoboedientiae malum.
ex illa enim arbore, contempto praecepto, mors consecuta est; seruato praecepto, immortalitas
sequeretur. uidetis ergo quantum malum sit inoboedientia, fratres mei: prima ruina hominis
ipsa fuit; 2, 23 inoboedientia est uenenum, ipsa primum hominem occidit.
98 Gn. litt. 9, 11, 19 cum anima pietate deo subdita legem istam peccati, quae est in mem-

bris corporis mortis huius, quam primus homo accepit in poenam, uicerit ipsa per gratiam,
paradise and punishment 91

In the start of his account of the sexual conduct before and after the Fall in
Gn. litt. 9, Augustine does not seem particularly keen to point out the analo-
gies between Adam and Eve’s spiritual disobedience towards God and their
subsequent disobedience of their bodies in the form of concupiscentia. It is
to be noted, however, that Augustine here loosely connects man’s relation
to God with the fallen stimuli of sexual desire, as he notes that before the
Fall, while there was no ‘concupiscence, or incitation of disobedient flesh’
(ubi nulla concupiscentia tamquam stimulus inobedientis carnis), the cou-
ple had to wait for “divine authorisation” for their act of procreation (ad
hanc rem diuina exspectaretur auctoritas).99 Moving on to comment on the
present state of human procreation, Augustine clearly considers death to
be the primal punishment for Adam and Eve’s transgression: death resides
in every human body from the start, much like a genetic illness (this anal-
ogy is drawn in Gn. litt. 9, 10, 17), and is the main reason for Paul to speak
of a “body of death” (corpus mortis huius). After having named death as the
fundamental poena peccati, Augustine sets out to suggest, perhaps some-
thing as a secondary corollary (quae cum ita sint), that in the Paradise, the
body was more in control of the mind (imperare potuisse) so that the act of
procreation was very much unlike to what it is now (neque cum ardore semi-
naretur, neque cum dolore pareretur).100 However, as Augustine proceeds,
this notion gains more impetus. The mortal human body began to carry a
“law of sin,” and it is the “movement” of this law that is also meted out as
a punishment (supplicium) for humanity.101 In the following dense passage

praemium caeleste percipiat maiore gloria, demonstrans, quanta sit laus oboedientiae, quae
alienae inoboedientiae poenam potuit uirtute superare. Cf. Rist 1994, 324, taking here concu-
piscentia to represent a “harbinger of death.” This is a strained reading of a passage where
concupiscentia only appears in a supporting role, behind the protagonist of death. For death
as a divine punishment in Gn. litt. see e.g. Gn. litt. 9, 10, 18; 11, 1, 3; 11, 35, 47; 11, 37, 50. In cat.
rud. 29 (written ca. 400), mortality and sexual concupiscentia were also taken as being con-
nected. cat. rud. 29 fecit illi etiam adiutorium feminam: non ad carnalem concupiscentiam,
quando quidem nec corruptibilia corpora tunc habebant, antequam eos mortalitas inuaderet
poena peccati. Note that in this remark, mortalitas represents the fundamental punishment,
of which a corrupted use of sexuality (concupiscentia) is seen as a corollary. Of course, there
are also other concrete applications for poena peccati in Gn. litt., e.g. the deteriorated intel-
lectual abilities (Gn. litt. 11, 34, 46 stulti facti sunt). For discussions of punishment, see Rist
1994, 135–145, 272–276.
99 Gn. litt. 9, 4, 8. A search with CAG2 reveals that the combination of caro and inoboediens

(or inoboedientia) appears here for the first time in the Augustinian corpus.
100 Gn. litt. 9, 10, 18. Here, Augustine is still considerate enough to mention the conse-

quences on both sexes. Later, the perspective is more on the male sexual organs.
101 Gn. litt. 9, 10, 18.
92 chapter three

Augustine draws an outline of the bodily punishment that reflects the orig-
inal disobedience against God in Paradise:
Consequently, when someone asks what help the woman was intended to
give the man, as I carefully consider to the best of my ability all that we are
told, I can think of no other purpose than the procreation of children in order
to fill the earth with their descendants. But the begetting of children by the
first man and woman was not to have been as it is today, when there is the
law of sin in the members at war with the law of mind, even though virtue
overcomes it by the grace of God. For we must believe that this condition
could not have existed except in this body of death, a body that is dead
because of sin. What punishment could have been more deserved than that
the body, made serve the soul, should not be willing to obey every command
of the soul, just as the soul herself refused to serve her Lord?
It is possible that God creates both body and soul from the parents: the body
from their bodies, the soul from their souls. Or could it be that He creates souls
some other way? But whatever is the case, it is not for some impossible task
nor for any trifling reward that He creates the soul. And when it [the soul] is
devout and faithful to God, it conquers with the help of His grace the law of
sin in the members of this body of death, which the first man received as a
punishment; and thus it gains a heavenly reward with greater glory, showing
how praiseworthy is that obedience which by virtue was able to triumph over
the punishment deserved by another’s disboedience.102 [transl. Taylor]
While through this description Augustine holds to the idea of death as
defining the present bodily state of humanity, he also takes note of the
justice of a punishment that underlines the rightly ordered hierarchy of God,
the soul and the body in Paradise. On the other hand, Augustine notes that
such a punishment can be annulled by Christian submission to God and His
grace. In this way, obedience even in the fallen state is able to conquer the
dire punishment deserved by Adam and Eve’s disobedience.

102 Gn. litt. 9, 11, 19 cum ergo quaeritur, ad quod adiutorium factus sit ille sexus uiro, dili-

genter, quantum ualeo, cuncta consideranti nonnisi causa prolis occurrit, ut per eorum stirpem
terra inpleretur, et non eo modo procreatam, quo nunc procreantur homines, cum inest pec-
cati lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, etiamsi per dei gratiam uirtute superatur; hoc enim
esse non potuisse credendum est nisi in corpore mortis huius, quod corpus mortuum est propter
peccatum. et quid hac poena iustius, quam ut non ad omnem nutum seruiat corpus, id est suus
famulus animae, sicut domino suo detrectauit ipsa seruire, siue utrumque ex parentibus creet
deus, corpus ex corpore, animam ex anima, siue alio modo faciat animas, non utique ad opus
inpossibile nec mercede parua, ut cum anima pietate deo subdita legem istam peccati, quae est
in membris corporis mortis huius, quam primus homo accepit in poenam, uicerit ipsa per gra-
tiam, praemium caeleste percipiat maiore gloria, demonstrans, quanta sit laus oboedientiae,
quae alienae inoboedientiae poenam potuit uirtute superare?
paradise and punishment 93

Gn. litt. was written over a long period of time, and a shorter work against
certain teachings by Pelagius and his disciples intervened in producing this
large exegetical work. In de peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo
paruulorum, written in 411–412, Augustine uses once again the account of
Adam and Eve’s Fall for the purposes of a theological debate, this time
against what he briefly later grew accustomed to call the ‘Pelagians.’103 It will
here be helpful to follow the chronology of Augustine’s works rather closely
to see the ways in which Augustine expanded his ideas about the punitive
concupiscentia reflecting the circumstances of Paradise.
The work consists of three books. The first book presents Augustine’s
opposition to the position of the Pelagius’ circle toward Adam as an example
of sinning. However, Augustine discerns between each person’s voluntary
acts which indeed imitate Adam’s example and between the involuntary,
inborn evil inheritance resulting from Adam’s first act of disobedience.104
Imitating Adam’s act is not the only way to take part in his sin, for the
punishment of his sin has also spread from generation to generation “in
the flesh.”105 In the first book, Augustine draws a parallel between Adam
and Christ in discerning between an outward and voluntary example, on
the one hand, and an inward, “most secret” influence of Adam and Christ
on the other hand. This secret (occultissima) influence of Adam is carnalis
concupiscentia, which is contrasted with occultissima gratia, once again
reflecting the analogical way in which Augustine treats divine punishment
for sin and divine grace to rescue us from that sin.106
However, a more extensive discussion on concupiscentia can be found
in pecc. mer. 2, 35–36.107 By providing an account of Adam’s sin and its

103 In this work, however, Augustine still avoids openly hostile criticism of Pelagius. For

a recent overview of the Pelagian movement, see now Lamberigts 2008b. For pecc. mer., see
Delaroche 1996.
104 See e.g. pecc. mer. 1, 10.
105 pecc. mer. 1, 19 Adam unus est in quo omnes peccauerunt, quia non sola eius imitatio

peccatores facit, sed per carnem generans poena.

106 pecc. mer. 1, 10 sicut ergo ille, in quo omnes uiuificantur, praeter quod se ad iustitiam

exemplum imitantibus praebuit, dat etiam sui spiritus occultissimam fidelibus gratiam, quam
latenter infundit et paruulis; sic et ille, in quo omnes moriuntur, praeter quod eis qui praeceptum
Domini uoluntate transgrediuntur imitationis exemplum est, occulta etiam tabe carnalis con-
cupiscentiae suae tabificauit in se omnes de sua stirpe uenturos. Concupiscentia is here called
“decay” (tabes), a rare word in Augustine, appearing also in Manichaean contexts. See c.
Faust. 5, 7 qui nihil suo uitio peccauerunt, sed hostili tabe, quo eos pater misit, inexpiabiliter
infecti sunt, insuper triumphare? The comparison between Adam and Christ and their dis-
obedience viz. obedience is recalled in pecc. mer. 2, 48.
107 Shorter remarks on obedience and concupiscentia precede in pecc. mer. 1. In [Link]. 1,

21 Augustine notes how in the Fall Adam’s body lost its grace, by which it obeyed the mind in
94 chapter three

punishment, Augustine wishes to answer whether there has lived anyone

who has not been bound by sin.108 He has already stated in a previous
section how pride and concupiscence are interconnected: a desire to have
possession of one’s own power leads to a “just punishment” under which it
is difficult to obey justice.109 Now Augustine proceeds to a more thorough
narration of such of a chain of events.
The setting is described in accord with the one in Gn. litt. Thus, many
details of Adam and Eve’s life in Paradise are only repeated to correspond
to Augustine’s exegesis of Genesis (Augustine, too, is “recalling” here, pauca
repetere). Adam and Eve ate every other fruit of Paradise but the one grown
from the tree of good and evil knowledge. The tree of the knowledge of
good and evil was as such nothing bad or harmful. On the contrary, it
was a part of God’s good creation. This already familiar emphasis mirrors
Augustine’s insistence that God’s commandment only served the purpose
of obedience. So the “piety of obedience” (sibi commendata pietate oboedi-
entiae) was the only way to serve God, and it was “sufficient in helping
a rational creature to live under the creator.”110 God even pointed to the
inherent and axiomatic value of obedience by forbidding Adam and Eve
to touch a tree that was essentially harmless.111 The name of the tree was
proleptic: it showed what would happen if God’s commandment was kept
or broken (quo nomine significaretur experientiae consequentia). Augustine
repeats several times, from various angles, the simplicity and usefulness of
obedience to God’s command over His servants (famulus). Adam and Eve’s

every respect. This happened because Adam did not obey God. In pecc. mer. 1, 57 Augustine
describes how the present corrupt sexual desire “moves in a disobedient way” (inobedienter),
and contrasts with it the way Christian spouses use concupiscentia to procreate “in an orderly
fashion” (ordinate) to have children “in an orderly companionship” (ordinata societate).
Again, Augustine here compares Christ’s birth, which happened by the “obedient mind of
a virgin,” to standard reproduction by concupiscentia carnis.
108 pecc. mer. 2, 35 non itaque ab re est, quantum praesenti causae sufficere uidetur, ab ipso

exordio generis humani pauca repetere. Thus, Augustine’s account of Genesis is motivated
by his wish to answer what he saw as a Pelagian doctrine of impeccantia (Zumkeller 1971,
633–634), but the close date of composition of pecc. mer. with the later books of Gn. litt. also
provided some useful benefit of synergy for the writer.
109 pecc. mer. 2, 33 praecedit ergo in uoluntate hominis adpetitus quidam propriae potestatis,

ut fiat inoboediens per superbiam. hic autem adpetitus etiam si non esset, nihil molestum esset,
et cum hoc uoluit homo, sine difficultate noluisset. secutum est autem ex debita iusta poena tale
uitium, ut iam molestum esset oboedire iustitiae.
110 The central positition of obedience in the Paradise was anticipated in a remark in the

previous book, pecc. mer. 1, 5 quam mortalitatem fuerat absumptura mutatio in aeternam
incorruptionem, si in homine iustitia, id est oboedientia, permaneret.
111 pecc. mer. 2, 35.
paradise and punishment 95

observance was “most useful” (utilissima seruitus), nothing but obedience

was expected (sola oboedientia), and this obedience only served the good
of Adam and Eve, not that of God.112 Indeed, Augustine stresses that the
essence of Adam and Eve’s transgression lay in disobedience, for God did
not expect anything else than obedience (solam) from his creatures. The fol-
lowing events, or the “just and deserved punishment” (iusta ac debita poena)
clearly demonstrate (satis ostenderetur) that the fruit as such was not poi-
sonous by nature; the actual damage was rather the breach of obedience.113
So far, Augustine has only varied and repeated ideas and material he had
been previously using. Hereafter, however, he proceeds into something new
in constructing the analogies of an obedient life in Paradise and the punish-
ment of disobedience in the present state of humanity.
In the state of the original “order of justice” (ordo iustitiae), the bodies of
Adam and Eve obeyed their soul, corresponding to the obedience their souls
showed to God. Just as their souls were positioned in servitude to God, so
were their bodies given by God to “show subservience (famulatum) to the
soul without any resistance.”114 That circumstances now are very different is
documented by a weakness (nescio qua infirmitate) that has disturbed the
servitude of the body to the soul so that certain bodily members now move
against one’s will. This, notes Augustine, is the reason why these members
are called pudenda, for the broken servitude of the body causes natural
shame in the soul. These members may now be excited “as if they had an
independent will” (quasi suae sint potestatis). Augustine then compares the
nature of the punishment to the relationship between the soul and God in
Paradise:

112 pecc. mer. 2, 35. See also s. Dolbeau 2, 7 tamen quia inter omnia bona quae posita

erant in paradiso melior erat oboedientia, prohibuit deus alicunde, ne nihil prohibendo non
dominaretur. et quid? forte aliquis putat quia deus pro suo fastu uoluit dominari. dominatio
dei non deo, sed cui dominatur, est utilis. ille nec nobis contemnentibus minor est, nec nobis
seruientibus maior est. sub tali domino esse nobis expedit, non illi. qui dominari nobis uult, ad
utilitatem nostram uult, non ad suam. ille nullo bono nostro eget, nos omnium bonorum eius
indigemus, et ipso deo nostro summo bono. summum enim bonum nostrum et optimum, quo
nihil melius sit, ipse deus est.
113 pecc. mer. 2, 35.
114 pecc. mer. 2, 36 faciebat quippe hoc ordo iustitiae, ut, quia eorum anima famulum corpus

a domino acceperat, sicut ipsa eidem domino suo ita illi corpus eius oboediret atque exhiberet
uitae illi congruum sine ulla resistentia famulatum. This is why punitive concupiscentia can
be perceived as inordinatus. Cf. van Oort’s (1987, 146–149, and recently 2010, 544) influential
suggestion of the Manichaean provenance of concupiscence as “random movement.” The
“servitude” of the body is already noted in Simpl. 1, 2, 20 (omnisque natura hominis dominatu
animae et famulatu corporis conditione mirabili temperata) but it is not connected to the idea
of punitive concupiscentia, even though concupiscentia is mentioned in the same context.
96 chapter three

Such disobedience of the flesh as this, which lies in the very excitement
(motu), even when it is not allowed to take effect, did not exist in the first
man and woman whilst they were naked and not ashamed. For not yet had
the rational soul, which rules the flesh, developed such a disobedience to its
Lord, as by a reciprocity of punishment to bring on itself the rebellion of its
own servant the flesh, along with that feeling of confusion and trouble to itself
which it certainly failed to inflict upon God by its own disobedience to Him
[…] As soon, indeed, as that transgression was effected, and the disobedient
soul turned away from the law of its Lord, then its servant, the body, began
to cherish a law of disobedience against it; and then the man and the woman
grew ashamed of their nakedness, when they perceived the rebellious motion
of the flesh, which they had not felt before.115 [transl. Holmes]
Adam and Eve received a “corresponding punishment” (poena reciproca, the
attribute is here used for the first time in connection with concupiscentia)
for their disobedience against God: their flesh began to have disobedient
movements against their will and soul. As far as the soul honoured God as
its Lord (dominus), it had the body under its domination (anima rationalis
domina carnis). When this obedience was ended, so also was the servitude
of the flesh lost (caro famula sua). Again, when the soul turned away from
“the law of the Lord” (a lege sui domini), it was opposed by its former slave,
and by the “law of disobedience” (lex inoboedientiae). That Augustine is here
particularly sensitive to apt analogies is reflected by a notable exception:
whereas the body now affects the soul with a “feeling of confusion and
discomfort,” no such thing is obviously caused to God. “It is not shameful
nor uncomfortable to God, if we do not obey Him, for we cannot diminish
his great power over us.”116
Augustine connects this reciprocal divine punishment with Paul’s turns
of phrases in Romans 7. Thus, the “law of disobedience” equals the “law of
sin” (lex peccati), or “the sin living in our members” (peccatum habitans in
membris nostris, Augustine here corrects Paul’s careless words by noting
that this means, of course, only “the punishment of sin”).117 Augustine had

115 pecc. mer. 2, 36 haec igitur carnis inoboedientia, quae in ipso motu est, etiamsi habere

non permittatur effectum, non erat in illis tunc primis hominibus, quando nudi erant et non
confundebantur. nondum quippe anima rationalis domina carnis inoboediens extiterat domino
suo, ut poena reciproca inoboedientem experiretur carnem famulam suam cum sensu quodam
confusionis et molestiae suae, quem sensum certe ipsa per inoboedientiam suam non intulit
deo […] denique posteaquam est illa facta transgressio et anima inoboediens a lege sui domini
auersa est, habere coepit contra eam seruus eius, hoc est corpus eius, legem inoboedientiae et
puduit illos homines nuditatis suae animaduerso in se motu, quem ante non senserant.
116 pecc. mer. 2, 36.
117 For Augustine’s Pauline exegesis on Rom 7, see Chapter 6.
paradise and punishment 97

used the phrase corpus mortis huius in Gn. litt. to designate the punishment
of death, but now the phrase also appears here: mortal bodies, or “these
bodies of death” are born by and with lex peccati, and there is no other
way to escape these powers than “God’s grace in Jesus Christ, our Lord”
(Rom 7, 25).118 The account of Adam and Eve is finished with remarks on the
universal influence of the first sin (in omnibus uidemus) and on the cure for
this punishment, or lex concupiscentiae, which is to turn back to the original
obedience to God, and to accept the grace of Jesus Christ. This results,
in turn, in disobedience to the “wishes of said concupiscence” (desideriis
eiusdem concupiscentiae non oboedire).
The account of pecc. mer. 2, 35–37 has thus taken another step forward
in linking concupiscence to strongly theological origins: the involuntary, or
reflexive movements and the excitement of procreative organs reflect the
sinister past of fallen humanity. In concupiscentia carnis, Augustine sees a
nicely fitting analogy in reverse of the human obedience to God, and of the
original coherence of the soul and body. In Augustine’s universe, justice is
equal to order, order requires obedience, and the end result is aesthetic
harmony. But even in disharmony, in broken order and in disobedience,
God and His justice direct all things: the present disordered state in itself
creates a harmonious analogy, corresponding in minute details to the lost
state of integrity. For God only is able, as Augustine never tires to point out,
to bring good out of evil, and harmony even from disorder.119
Augustine depicted poena in Gn. litt. 1–9 primarily in terms of mortal-
ity. To Augustine, humanity in its present state is affected with a lethal
illness due to our ancestors in Paradise. Indeed, the moment Adam and
Eve chose to violate God’s commandment, their bodies were changed into
mortal ones. Simultaneously, however, Augustine had noted, their sexual
constitution also suffered from a change for the worse. Does the view pre-
sented in pecc. mer. on the correspondence of disobedient concupiscence to
the disobedience of human ancestors affect how Augustine works through
the remaining books of de Genesi ad litteram 10–12?
Concupiscentia appears in Gn. litt. 10, 12, 20–14, 25, where Augustine first
discerns between the purely spiritual desires and carnal desires, and then
moves on to ponder in which way the damaging inheritance of Adam is

118 pecc. mer. 2, 37.

119 It is perhaps a sign of Augustine’s disposition that seldom if ever are the comical sides
of such a punishment noted. That Augustine had a satirical eye for penile institutions, see,
however, ciu. 6, 9.
98 chapter three

passed from generation to generation.120 Augustine briefly notes that when

the soul has lusts “according to flesh” (secundum carnem concupiscit), it
shows symptoms of the punishment that was imposed in Paradise (ueniens
de uindicta illius peccati).121 Again, Augustine remarks that while living in
“this body of death,” nobody is able to be without such corrupted desires.122
However, a correspondence between the bodily disobedience of concu-
piscentia with the disobedience of Adam and Eve, similar to that of pecc.
mer., can be found in the following book, Gn. litt. 11. In the first pages of the
book, Augustine rehearses the events of Paradise, noting that something has
already been said about the subject (quemadmodum propagaturi […] iam
antea disputatum est). At this point, Augustine adds to the question of post-
lapsarian sexual behaviour what he has learned in composing pecc. mer:
Why would they be ashamed, since they did not perceive in their members
any law at war with the law of their mind? That law was rather the penalty for
sin, inflicted on them after their transgression, when disobedience violated
the command and justice punished the deed. But before this happened they
were naked, as has been said, and they were not embarrassed. They expe-
rienced no motion of the flesh of which they would be ashamed. They did
not think that anything had to be covered, because they did not feel that
anything had to be restrained. How they would have begotten children has
already been discussed. It must not be thought that the manner of begetting
would have been the same as after the punishment which followed their sin;
for before they would die, death entering the body of disobedient men by a
just retribution would stir up the revolt of their disobedient members.123
[transl. Taylor]

120 Naturally, concupiscentia already appears in the earlier books of Gn. litt. in the remarks

relating to sexual propagation. There were no corrupted sexual desires (corruptionis concu-
piscentia) in Paradise before the Fall: children would have been born solely by “true parental
affection,” Gn. litt. 3, 21, 33 solo pietatis adfectu nulla corruptionis concupiscentia filii nasceren-
tur, nec mortuis parentibus successuri nec ipsi morituri, donec terra inmortalibus hominibus
inpleretur, ac sic instituto iusto et sancto populo, qualem post resurrectionem futurum cred-
imus, nascendi etiam modus fieret.
121 Gn. litt. 10, 12, 21 quanto congruentius dicitur caro concupiscere, quando anima non solum

carni animalem uitam praebet, uerum etiam secundum ipsam carnem aliquid concupiscit,
quod in potestate non est, ne concupiscat, quamdiu inest peccatum in membris, id est uiolenta
quaedam carnis inlecebra in corpore mortis huius, ueniens de uindicta illius peccati, unde
propaginem ducimus, secundum quam omnes ante gratiam filii sunt irae.
122 For this emphasis, see Chapter 6.
123 Gn. litt. 11, 1, 3 quid enim puderet, quando nullam legem senserant in membris suis repug-

nantem legi mentis suae? quae illos poena peccati post perpetrationem praeuaricationis secuta
est usurpante inoboedientia prohibitum et iustitia puniente commissum. quod antequam fieret,
nudi erant, ut dictum est, et non confundebantur; nullus erat motus in corpore, cui uerecundia
deberetur; nihil putabant uelandum, quia nihil senserant refrenandum. quemadmodum propa-
paradise and punishment 99

For their disobedience, the first couple was “justly punished.” Another
“law” (as in Gn. litt. 9 and pecc. mer. 2) began to rebel in their bodily mem-
bers as a punishment for their sin. Whereas death would be the ultimate
punishment, it would be anticipated by yet another one: a confusion of
the members would be a reminder of mors, reciprocating “most justly” to
their original disobedience. Whereas death was the primary punishment for
Adam and Eve in Gn. litt. 9, it is now giving space to inoboedientia carnis,
or concupiscence. In an almost ironic way, the sources and beginnings for
human bodily existence bear the stain of mortality.124
Following this lead, Gn. litt. 11 is scattered with remarks on concupiscen-
tia as a consequent punishment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience. In Gn.
litt. 11, 11, 15, where Augustine praises God for His remarkably just ways of
retribution and forgiveness, the correspondence of punishment to the sin
is emphasised to the degree of becoming interchangeable: the first cou-
ple was tempted with a “desire of pride and lust for their own power”
(superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis), which then led to iustum sub-
plicium.125
Again, when the soul followed the serpent’s temptation, the soul felt
a “proud presumption” concerning its status in relation to God, and love

gaturi filios, iam antea disputatum est; non tamen eo modo credendum est, quo propagauerunt,
posteaquam crimen admissi praedicta ultio consecuta est, cum, priusquam morerentur, iam in
corpore inoboedientium hominum iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientium membrorum tumul-
tum mors concepta uersaret.
124 For death intertwining with sexual desire, see also Gn. litt. 11, 31, 40 ergo ederunt. et aperti

sunt oculi amborum [Gn 3,7]. quo nisi ad inuicem concupiscendum, ad peccati poenam carnis
ipsius morte conceptam, ut iam esset corpus non animale tantum, quod poterat, si oboedientiam
conseruarent, in meliorem spiritalemque habitum sine morte mutari, sed iam corpus mortis, in
quo lex in membris repugnaret legi mentis?
125 Even this chain of events is turned into something good by God, says Augustine, for

it works as a warning for pride and disobedience for the future generations. Gn. litt. 11, 11,
15 magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius! praeuidet bonos futuros et creat,
praeuidet malos futuros et creat, se ipsum ad fruendum praebens bonis, multa munerum suo-
rum largiens et malis, misericorditer ignoscens, iuste ulciscens, itemque misericorditer ulcis-
cens, iuste ignoscens, nihil metuens de cuiusquam malitia, nihil indigens de cuiusquam iustitia,
nihil sibi consulens nec de operibus bonorum et bonis consulens etiam de poenis malorum. cur
ergo non permitteret temtari hominem illa temtatione prodendum, conuincendum, puniendum,
cum superba concupiscentia propriae potestatis quod conceperat pareret suoque fetu confun-
deretur iustoque subplicio a superbiae atque inoboedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea
conscribenda et adnuntianda parabantur? Propria potestas should be taken literally, entail-
ing a notion of the unsocial character of sin as a peruersus sui amor. Falling into the serpent’s
temptation did not join Adam and Eve together, but separated them from each other. This
aspect is illuminated by a wordplay on priuatum and priuatio: the more you want to possess
only yourself, the less you actually have. See Markus 1990; Ruokanen 1993, 79.
100 chapter three

(amor) for its “own power.”126 This proud desire was instantly (mox) reflected
in the sensual and bodily state of Adam and Eve. In sum, their high-aiming
attempt to achieve an ontological status independent from God had ridicu-
lously failed: instead of potestas, they received a punishment carved in flesh,
a sign of which they immediately felt in their lowest levels of being.127 This
bodily punishment also became a source of shame (pudor), not only because
it consisted of a movement (motus) not felt before, but also because it orig-
inated from the transgression against God and His commandment.128 The
involuntary erection of Adam might thus be compared to a brand of a slave,
testifying for a failed attempt to escape from his rightful Master.129

126 Gn. litt. 11, 13, 17 malam uero uoluntatem inordinate moueri bona inferiora superioribus
praeponendo, atque ita factum esse, ut rationalis creaturae spiritus sua potestate propter
excellentiam delectatus tumesceret superbia; Gn. litt. 11, 30, 39 quando his uerbis crederet
mulier a bona atque utili re diuinitus se fuisse prohibitos, nisi iam inesset menti amor ille
propriae potestatis et quaedam de se superba praesumtio, quae per illam temtationem fuerat
conuincenda et humilianda? This theme is also used in trin. 12, 16, where Augustine is not,
however, wishing to add anything to his historical considerations of Gn. litt., but approaches
the subject from a distinctly psychological point of view. Thus, the concrete prohibition of
Paradise, for instance, is not mentioned. On the contrary, the leges that Augustine seems to
refer to are those by which “all universe is administered.” The Fall begins with a wish to be
like God (peruersus appetitus), ending in a punitive existence that is much similar to that of
irrational beasts (trin. 12, 16). Because man wished to “experiment on his own power” and to
be like God, having no other authority than himself (sub nullo), he was cast into a punishment
of a life comparable to that of beasts. The Fall appears as radical self-centredness, a “nod
towards the middle.” Once the soul stops to reach out to God, it begins to lean and focus
on itself. The image of God is then immediately distorted as the human person turns away
from looking God’s face, and the original love of God’s wisdom (neglecta caritate sapientia)
is changed into a desire of earthly knowledge (concupiscitur scientia). This rearrangement
of the soul’s focus results in a disastrous “heaviness” in the soul, and the soul learns to its
own detriment the true effect of its experiment in the will to power. Nevertheless, Augustine
links these psychological considerations to the same verse of Rom 7, 24–25 as the ones in Gn.
litt. and pecc. mer. Note also that the few remarks on the punishment for sin in trin. involve
death; trin. 4, 5; 4, 15; 7, 5. Not until trin. 13, 23 does concupiscentia appear in connection
with Paradise, in a discussion on the birth of Christ: 1) no concupiscentia carnalis was present
in Paradise, at least in the present form, 2) concupiscentia appears now as the “involuntary
movements” of the genitals 3) in allusion to Rom 7, concupiscentia goes against the law of
mind (lex mentis). No further analogies to the disobedience of Adam and Eve are made in
trin.
127 Gn. litt. 11, 31, 41 mox ergo ut praeceptum transgressi sunt intrinsecus gratia deserente

omnino nudati, quam typho quodam et superbo amore suae potestatis offenderant, in sua
membra oculos iniecerunt eaque motu eo, quem non nouerant, concupiuerunt. It would be
tempting to suggest that Augustine expresses here an elaborate kind of Schadenfreude.
128 Gn. litt. 11, 32, 42 bestialem motum in membris suae carnis erubuit eique incussit pudorem

non solum, quia hoc ibi sentiebat, ubi numquam antea tale aliquid senserat, uerum etiam quod
ille pudendus motus de praecepti transgressione ueniebat.
129 The metaphor is not altogether un-Augustinian, see exp. Gal. 64 on Gal 6, 17: stigmata
paradise and punishment 101

Due to their primary disobedience, Adam and Eve were punished by a

secondary, bodily disobedience; because they were tempted to desire what
was not theirs to desire, they were inflicted with a base, sensual movement
of fleshly concupiscence. The original (‘theological’) fall of pride is reflected
in human (‘psychological’) distress.
Concupiscentia as an ancient punitive heritage from the Fall of Paradise
became a tool in Augustine’s set of arguments in the gradually heightening
Pelagian crisis towards the end of the 410s. The idea of a ‘theologically’
preconditioned sin being reflected in the human ‘psychological’ condition
became a fortunate invention for Augustine during the 410s and was used
to oppose the Pelagian claim of the intrinsic innocence of infants. In many
works of the Pelagian period, some features of this idea are focused on
at the expense of others; thus, for example, when Augustine is forcefully
underlining the disorderly features of sexuality, it may be easy to forget his
underlying theological inventions about the history of this punishment.130
The development of concupiscentia as a poena peccati finds its culmi-
nation in de ciuitate dei where Augustine discusses the circumstances of
Paradise, the Fall and its consequences, with extensive argumentation and
for good.131 We will therefore conclude this section by examining Book 14
of Augustine’s opus magnum.132 His observations on concupiscentia carnis
revolve around the disobedience of the body, the parallel and reciprocal
nature of punitive concupiscentia and the harmoniously just form of this
punishment.

enim dicuntur notae quaedam poenarum seruilium, ut si quis, uerbi gratia, seruus in comped-
ibus fuerit propter noxam, id est propter culpam, uel huiusmodi aliquid passus fuerit, stigmata
habere dicatur. For the practice, see Jones 1987.
130 Solignac (1956, 375) rightly notes that the view of concupiscentia being a punishment

was resulted from Augustine’s literal exegesis on Genesis.

131 In 420, Augustine discusses the topic again in c. adu. leg. 1, 18–26, only about two years

after writing ciu. 14, but nothing substantially new is said there. Obedience has, again, a
strong emphasis. By its nature, human will is necessarily situated under domination (necesse
sit uiuere sub potestate melioris). Both the prohibition and the punishment were designed
for useful purposes, instituit [deus] quod prodesset, quia homo non sine bona mercede oboe-
dientiam custodisset et non sine utili exemplo, ut eam sancti eius posteri custodirent, poenas
inoboedientiae persoluisset (c. adu. leg. 1, 21). For the date of the work, see Raveaux 1987, 7; for
theories of provenance, see Coyle 2009, 297–306.
132 In about 418, Augustine sent ep. 184A as a reply to inquiries about sin, sex and babies.

In the letter, Augustine advises his recipients to read his books (perhaps with a hint to stop
sending him any more letters); and tells that ciu. 14 was about to be finished at this time. Little
later, ca. 420, in c. adu. leg. 1, 18, Augustine seems to think of ciu. 14 as the best expression of
his thoughts in the matter.
102 chapter three

3.2.1. Disobedience
Many of Augustine’s previous ideas on punitive concupiscence are repeated
on the pages of ciu., even in detail.133 Thus, the central role of obedience in
Paradise is emphasised thoroughly. In fact, the division between obedience
and disobedience is stressed in ciu. 14 to the extent that it characterizes the
two opposite cities of ciuitas dei and ciuitas terrena.134 In Paradise, obedience
was the only virtue that rational human creatures, subordinated under
God’s dominion, were able to show to Him. Indeed, obedience was, and still
is, the mother of all virtues.135 By giving the commandment, God told Adam
and Eve that He is the Lord.136
The parallelism between the two kinds of disobedience is strongly em-
phasised. Primal disobedience manifested itself in man’s desire to be free
on his own (libertas quam concupiuit), that is, in his pride. The secondary
disobedience appears in the self-contradictory body-soul composition of
the present state of humanity. Here Augustine makes use of a phrase already
familiar from previous works: inoboedientia retributa (or reddita). On a
larger scale, it could even be said that the human weakness of the will is
due to Adam and Eve’s unwillingness to subdue under divine domination.137

133 Here, as elsewhere, the tree and fruit of good and evil knowledge were good by nature,

although prohibited (ciu. 13, 20); it also was a sign for “the experience that comes with
transgression of a commandment” (ciu. 13, 21).
134 O’Daly 1999, 159: “The themes of obedience and self-assertion point to the polarization

of the two cities, with their defining kinds of love (14.28). The polarity is expressed in political
terms, in anticipation of the political themes of later books. The city of God is a community
where consensus and recognition of authority prevail.” See ciu. 14, 13 pia humilitas facit
subditum superiori; nihil est autem superius Deo; et ideo exaltat humilitas, quae facit subditum
Deo […] quapropter quod nunc in ciuitate Dei et ciuitati Dei in hoc peregrinanti saeculo maxime
commendatur humilitas et in eius rege, qui est Christus, maxime praedicatur contrariumque
huic uirtuti elationis uitium in eius aduersario, qui est diabolus, maxime dominari sacris litteris
edocetur: profecto ista est magna differentia, qua ciuitas, unde loquimur, utraque discernitur.
135 ciu. 14, 12; see also c. adu. leg. 1, 19. Cf. Colish 1990, 227: “[Augustine’s] nomination of

obedience as the mother of the virtues in the City of God (14.12), rather than Stoic prudence,
Aristotelian justice, or Ambrosian temperance, reflects the deep misgivings of the later
Augustine about man’s ability to function as a moral agent sui iuris.” The idea of obedience
as the matrix of all virtues is, of course, earlier than ciu. 14, appearing already in b. coniug. 32
and s. Dolbeau 2, 12, and thus perhaps not something that Augustine would subscribe to only
in his “later” years.
136 ciu. 14, 15 [praecepto] quo […] se esse Dominum commonebat.
137 ciu. 14, 15 denique, ut breuiter dicatur, in illius peccati poena quid inoboedientiae nisi

inobodientia retributa est? nam quae hominis est alia miseria nisi aduersus eum ipsum inoboe-
dientia eius ipsius, ut, quoniam noluit quod potuit, quod non potest uelit? For reddita see c. ep.
Pel. 1, 15, 31; c. adu. leg. 1, 18; nupt. et conc. 2, 22. For akrasia, see Saarinen 1994, 20–43; especially
pp. 30, 42–43; 1997.
paradise and punishment 103

The punishment thus received was reciprocal and is reflected now in our
bodies:
They became aware, therefore, of a new stirring of their flesh, which had
become disobedient to them as a punishment, in requital of their own dis-
obedience to God. For the soul, now taking delight in its own freedom to do
wickedness, and disdaining to serve God, was itself deprived of the erstwhile
subjection of the body to it. Because it had of its own free will forsaken its
superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant in obedience to its
will. Nor could it in any way keep the flesh in subjection, as it would always
have been able to do if it had itself remained subject to God. Then began the
flesh to lust against the Spirit.138 [transl. Dyson]
The close connection of the two kinds of disobediences is implicitly present
in an interesting way in ciu. 13, 15, where God calls for Adam, who is hiding
behind the trees. According to Augustine, this is an admonition to reflect
one’s disobedient identity in order to draw particular theological conclu-
sions.
For in the disobedient stirring which arose in the flesh of the disobedient soul,
by reason of which Adam and Eve covered their shameful parts, one death
was indeed experienced: namely, that which occurs when God forsakes the
soul. This was signified by the words which God spoke when man […] had
hidden himself […] For God certainly did not ask this in ignorance of Adam’s
whereabouts, but to admonish him to reflect upon where he was, now that
God was no longer with him.139 [transl. Dyson]
The disobedient act of the first human beings had caused God to interrupt
His presence in his human creation. In turn, God acts per iustitiam and aban-
dons the souls of Adam and Eve. This abandonment Augustine now calls a
kind of death (mors). Adam’s bodily disorder reflects his crumbling onto-
logical status and his broken relationship with God (ubi esset, in quo deus

138 ciu. 13, 13 senserunt ergo nouum motum inoboedientis carnis suae, tamquam reciprocam

poenam inoboedientiae suae. iam quippe anima libertate in peruersum propria delectata et
deo dedignata seruire pristino corporis seruitio destituebatur, et quia superiorem dominum
suo arbitrio deseruerat, inferiorem famulum ad suum arbitrium non tenebat, nec omni modo
habebat subditam carnem, sicut semper habere potuisset, si deo subdita ipsa mansisset. tunc
ergo coepit caro concupiscere aduersus spiritum.
139 ciu. 13, 15 tamquam diceret: qua die me deserueritis per inoboedientiam, deseram uos per

iustitiam: profecto in ea morte etiam ceterae denuntiatae sunt, quae procul dubio fuerant secu-
turae. nam in eo, quod inoboediens motus in carne animae inoboedientis exortus est, propter
quem pudenda texerunt, sensa est mors una, in qua deseruit animam deus. ea significata est
uerbis eius, quando timore dementi sese abscondenti homini dixit: Adam, ubi es? non utique
ignorando quaerens, sed increpando admonens, ut adtenderet ubi esset, in quo deus non esset.
104 chapter three

non esset). In the following book (ciu. 14), the state of punitive disobedience
is explicitly connected to the corruption of the flesh (ciu. 14, 3), and docu-
mented by human emotions.140 The secondary disobedience is clearly visible
in the soul’s unwillingness to yield to its own volitions and, even worse, in
the body’s reluctance to obey the soul’s commandments.141 In this disobe-
dience, the disorder shown by the procreative members holds the pride of
place. So the “punitive disobedience” of libido is resulted from a “culpable
disobedience” in Paradise.142
The range of divine punishments for Adam and Eve’s sin in de ciuitate
dei varies, including very generally death and corruption.143 The distinct
emphasis of the Genesis-narratives in ciu. 14 is, however, on the very spe-
cial sign of disobedience, which can be discerned in human procreation.
Admitting that all kinds of emotions entail something of the involuntary
disobedience to the mind’s control, Augustine takes sexual desire to repre-
sent divine punishment in its most acute form, and this is fitting (maxime
oportuit), for in the genitals libido takes entirely over all kind of mental con-
trol, and “in that part of the body the generation of the very nature is brought
about.”144

3.2.2. Justice
Augustine’s insistence, as always, is also in ciu. 14 on the deeply just char-
acter of God’s punishment. While Augustine acknowledges in ciu. 14, 12
the strange and unique nature of Adam and Eve’s transgression in that it
“mutated the very being of humanity” (natura […] praeuaricatione mutata
est), he points out the unique and aggravating circumstances in the first sin
of disobedience that earned the punishments endured presently by human-
ity.

140 Emotions are treated in length in ciu. 14, 6–10. See Chapter 5 for discussion and litera-
ture.
141 ciu. 14, 15 quis enim enumerat, quam multa quae non potest uelit, dum sibi ipse, id est

uoluntati eius ipse animus eius eoque inferior caro eius, non obtemperat? See also ciu. 14, 23.
142 ciu. 14, 23 hanc repugnantiam, hanc uoluntatis et libidinis rixam uel certe ad uoluntatis

sufficientiam libidinis indigentiam procul dubio, nisi culpabilis inoboedientia poenali inoboedi-
entia plecteretur, in paradiso nuptiae non haberent.
143 This is all neatly summarized in ciu. 14, 1 id inoboedientia meruissent, a quibus admissum

est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros
obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa. For punishments, see Macqueen 1973,
260–265.
144 ciu. 14, 20.
paradise and punishment 105

Augustine points out several factors that formed these aggravating cir-
cumstances and justify the severe punishment that followed the primal dis-
obedience. First, there were outward factors, involving the commandment
as such and the living conditions in Eden. This means that God’s command-
ment was quite easy to observe, for it was simple and small, and there was
only one of them. Hence, it was also rather easy to remember. In addition,
Augustine notes that there was such an abundance of food in Eden that
there was no real need to touch the fruit of the knowledge of good and
evil.145
[God] had not burdened him with a large number of oppressive and difficult
precepts, but had given him one very brief and easy commandment to keep
him in wholesome obedience.146 [transl. Dyson]
Second, Augustine lists interior factors that underscore the need for an
exceptional punishment. One of these factors is the original state of will:
with no evil desire (cupiditas) opposing the intact will of Adam and Eve, the
commandment was extremely simple to follow. Another factor, as Augus-
tine notes, is that human nature was created in such a way that it was “to
[Adam’s] advantage to be subject to God, and harmful to him to act accord-
ing to his own will rather than that of his Creator.”147
While Adam’s task was so easy, the crime was therefore all the more ter-
rible.148 Adam and Eve fell out of their own free will.149 There is no excuse for
their sin, and there is hence no question about the just nature of the divinely
ordered psychological disobedience, or concupiscentia carnis. Augustine is
very careful to defend God’s judgment in this matter, and forcefully denies
it to be “excessive or unjust” (uel nimia uel iniusta), for Adam and Eve had
such an easy time in not sinning.150 Augustine is led to defend God’s single

145 ciu. 14, 12.

146 ciu. 14, 15 qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat, sed uno
breuissimo atque leuissimo ad oboedientiae salubritatem adminiculauerat. The prohibition is
an adminiculum; a support, not a hindrance.
147 ciu. 14, 12 oboedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae uirtus in creatura rationali

mater quodam modo est omnium custosque uirtutum; quando quidem ita facta est, ut ei sub-
ditam esse sit utile; perniciosum autem suam, non eius a quo creata est facere uoluntatem.
Augustine had mentioned the “usefulness” (utile) of being submitted to a commandment
in Gn. litt. 8, 13, 30; and in Gn. adu. Man. 2, 15, 22.
148 ciu. 14, 12 tanto maiore iniustitia uiolatum est, quanto faciliore posset obseruantia custo-

diri.
149 ciu. 12, 22 libera uoluntate. Cf. 13, 13.
150 ciu. 14, 15 quisquis huius modi damnationem uel nimiam uel iniustam putat, metiri

profecto nescit, quanta fuerit iniquitas in peccando, ubi tanta erat non peccandi facilitas.
106 chapter three

and easy command by contrasting it to the more difficult test of obedience

of Abraham, and to that of Christ, who obeyed Father “until death.”
There are, again, three discernible factors, which make Adam’s crime
“detestable”: first, the commandment was simple and easy to obey, second,
God’s authority was highest imaginable (tanta potestas), and third, the
threat of punishment was known beforehand.151 With such justifications,
Augustine has created a defence for divine punishment. This is not to
say that no difficulties remain, as Augustine himself admits. For it is not
perfectly clear how the reciprocal punishment of Adam’s disobedience is
converted into our empirical disobedience: one has, however, to concede
that this happens “through the justice of Lord God, Whom we refused
to serve as his subjects.” While a case can be made for God’s justice and
His punishments, it does not in the end matter (quid interest unde) how
well the arguments are formed or understood, for God’s justice cannot
be questioned. The problem of how an ethical choice was turned into a
hereditary quality resurfaces, as we shall soon see, with a vengeance during
the debate with Julian of Aeclanum.152
In justifying divine punishment, Augustine is therefore keen to point out
factors that make concupiscentia seem as a perfectly deserved and reason-
able consequence for the evil choice that Adam and Eve made in Paradise.
Concupiscentia, as a divine punishment, has an intellectual form and use in
the fallen humanity. With other punitive sufferings, concupiscentia teaches
the fallen humankind of its glorious past and inglorious fall, and makes
understandable the miseries of the present life. In addition, it turns the
Christian intellect to gaze at the life that lies in the future. Augustine thereby
invites his readers to acknowledge the intellectual contents of concupiscen-
tia: as a divine punishment, it has a reflective value, which may be given
certain intellectual significance, so that it can be seen to refer both to the
history of humankind, and to its future hope alike:
Thus, “An heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam, from the day that they return
to the mother of all things.” Yet even this evil is found to be marvellous; for it
teaches us to live soberly and to understand (intellegamus) that, by reason of

151 ciu. 14, 15.

152 ciu. 14, 15 quid interest unde, dum tamen per iustitiam dominantis dei, cui subditi seruire
noluimus, caro nostra nobis, quae subdita fuerat, non seruiendo molesta sit. Note that con-
cupiscentia is not the only form of divine punishment that is entirely just but not entirely
understandable. God’s judgments (iudicia) cannot be followed in this life, ciu. 20, 1–2. Be
that as it may, God’s justice cannot be questionable: iustitiam uindicantis iuste nemo repre-
henderet, ciu. 21, 17.
paradise and punishment 107

that first and most grievous sin which was committed in Paradise, this life has
been made penal to us, and that all the promises of the new covenant refer
only to our new inheritance in the world to come.153 [transl. Dyson]

3.2.3. Rhetorical Aesthetics of Punitive Concupiscence

In ciu. 14, Augustine paints the aesthetic correspondence between the origi-
nal state of beatitude and the present state of punishments in strong and
impressive colours. An extensive sequence in ciu. 14, 15 is assigned to a
rhetorically impressive picture on the subject of disobedience and pun-
ishments, preceding Augustine’s treatise of concupiscentia as inoboedientia
carnis.
A heuristic arrangement of these lines reveals how Augustine here works
with the ideas of analogy and parallel and is fascinated by the invention of
the correspondence of punishments:
(1) quia ergo contemptus est deus iubens,
qui creauerat,
qui ad suam imaginem fecerat,
qui ceteris animalibus praeposuerat,
qui in paradiso constituerat,
qui rerum omnium copiam salutisque praestiterat,
qui praeceptis nec pluribus nec grandibus nec difficilibus onerauerat […]:
(2) iusta damnatio subsecuta est […]
(3) ut homo, qui custodiendo mandatum
futurus fuerat etiam carne spiritalis,
fieret etiam mente carnalis
(4) qui
sua superbia sibi placuerat,
dei iustitia sibi donaretur;
(5) nec sic,
ut in sua esset omnimodis potestate,
sed a se ipse quoque dissentiens
sub illo, cui peccando consensit,
(6) pro libertate, quam concupiuit,
duram miseramque ageret seruitutem,

153 ciu. 21, 15 uerum tamen in graui iugo, quod positum est super filios Adam a die exitus de

uentre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, etiam hoc malum mirabile
reperitur, ut sobrii simus atque intellegamus hanc uitam de peccato illo nimis nefario, quod in
paradiso perpetratum est, factam nobis esse poenalem totumque, quod nobiscum agitur per
testamentum nouum, non pertinere nisi ad noui saeculi hereditatem nouam.
108 chapter three

(7) mortuus spiritu uolens

et corpore moriturus inuitus,
desertor aeternae uitae
etiam aeterna […] morte damnatus.154
Augustine first (1) compiles all the good things that God had given to Adam
and Eve; this is evidence of the immensity of the evil that Adam and Eve
committed by abandoning such goods. Such enumeratio also speaks for
the just and equal punishment, which God subsequently distributed (2) to
humanity. Along with divine punishment, the destiny that was intended
for Adam and Eve was turned upside down (3): the body that was meant
to be changed into a spiritual entity was now corrupted. It also infected
the mind with the corruption of the flesh. Human pride and divine justice
are then opposed (4) to each other; the desire for independence led to the
disintegration of mind and body (5). The desire for freedom ended in slavery
(of disturbed desires) (6). The mirror image of the spiritual death of Adam’s
own will is the future bodily death against his will (7).
These rhetorical parallels depict well Augustine’s view of distributive
justice as a force creating harmony and balance even from disorder and
damage. The result is that in the pages of ciu. 14, the idea of concupiscentia
carnis as a divine punishment is given an aesthetic silver lining: there lies,
in Augustine’s mind, a certain kind of beauty and harmony in the beastly
state of bodily corruption.155
The view of concupiscentia carnis as a psychological disorder correspond-
ing to the theological disobedience of Adam and Eve remained in Augus-
tine’s use as a commonplace argument during the later phases of the Pela-
gian debate.156 Thus, in de gratia Christi et de peccato originali, a work written
in 418 in order to refute Pelagius’ and Caelestius’ theological core convic-
tions, Augustine takes up the problem of concupiscentia, or libido, while
discussing the goods and evils of marriage. To Augustine, Christian married
life and propagation entails both natura and naturae uitium. The former

154 ciu. 14, 15.

155 The beauty of justice is different in Heaven, see. ciu. 19, 27 hic itaque in unoquoque
iustitia est, ut oboedienti deus homini, animus corpori, ratio autem uitiis etiam repugnantibus
imperet, uel subigendo uel resistendo […]. in illa uero pace finali, quo referenda et cuius adip-
iscendae causa habenda est ista iustitia, quoniam sanata inmortalitate atque incorruptione
natura uitia non habebit nec unicuique nostrum uel ab alio uel a se ipso quippiam repugnabit,
non opus erit ut ratio uitiis, quae nulla erunt, imperet; sed imperabit deus homini, animus cor-
pori, tantaque ibi erit oboediendi suauitas et facilitas, quanta uiuendi regnandique felicitas.
156 In a concise form, see e.g. cont. 21.
paradise and punishment 109

indicates God as the Creator, but the latter points (indicat) to God as a
“punisher of disobedience.”157 The same applies to sexual shame, which
in the present life is connected to the first disobedient act and its divine
punishment in Paradise; shame therefore carries a theological message,
reminding humanity of God and His justice.158

3.3. Defending Divine Punishment and Divine Justice

So far, we have seen how Augustine as a rule emphasises divine justice (iusti-
tia) in punishing the fallen humanity with a set of varying punishments, and,
concerning especially our case, with concupiscentia carnis. The justice of the
retributive side of concupiscentia is underlined by depictions that focus on
the harmoniously reciprocal correspondence between Adam and Eve’s pri-
mal disobedience and the involuntary movements of the body and soul in
sexual desire. Augustine has also pointed out God’s own nature as the ulti-
mate guarantee for the just character of concupiscentia as a punishment.
During the last decade of his life, Augustine was confronted by the acute and
detailed criticism of Julian of Aeclanum. While all of Julian’s philosophical
and theological criticism against Augustine’s hamartiological and anthro-
pological convictions lies beyond the scope of this study, we will, however,
focus on those parts of Julian’s and Augustine’s debate that concern concu-
piscentia as a poena, and how the justice of such a punishment can be argued
(or denied) and understood.159

157 Nature and corruption, in this case, thus work as signs pointing to God. gr. et pecc. or. 2,

38 simul autem utrumque propagatur, et natura et naturae uitium, quorum est unum bonum,
alterum malum. illud de conditoris largitate sumitur, hoc de origine damnationis attrahitur;
illi est causa bona uoluntas dei summi, huic mala uoluntas hominis primi; illud indicat deum
creaturae institutorem, hoc indicat deum inoboedientiae punitorem.
158 gr. et pecc. or. 2, 39 quicquid est pudendum in membrorum illa inoboedientia, de qua

erubuerunt qui post peccatum foliis ficulneis eadem membra texerunt […] inputatur peccato
inoboedientiae, cuius haec poena est consecuta, ut homo inoboediens deo sua quoque sibi
inoboedientia membra sentiret, de quibus erubescens, quod non ad arbitrium uoluntatis eius,
sed ad libidinis incentiuum uelut arbitrio proprio mouerentur, quae pudenda iudicauit, ope-
rienda curauit. non enim confundi debuit homo de opere dei aut ullo modo fuerant creato
erubescenda, quae instituenda uisa sunt creatori. itaque nec deo nec homini illa simplex nudi-
tas displicebat, quando nihil erat pudendum, quia nihil praecesserat puniendum. See also gr. et
pecc. or. 2,41 quia nisi praeisset facinus, quod inoboedientia est ausa committere, non sequere-
tur dedecus, quod uerecundia uellet abscondere.
159 For Julian in general, Lössl (2001) is now the standard work. For Julian’s views on central

theological topics such as creation, sin, and man, Christology and concupiscentia, see also
Lamberigts 1988, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2008a.
110 chapter three

The question of justice and God’s retribution has also been discussed,
from slightly various angles, from time to time during the last three de-
cades.160 Four examples are given here:
Alister McGrath (1983) has made the point that Augustine seems to have
followed a classical notion of justice in the works prior to Simpl. In Simpl.,
however, the concept of justice underwent a significant change in that its
source in divine nature was now claimed to be hidden from human reflec-
tion, and Augustine starts to make a clear difference between human and
divine justice.161 In McGrath’s description, Julian of Aeclanum followed a
Ciceronian model in defining justice (restituens suum unicuique), and theo-
logically based this claim on God’s equity towards all individuals according
to their merits.162 In opposition, Augustine justifies his basic views on orig-
inal sin and grace by the notion of justice that he had already presented
in Simpl.: this notion entails that God indeed acts justly but in a way that
does not lend itself to “some commonsense quid pro quo morality.” Instead,
according to McGrath, Augustine ties justice to “divine nature itself” and
the “divine promises of mercy.”163 In McGrath’s view, Augustine’s notion of
justice was likewise opposite to Julian’s in that it did not consider people
“purely as individuals, but as members of the fallen race.”164 In sum, McGrath
emphasises the way Augustine’s and Julian’s debate showed how “divine
justice and human justice may be related,” but not “identical.”165
John Rist (1994) offers an important discussion on the topic of the inscru-
table divine justice in the debate of Augustine and Julian. Rist proposes that,
for Augustine, justice was “primarily, if not exclusively, as the setting aright
of what has become disordered, the restoring of a proper balance.” Rist is
also convinced that Augustine “rejects arbitrariness.”166 But in general, Rist
thinks that Julian eventually held the upper hand in the question of justice

160 For the concept of justice in general, see Dihle 1978; and particularly in Augustine, see

Dodaro 2009.
161 Fredriksen (1995) iterates the same point of the role of Simpl. in conceiving of justice,

but in somewhat sharper terms. Thus, in Fredriksen’s (1995, 308) view, “Augustine, in short,
abandoned any thought of God as an exemplar of justice” (italics mine). Again, “post-396, this
God’s ways, to time-bound humans, were unknowable in principle, opaque” (p. 311).
162 McGrath 1983, 314. Cf., however, Lamberigts’s (2002, 191n88) criticism in this respect:

“this study devotes too little systematic attention to the biblical basis upon which Julian
founded his vision of justice.”
163 McGrath 1983, 316.
164 McGrath 1983, 317.
165 McGrath 1983, 318.
166 Rist 1994, 273.
paradise and punishment 111

(and divine punishment). Like Paula Fredriksen (1995), Rist sees Augustine’s
notion of justice as being hidden in God’s inscrutable nature leading to very
problematic positions, and acknowledges Julian for having pointed this out:
Julian’s underlying point is that the justice of Augustine’s God appears totally
unlike [italics mine] human ideas of justice. If that were the case, then on
purely Platonic grounds we could form no notion of justice at all […] Augus-
tine’s difficulty lies not in his insistence that God’s justice is vastly superior to
our own, or to anything we can imagine, but in that it seems (to Julian) to be
a different kind of thing altogether [italics mine], merely being given the same
name.167
Again, “there is no reason why justice should be uniquely incomprehensible,
and Julian’s attack is more serious than Augustine would allow.”168
Josef Lössl (2001, 2002) has also made similar observations on the differ-
ence between Augustine and Julian in this respect. Lössl, and Rist, seem to
admit the legitimacy of Julian’s critique in pointing out that if the notion
of justice is severed from all human analogies it becomes unsustainable.169
Lössl notes that even negative statements of God’s nature become impossi-
ble if the analogy between divine and human justice is completely denied:
Augustine’s case [was] that human and divine justice are incomparable be-
cause of the fundamental difference between divine and human nature.
Taking Julian’s query a step further one might ask how, if that is the case,
Augustine, as a creature, should be able to make a judgment about God’s
nature of the kind: “We cannot make a judgment about God’s nature?” At
the level of creation, as Julian already points out, divine justice can only be
measured by the standards of human justice.170
Robert Dodaro (2004) has studied Augustine’s theological notions of jus-
tice and their manifestation in his political thought and practice. Dodaro
acknowledges and evaluates carefully Augustine’s insights into the hidden-
ness of divine justice, and relates them to Augustine’s doctrine of grace and

167 Rist 1994, 276.

168 Rist 1994, 276.
169 So Lössl (2001, 132) paraphrasing Julian’s lines of thought in c. Iul. imp 4, 136: “Denken

und Sein Gottes und der Menschen entsprechen sich. Ein menschlichen Begriffen und
menschlicher Vernunft völlig entzogener [italics mine] göttlicher Gerechtigkeitsbegriff, wie
er von Augustinus vertreten wird, ist in sich widersprüchlich. Vielmehr ist Gott und das
Prinzip seines Handelns der menschlichen Vernunft zugänglich.”
170 Lössl 2002, 224n62, critisizing here McGrath’s defence of the Augustinian notion of

justice. McGrath, however, seems to me to advocate a more modest claim than Lössl thinks
he is: all depends on the qualifications applied to the difference on human and divine justice.
Are they “incomparable,” and “totally unlike,” or “related,” although not “identical”?
112 chapter three

incarnation. In a chapter entitled “Wisdom’s hidden reasons,” Dodaro charts

Augustine’s way of joining divine justice to divine mercy and the mystery of
Christ’s humility: The cross of Christ symbolizes in its form the hiddenness
of God’s grace and mercy as well as justice. So to know divine justice is
to love God, and this love is only acquired by receiving the sacrament of
Christ and following him.171 The form of divine justice can only be adequately
known by love, not by knowing and practicing the classical definition of
justice, ‘to render to each his due.’172 “[A]ccording to Augustine it is only
through faith in Christ’s sacrament that the example of Paul’s justice spurs
the soul on to deeper love of God, in whom the form of justice resides.”173
Dodaro also points out how Augustine connects the knowledge of justice
to the confession of sins; in other words, the correct form of speech in
explaining divine justice is that of a confessor.174 In placing oneself to the role
of a repentant, such as King David, the perspective to divine justice becomes
corrected, as it becomes dependent of divine grace. In brief, an insistent
and autonomous attitude, relying on human reasoning and knowledge,
cannot comprehend or submit to the hiddenness of divine mercy, and
thereby divine justice. In this way, Dodaro emphasises the correct self-
knowledge of the human observer in relation to God in Augustine’s insights
into mysterious divine justice.175
We will now turn to the debate between Julian and Augustine and see
how the notion of hidden divine justice is applied to the punishment of
concupiscentia carnis. As Julian’s criticism was aimed at Augustine’s insis-
tence on both God’s justice and at his notion of seemingly involuntary sin,
Augustine had to formulate these views once more and yet more sharply. In
short, concupiscentia as a reciprocal punishment for the properly voluntary
act of Adam and Eve, and its origin in God’s ultimate justice are unques-
tionable points for Augustine and his defence. How did Julian criticize this?
What kinds of arguments did Augustine shape in defending his position?
Was Augustine merely satisfied in pointing out the inscrutable justice of
God in afflicting humanity with the punishment of concupiscentia carnis?

171 Dodaro 2004, 159, 162.

172 Dodaro 2004, 158. See also ibid., 169, “since knowledge of God and knowledge of justice
are commensurate with each other, and knowledge and love of God are similarly interrelated,
then knowledge of justice and love of God are likewise commensurate with each other.”
173 Dodaro 2004, 159.
174 Dodaro 2004, 173.
175 Dodaro 2004, 178–181.
paradise and punishment 113

3.3.1. Starting the Defence—nupt. et conc. and c. ep. Pel.

Augustine’s debate with Julian was marred by unfavourable practical cir-
cumstances; these are now well charted.176 In the first stages of this debate,
Augustine is satisfied with mostly repeating his previous ideas concerning
concupiscentia and its punitive character. In the course of their prolonged
discussion, Augustine is, however, compelled to adopt a defensive position.
The first book of de nuptiis et concupiscentia was written in 418/419 as a
reaction to Julian’s initial critique of Augustine’s views on original sin. Argu-
ing for his view on sexual desire being corrupted by sin, Augustine returns to
Gen 3 in nupt. et conc. 1, 6–7. First, Augustine states that to touch the fruit of
the tree of good and evil knowledge was indeed a critical moment in relation
to sexual behaviour, for this afflicted Adam and Eve’s souls with shame (or,
as Augustine sees it, “their eyes were opened”). Then he presents his already
standard model in which the primal act of disobedience and the bodily dis-
obedience, manifested by the involuntary movements of their members,
are matched together. The consequences of the theological offence against
God was immediately “felt” (sensit) and “found” (inuenit) in their body after
the first transgression of divine law. The “other law,” as it was referred to
by Pauline authority, is a “most honourable retribution of disobedience”
(dignissime retributa inoboedientia) for the disobedience of Adam and Eve
against God. This retributive disobedience thus served immediately as a
means of acknowledging and realizing the primal, theological disobedience;
concupiscentia was a link that made the first disobedience concrete and
empirical (tunc in se quippe sensit homo quod fecit). There is also another
point to be considered, for as Augustine reminds us, it would be quite unjust
(iniustum), if the human body would serve such a mind that did not origi-
nally serve God as its Lord. Injustice here refers obviously to the hierarchical
order of authority. Just as humans are placed below God as their Lord (domi-
nus), so should their bodies serve them as their slaves (seruus). The broken
relationship to God as one’s unquestionable ruler was reflected in the bro-
ken rule over one’s bodily functions.177

176 For a good and quick overview of the chain of events and of who responded to whom,

and to which text, see Lamberigts 2008c, 837–840.

177 nupt. et conc. 1, 7 ibi homo primitus dei lege transgressa aliam legem repugnantem suae

menti habere coepit in membris et inoboedientiae suae malum sensit, quando sibi dignissime
retributam inoboedientiam suae carnis inuenit. talem quippe etiam serpens oculorum aper-
tionem seducendo promiserat, ad aliquid uidelicet sciendum, quod melius nesciretur. tunc in
se quippe sensit homo quod fecit, tunc a bono malum non carendo, sed perpetiendo discreuit.
114 chapter three

However, God chose one particular bodily function as a carrier for the
punitive disobedience. What is left of the free will cannot but blush over
the fact that it is not able to control the act of reproduction but is bound
to the irrational and involuntary impulses of the genitals; these produce
new “natures,” and were thus most fitting (ubi conuenientius) to be the
objects of God’s distributive justice.178 Clearly Augustine is here convinced
of the harmony and persuasiveness of his own argument. The involuntary
discontinuity of the body and soul in using the genitals, their purpose in
producing offspring and their concealment by Adam and Eve in Gen 3,
all argue neatly, in Augustine’s view for his case: the first disobedience,
and its effects on human nature, is demonstrated (monstraretur) best in
these parts of the body.179 Since Adam and Eve despised their creator and
His command (imperantem deum) by their free choice of will, God meted
out a parallel punishment in their mind-body constitution, so that their
command (imperium) over their own bodily movements was lost.180
As in previous texts, Augustine’s notion of sexual shame in nupt. et conc.
is closely connected to the punitive side of concupiscentia. In other words,
shame arises from the fact that one cannot control one’s bodily members.
Concupiscentia was named as law of sin by Paul, for it has a quasi-dominant,
subordinating quality, thereby perversely reflecting the pristine, genuine
dominion of God over humanity. Such disorder and disjunction of the right
order is bound to create shame.181 Furthermore, what should be a “servant of

iniustum enim erat, ut obtemperaretur a seruo suo, id est a corpore suo ei qui non obtemperarat
domino suo.
178 nupt. et conc. 1, 7 ubi autem conuenientius monstraretur inoboedientiae merito humanam

deprauatam esse naturam quam in his inoboedientibus locis, unde per successionem subsistit
ipsa natura? nam ideo proprie istae corporis partes naturae nomine nuncupantur. In nupt. et
conc. 2, 53 Augustine mentions the original control over all bodily functions taking examples
from some organs which are controlled in present state as well (e.g. bladder). But because
they do not take part in procreation they were left under voluntary control.
179 Augustine does not here discern between the sexes: both male and female genitals are

included.
180 nupt. et conc. 1, 7. Augustine plays here deliberately with the notion of libertas arbi-

trii, a highly regarded concept in the Pelagian view of sin. See also nupt. et conc. 1, 9 where
Augustine claims that concupiscentia is now adjoined to human propagation as a “necessity,”
overriding and replacing the original control of the rational will, thus adding to the embar-
rassment, iste concubitus, qui nihil morbidae libidinis haberet adiunctum, si non praecedente
peccato in eo perisset libertatis arbitrium, quod nunc id habet adiunctum, non sit uoluntatis,
sed necessitatis, sine qua tamen in procreandis filiis ad fructum perueniri non potest ipsius
uoluntatis.
181 nupt. et conc. 1, 24. Augustine here mentions the Cynic philosophers as an exception to

the rule; elsewhere (ciu. 14, 20) he thinks that even Cynics only fake their unashamed attitude
to public presentation of sex.
paradise and punishment 115

the superior” is now discerned as a punishment of a disobedient will. Once

more, sexual embarrassment, shame and disorderly impulses “indicate”
(indicat) to the fact that concupiscentia is a punishment for an original,
disobedient will.182
In the remarks of nupt. et conc. on concupiscentia as a parallel punish-
ment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience, there is an interesting undertone
of the importance of recognizing concupiscentia as a sign of, or evidence
for, what took place in the ancient history of humanity. The corruption of
sexual desire is a concrete, sensed, and obvious sign, which demonstrates,
shows, and indicates. To Augustine, its evil disorderly character refutes
the mistaken opposite view, according to which concupiscentia is a cre-
ated good, promoting the good goal of marriage. But it is equally impor-
tant to note how Augustine places emphasis on what could be said to
be the non-sensual side of concupiscentia: for concupiscentia is unlike any
other reoccurring emotion or temptation in that it signifies and points, with
interpretable cognitive contents, to the relationship of God and human-
ity in its ideal and fallen state. Due to its growing importance in mirror-
ing divine retributive justice, concupiscentia had achieved a role as natu-
ral theological evidence; concupiscentia is theology carved in flesh, so to
speak.183
Two years later in 420/421, Augustine was urged to respond to Julian’s
reactions against nupt. et conc. (ad Turbantium, written in 419). Augustine
based his answer on an epitome made of Julian’s work, and attached it as
a second book to nupt. et conc. In de nuptiis et concupiscentia 2, Augustine
repeats his standard formulations of concupiscentia being a parallel punish-
ment for the sin of disobedience in Paradise.184 He also returns to the topic
of sexual shame and cites it again as evidence for the punitive character

182 nupt. et conc. 1, 27 non tamen nisi ipse quodam quasi suo imperio mouet membra, quae

moueri uoluntate non possunt, atque ita se indicat non imperantis famulum, sed inoboedientis
supplicium uoluntatis.
183 Note also Augustine’s remark of a need to think and observe human sexual behaviour

in its fallen state in nupt. et conc. 1, 8: quia ergo nec isto adiuncto malo perire potuit nuptiarum
bonum, putant imprudentes hoc non esse malum, sed pertinere ad illud bonum. discernitur
autem non solum ratione subtili, uerum etiam uulgatissimo iudicio naturali, quod et in illis
apparuit hominibus primis et hodieque tenetur ab hominibus coniugatis. Only “stupid” people
cannot draw the right conclusions from the evidence given by Adam and Eve, and the present
humanity alike, that the good of marriage should be separated from malum concupiscentiae.
Such a discernment only requires “rudimentary common sense.” It is perhaps useful to recall
that Augustine detests an intellectually mistaken description of concupiscentia as much as
he is repelled by the “bestial” and sensual confusion of sexual desire.
184 For these standard formulations, see e.g. nupt. et conc. 2, 53–54.
116 chapter three

of concupiscentia (called also “wound” or “the tinder of sin” here).185 Adam

and Eve’s punishment is shared by the present humanity alike. This highly
just, reciprocal disobedience (inoboedientia iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedi-
entibus reddita) causes shame, which indicates that concupiscentia cannot
be of God’s doing, for who would be so “ungrateful” or “impious” as to feel
shame for God’s good work?186 Later in the same book, Augustine again
emphasises what he thinks to be crucial in deciding on the quality of concu-
piscentia: its disobedience to the control of the will. This is a disobedience
that was earned by much greater disobedience, and was hence transferred
(in which way, is not considered here) to future generations. Augustine is
here even prepared to allow concupiscentia a place in the original human
constitution in Paradise, given that it was there an obedient servant of man’s
will and reason, and “moved in an obedient and orderly fashion.” In the
present state, such a version of concupiscentia carnis is no longer an option,
for it was made faulty (uitiata) by God’s just decree, and was then transferred
to future generations.187

185 nupt. et conc. 2, 22. This is the only instance of fomes occurring as a metaphor for
concupiscentia in Augustine. Cf. however ep. 167, 10; a letter to Hieronymus on marital
chastity.
186 nupt. et conc. 2, 22 sed profecto illud nos pudet, quod puduit primos illos homines, quando

pudenda texerunt. illa est poena peccati, illa plaga uestigiumque peccati, illa inlecebra fomes-
que peccati, illa lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, illa ex nobis ipsis aduersus nos ipsos
inoboedientia iustissimo reciprocatu inoboedientibus reddita. huius nos pudet et merito pudet.
nam si hoc non esset, quid nobis esset ingratius, quid inreligiosius, si in membris nostris non de
uitio uel de poena nostra, sed de dei confunderemur operibus? See also nupt. et conc. 2, 26.
187 nupt. et conc. 2, 59 et si non uult concedere uitium esse libidinem, dicat saltem per illorum

hominum inoboedientiam etiam ipsam uitiatam esse carnis concupiscentiam, ut illa, quae oboe-
dienter et ordinate moueretur, nunc inoboedienter inordinateque moueatur, ita ut ipsis quoque
pudicis ad nutum non obtemperet coniugatis, sed et quando non est necessaria moueatur et,
quando necessaria est, aliquando citius, aliquando tardius, eorum sequatur nutus, sed suos
exerat motus. hanc ergo eius inoboedientiam inoboedientes illi tunc homines receperunt et in
nos propagine transfuderunt. neque enim ad eorum nutum, sed utique inordinate mouebatur,
quando membra prius glorianda, tunc iam pudenda texerunt. The outline of this suggestion
can be seen in a letter from the same period to Atticus, in which Augustine suggests two
possible options: either there was no concupiscentia in Paradise, or it was of the kind that is
now unavailable to us. Augustine describes the second option in the following way: haec ergo
concupiscentia carnis si fuit in paradiso, ut per illam filii generarentur ad implendam benedic-
tionem nuptiarum multiplicatione hominum, non utique talis qualis nunc est fuit cuius motus
et ad licita et ad illicita indifferenter inhiaret; auferretur in multa turpissima, si quocumque
moueretur peruenire sineretur, contra quam pugnandum esset, ut castitas seruaretur; sed talis
esset—si tamen ulla ibi esset—qua numquam caro aduersus spiritum concupisceret, sed uolun-
tatis nutum pace mirabili non excederet, ut numquam adesset, nisi cum opus esset, numquam
delectatione inordinata uel illicita se animo cogitantis ingereret, nihil haberet improbandum
quod habenis temperantiae frenaretur aut expugnaretur labore uirtutis, sed utentis uolun-
paradise and punishment 117

While Augustine had written nupt. et conc. 1 in response to Julian’s letters

to Valerius and Zosimus, he felt it necessary to react to two other documents
composed by Julian in the wake of the events of 418, namely Julian’s epis-
tula ad Romanos and epistula ad Rufum Thessalonicensem. This reaction is
known as contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, written at the same time as
nupt. et conc. 2, in 420/421. The basic propositions on the punitive concupis-
centia are quite similar to what we have already seen.188
Augustine once more admits that sexual behaviour as such (motus gen-
italium, uirilitas) was part of God’s good creation, but, as in nupt. et conc.
discerns as separate the punitive, disobedient element of concupiscentia,
which resulted from Adam and Eve’s disobedience to God.189 Augustine
sketches four options for the sexual behaviour in Paradise, of which he could
approve of two: either libido was completely at the service of voluntary con-
trol, so that it did not precede, nor did it slow down, nor did it exceed the
command of will; or, there was no particular sexual pleasure in Paradise at
all.190 Whatever the state of sexual conduct in Paradise was, one matter is
clear: such a state is not found anywhere in present humanity, due to the
divine punishment which has been imprinted on human sexual behaviour.
Even Christian spouses suffer from these divine punitive measures. Augus-
tine again insists that the importune and disobedient element of concupis-
centia “testifies” (testetur) to the ancient crime of theological disobedience.
This involuntary, restless, and disordered fashion of sexual conduct points
to Paradise, where Adam and Eve abandoned God’s commandment and
took all future generations with them in this act of disobedience.191

tatem, quando necessaria fuisset, facili atque concordi oboedientia sequeretur. nunc ergo quo-
niam talis non est eiusque aduersitatem oportet ut castitas eluctetur, fateantur eam peccato
esse uitiatam. ep. 6*, 8. In this description, obedience to will’s control is also stressed. This
lengthy and admittedly fantastic description serves at least one purpose: it is very easy for
Augustine to make the final conclusion (haec ergo): look, it is obvious we do not have this
kind of concupiscentia!
188 Thus, the formulations between nupt. et conc. 2, 53 hominibus illis inoboedientibus mem-

brorum istorum inoboedientia iusto supplicio redderetur and c. ep. Pel. 1, 31 inoboedientia mem-
brorum supplicio iusto primis hominibus inoboedientibus reddita est, show, if not anything
else, at least the settled way Augustine was by now approaching the topic.
189 c. ep. Pel. 1, 31.
190 c. ep. Pel. 1, 34–35. The other two options were not acceptable: 1) aut quotienscumque

libuisset, totiens concubuissent; 2) aut frenarent libidinem, quando concubitus necessarius non
fuisset.
191 c. ep. Pel. 1, 35 castos etiam nolentes eamque temperantia castigantes inquietudine inordi-

nata inportunaque sollicitat et plerumque sese uolentibus subtrahit, nolentibus ingerit, ut nihil
aliud inoboedientia sua quam illius priscae inoboedientiae poenam se esse testetur.
118 chapter three

3.3.2. An Escalating Conflict—c. Iul. and c. Iul. imp.

After he got hold of Julian’s complete ad Turbantium, and realised the need
for a more comprehensive answer to this work, Augustine composed the six
books of contra Iulianum (in 421/422). Meanwhile, Julian had read Augus-
tine’s nupt. et conc. 2, and composed a response, known as ad Florum. This
response found its way to Augustine after its completion in 426/427. For
the first time during the dispute, the two adversaries were now respond-
ing at the same pace to the correct versions of the opponent’s text, and
during the years 428–430 Augustine was writing yet another work against
his unrelenting critic, contra Iulianum opus imperfectum. This work was left
unfinished due to Augustine’s death in August, 430. Together, c. Iul. and
c. Iul. imp. represent a veritable explosion of arguments concerning God,
creation, sin, moral responsibility, Adam’s sin and its consequences to the
present humanity, tradition of the Church, marriage and sex, hermeneu-
tics, logic, etc. Augustine’s basic insights into the central role of obedience
in Paradise, and the fatal consequences of Adam and Eve’s disobedience
as the disobedient punishment of concupiscentia remain present during
the entire dispute. Thus, for instance, concupiscentia carnis is seen, pas-
sim throughout the works, as due to Adam’s disobedience: it is “born” and
“transmitted” owing to that disobedience, being healed by the obedience of
Christ.192
A perfectly standard account of punitive concupiscentia and its relation
to the first disobedient volition of Adam and Eve can be found e.g. in c. Iul.
imp. 6, 14:
But we say that the first human being was so happy before the sin and had
such free will that, while observing the commandment of God by the great
strength of his mind, he did not suffer the flesh resisting him in any conflict,
and he did not experience anything at all from any desire that he did not will,
but that his will was first damaged by the poisonous enticement of the serpent
so that desire came into being which would rather have followed upon the
will than resisted it; but once sin had been committed, concupiscence fought
back against the weakened mind as a punishment. And for this reason, if

192 c. Iul. 4, 1 malum tamen esse concupiscentiam carnis qua concupiscit aduersus spiritum,

eoque malo bene uti pudicitiam coniugalem, meliusque non uti continentiam sanctiorem: quod
malum non ex alia substantia quam deus non condidit, sicut Manichaeus insanit, nobis esse
permixtum; sed per inoboedientiam unius hominis exortum atque traductum, et per oboedi-
entiam unius hominis expiandum atque sanandum; cuius obligatione implicat debita poena
nascentem, soluit indebita gratia renascentem. Cf. also c. Iul. 6, 48.
paradise and punishment 119

Adam did not first do what he willed by sinning, he would not have suffered
what he did not will by desiring.193 [transl. Teske]
This account is followed by a familiar assertion concerning obedience, and
its “single or special” value as a virtue. In a previous book of the same
work, Augustine had already returned to his common phrase on the topic:
disobedient human beings received retribution in the disobedience of their
own flesh (inoboedienti homini suae carnis inoboedientia retributa). This was
done by the “just judgment of God” (iusto iudicio dei).194
Again, as an answer to Julian’s consistent use of peccatum naturale in
describing Augustine’s position, Augustine admits that concupiscentia car-
nis may be called a “natural defect,” but only in the sense that it is now
adherent to each individual born, not as being part of the original human
nature. This defect has its origin in the “evil will of the first human.”195 During
the debate, Augustine also remarks on the specific character of this divinely
decreed punishment; it is, for instance, by nature a force which acknowl-
edges no rational limits of virtues (so Julian), but craves for its objects with
a brutish force. Indeed, what is even now “appropriate for the nature of an
animal” is for human nature a punishment.196
A complete and thorough analysis of the arguments of both adversaries
that would pay attention to all theologically relevant topics related to and
connected with punitive concupiscentia obviously lies outside the scope of
this study: therefore, we will here highlight some important trajectories of
those insights during the debate that were presented into topics that Augus-
tine had considered to be of importance in connection with concupiscentia
as a punishment. These were also the topics against which Julian posed seri-
ous critical questions, and with unpreceded force. These topics and ques-
tions include: why does Augustine insist on his claim that all of humanity

193 c. Iul. imp. 6, 14 nos autem dicimus tam beatum fuisse illum hominem ante peccatum,

tamque liberae uoluntatis, ut dei praeceptum magnis uiribus mentis obseruans, resistentem
sibi carnem nullo certamine pateretur, nec aliquid omnino ex aliqua cupiditate sentiret, quod
nollet; uoluntatemque eius prius fuisse uitiatam uenenosa persuasione serpentis, ut oriretur
cupiditas quae sequeretur potius uoluntatem, quam resisteret uoluntati; perpetratoque peccato
iam poena infirmatae menti etiam carnis concupiscentia repugnaret. ac per hoc, nisi prius
homo faceret peccando quod uellet, non pateretur concupiscendo quod nollet.
194 c. Iul. imp. 4, 44. The scriptural background (Rom 5, 18–19) for Augustine’s emphasis on

Adam’s disobedience and its consequences for future generations is tested and disputed by
Julian in c. Iul. imp. 2, 215.
195 c. Iul. 4, 54. See also c. Iul. 4, 56 where punitive concupiscentia is conceived as an inborn

disease (morbus).
196 c. Iul. imp. 4, 41; 4, 43.
120 chapter three

in its present state, newborn infants included, are suffering from the puni-
tive consequences of Adam’s fall? In other words, is the concept of poena
peccati, as concerning the entire humanity, at all necessary? Second, Julian
recognised easily the importance of Augustine’s emphasis of God’s punish-
ment being just. How does Julian then criticise Augustine’s views on iusta
poena and its source, divine justice? In other words, if concupiscentia car-
nis is a divinely insituted punishment, how could such a God conceived to
be just when punishing sins by increasing them? The notion of the punitive
concupiscentia also gives rise to an extensive debate on the “third kind of
sin,” which is seen by Augustine to be both a sin and a punishment, thus
creating conditions that necessitate sinning. Finally, Julian poses the diffi-
cult question of how exactly an ethical choice made by Adam and Eve had
been turned into a “biological,” or “genetical” necessity.197

Punishment Induced from Suffering

Julian thought that sexual desire was a bodily function created by God. It
was to be used for virtuous purposes and not allowed immoderate excess,
rather like food, or sleep. Julian argued that libido did not entail any notion
of corruption (uitium) or punishment (poena). Thus, one of the major objec-
tions Julian made to Augustine’s general approach of original sin and concu-
piscentia carnis was a rather simple one: why should concupiscentia or other
sensual, and emotional responses be thought of as punishments?
Augustine’s own, similarly general answer admittedly partly presupposes
what it tries to prove: concupiscentia carnis is a punishment because it is by
nature an evil, indifferent force—and therefore can only be a punishment.
But in describing the palette of various punishments in fallen humanity,
Augustine also aims at a weak spot in Julian’s critique: because God is not
“weak” or “cruel,” concupiscentia carnis, along with all other miseries of life,
must be a punishment.198 If all human beings are born good and innocent,
does Julian think that all the pains, illnesses and mental deficiencies of
infants should be seen as something good as well?199 According to Augustine,
all pain and every instance of suffering is due to the just decisions of God.
Indeed, the miserable state of infants is for Augustine a distressing and
alarming piece of evidence for God’s punishments for humanity. In c. Iul.
imp, several passages list the sufferings of children, who from Augustine’s

197 See Rist 1994, 321–327, and Sorabji 2000, 416.

198 Rist 1994, 262.
199 Lamberigts 1988, 23.
paradise and punishment 121

point of view are in fact born innocent as what comes to their own personal
and voluntary choices (for there are none without the use of reason, which
the infants do not yet possess).200 Because God is not unjust (iniustus) or
powerless (impotens), the “heavy yoke” of Adam on humanity cannot but
be a punishment. This yoke is shared by infants and adults alike, and it is
construed of a long list of miseries of life:
If this is not clear from what has been recalled, look at infants: see how many
and how great are the evils they endure; in what vanities, torments, errors,
and terrors they grow up. Error tempts adults, even those who serve God, to
deceive them; labor and pain tempt them, to crush them; lust tempts them,
to inflame them; grief tempts them, to prostrate them; pride tempts them,
to make them vain. Who can easily explain all the ways in which the heavy
yoke presses down upon the children of Adam? […] We must, then, hold that
the reason for these evils must be either the injustice or impotence of God, or
the punishment for the first and ancient sin. Since God is neither unjust nor
impotent, there is only […] that the heavy yoke upon children of Adam […]
would not have existed if the offense by way of origin had not come first to
deserve it.201 [transl. Schumacher]
A similar induction from the diverse sufferings of infants and adults can
be found elsewhere in these two works;202 in c. Iul. imp. 3, 154, such a list
is again clearly composed in order to both back up Augustine’s claim of
punitive conditions (libido included) and to criticise Julian’s creationistic
account of the souls’ innocent origin. These lists also contain a constant
appeal to divine justice (hoc dogma catholicum et iustitiam Dei defendit,
quia non immerito uitam mortalium uoluisset esse poenalem) as a guarantee

200 See e.g. c. Iul. imp. 3, 198 for a description that is both touching and fanciful, reflecting

under all its polemical rhetoric Augustine’s sensitivity to address the problems of evil that
were left untouched by Julian’s individualistic solutions.
201 c. Iul. 4, 83 sed in iis quae meminisse iam non potes, paruulos intuere, quot et quanta

mala patiantur, in quibus uanitatibus, cruciatibus, erroribus, terroribus crescant. deinde iam
grandes, etiam deo seruientes tentat error, ut decipiat; tentat labor aut dolor, ut frangat; tentat
libido, ut accendat; tentat moeror, ut sternat; tentat typhus, ut extollat. et quis explicet omnia
festinanter, quibus grauatur iugum super filios Adam? […] quid igitur restat, nisi ut causa
istorum malorum sit aut iniquitas uel impotentia dei, aut poena primi ueterisque peccati? sed
quia nec iniustus, nec impotens est deus; restat […] quod graue iugum super filios Adam […] non
fuisset, nisi delicti originalis meritum praecessisset. Similarly in c. Iul 5, 8 in the case of caecitas
cordis: istam caecitatem si poenam fuisse negaueris, similem te perpeti etiam non confitens
indicabis. si autem poenam quidem fuisse, sed peccati poenam non fuisse contendis; interim
fateris quod unum aliquid et peccatum esse possit et poena: si autem non est haec poena peccati,
profecto iniqua poena est, et iniustum facis deum, quo iubente uel sinente; aut infirmum, quo
non auertente, infligitur innocenti.
202 E.g. c. Iul. 3, 9–10; 5, 4; 5, 44; 6, 2; 6, 30–32; c. Iul. imp. 1, 29; 1, 35; 3, 5; 6, 23.
122 chapter three

for their ultimate meaningfulness. Augustine also makes clear, by way of

scriptural evidence (Jn 9, 1–3) and by experience in his own circles (a man
named Acatius was born blind), that people suffering from innate diseases
or defects should not be held morally responsible for these punishments;
rather, such poenae are a general or communal sign of God’s just judgment
of humanity (iustum iudicium dei).203 Into these conditions, due to punitive
concupiscentia, and due to being implicated by Adam’s evil will, infants are
born, into the “depths of the miseries with which we are familiar.”204

A Third Kind of Sin

An extensive discussion of the punishment for Adam and Eve’s sin can be
found in c. Iul. 5, 3–16. Augustine starts by asserting that his view on divine
justice is not based on merely nothing (uana, frustra) but lies firmly in the
fact that there was a preceding sin for which humanity is now punished.
Therefore, his teaching also does not “ascribe injustice to God,” for there is
thus a reason for all the miserable sufferings of even little children.205
In his ad Florum, Julian had commented directly on Augustine’s stan-
dard formulation of punitive concupiscentia (nupt. et conc. 1, 7). Julian had
pointed out that if concupiscentia should be conceived as a divine punish-
ment, should it not be taken as something good because of its origin?206
Second, a more serious remark was that a punishment could not be simulta-
neously something that would also be seen as a sin, for this would strain the
concept of divine justice too much: sin should not be punished in a way that
would produce more sins. However, this is exactly what Augustine wishes to
say about concupiscentia: it works as a just punishment for Adam and Eve’s
sin, and is simultaneously to be conceived of as some kind of sin, as it entails
as such a “disobedience against the control of the mind.”207 The discussion

203 c. Iul. imp. 3, 162. Cf. 3, 161 deum iustum […] miserae mortalium, quae iustissime inflicta
est.
204 c. Iul. imp. 5, 15 paruuli […] quos non uultis credere meritis malae uoluntatis alienae, sed

tamen eius in cuius lumbis ratione seminis fuerunt, ad profunda miseriarum quas nouimus,
fuisse deiectos. On concupiscentia in particular, see c. Iul. imp. 4, 120 per primi hominis tamen
praeuaricatricem uoluntatem factum esse concupiscentiae uitium, unde per commixtionem
sexuum nascentes trahunt originale peccatum.
205 c. Iul. 5, 3.
206 c. Iul. 5, 8. Julian had called the libido ultrix peccati, dei ministra. See also c. Iul. 5, 16.
207 c. Iul. 5, 8 et sicut caecitas cordis, quam solus remouet illuminator deus, et peccatum est,

quo in deum non creditur; et poena peccati, qua cor superbum digna animaduersione punitur;
et causa peccati, cum mali aliquid caeci cordis errore committitur: ita concupiscentia carnis,
aduersus quam bonus concupiscit spiritus, et peccatum est, quia inest illi inoboedientia contra
paradise and punishment 123

moves to citing a scriptural example of the sins that work simultaneously

as punishments for sins. Julian had attempted to show that Augustine had
misunderstood the verses of Rom 1, 25–28 on homosexual desires, which in
a previous work Augustine had interpreted as both sins and divine punish-
ments.208 But Augustine still insists that in those cases mentioned in Romans
1, the punishment actually produces guilt in the same way a sin would (nec
solum de praeteritis reos propter quae damnatos, sed inde etiam reos unde
damnatos). In this case, idolatry works as the first sin, for which a punish-
ment of degrading passions is given. Augustine admits that this punishment
is received in a way that does not necessarily open itself to human scrutiny,
but he is adamant to claim that the punishment ensued from the first sin in
Paul’s example is also actually a sin in itself.209 What follows is a host of scrip-
tural examples in which divine punishments are considered as sins (c. Iul.
5, 12–13). However, it seems that Augustine would not wish to make a too
straightforward analogy between concupiscentia as a punishment and the
example of Rom 1, 25–28, for he remarks that there is a difference between
having (habere) evil desires and being abandoned to them (tradi): the for-
mer represents the common state of affairs of a Christian, the latter rep-
resents a severe case of divine punishment in which one is abandoned by
God into a state of habitual and continual consent to evil desires.210 While
an analogy between punitive concupiscentia and the special case of Rom
1, 25–28 is thus problematic, Augustine, however, has attempted to form an
argument on a more general level by which he would demonstrate that sin
indeed can work as a punishment and vice versa. The discussion then moves
to Augustine frequently pointing out the “hidden” and often inexplicable

dominatum mentis; et poena peccati est, quia reddita est meritis inoboedientis; et causa peccati
est, defectione consentientis uel contagione nascentis.
208 Julian had picked this example in nat. et grat. 24. and reads the verses as a rhetorical

hyperbole, intended to persuade readers of the horrific nature of such sins as are described
in Rom 1.
209 c. Iul. 5, 10 ista damnatio etiam reatus est, quo grauius implicantur. ita et peccata sunt

ista, et poenae praecedentium peccatorum.

210 c. Iul. 5, 11–12 numquid autem consequens est, ut si habet aliquis cordis desideria mala,

iam etiam consentiat eis ad committenda eadem mala? ac per hoc aliud est habere mala
desideria cordis, aliud tradi eis; utique ut consentiendo eis possideatur ab eis, quod fit cum
diuino iudicio traditur eis. alioquin frustra dictum est, post concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecli
18,30]; si iam quisque reus est, quod tumultuantes et ad mala trahere nitentes sentit eas, nec
eas sequitur, si non eis traditur; exercens aduersus eas gloriosa certamina, si uiuit in gratia.
[…] cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a deo cedit eis atque
consentit; uincitur, capitur, trahitur, possidetur. For the state of concupiscentia in Christian
renewal, see Chapter 6.
124 chapter three

way divine judgment works in handing out punishments that are also sins.
Occultum iudicium dei may thus result in perverse obstinacy, blindness to
understand God’s works, erroneous judgments in taking false as right and
so on. Thus divine punishments and their exact way of working is rooted in
God’s unfathomable being, analogically to divine election of grace. Because
these judgments arise from His justice, they cannot be unjust, although they
can be inexplicable:
It is not in vain that the Apostle exclaims: “O the depth of the riches of the
wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How inscrutable are his judgments,
and how unsearchable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord; or
who has been his counsellor? or who has first given to him that recompense
should be made him?” None He chooses is worthy; but, choosing, He makes
them worthy. Yet He punishes none who does not deserve it.211
[transl. Schumacher]
Julian’s critical question of how a punishment can possibly be a sin without
damaging consequences to divine justice, has led Augustine to assert that
this can indeed be possible but in a way that is as concealed from the
horizon of human reason and justice as is God’s mercy.212 This question had
arisen from Augustine’s picture of concupiscentia being a just and reciprocal
punishment of Adam and Eve’s sin. Again, this picture was criticised by

211 c. Iul. 5, 13 non frustra exclamat apostolus, o altitudo diuitiarum sapientiae et scientiae

dei! quam inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius, et inuestigabiles uiae eius! quis enim cognouit sensum
domini? aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? aut quis prior dedit illi, ut retribuatur ei? [Rom 11,33sq.]
nullum eligit dignum, sed eligendo efficit dignum; nullum tamen punit indignum. Cf. c. Iul. 5, 15
tradit ergo deus in passiones ignominiae, ut fiant quae non conueniunt; sed ipse conuenienter
tradit: et fiunt eadem peccata, et peccatorum supplicia praeteritorum, et suppliciorum merita
futurorum: sicut tradidit Achab in pseudoprophetarum mendacium; sicut tradidit Roboam in
falsum consilium. facit haec miris et ineffabilibus modis, qui nouit iusta iudicia sua, non solum
in corporibus hominum, sed et in ipsis cordibus operari.
212 There is a parallel and even more clearer line of argument in gr. et lib. arb. 41–43. God

works in hidden ways in order to convert some people into salvation, and some to suffer
from punishments that are also sins: scriptura diuina si diligenter inspiciatur, ostendit non
solum bonas hominum uoluntates quas ipse facit ex malis, et a se factas bonas in actus bonos
et in aeternam dirigit uitam, uerum etiam illas quae conseruant saeculi creaturam, ita esse in
dei potestate, ut eas quo uoluerit, quando uoluerit, faciat inclinari, uel ad beneficia quibusdam
praestanda, uel ad poenas quibusdam ingerendas, sicut ipse iudicat, occultissimo quidem
iudicio, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimo. nam inuenimus aliqua peccata etiam poenas esse
aliorum peccatorum: sicut sunt uasa irae, quae perfecta dicit apostolus in perditionem: sicut
est induratio Pharaonis. This work ends with unmistakable echoes of Simpl.: operari deum in
cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum uoluntates quocumque uoluerit, siue ad bona pro sua
misericordia, siue ad mala pro meritis eorum, iudicio utique suo aliquando aperto, aliquando
occulto, semper tamen iusto. fixum enim debet esse et immobile in corde uestro, quia non est
iniquitas apud deum.
paradise and punishment 125

Julian on theological grounds and is likewise defended by Augustine on

theological grounds.
In c. Iul. imp., the adversaries frequently remark on the classification
of concupiscentia and other punitive states. In c. Iul. imp. 1, 44–47, this
question is once more at stake, as Julian has attempted to demonstrate that
Augustine contradicts his own definition of sin in an earlier work (duab.
anim.). Augustine evades this allegation by stating that the definition of
sin in duab. anim. simply concerns the individual, voluntary sin of Adam.
In addition to that, and to a thoroughly passive form of a punishment,
there is also a third class (genus tertium), which consists of sins that work
simultaneously as punishments. This class of punitive sins includes actions
and states from which an individual has not the “freedom to hold back,”
but which is not a purely passive state, either (as in evil “which one in
no sense does, but only suffers”). The plight of Paul’s ego in Romans 7 is
mentioned as an example of this third class of evils.213 Augustine holds fast
to the need for this distinction all along c. Iul. imp. as essential for a correct
understanding of the punitive character of concupiscentia. He points out
again and again that Julian’s view of sin as a purely individual, voluntary
action is not adequate in covering all instances of evil human behaviour.
Therefore, Augustine insists that there are simple sins, but that there are
punishments that also count as sins; concupiscentia carnis being the most
important. What Julian thinks as an unjust and unreasonable mode of
punishment, leading to an untenable conception of God as a producer and
guardian for sins, is in Augustine’s opinion simply one of the biblical cases
of just divine punishments that also work as sins:
JUL. For, since he [sc. Augustine] invented the idea that the punishment that
is sexual desire was justly imposed and teaches that this justice is in accord
with the divine sentence, but does not deny that God’s action is found in
pronouncing the sentence from which he says sexual desire has arisen […] he,
of course, has restored to the work of God the shame […] To this, nonetheless,
he added as a corollary of particular impiety his statement that God inflicted a
punishment of the sort which would be an enticement and incentive toward
sin, a punishment which as the unconquerable law in the members would not
resist the law of our mind. With that sort of vengeance God would multiply,
not punish sins […] this judge whom Augustine dreamed up pretends that he
is horrified at sin, but clings to sins with such great affection that they could
not find a more diligent guardian.

213 c. Iul. imp. 1, 47 tertium uero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum et poena peccati, potest intellegi

in eo qui dicit: quod nolo malum hoc ago [Rom 7,19].

126 chapter three

AUG. Read what scripture says: because they did not want to keep God in mind,
God handed them over to an evil frame of mind so that they did what was not
right (Rom 1:28), and see that certain sins are also the punishment of sins. In
order to understand how God does this, reread what I warned you about in
connection with King Ahab. His sin was, of course, to believe the false prohets,
and yet this sin was also, under the vengeance of God, the punishment of the
sinner.214 [transl. Teske]
This other kind of sin, punitive in character, Augustine every now and
then is ready to even call a necessity.215 Julian had denied that there can
be no other kind of sin than that which is committed by an individual’s
will, and claims that a voluntary concept of sin is mutually exclusive with
a notion of sin that is based on necessity, being natural, or “non-voluntary”
(non uoluntarium) in character. Logically, sins cannot be committed both
voluntarily and by necessity by the same person. Augustine, on the other
hand, maintains that based on the connection with, and collective share
to, Adam’s sin, one is in fact entitled to speak of involuntary sins, though
perhaps in a specific, restricted meaning.216 Based on Romans 7, Augustine
argues that a punitive state of a habitual sin remains from Adam’s free
choice of the will; moreover, it is indeed possible for this punitive state to co-
exist simultaneously (simul) with a renewed Christian will.217 During a long

214 c. Iul. imp. 4, 34–35 IUL. cum enim confinxerit iuste redditam libidinis poenam, et hanc
iustitiam diuinae inculcat conuenire sententiae, in prolatione autem sententiae opus dei esse
non denegat, ex qua libidinem euenisse dicit […] in operam nimirum dei […] reduxit pudorem
[…] ad quod tamen quasi corollarium peculiaris sceleris adiunxit, ut talem poenam a deo
illatam diceret, quae esset illecebra et fomes peccati, quae lex in membris inuicta repugnaret
legi mentis nostrae: quo genere ultionis multiplicaret deus flagitia, non puniret; […] hic iudex
qui ab Augustino fingitur, simularit se horrere peccatum, ceterum tanto eis adhaeret affectu,
ut diligentiorem nutritium inuenire non possint. AUG. lege quod scriptum est, quoniam non
probauerunt deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos deus in reprobam mentem, ut faciant quae
non conueniunt [Rom 1,28]: et uide quaedam peccata etiam poenas esse peccantium. quomodo
autem id faciat deus ut intellegas, relege quod te admonui superius de rege Achab: cuius utique
peccatum fuit credere pseudoprophetis; et tamen hoc peccatum, deo uindicante, fuit etiam
poena peccantis. See also c. Iul. imp. 2, 38 and c. Iul. imp. 6, 17, where concupiscentia is
both sin and punishment for sin (caecitas and concupiscentia here stand for ignorantia and
difficultas): caecitas igitur cordis, qua nescitur quid iustitia uetet, et uiolentia concupiscentiae,
qua uincitur etiam qui scit unde debeat abstinere, non tantum peccata, sed poenae sunt etiam
peccatorum. […] porro si etiam peccata ideo ista non essent, quia non ab eis liberum est
abstinere, non diceretur, delicta iuuentutis meae et ignorantiae meae ne memineris [Ps 24,7]:
non diceretur, signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et adnotasti si quid inuitus admisi [Iob 14,17
LXX].
215 Already in c. Iul. imp. 1, 105. It seems that Augustine uses the word more as meaning

inevitability than compulsion: “there is a necessity to die,” c. Iul. imp. 4, 103.

216 For Rom 7 in the debate against Julian, see also Chapter 6.
217 c. Iul. imp. 4, 103 tale aliquid in natura humana factum esse non creditis, ut ex uoluntate
paradise and punishment 127

debate (c. Iul. 5, 26–64) on the reiterating questions on voluntariness or on

the possibility of sin versus the necessity of sin, and on the implications of
a ‘natural’ conception of sin to the notion of divine justice, Augustine holds
onto the core conviction that we are, indeed, suffering from a punishment
that is simultaneously a sin, and that Adam’s free choice of will resulted in
a punitive state in the present humanity, which then was transmitted and
manifested by concupiscentia carnis, and eventually documented by Paul’s
anguished cry in Romans 7.218

How and Why Was an Individual Ethical Choice Turned into a Biological
Necessity?
A crucial juncture in Augustine’s depiction of the punitive concupiscentia
was the question of how Adam’s ethical choice of will was turned into a
biologically reproduced, or ‘genetic,’ inevitability.219 Julian poses this critical
question in c. Iul. imp. 6, 9 (“it is completely insane to suppose that an act
of choice is mixed in with the seeds […] to believe that what you admit is
voluntary has been turned into our nature”) as a specific form of the truth
that acquired qualities are not inherited.220

primi hominis, de quo est origo humani generis, fieret necessitas peccati originalis in posteris
[…] in homine mole consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae uoluntas et peccati
necessitas. quoniam, uelle adiacet mihi [Rom 7,15], professio est uoluntatis; perficere autem
bonum, non inuenio [Rom 7,18], confessio est necessitatis. tu uero dixisti uoluntatem et necessi-
tatem simul esse non posse; cum cernas simul eas esse cum concordant, simul esse cum pugnant.
218 c. Iul. imp. 5, 28 aliter ergo natura humana peccauit, quando ei liberum fuit abstinere a

peccato: aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget liberatoris auxilio. et illud tantum-
modo peccatum erat: hoc autem etiam est poena peccati. c. Iul. imp. 5, 59 nec attendere uultis,
quod in unoquoque agitur per uiolentiam consuetudinis—quam quidam docti dixerunt esse
secundam naturam—, hoc actum esse per uiolentiam poenalem summi illius maximique pec-
cati primi hominis in omnibus qui erant in lumbis eius, per eius concupiscentiam exorturi, cum
propagaretur humanum genus, quam concupiscentiam peccantium pudor operuit in regione
lumborum. See also c. Iul. imp. 5, 40; 5, 51; 5, 64.
219 See Sorabji 2000, 416. This change was already alluded to in biological terms in nupt. et

conc. 1, 37 Adam ex olea tali, in qua nec semen erat eius modi, unde amaritudo nasceretur oleas-
tri, in oleastrum peccando conuersus est, quia tam magnum peccatum fuit, ubi magna fieret
in deterius mutatio naturae, totum genus humanum fecit oleastrum, ita ut—quemadmodum
nunc in ipsis uidemus arboribus—si quid inde in oleam gratia diuina conuertit, ibi uitium pri-
mae natiuitatis, quod erat originale peccatum de carnali concupiscentia traductum et adtrac-
tum, remittatur, tegatur, non inputetur, unde tamen oleaster nascatur, nisi et ipse in oleam
eadem gratia renascatur. See also c. Iul. imp. 4, 10, where Augustine uses Ambrose’s (in Luc. 7,
141) turn of phrase: concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, sine qua
nullus hominum nascitur, et hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus […] per praeuaricationem primi
hominis in nostram uertisse naturam.
220 Or, how disobedience committed in the soul was followed by disobedience of the body,
128 chapter three

Not limiting himself to the subject of concupiscentia, Augustine had for

long maintained that the “order of punishments” remains hidden from
human reason, and thus there perhaps is no satisfying answer to Julian’s
question of how such an anomaly would take place. However, the discus-
sion in c. Iul. imp. 6, 20–23 on the magnitude of Adam and Eve’s disobedi-
ence shows why Augustine thought such exceptional punishment possible.
Julian had mocked Augustine’s idea of punitive sin by stressing the minor,
even petty character of Adam’s disobedience. How could Augustine claim
that a mere theft of a single fruit should deserve punishments of such incred-
ible magnitude?221 Again, Julian points to Augustine’s weakness of suppos-
ing the circumstances in Paradise as being entirely unlike those with which
present humanity is familiar. Thus also with the concept of disobedience:
the primal disobedience by which Augustine has argued for the fitting pun-
ishment of concupiscentia carnis seems to be qualitatively different from the
acts of disobedience and sin in this life (ostendis, illam inoboedientiam non
te eiusdem generis arbitrari, cuius etiam ceterae sunt).222 If this is the case,
how can we know anything about the conditions of that primal sin; in other
words, if Augustine presumes that the disobedience of Adam and Eve in Par-
adise was of such a singular character, how can he know anything about it
or compare it to anything, if it is in no way analogical to the sins committed
in the present state of humanity?223
Augustine partly concedes this point. Indeed, Adam’s spiritual capacities
were much greater than ours and therefore “his nature fell more seriously
to the extent that it stood more sublimely.”224 For Augustine, then, the

as in c. Iul. imp. 4, 68: inoboedientiam persuaserat animo humano, quam poenalis et pudenda
carnis inoboedientia sequeretur.
221 However, Julian agrees with Augustine in saying that the fruit as such was not impor-

tant: Adam’s sin was in breaking God’s commandment (6, 23). See c. Iul. imp. 6, 7; 6, 20,
especially 6, 23 iussum fuerat ut edulio unius arboris abstineret: rudis, imperitus, incautus,
sine experimento timoris, sine exemplo iustitiae, suggestu mulieris usurpauit escam, cuius illex-
erat et suauitas, et uenustas. uide hic transgressionem fuisse mandati. Augustine notes here a
discrepancy in Julian’s polemical tactic: tu quoque in huius operis tui libro secundo, in Adam
peccati formam, quia prior peccauit Eua, non primam dixisti esse, sed maximam.
222 c. Iul. imp. 6, 21.
223 c. Iul. imp. 6, 21.
224 c. Iul. imp. 6, 21 frustra ergo peccato illius peccata filiorum eius quamlibet magna et hor-

renda, uel aequare, uel etiam praeferre conaris. illius natura quanto magis sublimiter stabat,
tanto magis grauiter concidit. natura illa talis fuit, ut nec mori posset, si peccare noluisset:
natura illa talis fuit, ut in se discordiam carnis, et spiritus non haberet: natura illa talis fuit,
ut contra uitia sua nulla certaret; non quod ei cedebat, sed quod in eo nulla erant. tunc ergo
debes peccata posterorum eius peccato eius aequare, si talem; tunc uero et maiora ea dicere, si
paradise and punishment 129

punishment is incredibly severe (a transgression of the will is turned into a

biologically inherited defect) because the first sin was also incredibly grave.
Adam’s disobedience was so serious, that its consequences are nothing
short of unbelievable: the anomaly of our present state is due to an even
more serious anomaly in the ideal state of Paradise.
What Augustine does, however, in replying to Julian’s question on the
knowability of Adam’s disobedience, is to induce the magnitude of the
crime from the punishments received (c. Iul. imp. 6, 23).225 While human
reason cannot estimate Adam’s disobedience nor can it be compared to any
known crimes of this world, the punishments are, nevertheless, known to
all, and from these one can easily see that something horrific was done in
Paradise, something “greater than we can judge.”226 Once more, Augustine
admits that if human judgment were to compare Adam’s crime to that of his
son’s, Cain, “the comparison would be judged ridiculous.” This also applies
to the divine punishments that these actions received. That Adam took
an apple from the tree of good and evil knowledge was punished by an
extraordinary set of varying punishments; but Cain, on the other hand, after
murdering his own brother, was handled rather leniently.
The ultimate reason for this is, once again, the inadequacy of human
judgment as compared to the divine point of view:
The sin [of Cain] was again great, and the punishment light, but this seems
so in the judgments of human beings who do not know these mysteries and
who cannot measure the sins of human beings with as clear and complete a
judgment as God.227 [transl. Teske]

meliorem naturam potueris inuenire. natura quippe rationalis quanto est ipsa superior, tanto
ruina eius peior, et peccatum eius quanto incredibilius, tanto est damnabilius.
225 c. Iul. imp. 6, 23 pomum quippe lege dei uetitum manducare, leue uideretur esse peccatum:

sed quanti hoc aestimauerit qui non potest falli, satis apparet granditate supplicii. […] quam
magna poena est, tam magnum debemus intellegere peccatum, quod ea poena dignum fuerat
uindicari. quid igitur agis, obsecro te, cum peccatum Adae tanta extenuare conaris instantia,
nisi deum arguis immanis horrendaeque saeuitiae, qui hoc tanta, non dico seueritate, sed
crudelitate puniuit? quod de deo, si nefas est sentire, cur non quantitatem culpae, de qua
homines iudicare non possunt, iudicante iudice incomparabiliter iusto, de poenae granditate
metiris, et tuam linguam a sacrilega loquacitate compescis? Ultimately, Augustine depends
on God’s justice in that the punishment corresponds to the crime: only a cruel and unjust
judge measures disproportionately excessive punishments.
226 c. Iul. imp. 6, 23, (quoting nupt. et conc. 2, 58) multo est grandius quam iudicare nos

possumus.
227 c. Iul. imp. 6, 23 hic rursus ingens culpa, et leuis poena: sed hominum iudiciis hoc uidetur,

qui nec mysteria ista cognoscunt, et hominum culpas tam liquido atque integro examine, quam
deus pensare non possunt.
130 chapter three

There is thus one factor in common between Adam and Eve’s singular
act of disobedience and the ‘ordinary’ sins of disobedience on the one hand,
and between human judgments and divine justice, on the other: the great
distance between these pairs of concepts.

Whose God? Which Justice?

On what could be called the most general theological level, Augustine’s
position of just punishment for collective humanity is challenged by Julian’s
remarks on the divergence between his and Augustine’s conceptions of
justice and God. As Julian does not acknowledge any other consequences
of Adam’s fall than its bad example, he finds untenable Augustine’s notions
of the justice of God who punishes people who are unable to commit any
sins (that is, infants who cannot will, or make judgments, as having no
reason).
Indeed, Julian concludes, Augustine’s views of divine justice lead him to
confess a different god who is an evil criminal and not the just God of the
Christians.228 For God would not be God, if He were not to act according
to justice.229 In response to these allegations, Augustine again appeals to
a more communal view of Adam’s figure than Julian is ready to admit:
“all who were going to be born from Adam through concupiscence of the
flesh were present in his loins.”230 In other words, concupiscentia carnis
transmits the sin of Adam and links all humanity to the fate of Adam. To
perceive Adam’s crucial role in the divine punishments for humanity calls
for a “Christian eye” by which Julian could see “by faith, if he cannot by
intelligence.” It is clear that Augustine takes Julian’s critique to be a result
of a mistaken understanding of how God acts in His mercy and in His
justice. To Augustine, humanity’s state of affairs has obvious relevance to
the concept of justice:
You complain in the same way that stupid and ignorant people like you
complain about him when they say: Why does he create those whom he
foreknows will be sinners and will be condemned? […] If someone says to
them, Who are you, a human being, to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) and
His judgments are inscrutable (Rom 11:33), they become angry rather than
calm down […] In those, then, whom he sets free we embrace his mercy, but

228 Julian emphasises his different conception of God by using phrases such as deus tuus,

deus meus, noster deus, ecclesiae catholicae deus, pro hoc igitur deo meo. c. Iul. imp. 1, 50–51.
229 See Lössl 2001, 130–134.
230 c. Iul. imp. 1, 48 in lumbis Adam fuisse omnes, qui ex illo fuerant per concupiscentiam

carnis orturi.
paradise and punishment 131

in those whom he does not set free we acknowledge his judgment which is
indeed most hidden, but undoubtedly most just.231 [transl. Teske]
Nowhere is the difference more acute between the debaters than in c. Iul.
imp. 3. Julian returns to his statement on God’s being and justice that he had
made in c. Iul. imp. 1: God is the “genus of justice,” and divine justice is known
from divine laws; furthermore, according to Julian, justice does not entail a
notion of favouritism or fraud (sine fraude, sine gratia), but gives “to every-
one what is due” (suum cuique tribuens). Divine justice also acts “according
to reason.”232 For his part, Augustine agrees with Julian’s statement of justice
equalling to God’s being, but denies Julian’s other premise of justice work-
ing sine gratia. Furthermore, Augustine acknowledges the classical notion
of justice in giving each his or her due by noting that all divine punishments
are certainly duly merited, and then finds entire humanity suffering from
just and divine punishments because of Adam, concupiscence and original
sin, while Julian cannot conceive of just punishment “except for those sins
which it is clear were committed by free will.”233
The gist of the argument of God’s justice in c. Iul. imp. 3 lies in the
diverging views both sides take on the following question: is it just to punish
the descendants of Adam and Eve for a sin these two had committed?
Julian’s answer is clear enough:
[T]he true God can do nothing in judgment that is opposed to justice, and
for this reason none can be held guilty for the sins of others […] it would be
unjust that guilt is passed on in the seeds.234 [transl. Teske]
This stance is defended with an array of biblical laws. While Augustine takes
for granted the just nature of God’s laws, he is equally convinced of the fact
God is not bound to his own laws about justice: aliter ergo iudicat deus,
aliter homini praecipit ut iudicet, cum deus homine sine ulla dubitatione sit
iustior.235

231 c. Iul. imp. 1, 48 grauius conquerantur stulti et indocti similes tui qui dicunt: utquid creat,

quos impios futuros et damnandos esse praesciuit? […] quibus si dicatur: o homo, tu quis es qui
respondeas deo [Rom 9,20]? inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius [Rom 11,33], irascuntur potius quam
mitescunt […] in eis ergo quos liberat amplectamur misericordiam, in eis autem quos non liberat
agnoscamus iudicium occultissimum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimum. See also c.
Iul. 4, 45–46: if God bestows grace, he is merciful; if he punishes, he is just; c. Iul. imp. 1, 129–
130. See Lössl 2001, 118, with literature.
232 c. Iul. imp. 3, 6.
233 c. Iul. imp. 3, 3.
234 c. Iul. imp. 3, 11.
235 c. Iul. imp. 3, 12.
132 chapter three

The problem is personified in the form of a fictitious human judge.236

Both adversaries agree that if such a judge would act in the way God judges
human beings for the sins of their parents, he would be unjust (iniustus).
Thus, concludes Julian, even God cannot act likewise. On the contrary,
Augustine claims:
[I]f a human judge says, “I shall punish the children for the sins of their
parents,” he says something most unjust and contradicts God’s order, but God
is neither a liar nor unjust when he says this.237 [transl. Teske]
As has been noted by many, Julian takes divine and human justice to be
equal enough to allow the conclusions of the kind he makes. Augustine, on
the other hand, is able to hide the grounds for seemingly unjust judgments
in the ‘higher’ state that divine justice has compared to that of human one.
Augustine’s language here is paradoxical. On the one hand, he denies the
comparison (incomparabiliter, noli comparare) between human judges and
divine justice: ab humana iustitia discerne diuinam.238 On the other hand, he
constantly uses comparatives in stating the way divine justice is related to its
human version (excelsior, distantior, iustior, maior): divine judgments only
seem (uidetur) unjust, even though they are, in fact, undoubtedly just.239 In
sum, Julian knows that divine justice cannot diverge from what we know to
be justice, and divine justice can be scrutinised in light of reason.240 More-

236 See also c. Iul. imp. 5, 28.

237 c. Iul. imp. 3, 17 si homo iudicans dicat: reddam peccata patrum in filios, iniustissime dicit
et diuino imperio contradicit, nec ideo tamen deus aut mendax aut iniustus est, cum hoc dicit.
Augustine himself followed this rule in ecclesial jurisdiction. See the highly satirical and caus-
tic remarks to Auxilius, who had excommunicated an entire household for the shortcomings
of the paterfamilias, ep. 250. Augustine inquires whether Auxilius had thought that he could
take a divine standpoint and punish the children for the sin of their father, as in the case of
Adam and future generations? Of course, this was not the case: the excommunication had to
be cancelled.
238 c. Iul. imp. 3, 24–27.
239 c. Iul. imp. 3, 24 quid est quod dicis, homo, qui multum desipis? quanto excelsior, tanto

inscrutabilior diuina quam humana iustitia tantoque ab hac illa distantior. quis enim homo ius-
tus sinit perpetrari scelus, quod habet in potestate non sinere? et tamen sinit haec deus incom-
parabiliter iustis omnibus iustior et cuius potestas est inconparabiliter omnibus potestatibus
maior. haec cogita et noli iudicem deum iudicibus hominibus comparare, quem non dubitan-
dum est esse iustum, etiam quando facit, quod hominibus uidetur iniustum et quod homo si
faceret esset iniustus. Cf. Bourke 1970, 14: “So God has his own unique justice and it is quite
different from the other justice which He provides as a basis for human judgment.”
240 This equivalency can also be seen in Julian’s logical argument in c. Iul. imp. 3, 31.

Augustine answers by pointing out, not the completely unequivocal nature of human and
divine justice, but God’s incomparably better view of justice, so to speak, and the immensely
limited scope of humans on justice, especially on the matter of original sin and grace. Hence,
paradise and punishment 133

over, Augustine knows that human knowledge of divine justice is incom-

plete and literally inferior to God’s justice, and therefore allows a special
plea for the inscrutable and hidden nature of justice in divine punishments.
Adam’s sin and its punishment override the human horizon of justice, and
therefore cannot be searched for with human standards of reason and jus-
tice. Thus, they have to be left under divine, inscrutable jurisdiction:
This sin, then, belongs to God’s judgment, not to that of human beings, just
like many other things about which human beings are completely unable
to judge […] this was something God did not want a human judge to be
permitted to do, because he himself knows why he does this justly when he
does it, but human weakness does not know it.241 [transl. Teske]
The debate with Julian brought to light Augustine’s crucial convictions of
God, justice and humanity, and the way these were related to his posi-
tion on concupiscentia carnis as being a divine punishment for Adam and
Eve’s sin. We have seen that all four assessments that were presented in the
beginning of this section have each covered some part of Augustine’s defen-
sive tactics against Julian’s acute criticism. Lössl and Rist have pointed out
the problems that ensued from Augustine’s emphasis on the great differ-
ence between divine and human justice. It is true that Augustine frequently
refers to God’s obscure nature and justice in defending his picture of con-
cupiscentia. To Augustine, God acts in a different way than a just human
judge would act. Therefore one indeed has to “discern between human and
divine justice.” The character of Adam’s disobedience remains inscrutable,
as does the exact manner by which the secondary disobedience of concupis-
centia carnis is turned into an inseparable weakness of the human nature.
On the other hand, Augustine emphasises more the difference in degree
than in quality when defending divine justice. This means that God’s jus-
tice is “higher,” “clearer,” and “more complete,” and therefore he is “more
just” (iustior). While Augustine declines to treat divine and human justice
as simply comparable and straightforwardly analogical to each other, he is
still able to argue for divine justice and induce theological truths from what
he conceives to be punishments. Augustine maintains that the magnitude
and depth of sufferings and punishments of humanity point both to a justice
high above human reasoning and to an ancient crime that was duly pun-
ished.

as Augustine emphasises to Julian, “distinguish the persons of God and of the human judge.”
c. Iul. imp. 3, 34.
241 c. Iul. imp. 3, 33.
134 chapter three

However, the insights offerred by McGrath and Dodaro are corroborated

by the obvious similarities in Augustine’s way of treating both divine mercy
and divine punishment as arising from the hidden and unfathomable judg-
ments of God. The traditional notion of justice as giving each his or her due,
is indeed inadequate from the Augustinian point of view: the mystery of
the divine justice in the punishment of concupiscentia is similar to the mys-
tery of divine justice in the merciful gift of grace. Furthermore, while Julian
focused on the voluntary decisions of each individual soul in determining
moral responsibility, Augustine held fast to his idea of the solidarity of sin
in the figure of Adam: every member of humanity is implicated with the
voluntary choice of Adam, and is thereby justly punished.

3.4. Conclusion

How was the notion of concupiscentia as a divine punishment developed in

Augustine’s theology?
From early on, Augustine was interested in investigating the causality
of sin and punishment, the circumstances of Paradise, the possible con-
sequences of Adam and Eve’s choices for future generations, and the role
of desire. However, these investigations were at first conducted somewhat
separately, and with conflicting results: the causality of sin and punish-
ment emphasised the role of the individual (lib. arb. 1), the circumstances
of Paradise were read as figures for psychological and spiritual realities on
a general level and the possible consequences of Adam and Eve’s sin were
described on a varied and tentative scale and certainly not with the later
emphasis on sexual desire.
What happens in the early 410s is a certain conglomeration of all these
elements, added to an invention concerning sexual desire (concupiscentia
carnis). As Augustine was writing his extensive commentary on Genesis,
and simultaneously involving himself with the ascetic teachings of Pelagius
and his circle, he did not randomly create the depravity of sexual desire from
thin air, and then arbitrarily advance it as a vehicle for original evil. Instead,
he invented, or discovered, concupiscentia carnis as perfectly fitting to his
views on punishment, justice, obedience, and the inability of humanity
to deliver itself from the servitude of Adam’s heritage. As the secondary
disobedience, concupiscentia carnis worked as evidence for the major sin
of Adam and Eve, and pointed not only to the ideal state of Paradise,
but also to the damaging influence that Adam and Eve’s choice of free
will had had on the human constitution. In essence, the reciprocity of
paradise and punishment 135

concupiscentia as a bodily disobedience for a theological disobedience of

Adam and Eve was a piece that fit too well Augustine’s puzzle of hidden
grace, of the occult ways of divine punishment, and of justice and obedience
to be abandoned as a mere piecemeal ammunition for what became a
serious doctrinal debate. Augustine also seems to have been convinced
of the rhetorical and persuasive force of his construction of the punitive
concupiscentia, as can be seen from its extensive and eloquent description
in ciu. 14.
However, Augustine’s invention was just that: an invention. It was not
an inevitable conclusion, drawn from undisputable arguments, but rather
an interesting suggestion, and was therefore prone to attract heavy criti-
cism from the part of his latter day nemesis, Julian of Aeclanum. Julian’s
attacks were astute for he was acute to perceive what was behind Augus-
tine’s emphasis on the corrupt and evil character of sexual desire. The
result of Julian’s critique, in hindsight, was that Augustine did not manage
to retain the harmonious, aesthetically satisfying account of two, recipro-
cal disobediences, reflecting man’s position before God and God’s justice
towards humanity. Instead, the construction was submitted to analytical
and deconstructive, albeit openly hostile, criticism.
We have seen in this chapter how Augustine was extremely concerned
with connecting corrupt sexual desire (concupiscentia carnis) to a larger the-
ological context. This context was provided by the relationship of God with
Adam and Eve (both as historical individuals and symbolical, communal
figures of the human soul) in the ideal state of Paradise, and their conse-
quent Fall from this relationship. The notion of concupiscentia carnis as a
divine punishment was for Augustine a psychological tip of a theological
iceberg, being inseparably connected to his views on God, God’s justice, and
God’s mercy. It is perhaps to Augustine’s merit as a theological thinker that
his insights into the hidden ways of divine punishments, justice, grace, and
their interrelation always remain constant and coherent. On the other hand,
the success of Julian as Augustine’s relentless critic lay exactly in Julian’s
ability to correctly identify the theological corollaries behind Augustine’s
invention of concupiscentia as a divine punishment, even if one would not
be willing to admit Julian’s superiority in forming competing accounts on
sin, moral responsibility and grace.
chapter four

THE ROOT AND MATRIX OF SIN

uenam inspice, radicem unde procedant quaere.

ep. Io. tr. 10, 7

in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas

est, in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet
omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.
s. Denis 14, 2
A constant feature in Augustine’s work is the antagonism of two kinds of
basic attitudes (or wills, or loves) that are directed either to temporal and
sensual satisfaction or to eternal and intellectual things, and ultimately
to God.1 These two loves define, for example the true nature of the two

1 A concise overview is Bonner 1996, 166–172. The opposite of caritas and cupiditas

provided the subject for the classic studies of Nygren 1938 (the references below are to the
revised English translation [1953]) and Burnaby 1938, the latter being partly a reaction to the
former’s thesis on two competing motifs of love (agape, eros). To Nygren, these were brought
into a synthesis by Augustine as what Nygren refers to as the caritas-ideal. Nygren treats
cupiditas (1953, 482–503) as the other possible kind of one basic desirous love, caritas being
the opposite one. A substrate of desirous love is thus detached and induced from Augustine’s
concepts of cupiditas and caritas, as an “elemental drive.” There is no actual difference in
the quality of these two loves; the difference lies only in their objects. Nygren argues that
cupiditas can simply be seen as a “downward” movement to temporal things; this movement
contradicts man’s original destiny and turns man to “bend” towards earthly things. The falsity
of cupiditas-love lies in its striving for objects that are of less worth than the human soul
(1953, 490). As one becomes what one loves, so a person will be “of the world” if he or she
loves temporal objects. But, adds Nygren (1953, 496), even sins refer to God, for the acts
made by cupiditas, mirror a desire for God’s rest (quies). Unknowingly, man thus loves God,
even if his love is aimed at other things. On this point of his reconstruction, Nygren admits
that such definitions of caritas and cupiditas become inevitably incoherent (“very vague,”
1953, 497): the original dualistic difference is watered down. The common substrate of both
caritas and cupiditas represents for Nygren an example of the eros-motif, caritas representing
“heavenly Eros” and cupiditas playing the part of “vulgar Eros”: both finally lead to the same
form of desiring love, not having much to do with the agape-motif. Nygren concludes by
claiming that Augustine represents the ancient eudaimonistic tradition in a Christian frame.
Augustine’s caritas is an anthropocentric concept that seeks after its “own” (1953, 502–503,
“the Christian commandment of love to God—naturally cast in quite a new mould—is made
the answer to man’s inevitable desire”). In recent times, Burnaby 1938 has been considered
138 chapter four

opposing cities in ciu.; they define the ultimate quality of an individual

act, that is, according to its provenance an act may be either good or bad
regardless of its outer appearance (hence, all virtues can be reduced to
either cupiditas or caritas, depending on whether they are practised by
Christians or not);2 they are related to each other in a zero-sum equation
during the Christian renewal, that is, as divine caritas takes more and more
place in the life of a Christian, the less does cupiditas have hold of his or
her heart. An idea of two opposite loves is, obviously, formally dualistic,
attracting dualistic rhetoric and figures of speech.3
Augustine has several names for both of these attitudes, and he also
remarks on the terminology himself.4 The evil form of love is usually, but
not always, denoted with cupiditas, whereas the good form of love is usu-
ally, but not always, denoted with caritas. Other words used are libido or
concupiscentia; and amor or dilectio, respectively.5
On innumerable occasions the contrast between the two opposite loves
occurs as a stylistic, rhetorical device that is used, for example, in sermons,
or in letters: Augustine simply briefly appeals to the polarity between the
two as one of his own theological commonplaces.6

a better guide to Augustine’s doctrine of love (cf. Oliver O’Donovan’s preface in Burnaby
1991, v–vii, and O’Daly 1987, 6 n. 24). For Burnaby’s criticism of Nygren’s central thesis, see
Burnaby 1938, 15–21. Burnaby finds fault with Nygren’s “unnecessary and quite unjustified
claim to historical objectivity,” with Nygren’s artificial way of antithetically opposing and
isolating agape and eros as religious motives, and especially with Nygren’s way of picturing
agape as a purely self-giving and thus finally self-contradictory value: “For it belongs to the
nature of Agape never to be evoked in response to a present value, but to create value
in the person upon whom it is freely bestowed. And this is the point at which Nygren’s
whole scheme is left hanging in the air […] Nygren may speak constantly of the ‘new way
of fellowship with God’ which the Gospel opens. But he is forbidden by his premisses to find
in this fellowship itself any value which man may rightly desire.” See also Holte 1958, 207–210;
Burnaby 1970 and Rist 1970 for continued criticism of Nygren’s division. Other more recent
studies concerning the opposition of cupiditas and caritas are Babcock 1991; 1995. See also
O’Donovan 1980, especially on the aspect of self-love and cupiditas. For a more speculative
attempt, see Schlabach 1998.
2 c. Iul. imp. 1, 83.
3 Augustine is, of course, often very careful to note that the duality in concepts and terms

does not imply an ontological dualism. Cf. c. Faust. 20, 3–4, where Faustus, Augustine’s oppo-
nent, acknowledges the difference between Manichaean dualism and Augustine’s monism.
For different versions of ‘dualism,’ see Armstrong 1984; van Oort 1991, 225–226, who contrasts
the Manichaean “absolute” or “radical dualism” with Augustine’s “religious dualism.”
4 Most famously in ciu. 14, 7.
5 See above, Chapter 2.
6 See e.g. conf. 8, 12 ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae

cupiditati cedere; sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat; c. ep. Parm. 3, 10
desinant calumniari bonis non operantibus mala per morbidam cupiditatem, sed tolerantibus
the root and matrix of sin 139

While a thorough analysis of Augustine’s concept of love and its inter-

connections with cupiditas lies beyond the scope of this study, let us take a
a brief look on three larger discussions on the two forms of love. This serves
as an introduction to the two subsequent sections, which survey the func-
tion of cupiditas as the common inner source for the large variety of external
evil actions through two, striking literary images.

4.1. Cupiditas and Caritas—An Overview

The series of questions in de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 33–36

deals with fear and love.7 The main line of the somewhat tangled argument
is conventional: one should love eternal things over temporal ones (diu. qu.
35, 1).
Accordingly love ought not to be sought for itself, should it, when unmistak-
ably misery follows on the loss of what is loved […] when we seek what ought
to be loved we are lookinh for something to which this motion ought to direct
us. For this reason, if love ought to be loved, surely not every kind of love ought
to be. For there is a base love by means of which the soul chases after things
inferior to itself, and this love is more properly called covetousness (cupidi-
tas), that is to say, “the root of all evils.”8 [transl. Mosher]

propter pacificam caritatem; spir. et litt. 6 non ad luminosae caritatis fructum, sed ad libidi-
nosae cupiditatis adfectum; spir. et litt. 65 aliud est enim totam nondum adsequi caritatem,
aliud nullam sequi cupiditatem; ep. 209, 9 cui quanto magis sinceram habeo caritatem, tanto
magis prauae cupiditati eius obsisto; ep. 228, 7 ubi dei caritas flagrat, non mundi cupiditas
fumat; ep. 2*, 11 caritas enim qua es id facturus ex deo est, concupiscentia uero, qua id ut non-
dum facias detineris non est ex deo; Io. eu. tr. 38, 5 quantum inter pietatem et impietatem,
quantum inter spem et desperationem, quantum inter caritatem et cupiditatem; multum ergo
intererat; en. Ps. 31, 2, 5 amate, sed quid ametis uidete. amor dei, amor proximi, caritas dici-
tur; amor mundi, amor huius saeculi, cupiditas dicitur. cupiditas refrenetur, caritas excitetur;
s. 164, 6 male te subiugauerat cupiditas, salubriter te subiuget caritas; s. 265, 11 cupiditas enim
cupit diuidere, sicut caritas colligere; s. 311, 13 euome cupiditatem, bibe caritatem; s. Lambot 2
proponite autem uobis ante oculos duas quasdam personas: unam cupiditatis, unam caritatis.
cupiditatem dico amorem peccandi, quia est cupiditas nonnumquam quae appellatur in bono.
item caritatem dico amorem recte uiuendi quia aliquando et caritas appellatur in malo; s. Mai
14, 1 caritas enim innouat hominem: nam sicut cupiditas facit hominem ueterem, sic caritas
nouum.
7 As individual questions are difficult to date certainly, the dates of diu. qu. 34–36 remain

unascertainable. Mosher 1982, 20 suggests the year 391. The antithesis between the good and
evil forms of love was part of Augustine’s thought from the start, and had appeared already
in mor. 1, 21: quanto ergo magis longe discedit a deo non loco sed affectione atque cupiditate
ad inferiora quam est ipse, tanto stultitia miseriaque completur. dilectione igitur redit in deum,
qua se illi non componere, sed supponere affectat.
8 diu. qu. 35, 1 num igitur propter se ipsum amor appetendus est, cum quando desit quod

amatur ea sit indubitata miseria […] cum quaerimus quid amandum sit, quid sit illud ad quod
140 chapter four

The concept of cupiditas represents a shameful (turpis) kind of love that

seeks inferior, temporal things instead of eternal ones (quae non potest
deesse); it truly is the “root of all evil.” Augustine points out that in determin-
ing the quality of love, one has to evaluate its object; that is, the direction of
its movement (ad quod moueri). In the case of “shameful love,” the objects
are perishable, and always entail the possibility of being taken away from
the one who loves or enjoys them. In contrast, the right kind of love imme-
diately possesses the imperishable objects of its knowledge (cognoscendo
habere 35, 2). Augustine attempts to define caritas as a “kind of movement”
or “a kind of desire” with intellectual contents. While mens is the only part
of the soul that can know the eternal matters, the lower part of the soul can
also be said to love the right object. “The soul ought to love with its other
parts as well this magnificent object which must be known by the mind.”9
Especially in diu. qu. 36, the opposite character of caritas and cupiditas is
emphasised. Augustine analyses them in the context of the progress of the
soul, or through Christian renewal; Augustine claims that there is a zero-
sum equation between caritas and cupiditas both before and after baptism.
Together with fear (timor), cupiditas is a force inhibiting the progress of
love in the soul, and these forces should therefore be dispelled by the
opposing force of love.10 A gradual change into a homo nouus (diu. qu. 36, 2)
proceeds by diminishing evil desire and its effects on the soul. Accordingly,
cupiditas should be first expelled by invoking a healthful fear of God.11
Augustine compares this process to the taming of animals, although the task
is more difficult, as cupiditas is able to corrupt even human reasoning into
its service (ratio, quae cum seruit cupiditati peruersione miserabili). Next, a
fear of God should then be replaced by caritatis libertas. Finally, one should
receive baptism. As for Christian life following the baptism, what remains is
determining how one’s life is divided between homo uetus and homo nouus.
The former constantly tries to find its enjoyment in temporal and carnal
goods by way of cupiditas, whereas the “new man” pursues the spiritual

moueri oporteat quaerimus. quare si amandus est amor, non utique omnis amandus est. est
enim et turpis amor, quo animus se ipso inferiora sectatur, quae magis proprie cupiditas dicitur,
omnium scilicet malorum radix. et ideo non amandum est quod amanti et fruenti auferri potest.
9 diu. qu. 35, 2 [transl. Mosher]. Note that Augustine later rejected the idea of immediate

possession through knowledge. retr. 1, 26.

10 Augustine has found timor and cupiditas from two Scriptural verses respectively, 1Jn 4,

18 and 1 Tim 6, 10.

11 Persuasion to fear God should not be based on reasoned arguments, but on scriptural

examples (diu. qu. 36, 1).

the root and matrix of sin 141

and eternal goods. In progress, the different and subtle forms of cupiditas
may constitute serious obstacles to right love (cupiditas uoluptatis, cupiditas
placendi hominibus, superbia). Pride (superbia) is the ultimate challenge for
the “wise man” who has already overcome his carnal pleasures and his desire
to please other people. Augustine advises to check pride by fear of God.
Thus, the circle in the progress of virtue is completed.12
These questions in diu. qu. demonstrate that Augustine was, from his
early works onwards, convinced of the explanatory force of the search for
a common denominator of sinful human behaviour, one that could be
reduced to one single concept, cupiditas. In contrast to this force, Augus-
tine posited love as the fundamental motivation to virtuous action. More-
over, Augustine is able to evaluate the forms of love by inquiring about
their objects; again, this occurs in a reduced and dualistic form in distin-
guishing between temporal and eternal, perishable and imperishable, exter-
nal and immediately internal objects. Finally, diu. qu. 33–36 indicates how
Augustine approaches the division of two loves explicitly from the angle of
renewal, so that the contrast between cupiditas and caritas immediately
invites him to consider how and by which methods one could conquer
cupiditas and grow in caritas.
The role of cupiditas as antithetical to love (caritas) in de doctrina chris-
tiana has crucial significance. On a general level, Augustine knows of love
that has fallen from the truth. Despite this fall, there remains a certain
amount of love for oneself (dilectio sui) and one’s body (corporis sui).13 The
fallen element in such a love consists of a wish to rule over one’s equals,
and to strive for a similar position to that of God. This, says Augustine, is
no longer love, but hatred (odium). To strive for such power results from
a perverse order in the hierarchy of loves. The “most intolerable” aspect of
such love that has turned upside down is pride (superbia), particularly in its
social dimensions.14
In doctr. chr., cupiditas is referred to as the wrongly aimed, egotistic form
of love; it is a perversion of the good form of love.15 Augustine first defines

12 diu. qu. 36, 4 dei timor non solum inchoat, sed etiam perficit sapientiam.
13 doctr. chr. 1, 22.
14 doctr. chr. 1, 23 qui sibi naturaliter pares sunt, hoc est hominibus, dominari affectat.
15 doctr. chr. 1, 12: sed quoniam cupiditate fruendi pro ipso creatore creatura, homines con-

figurati huic mundo et mundi nomine congruentissime uocati, non eam cognouerunt, propterea
dixit euangelista: et mundus eam non cognouit. While Augustine introduces his distinction
between uti and frui (1, 3, 3–5, 5) in doctr. chr., it has been shown that the distinction does
not play a particularly significant role in Augustine’s oeuvre as a whole, despite its deep
142 chapter four

cupiditas in terms of goals in the following way: motus animi ad fruendum

se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum.16 He then proceeds by
proposing a generalising theory for the emergence of sin against oneself and
other people. According to this theory, an inadequate or missing relation to
God also distorts the relations to other persons. If one’s fruitio is ordered
mistakenly, and has as its goal the created things instead of the creator, it
results in two kinds of evils that are tightly interconnected. In both cases,
the opposite of well-ordered love, that is, “unbridled lust” works as the main
agent (cupiditas […] agit) in causing two kinds (genera) of sins:
What unbridled lust does to corrupt a person’s own mind and body is called
wickedness; what it does to harm another person is called wrongdoing. All
sins can be divided into these two kinds, but wickedness comes first. Once it
has depleted the mind and as it were bankrupted it, it rushes on to commit
wrongdoing in order to remove the obstacles to wickedness or to find assis-
tance for it.17 [transl. Green]
The purpose of cupiditas and its two corollaries here is to give a general
classification for “all sins” (omnium peccatorum). Augustine’s depiction of
the two kinds of cupiditas-driven sins entails a consumerist notion of a force
that first exhausts one’s own soul (by flagitium), and then turns to other
persons in its thirst for satisfaction and fulfilment through “injurious acts,”
or “wrongdoing” (facinora). Being opposed to caritas, evil desire diminishes
and exploits the value of human soul, destroying both the individual soul
and its neighbours.18 The “movement” of cupiditas is in polar opposition to

influence on the later history of theology. A concise definition of the distinction is doctr. chr.
1, 4 frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam. uti autem, quod in usum uenerit,
ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. The most recent extensive study
is Pollmann 1996, who gives cupiditas less attention and concentrates more on caritas. See,
however, Pollmann 1996, 137.
16 doctr. chr. 3, 16. For motus, see Pollmann 1996, 137.
17 doctr. chr. 3, 16 quod autem agit indomita cupiditas ad corrumpendum animum et cor-

pus suum, flagitium uocatur; quod autem agit, ut alteri noceat, facinus dicitur. Et haec sunt
duo genera omnium peccatorum, sed flagitia priora sunt. Quae cum exinaniuerint animum et
ad quandam egestatem perduxerint, in facinora prosilitur, quibus remoueantur impedimenta
flagitiorum aut adiumenta quaerantur. The word pair facinus—flagitium is standard distinc-
tion in Augustine, and appears e.g. in conf. 3, 15–17 in connection with Mt 22, 39. For the
classical uses of the words, see O’Donnell 1992, II, 191.
18 Quite unlike cupiditas, caritas aims at usefulness and wellbeing of oneself and benev-

olence towards one’s neighbour. For a colourful description of the benevolent aspect of
caritas, cf. ep. Io. tr. 8, 5 non sic debemus amare homines, quomodo audimus gulosos dicere,
amo turdos. quaeris quare? ut occidat, et consumat. et amare se dicit, et ad hoc illos amat ut
non sint, ad hoc amat ut perimat. et quidquid ad cibandum amamus, ad hoc amamus, ut illud
consumatur, et nos reficiamur. numquid sic amandi sunt homines, tanquam consumendi? sed
the root and matrix of sin 143

love. However, both forms of love seem to proceed from an evaluation of

oneself, being either misguided or correct.19 Augustine again mentions the
zero-sum situation between caritas and cupiditas: the more the realm of evil
desire is destroyed, the more the realm of love increases.20
A rather unique feature of cupiditas in de doctrina christiana is its role in
Augustine’s hermeneutical approach, which is centred and preconditioned
by love.21 From doctr. chr. 3, 14 on, Augustine takes up the notion of caritas as
a hermeneutical key. While doing this, he also pays attention to the opposite
side of cupiditas. In general, his application of the figurative interpretation is
restricted to those passages that do not relate to moral conduct (morum hon-
estas) or to doctrinal truths (fidei ueritas).22 Both mores and fides refer to God
and one’s neighbour, by love and by knowledge. Furthermore, neither of
these norms should be taken as defined by any human standards or conven-
tions (consuetudines), as these conventions suffer from local and temporal
limitations (that is, they vary depending on time and place). Human moral
conventions are also always open to erroneous intellectual judgments.23 A

amicitia quaedam beneuolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. quid, si non
sit quod praestemus? sola beneuolentia sufficit amanti. non enim optare debemus esse miseros,
ut possimus exercere opera misericordiae. For a contemporary application of this theme, see
Jenson 1999, II, 141.
19 doctr. chr. 3, 16 item quod agit caritas quo sibi prosit, utilitas est; quod autem agit ut prosit

proximo, beneficientia nominatur. et hic praecedit utilitas, quia nemo potest ex eo quod non
habet prodesse alteri.
20 doctr. chr. 3, 16 quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto caritatis auge-

tur.
21 The standard study by Karla Pollmann (1996) on doctr. chr. emphasises and analyses

the role of caritas in Augustine’s hermeneutics. Pollmann (1996, 135–136) remarks that doctr.
chr. is in fact the first and only systematic presentation of the concept of caritas in Augustine.
In this work, love (caritas) of God and neighbour in the form of the twin commandments
grows to a primary hermeneutical key in understanding the Scripture. Pollmann 1996, 121–
147. This hermeneutical frame is set in doctr. chr. 1, penetrating the following books, and
surfacing especially in doctr. chr. 3. See e.g. doctr. chr. 2, 10 nam in eo se exercet omnis
diuinarum scripturarum studiosus, nihil in eis aliud inuenturus quam diligendum esse deum
propter deum et proximum propter deum, et illum quidem ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota
mente, proximum uero tamquam se ipsum, id est, ut tota proximi, sicut etiam nostri, dilectio
referatur in deum. In doctr. chr. 3 the distinction appears mainly in the parts written in
the first stage of editing doctr. chr. (396/397). Pollmann also notes (1996, 128, 146) that the
connection between the concept of caritas and uti-frui-division is made for the first time in
doctr. chr. For the importance of doctr. chr. in Augustine’s view of love, see also Burnaby 1938,
105; Babcock 1988, 53.
22 See Pollmann 1996, 136–137. For the development of these criteria, see Teske 1995.
23 doctr. chr. 3, 15 sed quoniam procliue est humanum genus non ex momentis ipsius libi-

dinis sed potius suae consuetudinis aestimare peccata, fit plerumque ut quisque hominum ea
tantum culpanda arbitretur, quae suae regionis et temporis homines uituperare atque damnare
144 chapter four

divinely authorised vicious circle therefore becomes unavoidable: First, the

passages that do not relate to mores or fides are to be interpreted figura-
tively. Second, however, due to the customs of the time (consuetudo) or to
misguided opinions (erroris opinio) one is unable to discern which passages
relate to mores or fides. Therefore, whatever the scripture commands in the
field of mores, relates to caritas and cupiditas; again, whatever the scripture
prescribes in the field of fides, relates to caritas and cupiditas as well (doctr.
chr. 3, 15).24
That the inevitable temporal perspective causes problems for the scrip-
tural interpretation is illuminated by way of yet another example which
emphasises the corruptive force of cupiditas in the hermeneutical process.
Accordingly, one should not regard the seemingly morally reproachable
narrations about the Old Testament figures (e.g. polygamy) in terms of the
standards of one’s own time, for times may have changed for the worse, and
what could be done previously without lust, may now no longer be possi-
ble.25 Therefore, even passages that seem to commend immoral action from
the present view of point should be related to love.
In the same vein, Augustine is concerned with another way cupiditas
may lead biblical interpretation astray. Such an error is committed if the

consuerunt, et ea tantum probanda atque laudanda, quae consuetudo eorum cum quibus uiuit
admittit, eoque contingit ut, si quid scriptura uel praeceperit quod abhorret a consuetudine
audientium uel quod non abhorret culpauerit, si animum eorum iam uerbi uinxit auctori-
tas, figuratam locutionem putent […] item, si animum praeoccupauit alicuius erroris opinio,
quidquid aliter adseruerit scriptura, figuratum homines arbitrantur. For the role of human
conventions in doctr. chr., see Babcock 1995.
24 doctr. chr. 3, 15 non autem praecipit scriptura nisi caritatem nec culpat nisi cupiditatem

et eo modo informat mores hominum […] non autem adserit nisi catholicam fidem rebus prae-
teritis et futuris et praesentibus. praeteritorum narratio est, futurorum praenuntiatio, praesen-
tium demonstratio: sed omnia haec ad eandem caritatem nutriendam atque roborandam et
cupiditatem uincendam atque exstinguendam ualent. Pollmann (1996, 136) formulates clearly
the intrinsic flaw of Augustine’s hermeneutical approach: “Die Ethik ist nach dem Willen
Augustins also die Teleologie der Hermeneutik, d.h. der Ausleger muss auf sie hingerichtet
auslegen und das Auslegungsresultat muss mit ihr übereinstimmen. Anders formuliert: Die
caritas-Ethik Augustins bildet den hermeneutischen Normenhorizont für die tractatio scrip-
turarum, d.h. sie ist sowohl deren Ziel als auch deren Voraussetzung.” See also Pollmann
1996, 138–139 and 142–143: “Dadurch, dass Augustin die caritas zur eigentlichen res der Bibel
macht, die als signum bzw. als signa-haltiger Text auf diese verweist, reduziert er die Bibel
inhaltlich radikal auf einen Teilelement dieser caritas.”
25 doctr. chr. 3, 20 in huiuscemodi moribus quicquid illorum temporum sancti non libidinose

faciebant, quamuis ea facerent, quae hoc tempore nisi per libidinem fieri non possunt, non
culpat scriptura. Libido is prone to be concealed under the customs of the time. doctr. chr. 3,
20 libidinem […] quae inter claustra morum sollemnium latitabat. For the effects of changed
customs and evil desires, see further the cases made in doctr. chr. 3, 30–31.
the root and matrix of sin 145

interpreter is driven by his or her own approach of interpretation to seek

licence for sin in the Old Testament narratives. In Augustine’s example,
this happens by claiming that it would be morally irreprehensible to live
in polygamous relationships now in the same way as the patriarchs did,
without taking into consideration the contemporary state of caritas and
cupiditas. In other words, what was possible for the patriarchs to do without
evil desire, it is not possible for us anymore.26 Evil desire appears here
as a flawed moral precondition in the hermeneutical process, resulting in
something that could be called the hermeneutics of cupiditas; accordingly,
Augustine finds fault with interpreters who would turn biblical material
into the service of selfish needs, thus obscuring the core and norm of the
Bible, i.e. caritas.27
While Augustine admits that different times and varying conventions
affect the way in which caritas may be applied to moral action, he bluntly
rejects a relativistic approach to moral questions (doctr. chr. 3, 22). For
instance, Augustine mentions the Golden Rule as an invincible example
of a commandment that is universal and unchangeable. When the Golden
rule is practised with the only two objects worthy of love, that is, God

26 doctr. chr. 3, 26 item cauendum est ne forte, quod in scripturis ueteribus pro illorum

temporum condicione, etiamsi non figurate sed proprie intellegatur, non est flagitium neque
facinus, ad ista etiam tempora quis putet in usum uitae posse transferri. quod nisi domi-
nante cupiditate et ipsarum quoque scripturarum, quibus euertenda est, satellitium quaerente,
non faciet; nec intellegit miser ad hanc utilitatem illa esse sic posita, ut spei bonae homines
salubriter uideant et consuetudinem, quam aspernantur, posse habere usum bonum et eam,
quam amplexantur, esse posse damnabilem, si et ibi caritas utentium et hic cupiditas adtenda-
tur.
27 Cf. Evans 1982, 163, who fails to notice the corruptive effect of cupiditas on the herme-

neutical process. Moral complaints on sexual behaviour of the OT patriarchs were common
in the Manichaean Bible criticism. Augustine often answered these complaints by deducing
moral flaws in his opponents from their mistaken biblical interpretation. Augustine’s first
anti-Manichaean work, mor., is based on this assumption, which then appears later e.g. in c.
Faust. See c. Faust. 16, 14, where Faustus’ intellectual disability to find Christ in Torah is said
to be due to his moral failure (tumida adrogantia). On a more general level, Augustine points
out that there is something sinister in the way the Manichaeans describe cosmogony in terms
of concupiscentia (c. Faust. 15, 7). See also c. Faust. 19, 24; c. Faust. 19, 26 non ad matrimonii
fidem, sed ad concupiscentiae crimen habendam esse censetis. matrimonium quippe ex hoc
appellatum est, quod non ob aliud debeat femina nubere, quam ut mater fiat: quod uobis
odiosum est. c. Faust. 20, 6 puellas pulchras et pueros proponi dicitis, quorum formosissimis
corporibus inardescant principes tenebrarum, ad feminas masculi et ad masculos feminae, ut
in ipsa flagranti libidine et inhianti concupiscentia de membris eorum tamquam de taetris
sordidisque compedibus dei uestri membra soluantur. Sexual concupiscentia, exorcised by the
Manichaeans in their ethical teaching on continence, became a weapon of propaganda in
Augustine’s hands. For the most vehement attack, see c. Faust. 22, 98.
146 chapter four

and one’s neighbour, (doctr. chr. 3, 22), the two genera of sins (flagitium,
facinus) that were caused by cupiditas in the first place, eventually and
gradually die out. Augustine considered natural self-regard to be universal,
and if it is accompanied with dilectio dei, it works as evidence against all
relativistic claims. To Augustine, an interpreter of the Bible has a clear
moral duty: he or she has to search for an interpretation that will find
love (caritas) towards God and his or her neighbour even in the most
difficult and unpleasant passages of the Bible, and thereby to invert the
“tyranny” of evil desire (cupiditas).28 The seemingly simplistic and reduced
division between the two opposite moral principles of caritas and cupiditas
in biblical interpretation shows thus how Augustine was able to apply his
central theological convictions to matters of surprising complexity.
The opposition between caritas and cupiditas appears in confessiones as
well, written shortly after doctr. chr. In the critical moments preceding the
conversion of his will, Augustine finds himself lingering on the threshold of
divine caritas and his own selfish cupiditas.29 The divine love that Augustine
sees right before his eyes means a rejection of his own wishes and his own
will. So, evil desire impedes Augustine’s dedication to love, for it is essen-
tially “his own” (meae), whereas the origin of love is God (tuae). Later in conf.
13, the opposition of caritas and cupiditas is described with the imagery of
weight and lightness. The directions of these loves are determined by their
objects. Whereas the downward movement of cupiditas is caused by “love
of anxieties” (amor curarum), the upward lift is due to the love of a freedom
from anxieties (amor securitatis). With the help of the Holy Spirit, who is
the giver of caritas, a person drawn by his or her cupiditas is therefore able
to rise to heavenly rest (requies) from the turbulent waters of sins.30

28 doctr. chr. 3, 23 sic euersa tyrannide cupiditatis caritas regnat iustissimis legibus dilec-

tionis dei propter deum, sui et proximi propter deum. seruabitur ergo in locutionibus figuratis
regula huiusmodi, ut tam diu uersetur diligenti consideratione quod legitur, donec ad regnum
caritatis interpretatio perducatur.
29 conf. 8, 12. certum me habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati

cedere, sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat.

30 conf. 13, 8 cui dicam, quomodo dicam de pondere cupiditatis in abruptam abyssum et de

subleuatione caritatis per spiritum tuum, qui superferebatur super aquas [Gn 1,2]? cui dicam?
quomodo dicam? neque enim loca sunt, quibus mergimur et emergimus. quid similius et quid
dissimilius? affectus sunt, amores sunt, immunditia spiritus nostri defluens inferius amore
curarum et sanctitas tui attollens nos superius amore securitatis, ut sursum cor habeamus ad
te. See conf. 13, 10 pondus meum amor meus. Cf. cat. rud. 31, where evil desire is also depicted
as a “weight” that will finally precipitate all evil angels and men into eternal damnation:
omnes enim homines amantes superbiam et temporalem dominationem cum uano typho et
pompa arrogantiae, omnesque spiritus qui talia diligunt, et gloriam suam subiectione hominum
the root and matrix of sin 147

Cupiditas as a privative and self-destructing love, as opposed to caritas,

surfaces again in de trinitate.31 In trin. 10, 7, Augustine reflects on the Delphic
maxim and the self-knowledge of the mind. The evil version of love is a
privative force, not satisfied with a peaceful vision of God, but striving for
something more. When the mind acts out its evil desire (cupiditas praua),
it abandons the calm admiration of divine beauty, and starts to desire for a
private appropriation of divinity and beauty. The mind now cherishes an
idolatrous position: for it seeks to change its status as imago dei, and to
possess a state similar to God’s own nature. Because of such a wish, the
soul does not, of course, achieve its goal, but paradoxically suffers from
diminution. While the soul formerly knew itself better, and was intent upon
God, it now thinks of itself less, and is intent upon the “lower things,” trying
to gain security for itself in those things. By striving for a freedom outside
God, the mind is bound to a gradually deepening servitude of bodily reality.
As a result, what the mind thinks as “more and more” becomes progressively
less.32
An account of the movements in the soul highlights the activities of greed
(cupiditas is here changed with the variant auaritia) as the corrupt form of
love; as the root of all evils and as appearing in form of three temptations or
sins of pride, curiosity and lust of the flesh.
What happens is that the soul, loving its own power, slides away from the
whole which is common to all into the part which is its own private property.

quaerunt, simul una societate deuincti sunt; et si saepe aduersum se pro his rebus dimicant, pari
tamen pondere cupiditatis in eamdem profunditatem praecipitantur.
31 For a definition of love see trin. 8, 10–14, with the usual terminological division: ea

quippe dilectio dicenda quae uera est, alioquin cupiditas est; atque ita cupidi abusiue dicuntur
diligere quemadmodum cupere abusiue dicuntur qui diligunt. Ordo amoris appears in clear
form in trin. 9, 4, as well as in 9, 13, where the antithesis is again referred either to God or
creature: ergo aut cupiditate aut caritate, non quo non sit amanda creatura, sed si ad creatorem
refertur ille amor, non iam cupiditas sed caritas erit.
32 trin. 10, 7 utquid ergo ei praeceptum est ut se ipsa cognoscat? credo ut se cogitet et

secundum naturam suam uiuat, id est ut secundum suam naturam ordinari appetat, sub eo
scilicet cui subdenda est, supra ea quibus praeponenda est; sub illo a quo regi debet, supra ea
quae regere debet. multa enim per cupiditatem prauam tamquam sui sit oblita sic agit. uidet
enim quaedam intrinsecus pulchra in praestantiore natura quae deus est. et cum stare debeat
ut eis fruatur, uolens ea sibi tribuere et non ex illo similis illius sed ex se ipsa esse quod ille est
auertitur ab eo, moueturque et labitur in minus et minus quod putatur amplius et amplius quia
nec ipsa sibi nec ei quidquam sufficit recedenti ab illo qui solus sufficit. ideoque per egestatem
ac difficultatem fit nimis intenta in actiones suas et inquietas delectationes quas per eas colligit;
atque ita cupiditate adquirendi notitias ex his quae foris sunt, quorum cognitum genus amat
et sentit amitti posse nisi impensa cura teneantur, perdit securitatem, tantoque se ipsam minus
cogitat quanto magis secura est quod se non possit amittere.
148 chapter four

By following God’s directions and being perfectly governed by his laws it

could enjoy the whole universe of creation; but by the apostasy of pride which
is called the beginning of sin it strives to grab something more than the whole
and to govern it by its own laws; and because there is nothing more than the
whole it is thrust back into anxiety over a part, and so by being greedy for
more it gets less. That is why greed is called the root of all evils. Thus all that
it tries to do in its own against the laws that govern the universe it does by its
own body, which is the only part it has a part-ownership in. And so it finds
delight in bodily shapes and movements, and because it has not got them
inside, it wraps itself in their images which it has fixed in the memory. In this
way it defiles itself foully with a fanciful sort of fornication by referring all its
business to one or other of the following ends: curiosity, searching for bodily
and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, affecting to be
above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal pleasure,
plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool.33 [transl. Hill]
Several images of the source of evil merge in this text. Augustine combines
the image of ‘root’ (radix) of pride (superbia) and greed (auaritia); the topos
of wrongly ordered love, referring its enjoyment to temporal things instead
of divine truths;34 the three concupiscences as the goals of this perverted
love (curiose quaerit, tumidus fastus, carnalis uoluptas);35 and finally, the
original fallen will is being characterised as a privative paradox: the soul falls
in love with its own power and wants to have “more than the whole” and by
this desire of having more, it eventually gets less. Adam and Eve would have

33 trin. 12, 14 potestatem quippe suam diligens anima, a communi uniuerso ad priuatam

partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia, quod initium peccati dicitur, cum in uniuersitate
creaturae Deum rectorem secuta, legibus eius optime gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid uniuerso
appetens, atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil est amplius uniuersitate, in curam par-
tilem truditur, et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur, unde et auaritia dicitur radix
omnium malorum; totumque illud ubi aliquid proprium contra leges, quibus uniuersitas admin-
istratur, agere nititur, per corpus proprium gerit, quod partiliter possidet; atque ita formis et
motibus corporalibus delectata, quia intus ea secum non habet, cum eorum imaginibus, quas
memoriae fixit, inuoluitur, et phantastica fornicatione turpiter inquinatur, omnia officia sua
ad eos fines referens, quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia per corporis sensus quaerit, aut
tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat excelsior, aut coenoso gurgite
carnalis uoluptatis immergitur.
34 The images of temporal goods are “sucked” into the soul (introrsus rapiens), and the

soul gets hopelessly entangled with these images. The possession of temporal things obvi-
ously distorts the soul’s relation with God, so that the one and only finis is changed into bodily
things that are wished either as experiences, as means to high position, or as sensual objects.
trin. 12, 15 cum uero propter adipiscenda ea quae per corpus sentiuntur, propter experiendi uel
excellendi uel contrectandi cupiditatem, ut in his finem boni sui ponat, aliquid agit, quidquid
agit, turpiter agit; et fornicatur in corpus proprium peccans.
35 Pride thus plays a double role in this passage: initium and finis. For arrogance towards

other souls, see doctr. chr. 1, 23.

the root and matrix of sin 149

preserved the image of God (custoditur) by loving God, the source of their
divine image, instead of loving their proprium.36
While diu. qu. reflects Augustine’s early interest in treating cupiditas, as
opposed to caritas, as the most general source for morally reprehensible
actions, doct. chr. may be taken as a serious systematization of the pair
of these concepts. In turn, trin. is an attempt to define cupiditas as an
antisocial, consumerist and privative counter-love. Finally, in ciu. Augustine
joined his view of two opposite loves to his great vision of the two opposing
cities:
Two cities, then, have been created by two loves: that is, the earthly city by
love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love of
God extending to contempt of self.37 [transl. Dyson]
The aforementioned examples obviously do not exhaust the wealth of mate-
rial in Augustine concerning the antithesis of caritas and cupiditas. These
examples show, however, that Augustine was capable of applying this very
simple tool into various contexts throughout his career. As we have already
seen, an important role of cupiditas (with variants) in opposition to caritas
(with variants) was to name a common inner source for the great variety of
external evil actions. A particularly illustrating way to represent this func-
tion was to speak of cupiditas as the ‘root’ (radix) of all evils. Another type of
this function was the formula of triplex cupiditas, occurring especially in the
works of 390s as a schematized attempt to cover all sinful behaviour. This is a
structural element of Augustine’s views on sin in two important works, uera
rel. and conf., and, similar to the image of root, reduces the source for sinful
actions into some kind of a trinitarian matrix of sin. Both of these images
are linked to a single verse of the Bible. Accordingly, the image of ‘root’ is
based on the Pauline verse of 1Tim 6, 10 radix omnium malorum cupiditas
est,38 while the formula of triplex cupiditas is based on 1 Jn 2, 16 quia omnia
quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et
ambitio saeculi.39

36 trin. 12, 16 honor enim hominis uerus est imago et similitudo Dei, quae non custoditur

nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur. Tanto magis itaque inhaeretur Deo, quanto minus diligitur
proprium.
37 ciu. 14, 28 fecerunt itaque ciuitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad

contemptum dei, caelestem uero amor dei usque ad contemptum sui. Van Oort (1991, 142–145)
speaks rather of a division into uti and frui.
38 The earliest securely datable occurrence of the verse is mor. 1, 35. Augustine also uses

the variant radix omnium malorum auaritia est, for the first time in lib. arb. 3, 48.
39 Already in mus. 6, 44. Notable variants are quae enim in mundo sunt, desiderium carnis

est, et desiderium oculorum, et ambitio saeculi (ep. Io. tr. 2, 11) and the one used by Julian in
150 chapter four

In the following two sections let us examine the way in which Augustine
uses these two images, how and why they vary in time, and in which con-
texts they seem to appear.

4.2. Cupiditas As the Root of All Sin

Manichaean cosmology offered a clear, materialistic solution to the ques-

tion of the source of evil. Augustine’s early uses of the image of the ‘root’
of sinful acts appear in a context where he needed to solve the problem in
such a way that would avoid the radically dualistic Manichaean approach.40
Indeed, the first occurrence of 1Tim 6, 10 can be found in Augustine’s earliest
anti-Manichaean work, in mor. 1, 36, where it is said to have led to Adam’s
Fall: “Paul, then, says that covetousness is the root of all evil, and the Old
Law indicates that it was through this sin that the first man fell.”41

c. Iul. imp. 4,18–22 concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, uel,
sicut ipse posuisti, superbia uitae.
40 See especially conf. 7, 7 bonus bona creauit: et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea:

ubi ergo malum et unde et qua huc inrepsit? quae radix eius et quod semen eius? an omnino
non est? Admittedly, the phrase of the ‘root of evil’ was common good, and not limited to
Christian authors, who were obviously inspired by 1Tim 6, 10. For the background of the
Pauline verse (1 Tim 6, 10), see Renehan 1973, 18–19, who points to e.g. Dinarchus oratio 1, 22;
Arist. frag. 544 Rose; Hippocr. Ep. 16, 15, and concludes: “The evidence is fairly clear that this
kind of statement is proverbial commonplace, which had long been current in the classical
world.” Similarly Stein (1998, 30 n. 2): “wird verschiedentlich Demokrit, Diogenes oder Bion
zugeschrieben, ist aber darüber hinaus alter Zeit weit verbreitet.” For the occurrence of the
phrase, see also Cic. Tusc. 4, 38, 83 hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus
philosophia se extracturam pollicetur; Greg. Nys. Vit. Moys. 2, 256 φθόνος […] ἡ τῆς κακίας
ῥίζα; cf. Plot. En. 3, 6, 4. Donatist Petilian also speaks about the ‘root’ or the original cause as
necessary in defining things. Petil. A. c. litt. Pet. 1, 5 omnis enim res origine et radice consistit, et
si caput non habet aliquid, nihil est. For Manichaean uses of the image of the ‘root,’ see Decret
1995, 148; Lee 1996, 133 n. 193; Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 143–145. Considering the Jewish-
Christian background of Manichaeism, it is no surprise that the Pauline verse was quoted, for
instance, in epistula ad Menoch (c. Iul. imp. 3, 175): radix enim ait scriptura omnium malorum
concupiscentia. Coyle (2009, 78–79) points out to a Manichaean text (Acta Archelai), in which
Mani combines together Christ’s parable of the good and evil tree (Mt 7, 16) and the image
of the root: “Manes said: ‘The root is indeed evil, and the tree very bad […] and its fruits
of fornication, adulteries, mureders, avarice and all evil deeds come from that evil root.’”
(transl. M. Vermes) The Latin text runs: Manes dixit: Radix quidem mala, arbor autem pessima
[…] fructus autem fornicationes, adulteria, homicidia, auaritia et omnes mali actus malae illius
radicis.
41 mor. 1, 35–36 namque, ut ait apostolus, radix est omnium malorum cupiditas […] dicit

ergo Paulus radicem omnium malorum esse cupiditatem, per quam etiam lex uetus primum
hominem lapsum significat.
the root and matrix of sin 151

Augustine challenged the Manichaean concept of the source of sin and

evil by appealing to the moral responsibility of the will.42 In de libero arbi-
trio 1, Augustine and Evodius discuss the topic of love. They agree that evil
acts emerge from a flawed love of such things that could be lost unwillingly
(inuitus amittere). They also agree that this love, or libido, is the source for
all evil acts (lib. arb. 1, 10). Libido as a form of love for temporal goods is thus
sin, and the exact opposite of happiness.43 It is, however, only after one freely
gives up his or her position of rational control over wrongly ordered and irra-
tional movements, that is, one abandons the “citadel of virtue,” that such a
perverse situation becomes possible (lib. arb. 1, 20–22). From then on, libido,
or cupiditas, is to be counted for causing all evil acts:
For we agree that all wrongdoing becomes such only by passion (libidine),
namely, by a desire (cupiditate) that is blameworthy.44 [transl. Russell]
This remark on the fundamental role of evil love is made towards the end
of the question. It is concluded that good people as well as those who are
evil desire a life without fear (cupere sine metu uiuere): but the good ones do
not desire things which they are in constant risk of losing; in contrast, evil
people try to enjoy (his fruendis) and secure insecure things for themselves
and thus live a life that consists of faults and crimes.
[Evodius:] [I] am very glad to have a clear understanding of the nature of that
blameworthy desire (cupiditas) called passion (libido). I now see that it is the
love of things which each one can lose against his will.45 [transl. Russell]
The unfortunate trade of the free choice of the will into a tyranny of libido
is, in turn, divinely punished by a disturbed and emotional life under tem-
poral circumstances. The antagonism of the two loves is now developed
further. Augustine defines what it is to love temporal things instead of eter-
nal. According to the eternal divine law, man should turn one’s love away
from all temporal goods towards eternal things. Despite this law, people

42 In the Manichaean view, the ultimate origo was, of course, the King of Darkness.

immanis princeps omnium et dux habens circa se innumerabiles principes, quorum omnium
ipse erat mens atque origo. haeque fuerunt naturae quinque terrae pestiferae [Manich. ep. fund.
frg. 2, 9 Stein].
43 See Wetzel 1992, 67–68.
44 lib. arb. 1, 10 conuenit enim inter nos omnia malefacta non ob aliud mala esse nisi quod

libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate, fiunt.

45 lib. arb. 1, 10 gaudeo tam me plane cognouisse, quid sit etiam illa culpabilis cupiditas, quae

libido nominatur. quam esse iam apparet earum rerum amorem, quas potest quisque inuitus
amittere. This idea is an echo from Stoic evaluation (ta eph’ hemin—ta ouk eph’ hemin). See
O’Connell 1970, 55; De Capitani 1987, 476.
152 chapter four

still adhere to temporal things in their evil desire (cupiditas). They attach
their life to mutable things: their body, their freedom, their parents, their
relatives, their spouses, their community, their worldly achievements, and
their money (lib. arb. 1, 32). In fact, all sin could be easily determined as
“turning away from divine things to temporal and insecure ones” (uereque
manentibus et ad mutabilia atque incerta conuertitur, lib. arb. 1, 35).46 Thus,
the antithesis of cupiditas and caritas is strongly present in the lib. arb. 1.
This will recur in the later phases of Augustine’s edition of this work, in the
form of the topic of radix. However, the image appeared before the sequels
of lib. arb. 2 and 3 more directly in contra Fortunatum. In 392, a disputation
took place in Hippo between the representatives of the Catholic Christians
and the Manichaeans. Augustine represented the Catholic Christians, and a
prominent Manichaean presbyter, Fortunatus, represented the latter.47 The
discussion was put into books in form of forensic acts. This disputation
concentrated (by Augustine’s initiative) on the question of the origin of evil.
During their conversation, an interesting notion of the root of the evil is
mentioned.48 Fortunatus and Augustine take different stands on this notion.
Fortunatus claims that all personal sins must have a common origin. Oth-
erwise, we would not sin. Thus, Fortunatus is not satisfied in analysing some
particular sins, but wishes to find a general explanation for their occurrence.
For this reason, an evil substance (substantia) has to be supposed. Due to
this substance, people indeed sin involuntarily (inuiti peccamus), that is,
an alien nature compels humans to sin, until they gain the “knowledge of
things” (scientia rerum), by which the origin of the good part of the soul is
confirmed, and a process of repair (emendatio) is begun. Fortunatus takes
his opponent’s position to represent what he calls a “spontaneous fall” in a
body created by God, and Fortunatus fails to find a satisfying rational expla-
nation for such position. By “spontaneous,” Fortunatus here refers to the
inexplicable, completely arbitrary character of the fall that Augustine, in his
view, has suggested.49

46 Later, in Book 2, Augustine divides this turning away (auersio) into three different types

(2, 19, 53) of triplex cupiditas. Cf. uera rel. 6 where cupiditas bonorum temporalium atque
affluentium is opposed to spes uitae aeternae et bona spiritalia.
47 For the circumstances and the protagonists, see now Decret & van Oort 2004.
48 During the debate, Augustine shows expert and intimate familiarity with Manichaean

texts (especially Epistula Fundamenti and Thesaurus) and concepts. For an overview, see van
Oort 2008a and his extensive index of Manichaean terms and concepts in Decret & van Oort
2004, 91–112.
49 c. Fort. 20.
the root and matrix of sin 153

Augustine answers by appealing again to responsibility: one cannot be

properly responsible for one’s actions unless they are undertaken without
compulsion and freely (propria uoluntate). Augustine approaches the ques-
tion on the origin of evil by quoting 1Tim 6, 10 (radix omnium malorum est
cupiditas).50 Sin, or cupiditas, cannot be explained or unravelled any fur-
ther:
For if you seek the root of all evils, you have the apostle saying that covetous-
ness (cupiditas) is the root of all evils. But the root of a root I cannot seek […]
if it is true that covetousness is the root of all evils, in vain do we seek some
other kind of evil.51 [transl. Newman]
Fortunatus objects to Augustine’s explanation by stating that even our
cupiditas (quod in nobis malum) has its origin in a cosmological principle:
it would be absurd to think that human sin is responsible for all adversary
and for all evil things in the whole world. Thus, each one’s own cupiditas
is only a small part (portiuncula)52 of the universal, cosmological evil.53 It
is an alien representative of evil in our human constitution, and all sin
should indeed be imputed to this adversary nature (contraria natura, c.

50 Perhaps this particular verse was chosen deliberately by Augustine. Harrison & BeDuhn
(2001, 144–145) argue that Fortunatus used a standard Manichaean set of Pauline passages
in speaking of the ‘root’ (Gal 5, 17 and 1 Tim 6, 10). The verse is used together with Gal 5,
17, as Harrison & BeDuhn (2001, 144) point out, in epistula ad Menoch, quoted by Julian (in
c. Iul. imp.) to label Augustine as a follower of Mani. Manich. ep. Men. 2, 4: tolle denique
malignae huius stirpis radicem, et statim te ipsam spiritalem contemplaris. radix enim, ait
scriptura, omnium malorum concupiscentia. Cf. 5, 2 uidesne concupiscentiam mali esse orig-
inem. See Stein 1998, 28–43, 67, for the provenance and the form of the Bible quotation.
The authenticity of the letter has been disputed; even Pelagian forgery has been suggested.
Aalders (1960, 245) calls the letter a “pseudépigraphe.” Lieu (1992, 210) also regards the letter
as being spurious. Harrison & BeDuhn (2001) defend the letter’s authenticity. See also Van
Oort 2010a, 515, but cf. Gardner & Lieu 2004, 172–174. Gardner (2001, 104) adopts a minimal-
istic approach to the canon of Mani’s letters, and does not mention ep. Men. In van Oort’s
view, Augustine’s skeptical reaction to the letter merely reflected his deep knowledge of
the Manichaean source material that was available in Latin (2010a, 515 “genuine surprise”).
Although the provenance of this letter is sometimes disputed, it has been used to argue for
the Manichaean influences in Augustine’s thought. Clark 1986a, 315. Cf. O’Donnell 1992, III,
202–203.
51 c. Fort. 21 si enim radicem omnium malorum quaeris, habes apostolum dicentem radicem

omnium malorum esse cupiditatem. radicem radicis quaerere non possum […] si autem uerum
est omnium malorum radicem esse cupiditatem, frustra aliud aliquod mali genus quaerimus.
52 This rare word in the Augustinian corpus (seven occurrences altogether) appears e.g.

in en. Ps. 140, 10, designating ‘part of divinity’ in reference to Manichaean mythology.
53 For an analysis of how Augustine’s Manichaean opponents may have perceived the

macrocosmic salvation event in their inner struggle between two opposing forces, see Sci-
bona 2011, 396–401.
154 chapter four

Fort. 21).54 Fortunatus concludes by stating that our sins are not committed
by our soul (anima) and not by an arbitrary and inexplicable decision
(sua sponte), but by the evil element of the cosmological evil. Fortunatus
identifies his portiuncula with Augustine’s cupiditas, in an evidently bodily
and substantial tone (quae in corporibus habemus).55 Fortunatus seems to
interpret Augustine’s image of ‘root’ as being a reference to the body:
[Y]our Reverence said that this covetousness, which is found in our bodies is
the root of evil. [transl. Teske]
Fortunatus claims, however, that Augustine’s view is distorted. In each
person, cupiditas is part of the bigger picture, namely that of the totality
of evil substance. This is the real root and the evil tree, of which Jesus had
spoken (Mt 15, 13).56 Fortunatus bases his conception of the ‘root’ by also

54 According to Fortunatus, there is, however, one sin that can be reckoned as committed
by the soul (anima), namely, to hear from purification, and then to alienate itself from this
“wholesome instruction.” See Lieu 1992, 24–26.
55 c. Fort. 21 haec nos dicimus, quod a contraria natura anima cogatur delinquere: cui

non uis esse radicem nisi hoc tantum, quod in nobis malum uersatur, cum constet exceptis
nostris corporibus mala in omni mundo uersari. non ista, quae in corporibus solum habemus
sed quae in toto mundo uersantur et nominibus ualent bona, mala radix habet. nam dixit
dignatio tua, quod haec sit radix malorum, cupiditas, quae in nostris corporibus uersatur,
cum quando non est cupiditas mali ex nostris corporibus, ex principali illa contraria natura
uersatur in toto mundo. Cf. Coyle (2009, 83) for a suggestion to read cordibus instead of
corporibus, but this seems to apply only to a single sentence in Fortunatus’ reply. Decret
(1970, 238–239) has noted that in c. Fort. there are practically no references to the mythical
gens tenebrarum from Fortunatus’ part; instead, the origin of evil is explained in evasively
abstract terms. Such avoidance of mythological explanations seems to have been common
in several Manichaean texts in the West. See van Oort 2010b, 1125. Decret (1986, 57–58)
has also noted how few references Augustine has to the Devil in the debates with the
Manichaeans. In agon. 1, however, the ‘root’ is an instrument used by the Devil: cupiditas
is a handle through which the Devil holds the hearts of humans. In s. dom. m. 2, 9, 32 the
Devil is depicted as being blindfolded by his cupiditas: if he can perceive something right,
it is only due to the divine illumination. Cupiditas is even said to have “given name to the
Devil.” In other words, cupiditas counts for all that is false in the Devil, while all that he
can perceive or think in a clear manner is tributed to God. s. dom. m. 2, 9, 32: quapropter si
omnis anima rationalis etiam cupiditate caecata tamen cum cogitat et ratiocinatur, quidquid
in ea ratiocinatione uerum est non ei tribuendum est sed ipsi lumini ueritatis, a quo uel tenuiter
pro sui capacitate inlustratur, ut uerum aliquid in ratiocinando sentiat, quid mirum si diaboli
anima praua cupiditate peruersa quidquid tamen uerum de iusto uiro cogitauit, cum eum
temptare uellet, ipsius dei uoce, id est ipsius ueritatis uoce audisse perhibetur, quidquid autem
falsum, illi cupiditati tribuitur qua diaboli nomen accepit?
56 Decret 1970, 157–158, 196–197. For Manichaean texts on the evil matter and/or desire in

human beings, see Epiph. Panarion 30, 6 and especially Manich. ep. Men. 2, 3–4, translated in:
Gardner & Lieu 2004, 172–174, 186. On the image of good and bad tree in Manichaean texts,
see Decret & van Oort 2004, 8; Coyle 2009, 65–88.
the root and matrix of sin 155

referring to Romans 7. Even the apostle Paul knew that the evil desire that
inhabits the body is part (portiuncula) of the cosmic evil principle.57
The Manichaean Fortunatus thus bases on Paul for his viewpoint on
cupiditas. He quotes both Gal 5, 17 and Rom 7, 23–25 as affirming his posi-
tion: there is an alien, evil element working in the human constitution, and
because of it, people sin out of necessity. The Pauline saying of the ‘root’ of
all evil has been linked to the idea of two opposite elements, or two men,
the ‘old’ and the ‘new,’ in a distinctly Manichaean way.58
Augustine picks up Fortunatus’ thread of necessity. In the previous chap-
ter we have seen how Augustine was forced to resort to the figure of Adam
and Eve in order to explain the punitive and compulsory character of the
limitations that the human will has in moral actions. As it is, Augustine turns
to Adam for help. Indeed, the first human person was equipped with full
freedom of choice. Nothing resisted his will. But when he committed sin by
his own will (libera uoluntate), he plunged us, Adam’s descendants, into a
necessity of sin (in necessitatem praecipitati sumus).59 Playing with Fortuna-
tus’ own words, Augustine shows that the necessity and servitude, which
Paul had described in Romans 7 and which the Manichaeans have claimed
to be originating from the “evil stem” (or stirps),60 is actually a heritage
of sinful “habit” (or consuetudo). A good example of this kind of consue-
tudo is swearing, which in fact is the attitude fighting against the soul, the
“fleshly prudence” in Paul’s words.61 The crucial point of Augustine is to deny
all substantiality for cupiditas, in line with his Platonist conception of the

57 Radix is used in other sources besides Paul as well. Decret (1970, 196) points to the

oriental Manichaean texts and concludes: “cette terminologie commune est une preuve
de plus des liens étroits qui devaient exister entre le manichéisme africain et son berceau
oriental.” See also Decret 1995, 86–88.
58 Fortunatus’ Manichaeism thus appears rather similar to the Catholic teachings in its

concepts. For North-African Manichaeism and the use of New Testament and Paul, see
Decret 1970, 151–152, 167; 1995, 55–106; Bammel 1993, 7; Stark 1989, 346. For the evil bodily
element in individuals according Manichaean teaching, see Gardner & Lieu 2004, 16–17; for
the division between the old and the new man in the Manichaean Kephalaia, see Gardner &
Lieu 2004, 208–218.
59 Alflatt 1974, 129–130. Djuth (1993, 1999) attempts to discern between “absolute neces-

sity” and a “necessity of moral condition.”

60 See also c. Fel. 1, 19 (= Manich. ep. fund. frg. 3 Stein) stirpem tenebrarum. For the term

stirps, see Decret 1970, 241–242, who sees an implicit connection between the Manichaean
cosmogony of evil nature and Augustine’s concept of original sin later in nupt. et conc. 1, 26
hic est fructus eius [sc. diaboli] ex antiqua inmunditiae stirpe, quam plantauit in homine. For
such accusations by Julian, see pp. 165–168.
61 See also s. dom. m. 1, 17, 51.
156 chapter four

cosmos.62 Yet this is not an element that is independent of the soul, as it

ceases to exist when the soul is illuminated.63 Augustine’s interpretation of
Romans 7, as compared to the one Fortunatus had offered, is thus clear
enough: merely due to the fleshly habit, there appears to be a limited
necessity in the “old man.” In the end, Augustine thus admits that sins
sometimes are committed against one’s will:64
[A]s long as we live according to the flesh, which is also called the old man,
we have the necessity of our habit, so that we may not do what we will.65
[transl. Newman]
On a general level, c. Fort. reveals that a common Pauline background took
different forms in Fortunatus’ and Augustine’s interpretation. Despite their
differences, they both consider 1Tim 6, 10 as teaching of a universal basis for
sins.66 To be exact, it is Augustine himself, however, who introduces Paul’s
teaching of the ‘root’ in c. Fort., and Augustine is in pain to show how his con-
ception of evil deviates crucially from the Manichaean one, so that cupiditas
is not a ‘root’ in any material, contagious sense, but should be understood
more as a posture, or as a perverse attitude; hence Augustine’s depictions
of habit (consuetudo), in which the essential point is the immaterial char-

62 O’Donovan (1980, 94): “Plotinus had to account for disruption and disunity in a way
that would impute no fault to the totality of things.”
63 Augustine offers a concrete example. Snow cannot be warm, and when it melts into

water by warmth, it is no longer cold or snow but gives heat in itself, as well. The point is: the
nature of water remains the same despite its different status; there is no separate element in
water that would make it either cold or warm. Cf. s. dom. m. 2, 24, 79.
64 Despite this, much remains of Augustine’s trust in the free choice of the will, i.e. one is

free to choose what one wishes to will: si ergo imperatum est nobis, ut faciamus arborem aut
bonam aut malam, nostrum est eligere, quid uelimus. c. Fort. 22. In essence, the same points
are made in his less ambitious debate with Felix in 404, including the quotation from Rom
7. c. Fel. 2, 8 manifestum est hoc uenisse de traduce primi peccati Adam et de consuetudine
mala. nam hodieque libera uoluntate faciunt homines consuetudinem, quam cum fecerint,
facile superare non possunt; ipsi ergo sibi de se ipsis fecerunt, quod contra eos lex habitet in
membris eorum. sed qui concipiunt timorem dei et per liberum arbitrium subdunt se sanandos
optimo medico et sicut bono curatori, ita et misericordi creatori, per humilitatem confessionis
et paenitentiae sanantur. For the date, see Decret 1970, 77–78.
65 c. Fort. 22 quamdiu secundum carnem uiuimus, qui uetus etiam homo nominatur, habe-

mus necessitatem consuetudinis nostrae, ut non quod uolumus faciamus.

66 The concentration on Pauline texts in 390s shows how Augustine responded to his

previous Manichaean understanding on certain central texts, e.g. Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17. On
Manichaeism and Paul, see Decret 1995, 55–106; Drecoll 2010, 1144–1145. BeDuhn (2011, 475–
479) seems to me to overdo the case by claiming that by Fortunatus’ arguments Augustine
is compelled to read Paul anew, and that “it was from the lips of Fortunatus that Augustine
first heard a reading of Paul that emphasised grace over free will” (BeDuhn 2011, 475).
the root and matrix of sin 157

acter of sin.67 This is all about how one’s will is ordered, not about different
natures.68 At the same time, Augustine’s observations on habit and neces-
sity in c. Fort., clearly result from his efforts to describe the urgent iron grip
of sin; as such, they naturally run parallel to the Manichaean position.69
Augustine returns to the image of root in de libero arbitrio 3, repeating
the results of c. Fort.: as the root of all evil, cupiditas represents the ultimate
source for all sins, and there is no other source for a will that turns away from
the right order of creation.70 Evodius presents the same question that was
also made by Fortunatus: what is the cause for a will to sin (lib. arb. 3, 47)?
Again, Augustine declines to give any further causes. Since the ultimate
reason for all evil is cupiditas or improba uoluntas, it is not possible to inquire
any of its causes. This means that between the pure and good will and the
improper, perverse will, there is a ‘qualitative leap’ that cannot be explained
by any further causalities.71 Cupiditas, or the perverse will, is the singularity
of the ‘Big Bang’-theory of sin:
Beware of supposing that anything could possibly be truer than the saying
that ‘avarice (auaritia) is the root of all evil’ (1Tim 6, 10), namely the desire for

67 When one has received God’s aid in order to cure the symptoms of cupiditas and con-

suetudo cum carne, these simply cease their influence on the soul, and a good consuetudo is
evolved in exchange, inluminata anima desinit illa esse carnis prudentia […] consuetudo facta
cum carne, cum fuerit mens nostra inluminata et ad arbitrium diuinae legis totum hominem
sibi deus subiecerit, pro illa consuetudine animae mala facit consuetudinem bonam. c. Fort. 22.
68 c. Fort. 22 non naturas esse istas duas arbores, sed uoluntates nostras.
69 Alflatt (1974, 134) concludes by noting Augustine’s similar “pessimism” to that of Mani-

chaean anthropology; Wetzel (1992, 88–98) charts the nuanced changes in Augustine’s argu-
ments against his Manichaean opponents. Cf. also O’Donnell’s (1992, III, 203) remark on ep.
Menoch: “coincidence of opinion does not demonstrate influence or allegiance, and not every
proposition to which a Manichee could subscribe must be therefore forever declared ana-
thema, even by ourselves.” Similarly Drecoll 2010, 1152–1153: “Dabei ist einerseits zu berück-
sichtigen, daß solche Linien immer mit anderen Einflüssen konvergieren, andererseits, daß
A. an wesentlichen Punkten Veränderungen vornimmt und sich mit seiner eigenen Vergan-
genheit kritisch auseinandersetzt.”
70 The only way sin can exist is that its origin is voluntary. Hence, nobody commits sin

because of his or her own created nature (lib. arb. 3, 46); furthermore, there is no other
(aliena) nature in us, either, that would be held responsible for sinning. Augustine thereby
concludes that it remains that all commit sin by their own will.
71 See, however, MacDonald’s (1999) interesting discussion of this issue. MacDonald

attempts to reconstruct an Augustinian account of primal sin, in which the cause for the
first “inexplicable” movement of the will appears to be neglicence of practical reason. In
other words, just before the Fall, Adam and Eve were not fully applying all relevant reasons
for not to make the sinful choice of disobeying God. But it seems that Augustine thinks of
Adam and Eve as beings whose rational capabilities exceed those of ours: the limitations
and difficulties of moral practical reasoning (ignorantia) were something Adam should not
have experienced.
158 chapter four

more than is sufficient. Sufficiency is measured by what each nature requires

for its preservation according to its class. Avarice […] must be understood in
regard to everything that is desired immoderately whenever anyone simply
wants more than is sufficient. Such avarice is cupidity (cupiditas), and cupid-
ity is a perverse will. A perverse will, therefore, is the cause of all evil […] But if
you are looking for the cause of this root, how will it be the root of all evil? For
there will be a cause of this cause and, as I said, when you find it, you will look
for what caused it and there will be no end to our inquiry.72 [transl. Russell]
Note that auaritia, or cupiditas,73 is now defined as “to want something more
than is enough” (plus uelle quam sat est). Here “more” defines quantity in
the universal order; the case in which the subject strives after more than
is appropriate for one’s standing in the ordo rerum. This is said to be the
hallmark of inproba uoluntas. The point about cupiditas as being the ‘root’
insists that there has to be something to be counted as the fundamental sin,
for otherwise one would be tied to an infinite chain of causes. This argument
is practical as well: to find the root of all evil means that the search for causes
will come to an end.
Confessiones is deliberately rich in Manichaean images and themes.74
Especially the problem of the origin and cause of evil became a particular
source of confusion in the mind of the young rhetor.75 Recalling the time

72 lib. arb. 3, 48. caue enim putes quicquam potuisse dici uerius quam id quod dictum est,
radicem omnium malorum esse auaritiam, hoc est plus uelle quam sat est. tantum autem sat est
quantum sibi exigit naturae in suo genere conseruandae modus. auaritia enim […] in omnibus
rebus quae inmoderate cupiuntur intellegenda est, ubicumque omnino plus uult quisque quam
sat est. haec autem auaritia cupiditas est, cupiditas porro inproba uoluntas est. ergo inproba
uoluntas omnium malorum causa est […] tu autem si huius radicis causam requiris, quo modo
erit ista radix omnium malorum? illa enim erit quae huius est causa. quam cum inueneris, ut
dixi, etiam ipsius causam quaesiturus es et quaerendi nullum habebis modum.
73 Both words translate the biblical φιλαργυρία in 1 Tim 6 and both variants of the verse

are attested by previous Christian authors. Cyprian and Tertullian both have cupiditas in
quotations of 1 Tim 6, 10. Ambrose and Jerome use avaritia. See Schindler 1986, 494.
74 The presence of Manichaean terms and concepts at Augustine’s deliberate use in

conf. has been stressed by Johannes van Oort. See e.g. van Oort 1994, 1997. Van Oort has
also consistently argued for Augustine’s expert and detailed knowledge of Manichaean
texts and doctrines, see e.g. 2008b, 2010a. Kotzé (2004) continues this line of research in
systematically exploring Augustine’s communicative strategies and efforts to persuade his
former Manichaean colleagues of Catholic truth. See also Joubert 1992. See e.g. conf. 13, 15
for a relevant description for our purposes, in which Augustine is toying rather closely with
Manichaean ideas. spera et perseuera, donec transeat nox, mater iniquorum, donec transeat
ira domini, cuius filii et nos fuimus aliquando tenebrae, quarum residua trahimus in corpore
propter peccatum mortuo.
75 Some aspects of evil remain unsolved even in the mind of the bishop. Augustine is

completely puzzled by the youthful incident of the theft of pears: it is not the pettiness of
this crime but the inexplicability of “loving a theft for its own sake” that baffles him. There
the root and matrix of sin 159

he spent in Rome with the Manichaean electi, Augustine notes how at

that time he was proud enough to think that the sins he committed were
of some alien nature.76 In the interval between rejecting the Manichaean
conceptions of evil and his coming to comprehend the Christian doctrine
of incarnation, the problem of unde malum aggravates him, as he recounts
it in conf. 7, 7:
I searched for the origin of evil, but I searched in a flawed way […] Here is God
and see what God has created […] being good God created good creatures.
See how God surrounds and fills them. Then where and whence is evil? How
did it creep in? What is its root and what is its seed? Or does it not have any
being?77 [transl. Chadwick]
The appearance of the image of ‘root’ in this context is not accidental.
Augustine had been challenged in disputations against the Manichaeans to
interpret the biblical source material in a way that suited the Neoplatonic
monistic view of the universe. Can there be any root or radix for evil in
the substantial sense of ‘being’ (omnino non est)? In confessiones, as is well
known, Augustine construes his answer to the question of the source of
evil around the formula of triplex concupiscentia, to which we shall soon
return.
The image of root sometimes also covered the notion of rightly ordered
caritas in Augustine’s theology. A central work in this respect is a collection
of sermons on 1John, in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem.
The opposition of caritas and cupiditas is in those sermons related to a
fundamentally concealed and inner character of love. The argument is that
the quality of moral action should not be based on our outer actions, but on
our ultimate inner motivation for these actions. As a paradoxical example

is no cause for the spontaneous evil he committed with his comrades. conf. 2, 9–18. essem
gratis malus et malitiae meae causa nulla esset nisi malitia. foeda erat, et amaui eam. […]
pulchra erant illa poma, sed non ipsa concupiuit anima mea miserabilis. See O’Donnell 1992,
II, 126–128, for considerations of concupiscentia and the analogy of the tree of good and evil
knowledge.
76 conf. 5, 18 adhuc enim mihi uidebatur non esse nos qui peccamus, sed nescio quid aliam

in nobis peccare naturam, et delectabat superbiam meam extra culpam esse et, cum aliquid
mali fecissem, […] excusare me amabam et accusare nescio quid aliud quod mecum esset et
ego non essem. On this passage and Augustine’s picture of Manichaean teaching on moral
responsibility, see van Oort 2011, 555: “[this] is a distortion of the Manichaean doctrine and,
in all probability, a conscious misrepresentation by Augustine.”
77 conf. 7, 7 et quaerebam unde malum, et male quaerebam […] “ecce deus et ecce quae

creauit deus […] bonus bona creauit, et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea. ubi ergo malum
et unde et qua huc inrepsit? quae radix eius et quod semen eius? an omnino non est?”
160 chapter four

to illuminate his stance, Augustine here sees cupiditas as producing out-

wardly blameless deeds, while the inner motivation remains depraved and
egotistic.78 In ep. Io. tr. 5, 2, Augustine comments on the failure of obeying
Christ’s commandment of love (Jn 13, 34) by depicting it as a basic failure;
as a “grave sin, the root of all sins.”79 These sermons contain an insistence
on the interiority of the criteria in judging the value of good or morally
insufficient acts to the extreme and in a rather rhetorical manner. Whereas
the quest for the ‘root’ of evil in the anti-Manichaean works was mainly
motivated by the need to answer problems related to theodicy (why and
whence the evil, if God is good), the emphasis in pointing out the basic,
hidden quality or the ‘root’ of individual good actions is due to Augustine’s
strengthened tendency to separate the divinely originating effects of grace
from what he regards as being the superficial criteria of just action. In short,
one may act roughly and ugly, but these acts may still fulfil divine crite-
ria for what is to be considered as good, that is, they may count as acts of
love. On the other hand, one may act with the appearance of virtue, but if
these acts are not rooted nor originated in love, they are and must simply
be evil.
This is clearly Augustine’s position in ep. Io. tr. 8, 6–9, where he elaborates
on the biblical passages condemning pride (superbia) and greed (auaritia).
Alongside cupiditas there was another fault, which could be taken to repre-
sent the “beginning” (initium) or “head” (caput) of all sins. Based on a rather
literal reading of yet another single verse of the Bible (Sir 10, 13 initium omnis
peccati superbia), Augustine was able to treat both cupiditas and superbia as

78 A parallel emphasis is Augustine’s idea that the workings of cupiditas resemble and

imitate the acts of caritas. In c. Sec. 10, Augustine asserts that wisdom is imitated by foolish-
ness and error, and virtue is imitated by power. While caritas is the gift of the Holy Spirit,
it is therefore also imitated by greed and evil desire (cupiditas). This is due to the parasitic
quality of sin that cannot abandon the form of God even in utmost depravity. ipsum etiam
deum patrem peccantes imitantur inpia superbia, iusti pia liberalitate. spiritum denique sanc-
tum iniquorum cupiditas, rectorum caritas imitatur: utrique tamen ab imitatione dei, a quo et
per quem et in quo naturae ipsae factae sunt, recedere, sed illi uitiosa, illi laudabili.
79 ep. Io. tr. 5, 2 hoc mandatum Christi dilectio uocatur: per hanc dilectionem peccata

soluuntur. haec si non teneatur, et graue peccatum est, et radix omnium peccatorum. The image
of the ‘root of love’ is frequent in ep. Io. tr. See e.g. 2, 9; 3, 12; 6, 2; 6, 6; 7, 8 (“dilige et quod uis
fac”). While the ethical stance of dissecting the outer actions from an inner motivation was
clearly inspired by Augustine’s problems with the Donatian party at the time of ep. Io. tr.,
it seems that the image of the ‘root’ was meaningful to the Donatists at the ecclesiological
level. They had grown from the good root (s. Denis 19, 7 sicut in parte Africae constituta est
pars Donati, dicant nos praecisos, et dicant se esse radicatos) and they insisted on pointing
out the ‘root’ of every Christian, in the sense of a correct ecclesial tradition: omnis res enim
origine et radice consistit, et si caput non habet aliquid, nihil est, c. litt. Pet. 1, 5–8.
the root and matrix of sin 161

some kind of originating evils: they are parallel to each other in that they can
both be conceived as the starting point for all sins.80
Not until ep. Io. tr., however, does Augustine see any need to explain the
contradiction in claiming that both superbia and cupiditas can be inter-
preted as the ultimate sources, roots, or heads of all other sins, for which
no other causes are needed. According to Augustine, this contradiction is
only apparent, and he explains how the two verses (Sir 10, 13 and 1 Tim 6, 10)
can be reconciled (quomodo sibi concordent istae duae sententiae). Indeed,
pride and greed seem to be intertwined to such a degree that they can be
taken to describe the same phenomenon. Both vices consist of “going over
the limits” (excessit modum). Augustine takes Adam as an example of the
pride that reveals itself as greed: in Adam’s case a human being created
as the image of God wished to “go further than needed,” and was greedy
enough to want something more than God (quid auarius illo, cui deus suf-
ficere non potuit?).81 The common ground in pride and greed is thus a kind
of theological immoderation, and Sir 10, 13 and 1Tim 6, 10 both describe this
attitude.
Augustine proceeds by depicting certain similarity between pride and
love, which may both result in surprisingly similar actions. However, if one’s
heart is infected with evil desire (cupiditas), the acts only have a superficial
resemblance to good deeds. Conversely, if one acts by caritas, these acts are
always good, independent of their possibly offensive appearance. Therefore,
one should always inspect the inner source of actions, to “look for the root”!82
On the other hand, once a Christian is “rooted” in love, he or she stands on
secure ground: nothing evil can result from this root.83

80 The verse Sir 10, 13, together with short statements about its meaning, appears in

Augustine’s works from very early on (e.g. mus. 6, 40; Gn. adu. Man. 2, 9, 12; en. Ps. 7, 4).
O’Connell 2001 studies the interconnection between Sir. 10, 13 and 1Jn 2, 16, but does not
mention 1 Tim 6, 10.
81 Cf. s. 117, 9 et in ipso Adam radix omnium malorum auaritia fuit. plus enim uoluit, quam

accepit, quia deus illi non suffecit.

82 Cf. ep. Io. tr. 10, 7 noli attendere uerba blandientis, et quasi saeuitiam obiurgantis; uenam

inspice, radicem unde procedant quaere. See Dideberg 1975, 104–105, for the interiority of love.
83 ep. Io. tr. 8, 9 et uidete quanta opera faciat superbia; ponite in corde quam similia facit,

et quasi paria caritati. pascit esurientem caritas, pascit et superbia; caritas, ut deus laudetur;
superbia, ut ipsa laudetur. uestit nudum caritas, uestit et superbia; ieiunat caritas, ieiunat et
superbia; sepelit mortuos caritas, sepelit et superbia. omnia opera bona quae uult facere caritas
et facit, agitat contra superbia, et quasiomnia opera bona quae uult facere caritas et facit, agitat
contra superbia, et quasi ducit equos suos. sed interior est caritas: tollit locum male agitatae
superbiae […] scriptura diuina intro nos reuocat a iactatione huius faciei forinsecus; et ab ista
superficie quae iactatur ante homines, reuocat nos intro. […] noli attendere quod floret foris,
162 chapter four

The considerations on the identical nature of pride and greed are con-
tinued in de Genesi ad litteram 11, where Augustine analyses the origins of
sin in Paradise where the Devil began to envy human beings because they
were created in the very image of God. At the root of this diabolical envy
was pride, which Augustine refers to as a “love for one’s own excellence.”84
Augustine again combines (“with no particular inconvenience”) the two
biblical verses in defining this root, and identifies pride with greed:85 they are
the twin sides of the same coin.86 This, however, presupposes that one has
to understand greed in a wider meaning, as not only referring to money and
riches.87 Both are focused on the private good, and share a privative interest
in usurping wealth from the common good for one’s own glory and enjoy-
ment.88 Such a conceited greed was then the root of all evil in the case of the
Devil, and became his downfall, for he loved (amauit) his own power, and

sed quae radix est in terra. radicata est cupiditas? species potest esse bonorum factorum, uere
opera bona esse non possunt. radicata est caritas? securus esto, nihil mali procedere potest […]
redite ergo intro, fratres. To be rooted (radicatus) in love has a scriptural background in Eph
3, 17, a verse quoted by Augustine already in mor. 1, 33. Radico appears as a rule only in the
positive context of caritas or Christ; with very few exceptions, as in above, or in ciu. 21, 12 on
Adam: ea quae in illo fuerat radicata sua stirpe punitus est.
84 Gn. litt. 11, 14, 18 superbia sit amor excellentiae propriae.
85 Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 cui testimonio non inconuenienter aptatur etiam illud.
86 The two verses on cupiditas and superbia also appear in trin. 12, 14, explaining the

emergence of sin. See also s. Dolbeau 26, 33, where pride (Sir 10, 13) and auaritia (1Tim 6,
10) both represent different sides of the same coin, plus uelle quam deum auaritia est, plus
uelle quam sufficit auaritia est […] quid autem superbius eo qui de se praesumendo deserit
deum? quid auarius eo cui non sufficit deus? ipsa est ergo superbia quae auaritia in origine
peccatorum. Pride is seen as the root of all sins, but without clear reference to 1Tim 6, 10, also
in s. Dolbeau 21, 11. Augustine compares the relation of pride and other sins to an illness with a
great variety of symptoms. Only the most experienced doctor (medicus peritissimus, dominus
Iesus Christus) can deduce the causes for all diseases (causas omnes omnium morborum), and
when he finds the first, original cause (quam primam inuenerit causam), he will cut it away
like it was a root (amputat radicem) to an entire tree of miseries. For Christ as the physician
who cures the illness of pride, see Arbesmann 1954.
87 See also the later en. Ps. 118, 11, 6, where Augustine exhibits his exegetical skills in the

matter: he was aware that the Greek word in 1 Tim 6, 10 referred specifically to a ‘desire
for money,’ but Augustine still prefers a more general understanding of Paul’s intention:
apostolus intellegendus est isto nomine genus significasse per speciem, id est, per amorem
pecuniae uniuersalem generalemque auaritiam, quae uere radix est malorum omnium. For
pride and envy as affiliated attitudes, see cat. rud. 8.
88 Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 auaritiam generalem intellegamus, qua quisque adpetit aliquid amplius

quam oportet propter excellentiam suam et quendam propriae rei amorem. cui sapienter
nomen Latina lingua indidit, cum appellauit priuatum, quod potius a detrimento quam ab
incremento dictum elucet; omnis enim priuatio minuit. unde itaque uult eminere superbia,
inde in angustias egestatemque contruditur, cum a communi ad proprium damnoso sui amore
redigitur.
the root and matrix of sin 163

his perverse self-love (peruersus sui amor) detached him from the sacred
company of the angelic community.89
Proceeding to humans, Augustine points to the fault of self-appreciation
in persons who desire more money, for they tend to regard themselves as
the more excellent the more they own riches.90 Greed, both in its general
and special meaning, is deeply bound to one’s view of the self: the desire for
immoderate acquisition springs from an erroneous view of one’s position
in relation to God and one’s neighbours. Contrary to this kind of depraved
love, the right love (caritas) does not find its joy in “private excellence” and
does not suffer from the inflation of pride.91 Augustine continues with a
highly rhetorical and extensive comparison between caritas and cupiditas.
The evil version of love is characterised by asocial and privative attributes
that refer to private good (priuatus, adrogans dominatio, seditiosus, inuidus,
uolens subicere proximum sibi).92 The two loves form two cities of good and
evil men as well, thus anticipating the major structure of ciu.93

89 Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 specialis est autem auaritia, quae usitatius appellatur amor pecuniae.

cuius nomine apostolus per speciem genus significans uniuersalem auaritiam uolebat intellegi
dicendo: radix omnium malorum est auaritia [1 Tm 6,10]. hac enim et diabolus cecidit, qui utique
non amauit pecuniam, sed propriam potestatem. proinde peruersus sui amor priuat sancta
societate turgidum spiritum eumque coartat miseria iam per iniquitatem satiari cupientem. See
also Gn. litt. 11, 23, 30.
90 See also qu. eu. 2, 47, where pride and greed are tightly connected: non ita accipiendum

est, quod cupidi et superbi, qui nomine illius diuitis significati sunt, in regnum caelorum sint
intraturi cum suis cupiditatibus et superbia, sed possibile est deo, ut per uerbum eius, sicut et
iam factum esse et cotidie fieri uidemus, a cupiditate temporalium ad caritatem aeternorum et
a perniciosa superbia ad humilitatem saluberrimam conuertantur.
91 Gn. litt. 11, 15, 19 neque enim essent etiam homines amatores pecuniae, nisi eo se putarent

excellentiores quo ditiores. cui morbo contraria caritas non quaerit, quae sua sunt, id est non
priuata excellentia laetatur; merito ergo et non inflatur. Also in conf. 3, 16. Augustine applies
here the Tyconian rule of de specie et genere. See Pollmann 1996, 42–47.
92 Gn. litt. 11, 15, 20 hi duo amores—quorum alter sanctus est, alter inmundus, alter socialis,

alter priuatus, alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem
communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter adrogantem dominationem, alter subdi-
tus, alter aemulus deo, alter tranquillus, alter turbulentus, alter pacificus, alter seditiosus, alter
ueritatem laudibus errantium praeferens, alter quoquo modo laudis auidus, alter amicalis, alter
inuidus, alter hoc uolens proximo quod sibi, alter subicere proximum sibi, alter propter proximi
utilitatem regens proximum, alter propter suam. Gn. litt. 11, 37, 50 dixit quidem apostolus: per
caritatem seruite inuicem [Gn 5,13]; sed nequaquam diceret: inuicem dominamini. The social
aspect of love is also emphasised in many anti-Donatist works. See e.g. c. ep. Parm. 3, 10:
desinant calumniari bonis non operantibus mala per morbidam cupiditatem, sed tolerantibus
propter pacificam caritatem.
93 See also cat. rud. 31, where pride, along with cupiditas, distinguishes the two cities of

God and the Devil. In the city of God, humility is the primary virtue. For the origins of the
concept ciuitas dei, see van Oort 1991, 199–360; O’Daly 1999, 53–62.
164 chapter four

During the last two decades of Augustine’s life, the image of the root
appears in his writing on a general level as connected to the damaging
heritage of Adam and Eve: the common origins of humanity is corrupt “in
its root.”94 The idea of a perverse self-love as producing the great variety of
individual sinful acts and attitudes (together with moral ignorance) finds
continuity as well, as in ciu. 22, 22, where an exhaustingly long list of sins is
followed by the following remark:
[T]hese are the crimes of wicked men; yet they come forth from that root of
error and perverse love which is born with every son of Adam.95
[transl. Dyson]
We will end our survey on cupiditas as the ‘root’ of evil actions by focusing
on two features in the Pelagian debate. The first is a part of a discussion
with Pelagius in gr. et pecc. orig. and the second is part of Julian’s polemical
tactics in the second phase of the Pelagian debate.
De gratia Christi et de peccato originali was written in response to Pelag-
ius’ de libero arbitrio in 418. Pelagius had distinguished between three sepa-
rate factors in acting according to God’s will. These factors were possibilitas,
uoluntas and actio (or posse, uelle, esse). The first of these factors was a gift of
God, necessary for the individual to will and act according to God’s law. The
other two factors were dependent on the individual’s own choice: the will
and the actions could be used for either good or bad purposes. In describ-
ing the first factor, possibilitas, Pelagius had also illustrated it by evoking the
image of the ‘root.’ So a ‘root’ resided in each individual that could produce
either good or bad fruit, “flowers of virtue” or “thorns of vice,” respectively.96

94 E.g. gr. et pecc. orig. 2, 43 uoluntate peccantem iusto iudicio cum stirpe damnauit, et ideo

ibi quicquid etiam nondum erat natum merito est in praeuaricatrice radice damnatum, in qua
stirpe damnata tenet hominem generatio carnalis, unde sola liberat regeneratio spiritalis; ench.
26 hinc post peccatum exul effectus stirpem quoque suam, quam peccando in se tanquam in
radice uitiauerat; ciu. 14, 26 uniuersa massa tamquam in uitiata radice damnata; c. Iul. imp. 6,
5.
95 ciu. 22, 22 quid amor ipse tot rerum uanarum atque noxiarum et ex hoc mordaces curae,

perturbationes, maerores, formidines, insana gaudia, discordiae, lites, bella, insidiae, iracun-
diae, inimicitiae, fallacia, adulatio, fraus, furtum, rapina, perfidia, superbia, ambitio, inuiden-
tia, homicidia, parricidia, crudelitas, saeuitia, nequitia, luxuria, petulantia, inpudentia, inpu-
dicitia, fornicationes, adulteria, incesta et contra naturam utriusque sexus tot stupra atque
inmunditiae, quas turpe est etiam dicere, sacrilegia, haereses, blasphemiae, periuria, oppres-
siones innocentium, calumniae, circumuentiones, praeuaricationes, falsa testimonia, iniqua
iudicia, uiolentiae, latrocinia et quidquid talium malorum in mentem non uenit et tamen de
uita ista hominum non recedit? uerum haec hominum sunt malorum, ab illa tamen erroris et
peruersi amoris radice uenientia, cum qua omnis filius Adam nascitur.
96 Pelag. A. gr. et pecc. or. 1, 19.
the root and matrix of sin 165

Depending on each invidual’s will and inclination, this root was thus open
to either a good or bad way of life. Augustine reacted against this use of his
favourite image by noting that Pelagius had read his Bible carelessly. For
instance, there were two roots in Christ’s parable of trees and fruit, one evil
and one good. Alluding to Paul’s statement of cupiditas being the root of
all evil, Augustine concludes that, obviously, by this statement “the apostle
admonishes us to understand that the root of all good is caritas.”97 Augus-
tine denies the neutral character of the root that Pelagius had suggested and
takes a more dualistic stand: there are two kinds of roots, which make two
kinds of people, and therefore, two kinds of wills and deeds. Augustine fur-
ther argued that to alter the quality of the evil root depends not on the will,
or the actions, of the individual, but on God’s grace. Furthermore, contrary
to what Pelagius had suggested, to commit good actions also depends on
divine aid. Augustine had already pointed out a problem in Pelagius’ posi-
tion on divine contribution in human actions: if possibilitas is said to cause
both will and actions, is not God thereby made the instigator of evil deeds
as well? By positing two roots, Augustine avoids (or at least postpones) a
similar problem, for he can claim that the good root and good fruits are
given by God, whereas the evil root and the evil fruits are of human origin
(malam uero arborem homo facit […] ab eo quippe defectus est origo uolun-
tatis malae). “The evil desire of man, which is an evil, has man as its author,
or man’s deceiver [i.e. the Devil]: it is not from the creator of man.”98 Again,
Augustine is very careful to note that this does not lead to a doctrine of two
different natures (non aliam naturam malam initiat).99 In other words, con-
crete metaphors of sin do not imply a materialistic Manichaean stance on
moral questions.100
While Pelagius’ use of the image of radix in explaining individual actions
and their moral status was in all likelihood not a conscious attempt to
dismantle a metaphor so dear to Augustine, the same cannot be said of
Julian’s way of describing and parodying Augustine’s teaching on original
sin and concupiscentia as directly originating from the Manichaean doctrine
of ‘root.’
One of such instances can be found in c. ep. Pel. 1, 26, where Augustine has
to defend himself against Julian’s caricature on baptism being compared to

97 gr. et pecc. orig. 1, 19.

98 gr. et. pecc. orig. 1, 21. This evil tree can also be described by the scheme of triplex
cupiditas.
99 gr. et. pecc. orig. 1, 19.
100 See Coyle 2009, 82–87.
166 chapter four

shaving. This was Julian’s way of criticizing the view that baptism does not
entail forgiveness of all sins and does not abolish them altogether, but only
“shaves” them, leaving the “roots of all sins in the evil flesh” so that they have
to be cut again and again like hair from one’s face. Such a caricature, Augus-
tine has learned, had been intentionally used on Julian’s side to tarnish his
views (adhibere calumniae). Augustine brusquely denies the force of such
a caricature, and affirms that to him baptism really forgives and abolishes
sins. Julian’s parody, obviously, was meant to underline Augustine’s insis-
tence on the remaining sinfulness in a Christian, and his emphasis on the
daily repentance of the venial sins that this sinfulness produces. Moreover,
it seems likely that Julian did not choose the details of his illustration by
coincidence: the roots (radices) grow out from the evil flesh (mala caro).
The Manichaean undertones of this terminology were evident.
The attacks against Augustine’s idea of evil desire as a ‘root’ in each
individual appear more explicitly in c. Iul. and c. Iul. imp. In c. Iul. 1, 42,
Julian and Augustine proceed from a debate concerning Jesus’ parable of
trees to Julian’s conclusion that “original sin has vanished, because the root
of evil cannot be located in that which you say is the gift of God.”101 Augustine
disagrees: a root of evil can persist in things that were created good, such as
the bodily senses (nonne sensus hominis donum dei est? et tamen ibi locauit
inimicus ille seminator radicem mali, quando peccatum homini serpentina
fraude persuasit) or the soul (anima), in which Augustine locates greed
as the root of all evil. Augustine is again very careful to stress that his
position cannot be seen as agreeing with the Manichaean teaching of evil;
on the contrary, it is rather Julian’s insistence that evil cannot emerge from
good that works for the Manichaean case. From Augustine’s perspective,
the root of evil springs from the free choice of the human will and resides
in the “rational human nature,” being as such nothing else than priuatio
boni.102
Julian argues at length in c. Iul. imp. 3, 170–187 for the deep similarities
between Augustine’s and Mani’s positions on concupiscentia carnis. For this
purpose, Julian has managed to get hold of a letter, purportedly written by

101 Iulian. c. Iul. 1, 42 euanuit, inquis, originale peccatum, quia non potest mali radix in eo

quod donum dei uocas locari.

102 c. Iul. 1, 42 nec aliunde oriri, nec alicubi esse posse dicit radicem mali, nisi ex natura

et in natura rationali; cui esse naturam rationalem non est nisi donum dei: sed quoniam a
summo atque incommutabili bono de nihilo facta est, ut esset, quamuis mutabile, tamen bonum;
deficere a bono a quo facta est, hoc est ex illa, uel in illa radix mali: quia nihil est aliud malum,
nisi priuatio boni.
the root and matrix of sin 167

Mani to a female follower, and known as epistula ad Menoch.103 Julian claims

that the wording of the letter shows how Augustine never completely aban-
doned Manichaean teachings on sexuality. Augustine retorts that Julian’s
sensational disclosure of parallels between Augustine and Mani is, in fact,
no sensation at all: “who is there, after all, who has even a slight knowledge
of the Manichaean teaching and does not know that the Manichees say that
the concupiscence of the flesh is evil?”104 As it happens, the letter introduces
the image of the root (as taught by Apostle Paul in 1 Tim 6, 10) and attaches it
to sexual concupiscentia. According to ep. Men., it is through concupiscentia
that the Devil traps human bodies:
He traps them by sight or by touch or by hearing or by smell or by taste. Take
away at last the root of this evil tree, and you will immediately see yourself as
spiritual. For the root, scripture says, of all evil is concupiscence.105
[transl. Teske]
The letter shows well how the Manichaeans viewed concupiscentia as the
‘origin of evil.’ This missive has also convinced Julian of the identical nature
of the way Augustine and Mani treat humans as originating from the “dia-
bolical concupiscence,” “generated from an evil root” and being claimed by
the Devil “as the fruit of this root.”106
Once again, Augustine seems to be rather undisturbed by the similarities
in the terms and the verses of the Bible used, and recourses to his stan-
dard defence against Julian’s accusations about his crypto-Manichaeism:
in contrast to Mani, Catholic faith denies the existence of two opposing

103 For the letter, see above p. 150 n. 40; 153 n. 50; Alfaric 1918, 74; Lieu 1992, 210; Stein 1998;

Harrison & BeDuhn 2001; Lamberigts 2001, 116–117.

104 c. Iul. imp. 3, 170.
105 c. Iul. imp. 3, 175 siue per uisum siue per tactum siue per auditum siue per odoratum

siue per gustum. tolle denique malignae huius stirpis radicem et statim te ipsam spiritalem
contemplaris. radix enim, ait scriptura, omnium malorum concupiscentia. Note the peculiar
form of the Pauline verse. Augustine never quotes 1 Tim 6, 10 with the word concupiscentia.
See Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 143–145. In c. Iul. imp. 3, 180 Julian has edited the letter to
continue: […] tolle, inquit, malignae stirpis radicem et spiritalis fies; de hac apostolus clamat
ad Romanos: non bonum quod uolo, sed malum operor quod exhorreo [Rom 7,19].
106 Iulian. c. Iul. imp. 3, 181 fructum concupiscentiae diabolicae hominem dicens […] malum

et de mala radice prolatum […] quem fructum radicis suae diabolus sibi uindicet. Julian had
already previously referred to Augustine’s view of “diabolical libido,” Iulian. c. Iul. imp. 2,
218 an lex data nascentibus est, ut qui de libidine, quam dicis diabolicam esse et radicem fruc-
tumque peccati, geniti erant, ammonerentur emendare quod facti erant […]? See Lamberigts
2001, 126–129, for a discussion on the parallels between Mani’s letter and Augustine, as sug-
gested by Julian. Lancel (2002, 419) thinks that Julian resorted to the accusations of Augus-
tine’s residual Manichaeism only for tactical purposes.
168 chapter four

substances, and holds to the doctrine that the one and only created human
substance is corrupted by the “sin of the first man” and that it has to be
healed by the “rebirth through the righteousness of the second man.” Fur-
thermore, Augustine could also have defended himself by pointing out the
difference between his and Mani’s way of speaking of the ‘root.’ For Augus-
tine by this time had grown accustomed to taking radix to represent a com-
bination of greed and pride that go against God and the order of things, not
limited to sensual and sexual, unbridled desire.
Let us now turn to the other common figure by which Augustine illus-
trated a need to interpret cupiditas (or concupiscentia) as being an inner
source for individual, evil acts. While the image of the ‘root’ underscored
the inner causality of evil motivation and evil action, the feature following
in the next section was designed to give a generalizing, all-embracing model,
or a matrix for all evil actions. Naturally, such images easily overlapped, as in
s. Denis 14, where Augustine describes cupiditas as the mighty and worldly
force of temptations, described by the Apostle John in 1 Jn 2, 16 as uoluptas
carnis, concupiscentia oculorum and ambitio saeculi. “This is some kind of
a three-headed dog of Hell.”107 The three temptations represent three basic
roots of a baffling variety of all kinds of sinful acts: “there are many branches,
but only one, threefold root.”108

4.3. Triple Concupiscentia As the Matrix of Sin

James O’Donnell has noted that triple concupiscentia (or triplex cupiditas)
as a formal literary scheme, structuring Augustine’s views of sin, is rather lim-
ited in the time frame of Augustine’s works. Indeed the scheme is present
in the early writings but disappears gradually after conf., being then virtu-
ally absent or “fading” after ep. Io. tr. (Easter 407). However, the separate
members of the three-part scheme obviously maintain their importance in
Augustine’s thought to the very end of his literary career. As the motif is
rather formal and easily discerned in Augustine’s texts, it is most conve-
nient to present it here as a separate unit, although it has to be emphasised
that the theological contents of the formula are quite similar to the role of
cupiditas as the opposite form of caritas, and as a root of evil actions. As to
the function of the scheme, then, triplex cupiditas is also clearly intended

107 s. Denis 14, 2 nescio quis iste tricapitus est canis inferni.
108 s. Denis 14, 2 qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod uincat. multi
rami, sed triplex radix.
the root and matrix of sin 169

to answer the following questions: From which general motives do our sins
emerge? Is there a universal explanation for individual evil actions? While
triple concupiscentia is a formally distinguishable continuation of the more
general idea of evil desire as the ‘root’ of all sin and as a debased love for
everything else but God (as in the biblical verse, nolite diligere mundum), its
function is very much the same.109
The motif of triplex cupiditas has attracted scholarly attention for
decades. Often, this attention has been motivated by a desire to point out
the possible sources for the theme of triplex cupiditas in Augustine.110 Willy
Theiler suggested as early as in 1933 that the theme of triplex cupiditas
betrays the influence of Porphyrios.111 In 1963, Robert J. O’Connell proposed
an alternative, which he repeated in 1968, that the source of the formula is
in Plotinus’ Enneads.112 While pointing out similarities between each of the
three cupiditates,113 O’Connell was unable to identify a convincing source
text for a firm set of three-fold cupiditas, and he finally appeals to Augustine’s
powers to produce an independent synthesis from what are essentially Plo-
tinian elements.114
In 1966, however, Olivier Du Roy wrote his account on the theme of
triplex cupiditas.115 He criticized both Theiler and O’Connell for their

109 Cf. the categories of temptations in Evagrius of Pontos, malign. cogit. 1, where the

strongest three are gluttony (γαστριµαργία), greed (φιλαργυρία) and the desire for renown
(δόξα). Evagrius also joins together the condemnation of greed in 1Tim 6, 10 and pride.
Evagrius, malign. cogit. 1. See Sinkewicz 2003, 137.
110 Good general treatments are Du Roy 1966 and O’Donnell 1992.
111 Theiler 1933, followed by O’Meara 1954.
112 O’Connell 1963; 1968, 173–182.
113 For example, superbia, or τόλµα, and libido, or ὕλη, are likewise connected to each other

in both Plotinus and Augustine. O’Connell 1968, 173. O’Connell finds the element of curiosity
the hardest to track from the Neoplatonic authors; but, as ever, the answer is to be found
in Plotinus. O’Connell quotes En. 3, 7, and connects Plotinus’ φύσεως δὲ πολυπράγµονος καὶ
ἄρχειν αὐτης βουλοµένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς with Augustine’s curiositas and superbia in mus. 6, 39.
For critical remarks concerning curiositas, see Du Roy 1966, 345 n. 2.
114 As for the parallels between τόλµα and superbia, O’Connell is undoubtedly right, but

one should perhaps remain careful concerning his confidence in seeing a close-knit ambiva-
lence in Augustine between superbia and libido as having the “corruptible body” as their sole
object, and thus pointing again to original Plotinian ambiguity in the matter. O’Connell 1968,
180: “It is clear from the context [of Gn. adu. Man.] that Augustine means this aliquid pro-
prium to stand for the animal skins that symbolize the corruptible body conferred on the soul
after the fall […] Among other things involved in soul’s primal sin, however, is this desire to
have a body, aliquid proprium, something suum—something it can independently control,
and at the same time ‘delight’ in controlling. Pride? or bodily ‘concupiscence’? The ambiva-
lence of Plotinus’ τόλµα seems, for the moment, to gloss over the difficulty.” See also ibid.,
p. 182.
115 Du Roy 1966, 343–367.
170 chapter four

inadequate textual evidence in pinpointing any previous philosophical

sources for the theme, and stated that the theme was essentially Augus-
tine’s own invention.116 The crucial point in triplex cupiditas is, according
to Du Roy, its complementarity with the Trinity. The three general vices
reflect the persons of the Trinity, respectively.117 It is to be noted here that
this kind of complementarity is found mainly in later works (from conf.
onwards, perhaps with the exception of uera rel.), and does not therefore
explain the occurrence and the function of the theme in Augustine’s earlier
works.118
In 1992, James O’Donnell, given his lack of enthusiasm for Quellenfor-
schung, proposed by far the most simple and elegant solution to the quest
of sources.119 While he suggests that there are similarities between Augus-
tine’s interpretation of 1Jn 2, 16 and Cicero’s off. 1, 4, 11–13, O’Donnell remarks
that in the case of triplex cupiditas as a threefold formal set, there are no
previous Platonic texts that would support the idea of the triad.120 Again, as
the ‘Platonic order’ of the three vices (curiositas—superbia—concupiscentia
carnis, or uoluptas—superbia—curiositas), is a reconstruction based solely
on Augustine’s texts, one cannot make much of the changing order of the
vices in the different works. As a consequence, O’Donnell concludes, in a
similar vein to that of Du Roy: “we must leave room for A.’s own powers
of imaginative response to an evocative text.”121 As noted above, O’Donnell
also makes the important observation that the role of the three temptations
becomes less structural in Augustine’s later writings, while the verse quota-
tions “fade” shortly after confessiones.122

116 Du Roy 1966, 346: “tout à fait original et profondément marqué par son génie propre.”

Du Roy refers to the triad of passions (or ἀλογία) in Olympiodorus’ commentary, which goes
back to the elements of Platonic psychology in Plat. Rep. 441–442. Du Roy seems to discard
this explanation, and rightly so, (1966, 344 n. 3), but for inadequate reasons.
117 Du Roy 1966, 348–352. Especially the following passages work as Du Roy’s evidence: c.

Secund. 10, ciu. 12, 15–22, uera rel. 3.

118 Dideberg (1975, 175–190) generally agrees with Du Roy in emphasising the synthetic

powers of Augustine, and pointing out the nonbiblical extensions of the scheme.
119 O’Donnell 1992, I, lxiii–lxiv. The Johannine verse also plays a remarkable role in

O’Donnell’s own interpretation of conf.

120 O’Donnell 1992, III, 204.
121 O’Donnell 1992, III, 205. Note his choice of passages from those early works of Augus-

tine, in which the resemblances of matured exposition can be traced (e.g. ord. 2, 8, 25; an.
quant. 14, 24). Cf. Verschoren 2002, 223–230, who continues to stress the problem of word-
order.
122 O’Donnell 1992, III, 204. For other relevant studies, see Macqueen 1973; Torchia 1987;

1988; Procopé 1982; 1987; van Fleteren 1976, 1994.

the root and matrix of sin 171

As the appearance, occurrences and disputes on the sources for triplex

cupiditas in Augustine’s works are more than adequately settled, the fol-
lowing section offers an overview of the most relevant texts on the subject;
the emphasis in this section is, once again, on the use, or function, of the
scheme as describing a general, all-embracing explanation for human sin-
ful behaviour that ultimately reflects the trinitary being of man’s creator.
The theme of triplex cupiditas does not play a significant role in the early
philosophical works (c. acad., ord., [Link]., sol.).123 Its full application evolves
in the first anti-Manichaean works (mor., Gn. adu. Man.).124 Furthermore, the
scheme grows to structural importance in uera rel., which was Augustine’s
last work before his ordination.125
In de moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum all three
members of the scheme are already present as separate ideas. So the Fall is
due to lust and pride (cupiditas, superbia).126 The human mind was created
invisible and immaterial. Therefore, it assumed itself to “be of same nature
as its Creator, thus cutting itself off by pride from Him to whom it ought to be
united by love.” Pride is therefore an illusory wish to be divine, in the sense
of absolute independency. Finally, man’s desire to be his own master and to
become a self-sufficient person results in his disobedience to God and His
laws. The more this desire is manifested, the deeper one is separated from
the Divine Being. As is suitable for an anti-Manichaean work, Augustine
refutes all spatial connotations of the Fall, however; for the separation is
an “inner” reality, and it is therefore more of an affectio, or cupiditas:
Thus, the farther the mind departs from God, not in space but in fondness
(affectione) and greed (cupiditate) for things inferior to Him, the more it is
filled with foolishness and misery.127 [transl. Gallagher]
Evil desire that is swollen with pride thus goes against ordo rerum: if one is
submitted to the created order, one will truly become “like God.” However,
if one is cut away from the immutable, immaterial and invisible God, and

123 The separate elements are not altogether absent, however. In Acad. 2, 21, Trygetius

mentions pride as the greatest of vices (uitium). For other possible “adumbrations of the
triad,” see O’Donnell 1992, III, 205.
124 See e.g. Verschoren 2002, 213–230, for the genealogy of the triplex concupiscentia in the

early works.
125 For the work, see van Fleteren 1976; 1994, 1999.
126 mor. 1, 12; 1, 20–21.
127 mor. 1, 21 quanto ergo magis longe discedit a deo, non loco, sed affectione atque cupiditate

ad inferiora quam est ipse, tanto magis stultitia miseriaque completur. Note the aspects of
stultitia and miseria, possibly related to the word pair ignorantia and difficultas in lib. arb.
172 chapter four

strives for lower things, one will fall out from God in striving for an inde-
pendent state of being.128
In comparable length, the element of curiosity is treated in mor. 1, 38,
where temperance (which should check cupiditates) is said to restrain curio-
sitas.129 Curiosity means to explore that “universal mass of matter we call
the world.” This, in turn, leads one to think even of the immutable and
incorporeal beings in terms of corporeality. In short, curious pride leads to
materialism (“nothing but matter exists”). This presentation on curiositas
is preceded by a refutation of the “bodily delights” based on 1 Tim 6, 10
(cupiditas omnium malorum radix). As pride seems to be tightly interwoven
with intellectual curiosity as well, it is clear that many of the essential
features of triplex cupiditas are present in mor.
Augustine’s first biblical exercise, de Genesi aduersus Manicheos, force-
fully exploits the polemical value of the triplex cupiditas. At the end of this
work, Augustine explicitly brings his former co-religionists under the power
of this threefold vice: the curse God made on Satan in the Paradise con-
cerns, in fact, particularly the sect of Mani. However, the three elements
were already brought together before this polemical turn.130 In Gn. adu. Man.
1, 23, 40, the three concupiscentiae are represented as various animals of
the created world, brought under man’s control. They also signify Christ’s
dominion over His church in the sixth age of the world, in which the differ-
ent kinds of sinners are brought under His control.131
[I]n this age Christ rules souls obedient to him who have come to his Church
in part from the Gentiles and in part from the Jewish people. Thus, whether
given over to carnal desire (carnali concupiscentiae), like the cattle, or blinded

128 It is clear from the context, that Augustine’s emphasis on the “obedience to divine

laws” refers to the intellectually conceived ordo rerum, and not to particular divine com-
mandments. See mor. 1, 39: subicere se homines uolunt his rebus per peccata, quae illis per
recte facta diuina lege subiecta sunt. quid est enim aliud falsis bonis illudi atque decipi quam
teipso inferiora miranda et appetenda arbitrari? habet igitur uir temperans in huiuscemodi
rebus mortalibus et fluentibus uitae regulam utroque testamento firmatam, ut eorum nihil dili-
gat, nihil per se appetendum putet, sed ad uitae huius atque officiorum necessitatem quantum
sat est usurpet utentis modestia, non amantis affectu. For the rightly ordered love, see mor. 1,
57–60. For ordo amoris in the early works, see Rief 1962, 332–335.
129 Du Roy 1966, 346. For the alleged Plotinian influences, see O’Connell 1968, 175–182. For

curiositas in Augustine, see Labhardt 1960; 1994, 188–196; Torchia 1988.

130 O’Connell (1968, 175) conjectures without providing good reasons that Gn. adu. Man. 1,

40 is an addition to the final version of the work.

131 Du Roy 1966, 346–347; O’Donnell 1992, III, 205: “the first appearance of all three in a

single sentence and in the order in which they appear in 1Jn. 2, 16.” Cf. Verschoren 2002, 224,
who analyses the passages from the viewpoint of order.
the root and matrix of sin 173

by dark curiosity (curiositate), like the serpents, or puffed up with pride

(superbia), like the birds, men might be tamed by him and grow gentle.132
[transl. Teske]
The scheme thus appears in a highly allegorising context, in which Augus-
tine tries to apply different ages of salvation history to the events in Gen 1.
There is no direct polemic against the Manichaean interpretation.133
The allegories are brought further in Gn. adu. Man. 2, 17, 26–18, 27, where
Augustine expounds on the punishment of the Devil. The punishment
(poena) is, however, aimed at fallen humans through the Devil. In this man-
ner, Augustine instructs his Christian reader to avoid the three main temp-
tations of the Devil:
For the term “chest” signifies “pride” because the strong drives of the soul
rule there. The term “belly” signifies “carnal desire” because that part of the
body is recognized as softer. Since by these means he creeps up on those
whom he wants to deceive, God said, “You will creep upon your chest and
belly.” […] “You will eat the earth,” can be understood in two ways: Either you
will own those whom you deceive by earthly desire, that is, sinners, who are
signified by the word, earth, or these words surely symbolize the third kind of
temptation, namely, curiosity. For one who eats the earth penetrates things
deep and dark, but nonetheless temporal and earthly.134 [transl. Teske]
The third temptation in the order, curiositas, once more includes a refer-
ence to Manichaean attitude (tenebrosa penetrat et tamen temporalia) of a
rational, yet materialistic search for the truth and it is introduced with a
slight delay in comparison to the first two, possibly for rhetorical purposes.
What is noteworthy in these passages from Gn. adu. Man. is that Augustine
speaks in a generalizing tone of the threefold genus temptationis: that is, the
temptations cover the all main routes of sin and the Devil into the soul of a
Christian.

132 Gn. adu. Man. 1, 23, 40 sicut […] Christus regit animas obtemperantes sibi, quae ad eccle-

siam eius partim de gentibus, partim de populo Iudaeorum uenerunt, ut ab eo mansuescerent

homines uel carnali concupiscentiae dediti sicut pecora uel tenebrosa curiositate obscurati
quasi serpentes uel elati superbia quasi aues.
133 Unless one should count the phrase tenebrosa curiositate obscurati as one. Curiositas

is often applied particularly to the Manichaeans. For the allegorising tendencies and direct
refutations of Manichaean Bible criticism, see Weber 2001a.
134 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 17, 26–18, 27 Nomine enim pectoris significatur superbia, quia ibi dom-

inatur impetus animae, nomine autem uentris significatur carnale desiderium, quia haec pars
mollior sentitur in corpore. Et quia his rebus ille serpit ad eos quos uult decipere, propterea dic-
tum est: pectore et uentre repes […] terram ergo manducabis duobus modis intellegi potest: uel
ad te pertinebunt quos terrena cupiditate deceperis, id est peccatores qui terrae nomine signif-
icantur, uel certe genus tertium temptationis his uerbis figuratur, quod est curiositas. Terram
enim qui manducat, profunda et tenebrosa penetrat et tamen temporalia atque terrena.
174 chapter four

The bodily divisions of pride and lust are given according to a traditional
division between the breast (θυµός) and the belly (ἐπιθυµία).135 Pride, super-
bia, however, is taken to be a vice of the soul (ibi dominatur impetus animae),
while the “fleshly desires” seem to be an issue for the body. As for curios-
ity, it is not assigned to any particular part in the human constitution, for it
emerges partly from corrupt intellect, and partly from attraction to sensed,
or “earthly” reality.
Augustine returns to the figure of the serpent in Gn. adu. Man. 2, 25, 38–
26, 40. The three temptations are now efficiently appropriated to Mani-
chaean theology, and the victims of the Devil are much alike Manichaeans:
For [the serpent] deceives none but the proud who claim for themselves what
they are not, and who soon believe that the supreme God and the human
soul have one and the same nature. They deceive also those caught in carnal
desires, who are glad to hear that it is not they themselves who do whatever
they do in their wantonness, but the nation of darkness. They deceive also the
curious who are wise about the things of earth and search out spiritual things
with an earthy eye.136 [transl. Teske]
To Augustine, the three temptations accurately describe the main faults of
his former beliefs. Divine nature is not shared by humans (una eademque
natura). Moreover, the “fleshly desires” and the acts these desires result in,
are not committed by an alien nature in human beings (non ipsi […] sed gens
tenebrarum).137 The human intellectual approach (sapiunt […] inquirunt) to
spiritual things should not be aimed at earthly and temporal things. The
tripartite scheme of sin appears thus as part of Augustine’s anti-Manichaean
polemics from the start.138

135 Du Roy (1966, 347) points out a parallel exegesis of Gen 3, 14 in Philo (all. 3, 114–115), and

ponders the possibility of indirect Alexandrian influences.

136 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 26, 40 Non enim decipit [sc. serpens] nisi aut superbos, qui sibi arrogantes

quod non sunt cito credunt, quod summi dei et animae humanae una eademque natura sit,
aut desideriis carnalibus implicatos, qui libenter audiunt, quod lasciue quicquid faciunt non
ipsi faciunt, sed gens tenebrarum, aut curiosos, qui terrena sapiunt et spiritalia terreno oculo
inquirunt.
137 This is perhaps also a reference to the Manichaean cosmological myth of how the

material world came into being through the spontaneous ejaculation of the People of the
Darkness. The teaching was included in e.g. Mani’s Thesaurus. See, for example, nat. b. 44;
c. Fel. 2, 7; 2, 13. Verschoren (2002, 238) rightly notes here that the occurrences of the word
concupiscentia in the context of sexual desire are rare or even unextant before uera rel. For
her useful critical remarks on Lee 1996, see Verschoren 2002, 230–240.
138 For the presence of Manichaean themes and questions in Gn. adu. Man., see van Oort

2010a, 519–521.
the root and matrix of sin 175

In de uera religione, written for Augustine’s patron Romanianus in ca. 390,

the theme of triplex cupiditas “emerges to dramatic structural impor-
tance.”139 This work summarizes Augustine’s Neoplatonic convictions and
arguments against Manichaean cosmology. While the first part of the work
concentrates on the ontological status of evil, the second part concerns
man’s ascent to God. Here the three concupiscentiae get their remarkable
role as “inner” explanations for those hindrances that stay on the way of the
ascent.140
Let us now briefly examine Augustine’s argumentation. In uera rel. 4, 1 Jn
2, 15–16 is quoted in its entirety.141 In his introduction to the work, Augustine
gives biblical exhortations to all kinds of sinners (auaris, luxuriosis, superbis,
iracundis, discordiosis, superstitiosis, curiosis) with one general command in
mind: nolite diligere mundum, quoniam ea, quae in mundo sunt, concupiscen-
tia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi. The choice of bib-
lical quotations emphasises Augustine’s Neoplatonist axioms of immutabil-
ity, the ascent to the One (God), and inwardness (e.g. dicitur superstitiosis:
regnum dei intra uos est).
From uera rel. 69 on, cupiditas triplex assumes an important role as the
fundamental structure of all sin.142 Beginning with a gradual description of
the forms of idolatry (ad animalia et inde ad ipsa corpora colenda delabun-
tur), Augustine ends in condemning people who do not worship any deities
at all but their own thoughts.143 To Augustine, these people are, in fact, the
worst kind of idolizers, for they are entirely in the servitude of cupiditas
triplex. In other words, they serve pleasure (uoluptatis), or high position
(excellentiae), or show (spectaculi). These three objects are considered to

139 O’Donnell 1992, III, 205, of 1 Jn 2, 16. For outlines of the work, see van Fleteren 1976,

478–479 nn. 17–18; Verschoren 2002, 221 n. 71.

140 van Fleteren 1976, 479, 490–493.
141 The verse is cited in the same year in mus. 6, 45. See also mus. 6, 48 quamobrem neque in

uoluptate carnali, neque in honoribus et laudibus hominum, neque in eorum exploratione quae
forinsecus corpus attingunt, nostra gaudia collocemus, habentes in intimo deum, ubi certum est
et incommutabile omne quod amamus. Verschoren 2002, 221 n. 70.
142 Prior to the structural turning point in uera rel. 68, superbia and curiositas are treated

in the manner familiar from other works from Augustine’s early career. Thus, the Devil is an
archetype of impious pride (26), for he loved himself more than God, and did not want to
submit himself under God’s power. Again, concupiscentia oculorum refers to epistemological
delusion: man tries in vain to find the first principle (prima species) from the sensual world
and in its lowest creatures (naturae corporeae). uera rel. 40. See also uera rel. 65. Thus, the
realms of intellectus are erroneously imagined by means of bodily visions (phantasma), and
eternal light is conceived as an immense space full of light (cf. conf. 5, 20).
143 uera rel. 69 quidquid animo errante imaginati fuerint.
176 chapter four

be idols due to their force of eliciting people’s expectations of happiness

from them, either in the form of fleshly joys, futile power, or delights taken
in unhealthy visual pleasures.144
Being temporal, however, these things—pleasure, power and beauty—
pass in time. They can be lost randomly.145 People following such idols are
thus dominated either by their libido, or, superbia, or curiositas, or by all of
them together, and while denying all submission to any deities, they end up
in servitude of the entire temporal universe and its parts. Finally, Augustine
quotes here 1Jn 2, 15–16, and correlates the biblical terms with the ones used
in his own exposition.146
Triplex cupiditas can also be referred to as a threefold temptation (triplex
etiam temptatio). This is shown by Christ’s three temptations in the wilder-
ness (Mt 4, 1–11).147 The first temptation of the breads teaches how cupiditas
uoluptatis should be checked—one should not yield even to hunger. If one
eats the “inner” food (intus pascitur) of God’s word, one does not need the
pleasures of the “wasteland” (ista eremo). The second temptation, to bow
in front of the Devil, refers to pride, and it is warded off by a submission
to God. The third one (and the most contrived in its context), to leap from
the roof of the Temple, is a temptation of curiosity. There was no other rea-
son for Christ to do such a thing than to “conduct an experiment” (aliquid
experiendi). But divine things cannot be searched for by a method that is vis-
ible, and a person who is attached to immutable wisdom is not interested
in hurling himself into temporal, “inferior” knowledge (uera rel. 71).
Augustine continues to explore true and false religion within the struc-
ture of triplex cupiditas-scheme.148 The tone of this exploration is set by an

144 uera rel. 69 his autem rebus, quibus quisque beatus uult effici, seruiat necesse est, uelit
nolit.
145 uera rel. 69 possunt autem auferre ista et scintilla ignis et aliqua parua bestiola.
146 uera rel. 70: hoc modo tria illa notata sunt, nam concupiscentia carnis uoluptatis infimae
amatores significat, concupiscentia oculorum curiosos, ambitio saeculi superbos.
147 uera rel. 71. Augustine treats the vices in the sequence in which they appear in Mt

4. Evagrius of Pontos (malign. cogit. 1) also attaches the three main human temptations to
Christ’s victorious answers against the Devil.
148 See Du Roy 1966, 352–363, for an attempt to reconstruct a thoroughgoing Trinitarian

theology behind the triplex cupiditas-scheme in uera rel. Van Fleteren 1976, 491–493, suggests
in accordance with Du Roy that the vices refer to the threefold division of the soul in Plato
(ἐπιθυµητικόν, θυµοειδές, λογιστικόν). It seems, however, that in uera rel. Augustine is not so
much interested in psychological correspondences of the three basic sins than in simply
analysing them. uera rel. 78 is an exception; but there only two (higher-lower) parts are
mentioned. Neither Du Roy or van Fleteren mention the traditional auriga-image in uera
rel. 83, which appears in connection with corporis uoluptas.
the root and matrix of sin 177

explicitly Neoplatonic worldview. Thus, uera rel. 72–83 is a treatise on bodily

things: how they serve ordo rerum in their beauty, and yet how wrong it is
to try to find ultimate happiness in them. After bodily uoluptates, Augustine
turns to pride.149 Superbia is characterised as a wish to be invincible, in
imitation of the omnipotent God. Finally, in uera rel. 94–100, curiositas is
treated as a vain intellectual delight, or rather, as a defect. In uera rel. 101,
Augustine then sums up all the three fundamental temptations.
Let us examine Augustine’s description of each vice. Even in their corrup-
tion, they paradoxically reflect virtues or point “upwards,” to the real source
of all good, high and beautiful. In Augustine’s monistic worldview, even the
basest of sins have reference to what is good.
1. The bodily uoluptas attempts to find “convenience” and tries to avoid
inconvenience (conuenientia—resistentia, 72). By the principle of con-
venience, all bodily things come into being, even in sexual reproduc-
tion (74). But the temporal beauties and harmonies are mutable to
the extent that they also lead one to conclude that there must be
something immutable (ex his admoneamur incommutabile aliquid esse
quaerendum). As in a sort of paradox, the bodily pleasures remind one
to hold them in contempt (83), and the “weakness of visible flesh”
helps one to seek eternal beauty in the entire universe (uera rel. 84).
2. Likewise, perverse human pride, which consists of a wish to subdue
everything under its power, reflects and refers to the ideal state of
affairs, where one lives under God’s dominion, “imitating” His power,
not with pride, but by living according to His laws. In human sinful
reality, pride has an “appetite for unity and omnipotence” (uera rel.
84) over temporal things, in other words, pride strives for invincibility.
The result of the cupiditas of pride, however, was and is that human
beings are not able to conquer even their emotions (ira, inuidentia,
85). The fallen humans wish to be unconquerable, but they cannot
win even their own vices (85).150 The aspect of invincibility is then
elaborated further. To actually gain the object of prideful appetite
(inuicti esse uolumus) in a permanent and appropriate way, one has
to love (diligere) God and one’s neighbour as oneself (uera rel. 86–
92), not as bodily or relational objects (as brothers or sons or spouses),
but as “humans” (homines) in their eternal (and partly future) essence

149 uera rel. 84–93.

150 Cf. s. 392, 5.
178 chapter four

(88).151 Again, the right conditions of freedom can be found in the

loving God, and by turning away from the love of mutable things. If
one wishes to rule, one should submit oneself to God’s universal rule
(93). In this way, even pride foreshadows real liberty and real power.
The sin of pride reminds human beings of their real destiny in God
(93).
3. Curiosity is treated last.152 Augustine defines it as a “joy derived from
knowing things” (de rerum cognitione laetitia, 94). Even in its depraved
form, it refers to the truth, and to finding out the truth. However, in
the fallen world, the focus of human intellect has become fuzzy and
aberrant in this respect.153 Nevertheless, there is a way out of this intel-
lectual confusion, and this is God’s self-revelation in the Bible (99).
Instead of imaginative alimentations in service of curiosity, divine
scriptures provide the food of the real Wisdom for the soul (uera rel.
100).154
Augustine’s description of the function of the vices in ascent to God ends in
a chiastic sentence structure, in which the three cupiditates are summed
up. At the same time, this threefold scheme evolves to a new level. The
real objects of the perverted human strivings are stated as cognitio (viz.
curiositas), facilitas agendi (viz. superbia) and quies corporis (viz. uoluptas):
This is the return from temporal to eternal things, and the transformation of
the old man into the new. What can fail to urge man to strive for virtue, when
his very vices urge him? Curiosity seeks nothing but knowledge, which cannot
be certain knowledge unless it be knowledge of eternal things which remain
ever the same. Pride seeks nothing but power, which has reference to facility
in acting. But power is attained only by the perfect soul which is submissive
to God and which with great love turns towards his kingdom. Bodily pleasure
seeks nothing but rest, and there is no rest save where there is no poverty and
no corruption.155 [transl. Burleigh]

151 See O’Donovan 1980, 30–31.

152 For the order of the temptations and its significance, see O’Donnell’s (1992, III, 204)
skeptical remarks.
153 The Manichaean views on divinity are refuted in uera rel. 96: according to them, eternal

things and God are pictured as corporeal phantasmata, as a huge spatial beam of light. Du
Roy 1966, 362.
154 van Fleteren 1976, 492: “the understanding of the Scriptures takes on a more important

role than in many of his previous works.”

155 uera rel. 101 haec est a temporalibus ad aeterna regressio et ex uita ueteris hominis in

nouum hominem reformatio. quid est autem, unde homo commemorari non possit ad uirtutes
capessendas, quando de ipsis uitiis potest? quid enim appetit curiositas nisi cognitionem, quae
certa esse non potest nisi rerum aeternarum et eodem modo se semper habentium? quid appetit
the root and matrix of sin 179

This triplicity is then exemplified by two groups of people. The unhappy

ones (miseri) are not interested in finding the ends or goals (fines) to their
desires and actions; they prefer studying things to knowing them (curiositas
instead of cognitio), struggle to victory (superbia instead of facilitas actionis)
and hunger and sexual desire to satiety and lack of such desires (uolup-
tas instead of salus corporis). In the opposite case, that is, on the way to
true happiness, one has to first abandon curiosity, and to acknowledge the
“inner” (intus) knowledge as the only certain knowledge. Next, one may
achieve facilitas actionis. The last phase (and apparently the hardest one to
achieve) is to receive quies corporis by “abstaining from those things without
which this life can be lived” (103). This process cannot be perfected in this
life, however, as Augustine points out by referring to certain bodily limita-
tions.156 Hence, one has to wait for the final consummation in Heaven. There,
the threefold cupiditas has been replaced by ueritas, pax and sanitas, each
referring to the struggle felt in this life due to sins (uera rel. 103).157 On the
other hand, people who have not submitted themselves to the intellectual
ascent towards the immutable God will receive their appropriate eschato-
logical punishment. These people will have to face in a perfected way the
things they actually loved in their life because of their triplex cupiditas (104).
The beginning of this darkness is fleshly knowledge and the weakness of
the bodily senses. Those who delight in strife will be aliens from peace and
involved in frightful difficulties. The beginning of the greatest difficulty is war
and contention […] their hands and feet are bound, i.e., all facility of working
is taken from them. Those who want to hunger and thirst, to burn with lust
and be weary […] love indigence which is the beginning of the greatest of
woes. What they love will be made perfect for them, for they will be where
there is weeping and gnashing of teeth.158 [transl. Burleigh]

superbia nisi potentiam, quae refertur ad agendi facilitatem, quam non inuenit anima perfecta
nisi deo subdita et ad eius regnum summa caritate conuersa? quid appetit uoluptas corporis
nisi quietem, quae est nisi ubi nulla est indigentia et nulla corruptio?
156 This he does by quoting Rom 7, 23–25, a passage that will have a deep impact on his

teaching about human abilities in virtue. See Chapter 6.

157 uera rel. 103 Non mirum autem, si hoc dabitur his, qui in cognitione solam ueritatem

amant et in actione solam pacem et in corpore solam sanitatem. Hoc enim in eis perficietur
post hanc uitam, quod in hac uita plus diligunt.
158 uera rel. 104 harum [sc. tenebrarum] initium est carnis prudentia et sensuum corporeo-

rum imbecillitas. et qui certaminibus delectantur, alienabuntur a pace et summis difficultatibus

implicabuntur. initium enim summae difficultatis est bellum atque contentio […] ligantur ei
manus et pedes, id est facilitas omnis aufertur operandi. et qui sitire et esurire uolunt et in
libidinem ardescere et defatigari […] amant indigentiam, quod est initium summorum dolo-
rum. perficietur ergo in eis quod amant, ut ibi eis sit ploratus et stridor dentium.
180 chapter four

The eschatological point of view is clear in the final exhortations, where

Augustine returns to his original biblical motto (1 Jn 2, 16). To love bodily
pleasures (concupiscentia carnis), to love competition (ambitio saeculi) or to
love uisibilia spectacula (concupiscentia oculorum) will have serious, infer-
nal consequences.
Some years after writing uera rel., Augustine completed his de libero arbi-
trio. As we have already seen, libido (cupiditas) plays a remarkable role as the
single foundation of sinful acts in lib. arb. 1.159 In lib. arb. 2, Augustine con-
centrates on the will as the locus of sinful corruption. Thus, in lib. arb. 2, 53,
Augustine brings the theme of triplex cupiditas under the headline of the
corrupt will. So threefold concupiscentia appears as an interpretative instru-
ment to explain the ways of uoluntas auersa. Human aversion from God is
organised in three categories, according to the direction of the aversion of
the will. If the will directs towards “what is its own” (ad proprium), it belongs
to the category of pride (suae potestatis uult esse).160 If it turns to inspect “out-
ward things” (ad exterius), it falls into the class of curiosity (quaecumque
ad se non pertinent cognoscere studet). Finally, if it gazes at and prizes the
“things below” (ad inferius), it is led by bodily pleasure (uoluptatem corporis
diligit). Augustine readily points out that human will is not evil (mala) as
such, nor are the goods that the human will is striving after. The evil lies in
the direction that the will’s aversive movement takes.161
Unquestionably, the most important work using the scheme of triplex
cupiditas is confessiones.162 The three evil desires give structure not only to
Augustine’s view of sin in general, or to his verdict on Manichaeism, but also

159 lib. arb. 1, 8–12, 22.

160 See also lib. arb. 3, 28 aequalitatem angelorum desiderant propter inanem gloriam
suam […] in tali uoluntate perseuerantes […] potestatem suam potius quam dei omnipotentis
diligentibus. Christ is here described as the “door of humility” (humilitatis ianua). Cf. conf. 3,
16.
161 lib. arb. 2, 53: uoluntas autem auersa ab incommutabili et communi bono et conuersa ad

proprium bonum aut ad exterius aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium conuertitur, cum suae
potestatis uult esse, ad exterius, cum aliorum propria uel quaecumque ad se non pertinent
cognoscere studet, ad inferius cum uoluptatem corporis diligit. Atque ita homo superbus et
curiosus et lasciuus effectus excipitur ab alia uita, quae in comparatione superioris uitae mors
est […] ita fit ut neque illa bona quae a peccantibus adpetuntur […] mala sint neque ipsa
uoluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam mediis numerandam esse comperimus, sed malum
sit auersio eius ab incommutabili bono et conuersio ad mutabilia bona; quae tamen auersio
atque conuersio […] est uoluntaria, digna et iusta eam miseriae poena subsequitur.
162 For detailed comments and analyses in this respect, O’Donnell (1992) should be con-

sulted. Cf. the classical study by Courcelle (1950a), where this subject is practically non-
existent.
the root and matrix of sin 181

to the general composition of the work.163 He continuously reflects his past

life through the scheme, providing eventually a substantial analysis of all
three desires and their relation to the senses in conf. 10.164
From his childhood on, he sees himself bound by these three tempta-
tions.165 In his youth, he is festered with “sacrilegious curiosity” (sacrilega
curiositas); he laments his visit to a church where he “dared to lust after a
girl” (concupiscere) and he confesses that the studies he went through were
motivated by his vainglory (gaudebam superbe et tumebam typho).166 After
recalling his first encounters with philosophy, the crude style of the Bible
and the Manichaeans, he sums up the categories of sin (flagitium, facinus)
as “chief kinds of wickedness.” Their sources are threefold, and often intri-
cately bound together.
They spring from the lust of domination or from the lust of the eyes or from
sensuality—either one of or two of these, or all three at once. Thus an evil-
living person transgresses your decalogue of three commands with our duty
to you and seven with our duty to our fellow human beings.167
[transl. Chadwick]

163 Of the host of allusions and references, I only quote two: conf. 5, 4 exultant atque
extolluntur qui sciunt, et per impiam superbiam recedentes et deficientes a lumine tuo tanto
ante solis defectum futurum praeuident et in praesentia suum non uident—non enim religiose
quaerunt, unde habeant ingenium, quo ista quaerunt—et inuenientes, quia tu fecisti eos, non
ipsi se dant tibi, se ut serues quod fecisti, et quales se ipsi fecerant occidunt se tibi et trucidant
exaltationes suas sicut uolatilia et curiositates suas sicut pisces maris, quibus perambulant
secretas semitas [Ps 8,9] abyssi, et luxurias suas sicut pecora campi [Ps 8,8], ut tu, deus, ignis
edax consumas mortuas curas eorum recreans eos immortaliter; conf. 9, 1 sed ubi erat tam
annoso tempore et de quo imo altoque secreto euocatum est in momento liberum arbitrium
meum, quod subderem ceruicem leni iugo tuo et umeros leui sarcinae tuae, Christe Iesu, adiutor
meus et redemptor meus [Ps 18,15]? quam suaue mihi subito factum est carere suauitatibus
nugarum, et quas amittere metus fuerat, iam dimittere gaudium erat. eiciebas enim eas a
me, uera tu et summa suauitas, eiciebas et intrabas pro eis omni uoluptate dulcior, sed non
carni et sanguini, omni luce clarior, sed omni secreto interior, omni honore sublimior, sed non
sublimibus in se. iam liber erat animus meus a curis mordacibus ambiendi et adquirendi et
uolutandi atque scalpendi scabiem libidinum, et garriebam tibi, claritati meae et diuitiis meis
et saluti meae, domino deo meo.
164 See Kotzé 2004, 216–217.
165 conf. 1, 16; 1, 30. O’Donnell 1992, II, 65, 101. See also Augustine’s analysis of the possible

causes for his theft of pears in conf. 2, 13, where a set of superbia, curiositas and luxuria is
joined with another set consisting of emotions.
166 conf. 3, 5–3,6. O’Donnell 1992, II, 160. Augustine’s friend Alypius was notorious for his

curiosity to see the shows. See the depiction of s. Denis 14, 3, where Augustine opposes a good
version of spectacula (i.e. those of the pains of the martyrs) to the reproachable traditional
ones.
167 conf. 3, 16 haec sunt capita iniquitatis, quae pullulant principandi et spectandi et sentiendi

libidine aut una aut duabus earum aut simul omnibus, et uiuitur male aduersus tria et septem,
[…] decalogum tuum, deus altissime et dulcissime.
182 chapter four

Proceeding with his biographical account of threefold desire, Augustine

provides an account of his time spent in the Manichaean sect. Conf. 4 starts
with dark undertones. By the delusion of the followers of Mani and by his
own ambitious plans for a career, he also was deluded in a full spectrum of
cupiditates. In brief, he was both proud and vain.168 He was also won over
by greed.169 He started to live with the future mother of Adeodatus, in an
agreement that was dictated by sexual desire.170 Augustine ends the book by
depicting himself in servitude to evil desires and as a prodigal son among
“meretricious lusts.”171
After having written in some length on memory in conf. 10, Augustine
proceeds to analyse the central topic of continentia and the threefold temp-
tation of evil desire. Here continence contains and offers a remedy to all
aspects of Augustine’s past sinful life (concupiscentia carnis et concupiscen-
tia oculorum et ambitio saeculi).172 Whereas threefold cupiditas covers the
sins of Augustine’s own uita in general,173 concupiscentia carnis covers the
sensual aspects of sin in particular.174 The account of sensual aspects of con-

168 conf. 4, 1 seducebamur et seducebamus falsi atque fallentes in uariis cupiditatibus et

palam per doctrinas, quas liberales uocant, occulte autem falso nomine religionis, hic superbi,
ibi superstitiosi, ubique uani.
169 conf. 4, 2 uictoriosam loquacitatem uictus cupiditate uendebam.
170 conf. 4, 2 in illis annis unam habebam non eo quod legitimum uocatur coniugio cognitam,

[…] experirer exemplo meo, quid distaret inter coniugalis placiti modum, quod foederatum esset
generandi gratia, et pactum libidinosi amoris, ubi proles etiam contra uotum nascitur. See also
conf. 6, 25 non amator coniugii sed libidinis seruus eram.
171 conf. 4, 30 malarum cupiditatum seruus […] bonam partem substantiae meae sategi

habere in potestate […] profectus sum abs te in longinquam regionem, ut eam dissiparem in
meretrices cupiditates. For the allusions to prodigal son in conf. see O’Donnell 1992, II, 95–98.
172 conf. 10, 40–41 da quod iubes et iube quod uis: imperas nobis continentiam […] per

continentiam quippe conligimur et redigimur in unum, a quo in multa defluximus. Minus enim
te amat qui tecum aliquid amat quod non propter te amat. continentiam iubes: da quod iubes et
iube quod uis. iubes certe, ut contineam a concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum et
ambitione saeculi [1 Io 2,16]. O’Donnell 1992, III, 200: “Everything about conf. as literary artefact
conspires to emphasise the place of continentia in A.’s view of his life and his conversion.” For
continence and Augustine in general, see Hunter 1994; Schlabach 1998.
173 conf. 10, 39 temptatio est uita humana super terram. O’Donnell 1992, III, 203, on 1Jn

2, 16 “this passage gives structure to the first eight books as well as to this second half of
Bk. 10.” Cf. the roughly contemporary cat. rud. 55, where the scheme is part of a shorter
baptismal instruction. cat. rud. 55 tu itaque credens ista, caue tentationes: […] immoderatis
uoluptatibus uentris et gutturis, aut impudicos, aut uanis curiositatibus uel illicitis deditos,
siue spectaculorum, siue remediorum aut diuinationum diabolicarum, siue in pompa et typho
auaritiae atque superbiae. Note that people driven by these temptations are found not only
among the pagans and the heretics, but also inside the church.
174 Augustine follows the traditional partition of the five senses that was strongly repre-

sented in Manichaean anthropology as well. O’Donnell 1992, III, 167–168; Kotzé 2004, 216–217.
the root and matrix of sin 183

cupiscentia starts with an account of sexual desires and spontaneous images

seen in dreams.175 The tone of Augustine’s report on his current state of sex-
ual continence is surprisingly confident: it is perfectly possible to God to
grant a better state of mind in this respect: the “glue of lust” will soon be dis-
solved.176 The concrete physical abstinence is mentioned only casually, “this
was done even before I became a dispenser of the sacrament.” In Augustine’s
current personal position, nocturnal sexual illusions seem to represent only
a fragment of the entire spectrum of sensual concupiscentia.177
Moving to the five senses and to the risks they entail, Augustine is more
concerned about the lingering temptations of gluttony, lurking behind the
acceptable needs for nourishment, than about the effects of sexual concu-
piscentia.
I struggle every day against uncontrolled desire in eating and drinking. It is
not something I could give up once and for all and decide never to touch it
again, as I was able to do with sexual intercourse. And so a rein has to be held
upon my throat, moderated between laxity and austerity.178
[transl. Chadwick]
Whereas the effects of past sexual desires are lingering in Augustine’s
dreams like rather harmless phantom pains, the temptation of food and
drink is a daily temptation, which requires constant vigilance. Again, Augus-
tine emphasises God’s ability to grant continence even in an immoderate
desire for food and drink.179 While the sense of smell is dismissed as some-
thing that does not cause any serious appeal to Augustine, he is ready to

175 conf. 10, 41. Traditionally, sexual propagation and the senses belonged to the same set

of sensual activities together with the ability of speech, which in Augustine’s composition is
treated together with flattery and deception in connection with pride. See Long & Sedley I,
315–316 (Aetius). Although Augustine holds these images to be slightly disturbing, resulting
from his past consuetudo, he deems them not culpable, despite the fact that the dreamer may
even give rational consent to these illusory images. See Matthews 1992, 90–106; Mann 1999,
160–162.
176 conf. 10, 42 augebis, domine, magis magisque in me munera tua, ut anima mea sequatur

me ad te concupiscentiae uisco expedita, ut non sit rebellis sibi atque ut in somnis etiam non
solum non perpetret istas corruptelarum turpitudines per imagines animales usque ad carnis
fluxum, sed ne consentiat quidem. nam ut nihil tale uel tantulum libeat, quantulum possit nutu
cohiberi etiam in casto dormientis affectu non tantum in hac uita, sed etiam in hac aetate, non
magnum est omnipotenti, qui uales facere supra quam petimus et intellegimus [Eph 3,20].
177 Cf. his earlier agonies in the matter, in conf. 8, 10–13; 8, 17.
178 conf. 10, 47 in his ergo temptationibus positus certo cotidie aduersus concupiscentiam

manducandi et bibendi: non enim est quod semel praecidere et ulterius non attingere decernam,
sicut de concubitu potui. itaque freni gutturis temperata relaxatione et constrictione tenendi
sunt.
179 conf. 10, 45.
184 chapter four

confess that he cannot guarantee a safeguarded indifferent position even

on this matter: “No one should be complacent in this life which is called a
‘total temptation.’”180 Both the sense of hearing and the sense of sight lead to
an even more uncertain ground. The aesthetic pleasures derived from beau-
tiful singing and visually pleasant works of art are powerful enough to cause
lapses. The visual pleasure of light and colours is all the more deplorable, as
it is always present, unlike agreeable voices and songs.181
In general, the presentation of temptations of five senses has an unde-
niably contrived appearance.182 Nevertheless, all five sensual temptations,
added with the separate case of sexual desire, are designed to reinforce the
arguments of progress and dependency on God’s grace, made frequently
during the discussion on each sense. Furthermore, Augustine seems to con-
stantly remind his reader of the inherent goodness of the sensual reality,
despite the risks of misguided commitment that it may entail.183
Curiositas is treated as a higher form of temptation, based on the five
senses, although not taking pleasure in the sensations as such but in “per-
ceptions acquired through the flesh” (10, 54).184 The idea is exemplified by
a desire to see mangled corpses,185 a desire to achieve useless knowledge,
to use magical arts, and a desire to experience miracles with the pretext
of religion.186 Although Augustine again maintains that the grave forms of
these temptations no longer belong to his present life as a Christian, he
also wishes to make a confession for the more trivial forms of curiosity.187
For instance, Augustine blames the element of distraction, the banality of

180 conf. 10, 48 nemo securus esse debet in ista uita, quae tota temptatio [Iob 7,1] nominatur.
181 conf. 10, 50 tamen cum mihi accidit, ut me amplius cantus quam res, quae canitur, moueat,
poenaliter me peccare confiteor et tunc mallem non audire cantantem. 10, 51 pulchras formas
et uarias, nitidos et amoenos colores amant oculi […] et tangunt me uigilantem totis diebus, nec
requies ab eis datur mihi, sicut datur a uocibus canoris, aliquando ab omnibus, in silentio. 10,
53 ego autem haec loquens atque discernens etiam istis pulchris gressum innecto, sed tu euellis,
domine, euellis tu, quoniam misericordia tua ante oculos meos est [Ps 25,3]. nam ego capior
miserabiliter, et tu euellis misericorditer aliquando non sentientem, quia suspensius incideram,
aliquando cum dolore, quia iam inhaeseram.
182 conf. 10, 41–53. In O’Donnell’s words (1992, III, 217): “alien to our taste.”
183 Cf. the strongly emotional language in the roughly contemporary (ca. 401) s. Denis

14, 2 quanta mala habet, quanta mala facit carnalis uoluptatis appetitio. inde adulteria, for-
nicationes: inde luxuriae, ebrietates: inde quicquid titillat sensus inlicite, et mentem penetrat
suauitate pestifera, addicit carni mentem, deturbat ex arce rectorem, subdit seruienti imperan-
tem. et quid poterit homo facere rectum in se ipso peruersus?
184 conf. 10, 54. For curiositas in conf., see Blumenberg 1961, 36–41.
185 Cf. Plat. Rep. 439e.
186 conf. 10, 55.
187 conf. 10, 57: a dog hunting a rabbit, a lizard or a spider catching flies.
the root and matrix of sin 185

the images emerging from the sensual world, and intruding in the midst of
“thinking some weighty matter” of “deepest importance.”188
Proceeding to the third member of threefold lust, that of pride (superbia),
Augustine presents this as the most severe temptation, for there are virtually
no secure means for investigating it in one’s own soul:
In temptations of a different sort I have some capacity for self-exploration,
but in this matter almost none.189 [transl. Chadwick]
Superbia imitates God’s sovereignty in a perverse way. To love the power,
praise and fear that come from other people, forms an obstacle for the
perfection of love. The extreme difficulty in warding off this temptation
lies in its close connection to good things, “good life and good actions.”190
The appreciation of one’s community leads to a gradually increasing self-
regard at the expense of a truthful relation to God. In addition, pride has
a self-reflective capacity: if I renounce my prideful attitude, I may simul-
taneously feel pride of this very renunciation.191 Thus, pride can never be
safely discerned by the person who feels it: it is a blind spot in one’s self-
knowledge. Of the three temptations that Augustine has listed here, the case
of pride most clearly seems to affirm his view that he cannot effectively part
with his own sins and evil desires. The threefold concupiscentia is there for
God to heal; only God can deliver the soul from temptations. The ultimate
example of pride is to regard advances in virtuous living to be one’s own
achievement, and to enjoy or proclaim these advances in a private fashion,
without “sharing this grace with the community.”192 God commands conti-
nence in self-regard and pride as well, for it is only his to give.193 The view
of extreme dependency on gratia dei that was formulated in Simpl., thus
reappears in Augustine’s thoughts about his possibilities to achieve a vir-
tuous life.194 Consequently, Book 10 ends in praise of the incarnated Word,

188 Evagrius had also made similar observations on the difficulty of focusing one’s

thoughts. See Sorabji 2000, 362.

189 conf. 10, 60 est enim qualiscumque in aliis generibus temptationum mihi facultas explo-

randi me, in hoc paene nulla est.

190 E.g. the love and praise that various officia deserve. conf. 10, 59.
191 conf. 10, 63.
192 conf. 10, 64 intus est aliud in eodem genere temptationis malum, quo inanescunt qui

placent sibi de se […] sed sibi placentes multum tibi displicent non tantum de non bonis quasi
bonis, uerum etiam de bonis tuis quasi suis, aut etiam sicut de tuis, sed tamquam ex meritis suis,
aut etiam sicut ex tua gratia, non tamen socialiter gaudentes, sed aliis inuidentes eam.
193 conf. 10, 60 imperas nobis et in hoc genere continentiam: da quod iubes et iube quod uis.
194 This is also discernible in s. Denis 14, 4–5. Celebrating Cyprian’s martyrdom, Augustine

says to the parish that only God may give the ability to resist the temptations, ubi mors
186 chapter four

who has been shown to be a much more potent and valid medicine to
cure Augustine’s self-deceptive temptations than any of the methods that
have been suggested by the philosophers.195 The three evil desires are sum-
marised as representing all the sicknesses of the soul.196 As a consequence,
the true mediator between God and man is invoked to cure these sick-
nesses.197
After this extended treatise of threefold concupiscentia in confessiones,
the scheme moves into the background, only to reappear briefly in the last
book, where Augustine returns to his favourite anti-Manichaean tool of
identifying the soul’s movements with the various creatures of Genesis. In
the continence that God will grant, these movements, or threefold desires,
may be checked and changed into tame beasts.
However, Augustine wishes to draw a line between legitimate “move-
ments” and between the qualities that form the culpability of the threefold
evil desires for these latter qualities belong to a “dead soul.”198 By the creative
Word of God, the sinful movements of the dead soul are then awakened and
changed into good ones.199
The biblical source text (1Jn 2, 16) of triplex cupiditas is covered in a col-
lection of sermons on 1Jn (in epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem
2, 10–12, 14, written in 407), where it is located in a discussion concerning the

uenerit, nulla remanebit ambitio, nulla curiositas oculorum, nulla appetitio sordidarum et
carnalium uoluptatum: una uita contemta omnia superantur. beatus ergo laudetur in domino.
quando hoc posset, si non adiuuisset dominus? quando uinceret, si non spectator, qui coronam
parabat uincenti, subministraret uires laboranti?
195 These are exemplified by the Neoplatonic theurgical rites, conf. 10, 67. O’Donnell 1992,

III, 241.
196 conf. 10, 66 ideoque consideraui languores peccatorum meorum in cupiditate triplici.
197 conf. 10, 69 pro nobis tibi uictor et uictima, et ideo uictor, quia uictima, pro nobis tibi

sacerdos et sacrificium, et ideo sacerdos, quia sacrificium, faciens tibi nos de seruis filios de te
nascendo, nobis seruiendo. merito mihi spes ualida in illo est, quod sanabis omnes languores
meos per eum, qui sedet ad dexteram tuam et te interpellat pro nobis [Rom 8,34]. Cf. doctr.
chr. 1, 13 sic sapientia dei hominem curans, se ipsam exhibuit ad sanandum, ipsa medicus
ipsa medicina. quia ergo per superbiam homo lapsus est, humilitatem adhibuit ad sanandum:
serpentis sapientia decepti sumus, dei stultitia liberamur.
198 conf. 13, 30 continete uos ab immani feritate superbiae, ab inerti uoluptate luxuriae et

a fallaci nomine scientiae, ut sint bestiae mansuetae et pecora edomita et innoxii serpentes.
motus enim animae sunt isti in allegoria: sed fastus elationis et delectatio libidinis et uenenum
curiositatis motus sunt animae mortuae, quia non ita moritur, ut omni motu careat, quoniam
discedendo a fonte uitae moritur atque ita suscipitur a praetereunte saeculo et conformatur ei.
199 conf. 13, 31 seruiunt enim rationi haec animalia, cum a progressu mortifero cohibita ui-

uunt et bona sunt. The “change” of three evil desires is supposed in s. Denis 14, 2 non auferatur
cupiditas, sed mutetur […] Quid cupiebas? uoluptatem carnis, concupiscentiam oculorum,
ambitionem saeculi.
the root and matrix of sin 187

love of the world.200 The main danger in the trio of depraved love is the way
its forms are bound in time. The flow of time drowns everyone who runs
headlong into it. The only remedy against temporality is Christ, who is “a
tree in the midst of the flowing water of time.”201 Albeit created by God, the
created good things conceal a risk of enticement to love them instead of
the Creator.202 By claiming an ambiguity in the term, Augustine can say that
the “world” (mundus) may also be understood to refer not only to the good
order of things, but to those who love the created reality as their source for
happiness (diligere ad beatitudinem).203 The entire existence of these peo-
ple is based on the three worldly desires.204 In loving the sensual pleasures
and objects, they “enjoy” that which ought to be only “used” in modera-
tion and in reference to God.205 The “fleshly” desires seek bodily goods;206
the desire of the “eyes” (curiositas) appears in theatres, shows, magical arts
and in the wishes of those Christians who wait too eagerly for miraculous
signs from God. Finally, ambitio saeculi means pride, a wish to be great
in one’s own eyes either by wealth or by some other power.207 Succinctly
put, the people of the world love things that eventually and in time will be
lost.
The three worldly desires thus provide a neat summary of the perverted
and opposite love, or cupiditas.208 However, Augustine is not content only
to categorise the wrongly oriented love into the three temptations, for he
also wants to show how these temptations may be conquered. This he
does (as in uera rel.) by pointing to the example of Christ and His three

200 An exhaustive analysis of ep. Io. tr. is offerred by Dideberg 1975; for triple concupiscence

as the love of the world, see 175–190. Dideberg treats Augustine’s uoluptas, curiositas and
superbia vaguely as “sa conception des passions” (1975, 183).
201 ep. Io. tr. 2, 10 rerum temporalium fluuius trahit: sed tanquam circa fluuium arbor nata

est dominus noster Iesus Christus.

202 ep. Io. tr. 2, 11.
203 See also s. Denis 14, 2 quis eum mundus non cognouit? dilector mundi. Dideberg 1975, 180.
204 ep. Io. tr. 2, 12 ipsi non habent nisi ista tria, desiderium carnis, desiderium oculorum, et

ambitionem saeculi.
205 ep. Io. tr. 2, 12 ne ad fruendum hoc ametis, quod ad utendum habere debetis. Food, drink

and sex are given as examples.

206 See also ep. Io. tr. 10, 6 qui claudunt oculos contra caritatem, obdormiscunt in concu-

piscentiis delectationum carnalium. euigila ergo. delectationes enim sunt, manducare, bibere,
luxuriari, ludere, uenari: pompas istas uanas omnia mala sequuntur.
207 ep. Io. tr. 2, 13 ambitio saeculi superbia est. iactare se uult in honoribus; magnus sibi

uidetur homo, siue de diuitiis, siue de aliqua potentia.

208 ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tria sunt ista, et nihil inuenis unde tenetur cupiditas humana, nisi aut

desiderio carnis, aut desiderio oculorum, aut ambitione saeculi.

188 chapter four

temptations in the desert (Mt 4, 1–10).209 In fact, by keeping Christ and his
victory of Satan’s temptations in mind, one should be able to completely
dispel the threefold concupiscentia.210 In this way, the zero-sum game of
the two loves is retrieved again. There is no room for the love of God in
a person who is bound with concupiscentia mundi, but once the worldly
desires have stepped aside, there is room again for dilectio dei.211 Augustine
returns to the main argument on the importance of choosing one’s objects of
love correctly: only divine love can assure eternity. “You are what you love.”
Therefore, if one loves God, one will eventually turn up to “be a god.”212
It is clear that the theme of cupiditas triplex functions in Augustine’s ear-
lier works, together with the image of the root, as a concrete answer to the
question, “whence the evil?” The scheme is designed to describe a general
explanation for human sinful behaviour, and it is clearly formed in oppo-
sition to his former Manichaean conviction of evil substance residing in
human nature; some of its allegorical applications, as we have seen in Gn.
adu. Man., even find their very target in the Manichaean religion. Whatever
the exact sources for this threefold division of sin are, its role and impor-
tance is plain enough. Triplex cupiditas should cover all the moral deficien-
cies in the bodily, the intellectual and social levels of human behaviour.

209 See Dideberg 1975, 186, who overlooks qu. eu. 1, 47, where triple cupiditas occurs in
a casual remark on the temptations of the Christ in Gethsemane. qu. eu. 1,47 sicut temp-
tatio cupiditatis trina est, ita et temtatio timoris trina est. cupiditati quae in curiositate est
opponitur timor mortis; sicut enim in illa cognoscendarum rerum est auiditas, ita in ista metus
amittendae talis notitiae. cupiditati uero honorum uel laudis opponitur timor ignominiae et
contumeliarum. cupiditati autem uoluptatis opponitur timor doloris. non absurde ergo intel-
legitur propter trinam temptationem passionis ter dominum orasse ut transiret calix, sed ita ut
potius impleretur uoluntas patris. Cf. qu. eu. 2,13 (superbia, curiositas).
210 ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tenentes ista, non habebitis concupiscentiam mundi: non habendo concu-

piscentiam mundi, non uos subiugabit nec desiderium carnis, nec desiderium oculorum, nec
ambitio saeculi.
211 ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 et facietis locum caritati uenienti, ut diligatis deum. quia si fuerit ibi dilectio

mundi, non ibi erit dilectio dei. See also ep. Io. tr. 6, 3. Similar emphasis on totality can be found
in s. Denis 14, 2 in concupiscentia carnis uoluptas est, in concupiscentia oculorum curiositas est,
in ambitione saeculi superbia est. qui tria ista uincit, non ei remanet omnino in cupiditate quod
uincat. multi rami, sed triplex radix.
212 ep. Io. tr. 2, 14 tenete potius dilectionem dei, ut quomodo deus est aeternus, sic et uos

maneatis in aeternum: quia talis est quisque, qualis eius dilectio est. terram diligis? terra eris.
deum diligis? quid dicam? deus eris? non audeo dicere ex me, scripturas audiamus: ego dixi,
dii estis, et filii altissimi omnes [Ps 81,6]. si ergo uultis esse dii et filii altissimi, nolite diligere
mundum, nec ea quae sunt in mundo. si quis dilexerit mundum, non est caritas patris in illo. quia
omnia quae sunt in mundo, desiderium carnis est, et desiderium oculorum, et ambitio saeculi,
quae non est ex patre, sed ex mundo [1 Io 2,15 sq.]. s. Denis 14, 2 non enim faciunt bonos et malos
mores nisi boni uel mali amores.
the root and matrix of sin 189

Triplex cupiditas thus works as a theologically pregnant idea in explaining

man’s disability and unwillingness to have a vision of God and to participate
in divine life.
Furthermore, Augustine often represents triplex cupiditas as a tempta-
tion. Thus, in Gn. adu. Man., the Devil’s successful attempt to entice Adam
and Eve is divinely punished by a threefold diabolical power over humans.
Even Christ is tempted by the Devil according to the schema of triplex cupid-
itas (uera rel.). Obviously, Augustine does not wish to restrict triplex cupid-
itas to being merely an outward force with no initial human involvement;
for the responsibility for the actions made in the scheme of triple concu-
piscence remains on the subject whether it is the case of Adam and Eve,
or present humanity. The ascent to God begins and ends in conquering the
threefold sin of the intellectual disturbances of curiosity, separation from
God’s nature in pride, and the love of temporal, bodily beauty in lust.
In many senses, uera rel. can be said to represent a climax in the role
of triplex cupiditas. This motif governs and structures the latter part of the
work and gives it a compositional coherence. The contents of threefold
concupiscentia are evolved at a high level of sophistication as well. In the
narrower sense of the word, concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum
and ambitio saeculi become a theological triad. They are the fundamental
factors that inhibit man’s final destiny, that is, his participation with God. In
all their perversity, even these vices reflect the actual goals of salus, cognitio
and facilitas, which are achieved only in relation to true harmony, true
wisdom and true power.
Augustine’s Neoplatonic solution in refuting the Manichaean teaching
of evil substance involves a commitment to good even in the case of such
concepts that describe sin and evil: that is, even triplex cupiditas refers to
the origin of all being.213 Vera rel. thus posits human sinful motives and
actions in the form of triplex cupiditas as an opposing, anti-Trinitarian force;
this is not in the sense of an independent, absolute negative ‘matter,’ but
as an explanation for sin and how it is distributed in humanity. Threefold
desire obstructs one’s knowledge of God (curiositas), it distorts man’s sub-
ordination to one Being (superbia) and misleads the human sense of beauty
and proportion to a pursuit of vanishing bodies (concupiscentia carnis). The

213 Of course, this Neoplatonic solution could be interpreted as representing a “positive”

or at least an instrumental character of concupiscentia in the process of ascent, or renewal.

Nevertheless, I believe Augustine’s only intention here is to guarantee the coherence of a
good Neoplatonic universe: all things have their designed place in the ordo, and are thus
“good,” i.e. at least used for good purposes. Thus, in the end, the final goal of evil is “good.”
190 chapter four

force of the threefold scheme lies more in distinguishing wrongful thoughts

and acts under three different categories depending on their relation with
internal motives and different objectives; as such, the scheme seems to be
less concerned of the problem of the origin of sin than the image of the ‘root.’
In actual contents, triplex cupiditas with its three parts are closely knit
to Augustine’s view of the corruptive influence of temporal and mutable
goods to the soul. The fleshly pleasures and delights of temporal knowledge
distract and inhibit one’s vision of God. In addition, the desire to aban-
don submissive participation with God and a striving after an independent
essence of one’s “own” all reflect Augustine’s strongly Neoplatonically con-
ditioned anthropology and theology in the context of triplex cupiditas.
Alongside uera rel., conf. also represents triplex cupiditas in structural
scale. The three evil desires serve as a matrix of Augustine’s past life, and
they also serve as a tool in charting his present risks of temptations. In
addition, the scheme offers a systematic tool in listing all the wonderous
ways in which God has given his grace to Augustine’s life. As for the concrete
possibilities of this grace, Augustine has, in conf., unshaken confidence. In
ep. Io. tr. the scheme appears in conjunction with the polar opposition of the
two loves and their ultimate goals. As is fitting for a sermon to a Christian
congregation, the perspectives of renewal are strongly present in ep. Io. tr. 2
as well.
As noted above, the formal scheme of triple concupiscentia fades away in
structural importance in Augustine’s works soon after conf. and ep. Io. tr.214
Exceptions can be found in a few sermons, however, which were written
during the years 412–420, and in which Augustine treats 1 Jn 2, 16 as describ-
ing depraved love for temporary things.215 In his debate with Julian, this verse
is discussed, but only briefly, and as an appendix to the more general and
urgent horizon of concupiscentia carnis.216

214 O’Donnell 1992, III, 207.

215 s. 112 attaches triplex cupiditas to the three answers given to the dinner invitation
in Lk 14. The evil desires appear in the following order: superbia, curiositas, uoluptas, and
with familiar contents. What is striking in the interpretation that the Johannine verse now
gets, is the way it is applied to the Donatians; the final exhortations of the parable (cogite
intrare) clearly point to this way. s. 162, on the other hand, treats dilectio mundi as part of a
commentary on 1 Cor 6, 18, and as an explanation for the theological meaning of fornicatio.
s. 162,4 ista ergo dilectio mundi, quae uniuersalem in se concupiscentiam continet mundi,
generalis est fornicatio, qua peccatur in corpus proprium; eo quod omnibus corporalibus et
uisibilibus et temporalibus desideriis et uoluptatibus humanus indesinenter seruit animus, ab
ipso creatore uniuersorum desolatus atque derelictus.
216 This observation is made by Dideberg 1975, 187–189.
the root and matrix of sin 191

While the formal scheme loses significance, it does not, however, mean
that the three vices or evil desires would disappear from Augustine’s teach-
ing of sin: on the contrary, the role of superbia as explicating the first and
foremost cause of the Fall is nowhere more stressed than in Augustine’s later
expositions of the Genesis narratives, and pride maintains its role as the pri-
mal, radical source of sin (Gn. litt., ciu. 13–14); curiositas is implicitly involved
e.g. in the condemnation of physici in ench. 9, where the futile inquiries on
natural phenomena and their causes are criticised. Concupiscentia carnis, in
turn, will return with an incomparable force in the Pelagian polemics.217

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has presented a survey of a typical feature in Augustine’s ethics

(the two opposite forms of love, caritas and cupiditas) by using two images,
or literary distinguishable forms, namely the image of the ‘root’ (radix) and
the scheme of the threefold evil desire (triplex cupiditas). These two images
both highlight Augustine’s need for a generalising account of the source and
matrix of sin; they describe its origin, they synthesise its overwhelmingly
various manifestations, and they provide tools for evaluating the different
kinds of risks entailed in the different kinds of temptations. All these aspects
are covered by the image of the root, which concentrates on the source and
cause for sinful actions, and by the scheme of triplex cupiditas, which offers
a concise, fundamental matrix of the variety of sins and temptations. Both
of these descriptive tools are regularly opposed to the force of divine caritas,
and all its adjoining qualities, e.g. humility, immutability, order, and so on.
Augustine uses the image of the root rather constantly: it appears in early
works, and is part of his debates with the Pelagians. Equally constant is
his concern with this image: due to its rather concrete form and its appar-
ent affinity with the Manichaean terminology, it is at risk of leading the
readers’ thoughts into a Manichaean, materialistic view of sin as appear-
ing as another nature in the created human constitution. This concern was
usurped by Augustine’s opponents, most acutely by Julian, during the later
Pelagian debates. By drawing caricatures of the roots of evil and by point-
ing out the striking similarities with Manichaean texts, which likewise used
the image of the ‘root’ in relation to concupiscentia, Julian attempted to

217 An interesting example of Augustine’s way of discerning between sexual concupiscentia

and a universal concupiscentia can be found in the sermon quoted above (s. 162), dated to the
year 416.
192 chapter four

question Augustine’s position. Even before his outspoken Pelagian oppo-

nent, however, Augustine is careful enough to clarify the basic difference
between his and the Manichaean position: no suggestion of two different
natures is meant by the image of the ‘root,’ even in contexts where Christ’s
parable of the two trees and the two kind of fruits defines the tone.
Parallel in function, the scheme of triplex cupiditas is exploited in various
works from the beginning of the 390s. It provided Augustine not only a gen-
eralising instrument to describe the various levels of sins and temptations,
but also an effective propaganda weapon with which to characterise his
former co-religionists. In some central works, the matrix of triple concupis-
centia even structures large elements of composition. While Augustine’s use
of 1Jn 2, 16 as a generalising device seems to dissolve after conf. and ep. Io. tr.,
the individual elements of the scheme obviously continued to strongly influ-
ence Augustine’s position in conceiving the mechanisms of temptation, fall
and sin. Only speculation is left to offer explanation for this dissolution. One
could suggest that the three-fold scheme as a general explanation for all
human sinful behaviour and as a common form to all temptations appeared
too limiting and inflexible, and analyses along more flexible lines that were
offerred by the separate members of the scheme were found to be more sat-
isfactory to Augustine. Perhaps Augustine also thought that the power of the
scheme for a literary composition had already been exhausted fully in uera
rel. and conf. What is absolutely certain, however, is that during the 410s and
the 420s it was concupiscentia carnis that became Augustine’s main occupa-
tion in the context of Christian renewal.
chapter five

CONCUPISCENTIA AND
PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS OF EMOTIONS

haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius rationi
ueritatique consentiunt, et uocantur gaudia et amores sancti et casti et boni.
si autem non consentiunt, dum neglegenter reguntur, conscindunt et dissi-
pant animum et faciunt uitam miserrimam, et uocantur perturbationes et
libidines et concupiscentiae malae.
Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31

uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbation-

ibus adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos
non tam de rebus, quam de uerbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam ueri-
tatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam ciues
sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum uiuentes
metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas
omnes affectiones rectas habent.
ciu. 14, 9
So far, we have traced Augustine’s thoughts on concupiscentia in lines of
divine punishment and as an originating, ‘radical’ evil. These functions of
concupiscentia could be identified, in most general terms, as theological, for
they were attached to Augustine’s ideas of God and divine justice on the one
hand, and on his insistence on searching the fundamental cause for man’s
evil actions against God, himself and his neighbour, on the other hand.
It is now time to present a function of concupiscentia that could, again
in a rather heuristic way, be termed as philosophical, namely the function
of concupiscentia as part of Augustine’s ‘theory of emotions.’1 The role of
emotions (passio, perturbatio, πάθος)2 in Augustine’s thinking has drawn
some attention in recent scholarship, and its links to previous traditions and

1 It is questionable whether Augustine indeed had any clearly articulated and compre-

hensive theory of the emotions of his own, or he was merely satisfied in using traditional
elements of various schools on this issue, for reasons suggested in this chapter.
2 Augustine’s terminology of emotions is flexible. Terms occur such as adfectus, pas-

siones, perturbationes, or even libidines in the general sense of ‘emotion.’ See O’Daly &
Zumkeller 1986.
194 chapter five

deviations from them have been studied with care, thus allowing a more
nuanced picture of Augustine’s contribution to the philosophy of emotions
in general. In particular, the role of concupiscentia, as connected to the
ancient philosophical traditions of Stoicism and Platonism, has also been
of interest for the scholars of the history of philosophy during the past two
decades or so.3
The task in this chapter is to present an overview of Augustine’s way of
discussing concupiscentia in a context which bears identifiable debt to the
philosophical traditions concerning emotions, and to examine those parts
of this debt that were of particular importance to Augustine. Most impor-
tantly, I will attempt to show how Augustine’s discussions on concupiscentia
that were connected to the context of the philosophical traditions devel-
oped in his thoughts to useful secondary tools for his more urgent, primarily
theological needs. Most studies of Augustine’s views on emotions concen-
trate on the most crucial texts in the matter, i.e. ciu. 9 and 14, which show
Augustine directly in dialogue with the philosophical schools.
There were, however, certain themes that evoked in Augustine more or
less reflected positions in relation to the emotions, and to desire in partic-
ular. Some of these themes are very basic and commonplace ideas of the
soul’s partition into an irrational and a rational part, of the progress from
the initial stages to an emotion (or sinful act) proper, or of the use of the
concept of consent in determining whether or not an emotion (or sinful
act) has taken place.4 Augustine’s commitments to various philosophical
traditions in this respect were eclectic and his principal source for the phi-
losophy of emotions is Cicero.5 Obviously, only a selection of the instances
when Augustine returns to these ideas and situates concupiscentia into the

3 For general treatises of the philosophy of mind and emotions, see Gersh 1986; Dillon

1990; Annas 1992; Nussbaum 1994; Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Sorabji 2000; Knuuttila
2004. For the emotions in the Stoic tradition, see Lloyd 1978; Brennan 1998; Cooper 1998;
Graver 2007. For the position of Plotinus, see Emilsson 1998. The role of Philo in the history
of emotions is discussed by Dillon & Terian 1976; Aune 1994 and Graver 1999. Christian
contributions to these philosophical traditions are studied by e.g. Savon 1984 (on Ambrose
and Jerome); Williams 1993 (on Gregory of Nyssa); Nicholson 1997 (on Lactantius); Parel 2001
(on Clement of Alexandria). For terminology of emotions in Christian writers, see Braun 1962,
62–65.
4 E.g. diu. qu. 77 on whether emotions are sin.
5 See O’Daly 1987, 46–54, esp. 51n140. In de ciuitate dei Augustine mainly quotes from two

other authors as well, i.e. Aulus Gellius and Apuleius. For Cicero’s own fluctuating affiliations
and style of philosophy, see Gluckner 1988, 63. For Cicero’s influence on Augustine on the
subject of emotions, see Brachtendorf 1997.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 195

architecture of these received traditions is discussed in this chapter. Thus,

for example, the allegorical, or psychological, reading of Gen 1–3, which
we have already discussed in previous chapters, also finds its place in this
chapter, representing Augustine’s familiarity with the previous Christian, or
even Jewish, discussions on the soul and temptations.
In addition, some special questions were part of the traditional set of doc-
trines of emotions, and Augustine also demonstrates his familiarity with
these questions. Such special problems would include concupiscentia in
dreams, habituation of concupiscentia, sexual shame, or even the treatment
of concupiscentia with a certain kind of music. Some of these special ques-
tions hold a more permanent place in Augustine’s philosophy of concupis-
centia, some appear only in passing. Last but not least, Augustine’s apolo-
getic concerns in direct dialogues with pagan philosophical traditions will
be of interest in this chapter: what kind of tactical moves does Augustine
employ when discussing concupiscentia in the context of theories of emo-
tions.
In philosophical traditions preceding Augustine, the terms cupiditas and
libido were used to signify irrational human desires as opposed to tran-
quil reasoning.6 Along with concupisco and its derivatives, Augustine reg-
ularly also contrasted these terms with calm and controlled reasoning, and
attached desire to the appetitive lower part of the soul, or sometimes even
identified the part itself as libido. Already in his earliest works, Augustine
opposes a lifestyle that follows libidines and cupiditates to a philosophical
and rationally conditioned existence.7 In general, Augustine’s approach to
concupiscentia as an emotion bears Platonist marks, but the elements and
questions of Stoic tradition are equally familiar to him as well.8

6 See Chapter 2, pp. 23–28.

7 Thus, in Acad. 1, 11, Licentius describes ideal living in the following way: uiximus enim
magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum uindicantes et a cupiditatium
facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, operam rationi, hoc est secundum
diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam esse uitam hesterna inter nos definitione
conuenit. See also Acad. 1, 23. The return to the fatherland of the soul is a journey ending
in a triumph over libidines, as is stated in Acad. 2, 22: de uita nostra de moribus de animo
res agitur, qui se superaturum inimicitias omnium fallaciarum et ueritate conprehensa quasi
in regionem suae originis rediens triumphaturum de libidinibus atque ita temperantia uelut
coniuge accepta regnaturum esse praesumit securior rediturus in caelum.
8 Augustine’s familiarity with the traditional images of emotions and their control can

be gleaned e.g. from uera rel. 83, where Augustine claims that the soul earned weakness to
the body (imbecillitas) in Paradise by attaching itself to lower, bodily goods: the restoration
process of the soul is pictured as a charioteer (auriga) gaining control and moderation again
over his bolting horses. See Plat. Phaedr. 246a–256e; Ambr. Isaac 8, 65.
196 chapter five

Augustine’s subscription to the rational/irrational bipolarity of the soul,

in which the emotions, and concupiscentia, originate from the lower part,
makes him a standard Christian Platonist of Late Antiquity.9 These later fol-
lowers of the Platonic, or Neoplatonist, view normally emphasised the gap
between the affective movements based on sense perceptions and between
the intellectual, contemplative soul free of such emotions (for Augustine,
however, the picture was not that tidy).10 But the distinctively Stoic talk of
the involuntary and preparatory stages of an emotion (‘pre-passions’); the
emotions as spatial changes of the soul; and the importance placed on ratio-
nal consent as a sign of moral responsibility are also present in Augustine’s

9 O’Daly 1987, 13. Plat. Rep. 439c–440b: “we’ll call the part of the soul with which it

calculates the rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited
by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and
pleasures.” Plat. Tim. 69a makes use of the eminent tripartite division: the ambitious part,
that “exhibits manliness and spirit,” restrains by force the “part consisting of appetites, should
the latter at any time refuse outright to obey the dictates of reason coming down from the
citadel.” See also Tim. 70e–71e. For moral responsibility, cf. Tim 86d. For Plato’s own diverse
positions and for an evaluation of the moral status of the emotions in Plato, see Dillon (1993,
188): “there is a good deal of semantic juggling involved in the controversy (is a properly
moderated passion a passion at all, after all?), and Plato could be quoted on either side of it.
In Phaed., for instance, he would seem to be on the side of the extirpation of the passions,
while in the Republic, the passionate part of the soul cannot be done away with, but only
moderated by the reason and spirit, acting in unison. Platonists on the whole tended to
side with Aristotle (though Antiochus of Ascalon seems to have adopted the Stoic ideal of
apatheia, if we may judge from Cic. Acad. Pr. 135, and the Platonist fellow traveller, Philo,
manages to combine the two ideals by relating them to different degrees of moral progress,
cf. the contrast between Aaron and Moses, Leg. All. 3.129–132).” Knuuttila & Sihvola (1998,
1–5) also point to Plato’s differing descriptions in the different dialogues.
10 For Plotinus’ view on emotions, see Emilsson 1998, 340, who forms the problem in brief:

“First, if undergoing an emotion involves a change in the soul, it seems that its immortality
is threatened […] Secondly, the body is below the soul in Plotinus’ hierarchy of things […]
Thus nothing below the soul should be able to affect the soul. The emotions, which typically
appear to have their beginning in the body or in the sensible world and end in the soul, are
an apparent violation of this law.” For a Christian modification of the problem in Marius
Victorinus, see Clark 1974, 159–160. Alcinous’ Handbook (Dillon 1993) represents the later
Platonic tradition, sharing the basic belief of the soul’s division and showing a critical mind
against the Stoic views (“neither judgments nor opinions, but rather motions of the irrational
parts of the soul,” Alcin. 32). Alcinous teaches moderation (metriopathes) of the emotions
(for the distinction “tame” and “wild,” see Dillon 1993, 196–198). See also Alcin. 25, 7 (Dillon
1993, 34): “The souls of the gods too possess both a critical element, which might also be
called cognitive, and further an appetitive element, which one might term also dispositional,
and an appropriative element. These are to be found as faculties in human souls, but after
embodiment the latter two suffer alteration, the appropriative faculty into the libidinous,
and the appetitive into the spirited.” For the distinctions of virtue according to the faculties
of the soul in Middle Platonism, see Alcin. 29 (Dillon 1993, 38–39) with comments.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 197

views on emotions in general, and in concupiscentia in particular.11 In addi-

tion, Augustine frequently uses the Stoic tetrachord of generic emotions, or
a variation of it, as representing the sphere of the basic movements of the
soul.12 Recent assessments of Augustine’s thoughts of emotions as a whole
have varied, depending on the viewpoint individual scholars have adopted
on Augustine’s philosophical affiliations.13 Here I will briefly mention three
significant evaluations.14

11 See O’Daly’s (1987, 48) presentation of Io. eu. tr. 46, 8, on spatial qualifications (contrac-

tio, diffusio, fuga, progressio) of emotions as “figurative” states of the soul. On a larger scale,
Sorabji 2000 emphasises the importance of the Stoic analysis for Augustine in discerning
between pre-passions, or ‘first movements,’ and the emotions proper.
12 trin. 6, 8; ciu. 14, 5; Io. eu. tr. 60, 3. By the Stoic tetrachord of emotions, the group of four

basic emotions of fear, desire, joy and grief is meant, for which see SVF 3, 394 and Long &
Sedley 1987, i, 419–423.
13 There has been much ado about searching broad and implicit ‘Stoic’ and ‘Platonic’

motives in larger contexts of Augustine’s thought. Sometimes these labels are used in very
general meaning, without claims of historical dependencies. Consider Wetzel’s (1992, 10)
statement: “When I insist on Augustine’s Platonism, I allude broadly to his philosophical
orientation and not narrowly to his ties to the Neoplatonism of Porphyry and Plotinus.”
Wetzel (1992, 11) himself prefers Stoicism, with Neoplatonic influences, as the primary source
for Augustine’s ethics. Cf. Wetzel 1992, 56–57. See also O’Connell 1970, 49: “It should be
borne in mind in this connection that Augustine could have found many Stoic themes
already Platonized in Plotinus’ Enneads. Indeed, the eclectic movements in ancient-world
philosophy encouraged some of the Stoics to Platonize many of the insights of their school.
This does not prevent one from making an educated guess as to a theme’s original derivation
from the Stoic heritage.” For a critique of O’Connell’s educated guesses, see again Wetzel
1992, 70–72.
14 Apart from those works mentioned above, Augustine’s philosophical heritage and his

views on emotions has been studied from various angles. Wetzel (1992) charts, sometimes
in rather speculative mode, Augustine’s development in his views on the will, virtues and
ends, but (as he himself readily admits) his account is not a historical description (“I found it
impossible to maintain a sharp distinction between interpretation and reconstruction […] I
could not make sense of what Augustine said without sometimes having to consider what he
was trying to say, what he might have said, or even on occasion what he ought to have said,”
pp. xi–xii). For an example of Wetzel’s approach of “reconstruction” see e.g. his rephrasing of
Augustine’s defence against the Pelagians in retr. 1, 8 (Wetzel 1992, 122–123). Augustine’s debt
to Stoicism has been emphasised by e.g. Verbeke 1958, Spanneut 1975 (see also Spanneut 1994
on the ideal of apatheia), and especially Colish 1990, 142–238. In her account of Augustine and
the passions (1990, 207–210, 221–225), she stresses, on one hand, the consistent way in which
Augustine follows Stoic tradition in the matter (e.g. the passions are not derived from the
body, p. 209), and on the other hand, Augustine’s development in using parts of the Stoic
ethical tradition (e.g. the ideal of apatheia, pp. 221–225). Augustine’s views of emotions and
consent in dreams, has been analysed by Matthews 1992, 90–106 and Haji 1999. Johannes
Brachtendorf’s (1997) article on Augustine’s debt to Cicero’s Tusculan disputations is useful
and penetrating. Lössl (2002) compares Augustine’s and Julian’s views of emotions in general,
and of pain (dolor) in particular. Cavadini (2005) discusses Augustine’s descriptions of sexual
198 chapter five

Gerard O’Daly views the matter as part of the problems concerning the
relation of the body and soul.15 In O’Daly’s neutral and concise account,
Augustine is depicted as being in a constant interaction with the Stoic and
Platonist traditions. Though “syncretistic” (p. 48) this may be, O’Daly does
not fail to bring to the fore many points in which Augustine deviates from
the previous traditions and transforms classical material to new uses. Thus,
O’Daly emphasises how Augustine shared the Platonist belief on the virtu-
ous use of controlled emotions, and notes how special problems originating
from the Platonist division of tripartite soul are present in Augustine, such
as the problem of mortality vs. immortality of the irrational part.16 However,
Augustine distances himself from the Platonist identification of emotions
as arising from the body.17 Again, O’Daly notes how Augustine both adapts
and rejects Stoic views: the notions of emotions as disturbances of exclu-
sively human rationality and the spatial terminology of the emotions as
soul’s “positions” or “conditions” are of Stoic origin.18 Although Augustine
seems to subscribe to the Stoic ideal of apatheia, he criticizes its application
to temporal life. According to Augustine, true apatheia, and thereby “trans-
posed” eupatheiai, await Christians in heaven.19 O’Daly comments mainly
on Augustine’s major discussion of emotions in ciu. 9 and 14.
Richard Sorabji has studied the impact of Stoic theory of emotions on
Christian authors.20 For Augustine’s part, Sorabji concentrates on Books 9
and 14 of de ciuitate dei, but also includes a substantial discussion of Augus-
tine’s debate with Julian. In his book, Sorabji formulates a theory that Augus-
tine did not have the means to discern between ‘first movements’ and emo-
tions proper, like the Stoics (primarily Seneca) had done. Instead, Augustine
muddled the distinction in ciu. 9 by way of a terminological vagueness.21

intercourse before the Fall in a rather speculative tone (see e.g. his discussion of sexual
intercourse without the “signifier” of lust, pp. 205–208).
15 O’Daly 1987, 40–54.
16 O’Daly 1987, 53–54.
17 O’Daly 1987, 47. See also O’Daly 1986, 420, for Augustine’s use of appetitus as corre-

sponding rather to the Stoic notion of impulse than the Platonic appetitive element of the
soul.
18 O’Daly 1987, 47–48.
19 O’Daly 1987, 51.
20 Sorabji 2000, 343–417.
21 Sorabji 2000, 384, 375, where he refers to his theory as “the history of a mistake”: “In

Gellius’ report of Stoicism there is a change of one single letter of the alphabet. This change
was enough to mislead Augustine, and so to play a role, if only small one, in shaping Western
views on sexuality.” The ambiguity, according to Sorabji, lies in the verb pauescere (p. 383), a
word that no Stoic would have used for mere prepassion.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 199

This mistake, so Sorabji, led Augustine to treat the slightest involuntary

movements (the Stoic ‘first movements’ or propassiones) as being emotions
proper.22 For this reason, they cannot be eradicated, and what is recom-
mended instead is moderation by rational will.23 Sorabji notes that Augus-
tine makes crucial reservations to this theory when it comes to sexual desire
(concupiscentia carnis), which Augustine holds culpable despite its obvi-
ous involuntariness. Sorabji implicitly argues that Augustine’s inability to
understand the classical Stoic distinction between involuntary movements
and voluntarily assented emotions produces an untenable and confused
account on “lust.”24 In general, Sorabji tends to view Augustine as represent-
ing and adapting the Stoic positions of the emotions, although he points out
the “distortions” described above.25
Simo Knuuttila’s account of Augustine’s theory of emotions concentrates
on conf. and ciu.26 Where O’Daly and Sorabji tended to emphasise Augus-
tine’s ties to the Stoic heritage,27 Knuuttila stresses the overall Platonic
understanding of the emotions in these passages and notes Augustine’s crit-
ical opinions about the Stoic tradition.28 Knuuttila offers useful comments
on Augustine’s various concepts of the will and on their relation to the
emotions,29 and is interested in the way Augustine follows the preceding tra-
dition concerning fictitious emotions.30 Furthermore, Knuuttila disagrees
with Sorabji’s view of Augustine’s disability to discern between the first
movements and the voluntary assented emotions, by rightly suggesting that
Augustine saw the first movements as well as all human emotional patterns
“contaminated by original sin.” The old Stoic analysis did not therefore work
as such in the Christian and Augustinian version: the first allurements to sin
are not distinct, previous states to the emotions, but initial emotions.31 Due

22 The alteration is also noted by Brachtendorf 1997, 298.

23 Sorabji 2000, 380.
24 Sorabji 2000, 380–381. Sorabji seems to be one of the few to note the exceptional

character of concupiscentia in ciu. 14 as compared to the theory of emotions proposed in

ciu. 9.
25 Sorabji 2000, 375.
26 Knuuttila 2004, 152–172.
27 O’Daly’s (1987, 49) characterization of the Augustinian interpretation of ciu. 9, 4 (about

the Stoic sage on rough seas) could very well represent his general view on Augustine’s
exposition of the emotions: “Augustine makes this interpretation of Stoic doctrine, which
[…] he understands to be in harmony with the Platonic and Aristotelian views, his own.”
28 Knuuttila 2004, 153, 156–157, 160.
29 Knuuttila 2004, 159, 168–172.
30 Knuuttila 2004, 164–166.
31 Knuuttila 2004, 170–172.
200 chapter five

to the Fall, “emotions have become relatively autonomous”: the strongest

example of autonomy is sexual desire that occurs spontaneously not only
in the mind but also affects involuntary movements in the body.32

5.1. Emotions, Libido and Anti-Manichaean Apology (388–396)

That many of the traditional attitudes and discourses connected with the
emotions were relevant to Augustine already from the early stages of his
literary career in his thinking about concupiscentia, or rather cupiditas and
libido at this time, becomes evident by taking a look at some of his works
that precede his seminal work, ad Simplicianum. These works introduce an
Augustine who depicts (not with any innovative approach) the unreason-
able and miserable life under the tyranny of desires and passions. He appro-
priates an old Christian tradition of reading the first chapters of Genesis as a
psychological allegory. Moreover, Augustine sketches a persuasive analysis
of how the manifestly lower level of bodily reality and bodily temptations
are able to divert higher levels of the soul from the intellectual goods they
should naturally (or ordinate) pursue. Finally, he shows his fellow Christians
that to commit oneself to emotional states, and to lapse under a sustained
rule of cupiditates lies in each one’s own power.
After composing his early dialogues on various philosophical questions,
as a prolegomena to Christian faith, as it were, Augustine commenced to
write his anti-Manichaean work on human free will.33 While the later books
concentrate on the punitive effects of the Fall, it is in de libero arbitrio 1 (388),
in which Augustine depicts libido as the most serious opponent to reason
and to the rational way of life. Libido is defined with Stoic undertones as a
committed desire or love for things that one can lose “against one’s will” (lib.
arb. 1, 10, inuitus amittere).34 The goal of virtuous life is calm and detached
use of these temporal goods. In the course of the argument in lib. arb. 1

32 Knuuttila 2004, 157. See also p. 169, “concupiscence as the permanent inherited weak-

ness we have for sinful things inclines us to evil desires.”

33 The four dialogues, Acad., beata u., ord. and sol., have usually been treated as repre-

senting a philosophical or even something of a pre-Christian stage in Augustine’s career. See,

however, Carol Harrison’s (2006, 35–73) recent reclaim concerning their Catholic Christian
character.
34 The word libido is constantly translated as ‘passion’ in Robert Russell’s translation

(FC 59) and as ‘passione’ in De Capitani 1987. For an analysis of lust and affections in lib. arb.
1, see Wetzel 1992, 62–68. Wetzel’s emphasis is on the temporality of the objects of desire:
“Affections are the internal springs of sin when they move sinners to seek beatitude in the
possession of external goods.” (p. 67).
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 201

(from lib. arb. 1, 18 on), Augustine describes a person who is living in perfect
order. Such an order would result from reason, or the higher part of the soul,
being in control of all actions. The libidines (now in the plural) would then
appear as the irrational movements of the soul, but they could not form
significant temporal attachments anymore.35 Bodily pleasures are seen as
an animal activity, and they create a serious disorder in the human soul.
Moreover, desires that are distinctively limited to human experience, such
as amor laudis or adfectatio dominandi (lib. arb. 1, 18), and which also strive
for temporal goods, are to Augustine “irrational.” If these desires (appetitus)
cannot be subjected to reason, they will take control of man’s higher part,
and will eventually result in an unhappy life.36
This sketch of the human soul and the dangers facing it from its inward
movements takes for granted that the soul, consisting of rational and irra-
tional components, is able to function in an orderly manner if it lives in
accordance with the “eternal law,” which prescribes that reason should have
control over all human appetites and libidines. In the wise man’s (sapiens)
ideal state of the soul, the inferior movements always comply with the supe-
rior domination of reason.37
After these statements about the ideal state of the human soul and its
rational order, Augustine moves on to present his actual (anti-Manichaean)
agenda in lib. arb., and to show how there is no other source for a disor-
dered and sinful life than the free will of each human being. To show this,
Augustine attempts to affect his readers with a presentation of the soul’s
lamentable state if it, of its own free choice, would enter in the company
of desire and become its follower (cupiditatis comes). Augustine is insistent
upon his claim that such a companionship only results from the mind’s own
choice: no other exterior or interior force can move or persuade the higher
part of the soul, which by definition has higher value and strength due to
the right and just order of things.38

35 lib. arb. 1, 18 si dominetur atque imperet ceteris, quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse

hominem ordinatissimum.
36 lib. arb. 1, 18 nam et iste adpetitus, cum rationi subditus non est, miseros facit. […] hisce

igitur animae motibus cum ratio dominatur, ordinatus homo dicendus est. non enim ordo rectus
aut ordo appellandus omnino est, ubi deterioribus meliora subiciuntur. […] ratio ista ergo
uel mens uel spiritus cum inrationales animi motus regit, id scilicet dominatur in homine, cui
dominatio lege debetur ea, quam aeternam esse comperimus. For the Stoic notion of aeterna
lex, see De Capitani 1987, 198.
37 As De Capitani (1987, 478) notes, Augustine does not here support the Stoic ideal of the

complete eradication of the irrational movements.

38 lib. arb. 1, 21. The underlying question of how a lower entity can affect a higher one is

of Plotinian origin. There is a gap between mens and anima and their respective activities
202 chapter five

Augustine’s description of the rational mind living in and under the

company of libido is intentionally colourful. This state of affairs is seen as a
tyrannical “rule of the libido,” and it leads to a variety of sufferings and dire
consequences. If libido or cupiditates are allowed to control reason, one may
bid farewell to both moral and intellectual progress. The rule of libido brings
with it a sustained existence in various, contradicting emotions.39
Well, then, are we to take lightly a punishment entailing such consequences
as these, where passion lords it over the mind (libido dominatur), dragging it
about, poor and needy, in different directions, stripped of its wealth of virtue,
now mistaking the false for the true, even defending something vigorously at
one time only to reject at another what it had previously demonstrated, while
all the while it rushes headlong into other false judgments; now withholding
all assent, while fearful for the most part of the clearest demonstrations; now
in despair of the whole business of finding the truth while it clings tenaciously
to the darkness of its folly; now at pains to see the light and understand,
and again falling back out of weariness to the darkness? And all the while,
the cruel tyranny of evil desire (cupiditatum regnum tyrannice saeuiat) holds
sway, disrupting (tempestatibus perturbet) the entire soul and life of man
by various and conflicting surges of passion; here by fear (timore), there by
desire (desiderio); here by anxiety (anxietate), there by empty and spurious
delights (laetitia); here by torment over the loss of a loved object, there by a
burning desire to acquire something not possessed; here by pain for an injury
received, there by the urge to revenge an injury. On every possible side, the
mind is shriveled up by greed, wasted away by sensuality, a slave to ambition,
is inflated by pride, tortured by envy, deadened by sloth, kept in turmoil by
obstinacy, and distressed by its condition of subjection. And so with other
countless impulses that surround and plague the rule of passion (regnum
libidinis).40 [transl. Russell]

that seems wide enough to have resulted in such a problem. See Emilsson 1998, 340. Note
also that in ord. 2, 2, 6–7, Licentius had asserted that for the wise man, memory and sense
perceptions belong to the lower part of the soul.
39 Augustine also thinks that such a state is a veritable “punishment” (poena). See Chap-

ter 3.
40 lib. arb. 1, 22 quid ergo? num ista poena parua existimanda est quod ei libido dominatur

expoliatamque uirtutis opulentia per diuersa inopem atque indigentem trahit, nunc falsa pro
ueris adprobantem, nunc etiam defensitantem, nunc improbantem quae antea probauisset et
nihilominus in alia falsa inruentem, nunc adsensionem, suspendentem suam et plerumque per-
spicuas ratiocinationes formidantem, nunc desperantem de tota inuentione ueritatis et stulti-
tiae tenebris penitus inherentem, nunc conantem in lucem intellegendi rursusque fatigatione
decidentem; cum interea cupiditatum illud regnum tyrannice saeuiat et uariis contrariisque
tempestatibus totum hominis animum uitamque perturbet, hinc timore inde desiderio, hinc
anxietate inde inani falsaque laetitia, hinc cruciatu rei ammissae quae diligebatur inde ardore
adipiscendae quae non habebatur, hinc acceptae iniuriae doloribus, inde facibus uindicandae;
quaquauersum potest coartare auaritia, dissipare luxuria, addicere ambitio, inflare superbia,
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 203

Thus, a general commitment to serve libido results in various disturbed

emotions (e.g. timor, desiderium, anxietas, laetitia). This happens if the ratio-
nal soul has voluntarily thrown itself down from the “citadel of virtue” and
submitted itself under the rule of the libido.41
The terms, images and the commonplace architecture of the soul in
Augustine’s lib. arb. 1 are recognizable enough. They are tools, or bricks,
borrowed from the distinct traditional discussions on emotions, both from
the Platonic and Stoic sources. But Augustine is not here interested in giving
his audience any coherent theory of the emergence, structure or technical
therapy of desire or any other emotion for that matter, nor does he wish
to outline any constructive role for the emotions to contribute to the life
of a wise man. Instead, a somewhat crude opposition of the virtuous and
vicious ways of life and their origins in the choice of human free will is what
Augustine attempts to achieve here, in order to emphasise that each of us
is, or at least should be, able to resort to one’s own will in starting to live
a virtuous life.42 The function of this startling account of emotions (at first
sight, at least) is clearly to underline the primacy of the simple task of getting
one’s will to love God, and His eternal goods: in the opposite case, as we
are told, the tyranny of evil desire will torment us in innumerable ways.43
The overtly negative tone in which Augustine here describes emotions is
not a reflected philosophical position, despite Augustine’s familiarity with
the terminology: it is, rather, an educated rhetorical tool in the service of
distinctively Christian goals.44

torquere inuidia, desidia sepelire, peruicacia concitare, adflictare subiectio et quaecumque alia
innumerabilia regnum illius libidinis frequentant et exercent? De Capitani (197, 479) suggests
that part of the description has autobiographical undertones. See also O’Donnell 1992, I, xlviii.
41 lib. arb. 1, 20 ex arce deicere et libidini subiugare. The Stoic tetrachord is likewise present

in an obvious way. Evodius agrees that the state described above by Augustine would be a
“just punishment” for such a crime, but he is not yet intellectually convinced of the existence
of the ideal state of the soul that Augustine has here assumed (lib. arb. 1, 23).
42 lib. arb. 1, 29. See Wetzel’s remarks in this respect (1992, 76): “The affections […] become

the mind’s irrational motions, subject to the dictatorial authority of wisdom. These affections
have no power to disrupt beatitude, because they have no right or authority to do so.”
43 When this task is fulfilled, the temporal goods appear as adiafora (lib. arb. 1, 33).
44 For our present purposes, it does not matter much whether Augustine here believed in

his rather “optimistic” image of the powers of human will as depicted in lib. arb. 1, or whether
the first book is only an intentionally simplistic prelude for the more “pessimistic” books that
follow. For a reading that stresses the continuity of lib. arb. 1–3, see Harrison C. 2006, 222–224
(p. 223, “Augustine […] leads his pupil […] from the simple to the complex, the plain to the
profound, the straightforward to the difficult”).
204 chapter five

Another account of desire situated in traditional Christian imagery that

was seen to be suitable to analyse human psychology and emotions can be
found in Augustine’s earliest commentary on the first chapters of Genesis,
de Genesi aduersus Manichaeos (389), written only shortly after lib. arb. 1.
According to Augustine, the divine mandate to humans to have com-
mand over all other creatures is due to the fact that man was created in God’s
image. This notion elicits an anti-Manichaean argument, which unfolds in
two phases: first, Augustine declares that imago dei cannot be found in the
human bodily constitution but rather in reason or intellect, that is, accord-
ing to the “interior man.” It is exactly due to this quality that humanity is
still able to have dominion over animals. The second point is that Augus-
tine proceeds in his “spiritual reading” by transferring the self-evident fact
of humans being more reasonable than animals into a statement on human
psychology. In Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31, Augustine interprets the animals of
Paradise to mean the lower bestial movements of the soul. So as the beasts
in Paradise were given under human dominance, so these movements must
be controlled by reason and power of virtue. This means that the move-
ments of the soul (motus) must be dominated by temperance and modesty,
for if the opposite occurs they will gradually change into shameful habits
(consuetudines).45 Against his Manichaean past, Augustine now claims that
these motus are anything but “alien to our soul” (non enim alieni a nobis sunt
motus animi nostri).46 Taking this step, Augustine has not only saved Gen.
1, 27–28 from a naively realistic Manichaean critique but has also moved
himself into a position where he can give a more credible account of those
movements, which the Manichaean anthropology labelled as the work of
gens tenebrarum. These movements are a natural and inherent part of the
soul, even though they can be said to be low and susceptible to cause some
bad changes.
It therefore seems for a moment that Augustine wishes to impart a con-
structive role to the emotions; he even states that if (or when) these move-
ments are directed and submitted to “reason and truth,” they could be

45 Note how Augustine takes these “movements” to be temporal changes: the soul (here

anima) is mutable temporaliter because of its passions (adfectiones), even though it is not
mutable spatially (localiter) like the body. See also uera rel. 18. For Augustine’s figurative use
of Stoic spatial qualifications of emotions, see O’Daly 1987.
46 See also Gn. adu. Man. 2, 11, 16 where Augustine emphasises—again contrary to his

previous Manichaean views—the importance of a correct view on the two created parts of
the soul: <conside>ratio […] illa est difficilis, qua intellegit in seipso aliud esse rationale quod
regit, aliud animale quod regitur.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 205

called “holy, pure and good joys and desires (amores).” However, this line of
thought is not extended any further, for Augustine then hastens to expound
on the opposite way of handling these lower movements: if one neglects
their control, they will lead to a “most miserable life.” Such movements
deserve the infamous names of perturbationes or libidines or concupiscentiae
malae.47 With these rather simple moves, which from the viewpoint of the
philosophical traditions of emotions do not offer anything revolutionary,
Augustine renounces his former Manichaean views of human psychology
with devastating blows: his former idea of the structure of the soul was erro-
neous, and is now replaced with a standard Platonic version, seasoned with
a Christian emphasis on the original created goodness of both parts of the
soul. Moreover, he is able to relocate the concept of concupiscentia, which
the Manichaeans held in disgust, to be a mere intemperate movement, or a
passion of the soul. This terminology is similar to lib. arb. 1, where all such
movements were already labelled by the term libido.48
The biblical source text of Gen 1, 27–28 therefore gave Augustine a start-
ing point from where he could expound his anti-Manichaean psychology
of emotions and concupiscentia. The choice of these particular verses to
be read in a “spiritual” way, that is, explaining allegorically certain facts of
human psychology, was not Augustine’s own, but was backed by a venera-
ble Christian tradition.49 Nonetheless, it is not until Gn. adu. Man. 2, when

47 Gn. adu. Man. 1, 20, 31 haec est hominis uita beata atque tranquilla, cum omnes motus eius

rationi ueritatique consentiunt, et uocantur gaudia et amores sancti et casti et boni. si autem
non consentiunt, dum neglegenter reguntur, conscindunt et dissipant animum et faciunt uitam
miserrimam, et uocantur perturbationes et libidines et concupiscentiae malae. de quibus nobis
iam praecipitur, ut eas cum quanto possumus labore crugifigamus in nobis, donec absorbeatur
mors in uictoriam. dicit enim apostolus “qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt
cum passionibus et concupiscentiis”. The “therapy” of emotions is thus likened in Paul’s
simile to crucifixion. Gal 5, 24 remains part of Augustine’s scriptural palette in discussing
concupiscentia and its treatment, see e.g. exp. prop. Rm. 26; en. Ps. 25, 6; c. Adim. 21; Io. eu.
tr. 118, 5; ench. 14. Some manuscripts read the following: carnem suam crucifixerunt cum
perturbationibus et concupiscentiis.
48 Cf. Lee 1996, 128, 133–134, who seems to think that by using (in a very narrow and fixed

meaning) the word libido, Augustine automatically reproduces a merely sexual, Manichaean
view of concupiscentia. For a critique of Lee’s claims, see Verschoren 2002, 230–240.
49 See Cox 1982, 124–131, for Origen’s bestial imagery concerning Gen 1, 28. In general,

the Christian psychological readings of Genesis 1–3 were deeply influenced by the accounts
of Philo of Alexandria. See, for example, Phil. all. 3, 107–160, where the serpent is seen as
representing sensual pleasures (ἡδονή). See also Phil. all. 2, 71–108. In Philo’s view, God laid
curse on pleasure, which is the worst of all passions (τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν χείρων), because it
is “like a kind of starting-point and foundation” for all passions. Thus desire (ἐπιθυµία), for
example, “comes into play through love of pleasure” (ἡ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυµία γέγονε δι ἔρωτος
ἡδονῆς). In quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin 31–48, the serpent represents both pleasure
206 chapter five

Augustine reaches the figures of Adam and Eve, that the commonplace
themes of the classical traditions of emotions and the traditional Christian
exegesis are combined in Augustine’s concentrated effort to answer and to
refute the Manichaean views of the emergence and quality of sin.50
Augustine’s psychological reading of Adam and Eve (Gn. adu. Man. 2, 11,
15–13, 18) starts with an assertion of the need for a correct understanding of
the soul’s structure—an understanding that can only be achieved by figu-
rative reading, and by turning inwards from the bodily world to intellectual
vision. This apparently is exactly what is missing in the Manichaean critique
of the Genesis narratives. The tale of the creation of two different sexes has
a deeper secret to conceal. The creation of Eve in the Genesis narrative is
not told “without a cause.”51 In presenting God as making Adam fall asleep,
in order to create Eve from his rib, Augustine also invites his readers to “fall
asleep” (quasi obdormiscere) and to turn from the coarse, physical world to
the higher realm of intellectual truths, conveyed by the figurative language
of the Scripture.
The creative act of God, that is, the appearance of Eve from Adam’s
inward turn, is something that the former Manichaean Augustine here
considers to be a new understanding of the soul’s structure, as something
more profound than merely knowing about man’s position in the realm of
nature (illa est difficilis [sc. ratio], qua intellegit in seipso aliud esse rationale
quod regit, aliud animale quod regitur).52

(QG 1, 31) and desire. “For the serpent is a symbol of desire, as was shown; and woman is a
symbol of sense, and man of mind. So that desire becomes the evil origin of sins, and this first
deceives sense, while sense takes the mind captive” (QG 1, 47 [transl. Marcus]). Philo enjoyed
certain respect in the eyes of both Greek and Latin Christian exegetes, such as Origen and
Ambrose. See e.g. Ambr. parad. 2, 11. For an overview of Philonic reception in Augustine, see
Runia 1993, 320–330; for the role of Philo in Stoic tradition, see Graver 1999; 2007, 88, 102–105.
50 A bipartite structure of the soul as represented by the two sexes appears in the final

sections of Gn. adu. Man. 1. Augustine here meditates the seven ages of the world, and
considers how they can be applied to the soul’s ascent to God. The sixth age (or the age
of the Church) becomes manifest through Christians who have control over their own
movements or affections. For these people, the lower part of the soul serves reason, not sin
(temeritati atque peccato). As a result of such domination over the emotive part of the soul,
God’s image in human beings will become restored. As a man should rule upon his wife, so
should intellectual contemplation have preference over outward action (masculus-femina;
intellectus-actio). See also c. Faust. 22, 27.
51 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 12, 17 non utique sine causa ita facta est, nisi ut aliquod secretum

intimaret. Thus, the creation narrative is “a myth with a meaning” (Pagels 1988a, 63–64).
52 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 12, 16 ut enim hoc uideatur, non est opus oculis istis corporeis, sed

quanto quisque ab istis uisibilibus rebus in interiora intellegentiae secesserit (hoc est autem
quasi obdormiscere), tanto melius et sincerius illud uidet. Ipsa enim cognitio, qua intellegitur
in nobis aliud esse quod ratione dominetur, aliud quod rationi obtemperet.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 207

This new cognitio also leads to a new understanding of the place and
quality of concupiscentia. One has to have control over the sensual part of
the soul, so that the concupiscence of the flesh does not resist reason, but
obeys the higher part, and “ceases to be fleshly.”53
Overall, Augustine’s presentation moves along traditional lines if it is
considered from the viewpoint of classical philosophical psychology and
Christian exegesis:
The woman was made as an illustration of this, for the order of things makes
her subject to man. Thus we can also come to see in one human what we
can see more clearly in two humans, that is, in the male and the female. The
interior mind, like virile reason, should hold subject the soul’s appetite by
means of which we control the members of the body, and by just law it should
place a limit upon its helper, just as man ought to rule woman and ought not
to allow her to rule him.54 [transl. Teske]
The evident sexual difference of the first human beings refers to a division
in the soul between appetitus animae, which operates the bodily functions,

53 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 12, 16 deinde, ut quisque huic suae parti recte dominetur, et fiat quasi

coniugalis in seipso, ut caro non concupiscat aduersus spiritum, sed spiritui subiugetur, id est
concupiscentia carnalis non aduersetur rationi, sed potius obtemperando desinat esse carnalis,
opus habet perfecta sapientia. For a “change” in the lower part of the soul, see also uera
rel. 78, where Augustine attaches concupiscentia to the lower part of the soul. One has to
subjugate “this woman” into one’s service, and then it no longer can be called cupiditas but
temperantia. The correct order between appetite (cupiditas, libido)—reason (mens, ratio)—
Christ becomes realised only if one follows “Christ, our head.” Augustine is sometimes,
though not often, in the habit of identifying the lower part with its movements, the affective
part thus called e.g. concupiscentia. See e.g. op. mon. 40 illam quippe significant partem eo
ipso, quo mulieres sunt, quae concupiscentialis dici potest, cui mens dominatur, etiam ipsa
subdita deo suo, quando rectissime et ordinatissime uiuitur. quod ergo est in uno homine
mens et concupiscentia—illa regit, haec regitur; illa dominatur, haec subditur—hoc in duobus
hominibus, uiro et muliere, secundum sexum corporis figuratur.
54 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 11, 15 ad huius rei exemplum femina facta est, quam rerum ordo subiugat

uiro, ut, quod in duobus hominibus euidentius apparet, id est in masculo et femina, etiam in
uno homine considerari possit: ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur,
habeat mens interior tamquam uirilis ratio subiugatum et iusta lege modum imponat adiutorio
suo, sicut debet uir feminam regere nec eam permittere dominari in uirum. For Augustine’s
figurative readings of sexes, see both O’Meara 1980 and Pagels 1988a, 64–65; 1988b. See
also conf. 13, 32–34. The metaphor reappears on a large scale in trin. See van Bavel 1989;
Soennecken 1989. Psychological insights based on sexual division go back to Plat. Tim. 69e:
“And since one part of the mortal soul was naturally superior to the other, they built the
hollow of the trunk in sections, dividing them the way that women’s quarters are divided
from men’s.” In the tripartite division the ambitious part, that “exhibits manliness and spirit”
restrains by force the “part consisting of appetites, should the latter at any time to refuse
outright to obey the dictates of reason coming down from the citadel.” Cf. also Dillon 1993,
26 [Alcin. 16, 2]: “others who had been overcome by injustice would come on their second
birth to the life of a woman.”
208 chapter five

and mens interior or ratio, which contemplates the eternal “perfect wisdom.”
In the ideal state, the soul functions in a harmonious unity. In other words,
the higher masculine intellect (mens interior) rules over the lower feminine
part of the soul, which in turn works as an instrument for controlling the
body.55
If the lower part of the soul would obey (obtemperare) reason, no sin
would occur. Contrariwise, if the lower element would come to control the
higher, “the household,” or the soul as a whole, would “turn into perversity
and misery.” As it is, the lower, or “feminine,” part of the soul is the part
dealing with the sensory world through the body. Hence, it is the only
avenue by which sin is able to enter the rational soul.56 While Augustine
does not seem here to have any major difficulties in assuming that the
sensory world and bodily affects may cause a change to the worse even in the
higher part of the soul, the elaborated gradual mechanism of the soul’s fall
may reflect something of the old Neoplatonic difficulty to understand why
the intellectual soul, participating in eternal wisdom, ever fell to the lower
realms in the first place.57 However, it is safe to assume that Augustine’s
interest in commonplace Platonist psychology and his insistence in Gn. adu.
Man. to label libido, or cupiditas, as indigenous to the lower parts of the soul,
is dictated by his need to refute the Manichaean model of the emergence of
evil actions and the account for their causes, and to reformulate the concept
of concupiscence to fit his new understanding (ratio, or cognitio concerning
the structure of the soul) in Platonist Christian psychology. “Our desires”
have therefore been deprived of their Manichaean, substantial status, and
they are also said to have a chance of undergoing a process through which

55 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 11, 15 uirilis ratio subiugaret sibi animalem partem suam, per quod adi-

utorium imperat corpori […] ut appetitum animae, per quem de membris corporis operamur,
habeat mens interior tamquam uirilis ratio subiugatum. Cf. 2, 13, 18 where pars inferior prac-
tises fortitudo and temperantia and 2, 26, 40, where both parts are said to be created by God. In
Gn. adu. Man., Augustine uses words such as obtemperare, dominare, subiugare and praeesse
in the context of an orderly operating soul. Everything in a human being occurs ordinatis-
sime, in a sequence that follows the forms of rationality. The weight of the argumentation
lies in present ‘psychological’ presuppositions. So if we understand how and in what order
a soul should properly function, we can also understand why Christ or God’s wisdom is of a
higher order than human intellect. For rationality in God’s universe and its Stoic affinities,
see Colish 1990, 156–159.
56 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 14, 20 non enim etiam ratio nostra deduci ad consensionem peccati

potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi
tamquam rectori uiro.
57 For the impassibility of the rational soul in Plotinus, see Emilsson 1998. For the problem

of the soul’s impassibility and emotions, see Knuuttila 2004, 98–101.

concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 209

they cease to be “carnal.” They are inordinate movements only in the sense
that they do not always obey rational control, but not in the sense that they
would be a compulsive essence, alien to the human soul.58 So Augustine
builds on the biblical source text, and its three protagonists (the serpent,
Eve, Adam), with the elements provided by the Platonist psychology, and
presents his gradually proceeding heuristic model of how a consented evil
action comes forth, and what is the actual place of cupiditas, or libido, in
this narrative.59 The function of evil desire in an emotional context is thus
revealed to be a concept that serves the purposes of theological apology. The
model is constructed as follows:
1. First comes the serpent’s suggestio through the five bodily senses, or
the bad cogitatio.
2. It is followed by the response of the lower part of the soul (cupiditas).
a. If cupiditas nostra is not “moved” (mouebitur), no sin results.
b. If cupiditas “moves,” it then proceeds to the next phase.
3. Finally, the response of reason (ratio) is given.
a. If reason checks and reins cupiditas, some struggle is felt, but no sin
results.
b. If reason consents (consentiat) and decides to do according to the
libido of the lower part, sin is resulted, with the consequence that
the soul is expelled from happy life.
In agreement with the traditional views of emotions, one has to be held
morally responsible (iam enim peccatum imputatur) only if an assent is

58 There is a strong polemical undertone also in Gn. adu. Man. 2, 17, 25, where Augustine

explains how Adam and Eve reacted to their shared guilt. Augustine indicates that such is the
mechanism of sin even in present times: in their pride, people are prone to accuse God for
their own assents to sin. This, of course, is what the Manichaeans do in asserting the foreign
nature of lower movements.
59 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 14, 21 etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur, cum ad pec-

catum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus, serpente, muliere, et uiro. nam
primo fit suggestio siue per cogitationem, siue per sensus corporis, uel uidendo, uel tangendo,
uel audiendo, uel gustando, uel olfaciendo: quae suggestio cum facta fuerit, si cupiditas nostra
non mouebitur ad peccandum, excludetur serpentis astutia; si autem mota fuerit, quasi mulieri
iam persuasum erit. sed aliquando ratio uiriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque
compescit. quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquanta luctatione coronamur.
si autem ratio consentiat, et quod libido commouerit, faciendum esse decernat, ab omni uita
beata tamquam de paradiso expellitur homo. Iam enim peccatum imputatur, etiamsi non sub-
sequatur factum; quoniam rea tenetur in consensione conscientia. As pointed out in Dorothea
Weber’s edition to Gn. adu. Man., Gregory the Great was influenced by the division of phases
(Greg. moral. 4, 27 suggestio, delectatio, consensus, defensionis audacia = Aug. Gn. adu. Man.
2, 14, 21).
210 chapter five

given to the movement that arose from the lower part (rea tenetur in con-
sensione conscientia).60
The question of the habituation of the emotions surfaces in Augustine’s
discussion on the punishment of Eve. The affective part of the soul (Eve) will
suffer from “birth pangs” when it starts the habituation to obey the demands
of the rational mind, instead of “fleshly joys.” The conflict that arises from
one being captive to the old, bad habits on some occasions, and one wishing
to overcome these habits on other occasions, leads to a state of “difficulty
and pain.” This is when the new consuetudo of the control of reason over
affects is being born. Trained (erudita) by these pains, the lower part of
the soul thereby becomes obedient to the dominion of ratio. In this way,
through the lens of figurative reading, the curse (quae uidentur maledicta)
that Eve receives from God is more like a precept—but only “if we do not
read spiritual things in a carnal way.”61
Thus far, Augustine’s apologetic bias in interpreting the Genesis accounts
of human creation by the traditional, commonplace theories of the emo-
tions has been somewhat modest and remained implicit.62 However, after
providing a psychological account of the creation of the soul, with which he
has intended to instruct his Catholic Christian audience, Augustine adopts
an openly polemical stance by attempting to purport that the Genesis
accounts also contain a prophecy of things to come.63 According to this

60 Evil suggestion may be resisted in the earlier phase as well. Gn. adu. Man. 2, 18, 28 ut

eum [sc. the suggestion of the Devil] in ipso initio malae suasionis excludat.
61 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 19, 29 cautius iam et diligentius rationi obtemperat tamquam uiro et ipsis

quasi erudita doloribus conuertitur ad rationem et libenter seruit iubenti, ne iterum in aliquam
perniciosam consuetudinem defluat. See also Gn. adu. Man. 2, 21, 31, for Eve’s name as uita:
when the affective part of the soul obeys reason, it will be called “life,” and when it resists
bad habits and begets a new habit for doing what is right, it will also become a “mother of all
living.” For consuetudo, see Zumkeller 1986b.
62 I use the term ‘apology’ in a wider sense to cover not only the direct and hostile attacks

against a competing system of thought, but also the discussions that can be defined as
‘protreptic,’ which address an audience that the writer wishes to convert with e.g. using the
terminology of the competing party, and giving it new meanings. Thus, an ‘apologetical bias’
or ‘apology’ is present in Augustine’s text when he is treating subjects that he knew were
controversial from the Manichaean viewpoint, and for which he is wishing to win converts
to the Catholic faith. For definitions and useful discussion on apology, protreptic, paraenetic
and communication, see now Kotzé 2004, 59; 2011.
63 The instructive function of Genesis accounts is emphasised with such asides as Gn. adu.

Man. 2, 14, 21 etiam nunc in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur, cum ad peccatum quisque
delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis, or 2, 15, 22 pertinet enim maxime ad nostram salutem:
nam ideo haec scripta sunt ut iam talia caueamus. From the viewpoint of the instructive
function of Gn. adu. Man., the accounts of cupiditas/libido/carnalis concupiscentia work as
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 211

prophetical reading, Augustine claims, it is easy to cast the three main roles
of the Genesis narrative. While the figures of Adam and Eve may have mul-
tiple meanings (Adam may signify either Christ or a Christian), it is per-
fectly clear for whom the serpent stands: haereticorum uenena significat, et
maxime istorum Manichaeorum, et quicumque ueteri testamento aduersan-
tur.64 With this line of thought, Augustine proceeds in giving a present-day,
anti-Manichaean explanation for the various details in the Genesis account.
Occasionally, the explanation seems to be even satirically propagandistic,
as when Augustine claims that the Manichaean teachings are designed to
“seduce us through our carnal concupiscence.”65
Augustine had applied the philosophical commonplace views concern-
ing the soul’s parts and emotions to the Genesis narratives with apologetical
intentions and as subsidiary instruments. This becomes explicit in Gn. adu.
Man. 2, 26, 40. The ways of the serpent and the ways of Eve as well as their
respective offspring (i.e. Manichaeans and Catholic Christians) are opposed
to each other. Augustine connects his previous explanations of the parts of
the soul and the habituation of the affects of the sensual part, or pars ani-
malis, to an openly hostile stance against the Manichaean psychology and
understanding of the emotions in general, and of concupiscentia in particu-
lar. All parts of the soul are God’s design, even the affective part, albeit for
the need to habituate it under rational moderation:
There will, however, be enmities between it [the serpent] and the woman,
and between its seed and the woman’s if she bears children with pain and
turns to her husband so that he may rule over her. For then one can know
that one part of us does not belong to God as its author and another to the
nation of darkness, as these men say. Rather the part that has the power of
ruling in man and that lower part that should be ruled are both from God.66
[transl. Teske]

psychological mirrors and are therefore naturally placed in a context that the traditional
theories of emotions had usually addressed. These narrations offer a certain explanation
of how morally responsible evil actions and bad habits evolve to touch even the higher,
intellectual part of the soul. This seems also to be the reason for the surprisingly flexible
way in which Augustine treats the Genesis accounts simultaneously as historical events and
psychological truths, i.e. he has no urgent need to draw a tight distinction between Eve
before her Fall and our present emotional part of the soul after the historical Fall. The entire
process of the Fall in Paradise in. Gn. adu. Man. mainly represents our misguided emotional
responses.
64 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 25, 38.
65 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 26, 39. See also 2, 27, 41, where the Manichaeans are identified with the

personification of Stupidity in Prov 9, 13–18 (sub mulieris imagine).

66 Gn. adu. Man. 2, 26, 40 erunt autem inimicitiae inter istum et mulierem, et inter semen
212 chapter five

Only a few years later after Gn. adu. Man., Augustine returns to his figura-
tive reading of Genesis, again combined with an analysis of the progress of a
temptation. While the analysis in de sermone Domini in monte (394), shares
most of the elements with Gn. adu. Man., there is an interesting clarifying
addition as well. When Augustine’s account of the Sermon of the Mount
reaches Jesus’ teaching on lust and adultery (Mt 5, 27), he reproduces the
three-stage progress of the temptation of Gn. adu. Man.:67 First, the serpent
persuades Eve, i.e. the lower part of the soul receives suggestions or persua-
sions from the sense perceptions or memories. This may then lead the lower
part of the soul to feel pleasure, or delectatio (Augustine’s example is here
taken from fasting, cum ieiunamus et uisis cibis palati appetitus adsurgit, non
fit nisi delectatione). Augustine here underscores the outward character of
the sense perceptions; pleasure is only possible if these bodily sensations
are, as it were, transported into the soul (si qua talia fantasmata intus uer-
santur in anima de corpore forinsecus tracta sunt). However, a sin in the
proper sense only occurs if the lower part is able to receive reason’s (ratio)
consent for the pleasure felt in the lower part. Rational consent is therefore
once again brought to the fore to determine moral responsibility.68 Augus-
tine had started his analysis by asserting that one has to distinguish the
proper consent to one’s libido from a mere preceding “tickling” (titillatio)
of the flesh. The preparatory stage of an emotion is thus separated from the
emotion proper (s. dom. m. 1, 12, 33).69 Reason, in turn, should be submissive

eius, et semen mulieris, si pariat ista filios quamuis cum doloribus, et se ad uirum suum conuer-
tat, ut eius ipse dominetur. Tunc enim potest cognosci non aliam partem in nobis pertinere
ad auctorem Deum, et aliam ad gentem tenebrarum, sicut isti dicunt; sed potius et illud quod
regendi habet potestatem in homine, et illud inferius quod regendum est, ex Deo esse […].
67 s. dom. m. 1, 12, 34–36.
68 There is a parallel discussion on rape in mend. 40, where Augustine discusses the effects

of sexual coercion in the rape victim: agendum quibus possumus uiribus, et pia supplicatione,
ut cum uiolanda appetitur pudicitia corporis nostri, nec ipse animae sensus extremus, qui
carne implicatus est, aliqua delectatione tangatur; si autem hoc non potest, uel mentis in non
consentiendo castitas conseruetur. In cases when the lower, sensual parts of the soul cannot
totally resist the feeling of some kind of pleasure in coerced intercourse, we have to preserve
the integrity of the highest part, for it is by that part the human integrity as a whole is
vouchsafed. See the “natural separation” of the affective and rational parts of the soul in
Dillon 1993, 31–32, 149 [Alcin. 24, 1].
69 The position of reason against the lower emotional movements becomes clear in other

parts of s. dom. m., as well. Thus, for example, peacemakers (Mt 5, 9) are people who subdue
all the soul’s movements under reason. Once fleshly desires (concupiscentiae) are thus reined,
these people will become God’s kingdom. s. dom. m. 1, 2, 9 omnes animi sui motus conponentes
et subicientes rationi, id est menti et spiritui, carnalesque concupiscentias habentes edomitas
fiunt regnum dei.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 213

to a higher power, that is, to the embodied Truth in Christ (mens et ratio,
subiciatur potiori, quod est ipsa ueritas).
Nonetheless, this already familiar analysis is added to a more precise
view of how sin gradually takes hold of a person and becomes a habit
(consuetudo). While in Gn. adu. Man. Augustine was satisfied with opposing
the good habits and the bad habits with each other, and underscored the
pain emerging from the gradual disavowal of the latter, he now makes a
clearer point of the emergence of the consuetudo and its continuity with
the three-stage process of the emotions. The process during which an evil
habit is born is symmetrical to that of the inner movements in the soul.
An evil habit is thereby formed with a repeated sequence of consented
temptations, which are then made visible in outward actions, and again, if
the actions are repeated long enough, the sequence becomes fossilised as a
habit. Augustine compares this process to the circumstances surrounding
death and funerals. First, sin is committed by the consent of the reason (or,
as in Augustine’s inward/outward metaphor of a funeral procession, the sin
is still “lying inside the house”), not producing any external action. Second,
a secret consent may erupt into a sinful act (as in “being carried out of the
door”). Finally, the repeated process of actions leads to an addictive habit
(consuetudo), which Augustine compares to the fate of a corpse, burdened
beneath layers of earth in the grave (terrena mole).
In Gn. adu. Man., Augustine’s anti-Manichaean motive in using the tra-
ditional scheme of the emotions was explicit. While not a polemical work
per se, s. dom. m. can be suggested as reflecting similar concerns to those of
Augustine’s previous analyses in Genesis readings: consuetudines, with all
their seemingly involuntary traits, are now joined to the sequence of sug-
gestio/delectatio/consentio, which was originally presented to counter the
Manichaean view of evil.70 Even persons with the most deeply rooted evil
habits should not despair of conquering them “with Christ leading and help-
ing the Christian warfare.” This can be perceived in those remarks by Augus-
tine that insist on the free and non-compulsory character of the movements
and choices of the soul.71

70 Augustine is explicitly countering Manichaean teaching in s. dom. m. 2, 9, 32. The

Donatists are referred to in 1, 5, 13. Neither party is mentioned by name.

71 s. dom. m. 1, 12, 34 non enim cogit qui suadet. et omnes naturae in ordine suo gradibus suis

pulchrae sunt, sed de superioribus, in quibus rationalis animus ordinatus est, ad inferiora non
est declinandum. nec quisquam hoc facere cogitur; […] non enim hoc committit inuitus. Note
also how Augustine expands the context of evil sexual desire to cover all corrupt human
affects and desires in the lines following immediately his discussion on the emergence of
214 chapter five

The traditional, and again, rather commonplace views of emotions serve

here once more as a tool for Augustine to emphasise two simple facts of the
Christian Catholic anthropology: first, that we are morally responsible for
our thoughts and actions; and second, that even our seemingly involuntary
and mechanical habits are of our own doing. Both these facts were antithet-
ical to Augustine’s Manichaean past.
Let us close our survey on Augustine’s early attempts to locate concu-
piscentia in the traditional models of emotions by a brief look at a curious
collection of diverse problems which indicate that the questions related to
the emotions and their moral status were indeed on the menu in Augus-
tine’s circle in Hippo. In this collection, de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta
tribus (388–396), Augustine ponders a set of questions concerning the soul
and its movements.72 In addition, the collection includes two source quo-
tations, one from an obscure text by a certain Fonteius, and another from
Cicero’s de inventione, and these also attest to Augustine’s interest in com-
bining the existent, commonplace philosophical psychology with his the-
ological apology against the basic Manichaean solutions of the soul and of
its responsibility for evil actions.73 Unfortunately, especially in the case of
Fonteius’ quotation, neither of these texts include any extensive comments
by Augustine.
The series of four questions in diu. qu. 33–36 treats caritas and its relation
to the emotional movements of the soul. Augustine begins with the tradi-
tional set of emotions (diu. qu. 33), “fear” (metus) being the foremost. The

sinful action. The Manichaean notion of sexual lust as a substantial evil in each human
person is refuted once more by a redefinition of desire as the soul’s own movement, and by a
generalizing notion of desire that undermines its merely sexual contents: quis dubitet omnem
malam concupiscentiam recte fornicationem uocari, quando anima neglecta superiore lege qua
regitur inferiorum naturarum turpi uoluptate quasi mercede prostituta corrumpitur? (s. dom.
m. 1, 12, 36). See, again, for a parallel in mend. 10 etenim libido quoque ipsa recte definitur
adpetitus animi, quo aeternis bonis quaelibet temporalia praeponuntur.
72 Augustine’s psychology in diu. qu. 7 shows obvious Neoplatonic features. Man consists

of soul and body; depending on how the word ‘soul’ is understood, it either includes or
excludes the exclusively human, rational part of mens. O’Daly 1987, 7–8.
73 Bardy (1952, 11–50) has suggested that roughly the first twenty-four questions of the

work are composed around philosophical, and anti-Manichaean themes. The first one is diu.
qu. 12, quoted from a certain Fonteius and his work de mente mundanda ad uidendum deum.
Here the sensible world is depicted as defiled by a malignus spiritus, who “darkens the senses
with darksome affections” (tenebrosis affectibus tenebrat sensus): these words remind one of
the Manichaean turns of phrases. Pépin (1992, 134) suggests that Fonteius’ affiliation was “aux
confins du platonisme et du christianisme.” The second extensive source quotation is from
Cicero (diu. qu. 31 = Cic. inv. 2, 159–167 temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque alios non
rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio).
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 215

other three—cupiditas, aegritudo, and laetitia—follow fear in a construc-

tion that resembles the Stoic tetrachord of emotions.74 Augustine concludes
that one should love (amare) a rational life where no fear is felt for the things
that one can lose (diu. qu. 35).75 Augustine seems to be interested here in the
analysis of the emotions as some kind of a preparatory stage, or as an intel-
lectual tool, on the way to Christian baptism and to the Christian way of
life. To acknowledge the fear (metus, timor) of loosing one’s temporal pos-
sessions leads to a gradual opening to the love (caritas) of God. Thereby, the
Christian option is also opened:
Now, however, as soon as a habitual avoidance of sin has shown the sup-
posedly burdensome to be easy, there is need to begin tasting the sweetness
of piety and commending the beauty of virtue so that the freedom of char-
ity might stand out in comparison with the bondage of fear. Then, after the
faithful have received the rites of regeneration (and these should be deeply
moving), they must be clearly shown the difference between two men: the
old and the new […].76 [transl. Mosher]
The concise question in diu. qu. 77 gives the impression of a rash note.
Augustine proves wrong a syllogism that tries to demonstrate that fear
and desire (timor, cupiditas) are not sins if they are passions (passio, pati).
Augustine denies the crucial premise as a non sequitur. If something is a
passion and felt in “a passive state,” it does not follow that it would definitely
not be a sin. This argument, against which Augustine takes a stand, seems
to be based on a Plotinian notion of pati as something that is limited to the
lower parts of the soul, and consequently as something that cannot be said
to be “our own,” that is, in the Christian idiom used in this question, a sin.
The syllogism seems to lean on the meaning of pati in the sense of being
an object of some outward influence, and therefore involving no personal
commitment in the strict sense, as in emerging from ratio. But Augustine
is only satisfied in denying this as a logical misstep. To claim that emotions
are only “happening” in us, and are only caused by an outward influence,
as in the narrow sense of pati, is something Augustine will not admit. On

74 See Cic. Tusc. 4, 10–11. The tetrachord had become commonplace long before the time

of Augustine. Knuuttila 2004, 52, 112.

75 In the last question of the series, an addition is made: one should fear God (diu. qu. 36).
76 diu. qu 36, 2 iam uero cum aliqua non peccandi consuetudo quod onerosum putabatur

facile esse persuaserit, incipiat gustari dulcedo pietatis et commendari pulchritudo uirtutis, ut
caritatis libertas prae seruitute timoris emineat. tunc iam persuadendum est fidelibus praece-
dentibus regenerationis sacramentis, quae necesse est plurimum moueant, quid intersit inter
duos homines, ueterem et nouum […].
216 chapter five

the contrary, he seems to rather hold on to the Stoic view of the perturbatio,
which always entails the assent of reason, and accordingly also a notion of
pati as something which remains our own responsibility. Hence an emotion
cannot be logically excluded from the Christian notion of sin, and to end
up in a state of emotion is not equivalent to being in a purely “passive
state.” One is morally responsible for one’s emotions, including cupiditas
and timor. Therefore, to “suffer” from an emotion can be condemnable, that
is, a sin (peccatum).77
While it is not possible to draw any further conclusions on this brief piece
of text, it does indicate, however, that during the years 388–396, Augustine
had an active interest in the traditions of the emotions and their moral
status.78 As we have seen, this interest was not a scholarly exercise for its
own sake, but was deeply invested with Augustine’s need to counter his
main theological opponents of the time, namely the Manichaeans. Thus far,
we have seen how Augustine has made an effort to convince his audience
of how an unreasonable and miserable life led under the tyranny of desires
is due to our own, deliberate choices. Augustine has consistently insisted
that to commit oneself to emotional states, and under a sustained rule of
cupiditas/libido, which he seems to take as something of an emotion par
excellence, is in the will’s power, (or eph’ hemin):79 it is therefore possible
to control and fight off the suggestions of these movements of the soul
(which, Augustine points, were corrupted by the Fall). He has also shown
how a psychological reading of Gen 1–3 teaches us to appropriate both the
rational and irrational part of the soul as our own nature. Furthermore, he
has attempted to clarify how the bodily and obviously lower part of reality
has been able to divert reason from intellectual goods.
In all these aspects, Augustine found a useful tool in the teachings of
various philosophical traditions of the emotions. It may also be an impor-
tant matter to notice that in the early stages of his literary career Augustine
has not been especially keen on distinguishing between these various tra-

77 For a useful discussion of the Plotinian distinction between actions and passions, see

Remes 2007, 90–93.

78 There were, of course, other themes related to the emotions that concerned the Chris-

tian circles of amateur philosophy as well. For divine apatheia and biblical exegesis on God’s
emotions, see diu. qu. 52; for passiones in Christ, see Gn. adu. Man. 1, 8, 14 motus […] non
perturbati animi; diu. qu. 80.
79 For the philosophical tradition in this respect, see Remes 2007, 89 with literature;

although the phrase ‘up to us’ had a distinctively Stoic ring, it was also used by the Platonic
authors who were important sources for Augustine’s philosophical education, such as Aulus
Gellius and Plotinus.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 217

ditions, nor has he felt any kind of need to pit these traditions against each
other, as will happen in his later works. In his early works, Neoplatonic and
Stoic emphases, phrases and questions converge fluently with a distinctly
apologetic concern.
It seems in place to note here also that Augustine is constantly positive
about the real possibility of achieving the moderation that the lower part of
the soul and its movements need. There is an implicit confident strain in the
depictions of libido, or cupiditas: with God’s help, people are able to turn into
virtuous sages, and moderation, or the good use of the lower part of the soul,
is set as an attainable goal. Thus, the sinister description of the emotional
disturbances in lib. arb. 1 and the lamentable chain of effects in Gn. adu.
Man. and s. dom. m. also serve as instructive reflections on what should
be avoided (with the necessary implication that the irrational tyranny of
passions indeed can be avoided) in the Christian way of life. The struggle
with evil desire as an emotional force is seen from the vantage point of the
“citadel of virtue.”80

5.2. Continuities and Interludes

So far, our cases of evil desire as situated in the traditional philosophi-

cal frames of emotions have preceded Augustine’s pivotal work, de diuer-
sis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum. In the following sections, texts will be
reviewed that followed this arguably revolutionary work. First, we will ob-
serve how Augustine’s preoccupation with the emotions and concupiscentia
was continued in three major works, written or commenced shortly after
Simpl. The three works in question, conf., c. Faust. and trin., will highlight
some of the continuities in Augustine’s use of psychological commonplaces,
such as its aptitude in Manichaean polemics as well as the allegorical read-
ing of Gen 2 in the use of psychological observations.

5.2.1. Affective Confessions

Confessiones is a complicated work in its own right, but this is true also from
the viewpoint of the present study.81 The form and contents of this literary
masterpiece do not easily lend themselves to straightforward classifications

80 We will return to this angle to concupiscentia in Chapter 6.

81 For a general discussion of emotions in conf., focusing on Augustine’s views on the
aesthetic and artificial emotions, and emotions and the will, see Knuuttila 2004, 162–168, 171.
218 chapter five

of philosophical sources, or taxonomies of purposes in the using of or the

alluding to such sources.82 Moreover, Augustine moves fluently between
various functions of concupiscentia in this work: as we have seen in the pre-
vious chapter, Augustine uses the theme of triplex cupiditas to the degree
of giving structure to large parts of the work. We will once more briefly
return to this work in the next chapter, to discuss the dimensions of Chris-
tian renewal in its presentation of concupiscentia and Romans 7.
Corrupt desire, or concupiscentia, or libido, can thus be seen in various
shades in conf. Indeed, the very last book of the work offers an illustrating
example of the overlapping functions of concupiscence as an emotion (1),
matrix of sin (2), and renewal (3). In conf. 13, 30–31, Augustine sees in
the human domination over the animal kingdom an allegory of the soul’s
moderation over the passions of the soul (1). These passions are named
according to triplex cupiditas (2), connected to representative groups of
animals: fastus elationis (bestiae), delectatio libidinis (pecora) and uenenum
curiositatis (serpentes). Such passions, claims Augustine, are “movements
of a dead soul” and can be renewed and reformed into quiet, tame and
harmless affections to serve reason, when a person is renewed according
to God’s image in Christ (3).83

Commonplaces
Augustine’s familiarity and engagement with the philosophical traditions
of emotions surfaces occasionally in the pages of conf. Thus, conf. repeats
the commonplace view of cupiditas as one of the generative emotions.84 In
conf. 2, 13, both triplex cupiditas and a set of emotions coming close to the
traditional Stoic tetrachord appear in a list in which they are contrasted to
God and His qualities. Augustine holds that even in these aberrant move-
ments of the soul, something is reflected of the original creation and of the
being of the Creator. The latter part of the list is designed in a Stoic fashion,
where each of the objects of the emotions is presumed to be resulted from

82 Nevertheless, conf. has provided a rich quarry for the miners of sources, influences and

affinities. See O’Donnell 1992, I, xx–xxxi with literature. For the purposes of conf. see now van
Oort 2008b and Kotzé 2004; 2011, 20.
83 conf. 13, 30–31.
84 Note that Augustine is quite sensitive to the fact that the traditional sets of emotions

are only simplified heuristic devices for a manifold phenomenon of affective experiences.
conf. 4, 22 grande profundum est ipse homo, cuius etiam capillos tu, domine, numeratos habes
et non minuuntur in te: et tamen capilli eius magis numerabiles quam affectus eius et motus
cordis eius.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 219

mistaken preferences or from choices of attachment; these emotions are

then compared to God and His being.
Anger (ira) seeks revenge; who avenges with greater justice than you? Fear
(timor) quails before sudden and unexpected events attacking things which
are loved, and takes precaution for their safety; to you is anything unexpected
or sudden? […] Regret (tristitia) wastes away for the loss of things which
cupidity (cupiditas) delighted in. Its wish would be that nothing be taken
away, just as nothing can be taken from you.85 [transl. Chadwick]
The Stoic tetrachord, together with notions of cupiditas, surfaces again in
conf. 10, 21–22, where the relation of emotions to memory is analysed.86
While recording his past, Augustine has noted that he is able to remember,
for instance, his desires without actually feeling them anymore.87 The same
applies to an intellectual analysis of the said emotions; one can discuss
emotions and categorize them without actually feeling the affects under
consideration.88

Concupiscentia in Manichaean Colours

Apart from these more easily recognizable references to the traditional dis-
courses of the emotions, conf. abounds in characterizations of concupiscen-
tia that could be labelled as affective, or even sensuous in tone. Thus, in
a famous passage, Augustine recalls his youth and social relations being
stained by concupiscentia.
The single desire that dominated my search for delight was simply to love and
to be loved. But no restraint was imposed by the exchange of mind with mind,
which marks the brightly lit pathway of friendship. Clouds of muddy carnal
concupiscence (concupiscentia carnis) filled the air. The bubbling impulses
of puberty befogged and obscured my heart so that it could not see the

85 conf. 2, 13 ira uindictam quaerit: te iustius quis uindicat? timor insolita et repentina exhor-

rescit rebus, quae amantur, aduersantia, dum praecauet securitati: tibi enim quid insolitum?
quid repentinum? aut quis a te separat quod diligis? aut ubi nisi apud te firma securitas? tristi-
tia rebus amissis contabescit, quibus se oblectabat cupiditas, quia ita sibi nollet, sicut tibi auferri
nihil potest.
86 conf. 10, 21 affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas

habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diuerso. Knuuttila 2004, 158–159.
87 conf. 10, 21 nam et laetatum me fuisse reminiscor non laetus et tristitiam meam praeteri-

tam recordor non tristis et me aliquando timuisse recolo sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine
cupiditate sum memor. Augustine will return to the topic of memory and emotions in trin. 11,
see pp. 232–234.
88 conf. 10, 22 quidquid de his disputare potuero diuidendo singula per species sui cuiusque

generis et definiendo, ibi inuenio quid dicam atque inde profero, nec tamen ulla earum pertur-
batione perturbor, cum eas reminiscendo commemoro.
220 chapter five

difference between love’s serenity and lust’s darkness (caligine libidinis). Con-
fusion of the two things boiled within me. It seized hold of my youthful weak-
ness, sweeping me through the precipitous rocks of desire (abrupta cupidita-
tum) to submerge me in a whirlpool of vice.89 [transl. Chadwick]
This passage is written in a strongly sensual language (reminiscent of a com-
parable depiction of the tyranny of libido in lib. arb. 1). The clarity and seren-
ity of right love is strongly, even dualistically opposed to muddy, shadowy
desires. The contrast between light and darkness is vivid and striking, and
the imagery around the “muddy” concupiscentia carnis is designed to con-
vey an impression of an almost material element of disturbance and being
out of control.90 Similar imagery of stained friendship is used again in conf.
3, 1:
I therefore polluted the spring water of friendship with the filth of concupis-
cence (concupiscentiae). I muddied its clear stream by the hell of lust (libidi-
nis), and yet, though foul and immoral, in my excessive vanity, I used to carry
on in the manner of an elegant man about town.91 [transl. Chadwick]
Augustine claims that he loved to love, but the love he was in was not the
love he really sought. The bodily and exterior forms of love were not love
that would have had healthy effects for the soul. Since the emotions of love
did not originate from a love of immutable God, but from a love of bodily
things, the “incorruptible nourishment” only seemed more unattractive.92
According to Annemare Kotzé, these passages contain a strong protrep-

89 conf. 2, 2 et quid erat, quod me delectabat, nisi amare et amari? sed non tenebatur modus

ab animo usque ad animum, quatenus est luminosus limes amicitiae, sed exhalabantur nebulae
de limosa concupiscentia carnis et scatebra pubertatis et obnubilabant atque obfuscabant
cor meum, ut non discerneretur serenitas dilectionis a caligine libidinis. utrumque in confuso
aestuabat et rapiebat imbecillam aetatem per abrupta cupiditatum atque mersabat gurgite
flagitiorum.
90 O’Donnell 1992, II, 111: “These specially vivid metaphors of loss of control arising from

self-will and concupiscence, leading to loss of self, prepare the paradox of restoration of self
and of control through surrender to a power outside the self.”
91 conf. 3, 1 uenam igitur amicitiae coinquinabam sordibus concupiscentiae candoremque

eius obnubilabam de tartaro libidinis, et tamen foedus atque inhonestus, elegans et urbanus
esse gestiebam abundanti uanitate.
92 conf. 3, 1 quaerebam quid amarem, amans amare, et oderam securitatem et uiam sine

muscipulis, quoniam fames mihi erat intus ab interiore cibo, te ipso, deus meus, et ea fame non
esuriebam, sed eram sine desiderio alimentorum incorruptibilium, non quia plenus eis eram,
sed quo inanior, fastidiosior. Thereby Augustine sets the stage for an analysis of the emotions
that the theatric plays in Carthage excited in him (conf. 3, 2–4 ego tunc miser dolere amabam).
In retrospect, Augustine reproaches the tragedies on the basis that they are designed to
arouse feelings only for the sake of the artificial enjoyment of these feelings (cupere esse
miseros, ut misereatur). Knuuttila 2004, 164–166.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 221

tic tendency towards an expected Manichaean readership. The language

of food, contaminated friendship, and sexual desire were all designed to
communicate forcefully with a Manichaean audience.93 By writing about
concupiscentia carnis (or libido) in such colourful tones and materialistic
pictures (caligo, nebula, sordes), Augustine creates a hook by which he
attempts to capture his former co-religionists’ attention, and to have them
follow his way out from the darkness of Manichaean vanities into the light
of Catholic Christianity.
Augustine’s underlying anti-Manichaean purpose in conf. can also be
discerned in his reproaches against his own lost work de pulchro et apto.
This work was, according to Augustine, based on a division between the
monad and the dyad, of which the monad represented everything that is
good, being a principle of unity and concord, while the dyad was a principle
of division and discord, and thus evil. As for the generative emotions (or
parts of the soul) of ira and libido, in pulch. Augustine located them to
the workings of the dyad, and held it to be some kind of substance of
irrationality.94 Such a view of libido and human emotional matrix was fitting
enough for a young and ambitious Manichaean convert that Augustine was,
but in retrospect these musings receive his outright condemnation, based
on the simple Platonist and Christian psychological principles of the parts
of the soul, all as created and all as vulnerable to corruption:
Just as crimes occur when the mind’s motive force, which gives the impetus
for action, is corrupt and asserts itself in an insolent and disturbed way, and
as vicious acts occur if obsession has captured the mind’s affective part which
is the root of the impulse to carnal pleasures, so also errors and false opinions
contaminate life if the reasoning mind is itself flawed.95 [transl. Chadwick]
All the parts of the soul may be vitiated by sin and evil, and therefore, all the
parts are implicitly created by God, and thus originally good. The crimes

93 Kotzé 2004, 199–203, 211–215.

94 conf. 4, 24 et cum in uirtute pacem amarem, in uitiositate autem odissem discordiam,
in illa unitatem, in ista quandam diuisionem notabam, inque illa unitate mens rationalis et
natura ueritatis ac summi boni mihi esse uidebatur, in ista uero diuisione inrationalis uitae
nescio quam substantiam […] miser opinabar. et illam monadem appellabam tamquam sine
ullo sexu mentem, hanc uero dyadem, iram in facinoribus, libidinem in flagitiis, nesciens quid
loquerer. The terminology of monad and dyad is of Pythagorean origin. See O’Donnell 1992,
II, 257–258, for further literature.
95 conf. 4, 25 sicut enim facinora sunt, si uitiosus est ille animi motus, in quo est impetus, et

se iactat insolenter ac turbide, et flagitia, si est immoderata illa animae affectio, qua carnales
hauriuntur uoluptates ita errores et falsae opiniones uitam contaminant, si rationalis mens ipsa
uitiosa est.
222 chapter five

(facinora) against the neighbour; the vices (flagitia) against one’s own body
and soul, and the errors committed against the mind, concern all three parts
of the soul, animus, anima and mens, respectively.96 Thus, the evil in the
appetitive part consist of immoderation by which “carnal pleasures” are
“imbibed” in the soul.

Therapy of Concupiscentia in Conf.

Augustine’s evaluations of his past life teem with colourful depictions of his
emotional behaviour, especially of his sexual desire and continence. The
crucial role of continence, celibacy and fighting with concupiscentia carnis
in the overall plot of conf. has been charted exhaustively, and there is no
need for extensive documentation in this respect.97 In conf. 6, 20–26, Augus-
tine recalls the turbulent period of life before his conversion, and the special
hindrance of the idea of celibacy that caused him excessive agony.98 Yet,
Augustine seems to blame as much his inability to see continence as a free
and immediate gift of God, as his reluctant attitude towards abandoning
his sexually active life.99 Writing conf. (some years after Simpl.), Augustine
notes how he erroneously had first thought that sexual continence could be
achieved by his own resolution, and that the allurements of sexual concupis-
cence could be overthrown by his own initiative. In other words, he did not

96 See O’Donnell, II, 258–259 on the tripartite soul, and his comment ad loc.: “Here the

trinitarian analogy applies in the first instance to the categories of sin […] and the other
terms are employed in the first instance because of their applicability to each category of
sin.” For terminology, see also O’Daly 1987, 7–8. The division is distinct from the two-part-
division of conf. 13, 47, where Adam represents, anticipating the positions in trin. 12, mentis
ratio and Eve symbolizes appetitus actionis.
97 For this theme in conf., see especially O’Donnell 1992, III, 3–4, 7–10 with literature.
98 See e.g. conf. 6, 21 deligatus morbo carnis mortifera suauitate trahebam catenam meam

solui timens; 6, 22 uehementer consuetudo satiandae insatiabilis concupiscentiae me captum

excruciabat; 6, 25 quia non amator coniugii sed libidinis seruus eram, procuraui aliam, non
utique coniugem, quo tamquam sustentaretur et perduceretur uel integer uel auctior morbus
animae meae satellitio perdurantis consuetudinis in regnum uxorium. nec sanabatur uulnus
illud meum, quod prioris praecisione factum erat, sed post feruorem doloremque acerrimum
putrescebat et quasi frigidius, sed desperatius dolebat. O’Donnell 1992, II, 374: “continence first
appears here as the central issue retarding the ‘conversion.’”
99 conf. 6, 20 putabam enim me miserum fore nimis, si feminae priuarer amplexibus, et

medicinam misericordiae tuae ad eandem infirmitatem sanandam non cogitabam, quia exper-
tus non eram, et propriarum uirium credebam esse continentiam, quarum mihi non eram con-
scius, cum tam stultus essem, ut nescirem, sicut scriptum est, neminem posse esse continentem,
nisi tu dederis. Cf. also Augustine’s view on continence in uirg. 25 continentes, corpus usque
ad contemptas nuptias castigantes, se ipsos non in corpore, sed in ipsa concupiscentiae radice
castrantes.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 223

at first realize continence to be comparable to divine grace, in that it, too,

should be seen exclusively as a donum dei.100 In conf. 6–8, Augustine com-
poses an extensive narrative, which is focused on God’s mysterious action
in granting Augustine what He demands (da quod iubes): Augustine depicts
himself as clay, or earth (humus), upon which God works His miracles (conf.
6, 22 sic eramus, donec tu, altissime, non deserens humum nostram miseratus
miseros subuenires miris et occultis modis).
The basic proposition of conf. 8 then gives Augustine’s audience a simple
enough understanding of God’s grace and the way it affects the human
soul: only grace is able to create the virtue of continence and control over
corrupted affects in general, and concupiscentia carnis in particular.
We have already seen the way Augustine thinks about the effects of Chris-
tian renewal in conf. 13, 30–31. According to this remark, the force of the
corrupted passions in the form of triplex cupiditas is tamed by divine grace:
seruiunt enim rationi haec animalia, cum a progressu mortifero cohibita uiu-
unt et bona sunt.101

5.2.2. Contra Faustum

Augustine’s largest directly anti-Manichaean work after writing Simpl. is
contra Faustum.102 In general, concupiscentia, cupiditas, or libido along with
the other emotions are depicted as being irrational and wrongly ordered
movements, having their source in the lower part(s) of the soul. They do not
originate in the immutable and righteous God. In c. Faust., Augustine also

100 See Zumkeller 1986, 39; O’Donnell, II, 374–375.

101 See also conf. 13, 49 fidelium animam uiuam per affectus ordinatos continentiae uigore
formasti atque inde tibi soli mentem subditam et nullius auctoritatis humanae ad imitan-
dum indigentem renouasti ad imaginem et similitudinem tuam praestantique intellectui ratio-
nabilem actionem tamquam uiro feminam subdidisti. The answer of the contemporary doctr.
chr. 1, 24–25, which is a brief study of the body, the mind (or spiritus, from Gal 5, 17, which
Augustine here quotes) and the corrupted habits of concupiscentia, remains in this respect
inconclusive. Augustine there writes how one should tame the untamed fleshly habit of con-
cupiscentia, which weighs the body, and to turn it into a ‘better one’ (hoc etiam in hac uita
meditandum est, ut consuetudo carnalis mutetur in melius nec inordinatis motibus resistat spi-
ritui). Apparently, this mutation will cause much labour, but should be possible in this life;
the language betrays uncertainties (meditandum est). See also doctr. chr. 2, 9–11 for a change
in the quality of emotions.
102 For Faustus, see Decret 1970, 51–70. Bammel (1993, 4–6) discusses Faustus’ use of the

letters of Paul as source texts for central Manichaean doctrines (e.g. the two principles, the
division between the old man and the new man). For a quite recent discussion on the figure
of Faustus and his role in Augustine’s own conversion, see BeDuhn 2010, 106–134 and van
Oort 2011, 558–564.
224 chapter five

rather carefully avoids the accusations by Faustus that disordered emotions

could be assigned to the holy people of the biblical narratives, and stresses
the modification and rational control of emotions.
The most extensive discussion of the emotions and evil desire takes place
in c. Faust. 22, where Faustus treats the offensive Old Testament narra-
tives of the divine emotional movements and the reproachable passions of
the patriarchs. Faustus blames the God of the Old Testament as being tor-
mented by various dark passions, such as envy (inuidus), fear (timens), and
anger (irascens).103 Again, the patriarchs and kings of Israel, who are ven-
erated by Catholic Christians, not only suffered from wild sexual desires
(insana flagrans cupido, inconcessa libidinis flamma), but also fell prey to
greed, homicide and all other kinds of atrocities. Faustus contends that
the emotional imagery in which God and his actions in the Old Testa-
ment is described, and the immoral and irrational conduct of patriarchs
all serve as evidence in favour of the Manichaean case: the Old Testa-
ment should be abandoned as a distorted, misleading and outright deceitful
text.104
Augustine responds to these accusations that, to begin with, God is not
liable to any effects from the part of His creation, anymore than Christ
suffered from any emotions or would be liable to charges of any immoral
affects.105 Here, as elsewhere, the difficulty posed by the emotional language
of the Bible is solved by linguistic ingenuity: for according to Augustine,
even the pagan philosophers have used flexible terminology when denoting
virtues in terms which strictly speaking refer to harmful passions. Augus-
tine refers to Cicero’s way (without explicitly naming him) of describing
the Stoic eupatheiai, listing three generic emotions and their acceptable
counterparts.106 In short, God simply cannot be perturbatus. Therefore, the

103 God’s envy in the Genesis narratives was a consolidated part of the Manichaean polem-

ics against the Old Testament. See Raveaux 1987, 64–65.

104 For the Manichaean criticism and its Marcionite roots, see Lieu 1992, 51–53, 154–158.
105 c. Faust. 22, 9–14. On Christ and his perfectly voluntary emotions, see c. Faust. 26, 8 nam

homo plerumque etsi nolit, irascitur; etsi nolit, contristatur; etsi nolit, dormit; etsi nolit, esurit ac
sitit: ille autem omnia ista, quia uoluit.
106 c. Faust. 22, 18 docti eorum [sc. paganorum] discernant inter uoluntatem et cupiditatem,

gaudium et laetitiam, cautionem et metum […] his binis uerbis ea, quae priora posui, uirtutibus,
quae autem posteriora, uitiis adponant: pleni sunt tamen libri eorum, cum abusione istorum
nominum, quae proprie uitia significant, etiam uirtutes sic appellantur. Cic. Tusc. 4, 13–14
uoluntas—libido vel cupiditas effrenata; gaudium—laetitia; cautio—metus. In accordance
with Cicero’s list, aegritudo falls out from Augustine’s account. See further Colish 1990, 222.
In addition, Augustine notes that the Hebrew language may as well denote both a bad and a
good action by the same word, as in the case of jealousy (c. Faust. 22, 18 zelus).
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 225

emotional language and imagery used of God refers metaphorically to God’s

immutable justice and to His actions, in the same way the philosophers
have resorted to the flexible use of language in these matters.107 So Augus-
tine effectively applies the rule he had already used in Simpl. 2, 2, 2: eodem
uerbo non eodem modo.
But what about the allegations against the Old Testament patriarchs
and their seemingly immoral conduct and vicious passions? While point-
ing out that the superficially reproachable actions of the central Old Tes-
tament figures are sui generis,108 Augustine proceeds by defining sin on a
more general level. Thus, sin is a transgression of the eternal law, which in
other words equals as the commandment to preserve “the natural order”
(ordo naturalis). Augustine then depicts this order in a human person by
using a standard Platonist model: every human individual consists of (c.
Faust. 22, 27) corpus, anima, and ratio. Ratio in itself is divided between
the “active” (actiua) and the “contemplating” part (contemplatiua), of which
the contemplative part excels, for the image of God lies in that part of each
human being. Thus, if there would be a person who would always and in all
instances control his or her “mortal pleasures,” no sin would occur.109 Con-
sequently, all who do not rein in their pleasures commit a sin against the
“natural order” of creation in their body-soul composition.110 The “mortal
pleasures” (mortales delectationes) are intended to be used for retaining or
regaining corporeal health; however, if they become unbridled, they evolve
into sins and cease to be moderated by reason.111
With these general considerations, Augustine then begins to give a de-
tailed answer to Faustus’ objections. Augustine states that Abraham did
not fall into wild sexual desires, for he only tried to guarantee offspring for

107 c. Faust. 22, 21.

108 Augustine’s first objection to Faustus’ criticism is to claim that all the seemingly im-
moral actions of the patriarchs and prophets act as signs for Christ. To find fault with these
would be comparable to the childish objections of schoolboys who are eager to correct
Virgil’s Latin. c. Faust. 22, 24–25 uitam fuisse propheticam totumque illud regnum gentis
Hebraeorum magnum […] fuisse prophetam.
109 c. Faust. 22, 28 quapropter hominis actio seruiens fidei seruienti deo refrenat omnes mor-

tales delectationes et eas cohercet ad naturalem modum meliora inferioribus ordinata dilec-
tione praeponens. si enim nihil delectaret inlicitum, nemo peccaret. Note the unambiguously
conditional language by which Augustine here demonstrates the purely theoretic character
of such a presumption.
110 Sin is thus limited to human beings and fallen angels (i.e. those without bodies but

already been shown to commit sins). Animals (non possunt) and good angels (nolunt) are
excluded.
111 c. Faust. 22, 29.
226 chapter five

himself by having sex with Hagar, nor can be Sarah be reproached either,
for she, too, only wished to have children. Thus, their action was com-
pletely dictated by the higher purposes of reason.112 The vocabulary in this
passage refers consistently to irrational, unbridled desires (libido, concupis-
centia carnalis, insana cupiditas, or cupido in Faustus) opposing the rational
uoluntas according God’s eternal law.113
Augustine’s explanation is similar for the incestuous actions undertaken
by Lot’s daughters: the daughters only wished to procreate offspring, and
while they could not know that any other man was still alive on earth, they
had an excusable motive for their act; therefore, the accusation of nefaria
libido appears to be without force. And as Augustine remarks, whatever
the motive for this act was, the narrative as such does not recommend
the actions it describes.114 Moreover, Augustine hints, Faustus’ reproach of
polygamous marriages only reflects his own shortcomings in the matter:
if Faustus thinks that children cannot be conceived without indecent lust
and dirty pleasures, that is Faustus’ problem, not the patriarchs.’115 As the
figures of the Old Testament were strengthened by heroic self-control in
this respect, they were even able to have many wives at the same time.116
Augustine concludes the case of Jacob and his wives by pointing out how
Jacob’s only concern was to provide both Lea and Rachel with children;

112 c. Faust. 22, 30–31.

113 c. Faust. 22, 31 (on Sarah) neque enim conscientiam suam flagitio coniugis miscuit, quo
ille suam libidinem turpi et inlicita uoluptate satiaret, sed etiam illa naturali ordine filios uolens
[…] non cedens uiro concupiscenti, sed iubens oboedienti […] numquam hoc faceret mulier,
si in corpore uiri carnali concupiscentia teneretur […] nunc uero propterea sic propagandi
uoluntas pia fuit, quia concumbendi uoluntas libidinosa non fuit. Augustine polemically turns
the allegations concerning evil desires against Faustus, who is thus said to be driven by insana
criminendi cupiditas (22, 30) or libidine calumniandi (22, 32) himself! Again, the charge of
irrationality is turned against Mani as well (22, 30 non igitur Abraham prolis habendae insana
cupiditate flagrabat, sed Manichaeus prolis deuitandae insana uanitate delirabat). In line with
the evaluations of the Old Testament, Solomon is pointed out as an example of exhibiting
conduct that is opposite to the patriarchs: plures uxores […] magis ad libidinem quam ad
propaginem habuit.
114 c. Faust. 22, 45.
115 c. Faust. 22, 47 sed quia homines aliter se habentibus iam moribus et legibus non possunt

delectari uxorum multitudine nisi libidinis magnitudine, ideo errant et putant haberi omnino
non potuisse uxores multas nisi flagrantia concupiscentiae carnalis et sordidae uoluptatis.
116 c. Faust. 22, 48. Possunt isti maledici etiam sanctos apostolos accusare, quod non caritate

generandi filios uitae aeternae, sed cupiditate laudis humanae […] euangelium praedicauerint
[…] hanc in ecclesia gloriam peruersa uoluntate Simon perditus concupiuit. The question of
the virility of the patriarchs is treated in Augustine’s systematic account of hermeneutics as
well. doctr. chr. 3, 27–28.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 227

therefore, Jacob was a servant of justice, not of evil desire (si concupiscentiae,
non iustitiae seruus esset).117
Again, when it comes to the rational moderation of the disturbed pas-
sions, the case of Moses is taken as an example. Faustus had found fault in
Ex 12, 35–36, where the Israelites plunder the Egyptian gold and jewellery,
accusing Moses of greed (cupiditas) in committing such a crime. Augustine
answers by pleading to divine commandment. Moses acted in accordance
with God’s directions in this matter, and cannot therefore be accused of
greed or of any other disturbed movement of the soul.118 If Moses or other
prominent figures of the Old Testament are acting under clear orders by
God, they cannot be acting under any reproachable emotions, even in the
cases that would in ordinary circumstances be deemed as resulting from
such perturbations. Indeed, whatever God commands is by definition ratio-
nal and in accordance with aeterna lex. Plundering the gold of Egypt was
therefore not committed by greed (humana cupiditate, 22, 74). The patri-
archs’ seemingly immoral actions were often based on divine, purposeful
and rational mandates.119 From this perspective, Moses acted in obedience,
not in rage (non saeuiens, sed oboediens).
The immoral actions in the history of Israel are thus immoral only in an
illusory way. They have not been committed by reproachable passions, but
by God’s unerring command. Therefore, despite their seemingly irrational
appearance, they are in fact wholly rational, for God cannot give irrational
commandments.120

117 In his more constructive part of the exegesis, Augustine is emphatic that one cannot

obtain the vision of wisdom without much toil and labour (cf. Jacob’s toil under Laban). c.
Faust. 22, 53. Moreover, the moderation of desire is achieved with no less trouble. All other
narratives of the seemingly immoral behaviour of patriarchs are interpreted with similar
preconditions of rational ends: hanc […] modestiam, hanc concupiscentiae cohercitionem et
in conmixtione corporum coniugalium solum adpetitum posteritatis humanae (c. Faust. 22,
50). See also c. Faust. 29, 4: inlicitus itaque et temperantiae legibus non subiectus membrorum
illorum usus est turpis, non ipsa membra […] sic eis generationi tatntummodo consulentes
utebantur, ut ille naturalis motus nullo modo turpis esset, qui non libidini, sed rationi seruiret;
c. Faust. 30, 6.
118 Augustine’s ‘voluntaristic’ mood surfaces here (22, 71–72): penes dominum esset consil-

ium iubendi, penes famulum autem obsequium peragendi. sed deus, inquit, uerus et bonus nullo
modo talia iussisse credendus est. immo uero talia recte non iubet, nisi deus uerus et bonus, qui
et solus nouit, quid cuique iubendum sit.
119 Unlike the usual evils of war which can be summarized thus (anticipating the ideas

of social and political corruption in ciu.): nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, inpacatus
atque inplacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si qua similia. c. Faust. 22, 74.
See also c. Faust. 22, 75 [bellum] quod humana cupiditate geritur.
120 Nothing new is left to be said for the death penalty that Moses imposes on the idolaters:
228 chapter five

Augustine’s positions of concupiscentia as a philosophically coloured

emotion in c. Faust. still rely on the validity of the standard psychological
views of the emotions he had subscribed to in his earlier works. The obvi-
ous difficulties of the unflattering stories about the ancestors of Israel are
cleared away with contrived explanations that are, nevertheless, in line with
Augustine’s emphasis on the rational control of emotions and the rational
motivation of human action. In c. Faust., the commonplaces of Platonic psy-
chology still back Augustine’s anti-Manichaean stand.

5.2.3. De Trinitate
Augustine’s major theological and psychological work, de trinitate, was
begun approximately at the same time conf. and c. Faust. were completed,
but trin. was not finished, however, until about two decades had passed after
its inception. In 416, trin. 12 together with all previous books were published,
as it seems, against Augustine’s will.121 The final version of trin. was com-
pleted some time during 419–425.122 Despite its important role in Augustine’s
trinitarian theology and philosophy of the mind, the work only digresses in
ethical topics, mainly in trin. 12 and 13, the latter concerning the role of luck
in human happiness, and the previous book dealing with Augustine’s uti-
frui-distinction. It is with this motivation that Augustine returns briefly to
the figures of Adam and Eve and the psychological insights these figures
provide for his overall project in trin.123
As in Gn. adu. Man., the Genesis narrative of the Fall again has a tale
to tell about the human mind. The roles are, however, now cast somewhat
differently, and Augustine is altogether keen to stress the unity of the soul
with its trinitarian functions on the various levels of perception, memory,
cogitation and self-knowledge. Hence, Adam and Eve are not so much
perceived as different parts of the soul than as two diverging aspects of

the passage is to be read figuratively, as concerning human sinful passions (ira, concupiscen-
tia mala). See c. Faust. 22, 92 quoting Ps 4,5 (irascimini et nolite peccare) and Col 3,5.
121 ep. 174.
122 For the date, see Brachtendorf 2007; for the work in general, see Brachtendorf 2000;

2003.
123 See Brachtendorf 2000, 199–206; 2007, 374. The psychological allegory of Gen 2 here

also offers Augustine an explanation for the seemingly contradictory assertions by Paul in
1 Cor 11, 7. trin. 12, 19, ad hoc tantummodo audienda est, ut intellegatur apostolus imaginem Dei
uiro tantum tribuendo, non etiam feminae, quamuis in diuerso sexu duorum hominum, aliquid
tamen significare uoluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur. For modern discussions of these
aspects, see Boerresen 1981, 26–30; van Bavel 1989, Soennecken 1989.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 229

the rational mind, reflecting in an individual soul the image of God that
was bequeathed to both sexes in Paradise. In this, Augustine follows a line
of thought he had already suggested in conf. 13, 47 and c. Faust. 22, 27–
28, but now with fuller argumentation. Augustine explains that as sense
perceptions are shared equally by humans and animals, neither Adam nor
Eve can stand as symbols for these. Therefore, the senses (sensus corporis)
are now represented by the snake.124
While Augustine has thus refined his previous view of the psychologi-
cal contents of Genesis 2–3, he continues to use these figures as stages in
a progressive account of temptation and sin.125 Thus, when sensual images
are transferred from the sensus corporis to the higher part of the soul, they
are encountered by two varying aspects of reason (ratio). These two aspects
stand for Eve and Adam, i.e. for the practical (scientia) and contemplative
(sapientia) “parts” of reason.126 An occasion for sin arises when the bodily
senses present something worthy of pursuing for its own sake (frui) and
not only in reference to God (uti). There is, according to Augustine, a dif-
ference in the degree in the way in which the reason may consent to the
representation of the values from the sensus corporis. This difference is due
to two levels of consent in the reason. On the first level, only the practical
part of reason consents to the insight that temporal and private goods are
worthy of fruitio, and takes pleasure in this thought (cogitationis delectatio).
This is comparable to the decision by Eve to submit to the serpent’s sug-
gestion. The second, more serious case of consent occurs when the reason
as a whole, together with the practical and contemplative sides, decides to
act according to the presentation of values given by the sensus corporis and

124 Augustine is aware that with such readjustment of the allegorical roles of the figures

of Paradise, he is here breaking a venerable Christian tradition, as well as refining his own
previous position in Gn. adu. Man. trin. 12, 20 nec me fugit quosdam qui fuerunt ante nos egregii
defensores catholicae fidei et diuini eloquii tractatores cum in homine uno cuius uniuersam
animam bonam quendam paradisum esse senserunt duo ista requirerent, uirum mentem,
mulierem uero dixisse corporis sensum.
125 There is a reason for such a cumulative progress, claims Augustine (trin. 12, 15–16): nec

ad tam turpem et miserabilem fornicationem semel ab exordio prosiliret, sed sicut scriptum
est: qui modica spernit paulatim decidet. quomodo enim coluber non apertis passibus sed
squamarum minutissimis nisibus repit, sic lubricus deficiendi motus neglegentes minutatim
occupat.
126 trin. 12, 17 sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur; aeterna uero et incommutabilia

spiritalia ratione sapientiae intelleguntur. rationi autem scientiae appetitus uicinus est quan-
doquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur ratiocinatur ea quae scientia
dicitur actionis. Sorabji (2000, 374) seems to miss Augustine’s reconsiderations here, taking
Eve to represent “pleasure or appetite.”
230 chapter five

mediated through the ratio scientiae. Whereas mere pleasure in the thought
of a misjudged fruitio does not result in concrete action, the decision of the
higher part of reason does result in such action.127 Augustine wants to be
exact here: there is a noticeable and important difference between the two
kinds, or levels, of consent. A mere thought (sola cogitatio) that derives satis-
faction from “holding and fidgeting with pleasure” (tenens tamen et uoluens
libenter) things that should be rejected immediately is to be carefully distin-
guished from a decision to act according to such a thought.128 Nonetheless,
such a thought should also be counted as a sin; as sins, they are however, of a
much less (longe minus) serious character as those perpetrated in action.129
Some noteworthy aspects can be discerned in Augustine’s retouched
image of Adam and Eve in trin. 12. First, the heavy emphasis on temptations
as referring to mistaken judgments of value. So it is not the bodily and
sensual images as such that give rise to temptation, but a temptation occurs
only if these images are connected to a mistaken judgment of their inherent
value in producing happiness. In other words: Should the soul refer the

127 trin. 12, 17 cum ergo huic intentioni mentis quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus
propter actionis officium ratiocinandi uiuacitate uersatur carnalis ille sensus uel animalis
ingerit quandam inlecebram fruendi se, id est tamquam bono quodam priuato et proprio non
tamquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc uelut serpens allo-
quitur feminam. huic autem inlecebrae consentire de ligno prohibito manducare est. sed iste
consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris uero auctoritate consilii ita
membra retinentur ut non exhibeantur iniquitatis arma peccato, sic habendum existimo uelut
cibum uetitum mulier sola comederit. si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sen-
sum corporis sentiuntur ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum ut si potestas sit etiam corpore
compleatur, intellegenda est illa mulier dedisse uiro suo secum simul edendum inlicitum cibum.
neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suauiter uerum etiam efficaciter perpe-
trandum mente decerni nisi et illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in
opus mouendi uel ab opere cohibendi malae actioni cedat et seruiat.
128 Knuuttila (2004, 170) insists on the importance of immediacy in the action of the higher

part: “the suggestion is not a sin, nor is the incipient pleasure of cogitation, provided that it
is destroyed by the higher part as soon as it becomes aware of it.”
129 trin. 12, 18 nec sane cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur inlicitis, non quidem decer-

nens esse facienda, tenens tamen et uoluens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui
debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implen-
dum. et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus uenia petenda est pectusque percutiendum atque
dicendum dimitte nobis debita nostra [Mt 6,12], faciendumque quod sequitur atque in oratione
iungendum: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris. Augustine then strongly emphasises
the unity of the mind by abandoning the allegory of Adam and Eve and rejecting its appli-
cability even to the minute details: it would be a serious mistake to think that, as in Adam
and Eve’s case, the ratio scientiae and ratio sapientia each carry their own individual respon-
sibility in consenting or not consenting to the temptation. Even the “lighter” consent of only
taking pleasure in thoughts of something evil, is culpable for the whole person: haec quippe
una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 231

images of bodily senses to its own fruitio or should they be referred to God?
Should the bodily goods be pursued for oneself as private belongings, or
should their temporal existence be duly acknowledged and submitted to the
eternal true goods that cannot suffer from any loss or privation? And as an
answer: if the higher part of the ratio consents to a misguided calculation
of goals (officium ratiocinandi), and the body is used to perpetrate these
goals, a sin is at hand. The distinction of uti-frui has here been merged with
noticeable clarity into the psychological allegory of Adam and Eve, which
in Gen. adu. Man. was presented more in lines with a schematic Platonist
account of the soul, and used there as a crude polemical tool against the
Manichaean radical dualism.130
With this reassessment in the main function of the allegory, the roles of
the Genesis narrative have also been subjected to reconsideration. Eve is
no longer seen as simply representing the lower part of the soul, but the
active, non-contemplative part of reason. However, even in this function,
the Eve-part is still (as in Gn. adu. Man.) responsible for the contacts with
the sensible world, and in mediating them from the snake, that is, she
is active in processing irrational suggestions, which arise from the sense-
perceptions, to the higher, intellectual soul. Together with the emphasis of
temptation as a judgment of value, goes Augustine’s wish to clarify how the
distance is won between the bodily images and senses on the one hand,
and the contemplative reason, which holds as its natural object of vision
the immutable, eternal God, on the other hand.131 Crucial in this respect is
then the mediating role that ratio actionis has in submerging higher reason
into the servitude of triplex cupiditas:
[T]hus referring all its means to the following ends: curiosity, searching for
bodily and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, affect-
ing to be above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal
pleasure, plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool.132 [transl. Hill]
Thus, the role of cupiditas or concupiscentia in the psychological scheme
concerning Adam and Eve seems to have waned from its position that it
had for instance in Gn. adu. Man. Certain elements of the philosophical

130 trin. 12, 21.

131 Again, diverse concerns that could be labelled as both ‘Stoic’ (temptations as mistaken
judgments of value) and ‘Neoplatonic’ (how the higher, immutable intellect comes to touch
the sensible reality) thus merge in Augustine’s psychological views.
132 trin. 12, 14 omnia officia sua ad eos fines referens quibus curiose corporalia ac temporalia

per corporis sensus quaerit, aut tumido fastu aliis animis corporeis sensibus deditis esse affectat
excelsior, aut caenoso gurgite carnalis uoluptatis immergitur.
232 chapter five

traditions of emotions are conserved or developed further (e.g. the place and
nuances in the role of consent), but the role of concupiscentia, or cupiditas,
as explaining away the seemingly dualistic experience of reason versus the
bodily desires of the soul, has been watered down in trin. 12.
In discussing the various trinitarian structures in the sense perceptions
and memories, Augustine makes some interesting remarks on the emotions
and their ethical value that relate to their intensity and ability to either
bring out physical changes in the subject, or to create powerful distractions
in the mind.133 Overall, Augustine regularly makes negative judgments of a
soul that lives according to the exterior trinities (deformiter uiuit), attaching
mistaken values to bodily objects or to their recalled images (such a misap-
prehension is named turpis cupiditas, in opposition to laudabilis uoluntas,
which only “uses” external things), or of a soul that experiences too intense
(uiolenta, nimia) emotions through bodily senses.
At the level of the external sense perceptions (species corporis—imago
impressa—uoluntas animi), Augustine notes how the will to keep an exter-
nal bodily object in the hold of the senses (Augustine’s example here is sight)
may become so intense (uiolenta) that even the body may be changed and
affected by the act of perception (e.g. chameleons, pregnant mothers affect-
ing their foetuses by their libidines). Such an intense will is thus better called
amor, cupiditas, or libido.134
Proceeding to the level of the interior perceptions (the trinitarian struc-
ture is here formed of memoria, interna uisio and uoluntas), Augustine offers
examples of how the will may be entirely submerged into the realm of inte-
rior images, turning towards them with such a force that even reason (ipsa
ratio) cannot then discern between real or imagined objects. In these situ-
ations, people tend to be driven by such images as if they were in the midst
of those actions or emotions, sometimes with such a force that they may
exclaim something, or as in Augustine’s special example of a man who was
able to produce particularly vivid expressions of women:
I remember once hearing a man say that it was usual with him to see the
form of a woman’s body so vividly and as it were so solidly in his thoughts
(cogitando) that he would as good as feel himself copulating with her and
seed would even flow from his genitals.135 [transl. Hill]

133 These trinitarian structures are not the actual imago dei, as becomes clear in trin. 11, 8.

Even human sinful actions, however, have certain resemblances to God’s being.
134 trin. 11, 5. The behaviour of Jacob’s sheep (Gen 30, 37) is also cited as an example of this

phenomenon.
135 trin. 11, 7 et memini me audisse a quodam, quod tam expressam et quasi solidam speciem
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 233

Comparable to the occasions where the will forms the inner vision (acies
animi) with excessive force are situations in which the conscious will seems
to be overridden by dreams (in somnis per imagines ludimur), or by some
other inner confusion, which may take place during fits of madness, divina-
tion, or prophecy. In these cases, however, the inner vision of the soul is
driven by necessity (necessitate incurrat) to such images, and is therefore to
be carefully discerned from a voluntary submersion to interior imagery.
Augustine also makes some brief but important remarks on emotions
and their effect on the exterior or interior sense perceptions. First, it does
not matter whether the sensed or imagined object is connected to attrac-
tion or repulsion (cupiendo seu metuendo): in both cases, the will produces
an intention to watch the object with equal force (rapitur animus in ea
contuenda quae fugiat). Second, Augustine claims that the more intensive
(uehementior) the emotion is, be it either cupiditas or metus, the more clear
and detailed (expressius) is the acies animi that beholds the image.136
The digressive or accidental remarks in trin. on the emotions, and their
ethical value in general, or on desire in particular, thus show us a non-
polemical Augustine, either developing his own scriptural-psychological
allegories or making fine-tuned remarks on the interrelations between the

feminei corporis in cogitando cernere soleret, ut ei se quasi misceri sentiens, etiam genitalibus
flueret. Augustine takes this as evidence for the powers that the soul (anima) has over the
body, for it can in these occasions move the body and change its quality. The interaction
of body and soul, with a focus on emotions, is a topic that interested Augustine in Gn.
litt. 10 as well. Discerning between two different desires (based on Gal 5, 17), Augustine
points out how the fleshly concupiscence (the one Paul mentions in Gal 5, 17) is generated
by the soul (anima) but necessarily needs body (caro) for its material. carnem sine anima
concupiscere nihil posse puto quod omnis doctus indoctusque non dubitet. ac per hoc ipsius
concupiscentiae carnalis causa non est in anima sola, sed multo minus est in carne sola. ex
utroque enim fit: ex anima scilicet, quod sine illa delectatio nulla sentitur, ex carne autem, quod
sine illa carnalis delectatio non sentitur. Gn. litt. 10, 12, 20. A fleshly desire is thus denied
to be derived from the body alone; nor is the soul able to desire without any contact to
the body. “Fleshly desire” is a result from the interactive relationship of both. While the
flesh provides the soul with the material of desire, the actual emotion of concupiscentia is
felt as an enjoyment (delectatio) in the soul (anima). For Ambrose’s idea on concupiscentia
in the body-soul paradigm, see Ambr. Isaac 7, 60 ignorantia et concupiscentia animae sunt
aegritudines, sed ad speciem quam ad materiem magis referuntur. materia est caro, species
est ignorantia et concupiscentia. cur igitur caro accusatur, cum tantae sint in specie labes?
quia nihil species potest sine materia. denique nihil species securis sine materia facit. quid
enim esset concupiscentia, nisi eam caro inflammaret? This is built on Plotinian material
(En. 1, 1, 4; 1, 8, 8). For Ambrose’s knowledge of Plotinus, see Lennox-Conyngham 1993, 114–
119.
136 From these depictions, it is indeed clear that Augustine conceives emotions as “forms

of will,” or volitions. Knuuttila 2004, 159, 168.

234 chapter five

senses, memory and emotions as overdriven volitions. Again, these consid-

erations betray some influences of the traditional discourses of emotions
(e.g. the physical effects of emotions, and, more implicitly and suggestively,
the emphasis on the emotions as overdriven or overdone, or as voluntary
responses to mistakenly valued objects, resembling Stoic notions), but also
something of Augustine’s own philosophical capabilities.137 However, in the
course of the Pelagian debate, he was forced to have another, reflexive look
at what he conceived to be the mistakes of commonplace philosophical
psychology about the emotions in general, and about concupiscentia in par-
ticular. These reflections can be found in their sharpest form in ciu., and in
Augustine’s debate with Julian of Aeclanum.

5.3. Critical Reflections—De Ciuitate Dei

and the Debate with Julian of Aeclanum (410–430)

In the third and last section of this chapter, we will see Augustine at his most
sceptical towards the contribution of the traditional (or commonplace)
philosophical positions on the emotions in connection with concupiscen-
tia. It seems reasonable to presume that if Simpl. held a crucial position
in Augustine’s understanding of grace, this may have had some repercus-
sions for his way of using the traditional views of emotions and their therapy
as well. Did a stronger notion of grace affect Augustine’s emphasis on the
soul’s passions and their controllability? Did Augustine become critical of
certain facets of the old philosophical views of the emotions and their mod-
eration?138 What would be Augustine’s reaction if he would be opposed to a
philosophical analysis of his views of sexual concupiscentia? However, as we
have seen in the previous section, the evidence for such repercussions dur-
ing the decade following Simpl. remains at best inconclusive.139 Nonetheless,

137 For these Stoic notions, see Graver 2007, 38–41, 66–70.
138 Such a development has been argued by e.g. Wetzel 1992, 50–55, 98–111.
139 Simpl. as such does not betray any particular interest in desire in the framework of a

general theory of emotions; a more relevant question for Augustine in this work was about
cupiditas or concupiscentia and their role in Christian renewal and in interpretation of Rom
7. The only instance where Augustine’s discussion moves along the themes of emotions and
their quality in Simpl. is on the question of whether God is actually affected by anger or pity
in the same way as human beings are (Simpl. 2, 2, 2). Augustine’s answer can be succinctly
put as following: eodem uerbo non eodem modo. Only after human emotions are “distilled”
from their disturbed and temporal aspects, one can obtain a glimpse of what kind of states
of the divine mind are meant by the biblical phrases about God’s wrath, jealousy or pity.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 235

in this last section it will be argued that Augustine indeed had to consider
some modifications or adjustments in his use of psychological common-
places, the kind of which we have seen he used in his earlier works against
the Manichaeans. These adjustments, with a more direct criticism towards
the philosophical schools on the matter of the emotions in general, and con-
cupiscentia in particular, came somewhat late, however, in connection with
the Pelagian crisis.
So far, we have seen how Augustine appropriated certain commonplace
elements of traditional philosophical psychology into his theological cam-
paigns, mainly against the Manichaeans. The Platonist insights into the soul
and its parts had shown Augustine how to include even subrational desires
into the created human constitution. Together with the Stoic emphasis on
the sovereignty of reason over emotions, with consent marking the limits
of moral responsibility, these insights were all an effective part of Augus-
tine’s reformulations against his previous radically dualistic and fatalistic
psychological views. To complete this account, it is therefore time to see
how Augustine was also able to be critical of the mainstream philosoph-
ical views. For that, we shall first turn to Augustine’s most extensive and
comprehensive discussions of the traditional theories of emotions, in con-
nection with his insights into evil desire. These can be found in his magnum
opus, de ciuitate dei, mainly in Books 9 and 14. We will then select some
points of argument from the debate between Augustine and Julian that con-
cern concupiscentia, emotions and the representatives of the philosophical
traditions.

5.3.1. De Ciuitate Dei 9 and 14

The larger setting of Augustine’s goals in his discussion of emotions in de
ciuitate dei 9 could be reduced to very basic propositions such as to worship
demons and to use them as intermediaries between the gods and men
is foolishness, or to think that a virtuous life could be achieved without
divine aid is a mistaken ethical standpoint. Thus, Augustine’s theological
deconstruction starts with an argument by which he shows that the demons
are unable to use virtue to overpower their emotions, and therefore such
spirits are not in any reasonable way worthy of people’s worship.140 No
creatures, be they demons or anything else, can work as mediators between

140 ciu. 9, 3.
236 chapter five

men and God. This leads Augustine to confirm that there is, however, one
real mediator, the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ.141
With such theological points, Augustine starts ciu. 9. These specifically
apologetic and Christian, basic tenets underlie Augustine’s discussion of
the emotions in ciu. 9; and while it is relatively easy to point out Augus-
tine’s simple strategic aims in ciu. in connection to the role and importance
of the pagan philosophical traditions, it is easy to get implicated into, and
thus put too much weight on, the clever tactical moves by which Augus-
tine proceeds in his considerations of the philosophical schools. The main
function of these considerations is to commend and to end with the goal
and contents of the Christian way of life, and not to present detached and
balanced philosophical inquiries as such.142 It is therefore crucial to notice
how Augustine’s discussion of the philosophical traditions of the emotions
is embedded into this larger context of the correct object of worship, the
goal of the virtuous life and the possibility (of which Augustine is explicitly
sceptical in ciu.) of reaching such a way of life with the assistance of pagan
philosophy.143
Within the context of emotions, Augustine pursues his strategy by creat-
ing the effect of the uselessness of all philosophical schools alike in achiev-
ing virtuous life, and combines therefore artificially the conflicting views
of emotions in these traditions. Then he argues that none of the schools is
able to teach or achieve control of the affectional impulses in this life, and
thereby lead people into a happy life. In the course of argument, Augustine
represents all humankind (Stoics and Platonists and Peripatetics included)
sharing with the unhappy demons the inability to help their disturbed states
of mind. The solution Augustine offers in ciu. 14 is already pointed at in ciu.
9—only Christians are able to put their emotions to constructive uses.144 As
it seems impossible to eliminate emotions from this life, Augustine offers

141 Augustine returns to this theological starting point in the last sections of ciu. 9, where

he makes the comparison between these two kinds of mediators in terms of pride and
humility: demons in their emotional upheavals are proud enough to expect divine honours
to be given to them, while Christ is the only lowly and humble mediator between God and
men.
142 ciu. 9, 15; 9, 17.
143 It is not intended here that Augustine would have treated the philosophical schools as

unable to offer constructive aid to anyone due to their impractical and theoretical nature,
and that only the Christian faith was practically oriented to overcoming difficulties in moral
behaviour. For Augustine, too, philosophical traditions were “ways of life,” but they were
mistaken in their basic premises about God and virtue. See Hadot 1993, 1995, 2002.
144 ciu. 9, 5.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 237

another solution: one has to receive the right kind of “reason,” or “attitude,”
or love, which directs the emotions into an ordered and reasonable contri-
bution in the progress towards happy life.145
Let us examine closer how Augustine tactically reaches his strategic ends.
As a prelude to a more serious discussion of the schools and their con-
flicts, he chooses Apuleius’ account of the gods and daemones (Apul. de deo
Socratis 12) to represent a Platonic case concerning the difference between
the gods and the lower spirits.146 The Platonici have been Augustine’s part-
ners in dialogue in his previous books and they will continue to be so
in ciu. 9.147 Soon enough, Augustine is led to inquire about the nature of
the emotional life of the demons by Apuleius’ somewhat lyrical notion of
the demons and their “minds being tossed upon a heaving sea by all their
thoughts.”148 With relish, Augustine points out that the demons must be mis-
erable creatures indeed, for not only the inferior parts of their souls are dis-
turbed by emotions, but also their very minds (mens) are in turbulent states.
Augustine then compares these creatures to wise men (homines sapientes)
who are able to resist such disturbances with untroubled minds.149 Or are
they? This episode works as Augustine’s lead to test the more serious ideas,
conceived by Stoics and the other schools, of control over the emotions. The
wise man, or the Stoic sapiens, represents the test case, for if he fails, then no

145 In his well-known phrase, Augustine refers to these affects as “wills” (uoluntates, ciu.

14, 6), but these dynamic movements of the soul are ordered, and directed by the singular
will, caritas. For evaluations of Augustine’s aims in his discussion of emotions in ciu. see
Wetzel 1992, 98–111; Brachtendorf 1997. Sorabji (2000, 380–384) concentrates more on how
Augustine misinterpreted the Stoic tradition and less on Augustine’s own intentions in doing
so. Knuuttila (2004, 153–162) is also rather economical in speculating Augustine’s motives for
his tendentious representation of the Stoics in ciu. 9.
146 Why Apuleius? Augustine certainly knew about the more reputed Neoplatonist philo-

sophers. Perhaps it was Apuleius’ “vague psychological terminology” (O’Daly 1999, 119) that
offered Augustine a useful starting point in his critique of the philosophical traditions of emo-
tions, and ultimately, in pointing out their uselessness in reaching beata uita. Augustine’s
manoeuvre is thus understandable, but of course, “unfair” (ibid.). O’Donnell (1980) suggests
another reason, similarly related to apologetic concerns: Apuleius was a popular read in
those philosophical circles with which Marcellinus was acquainted, and worried about (ep.
136, 1), and thus gave Augustine a reason to direct his criticism against this author.
147 ciu. 9, 1 Platonici […] praecipui philosophorum ac nobilissimi […] cum quibus uelut cum

excellentioribus placuit istam examinare quaestionem.

148 ciu. 9, 3. Discussion with Apuleius had commenced already in the previous book, ciu.

8, 14–18, on the passions of the demons.

149 ciu. 9, 3 ut ne hominibus quidem sapientibus comparandi sint, qui huius modi perturba-

tionibus animorum, a quibus humana non est inmunis infirmitas, etiam cum eas huius uitae
condicione patiuntur, mente inperturbata resistunt, non eis cedentes ad aliquid adprobandum
uel perpetrandum, quod exorbitet ab itinere sapientiae et lege iustitiae.
238 chapter five

other candidates can be found. Again, Augustine provides his audience with
an entertaining philosophical anecdote, this time from Aulus Gellius (noct.
Att. 19, 1). Augustine’s tendentious use of Gellius’ report has been noted on
several occasions, and there is no need for any further detailed analyses of
the discrepancies between Augustine’s and Gellius’ reports here.150 A sim-
ple comparison of terminology, following the outline of Richard Sorabji can
however be presented as follows:

AULUS GELLIUS (Noct. Att. 19, 1) AUGUSTINE (ciu. 9, 4)

α) hominem conspicimus pavidum et α) ui timoris expalluit
exterritum
β) “quid hoc est,” inquit “o philosophe, β) diues luxuriosus […] inludens, quod
quod, cum in periculis essemus, ti- extimuisset atque palluisset
muisti tu et palluisti? ego neque timui
neque pallui.” “si quid ego” inquit “in
tanta violentia tempestatum videor
paulum pavefactus, non tu istius rei
ratione audienda dignus es.”
γ) quaenam illa ratio esset pavoris sui γ) quaenam illa ratio esset pauoris sui
δ) quid super isto brevi quidem, sed δ)
necessario et naturali pavore maiores
nostri, conditores sectae Stoicae, sen-
serint
ε) sapientis quoque animum paulisper ε) animi uisa […] necesse est etiam
moveri et contrahi et pallescere neces- sapientis animum moueant, ita ut pau-
sum est non opinione alicuius mali lisper uel pauescat metu, uel tristi-
praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus ra- tia contrahatur, tamquam his passion-
pidis et inconsultis officium mentis ibus praeuenientibus mentis et ratio-
atque rationis praevertentibus. nis officium; nec ideo tamen in mente
fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari
ista eisque consentiri.
ζ) ζ) ita illud periculum perhorresceret,
ut palloris etiam testimonio prodere-
tur. uerum tamen et illam poterat per-
motionem pati, et fixam tenere mente
sententiam,

150 The story appears also in qu. 1, 30. For the discrepancies between Gellius and Augustine,

see Brachtendorf 1997, 297–300; Sorabji 2000, 372–384; Knuuttila, 153–155. For a minimalist
suggestion of Augustine’s knowledge of Gellius’ work, consult O’Donnell 1980, who thinks
that Augustine even used some type of intermediary florilegium in his treatment of Gellius.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 239

AULUS GELLIUS (Noct. Att. 19, 1) AUGUSTINE (ciu. 9, 4)

η) rebus forte id genus, quibus dixi, η) non minus Stoicus quam Peripateti-
obortis pavescere sensim et quasi albe- cus pauescat et palleat, ea non aequa-
scere non insipientis esse hominis ne- liter appellando, sed aequaliter aesti-
que ignavi putemus et in eo tamen mando?
brevi motu naturali magis infirmitati
cedamus, quam quod esse ea, qualia
visa sunt, censeamus.
θ) θ) ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia,
nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt
inferioribus animi partibus, in se con-
tra rationem praeualere permittit; quin
immo eis ipsa dominatur eisque non
consentiendo et potius resistendo reg-
num uirtutis exercet.

The phrases in roman show how Augustine faithfully renders parts of Gel-
lius’ terminology.151 The original Stoic terminology, which kept the first
movements, or prepassions, strictly separate from the actual emotions, had
already become muddled in Gellius’ report, and this suits Augustine’s pur-
poses well. The phrases in bold are examples of Augustine going even fur-
ther in making futile the crucial differences between the Stoic, Platonist, and
the Peripatetic views of emotions.152 Gellius’ report, in fact, serves Augus-
tine’s purposes so well that the choice of the source seems hardly coinci-
dental so as to betray mere innocent ignorance on Augustine’s part.153 On
the contrary, with Gellius’ report, Augustine is able to show that the ancient
schools were splitting hairs on a problem they were essentially in agree-
ment: one should control one’s emotions “in the lower parts of the soul” in
order to a achieve happy life in this life on one’s own, without God’s help.154
According to Augustine, this is a serious mistake.

151 As Sorabji (2000, 375) has pointed out, even Gellius’ terminology is essentially mistaken.
152 For Augustine’s take on the Peripatetic views, Knuuttila (2004, 155) notes: “Augustine
apparently did not have any clear picture of the Aristotelian theory; he assumed that it did
not differ significantly from the Platonic view.”
153 Brachtendorf (1997, 298 n. 32) argues that Augustine’s way of interpreting the Stoic

commoda and the Platonic bona is part of his larger strategy and analogical to his way of
conflating the Stoic view on prepassions and the Platonic model of the parts of the soul.
Thus, Brachtendorf also thinks that Augustine’s alterations are deliberate and designed for
his larger scale purposes in ciu.
154 ciu. 9, 4 ita mens, ubi fixa est ista sententia, nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt

inferioribus animi partibus. Augustine’s final conclusion on his discussion here reveals his
Platonic preference over Stoic psychology.
240 chapter five

Remarkably, Augustine takes Gellius’ account further by claiming that

some passions briefly by-pass (passionibus […] paulisper praeuenientibus)
the controlling function of the mind, thus affecting a short period during
which even the soul of the wise necessarily and unavoidably grows pale
with fear and is contracted by sadness (Augustine uses here the terms of
the actual emotions). This is much more than what is said in Gellius’ orig-
inal report, according to which the Stoic view is paraphrased as “the soul
moving, contracting and growing pale […] by certain rapid and unsolicited
movements, which happen before the function of mind and reason.”155 With
these moves, Augustine has deliberately misrepresented certain points of
the Stoic theory, and subsequently dismissed it together with other theo-
ries. Augustine is not interested in (in his view) the secondary differences
in these theories of the quality of the preceding movements; instead, he
wishes to oppose these pagan visions of attaining the virtuous life by pre-
senting his own Christian understanding of emotions and their relation
to a good life. Thus, in the next period, we see Augustine establishing
this understanding by accentuating the “righteous use” of emotions under
the governance of mind and God. Augustine’s point of view is emphati-
cally Christian, and he here stresses the difference between the Christian
and pagan solution to the problem of emotions, and hence, to a happy
life.
Within our discipline, then, we do not so much ask whether a pious soul is
angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but whence comes his
sadness; not whether he is afraid, but what he fears.156
[transl. Dyson, italics mine]
Formally, Augustine’s solution resembles that of the Platonic model; what is
added, is his idea of the supernaturally given motivation in the moderation
and “righteous use” of the passions.157
In ciu. 9, Augustine analyses the passions and the theories of emotions as
a whole, and he does not feel the need to pursue his investigation to include
the considerations of individual emotions, such as desire. However, Augus-

155 Sorabji 2000, 378.

156 ciu. 9, 5 non est nunc necesse copiose ac diligenter ostendere, quid de istis passionibus
doceat scriptura diuina, qua christiana eruditio continetur. deo quippe illa ipsam mentem
subicit regendam et iuuandam mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas, ut in
usum iustitiae conuertantur. denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus
irascatur, sed quare irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed
quid timeat.
157 See Knuuttila 2004, 160–161.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 241

tine returns to the theories of emotions in ciu. 14, and provides yet another,
fuller account of his understanding of the philosophical theories of emo-
tions, of their lesser value and of their shortcomings as compared to his own
Christian version. In this discussion, Augustine uses a particular emotion to
highlight his argument of the corrupted human emotions, whose control
and moderation is impossible with the aid offered by the philosophical dis-
courses; for it seems to him, that certain movements of the lower part of the
soul are even capable of violently rapturing the mind’s consent, and their
moderation requires something else than is given by the schools. For such
a raptured consent, Augustine offers the special example of sexual desire
(concupiscentia carnis).
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the focus in ciu. 14 is uncompromisingly
theological. Augustine describes the first sin as a deliberate abandonment
of God and His good will, and as the ultimate act of the pride of humanity
to live its life “on its own.” In course of the argument of ciu. 14, concerning
emotions in general and libido, or concupiscentia, in particular, Augustine
anticipates his critique of the ancient philosophical traditions of the virtues
in later books. These traditions, albeit having found some fundamental
truths concerning God, creation and humankind, have never understood
the incarnation of Christ or divine grace. The book starts with Augustine’s
definitions of caro and spiritus. He thereby charts the way in which the Bible
uses these words: ‘flesh’ denotes both the human body and the mind, when
they are both in opposition to God’s will.158 To live ‘according to the flesh’
is ultimately a sign of belonging to ciuitas terrena, or ciuitas diaboli. As for
the opposite, to live according to the spirit is to live according to God’s will,
and to let the basic attitude of love (caritas) direct one’s mind and actions.
People living according to the spirit are also by definition members of the
City of God.
In such a context, Augustine returns to the discussion of emotions where
he left in ciu. 9, 5:
What is important here is the quality of man’s will. For if the will is perverse,
the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will be not
only blameless, but praiseworthy.159 [transl. Dyson]

158 See Mayer 1986. For a developmental account of Augustine’s theology of the body, see

Miles 1994, 6–20. For the Christian attitudes toward the body, see also the material collected
in Courcelle 1965.
159 ciu. 14, 6 interest autem qualis sit uoluntas hominis; quia si peruersa est, peruersos habebit

hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, uerum etiam laudabiles erunt.
242 chapter five

Once more, Augustine opposes his Christian view of the emotions to

that of the “philosophers,” claiming that because the right basic attitude of
Christians is “righteous,” their emotions are all righteous as well.160 Augus-
tine then gives several examples of such rightly ordered Christian emotions.
These are grouped according to three different categories: first, Christians
may have just emotions in relation to their eternal destiny; second, accept-
able emotions arise in relation to sin and good works; and third, Scripture
commends the good emotions that arise in the time of temptation. Johannes
Brachtendorf has called these emotions “second-order passions,” for they
seem all to be “reactions to sin, i.e. reactions to the victory of first-order pas-
sions.”161 This may be true for many examples that Augustine has to offer,
but not necessarily for all of them: it is hard to see why the emotions aris-
ing from, for example, good works should be counted as second-order pas-
sions.162
Augustine emphasises that the Christian version of passions are not
meant to serve individual purposes and happiness only: the emotions are, so
to speak, communal.163 The epitome of such communal Christian emotions
was the apostle Paul, to whom Augustine dedicates a rather long sequence
of eulogy in ciu. 14, 9.

160 ciu. 14, 9 uerum his philosophis, quod ad istam quaestionem de animi perturbationibus

adtinet, iam respondimus in nono huius operis libro, ostendentes eos non tam de rebus, quam
de uerbis cupidiores esse contentionis quam ueritatis. apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas
sanamque doctrinam ciues sanctae ciuitatis dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum deum
uiuentes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes
affectiones rectas habent.
161 Brachtendorf 1997, 301.
162 ciu. 14, 9 ut gaudeant in operibus bonis, audiunt: hilarem datorem diligit deus.
163 ciu. 14, 9 non solum autem propter se ipsos his mouentur affectibus, uerum etiam propter

eos, quos liberari cupiunt et ne pereant metuunt, et dolent si pereunt et gaudent si liberantur. In
a sermon dating after ca. 419, Augustine centres Christian affective responses around Christ,
with a heavily critical stance against the Stoic ideal of apathy (described as stupor). Io. eu. tr.
60, 3 pereant argumenta philosophorum, qui negant in sapientem cadere perturbationes ani-
morum. stultam fecit deus sapientiam huius mundi; et dominus nouit cogitationes hominum,
quoniam uanae sunt. turbetur plane animus christianus, non miseria, sed misericordia; timeat
ne pereant homines Christo, contristetur cum perit aliquis Christo; concupiscat adquiri homines
Christo, laetetur cum adquiruntur homines Christo; timeat et sibi ne pereat Christo, contristetur
peregrinari se a Christo; concupiscat regnare cum Christo, laetetur dum sperat se regnaturum
esse cum Christo. istae sunt certe quatuor quas perturbationes uocant, timor et tristitia, amor
et laetitia. habeant eas iustis de causis animi christiani, nec philosophorum Stoicorum, uel quo-
rumcumque similium consentiatur errori; qui profecto quemadmodum uanitatem existimant
ueritatem, sic stuporem deputant sanitatem, ignorantes sic hominis animum, quemadmodum
corporis membrum, desperatius aegrotare, quando et doloris amiserit sensum.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 243

Accordingly, concrete examples of rightly ordered Christian emotions

occur in the Bible. But they can also be defined in more general terms
as being “exhibited in the proper circumstances” (ubi oportet adhibentur),
and being “consequences of right reason” (rectam rationem sequantur).164
Augustine formulates yet another qualification of virtuous emotions, but
finds this to be fully manifested only in Christ: for He only has been able to
accept an emotion to take place in the mind “when He so willed.”165 When it
comes to the Christians, however, even the acceptable emotions are more
ambiguous, and they may take place in the mind against one’s will.166 Even
so, these types of emotions are signs of humanity, and should not be thought
as something to be completely eradicated. Augustine condemns the ideal of
apatheia as insensitivity.167
In his concluding general remarks on emotions in ciu. 14, 9, Augustine
returns to his fundamental division between ciuitas dei and ciuitas impio-
rum. Augustine has exposed his own theory of the Christian emotions as
a critique of other views of emotions, be they either unreflected or more
elaborately philosophical. The representatives of these competing views
he now labels either as “convulsed by the emotions as if by diseases and
upheavals” or, referring to a more reflective attitude to emotions, as people
who “seem to control and in some way temper those emotions, they are […]
proud and elated in their impiety.” The Stoic representatives of apatheia are

164 ciu. 14, 9.

165 ciu. 14, 9 nullum habens omnino peccatum adhibuit eas, ubi adhibendas esse iudicauit
[…] ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita cum uoluit suscepit animo humano.
166 ciu. 14, 9 etiam cum rectas et secundum deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae

sunt, non illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus. itaque aliquando,
quamuis non culpabili cupiditate, sed laudabili caritate moueamur, etiam dum nolumus fle-
mus.
167 The term ‘eradication’ surfaces in the debate with Julian. This term appears only

briefly in c. Iul. 4, 8, where Julian had pointed out to Augustine that if concupiscentia
carnis, or calor genitalis in Julian’s diction really is evil by nature, it should be eradicated
(extirpandus), not “quieted” (componendus). Julian knew of methods by which overheated
male libido may be moderated: music, particularly in spondaic rhythm, is a good way of
acquiescing libido. Julian quotes here a well-known story, handed down by e.g. Cicero. c. Iul.
5, 23. Similar non-cognitive therapies were described by several philosophers in the various
schools. Sorabji 2000, 81–91, 405–406. Augustine provides a standard reply: concupiscentia is
an unavoidable evil that has to be suffered in this life. This is, by the way, one of the rare
instances in Augustine’s corpus where the word extirpare occurs in relation to emotions,
and concupiscentia. The initiative, in addition, came from Julian’s side. Generally, Augustine
only uses extirpare or eradicare in the biblically coloured context of one’s basic motives, or
attitudes, of cupiditas or caritas. The former should be “eradicated,” while the other should
be “implanted.”
244 chapter five

characterised as “so entranced by their own self-restraint that they are not
stirred or excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all.”168
Having thus depicted the philosophical traditions of emotions in a
polemical way that serves well his larger purposes in ciu., Augustine moves
on to discuss some biblical evidence of emotions (especially passages con-
cerning the origin of sin). By doing this, he is gradually able to focus on
a special case of emotion which he thinks exemplifies the way in which
even the most involuntary emotional impulse (to the degree of being actu-
ally a punishment), may serve righteous purposes in the life of a Christian,
and a Christian only. Augustine’s analysis of emotions is intervened by a
discussion on how and why, in fact, the human soul became corrupted
and disordered in Paradise (ciu. 14, 10–15). After this theological discussion,
Augustine proceeds to treat the problem of sexual desire.169 Augustine uses
sexual desire (libido) as an extreme example of the disordered emotional
responses in this life. It is important to remember that Augustine’s discus-
sion of libido in ciu. 14 is tightly woven into the more theological context
of it being a corresponding punishment for the first self-centred movement
of the will in Paradise. This theological framework tones and directs every-
thing Augustine has to say about libido in ciu. 14. While certain elements of
both the Stoic and Platonic traditions are used in Augustine’s discussion in a
commune bonum fashion, his main concern is to show the inadequacy and
the erroneous goals of the ancient therapies. Augustine pursues this con-
cern by emphasising the disordered state of sexual desire as opposed to the
Golden Age means of conception in Paradise (which entailed a complete
and tranquil voluntary control of the sexual organs); by studying the iron
grip of the disordered libido even in the legitimate contexts of (Christian)
marriage; and by treating sexual shame as providing an obvious testimony
for the detachment of libido from the voluntary control of the body.
Augustine therefore describes libido as the most disordered of all emo-
tions.170 While libido affects a strong bodily pleasure, its influence on the
mind is equally serious, and the whole person is moved by the joint affect
and appetite of both the body and the soul. During the climax of libido, the
ability of the mind to focus (acies cogitationis) on anything else becomes
nearly impossible.171

168 ciu. 14, 9.

169 For Augustine’s discussion on obedience, disobedience and its just punishment, see
Chapter 3.
170 By libido with no specifying attributes, Augustine denotes sexual desire (see Chapter 2).
171 ciu. 14, 16.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 245

Augustine mentions several times the extreme disjunction between

libido and rational will. In other words, there are times when there seems
to be no connection between the dual effects of libido on the body and the
mind: libido may stir one’s body without any incitations of the soul; on the
other hand, libido may “burn in the mind,” but “grow cold in the body.” Thus
libido may even contradict its own agitations.172
Subscribing to the Platonic view of three parts of the soul, Augustine
claims that the two lower parts were not corrupted before the Fall. How-
ever, due to the Fall, these two parts became in constant need of rational
moderation and control, and reason should therefore direct them into good
uses: anger, or the spirited part, is needed in “just coercion” and libido, or
the desiring part, is used for the reproduction of children. In this life, even
Christians (qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt) have to control and curb
these impulsive parts of their souls. However, there lies a crucial difference
between ira and libido. Whereas anger produces voluntary movements of
the body (angry words, or even punches), the actual effects of libido remain
involuntary even in the area of bodily movements. This is because “the sex-
ual organs have somehow fallen so completely under the sway of lust that
they have no power of movement at all if this passion is absent […] it is this
that makes us ashamed.”173 The shame and disorder of libido lies in that it
practically bypasses the higher functions of the soul, and snatches (eripuit)
away what should be under the will’s control.174 The “natural order” of things
dictates that the soul should be in control of its own lower parts; at least
it should have control over all bodily movements. Both of these kinds of
control of the soul fail under the influence of sexual desire, which there-
fore for Augustine represents the extreme case of emotional disorder in our
fallen world.175 Even the Christians, high above all philosophically oriented

172 ciu. 14, 16.

173 ciu. 14, 19 opera libidinis, quae fiunt genitalibus membris, quid causae est, nisi quia in
ceteris membra corporis non ipsae affectiones, sed, cum eis consenserit, uoluntas mouet, quae
in usu eorum omnino dominatur? nam quisquis uerbum emittit iratus uel etiam quemquam per-
cutit, non posset hoc facere, nisi lingua et manus iubente quodam modo uoluntate mouerentur;
quae membra, etiam cum ira nulla est, mouentur eadem uoluntate. at uero genitales corporis
partes ita libido suo iuri quodam modo mancipauit, ut moueri non ualeant, si ipsa defuerit.
174 ciu. 14, 20 in eius quippe inoboedientia, quae genitalia corporis membra solis suis motibus

subdidit et potestati uoluntatis eripuit.

175 ciu. 14, 23 et utique ordine naturali animus anteponitur corpori, et tamen ipse animus

imperat corpori facilius quam sibi. uerum tamen haec libido, de qua nunc disserimus, eo magis
erubescenda extitit, quod animus in ea nec sibi efficaciter imperat, ut omnino non libeat, nec
omni modo corpori, ut pudenda membra uoluntas potius quam libido commoueat.
246 chapter five

aspirations to control emotions, have to confess now and then that they are
overcome by the suggestions of libido (but only in a rather restricted sense).
Augustine notes that in all other emotional states the struggle is felt only
inside the soul, and even though the lower parts would achieve victory over
the higher part, the strife would remain internal, “for it is then conquered
only by itself, and so is itself still the victor.”176 This is not so in the case of
sexual desire, where the movements of the body seem to overrule the higher
control of the soul.
In discussing emotions in general and sexual desire in particular, Augus-
tine is prone to emphasise the way they influence the members of the City
of God, i.e. Christians.177 These people are inevitably affected by emotions,
and sometimes even by disordered emotions, of which libido represents the
extreme case. The citizens of ciuitas dei are, however, able to use even libido
for good purposes, that is, for the procreation of new members to the City.178
Moreover, their struggle against disordered emotions is itself ordered; in
other words, it does not lead the members of the City of God into even more
damaging attitudes of pride and illusory views of one’s independency in a
supposed control over emotional impulses.
On the other hand, the members of ciuitas terrena are once more seen as
prey to their impious impulses. The most serious forms of opposition to God
are noted in the end of ciu. 14, where Augustine sums up the two different
qualities of the two cities as follows:
In the Earthly City, princes are as much mastered by their lust for mastery
(dominandi libido dominatur) as the nations which they subdue are by them
[…] the city loves its own strength (diligit uirtutem suam) as displayed in its
mighty men […] Thus, in the Earthly City, its wise men, who live according
to man, have pursued the goods of the body or of their own mind, or both
[…] Professing themselves to be wise (that is, exalting themselves in their
wisdom, under the dominion of pride, dominante sibi superbia in sua sapientia
sese extollentes), they became fools.179 [transl. Dyson]
Augustine thus sees both the secular powers of ciuitas terrena and its cul-
tural values and representatives as having failed in their different projects
of attempting to reach control, either over social communities or over the

176 ciu. 14, 23.

177 ciu. 14, 19 ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen
cohibendo et repugnando modificantur.
178 ciu. 14, 16. To use evil things for good purposes is, in fact, characteristic of God’s works,

ciu. 14, 27.

179 ciu. 14, 28.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 247

mind and body. The meandering discussions of emotions in ciu. 9 and 14

have one very particular end: this end is not to show how close to the truth
the ancient philosophical traditions have come, but rather, how they have
failed in their attempts in reaching virtuous life, wisdom and God.180 The
reasoning is similar enough in the main argument later in ciu. 19, where
Augustine discusses the connection between the rightly ordered soul and
the rightly ordered communities. Only when people adjust their loves and
lives according to God’s will they become able to pursue a right and just
order in their souls, in their families and in their public lives. Augustine
denies this to be possible for anyone but Christians, albeit non-Christians
may form communities based on their shared convictions on what to love
and pursue.181 In ciu. 19, 4, Augustine discusses the cardinal virtues in relation
to the old philosophical schools, and denies that any of these virtues can be
achieved or practised without the Christian faith. Augustine sums it all up in
ciu. 19, 27 by asserting that only Christians are efficiently able to resist vices,
and even they do it with difficulty.182
The special and rather distinctively Augustinian exposition of the sex-
ual libido is one part of his tactics to illustrate how the emotional disorder
of fallen humankind cannot be in any way reinstated and put to good use
except in the Christian context of “holy matrimony” and in a “wise and pious
style of life.” Outside the City of God, libido either drives people to a des-
perate hunt of pleasure or to a doomed attempt at self-control, which may
appear as successful on the level of reining in the wild, involuntary incita-
tions of libido, but necessarily leads to pride and self-deception without the
right wisdom, namely the Christian pietas.183 In ciu. 14, sexual desire, situated
in a familiar scheme of the traditional discussions of emotions, is therefore
given some extra potency in order to highlight Augustine’s major apologetic
and theological goals. Augustine is driven by a need to show that the philo-
sophical therapies of emotions are essentially similar, and also similar in
their inadequacy; even the renewed, and supernaturally motivated Chris-
tian community finds it hard or even impossible to gain full control over
the emotional impulses in this life. Libido in ciu. 9 and 14 can therefore be
seen as a psychologically treated proof for theological realities, which are
awaiting their outcome in future life.

180 See ciu. 19, 21; 19, 23–24. See also ciu. 22, 23.
181 See ciu. 19, 21; 19, 23–24.
182 See also ciu. 22, 23.
183 ciu. 14, 28.
248 chapter five

5.3.2. Critical Encounters with Philosophy, Emotions,

and Christian Psychology in the Debate with Julian of Aeclanum
The last major discussions on concupiscentia in the context of the ancient
philosophical traditions of the emotions can be found in Augustine’s debate
with Julian.184 Due to the nature of the debate, the insights presented by
Augustine have an air of being piecemeal discussions of various techni-
cal subjects. The seemingly fragmentary notions do, however, confirm the
undercurrent found in ciu.: that is, Augustine finds some use for the philo-
sophical notions of concupiscentia, but remains quite critical of what he
conceives as the pagan option in dealing with the causes and origins of the
problem of concupiscentia. At the same time, Augustine does seldom miss
an opportunity to remind us of the correct context of conceiving the role
and status of concupiscentia, i.e. Christian renewal after baptism (see fur-
ther Chapter 6). The emphasis on sexual desire, peculiar as it may seem
to modern tastes, returns to theological reasons: the overwhelmingly, even
compellingly strong sexual desires cannot be overcome using pagan (or
Pelagian, for that matter) insights, as they are hardly composed even by
Catholic Christians, who are, after all, aided by God’s grace.

Is Concupiscentia an Emotional Quality?

A brief discussion between Julian and Augustine on concupiscentia as an
“emotional quality” (affectionalis qualitas) occurs in c. Iul. 6, 53–56.185 Julian
had read from nupt. et conc. 1, 28 Augustine’s remark on concupiscentia
as being an “affection of evil quality” (affectio malae qualitatis).186 This has

184 Augustine’s final, voluminous debates with Julian have been studied from the view-

point of the philosophical traditions of emotions by Sorabji 2000, 400–417 (excluding dreams
and consent); and Lössl 2002, writing on Julian’s conception of pain. Sorabji takes an openly
critical stance against Augustine and finds Julian’s positions on the emotions more convinc-
ing than those of Augustine’s. Sorabji 2000, 416: “Julian won the philosophical, but Augustine
the political, battle.” Cf. Rist 1994, 327, for Julian’s critique of Augustine’s views of sex: “Julian’s
failure was precisely as a philosopher.” Lössl (2002, 203–207) is more modest in judgment,
advocating rather a fair treatment of Julian’s philosophical and theological positions. Cf.,
however, Lössl’s (2002, 242) concluding remarks: “Even though Julian ostensibly stressed that
the claims of medicine were much more limited than Augustine assumed, what he in fact
proposed was a theological explanation and justification of natural philosophical and scien-
tific research in its own right. In doing so he may not have solved once and for all the question
concerning the nature and causes of pain, but some of his suggestions have stood the test of
time remarkably well.”
185 Mentioned later by Augustine in c. Iul. imp. 1, 105.
186 nupt. et conc. 1, 28 non enim substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus,

sed affectio est quaedam malae qualitatis, sicut languor. Augustine seems to be somewhat
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 249

led Julian to ask what exactly Augustine had meant by such a definition.
Julian’s inquiry is based on Aristotle’s definitions of inherent emotional
qualities (the third class of qualities, παθητικαὶ ποιότητες) in Cat. 8b–9b
(Bekker), where permanent affectional qualities are separated from the
transient emotional states of the body and soul.187 In Aristotle’s exposition,
an affection of the body, such as becoming pale, should therefore be dis-
tinguished from an affectional quality, such as being pallid, for the latter
kind of quality is “difficult to remove, or [it] indeed remain[s] throughout
life.” Concerning the soul, Aristotle had mentioned as examples of affec-
tive qualities, insanity, and irascibility, that is, such various states of the
soul, with which one is born. Furthermore, such states of the soul which
have resulted from causes that are “difficult to remove, or altogether per-
manent,” are also affective qualities of the soul. These differ from proper
affections, such as losing temper (in contrast to the quality of irascibili-
ty).
Julian seems to have made two comments based on Aristotle’s account.188
First, if concupiscentia is affectio malae qualitatis, as Augustine had claimed,
it cannot have such necessitating and irremovable features as Augustine
had given it. Affectio (or πάθος) is by definition “coming and going” (accedens
recedens). But if, as it seems, Augustine intended to view concupiscentia as
affectionalis qualitas, then he should acknowledge its inherent and perma-
nent created value as something good.189

irritated by Julian’s lengthy remarks about what he himself considered to be of secondary

importance: quod uero te libuit tam multum de qualitatum differentia disputare, quia ego semel
nominaui qualitatem, c. Iul. 6, 53.
187 Lamberigts (2008, 257–258) suspects that Julian did not have direct access to Aristotle,

but used “a summary as one might find in a handbook of philosophy.”

188 Iulian. A. c. Iul. 6, 55 tertia species qualitatis est, inquis, affectio et affectionalis quali-

tas. affectio autem in qualitate ob hoc ponitur, ais, quia principium qualitatum est; cui etiam
reputantur ad momentum accedentes recedentesque aut animi aut corporis passiones. affec-
tionalis uero qualitas, inquis, omnibus quibus euenerit, ex maioribus orta causis ita inhaerescit,
ut aut magnis molitionibus, aut nullis omnino separetur.
189 I depend here on Josef Lössl’s accounts. Lössl 2001, 115: “Julian hatte jedoch gefragt, wie

Augustinus dazu komme, die Konkupiszenz als emotionale Qualität zu bezeichnen, wo er

ihr doch nur die Eigenschaften einer vorübergehenden Emotion zubillige, insofern er sie
nicht mit der Personsubstanz identifiziere, was manichäisch sei.” Lössl 2002, 220–221: “In that
respect all emotions fulfill a positive role in the universe. They possess ontological value, a
quality of being, or, as Aristotle put it, ‘emotional quality’ (affectionalis qualitas). They are life-
enhancing and therefore good; and that includes all emotions, not just the nice and pleasant
ones […] but also emotions like greed, desire for power and sexual pleasure, concupiscence
[…] They are all attached, as accidents, to ‘emotional quality,’ and are therefore good; and
even if one were to apply stricter standards to the term ‘good,’ as the Stoics did, one might
250 chapter five

Augustine seems to start his answer by making an indirect admission of

a mistake. Indeed, in Julian’s and Aristotle’s terms, to name concupiscen-
tia as a bypassing affect is a misnomer. Augustine makes his admission by
explaining his oft repeated position of concupiscentia as not being a sub-
stance, but a defect. However, according to Augustine, “many philosophers
have asserted it is a faulty part of the soul.” To Augustine, this should be
taken as a synecdoche: the created lower part of the soul becomes named
after the vice it is influenced by.190 Hereafter, Augustine begins to answer
directly Julian’s remark. Whereas Julian seems to have taken concupiscen-
tia (or any other emotion or emotional quality) to be something designed
by God and enriching the human experience, Augustine’s ground convic-
tion is quite the opposite. He starts by helpfully providing what he thinks
was missing from Julian’s account, in order to aid those of his readers who
did not have direct access either to Julian’s works or to Aristotle’s original
exposition.191
Julian seems not to have offered any detailed cases of the difference
between affections and affectional qualities, but only to have raised interest
in the permanence, and hence inherent goodness, of the qualities. However,
Augustine is more than willing to provide such examples.192 Thus, he reports
a series of passing emotions and qualitates they may be resulted from,
with reference to Aristotle’s original cases of blush (ἐρυθρός) and blusher
(ἐρυθρίας), pallor and fear (φοβηθείς, ὠχρός), angered man (ὀργιλώτερος)

still speak of them as indifferent. A prejudicial attitude, however, like, e.g., Cicero’s against
uoluptas, or Augustine’s against concupiscentia carnis […] is, according to this model (fol-
lowed by Julian) not rationally sustainable.” For Julian’s application of Aristotle’s categories,
see further Lössl 2001, 81n28; 114–115.
190 c. Iul. 6, 53.
191 It is well known that Augustine claims to have read Aristotle’s Categories in his youth

(conf. 4, 28 legi eas solus et intellexi). The work was available in Latin translation, presumably
by Marius Victorinus (see, however, Stead 1986–1994, 446). For categories in Augustine, see
also imm. an. 5, and Du Roy 178, n. 2; O’Daly 1987, 36. Brachtendorf (2000, 131–139) discusses
the parallels and the differences between Aristotle and Augustine on qualities and relations.
Is the present discussion on Aristotle with Julian based on Augustine’s own readings of the
work? It seems that here Augustine was forced to check this philosophical source text, as this
becomes clear from the examples of the distinction between an affection and an affectional
quality. For evaluations of Augustine’s philosophical readings, see O’Donnell 1980 (on Latin
authors only); Marrou 1958, 34–37; 240–248; Hagendahl 1967. For Aristotle in Augustine in
general, see Stead 1986–1994.
192 c. Iul. 6, 54 haec quidem satis explicasti scientibus: sed quia contemnendi non sunt, qui

lecturi libros nostros disciplinae huius ignari sunt. quod deesse uideo, faciam ut a me illustrentur
exemplis.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 251

and irascibility (ὀργίλος, ὀργή).193 Aristotle’s example of an inherent mental

disease is replaced by alcoholism in Augustine’s scheme:

Affection Affectional quality

Soul Fright (timere) Timidity (timidus esse)
Angered (iratus) Irascibility (iracundus)
Intoxication (ebrius) Alcoholism (ebriosus)
Body To grow pale (pallens) Pallid (pallidus)
To blush (rubens) Blusher (rubicundus)

While Augustine’s choice of examples show a familiarity with Aristotle’s

source text, his following remarks also betray his intention of using the
distinction between an affection and an affectional quality. All qualities
of the soul represent an undesirable, if not forthright vicious state of the
soul. Moreover, Augustine does not have much regard for what seemed
to be Julian’s point in picking up Aristotle’s distinction: morally neutral
qualities cannot, or even should, be “separated” from the subject, for they are
inherent, or natural properties (Aristotle had used the words κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν
τῇ γενέσει). On the contrary, Augustine puts weight on the actual examples,
which (added to the case of alcoholism) point to his conclusion, backed
by scriptural evidence, that such qualities are morally degenerate and lead
to a habituated sinful life. Therefore, they can, and should be opposed by
baptised Christians. Paul’s plight in Romans 7 is taken as a biblical case
for a person suffering from such an affectional quality: does Julian think
that Paul should have remained satisfied with his inherent feature he is
complaining of?194 Baptism stands as a crucial watershed in Augustine’s
view of moral qualities, for only after baptism it is possible to resist various
affectional qualities, or “habits” (consuetudines), as Augustine calls them
in c. Iul. 6, 55, highlighting two cases of habituation, or acquired moral
qualities. The first of these cases is the already mentioned alcoholism, which
Augustine considers a self-afflicted habit, not an inborn disease. The other
case is corrupted sexual desire, which, like alcoholism, “draws people to

193 Arist. Cat. 9b (Bekker). Aristotle does not provide an example of affection, or a bypass-

ing effect, for insanity here.

194 c. Iul. 6, 54 quando secundum eam dicitur animus malus, uel potius homo malus; nonne

metuis, ne uoluntas bona aut non ibi esse possit, aut ualere nihil possit? nonne concedis, homi-
nem miserum, quicumque ille sit uel fuerit, certe aduersus talem clamasse qualitatem, uelle
adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum non inuenio? For baptism as a central tenet of Augus-
tine’s view of concupiscentia, see Chapter 6.
252 chapter five

the ways of evil habit”; unlike alcoholism, however, it is an innate evil

quality. Moreover, Augustine notes that in the case of sexual desire, there
are certain differences between people who have habituated themselves to
different ways of using sex: a widow or a former prostitute are mentioned as
people who have stronger inclinations to concupiscentia genitalium than a
virgin or a person who has no experience of sexual relations. Once more,
Augustine seems to treat inborn concupiscentia as a curious kind of bad
moral habit, sharing similarities to personally acquired habits in its effects,
but different in its cause. Augustine argues in ways that must have seemed
odd and mistaken to Julian, that even though the affectional quality, or
habit of concupiscentia is not self-afflicted and not achieved by personal
contribution, but is inborn (ingenita), it is still “ours”; that is, we are morally
responsible for it.195 Whereas Julian argued that an inborn quality is by
definition good, or at least neutral, Augustine’s perspective extends moral
responsibility to the “given” and inherent properties of the individual souls:
thus, he is also able to treat them as being evil and corrupted. But such
old habits or qualities can be replaced by new ones, maintains Augustine,
pointing to baptism, by which such good qualities are implanted to be
cultivated during Christian renewal. The old sinful habits of an alcoholic
or a prostitute are replaced by new ones in baptism, and the inclinations
of the old life are gradually weakened and diminished, while the new good
quality (concupiscentia bona) grows stronger.196
According to Augustine these notions of habits also refute Julian’s brief
conclusive remark in his discussion about affectional qualities that it would
be better to talk about concupiscentia as a sense perception (sensus) than
as a quality. For if bad inclinations can be changed for good habits, there is
not much sense in naming such inclinations as sense perceptions: a more

195 c. Iul. 6, 55 cum et ipsa in nobis sint, nec aliena, sed nostra sint. nam et uinolentiae con-

suetudini utique malae, quam sibi homines fecerunt, non nascendo traxerunt, resistunt post
baptismum, ne eos ad mala solita pertrahat: et tamen malo resistitur, dum concupiscentiae per
continentiam denegatur, quod per consuetudinem concupiscitur. unde etiam contra istam geni-
talium concupiscentiam, quae ingenita nobis est per originale peccatum, uehementius uidua
quam uirgo; uehementius meretrix quando casta esse uoluerit, quam quae semper fuit casta,
confligit: et tanto amplius in ea superanda uoluntas laborabit, quanto maiores ei consuetudo
uires dedit. ex isto et cum isto hominis malo nascitur homo: quod malum per se ipsum tam
magnum est, et ad hominis damnationem atque a regno dei separationem tantum habet obli-
gationis, ut etiamsi de parentibus regeneratis trahatur, nonnisi, quemadmodum in illis, sola
regeneratione soluatur, atque isto unico remedio praepositus mortis a prole pellatur, quo a
parentibus est pulsus.
196 c. Iul. 6, 56.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 253

reasonable stance is to think of concupiscentia or any other quality as being

sensed in itself in the soul. Thus, the increase and decrease of concupiscentia
can also be sensed.197
The above account shows how the philosophical traditions were, even in
a very special and technical form, part of Augustine’s and Julian’s debate
over concupiscentia. It seems undisputable that Augustine was perfectly
aware of Julian’s starting point in Categories, and had even done some cross-
checking himself. However, although familiar with a specific philosophical
discussion of the emotions, Augustine seems rather reluctant to develop any
further notions based on Aristotle’s distinction, and certainly is not willing
to express affiliation to an author that Julian had claimed to fight on his
side—despite the ambiguous state of the source text and its potential to
back both Julian’s and Augustine’s positions in the debate. On the contrary,
Augustine is eager to join the Aristotelian terminology to what he takes to
be much more firmer ground of scriptural evidence, and colours the distinc-
tion between affectio and affectionalis qualitas as a variation of a distinction
between sin and habitual sin.
Richard Sorabji is correct in claiming that this was due to Augustine’s
axiomatic contention of treating concupiscentia as evil by definition. How-
ever, there is perhaps a bit more to that: for Augustine, consistent to his
entire argument in his debate with Julian, quickly adds the divine interces-
sion of baptism into an analysis of an originally philosophical distinction.
Julian’s remark was made from a philosophical, and technical perspective,
but Augustine soon turns it into a yet another way to prove that baptism
offers the means to cope with evil concupiscentia. By the time the debate
with Julian was in full swing, Augustine had very clear ideas of the role
and status of concupiscentia, and how to deal with it. These ideas, however,
were not formed along the lines of philosophical sets of concepts, even if
Augustine seems able to have recourse to these concepts, if needed, but
only to adjust and attach them to the more central and weighty arguments
of theological and biblical nature. In c. Iul. 6, 53–56, we see an Augustine
who is rather unenthusiastic in expounding concupiscentia in terms of the
traditional philosophical distinctions, notwithstanding the apologetic con-
text, the ambiguity of the source text, and Julian’s previous condescending

197 It seems that because Julian wished to emphasise the inherent goodness of concu-

piscentia he also preferred to label it a sensus, thus emphasising the absurdity of trying to
“diminish” it in its lawful limits, quando minuitur concupiscentia, sensus minuitur. See Lössl
2002, 209, 219–221.
254 chapter five

remarks of Augustine’s philosophical abilities. To Augustine, concupiscentia

has moved beyond philosophical competence.198

Stolen Consent, Dangers of the Senses and the Flaws of Philosophy

The concept of consent regularly appears in the debates of Augustine and
Julian, but not many particularly significant or pertinent remarks are made
on the topic. There are, however, a few interesting passages in which Augus-
tine finds some use for the traditional views of consent and its relation to
emotions, sexual desire being once again the extreme example.
Augustine presents at least one special case in which even Christians
seem to be unarmed against grave (turpes) consented actions, namely
dreams.199 While awake, a Christian is able to control and fight against con-
cupiscentia. But in dreams, such control may fail and fighting may cease,
and the “consent is stolen from them” (furatur assensus). Augustine’s pecu-
liar metaphor here underlines the inexplicable nature of this phenomenon.
The consent, as it were, slips even to approve of certain grave sins. Augus-
tine seems to think that this has something to do with the “sleeping senses”
which can be tricked by certain disturbing images in dreams.200 However,
Augustine, as elsewhere, does not think that consent in dreams should

198 Ironically, the discussion here confirms, in a restricted sense, Julian’s caustic remark
of “priests who are not able to judge over Christian doctrines by Aristotle’s categories.” Iul.
A. c. Iul. 2, 37. However, this is not to say that the debate between Julian and Augustine
was a debate between an Aristotelian philosopher and a Christian theologian. Julian also
had theological presuppositions on the subjects of the debate, and attempted to use his
philosophical training to show the inconsistency of Augustine’s position. See Lössl 2001, 120.
The status of concupiscentia in Christian renewal will be discussed in Chapter 6.
199 In Gn. litt. 12, 15, 31 (written ca. 412–415), Augustine had already addressed the question

of sexual images in dreams and whether they are sins or not, cf. Gn. litt. 12, 30, 58 (for this topic,
see Matthews 1992, 90–106; Mann 1999, 160–162; Haji 1999, 166–182). According to Gn. litt.,
dreams should be treated as vivid images of something that has been discussed while awake,
which obviously can be done without consent to any sinful thoughts. Apparently, Augustine
seems to think that when dreaming, the ability to discern between consented images and
images that are only “working tools” of a reasoned conversation is critically weakened. Thus,
even unintentional and reproachable sexual images may appear in dreams and are not to
be deemed to be sins. However, the process of Christian renewal should have some effect
on the choices made in dreams, as well; but Augustine does not go into detail in discussing
the quality of such improvement. Augustine mentions Solomon as an example of making the
right choices in dreams.
200 c. Iul. 4, 10 quid agit in eis, quos contra se compellit uigilare atque pugnare; et si quando

ab eis ullum uel in somnis furatur assensum, cum euigilauerint, gemere et inter gemitus dicere,
quomodo impleta est anima mea illusionibus? quia cum sopitos deludunt somnia sensus, nescio
quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur assensus; quae si imputaret altissimus, quis
uiueret castus?
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 255

count as morally responsible, probably because this kind of consent is as

illusory as the dream images it is given.
Shortly thereafter, Augustine emphasises the force by which the desires
for sensual pleasures present themselves to the soul and “impel” consent.
This he does by presenting a fourfold division of the functions of senses
(uiuacitas, utilitas, necessitas, libido sentiendi).201 The “lust for sensation” is
the one that worries Augustine, for it “impels us by the appetite of carnal
pleasure to sense something, whether we mentally consent to or resist
it.”202
What follows is a short and loosely composed study of the various sense
perceptions and their effects and evil uses. Thus, pleasing scents, or music,
or food, may cause libido sentiendi. Concerning food and eating, Augus-
tine would prefer alimentation that would be completely void of scents
and taste, for these entail a constant risk of excessive pleasure for those
who consume food. A much safer way of eating would be analogical to
breathing air, which does not taste or smell of anything.203 So far, this can
be compared to Augustine’s ideal of paradisiacal intercourse, which would
have been a completely tranquil and unemotional procedure.204 Many bod-
ily sensations are linked to pleasure, and this creates a “very great nui-
sance and danger.” However, Augustine is very clear about the difference
between the pleasures of eating and pleasures of sex (in the lawful context
of marriage). The latter entails such a submerging effect on the mind and
body that practically every higher mental activity seems to be excluded,

201 The division bears resemblance to the Stoic views of phantasmata and oikeiosis. c.

Iul. 4, 65 aliud esse sentiendi uiuacitatem, uel utilitatem, uel necessitatem, aliud sentiendi
libidinem. uiuacitas sentiendi est, qua magis alius, alius minus in ipsis corporalibus rebus pro
earum modo atque natura quod uerum est percipit, atque id a falso magis minusue discernit.
utilitas sentiendi est, per quam corpori uitaeque quam gerimus, ad aliquid approbandum uel
improbandum, sumendum uel reiciendum, appetendum uitandumue consulimus.
202 c. Iul. 4, 65 libido autem sentiendi est, de qua nunc agimus, quae nos ad sentiendum,

siue consentientes mente, siue repugnantes, appetitu carnalis uoluptatis impellit. Cf. also the
language in c. Iul. imp. 4, 27 caro aduersus spiritum concupiscens in quaeque illicita atque
inhonesta praecipitat. Augustine mentions also morally commendable desires and wishes,
but they are not called libidines. See Cipriani 2010, 982–983.
203 c. Iul. 4, 68.
204 As we have seen from c. ep. Pel. 1, 34–35, Augustine pondered the different options

on the problem of Adam and Eve’s hypothetical sexual intercourse before the Fall. In c.
Iul. Augustine once again ends up having two possibilities: either there was no carnalis
concupiscentia at all or there was a carnalium sensum libido that was perfectly under the
control of the will (c. Iul. 4, 69). Augustine prefers the former option (4, 71) because of the
violent force of empirical sexual pleasure. Similarly, c. Iul imp. 5, 17. See Sorabji 2000, 406–
408.
256 chapter five

whereas one can easily discuss or even debate important matters at the
table.205 If a married Christian couple has lapsed into sexual intercourse
with the inferior intention of delectatio carnalis, it is clear, so argues Augus-
tine, that they afterwards feel ashamed when they are again able to “think
clearly.”206
Augustine’s argument is built climactically: he starts with the less dan-
gerous sensations of smelling, tasting, and touching, concluding these to
be more directed at seeking convenience or natural health. Pleasant scents
produce a very limited sensation of pleasure; and concerning food, it is per-
fectly possible to discern between a healthy and natural consumption on
the one hand, and unnecessary and lustful gourmandizing on the other,
even though the limits of unnecessary eating may sometimes be difficult
to find. The apogee of various concupiscentiae is then sexual desire, for the
reasons mentioned above.
But it is Augustine’s remarks that follow the discussion of sensations that
are of particular interest here. After he has made the concession of analysing
the various sensations and the intensity and quality of the pleasures they
may affect, and then showing how sexual desire is the most forceful and
dangerous sensation of all, he subsequently demonstrates how such a view
is in line with even the pagan philosophers who had “no belief concerning
the life of the first man, the happiness of paradise, or the resurrection of

205 c. Iul. 4, 71 quem permittit aliquid, non dico sapientiae, sed cuiuslibet rei aliud cog-

itare? nonne illi totus animus et corpus impenditur, et ipsius mentis quadam submersione
illud extremum eius impletur? The source for the conviction that nothing reasonable can
be thought of during intercourse is Cic. Hort. (frg. 84 Grilli). Cicero is quoted in c. Iul. 5, 42
where Augustine suggests an analogy between sleeping and using libido, for both may be
used to good ends, even though both exclude rational thought and reflection on their use-
fulness (i.e. in sleep one is not able to make judgments on the healthy effects of sleep, and
during intercourse, one is not able to calculate the rational and pious motives of procre-
ation). The difference between libido and sleeping, in Augustine’s view, is presumably that
during intercourse the will preserves its “command” (imperium) but becomes momentarily
unable to use this due to the force of libido, whereas in dreams this command is (voluntarily)
given away (sed somnus cum occupat membra, non ea facit inoboedientia uoluntati; quia et
ipsam uoluntatem ab huiuscemodi alienat imperio). For a discussion of imperium, see Sorabji
2000, 409–410. An equally interesting distinction between permission and consent is made in
mend. 40: sed permittendi potest esse aliqua ratio, consentiendi autem nulla. tunc enim consen-
timus, cum approbamus et uolumus: permittimus autem etiam non uolentes, euitandae alicuius
maioris turpitudinis gratia. Permission is here seen as passive subjugation to an outer force,
whereas giving or withholding consent is always freely at hand as an independent, inner,
active assent of the mind.
206 c. Iul. 4, 71 ita hinc emergitur, et quasi in auras cogitationis post illum gurgitem respiratur,

ut fiat consequens, quod uerum ait quidam, et paenitendi quae est cum uoluptate uicinitas.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 257

bodies.”207 Augustine implies that his view of concupiscentia carnis, albeit

debated in a more philosophical context, depends on the articles of faith,
of which he has here listed the most relevant to the question. Nevertheless,
the philosophical positions on pleasure and the emotions may be granted
a subsidiary role, as in the case of Cicero and his statement in Hortensius,
even if he “did not know where this [battle between the flesh and the
spirit] originates.”208 Yet Cicero did not “favour concupiscence” in the way
Julian does, but went in the opposite direction together with Augustine.
Ancient philosophical views of the emotions provide Augustine a flexible
tool in highlighting, developing and debating concupiscentia, but the origin
of concupiscentia, the purpose and the means to deal with it, are explained
and given by Christian doctrine and the Scripture.
Let us, then, who have learned in the true and holy philosophy of true godli-
ness that the flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh (Gal
5, 17), blush as we hear the true judgments of the ungodly.209
[transl. Schumacher]
The great number of philosophers whom Julian has mentioned in his ad Tur-
bantium does not impress Augustine, mainly for two reasons. First, Julian
fails to mention any true moral philosophers (4, 76), relying only on nat-
ural philosophers. Second, and more importantly, Julian’s philosophers are
flawed by the simple fact that they were not familiar with the Christian doc-
trines about conditio humana:
What could they have learned or said about Adam, the first man, and his wife;
about their first prevarication; about the cunning of the Serpent; about their
nakedness without embarrassment before sin, always with embarrassment
after sin? Could they have heard anything like the Apostle’s words “Through
one man sin entered into the world and through sin death, and thus death
has passed unto all men; in who all have sinned”? What could men without
knowledge of those writings and of this truth know about the matter?210
[transl. Schumacher]

207 Cf. Richard Sorabji’s remarks (2000, 412–413) of Augustine’s failed attempts to provide a

philosophically satisfactory reason for the unique position of libido, “[i]t depends on a literal
interpretation of Genesis,” and his notion of an “other-worldly rationale” for Augustine’s
attack on lust. As can be seen in Augustine’s reflections on Cicero, he did not try to conceal
these rationales, but gave them a place of pride even in the context of a philosophical debate
on concupiscentia. For the role of Cicero in c. Iul. in general, see Testard 1958, i, 244–245.
208 In fact, it is uoluptas that Cicero here finds reprehensible, but Augustine has no dif-

ficulties in making the analogy with concupiscentia. See also c. Iul. 4, 76–78. Cf. Lössl 2002,
219–201.
209 c. Iul. 4, 72.
210 c. Iul. 4, 77 quid enim illi didicerant, uel quid locuti fuerant de primo homine Adam et

eius coniuge, de prima eorum praeuaricatione, de serpentis astutia, de nuditate corporis ante
258 chapter five

As soon as Augustine denies the worth of philosophical tradition con-

cerning man, creation and the soul, he also acknowledges certain view-
points that assert that the present state of humanity resembles a divinely
ordained punishment. Again, Augustine uses Cicero’s Hortensius, which
quotes a lost account by Aristotle of the Etruscan pirates who tortured
their victims by attaching corpses of the dead to living people—this being
a metaphor for the human condition being torn between the union of the
body and soul. This proves to Augustine that some philosophers have under-
stood something right—but they lack the most important aspect, which, in
turn, the Christians do possess:
Did not the philosophers who thought these things perceive much more
clearly than you the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, and the power
and justice of God, though not aware of the grace given through the Mediator
for the purpose of delivering men?211 [transl. Schumacher]
There are thus, in Augustine’s view, some philosophical ideas of emotions
that may be put in the service of Christian doctrine of the Fall and, indirectly,
of grace and renewal. Nevertheless, to resist and overcome concupiscentia,
more is needed than what the ancient moral philosophy had to offer.

Shame, Sex and Cicero

In addition to the view that sexual desire hinders all reasonable thinking,
Augustine also appeals to other factors in arguing its evil character. These
appeals also have a dilettante air of familiarity with philosophical discourse
on emotions, although no particularly profound arguments can be found in
them. Thus, for instance, Augustine remarks that only humans are capable
of experiencing sexual desire as something evil, for only in humans libido
is opposing reason.212 Animals lack reason, and therefore the movements of

peccatum sine confusione, et cum confusione continuo post peccatum? quid denique tale audi-
erant, quale illud est quod ait apostolus, per unum hominem peccatum intrauit in mundum, et
per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccauerunt [Rom 5,12]?
See also c. Iul. 4, 60.
211 c. Iul. 4, 78 nonne qui ista senserunt, multo quam tu melius graue iugum super filios

Adam et dei potentiam iustitiamque uiderunt, etiamsi gratiam, quae per mediatorem liberandis
hominibus concessa est, non uiderunt? For the scriptural corrigendum Augustine offers for
such a view, see c. Iul. 4, 83.
212 Augustine also notes the irrational character of concupiscentia carnis in the way that it

does not yield to the differentiation between good and evil ends, but strives for licit and illicit
objects alike. Only by Christian conscience and intellect, is it possible to judge between good
and evil goals. See Griffiths 2009. c. Iul. 4, 7; 6, 50; c. Iul. imp. 4, 69 concupiscentia uero carnis
indifferenter illicita et licita cupiuntur, quae non concupiscendo, sed intellegendo diiudicantur;
nec ab illicitis abstinetur, nisi concupiscentiae resistatur.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 259

libido are innocent in them.213 This only highlights Augustine’s core belief
of sexual desire: it is not libido as such, or sexual intercourse as such, that
bothers Augustine, but its disorder, irrational and uncontrollable character
that he finds fault with.
[C]oncupiscence is a good in a brute, to delight a nature unable to desire
wisdom […] it is said to be a good for the brute, whose spirit it delights without
opposition, but an evil for man, in whom it lusts against the spirit.214
[transl. Schumacher]
The aspect of disorder and involuntary actions of libido are, according to
Augustine, also the reason for sexual shame.215 In the fallen state of human-
kind, it is not mere nudity that should cause shame on every occasion, but
the “unaccustomed appearance” of sexual arousal.216 Moreover, both man
and woman are able to feel sexual shame, due to the equal effects of disor-
der caused by concupiscentia.217 In c. Iul. 4, 58–62, Augustine enters into a
minor debate on Cicero’s legacy in the question of shame. First, he denies
the relevance of Julian’s quotation of de natura deorum to explain why peo-
ple hide certain parts of their bodies from view. There are many reasons for
such concealment, points out Augustine, but only shame and the wish to
avoid bodily pleasure and sexual desire cause people to hide their sexual
organs from public view. Furthermore, all analogies to animals are off the
point (non idem esse arietis et Publii Africani bonum), but more importantly,
Augustine claims that the main intention of the pagan philosophers, such
as Cicero, are on his side, not Julian’s. Even though Cicero did not know the
testimony of the Scripture on original sin, he could make true assertions
concerning the human condition and emotional disorder. “He saw the real-
ity, but did not know the cause.”218

Cognitio Peccati—An Analogy to a Classical Stoic Doctrine?

Thus far, we have been satisfied with giving examples of the explicit dia-
logue and transformation of the philosophical traditions of emotions in
Augustine’s debate with Julian. However, our discussion will end by

213 c. Iul. 4, 35. The notion of animals not being capable of affects traces back to Chrysippus.

See O’Daly 1989, 47 n. 128.

214 c. Iul. 4, 74. See also c. Iul. imp. 4, 38–40.
215 c. Iul. 4, 58–62; c. Iul. imp. 4, 37. This aspect of libido has been discussed by Rist 1994,

324–326 and Sorabji 2000, 411–412.

216 c. Iul. imp. 5, 16.
217 c. Iul. 4, 62.
218 c. Iul. 4, 60 rem uidit, causam nesciuit.
260 chapter five

considering a recent suggestion by Risto Saarinen (2011) of implicit Stoic

influence in one, precise detail in the Julian debates. This detail concerns
those passages in Augustine’s argumentation that speak of concupiscentia
as peccatum. Do these passages resemble to the classic Stoic doctrine of the
emotions as rational, judgmented impulses from the start; a doctrine not yet
modified with the later development of the first movements or prepassions
(which was Augustine’s standard way of dealing with concupiscentia and
its moral status)?219 As a consequence, concupiscence would be a (sinful)
emotion as soon as the controlling mind, or will, would be able to recog-
nize its presence in the soul without the need of distinguishing between
prepassions, which are not (yet) consented to, and the emotions proper
which have received the assent, and thereby are considered as being morally
responsible. There are certain elements in Augustine’s thought that lend
plausibility to this suggestion. For instance, Augustine claims more than
once that the power of concupiscentia is connected to the power of the con-
trolling reason and its abilities to make judgments, recognize and, in a way,
give form or label the movements of concupiscentia. So Augustine makes a
rather brief statement in c. Iul. imp. 2, 221 of the sin which is increased in
the newborn later, after the acquisition of the will, and the original concu-
piscence then drags (trahente) the assent with it.220 Concupiscentia is in a
passive state without the active rational mind, or will, which to Augustine
is not yet formed in a newborn baby. Similarly in c. Iul. imp. 2, 235, the active
power of concupiscentia goes hand in hand with the growing cognitive

219 Saarinen 2011, 24: “Augustine in some cases connects the desire of concupiscence

with the judging power of reason. Concupiscence is sin, for instance, when reason learns
the command not to covet and this act of learning and recognition evokes the desire.
Concupiscence is likewise a sin when it contains a judgment of disobedience and rebellion
against the rule of reason. These passages affirm the view of concupiscence as judgment
which in itself involves consent. They break the twofold sequence of desire and consent and
claim in a genuinely Stoic manner that the awareness of some desires already involves proper
judgment and assent.”
220 c. Iul. imp. 2, 221 peccatum, sine quo nemo nascitur, creuit uoluntatis accessu originali

concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum. See also ciu. 21, 16 prima hominis aetas, id est
infantia, quae sine ullo renisu subiacet carni, et secunda, quae pueritia nuncupatur, ubi non-
dum ratio suscepit hanc pugnam et fere sub omnibus uitiosis delectationibus iacet, quia, licet
fari iam ualeat et ideo infantiam transisse uideatur, nondum in ea est praecepti capax infirmitas
mentis. Conversely in ciu. 22, 24 ipse itaque animae humanae mentem dedit, ubi ratio et intel-
legentia in infante sopita est quodam modo, quasi nulla sit, excitanda scilicet atque exerenda
aetatis accessu, qua sit scientiae capax atque doctrinae et habilis perceptioni ueritatis et amoris
boni; qua capacitate hauriat sapientiam uirtutibusque sit praedita, quibus prudenter, fortiter,
temperanter et iuste aduersus errores et cetera ingenerata uitia dimicet eaque nullius rei deside-
rio nisi boni illius summi atque inmutabilis uincat.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 261

abilities of the mind: “[C]oncupiscence begins to burn especially from the

age of youth. Its power is, of course, dormant in an infant, just like reason,
just like the will.”221 Such statements bypass the standard first movement-
second movement pattern; instead they stress the character of concupiscen-
tia as something that only waits for the awakening of reason and the will in
order to be identified, and is experienced as both poena peccati and pecca-
tum.
Furthermore, Augustine certainly sees God’s law as a necessary element
in recognising the genuine character of concupiscentia; the law assists in giv-
ing a right cognitive form to concupiscentia, which may have been a hitherto
unreflected, and unquestioned force in a person living in ignorance of the
law.222 This position is colourfully described in one of Augustine’s sermons,
where he composes a satirical caricature of a man who is a lecherous drunk-
ard who lives a happy life with abundant alcohol and many women and yet
he cannot see that he is in the chains of concupiscentia. Only when God’s law
hits him hard and opens his eyes to have a correct recognition of sin and con-
cupiscentia does the man realize that what he had thought to be happiness
and bliss is, in fact, sin. Concupiscentia receives its authentic cognitive form
through the Law, and is eventually known as the sin it always was.223
However, as Augustine continues it becomes clear that this correct recog-
nition of concupiscentia is of no avail to the man: it only makes him “not
only a sinner, but also a criminal.” Augustine has led his pathetic character
to a dead end, in which even the divine aid of the recognition of concupis-
centia (or one’s impulses and seeing them as rational judgments as such, in
the instant they are sensed and noticed, as Saarinen suggests) does not help.
This is also Augustine’s main intention in all the passages in which he writes
about the law giving cognitio peccati, that is, helping a person to identify
his or her concupiscentia as sin. Something else is needed to resist concupis-
centia than correct information, or reflected judgments upon its character.
This always leads Augustine to an inquiry for grace. With no exception, the
correct identification of concupiscentia appears in the writings of Augustine
in connection with his Pauline exegesis of Romans, by which he describes
the progress from the non-Christian stage to the Christian one. The cor-
rect information offered by the law, cognitio peccati, is seen as an ultimately

221 c. Iul. imp. 2, 235 concupiscentia de iuuenali aetate maxime accenditur, cuius utique uis

in infante sopita est sicut rationis, sicut ipsius uoluntatis.

222 gest. Pel. 21; c. ep. Pel. 1, 14; cont. 7; gr. et lib. arb. 5; c. Iul. imp. 3, 210; c. Iul. imp. 4, 28; c. Iul.

imp. 6, 41; en. Ps. 83, 10; s. 153, 6.

223 s. 153, 6–9, 14. See also TeSelle 2001 and Martin 2001.
262 chapter five

unfruitful work of God, which only exacerbates and adds fuel to the distress
caused by concupiscentia: cognitio is not the same as euictio, or consumptio,
which is the working of grace.224 As the term of cognitio peccati is taken from
Paul, and the function of such a cognitio is always to underline the solution
to the undesirable state of affairs this cognitio brings about, i.e. grace, some
caution seems to be necessary in seeing these remarks of cognitio peccati as
simply analogical to the old Stoic concept of emotions as judgments of rea-
son. It is true, however, that Augustine’s approach in such contexts as seen
in s. 153 pushes the question of the different moral states of concupiscentia
depending on the mind’s assent to background. That is to say, concupiscen-
tia in a non-Christian person (either in sine lege or sub lege state) is always a
sin, and there is no need to use the first movement viz. second movement-
analysis there, unlike for a person in the state of Christian renewal.

5.4. Conclusion

In this Chapter, we have charted how concupiscentia is connected to Augus-

tine’s general knowledge and use of the common philosophical and psycho-
logical notions of the emotions.
In his earlier works, Augustine found it useful to appropriate libido, along-
side with other emotions, as a corrupted but inherent part of the soul,
situated within the standard Platonist bipartite or tripartite account of
the soul. Augustine’s appropriation of the commonplace themes of philo-
sophical psychology worked on two tiers. First, he was able to counter the
Manichaean dualist account of the soul as a division between two natures,
of which the good and divine one could not be held accountable for the
evil and corrupted one. A continuing emphasis in Augustine’s early works
is also to claim the fundamental unity of the soul in this respect. In terms of
Augustine’s allegorical reading of Genesis, both Adam and Eve are created
by God. The problems arise from a disorder in the soul, not from a division
of natures. Second, Augustine responds to the Manichaean perspective on
sin by creating an account with certain variations, where the progression of
the sensual enticements and tempations into a full blown evil act or sin is
depicted in terms very similar to those of the traditional theories of emer-
gence of emotions. The elements of preparatory stages (‘prepassion’), the
consent of reason, and the actual emotion (or sin) are present in Augustine’s

224 gest. Pel. 21; gr. et lib. arb. 22.

concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 263

thoughts from early on. They are applied in varied ways in his works during
the 390s; and many of these works have explicit or implicit anti-Manichaean
tenets.
In his larger works that were composed or commenced in the late 390s,
i.e. conf., c. Faust. and trin., Augustine continues to use certain common-
places of the Platonic and Stoic traditions of emotions, leaning e.g. on the tri-
partite division of the soul in confronting Manichaean anthropology, using
the classification of generic emotions, and even making some pertinent
remarks on the relation of the voluntary attention, memory and emotions
in trin. In these works, he also develops his original stance on Adam and
Eve’s role in his analysis of the progress of a temptation into a proper sin;
their roles in figurative exegesis is adjusted in order to fit Augustine’s con-
cern in both locating the imago dei in the ratio sapientiae and in justifying
a Pauline statement over the subject. The role of cupiditas (or libido or con-
cupiscentia) as conceived in the tradition of the commonplace emotional
psychology in these interludes is rather difficult to evaluate: sometimes, as
in trin, it appears somewhat faded and sometimes it is utilized along the
previous strands of thought of Augustine’s anti-Manichaean tactics, as in c.
Faust. or in conf.
From the 410s on, Augustine, however turns to a more reflective and
critical stance towards the philosophical traditions of the emotions in rela-
tion to the status and role of concupiscentia. In ciu., he develops an exten-
sive exposition of emotions, both in philosophical traditions, and in what
could be called his own contribution. By ways charted in this chapter,
Augustine combines diverse pagan teachings of emotions and virtue, finds
them partially correct, but useless in the end, and juxtaposes them with his
own scheme of temporal, communal (or Christ-centred) emotions (or, in
Johannes Brachtendorf’s diction, “second-order passions”). Concerning con-
cupiscentia, or libido, we have noted the negative impact which Augustine
deliberately imputes to this concept in conjunction with his exposition of
the emotions. Concupiscentia is treated as a violent, compulsive, and puni-
tive force, which cannot be resisted and tempered outside ciuitas dei. All
attempts to rein it in with the tools and analyses provided by the tradi-
tional insights into the emotions seem to be, in Augustine opinion, futile
and ridiculous. This emphasis finds continuity in Augustine’s debate with
Julian, where the representatives and sources of the traditional philosoph-
ical views of the emotions are evoked from time to time. Augustine is not
willing to spend his time in what he takes to be a fruitless exercise; he is
merely satisfied with pointing out certain useful ideas by either Aristotle or
Cicero on different points concerning concupiscentia, but he is not in the
264 chapter five

least willing to enter into a scholarly debate over Christian revealed truths
with philosophical tools and terms into the same degree Julian has seemed
to be (and has himself claimed, e.g. with his quip on priests, dogmas and
Aristotle’s categories).
It thus seems clear that Augustine was not particularly interested in
treating concupiscentia in the context of the philosophically conditioned
discussion on emotions as such. There seems to be, more often than not,
an apologetic, or ‘theological’ concern in Augustine’s way of linking his
concept of concupiscentia to the debates of emotions. Augustine was rather
well aware of the main discussions of the ancient philosophical schools,
albeit from inferior Latin sources, but these discussions served him as an
ancillary role in his thinking of concupiscentia. At best, they were a sign
of the abilities of pagan philosophy to identify certain problems in human
nature, but they could not provide effective help in dealing with these
problems. This also seems to apply to the use of the traditional discussions
of the emotions in Christian context; an example of such a context and
use is the familiar gallery of roles in Genesis as an application of human
psychology. In sum, the treatises of evil desire in terms of the traditional
discourse of the emotions seem to be more often than not dictated by
varying apologetic agendas.225
Augustine’s position on sexual desire has been criticized for its excep-
tional role and for its emphasis on the violently compulsive effects of sex
as compared to the other emotions in a frame of philosophical psychology.
Richard Sorabji has concluded that there seems to be no philosophically

225 Kolbet (2010) is a recent study of Augustine’s relation to the classical philosophical

ideal of the cure of the souls, and its rhetorical dimensions. Kolbet stresses Augustine’s
essential continuity with traditional views of the therapy of emotions, but is also aware of
discontinuities, as can be seen from his descriptions of the difference between younger and
“mature” Augustine in the issue. Thus, Augustine “adapts,” “alters” and “recontextualizes”
(Kolbet 2010, 12); “nearly always makes them [sc. philosophical categories] his own to such a
degree that they become nearly unrecognizable” (p. 13); finally, Augustine “not only questions
the desirability of the human ends promoted by philosophy, but also the efficacy of the
means employed to achieve them” (p. 130). See also Kolbet 2010, 129, 132. It is easy to agree
with Kolbet’s rather general claim that both the preceding philosophical traditions and
Augustine’s version of them advocated a need to “cure” the soul through non-conventional
wisdom by a process of oral teaching (or “psychagogy”). In other words, while Augustine
criticized, even dismissed some parts of traditional theories of emotions, and found them,
at best, as an incomplete testimony of revealed Christian truths, as shown in the present
chapter, he naturally shared certain, very general elements of the preceding philosophical
traditions. My interpretation is interested on the critical, distinctive Augustine, whereas
Kolbet searches for the common heritage.
concupiscentia and philosophical traditions of emotions 265

convincing grounds for the special character of sexual desire as an emotion.

The explanation, of course, lies in the direction Sorabji himself points to:
Augustine sees concupiscentia carnis as evil because it is a divine punish-
ment, a theologically conditioned inner disobedience of the soul, and as
such, it is God’s decree. While these grounds are non-philosophical, they are
nonetheless essential for Augustine’s way of treating concupiscentia even in
the context of philosophical theories, and he does not wish to discuss concu-
piscentia as being totally detached from such theological views as Adam and
Eve’s Fall, justice, grace, baptism and the Christian struggle in the renewed
state.226
In the next and final chapter this study explores the function of concupis-
centia within the context of the only aid Augustine knew would effectively
cure the workings of evil desire, namely Christian baptism. We will also
see why the (traditional Stoic) concept of consent gained so much impor-
tance, especially in the later stages of Augustine’s thought. Once more, this
development found its impetus not from some newly found philosophical
interest on Augustine’s part but, as shall be argued, was bound to his deep-
ening understanding of what it is to be a Christian, dei gratia.227

226 Thus, Augustine’s use of corrupt and evil desire in the scheme of the theories of the

emotions of the philosophical tradition finds certain correspondence in his stance between
the philosophical and theological concerns as paraphrased by MacIntyre (2009, 29–31):
“[Philosophy] is dependent [of theology] in that the point and purpose of its enquiries and
the significance of the conclusions of its arguments can only be understood from within a
theologically committed standpoint […] And a theological perspective brings to light the
defects and the inadequacies of any purely philosophical, purely natural standpoint. For
what we have learned from the Christian revelation is that blessedness is not to be had in
this present life and that the exercise of the virtues does not achieve happiness. The virtues
are engaged in an unending struggle with vices and evils and the most that we can expect
[…] is that we will be able to avert certain evils, at least for the time being.”
227 See here Löhr 2008, who also explores Augustine’s and Pelagius’ differing views on

human capacities in reaching salvation as a continuation of ancient therapies, and refers to

Pierre Hadot’s studies (p. 225, “Pelagius’ Argumentation greift auf Grundeinsichten antiker
philosophischer Seelsorge zurück.”) Löhr (2008, 230–234) thus sees e.g. Augustine’s conf.
representing the ancient philosophical protreptic tradition, although the solutions are, of
course, different from those of Pelagius. Löhr (2008, 231) points out how the insulting refrain
da quod iubes et iube quod uis is tightly connected with Augustine’s description of triplex
cupiditas and the weakness of the will; however, both the refrain and the descriptions of
weakness should work as a powerful proptreptic discourse for a new life in and through
divine grace. For a similar suggestion to read conf. as a philosophical consolation, see now
Lössl 2011.
chapter six

GRACE AND RENEWAL—

THE DOMESTICATION OF CONCUPISCENTIA

unde hoc est, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum, id est
peccatum?—unde nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et adsiduitate uoluptatis? illud
est ex poena originalis peccati, hoc ex poena frequentati peccati; cum illo
in hanc uitam nascimur, hoc uiuendo addimus. quae duo scilicet tamquam
natura et consuetudo coniuncta robustissimam faciunt et inuictissimam
cupiditatem, quod uocat peccatum et dicit habitare in carne sua, id est domi-
natum quendam et quasi regnum obtinere.
Simpl. 1, 1, 10

ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis
concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de
apostolo dementis est credere.
c. Iul. 6, 70

6.1. Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Augustine develops the functions of concu-
piscentia in the contexts of divine punishment (Chapter 3), as part of his
views on the origin of evil (Chapter 4), and in the context of the traditional
topics of the philosophical theories of the emotions (Chapter 5). It is now
time to discuss how Augustine treats the problem of concupiscentia in the
context of Christian renewal. This includes how Augustine sees the states
of concupiscentia before and after God’s grace is received, the differences
between these states, and how grace affects concupiscentia, or how concu-
piscentia affects the person experiencing Christian renewal.1 Once more,
a loose chronological order will be followed in reading Augustine’s works
with this context in mind. As with previous functions, however, we will not
attempt to offer a detailed historical account of the genesis of concupiscen-
tia in relation to Christian renewal, but instead provide an overview of the

1 For the multidimensional concept of grace in Augustine, see TeSelle 1970, 161–162; Lössl

1997; Drecoll 1999.

268 chapter six

relevant material and highlight possible continuities and certain discrepan-

cies in Augustine’s thought.
In this chapter, it will be suggested that there is a growing awareness in
Augustine of the continuity of the effects of concupiscentia that lasts even
after grace is received.2 Hand-in-hand with this awareness is Augustine’s
conviction of concupiscentia as a fully resistible and weakened force of resid-
ual sin. While he begins to realise that concupiscentia should be realistically
identified as a part of a problem for a Christian believer, he makes concupis-
centia part of the solution. We will see how Augustine proceeds from rather
vague beginnings in which he is either reluctant or ambiguous about locat-
ing concupiscentia in a person under renewal, to a detailed and outspoken
conception, in which concupiscentia is clearly present in the Christian, but
in a very qualified and restricted sense.
In discussing Augustine’s position on concupiscentia in Christian re-
newal, it is difficult to bypass his reading of Romans 7. Therefore, we will
also see the ways in which Augustine locates concupiscentia in its Christian,
“internalised” sense in Paul’s narrative of the inner struggle between the
“law of sin” and the “inner man.” It will be shown that Augustine’s new read-
ing of Romans 7, from 411 onwards, is tightly connected to his other ways of
qualifying and restricting the effects of concupiscentia in the renewed Chris-
tian.3
In the following analysis, the main stress is thus on Augustine’s crucial
treatises on grace and human abilities on the one hand, and on his inter-
pretation of Romans 7 on the other. All of these find their climax in the
anti-Pelagian period and in Augustine’s debates with Julian of Aeclanum.4

2 For the strict discontinuity with the old man and the new man in the Pelagian view,

see the outline of Brown 1972, 195–197.

3 We have already seen how Paul’s texts played a remarkable role in the Manichaean

discussions on ‘root,’ see above Chapter 4. There is already an extensive number of stud-
ies concerned with Augustine’s development of the exegesis of Rom 7, and my study is
not an attempt to offer a detailed historical reconstruction of Augustine’s exegesis in this
respect. See Burns 1979; Babcock 1979; Berrouard 1981; Fredriksen 1988; Ring 1989; Stark 1989;
Delaroche 1996; Martin 2001; van Fleteren 2001; TeSelle 2001; Verschoren 2004. For the noto-
riously difficult problem of the identity of the ego in Paul’s source text, see the diverging
views of e.g. Schweizer 1964, 133–134; Stowers 1994; 2003; Anderson 1996; Lichtenberger 2000;
Thurén 2000.
4 It is interesting to note that while the role of baptism as a medium of God’s grace

and as a crucial starting point of Christian renewal steadily gains importance in Augustine’s
thought, his anti-Donatist writings, which likewise deal with problems related to baptism
and sin, have little or no relevance to the problem of concupiscentia. For a rare example, see c.
litt. Pet. 2, 154, in which Augustine compares the Donatists to concupiscentia by characterising
both as spiritual enemies. The rational soul loves its body, but has a duty to control the fight
the domestication of concupiscentia 269

The question of development in Augustine’s thought seems to be a per-

manently unresolved problem. Recent studies tend to stress the continuity
of Augustine’s thought, in contrast to the exaggerations of the past decades,
in which Augustine effectively was split into two distinct and separate
halves.5 Concerning Augustine’s position on concupiscentia under Christian
renewal, there are at least two indisputable mileposts: the turn of ad Sim-
plicianum to grace, and Augustine’s changed reading of Romans 7. These
landmarks will structure the following analysis, but this is not to advocate
a purely disjunct and arbitrary way of thought in Augustine. As for the case
of concupiscentia and its relation to renewal, one could perhaps speak of a
steady development from vague beginnings to a coherent, and rather com-
plicated view of concupiscentia in a baptised Christian.6

6.2. Disavowing Concupiscentia—Vague Beginnings

From early on, Augustine discerns different stages, or levels, in the process
of renewal. In de uera religione 48, he introduces an archetypal distinction
between the “old man” (uetus homo) and the “new man” (nouus homo). The
“old man” is exterior and earthly (terrenus),7 being attached to temporal and
mutable goods. In contrast, the “new man” is detached from the temporal
things and gradually attaches to what is divine, immutable and rational.
The life of the “old man” is described as uita hominis uiuentis ex corpore et
cupiditatibus rerum temporalium colligati.8

against its hostile movements in the same way as a Catholic Christian should love a Donatist
but hate his or her rebellious attitude. On a more general level, Simonis 1968 tracks Augus-
tine’s premises of infant baptism during the Donatist controversy and their continuation
and development during the Pelagian struggle, showing how the ecclesiological presuppo-
sitions (salus extra ecclesiam non est) had a role to play in the way Augustine makes the
hamartiological conclusions in the Pelagian controversy (i.e. infants are guilty of peccatum
originale). Simonis 1968, 500. Similarly, TeSelle (1970, 261) argues that “in controversy with
the Donatists […] Augustine first began to qualify his own perfectionism with an awareness
of the continuing actuality of sin and the need of incorporation into Christ.” See also Burns
1980.
5 For a strong version of the case for continuity, see e.g. Harrison C. 2006.
6 Some of the views expressed in this chapter have appeared in condensed form in Nisula

2010.
7 The opposites exterior vs. interior also appear in diu. qu. 51, where they are discussed in

their biblical context (2 Cor 4, 16 “outer man corrupted—inner man renewed”). The “outer
man” and “inner man” can both refer to Adam. Thus, they both are parts of created humanity.
They can, however, also refer to Adam as a sinner, and to Christ as righteousness (diu. qu. 51,
1). See also c. ep. Man. 36, 41.
8 uera rel. 48.
270 chapter six

Then a description follows of the “new man,” which is divided into seven
spiritual “ages.”9 Augustine here characterises renewal as a process of sub-
limation from the coarse historical facts to the more purely rational ways
of Christianity, where “fleshly appetite” is “married” to reason and exists
under the control of reason. The result of this marriage is that sin loses all
attraction (etiamsi omnes concedant, peccare non libeat). This process ends
in the sixth phase with a total submersion into an “eternal mode of life,
where everything temporal has been left aside.”10 In Augustine’s vision of the
seven stages of renewal, libidines and earthly cupiditates are mainly allotted
to the realm of the “old man,” while the life of the homo nouus is depicted
as being capable of vanquishing these appetites even to the degree that the
renewed person does not feel any urge to sin. However, Augustine wishes to
add that no one is able to live solely as a “new man.” In other words, the “old
man” follows with the interior, renewed person until death.11 Unfortunately,
this remark is not elaborated on further; no clear view emerges of how the
desires and urges of the old man affect the renewed person, if at all.12
Augustine’s vagueness in allocating the urges and desires of the “old
life” into the renewed life is also reflected in his works concerning renewal

9 uera rel. 49 nonnulli totum [sc. ueterem hominem] agunt ab istius uitae ortu usque ad
occasum, nonnulli autem uitam istam necessario ab illo incipiunt, sed renascuntur interius […]
iste dicitur nouus homo et […] habens distinctas quasdam spiritales aetates suas. See Gn. adu.
Man. 1, 23, 40, where the seven stages of human progress are also mentioned, but in a different
context of salvation history: homo nouus appears there in conjunction with the incarnation
of Christ.
10 uera rel. 49 tertiam iam fidentiorem et carnalem appetitum rationis robore maritantem

gaudentemque intrinsecus in quadam dulcedine coniugali, cum anima menti copulatur et

uelamento pudoris obnubitur, ut iam recte uiuere non cogatur, sed etiamsi omnes concedant,
peccare non libeat […] sextam omnimodae mutationis in aeternam uitam et usque ad totam
obliuionem uitae temporalis transeuntem perfecta forma, quae facta est ad imaginem et simi-
litudinem dei.
11 uera rel. 50 ueterem […] possit in hac uita unus homo agere, nouum uero […] nemo in hac

uita possit nisi cum uetere, nam et ab ipso incipiat necesse est et usque ad uisibilem mortem cum
illo quamuis eo deficiente se proficiente perduret.
12 Note also that in s. dom. mont. 2, 6, 23 Augustine briefly takes up Rom 7, 18, 25 and

infers to the “resistance,” or “weakness” of the body, which is prone to carnalis consuetudo.
See van Fleteren 2001, 90–91. See also c. Adim. 21, where Augustine works with a similar set of
concepts. The “old life,” or the “old man,” has been received from Adam. The sin of Adam was
a properly voluntary act, while in the fallen humankind, it has grown “natural” (naturale).
Again, Augustine does not elaborate as to how and when the old life is “destroyed,” but is
satisfied with only claiming that this is done by the cross of Christ. qui autem Iesu Christi
sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus concupiscentiis. tali enim cruce uetus homo,
id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit uoluntarium, in nobis
fieret naturale. quod ostendit apostolus dicens: fuimus et nos aliquando natura filii irae sicut et
ceteri.
the domestication of concupiscentia 271

and Romans 7 during the 390s. These works stem from a roughly coincid-
ing period.13 Let us first turn to the collection of the various questions and
answers, de diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, based on the discussions
in the ascetical community of Hippo.14 The imperfect state of renewal sur-
faces in question 65. Here Augustine discusses the allegorical meaning of
Lazarus’ resurrection. To Augustine, the story is an allegory of the soul’s
progress towards divine life. Lazarus’s tomb, the stench of his body, and the
strips of cloth, all signify carnal life, the sins of fleshly desires.15 Although
alive, Lazarus comes out of the tomb with his face and body all wrapped
in cloth. This detail produces a highly interesting, but again, rather vague
and scant remark on renewal and “fleshly desires”; like Lazarus, the renewed
Christian leaves the “carnal vices” behind. Because the Christian still inhab-
its a body, he or she cannot be totally estranged to molestiis carnis. Here
Augustine also quotes a few words from Romans 7 (v. 25 mente seruio legi
dei, carne autem legi peccati), which he explains in the following question
as being words of a person who is on the verge of the sub gratia state.
Thus Augustine hints here that the remains of the old life in the flesh
are somehow present in the Christian, who cannot be free from all sin and
ignorance, even if being reborn and renewed.16
In the following question (diu. qu. 66), Augustine returns to the mixed
character of renewal, and discusses Romans 7 at some length. Augustine
now uses a four-stage model to depict the progress of renewal: ante legem,
sub lege, sub gratia, in pace.17

13 Fredriksen (1988, 90 n. 13) dates diu. qu. 65 and 66 after exp. prop. Rm., “because of

their more developed concept of the massa.” She refers to the metaphor of massa luti in exp.
prop. Rm. 54 and massa peccati in diu. qu. 68, 3–4, finding the latter more nuanced, and thus
following the former in time. Mosher (1977, 19) treats the problem of dating more carefully.
The similar details of argumentation, e.g. sin as an unintelligible reality and notions of carnis
prudentia, suggest a roughly concurrent composition. Cf. here Drobner’s (2000, 2003, 2004)
strict principles of dating, in which dating that is based on more or less developed expositions
of the same motifs is categorically discarded.
14 For the implications of this audience, see Martin 2001, 61–62, 65.
15 diu. qu. 65 terrenorum peccatorum, id est cupiditatum carnalium.
16 diu. qu. 65 alieni a molestiis carnis esse non possumus […] libera ab omni peccato et

ignorantia esse non potest.

17 These stages are called differentiae or actiones (66, 3 ex quo comprehendimus quattuor

esse differentias etiam in uno homine, quibus gradatim peractis in uita aeterna manebitur, diu.
qu. 66, 3; see also diu. qu. 61, 7). Fredriksen 1988, 90–92; Martin 2001, 62: “while drawing upon
the inherited tradition for components of this four-fold framework, the overall configuration
with the the four descriptive labels and the interrelated progression of the stages is uniquely
Augustine’s.”
272 chapter six

Augustine begins with an overview of law, sin and humanity. Law as

such cannot help fallen humanity. Law prohibits us to covet, and yet we
do.18 Moreover, life under law is described as a life driven and harassed by
worldly pleasures (temporales uoluptates) and with the emotions being in
control (passiones […] operatas in membris nostris); these forces eventually
lead to death, and they can be said to rule over humans. The first-person
narrative in Rom 7, 15–23 describes such a person, living “under law.”19 In
contrast, a Christian lives in the law of the Spirit, which frees him or her
from the law of sin and death. In addition, this results in the Christian
no longer desiring harmful things (non concupiscamus), but fulfilling the
orders made by Law, and doing this “without difficulty and most willingly.”20
Consequently, the slavery from evil desire and other passions belongs to the
past, to a time when the Christian was still under the Law of sin.21 In these
kinds of statements, Augustine posits a clear demarcation line between a
stage that is sub lege and one that is sub gratia; the problems due to the “law
of sin” in Romans 7 would be neatly limited to life before grace.
However, this is not the whole story. Despite these statements, Augustine
also immediately assures us that even a person under grace (sub gratia) is
not totally alienated from the passiones.
Therefore he who now serves with the mind the Law of God dies to these
passions, although the passions themselves are not yet dead as long as he
serves with the flesh the law of sin. Consequently there still remains in the
one under grace something which, [although] incapable of overcoming him
or taking captive, [will persist, nonetheless,] until the mortification of all
that which draws its strength from the habits of sin and which is the reason
why the body even now is said to be dead as long as it does not give perfect
obedience to spirit.22 [transl. Mosher]

18 diu. qu. 66, 1 lex ergo peccati et mortis, id est quae imposita est peccantibus atque mori-

entibus, iubet tantum ne concupiscamus, et tamen concupiscimus.

19 diu. qu. 66, 5 sunt uerba hominis sub lege constituti nondum sub gratia, qui etiam si nolit

peccare, uincitur a peccato.

20 diu. qu. 66, 1 accedente autem gratia id ipsum quod lex onerose iusserat iam sine onere ac

libentissime implemus […] facit ut non concupiscamus et impleamus iussa legis, non iam serui
legis per timorem, sed amici per caritatem.
21 diu. qu. 66, 2 sub istis passionibus tamquam sub uiro dominante agebat anima, antequam

ueniret gratia per fidem.

22 diu. qu. 66, 2 his ergo passionibus moritur qui iam seruit mente legi dei, quamuis ipsae

passiones nondum mortuae sint, quamdiu carne seruit legi peccati. restat ergo adhuc aliquid
ei qui est sub gratia, quod eum non uincat nec captiuum ducat, donec mortificetur totum quod
consuetudine praua roboratum est; et inde corpus etiam nunc mortuum esse dicitur, quamdiu
non perfecte seruit spiritui.
the domestication of concupiscentia 273

Hence, there is still “something” (aliquid) that causes the body to be

“mortal,” although this “something,” a reluctance of the flesh, can no longer
overcome the mind’s freedom to serve righteousness nor to achieve victo-
ries for sin.23 These general introductory statements are then followed by
a more precise and systematic presentation, in which Augustine describes
each stage and their corresponding words in Rom 7–8.
Augustine seems to suggest that a distinctive feature in discerning
whether one belongs to sub lege or sub gratia is the effectiveness or weak-
ness of the remains of past sins in affecting forbidden actions.
Under the law we now live forbidden to sin, and yet, overcome by sin’s habits,
we sin because faith does not yet assist us. The third phase of life is when
now we trust fully in our Deliverer and do not attribute anything to our own
merits, but, by loving his mercy, we are no longer overcome by the pleasure of
evil habit when it strives to draw us into sin. But, nonetheless, we still suffer
from its attempted seductions, although we are not betrayed to it.24
[transl. Mosher]
In describing the transition from the second to third stage, Augustine clearly
searches for something that he could assign to both stages, but in a qualified
mode in sub gratia. His language varies between the different labels in
pinpointing this “something.” Thus, on the sub lege stage, the bonds of the
consuetudo carnalis and naturale uinculum mortalitatis are too strong to be
broken and withheld.25
By the transition to the third stage, however, the reluctans mortalitas
carnis and desideria carnalia are restricted in their force, and the pruden-
tia carnalis is changed into a “spiritual wisdom.”26 The soul then starts to

23 diu. qu. 66, 2. Cf. diu. qu. 67, 5, where Augustine states that this life is led with a certain

molestia.
24 diu. qu. 66, 3 sub lege est actio, cum iam prohibemur a peccato, et tamen eius consuetu-

dine uicti peccamus, quoniam nos nondum adiuuat fides. tertia actio est, quando iam plenis-
sime credimus liberatori nostro, nec meritis nostris aliquid tribuimus, sed eius misericordiam
diligendo iam non uincimur delectatione consuetudinis malae, cum ad peccatum nos ducere
nititur, sed tamen adhuc eam interpellantem patimur, quamuis ei non tradamur.
25 diu. qu. 66, 5.
26 The transition from sub lege stage to sub gratia stage is covered in Rom 7, 24 (miser

ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?), which forms a bridge between the
two stages. The frontier lines of this bridge are somewhat blurred. The verse is in similar
use in diu. qu. 67, 6. See also en. Ps. 6, 7 and Ring’s (1989, 390–391) discussion. Diu. qu. 67,
6 has perplexed scholars for the reason that Augustine seems to abandon his strict division
between the two stages. See Berrouard 1981, 108–109 (who thinks that Augustine does not
here “work exegetically anymore”); Martin 2001, 68; followed by Harrison C. 2006, 132, who
see such use as anticipating Augustine’s later, anti-Pelagian view of Rom 7. Hombert (1998,
226–227) emphasises that Augustine deals with Rom 7 extremely rarely in sermons predating
274 chapter six

desire spiritual goods and to hold temporal ones in contempt. Augustine

even seems to claim that the fleshly wisdom, or prudentia carnis, vanishes
altogether. But then it is defined to be a “disposition” or an affection of the
soul, which ceases completely (omnino) only after the entire soul is con-
verted towards eternal goods. Augustine concludes that even the person
sub gratia still has to suffer from certain “needs” (indigentia) of the bod-
ily things.27 In a way that will become his standard conviction, Augustine
argues that in the third stage, that is sub gratia, one does not, nonetheless,
consent to the movements (motus) arising from the needs of bodily real-
ity, for the mind of the renewed person serves God’s law.28 It is noteworthy
that the terminology in this question is fluctuating and searching. Instead
of naming concupiscentia as being straightforwardly the number one prob-
lem for a person sub gratia, Augustine vacillates and circumscribes. There
is, however, an awareness of the presence of remnants of “something” of the
old sub lege person, still lingering in the renewed Christians.
At approximately the same time as addressing the questions dealing with
Romans in diu. qu. Augustine also composed other relevant commentaries
to Paul. In 394 he wrote an exegetical treatise on Romans, concentrating
only on certain passages (expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad
Romanos). The four-fold division of ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace
is introduced already in connection with Rom 3, 20. In this work, the stages
(gradus) are characterised in terms of their relation to concupiscentia—
despite the fact that concupiscentia does not even occur in the source text
(exp. prop. Rom. 12).29

411. In general, Harrison C. (ibid.) claims Augustine’s exegesis of the stages to be a “theoretical
rehearsal […] wholly absent elsewhere”; at the same time admitting that the demarcation
line between sub lege and sub gratia is still present in Augustine’s main anti-Pelagian works
(ibid.). See however s. dom. m. 2, 6, 23, in which Rom 7, 18, 25 are read as concerning the body
and mind of a Christian person. van Fleteren 2001, 90–91.
27 diu. qu. 66, 6 mortuum corpus dicit […] ut indigentia rerum corporalium molestet ani-

mam, et quibusdam motibus ex ipsa indigentia uenientibus ad appetenda terrena sollicitet.

28 diu. qu. 66, 6 quibus tamen quamuis existentibus mens ad inlicita facienda non consentit,

quae iam seruit legi dei.

29 exp. prop. Rm. 13–18 ante legem sequimur concupiscentiam carnis, sub lege trahimur

ab ea, sub gratia nec sequimur eam nec trahimur ab ea, in pace nulla est concupiscentia
carnis. ante legem ergo non pugnamus, quia non solum concupiscimus et peccamus, sed etiam
approbamus peccata. sub lege pugnamus, sed uincimur, fatemur enim mala esse, quae facimus,
et fatendo mala esse utique nolumus facere, sed quia nondum est gratia, superamur […] uenit
ergo gratia […] quod cum fit, tametsi desideria quaedam carnis, dum in hac uita sumus,
aduersus spiritum nostrum pugnant, ut eum ducant in peccatum, non tamen his desideriis
consentiens spiritus, quoniam est fixus in gratia et caritate dei, desinit peccare. non enim in
ipso desiderio prauo, sed in nostra consensione peccamus.
the domestication of concupiscentia 275

The evil desires are a legacy from the first sin of the first man (trahimus
ex primo peccato primi hominis), and they are born out of the mortality of
the flesh. Thus they will not cease to exist until the Resurrection, where our
bodies are changed into a better state of being. When a person has cried
for God’s help, he or she receives grace, and the state of concupiscentia is
changed. In short, it no longer drags us into sin (trahimur). Instead, we
are free not to follow or to be dragged away by it (nec sequimur eam nec
trahimur ab ea). The result of renewal in the third stage is put bluntly:
consent is simply not given to the evil desires. Thus, the renewed person
ceases to sin (desinit peccare), because his or her spirit is “fixed” in God’s
grace and love. The ability to never yield to evil desire is the hallmark of
living sub gratia.30 There are no qualifications or differentiation between
venial sins and flagrant crimes; the life of the renewed with the remnants
of the desideria praua is depicted in clear and unambiguous tones.31
The actual analysis of Romans 7 is conducted along similar lines. When
God’s law is made known to the sinner, concupiscentia grows in force (omnis,
id est, consummata fiat) and exceeds the limits of prohibition (etiam contra
legem fiat et praeuaricatione crimen accumulet). The verses that stress the
inability to act according to God’s law (Rom 7, 19–20, “I do not do what I
want”) are explained as coming from the lips of the person living under the
Law, whose will is only able to call for God’s help.32 After grace is received,
life under law is efficiently ended, and another one begins, in which evil
desires are no longer consented to.33

30 exp. prop. Rm. 13–18 hinc enim ostendit esse desideria, quibus non oboediendo peccatum

in nobis regnare non sinimus. See also exp. prop. Rm. 35 quia ergo non consentimus desideriis
prauis, in gratia sumus et non regnat peccatum […] cui autem dominatur peccatum, quamuis
uelit peccato resistere, adhuc sub lege est, nondum sub gratia.
31 Similarly in exp. prop. Rm. 35 non enim obaudit desiderio peccati quamuis adhuc sollici-

tent concupiscentiae et prouocent ad consensionem, donec uiuificetur etiam corpus et absorbea-

tur mors in uictoriam. quia ergo non consentimus desideriis prauis, in gratia sumus et non
regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. See also en. Ps. 4, 6 etiam si surgit motus animi, qui
iam propter poenam peccati non est in potestate, saltem ei non consentiat ratio et mens, quae
intus regenerata est secundum deum, ut mente seruiamus legi dei, si adhuc carne seruimus legi
peccati.
32 exp. prop. Rm. 44 tunc enim peccatis uincitur, dum uiribus suis iuste uiuere conatur sine

adiutorio liberantis gratiae dei. Augustine still holds on to his view of liberum arbitrium (that
is soon to be abandoned in Simpl.): though a person under the Law cannot help his or her
defeats to sin and concupiscentia, he or she can implore God for help by means of liberum
arbitrium.
33 exp. prop. Rm. 36 adhuc manentibus in nobis desideriis et incitamentis quibusdam ad

peccandum non oboedimus tamen neque consentimus. See Fredriksen 1988, 91–92.
276 chapter six

Thus, Augustine emphasises in his interpretation the categorical differ-

ence between the stages of sub lege and sub gratia in their relation to con-
cupiscentia. In other words, a renewed person simply does not consent to
the remnants, or the law of sin, or to the carnalis consuetudo, or to the law
of mortality. The “fleshly habit,” active in the person sub lege fights against
“the law of mind” and “captivates” one under sin. Carnalis consuetudo, or
concupiscentia, is a result of Adam’s transgression; because of it, we are
bound to mortality.34 The presence of evil desires in the renewed state is
acknowledged in this depiction, but not much else is said about the renewed
person’s problems or ways of surviving with them.35
Augustine’s contemporary commentary on the Galatians (expositio epis-
tulae ad Galatas) repeats many notions of concupiscentia and renewal that
we have seen in diu. qu. and exp. prop. Rom.36 The comments on the verse
Gal 5, 17 are the most important from our perspective.37 The fourfold divi-
sion of ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia, in pace is also used here. The peo-
ple living “under law” are characterised as people who attempt to abstain
from sin, but are defeated by it. People living under grace, however, do
not succumb to sin, for they do not prefer anything to the treasure of righ-
teousness given by God.38 The presence and anticipated annihilation of the
desideria carnis in the sub gratia stage are acknowledged again in a simple,
matter-of-fact tone.39 The presence of desires against God’s love is labelled as
aduersitas carnis, and Augustine now also makes the notion of this adver-
sary serving as a practice or a training for the renewed Christians.40 They

34 exp. prop. Rm. 45–47 legem autem peccati dicit ex transgressione Adae conditionem

mortalem, qua mortales facti sumus. ex hac enim labe carnis concupiscentia carnalis sollicitat
et secundum hanc dicit alio loco: fuimus et nos naturaliter filii irae sicut et ceteri [Eph 2,3]; satis
ostendit condemnationem non esse, si existant desideria carnalia, sed si eis ad peccandum non
oboediatur. quod contingit his, qui sub lege constituti sunt, nondum sub gratia. nam sub lege
constituti non solum repugnantem habent concupiscentiam, sed etiam captiui ducuntur, cum
obtemperant ei. non autem contingit his, qui mente seruiunt legi dei, thus also s. dom. mont. 2,
6, 23.
35 In exp. prop. Rm. 51 these problems are vaguely referred to as molestiae de corpore; see

also in exp. prop. Rm. 53.

36 For this work, see Ring 1996–2002, 1199–1207; Plumer 2003, 1–118.
37 exp. Gal. 46–48.
38 exp. Gal. 46.
39 exp. Gal. 46 existant desideria carnis de mortalitate corporis, tamen mentem ad consen-

sionem peccati non subiugant. ita iam non regnat peccatum in nostro mortali corpore, quamuis
non possit nisi inhabitare in eo, quamdiu mortale corpus est. primo enim non regnat, cum mente
seruimus legi dei quamuis carne legi peccati, id est poenali consuetudini, cum ex illa existunt
desideria, quibus tamen non oboedimus. postea uero ex omni parte extinguitur.
40 exp. Gal. 47 quippe non eas omnino habere non iam certamen sed certaminis praemium

est, si obtinuerimus uictoriam perseuerando sub gratia.

the domestication of concupiscentia 277

are “touched” by the “movements” of evil desires but do not consent to

them, for they live a stable life in “a greater love.”41 The ability to resist these
movements is once again coolly noted. Augustine’s language continues to
fluctuate: the adversary of the renewed person is called desideria, natu-
ralis consuetudo, etc. Here Augustine also makes the distinction between
“having sin” (habere peccatum) and actually committing sin (peccare), one
which will become a standard argument in Augustine’s view of concupis-
centia in Christian renewal. Augustine is sufficiently confident to claim that
even the passive state of having sin can be diminished effectively in this
life.42
Thus, in Augustine’s first attempts to clarify the position and effects of
the remnants of the “old life” in the renewed self, concupiscentia seems to
be present, but in a vague and shifting form. All the descriptions of the
sub gratia stage, a subcategory created for exegetic purposes, do somehow
admit that the Christian life still awaits perfection; however, the force of
concupiscentia is mainly located in the sub lege stage, where it is seen as a
powerful bondage to sin.43
Admittedly, Augustine also uses the concept of consent in his notions of
Christian renewal already in his early works. But the “aliquid” that should
not be, and indeed is not, consented, remains vague in its effects and des-
ignation. Moreover, the notion of the consent in the renewed state remains
very straightforward, or even crude: Augustine has no need to develop qual-
ified or elaborated views of the kinds of sins that would be fatal to consent,
or to discuss whether there are some “lighter” kinds of sins that cannot be
avoided even during Christian renewal.

41 exp. Gal. 48 immobiles in maiore caritate consistunt. Cf. c. Fort. 22 cum autem gratia

dei amorem nobis diuinum inspirauerit et nos suae uoluntati subditos fecerit […] ab ista lege
liberamur, cum iusti esse coeperimus.
42 exp. Gal. 48 nam in quo peccatum non regnat, non peccat, id est qui non oboedit desideriis

eius, in quo autem non existunt omnino ista desideria, non solum non peccat, sed etiam non
habet peccatum. quod etiam si ex multis partibus in ista uita possit effici, ex omni tamen parte
nonnisi in resurrectione carnis atque commutatione sperandum est.
43 This is particularly the case in lib. arb., which we have not included in the analysis here,

because Augustine has little to say about renewal in that work, important as such as it is for
Augustine’s theology of sin and grace.
278 chapter six

6.3. Inuictissima Cupiditas—

In Search of the Effects of Grace

Augustine’s de diuersis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum is usually mentioned

as a critical watershed in his theology of sin and grace.44 Already Augustine
himself recognised the tensioned, process-like flow of the argument in this
work.45 The relevant questions from our perspective appear in Simpl. 1,
where the first question concerns Romans 7, and the second question relates
to Romans 9. We shall now have a closer look at these questions.
As we have already seen, Paul’s narrative in Romans 7 is, according to
Augustine, an exercise of rhetorical transformation: Paul takes on the role
of a person who is still sub lege.46 Augustine contends that God’s law does
not cause anyone to sin, nor does it produce the desire (concupiscentia)
to sin, but rather informs us of its true nature and existence: the sinner
has sole responsibility for it.47 What is important is the way that Augus-
tine depicts concupiscentia as an irresistible force if one lives without grace:
the recognition of God’s law only increases the powers of concupiscen-
tia.
[C]oncupiscence was even increased, since it could not be resisted when
grace was not yet received. For concupiscence acquires greater strength when
in addition there is violation of a law. It is aggravated when it is done against
the law, and becomes a worse sin than if there had been no law prohibiting
it.48 [transl. Burleigh]

44 The concise presentation of de Bruyn (1993, 1–10) is a good introduction for what has

been a source for extensive studies in past decades (for different angles, see, for instance,
Burns 1980; Flasch 1995; Lössl 1997; Drecoll 1999). Simpl. is usually given a crucial position
in Augustine’s theological development of the doctrine of grace. Most scholars stress the
groundbreaking character of this work, some others, however, see it as a natural follow-
up of a process already begun in the very earliest expositions of Augustine. For a clear, but
provocative overview in favour of the latter view, see Harrison C. 2006, 3–19. See already
TeSelle 1970, 159, for a moderate emphasis of continuity.
45 retr. 2, 1, 1 laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei

gratia.
46 Simpl. 1, 1, 1 uidetur mihi apostolus transfigurasse in se hominem sub lege positum. For the

verb transfigurare, see Quint. Inst. 6, 2, 1 quare adhuc opus superest cum ad obtinenda quae
uolumus potentissimum, tum supra dictis multo difficilius, mouendi iudicum animos atque in
eum quem uolumus habitum formandi et uelut transfigurandi.
47 Simpl. 1, 1, 2.
48 Simpl. 1, 1, 3 nondum accepta gratia concupiscentiae resisti non poterat, augeretur etiam,

quia maiores uires habet concupiscentia crimine praeuaricationis adiuncto, cum etiam contra
legem facit, quam si nulla lege prohiberetur.
the domestication of concupiscentia 279

An accurate knowledge of one’s sinful state does not help the victim of
these forces; on the contrary, the insight given by God’s law only adds to the
guilt of the perpetrator.49 In Augustine’s report, sin is described in a language
that emphasises the importance of correct insight and recognition. Thus,
Paul’s words (Rom 7, 10 “and I died”) mean, “I knew myself to be dead.”50
In depicting the human state of sub lege, Augustine does not spare his
words. This is a life branded with servitude. While even people under grace
might be said to be carnal “to a certain extent” (ad quendam modum),
the attribute properly denotes those who live under law, for they are “not
reborn” away from the sinful life.51 This state is further qualified as a state of
slavery under evil desires (libido, cupiditas):
[One is] being compelled to serve lust as chattel-slave. He who knows that an
act is prohibited and rightly prohibited, and yet does it, knows that he is the
slave of an overmastering desire.52 [transl. Burleigh]
The verses Rom 7, 16–17 are explained with an extraordinary stress on the
compulsory and debilitating force of concupiscentia. The persona hominis
sub lege constituti speaks in Paul’s voice and attests to a grave form of
submission to concupiscentia:
He is still speaking in the person of a man under the law and not yet under
grace who is brought to do wrong by some dominant desire, and by some
deceptive sweetness associated with prohibited sin.53 [transl. Burleigh]
Augustine here subscribes to a sub lege Paul, who is so bound to the dom-
inant evil desire that even the identity of the agent is at stake (non ego):
“Paul” is “drawn” to sin, “betrayed” by the sweetness of forbidden sin, and is
finally overcome by cupiditas, and thus fulfilling its bids.54

49 Although some pleasure is achieved by sin, it all dries up through the resulting guilt

(reatus) and death. Simpl. 1, 1, 5.

50 Simpl. 1, 1, 6. This solves the problem of the words that seem to suggest that there was no

sin at all before the Law, but also reflects Augustine’s insistence on intellectus in the matters
of sin and grace. See Lössl 1997, 79–80.
51 Simpl. 1, 1, 7 qui autem nondum est sub gratia sed sub lege ita carnalis est, ut nondum sit

renatus a peccato.
52 Simpl. 1, 1, 7 delectatur etiam contra legem facere, cum tanto magis libet, quanto minus

licet. […] cogatur tamquam emptum mancipium seruire libidini. sentit enim se seruum domi-
nantis cupiditatis qui prohibetur et se recte prohiberi cognoscit et tamen facit.
53 Simpl. 1, 1, 9 loquitur enim adhuc ex persona hominis sub lege constituti nondum sub

gratia, qui profecto trahitur ad male operandum concupiscentia dominante atque fallente
dulcedine peccati prohibiti.
54 Simpl. 1, 1, 9 propterea dicit: non ego operor illud, quia uictus operatur. cupiditas quippe

id operatur, cui superanti ceditur. ut autem non cedatur sitque mens hominis aduersus cupidi-
tatem robustior, gratia facit.
280 chapter six

Eventually, in Simpl. 1, 1, 10, Augustine ends up characterising the human

servitude under sin in extreme terms. The sin that “dwells within” a person
sub lege is a joint product of both the “sprout of mortality” (tradux mor-
talitatis),55 and the constantly present allurement of pleasures (adsiduitas
uoluptatis). The first is brought along at birth, the second is cumulative in
each individual’s life. These two together, as it were, nature and nurture
combined (natura et consuetudo), form a robust and invincible evil desire
(cupiditas) that is called sin and said to inhabit our flesh. Augustine inter-
prets the “inhabitation” of this strong chain of sin to mean primacy (princi-
patus), an overwhelming control over all better aspirations. The notion of
inhabitation entails, in Augustine’s view, that the person sub lege is entirely
subjected to cupiditas and serves, as it were, as a domain for it.56
Thus, the weight and force of evil desire is too much for human weakness:
although a person living sub lege would want the things that God’s law
reveals, the burden of mortality and self-afflicted habit effectively prevent
all such wishes to be manifested in action. Both of these factors boost
concupiscentia as insuperable. Hence, concupiscentia may even be called
one’s “second nature.”57 In Augustine’s account, concupiscentia comes out of
the battle as the incontestable winner (concupiscentia superans is repeated
throughout the exegesis).
From these sobering visions, Augustine still manages to draw a hopeful
conclusion. While it is true that a person sub lege cannot achieve a virtuous

55 Fredriksen 1986, 96. Tradux already appears in Ambrosiast. in Rom 7, 22 hic est interior

homo, quia non in animo habitat peccatum, sed in carne, quia est ex origine carnis peccati, et
per traducem omnis caro fit peccati.
56 Simpl. 1, 1, 10 unde hoc est, quod dicit habitare in carne sua non utique bonum, id est

peccatum?—unde nisi ex traduce mortalitatis et adsiduitate uoluptatis? illud est ex poena

originalis peccati, hoc ex poena frequentati peccati; cum illo in hanc uitam nascimur, hoc
uiuendo addimus. quae duo scilicet tamquam natura et consuetudo coniuncta robustissimam
faciunt et inuictissimam cupiditatem, quod uocat peccatum et dicit habitare in carne sua, id
est dominatum quendam et quasi regnum obtinere. The inhabitation, or occupancy of sin
ends, however, when God’s grace is present: as concupiscentia no longer then has primacy, it
cannot be properly said to continue to inhabit the person.
57 Simpl. 1, 1, 11 certe enim ipsum uelle in potestate est, quoniam adiacet nobis; sed quod perfi-

cere bonum non est in potestate, ad meritum pertinet originalis peccati. non enim est haec prima
natura hominis sed delicti poena, per quam facta est ipsa mortalitas quasi secunda natura,
unde nos gratia liberat conditoris subditos sibi per fidem. sed istae nunc uoces sunt sub lege
hominis constituti nondum sub gratia. non enim quod uult facit bonum qui nondum est sub
gratia, sed quod non uult malum hoc agit superante concupiscentia non solum uinculo mortal-
itatis sed mole consuetudinis roborata. For the “natural” terminology see also c. Adim. 21. uetus
homo, id est uetus uita perimitur, quam de Adam traximus, ut quod in illo fuit uoluntarium, in
nobis fieret naturale. Cf. retr. 1, 10, 3.
the domestication of concupiscentia 281

life, nor conquer the rule of concupiscentia, the possibility always remains
of appealing to God. In fact, the very burden of the Law and mortality are
intended for our benefit. As they show the miserable condition under the
slavery of concupiscentia, they press us to seek aid from divine resources.
What is thus left (hoc enim restat) for the human will sub lege, who is in
every other aspect “conquered, damned, captive,” is the freedom to call for
God’s help in one’s anguish and bondage to sin.58
In Simpl. 1, 2, Augustine effectively denies all human possibilities of reach-
ing salvation in his interpretation of Romans 9, which represents Paul’s revi-
sion of the story of Jacob and Esau. All merits preceding grace are excluded;
thus, even the act and initiative of seeking help is only due to God’s grace.
The argumentation proceeds in a hide-and-seek manner; and in order to
explain why some people are saved and others are not, Augustine eventu-
ally has to draw his wildcard of congruent divine call, which is ultimately
yet another way to avoid the problem. The problem of divine equality and
justice then naturally becomes acute.59 The conclusions in Simpl. 1, 2 are
nothing short of staggering: Jacob was saved without any preceding mer-
its and Esau was damned without any preceding merits. The ways of God
are inscrutable.
In this second question, Augustine places, if possible, even more empha-
sis on the strong, iron grip of sin and concupiscentia. All humankind to-
gether—the total progeny of Adam—forms a “lump of sin”: as such, it has
no rights whatsoever to demand merciful action from God. On the contrary,
the rights of the debtor remain on God’s side.60 In line with the previous

58 Simpl. 1, 1, 14 hoc autem totum ideo dicitur, ut demonstretur homini captiuato non esse

praesumendum de uiribus suis. unde Iudaeos arguebat tamquam de operibus legis superbe
gloriantes, cum traherentur concupiscentia ad quidquid inlicitum est, cum lex de qua gloria-
bantur dicat: non concupisces. humiliter ergo dicendum est homini uicto damnato captiuo et
nec saltem accepta lege uictori sed potius praeuaricatori, humiliter exclamandum est: miser
ego homo. quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum
nostrum [Rom 7,24 sq.]. hoc enim restat in ista mortali uita libero arbitrio, non ut impleat
homo iustitiam cum uoluerit, sed ut se supplici pietate conuertat ad eum cuius dono eam possit
implere.
59 Augustine holds tightly to God’s justice, even under the utmost paradox of glaring

inequality. Simpl. 1, 2, 16 sit igitur hoc fixum atque immobile in mente sobria pietate atque
stabili in fide, quod nulla est iniquitas apud deum. atque ita tenacissime firmissimeque credatur
id ipsum, quod deus cuius uult miseretur et quem uult obdurat, hoc est cuius uult miseretur et
cuius non uult non miseretur, esse alicuius occultae atque ab humano modulo inuestigabilis
aequitatis. If we are unsatisfied with the way God treats humankind, this is only because we
are unable to understand our own position (o homo, tu quis es?).
60 Simpl. 1, 2, 16.
282 chapter six

question, concupiscentia holds sway: it binds the entire humankind under

joint guilt and debt, repressing effectively all initiative towards God. Concu-
piscentia is a ruling power (regnans); it is diffused in all those who are part
of the fallen humankind.
But carnal concupiscence now reigns as a result of the penalty of sin, and has
thrown the whole human race into confusion, making of it one lump in which
the original guilt remains throughout.61 [transl. Burleigh]
In the end, Augustine has engraved in the minds of his hearers the total
inability of free will to choose freely anything but sin. Referring to Gal 5, 17,
Augustine claims that the bondage of concupiscentia in those who are “sold
unto sin,” i.e. in those who live without grace, is simply too strong to give
room for any kind of other possibilities. Hence, it is God’s absolute act of
will that picks out those who are to be saved from the mass (consparsio) of
the damned.
The apostle, therefore, and all those who have been justified and have demon-
strated for us the understanding of grace, have no other intention than to
show that he that glories should glory in the Lord. Who will call in question
the works of the Lord who out of one lump damns one and justifies another?
Free will is most important. It exists, indeed, but of what value is it in those
who are sold under sin? “The flesh,” says he, “lusteth against the spirit and the
spirit against the flesh so that ye may not do the things that ye would.”62
[transl. Burleigh]
In Simpl., the force of concupiscentia is emphatically limited to the nar-
ratives concerning the soul sub lege, while the renewed soul is omitted
from the focus. To claim that this results from the plain fact that Augus-
tine interprets Romans 7 as being a testimony of a sub lege person, and
therefore the voice of the renewed is not heard, would be to evade Augus-
tine’s fundamental decision to read Romans 7 as such in the first place.
It is clear from Simpl. that Augustine, knowingly or not, disavows concu-
piscentia from the renewed life by painting it in such vivid colours as a

61 Simpl. 1, 2, 20 sed concupiscentia carnalis de peccati poena iam regnans uniuersum

genus humanum tamquam totam et unam consparsionem originali reatu in omnia permanente
confuderat.
62 Simpl. 1, 2, 21 nulla igitur intentio tenetur apostoli et omnium iustificatorum, per quos

nobis intellectus gratiae demonstratus est, nisi ut qui gloriatur in domino glorietur. quis enim
discutiet opera domini, ex eadem consparsione unum damnantis aliud iustificantis? liberum
uoluntatis arbitrium plurimum ualet, immo uero est quidem, sed in uenundatis sub peccato
quid ualet? caro, inquit, concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem, ut non ea
quae uultis faciatis. See Lössl 1997, 94–95.
the domestication of concupiscentia 283

problem of people living without God’s grace. This is seen for instance
in the way Augustine depicts God as the only subject who can “invite
and delight” the human will, which is perverted by its own evil choices
and bound to servitude under the invincibly robust powers of habituated
concupiscence.
In de doctrina christiana, written for the most part contemporaneously
with Simpl., Augustine touches upon the problem of concupiscentia and
renewal in passing. From the general setting of rightly ordered loves in
doctr. chr. 1, 23–24, Augustine proceeds to an analysis of the body-soul
relation.63 Augustine rejects all kinds of hatred against the body as such,
and defends only such ascetic practices that are motivated by moderate
continence (continentia) and are aimed at curbing the lusts (libidines); it
is these lusts that “abuse” (male utentes) the body, i.e. they are habits of
the soul that are inclined to “enjoy the lower things.”64 Therefore, it would
be a mistake to despise one’s body on the basis of Paul (Gal 5, 17 caro
concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem; haec enim inuicem
aduersantur).
These words were spoken because of the ungovernable habits of the flesh,
against which the spirit lusts not in order to destroy the body but to make it
subservient to the spirit, as our nature demands, by taming its lusts, that is,
its evil habits.65 [transl. Green]
Augustine distinguishes somewhat vaguely between concupiscentia indo-
mita and edomita. Christian renewal should somehow bring about that the
wild, untame concupiscentia is changed in its quality. But Augustine does
not provide any answers to the questions of how this would happen, and
to which extent this should be achieved. This much is said, however, that
while complete domination of the spirit over the body will not be realised
until the Resurrection, evidently the goal for a Christian must be that the
fleshly habit of the body will be changed for the better:

63 Clearly motivated by a need to discredit the Manichaean contempt for the body which

seems to be supported by e.g. Gal 5, 17.

64 doctr. chr. 1, 24 quod autem continentia quadam et laboribus quasi persequi uidentur cor-

pora sua, qui hoc recte faciunt, non id agunt, ut non habeant corpus, sed ut habeant subiugatum
et paratum ad opera necessaria. libidines enim male utentes corpora, id est consuetudines incli-
nationis animae ad fruendum inferioribus, per ipsius corporis laboriosam quandam militiam
extinguere adfectant.
65 doctr. chr. 1, 25 dictum est enim hoc propter indomitam carnalem consuetudinem, aduer-

sus quam spiritus concupiscit, non ut interimat corpus sed ut concupiscentia eius, id est consue-
tudine mala, edomita faciat spiritui subiugatum, quod naturalis ordo desiderat.
284 chapter six

[I]t should be our concern in this life that the tendency of the flesh (consue-
tudo carnalis) is reformed and not allowed to resist the spirit with its unruly
impulses.66 [transl. Green]
While ascertaining goodness for both the mind and body, Augustine again
stresses the habituated and enslaving character of evil desires (consuetu-
dinis uinculum), which have to be overcome by the spirit. The chain of
consuetudo has become “planted” into the human offspring as if being a
law of nature (or, “naturally ingrained,” transl. Green).67 From Augustine’s
depiction in doctr. chr., it again seems clear that the rule of concupiscentia
as something actually dividing one’s person does not belong to the status
of renewal: the binding force of libido and consuetudo are brought under a
healing process so that they would be “changed” and that the bodily needs
should be mitigated under the rule of the spirit. Further in doctr. chr. 3, in
the context of the division between caritas and cupiditas, Augustine notes
that there are two kinds of people. The first will receive the final judgment of
God, for they have been unwilling (noluerunt) to conquer their cupiditas. On
the other hand, there are people who have succeeded in this, and have over-
come the realm of cupiditas. According to Augustine, this is the meaning of
Paul’s harsh words in Gal 5, 24 (carnem suam crucifixerunt cum passionibus
et concupiscentiis).68 The outcome of this passing notion remains somewhat
ambiguous, and the “crucifixion” of the forces of “untame desires” is not
elaborated on further.69
In confessiones 7–8 Augustine describes a series of conversions. A change
from an intellectual approach to a moral one is apparent (conf. 8).70 The
end of conf. 7 (26–27) lucidly describes the threshold between the intellec-

66 doctr. chr. 1, 25 hoc etiam in hac uita meditandum est, ut consuetudo carnalis mutetur in

melius nec inordinatis motibus resistat spiritui.

67 doctr. chr. 1, 25 per consuetudinis uinculum, quod a parentum etiam propagine inuetera-

tum naturae lege inoleuit.

68 doctr. chr. 3, 17 angustia in omnem animam hominis operantis malum, Iudaei primum

et Graeci [Rom 2,7–9]. sed hoc ad eos cum quibus euertitur ipsa cupiditas, qui eam uincere
noluerunt. cum autem in homine cui dominabantur, regna cupiditatis subuertuntur, illa est
aperta locutio: qui autem Iesu Christi sunt, carnem crucifixerunt cum passionibus et concupis-
centiis [Gal 5,24].
69 doctr. chr. 3, 16–17.
70 O’Donnell 1992, II, 391. Note also O’Donnell’s musings of “middle time” (ibid.). The

change also seems to entail a transition from a trinitarian perspective to the incarnation of
Christ. For this, see Du Roy 1966, 96–106. In Augustine’s own words, the letters of Paul began
to show him una facies eloquiorum castorum (conf. 7, 27). Biblical allusions to Paul frequent
the last pages of conf. 7.
the domestication of concupiscentia 285

tual and moral conversion.71 The libri Platonicorum appeared inefficient in

reaching the divine homeland, and so Augustine sees himself to be in the
helpless state of the Pauline man sub lege (Rom 7, 22–23).72 From his post-
Simplician perspective, Augustine confesses that only the grace of Christ
(Rom 7, 24) was able to set him genuinely free, i.e. not only in terms of
knowledge, but also in terms of action.73
Conf. 8 is a study of Augustine’s imperfect and unsuccessful attempts to
master his will and thus accomplish his own conversion.74 After recounting
the story of Victorinus’ conversion, Augustine turns to an analysis of his
own state of will at that time.75 Augustine explicitly identifies himself in
the two agents of Gal 5, 17.76 Importantly, Romans 7 is strongly present in
the description as well.77 Paul’s words on concupiscentia are confirmed by
Augustine’s own experience. His will is bound through a chain of events,
to which he is himself responsible. The images of strong chains abound in
the narrative: by a perverted choice of the will, it has changed to a “lust”
(libido). A long habituation to lust has changed it to “necessity” (necessitas).
As a result, Augustine lives in “harsh bondage.” The “new will” that knows
better is too weak to act, to accomplish its own deliberation.78

71 See Berrouard 1981, 105–106; and O’Donnell’s (1992, II, 478–479) comments.
72 conf. 7, 27. For the significance of libri Platonicorum in the twentieth century Augus-
tinian scholarship, see e.g. Cary 2000, 33–36.
73 O’Donnell 1992, III, 3–4: “The central issue, ‘conversion,’ is presented in terms that were

only possible for A. after he reached the positions he expressed in diu. qu. Simp. 1.2.” Cf. the
reflections on the difference between Platonicorum libri and Scriptural truths in conf. 7, 26
beatificam patriam non tantum cernendam sed et habitandam. See also conf. 8, 11 et non erat
iam illa excusatio qua uideri mihi solebam […] seruire tibi, quia incerta mihi esset perceptio
ueritatis: iam enim et ipsa certa erat. ego autem adhuc terra obligatus militare tibi recusabam.
74 For extensive comments for the entire context in conf. 8, 10–27 see O’Donnell 1992, III,

30–55.
75 Augustine’s position on the will in confessiones has received considerable attention.

For various interpretations, see Dihle 1982, 127; Fredriksen 1986, 20–26; Rigby 1987, 69–84;
Stark 1989; O’Donnell 1992, III, 30–31; Saarinen 1994, 26–31; Harrison C. 2000, 89–93; Sorabji
2000, 336; Knuuttila 2004, 162–168; Müller 2009, 323–335. For Marius Victorinus and his
commentaries on Paul, see Erdt 1980.
76 conf. 8, 11.
77 For the readings of Rom in conf., see O’Donnell 1992, III, 3–4. For the identity of Rom 7

and Augustine in the time just before his conversion, see ibid., III, 34–35. See also Stark 1989,
352–357.
78 conf. 8, 10 uelle meum tenebat inimicus et inde mihi catenam fecerat et constrinxerat me.

quippe ex uoluntate peruersa facta est libido, et dum seruitur libidini, facta est consuetudo, et
dum consuetudini non resistitur, facta est necessitas. quibus quasi ansulis sibimet innexis—
unde catenam appellaui—tenebat me obstrictum dura seruitus. uoluntas autem noua, quae
mihi esse coeperat, ut te gratis colerem fruique te uellem, deus, sola certa iucunditas, nondum
286 chapter six

Augustine had found Paul’s dichotomic presentation to be convincing,

because it described an inner conflict which Augustine himself was acutely
feeling, and which was not caused by some exterior, foreign element (as
in the Manichaean teaching), but resulting from a division of one’s own
self, one’s own will. While at this stage, Augustine recalls himself to have
identified more with the “better” will by the knowledge he had received, he
still has to admit that what he was actually doing were the actions his “old
will” was recommending.79
All intellectual objections to Christian faith had vanished, and what was
needed now was an undivided effort of the will.80 However, no such effort
emerged. Bound by all the chains of libido, concupiscentia and consuetudo,
Augustine depicts himself as having been too weak to make the leap from
the perception of the truth to a conversion accomplished by an intact will,
and to make a change in his mores. He had received the divine knowledge
and exhortation, but he could not find a way to answer that call by himself
(conf. 8, 12 non erat omnino quid responderem). In terms of Romans 7, as he
still was living sub lege, he took delight in God’s law, but continued to serve
the “law of sin.” That delight was inefficient (frustra), for the bondage of self-
inflicted habit prevented him from an effective use of the will.81

erat idonea ad superandam priorem uetustate roboratam. ita duae uoluntates meae, una
uetus, alia noua, illa carnalis, illa spiritalis, confligebant inter se atque discordando dissipabant
animam meam. Augustine’s sexual practice and continence are, of course, at stake in his
moral dilemma (conf. 8, 13 uinculum desiderii concubitus). However, there is some sense in
O’Donnell’s observation (1992, III, 34) that Augustine’s insistence on celibacy was to him a
“sign” (or “test,” ibid., 8) of his ability to answer God’s call. See also O’Donnell 1992, III, 7–10.
Again, continence applies to other desires than sexual ones in conf. as well: in the above-cited
passage, sex is mentioned together with saecularium negotiorum seruitus. See also conf. 8, 30;
conf. 9, 18 (on Monnica and her consuetudo) with comments by O’Donnell 1992, III, 117–118.
79 conf. 8, 11 sic intellegebam me ipso experimento id quod legeram, quomodo caro concupis-

ceret aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem [Gal 5,17], ego quidem in utroque, sed magis
ego in eo, quod in me approbabam, quam in eo, quod in me improbabam. ibi enim magis iam
non ego, quia ex magna parte id patiebar inuitus quam faciebam uolens. The new will counts
thus more as an actual will. O’Donnell 1992, III, 34: “At diu. qu. Simp. 1, 1, 1, A. still takes the
position that Rom 7, 7–25 is written in the person of ‘hominem sub lege positum’; by making
those word his own here […] A. depicts himself in that same condition, looking for a grace
that will liberate him from concupiscence.”
80 conf. 8, 11 et non erat iam illa excusatio qua uideri mihi solebam […] seruire tibi, quia

incerta mihi esset perceptio ueritatis: iam enim et ipsa certa erat. ego autem adhuc terra
obligatus militare tibi recusabam; conf. 8, 12 non erat omnino, quid responderem ueritate
conuictus, nisi tantum uerba lenta et somnolenta.
81 The bondage of concupiscentia is thus seen as presently “involuntary” (tenetur […]

inuitus), although the choice or fall to concupiscentia has been “voluntary” (uolens inlabitur).
Augustine does not specify the exact nature of this choice until somewhat later.
the domestication of concupiscentia 287

After an excursion concerning Ponticianus’ report about Antony, which

is again replete with examples of true conversion of the will, Augustine
turns back to evaluate his own state at the time.82 The lingering effect of
concupiscentia is recalled in a presentation of his past youthful prayers,
while Augustine notes that all persuasive intellectual arguments became
completely ineffective due to his strange inability to make a final decision.83
Questioning himself on the problem of the divided will, Augustine alludes
to the punishment (poena) that was due to the freely willed sin of Adam.84
It is partly Augustine himself, and partly the “sin which dwells in” him that
is the cause to his inability to will whole-heartedly:
[T]he self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwill-
ing. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in
conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came
about against my will. Yet this was not a manifestation of the nature of an
alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind. And so it was ‘not
I’ that brought this about ‘but sin which dwelt in me,’ sin resulting from the
punishment of a more freely chosen sin, because I was a son of Adam.85
[transl. Chadwick]
Being sub lege, Augustine is bound by the punitive sin that inhabits him:
from the part of his “new will,” he may say that this happens against his
will (inuitus), but from the viewpoint of his full identity, he has to confess a
responsibility in his “own mind” for a sin chosen “more freely” by Adam.86

82 Augustine’s cry in conf. 8, 19 (surgunt indocti et caelum rapiunt) recalls the comparison

made in Simpl. 1, 2, 22.

83 conf. 8, 17 petieram a te castitatem et dixeram: da mihi castitatem et continentiam, sed

noli modo. timebam enim, ne me cito exaudires et cito sanares a morbo concupiscentiae, quem
malebam expleri quam extingui. The anguished report of a half-wounded will (conf. 8, 19–20)
is far from the easiness of lib. arb. 1: yet another hint of the strong redaction from the part of
the post-Simplician Augustine.
84 conf. 8, 21 poenarum hominum et tenebrosissimae contritiones filiorum Adam. See also

conf. 8, 22.
85 conf. 8, 22 ego eram, qui uolebam, ego, qui nolebam; ego eram. nec plene uolebam nec

plene nolebam. ideo mecum contendebam et dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me inuito
quidem fiebat, nec tamen ostendebat naturam mentis alienae, sed poenam meae. et ideo non
iam ego operabar illam, sed quod habitabat in me peccatum [Rom 7,17] de supplicio liberioris
peccati, quia eram filius Adam.
86 The emphasis on responsibility is due to the Manichaean explanation to which Augus-

tine devotes some time to refute it in conf. 8, 23–24. Despite the divisions and all the talk of
numerous wills (by Paul and Augustine himself, conf. 8, 21, ideo sunt duae uoluntates), the
will remains a single entity. For the differences between the Aristotelian concept of reluc-
tant actions and Augustine’s idea of an imperfect second-order will, see Knuuttila 2004,
171–172.
288 chapter six

Reading these reports of Augustine’s state of will, one has to bear in mind
that they concern a state of will before a divinely effected conversion to a
life led sub gratia. The effects of concupiscentia, derived from Adam and
strengthened by his own habituating action, are felt most acutely in the will
of a person under the law.87 Of the renewal sub gratia, and consequently of
the renewed will, Augustine has little to say in conf. 8. The change between
the two states finally occurs in the famous garden scene, through a divine
oracle, and without Augustine’s own contribution.88
It is not until conf. 10, when Augustine turns his attention from his mem-
ories of his past struggles with sin to his present life as a Christian—and
he quickly mentions that to remember one’s past emotions is a completely
different matter from actually suffering from them, a way of noting a clear
discontinuity with his past self.89 We have already seen how Augustine uses
the function of root in the form of triplex cupiditas in conf. 10, so only brief
observations are made here on the way Augustine characterises his present
temptations in terms of the three worldly desires.90
On concupiscentia carnis and its particular sexual form, Augustine admits
that he still suffers from vivid dreams which are able to produce a quasi-
consent to illicit acts. But this is not necessarily his “true self,” for in a waking
state, his reason would “remain unmoved” when facing such persuasions.91
Augustine seems confident that in time, his dreams will also undergo a
similar healing process to his waking state, “by a more abundant outflow of
your grace.”92 Then, the “glue of concupiscentia” would be eradicated so that
the dreams would no longer have his self committing sexual actions, nor
even consenting to them in dreams. But when will this happen? Augustine
leaves open certain possibilities, either non tantum in hac uita, sed etiam in
hac aetate, or in pax plenaria of the next life.

87 For a lively image of the habituated desires, see also conf. 8, 26, where the old loves

whisper to Augustine, an Orphean figure returning from Hades, to turn back, suggesting to
him various disturbing images in order to achieve their objective.
88 The oracle is first received with rational suspicion, but then accepted as a “divine

command.” conf. 8, 29. O’Donnell 1992, III, 61.

89 conf. 10, 21 affectiones quoque animi mei eadem memoria continet non illo modo, quo eas

habet ipse animus, cum patitur eas, sed alio multum diuerso […] me aliquando timuisse recolo
sine timore et pristinae cupiditatis sine cupiditate sum memor.
90 O’Donnell (1992, III, 199) is satisfied with a general remark: “That life after baptism

was a struggle with concupiscence was obvious to A., and became over time an increasingly
important part of his teaching.” All examples of this obvious fact are taken from later works
than the conf.
91 conf. 10, 41.
92 conf. 10, 42.
the domestication of concupiscentia 289

Similarly, eating presents dangers for Augustine’s renewed self, as do

beautiful voices, and lights and colours.93 However, Augustine also limits
the effects of some of these temptations, much like the sexual temptations
in dreams. Thus, the pleasures of lovely voices no more subjugate him,
although he still finds “some contentment” (aliquantula acquiesco) in har-
monious singing. Again, he is able to admit that pleasing scents do not have
any particular effect on him.94 The case of the lights and colours is differ-
ent, and Augustine writes in a more anguished tone of the sensual pleasures
aroused by beautiful colours and visual aesthetics.95
On the subject of curiositas, Augustine first stresses his own progress
by God’s grace: ecce multa praeciderim et a meo corde dispulerim.96 The old
forms of curiosity lie behind in the past (theatre, astrology, etc.). But Augus-
tine hastens to add that in “tiny and contemptible matters,” his curiosity is
still alive. Although these are tiny and mundane, Augustine is careful not to
underestimate their effects on his renewed self.97
Augustine’s treatment of pride resembles the two other forms of concu-
piscentia. On the one hand, he acknowledges the major changes in his life
concerning this temptation (tu scis, quanta ex parte mutaueris).98 On the
other hand, Augustine knows that pride has not left him alone, nor will it
ever in this life.99 Summarizing the effects of all three forms of worldly concu-
piscentiae, Augustine notes that after having made a considerable progress
in relation to concupiscentia carnis and curiositas, superbia remains the
most dangerous temptation.100
In confessing all the remnants of the triplex cupiditas in his contemporary
life as the bishop of Hippo, Augustine emphasises more than anything the
almighty powers of God’s grace: even if Augustine’s residual sins and temp-
tations are many and great, God’s medicine is more potent.101 Thus, the turn
made in Simpl. is clearly present in conf., and God’s grace is depicted in its
“steamroller” form, as Carol Harrison puts it, “assaulting human beings […]

93 conf. 10, 44; 10, 49; 10, 51–53.

94 conf. 10, 48.
95 One should perhaps not put too much weight on the varying degrees of “success” or

“anguish” in respect to the five senses, for Augustine may deliberately vary his approach due
to literary reasons. O’Donnell 1992, III, 217.
96 conf. 10, 56.
97 conf. 10, 57.
98 conf. 10, 58.
99 conf. 10, 59.
100 conf. 10, 60.
101 conf. 10, 69 magni sunt idem languores, multi sunt et magni; sed amplior est medicina tua.
290 chapter six

causing pain and suffering, disregarding or overriding their wills, purging

and cleansing them like a consuming fire.”102 The overarching presence of
grace and the total dependence on its effects from start to end now makes
possible a more realistic, or keener picture of the effects of concupiscentia in
the renewed state.103 In conf., at least the door is clearly and unambiguously
open for a search of concupiscentia in Augustine’s own post-conversion
state, and he scrutinizes the residue of his past life in the renewed state with
unprecedented care.
We have already seen how the Manichaean anthropology exploited
Pauline imagery in describing evil desire as the substantial root of all evil.
In contra Faustum, the large anti-Manichaean work contemporary to conf.,
Faustus and Augustine argue about renewal in a sexual subtext (c. Faust. 24).
Faustus recalls the apostolic teaching of two men, of which one is “outer,”
“old,” or “earthly,” and the other is “inner,” “new” or “heavenly.”104 From a
Manichaean perspective, the old man is born bodily by humans who are
“bound with fleshly ties” (carnalis uinculis) and with an immodest burn-
ing passion (furor, intemperantia). Faustus, of course, refers here to sexual
desire (libido).105 In contrast, the new, inner man is created by God at the
moment of conversion.106
Initially, Augustine’s reply bypasses Faustus’ condemnation of sex and
instead stresses the integrity of the created human being: “there are not two
persons.”107 Paul’s qualifications of the inner and outer man refer to the mind
and body, which together form one human person. However, both the inner
and exterior part of a person are affected by the consequences of Adam’s sin,
which properly should be understood as the “old life.”108 Therefore, God will

102 See Harrison C. 2006, 248, 286.

103 See Martin 2001, 81; van Fleteren 2001, 98.
104 c. Faust. 24, 1.
105 c. Faust. 24, 1 modus quoque nascendi duplex est: unus ille furoris et intemperantiae

proprius, quo sumus a generatoribus turpiter et per libidinem sati […] si cum in utero fingimur,
ut fere gentibus placet et Iudaeis et ipsis uobis, tunc nos deus format ad imaginem suam
et ueteres nos facit et per furorem ac libidinem creat […] corpora nostra furiosis genitorum
conplexibus seminauit.
106 Faustus backs his arguments with Pauline evidence, mainly Eph 4, 22–24 and Col 3,

9–10.
107 c. Faust. 24, 2 non […] duos homines […] sed unum, quem totum deus fecerit. Only in

the final sequence of c. Faust. 24 does Augustine provide some snide comments on the
Manichaean view of sexes, and stresses that these were of God’s good design, not a scheme
of gens tenebrarum.
108 c. Faust. 24, 2 et interiore et exteriore sui parte, inueterauit propter peccatum et poe-

nae mortalitatis addictus est […] ueterem autem hominem nihil aliud apostolus quam uitam
ueterem dicit, quae in peccato est, in quo secundum Adam uiuitur.
the domestication of concupiscentia 291

renew both the inner and outer man, though on a different schedule: the
inner man is renewed in the present life (nunc), while the outer man will not
be new until after the Resurrection (tunc).109 Here Augustine is satisfied with
leaving the question open as to how the inner renewal will proceed in this
life, and to what extent it will be achieved. In a previous passage, Augustine
clearly limits the effects of concupiscentia during renewal to the body, as he
works out an allegorical interpretation for the fact that in the story of Noah,
men and women are mentioned separately while entering the ark, but when
coming out from the ark, a distinction is no longer made between the sexes.
Augustine states that this means that here in this life, the baptised person (in
hoc enim tempore huius sacramenti) lives in a tension between the body and
soul, but during the Resurrection, there will be no more of concupiscentia
left in the body to resist the spirit any longer.110 Again, the precise nature of
the residue of concupiscentia is left vague, even though its presence in the
baptised is acknowledged. To assign concupiscentia to the body only in a
very general way in the renewed state seems at this point to be a sufficiently
functional solution.111 A noteworthy detail in c. Faust. 12, 21 is also the way in
which baptism, renewal and concupiscentia are connected in an emergent
form: Augustine will return to this combination in the years to come.
So far, we have seen how Augustine, as a rule, tends to treat concupis-
centia mainly as a strong chain binding those who have not received God’s
grace. Augustine’s important treatise, Simpl., offered a detailed exegesis of

109 c. Faust. 24, 2 renouatur autem nunc secundum interiorem hominem, ubi secundum sui

creatoris imaginem reformatur, exuens se iniustitiam, hoc est ueterem hominem, et induens
iustitiam, hoc est nouum hominem. tunc autem, cum resurget corpus spiritale, quod seminatur
animale, etiam exterior percipiet caelestis habitudinis dignitatem, ut totum, quod creatum
est, recreetur et totum, quod factum est, reficiatur illo recreante, qui creauit, et reficiente, qui
fecit. See also ep. Io. tr. 4, 3, some eight years later, on the perfection of renewal: coepisti
non defendere peccatum tuum, iam inchoasti iustitiam: perficietur autem in te, quando nihil
aliud facere delectabit, quando absorbebitur mors in uictoriam, quando nulla concupiscentia
titillabit, quando non erit lucta cum carne et sanguine, quando erit corona uictoriae, triumphus
de inimico; tunc erit perfecta iustitia.
110 c. Faust. 12, 21 seorsum uiri, seorsum feminae commemoratae sunt. in hoc enim tem-

pore huius sacramenti caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum et spiritus aduersus carnem. exeunt
autem Noe et uxor eius et filii eius et uxores filiorum eius, nunc coniuncte commemorati mas-
culi et feminae, quia in fine saeculi atque in resurrectione iustorum omnimoda et perfecta pace
spiritui corpus adhaerebit nulla mortalitatis indigentia uel concupiscentia resistente.
111 In the Pelagian debate, this will offer Julian an easy target for the accusation of Augus-

tine’s concealed Manichaeism, as we shall later see. Cf. the use of concupiscentia in adn. Iob,
in which the word usually seems to be mentioned as belonging to people who are not under
renewal, with the exception of adn. Iob 39 ad euertendas in se terrenas concupiscentias. In the
same work, Augustine characterises Christians as hybrid creatures (tragelaphus […] composi-
tum animal), partly consisting of lex peccati and lex mentis. See Berrouard 1981, 112.
292 chapter six

Romans 7, and in this work, he was particularly focused upon concupiscen-

tia in the state before Christian renewal, using exceptionally strong colours
to paint the servitude to evil desire and inherited sin. Even so, there is an
undeniable awareness of the effects of the past life, or some residue of sin-
fulness that is still there to be opposed in the renewed state. This awareness
is shown in several works that were written at approximately the same time
as Simpl. Thus, in doctr. chr. Augustine maintains that concupiscentia should
be somehow tamed during renewal, or transformed into something bet-
ter. In conf., Augustine depicts his divided state of mind before his actual
conversion and thus treats Romans 7 as that of a narrative of a person still
under the law, but in conf. 10, he also wishes to create an effect of a similarly
close scrutiny of the presence of the worldly temptations in his renewed life
(although he is also very keen to point out the rather good progress through
God’s grace). Similarly, in c. Faust., Augustine seems to admit the presence
of concupiscentia in the baptised person, locating it mainly in the domain
of the body. Together with this growing awareness and gradual emergence
of a clearer and more detailed picture of the effects and quality of concupis-
centia in the renewed state, is also Augustine’s oscillating view of Romans
7 and its application; despite his fluctuating practice of assigning especially
verses 24–25 to either a sub lege or a sub gratia stage, he mainly sees Romans
7 as depicting too serious a division for it to be read as a self-description of
a Christian person.112

112 Augustine’s developing exegesis on Rom 7, a close and overlapping subject with this

study, has attracted scholarship for a long time. Many studies stress the complex and grad-
ual transitions in this respect; many studies also emphasise the way in which the different
genres in Augustine’s oeuvre do not proceed in the same pace in treating Rom 7. Hence, his
“pastoral” motives are usually highlighted in cases where Rom 7 appears as a description of a
sub gratia person, before his “official” change of exegesis. In Berrouard’s (1981, 126–127) view,
Augustine often already uses Rom 7 before the Pelagian debate to describe the inner division
of a Christian. Berrouard has collected a wealth of material, in which Augustine seems to use
Rom 7 as dealing with Christians’ plight before 411. His collection is partly reliant upon mainly
undatable sermons (both s. and en. Ps.), thus also rendering his conclusions on pp. 126–127
partly inadequate. This pertains especially to s. 145, for which no exterior grounds for dating
can be found; also, Berrouard neglects Augustine’s fine-tuned rhetorics of the sermon, for
which Martin (2001, 69–75) is a better guide, with a slightly more careful conclusion: “Pas-
torally, Augustine has at least implicitly applied this sub lege text to sub gratia living” (ibid.,
p. 75). For Rom 7 in en. Ps. see Ring 1989, who also stresses Augustine’s “pastoral” way of using
Rom 7 to describe Christian reality before the year 411. Ring is aware of the problems in dat-
ing enarrationes (p. 387 n. 18, 391 n. 27, 393) but has decided to follow the generally accepted
dates given mainly by Zarb in 1948 and Bonnardière in 1965 (with consequent studies in 1971,
1976, 1978–1980). Ring’s conclusions on the pre-Pelagian enarrationes are somewhat more
qualified as compared to Berrouard: he also emphasises the overall tendency of Augustine
the domestication of concupiscentia 293

Furthermore, running parallel to Augustine’s gradually sharpened per-

ception of grace, there is a need to specify the presence and effects of con-
cupiscentia in the renewed life. I shall argue that this specification appears
as a moderation or domestication of concupiscentia in the renewed state.
This seemingly paradoxical connection could be seen as Augustine’s capit-
ulation to a totalising view of grace, in which it is no longer important to
secure a free human contribution to one’s salvation—be it in the sub lege or
in sub gratia stage. Grace is thus needed not only at the point of conversion,
but also along the process of renewal. A strong view of grace seems thus to
weaken, or dilute the states of concupiscentia before and after the moment
of being subjected to God’s merciful action. But this is partly to anticipate;
let us now turn to the last two decades in Augustine’s life when he is driven
to take the defensive on his insights into grace, and thereby on concupiscen-
tia in the renewed state.

6.4. Relocating Concupiscentia—

The First Phase of the Pelagian Debate

Thus far, we have noted a growing awareness of the presence and effects of
concupiscentia in the renewed person. In the beginning of this chapter it was
suggested that during the Pelagian debate, Augustine effectively expresses a
detailed and outspoken conception of concupiscentia as internalised in the
Christian self. We will now track this development by taking a closer look
at some prominent texts from this period.113

to apply mainly Rom 7, 24–25 for the Christian sub gratia. The clearest evidence of a pre-
Pelagian sub gratia reading of Rom 7 Ring sees (ibid., 392–393) in en. Ps. 42 (42, 7 uidete si
non est ista allocutio in illo conflictu apostoli, in se praefigurantis quosdam, et forte nos, et dicen-
tis: condelector legi dei secundum interiorem hominem, uideo autem aliam legem in membris
meis), but here his discussion is contradictory (cf. p. 391, n. 27). Van Fleteren 2001 is a good and
precise account of the process. Although van Fleteren uses sermons to hint of the changes
in Augustine’s use of Rom 7 in the first decade of the fifth century, he is cautious to draw
any definite termini based on these. Van Fleteren 201, 106: “The texts from these years are
catechetical and pastoral, not theological and polemical. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret
them precisely.” See also van Fleteren’s (2001, 97 n. 37) moderate general comments on evo-
lution vs. continuity in Augustine’s thought. For dating Augustine’s sermons (ad populum),
see once more Drobner’s (2000, 2003, 2004) sobering caveats.
113 In the last four decades, Pelagius and other central figures in the Pelagian (or “Pela-

gian”) struggle have been studied extensively and from new, interesting angles. It seems that
a historically oriented research of the persons and issues in the doctrinal struggles of 410–430
has provided for something of a rehabilitation of Pelagius and Julian of Aeclanum (to be sure,
a rehabilitative attitude precedes modern historical research of Pelagius, see e.g. Wolfson
294 chapter six

Recently, many scholarly contributions have made the enterprise of pin-

pointing in detail how and when Augustine started to reconsider his analy-
sis of Romans 7. In the works of the 390s Augustine maintains that the ego
in Paul’s description refers to a person sub lege. Early in the 410s the identity
of the ego begins to reshape and it appears to be a Christian sub gratia. Not
until the early 420s, however, does Augustine state explicitly that ego simply
means Paul himself. Even this is not an exclusive reading, as we shall see.
However, in view of concupiscentia and its function in Christian renewal,
there is of course more to this than to merely state a change of identity in
Augustine’s reading of a Pauline source text, albeit a central one. We will
therefore ask, in which terms does Augustine usually describe concupis-
centia in its new, baptised context during the Pelagian debate? Moreover,
what kind of an effect does it have on Christian renewal, or vice versa, how
does baptism affect concupiscentia? Another question is how does Augus-
tine defend himself against polemical readings of his position, in particular
those of Julian of Aeclanum? Furthermore, is Paul, and thereby every Chris-
tian, an akratic person, not able to fight against his or her evil desires? And
finally, is the Christian able to resist concupiscentia, and if so, why?114

1959, 562: “In our judgment, Pelagius, on the problem of freedom, represents the original
Christian belief”). For surveys of studies, see Bonner 1966; 1972 for older scholarship, and for
Lamberigts 2002; 2008b and Lössl 2007 for more recent studies. Souter 1927 and Rees 1998
are accesible works on Pelagius’ texts. For the course of events in the Pelagian struggle from
410 onwards, see Wermelinger 1975 and Bonner 2002, 312–393. As modern scholarship has
shown that it is rather difficult to argue for a conceptually and socially coherent ‘Pelagian
movement’ anymore, the terms ‘Pelagian,’ ‘Pelagian struggle,’ ‘Pelagian controversy’ etc. are
here used only for sake of convenience, referring mainly either to the period in question, or
Augustine’s own conception of what he saw as a systematic construction inimical to his own
teachings of grace.
114 In the two following sections I will focus on the the explicitly anti-Pelagian works of

Augustine; this is, of course, not to imply that the questions related to concupiscentia and
renewal were not treated elsewhere in Augustine’s works in this period. Thus, e.g. in Gn. litt.,
Augustine exploits several themes that he is developing in the undergoing Pelagian dispute.
See Gn. litt. 9, 10, 18; 9, 11, 19; 10, 12, 21; 10, 18, 32. Again, in trin. 14, 22–25 Augustine treats
the renewal of imago dei. Both instant and processual sides of renewal are stressed with the
similes of fever and sickness, taking out an arrow and healing the wound. trin. 14, 23 sane
ista renouatio non momento uno fit ipsius conuersionis sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo
renouatio remissione omnium peccatorum; neque enim uel unum quantulumcumque remanet
quod non remittatur. sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate quae
febribus facta est reualescere, itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud uulnus
quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare. ita prima curatio est causam remouere languoris,
quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit pau-
latim proficiendo in renouatione huius imaginis. quae duo demonstrantur in Psalmo ubi legitur:
qui propitius fit omnibus iniquitatibus tuis [Ps 102,3], quod fit in baptismo; deinde sequitur: qui
the domestication of concupiscentia 295

Let us begin to answer these questions by looking into Augustine’s earli-

est anti-Pelagian work, de peccatorum meritis et remissione (411–412).115 This
work was dedicated to Augustine’s committed Catholic friend, Marcellinus.
The main goal of this work is to offer resources to answer the claims of Cae-
lestius concerning baptism and Adam’s sinful heritage. Besides Marcellinus,
the audience would also clearly consist of those Catholic Christians who are
interested in the implications of the new (nouitas) Roman teaching about
human natural abilities to start and advance in Christian life.116 The work
can also be seen as an exposition of Pauline theology, against those inter-
pretations of Paul that were suggested by Pelagius and Caelestius.117
Already at the start, Augustine briefly sketches his general idea of re-
newal. The process of renewal starts in this life in the inner man, and is
only completed in the future life, when the body will be “made alive” as
well.118 This is later stressed with respect to the residue of past life still
lingering in the renewed person: even though baptism is a full and per-
fect remission of sins, “the very quality of human being does not change
right away and entirely.” Through baptism, everything that is inimical to
God and separates the human person from God, is “destroyed,” but there
remains, in Paul’s words, a “law of sin” in carnis uetustate. This law of sin is,
however, “conquered and annulled.”119 It is clear that Augustine has specifi-
cally concupiscentia in mind. Augustine has already contrasted the frightful
bond of carnal and evil desire to the deliberation achieved in baptism. The

sanat omnes languores tuos [Ps 102,3], quod fit cotidianis accessibus cum haec imago renouatur.
During renewal, cupiditas is gradually diminishing, while caritas is increasing. trin. 14, 23 in
agnitione igitur dei iustitiaque et sanctitate ueritatis qui de die in diem proficiendo renouatur
transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a uisibilibus ad intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spi-
ritalia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere illisque se caritate alligare diligenter
insistit.
115 Delaroche 1996, 40.
116 The notion of newness is, of course, Augustine’s own. For the circumstances of pecc.

mer., see Delaroche 1996, 15–48. See also Delaroche’s (1996, 40) notion of Augustine’s pastoral
concerns in pecc. mer., and p. 48 of the audience of the three books of the work.
117 Most frequently used is Rom. For the sheer quantity of Paul’s presence in pecc. mer.,

see Delaroche 1996, 131.

118 pecc. mer. 1, 6. See also pecc. mer. 2, 9.
119 pecc. mer. 2, 44–45 meminisse debemus tantummodo peccatorum omnium plenam per-

fectamque remissionem baptismo fieri, hominis uero ipsius qualitatem non totam continuo
commutari […] plena et perfecta fit remissio peccatorum omnibus inimicitiis interfectis, quibus
separabamur a deo, sed manet in uetustate carnis tamquam superatum et peremptum, si non
inlicitis consensionibus quodammodo reuiuescat et in regnum proprium dominationemque
reuocetur. Delaroche (1996, 284) shows in detail the way Augustine uses Paul to mark bap-
tism as a decisive moment in relation to concupiscentia.
296 chapter six

disobedience of the flesh affects the natural birth, but the spiritual rebirth
of baptism conveys the righteousness and eternal life of Christ.120
The concept of guilt as related to concupiscentia is present in a short
observation already in the first book of pecc. mer., where Augustine presents
two possible outcomes for a baptised person. First, either the Christian will
abandon the blessings of baptism after arriving in a “rational age,” or the
Christian may also keep away from the guilt that has been “dissolved” in
baptism, and thus be perfected in future life.121 Later, in the second book,
Augustine notes that the guilt for an evil action remains after the deed is
done; similarly, concupiscentia may remain in the baptised Christian, dis-
connected of its guilt.122 Guilt and sin are thus detachable from each other.
The basic elements of this subsidiary concept are thus ready at this stage.123
The function of the detached reatus in connection with concupiscentia is
obviously to mitigate and render as harmless as possible the lex peccati of
Romans 7.
The end of pecc. mer. 1, however, prepares the reader for the most impor-
tant observation on concupiscence in Christian renewal. In Book 1, Augus-
tine has argued for the necessity of baptising children, and he ends the book
by stressing the harmless features of the remains of concupiscence in Chris-
tians. Although concupiscentia remains in the flesh (conspersa et innata)
its effectivity is strictly limited by baptism. Augustine lists many mitigating
aspects concerning concupiscentia: it is left for useful practice and for the
training of the body and continence; God will help in the struggle against
it; its guilt is dissolved (quo per illam diabolus animam retinebat). Augustine
finally ends the book by admitting that practically all have sometimes given
consent to concupiscence in their renewed lives, for the reason that they
have not “exerted the full powers of will” all the time. This is something not
to worry about, however, for it is possible that there has never been a human
person without sin. With this cliffhanger, Augustine ends pecc. mer. 1.124
Pecc. mer. 2, therefore, has to deal with the summary claims made at the
end of the previous book. The tone is clear right from the start. By way of
introduction, Augustine makes remarks against some people who “make
too much of free choice of the will.” He argues that to have the infirmities of

120 pecc. mer. 1, 21.

121 pecc. mer. 1, 25; 1, 70; 2, 3–4; 2, 45–46.
122 pecc. mer. 2, 46.
123 For the concept of reatus in later debates in the history of theology, see Mausbach 1929,

ii, 196–207.
124 pecc. mer. 1, 70. For the cyclical and repetitive structure of pecc. mer. 1–2, see Delaroche

1996, 145.
the domestication of concupiscentia 297

everyday sins has a particular advantage: the Christian is obligated to pray

for forgiveness every day, thus practising his or her dependence from grace.
In other words, temptations keep the Christians awake and on their toes.
However, sometimes these temptations grow so strong that they require the
full powers of will, something which cannot be perfectly guaranteed in this
life. In case of emergency, that is, in case one cannot but consent to these
strongest temptations, God has given a good means to repair such accidents:
there are “healthy medications against the guilt and bonds of sin even after
baptism […] namely, works of love (almsgiving).”125
After these introductory remarks, the subject of concupiscentia explicitly
enters the discussion. Concupiscentia represents the temptations of Chris-
tian life. The stress is on the word Christian, for it is exactly life after baptism
that Augustine is discussing here.
Concupiscence, therefore, as the law of sin which remains in the members of
this body of death, is born with infants. In baptized infants, it is deprived of
guilt, is left for the struggle [of life], but pursues with no condemnation, such
as die before the struggle.126 [transl. Holmes]
Concupiscentia thus becomes a sparring partner, and is part of God’s plan in
Christian renewal. The dark side of concupiscentia, of course, is that if bap-
tism does not intervene, concupiscentia has the power to draw the human
being into damnation. But it is not the effects of concupiscentia before bap-
tism that interest Augustine here. The emphasis lies on the renewal, and
here Augustine seems to coherently downplay the effects of Adam’s heritage
of concupiscentia. Consider the following way of describing how to withhold
one’s consent to this residue of sin:
After all sins have been blotted out, and that guilt has been cancelled which
by nature bound men in a conquered condition, it still remains,—but not to
hurt in any way those who yield no consent to it for unlawful deeds,—until
death is swallowed up in victory and, in that perfection of peace, nothing is
left to be conquered.127 [transl. Holmes]
Augustine heaps saving clauses one after another; he limits and mitigates
and minimizes the actual effects of concupiscentia on a baptised Christian,

125 pecc. mer. 2, 3.

126 pecc. mer. 2, 4 concupiscentia igitur tamquam lex peccati manens in membris corporis
mortis huius cum paruulis nascitur, in paruulis baptizatis a reatu soluitur, ad agonem relin-
quitur, ante agonem mortuos nulla damnatione persequitur.
127 pecc. mer. 2, 4 deletis peccatis omnibus, soluto etiam reatu, quo uinctos originaliter

detinebat, ad agonem interim manet non sibi ad inlicita consentientibus nihil omnino nocitura,
donec absorbeatur mors in uictoriam et pace perfecta nihil quod uincatur existat.
298 chapter six

even though he also reminds us that to consent to temptations without

recurring to the antidotes of Christ, constitutes a risk of damnation.
Concupiscence in the baptised Christian is thus a juncture to the orig-
inal root and guilt (reatus) of Adam’s sin. Baptism severs the connection
between one’s personal piece of concupiscence and the universal original
sin. What is left are the remains, and they are only left for training (ad
agonem). Concupiscentia brings Augustine to Romans 7, and the disjointed
state of the will in that description is now seen as the state of a Christian
will.128 The fight consists of the baptised person struggling with the remains
of concupiscence in a simple daily prayer (dimitte nobis debita nostra).129
Indeed, Augustine sums up the entire struggle with concupiscentia by refer-
ring to the three final requests of the Lord’s Prayer: if you consent to concu-
piscentia, you have a remedy for this consent in forgiving your neighbour.
When you have been forgiven, you pray to be saved from further incidents
with concupiscence. Finally, by asking for deliverance from evil, you wait
for the final rest in heaven, where all traces of concupiscentia have been
deleted.130 In Augustine’s narrative, the Christian struggle is made constantly
dependent on God’s iustitia. Therefore the Christian has to focus his or her
inner eye on this divine light, for the moment one turns away from God, he
or she ends up in “knowing according to the flesh,” and stumbles almost in
an automatical fashion upon his or her concupiscentia. Along with iustitia,
Augustine also names the divine gift of continentia as a powerful means in
restraining the temptations of concupiscentia.131
The entire passage of pecc. mer. 2, 4–6 is, of course, directed to Augustine’s
Catholic readers, who are exhorted to live their Christian calling by daily
prayer so that God would constantly help them in not sinning.132

128 See Delaroche 1996, 254–256, 264–265, 268.

129 See also pecc. mer. 2, 17.
130 pecc. mer. 2, 4.
131 pecc. mer. 2, 5 quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: intellegite

ergo, qui insipientes estis in populo [Ps 93,8], nosque illi dicimus: da mihi intellectum, ut dis-
cam mandata tua [Ps 118,73], quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: post
concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecli 18,30] nosque dicimus: scimus quoniam nemo esse potest
continens, nisi deus det, quid aliud dicimus quam: da quod iubes? cum iubet dicendo: facite
iustitiam [Is 56,1] itemque dicit: beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, quoniam ipsi saturabun-
tur [Mt 5,6], a quo debemus petere cibum potumque iustitiae nisi ab illo, qui esurientibus eam
et sitientibus promittit eius saturitatem? The allusion to conf. 10, 40 is clear. In a later work
(perseu. 53), Augustine reports having heard that Pelagius, who is not mentioned in pecc.
mer. 1–2 by name, was particularly irritated by such formulations.
132 pecc. mer. 2, 6 repellamus itaque ab auribus et mentibus nostris eos, qui dicunt accepto

semel liberae uoluntatis arbitrio nec orare nos debere, ut deus nos adiuuet, ne peccemus.
the domestication of concupiscentia 299

Another work dedicated to Marcellinus was de spiritu et littera (412).

Augustine answers Marcellinus’ question on whether anyone has lived who
would have reached perfection in this life. Augustine’s answer is negative.133
Considering concupiscentia, there are two points of view that are stressed in
spir. et litt.
The first point is Augustine’s insistence on the difference between the
sub lege-type of persons and the sub gratia-type of persons in their relation
to God’s will. This is exemplified by the law that prohibits evil desires (non
concupisces). In the first case (sub lege), the law only succeeds in arousing
fear in its object, but none of the other goals of the law are reached. In the
second case, God has poured out his grace and given the ability to resist evil
desires. Most importantly, the inner motivation of a sub gratia person lies
now in delight, instead of fear.134 The second point of view involves emphasis
on the simple fact that the effects of concupiscentia are nonetheless to be felt
in a Christian, sub gratia-type of life. Renewal is again seen as a process and
progress in diminishing the effects of concupiscentia in the actions of the
Christian.135
Augustine’s strategy in pointing out these facets of renewal and concupis-
centia is once more to focus on the final perfection, in which nothing of the
“movements of earthly passions” is any longer to be suffered as compared
to this life of “lesser righteousness” (minor iustitia) in the Christian strug-
gle, and to discern between “horrible vices and crimes” and “lighter” minor
peccadilloes committed in the Christian life. Both kinds of these sins—the
grave and the light—are the result of a consent to an “illicit delight,” but the
former ones are, according to Augustine, not part of a Christian’s renewal,
whereas the latter, the lighter versions of sin cannot actually be avoided.
Fortunately, they can be expiated by modest prayer.136 Augustine also offers
some examples of such minor offences, which are the result of consenting
to concupiscentia in a baptised life: to listen to, or to utter foul words, or to
entertain a wish of something forbidden to be lawful.137
Similarly to pecc. mer., Augustine downplays the effects and results of
concupiscentia in the Christian life, and warns Marcellinus and the Catholic

133 spir. et litt. 65.

134 spir. et litt. 22; 25; 51.
135 spir. et litt. 13; 59.
136 spir. et litt. 65.
137 spir. et litt. 65 ut uel aurem alicui uoci, quae audienda non esset, uel linguam alicui, quae

dicenda non esset, accommodet uel in ipso corde aliquid ita cogitet, ut mallet licitum quod male
delectat et per praeceptum scitur inlicitum.
300 chapter six

readership not to cherish the thought that a baptised Christian could “go
after his or her concupiscence,” while he or she might, and indeed does, have
and feel its “movements.”
The question of perfection is also dealt with in de perfectione iustitiae
(415).138 The work is a monotonic series of answers against theses on the per-
fection in this life. In the beginning of his treatise, Augustine firmly rejects
those enterprises aspiring to perfection by referring to the circumstances of
the human fallen nature. Indeed, certain aspects of human sinfulness make
it appear to be inevitable and inavoidable. While sin could theoretically be
avoided entirely by renewal in Christ, Christian progress never reaches per-
fection in this life due to the presence of concupiscentia.139
However, as we have already seen in previous works, Augustine discerns
between the sins that will not appear in Christian renewal and the ones
that do. The first instance is known as the crimina damnabilia. The second
kind are called the peccata uenialia.140 For the most part, Augustine speaks of
these lighter sins, some of which are also the remains of concupiscentia. To
struggle against these daily minor sins includes the means of fasting, works
of charity and prayer. These should rein in concupiscentia, which tempts the
Christian to “immoderate” behaviour.141
Augustine returns to his interpretation of Romans 7 in perf. iust. 28. While
Romans 7 has previously appeared in a single mention in perf. iust., this
source text now receives a more extensive analysis. Romans 7 is clearly
interpreted as describing the Christian sub gratia stage, and the strong terms
of Paul that stress necessity, compulsion and division are interpreted in a
mitigating scheme, the changed status of concupiscentia having a leading
role in this reading. Thus, v. 15 (non enim quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod
odi malum hoc facio) qualifies concupiscentia and its effects in Christian
renewal. The “good” that the Christian should do means non concupiscere;
and “to do what one hates” is to have such evil desires (quia concupiscit).
Once more, Augustine adds, this does not mean a dissolute life driven by
concupiscentia. Concupiscence exists in the body, but it does not “reign”
the Christian.142 By the very fact of having to admit the presence of concupi-

138 For the date, see Bonner 1999, who seems to think also 412 as a possible year of

composition.
139 perf. iust. 1–2.
140 perf. iust. 20. Burnell (1995) is an interesting discussion of this distinction in the Chris-

tian tradition preceding Augustine.

141 perf. iust. 18.
142 perf. iust. 28 inest quidem peccatum in membris eius, sed non regnat.
the domestication of concupiscentia 301

scentia and thereby not wishing to have it, the Christian “consents to the
law.” The Christian thus identifies his or her life with faith (fides), and can
therefore treat his or her concupiscentia as being partly an exterior prob-
lem to his or her true self. By not consenting to his or her concupiscentia,
he or she “lives from the faith,” crying for help from God. Augustine thereby
stresses the aspects of the renewed and mended will in the Christian. The
good actions are listed as “hating your concupiscence,” “not to neglect alms-
giving,” “forgiving those who sin against you,” “to pray for forgiveness of your
debts and to sincerely promise to forgive others,” “to pray that you would
not be led to temptation but to be delivered from evil.” Thus, the daily, reg-
ular, simple and easy tasks in practising one’s Christianity are mentioned as
being sufficient medication to the small wounds afflicted by concupiscen-
tia.143 Moreover, over time, the effects of concupiscentia will be eased even
more.144
In the final chapter of perf. iust., Augustine, however, notes that despite
the ability to reign over one’s tamed concupiscentia in the sub gratia stage,
and despite the distinction between the consented and non-consented
“movements” of concupiscentia, all Christians have to remember that they
usually and normally will have some consented sins to ask forgiveness
for. Augustine thus wants to preclude an interpretation that, based on
Augustine’s own distinction between the consented and non-consented
concupiscence, it is possible and easy to never consent to the remains of
concupiscentia.
[One] should consider what relation all this bears to the Lord’s Prayer,
wherein we say, “Forgive us our debts.” Now, if I judge aright, it would be
unnecessary to put up such a prayer as this, if we never in the least degree con-
sented to the lusts of the before-mentioned sin, either in a slip of the tongue,
or in a wanton thought.145 [transl. Holmes]
Again, however, Augustine’s description of consented sins under Christian
renewal are rather mild: “a slip of tongue” or “to take delight in some
thought.” Even the act of consent is here qualified with aliquantum, thus
making the consent in these cases “slight.”
So far, we have seen the way Augustine consistently stresses both the
imperfection of Christian renewal in this life, and the relative ease with

143 perf. iust. 28.

144 perf. iust. 31.
145 perf. iust. 44 uideat quid agatur de dominica oratione, ubi dicimus: dimitte nobis debita

nostra [Mt 6,12]. quod, nisi fallor, non opus esset dicere, si numquam uel in lapsu linguae uel in
oblectanda cogitatione eiusdem peccati desideriis aliquantum consentiremus.
302 chapter six

which concupiscentia may be overcome in the daily struggles of the Catholic

Christian. Likewise essential for Augustine’s treatment of concupiscentia in
the early Pelagian debates is his emphasis on concupiscentia as necessitating
a daily dependence on God’s grace.
Before we turn to the major works of the later, or second anti-Pelagian
phase, let us note how Augustine also underlines grace with concupiscen-
tia in his de gestis Pelagii (416/417) and de gratia Christi et peccato originali
(418). In both of these works, Augustine points out how the Pelagian under-
standing of grace as mere doctrine, law, or revelation, misses the point in
the life of a Christian. In Pelagius’ view, humankind after Adam only suffers
from ignorance. In Augustine’s view, there is something more amiss than
mere insufficient knowledge of what is good. In other words, law alone, sci-
entia legis, cannot but make things worse. Concupiscentia thus needs to be
resisted by a much more powerful conception of grace than that of Pela-
gius.146 In affirming this, Augustine uses the verses of Romans 7 to rebut the
Pelagian view of grace. To Augustine, God’s real grace appears as an effect-
ing and activating force that strengthens the Christian in his or her fight
against evil desires.147 A Pelagian, in Augustine’s view, may thus rightly iden-
tify concupiscentia as the sin living in his or her person, but is not able to
resist it by mere knowledge of the law, or is able to resist it in an illusory
way only.148
In gr. et pecc. or., Augustine once more inculcates the positive effects of
baptism against concupiscentia. Augustine points out that evil desire inhab-
its a baptised Christian, but it cannot form an obstacle to his or her salvation,
as is the case of those who are still unbaptised. Augustine here makes his first
soundings on the matter of how and why exactly concupiscentia also seems
to be transmitted to the next generation from Christian parents. The reason
lies in the already established fact that concupiscentia is (mainly) located in
the body, which is not yet under renewal and is still under “damnation.” A
neat analogy for this odd situation is provided by biblical botany: the seeds
of the olive tree still produce wild olives. In other words, acquired qualities,
such as grace and forgiveness in baptism, are not transmitted.149

146 gest. Pel. 20–21.

147 gr. et pecc. or. 1, 9. See also gr. et pecc. or. 1, 3.
148 In the polemics against Julian, Augustine will often note, however, how the represen-

tatives of the Pelagian party seem to show a happy inconsistence in their views: for, despite
their inaccurate analysis of human abilities, they still demonstrate how the inner workings
of grace oppose them against concupiscentia and give real powers to the fight against it.
149 gr. et pecc. or. 2, 44–45.
the domestication of concupiscentia 303

Together with these two directly anti-Pelagian works, the problem of

concupiscentia and Christian renewal is also treated extensively in de con-
tinentia (418–420).150 The basic argument is already familiar from previous
anti-Pelagian works. Thus, Augustine’s way of reading Romans 7 in cont.
emphasises again, how bonum facere, or uelle adiacet, in Paul means the
Christian life, in which one should not consent to the existing concupiscen-
tia, while bonum perficere (Rom 7, 18) is only achieved in heaven.151
However, Augustine now sharpens this reading by claiming that, in fact,
only people who undergo Christian renewal are familiar with such a (victori-
ous) internal struggle and opposition. While the virtue of continence is, like
grace in general, a gift of God, it follows that only those who have received
this gift can identify themselves with Paul’s words in Romans 7.
They do not experience this fight within themselves who are not defenders of
the virtues and opponents of the vices, nor does anything drive out the evil of
concupiscence except the good of continence.152 [transl. McDonald]
Augustine then begins to argue his claim in detail. He does this by apply-
ing once again his old four-fold scheme. First of all, people who have no
knowledge of the law at all (qui legem dei omnino nesciunt) fall prey to
evil desires, and do not even recognise them as their enemies but serve
them as if their happiness would consist of satisfying their passions rather
than of conquering them. But what about people who know the law (sub
lege)? Theirs is no happier destiny, for they have no means to conquer their
concupiscentia. On the contrary, the prohibition gives more force to their
concupiscence and makes it, as it were, invincible (auxit prohibitio concu-
piscentiam eamque fecit inuictam)! Augustine develops the state of the sub
lege person in directions where it is not difficult to note his anti-Pelagian
tendencies: he describes people who confide in their own abilities in fulfill-
ing God’s law and ignore God’s righteousness in trying to construct their
own.153 So far, Augustine has not yet depicted any “conquerors of vices”

150 An anti-Pelagian context for the work was first suggested by Bonnardière 1959. Hunter

(1995) and Rackett (1995) give additional reasons for the dating. Hunter suggests that the
contents of cont. link the work both to gr. et pecc. or. and the first debates with Julian. Such
links are the connection of concupiscentia with sex, marriage and the transmission of sin;
Julian’s accusation of Augustine’s crypto-Manichaeism; and the interpretation of Rom 7 as a
narrative of Christian life.
151 cont. 6.
152 cont. 7 hanc pugnam non experiuntur in se ipsis nisi bellatores uirtutum debellatoresque

uitiorum; non expugnat concupiscentiae malum nisi continentiae bonum.

153 cont. 7.
304 chapter six

(debellatores uitiorum). But when divine grace enters the scene, the situa-
tion is radically changed:
But when someone has become a transgressor and is wounded, as it were,
so severely that he needs a physician, the Law, like a pedagogue, leads him
back to grace. Against the harmful sweetness by which concupiscence was
formerly gaining the victory the Lord gives a beneficent sweetness by which
continence is the more delighted and “our land yields its fruit,” the fruit on
which the soldier feeds who with the help of God battles sin.154
[transl. McDonald]
In the sub gratia state the inner delight (suauitas benefica) for continence
is given by God, and according to Augustine, it is clearly strong enough to
conquer the harmful delights of concupiscentia. Augustine’s exhortation to
Catholic Christians continues with confident tones and optimism in defeat-
ing the enemy which, before grace came to play, was an invincible force.155
Augustine uses lavishly his military analogy in describing the situation of
the sub gratia person: the enemies consist of various vices (in Pauline list-
ings) and the Christian arsenal consists in turn of various virtues, among
which continence excels (ualet plurimum). Once more, Augustine stresses,
that it is only the sub gratia state which can realistically be compared to a
civil war, for unlike in the sub lege state, the power ratio is now equal or even
more favourable to the “new man,” or to a Christian’s real self in spirit.156
The special feature of cont. is Augustine’s acute awareness of the distinc-
tion between the body (caro, corpus) and its corruption (uitium). Augus-
tine also notes, how ‘flesh’ in the biblical language may denote life accord-
ing to man (secundum hominem), i.e. according to human aspirations as
opposed to God’s.157 Against the Manichaean disavowal of the body, Augus-
tine stresses the goodness of both the body and the soul.158
The rehabilitation of the body continues somewhat later, when Augus-
tine attempts to pinpoint where the sinfulness of the flesh exactly lies:

154 cont. 7 si autem lex factum praeuaricatorem, tamquam ad hoc grauius uulneratum, ut

desideret medicum, tamquam paedagogus perducit ad gratiam, contra suauitatem noxiam,

qua uincebat concupiscentia, dominus dat suauitatem beneficam, qua delectetur amplius conti-
nentia, et terra nostra dat fructum suum, quo pascitur miles, qui debellat deo iuuante peccatum.
155 cont. 8.
156 cont. 9.
157 On the other hand, he also notes, while commenting on Paul’s Gal 5, 16–21, that the

Christian spiritual life refers not only to the human spirit but also to the Spirit of God. cont.
12 itaque ut spiritu nostro opera carnis mortificemus, spiritu dei agimur, qui dat continentiam,
qua frenemus, domemus, uincamus concupiscentiam.
158 cont. 18.
the domestication of concupiscentia 305

Now, the flesh desires nothing except through the soul, but the flesh is said to
lust against the spirit when the soul through carnal concupiscence wrestles
with the spirit. We make up this whole: the flesh itself, which dies when the
soul departs, is our weak part, and is not dismissed as to be fled from, but is
placed aside to be received again, and when it is received, it will be abandoned
no more […] These two, therefore, which now struggle against each other
within us, since we consist of both, let us pray and endeavor that they may
be in accord. For, we ought not to consider one of them an enemy, but an
imperfection whereby the flesh lusts against the spirit.159
[transl. McDonald]
Augustine here makes a commitment, which could be named as being an
identification with the body.160 Accordingly, concupiscentia “happens” both
in the body and the soul, of which neither is to be seen as the real enemy
of the renewed Christian. The real enemy is the uitium, or discord element,
which may be located in the body, but which still desires through the soul
(per animam). Now Augustine returns to Romans 7, with focus on the ‘flesh’
and its exact meaning in Paul’s narrative. Augustine shows how even Paul
identified himself with his own body (se itaque dicit esse carnem suam), and
did not treat the body per se as an enemy (non ergo ipsa et inimica nostra).
But what about the description of Romans 7, where the flesh serves the law
of sin, while the mind serves God’s law? Augustine expressly denies that this
would mean that Paul consented to his fleshly desires. Instead, the Christian
reader should learn how Paul acknowledges his body as his own, how he
notes the “movements there” (motus desideriorum illic habendo), the move-
ments he does not want to have and yet has. But, Augustine claims, Paul
did not consent to these movements and therefore he served the law of God
and restrained his members.161 Augustine’s Paul, and Augustine’s renewed
Christian, are thus strong-willed persons, whose actions he describes in the
indicative:
There are in us, therefore, evil desires, and by not consenting to these we
do not live wrongly; there are in us the concupiscences of sins, and by not

159 cont. 19 caro enim nihil nisi per animam concupiscit; sed concupiscere caro aduersus spir-

itum dicitur, quando anima carnali concupiscentia spiritui reluctatur. totum hoc nos sumus. et
caro ipsa, quae discedente anima moritur, nostra pars infirma est, non fugienda dimittitur, sed
recipienda reponitur nec recepta ulterius relinquetur. […] haec igitur duo, quae nunc inuicem
aduersantur in nobis, quoniam in utroque nos sumus, ut concordent oremus et agamus. non
enim alterum eorum putare debemus inimicum, sed uitium, quo caro concupiscit aduersus spir-
itum. See also cont. 29.
160 Babcock (1994, 192–193) emphasises the anti-Manichaean aspects of cont. in this

respect. See TeSelle 2001, 315, 323, using Fredriksen 1988: “appropriating and internalizing.”
161 cont. 19.
306 chapter six

obeying these we do not accomplish (perficimus) evil, but by having them we

do not yet accomplish (perficimus) good.162 [transl. McDonald]
This image is once more argued by Augustine’s rather artificial reading of
Rom 7, 18 and Gal 5, 16, where the middle state of the Christian is seen
as not yet being in perfect rest without any concupiscentia and not “per-
fecting,” or consenting to the evil temptations of the same concupiscen-
tia.163 The relatively passive and domesticated state of evil inclinations in
the baptised Christian is again depicted by the word “movement.” These
movements are felt when one is “pleased in something inappropriate” (id
quod non licet libet). The mind serving the law of God efficiently curbs
these movements, and wins them by “the good delight” (bona delectatio).
Augustine treads a fine line between reducing the real effects of concupis-
centia to nothing on the one hand, and having to hold on to his view of
imperfect, grace dependent righteousness on the other. The words ‘move,’
and ‘movements’ seem to please Augustine, for they render well both the
weak and passive but still existing and continuing effects of concupiscen-
tia.164
[B]ut the perfection of good is not attained as long as, serving the law of sin
with the flesh, lust allures. Even though it is restrained, it still moves, for it
would not need to be restrained if it were not in motion.165
[transl. McDonald]
While Augustine’s depictions of the inner holy war in Christian renewal may
be called confident for good reasons, he still acknowledges some dangers in
warfare. The first danger is that of pride. Proud people are “pleased with
themselves” and do not wish to be found guilty. They live in denial of the
facts, that is, they do not recognize themselves as sinners. To resist the risk

162 cont. 20 sunt ergo in nobis desideria mala, quibus non consentiendo non uiuimus male;

sunt in nobis concupiscentiae peccatorum, quibus non oboediendo non perficimus malum, sed
eas habendo nondum perficimus bonum.
163 cont. 20 utrumque ostendit apostolus, nec bonum hic perfici, ubi malum sic concupiscitur,

nec malum hic perfici, quando tali concupiscentiae non oboeditur. illud quippe ostendit, ubi ait:
uelle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non [Rom 7,18]; hoc uero, ubi ait: spiritu ambulate et
concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis [Gal 5,16]. neque enim ibi dicit non sibi adiacere facere
bonum, sed perficere; neque hic dicit: concupiscentias carnis [Gal 5,16] ne habueritis, sed ne
perfeceritis [Gal 5,16].
164 Thus, motus (inordinatus) as meaning concupiscentia is not necessarily a crypto-

Manichaean remnant in Augustine’s thinking, but a simple way to express the passive state
of concupiscentia in the Christian renewal. Cf. van Oort 1987; 1989.
165 cont. 20 sed boni perfectio non inpletur, quamdiu legi peccati carne seruiente libido inlicit

et quamuis contineatur, tamen mouetur. non enim opus esset ut contineretur, si non moueretur.
the domestication of concupiscentia 307

of pride, Augustine suggests that Christians practise the virtue of continence

and living in daily prayer (dimitte nobis debita nostra).166
The second danger is a negligent, or even lax, attitude towards evil
desires. Augustine admits that even in the Church, there are some carnal
members who lust against Christ by their vices, and thus make corpus Christi
appear to be a mixed creature in this life, comparable to the divided Chris-
tian of Romans 7. But Augustine warns his Catholic readership against such
negligence. In short, concupiscentia should really be fought against. This
means that a Christian cannot live in grave sins and presume that he or she
will be saved despite them. In the end of cont., Augustine offers a stern warn-
ing against a too careless way of living, based exactly on his conviction that
grave temptations and libidines can be effectively resisted and conquered,
while lighter temptations and lapses may be propitiated by daily repentance
and by active Christian worship.167

6.5. Encountering Caricatures—

The Second Phase of the Pelagian Debate

It is now time to turn to the second phase of the Pelagian controversy.

Augustine’s understanding of concupiscentia carnis, or sexual desire, was a
central and debated concept during the crisis. In this second phase, Julian
of Aeclanum emerged as the main opponent of Augustine.168 Whereas in
the first phase of the Pelagian debate (411–418), the issues of baptism, grace
and human nature were approached on a more general level, in the second
phase (418–430), these and many more subjects of anthropology and theol-
ogy were developed and scrutinized in detail by Julian and Augustine. It is,
of course, not possible to give a satisfying account of the entire debate even
with the limitation of focusing only on Augustine’s way of treating concu-
piscentia. Some persistent features in Augustine’s way of depicting concu-
piscentia and its effects on Christian renewal will, however, be pointed out
in the following pages. It will become clear that Augustine’s previous ideas
of Christian renewal and concupiscentia during the Pelagian debate did also
persist and evolve in his literary war against Julian of Aeclanum. Recurring
themes in the debate with Julian are a realistic optimism on the possibilities

166 cont. 13.

167 cont. 30–31.
168 For Julian’s background and the circumstances of this debate, see Lössl 2001. For various

aspects of Julian’s theology, see e.g. Lamberigts 1988; 1990; 1996; Lössl 2002.
308 chapter six

of controlling evil desires, a mitigating reading of Paul, a constant self-

identification of the Christian with his or her body and a regular pastoral con-
cern for the Catholic readership.169 These themes have often been left unno-
ticed under the rhetorical racket of the two debaters. Especially Julian’s
accusation of Augustine’s hidden Manichaean sympathies has received a
benign readership, and has succeeded in muddling Augustine’s own, admit-
tedly narrow, carefully constructed position between an entirely exterior,
strongly compulsory interpretation of concupiscentia and a completely neu-
tralized form of concupiscentia expounded in Julian’s terms as a natural,
although irrational emotive energy. Instead of the plainly and overtly sex-
ual contents of concupiscentia in the debate with Julian, we will attempt to
highlight Augustine’s background concerns for the Christian renewal and
the process of justification even in sexual and marital matters.170
We will first turn to Augustine’s treatise on marriage and sexual desires,
de nuptiis et concupiscentia (418–421), written on the request of comes Vale-
rius to answer some serious and detailed allegations by Julian of Aeclanum.
The first book was written to Valerius after Augustine had heard from
him of Julian’s attack. Julian answered Augustine’s first book with his ad
Turbantium, of which Augustine then received some inaccurate excerpts,
and based his answer—the second book—on these excerpts.171
Augustine dedicated the work to Valerius for various reasons. First, Vale-
rius was a married man with a secular career, and second, he was clearly in
a position to have influence on putting the Pelagians in their right minds.
Third, Augustine also wished to offer Valerius some means of argument in
the matter.172 Augustine is under the impression that Valerius is very inter-
ested in the topic and is keen to hear his advice on the matter. This advisory
and exhortatory character of nupt. et conc. is something one should keep
in mind, for, although it is partly a polemical work, it is also a paedagogic
treatise on Christian renewal in married life.173

169 Cf. here Ring 1989, together with Martin 1995, 157.
170 For analyses of Augustine’s and Julian’s views of sexuality, see e.g. Rist 1994, 321–327;
Lamberigts 1997; 2000; Lössl 2001, 101–105 (criticizing Rist’s pro-Augustinian stance).
171 Lössl 2001, 6–8. Lamberigts (2005, 167) stresses the importance of nupt. et conc. 1 by

way of an exaggeration: “all succeeding works of the controversies were little more than a
deepening and rehashing of the questions raised in this work.” Zumkeller 1985 notes how
nupt. et conc. 1. continues and deepens the discussions of pecc. orig.
172 nupt. et conc. 1, 2. For Valerius’ person and role in the dispute, as well as for the

general circumstances between Africa and Ravenna, see Lössl 2001, 280–286. Lössl (2001, 281)
suspects that Valerius was initially closer to Julian than meets the eye.
173 Perhaps there is also a nervous twinkle in the bishop’s eye when he dedicates his work

to a Christian husband—to be read at nightly hours. nupt. et conc. 1, 40 ab homine dei, qui te
the domestication of concupiscentia 309

One of the central themes in nupt. et conc. is familiar from the previous
anti-Pelagian works, namely the emphasis on virtues as divine gifts. In the
beginning of this work, Augustine aims very clearly at a Catholic readership
by inculcating the impossibility of virtuous life without Christian faith.
When he starts to expound the role and purpose of concupiscentia carnis
for Valerius in the first pages of nupt. et conc., the paraenetic tone is evident.
Thus, in the first chapters of nupt. et conc., Augustine clarifies how Chris-
tian parents can use an evil means to good ends by using concupiscentia to
produce offspring. But merely the existence of children is not enough, for
Augustine also insists that the good in the Christian use of concupiscentia
lies in the fact that those children will be baptised.174 Augustine attempts to
comfort Valerius and other Catholic Christians, who are perhaps concerned
about their sexual behaviour in their marriages, that it is not a danger-
ous thing to have sex in order to get new citizens into the City of God. As
usual, Augustine has an image at hand: it is as if a walker would reach his
or her destination with a lame leg: nobody would praise the lameness of the
leg, but the leg would nevertheless have been useful in reaching the goal.175

familiarius nouit, audissem, quod tam libenter legas, ut etiam nocturnas aliquas horas lectioni
uigilanter inpendas. That the work was intended for the Catholic reading public, and not only
for Valerius, goes without saying. Julian had a keen eye to spot Augustine’s populistic motives
during the debate. See Lössl 2001, 284. That Augustine expected Catholic Christians, espe-
cially those who had any chance of using their time for reading, to be familiar with his works
on baptism and concupiscence, can be seen in ep. 184A to Petrus and Abraham, to whom
he recommends actually reading his works (with a poorly hidden innuendo that they should
stop bothering him with their elemental questions on the problem, plurimis autem opusculis
nostris aut ad omnia aut paene ad omnia, quae requiritis, iam me respondisse, quantum potui,
noueritis. quae si legatis, quoniam sic uos audio instituisse uitam, qua deo seruitis, ut uobis ad
legendum uacet, ep. 184A, 1). No other letters to these recipients survive. Morgenstern 1993,
64. See also ep. 6* to Atticus, in which Augustine gives a brief account of his views on marital
sexuality; the letter includes a rare occurrence of a ‘good concupiscence’ (concupiscentiam
nuptiarum […] concupiscentiam pudicitiae coniugalis, concupiscentiam legitime propagandae
prolis, concupiscentiam uinculi socialis), but the pleonastic style here should warn against any
complicated interpretations. For Augustine’s own anticipations of his readership in his later
years, see Vessey 1998, 264–267.
174 To be sure, Augustine had of course treated the question of marriage and allowable

sexual behaviour earlier in his b. coniug. and repeated the commonplace of having sex for
the sake of conceiving proles, but there the problem is not related explicitly to baptism and
renewal. b. coniug. 3 habent etiam id bonum coniugia, quod carnalis uel iuuenalis inconti-
nentia, etiamsi uitiosa est, ad propagandae prolis redigitur honestatem, ut ex malo libidinis
aliquid boni faciat copulatio coniugalis, deinde quia reprimitur et quodam modo uerecundius
aestuat concupiscentia carnis, quam temperat parentalis affectus. intercedit enim quaedam
grauitas feruidae uoluptatis, cum in eo, quod sibi uir et mulier adhaerescunt, pater et mater
esse meditantur.
175 nupt. et conc. 1, 5; 1, 8.
310 chapter six

Augustine also draws a clear line between a Christian use of sex and a non-
Christian way of sexual behaviour. In Christian marriages, it is not a sin to
use sex in serving good ends, while in the latter case, the “pleasure of the
body” seems, as a rule, take the lead over reason. Augustine is also ready to
allow sexual intercourse for a married Christian couple even in situations
where their intention is not (at least primarily) to produce proles, but to
take pleasure in concupiscentia. This is a venial sin, which prevents greater
scandals (e.g. adultery).176 While some irrational and sensual features of sex-
ual behaviour may be partly identified with Augustine’s understanding of
concupiscentia carnis, the main thrust of Augustine’s argumentation is that
a Christian married couple has all the means necessary to deal with their
sexual drives. The primary rule is to use this defect to good ends, and the
secondary rule is to try not to put too much weight on temporary and venial
lapses to sex that has been pursued just for the pleasure of it. While concu-
piscentia carnis is certainly not an original plan of God’s creation, it may be
very well tolerated in Christian marriage.
More mitigating factors limiting the effects of concupiscentia follow in
Augustine’s exposition. First, however, he has to acknowledge the existence
and transmission of concupiscentia from generation to generation (quo-
modo trahi possit captiuitas prolis etiam de parentibus iam redemptis).177 It
is clear that sexual, fleshly desire is not from God, but its root is elsewhere,
in the world (mundus).178 For the reason that the next generation has been
infected with concupiscentia despite it being forgiven in the baptism of the
parents, Augustine refers again to the analogy of the oleaster and domes-
ticated olive tree (first used in gr. et pecc. or.), which tells its tale to the
Christian readership.179 Augustine admits that it may be difficult for non-
Christians to understand why those freed by God’s grace still give birth to
sinful children. “This is incredible to the unbelievers.”180

176 nupt. et conc. 1, 13. Augustine adds the reservation that no contraceptive methods

should be used even in this case.

177 nupt. et conc. 1, 21.
178 The primary source text for Augustine’s function of concupiscentia as the root of evil,

1 Jn 2, 16, appears thus in a rather peculiar and extraordinary context, compared to its general
use in earlier works. See Chapter 4.
179 See Zumkeller 1985, 600.
180 nupt. et conc. 1, 21 haec inuisibilia et infidelibus incredibilia, sed tamen uera ut haberent

aliquod uisibile exemplum, hoc in quibusdam arbustis diuina prouidentia procurauit. cur enim
non credamus propter hoc esse institutum, ut ex oliua nascatur oleaster? an credendum non
est in aliqua re quae creata est ad usus hominum creatorem prouidisse et instituisse, quod
ad generis humani ualeret exemplum? mirum est ergo quemadmodum a peccati uinculo per
the domestication of concupiscentia 311

After constituting the inevitable transmission of concupiscentia as a link

for original sin to the newborn children even in Christian families, Augus-
tine hastens to mention important reservations to this state of affairs. First,
Augustine emphasises the crucial importance of baptism as the starting
point for Christian renewal; baptism is the most important single factor in
changing and diminishing the effects of concupiscentia.
[T]his concupiscence, I say, which is cleansed only by the sacrament of
regeneration, does undoubtedly, by means of natural birth, pass on the bond
of sin to a man’s posterity, unless they are themselves loosed from it by
regeneration. In the case, however, of the regenerate, concupiscence is not
itself sin any longer […]181 [transl. Holmes]
Augustine repeats the simple fact that, if not consented, concupiscentia can-
not harm baptised Christians, and then creates a space for Christian attitude
to concupiscentia in this life by juxtaposing again two biblical dictums on
concupiscentia: the prohibition not to covet (Ex 20, 17) and the advise not to
follow one’s desires (Sir 18, 30).182
From this viewpoint, Augustine then considers the origin, the force and
the effects of concupiscentia in a loose before vs. now-scheme. Before bap-
tism, concupiscentia is truly a condemning and terrifying, sinful force. After
baptism, the situation is radically different. It is true, Augustine notes, that
concupiscentia has its origin not in God but in the Devil, who is the “source
and author of all sin.” Therefore, children born by concupiscentia are some-
how “guilty” and under the Devil’s authority. Moreover, even in the renewed
state, concupiscentia may again become a link and a source for multiple sins,
if it is given consent: thus concupiscentia may not only be called a “daugh-
ter of sin,” but in some cases, also a “mother of many other sins.”183 While
Augustine thus obviously acknowledges many features in concupiscentia
which might render it as being terrifying and indeed sinful, even diaboli-
cal force, he never lets the horizon of Christian renewal and baptism to slip
from his eyes. In nupt. et conc. 1, 25–29, Augustine attempts to convince his
Catholic reader of the fact that in his or her life, concupiscentia is a tamed

gratiam liberati gignant tamen eodem uinculo obstrictos, quos eodem modo oporteat liberari.
fatemur, mirum est. See also nupt. et conc. 2, 58.
181 nupt. et conc. 1, 25 haec, inquam, concupiscentia, quae solo sacramento regenerationis

expiatur, profecto peccati uinculum generatione traicit in posteros, nisi ab illo et ipsi regenera-
tione soluantur. nam ipsa quidem concupiscentia iam non est peccatum in regeneratis.
182 nupt. et conc. 1, 25 si non fit quod scriptum est: non concupiscas [Ex 20,17], fiat saltem quod

alibi legitur: post concupiscentias tuas non eas [Ecli 18,30].

183 nupt. et conc. 1, 26–27.
312 chapter six

and defeated enemy that can and should be checked and subdued in daily
struggle. Even though concupiscentia thus has many qualities of sin, it is
no longer, however, a proper sin in a renewed Christian. Augustine maps
the way concupiscentia remains in the baptised person and lists several
factors that should console a Christian who is concerned about his or her
observation of still being under the influence of bodily, and apparently
sinful temptations:
If the question arises, how this concupiscence of the flesh remains in the
regenerate, in whose case has been effected a remission of all sins whatever
[…] the answer to be given is this: Carnal concupiscence is remitted, indeed,
in baptism; not so that it is put out of existence, but so that it is not to be
imputed for sin. Although its guilt is now taken away, it still remains until our
entire infirmity be healed by the advancing renewal of our inner man, day by
day, when at last our outward man shall be clothed with incorruption. It does
not remain, however, substantially, as a body, or a spirit; but it is nothing more
than a certain affection of an evil quality, such as languor, for instance. […]
[T]here remains this concupiscence of the flesh in the body of this death. Now
we are admonished not to obey its sinful desires to do evil: “Let not sin reign
in your mortal body.” Still this concupiscence is daily lessened in persons of
continence and increasing years, and most of all when old age makes a near
approach. The man, however, who yields to it a wicked service, receives such
great energies that, even when all his members are now failing through age,
and those especial parts of his body are unable to be applied to their proper
function, he does not ever cease to revel in a still increasing rage of disgraceful
and shameless desire.
In the case, then, of those persons who are born again in Christ, when they
receive an entire remission of all their sins, it is of course necessary that the
guilt also of the still indwelling concupiscence should be remitted, in order
that (as I said) it should not be imputed to them for sin. For even as in the
case of those sins which cannot be themselves permanent, since they pass
away as soon as they are committed, the guilt yet is permanent, and (if not
remitted) will remain for evermore; so, when the concupiscence is remitted,
the guilt of it also is taken away. For not to have sin means this, not to be
deemed guilty of sin.184 [transl. Holmes]

184 nupt. et conc. 1, 28–29 si autem quaeritur, quomodo ista concupiscentia carnis maneat

in regenerato, in quo uniuersorum facta est remissio peccatorum, […] respondetur dimitti con-
cupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non inputetur. quamuis
autem reatu suo iam soluto manet tamen, donec sanetur omnis infirmitas nostra proficiente
renouatione interioris hominis de die in diem cum exterior induerit incorruptionem; non enim
substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio est quaedam malae quali-
tatis, sicut languor. non ergo aliquid remanet, quod non remittatur, […] manet in corpore mortis
huius carnalis concupiscentia, cuius uitiosis desideriis ad inlicita perpetranda non oboedire
praecipimur, ne regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore. quae tamen concupiscentia coti-
the domestication of concupiscentia 313

What emerges from this account is the following: baptism removes all
guilt for every kind of sin, and this applies also to concupiscentia. Augustine
treats sin (peccatum) here in terms of juridical liability. If such a liability is
annulled, the existence of the original cause means nothing. “To have no
sin means to be not guilty of sin.” It is easy to note how Augustine very
strongly stresses exactly this point by repeating it time after time (sicut
dixi). Moreover, Augustine highlights the encouraging visions of Christian
progress: the effects of concupiscentia will concretely diminish and weaken
in time, as the process of justification goes ahead. What is important and
fully possible, is that Christians only remind themselves of not giving loose
reins to concupiscentia. Concupiscentia is a “reigned sin,” but if allowed,
it may again take the lead, even in old age, and then the result will be
extremely sad (turpius et procacius insanire non desinat).
Augustine then takes up Romans 7 for the first time in nupt. et conc. for a
more extensive treatment (a text he has mentioned only incidentally thus
far in this work). Augustine’s tendency is strong and constant: after having
recognised the subject of Romans 7 as the Christian Paul, he downplays
all innuendos of compulsive and necessitating inclinations to sin in Paul’s
narrative. We will now briefly review Augustine’s strategy in achieving this
goal. The basic structure of Augustine’s interpretation is to interpret Paul as
exhortating Christians not “to not have” evil desires, but “to not obey.” To
illustrate this, let us compare Augustine’s source text and his interpretation
in some detail:

PAUL AUGUSTINE
A. 7, 15 non enim quod uolo […] sed A. I wish to be perfect, but I have con-
quod odi, facio cupiscentia; therefore, I am not perfect.
B. 7, 16 consentio legi B. Because the law commands: “Do not
covet,” and I agree: I should not have
concupiscentia

die minuitur in proficientibus et continentibus accedente etiam senectute multo maxime. qui
uero ei nequiter seruiunt, tantas in eis uires accipit, ut plerumque iam aetate deficientibus mem-
bris eisdemque partibus corporis ad illud opus admoueri minus ualentibus turpius et procacius
insanire non desinat.
in eis ergo, qui regenerantur in Christo cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus omnium pec-
catorum, utique necesse est ut reatus etiam huius licet adhuc manentis concupiscentiae remit-
tatur, ut in peccatum, sicut dixi, non inputetur. nam sicut eorum peccatorum, quae manere non
possunt, quoniam cum fiunt praetereunt, reatus tamen manet et, nisi remittatur, in aeternum
manebit, sic illius, quando remittitur, reatus aufertur. hoc est enim non habere peccatum, reum
non esse peccati.
314 chapter six

PAUL AUGUSTINE
C. 7, 17 non ego operor illud, sed id quod C. Because I do not consent to concu-
in me habitat peccatum piscentia, which I still have! It is impos-
sible to deny one’s responsibility to
consented actions; therefore, Paul has
not consented to his actions, which he
denies to be his. “Inhabiting sin” means
only (tantummodo) the passive state of
concupiscentia.
D. 7, 18 scio enim quia non habitat in D. I am able to do good, i.e. not consent
me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum. uelle to evil desires; but I am not able to be
enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem perfect, i.e. to not have any evil desires
bonum non inuenio. at all.
E. 7, 19–21 non enim quod uolo […] E. Repetition: I wish the same as the
mihi malum adiacet law, i.e. not to covet, but I still covet,
against this wish (nolens concupisco).
F. 7, 22 condelector enim legi dei secun- F. Divine grace gives us an inner delight
dum interiorem hominem by which we are able to resist concupis-
centia and we now willingly rejoice of
God’s will.
G. 7, 23 uideo autem aliam legem in G. This law of sin is concupiscentia!
mebris meis […] et captiuantem me in It tries to capture us again under its
lege peccati, quae est in membris meis power. We cannot read this as Paul
would really mean that concupiscen-
tia actually would hold us prisoners.
Either it means that concupiscentia
holds our flesh in captivity, or—which
is a more natural reading—it has to be
understood as “trying to capture” (cap-
tiuare conantem).
H. 7, 24–25 ipse ego mente seruio legi H. Mente means that I do not consent
dei, carne autem legi peccati to concupiscentia (non consentiendo
legi peccati), carne means that in my
body I still have concupiscentia (haben-
do desideria peccati, quibus etsi non
consentio, nondum tamen penitus ca-
reo).
I. 8, 1 nulla ergo condemnatio est nunc I. Despite the existence of concupiscen-
his qui sunt in Christo Iesu tia in our bodies, Christians are freed
from condemnation.
J. 8, 2 lex enim spiritus uitae […] libe- J. This means: all guilt of concupiscentia
rauit me a lege peccati has been absolved in baptism, and it is
no more imputed as sin.
the domestication of concupiscentia 315

By now, it has become self-evident that Augustine interprets Romans

7 as a Christian self-reflexion.185 The entire chapter is here read in terms
of concupiscentia and its effects on the Christian struggle. Paradoxically,
this means that Augustine has to use a soft focus in reading the verses
that stress sin’s compulsory character and its strong grip on the human
person. The complaint of Paul’s ego of his straightforwardly involuntary
state is seen as a complaint of a Christian who yearns for perfection. The
active verb-forms of Paul in commiting a sin he does not accept (quod odi
facio) are read as a passive state of concupiscentia (concupisco), still existing
in the Christian. Whereas Paul does not say anything about a consent to
passions, this concept is crucial in Augustine’s interpretation. It is decisive
in defining whether or not the Christian ego is responsible for a sin. Despite
the feelings of frustration or self-loathing by Christians, once they consent
to the temptations of concupiscentia, responsibility for their personal sins
cannot be denied. Therefore, Paul’s description cannot act as a defense of
any kind for a double life. Augustine emphasises that the feelings aroused
by one’s state are not important: the only thing that matters is whether one
has decided to enjoy or to act according to concupiscentia by one’s “heart’s
consent,” not to mention one’s “body’s assistance.”186
Nonetheless, it is Rom 7, 23 that forms perhaps the most serious challenge
to Augustine’s reading. For in this verse Paul seems to depict the agony of
his renewed self in more pessimistic tones than suits Augustine’s view of
the presence of concupiscentia in a baptised Christian. Augustine admits
implicitly that there are some difficulties in interpreting the words captiuan-
tem me in a correct way. Augustine’s own solution entails a controversial
reading, namely, one has to add “conantem” in order to get Paul right. Augus-
tine would accept the verb captiuare as referring to the body, and then Paul
would mean “holding my flesh in captivity.”187 But as the word caro does not

185 Augustine had preached on Rom 7 (s. 151–156) in the previous autumn (in 417), explor-

ing and preparing the account he now gives to Valerius in 418. It seems that in those sermons
Augustine explicitly treats the ego of Rom 7 as the autobiographical Paul. See Partoens 2008
and Lössl 2008, for dating of the sermons. Lössl 2008, xlvii: “In serm. 154, 4 he clearly states,
for the first time ever, that Paul speaks of himself in this verse. From now on he will do
so frequently.” Note, however, Augustine’s wording in nupt. et conc. 1, 30, uelut ex sua per-
sonae introductione nos instruit. The ego is still not the purely autobiographical Paul, but also
a rhetorical construction, whose goal is paedagogical. Ego, in Augustine’s reading, includes
Paul, but also every Christian acknowledging his or her situation.
186 nupt. et conc. 1, 31. For a discussion of this passage as evidence for an “implicit two-

phased consent process of the will,” see Pang-White 2003, 154–155.

187 As in cont., Augustine here also makes the distinction between the ‘flesh’ and ‘body’ or

‘bodily constitution.’ The ‘flesh’ or carnale nostrum refers to a morbidus carnis adfectus, non
316 chapter six

appear in the text, and Paul explicitly says (in first person with an ego that
should be identified as a renewed Christian) that concupiscentia “holds me
in captivity,” he actually must mean that concupiscentia is only trying and
attempting to capture me as a renewed Christian.
Augustine concludes his exegesis on Romans 7 by recapitulating the most
important points. Paul, or the typical Christian, fights off and defeats carnal
captivity and the temptations of the concupiscence with new spirit (lex
mentis meae), even though there is still a presence of evil desires in his or her
mortal body. Augustine’s goal has now become evident: he needs to modify
and mitigate the effects of the involuntary concupiscentia of Paul’s narrative
and to explain them as relatively harmless and ineffective. Accordingly, it is
perfectly possible to control concupiscentia by a renewed will that has been
affected by grace. Augustine eloquently puts his position in the form of a
metaphor, again taken from warfare:
[T]here is in our members another law which wars against the law of the
mind, so long as the flesh lusts against the spirit–without, however, subju-
gating the mind, inasmuch as on its side, too, the spirit has a concupiscence
contrary to the flesh. Thus, although the actual law of sin partly holds the flesh
in captivity (whence comes its resistance to the law of the mind), still it has
not an absolute empire in our body, notwithstanding its mortal state, since
it refuses obedience to its desires. For in the case of hostile armies between
whom there is an earnest conflict, even the side which is inferior in the fight
usually holds a something which it has captured.188 [transl. Holmes]
Once more, Augustine uses a mitigating modification to depict the effects of
concupiscentia: aliquid teneat. He notes that concupiscentia will not “reign”
us anymore, unless consent is given to it. Finally, concupiscentia is a defeated
enemy, still waging a desperate guerrilla war in our lives. Even though it still
holds some insignificant ground and has some prisoners-of-war (aliquid), it
is a weak and beaten force; therefore, there is no need to worry!189

ipsam corporis conformationem. nupt. et conc. 1, 35. Augustine’s tendency to rehabilitate the
body is again apparent. Paul’s body belongs to the Christian self. A Manichaean interpreta-
tion of Rom 7 is thereby warded off by Augustine.
188 nupt. et conc. 1, 35 alia lex in membris repugnet quidem legi mentis, dum caro concupiscit

aduersus spiritum [Gal 5,17], etsi mentem non subiuget, quia et spiritus concupiscit aduersus
carnem. atque ita quamuis lex ipsa peccati captiuum teneat aliquid carnis, unde resistat legi
mentis, non tamen regnat in nostro licet mortali corpore, si non oboeditur desideriis eius. solent
enim et hostes, aduersus quos dimicatur, et inferiores esse in certamine et uicti aliquid tenere
captiuum.
189 Augustine uses e.g. the words pugna, agon, certamen, and bellum in describing the

situation of Christians fighting against their inner adversary. For the inner fight referred to
as a military combat, but also as a wrestling or boxing match, see the pertinent comments
by TeSelle 2001, 325–327.
the domestication of concupiscentia 317

Augustine thus has found his initial depiction of the tamed concupiscen-
tia confirmed by Paul’s account. This new account of Paul is rather far away
from Augustine’s earlier attempts to read the same text as describing the
agony of a sub lege person: the compulsory and akratic features have been
omitted tidily, and now Romans 7 neatly speaks with the words of a renewed
Christian, able to resist the evil inclinations of concupiscentia. While concu-
piscentia is perhaps not a force to be carelessly played with, it is a caged and
domesticated beast surrounded by the more powerful forces of Christian
renewal conducted by God’s grace. Moreover, Augustine invites his Catholic
readers to consider their brilliant future in Christian progress. He refers to
a time that awaits Christians when they have no adversaries to wrestle, and
even their bodies will be entirely free from the scars and the lameness of
concupiscentia.190
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Augustine’s ground conviction in nupt.
et conc. thus emerges as something that could be described as a confident
or enkratic view of Christian life. Baptism, God’s grace and the daily prayers
and works of charity all work as strong medications against concupiscentia;
they render the Christian with a strong, even if not yet a perfect, will. The
paraenetic function of nupt. et conc. is constantly present in the work; thus,
Book 1 ends with final remarks on the importance of baptism as a cleansing
sacrament, after Augustine has expounded his views of the weak and tamed
concupiscentia, and has argued this view with an extensive exegesis of his
biblical key text, Romans 7.
Simultaneously with nupt. et conc., Augustine also composed another
answer to Julian’s critique in contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum (419–
420).191 From the viewpoint of concupiscentia and Christian renewal, the
most interesting discussion of c. ep. Pel. is located in the first book, which
is aimed against Julian’s letter to the Pelagian Christians in Rome (Jul. ep.
Rom).192 Augustine attempts to answer and refute Julian’s caricatures of him
as a Manichaean.193 Some of these caricatures are either too inaccurate or do

190 nupt. et conc. 1, 35 quod in carne nostra quamuis sub peccati lege teneatur, tamen in spe

redemptionis est, quia ipsa uitiosa concupiscentia nulla omnino remanebit, caro autem nostra
ab ea peste morboque sanata et tota inmortalitate uestita in aeterna beatitudine permanebit.
191 For the circumstances, see Wermelinger 1975, 232–238; Lössl 2001, 286–292.
192 The main arguments of Jul. ep. Rom. are neatly collected in Lössl 2001, 290 n. 228.
193 To accuse one’s theological opponent of Manichaeism was something of a common-

place. See Markus 1990a, 48, 56–57. See also Markus 1991. Evans (1982, 139) thinks that Julian’s
accusation was an attempt to show not that Augustine still had secret sympathies for the sect
but that “the tendency of Augustine’s thought is ‘Manichaean.’”
318 chapter six

not concern the question of concupiscentia and renewal. At least two accu-
sations by Julian, however, merit a more extensive discussion. The first is his
allegation that Augustine would think that the apostles were gravely sinful
characters, who were driven by their base passions. The second is Julian’s
image of Augustine’s theology of baptism, in which concupiscentia is left to
grow and produce fresh sins in the same way a razor leaves the roots of a
beard to grow and produce new hair.
Augustine himself seems to devote his first more extensive treatments in
c. ep. Pel. 1 to these two allegations, while some other charges by Julian he
passes by and answers them with shorter comments.
Let us first turn to the charge of “apostles as debauchers” (apostolum
etiam Paulum, inquit, uel omnes apostolos dicunt semper inmoderata libidine
fuisse pollutos).194 Against this claim, Augustine firmly denies that Paul or any
other apostle would have been “polluted by immoderate libido.” He notes
that the question pertains to Romans 7, and to the identity of the ego in
that text. Augustine’s argumentation then aims to deny Julian’s accusation,
which would entail that Paul and his fellow apostles were at the same time
both practising Christians and practising debauchers, i.e. that they were
not able to resist consenting to sinful suggestions.195 To achieve his aim,
Augustine once more returns to Romans 7 and provides another detailed
interpretation of this text. Augustine is convinced that Julian is here led
to his accusation by his mistaken reading of Paul concerning the identity
of ego in Romans 7.196 The mistake of Julian also lies in the fact that he
does not understand the qualitative difference between law and grace in
relation to concupiscentia. Whereas the law only commands, grace also
assists Christians in their struggle.197 Augustine notes that the first half of
Romans 7 does not necessarily conflict with the Pelagian reading, for in
these verses Paul seems to speak of his past. The crucial turn in which
opinions differ is in v. 14, where Paul admits that he is “carnal” and “sold
into slavery under sin.” Here Pelagians think that Paul “transforms into
somebody else,” whereas Augustine holds on to the continuity of the past

194 c. ep. Pel. 1, 13.

195 Augustine makes an outraged side remark to Bonifacius and to his Catholic audience:
quis hoc uel profanus audeat dicere? c. ep. Pel. 1, 13. Cf. ep. 265, 2 et quis hoc fuerat, ut primum
apostolorum inter tales paenitentes numerandum putemus?
196 c. ep. Pel. 1, 13 contendunt id, quod dixit apostolus […] non eum dixisse de se ipso, sed nescio

cuius alterius, qui illa pateretur, induxisse personam. propter quod locus ipse in eius epistula
diligenter considerandus est et scrutandus, ne in eius aliqua obscuritate delitiscat error istorum.
197 c. ep. Pel. 1, 13.
the domestication of concupiscentia 319

and present in Paul.198 Augustine now shows less insecurity than in nupt. et
conc. 1 in maintaining that Paul here clearly refers to his body, which is not
yet spiritual and has not undergone similar changes to those of the mind,
but nevertheless suffers from the effects of mortality and of the original
sin.199 In fact, Augustine remarks once more that Paul’s description should
be read as being rhetorically extended, but not in the way that the Pelagians
suggest. For in addition to Paul’s own life, Rom 7, 14–25 also includes all
those Christians who experience a conflict between their “spiritual delight”
and “carnal affections,” and yet “without consent [to these].”200
Augustine’s basic intention thus remains unchanged. Now he only has
to give a verse-by-verse account of his view of a strong-willed Christian,
affected by grace. For the verses 7, 15–16, he repeats the position of nupt.
et conc. 1, but perhaps in more determined language:
[The apostle] says that he rather consents to the law than to the concupis-
cence of the flesh. For this he calls by the name of sin. Therefore he said that
he acted and laboured not with the desire of consenting and fulfilling, but
from the impulse of lusting itself (ipso motu concupiscendi).201
[transl. Wallis]
At the moment, the weakest point in Augustine’s reading is this: how could
a word referring to action (facio) really be read as having such a passive
sense as Augustine seems to presume (non affectu consentiendi et inplendi
sed ipso motu concupiscendi)? The “movement” of concupiscentia is once
again crucial, for it covers both the existence of evil desires in the Christian
person and the renewed person’s isolation from them.
However, the following verse eases the difficulties somewhat, as Paul
then claims that he does not in fact do what he does not want, but the sin

198 The words in se alium transfigurauerit are not accidental. Augustine himself has used

the term transfigurare in se in several passages in a way that suggests a technical understand-
ing of the word. See e.g. Simpl. 1, 1, 1; nat. et gr. 58; c. Iul. 6, 72; ep. 186, 40; s. 153, 9; 154, 2.
These passages all concern Rom 7. Augustine also uses the word in other connections to
denote rhetorical impersonation, see e.g. bapt. 6, 60; ciu. 17, 12; 20, 20. Towards the end of the
410s, there is an increasing tendency to include Paul personally in the descriptions of Rom
7. Delaroche 1996, 268. For rhetorical analyses of Rom 7 in general, and for the rhetorical
device of prosopopoiia in particular, see Stowers 1994a; 1994b; 2003; Anderson 1996; Thurén
2000. For Augustine’s use of prosopopoiia, see Drobner 1990; Martin 2000.
199 c. ep. Pel. 1, 17.
200 c. ep. Pel. 1, 17. See also c. ep. Pel. 1, 24.
201 c. ep. Pel. 1, 18 magis enim se dicit legi consentire quam carnis concupiscentiae—hanc

enim peccati nomine appellat—; facere ergo se dixit et operari non affectu consentiendi et
inplendi, sed ipso motu concupiscendi.
320 chapter six

which lives in him does. “Under grace,” Paul’s “delight of the will” has been
freed from “the consent of cupidity,” and therefore the Christian can also
disavow his or her new identity from evil desires, while at the same time
suffering from their existence.202 Augustine thus hints at the effective force
of grace in generating a new kind of consent, which is oriented according to
God’s will, but he will return to this a little later.
After having briefly stated his settled interpretation of verse 18 concern-
ing the impossibility of perfection, i.e. total freedom from concupiscentia,
Augustine sums up the three most difficult obstacles in Romans 7 for his
reading, namely the verses that seem to make Paul act under compul-
sion, or those that identify him with his sinful self; ego autem carnalis sum
(Rom 7, 14), uenundatus sub peccato (v. 14) and captiuantem me in lege pec-
cati (v. 23). Augustine admits that these three phrases may lead readers to
assume that Paul here refers to someone other than himself as a renewed
Christian. But, as Augustine points, with captiuantem me, we can easily
resort to the same device as with the two previous difficult verses in order
to locate Paul’s description in a renewed life. This only requires that Paul’s
ego here oscillates between the renewed mens and carnal body, which is
nevertheless his “own”:
“Bringing me into captivity in the law of sin, which is in my members,” [here]
the apostle seems to be describing a man who is still living under the law,
and is not yet under grace. But as I have expounded the former two sayings
in respect of the still corruptible flesh, so also this latter may be understood
as if he had said, “bringing me into captivity,” in the flesh, not in the mind; in
emotion (motione), not in consent; and therefore “bringing me into captivity,”
because even in the flesh there is not an alien nature, but our own.203
[transl. Wallis]
Romans 7 is thus fully applicable to Christian renewal, given that all phrases
suggesting a strong notion of the occupation of sin are understood as con-
cerning the corruptible body.

202 c. ep. Pel. 1, 18 quid est nunc autem nisi iam nunc sub gratia, quae liberauit delectationem

uoluntatis a consensione cupiditatis? non enim melius intellegitur: non ego operor [Rom 7,17],
nisi quia non consentit exhibere membra sua arma iniquitatis peccato. nam si et concupiscit et
consentit et agit, quomodo non ipse illud operatur, etiamsi se operari doleat et uinci grauiter
ingemescat?
203 c. ep. Pel. 1, 20 captiuantem me in lege peccati, quae est in membris meis [Rom 7,23],

potest uideri apostolus eum describere, qui sub lege adhuc uiuit, nondum sub gratia. sed sicut
illa duo exposuimus propter carnem adhuc corruptibilem dicta, sic et hoc potest intellegi, ut
captiuantem me dixerit carne, non mente, motione, non consensione et ideo captiuantem me,
quia et in ipsa carne non est aliena natura, sed nostra.
the domestication of concupiscentia 321

To Augustine, the final verses of Romans 7 seem to affirm his reading.

Paul’s heightening confidence in the grace of Christ confirms the identity
of Paul as a renewed Christian in the entire context. In brief, Paul lives sub
gratia. His inner mind thereby serves the law of God, and his flesh still has
concupiscentia. No divine judgment due to concupiscentia follows or should
be feared, however, because the grace of Christ fortifies the Christian so that
it is possible to no longer give consent to the old habits.204
Now Augustine only has to conclude his answer to Julian’s charge. This
he does in a twofold way. First, he explicitly admits that earlier he has had
an erroneous conception of the identity of the ego in Romans 7.205 He has
corrected his reading, however, due to Paul’s disavowal of his sinful desires
in v. 17, for this cannot be unless the person in question is a Christian sub
gratia and there is a new will, or a new point of view, at work in Paul.206
Secondly, Augustine returns to the changed status of consent that he has
discerned in Romans 7. While the sub lege consent is a forced consent by
fear of the Law and takes delight in sinning, the renewed consent sub gratia
is drawn by a joy and pleasure in God’s will.207 Again, this cannot be achieved
unless one is in the state of grace:
I do not see how a man under the law should say, “I delight in the law
of God after the inward man”; since this very delight in good, by which,
moreover, he does not consent to evil, not from fear of penalty, but from love
of righteousness (for this is meant by “delighting”), can only be attributed to
grace.208 [transl. Wallis]
The circle is now closed and Augustine can draw the conclusions of his
exegesis of Romans 7 which initially was motivated by Julian’s caricature:
even though the apostles were human beings and had a body which is not
yet renewed, it is outrageous to think that they would have been driven by
their evil desires and “polluted with immoderate lust.” In other words, there

204 c. ep. Pel. 1, 21.

205 See Verschoren 2004, 228, 231; Lössl 2008, xlvii–xlviii. Lössl (2008, xlix–lv) suggests that
Augustine’s change of exegesis was triggered by two works: Jerome’s Dialogus, in which a
Pelagian interlocutor holds to a sub lege interpretation of Rom 7, and Pelagius’ Pro libero
arbitrio holding to this kind of reading of Paul.
206 c. ep. Pel. 1, 22.
207 See Pang-White 1999 for a more developed thesis of the two different modes of consent

in Augustine.
208 c. ep. Pel. 1, 22 non uideo quomodo diceret homo sub lege: condelector legi dei secun-

dum interiorem hominem [Rom 7,22], cum ipsa delectatio boni, qua etiam non consentit ad
malum non timore poenae, sed amore iustitiae—hoc est enim condelectari—non nisi gratiae
deputanda sit.
322 chapter six

is a crucial difference between consenting to depraved passions and reining

in and controlling one’s existing concupiscence:
And that the apostles, because they were men, and carried about in the
mortality of this life a body which is corrupted and weighs down the soul,
were, therefore, “always polluted with excessive lust,” as that man injuriously
affirms, be it far from me to say. But I do say that although they were free
from consent to depraved lusts, they nevertheless groaned concerning the
concupiscence of the flesh, which they bridled by restraint with such humility
and piety, that they desired rather not to have it than to subdue it.209
[transl. Wallis]
But another caricature is still left for Augustine to respond to. Julian had
compared Augustine’s idea of incomplete renewal to shaving.
[Julian:] [B]aptism does not give complete remission of sins, nor takes away
crimes, but it shaves them off, so that the roots of all sins are retained in the
evil flesh […] as if of shaved hair on the head, whence the sins may grow to
be cut down again.210 [transl. Wallis]
Julian had thus cleverly referred to Augustine’s old conception of evil desires
as forming the root of evil actions, and claims that according to Augustine,
baptism has only superficial effects on sins and on the “evil flesh.” Such a
banal analogy effectively also ridiculed the idea of daily repentance that was
so important to Augustine. Of course, Augustine rejects Julian’s caricature
and points out that baptism has real and concrete effects on concupiscentia
which Julian had called radices peccatorum. Augustine argues that in the
renewed person, concupiscentia can no longer be treated as proper sin, for
the guilt accompanying it has been removed. Therefore Julian’s caricature
misses the point: the very hair of sin has changed its quality in the baptised
person, even though the “movements” of concupiscentia are often called
sins.211 Thus, Augustine’s auxiliary concept of reatus serves well again in

209 c. ep. Pel. 1, 24 et ideo apostolos, quia homines erant et corpus, quod corrumpitur et

adgrauat animam, in huius uitae mortalitate portabant, absit ut dicamus, sicut iste calum-
niatur, semper inmoderata libidine fuisse pollutos [Iulian. A. c. ep. Pel.], sed dicimus a consen-
sione prauarum libidinum liberos, de concupiscentia tamen carnis, quam moderando frena-
bant, tanta humilitate et pietate gemuisse, ut optarent eam non habere potius quam domare.
210 c. ep. Pel. 1, 26 baptisma non dare omnem indulgentiam peccatorum nec auferre crimina,

sed rarare, ut omnium peccatorum radices in mala carne teneantur […] quasi rasorum in capite
capillorum, unde crescant iterum, resecanda peccata. Brown 1972, 202, presents Julian’s cari-
cature in connection with the Pelagian concern of baptism as a radical watershed between
the past and present. Julian’s journalistic caricature would thus reflect a deeper concern for
the radical interpretation of the rite of baptism.
211 c. ep. Pel. 1, 27.
the domestication of concupiscentia 323

debutting Julian’s caricature of shaving. Against Julian’s notion, Augustine

maintains that baptism has some real and concrete effects on the primary
and most elementary sources of sinful behaviour.212
However, Augustine has to admit that there is one point in which Julian’s
comparison is rather accurate. This concerns the persistence of sinful
behaviour even in the renewed Christian, a fact that Augustine stresses even
here. Despite the real and deep effects of baptism, concupiscentia seems
painfully able to produce sinful actions, words, and thoughts, for which the
Christian has to ask forgiveness from God.213 Augustine is once more keen
to stress the idea that there are different classes of sin, those of the venial
kind, and those of crimina. The former are efficiently propitiated by Lord’s
prayer and almsgiving, whereas the latter form an obstacle, for example, for
an individual to be received in the ministry.214

212 For a thought-provoking recent study of Augustine’s theology of baptism, see Cary

2008, 193–220. In short, Cary claims that for Augustine, baptism as such did not confer any
real effects on the Christian, for the thrust of Augustine’s teaching of baptism as a sacrament
was formed in his anti-Donatist theology in which the efficacy of divine signs was bound to
the inner unity of the Church, and not to the external act of baptism. Cary also argues that
the conceptual work on baptism in the anti-Donatist writings was used in the anti-Pelagian
debates. According to Cary’s hypothesis, baptism was an ineffective door through which one
could be transferred from the massa peccati (“unity in Adam”) into the interior unity of all
those who are saved in Christ. In the present study, the effects of baptism can be discussed
only as far as they are connected to concupiscentia and its presence in the life sub gratia,
especially on the question of reatus, for which see the present and following section.
213 c. ep. Pel. 1, 27 fiunt autem siue operando siue loquendo siue, quod facillimum atque

celerrimum est, cogitando. a quibus omnibus quis etiam fidelium gloriabitur castum se habere
cor aut quis gloriabitur mundum se esse a peccato? For yet another caricature Augustine has
to refute, see c. ep. Pel. 3, 4. Julian had depicted the Augustinian Christian as a double-faced
creature, partly divine, partly diabolical. Augustine responds by stressing the real effects of
baptism and by refuting a diabolical remnant in the human constitution. After all, in faith,
Christians are children of God, while in their “infirmities” they can also be seen as children
“of this world.”
214 c. ep. Pel. 1, 28 multi quippe baptizati fideles sunt sine crimine; sine peccato autem in

hac uita neminem dixerim, quantalibet Pelagiani, quia haec dicimus, aduersus nos inflentur et
disrumpantur insania, non quia peccati aliquid remanet, quod in baptismate non remittatur,
sed quia nobis in huius uitae infirmitate manentibus cotidie fieri non quiescunt, quae fideliter
orantibus et misericorditer operantibus cotidie remittantur. Apparently, for a married Chris-
tian couple, sex for the sake of pleasure would in Augustine’s view be such a daily or venial
sin, c. ep. Pel. 1, 33. The sketch by Brown (1972, 205) of the “ordinary Christian layman of the
Later Empire” is highly attractive, but is prone to a misunderstanding not dissimilar to that of
Julian’s; that Augustine’s theology of grace, baptism and concupiscence was only a tailored
attempt to include large masses of converts with them having to make only the slightest
effort in their everyday lives as Christians. For Julian’s disdain over what he saw as a typical
audience of the Augustinian kind of a bishop, see c. Iul. 2, 37.
324 chapter six

Augustine invests substantial energy in c. ep. Pel. 1 to refute Julian’s

charges that were aimed against his views on concupiscentia and Christian
renewal. As we have seen, Augustine’s analysis is essentially motivated by
Julian’s caricature of Augustine’s apostles and by Julian’s satirical depiction
of daily repentance. Augustine’s basic conviction is crystal clear: a baptised
Christian is able and should control his or her evil desires and hold back
their movements. Paul’s Romans 7 now works as an important source text
for this conviction, and all debilitating notions in this text are cleared out
by an interpretation that sweeps away the notions of impotence and a weak
will. Therefore, Julian’s caricatures of Augustine’s position as representing
apostles (and Christians) as weak characters, or baptism seen as an ineffec-
tive ritual, are in Augustine’s opinion inaccurate and wrong.
The theological debate between Augustine and Julian continued. Con-
tra Julianum (421/422) was once again a response to Julian’s ad Turbantium,
now based on a more accurate version of Julian’s work. This response was
also conducted on a more massive scale than Augustine’s previous engage-
ments with Julian. Augustine obviously considered Julian’s positions as pre-
senting a severe threat for his own views on theological anthropology and
grace, and therefore he felt obliged to expend some more effort in dealing
with the case.215
In the following exposition I shall focus on the difference between Augus-
tine and Julian in describing the presence of concupiscentia in a Christian.
This includes the effects that Christian renewal would have on concupiscen-
tia. Again, the debate was still going on as to whether concupiscentia is a
problem for a Christian who was living renewed life. Finally, there was still
disagreement on the kind of a person that Romans 7 describes. As we have
seen above, Augustine has already sketched solid answers to these questions
in the works preceding c. Iul. In c. Iul., however, Augustine develops and
expands his arguments in various interesting ways. His basic contention is
constantly the same: Christians in an active renewed life are able to resist
and fight concupiscentia, which has been effectively weakened by baptism.
Let us now see how Augustine works out this contention.

215 There are numerous interesting theological aspects in this debate. See Chapter 3.

The studies of Lamberigts (1988, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2008a) have repeatedly emphasised the
theological relevance of these debates.
the domestication of concupiscentia 325

6.5.1. Resistibility
Augustine consistently stresses the resistibility of concupiscentia in Chris-
tian renewal. All Julian’s accusations about Augustine holding a laxist view
of renewal or teaching a compulsory view of concupiscentia are refuted. In
Book 2, Augustine discusses the previous tradition concerning concupiscen-
tia and sin in Christian life. He cites Ambrose and Cyprian as examples of
saintly Christians, who surely had to fight different vices but were not sub-
dued by them.216 Ambrose is the central figure in Augustine’s argument of
traditionality, and in the end of Book 2, Ambrose is depicted as a front man
of the Christian civil war against the “dead sin” (peccatum mortuum). Thus,
Ambrose and his teaching exemplify the weakened or debilitated character
of sin in Christian life. Augustine also accentuates that even though Chris-
tians possess this “dead sin” during their Christian renewal, this possession
as such does not give them cause to confess their daily sins; only consenting
to the illicit temptations of concupiscentia necessitates Christians to seek
forgiveness from God. Mortal sins, however, cannot be committed by faith-
ful Christians.217
Augustine is also clear in pointing out the means by which concupiscentia
may be resisted. The power (uirtus) to do so is in God’s grace,218 or, more
directly, in God’s presence in Christian life.219 Even though lust (libido) is in
its origins a divine punishment, it can be resisted by divine aid. In fact, there
is no other way to resist and conquer concupiscentia than by God himself
and through His love.
Therefore, when with the gift of God a man lives by faith, God Himself is
present (deus adest) to enlighten the mind and to overcome concupiscence,
and also to endure trials to the end. The whole work is done rightly when God
Himself is loved gratuitously; which is to say, when He is loved with the love
that can come only from Him.220 [transl. Schumacher]

216 c. Iul. 2, 24–25. For a compilation of Julian and Augustine’s arguments about previous

Catholic tradition in the issues under debate, see Lamberigts 2010.

217 c. Iul. 2, 32–33.
218 c. Iul. 3, 49 in hac tamen re, unde nunc agimus, non uideo, cur dicas, me habenas omnes,

quibus cupiditates frenantur, incidere [Iulian. A. c. Iul.]; qui omni uirtute secundum gratiam
dei, quae datur hominibus, omnes cupiditates frenandas esse decerno.
219 c. Iul. 5, 9.
220 c. Iul. 5, 9 quapropter, quando deo donante ex uera uiuitur fide, ipse deus adest et menti

illuminandae, et concupiscentiae superandae, et molestiae perferendae. hoc enim totum recte

fit, quando fit propter ipsum, id est, quando gratis amatur ipse: qualis amor nobis esse non
potest, nisi ex ipso.
326 chapter six

On the contrary, if people rely on their own strength and powers in Chris-
tian renewal, their pride leads them to even more lamentable servitude to
evil desires.221
Augustine vehemently denies that he would teach concupiscentia to be
a compulsive force in Christian life, and that Christians would sin out of
necessity. Compared to the Manichaean teaching that Julian often cites as a
reference for Augustine’s teaching, the Catholic view of concupiscentia lim-
its and narrows the effects and force of concupiscentia so that it is “under
the mind’s control by the grace of God,” and to be “castigated” in this life and
finally “cured” in Resurrection.222 The resistibility of concupiscentia becomes
thus one of the trade marks of Christian renewal. Augustine can therefore
with full reason claim Julian’s picture of his views to be erroneous, at least
when it comes to the possibilities of resisting and conquering the temp-
tations of concupiscentia. On the contrary, concupiscentia should and can
be conquered by God’s grace and love and by the Holy Spirit, infused into
the hearts of the faithful.223 A Christian undergoing the divine process of
renewal is thus not an akratic, weak-willed person, but an enkratic person,
whose will is strengthened by supernatural means to persist and conquer
evil desires and bad thoughts. Therefore, Augustine also emphasises that,
despite regular shortcomings in exerting this divinely received strong will,
there can be no necessity of sinning in a Christian person. Julian’s concep-
tions are here gravely mistaken, Augustine claims, for a Christian person is
not under any “necessity to commit crimes.”224

221 c. Iul. 5, 9.
222 c. Iul. 5, 24 non enim, sicut insimulas, cum Manichaeis dicunt, inesse carni suae mali
necessitatem [Iulian. A. c. Iul.]: quod malum illi substantiale, et deo coaeternum esse mentiun-
tur: sed dicunt sane cum apostolo, uideo aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis
meae [Rom 7,23]; esse tamen eam sub animi potestate, gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum
nostrum, in mortis corpore castigandam, in morte corporis resoluendam, in corporis resurrec-
tione et mortis morte sanandam. tenent enim sanctam professionem, non solo habitu uestis,
sed et mentis et corporis, resistendo concupiscentiae carnis, quod hic fieri potest; non ea pror-
sus carendo, quod hic fieri non potest.
223 c. Iul. 5, 32.
224 c. Iul. 5, 56 regeneratos autem absit ut redigamus sicut calumniaris, sub necessitate

criminum, deo largiente dona uirtutum [Iulian. A. c. Iul.]. quamuis ergo aliam legem uideamus
in membris nostris, repugnantem legi mentis nostrae: non solum tamen necessitatem criminis
non habet; sed habet potius honorem laudis, cuius spiritus spirituali munere adiutus aduersus
carnis concupiscentiam concupiscit.
the domestication of concupiscentia 327

6.5.2. Interiority in Christian Life225

Contrary to Julian’s view of concupiscentia being a harmless, or even pos-
itive “vital energy,” Augustine held that concupiscentia is not an original
part of created humanity. He also aims much criticism at Julian’s apparent
contradiction in first claiming concupiscentia to be a neutral instinct and
then exhorting continence in fighting against sexual drives. Augustine, for
his part, depicts concupiscentia in c. Iul. again as a tamed evil force, inter-
nal to Christian life. Sometimes Augustine also makes the claim that the
fight (agon) against concupiscentia is something that only renewed Chris-
tians can acknowledge and correctly identify in their lives. So Augustine
had emphatically denied Julian’s accusation of laxism.226 In contrast, Augus-
tine claims that Christians are by God’s grace able to resist every kind of evil
desire (cupiditates) of which sexual desire (concupiscentia carnis) is only a
special case. These desires, stresses Augustine, are innate in human beings,
including Christians (in nobis sunt […] quas bene uiuendo frenamus).
This interiority of concupiscentia in Christian renewal is highlighted for
the first time in c. Iul. 2, 7, where Augustine notes that in regenerated
Christians, the rite of baptism starts a “civil war” between the new mind and
concupiscentia. Augustine carefully draws the line between not committing
actual sins by only sensing this civil strife, and by assimilating them into
the Christian renewed experience. This means that these “internal vices”
are really “ours.” They consist of passions which should be reined, checked
and cured, and their effects should be gradually diminished.227 Augustine
argues that the civil war against concupiscentia is also dependent on the
development of rational life: infants do not yet reveal the existence of this
war, for their rational will as well as their vices are in a “dormant” state.228
A rather long debate is ensued by Julian’s attempt to deal with the sex-
ual libido by Aristotelian categories (c. Iul. 3, 26–43, genus, species, modus,
excessus).229 To Julian, concupiscentia is a form (species) of the genus, which
he names the creative force of life (ignis uitalis), its origin being in God.230

225 Cf. TeSelle 2001, 315, 323, “appropriating and internalizing erotic desire.”
226 c. Iul. 3, 49.
227 c. Iul. 2, 7. See also c. Iul. 3, 49.
228 c. Iul. 2, 8.
229 For Julian’s (eclectic) philosophical training and modes of argumentation, see Lössl

2001, 80–82, 112–126 (modus viz. excessus represent the category of differentia).
230 Lössl 2001, 126–129. Lössl correctly emphasises the theological implications of Julian’s

view of concupiscentia. Sexual drive is part of God’s creative activity in the world, and thus
tightly connected to the Christian doctrine of creation.
328 chapter six

Only excess in the use of this force is condemnable. Augustine, of course,

denies the validity of Julian’s division and approaches the problem by deny-
ing Julian’s view of concupiscentia as a created, peaceful and an honest urge
to procreate, and by holding to concupiscentia as an undesirable element in
Christian marriage.231 It is exactly the Christian state of renewal that Augus-
tine sees as opposing the force of concupiscentia, which is internal to the
struggle of the renewed person (honesti arbitrium coniugati, continens). But
this struggle lies merely in the continuing existence of concupiscentia, not
in its compelling power in generating actual sins. While Augustine again
admittedly describes the existence of concupiscentia in Christian life as
something active (inordinatis et turpibus motibus, moueri) it can, however,
be effectively resisted by an “honest spirit” and by a “watchful combat.”232
Augustine parodies Julian’s views of concupiscentia that is exercised in mar-
riage and reined by ascetics, and describes a married couple who do not
rein nor do they wish to rein in their “natural” instincts (sternunt se con-
iuges et inuadunt, quandocumque titillauerit).233 Augustine’s ideal is that the
Christian marriage is a battle, in which married couples fight against concu-
piscentia, “not permitting it to do anything unlawful.” Because the force of
sexual concupiscence is sometimes too powerful, the married couple may
lapse into having sexual intercourse without having the intention to beget
children. However, Augustine says, this is only a venial sin, which is cured
by the formal married state as such.234
Implied in Julian’s and Augustine’s differring views on the quality of con-
cupiscentia is their difference in viewing its relation to Christian renewal.
While Julian takes concupiscentia to be a natural, bodily drive, which
becomes culpable only in excess, Augustine sees in concupiscentia a force
that should be resisted in every form and by non-believers and Christians
alike, but which can actually be resisted only by faithful Christians. This
two-tier view is hinted at, for instance, in Augustine’s way of contrasting the
“most vicious crimes with reproductive members” with “those very move-
ments which it causes, to our sorrow, even in sleep, and even in the bodies of
chaste men.”235 Moreover, Julian’s example of the Sodomites, who according
to Julian must have had natural abilities to check the excessive or illegit-
imate use of concupiscentia, is answered by a nature and grace-type of an

231 For Julian’s own views on sexual desire, see now Lamberigts 2008a.
232 c. Iul. 3, 26–27.
233 c. Iul. 3, 28.
234 c. Iul. 3, 30.
235 c. Iul. 3, 38.
the domestication of concupiscentia 329

argument, in which Augustine admits that the mind by nature has pow-
ers to resist concupiscentia carnis, but stresses immediately the aspect of
Christian renewal.236 In Augustine’s own words, the gist of the debate is for-
mulated as the following: “the whole point between us in this controversy is
whether the thing of which good use is made is good or evil.”237 Anything but
the latter choice is incomprehensible to Augustine, who views concupiscen-
tia strictly as an evil, internal force in Christian life and marriage, whereas
Julian would only be concerned by the harmful by-products of exceeding
the virtuous use of libido. For Augustine, there is an ongoing raging battle
with concupiscentia, whereas Julian views the relation of sex and marriage
more like a peaceful gardener, who worries only about unnatural or exces-
sive growth.238
Internality in Christian life also entails in c. Iul. some mitigating aspects
concerning concupiscentia. One of these is Augustine’s way of dealing with
consent. First, even though the allurements of concupiscentia may be able to
“steal” consent from the Christians in ascetic life when their rational judg-
ment is held back, for example, due to a lowered state of consciousness, God
will not impute concupiscentiae thus consented as sins, despite them being
even grave and shameful (turpes).239 Second, Augustine points out that there
are different stages in how serious and continual one’s consent is (c. Iul. 5, 11–
12). In short, Christians are called to wage a war against their evil desires by
God’s grace. It is clear that accidental lapses of their consent to concupis-
centia in this war should be swiftly compensated, even though Augustine
does not mention this in the passage. At the other end of the scale, there
is a special case of what could be called a punitive, habituated consent.

236 c. Iul. 3, 39.

237 c. Iul. 3, 42 in hac controuersia de bene utendo isto, utrum bono an malo, tota inter nos
causa uersatur.
238 For an example of Augustine’s language of warfare, see c. Iul. 3, 43 (uinci, belligerere,

conflictus, dimicari, certamen, resisti). Augustine also addresses Julian more personally in
the following chapters, making much of Julian’s admission that concupiscentia should be
controlled in an ascetic lifestyle. According to Augustine, this proves that concupiscentia can
be neither a good nor a natural drive. Augustine also makes an interesting point that one
may err on the doctrinal level on original sin but live righteously on the practical level (c. Iul.
3, 50). c. Iul. 3, 44–46. See also c. Iul. 4, 1–9. Julian notes that Augustine’s position leads to a
qualitative difference in Christian and pagan sexual behaviour, which is absurd. c. Iul. imp.
2, 90–91. Lössl 2001, 140.
239 c. Iul. 4, 10 si quando ab eis ullum uel in somnis furatur assensum, cum euigilauerint,

gemere et inter gemitus dicere, quomodo impleta est anima mea illusionibus [Ps 37,8]? quia
cum sopitos deludunt somnia sensus, nescio quomodo etiam castae animae in turpes labuntur
assensus; quae si imputaret altissimus, quis uiueret castus?
330 chapter six

Augustine refers here to homosexual acts in Rom 1, 25–28 (tradidit illos deus
in reprobum sensum). This kind of consent is continuous and automated, as
it were, ultimately caused by God’s punishment. People acting in habituated
consent are “conquered, seized, drawn, and possessed” by their evil desires;
Augustine here clearly wants to emphasise the difference between acciden-
tal consent given in the Christian process of renewal on the one hand, and
the state of being abandoned by God in habituated consent, on the other.240
Another useful and mitigating aspect of concupiscentia and its presence
in Christian life is its curative effect. Fighting against concupiscentia keeps
Christians humble and wards off the more dangerous enemy of pride. A
Christian fighting against his or her own fleshly desires easily avoids the
temptations of pride. Here thus lies a Pauline paradox of the perfection of
Christian virtues: they will be perfected by weakness (uirtus in infirmitate
perficitur).241 Once again, Augustine has managed to create a domesticated
interpretation of concupiscentia that is internal to Christian renewal: con-
cupiscence works as a watch-dog against more serious enemies.

6.5.3. Real Effects of Baptism

As we have already seen in previous works against his Pelagian opponents,
Augustine tries to convince his Christian readership of the real effects of
baptism on concupiscentia. In c. Iul., Augustine defends his position against
Julian’s accusations that Augustine teaches an illusory (quasi) version of
renewal.242 Julian claims that Augustine’s view of evil concupiscentia as
being internal to Christian renewal leads to a limited and truncated concept

240 c. Iul. 5, 12 cum ergo dicitur homo tradi desideriis suis, inde fit reus, quia desertus a

deo cedit eis atque consentit; uincitur, capitur, trahitur, possidetur. For venial, non-lethal
sins see e.g. c. Iul. 2, 33 in hoc bello laborantes, quamdiu tentatio est uita humana super
terram, non ideo sine peccato non sumus, quia hoc quod eo modo peccatum dicitur, operatur
in membris repugnans legi mentis, etiam non sibi ad illicita consentientibus nobis—quantum
enim ad nos attinet, sine peccato semper essemus, donec sanaretur hoc malum, si ei nunquam
consentiremus ad malum—; sed in quibus ab illo rebellante, etsi non lethaliter, sed uenialiter,
tamen uincimur, in his contrahimus unde quotidie dicamus, dimitte nobis debita nostra [Mt
6,12]. sicut coniuges quando modum generationi necessarium causa solius uoluptatis excedunt:
sicut continentes, quando in talibus cogitationibus cum aliqua delectatione remorantur, non
quidem decernentes flagitium, sed intentionem mentis, non sicut oportet, ne illo incidat, inde
auertentes, aut si inciderit inde rapientes.
241 c. Iul. 4, 10.
242 Iulian. A. c. Iul. 6, 40 baptizatos ex parte mundari; 6, 44 non innouari homines per

baptismum, sed quasi innouari; non liberari, sed quasi liberari; non saluari, sed quasi saluari.
Julian’s critique thus shares similar features with Cary 2008, 156–252, who critizises Augustine
for teaching “powerless sacraments.”
the domestication of concupiscentia 331

of grace: “grace does not perfectly renew man.” Augustine denies this. On
the contrary, the effects of grace given in baptism actually lead to perfect
renewal; there is a reservation, however, for whereas this perfection is a
perfect forgiveness for all sins (peccata), it is not yet a perfect liberation from
all evils (mala).
You […] state untruly that I said: “Grace does not perfectly renew man.” Note
what I actually said: “Grace perfectly renews man, since it brings him even to
immortality of body and full happiness.” It perfectly renews man now, also,
as regards deliverance from all sins, but not as regards deliverance from all
evils, nor from every ill of mortality by which the body is now a load upon the
soul.243 [transl. Schumacher]
Augustine thus holds steadfast to both a full remission of sins together with
concupiscentia in baptism, and to a progressive perfection of new life in
Christ.
Though we, even now dead to sin, live to God, there is still something in us to
mortify in order that sin reign not (non regnet peccatum) in our mortal body
so that we obey its lusts. The full and perfect remission of sins has freed us
from subjection to them, yet they must be combated even by the chaste.244
[transl. Schumacher]
Among the real effects of baptism also belongs the removal of guilt (rea-
tus). The basic solution remains the same as in previous works, and in c. Iul.,
Augustine only defends further his view of reatus of concupiscence having
been forgiven in baptism. Julian had objected Augustine’s logic in the con-
vertibility of contraries: while guilt may remain after a sinful act, it does not
logically follow that an act could remain after removal of guilt. But Augus-
tine is satisfied with an obtuse answer, “there can be conversion of some,
not all; therefore, among the some, I find these [the convertibility of sin and

243 c. Iul. 6, 40 gratia non perfecte hominem nouum faciat [Iulian. A. c. Iul.]. non hoc dico:

attende quod dico. gratia perfecte hominem nouum facit; quandoquidem et ad corporis immor-
talitatem plenamque felicitatem ipsa perducit. nunc etiam perfecte innouat hominem, quantum
attinet ad liberationem ab omnibus omnino peccatis, non quantum ad liberationem attinet ab
omnibus malis, et ab omni corruptione mortalitatis, qua nunc corpus aggrauat animam.
244 c. Iul. 6, 42 quamuis enim iam peccato mortui, deo uiuamus: est tamen quod in nobis mor-

tificemus, ut non regnet peccatum in nostro mortali corpore, ad oboediendum concupiscentiis

eius; a quibus nos soluit, ne his essemus obnoxii, plena atque perfecta remissio peccatorum, et
remanserunt in nobis cum quibus gerantur bella castorum. During the progress, the effects of
concupiscentia diminish, while those of love (caritas) increase. c. Iul. 6, 50 horum itaque mal-
orum praeteritus omnis reatus sacro fonte diluitur. remittuntur ergo in renascentibus, minu-
untur in proficientibus. ignorantia minuitur ueritate magis magisque lucente: concupiscentia
minuitur caritate magis magisque feruente. For this common motif, see above Chapter 4.
332 chapter six

guilt].”245 However, Augustine wishes to clarify some of his statements con-

cerning reatus. Baptism affects concupiscentia so that its guilt (reatu suo) is
absolved. By this Augustine does not mean that concupiscentia should be
thought of as a hypostatised being which would have its own guilt (neque
enim aliqua persona est); reatus suus therefore has to be understood as that
guilt which remains in the person carrying the evil quality of concupiscen-
tia.246 Augustine points out that although baptism removes the guilt that has
been cast by concupiscentia, this does not sanctify or neutralize concupiscen-
tia as such.247
Augustine also attaches to his discussion of reatus an additional notion
of how in fact concupiscentia “remains in its action” while its guilt has been
forgiven. He first describes the “acts” of concupiscentia, which can be seen
when “evil desires (desideria) are aroused and which the mind must resist.”
These are the movements (motus) of concupiscentia, and once again, if not
consented to, they do not produce guilt for a baptised Christian.248 There
“is,” according to Augustine, however, “another evil” in the Christian person,
which exists even in a latent, passive state, and even if it does not produce
any notable evil wishes or aspirations. This evil is, of course, the quality of
concupiscentia.249 Augustine thereby depicts, if not a realistic depiction of

245 c. Iul. 6, 60. For the logical problems of these claims, see Lössl 2001, 115–116. Julian’s

point is simple: why should forgiveness reverse a category of contraries (sin-not-sin), for the
opposites are not each other’s aspects?
246 Cf. c. Iul. 2, 12. For Augustine trying to struggle free from substance-ridden metaphors,

see also c. Iul. 6, 58.

247 c. Iul. 6, 51 secundum mirabilem intellegentiam tuam, quando audis in aliquo homicidii

reatum solutum, non hominem, sed ipsum homicidium a reatu existimas absolutum.
248 c. Iul. 6, 60 actu enim manet non quidem abstrahendo et illiciendo mentem, eiusque con-

sensu concipiendo et pariendo peccata; sed mala, quibus mens resistat, desideria commouendo.
ipse quippe motus actus est eius, quamuis mente non consentiente desit effectus.
249 c. Iul. 6, 60 inest enim homini malum et praeter istum actum, id est, praeter hunc motum,

unde surgit hic motus; quem motum dicimus desiderium. non enim semper est desiderium con-
tra quod pugnemus: sed si tunc non est, quando non occurrit quod concupiscatur siue animo
cogitantis, siue sensibus corporis; fieri potest ut insit qualitas mala, sed nulla sit tentatione com-
mota: sicut inest timiditas homini timido, et quando non timet. Lössl’s (2001, 115) observation on
Julian’s criticism against Augustine’s muddled distinction between affectus and affectionalis
qualitas also applies here: “wie Augustinus dazu komme, die Konkupiszenz als emotionale
Qualität zu bezeichen, wo er ihr doch nur die Eigenschaften einer vorübergehenden Emo-
tion zubillige, insofern er sie nicht mit der Personsubstanz identifiziere, was manichäisch
sei.” Augustine in his part assumes that concupiscentia, as a quality, somehow is, even in a
state where it cannot be discerned by any “action” or effect. It is sometimes, to use Augus-
tine’s own metaphor, a disease without any symptoms, yet an existing disease. Julian seems
to hit more accurately in the following quotation from the Letter to Menoch (c. Iul. imp. 3,
187): denique omne peccatum extra corpus est, quia actuale est; qui autem fornicatur, in corpus
suum peccat; omne enim peccatum, antequam fiat, non est et post factum memoria sola eius
the domestication of concupiscentia 333

Christian renewal, at least a very effective ideal of it, in which concupiscentia

is a strikingly sterile force: its guilt removed, it can at best only produce
evil desires that are perfectly resistible, and sometimes not even felt to be
there.250 Augustine urges his Catholic readership with an image of a life
where the quality of concupiscentia perhaps remains but no movements can
be felt:
When occasion for lusting arises, yet no evil desire is excited, not even against
our will, we have full health.251 [transl. Schumacher]
In trying to avoid any hypostatising references to concupiscentia, Augustine
also offers a more specific notion of what reatus is:
What is this guilt and where does it remain […]? It is in a subject, then, in
the soul of him who remembers his transgression and is troubled by a scruple
of conscience until relieved by the remission of the offense. If he forgets his
transgression and is not stung by his conscience, where will this guilt be,
since you concede it remains present after the sin is past until it is remitted?
[…] Where, then, does it remain except in the hidden laws of God written in
somehow in the minds of the angels; in order that there be no wickedness
unpunished except what the blood of the Mediator expiates. By the sign of
His cross the waves of baptism are consecrated so that they may wash away
the guilt written as in a bond in the knowledge of the spiritual powers through
which punishment for sins is required.252 [transl. Schumacher]

operis, non ipse species manet. malum autem concupiscentiae, quia naturale est, antequam fiat,
est, cum fit, augetur, post factum et uidetur et permanet. […] qui his uerbis mihi interrogandi
sunt: si omne malum actuale est, antequam malum quispiam agat, quare accipit purificationem
aquae, cum nullum malum egerit per se? [Manich. A. c. Iul. imp. 3, 187] Augustine’s distinction
between mala qualitas and actiones thus appear already in this Manichaean text. See Harri-
son & BeDuhn 2001, 153–154.
250 See also the difference between the states before and after grace in c. Iul. 6, 61: nullo

modo, inquam, simile est sacrificium transiens manenti concupiscentiae, quae hominem iam
non committentem quod solet ei consentiendo committere, iam plena fide et cognitione retinen-
tem non esse talia facienda, stimulis tamen illicitorum desideriorum, quibus resistit castitas,
inquietare non cessat: neque scientia finitur, ut non sit; sed continentia refrenatur, ut quo tendit
peruenire non possit.
251 c. Iul. 6, 60 cum uero occurrit quod concupiscatur, nec desideria mala nobis etiam nolen-

tibus commouentur, sanitas plena est.

252 c. Iul. 6, 62 dic mihi reatus iste quis sit, et ubi maneat […] in subiecto est, hoc est, in animo

eius qui deliquisse se meminit, et scrupulo angitur conscientiae, donec fiat delicti remissione
securus. quid si obliuiscatur se deliquisse, nec eius conscientia stimuletur, ubi erit reatus ille,
quem transeunte peccato manere concedis, donec remittatur? […] ubi ergo manet, nisi in
occultis legibus dei, quae conscriptae sunt quodam modo in mentibus angelorum, ut nulla sit
iniquitas impunita, nisi quam sanguis mediatoris expiauerit; cuius signo crucis consecratur
unda baptismatis, ut ea diluatur reatus tanquam in chirographo scriptus, in notitia spiritua-
lium potestatum, per quas poena exigitur peccatorum?
334 chapter six

Guilt, claims Augustine, is surely a subjective mental state, accompanied

with pangs of conscience which arise from images produced by memory. It
is, however, also an objective, juridical state of affairs, which exists in divine
record (note the forensic language here!), and stays in need of an objective,
real expiation. This, implies Augustine, is what happens in baptism, where
the guilt of past sins is forgiven and washed away in a similar mode to
an annulled contract “in the presence of spiritual authorities.”253 Hereby
Augustine once again leads his Catholic readership to focus on their baptism
as a decisive and really effective event in their battle against sinful life.254

6.5.4. Romans 7
By now it has become clear how Augustine applies Romans 7 to his inter-
nalised view of concupiscentia in Christian renewal. His work against Julian
contains two major discussions of this text, and an additional one concern-
ing Ambrose’s reading of it. Much of what Augustine has to say to Julian
here has already been covered, but certain important points have to be
made based on this work. For in c. Iul., Augustine offers some highly interest-
ing explanations for the change of his reading and the reasons behind this
change. As we shall see, these reasons pertain to Augustine’s strengthened
emphasis on concupiscentia under the control of the Christian, baptised will.
In Book 2, Augustine lists ecclesiastical authors backing his view of orig-
inal sin. Ambrose’s short quotations of Romans 7 in de paenitentia is pre-
sented in this connection, and Augustine makes much of its weight as
evidence. Augustine appropriates Ambrose as attesting to his views: Paul
speaks (also, etiam!) for himself in the entire Romans 7; baptism cleanses all
sins, including original sin; the guilt of concupiscentia is taken away, while
its actions remain in the baptised. In addition, Augustine refutes Julian’s
reading of Romans 7 as a description of a Jew, who is fighting against his

253 Lössl’s interpretation here (1997, 373) emphasises, in accord with his central thesis,

the effects of grace as intellectus (“das Wirken der Gnade besteht genau darin, die Sünde
vom Bewusstsein des Sünders her in einem Prozess der Selbst- und Gotteserkenntnis zu
überwinden”) and seems to pass much of Augustine’s concern for the objective state of the
divine record and real effects of baptism on guilt. Cf. however c. Iul. 6, 12, where the absolution
of reatus is told to be discerned “in faith” only, i.e. by a new understanding in grace: reatus
autem ille, qui sola regeneratione dimittitur, quemadmodum cum inesset non sentiebatur; ita
eius ablatio fide creditur, non carne uel mente sentitur. Cary’s (2008, 206–209) discussion of
guilt concentrates on its ahistorical, “Plotinian” connotations and does not consider the
effective removal of guilt by baptism.
254 A nod towards this readership: haec quidem satis explicasti scientibus: sed quia contem-

nendi non sunt, qui lecturi libros nostros disciplinae huius ignari sunt. c. Iul. 6, 54.
the domestication of concupiscentia 335

or her evil habits before grace. On the contrary, by studying the character of
habit as a parallel case, Augustine claims, Julian could perceive how a Chris-
tian can both feel the stimulus and movements of concupiscentia and not be
responsible for them as committed sins.255
The two major passages dealing with Romans 7 are c. Iul. 3, 61–65 and c.
Iul. 6, 70–74. Various features concerning the mitigation of concupiscentia
in Christian renewal can be seen in these passages.
First, there is the basic task of the correct identification of the ego of Paul
in Romans 7. Augustine presents different arguments for this identification.
Verses 24–25 cannot belong to anyone but a baptised Christian; therefore, so
should the preceding verses be heard as the words of a renewed Christian.256
Augustine thus refutes Julian’s interpretation in which Romans 7 is read
as the words of the former Jew Paul, who “takes the role” (in se transfigu-
rauerit) of a Jew in these verses.257 Augustine likewise argues against these
words being read as words of a catechumen preparing for baptism.258 Augus-
tine here appeals to Christian experience, for only those who fight are able
to recognize the words of a fighter.259
Second, Augustine provides an account of certain exegetical and her-
meneutical devices by which Romans 7 can be correctly understood. Thus,
Gal 5, 16–18 offers a hermeneutical key in understanding Romans 7.260 After
having introduced the crucial verse (“walk in the Spirit, and you will not ful-
fill the concupiscences of the flesh”) Augustine notes various connections,
or signals of the common ground covered by these two Pauline passages.
These are the opposition between the Spirit and the flesh, and the new rela-
tionship to law that the life in the Spirit has effected.261 Then he constructs a

255 c. Iul. 2, 5.
256 c. Iul. 3, 61 eius ergo uoces sunt etiam illae superiores, ex quibus haec consequenter
expressa est. By the “previous verses,” Augustine refers to vv. 18–20, for these are quoted from
Julian’s work. The first half of the chapter can be understood as words of one living sub lege,
for the verbs are in past tense. c. Iul. 6, 73.
257 Iulian. A. c. Iul. 6, 72.
258 c. Iul. 3, 62.
259 c. Iul. 6, 70 simul itaque cognoscamus uerba pugnantium, si pugnamus. This argument

entails, of course, a polemical point: if you fail to recognize Paul’s words as the words of a
renewed Christian, perhaps there is something wrong with your renewed life.
260 For Augustine’s way of working Rom 7 with a set of other biblical passages, see Martin

2001.
261 c. Iul. 3, 62 caro enim, inquit, concupiscit aduersus spiritum, et spiritus aduersus carnem:

haec enim inuicem aduersantur; ut non ea quae uultis faciatis [Gal 5,17]. uide si non hoc est
ad Romanos: non enim quod uolo facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19].
deinde ad Galatas addit et dicit: quod si spiritu ducimini; non adhuc estis sub lege [Gal 5,18].
uide si non hoc est ad Romanos: iam non ego operor illud [Rom 7,17]; et, condelector legi dei
336 chapter six

sustained argument on the key term perficere that appears in both Gal 5, 16
and Rom 7, 18. Here “perfection” of the works of the flesh entails a consent
of the will and results in obvious sinful actions; in contrast, perfection of
the good works entails a total disappearance of the evil concupiscentiae.262
The connective signal between Gal 5, 16 and Rom 7, 18 is for Augustine thus a
complementary one: in the previous passage, Paul discusses the “perfection”
of evil actions, whereas in the latter, Paul speaks of the “perfection” of good.
The former can be avoided, the latter is yet to be achieved. The remaining
state is that of a Christian, who has the movements of concupiscentia, but
who “fights in this combat by living well,” that is, does not consent to these
movements.263 A device that should be seen as already being a common-
place in Augustine’s reading of Romans 7, appears as well, namely Paul’s
peccatum substituted by Augustine’s concupiscentia, “because it was made
by sin and, if it draws and entices one consenting, it conceives and brings
forth sin.”264
Augustine also gives a somewhat more personal account of his previ-
ous mistaken reading of Romans 7. Here he refers to vv. 14–23 and to his
difficulties in reading the words that stress the compulsive character of con-
cupiscentia (ego carnalis sum, uenundatus sub peccato, captiuantem me). He
admits that he could not read these verses to denote any other people than
those who “were compelled to do what concupiscentia” suggested. Later he
learned to distinguish the difference between the spiritual mind and the
captivity of the flesh, which refers to that part in the Christian that is still
prone to the temptations of concupiscentia, without, however, entailing a
notion of an automated consent to act according to it. Again, Augustine
refers to an interpretation in which Paul’s inability to do what he wants is
read as “wishing not to have carnal concupiscences.”265

secundum interiorem hominem [Rom 7,22]; et, non regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore,
ad oboediendum desideriis eius [Rom 6,12].
262 c. Iul. 3, 62 bona opera nostra tunc perficientur, quando ita spiritui caro consenserit,

ut aduersus eum etiam ipsa non concupiscat. hoc enim uolumus, cum perfectionem iustitiae
concupiscimus; hoc intentione non intermissa uelle debemus: sed quia id perficere in ista cor-
ruptibili carne non possumus, ideo dixit ad Romanos, uelle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum
non inuenio [Rom 7,18]. […]: id est, non mihi adiacet perficere bonum. non ait; facere; sed, per-
ficere bonum [Rom 7,18]. quia facere bonum, est post concupiscentias non ire: perficere autem
bonum, est non concupiscere.
263 c. Iul. 3, 62.
264 c. Iul. 6, 73.
265 c. Iul. 6, 70 ego non mihi enim uidebatur apostolus et de se ipso dicere potuisse, ego autem

carnalis sum [Rom 7,14], cum esset spiritualis: et quod captiuus duceretur sub lege peccati, quae
in membris erat eius. ego enim putabam dici ista non posse, nisi de iis quos ita haberet carnis
the domestication of concupiscentia 337

Augustine’s discussions of Romans 7 also include similar notions of a

qualified and mitigated view of concupiscentia than elsewhere in c. Iul.
Thus, after giving his reasons as to why Romans 7 has to be read as a
description of a baptised Christian, he stresses the presence of Christ in
the believer (Christus in nobis) as a factor leading to a struggle and fight
against concupiscentia. This means that only a person in whom the “spirit of
Christ” lives is “rightly” (recte) able to battle and overcome concupiscentia.266
Moreover, Augustine emphatically points out the difference between his
and Julian’s view of baptism and grace: whereas Julian thinks that baptism
only affects a punctual remission of sins, Augustine also includes into the
notion of grace the enduring ability to avoid and defeat (ad uitanda et
uincenda) sins and concupiscentia.267
A most interesting detail in the attempts to define the core elements and
differences between his and Julian’s interpretation of Romans 7 appears
after Augustine has given a close reading of Romans 7 in c. Iul. 3, 62. Augus-
tine then moves forward to point out the inconsistencies in the implications
that Julian’s reading will produce. One of these is the fact that Julian wants
to both fight against concupiscentia and to hold on to its good and natural
quality. According to Augustine, Julian wishes “it to appear that [he has]
reached the height of virtue.”

concupiscentia subiugatos, ut facerent quidquid illa compelleret; quod de apostolo dementis

est credere: cum etiam innumerabilis multitudo sanctorum, ne concupiscentias carnis perficiat,
contra carnem spiritu concupiscat. sed postea melioribus et intellegentioribus cessi, uel potius
ipsi, quod fatendum est, ueritati, ut uiderem in illis apostoli uocibus gemitum esse sanctorum
contra carnales concupiscentias dimicantium. qui cum mente sint spirituales, adhuc tamen
isto corruptibili corpore quod aggrauat animam, recte intelleguntur esse carnales; quia erunt
et corpore spirituales, quando seminatum corpus animale, resurget corpus spirituale: et recte
adhuc intelleguntur ea parte captiui sub lege peccati, quae desideriorum, quibus non consen-
tiunt, motibus subiacet. hinc factum est ut sic ista intellegerem, quemadmodum intellexit Hila-
rius, Gregorius, Ambrosius, et ceteri ecclesiae sancti notique doctores, qui et ipsum apostolum
aduersus carnales concupiscentias quas habere nolebat, et tamen habebat, strenue conflixisse,
eumdemque conflictum suum illis suis uerbis contestatum fuisse senserunt.
266 c. Iul. 6, 70 simul itaque cognoscamus uerba pugnantium, si pugnamus. hoc enim modo

non uiuimus nos, sed uiuit Christus in nobis, si et ad pugnam contra concupiscentias exercen-
dam, et ad uictoriam usque ad consumptionem eorumdem hostium capessendam, in illo fidi-
mus, non in nobis. c. Iul. 6, 71 in quantum quippe in illo uiuit Christus, in tantum expugnat et
superat quod non habitat bonum in eius carne, sed malum. neque enim recte cuiusquam spiritus
concupisceret aduersus carnem suam, nisi habitaret in illo spiritus Christi.
267 c. Iul. 6, 72 atque utinam ipsa dona Christi saltem ita saperes, ut ad uincendam concupis-

centiam ualere aliquid crederes. […] putatis gratiam dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum
sic in sola peccatorum remissione uersari, ut non adiuuet ad uitanda peccata et desideria uin-
cenda carnalia, diffundendo caritatem in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui ab illo
datus est nobis.
338 chapter six

You wish it to appear that you have reached the height of virtue, and from
the summit itself on which you think you stand, are warring against pursuing
concupiscence as though from a fortress (in arce), so that, no matter how
superior your position, you never cease to combat the internal enemy. Yet
you do not blush to praise concupiscence, which will unquestionably make
your destruction more complete if it conquers you—and that against Him
who seeks you who have been lost, even when it conquers.268
[transl. Schumacher]
According to Augustine, there is a dangerous illusion in Julian’s picture of
concupiscentia. For Julian thinks that he has reached an intact ground from
which he can fight against the lower and outward impulses of concupiscen-
tia (in ipso culmine quo te existimas euasisse). Hence, Julian does not see
that he is not alone in his “citadel of virtue”: for in reality, the enemy has
come through the gates already (tamquam in arce confligas […] tamen cum
hoste interno dimicare non desinas). This metaphor effectively underlines
Augustine’s own position in the issue, and it may well be compared to the
similar depiction in lib. arb. 1., where the mind is appointed the “citadel
of virtue” and should not give up to outward attacks of libido, which is
trying to subjugate one’s rational self-control under the servitude of pas-
sions. Decades later Augustine dissolves his own metaphor, perhaps uncon-
sciously, by stressing that no intact ground is left: the battle has to be fought
inside the citadel. What follows in c. Iul. 3, 65 is then a vigorous refutation
of Julian’s accusations about Augustine teaching an irresistible and compul-
sory version of concupiscentia.269 The implications of this connection is clear:
as Augustine had taken concupiscentia as being part of the Christian’s inner,
post-baptismal struggle, he also had to modify and qualify the strength of
concupiscentia, which he earlier had thought to be an irresistible force, bind-
ing mainly people living sub lege.

268 c. Iul. 3, 65 atque ita uis uideri te culmen ascendisse uirtutis, ut in ipso culmine, quo te exis-

timas euasisse, cum persequente concupiscentia, tanquam in arce confligas, et quantumlibet ex

loco superiore, tamen cum hoste interno dimicare non desinas. nec erubescis concupiscentiam,
quae te amplius perdet sine dubitatione si uicerit, laudare aduersus eum, qui te perditum etiam
cum uincit inquirit.
269 Indeed, Augustine’s stand on the citadel of virtue-metaphor is framed within Julian’s

accusations. In c. Iul. 3, 64 Augustine quotes Julian: dubium non sit euersionem sanctitatis,
contaminationem pudicitiae, morum labem nostris conuenire, imo inesse dogmatibus: neque
id esse me negaturum, qui ideo, sicut dicis,—in naturae inuidiam malae conuersationis sor-
des refundo, ut peccantibus metum demam; quorum obscenitates, apostolorum et sanctorum
omnium consolor iniuriis, eo quod uas aureum apostolum Paulum saepe dixisse commemorem,
non enim quod uolo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio [Rom 7,15]. Julian claims
that Augustine’s position is contrived to appease the sins of the masses, and that Augustine’s
new reading of Rom 7 is thus a result from a wilful thinking.
the domestication of concupiscentia 339

In both of the passages discussing Romans 7, Augustine makes perfectly

clear what he feels of Julian’s charges in which his position is described
as a laxist, laissez-faire kind of desperation with respect to concupiscentia
and obscenae libidines. This is a lie, says Augustine, for with divine help,
Christians are able to control their evil desires, just like the apostles.270
Julian seems to interpret Romans 7 as the words of a rhetorically con-
structed, akratic Paul, who “exaggerates the force of habit,” and thereby
describes the state of “wicked people” who have a weak and impotent will
and thus cannot produce any virtuous acts. On the contrary, Augustine
interprets the same text as the words of an enkratic Paul, who first describes
his life in past tense (Rom 7, 7–13), that is, the time that he was not yet able
of rational thinking and lived under the Law, but then moves on to describe
his present life sub gratia, “still battling against his own concupiscence, not
so that he consents and sins, but so that he experiences desires which he
resists.” For Julian, the baptised Paul is an enkratic apostle, and therefore
cannot be the subject of Romans 7; for Augustine, the baptised Paul is an
enkratic apostle as well, and still may be the subject of Romans 7, as long as
the passage is subjected to a careful exegetical analysis, and all the compul-
sive connotations of concupiscentia from v. 14 on are read in a qualified and
mitigated way.271
Of the four works written in the latter half of the 420s on human agency
and God’s grace, de gratia et libero arbitrio contains some concise but note-
worthy remarks on the effects of concupiscentia on the human will.272 It also
serves as an interlude for Augustine’s final, extensive work against Julian,
anticipating some of the arguments presented there on the role of grace.273
Augustine highlights the crucial importance of grace by a two-fold strat-
egy related to concupiscentia. First, he stresses the irresistibility of concu-
piscentia in the sub lege state. Augustine connects biblical quotations and

270 c. Iul. 3, 65 quod non sit alia mei sensus intentio, quam […] adipiscendae castitatis

desperatione repugnantes turpitudini territare, mentiri me tantas obscenae libidinis uires, ut

eam ratio regere ac frenare non possit, cui nec apostolorum legio repugnauerit [Iulian. A.
c. Iul.]. haec de me prorsus ipse mentiris. ego enim non infero uirtutibus bellum; sed uitiis,
quantum adiuuor, infero, et inferendum esse proclamo. […] mentiri me dicis tantas libidinis
uires, ut eam ratio regere ac frenare non possit. ecce ego non dico tantas libidinis uires, ut
humana ratio diuinitus accensa et adiuta eam regere ac frenare non possit […] ecce ego uoce
qua possum, quod me negare asseris clamo, apostolorum legionem repugnasse libidini.
271 c. Iul. 6, 73–74.
272 For an overview of the work, its position in the series of corrept., perseu. and praed.

sanct., and its central theological problems, see Weaver 1996, 16–22.
273 For the role of grace, see Weaver 1996, 21–23.
340 chapter six

allusions in order to show that a person bound by concupiscentia cannot

blame God for his or her inability to fulfil the law.274 “I wish to obey the
commandment of the law, but I am conquered by the strength of my con-
cupiscence.”275
Secondly, Augustine affirms that only in the state of grace (sub gratia) one
is able to resist temptations and do good. This ability to resist concupiscence
is solely due to God’s grace.276
In the struggle then against his concupiscence, let each one pray that he enter
not into temptation, that is to say, let him pray not to be drawn away and
enticed by this concupiscence. Now if a person overcomes concupiscence
by a good will, he does not enter into temptation. But man’s free will is not
enough unless he is given the victory by the Lord in answer to his prayer that
he be not led into temptation.277 [transl. Russell]
Augustine also expands on the abilities to do good with the new good will.
In the early stages of renewal, the will is “faint” and “weak.” It may grow to a
“strong” and “robust” will (uoluntas robusta), such as that which the martyrs
had in offering their lives for their faith. Yet Augustine is keen to stress that
although faint and weak, even such a renewed will is existing and as such
also a gift of God.278

6.6. Last Meanderings with Julian—

Resistibility and Necessity

Contra Julianum opus imperfectum (429/430), Augustine’s massive rehearsal

of arguments against Julian has been described by Thomas Martin as a “the-
ological ‘theater,’” in which Augustine “has full control as both ‘director’ and
‘actor.’” According to Martin, c. Iul. imp. is “more intended to move Augus-

274 gr. et lib. arb. 5; 24.

275 gr. et lib. arb. 8.
276 gr. et lib. arb. 9; 13; 24; 26.
277 gr. et lib. arb. 9 ergo unusquisque contra suam concupiscentiam dimicans oret, ne intret

in tentationem, id est, ne sit ab illa abstractus et illectus. non autem intrat in tentationem,
si uoluntate bona uincat concupiscentiam malam. nec tamen sufficit arbitrium uoluntatis
humanae, nisi a domino uictoria concedatur oranti, ne intret in tentationem.
278 gr. et lib. arb. 33. Voluntas robusta is a rare expression in Augustine. He uses it in c.

Iul. imp. 3, 167 of the present Christian state where concupiscentia should be resisted with
robustiore uoluntate. See Pang-White 2000 for a discussion of qualified akrasia in Augustine’s
later works. For the relation between a martyr and an “ordinary Christian,” see Markus 1990,
92–95.
the domestication of concupiscentia 341

tine’s readers than to change Julian’s own mind.”279 Throughout the work,
Augustine’s lowbrow audience is anticipated by both Julian and Augus-
tine.280 Julian even uses the sociological argument that the doctrine of “nat-
ural sins” is forged by Augustine and his fellows to meet the expectations of
the masses of the Church who are not interested nor able to convert their
lives to meet the strict ethical standards of genuine Christianity.281
Due to the circumstances, the arguments around concupiscentia are only
occasionally developed further, while the debaters often find fault in each
others’ methods of discussion and provide ample space for dealing with
meta-argumentative questions.282 Therefore, in face of the sheer mass of
the work, the most economical option is to either summarize only shortly
what Augustine has already said in his previous anti-Pelagian works, or
occasionally focus upon some new thread of argumentation.

279 Martin 2001, 196–197. I agree with Martin. It remains doubtful, however, as to what
kind of reader would really be moved by the exhausting and repetitive pseudo-dialogue of
c. Iul. imp. See also Lancel’s (2000, 417) description: “dialogue of the deaf.” Even Augustine
himself seems to get bored in writing the last books (note also his comment already in
c. Iul. imp. 2, 44 iam nescio quotiens haec dicta sunt eisque responsum est; […] et usque ad
odiosum fastidium eadem per eadem repetens). Lössl 1997, 383–384. More than a genuine play,
the work resembles of a dull monologue interspersed with often not so witty remarks. On
the other hand, one should admit that Augustine gives a fair treatment to his opponent in
incorporating Julian’s text into his own work. Lamberigts 2008, 245. For Augustine’s own
concerns of his readership and future reception, see Vessey 1998. Vessey (1998, 266–267)
distinguishes between the polemical works against Julian and the less polemical works of
this period (gr. et lib. arb., corrept., praed. sanct., perseu.), to the disadvantage of the former:
“the tracts against Julian, written at a rhythm dictated by the latter, retain to the last the air
of business the author would finish if he could and then have die with him.”
280 See c. Iul. imp. 1, 33; 1, 41; 2, 8; 2, 11; 2, 14; 5, 4; see especially 6, 3 IUL. pars igitur et

uoluptati consulens et pauori, uel arenae, uel circi, uel scenae populis comitata luxuria, ambiens
in omnibus flagitiis obtendere necessitatem, qua commissi inuidia semper leuatur […] AUG.
innumerabilis multitudo fidelium, quae promissa est Abrahae, quasi a uobis uulgaris turba
contemnitur. Weber (2001b, 507–508) points to the diverging readership as explaining the
stylistical differences between the two authors: Julian, the elitist, writes to an educated
minority, whereas Augustine, the populist, writes to an uneducated majority (“er übernimmt
bewusst die Rolle des mit dem einfachen Volk Vertrauten”).
281 Iul. c. Iul. imp. 2, 15 illud tamen nequaquam infitiari possumus, quod plurimum ut dixi tur-

bis placeat, luteis tamen, delicta uoluntatis imputare naturae et infamatione seminum morum;
petulantiam uindicare, ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod sperat in se ipso alterum
perpetrare; 3, 58 tamen, ut mentibus subueniatur incautis, quae crassiores quasque opiniones
et malis moribus blandientes in solacium assumunt conscientiae sauciatae. For a contem-
porary version of such a sociological argument, see Pagels 1988a, 98–126, especially p. 119:
“Augustine’s theory of original sin could make theologically intelligible not only the state’s
imperfection but the church’s imperfections as well.” For a critique of Pagels’s central thesis,
see Burnell 1995.
282 See e.g. c. Iul. imp. 4, 14–17.
342 chapter six

While many readers of c. Iul. imp. readily notice Augustine’s disillusioned

and stern views of human sexuality, the underlying theological motivations
of the debate cannot be neglected. Thus a passage that is very typical for the
entire debate, c. Iul. imp. 3, 167, in which Augustine reproaches sexual desire
(concupiscentia carnis et quae libido etiam nuncupatur) may overtly reveal
the raw nerve that Augustine had for sexual matters. But read more closely,
it only repeats what has been the subject of the latter part of our chapter: an
exhortation to Catholic Christians to live out their Christian vocation after
baptism, and doing this by the divine aid of Christ’s grace:
AUG. I do say that concupiscence of the flesh by which the flesh has desires
opposed to the spirit and which is also called sexual desire (libido) is evil. I say
that now in this flesh it must be reined in and diminished by good habits, but
that in eternal life it will be completely healed. It will not be separated from us
like some evil substance that was added to or mixed into us, as the Manichees
so foolishly think. But whatever you hold regarding it, I would not believe that
you could locate in paradise such a concupiscence as now exists, if I had not
found it in these books of yours filled with vain and insane wordiness […]283
[transl. Teske]
In general, c. Iul. imp. repeats, in a monotonic drumbeat tone, the standard
role of sexual desire in Christian marriages: in procreating children, Chris-
tian parents use a defect of their bodily constitution for good ends (bene
utuntur malo). Christian marriage also renders occasional “recreative” sex
only as a venial sin.284
There are also features in c. Iul. imp. that sets it somewhat apart from the
flow of anti-Pelagian works, at least what comes to Christian renewal. For
in this work, Augustine seems to be driven to a corner where he still holds
to the strictly qualified character of concupiscentia, but at the same time

283 c. Iul. imp. 3, 167 Aug. ego concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiri-

tum et quae libido etiam nuncupatur, malam esse dico, nunc in hac carne frenandam et bona
consuetudine minuendam, in aeterna uero uita omni ex parte sanandam, non, quasi addita
uel commixta nobis fuerit aliqua mala substantia, sicut Manichei desipiunt, separandam; sed,
quodlibet de illa sentias, talem te illam, qualis nunc est, ut ad illicita perpetranda etiam casto-
rum siue coniugatorum siue continentium corda sollicitet et, nisi ei robustiore uoluntate resis-
tatur, euertat, in paradiso constituere posse non crederem, nisi in istis tuis libris uana et insana
loquacitate plenissimis inuenirem. Note also c. Iul. imp. 3, 168 uos potestis congruenter seruire
laudatae libidini, nos autem in adiutorio domini obpugnamus et uincimus accusatam.
284 E.g. c. Iul. imp. 1, 68; 5, 10; 5, 13. It should be noted that Augustine seems to treat marriage

implicitly as a Christian order. While the married status is acknowledged in rather general
terms in c. Iul. imp. 5, 23, there soon follows a qualification that leads the reader to think of
a Christian marriage in particular. Marriage as a secular institution should be implemented
with the Christian castitas, and a wish to baptise one’s children—and this kind of marriage
“alone can make good use of the evil which you [sc. Julian] monstrously praise.”
the domestication of concupiscentia 343

he also stresses the compulsory and necessitating aspects of concupiscentia,

even in such a post-baptismal narrative as Romans 7. Let us now look at how
this ambiguity is reflected in a relevant selection of passages concerning
Christian renewal.

6.6.1. Resistibility and the Real Effects of Baptism

Faithful to his previous practises, Augustine consistently denies Julian’s
charges of laxism.285 Concupiscentia is amputated of its guilt, and is left ad
agonem.286 It can be resisted and conquered by God’s help.287 Furthermore,
in Christian marriages, the pleasures of libido can and should be resisted.288
Julian recurs to the charge that Augustine’s interpretation makes the saints
“polluted and conquered by” concupiscentia, which Augustine, in turn, once
again denies.289
In debating over Rom 6, 12 (non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali
corpore ad oboediendum ei), Augustine emphasises the fight to which Chris-
tians are called. He affirms the powers of a baptised Christian to hold con-
cupiscence in check, and warns of the consequences in case one consents to
its allurements. In Christians, concupiscentia is thus “present, but it does not
reign” (inest quidem, sed non regnat). In fighting against concupiscentia, the
inner delight of righteousness given by God renders the temptations of con-
cupiscentia void and weak (probatur autem esse, dum concupiscuntur mala,
et probatur non regnare, dum iustitiae delectatione uincente non fiunt.)290
Augustine argues (as he had done in c. Iul.) that divine grace entails a
twofold gift: both a forgiveness for sins and an ability to resist concupiscen-
tia, or “love […] to do the good things which we ought to do” (c. Iul. imp.
1, 84). This stance is repeated during the work.291

285 See c. Iul. imp. 1, 70 actio pia est in hac uita deum colere et eius gratia contra uitia interna

pugnare eisque ad illicita instigantibus cogentibusue non cedere.

286 E.g. c. Iul. imp. 2, 31; 5, 12; 6, 26.
287 E.g. c. Iul. imp. 1, 71; 1, 72; 2, 137; 4, 57; 4, 114; 6, 8 nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut iustificati

per fidem pacem habeamus ad deum; contra uero carnis concupiscentiam nos oppugnantem,
per ipsius dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. non est ergo huius uitae iustitia, uitium
non habere; sed uitia non eis consentiendo minuere, eisque resistendo, temperanter et iuste et
pie uiuere; 6, 14.
288 c. Iul. imp. 2, 39; 2, 218; 4, 14; 5, 7.
289 c. Iul. imp. 2, 71; 3, 72. Cf. c. Iul. imp. 6, 14.
290 c. Iul. imp. 2, 226. See also 2, 228; 6, 8.
291 c. Iul. imp. 1, 106; 1, 108; 2, 97 donat etiam gratia, ut contra concupiscentiam carnis

spiritus concupiscat; et, si quando fidelis homo in hoc certamine uenialiter uincitur, debita
dimittit oranti et, quando damnabiliter uincitur, dat humiliorem paenitentiam, cui tribuat
indulgentiam; 2, 227 utroque enim modo adiuuat gratia, et dimittendo, quae male fecimus, et
opitulando, ut declinemus a malis et bona faciamus.
344 chapter six

Julian has noticed how Augustine distinguishes between the state of

will before and after baptism, and tries to reveal Augustine’s view as being
inconsistent.292 In defending his position, Augustine modifies the ways in
which the spirit relates to the flesh. The imperfect state of the will consists
of “having concupiscentia” in this life. Augustine also admits that despite the
new forces of the spirit, some slips of consent are prone to happen even sub
gratia.293

6.6.2. Romans 7
The ambiguity of c. Iul. imp. in denoting concupiscentia in a Christian both
as a passive state of “having” evil desires and temptations and as something
that can, in fact, be called sin (peccatum) as such is best revealed in Augus-
tine’s reading of Romans 7.294
First, it can be noted that Augustine holds to his standard explanation
of Romans 7. It is clearly, at least from v. 15 on, a narrative concerning
Paulus christianus. This also works on the level of stressing the interiority
of concupiscentia and a correct identification with one’s body.295 Augustine
notes that Paul’s intention in these verses is not so much to ask forgiveness
from God, but to ask strength to resist temptations, “that is what he does in
this passage.” This implies that the state Paul is lamenting is a state (locus) in
which the Christian finds herself fighting against temptations, but explicitly
not committing actual sins (non est locus ut dicat: dimitte nobis debita nostra
sed ne nos inferas in temptationem).296

292 See c. Iul. imp. 2, 90–94, in which Julian ridicules Augustine’s view of concupiscentia

before and after baptism: it seems to Julian that Augustine’s concept of grace in baptism is
rather weak, for nothing seems to happen to the force and effects of sexual desire, e.g., in the
case of married Christian couples. Augustine replies that in this life, the effects of grace and
baptism remain invisible, while in the future life, all defects will be repaired. c. Iul. imp. 2,
90–97; 2, 140 hic enim accipimus per pignus spiritus et certandi et uincendi uires; ibi autem sine
hoste ullo externo et interno ineffabili ac sempiterna pace perfruemur; 2, 217.
293 c. Iul. imp. 1, 101.
294 Gal 5, 17 is also used as parallel evidence for the post-baptismal struggle against the

existence of concupiscentia in Christian bodies. c. Iul. imp. 1, 72; 6, 8; 6, 14.

295 Julian claims that the religiously and intellectually low-level audience of Augustine is

eager to hear that their sinful behaviour is the result of necessity, and that they would love
to find sin as “what they hope someone else commits in them.” This is, of course, a variant
of the accusation of Augustine’s Manichaeism. Augustine replies by appealing to Rom 7 and
by stressing the interiority of sin (suum esse). He also holds on to the divine aid in curing
concupiscentia and its effects in human nature. c. Iul. imp. 2, 15.
296 c. Iul. imp. 1, 67. In response to Julian’s comparison of Augustine’s and Mani’s interpre-

tation of Rom 7 in the Letter to Menoch, Augustine also notes the Christian’s fight against
concupiscentia: aut uictus abstrahitur aut, ne in eius labatur assensum, aduersus eam, si pius
the domestication of concupiscentia 345

Hence Augustine, as usual, stresses the present tense of Paul’s verbs

in Rom 7, 17–19 against Julian, who transfers them to Paul’s Jewish past;
however, he is not able to persist in their literal, active meaning of really
committing sins: they refer to a continuing state of having temptations,
but not consenting to them.297 Sometimes Augustine makes a concession
for argument’s sake: what if Romans 7 really was written from the sub lege
perspective and should be read in Julian’s way as describing a self-afflicted
habit to sin (consuetudo)?298 Then “Paul’s” state would indeed represent
a “heavy weight of necessity.”299 In all these cases, Augustine’s concession
should, however, be understood as a way of showing that even Julian himself
seems to unobservingly assume a kind of non-voluntary evil.300
But there are also some deviations, real or apparent, to this standard read-
ing of Romans 7, in the way that the necessitating aspects of Paul’s narrative
are pushed to the extreme, and that Augustine actually seems to insist that
concupiscentia described in Romans 7 should be called sin. Romans 7 is used
in responding to Julian’s definition of sin as a purely voluntary, individual
event. Augustine has a broader view: Paul’s narrative works as evidence
for the fact that the punishment that he suffers may also be called sin.301

est, domino adiuuante confligit. c. Iul. imp. 3, 178. See also c. Iul. imp. 3, 186 and the discussion
of Harrison & BeDuhn 2001, 147–150.
297 c. Iul. imp. 1, 67. Similarly in c. Iul. imp. 1, 69 (beatus Gregorius non inter principia

emendationis suae, sed iam episcopus, uolens exponere uel potius quae nota sunt ammonere,
in quali quantoque certamine cum uitiis interioribus propter corpus, quod aggrauat animam,
constituti sint sancti), where Augustine appeals to Gregory of Nazianzus’ Oratio apologetica to
refute Julian’s charge that Augustine has inherited his reading of Rom 7 from the Manichaean
Faustus.
298 Pelagius had already approached Paul’s Romans with the concept of consuetudo. See

de Bruyn 1993, 43–44. Brown (1972, 196) stresses the “external” character of consuetudo in
Pelagius’ thoughts.
299 c. Iul. imp. 1, 99 si enim sub lege, non sub gratia constitutus haec loquitur, istum nega

sub graui necessitatis pondere ingemere; hunc ad bene uiuendum et ad recte agendum per
uoluntatis arbitrium assere liberum clamantem tibi: mentiris aut falleris; non quod uolo ago
[Rom 7,19]. si autem sicut melius sensit Ambrosius, hoc etiam de se ipso dicit apostolus, nec
iustorum est in hac uita ad perficiendum bonum tanta libertas propriae uoluntatis, quanta erit
in illa uita, ubi non dicetur: non quod uolo ago [Rom 7,19]. See also Augustine’s subversive
argument in c. Iul. imp. 3, 112. Here Augustine refutes Julian’s argument against a “captive
will” by Julian’s own reading of Rom 7, 15. See also c. Iul. imp. 1, 105; 6, 13.
300 Note that in these cases, Augustine deliberately emphasises the compulsive and neces-

sitating aspects of Rom 7, but when advocating his own position, the same verses are read in
a different, softer tone.
301 c. Iul. imp. 2, 38 haec definitio peccati est eius, quod non est etiam poena peccati. nam

ubi malae consuetudinis uoces esse contenditis atque ita uoces uestri dogmatis suffocatis, dic,
si audes, quomodo uoluntati hominis liberum sit abstinere a malo, ubi audis: non quod uolo
ago [Rom 7,15], aut nega esse malum, ubi audis: non quod uolo facio bonum, sed quod nolo
346 chapter six

According to Augustine, Paul clearly thinks that concupiscentia is also a

sin; this is demonstrated by Rom 7, 7, and thus Julian’s definition of sin is
deficient.302 Recall, however, that in the latter case, Augustine only shortly
interjects to Julian, and that the verse is usually read by Augustine to con-
cern a sub lege person; that is, concupiscentia may well be defined sin in the
unregenerated person with its guilt still undetached.
Romans 7 appears again in a rather lengthy discussion about sin either
as a possibility or a necessity (c. Iul. imp. 5, 50–64). This distinction is intro-
duced by Julian, and seems to be only reluctantly taken up by Augustine.
While Julian denies all the necessitating aspects of sin, Augustine objects
that Paul clearly knew of a necessity to sin, or “to do evil” (agendi malum) in
Romans 7: this necessity is called concupiscentia.
AUG. Pay attention to the apostle who says, I do the evil that I do not will (Rom
7:19), and answer whether he does not have a necessity to do evil, who does
not do the good he wills, but does the evil he does not will. But if you dare
to oppose the apostle, look, the man who does evil out of necessity destroys
and does away with your definitions. He, of course, does evil out of necessity
who does not will it and does it. But if what he does unwillingly is only to
desire carnally without any assent of the mind or action of the members, such
concupiscence of the flesh is also evil, even if one does not consent to it to do
evil. And yet, it delights you to praise it. But if the one who cries out, I do the evil
that I do not will (Rom 7:19), is compelled so much that he offers his members
as weapons to sin, then evils are not merely desired, but also committed out
of necessity.303 [transl. Teske]

malum hoc ago [Rom 7,19]. sed utique agnoscimus hoc peccatum poenam esse peccati et
ideo discernendum ab illa definitione peccati, ubi uoluntas hoc committit, unde liberum est
abstinere. Augustine also uses here Julian’s own reading of Rom 7 as describing a sub lege
person suffering from a self-inflicted bad habit (consuetudo mala). See above p. 284.
302 c. Iul. imp. 3, 210 quid est, rogo, quod dicis nec concupiscentiam peccatum esse? itane con-

tra apostolum te disputare non uides? ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam satis omnino
monstrauit, ubi ait: peccatum non cognoui nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi
lex diceret: non concupisces [Rom 7,7]. quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia uanius
dici potest?
303 c. Iul. imp. 5, 50 Aug. attende eum qui dicit, quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19]; et

responde utrum necessitatem non habeat agendi malum, qui non quod uult facit bonum, sed
quod non uult malum, hoc agit. quod si apostolo repugnare non audes, ecce homo a necessario
malum agens definitiones tuas disrumpit et dissipat: necessitate quippe malum agit, qui non
uult, et agit. hoc autem quod nolens agit, si tantummodo concupiscere est carne, sine ulla
mentis consensione membrorumque operatione; mala est et concupiscentia carnis, etiamsi non
ei consentiatur ad malum; quam te tamen laudare delectat: si autem tantum cogitur iste qui
clamat, quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19], ut etiam sua membra exhibeat arma peccato;
non solum concupiscuntur a necessario mala, uerum etiam committuntur.
the domestication of concupiscentia 347

Here the compulsory element of concupiscentia seems to be stressed in

an extraordinary way.304 However, Augustine uses here the “necessity to do
evil” in a dubious manner; for after he has claimed that due to concupiscentia
there is a necessity to “do” (agere) evil even in the renewed Paul, he imme-
diately reviews this claim by positing two kinds of voices in Paul’s narrative:
one who does not give his consent to the desires of the flesh, and one who
“offers his members as weapons to sin” by his consent. Thus, even in the
necessity advocated by Augustine in this passage, there are two stages: one
where evil things are desired a necessario, and another where these things
are also actually committed.
In what follows, Augustine’s elaborations on these statements move in
similarly confusing tones: even to “have such desires in the flesh” without
the consent of the mind is to be counted as “to do” out of necessity. Finally,
this conceptual chicanery amounts to the same basic result which is familiar
from Augustine’s previous works and appears elsewhere in c. Iul. imp.: the
renewed Christian does not commit sin, if he or she does not consent to its
temptations.
Catholic teachers […] understand that the apostle Paul said these things
even about himself, and they do not doubt that it comes from the law in the
members which resists the law of mind and without which no human being
is born. And they see that even saints say, I do not do the good that I will, but
I do the evil that I do not will (Rom 7:19), precisely because they see how great
a good it is not even to desire with the flesh those things which they reject in
the mind. And they see that the saints will it and do not do it, and that it is evil,
nonetheless, even to have such desires in the flesh, although the mind does
not give its consent. They see that they do not will it and yet do it, without
any condemnation because, once the guilt of this sin has been wiped out by
rebirth, they resist with the mind so that they do not do what they desire with
the flesh. But they are not without some evil of their own, because it is not a
foreign nature mingled with theirs, but it is their own nature both in the mind
and in the flesh.305 [transl. Teske]

304 See also the exceptionally strong language used in c. Iul. imp. 5, 61 unde ille posteaquam

peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat, necessitatem poe-
namque defleuit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: miser ego homo [Rom 7,24sq.];
c. Iul. imp. 5, 62 iste quippe ex necessario malum agit, qui non uult et agit.
305 c. Iul. imp. 5, 59 agnoscunt eam catholici doctores, qui Paulum apostolum intellegunt

etiam de se ipso ista dicentem, et ex lege quae in membris repugnat legi mentis, sine qua nullus
hominum nascitur, uenire non dubitant; et ideo dici et a sanctis uident, non quod uolo, facio
bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago [Rom 7,19]: quia uident quantum bonum sit nec carne
concupiscere, quae mente auersantur; eosque id uelle, nec facere: et malum esse, quamuis mente
non consentiente, uel carne tamen talia concupiscere; eosque id nolle, sed facere, sine ulla
quidem condemnatione, quoniam peccati huius reatu regeneratione deleto, resistunt mente, ne
348 chapter six

Augustine therefore has a rather tortured way of saying that by the activ-
ity of concupiscentia, we as Christians do not really commit sins. “The flesh,
of course, acts through desiring, even if it does not pull the mind to con-
sent.”306 So the active verbs in Paul’s narrative again refer to the actions of
concupiscentia, which take place in the renewed person, but for which no
real responsibility should be claimed without consensio mentis.307
Julian’s views of the present human freedom of the will are countered
with Rom 7 and Gal 5, 17.308 These verses are evidence for the fact that
the post-baptismal state of a Christian is not a completely repaired state
of freedom, comparable to that of Adam and Eve, but is under a slow and
gradual process of healing (paulatim effectus potestatis accedat, aliis citius,
aliis tardius).
In the final pages of c. Iul. imp. Augustine once more describes the quali-
fied character of concupiscentia in Christians with the aid of Romans 7, while
explicitly claiming that it is a sin (peccatum)—at least before baptism takes
place:
[The apostle] most clearly showed that it is sin when he said the words I
quoted: I would not have known sin except through the law. And as if we asked,
“What sin?” he said, For I would not have known desire unless the law said, “You
shall not desire” (Rom 7:7). This desire (concupiscentia), then, which is surely
evil, this desire by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, did not
yet exist before that great sin of the first human being. But it then began to
exist, and it damaged human nature as if in its root from which it contracted
original sin. Every human being is, of course, born with it, and the guilt of this
concupiscence is not removed except in those who are reborn. And after this
forgiveness no one is defiled by it unless one consents to it to carry out an evil
act, when the spirit does not have any desires opposed to it or does not have
stronger desires opposed to it.309 [transl. Teske]

perficiant quod concupiscunt carne; sed non sine suo aliquo malo, quia non eis aliena commixta,
sed eorum natura est et in mente et in carne.
306 c. Iul. imp. 5, 59 dicendo quippe, quod nolo facio [Rom 7,19]; se facere ostendit: et rursus

dicendo, non ego operor [Rom 7,17]; non mentem consentientem, sed carnem suam concupiscen-
tem id facere ostendit: concupiscendo quippe caro agit, etsi ad consensum mentem non attrahit.
307 For Julian’s biting critique of Augustine’s reading of Rom 7 in this sense, see c. Iul. imp.

1, 71 nam si lex peccati id est peccatum et necessitas peccati membris est inserta naturaliter,
quid prodest non ei praebere consensum, cum propter hoc ipsum quod est necesse sit subire
supplicium? aut si est lex quidem peccati, sed, quando ei non consentio, non peccat, inaestima-
bilis potentia uoluntatis humanae, quae, si dici permittat absurditas, cogit ipsum non peccare
peccatum; c. Iul. imp. 1, 72 est peccatum et non peccat, id est una res est et non est.
308 c. Iul. imp. 6, 11.
309 c. Iul. imp. 6, 41 apertissime quippe illam demonstrauit esse peccatum, qui dixit, quod com-

memoraui: peccatum non cognoui, nisi per legem. et uelut quaereremus quod peccatum: nam
the domestication of concupiscentia 349

6.6.3. Christ As a Model for Renewal

The extensive discussion of Christ’s humanity and concupiscentia carnis
in c. Iul. imp. 4, 45–89 is a complex mixture of polemical exaggeration
and of genuine differences in anthropology, while it perhaps reflects some
real differences in the christological departure points of the adversaries as
well. Clearly for Augustine, the person of Christ reflects the final goal of
the Christian’s renewal. The person of Christ did not include the defect
of concupiscentia carnis and all its bothersome consequences, and is thus
concrete evidence for the kind of person into which the Christian will turn
in Heaven.310
If, nonetheless, he had evil desire (cupiditatem malam) and, to use your word
“a desire for sins,” it would have begun to exist in him from his will, because
he was not born with it, as we are. And for this reason, his virtue meant that
he did not have it; our virtue means that we do not consent to it and that we
imitate him so that, as he did not commit sin because he did not have this
desire, so we do not commit sin because we do not consent to it. And as he
willed not to have this desire and was able not to have it, so let us too will to
be without it because we will be able to be without it. His grace will, of course,
set us free from the body of this death, that is, from sinful flesh, the grace of
him who came to us in the likeness of sinful flesh, not in sinful flesh.311
[transl. Teske]
Augustine operates here and in the following pages with the already famil-
iar distinction of non consentire—non habere. Christ exemplifies the goal
in which also the latter commandment (cf. Sir 18, 30 “do not go after your

concupiscentiam, inquit, nesciebam, nisi lex diceret, non concupisces. haec igitur concupiscen-
tia, utique mala, qua caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum, nondum erat ante primi hominis illud
grande peccatum: sed esse tunc coepit, naturamque humanam tanquam in traduce uitiauit,
unde trahit originale peccatum. cum illa quippe omnis homo nascitur: nec huius concupiscen-
tiae reatus, nisi in renascentibus soluitur, ut eo post hanc absolutionem non inquinetur, nisi qui
ei ad perpetrandum opus malum, spiritu aduersus eam uel non concupiscente, uel non fortius
concupiscente, consentit.
310 The problem is not here approached with the division of propassiones and passiones,

which was the usual way to make Christ’s person sufficiently human (i.e. he felt the first
movements of emotions) but without sin (i.e. he did not consent to emotions proper).
311 c. Iul. imp. 4, 48 uerumtamen si haberet cupiditatem malam, atque ut tuo uerbo utar,

cupiditatem uitiorum, ab ipsius uoluntate in illo esse coepisset; quia non cum illa est natus, ut
nos. ac per hoc, illius uirtus haec erat, eam non habere: nostra uirtus est, ei non consentire; et
in hoc illum imitari, ut quemadmodum ipse peccatum non fecit, eam non habendo, ita nec nos
faciamus, non ei consentiendo; et quemadmodum ipse eam uoluit et potuit non habere, sic ea
nos uelimus, quia poterimus, carere. eius quippe gratia nos liberabit de corpore mortis huius,
hoc est, de carne peccati, qui uenit ad nos in similitudinem carnis peccati, non in carne peccati.
See also the lurid sections of c. Iul. imp. 4, 54 and 4, 58.
350 chapter six

desires,” and Ex 20, 17 “you shall not desire”) is fulfilled.312 While the person
of Christ had been a part of Augustine’s discussions of concupiscentia during
the 410s, in c. Iul. imp. he explicitly makes the positive connection between
Christ and the renewal of a Christian (ut ipse, ita nos), rather than inculcat-
ing the radical difference of Christ’s human nature as compared to the rest
of humanity born with concupiscentia.
Augustine’s final work against Julian was left unfinished. His position on
concupiscentia in the renewed state appear in a somewhat tangled form, a
feature not totally alien to the overall flow of the argument in this work.
It seems that in some special cases, the dividing line between the (actual)
voluntary sins (peccatum) and the involuntary, inborn inheritance of Adam
is blurred, and the “necessity” of living in the state of having lex peccati
still in one’s body is also said to be a sin; but these are special cases, and
do not seriously challenge Augustine’s general idea of concupiscentia as
a truncated evil presence in the baptised Christian. To say this is not to
trivialise the importance of these cases; they may actually reveal something
of Augustine’s “universalising” view of sin.313 They also may signal something
of Augustine’s adamant insistence upon the overarching importance of
grace which in the end seems to trivialise the classification of sins into
individual and voluntary on the one hand, and into punitive and non-
voluntary on the other.314

6.7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have followed the way Augustine works his views of con-
cupiscentia in relation to Christian renewal. It has been argued that in the
earlier works of the 390s, Augustine mainly treats concupiscentia as a prob-
lem concerning people who are not yet converted to a life in Christ. Hence,

312 c. Iul. imp. 4, 57 ad hoc se debet omnis imitator extendere, ut concupiscentias carnis, quas

uetat apostolus perfici; nitatur atque optet penitus non habere: sic enim eas potest prouectu
quotidiano minuere, quas nullas habeat salute perfecta. See also c. Iul. imp. 4, 86–87.
313 To use the word of Markschies (2001, 103). I do not find Markschies’s theory of two

series (“Reihen”) or ways of speaking (“Sprechweisen”) as permeating Augustine’s thinking

convincing (2001, 103–104). The standard version of concupiscentia in post-baptismal state as
a sin only in transferred meaning seems to be in overwhelming majority compared to few,
extreme cases of c. Iul. imp., and in this work only.
314 Similar development is to be found in Augustine’s dealings with the monks of Hadru-

metum. “A person never stands before God guilty simply of particular misdeeds, but these
very misdeeds attain their sinful reality as connected with the surpassing fault of Adam.”
Weaver 1996, 26.
the domestication of concupiscentia 351

the depictions of concupiscentia tend to underline the strong invincible fea-

tures of evil desire, from which especially those who are on the verge of
being Christians and who live “under law” (sub lege) suffer. This outline is
not clear cut enough to not allow Augustine to muse on “something” that is
left from the old life to linger in the regenerate Christian. However, these
musings seem to be experimental and they do not entail a comprehen-
sive view of a full scale concept of concupiscentia in the renewed state. The
development, in which the force of concupiscentia is depicted as an irre-
sistible, compelling bond over the fallen humanity, finds its climax in Simpl.,
that is, at the same time Augustine reaches his permanent stance on divine
grace. From Simpl. onwards, Augustine begins to allow concupiscentia a
more detailed role in Christian renewal. The strength of concupiscentia is
re-evaluated and effectively downplayed. The immediate years after Simpl.
and conf. offer only some sketchy evidence of this process of re-evaluation,
but by the time the first anti-Pelagian works are published, Augustine has
made some remarkable rearrangements and qualifications to his emphasis
concerning concupiscentia in Christian life.
While concupiscentia in the works of the anti-Pelagian period still
remains there, in the body of a Christian, it is now conceived more as of
a sparring partner than an outer, dangerous enemy. The “movements” of
concupiscentia are seen as forgiven movements and as such powerless or
harmless, lest one goes with them, and reconnects once again with the
old Adamic guilt. Thus, Augustine’s later emphasis views concupiscentia in
Christian renewal as a beaten force, which is fully resistible by God’s grace.
The force of concupiscentia is repeatedly qualified and limited by Augus-
tine’s stress on the real effects of baptism; on the useful character of con-
cupiscentia as driving the Christian to live from daily forgiveness; on the
harmless nature of the “movements,” or temptations of concupiscentia; on
the future outcome of renewal; and finally, on his new reading of Paul, in
which the Apostle himself is seen as a model in fighting against the residue
of Adam’s sinful heritage in his own life. As a result, concupiscentia begins
to look more like a tamed beast, introduced in chains into the inner courts
of a Christian heart, instead of being a raging force of nature outside of the
citadel of virtue. While certainly seeing concupiscentia a malum, which is to
be removed in Heaven once and for all, Augustine seems to think of a bap-
tised Christian also as living relatively safely with this old adversary, keeping
its leash short and whenever it manages to bite, to run for a cure in Christ.
It could be argued that the total aspect of grace as presented in Simpl.
affected Augustine’s view of concupiscentia in a surprising way: when sal-
vation became completely dependent from God’s inscrutable grace, and
352 chapter six

was detached from all human initiative, the integrity of Christian renewal
in relation to concupiscentia lost importance. It was replaced by a view
in which the renewed Christian has become more vulnerable to the ap-
proaches of evil desires. Fortunately, the renewed Christian is also well pre-
pared to meet them. Concupiscentia became an interior opponent, instead
of being an exterior foe. At the same time, God’s grace stripped this enemy
of a great part of its strength, and the Christian reached a position in which
he or she not only is able to correctly identify and review the genuine nature
and quality of concupiscentia, but also to effectively resist it.
chapter seven

CONCLUSION

This study offers a systematic analysis of Augustine’s concept of evil desire

and its theological functions in their historical context. Deliberate emphasis
was given to those texts from Augustine’s entire corpus operum that dis-
cussed evil desire more comprehensively and were thereby more relevant
for the topic.
The study commenced with a preliminary survey of the terminology for
‘evil desire’ including an overview on the Classical and Christian Latin lit-
erature on relevant words. Occurrences of the nouns libido and cupiditas
and the verb concupisco in Classical literature exemplified how these words
could be used to denote the reproachable desires for varying objects. Con-
versely, in the philosophical texts, concupisco was regarded as expressing
an excessive emotion of desire or more generally, a strong, intensive wish.
Again for Christian authors, the traditional fields of meaning are preserved:
libido and cupiditas denote lust and greed and evil appetite for worthless
objects. The Latin Bible translations offer yet another word for these pur-
poses, namely the noun concupiscentia, used by authors such as Tertullian
and Ambrose.
Typically, Augustine seems to have used these three standard nouns—
libido, cupiditas, concupiscentia—rather flexibly with no static, fixed or
detailed differences of meaning. An overview of their mutual synonymy and
of the contexts in which they could be used in Augustine’s texts revealed
that, while certain preferences apply, strict limitations in respect of which
word could be used in which context were rare (an instance of such rarity
would be finding that libido never appears to denote a ‘good desire,’ that is,
a good form of love, for which Augustine sometimes used concupiscentia or
even cupiditas for rhetorical purposes). Again, none of the words could be
found to correspond to one specific meaning, for instance, a sexual mean-
ing. These findings supported the conclusion that to restrict an account of
the functions of evil desire to one term only would distort the image. There
were reasons (e.g. stylistic or source-related) for preferring certain nouns to
others in certain contexts, but these reasons as a rule did not include strict
semantic restrictions.
The examination of the functions of evil desire was conducted in four
stages, each presented in its own chapter, and each following chronologi-
354 chapter seven

cally a particular function throughout Augustine’s works. The starting point

of the study was to examine the theological connections of concupiscentia
to Augustine’s central views on God, sin and grace, and to illustrate how
concupiscentia (with cognates) was used, or was assigned varying functions
in these contexts.
The first function of concupiscentia that was analysed in this study was its
use as an ancient punishment for Adam and Eve’s disobedience in Paradise
(Chapter 3). Augustine’s interest in investigating a variety of ideas related to
the causality of sin and punishment can be traced to his early works. For this
reason, the narratives of Paradise, consequences of Adam and Eve’s crime,
and the role of evil desire, all appear in his early theological and exegetical
expositions. These notions, however, were not tightly linked until some-
what later when Augustine began to conceive of sexual desire as closely
reflecting the circumstances of Adam and Eve’s sin against God. Augustine’s
invention of concupiscentia carnis as the most fitting punishment for the
original disobedience by humans against God, appearing as a prideful wish
to free themselves from all domination but their own, was appropriated to
his existing views on divine justice, the importance of obedience and the
inability of humanity to conquer the debilitating sinful heritage of Adam.
It was shown that Augustine also linked the function of concupiscentia as a
punishment (poena) to interesting parts of his views on divine justice. The
order and exact way of connecting concupiscentia to human propagation
remains a mystery, reflecting the secret ways of divine justice. Again, the
aesthetic harmony of Augustine’s stance on the highest justice is reflected in
his rhetorical depictions: he stresses the general complementarity between
the primary disobedience of Adam and Eve and the secondary disobedience
of retribution, which is exposed in the involuntary movements of the soul
and the body during sexual intercourse.
Augustine attributed to sexual desire a deep theological importance. This
claim is supported by the vehement critique from Julian of Aeclanum, who
chose his targets well, including Augustine’s assumptions on divine justice
and the insights into Adam’s disobedient act of will. Julian directed his
critique particularly at the seemingly unrelated conceptions of divine and
human justice and obedience. Julian thus correctly identified the important
theological attachments of sexual desire that Augustine had created by his
accounts of the involuntary (and therefore reproachable) activity of the
sexual organs.
Next, the study analysed the rather simple function of desire as a gen-
eral cause, or matrix, for individual sinful acts (Chapter 4). An overview was
provided of how Augustine would oppose two forms of love: a good form
conclusion 355

of love (caritas) towards God and neighbours, and an evil, privative and
destructive form of love (cupiditas). Then, the function of root and matrix
was depicted by following two formally distinct images with similar con-
tents, namely the image of ‘root’ and the scheme of threefold concupiscence.
Both these images were usually supported by scriptural quotations (that is,
1 Tim 6, 10 and 1Jn 2, 16).
The image of evil desire as the ‘root’ of all evil actions appears early
in Augustine’s thought. That image also gave rise to disagreements in the
debate with the Manichaean Fortunatus. It seems that Augustine resorted
to his Manichaean past in his interest in using this image. This can be
seen, for instance, in the Letter to Menoch, a Manichaean text quoted later
by Julian of Aeclanum to demonstrate Augustine’s residual Manichaeism.
This letter exploits the biblical imagery of evil desire as the root of all evil.
However, Augustine rather constantly departs from Manichaean ontology
each time he resorts to using the image of the ‘root,’ and he is always careful
to point out the fundamental difference between his position and that of the
Manichaeans. By using the image of the ‘root,’ Augustine does not intend to
suggest that there are two different natures: evil is parasitic and deprivative
in character, not a competing substance against God’s good creation. It
seems that Augustine was thoroughly convinced of the persuasiveness of
this difference and therefore did not assign much weight on the formal
and terminological parallels between the Letter to Menoch and his own
formulations of concupiscentia carnis. Nevertheless, to Julian of Aeclanum,
the parallels seemed incriminating.
The scheme of threefold concupiscence provided Augustine with a gen-
eralising instrument to describe the various levels of sins and temptations.
This scheme also had its polemical application, for it was commonly used
by Augustine to characterise his former co-religionists, the Manichaeans.
While this scheme no longer appears to have substantially exploited after
ep. Io. tr., the separate elements in the scheme—pride, depraved intellec-
tual curiosity and sensual desires (often exemplified by sexual desire)—
remained part of Augustine’s apparatus of dealing with sin. There are no
straightforward, convincing answers to the question of why this scheme
lost importance during the last two decades in Augustine’s thought, but
the emphasis on sexual desire during the Pelagian debates obviously forced
Augustine to narrow his scope in this respect. Moreover, what seems to
have gained importance in the later years is pride as an independent, single
source for all evil (initium omnis peccati superbia, in a parallel sense to the
image of cupiditas as the root of all evil, but not, according to Augustine’s
rather artificial explanation, contradictory to it).
356 chapter seven

An important factor of Augustine’s formulations of evil desire were the

previous philosophical traditions of emotions. Augustine’s use of these tra-
ditions and his relation to them, particularly related to concupiscentia, was
traced in Chapter 5.
The instrumental value of these psychological traditions was emphasised
in this study. In his earlier works, Augustine regularly used a commonplace
version of the Platonic soul structure, combined with certain Stoic notions
of the distinction between the preparatory stages of the emotion and the
emotion proper, in order to counter the radically dualistic Manichaean psy-
chology of two opposite substances. This means that for Augustine, the
philosophical traditions of emotions in general and desires in particular,
provided a respectable monistic explanation for a phenomenon he had pre-
viously been forced to analyse in the framework of Manichaean dualism,
which involved all the problems of moral responsibility and God’s omnipo-
tence.
However, Augustine later turned a more critical eye towards the philo-
sophical traditions of emotions in relation to the status and role of concupis-
centia. In this respect, this study concentrated on Augustine’s major discus-
sion of emotions and libido in ciu. and on selected examples from his debate
with Julian of Aeclanum. It was argued that Augustine’s manner of dealing
with philosophical traditions remained instrumental, despite his more criti-
cal stance towards them. They now provided Augustine with evidence of the
abilities of philosophers to correctly identify the main problems in human
constitution and its moral inclinations, but also worked as evidence for his
vision that a virtuous life was possible only within ciuitas dei. To Augustine,
the philosophers could not, in the end, prevail in affronting and control-
ling the emotions. To illustrate the futility of these “wise men of the ciuitas
terrena,” Augustine discusses sexual desire and its wildly compulsive and
overwhelming features that cannot be tempered or used correctly outside
ciuitas dei.
The examples selected from the debates with Julian corroborate Augus-
tine’s reluctant attitude towards the philosophical traditions when explain-
ing concupiscentia with what he now conceived as being better dealt with
in Christian and biblical terms. Augustine admits a certain usefulness, in
an instrumental way, in the discussions of authors such as Cicero and Aris-
totle (cited by Julian), but at the same time, Augustine very clearly points
out the inadequacy of these “wise men” when it comes to providing a full
description of the human condition. It was thus concluded, that while the
philosophical traditions of human emotions appeared rather constantly in
conjunction with Augustine’s accounts of evil desire, their function was
conclusion 357

mainly instrumental and subordinated to Augustine’s more urgent theolog-

ical agendas, both in the course of the Manichaean debate and the Pelagian
polemics.
The last function of concupiscentia analysed in this study was its role
within the Christian renewal (Chapter 6). More than the previous functions,
this role was tightly connected to Augustine’s understanding of divine grace
and its effects. Acknowledging the scholarly consensus of the crucial role
of Simpl. in Augustine’s developing notion of grace, the earlier remarks (in
works preceding Simpl.) made on the role of concupiscentia (with cognates)
in the life of a baptised Christian, were contrasted with later expositions,
notably those composed from the year 411 onwards. It was demonstrated
that while Augustine discusses the role of concupiscentia during the Chris-
tian renewal only experimentally and superficially in his works preceding
Simpl., the shift towards an entirely theocentric view of the grace in Simpl.
also affected Augustine’s position on concupiscentia. It was suggested that
after Simpl., a strong and invincible picture of the concupiscentia in peo-
ple living sub lege was gradually replaced by another picture that consis-
tently downplayed and qualified the effects of concupiscentia in the Chris-
tians who live sub gratia. Thus, Augustine frequently depicts concupiscentia
as “remaining, but forgiven”; the movements of concupiscentia in Chris-
tians exist, but they remain harmless unless they are given consent (the
old notion of consent thus serves theological purposes here, located as it
is in the Christian renewal as a decisive factor in battling and conquering
temptations); even Augustine’s invention of Adamitic guilt (reatus), when
removed from concupiscentia, emphasises the domestication process that it
undergoes during Christian renewal.
During the analysis of the function of concupiscentia in Christian renewal,
the study also explored Augustine’s reading of a related crucial scriptural
text in this respect, namely Romans 7. As Augustine’s changing interpreta-
tion of Romans 7 has already been well documented, the task of this study
was to examine how that changing interpretation coincided with Augus-
tine’s shift of emphasis with regard to concupiscentia and its role in Chris-
tian renewal in general. It was demonstrated that, for example, in nupt. et
conc., where Augustine offers a detailed reading of Romans 7 as regarding
a Christian sub gratia, some of the verses that emphasise the necessitating
and compelling effects of residual sin were toned down to accommodate
Augustine’s new conception of concupiscentia under Christian renewal. Of
course, these passages had not been problematic in Augustine’s previous
interpretation, which portrayed in Romans 7 a depiction of a person sub
lege.
358 chapter seven

To summarise, it was claimed that the position adopted in Simpl. affected

Augustine’s view of concupiscentia in a surprising way: as all human ini-
tiative was stripped from salvation, the integrity of Christian renewal in
relation to concupiscentia lost its importance. An overwhelming emphasis
on divine grace diminished the importance of making a black-and-white-
distinction between the sinful life ridden with the tyranny of concupiscentia
and the new life lived free from distracting desires and temptations. Augus-
tine gradually internalised the concept of concupiscentia in the life of a
baptised Christian, consistently qualifying, however, the effects and force of
concupiscentia. This can be seen in the way Augustine underscores the real
ability of Christians to ward off the temptations of concupiscentia, and in
his way of refuting Julian’s caricatures as for example the Apostles as being
“driven by shameful lusts.”
The analysis of these four functions of evil desire in Augustine’s theol-
ogy has revealed, in various cases, that the notion of concupiscentia was
deeply connected to Augustine’s other perhaps even more central theo-
logical concepts. Thus, as for the function of punishment, concupiscentia
carnis appears as a psychological sign of a deeply theological reality, reflect-
ing divine justice (and thereby God’s own being) and Augustine’s more
abstract insights into the role of obedience to God as a primal virtue. Indi-
rectly, concupiscentia carnis therefore works in Augustine’s construction as
a reminder of our relationship to God. Again, Augustine’s use of a com-
monplace psychological apparatus in analysing the emergence of sin from
temptations testifies to a more general need to build a coherent explanation
for sin in a uniformly good, created reality. Moreover, while Augustine later
adopts a more reflective and critical stance towards the traditional theories
of emotions in connection with concupiscentia, he nonetheless maintains
an acute sense of putting these discussions to use in his own theological
structures. Thus even apparent discontinuities mirror Augustine’s compact
and coherent way of approaching theology. In the case of Christian renewal,
Augustine’s picture of concupiscentia followed, albeit in time, his shifting
emphasis on divine grace, and went hand in hand with his scriptural argu-
mentation related to Romans 7.
It was crucial for Augustine to emphasise the role of concupiscentia as a
constant, evil (although a relatively harmless) object of Christian struggle
against what he conceived as a Pelagian ideal of perfection in this life. That
Julian saw concupiscentia as a created good that was able to be controlled
against the risk of its excessive indulgence, was from Augustine’s perspec-
tive related to the same Pelagian ideal: by establishing concupiscentia as a
neutral, even a positive force, Julian had secured that there were few obsta-
cles left on the path to the perfection of virtue in this life.
conclusion 359

As to the relative importance of the functions of concupiscentia, it could

be claimed that the functions of concupiscentia as a punishment and the
function of concupiscentia in Christian renewal were both tightly interwo-
ven into Augustine’s view of God’s being and God’s grace. Indeed, they
appeared in varying forms throughout his oeuvre, although in earlier works,
they occurred only in an experimental or very initial stage. Augustine’s use
of the philosophical traditions of emotions is also rather consistent in his
works, albeit growing in its reflective and critical attitude. Characteristi-
cally, however, this function contained less of Augustine’s own contribution
than the other two, appearing in an instrumental role only. Furthermore,
the function of the root and matrix more or less dispersed with time and
underwent transformations to the degree that it essentially disappeared
from Augustine’s later works, surfacing in the second Pelagian debate only
by Julian’s instigation. On the level of the imagery used, pride seems to have
taken the place of honour as the single fundamental starting point of sin
(initium), instead of cupiditas as the ‘root’ of all evil (radix).
Finally, the study has demonstrated the importance of reading Augus-
tine’s discussions of evil desire with a constant awareness of their role in a
larger context, that is, of their function in each situation. A too simplistic
and unifying reading runs many risks. One way to misunderstand Augus-
tine’s concupiscentia would be to see him as constantly advocating a scheme
of desire-consent-sin, where concupiscentia is always regarded as merely an
opportunity to sin, but never as a sin in itself. This kind of reading would
underestimate Augustine’s emphasis on concupiscentia as being both a sin
and a punishment (a stance vehemently criticised by Julian) and the func-
tion of cupiditas and concupiscentia as the ‘root’ and threefold matrix for all
sinful acts. Another way to misrepresent Augustine’s position would be to
over-emphasise his claims about the necessitating aspects of concupiscen-
tia, appearing as an unavoidable presence of sinful forces in each human
being, and thus to neglect the constant domesticated features of concupis-
centia during Christian renewal that Augustine considered to be the result
of God’s grace.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources

For Augustine’s works I have used the abbreviations of Augustinus-Lexikon

(1986–, Basel: Schwabe). The editions consulted on Augustine are those
collated by K.H. Chelius in Augustinus-Lexikon (“List of Augustine’s Works”:
AL 1 (1986–1994) XXVI–XLII).

1. Augustine
CCL Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina. Turnhout 1953–.
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Wien 1865–.
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Wien 1865–.
PL Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina (ed. J.P. Migne). Paris
1844–1864.
PLS Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina, supplementum (ed.
A. Hamman). Paris 1958–1974.

Acad. De Academicis
CCL 29, 3–61
c. Adim. Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum
CSEL 25/1, 115–190
adn. Iob Adnotationes in Iob
CSEL 28/2, 509–628
c. adu. leg. Contra aduersarium legis et prophetarum
CCL 49, 35–131
agon. De agone christiano
CSEL 41, 101–138
an. quant. De animae quantitate
CSEL 89, 131–231
bapt. De baptismo
CSEL 51, 145–375
beata u. De beata uita
CCL 29, 65–85
b. coniug. De bono coniugali
CSEL 41, 187–231
b. uid. De bono uiduitatis
CSEL 41, 305–343
cat. rud. De catechizandis rudibus
CCL 46, 121–178
ciu. De ciuitate dei
CCL 47, 1–314; 48, 321–866
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conf. Confessiones
CCL 27, 1–273
cont. De continentia
CSEL 41, 141–183
corrept. De correptione et gratia
CSEL 92, 219–280
diu. qu. De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus
CCL 44A, 11–249
doctr. chr. De doctrina christiana
Ed. M. Simonetti, Sant’Agostino, L’istruzione cristiana. Milano
1994.
duab. an. De duabus animabus
CSEL 25/1, 51–80
en. Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmos
CCL 38, 1–616; 39, 623–1417; 40, 1425–2196; CSEL 95/3, 37–340; CSEL
95/4, z23–228
ench. De fide spe et caritate
CCL 46, 49–114
ep. Epistulae
CSEL 34/1, 1–125; 34/2, 1–746; 44, 1–736; 57, 1–656
ep.* Epistulae ab I. Divjak repertae
CSEL 88, 3–138
ep. Io. tr. In epistulam Iohannis ad Parthos tractatus decem
PL 35, 1977–2062
c. ep. Man. Contra epistulam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti
CSEL 25/1, 193–248
c. ep. Parm. Contra epistulam Parmeniani
CSEL 51, 19–141
c. ep. Pel. Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum
CSEL 60, 423–570
ep. Rm. inch. Epistulae ad Romanos inchoata expositio
CSEL 84, 145–181
exp. Gal. Expositio epistulae ad Galatas
CSEL 84, 55–141
exp. prop. Rm. Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Roma-
nos
CSEL 84, 3–52
c. Faust. Contra Faustum Manichaeum
CSEL 25/1, 251–797
c. Fel. Contra Felicem Manichaeum
CSEL 25/2, 801–852
c. Fort. Acta contra Fortunatum Manichaeum
CSEL 25/1, 83–112
gest. Pel. De gestis Pelagii
CSEL 42, 51–122
Gn. litt. De Genesi ad litteram
CSEL 28,/1, 3–435
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Gn. adu. Man. De Genesi aduersus Manicheos

CSEL 91, 67–172
gr. et lib. arb. De gratia et libero arbitrio
PL 44, 881–912
gr. et pecc. or. De gratia Christi et de peccato originali
CSEL 42, 125–206
c. Iul. Contra Iulianum
PL 44, 641–874
c. Iul. imp. Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum
c. Iul. imp. 1–3 CSEL 85/1, 3–506
c. Iul. imp. 4–6 PL 45, 1337–1608
lib. arb. De libero arbitrio
CSEL 74, 3–154
c. litt. Pet. Contra litteras Petiliani
CSEL 52, 3–227
mend. De mendacio
CSEL 41, 413–466
mor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manicheorum
CSEL 90, 3–156
mus. De musica
PL 32, 1081–1194
mus. 6: M. Jacobsson, Aurelius Augustinus, De musica liber VI. Stock-
holm 2002.
nat. b. De natura boni
CSEL 25/2, 855–889
nat. et gr. De natura et gratia
CSEL 60, 233–299
nupt. et conc. De nuptiis et concupiscentia ad Valerium
CSEL 42, 211–319
op. mon. De opere monachorum
CSEL 41, 531–596
ord. De ordine
CSEL 63, 121–185
pat. De patientia
CSEL 41, 663–691
pecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum ad
Marcellinum
CSEL 60, 3–151
perf. iust. De perfectione iustitiae hominis
CSEL 42, 3–48
perseu. De dono perseuerantiae
PL 45, 993–1034
praed. sanct. De praedestinatione sanctorum
PL 44, 959–992
qu. Quaestiones
CCL 33, 1–377
qu. eu. Quaestiones euangeliorum
CCL 44B, 1–118
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retr. Retractationes
CCL 57, 5–143
c. Sec. Contra Secundinum Manicheum
CSEL 25/2, 905–947
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PL 38, 39
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Sermones 151–156: CCL 41 Ba
s. Denis Sermones a M. Denis editi
Miscellanea Agostiniana I. Roma 1930.
s. Dolbeau Sermones a F. Dolbeau editi
F. Dolbeau, Augustin d’Hippone, Vingt-six sermons au peuple
d’Afrique. Paris 1996.
s. Lambot Sermones a C. Lambot editi
PLS 2, 750–755, 759–769
s. Mai Sermones ab A. Mai editi
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s. Wilm. Sermones ab A. Wilmart editi
Miscellanea Agostiniana I. Roma 1930.
s. dom. m. De sermone Domini in monte
CCL 35, 1–188
Simpl. Ad Simplicianum
CCL 44, 7–91
sol. Soliloquia
CSEL 89, 3–98
spir. et litt. De spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum
CSEL 60, 155–229
trin. De trinitate
CCL 50, 25–380; 50A, 381–535
uera rel. De uera religione
CCL 32, 187–260
uirg. De sancta uirginitate
CSEL 41, 235–302

2. Other Sources
The abbreviations of Classical Latin authors are those to be found in TLL
Index (Index librorum scriptorum inscriptionum ex quibus exempla afferun-
tur. Editio altera, ed. Dietfried Krömer, Cornelis G. van Leijenhorst, Leipzig
1990).

a. Classical Authors: Latin Writers

Apuleius (= Apul.)
apol. Apologia
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flor. Florida
Ed. R. Helm. Teubner 1959.
met. Metamorphoses
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Plat. De Platone et eius dogmate
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Caesar (= Caes.)
civ. Commentarii belli ciuilis
Ed. A. Klotz. Teubner 1950.
Gall. Commentarii belli Gallici
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Catullus (= Catull.)
Carmina
Ed. H. Bardon. Teubner 1973.
Cicero (= Cic.)
ac. Academica posteriora
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fin. De finibus bonorum et malorum
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leg. agr. De lege agraria orationes
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nat. deor. De natura deorum
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off. De officiis
Ed. C. Atzert. Teubner 1963.
prov. De prouinciis consularibus oratio
Ed. A. Klotz. Teubner 1919.
rep. De re publica
Ed. K. Ziegler. Teubner 1969.
fam. Epistulae ad familiares
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Phil. In M. Antonium orationes Philippicae
Ed. P. Fedeli. Teubner 1986.
Lael. Laelius de amicitia
Ed. K. Simbek. Teubner 1917.
Cluent. Pro A. Cluentio Habito oratio
Ed. L. Fruechtel. Teubner 1931.
inv. Rhetorici libri duo qui uocantur de inuentione
Ed. E. Stroebel. Teubner 1915.
Tusc. Tusculanae disputationes
Ed. M. Pohlenz. Teubner 1918.
Hort. Hortensius
Ed. A. Grilli. Milano 1962.
Verr. In Verrem
Ed. C.F.W. Müller. Teubner 1901.
366 bibliography

Columella
rus. Res rustica
Ed. V. Lundström, A. Josephson, S. Hedberg. Collectio scriptorum
veterum Upsaliensis. 1897–1962.
Cornelius Nepos (= Nep.)
Con. Conon
Ed. P.K. Marshall. Teubner 1991.
Eum. Eumenes
Ed. P.K. Marshall. Teubner 1991.
Att. Atticus
Ed. P.K. Marshall. Teubner 1991.
Aulus Gellius (= Gell.)
Noctes Atticae
Ed. C. Hosius. Teubner 1903.
Horatius (= Hor.)
carm. Carmina
Ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey. Teubner 1995.
Livius (= Liv.)
Ab urbe condita
Libri I–IX ed. W. Weissenborn et M. Müller. Teubner 1932.
Libri XXIII–XXV ed T.A. Dorey. Teubner 1976.
Libri XXVIII–XXX ed. P.G. Walsh. Teubner 1986.
Libri XXXI–XL ed. J. Briscoe. Teubner 1991.
Libri XLI–XLV ed. J. Briscoe. Teubner 1986.
Plinius Maior (= Plin.)
nat. Naturalis historia
Ed. L. Ian et C. Mayhoff. Teubner 1892–1909.
Rhetorica ad Herennium
Rhet. Her. Rhetorica ad C. Herennium
Ed. F. Marx. Teubner 1923.
Sallustius (= Sall.)
Catil. De coniuratione Catilinae
Ed. A. Kurfess. Teubner 1957.
Seneca (= Sen.)
benef. De beneficiis
Ed. E. Hosius. Teubner 1914.
clem. De clementia
Ed. E. Hosius. Teubner 1914.
dial. 11 Dialogorum liber XI: Consolatio ad Polybium
Ed. E. Hermes. Teubner 1923.
dial. 12 Dialogorum liber XII: Consolatio ad Heluiam matrem
Ed. E. Hermes. Teubner 1923.
epist. Epistulae morales ad Lucilium
Ed. O. Hense. Teubner 1938.
bibliography 367

ira De ira (= Dialogorum libri 3–5)

Ed. E. Hermes. Teubner 1923.
Suetonius (= Suet.)
Nero De uita Caesarum, liber VI
Ed. M. Ihm. Teubner 1908.
gramm. De grammaticis et rhetoribus
Ed. G. Brugnoli. Teubner 1972.
Tacitus (= Tac.)
Agr. De uita Iulii Agricolae
Ed. J. Delz. Teubner 1983.
ann. Annales
Ed. H. Heubner. Teubner 1994.
Germ. Germania
Ed. A. Önnerfors. Teubner 1983.
hist. Historiae
Ed. H. Heubner. Teubner 1978.

b. Classical Authors: Greek Writers

Alcinous (= Alcin.)
Alcinous Didaskalikos
The Handbook of Platonism. Transl. by J. Dillon. Oxford 1993.
Aristoteles
Cat. Categoriae
Ed. L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpreta-
tione. Oxford 1949.
Platon (= Plat.)
Phaedr. Phaedrus
Ed. J. Burnet, Platonis opera, Vol. II. Oxford 1901.
Rep. Respublica
Ed. S.R. Slings. Oxford 2003.
Tim. Timaeus
Ed. J. Burnet, Platonis opera, Vol. IV. Oxford 1902.
Plotinus (= Plot.)
En. Enneades
Ed. P. Henry et H.-R. Schwyzer, Plotini opera, Vol I–III. Leiden 1951–
1973.

c. Christian and Jewish Writers

Ambrosiaster (= Ambrosiast.)
in Rom 7 Commentarius in Pauli epistulam ad Romanos (recensio gamma)
Ed. H.J. Vogels. CSEL 81/1. Wien 1966.
368 bibliography

Ambrosius Mediolanensis (= Ambr.)

Abr. De Abraham
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
bon. mort. De bono mortis
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
Cain et Ab. De Cain et Abel
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
fid. De fide libri V (ad Gratianum Augustum)
Ed. O. Faller. CSEL 78. Wien 1962.
fug. saec. De fuga saeculi
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Hel. De Helia et ieiunio
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Iac. De Iacob et uita beata
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Iob De interpellatione Iob et Dauid
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Ioseph De Ioseph
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Isaac De Isaac uel anima
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
Nab. De Nabuthae
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
Noe De Noe
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
obit. Theod. De obitu Theodosii
Ed. O. Faller. CSEL 73. Wien 1955.
off. De officiis
Ed. M. Testard. CCL 15. Turnhout 2000.
paenit. De paenitentia
Ed. R. Gryson. SC 179. Paris 1971.
parad. De paradiso
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
patr. De patriarchis
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/2. Wien 1897.
epist. Epistulae
Ed. O. Faller. CSEL 82/1. Wien 1968.
Ed. O. Faller et M. Zelzer. CSEL 82/2. Wien 1990.
Ed. M. Zelzer. CSEL 82/3. Wien 1982.
hex. Exameron
Ed. C. Schenkl. CSEL 32/1. Wien 1896.
exhort. virg. Exhortatio uirginitatis
Ed. F. Gori. Biblioteca Ambrosiana 14/2. Milano 1989.
in psalm. Explanatio psalmorum XII
Ed. M. Petschenig. CSEL 64. Wien 1919.
in psalm. 118 Expositio psalmi CXVIII
Ed. M. Petschenig. CSEL 62. Wien 1913.
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Cyprianus Carthaginensis (= Cypr.)

Demetr. Ad Demetrianum
Ed. M. Simonetti. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
ad Donat. Ad Donatum
Ed. M. Simonetti. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
Fort. Ad Fortunatum
Ed. R. Weber. CCL 3. Turnhout 1972.
testim. Ad Quirinum vel testimonia
Ed. R. Weber. CCL 3. Turnhout 1972.
patient. De bono patientiae
Ed. C. Moreschini. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
domin. orat. De dominica oratione
Ed. C. Moreschini. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
hab. virg. De habitu uirginum
Ed. W. Hartel. CSEL 3/1. Wien 1868.
laps. De lapsis
Ed. M. Bévenot. CCL 3. Turnhout 1972.
mortal. De mortalitate
Ed. M. Simonetti. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
eleem. De opere et eleemosynis
Ed. M. Simonetti. CCL 3A. Turnhout 1976.
epist. Epistulae
Ed. G.F. Diercks. CCL 3B/2–3. Turnhout 1993–1996.
Epiphanius (= Epiph.)
Panarion
Ed. K. Holl. Epiphanius, Bände 1–3. Leipzig 1915–1933.
Evagrius Ponticus
malign. cogit. De malignis cogitationibus
Ed. A. Guillaumont, C. Guillaumont et P. Géhin. SC 438. Paris 1998.
Gregorius Nyssenus (= Greg. Nys.)
Vit. Moys. De vita Mosis
Ed. J. Danielou. SC 1. Paris 1968.
Gregorius Magnus (= Greg.)
moral. Moralia in Iob
Ed. M. Adriaen. CCL 143, 143A, 143B. Turnhout 1979–1981.
Hieronymus (= Hier.)
epist. Epistulae
Ed. I. Hilberg. CSEL 54, 55, 56. Wien 1910–1918.
Manichaeus (= Manich.)
ep. fund. Epistula fundamenti
Ed. M. Stein. Manichaica Latina, Bd II. Papyrologica Coloniensia
XXVII/2. Paderborn 2002.
ep. Men. Epistula ad Menoch
Ed. M. Stein. Manichaica Latina, Bd I. Papyrologica Coloniensia
XXVII/1. Wiesbaden 1998.
370 bibliography

Philo (= Phil.)
all. Legum allegoriarum libri I–III
Ed. L. Cohn. Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt. Berlin 1896.
QG Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin
Ed. et transl. R. Marcus. Philo, Questions and answers on Genesis.
London and Cambridge (Mass.) 1953.
Tertullianus (= Tert.)
mart. Ad martyras
Ed. E. Dekkers. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
nat. Ad nationes
Ed. J. Borleffs. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
uxor. Ad uxorem
Ed. E. Kroymann. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
adv. Marc. Aduersus Marcionem
Libri 1–3
Ed. E. Kroymann. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
Libri 4–5
Ed. E. Evans. Oxford 1972.
apol. Apologeticum
Ed. E. Dekkers. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
anim. De anima
Ed. J.H. Waszink. CCL 2. Turnhout 1954.
bapt. De baptismo
Ed. J. Borleffs. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
cult. fem. De cultu feminarum
Ed. E. Kroymann. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
castit. De exhortatione castitatis
Ed. E. Kroymann. CCL 2. Turnhout 1954.
idol. De idololatria
Ed. J.H. Waszink & J.C.M. van Winden. VCS 1. Leiden 1987.
paenit. De paenitentia
Ed. J. Borleffs. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
patient. De patientia
Ed. J. Borleffs. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
pudic. De pudicitia
Ed. E. Dekkers. CCL 2. Turnhout 1954.
resurr. De resurrectione mortuorum
Ed. J. Borleffs. CCL 2. Turnhout 1954.
spect. De spectaculis
Ed. E. Dekkers. CCL 1. Turnhout 1954.
virg. vel. De uirginibus uelandis
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d. Other Documents

Melanchthon Philippus (= Melanchthon)

Apol. Apologia confessionis Augustanae
Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. (7.
Aufl.) Göttingen 1976.

3. Translations
Burleigh, John, Augustine: Earlier Writings. Library of Christian Classics VI. Philadel-
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Chadwick, Henry, Confessions. Oxford 1992.
Dyson, R.W., The City of God against the Pagans. Cambridge 1998.
Gallagher, Donald & Idella, The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life. FC 56.
Washington 1966.
Green, R.P.H., On Christian Teaching. Oxford 1997.
Hill, Edmund, The Trinity. The Works of Saint Augustine I/5. New York 1991.
Holmes, Peter, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, and on the Baptism of Infants.
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers V. New York 1887.
———, On the Spirit and the Letter. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers V. New York
1887.
———, On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers V.
New York 1887.
———, On Marriage and Concupiscence. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers V. New
York 1887.
McDonald, Mary Francis, Continence. FC 16. Washington 1952.
Mosher, David L., Eighty-three Different Questions. FC 70. Washington 1982.
Russell, Robert R., The Teacher, the Free Choice of the Will, Grace and Free will. FC 59.
Washington 1968.
Schumacher, Matthew A., Against Julian. FC 35. Washington 1957.
Stothert, Richard, Reply to Faustus the Manichaean. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
IV. New York 1887.
Taylor, John Hammond, The Literal Meaning of the Genesis. ACW 42: 1–2. Mahwah
1982.
Teske, Roland J., Saint Augustine on Genesis: Two Books on Genesis Against the
Manichees and on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book. FC 84.
Washington 2001.
———, Answer to the Pelagians, III: Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian. The Works
of Saint Augustine I/25. New York 1999.
———, The Manichaean Debate: A Debate With Fortunatus, a Manichaean. The
Works of Saint Augustine I/19. New York 2006.
Wallis, Robert, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
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INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Aalders, G.J.D., 153 Burnell, Peter, 15, 300, 341

Adam, Alfred, 7 Burns, J. Patout, 268, 269, 278
Agaësse, Paul, 86 Burton, Philip, 18
Alexander, William, 60
Alfaric, Prosper, 7, 167 Canellis, Aline, 32
Alflatt, Malcolm, 69, 75, 155, 157 Cary, Phillip, 285, 323, 330, 334
Anderson, Richard Dean, 268, 319 Cavadini, John, 197
Annas, Julia, 24, 194 Chadwick, Henry, 62
Anrup, Nils Erik, 5 Chappell, Timothy, 89
Arbesmann, Rudolf, 162 Chelius, K.H., 361
Armstrong, A.H., 138 Cipriani, Nello, 15, 60, 255
Aune, David, 194 Clark, Elizabeth, 7, 60, 153
Clark, Mary, 196
Babcock, William, 69, 75, 138, 143, 144, Colish, Marcia, 33, 34, 89, 102, 197, 208,
268, 305 224
Bammel, C.H., 155, 223 Cooper, John, 194
Bardy, Gustave, 214 Couenhoven, Jesse, 12
Barnes, Timothy, 30 Courcelle, Pierre, 33, 34, 180, 241
Bavel, Tarsicius van, 7, 207, 228 Coyle, Kevin J., 6, 7, 101, 150, 154, 165
Beatrice, Pier Franco, 6 Cox, Patricia, 205
BeDuhn, Jason, 7, 8, 150, 153, 156, 167,
223, 333, 345 De Capitani, Franco, 151, 200, 201, 203
Berrouard, Marie-François, 268, 273, Decret, François, 83, 150, 152, 154, 155,
285, 291, 292 156, 223
Bianchi, Ugo, 6 Delaroche, Bruno, 93, 268, 295, 296, 298,
Blumenberg, Hans, 184 319
La Bonnardière, Anne Marie, 292, 303 DeSimone, Russell, 5, 6
Bonner, Gerald, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 28, Dideberg, Dany, 161, 170, 187, 188, 190
39, 52, 137, 294, 300 Dihle, Albrecht, 89, 110, 285
Boerresen, Kari, 228 Dillon, John, 194, 196, 207, 212
Bourke, Vernon, 89, 132 Djuth, Marianne, 69, 155
Boyer, Charles, 4 Dodaro, Robert, 110, 111, 112, 134
Brachtendorf, Johannes, 15, 194, 197, Dolbeau, François, 87
199, 228, 237, 238, 239, 242, 250, Drecoll, Volker Henning, 78, 156, 157,
263 267, 278
Braun, René, 30, 194 Drobner, Hubertus, 271, 293, 319
Brennan, Tad, 194 Du Roy, Olivier, 169, 170, 172, 174, 176,
Brown, Peter, 60, 61, 268, 322, 323, 345 178, 250, 284
Bruckner, Albert, 2, 7
de Bruyn, Theodore, 278, 345 Eddy, Paul Rhodes, 6, 7
Burnaby, John, 137, 138, 143 Emilsson, Eyjólfur, 194, 196, 202, 208
390 index of modern authors

Erdt, Werner, 285 Knuuttila, Simo, 10, 89, 194, 196, 199,
Evans, Gillian, 145, 317 200, 208, 215, 217, 219, 220, 230, 233,
237, 238, 239, 240, 285, 287
Fillion-Lahille, Janine, 25 Kotzé, Annemaré, 158, 181, 182, 210, 218,
Flasch, Kurt, 8, 78, 278 220, 221
van Fleteren, Frederick, 66, 170, 171,
175, 176, 178, 268, 270, 274, 290, Labhardt, André, 172
293 Lamberigts, Mathijs, 8, 9, 15, 61, 93, 109,
Frank, Karl, 88, 89 110, 113, 120, 167, 249, 294, 307, 308,
Fredriksen, Paula, 7, 79, 110, 111, 268, 324, 325, 328, 341
271, 275, 280, 285, 305 Lancel, Serge, 62, 63, 167, 341
Fuhrer, Therese, 66, 72 Lawless, George, 15
Leder, Hans-Günter, 86
Gardner, Iain, 153, 154, 155 Lee, Kam-lun Edwin, 8, 150, 174, 205
Garnsey, Peter, 88 Lennox-Conyngham, Andrew, 233
Geeraerts, Dirk, 17 Lewis, R.G., 20
Geerlings, Wilhelm, 7 Lichtenberger, Hermann, 268
Gersh, Stephen, 194 Lieu, Samuel, 153, 154, 155, 167, 224
Gluckner, John, 194 Lloyd, A.C., 194
Graver, Margaret, 194, 206, 234 Long, A.A., 183, 197
Griffiths, Paul, 258 Lössl, Josef, 4, 9, 10, 16, 66, 69, 74, 78, 86,
Gross, Julius, 5, 7, 8, 60 89, 109, 111, 130, 131, 133, 197, 248, 249,
250, 253, 254, 257, 265, 267, 278, 279,
Hadot, Pierre, 33, 34, 236, 265 282, 294, 307, 308, 309, 315, 317, 321,
Hagendahl, Harald, 19, 250 327, 329, 332, 334, 341
Haji, Ishtiyaque, 197, 254
Hanby, Michael, 12 MacDonald, Scott, 10, 157
Harrison, Carol, 11, 15, 69, 71, 78, 200, McGrath, Alister, 110, 111, 134
203, 269, 273, 274, 278, 285, 289, MacIntyre, Alasdair, 265
290 Macqueen, D.J., 104, 170
Harrison, Geoffrey, 8, 150, 153, 167, 333, Madec, Goulven, 33, 34, 69
345 Mann, William, 183, 254
Harrison, Simon, 11, 69 Markschies, Christoph, 5, 6, 350
Hendrikx, Ephraem, 62 Markus, Robert, 15, 60, 62, 87, 99, 317,
Holte, Ragnar, 138 340
Hombert, Pierre-Marie, 86, 273 Marrou, Henri-Irénée, 250
Hunter, David, 38, 40, 60, 182, 303 Martin, Thomas, 261, 268, 271, 273, 290,
292, 308, 319, 335, 340, 341
Jenson, Robert, 143 Matthews, G., 183, 197, 254
Jones, C.P., 101 Mausbach, Joseph, 5, 296
Joubert, Catherine, 158 Mayer, Cornelius, 241
Miethe, Terry, 61
Kahn, Charles, 89 Miles, Margaret, 60, 61, 241
Kelly, David, 60 Mohrmann, Christine, 16, 18
Kienzler, Klaus, 72 Morgenstern, Frank, 309
Kirwan, Christopher, 9 Mosher, David, 139, 271
Klauck, Hans-Josef, 33 Müller, Jörn, 10, 11, 89, 285
index of modern authors 391

Nicholson, Oliver, 194 Rönsch, Hermann, 30

Nisula, Timo, 269 Rudolph, Kurt, 7
Nussbaum, Martha, 194 Rytkönen, Aaro, 2
Nygren, Anders, 37, 137, 138
Saarinen, Risto, 2, 10, 68, 89, 102,
O’Connell, Robert, 61, 64, 69, 74, 151, 260, 261, 285
161, 169, 172, 197 Savon, Hervé, 194
O’Daly, Gerard, 9, 64, 74, 86, 89, 102, Schaffner, Otto, 64
138, 163, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, Scheppard, Carol, 60
204, 214, 222, 237, 250, 259 Schindler, Alfred, 54, 158
O’Donnell, James, 19, 38, 80, 82, 83, Schlabach, Gerald, 15, 88, 89, 138,
142, 153, 157, 159, 168, 169, 170, 171, 182
172, 175, 178, 180, 181, 182, 184, 186, Schneider, Wolfgang, 61
190, 203, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, Schweizer, Eduard, 268
237, 238, 250, 284, 285, 286, 288, Scibona, Concetta, 153
289 Sedley, David, 183, 197
O’Donovan, Oliver, 50, 138, 156, 178 Seeberg, Reinhold, 5
O’Keefe, John, 2 Sfameni Gasparro, Giulia, 6, 64
O’Meara, John, 169, 207 Sihvola, Juha, 194, 196
van Oort, Johannes, 6, 7, 8, 95, 138, 149, Simonis, Walter, 269
152, 153, 154, 158, 159, 163, 174, 218, 223, Sinkewicz, Robert, 169
306 Soennecken, Silvia, 207, 228
Solignac, Aimé, 33, 62, 86, 101
Pagels, Elaine, 61, 206, 207, 341 Sorabji, Richard, 9, 10, 120, 127, 185, 194,
Pang-White, Ann, 315, 321, 340 197, 198, 199, 229, 237, 238, 239, 240,
Parel, Kamala, 194 243, 248, 253, 255, 256, 257, 259, 264,
Partoens, Gert, 315 265, 285
Pépin, Jean, 214 Souter, Alexander, 294
Pétré, Hélène, 50 Spanneut, Michael, 197
Plumer, Eric, 276 Staffner, Hans, 5
Pollmann, Karla, 58, 142, 143, 144, 163 Stark, Judith, 155, 268, 285
Prendiville, John, 81 Stead, Christopher, 250
Procopé, J.F., 64, 170 Stein, Markus, 150, 151, 153, 155, 167
Stowers, Stanley, 268, 319
Rackett, Michael, 303 Syme, Ronald, 20
Ranke-Heinemann, Uta, 60
Raveaux, T., 65, 101, 224 Terian, Abraham, 194
Rees, Brinley R., 294 TeSelle, Eugene, 16, 261, 267, 268, 269,
Remes, Pauliina, 216 278, 305, 316, 327
Renehan, Robert, 150 Teske, R., 63, 86, 143
Reno, R.R., 2 Testard, M., 257
Rigby, Paul, 285 Theiler, W., 64, 169
Rief, J., 172 Thiele, Walter, 36
Ring, Thomas, 78, 268, 273, 276, 292, Thurén, Lauri, 268, 319
308 Thonnard, François-Joseph, 4, 5
Rist, John, 9, 61, 65, 73, 91, 110, 111, 120, Torchia, N.J., 64, 65, 170, 172
138, 248, 259, 308 Trapè, Agostino, 5, 6
392 index of modern authors

Verbeke, Gerard, 197 Williams, Rowan, 194

Verschoren, Marleen, 7, 8, 9, 64, 170, 171, Wilpert, P., 62
172, 174, 175, 205, 268, 321 van Winden, J.C.M., 29
Vessey, Mark, 309, 341 Wolfson, Harry, 293
Woolf, Raphael, 24
Waszink, J.H., 29 Wurst, Gregor, 83
Weaver, Rebecca, 339, 350
Weber, Dorothea, 173, 209, 341 Yates, Jonathan, 9, 16, 28, 36
Weidenaar, James, 62
Wermelinger, Otto, 9, 294, 317 Zumkeller, Adolar, 40, 81, 94, 193, 210,
Wetzel, James, 69, 75, 78, 81, 151, 157, 197, 223, 308, 310
200, 203, 234, 237
INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND NAMES

Aaron, 196n9 anger (ira), 31, 39, 54, 177, 219, 221,
Abraham (patriarch), 106, 225, 226n113 245
Abraham (ascetic), 309n173 animals, 20, 119, 140, 172, 204, 218,
Acatius, 122 225n110, 229, 258, 259, 259n213
acies animi, 233, 244 Antony, 287
Adam and Eve, 33, 64, 66, 70n34, 81, apatheia, 196n9, 197n14, 198, 242n163,
83, 86n84, 89n93, 90, 93, 94, 97, 99, 243
99n125, 100, 102, 103, 104, 108, 113, 114, divine, 30n83, 216n78, 224, 234n139
122, 124, 133, 148, 155, 189, 209n58, 211, apologetic motives, 2, 14, 195, 209, 210,
228, 230, 231, 255n204, 263, 265, 348 210n62, 211, 214, 217, 236, 237n146,
creation of, 86, 206, 262 247, 264
disobedience of, 76, 77, 79, 85, 86, 90, Apuleius, 23, 26, 27, 194, 237, 237n146,
91, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100n126, 101, 237n148
104, 108, 109, 113, 115, 117, 118, 128, arbitrariness, 87n87, 88, 110
130, 135, 354 Aristotle, 25n46, 196n9, 249, 249n187,
humanity linked to 59, 68n26, 77, 102, 249n189, 250, 250n191, 251, 251n193,
106, 116, 120, 130, 131, 134, 164, 275 253, 254n198, 258, 263, 264, 356
intelligence of, 157n71 asceticism, 6, 60n1, 134, 283, 328, 329
moral agency of, 70, 75n54 assent, see consent
obedience of, 62, 85, 88 Atticus, 116n187, 309n173
voluntary sin of, 73, 74, 77, 105, 112, Auxilius, 132
134, 287
Adeodatus’ mother, 62n2, 182 baptism, 14, 140, 165, 248, 251, 252, 253,
adiafora, 203n43 268, 269, 294, 295, 296, 302, 311,
aesthetic order, 76, 85, 97 317, 318, 322, 322n210, 323, 323n212,
agape, 137n1 323n213, 324, 327, 331, 333, 334,
akrasia, 10, 72, 73, 102, 265n227, 287n86, 334n253, 337
294, 317, 326, 339, 340 beauty, 70, 108, 108n155, 147, 177, 289
alcoholism, 251, 261 biological transmission, 61n1, 120, 127,
allegorical interpretation (see also 302, 310, 311
literal interpretation), 63, 63n5, birds, 173, 142n18
86n83, 143, 144, 195, 200, 205, 206, Bonifacius, 318n195
207n54, 210, 211, 217, 218, 228n120,
228n123, 229n124, 230, 230n129, 231, Caelestius, 108, 295
262, 263, 271, 291 Caesar, 22
Alypius, 181n166 Cain, 129
Ambrose, 28, 28n65, 28n66, 32, 32n103, calque translations, 18, 18n6
33, 33n109, 33n112, 34, 34n114, 34n115, Carthage, 220n92
35, 48, 57, 60n1, 63n5, 127n219, Catull, 19n9, 19n10
158n73, 194n3, 206n49, 233n135, 325, children, see infants
334, 353 Chrysippus, 259n213
394 index of subjects and names

Church, 172, 182n173, 206n50, 307, Cyprian, 16, 16n3, 28, 28n64, 28n65,
323n212, 341 28n66, 31, 32, 158n73, 185n194, 325
Cicero, 16, 18, 22, 23, 23n32, 23n33, 24,
25, 27, 32n107, 61n1, 170, 194, 194n5, daily prayer, 298, 300, 301, 307, 317,
197n14, 214, 214n73, 224, 224n106, 323
243n167, 250n189, 256n205, 257, da quod iubes, 182n172, 185n193, 223,
257n207, 257n208, 258, 259, 263, 265n227, 298n131
356 David, 33, 112
citadel of virtue, 151, 203, 217, 338, demons, 235, 236, 236n141, 237, 237n148
338n269, 351 development of A.’s thought (see also
ciuitas dei, 102, 163n93, 241, 243, 246, constancy, discontinuity), 11, 77,
247, 263, 309, 356 241n158, 268n3, 269, 357
ciuitas terrena, impiorum, 102, 243, 246, Devil, 41, 68, 86, 154n55, 162, 167, 172,
356 173, 174, 175, 176, 188, 189, 311
classical literature, 19, 57 difficulty (difficultas), 67, 70, 72, 74,
Augustine’s knowledge of, 19n8 74n51, 75, 83, 210
Clodius, 24n39 disease (morbus), 32, 34n114, 46, 91, 97,
cognitio peccati, 259, 261, 262, 278, 279 119n195, 122, 162n86, 186, 294n114, 332
Columella, 24n38 disobedience (inoboedientia), 13, 61, 89,
command (imperium), 114, 114n178, 91n99, 99, 99n125, 102, 107, 113, 116,
256n205 296
conception of God, 130, 130n228 in Paradise, 59, 65, 87, 90, 92, 95, 101,
consent, 123, 194, 196, 209, 212, 213, 216, 118, 128, 129
229, 235, 241, 245, 254, 255, 256n205, bodily, 101, 105, 117, 119
262, 265, 274, 275, 277, 298, 299, 301, disorder, 63, 97, 108, 114, 201, 245, 262
305, 315, 316, 319, 321, 329, 336, 344, of sexuality, 101, 104, 245, 259
348 of the body, 59, 103
constancy of A.’s thought (see also discontinuity in A.’s thought (see also
development, discontinuity), 11, constancy, development), 8, 269, 358
11n41, 203n44, 269, 269n5, 278n44 divine justice, 2, 13, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 76,
consumerism, 142, 149 77, 106, 121, 122, 135, 298, 354, 358
continence (continentia), 40n158, 43, acting according to reason, 131, 132
46, 53, 182, 183, 185, 186, 222, 223, 283, appears in terms of confession, 112
286n78, 296, 298, 303, 304, 307 distributive, 69, 108, 114
contraception, 310n176 hidden, 84, 111, 112
conventions, human, 143, 144 inscrutability of, 79n60, 83, 281,
Cornelius Nepos, 22 281n59
Council of Trent, 5 known by laws, 131
Curio, 23n32 known by love, 112
curiosity (curiositas), 172, 174, 176, 184, not analogical to human justice, 111,
289, 355 132, 133
as an intellectual vice, 175n142, 177, received in the sacrament, 112
178, 191 related to human justice, 132
leading to materialism, 172 divine nature, 60, 69, 76, 109, 131, 358,
of the Manichaeans, 173 359
various examples of, 184, 187 divine punishment, 64, 258, 325
Cynics, 114n181 analogical to grace, 84, 93, 124
index of subjects and names 395

as sin in itself, 123 as passive states, 215, 216

carved in flesh, 100, 115 Christian versions of, 242, 243, 263
comical sides of, 97 disturbed, 69, 198, 244, 245
defence of, 106 eradication of, 201n37, 243n167
experience of, 67 excessive, 57, 232, 234
intellectual form of, 106 fictitious, 199, 217n81, 220n92
hidden causes and order of, 78, 82, initial stages (sc. prepassions, first
83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 93, 124, 128, 133, movements) of, 9, 10, 194, 196,
354 197n11, 198, 199, 212, 214, 239,
justice of, 70, 92, 104, 109, 120 239n153, 260, 262
moderate, 69 irrationality of, 23, 30, 31, 33, 195,
of sin, 41 223
of concupiscence, 59, 135, 265 of Christ, 30n83, 216n78, 224n105,
of death, 64, 67, 80, 90, 90n95, 91, 243, 349
91n98, 97, 99, 103 Peripatetic views of, 239, 239n152
unjust, 68 Platonic theory of, 26, 194, 198, 199,
usefulness of, 101 203
transmission of, 93 responsibility for, 216, 216n79, 235
domestication of concupiscence, 14, spatialiaty of, 196, 197n11, 198, 204
186, 218, 223, 283, 292, 293, 301, 306, Stoic tetrachord of, 17, 19n7, 25, 26,
311, 317, 330, 351, 357, 359 33, 34, 197, 197n12, 203n41, 215,
Domitian, 20n15 215n74, 218, 219
Donatism, 3 therapy of, 78, 205n47, 243n167, 247,
Donatists, 213n70, 268n4 264n225, 265n227
dreams, 183, 183n175, 195, 197n14, 233, vocabulary of, 28, 193n2, 238, 239
254, 254n199, 255, 256n205, 288, 289, Epicurean ethics, 19n7
328 epistula ad Menoch, 8, 150n40, 153n50,
dualism 157n69, 167, 332n249, 344n296, 355
Manichaean, 68, 138n3, 150, 231, 235, ἐπιθυµία, 18, 25, 30n78, 30n79, 32,
262, 356 32n103, 34n114, 36n143, 37, 37n114,
of two loves, 137n1, 138, 141, 220 174, 205n49
of two roots, 165 erection, 100
ontological, 138n3 eros, 137n1
dyad, 221, 221n94 Esau, 79, 281
eternal law (aeterna lex), 201, 225, 226,
ecumenical negotiations, 2 227
ecumenics, 1 eupatheiai, 198, 224
ecumenical research, 4 Evagrius of Pontos, 169n109, 176n147,
Egypt, 227 185n188
emotional quality (affectionalis quali- evil
tas), 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 332 as priuatio boni, 34n114, 166, 355
emotions (passio, perturbatio), 2, 9, 10, distinctions of, 67, 69
14, 23, 24, 25, 27, 27n59, 30, 31, 32, 34, emergence of, 86
35, 47, 104, 193, 216, 219, 233, 234n139, non-substantiality of, 67, 71, 175
237, 240, 272, 358, 359 origins of, 158, 159, 188
as forms of will, 233n136, 234, primal, 66
237n145 problem of, 121, 158n75, 160
396 index of subjects and names

evil substance, 152, 188, 214 Gregory of Nyssa, 194n3

Evodius, 69, 72n40, 151, 157, 203n41 Gregory the Great, 209n59
excommunication, 132 greed (auaritia), 21, 28, 31, 34, 39, 53, 54,
55, 57, 147, 148, 158, 158n73, 160, 161,
facinus, 142, 142n17, 146, 181, 222 162n86, 163, 224, 227
fear (metus, timor), 26, 41, 48, 139, 140, guilt (reatus), 79n62, 279n49, 282,
151, 203, 214, 215, 219, 233 296, 296n123, 298, 312, 313, 314, 322,
figurative interpretation, see allegorical 323, 331, 332, 333, 334, 343, 346, 351,
interpretation 357
flagitium, 142, 142n17, 146, 181, 222
flesh (caro), 31, 32, 166, 233n135, 241, habit (consuetudo, hexis), 10, 80, 81, 126,
275, 304, 315, 315n187, 322, 335, 336, 155, 156, 157, 157n67, 183, 195, 204,
348 210, 210n61, 213, 251, 252, 270n12, 273,
as attribute to concupiscence, 38, 44, 276, 277, 280, 283, 284, 285, 286, 335,
45, 46, 98, 233n135 345n298, 346n301
corruption of, 104, 108 Hadrumetum, 350
disobedient, 91, 91n99 Hagar, 226
servant of the soul, 96 happiness, 151
Fonteius, 214, 214n73 happy life (beata uita), 65n15, 78n59,
Fortunatus, 83, 152, 153, 153n50, 154, 209, 236, 237, 239, 240
154n54, 154n55, 155, 155n58, 156, harmony, 97, 101, 108, 114, 177, 289,
156n66, 157, 355 354
free choice of the will, 68, 69, 73, 78, Harnack, Adolf von, 5n7
80, 114, 126, 151, 155, 156n64, 166, having sin (habere peccatum, concupis-
296 centiam), 277, 314, 344
fruitio, 41n162, 142, 151, 229, 230, 231 Hellenism, 62n4
hermeneutics, 143, 143n21, 144, 144n24,
Gellius, Aulus, 27n59, 194n5, 198n21, 145, 145n27, 226n116, 335
216n79, 238, 238n150, 239, 239n151, heterosexual behaviour, 20n15
240 Holy Spirit, 146, 160n78, 326
genitals, 39, 91n100, 95, 97, 99, 104, 114, homo nouus, 140, 269, 270, 270n9, 290,
114n179, 117, 232, 244, 245, 252, 328, 304
354 homosexual desires, 123, 330
gens tenebrarum, 154n55, 174, 174n136, homo uetus, 140, 156, 269, 270, 270n12,
204, 290n107 290
Gnosticism, 64, 65 Horace, 19n10
Golden Rule, 145
grace, 97, 297, 302, 317, 326, 337, 350, idolatry, 29, 63, 123, 175
358, 359 ignorance (ignorantia), 68, 70, 72, 73,
analogical to punishment, 84, 93, 124 74, 74n51, 75, 83, 157n71
effects of, 2, 223, 267, 275, 289, 293, imago dei, 147, 149, 162, 204, 225, 229,
318, 331 232, 263, 294n114
hidden causes of, 78, 83, 112, 351 illness, see disease
post-Simplician concept of, 185, 234, infant(s), 101, 101n132, 130, 260, 297, 311,
269, 278, 278n44, 285, 287n83, 327
351 born innocent, 121
Gregory of Nazianzus, 345n297 sufferings of, 120, 121, 122
index of subjects and names 397

inhabitation of Christ, 337 327n230, 328, 328n231, 329, 329n238,

inhabitation of sin, 280, 280n56, 302, 330, 330n242, 331, 332n245, 332n249,
314, 343 334, 335, 335n256, 337, 338, 338n269,
intellectualism (see also voluntarism), 339, 340, 341, 341n279, 341n280, 343,
10, 10n35, 89n92, 334 344, 344n292, 344n295, 344n296,
intellectual significance of concupis- 345, 345n297, 345n299, 346, 346n301,
cence, 115, 117, 129, 134 348, 348n307, 350, 354, 355, 356, 358,
internalisation of concupiscence, 268, 359
293, 327, 328, 329, 330, 334, 344, 352, justice
358 classical notion of, 110, 134
interpretation of Romans 7, 14, 79, 96, Ciceronian model of, 110
155, 156, 268, 271, 275, 278, 282, 285, Juvenal, 19n10
286, 292, 292n112, 293, 294, 298, 300,
303, 303n150, 305, 306, 313, 315, 316, Laban, 227
317, 318, 320, 321, 324, 334, 335, 336, law, 261, 272, 275, 278, 279, 281, 299, 302,
337, 338n269, 339, 344, 344n296, 305, 318, 321
348n307, 357 Lazarus, 271
inuitus, 68n24, 82, 286n81, 287 Lea, 226
literal interpretation (see also alle-
Jacob, 79, 226, 227, 227n117, 232n134, gorical interpretation), 86, 86n83,
281 101n130, 160, 257n207
Jansenius, 5n7 Livy, 16, 20, 20n12, 21, 21n18, 22
Jerome, 28n66, 30n82, 32n105, 60n1, logic, 126, 132n240, 215, 331, 332n245
158n73, 194n3, 321n205 Lot, 226
joy (laetitia, gratulatio), 33, 178, 197n12, love (amor, dilectio, caritas), 17, 40n159,
203 52, 138, 139, 146, 147, 160, 215, 220, 237,
judge, 69, 125, 132, 133 241, 283
Julian of Aeclanum, 3, 4n7, 6, 7, 8, 9, as good concupiscence, 37
9n29, 10, 13, 14, 19n7, 39, 46, 46n168, as the norm of the Bible, 145
52, 59, 60n1, 62n2, 63, 76, 106, 109, as will, 40, 50, 137
109n159, 110, 110n162, 111, 111n169, benevolence of, 142n18
112, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 119n194, fallen, 141
120, 121, 121n200, 122, 122n206, 123, interiority of, 159, 160
123n208, 124, 125, 126, 126n216, 127, object of, 140, 141, 146, 188
128, 128n221, 129, 130, 130n228, 131, of eternal things, 139
132, 132n240, 133, 134, 135, 149n39, of love, 220
153n50, 155n60, 164, 165, 166, 167, of one’s body, 141
167n105, 167n106, 190, 191, 197n14, of self, 50, 99n125, 141, 164
198, 234, 235, 243n167, 248, 248n184, opposite to evil desire, 17, 45, 49, 149,
249, 249n186, 249n187, 249n189, 250, 284, 354
250n191, 251, 252, 253, 253n197, 254, perversion of, 50, 99n125, 141, 164
254n198, 257, 259, 260, 263, 264, 268, privative, 147, 148, 163, 355
291n111, 293n113, 294, 302, 303n150, zero-sum game of , 138, 140, 143, 188
307, 307n168, 308, 308n170, 308n172, Lucretia, 21n18
309n173, 317, 317n193, 318, 321, 322, Lucretius, 16
322n210, 323, 323n213, 323n214, 324, Luther, Martin, 2n1, 5, 6, 6n8
325, 325n216, 326, 327, 327n229, Lutheranism, 6
398 index of subjects and names

Mani (Manichaeus), 8, 118n192, 150n40, Nebridius, 76

153n50, 167, 172, 182, 226n113 necessity, 68, 69, 72, 72n42, 114n180, 120,
Manichaeans, 152, 159, 172, 209n58, 211, 126, 155, 157, 285, 326, 345, 347
221 Neoplatonism, 48, 60n1, 64n9, 66, 159,
Manichaeism, 3, 14, 155, 165 175, 177, 186n195, 189, 190, 196, 208,
anthropology of, 157n69, 204, 214
283n63, 286, 289 Noah, 32n107, 291
A.’s knowledge of, 152n48, 153n50 North Africa, 8, 16, 16n3, 28n66, 160n79,
A.’s residue of, 6, 8, 167, 303n150, 308, 308n172
317, 317n193, 326, 344n295
Bible criticism in, 63, 145n27, obedience
173n133, 204, 206, 224, 224n104 arbitrary, 88
ethics of, 145n27, 159 between the soul parts, 65
evil deity in, 76 in Paradise, 66, 87
concept of evil in, 68, 80, 150, 151, of Christ, 87, 118
153, 159, 166, 167, 188, 208, 213, of Moses
262 usefulness of, 88, 94, 95, 105n147
cosmology of, 145n27, 150, 174, 175 in the fallen state, 92
dualism in, 138n3 olive tree, 302, 310
God’s envy in, 65, 224, 224n103 orexis, 38n136
in conf., 158, 158n74 Origen, 34n115, 205n49, 206n49
influence of, 2, 8, 8n22, 60n1, 62 Ovid, 19n10
materialism in, 165, 173, 178n153, 191,
208, 221 pain (dolor), 48, 197n14
motus inordinatus, 7, 7n16, 95n114, Paul’s ego, 10, 125, 272, 279, 285n77, 294,
306n164 313, 315, 315n185, 318, 320, 321, 335, 344
salvation in, 153n53 peccatum naturale, 119
two wills in, 82 Pelagianism (sc. Pelagian movement),
Marius Victorinus, 196n10, 250n191, 285, 3, 9, 35, 93n103, 101, 108, 134, 164, 234,
285n75 235, 291n111, 293, 293n113, 294n114,
Marcellinus, 237n146, 295, 299 302, 302n148
marriage, 108, 115, 244, 308, 309, 328, Adam’s example in, 93, 130
342, 342n284 doctrine of impeccantia in, 94n108
Martial, 19n10 doctrine of sin in, 114n180
memory, 148, 182, 219, 219n87, 228, 232, historical research of, 9
234, 263, 288, 334 innocence of infants in, 101
mind (mens), 32, 140, 147, 202, 207n53, Pelagians, 41, 68, 93, 191, 330
208, 213, 214n72, 222, 237, 320 Pelagius, 93, 93n103, 108, 134, 164, 165,
metriopatheia, 9, 196n10 265n227, 293n113, 295, 298n131, 302,
moderation, 39, 199, 217, 218, 224, 227, 321n205, 345n298
240, 241 Petilian, 150n40
monad, 221, 221n94 Petrus, 309n173
Moses, 196n9, 227 philosophical metaphors
movements of concupiscence, 274, 277, of charioteer, 33, 34n115, 176n148,
305, 319, 332, 351 195n8
music, 195, 243n167, 255 of Etruscan pirates, 258
of seafaring, 32
index of subjects and names 399

Platonism, 10, 62n4, 195, 196, 197n13, 198, relativism, 145, 146
228, 235, 237, 239, 263, 285 renewal, 14, 141, 267, 295, 299, 303, 306,
Plautus, 19n10 307, 329, 330
pleasure (uoluptas, delectatio), 18, 18n7, four stages (ante legem, sub lege, sub
21, 48, 64, 65, 141, 175, 176, 177, 178, gratia, in pace) of, 269, 271, 274,
180, 184, 187, 205n49, 212, 225, 229, 276
229n126, 255, 256, 257, 272, 280, rhetorical devices, 42, 43, 108, 123n208,
289 138, 178, 203, 250, 278, 319, 319n198,
Plotinus, 34n114, 61n1, 156n62, 169, 335, 339
169n113169n114, 194n3, 196n10, 197n13, resistibility of concupiscence, 61, 268,
208n57, 216n79, 233n135 325, 326, 351
polygamy, 144, 145, 226 rest (requies, quies), 137n1, 146, 178, 179,
Ponticianus, 287 298
power, 55, 56, 64, 99n125, 100, 141, 177 Resurrection, 256, 275, 283, 291, 326
love of, 148, 162, 185 Roman Catholicism, 4, 6
will to 100n126 Romanianus, 66, 175
pride (superbia), 64, 73n47, 99n125, 100, Rome, 16n3, 21, 22, 159, 317
141, 148, 160, 162, 176, 177, 178, 185, 187, root (radix), 14, 140, 148, 149, 150,
191, 209, 236, 241, 246, 247, 289, 306, 150n40, 152, 153, 154, 154n55, 157, 158,
326, 330, 355 159, 160, 164, 168, 191, 310n178, 322,
interconnected with concupiscence, 355, 359
94, 99, 102 Donatist uses of, 160n79
interconnected with greed, 161, 162, Manichaean uses of, 150n40, 156,
162n86 268n3, 290, 355
opposed to divine justice, 108 Pelagian uses of, 165, 191
self-deceptive, 185
procreation, 91, 94n107, 98n120, 183, 342 Sarah, 226, 226n113
Protestantism, 4 sage, see wise man
prototype theory, 17 Sallust, 16, 20, 20n14, 22, 56n179
Satan, see Devil
Rachel, 226 Seneca, 23, 25, 25n46, 26, 27, 198
Ravenna, 308n172 serpent, 65, 174, 205n49, 211, 212, 229,
reason, 201, 204, 208, 218, 232, 237, 260, 231
261, 270, 310 sexuality, 2, 9, 60, 329, 342
and faith, 66 masculine, 21
active and contemplating parts of, A.’s moderate views on, 60
225, 229, 231 A.’s prejudice against, 61, 62
corrupted, 140 sex
human standards of, 78, 124 and marriage, 46, 117, 309
opposed to desire, 33, 195, 200, 207, shameful, 20, 29, 43, 109
209, 245 illicit, 34, 46
presupposing voluntary choices, 121, immoderate, 44
327 A.’s personal experiences of, 61n2
reciprocity, 59, 62, 63, 76, 77, 85, 90, 91, post-lapsarian, 98
96, 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 107, 113, 116, in public, 114n181
124, 134 self-control, 29, 39, 226, 247
Reformation, 5 sexual affairs, 20n15, 27
400 index of subjects and names

sexual desire, 20, 21n18, 23, 26, 27, Suetonius, 20, 20n13, 20n15
27n59, 29, 31, 35, 52, 53, 57, 90, 104, suffering, 62, 67, 71, 106, 120, 202
244, 248, 286n78
and death, 99n124 Tacitus, 16, 20, 20n13, 21, 22
corrupted, 60, 91, 113 Terence, 19n10
indecent, 226 Tertullian, 16, 16n3, 28, 28n64, 28n65,
in Paradise, 116, 117, 255n204 28n66, 29, 29n71, 29n72, 29n76, 30,
violent, 21, 224, 225, 264, 356 30n78, 30n83, 31, 57, 158n73, 353
virtuous purpose of, 120 terminology of desire, 12, 12n43, 13, 15,
sexual connotations, 16, 20, 22, 25n41, 18, 205, 353
27, 28n66, 29, 34, 39, 40, 50, 58, contexts of, 15, 353
214n71 synonymy of, 15, 42, 45, 47, 353
sexual intercourse, 20, 61n1, 109, 117, 255, translations of, 15, 16, 200
256, 256n205, 259, 310, 328, 354 interchangeability of, 17, 40, 42
Schadenfreude, 100 third kind of sin, 120, 122, 125
shame, 100, 113, 114, 115, 116, 195, 244, 245, threefold concupiscence (triplex
256, 259 cupiditas), 14, 45, 56, 57, 64n10, 148,
sickness, see disease 149, 159, 168, 169, 171, 186, 188, 191, 192,
Simplicianus, 78 218, 223, 231, 265n227, 288, 355
snake, see serpent as literary structure, 149, 168, 171, 175,
Solomon, 226, 254 189, 190, 192
sorrow (tristitia), 33, 219, 240 as temptations, 147, 168, 176, 186, 188,
soul 189, 190
caught by temporal images, 148n34, bound in time, 187
232 describing the Donatists, 190n215
destroyed by cupiditas, 142 describing the Manichaeans, 172, 174,
immaterial, 63 188, 192
impassibility of, 208n57 eschatological consummation of,
involuntary states of, 77, 109 179, 180
middle position of, 63, 74n49 in A.’s own life, 181, 182, 190
movements of, 23, 30, 33, 48, 204, mirroring the Trinity, 170, 176n148,
204n45, 214, 218 189
origin of, 74 sources of, 169
(Platonic) parts of, 26, 27, 27n57, 30, word order in, 170, 170n121, 178n152
34, 48, 49, 174, 194, 195, 196, 196n9, Thomas Aquinas, 5n7
196n10, 198, 205, 206n50, 207n53, tinder (fomes), 116, 116n185
207n54, 208, 208n55, 211, 212, 216, tradux peccati (mortalitatis), 79, 280,
221, 222, 245, 262, 356 280n55
passions of, 30, 32, 33 tree of life, 63, 86, 86n84
pre-existence of, 74n50 tree of good and evil knowledge, 65, 67,
unity of, 228, 230 86, 87, 89, 94, 102, 113, 129
weakness of, 28, 95
Stoicism, 9, 17, 25n46, 151n45, 194, 195, uti-frui-distinction, 141n15, 143n21,
197n13, 197n14, 200, 203, 216, 234, 235, 149n37, 187, 187n205, 228, 229, 231
237, 239, 240, 255, 260, 263
strong-willed (enkratic) persons, 305, Valerius, 117, 308, 308n172, 309, 309n173,
317, 319, 326, 339, 340, 340n278 315n185
index of subjects and names 401

venial sins, 166, 299, 300, 310, 323, weakness of the will, see akrasia
323n214, 328, 342 will, 9, 10, 41, 180, 203, 233, 245, 285,
Vespasian, 20n15 287n86
Virgil, 19n10, 48, 225n108 as love, 40, 50, 137
virtue(s), 31, 48, 138, 160n78, 204, 223, as morally responsible, 59
224, 304, 309 division of, 286, 287
cardinal, 69, 247 in Paradise, 74, 77, 105
of humility, 163n93 new, 82, 126, 285, 287, 321
of obedience, 89, 90, 102, 102n135, 119 old, 81, 286
progress in 141, 337 reluctant, 76
virtuous life, 86, 141, 185, 200, 203, 309, wise man (sapiens), 201, 202n38, 217,
356 237, 240, 356
voluntariness works of love, 297, 301, 317
of sin, 67, 71, 83, 126 world (mundus), 38, 187, 310
in the fallen state, 70
voluntarism, (see also intellectualism) Zosimus, 117
89, 227n118
INDEX OF ANCIENT SOURCES

1. Augustine

Acad. 8, 14–18 237

1, 11 195 9, 1 237
1, 23 195 9, 3 235, 237
2, 21 171 9, 4 199, 238, 239
2, 22 195 9, 5 236, 240, 241
c. Adim. 9, 15 236
21 205, 270, 280 9, 17 236
26 81 12, 15–22 170
adn. Iob 12, 22 105
16 77 13, 13 103, 105
39 291 13, 15 103
c. adu. leg. 13, 20 102
1, 18 1, 59, 101, 102 13, 21 102
1, 18–26 101 14, 1 104
1, 19 102 14, 2 40
1, 21 101 14, 3 48, 104
agon. 14, 5 197
1 154 14, 6 54, 237, 241
an. quant. 14, 6–10 104
14, 24 170 14, 7 15, 38, 40, 52,
23, 42 47 138
bapt. 14, 9 1, 193, 242, 243,
6, 60 319 244
b. coniug. 14, 10–15 244
3 43, 309 14, 12 102, 104, 105
32 87, 102 14, 13 102
b. uid. 14, 15 19, 38, 39, 102,
10 53 104, 105, 106, 107,
cat. rud. 108
8 162 14, 15–16 38
29 91 14, 16 39, 52, 244, 245,
31 146, 163 246
55 182 14, 19 245, 246
ciu. 14, 20 104, 114, 245
1, 19 53 14, 23 104, 245, 246
3, 14 55, 56 14, 26 164
5, 12 55 14, 27 246
5, 19 55 14, 28 149, 246, 247
6, 9 97 17, 12 319
index of ancient sources 403

19, 4 247 8, 10–27 285

19, 21 247 8, 11 81, 285, 286
19, 23–24 247 8, 12 36, 146, 286
19, 27 108, 247 8, 13 286
20, 1–2 106 8, 17 183, 287
20, 20 319 8, 19 287
21, 12 162 8, 19–20 287
21, 15 107 8, 21 82, 83, 138,
21, 16 260 287
21, 17 106 8, 22 82, 287
22, 22 164 8, 23–24 82, 287
22, 23 247 8, 26 288
22, 24 260 8, 29 288
conf. 8, 30 286
1, 16 181 9, 1 181
1, 30 181 9, 18 286
2, 2 46, 81, 220 10, 21 219, 288
2, 9–18 159 10, 21–22 219
2, 13 181, 218, 219 10, 22 219
3, 1 43, 220 10, 35 56
3, 2–4 220 10, 39 182
3, 5 36, 53 10, 40 298
3, 5–6 181 10, 40–41 182
3, 15–17 142 10, 41 183, 288
3, 16 163, 180, 181 10, 41–53 184
4, 1 182 10, 42 183, 288
4, 2 182 10, 44 289
4, 22 218 10, 45 183
4, 24 221 10, 47 183
4, 25 221 10, 48 184, 289
4, 28 250 10, 49 289
4, 30 182 10, 50 184
5, 4 181 10, 51 184
5, 18 159 10, 51–53 289
5, 20 175 10, 53 184
6, 20 222 10, 54 184
6, 20–26 222 10, 55 18, 184
6, 21 222 10, 56 289
6, 22 18, 222, 223 10, 57 184, 289
6, 25 182, 222 10, 58 289
7, 5 80 10, 59 185, 289
7, 7 150, 159 10, 60 185, 289
7, 26 285 10, 63 185
7, 26–27 284 10, 64 185
7, 27 284, 285 10, 66 186
8, 10 285 10, 67 186
8, 10–13 183 10, 69 186, 289
404 index of ancient sources

conf. (cont.) 66, 6 72, 274

13, 8 146 67, 3 74
13, 10 146 67, 5 273
13, 15 158 67, 6 273
13, 30 186 68, 3–4 271
13, 30–31 218, 223 77 194, 215
13, 31 186 80 216
13, 32–34 207 doctr. chr.
13, 47 222, 229 1, 4 142
13, 49 223 1, 12 141
cont. 1, 13 186
6 46, 303 1, 22 141
7 261, 303, 304 1, 23 141, 148
8 304 1, 23–24 283
9 304 1, 24 283
12 304 1, 24–25 223
13 307 1, 25 283, 284
18 304 2, 9–11 223
19 305 2, 10 143
20 306 3, 10 49
21 108 3, 14 143
28 40, 46 3, 15 143, 144
29 305 3, 16 142, 143
30–31 307 3, 16–17 284
diu. qu. 3, 17 284
7 214 3, 20 144
12 214 3, 22 145, 146
24 68 3, 23 146
31 214 3, 26 145
33 214 3, 27–28 226
35 49, 215 3, 30–31 144
35, 1 139 duab. an.
35, 2 140 15 41
36 140, 215 en. Ps.
36, 1 140 4, 6 275
36, 2 140 6, 7 273
36, 4 141 7, 4 161
51 269 8, 13 19
51, 1 269 9, 15 49
52 216 25, 6 205
61, 7 271 31, 2, 5 50, 139
65 271 42, 7 293
66 271 57, 19 44
66, 1 272 83, 10 261
66, 2 272, 273 85, 8 50
66, 3 271, 273 102, 6 55
66, 5 272, 273 110, 9 50
index of ancient sources 405

118, 1, 1 18 c. ep. Man.

118, 8, 3 37, 51, 52 36, 41 269
118, 8, 4 37, 41 c. ep. Parm.
118, 11, 6 162 3, 10 138, 163
136, 9 53 c. ep. Pel.
140, 10 153 1, 13 318
141, 4 41 1, 14 261
ench. 1, 15 102
9 191 1, 17 319
14 205 1, 18 319, 320
26 164 1, 20 320
ep. 1, 21 321
136, 1 237 1, 22 321
167, 10 116 1, 24 44, 319, 322
174 228 1, 26 165, 322
184A 101, 309 1, 27 322, 323
184A, 1 309 1, 28 323
185, 42 55 1, 31 102, 117
186, 40 319 1, 33 323
209, 9 139 1, 34–35 117, 255
228, 7 139 1, 35 18, 117
250 132 2, 17 52
265, 2 318 2, 21 51
ep.* 3, 4 323
2, 11 139 exp. Gal.
6 309 50 69
6, 3–5 37 64 100
6, 8 117 46 276
ep. Io. tr. 46–48 276
2, 9 160 47 276
2, 10 187 48 277
2, 11 149, 187 exp. prop. Rm.
2, 12 187 12 274
2, 13 187 13–18 274, 275
2, 14 56, 187, 188 26 205
3, 12 160 35 275
4, 3 291 36 275
5, 2 160 44 275
6, 2 160 45–47 276
6, 3 188 48–49 72
6, 6 160 51 276
7, 8 160 53 276
8, 5 142 54 271
8, 6–9 160 c. Faust.
8, 9 161 5, 7 93
10, 6 187 12, 21 291
10, 7 137, 161 12, 44 84
406 index of ancient sources

c. Faust. (cont.) 20 69, 152

13, 11 84 21 36, 153, 154
14, 3–4 83 22 156, 157, 277
15, 7 145 gest. Pel.
16, 14 145 20–21 302
19, 24 145 21 261, 262
19, 26 145 Gn. litt.
20, 3–4 138 3, 21, 33 90, 98
20, 6 42, 52, 145 8, 2, 5 86
22, 9–14 224 8, 3, 6–13, 30 86
22, 18 40, 224 8, 4, 8 86
22, 21 225 8, 5, 9–11 86
22, 24–25 225 8, 10, 23 88
22, 27–29 229 8, 11, 24 88
22, 30 226 8, 6, 12 87
22, 30–31 226 8, 13, 30 105
22, 31 226 8, 13, 28 88
22, 32 226 8, 13, 29 88
22, 27 206, 225 8, 13, 30 88, 89
22, 28 225 8, 14, 31 89
22, 29 225 8, 15, 33 90
22, 31 18 9, 3, 6 90
22, 45 226 9, 4, 8 91
22, 47 18, 226 9, 10, 16–11, 19 90
22, 48 18, 226 9, 10, 17 91
22, 50 227 9, 10, 18 91, 294
22, 53 227 9, 11, 19 90, 92, 294
22, 61 44 10, 12, 20 19, 233
22, 71–72 227 10, 12, 21 98, 294
22, 74 227 10, 12, 20–14, 25 97
22, 75 227 10, 18, 32 294
22, 78 83, 84 11, 1, 3 91, 98
22, 92 228 11, 11, 15 99
22, 98 145 11, 13, 17 100
24, 1 290 11, 14, 18 162
24, 2 290, 291 11, 15, 19 162, 163
26, 8 224 11, 15, 20 163
29, 4 227 11, 23, 30 163
30, 6 227 11, 30, 39 100
c. Fel. 11, 31, 40 99
1, 19 155 11, 31, 41 100
2, 7 174 11, 32, 42 100
2, 8 156 11, 34, 46 91
2, 13 174 11, 35, 47 91
c. Fort. 11, 37, 50 91, 163
15 69 12, 15, 31 254
16 69 12, 30, 58 254
index of ancient sources 407

Gn. adu. Man. c. Iul.

1, 8, 14 216 1, 42 166
1, 19, 30 90 2, 5 335
1, 20, 31 36, 47, 193, 204, 205 2, 7 327
1, 23, 40 172, 173, 270 2, 8 327
2, 9, 12 63, 161 2, 12 48, 332
2, 11, 15 207, 208 2, 20 46
2, 11, 15–13, 18 206 2, 33 330
2, 11, 16 204 2, 24–25 325
2, 12, 16 206, 207 2, 32–33 325
2, 12, 17 206 2, 37 254, 323
2, 14, 20 208 3, 9–10 121
2, 14, 21 209, 210 3, 26–27 328
2, 15, 22 64, 65, 105 3, 26–43 327
2, 17, 25 209 3, 28 19, 328
2, 17, 26–18, 27 173 3, 30 328
2, 18, 28 210 3, 38 328
2, 19, 29 64, 210 3, 39 329
2, 21, 31 210 3, 42 329
2, 21, 32 64 3, 43 329
2, 25, 38 64, 211 3, 44–46 329
2, 25, 38–26, 40 3, 48 19
174 3, 49 325, 327
2, 26, 39 64, 211 3, 50 329
2, 26, 40 65, 174, 211 3, 61 335
2, 27, 41 211 3, 61–65 335
gr. et lib. arb. 3, 62 335, 336, 337
5 261, 340 3, 64 338
8 340 3, 65 338, 339
9 340 4, 1 118
13 340 4, 1–9 329
22 262 4, 7 258
24 340 4, 8 39, 43, 243
26 340 4, 10 254, 329, 330
33 340 4, 35 45, 259
41 59 4, 45–46 131
41–43 124 4, 54 119
gr. et pecc. or. 4, 56 119
1, 3 302 4, 58–62 259
1, 9 302 4, 60 258, 259
1, 19 164, 165 4, 62 259
1, 21 165 4, 64–65 19
2, 38 109 4, 65 255
2, 39 86, 109 4, 66 54
2, 41 109 4, 67 54
2, 43 18, 164 4, 68 255
2, 44–45 302 4, 69 255
408 index of ancient sources

c. Iul. (cont.) 6, 61 333

4, 71 19, 255, 256 6, 62 333
4, 72 257 6, 70 1, 267, 335, 336,
4, 74 259 337
4, 76–78 257 6, 70–74 335
4, 77 257 6, 71 337
4, 78 258 6, 72 319, 335, 337
4, 83 121, 258 6, 73 335, 336
5, 3 122 6, 73–74 339
5, 3–16 122 c. Iul. imp.
5, 4 121 1, 29 121
5, 8 122 1, 33 341
5, 9 325, 326 1, 35 121
5, 10 123 1, 41 341
5, 11–12 123, 329 1, 44–47 125
5, 12 330 1, 47 125
5, 12–13 123 1, 48 130, 131
5, 13 124 1, 50–51 130
5, 15 124 1, 67 344, 345
5, 16 122 1, 68 342
5, 23 243 1, 69 345
5, 24 326 1, 70 343
5, 26–64 127 1, 71 19, 46, 343, 348
5, 29 51 1, 72 343, 348
5, 32 326 1, 83 138
5, 39–40 19 1, 84 343
5, 42 256 1, 99 345
5, 44 121 1, 101 344
5, 56 326 1, 105 126, 248, 345
5, 63 51 1, 106 343
6, 2 121 1, 108 343
6, 12 334 1, 129–130 131
6, 30–32 121 2, 8 341
6, 40 330, 331 2, 11 341
6, 41 46 2, 14 341
6, 42 331 2, 15 341, 344
6, 44 330 2, 31 343
6, 48 118 2, 38 126, 345
6, 50 258, 331 2, 39 343
6, 51 332 2, 44 341
6, 53 48, 249, 250 2, 71 343
6, 53–56 248, 253 2, 90–91 329
6, 54 250, 251, 334 2, 90–94 344
6, 55 249, 251, 252 2, 90–97 344
6, 56 252 2, 97 343
6, 58 332 2, 137 343
6, 60 332, 333 2, 140 344
index of ancient sources 409

2, 215 119 4, 37 259

2, 217 344 4, 38–40 259
2, 218 167, 343 4, 41 119
2, 221 260 4, 43 119
2, 226 343 4, 44 119
2, 227 343 4, 45–89 349
2, 228 343 4, 48 349
2, 235 260, 261 4, 52–53 46
3, 3 131 4, 54 349
3, 5 121 4, 57 343, 350
3, 6 131 4, 58 349
3, 11 131 4, 67 38
3, 12 131 4, 68 128
3, 17 132 4, 69 258
3, 24–27 132 4, 86–87 350
3, 31 132 4, 103 126
3, 33 133 4, 114 343
3, 34 133 4, 120 122
3, 58 341 4, 136 111
3, 72 343 5, 4 341
3, 112 345 5, 7 343
3, 154 121 5, 10 342
3, 161 122 5, 11 19
3, 162 122 5, 12 343
3, 167 19, 340, 342 5, 13 342
3, 168 342 5, 15 122
3, 170 167 5, 16 259
3, 170–187 166 5, 17 255
3, 175 150, 167 5, 23 342
3, 178 345 5, 28 127, 132
3, 180 167 5, 40 127
3, 181 167 5, 50 346
3, 186 345 5, 50–64 346
3, 187 332, 333 5, 51 127
3, 198 121 5, 59 127, 347, 348
3, 210 261, 346 5, 62 347
4, 10 127 5, 64 127
4, 14 343 6, 3 341
4, 14–17 341 6, 5 164
4, 18 38 6, 7 128
4, 18–22 150 6, 8 343, 344
4, 27 255 6, 9 127
4, 28 261 6, 11 348
4, 27–28 39 6, 13 345
4, 28 18, 39 6, 14 118, 119, 343,
4, 33 43 344
4, 34–35 126 6, 17 126
410 index of ancient sources

c. Iul. (cont.) mend.

6, 20 128 10 47, 214
6, 20–23 128 40 212, 256
6, 21 128 mor.
6, 22 52 1, 12 171
6, 23 121, 128, 129 1, 20–21 171
6, 26 343 1, 21 139, 171
6, 41 261, 348 1, 33 162
lib. arb. 1, 35 149
1, 8–12 180 1, 35–36 150
1, 9 45 1, 36 65, 150
1, 10 151, 200 1, 38 172
1, 18 201 1, 39 172
1, 20 203 1, 41 49
1, 20–22 151 1, 57–60 172
1, 21 201 2, 51 54
1, 22 69, 180, 202 mus.
1, 23 203 4, 5 35
1, 29 203 6, 39 169
1, 32 152 6, 40 161
1, 33 203 6, 44 36, 149
1, 35 152 6, 45 175
2, 53 180 6, 48 175
3, 15 70 nat. b.
3, 17 49 7 85
3, 26 70, 71 31 84
3, 27 71 35 85
3, 29 73 37 85
3, 44 71 44 174
3, 46 71, 72, 157 nat. et gr.
3, 47 157 24 123
3, 48 149, 158 58 319
3, 51 72, 73, 76 nupt. et conc.
3, 52 74 1, 2 308
3, 53 72, 73 1, 5 18, 309
3, 54 74 1, 6–7 113
3, 56–59 74 1, 7 113, 114,
3, 58 73 122
3, 61 74 1, 8 115, 309
3, 63 75 1, 9 114
3, 65 75 1, 13 310
3, 70 74 1, 21 310
3, 71–73 70 1, 24 114
c. litt. Pet. 1, 25 311
1, 5 150 1, 25–29 311
1, 5–8 160 1, 26 155
2, 154 268 1, 26–27 311
index of ancient sources 411

1, 27 115 perf. iust.

1, 28 248 1–2 300
1, 28–29 312 18 300
1, 30 315 20 300
1, 31 315, 316 28 300, 301
1, 35 316, 317 31 301
1, 37 127 44 301
1, 40 308 perseu.
2, 22 102, 116 53 298
2, 23 38 qu.
2, 26 116 1, 30 238
2, 53 114, 117 7, 17, 4 45
2, 53–54 115 qu. eu.
2, 55 37 1, 47 47, 56, 188
2, 58 129, 311 2, 13 188
2, 59 116 2, 47 163
op. mon. 2, 18 55
40 48, 207 retr.
ord. 1, 8 197
2, 2, 6–7 202 1, 10, 3 280
2, 8, 25 170 1, 13, 5 68
pat. 1, 15, 4 41
4–6 46 1, 15, 6 77
14 49 1, 18 86
pecc. mer. 1, 26 140
1, 5 94 2, 1, 1 278
1, 6 295 c. Sec.
1, 10 93 10 160
1, 19 93 19 85
1, 21 93, 296 s.
1, 25 296 9, 10 43
1, 57 94 9, 13 44
1, 70 296 32, 14 54
2, 3 297 51, 21 50
2, 3–4 296 75, 5–6 46
2, 4 297 112 190
2, 9 295 145 292
2, 33 94 150, 4 15
2, 35 94, 95 153 262
2, 35–36 93 153, 6 261
2, 35–37 97 153, 6–9 261
2, 36 95, 96 153, 9 319
2, 37 97 153, 14 261
2, 44–45 295 154, 2 319
2, 45–46 296 162 191
2, 46 296 162, 4 190
2, 48 93 164, 6 139
412 index of ancient sources

s. (cont.) 1, 1, 11 80, 280

207, 2 53 1, 2 281
265, 11 139 1, 2, 16 281
284, 5 19 1, 2, 20 79, 95, 282
278, 5 53 1, 2, 21 78, 282
311, 13 139 1, 2, 22 79, 287
392, 5 177 2, 1, 5 37
s. Denis 2, 2, 2 225, 234
14, 2 1, 137, 168, 184, 186, 2, 6 79
187, 188 spir. et litt.
14, 3 181 6 49, 139
14, 4–5 185 13 299
19, 7 160 22 299
s. Dolbeau 25 299
2 87, 88, 90 51 299
2, 7 87, 90, 95 59 299
2, 12 87, 102 65 139, 299
21, 11 162 trin.
26, 33 162 4, 5 100
s. Lambot 4, 15 100
2 40, 139 6, 8 197
4 54 7, 5 100
s. Mai 8, 10 40
12, 4 44 8, 10–14 147
14, 1 139 9, 4 147
s. Wilm. 9, 13 147
13, 6 54 10, 7 147
s. dom. m. 11, 5 40, 232
1, 2, 9 212 11, 7 232
1, 5, 13 213 11, 8 232
1, 12, 33 212 12, 14 148, 162, 231
1, 12, 34 213 12, 15 148
1, 12, 34–36 212 12, 15–16 229
1, 12, 36 214 12, 16 100, 149
1, 17, 51 155 12, 17 229, 230
2, 6, 23 270, 274, 276 12, 18 230
2, 9, 32 154, 213 12, 19 228
2, 24, 79 156 12, 20 229
Simpl. 12, 21 231
1, 1, 1 278, 319 13, 23 100
1, 1, 2 278 14, 22–25 294
1, 1, 3 278 14, 23 294, 295
1, 1, 5 279 uera rel.
1, 1, 6 279 3 170
1, 1, 7 279 4 175
1, 1, 9 279 6 152
1, 1, 10 267, 280 18 204
index of ancient sources 413

23 66, 67 72–83 177

25 67 74 177
27 68 76 68
27–28 68 78 45, 176, 207
29 67, 69 83 176, 177, 195
38 56, 66, 67 84 177
39 67 84–93 177
40 175 85 177
44 67 86–92 177
48 67, 269 94–100 177
49 270 96 178
50 270 100 178
65 175 101 177, 178
68 175 103 179
69 18, 175, 176 104 179
70 18, 176 uirg.
71 176 25 222
72 177 42 87

2. Classical and Christian Authors

a. Latin Writers

Apuleius 2, 6 27
apol. 2, 13 27
102 27 2, 15 27
flor. 2, 21 27
17 27 Socr.
met. 12 237
2, 10 27
2, 11 27 Caesar
2, 16 27 civ.
2, 17 27 3, 74, 2 22
2, 22 27 Gall.
3, 14 27 1, 2, 1 22
3, 20 27 1, 41, 1 22
6, 24 27 6, 22, 3 22
7, 21 27 7, 50, 4 22
8, 22 27
8, 29 27 Catullus
9, 23 27 17 19
10, 2 27
10, 21 27 Cicero
Plat. ac.
1, 18 27 1, 38 25
2, 4 26, 27
414 index of ancient sources

Cicero (cont.) 5, 32 23
fin. 5, 85 23
3, 9, 32 24
leg. agr. Columella
2, 55 23 rus.
nat. deor. 8, 2 24
1, 22 25
off. Cornelius Nepos
1, 19, 64 25 Con.
prov. 5, 1 22
24 24 Eum.
rep. 2, 3 22
6, 29, 136 24 Att.
fam. 13, 4 22
9, 16, 3 23
Phil. Aulus Gellius
2, 45 23 15, 2, 2 27
Lael. 15, 2, 5 27
19 24 19, 1 238, 239
Cluent. 19, 2, 3 27
12 19 19, 4, 3 27
inv. 19, 12, 3 27
1, 23, 32 23
2, 45, 131 19 Horatius
2, 159–167 214 carm.
Tusc. 1, 25 19
3, 2, 4 24
3, 11, 24 24 Livius
3, 9, 19 25 praef. 11–12 21
4, 7, 16 19 1, 9, 16 22
4, 9, 20 19 1, 56, 7 22
4, 6, 12 24, 25 3, 44, 1 21
4, 11, 24 25 3, 50, 7 21
4, 15, 34 24 3, 67, 7 22
4, 26, 57 24 5, 5, 2 22
4, 32, 68 25 6, 6, 1 22
5, 7, 17 25 6, 20, 5 22
Hort. 7, 9, 4 22
frg. 84 256 24, 5, 5 21
Verr. 28, 24, 9 21
1, 78 24 28, 43, 5 22
3, 77 23 29, 9, 11 21
3, 82 23 30, 14, 5 21
3, 207 23 34, 4, 8 22
3, 220 23 39, 8, 6 21
42, 11, 3 22
index of ancient sources 415

Plinius Maior ira

nat. 1, 3, 2 26
14, 140 19 1, 3, 3 25
26, 95 20 1, 8, 6 26
26, 99 20 1, 10, 1 26
1, 17 19
Rhetorica ad Herennium 2, 28, 7 26
2, 2, 3 24
Suetonius
Sallustius Nero
Catil. 26, 1 20
2, 1 22 gramm.
5, 4 22 23, 5 19
11, 3 22
21, 4 22 Tacitus
55, 33 22 Agr.
15, 2 21
Seneca 21, 2 22
benef. ann.
2, 14, 1 26 2, 85, 1 21
7, 2, 2 25 3, 54, 1 19
7, 10, 3 26 4, 1, 3 20
7, 26, 4 25 6, 16, 2 19
clem. 11, 37, 4 20
1, 1, 5 26 12, 20, 1 22
2, 1, 4 26 13, 30, 2 21
dial. 11 13, 44, 3 21
11, 9, 5 26 14, 20, 5 22
dial. 12 14, 51, 3 20
12, 10, 2 26 16, 21, 1 22
12, 11, 4 26 16, 32, 3 21
12, 13, 2 26 Germ.
epist. 18, 1 21
7, 7 26 hist.
16, 9 26 1, 7, 2 21
77, 6 25 2, 31, 1 19
89, 6 26 2, 62, 1 22
101, 8 26 4, 73, 3 22
117, 25 26
124, 3 25
416 index of ancient sources

b. Greek Writers

Alcinous 439e 184

16, 2 207 441–442 170
24, 1 212 Tim.
25, 7 196 69a 196
29 196 69e 207
32 196 70e–71e 196
86b–c 34
Aristoteles 86d 196
Cat.
8b–9b 249 Plotinus
9b 251 En.
1, 1, 4 34
Platon 1, 8, 8 34
Phaedr. 3, 2, 7 73
246a–256e 195 3, 2, 8 63
Rep. 3, 6, 4 150
439c–440b 196 5, 1, 1 64

c. Christian and Jewish Writers

Ambrosiaster Hel.
in Rom 7 9, 30 34
7, 22 280 19, 69 34
Iac.
Ambrosius Mediolanensis 1, 1, 3 33
Abr. 1, 1, 1–1, 2, 5 33
1, 3, 12 34 1, 1, 3–4 35
1, 4, 24 34 1, 1, 4 33
2, 4, 13 35 1, 2, 5 33
2, 7, 43 34 1, 2, 6 33
2, 9, 67 35 1, 2, 8 33
bon. mort. 1, 6, 24 32
3, 9 34 8, 36 32
5, 16 34 Iob
7, 28 34 1, 3, 9 34
12, 55 35 Ioseph
Cain et Ab. 4, 19 35
2, 9, 31 34 Isaac
fid. 7, 60 33, 233
2, 11 33 8, 65 34, 195
3, 1 32 8, 67 34
5, 17 34 Nab.
fug. saec. 1, 2 34
1, 1 34 2, 26 35
12, 52 34
index of ancient sources 417

Noe 37, 38, 3 32

9, 28 34 45, 9, 1 35
10, 34 35 in psalm. 118
11, 38 34 2, 35 34
14, 49 34 3, 33 35
15, 51 35 8, 12 32
15, 53 35 8, 42 32
18, 64 34 11, 28 32
25, 93 35 13, 27 32
29, 113 34 16, 12 32
33, 125 34
obit. Theod. Cyprianus Carthaginensis
51 34 Demetr.
off. 9–10 32
1, 4, 14 34 11 31
1, 5, 17 34 ad Donat.
1, 47, 229 34 7 32
1, 49, 241 34 9–10 32
1, 50, 246 34 Fort.
paenit. 7 31
1, 14 34 testim.
parad. 3, 11 31
2, 11 206 3, 60 31
6, 34 33, 35 3, 61 31, 32
patr. patient.
3, 12 34 10 31
epist. 20 32
3, 8 34 domin. orat.
7, 10 34 14 31
7, 31 34, 35 16 31
10, 8 34 hab. virg.
14, 26 34 4 31
27, 16 34 6 31
57, 3 35 7 31
hex. 18–19 32
1, 8, 31 34, 35 22 31
3, 12, 50 34 laps.
3, 12, 52 34 2 31
5, 7, 19 34 12 32
5, 10, 30 34 19 32
5, 15, 52 34 mortal.
6, 9, 71 34 4 32
exhort. virg. 24 31
7, 48 34 eleem.
in psalm. 10 32
1, 28, 5 32 13 31
1, 29, 2 34 22 31
36, 32, 2 34
418 index of ancient sources

Cyprianus Carthaginensis (cont.) Tertullianus

epist. mart.
14, 1, 2 31 4, 2 31
55, 26, 2 32 nat.
55, 27, 2 31 1, 10 31
65, 3, 1 31 1, 16 31
65, 2, 3 32 2, 14 31
uxor.
Epiphanius 1, 4, 3 29
Panarion 1, 4, 5 29
30, 6 154 1, 5, 4 31
2, 8, 2 29
Evagrius Ponticus adv. Marc.
malign. cogit. 1, 25, 4–5 30
1 169, 176 3, 14, 3 29, 30
3, 18, 4 30
Gregorius Nyssenus 4, 40, 1 30
Vit. Moys. 4, 40, 3 30
2, 256 150 apol.
17, 4–5 28
Gregorius Magnus 22, 6 31
moral. 45, 3 29
4, 27 209 46, 11 29
49, 2 31
Hieronymus anim.
epist. 16 30
121, 8 32 16, 3–6 30
27, 4 31
Manichaeus 38, 2–3 29
ep. fund. 38, 3 26, 29
frg. 2, 9 151 40, 2–4 28, 30
frg. 3 155 bapt.
ep. Men. 12 31
2, 3–4 154 cult. fem.
2, 4 153 1, 1 31
5, 2 153 1, 9 29, 30
castit.
Philo 9, 1–3 29
all. 13, 4 29
2, 71–108 205 idol.
3, 107–160 205 1, 1 29
QG 2, 3 29, 30
1, 31 206 23, 3 28
1, 47 206 paenit.
3, 13 29
6, 19 29
index of ancient sources 419

patient. spect.
7 31 2 29
pudic. 10 31
6 29, 30 14 28, 29
14 31 21 31
17 31 virg. vel.
resurr. 7, 2 29
61 31