CHAPTER 33

Virtues of the Mind, Selections

Linda Zagzebski

General Account of a Virtue also concludes that there are several distinct kinds
of virtue. 3 This response is understandable and it
A serious problem in any attempt to give a gen- is possible that we will eventually be forced into it,
eral account of the nature of virtue is that our but I believe it should only be taken as a last
language does not contain a sufficient number of resort, and I see no reason to take it yet. It is more
names that convey the full unified reality of each plausible that the problem derives from a defect
virtue. Some names pick out reactive feelings in our virtue language rather than a division in
(empathy), some pick out desires (curiosity), the nature of virtue itself.
some pick out motivations to act (benevolence), Let us begin by reviewing the features of virtue
whereas others pick out patterns of acting that we have already identified. First, a virtue is an
appear to be independent of feeling and motive acquired excellence of the soul, or to use more
(fairness). For this reason it is easy to confuse a modern terminology, it is an acquired excellence
virtue with a feeling in some cases (empathy, of the person in a deep and lasting sense. A vice is
compassion), and with a skill in others (fairness). the contrary quality; it is an acquired defect of the
The result is that it is very difficult to give a uni- soul. One way to express the depth required for a
tary account of virtues using common virtue lan- trait to be a virtue or a vice is to think of it as a
guage. MacIntyre (1984) blames the problem on quality we would ascribe to a person if asked to
a defect in our culture,! but this cannot be an describe her after her death. Perhaps no quality is
adequate explanation since Aristotle's list was no really permanent, or, at least, no interesting qual-
better in this respect than ours. When we examine ity, but virtues and vices are in the category of the
Aristotle's virtues and vices we see that he had dif- more enduring of a person's qualities, and they
ficulty in finding names for some of them, and a come closer to defining who the person is than
few of his names seem forced, such as his term any other category of qualities.
"anaisthesia;' which he coins for the trait of insen- Second, a virtue is acquired by a process that
sibility to pleasure. Gregory Trianosky's response involves a certain amount of time and work on
to this situation is to say that virtues are not all the part of the agent. This is not to suggest that a
traits of the same general type. 2 Robert Roberts person controls the acquisition of a virtue entirely;
that is plainly false. Nevertheless, the time and
effort required partly account for a virtue's deep
Originally published in L. Zagzebski, Virtues of the and lasting quality, one that in part defines a per-
Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), son's identity and that leads us to think of her as
pp. 134-7, 166-84. responsible for it. This means that typically a
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 443

virtue is acquired through a process of habitua- success in bringing about the end (internal or
tion, although the virtues of creativity may be an external) of the motivational element. These
exception. elements express the two distinct aims of the
Third, a virtue is not simply a skill. Skills have moral project that we find in commonsense moral
many of the same features as virtues in their thinking. On the one hand, ordinary ways of
manner of acquisition and in their area of appli- thinking about morality tell us that morality is
cation, and virtuous persons are expected to have largely a matter of the heart, and we evaluate per-
the correlative skills in order to be effective in sons for the quality of their motivations. But
action, but skills do not have the intrinsic value of morality is also in part a project of making the
virtues. world a certain kind of place - a better place, we
Fourth, a virtue has a component of motiva- might say, or the kind of place good people want
tion. A motivation is a disposition to have a cer- it to be. Because of the latter interest, we are
tain motive, and a motive is an emotion that impressed with moral success, not to the exclu-
initiates and directs action to produce an end sion of an interest in people's cares and efforts,
with certain desired features. Motivations can but in addition to it.
become deep parts of a person's character and A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and
provide her with a set of orientations toward the enduring acquired excellence of a person, involv-
world that emerge into action given the appro- ing a characteristic motivation to produce a cer-
priate circumstances. A motivation is best tain desired end and reliable success in bringing
defined, not as a way of acting in circumstances about that end. What I mean by a motivation is
specifiable in advance, but in terms of the end at a disposition to have a motive; a motive is an
which it aims and the emotion that underlies it. action-guiding emotion with a certain end, either
The easiest way to identify a motivation is by internal or external.
reference to the end at which it aims, but it also This definition is broad enough to include the
involves an emotion disposition, and that is intellectual as well as the traditional moral vir-
harder to identify by name. tues. It may also be broad enough to include virtues
This brings us to another important feature of other than the moral or intellectual, such as aes-
virtue: "Virtue" is a success term. The motiva- thetic, religious, or perhaps even physical virtues,
tional component of a virtue means that it has an but I will not consider virtues in these other cate-
end, whether internal or external. A person does gories in this work. The definition may not apply to
not have a virtue unless she is reliable at bringing higher-order virtues such as integrity and practical
about the end that is the aim of the motivational wisdom, however.
component of the virtue. For example, a fair
person acts in a way that successfully produces a
state of affairs that has the features fair persons The Motivation for Knowledge and
desire. A kind, compassionate, generous, coura- Reliable Success
geous, or just person aims at making the world a
certain way, and reliable success in making it that In this section I will argue that the individual
way is a condition for having the virtue in ques- intellectual virtues can be defined in terms of
tion. For this reason virtue requires knowledge, motivations arising from the general motivation
or at least awareness, of certain nonmoral facts for knowledge and reliability in attaining the aims
about the world. The nature of morality involves, of these motives. Since all of the intellectual vir-
not only wanting certain things, but being reliable tues have the same foundational motivation and
agents for bringing those things about. The since all of the other moral virtues have different
understanding that a virtue involves is necessary foundational motivations, this means that a dis-
for success in bringing about the aim of its moti- tinction between an intellectual and a moral virtue
vational component. This means that virtue can be made on the basis of the motivational com-
involves a component of understanding that is ponent of the virtue. I maintain that this is the
implied by the success component. only theoretically relevant difference between
A virtue therefore has two main elements: a intellectual virtues and the other moral virtues,
motivational element, and an element of reliable and so there are good grounds for continuing to
444 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

call these virtues "intellectual:' even though I have that they all arise out of the motivation for
argued that they are best treated as a subset of the knowledge since that implies that all intellectual
moral virtues. It may be that at the deepest level virtues are unified by one general motivation.
the moral and intellectual virtues arise from the But, of course, the same thing can be said about
same motivation, perhaps a love of being in gen- all the other moral virtues since they also can be
eral. 4 If so, such a motivation would serve to unify unified by one general motivation for good, and
all the virtues, but I will not analyze the relations knowledge is a form of good.
among the virtuous motivations in this work. -7 Let me address one more point before begin-
The simplest way to describe the motivational ning. The definition of intellectual virtue in terms
basis of the intellectual virtues is to say that they of the motivation for knowledge is circular if we
are all based in the motivation for knowledge. then go on to define knowledge in terms of intel-
They are all forms of the motivation to have cog- lectual virtue. The thesis here must be formulated
nitive contact with reality, where this includes less succinctly but without circularity as the thesis
more than what is usually expressed by saying that the individual intellectual virtues can be
that people desire truth. Understanding is also a defined in terms of derivatives of the motivations
form of cognitive contact with reality, one that for truth or cognitive contact with reality, where
has been considered a component of the knowing the motivation for understanding is assumed to
state in some periods of philosophical history. be a form of the motivation for cognitive contact
I will not give an account of understanding in this with reality. I am formulating the position in
work, but I have already indicated that it is a state terms of the motivation for knowledge because
that includes the comprehension of abstract I think that that is closer to the way people actu-
structures of reality apart from the propositional. ally think of their own motives and the way those
I will assume that it either is a form of knowledge motives are described by others, but I am not
or enhances the quality of knowledge. Altk~ugb. wedded to this view. The formulation in terms of
all intellectual virtues have a motivational com- knowledge motivation is simpler, and, of course,
ponent that aims at cognitive contact with reality, it is only circular when the theory of virtue is
some of them may aim more at understanding, or combined with the theory of knowledge.
perhaps at other epistemic states that enhance the
quality of the knowing state, such as certainty,
The motivation for knowledge
than at the possession of truth per se. A few stellar
virtues such as intellectual originality or inven- Intellectual virtues have been neglected in the
tiveness are related, not simply to the motivation history of philosophy, but there were discussions
for the agent to possess knowledge, but to the of them in the early modern period as part of the
motivation to advance knowledge for the human general critical examination of human perceptual
race. We will also look at how the motivation to and cognitive faculties that dominated that era.
know leads to following rules and belief-forming Both Hobbes and Spinoza connected the intellec-
procedures known by the epistemic community tual as well as the moral virtues with the passions,
to be truth conducive, and we will see how and both traced the source of these virtues to a
the individual intellectual virtues are knowledge single human motivation, the motivation for self-
conducive. preservation or power. In the early part of this
The task of defining virtues immediately raises century John Dewey stressed the place of the
the question of how virtues are individuated and intellectual virtues in what he called "reflective
whether they are unified at some deeper level. thinking," arising from the desire to attain the
I will not go very far into this matter, although it goals of effective interaction with the world. We
is an interesting one and ought to be pursued in a will look first at some remarks by Hobbes and
full theory of virtue. I have no position on the Dewey, and then I will turn to the contemporary
question of whether intellectual virtues that share treatment of the intellectual virtues by James
a name with certain moral virtues are two differ- Montmarquet in the course of giving my own
ent virtues or one. Even within the class of intel- argument for the derivation of the motivational
lectual virtues it is difficult to demarcate the components of intellectual virtues from the
boundaries of the individual virtues if I am right motivation to know.
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 445

Let us begin with the lively discussion of the another motivational layer beneath the one I am
causes of intellectual virtue and vice in Hobbes's proposing, and so it is no threat to the structure
Leviathan: of the theory I am proposing. But I want to call
attention to Hobbes's second point, which I find
The causes of this difference of wits are in the insightful. Hobbes says that cognitive virtues and
passions, and the difference of passions pro- vices arise from differences in a motivation, and
ceeded partly from the different constitution of that motivation is a passion that admits of excess,
the body and partly from different education. deficiency, and distortion of various sorts, and
For if the difference proceeds from the temper of this seems to me to be generally right. I differ with
the brain and the organs of sense, either exterior Hobbes mainly in that I identify this motivation
or interior, there would be no less difference of with the motivation for knowledge, whereas
men in their sight, hearing, or other sense than in Hobbes includes several other forms of the moti-
their fancies and discretions. 5 It proceeds, there- vation for power along with the motivation for
fore, from the passions, which are different not knowledge.
only from the difference of men's complexions, If the human drive for knowledge naturally
but also from their difference of customs and and inexorably led to success, there would be no
education. need for intellectual virtues. But this motivation
The passions that most of all cause the differ- can be deficient or distorte_d}Il Illany ways, lead-
ence of wit are principally the more or less desire
ing to intellectual vices. Deficiency is presumably
of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of honor.
one of the most common problems, and Ralph
All which may be reduced to the first - that is,
Waldo Emerson expresses a pessimistic view of
desire of power. For riches, knowledge and honor
the human drive for knowledge that illustrates
are but several sorts of power.
And therefore a man who has no great pas- how a natural human motivation can be affected
sion for any of these things but is, as men term it, by lethargy:
indifferent, though he may be so far a good man
God offers to every mind its choice between
as to be free from giving offense, yet he cannot
truth and repose. Take which you please, - you
possibly have either a great fancy or much judg-
can never have both. Between these, as a pendu-
ment. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts
lum, man oscillates. He in whom the love of
and spies, to range abroad and find the way to
repose predominates will accept the first creed,
the things desired, all steadiness of the mind's
the first philosophy, the first political party he
motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding
meets, - most likely his father's. He gets rest,
from thence; for as to have no desire is to be dead,
commodity, and reputation; but he shuts the
so to have weak passions is dullness; and to have
door to truth. He in whom the love of truth pre-
passions indifferently for everything, GIDDINESS
dominates will keep himself aloof from all moor-
and distraction; and to have stronger and more
ings, and afloat. He will abstain from dogmatism,
vehement passions for anything than is ordinar-
and recognize all the opposite negations between
ily seen in others is that which men call
which, as walls, his being is swung. He submits to
MADNESS. 6
the inconvenience of suspense and imperfect
opinion, but he is a candidate for truth, as the
A couple of points in this passage are of inter- other is not, and respects the highest law of his
est to our present concern. First, the motivation being. ("Intellect;' Essay 11)
for knowledge is not a basic motive but is a form
of the motivation for power, according to Hobbes. In this passage Emerson describes how a deficiency
Second, Hobbes's cognitively ideal person is not in the desire for truth leads to such cognitive vices
passionless, but cognitive defects can be traced to as lack of autonomy, closed-mindedness, and dog-
an excessively strong, excessively weak, or mis- matism. This may lead us to wonder whether an
placed desire for power. I will not question the excess of the motivation for knowledge can also
first point. I think Hobbes is probably wrong in lead to intellectual vices, as Hobbes implies in the
his reduction of the desire for knowledge to the passage quoted above. This is parallel to the ques-
desire for power, but I will not dispute it here tion of whether a person can be a moral fanatic:
since even if he is right, the effect is simply to add excessively motivated by a desire to do or to
446 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

produce good. Since it is problematic whether except as he is personally animated by certain

this is possible, we will not examine it here. dominant attitudes in his own character [empha-
Few philosophers have given positive directions sis added). It was once almost universally
on how to think that are intended to circumvent believed that the mind had faculties, like
the pitfalls in forming beliefs. The stress has gener- memory and attention, that could be developed
ally been on the mistakes. A well-known exception by repeated exercise, as gymnastic exercises are
is Descartes in Rules for the Direction of the Mind, supposed to develop the muscles. This belief is
and another is John Dewey in How We Think. I will now generally discredited in the large sense in
which it was once held ....
not discuss the former since it has been exhaus-
What can be done, however, is to cultivate
tively examined many times, but I find Dewey
those attitudes that are favorable to the use of the
intriguing if rather nonspecific. Although he does
best methods of inquiry and testing. Knowledge
not discuss the motivation for knowledge directly,
of the methods alone will not suffice; there must
he does discuss the motivations to reach our goals be the desire, the will, to employ them. This
in action and to make systematic preparations for desire is an affair of personal disposition. But on
the future and the desire to be free from the control the other hand the disposition alone will not suf-
of nature, all of which are closely connected with fice. There must also be understanding of the
knowledge.? These values require the practice of forms and techniques that are the channels
what Dewey calls "reflective thinking;' which he through which these attitudes operate to the best
outlines in some detail: advantage. (pp.29-30)

No one can tell another person in any definite In this passage Dewey places special importance
way how he should think, any more than how he on the desire to employ better ways of thinking,
ought to breathe or to have his blood circulate. claiming that knowledge of methods is not suf-
But the various ways in which we do think can ficient. He thus traces a path from our motiva-
be told and can be described in their general tion to believe truly and to act effectively to the
features. Some of these ways are better than
formation of "attitudes" or intellectual virtues
others; the reasons why they are better can be
that lead us to employ certain methods of think-
set forth. The person who understands what
ing and forming beliefs. For my purposes, the
the better ways of thinking are and why they
salient point is that the foundation of these vir-
are better can, if he will, change his own per-
sonal ways until they become more effective; tues is a motivation: the motivation to think
until, that is to say, they do better the work that more effectively.
thinking can do and that other mental opera- The "attitudes" Dewey says one needs to culti-
tions cannot do so well. The better way of think- vate are the following:
ing that is to be considered in this book is called Open-mindedness. "This attitude may be defined as
reflective thinking. (p. 3) freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and such
other habits as close the mind and make it unwill-
The disclaimer in the first sentence of the above ing to consider new problems and entertain new
passage is surely too strong, but the rest of the ideas" (p. 30).
paragraph is reasonable. Dewey goes on to say Wholeheartedness. "When a person is absorbed, the
that reflective thinking requires not only certain subject carries him on. Questions occur to him
skills, but also certain "attitudes": spontaneously; a flood of suggestions pour in on
him; further inquiries and readings are indicated
Because of the importance of attitudes, ability and followed; instead of having to use his energy
to train thought is not achieved merely by to hold his mind to the subject. ... the material
knowledge of the best forms of thought. holds and buoys his mind up and gives an onward
Possession of this information is no guarantee impetus to thinking. A genuine enthusiasm is an
for ability to think well. Moreover, there are no attitude that operates as an intellectual force.
set exercises in correct thinking whose repeated A teacher who arouses such an enthusiasm in his
performance will cause one to be a good thinker. pupils has done something that no amount of
The information and the exercises are both of formalized method, no matter how correct, can
value. But no individual realizes their value accomplish" (pp. 31-2).
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 447

Responsibility. "Like sincerity or wholeheartedness, and determination. Notice that there is quite a bit
responsibility is usually conceived as a moral of overlap between these sets of virtues and
trait rather than as an intellectual resource. But Dewey's. The major differences are in Dewey's
it is an attitude that is necessary to win the virtue of wholeheartedness and Montmarquet's
adequate support of desire for new points of virtues of courage.
view and new ideas and of enthusiasm for and Montmarquet calls the desire for truth "epis-
capacity for absorption in subject matter. These temic conscientiousness" and argues that some
gifts may run wild, or at least they may lead the intellectual virtues arise out of this desire.
mind to spread out too far. They do not of
themselves insure that centralization, that
unity, which is essential to good thinking. To be The first point to be made ... is that such quali-
intellectually responsible is to consider the ties as open-mindedness are widely regarded as
consequences of a projected step; it means to truth-conducive. In contrast to the highly con-
be willing to adopt these consequences when troversial claims of various theories, the truth-
they follow reasonably from any position conduciveness of qualities such as openness and
already taken. Intellectual responsibility secures intellectual sobriety is widely acknowledged to
integrity; that is to say, consistency and har- be a fact, not only by the expert (if there are
mony in belief" (p. 32). "experts" on any such matter as this), but also by
the average nonexpert individual (at least if he or
In the contemporary literature Laurence she is suitably queried). Take openness. Unless
BonJour and Hilary Kornblith 8 introduced a one starts from the unlikely presumption that
motivational element into the discussion of epis- one has found the truth already and that the con-
temic normativity in the notion of epistemic trary advice and indications of others is liable,
responsibility, defined by Kornblith as follows: therefore, only to lead one astray, one can hardly
possess a sincere love of truth, but no concern
"An epistemically responsible agent desires to have
about one's own openness. Or take intellectual
true beliefs, and thus desires to have his beliefs
sobriety. Here, too, unless one starts from the
produced by processes which lead to true beliefs;
unlikely presumption that one's immediate reac-
his actions are guided by these desires" (p. 34).
tions and unchecked inferences are so highly
Although Kornblith does not specifically discuss reliable as not to be improved by any tendency to
intellectual virtues, he implies that a motivation withhold full assent until they are further inves-
or desire is at the root of the evaluation of epis- tigated, the virtue of sobriety will have to be
temic agents, and that seems to me to be right. A acknowledged. Or, finally, take intellectual cour-
more extensive treatment of epistemic virtue and age. Again, unless one makes an initially unap-
its connection with motivation has been given by pealing assumption that one's own ideas - true as
James Montmarquet 9 who connects a large set of they may seem to oneself - are so liable to be
intellectual virtues with the desire for truth, mistaken as to require not only deference to the
claiming that these virtues are qualities a person opinions of others, but also a deep sense that
who wants the truth would want to acquire. these are opinions more liable to be correct than
However, it is not Montmarquet's intention to one's own (even when one cannot see how or
define intellectual virtues the way I am proposing why) [, unless] one makes such an initial assump-
here or to derive them all from the motivation for tion, one will have to acknowledge intellectual
truth or from the motivation for knowledge. Still, courage as a virtue. 10
Montmarquet's work has an obvious affinity with
the theory I am proposing. I want to give it close The reader should not be misled into thinking
attention. that this is an argument that these virtues are
Recall Montmarquet's classification of the truth conducive; in fact, Montmarquet questions
epistemic virtues. Briefly, they are the virtues of the truth conduciveness of openness and courage,
impartiality, or openness to the ideas of others; as we will see. It is, instead, an argument that they
the virtues of intellectual sobriety, or the virtues are traits persons who desire the truth would want
of the careful inquirer who accepts only what is to have. I take this to mean that such persons
warranted by the evidence, and the virtues of would be motivated to act the way open-minded,
intellectual courage, which include perseverance intellectually sober, cautious, courageous, and
448 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

persevering people act in their belief-forming the acquisition of knowledge in a certain area.
processes. So if a person is motivated to get the Skills are more closely connected to effectiveness
truth, she would be motivated to consider the ideas in a particular area of life or knowledge than are
of others openly and fairly, to consider the evi- virtues, which are psychically prior and provide
dence with care, not to back down too quickly the motivations to develop skills. Intellectual
when criticized, and all the rest. This seems to me skills are sets of truth-conducive procedures that
to be correct. It means that the motivation for are acquired through habitual practice and have
knowledge gives rise to the motivation to act in application to a certain area of truth acquisition.
ways that are distinctive of the various intellectual Since the path to knowledge varies with the con-
virtues Montmarquet mentions. Undoubtedly it text, the subject matter, and the way a community
also leads to the motivation to acquire Dewey's makes a division of intellectual labor, people with
trait of intellectual responsibility; in fact, the the same intellectual virtues will not all need to
motivation to be able to accurately predict conse- have the same skills, at least not to the same
quences is a form of the motivation to know. The degree. Clearly the importance of fact-finding
trait that Dewey calls "wholeheartedness;' the skills, skills of spatial reasoning, and skills in the
attitude of enthusiasm, which moves us onward subtler branches of logic are not equally impor-
in thinking, is also a form of the motivation to tant for all areas of the pursuit of knowledge. But
know, in fact, an intensification of it. It is reason- all of these skills could arise in different people
able to conclude, then, that a wide range of intel- from the same intellectual virtues - for example,
lectual virtues arise out of the same general carefulness, thoroughness, and autonomy.
motivation, the motivation for knowledge, and We have already seen that virtue is more than
have the same general aim, knowledge. a motivation. Of course, we would expect many
virtuous motivations to lead to success in carry-
ing out the aims of the motive. So, for example,
The success component of the
the motive to be careful or persevering probably
intellectual virtues
leads somewhat reliably to success in being careful
Intellectually virtuous motivations lead the agent or persevering, but the correlation with success
to guide her belief-forming processes in certain is probably much less in the case of such virtu-
ways. They make her receptive to processes known ous motives as the motive to be autonomous,
to her epistemic community to be truth condu- the motive to be courageous, and perhaps even the
cive and motivate her to use them, even if it means motive to be open-minded. The weak connection
overcoming contrary inclinations. As Dewey tells between motive and success is also noticeable in
us, it is not enough to be aware that a process is Dewey's virtue of wholeheartedness (if it is a
reliable; a person will not reliably use such a proc- virtue), since it is surely naive to think that the
ess without certain virtues. At least this is the case motivation to be enthusiastic reliably leads to
with reliable processes that are not unconscious being enthusiastic. But even when the motiva-
or automatic. Contemporary research in episte- tional component of a virtue is generally related
mology has focused extensively on the concept of to success, we do not call a person virtuous who is
a truth-conducive belief-forming process, as well not reliably successful herself, whether or not
as on many specific examples of these processes. most people who have the trait are successful in
I have no intention of duplicating or replacing carrying out the aims of the virtue in question. So
this work here. My purpose is to point out that if she is truly open-minded, she must actually be
the motivation for knowledge leads a person to receptive to new ideas, examining them in an
follow rules and belief-forming processes that are evenhanded way and not ruling them out because
truth conducive and whose truth conduciveness they are not her own; merely being motivated to
she is able to discover and use by the possession act in these ways is not sufficient. Similarly, if she
of intellectual virtue. is intellectually courageous, she must, in actual
Intellectually virtuous motivations not only fact, refrain from operating from an assumption
lead to following reliable procedures but also lead that the views of others are more likely to be true
to the development of particular skills suited to than her own and must be willing to withstand
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 449

attack when she has good reason to think she is entrenchment of a trait would, of course, depend
right, but not otherwise. Parallel remarks apply to partly on the environment in which it is
the other intellectual virtues. It follows that each entrenched.13 Most of the qualities I have been
of these intellectual virtues has a motivational calling intellectual virtues - traits such as open-
component arising out of the motivation to know mindedness, carefulness, and perseverance - are
and a component of reliable success in achieving to a great extent environment neutral, but this
the aim of the motivational component. does not mean that there are not other intellec-
Most virtues are acquired by habituation and tual virtues that are more context sensitive.
we only consider them virtues when they are Many intellectual virtues, including those
entrenched in the agent's character. Entrenchment mentioned by Dewey, not only arise from and
is a necessary feature of virtues because they are serve the motivation to know the truth, but are
often needed the most when they encounter also crucial in such activities as the arts, crafts,
resistance. For example, the tendency to be moti- and games. The ultimate aim of these activities is
vated by compassion does not signify the exist- not knowledge but something practical: creating
ence of the virtue of compassion in a person who an artistically superior sonnet, making a fine
loses this motivation in the presence of physically violin, winning a chess game. 14 These ends cannot
unattractive persons in need, even if these cir- be successfully achieved without knowledge in
cumstances do not arise very often. Similarly, one of its senses, but probably not the kind of
the tendency to be motivated to fairly evaluate the knowledge whose object is true propositions. At
arguments of others does not signify the existence least, that sort of knowledge is not the one most
of the virtue of intellectual fairness in a person fundamentally connected to success in these
who loses this motivation when confronted with activities, which is more a matter of knowing-
arguments for unappealing conclusions, even if how rather than knowing-that. Still, some of the
she is lucky enough not to encounter such argu- same virtues that arise out of the desire for knowl-
ments very often. So the motivational component edge and aid its successful achievement can also
of a virtue must be inculcated sufficiently to reli- aid the achievement of these practical ends and,
ably withstand the influence of contrary motiva- in some people, may arise more out of a desire for
tions when those motivations do not themselves the practical end than out of a desire for knowl-
arise from virtues. The more that virtuous moti- edge. I do not claim, then, that intellectual virtues
vations and the resulting behavior become fixed arise only from the motivation to know, much
habits, the more they are able to reliably achieve less do I claim they arise only from the motiva-
the ends of the virtue in those cases in which there tion to have propositional knowledge, and I cer-
are contrary tendencies to be overcome. tainly do not claim that their exercise is properly
One way to distinguish among the truth- directed only at knowledge. The value of intellec-
conducive qualities those that are virtues and tual virtues extends beyond their epistemic use.
those that are not is by the difference in the value So not only is the distinction between intellectual
we place on the entrenchment of these traits. and moral virtues highly artificial, but the dis-
Montmarquet mentions that we would not want tinction between intellectual virtues and the
the desire to uphold behaviorist psychology to be practical virtues needed for doing such things as
an entrenched trait even if it is truth conducive,ll creating sonnets, making violins, or winning
unlike the desire for the truth itself or, I would chess games is artificial as well. Again, I will not
add, the desire to be open-minded, careful in discuss the problem of virtue individuation. There
evaluating evidence, autonomous, etc. The latter may be some difference between, say, the kind of
traits, when entrenched, lead to the truth partly openness displayed in writing a Shakespeare
because of their entrenchment, whereas the desire sonnet and the kind of openness displayed in
to uphold behaviorism is less likely to lead to the pure scientific investigation. This difference may
truth if it is entrenched than if it is not. The intel- amount to a distinction in the virtues themselves
lectual virtues are a subset of truth-conducive if virtue identity is determined by the ultimate
traits that are entrenched and whose entrenchment end of the virtue. The point is that even if this is
aids their truth conduciveness. 12 The value of the the case, there are practical and intellectual virtues
450 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

so similar to each other that they are very difficult flexibility, and so on. And the motivation to be,
to distinguish, and this means that it is highly say, open-minded, will lead to acquiring patterns
implausible to maintain that intellectual virtues of behavior characteristic of the open-minded;
are fundamentally different in kind from the vir- the motivation to be fair-minded will lead to
tues needed for the kinds of practical activities acquiring patterns of behavior characteristic of
just named. the intellectually fair; and so on. It is doubtful
Amelie Rorty points out that while the utility that such patterns of behavior are fully describa-
and success of intellectual virtues depend on their ble in terms of following rules or procedures. It is
becoming habits that lead to action without prior clear, then, that the following of truth-conducive
deliberation, habits can become pathological or procedures is not all that a knowledge-motivated
idiotic. 15 They become pathological, she says, person does, both because the motivation for
when they become so habitual that their exercise truth leads to behavior that is not fully describa-
extends to situations that no longer concern ble as the following of procedures, and because
their internal aims. So generosity is pathological the motivation for knowledge includes more than
when it debilitates its recipients. The capacity the motivation for truth. The motivation for
to generate what Rorty calls "bravura virtuoso knowledge leads us to be aware of the re,liability
thought experiments" becomes pathological when of certain belief-forming processes and the unre-
it applies only to a very rare, narrow range of cir- liability of others, but it also leads us to be aware
cumstances (p. 13). A virtuous habit becomes idi- that there are reliable belief-forming mechanisms
otic when its exercise resists a reasonable whose unreliability is not yet known. And simi-
redirection of its aims, a redirection that is appro- larly, there are unreliable belief-forming mecha-
priate to changing circumstances. Rorty gives the nisms whose unreliability is not yet known. This
example of courage when one is unable to make is something we cannot ignore; otherwise, knowl-
the transition from its military use to its use in edge about knowledge would not progress. This
political negotiation. In the intellectual sphere, means that intellectual virtues such as flexibility,
the virtue of properly arguing from authority open-mindedness, and even boldness are highly
becomes idiotic when it is used to block the inves- important. It also suggests that there is more than
tigation of the legitimacy of the authority itself one sense in which a virtues can be truth condu-
(p. 14). Some of these problems can be addressed cive. In the sense most commonly discussed by
by the function of the virtue of phronesis, but we reliabilists, truth conduciveness is a function of
do need to be reminded of the potential negative the number of true beliefs and the proportion of
effects of habit. Nevertheless, these considera- true to false beliefs generated by a process. There
-tions do not falsify the claim that there is an ele- is another sense of truth conduciveness, however,
ment of habit in virtue. So far, then, our analysis which is important at the frontiers of knowledge
of the components of intellectual virtue has iden- and in areas, like philosophy, that generate very
tified a component of habitual motivation arising few true beliefs, no matter how they are formed.
from the motive to know and a component of I suggest that we may legitimately call a trait or
reliable success in achieving the aims of the virtue procedure truth conducive if it is a necessary con-
in question. dition for advancing knowledge in some area
I have said that the primary motivation under- even though it generates very few true beliefs and
lying the intellectual virtues is the motivation for even if a high percentage of the beliefs formed as
knowledge. Such a motivation clearly includes the result of this trait or procedure are false. For
the desire to have true beliefs and to avoid false example, the discovery of new reliable procedures
ones, and we have looked at how such a motiva- may arise out of intellectual traits that lead a
tion leads a person to follow rules or procedures person to hit on falsehood many times before hit-
of belief formation that are known to her epis- ting on the truth. As long as these traits (in com-
temic community to be truth conducive. The bination with other intellectual virtues) are
motivation for knowledge also leads its posses- self-correcting, they will eventually advance human
sor to acquire the motivational components dis- knowledge, but many false beliefs may have to be
tinctive of the individual intellectual virtues: discarded along the way. A person motivated to
open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual know would be motivated to act cognitively in a
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 451

manner that is truth conducive in this sense, In "The Doctrine of Chances," C. S. Peirce
I would argue, in addition to acting in a way that is expressed the opinion that even the scientific
truth conducive in the more common sense. method is truth conducive only in a sense simi-
The virtues of originality, creativity, and lar to the one I have just described. Peirce says
inventiveness are truth conducive in the sense that the scientist must be unselfish because he is
just described. Clearly, their truth conduciveness not likely to arrive at the truth for himself in the
in the sense of producing a high proportion of short run. Instead, his procedures are likely to
true beliefs is much lower than that of the ordi- lead the scientific community to better theories
nary virtues of careful and sober inquiry, but and more comprehensive truths in the long
they are truth conducive in the sense that they run. 18 If Peirce is right, the sense in which the
are necessary for the advancement of human virtues of originality and creativity are truth
knowledge. If only 5 per cent of a creative think- conducive is not clearly different from the way in
er's original ideas turn out to be true, her which the virtues of careful scientific inquiry are
creativity is certainly truth conducive because truth conducive.
the stock of knowledge of the human race has Another reason the motivation to know is not
increased through her creativity. The way in fully expressed by following well-known reliable
which these virtues are truth conducive is prob- belief-forming processes is that, as already
ably circuitous and unpredictable, and for this remarked, the motivation to know includes the
reason it is doubtful that they give rise to a set of motivation for understanding. Knowledge has
rules, and, in fact, they may even defy those rules been associated with certainty and understand-
already established. Often creative people simply ing for long periods of its history, but generally
operate on intuition, which is usually what we not with both at the same time. 19 The virtues
call an ability when it works and we don't know that lead to the kind of knowledge that gives the
how it works. Ernest Dimnet relates the story possessor certainty may be different from the
that Pasteur was constantly visited by intuitions virtues that lead to understanding, and the fol-
that he was afterward at great pains to check by lowing of belief-forming processes known to the
the ordinary canons of science (1928, p. 187).16 epistemic community to be reliable may be
Presumably, following the canons in the absence insufficient for either one. For one thing, to aim
of his bold and original ideas would not have at certainty is not just to aim at truth but to aim
gotten him (or us) nearly as far. Dimnet tells to have an awareness of truth that has a certain
another anecdote about the creative process in quality. To get an awareness with that quality it
novelists. Apparently, when Sir Walter Scott hit may not be enough to use processes known or
upon the idea for a new novel, he would read truly believed by one's epistemic community to
volume after volume that had no reference to his be reliable. One may need to be aware of how
subject, merely because reading intensified the and why one's belief-forming process is justified,
working of his mind. Dimnet comments that this or at least how and why it is reliable and the
process did for Scott's power of invention what degree of its reliability. The virtues that enable
the crowds in the city did for Dickens's (p. 7). Of one to see how one's belief can stand up to attack
course, novelists are not aiming for truth in the contribute to certainty. Virtues that lead to clar-
sense that is the major focus of this book, but the ity in one's grasp of a matter may also contribute
same point could apply to creative work in phi- to certainty. Aiming at understanding is even
losophy, history, mathematics, and the sciences. farther removed from using procedures known
The knowledge-motivated person will want to to be reliable, because understanding is not a
have the virtues of creativity to the extent that she property whose object is a single proposition.
is able, and that gives us another reason why the Those virtues that enable the agent to see con-
motive to know includes more than the motive to nections among her beliefs - introspective atten-
follow procedures known to be reliable. The divi- tiveness and insight in its various forms - are
sion of epistemic labor probably limits the understanding conducive. All of these virtues
number of people who are strongly motivated in deserve careful attention, and although I will not
,this way, but their existence is important for the stop to investigate them individually, I hope that
knowledge of the whole community.17 others will do so.
452 LINDA ZAGZEBSKI

Notes

Alisdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre might have value, he suggests, independently
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, of its capacity to reliably lead to the truth.
1984). There is a passage in the Meno (81de) in
2 Gregory Trianosky, "Virtue, Action, and the which Socrates seems to be saying that even
Good Life: Towards a Theory of the Virtues," if we have no rational grounds for preferring
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987), pp. the religious story of 81ad to the eristic story
124-47. of 80d, we are better off believing the former:
3 Robert C. Roberts, "Aristotle on Virtues and it makes us energetic seekers, whereas the
Emotions;' Philosophical Studies 56 (1989), eristic story makes us lazy. I have noticed in
pp.293-306. myself and others the tendency to go for the
4 In Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to more metaphysically exciting position on
a Critique of Passional Reason (Ithaca, NY: such issues as the nature of time or the exist-
Cornell University Press, 1996), ch. 2, William ence of abstract objects, quite apart from a
Wainwright discusses the love of being in consideration of the weight of the argumen-
general as an epistemic virtue recognized by tative evidence. Such a tendency is clearly
Jonathan Edwards. dangerous, but it is not obviously a bad
5 Hobbes implies here that people do not thing. There might even be value in its
differ as much in their sensory faculties as in entrenchment.
their virtues and vices. He also says that part 13 I thank Hilary Kornblith for drawing my
of what leads us to call a quality a virtue attention to this point.
is that it is uncommon. The Hobbesian 14 I thank Charles Young for this point.
approach would hesitate, then, in attributing 15 Amelie Rorty, "From Exasperating Virtues to
anything virtuous to cases of simple percep- Civic Virtues," American Philosophical
tual beliefs that are produced by normally Quarterly 38 (1996), pp. 303-14.
functioning faculties. 16 Ernest Dimnet, The Art of Thinking (New
6 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: York: Simon and Schuster, 1928), p. 187.
Macmillan, 1958), pt. 1, ch. 8, pp. 68-9. 17 A careful study of the psychology of crea-
7 John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. tivity would probably show that motiva-
Heath and Co., 1933), ch. 2, sec. 1; page tion operates in a different way in the
numbers given in parenthesis in the text. virtues of creativity and originality than it
8 Laurence BonJour, "Externalist Theories of does in the other intellectual virtues. The
Empirical Knowledge," III Studies In motivation to be creative does not lead to
Epistemology. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, being creative in the way the motivation to
vol. 5 (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University be careful leads to being careful. I imagine
Press, 1980); Hilary Kornblith, "Justified that creative people begin by being creative
Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action;' involuntarily and find it pleasant, exciting,
Philosophical Review 92 (1983), pp. 33-48. even thrilling. These feelings give them the
9 James A. Montmarquet, "Epistemic Virtue," impetus to permit their creativity a certain
Mind 96 (1986), pp. 482-97; "Epistemic latitude, which may lead them to ignore
Virtue," in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa the established canons, at least temporar-
(eds), A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford: ily. This means that the motivational com-
Basil Blackwell, 1992); Epistemic Virtue and ponent in creativity does not so much lead
Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, MD: its possessors to acquire the trait as allow
Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), ch. 2. them to give it free rein, and this may lead
10 Epistemic Virtue, pp. 27-8. to ignoring the dictates of certain other
11 Ibid., pp. 26-7. virtues.
12 Charles Young has suggested to me that a 18 Christopher Hookway has an interesting
problematic case is the desire that the inter- discussion of this position of Peirce and
esting be true, a quality whose entrenchment related views. See C. S. Peirce, The Essential
VIRTUES OF THE MIND, SELECTIONS 453

Peirce, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and Basil Blackwell, 1993), and Stephen Everson,
Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana Epistemology, Companions to Ancient
University Press, 1992) and Christopher Thought, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
Hookway, "Mimicking Foundationalism: On University Press, 1990), for historical discus-
Sentiment and Self-Control," European sions of the difference between the values of
Journal of Philosophy 1:2 (1993), pp. 156-74. certainty and understanding in different
19 See Mary Tiles and Jim Tiles, An Introduction periods of epistemological history.
to Historical Epistemology (Cambridge, MA: