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Chapter Title: Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety

Book Title: The Truth About Freud's Technique

Book Subtitle: The Encounter With the Real
Book Author(s): M. Guy Thompson
Published by: NYU Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfvqq.8

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2

Realistic an d Neurotic Anxiet y

In a pape r rea d befor e th e Baltimor e Psychoanalyti c Societ y i n 1949 ,

Hans Loewal d addresse d a central aspect of Freud's conceptio n o f reality,
focusing o n Freud' s insistenc e tha t "external " reality—tha t is , th e
world—is essentiall y hostile and antagonistic .
In psychoanalyti c theor y w e ar e accustome d t o thin k o f th e relationshi p
between ego and reality as one of adjustment o r adaptation. The so-called
mature ego has renounced the pleasure principle and has substituted for it
the reality principle. It does not follow the direct path of instinctual gratifi-
cation, without regard to consequences, to the demands of reality, does not
indulge in hallucinatory wish fulfillment, bu t tests external reality . . . adapt-
ing it s thought s an d action s t o th e demand s o f reality . Thi s conceptio n
of th e relationshi p betwee n eg o an d realit y presuppose s a fundamenta l
antagonism that has to be bridged or overcome in order to make life in this
reality possible. (1980, 3)
Two year s afte r h e delivere d "Eg o an d Reality, " Loewal d returne d t o
this theme again in "The Problem of Defense an d the Neurotic Interpreta -
tion of Reality. "
The relationshi p betwee n organis m an d environment , betwee n individua l
and reality , i n genera l ha s bee n understoo d i n psychoanalyti c theor y a s
basically antagonistic. It is Freud's "biological assumption" that a stimulus
is something hostile to the organism and to the nervous system. Ultimately,
instinct itself is understood as a need or compulsion to abolish stimuli. Any
stimulus, as stimulus, represents a threat, a disturbance. On the psychologi-
cal level, Freud come s to th e conclusio n tha t a t the stag e of th e origina l
reality ego , "at th e ver y beginning , i t seems , the externa l world , objects ,
and what is hated are identical." (1980, 28)
Yet, what i s this "reality" that pose s such a threat to us> Is this a reality
of our ow n making , a s Freud hypothesize d s o enigmatically a s "psychical

12

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Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety1 3

reality," or i s it a reality completely independen t o f ourselves, imperviou s

to ou r whim s an d indifferen t t o ou r needs—unheeding , barren , cold ?
Even Marshall Edelson, no friend o f philosophical or hermeneutical inter -
pretations o f psychoanalysis , ha d t o admi t Freud' s problem s wit h thi s
concept.
We have seen that Freu d ha d troubl e wit h "psychi c reality. " But judging
from th e variety of adjectives precedin g "reality"—external, factual , mate-
rial, practical—w e ma y conclud e tha t th e conceptua l statu s o f "externa l
reality" offered a s much difficulty. Freu d avoided philosophical questions as
much as possible in his work in the interest of creating an empirical science,
but here an ontological specter seems impossible to evade. (1988, 7)

Freud wa s too subd e an d comple x a thinker t o b e accused of adoptin g

a superficia l attitud e towar d th e natur e o f reality , especiall y becaus e i t
plays suc h a n importan t rol e i n hi s theorie s o f psychopatholog y an d
psychoanalysis. Edelson point s ou t tha t Freu d "though t abou t suc h ques-
tions. Tha t h e kne w an d admire d th e wor k o f Kan t an d wa s awar e tha t
our knowledg e o f externa l realit y wa s shape d b y th e characte r o f ou r
minds i s eviden t fro m Jones ' biography 55 (7) . Freu d explicid y refer s t o
Kant in his paper "The Unconscious 55:
Just a s Kant warned u s not t o overloo k th e fac t tha t ou r perception s ar e
subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is
perceived thoug h unknowable , s o psycho-analysis warns us not t o equat e
perceptions b y means of consciousness wit h th e unconscious menta l pro-
cesses which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessar-
ily in reality what i t appears to be . We shall be glad to learn, however, that the
correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as
the correction of external perception—that internal objects are less unknowable
than the external world. (1957e , 171; emphasis added)

What a n amazing thing to say. As difficult an d imperfect a s our knowl -

edge o f our ow n mind s is—an d Freu d i s alluding to unconsciou s menta l
processes when he refers t o "internal perception 55—he say s that "external 55
reality is even more unknowabl e tha n that ! What i s the ego 5s relationshi p
with thi s unknowable an d hostile realit y like? How doe s that relationshi p
generate anxiet y an d what , i n turn , doe s tha t tel l u s abou t th e natur e o f
reality, as Freud conceived it?
It wa s du e t o anxiety , i n Freud' s view , tha t th e eg o develope d ou t o f
the i d i n th e first place , wha t Freu d onc e referre d t o a s " a frontie r
creature,55 whose purpos e wa s t o "mediat e betwee n th e worl d an d th e i d

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14 Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety

. . . and to mak e the world fal l i n with th e wishes of the id 55 (196 Id, 56) .
As I argue d i n The Death of Desire (Thompso n 1985 , 1-23) , Freud' s
initial conceptio n o f th e eg o wa s tha t o f a defensive , repressiv e agency .
Even whe n h e modifie d thi s vie w t o includ e a syntheti c function , th e
synthetic functio n itsel f continue d t o b e perceive d i n term s o f defense .
Freud neve r abandone d hi s conceptio n o f Das Ich a s basicall y defensive ,
partially becaus e h e neve r entirel y abandone d hi s vie w o f realit y a s pre -
dominandy hostile . Freud viewe d the individua l a s essentially opposed t o
the world an d culture. Culture and reality are repressive, thus they presen t
a threa t t o ever y huma n being . Bu t isn' t thi s ho w neurotic s typicall y
perceive reality , a s essentiall y hostile , ungratifying , threatening ? Isn' t th e
nature o f "transference " suc h tha t th e patien t i n psychoanalysi s antici -
pates—and, indeed , experiences—the analyti c relationship in such terms?
Loewald propose s tha t

on three levels, then, the biological, psychological, and cultural, psychoanal-

ysis has taken for granted the neurotically distorted experience of reality. It
has take n fo r grante d th e concep t o f a realit y a s i t i s experience d i n a
predominantiy defensiv e integratio n o f it . Stimulus , externa l world , an d
culture, all three, on different level s of scientific approach, representative of
what i s called , reality , hav e bee n understoo d unquestioningl y a s they ar e
thought, felt, experienced within the framework o f a hostile-defensive (tha t
is, regressive-reactive) ego-realit y integration. It is a concept of reality as it
is most typically encountered in the obsessive character neurosis, a neurosis
so commo n i n ou r cultur e tha t i t ha s bee n calle d th e norma l neurosis .
(1980, 30)

Loewald conclude s tha t "psychoanalyti c theor y ha s unwittingl y take n

over much o f the obsessive neurotic's experience and conception of reality
and ha s take n i t fo r grante d a s th e 'objectiv e reality' " (30) . O f course ,
Loewald is referring t o Freud's conception of reality, and that conception ,
generally accepte d b y contemporar y analysts , i s base d o n Freud' s under -
standing o f anxiet y an d fear . Freu d discusse d anxiet y throughou t hi s
lifetime an d revise d his thoughts abou t i t periodically. He returne d t o th e
subject i n 193 3 i n th e New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis i n hi s
lecture "Anxiet y an d Instinctua l Life " (1964c , 81-111) . Her e Freu d
reviews hi s earlie r pape r o n anxiet y i n th e Introductory Lectures, whil e
incorporating mor e recen t thought s fro m hi s "Inhibitions , Symptoms ,
and Anxiety" (1959a) .
Freud initiall y believe d tha t anxiet y wa s th e consequenc e o f sexua l

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Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety1 5

repression. Accordingly , whe n a n ide a i s repressed, "it' s quot a o f affec t i s

regularly transforme d int o anxiety 5' (1964c , 83) . Anxiet y wa s conceive d
in term s o f a transformatio n o f libid o and , so , serve d a n unconsciou s
purpose. Th e sympto m o f anxiet y wa s a displacemen t o f th e represse d
wish that was incapable of being fulfilled. Anxiet y was thus unconsciousl y
exciting. Freu d eventuall y cam e t o th e conclusion , however , tha t thi s
theory was untenable. Certain symptoms an d conditions, such as phobias,
showed tha t neurotic s wen t t o great length s to avoi d anxiety , s o the vie w
that anxiet y was unconsciousl y experience d a s pleasure wasn' t necessaril y
universal. Freu d conjecture d tha t a t leas t som e "symptom s ar e created i n
order t o avoi d th e outbrea k o f the anxiet y state. This i s confirmed to o b y
the fac t tha t th e first neurose s o f childhoo d ar e phobias " (84) . Earlier ,
Freud ha d define d rea l anxiet y a s a signal elicite d fro m a n externa l threa t
or danger . Neuroti c anxiety , o n th e othe r hand , wa s a derivativ e o f th e
economics o f sexua l life . Thi s suggeste d ther e wa s a n ulterio r motiv e i n
the neuroti c experienc e o f anxiety , similar , fo r example , t o conversio n
hysteria. Bu t Freu d bega n t o suspec t that ther e was a real fear i n neuroti c
anxiety a s well . Yet , thi s fea r wa s presumabl y locate d o n th e "inside "
rather tha n "outside. " I n othe r words , "wha t h e i s afrai d o f i s evidend y
his own libido . The differenc e betwee n thi s situatio n an d tha t o f realisti c
anxiety lie s i n tw o points : tha t th e dange r i s a n interna l instea d o f a n
external on e an d tha t i t i s no t consciousl y recognized " (84) . Freu d con -
cludes tha t "anxiety , i t seems , i n s o fa r a s i t i s a n affectiv e state , i s th e
reproduction o f a n ol d even t whic h brough t a threat o f danger ; anxiet y
serves the purpose s o f self-preservation an d i s a signal of a new danger ; i t
arises from libid o tha t ha s in som e way becom e unemployabl e an d . . . i s
replaced b y the formation o f a symptom" (84) .
Freud subsequend y incorporate d hi s formulatio n o f th e structura l
model int o hi s ne w conceptio n o f anxiety . Th e eg o i s increasingl y con -
ceived a s the sea t of anxiety, whereas th e i d is the sourc e of passion (85) .
Freud conclude d tha t "i t wa s no t th e repressio n tha t create d anxiety ; th e
anxiety wa s ther e earlier ; i t wa s th e anxiet y tha t mad e th e repression "
(86). Whereas neurotic anxiet y was previously interpreted i n terms of th e
(id's) unconsciou s deman d fo r pleasure , i t i s no w understood—i n th e
same wa y a s norma l anxiety—a s a respons e t o " a threatenin g externa l
danger." Freu d resolve s hi s apparen t dilemm a b y proposin g "castration "
as th e externa l danger , th e inevitabl e consequenc e o f th e boy' s lus t fo r
his mother .

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16 Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety

But we have not made an y mention a t all so far of what the real danger
is that th e chil d i s afrai d o f a s a result o f bein g i n lov e wit h hi s mother .
"The dange r i s th e punishmen t o f bein g castrated , o f losin g hi s genita l
organ. Yo u wil l o f cours e objec t tha t afte r al l tha t i s no t a rea l danger .
Our boy s ar e no t castrate d becaus e the y ar e i n lov e wit h thei r mother s
during th e phas e o f th e Oedipu s complex . Bu t th e matte r canno t b e
dismissed s o simply . Abov e all , it is not a question of whether castration is
really carried out; what is decisive is that th e dange r i s on e tha t threaten s
from outsid e an d that the child believes in it" (86; emphasis added).
Castration—which i s t o say , th e threa t o f castration—no w become s
the sourc e o f al l our (male ) neuroti c fears . Thi s threa t i s "perceived" a s a
real danger, comin g from outside . Yet, as Freud acknowledges , castratio n
doesn't eve r reall y occur , s o i n wha t sens e i s i t real ? Kee p i n min d tha t
what we'r e talkin g about—th e threa t o f castration—is a concept, no t a n
event. Yet , childre n ar e sai d t o experience , i n phantasy , th e possibilit y o f
danger, no t becaus e they perceive it, bu t becaus e they believe it. But isn' t
this ho w Freu d characterize d "internal " (i.e. , hallucinatory ) reality , a s
something w e believ e i s so , i n contras t t o somethin g tha t i s actuall y th e
case? This presumabl y external , rea l threat is , fundamentally, a belief tha t
is apparentl y derive d fro m (a ) noticin g tha t girl s lac k a peni s an d (b )
threats fro m adult s t o cu t of f one' s hand s o r peni s fo r playin g wit h
oneself. I n wha t sense , however , ar e threat s an d discoverie s o f thi s kin d
real, rather than a product o f the imagination ?
What abou t th e situatio n wit h girls ? Freu d observe s tha t "fea r o f
castration is not, of course, the only motive for repression : indeed , it find s
no plac e i n women , fo r though they have a castration complex they cannot
have a fear of being castrated. It s place is taken i n their se x by a fear o f loss
of love, which i s evidendy a later prolongatio n o f the infant's anxiet y if it
finds th e mothe r absent . You will realize how real a situation of danger is
indicated by this anxiety** (87 ; emphasi s added) . W e ca n se e wha t thes e
two forms o f "castration" share in common: los s of penis for the boy; loss
of mothe r fo r th e girl . Th e peni s an d th e mothe r ar e real , an d thei r los s
would trul y prove catastrophic. Bu t these losses are anticipated, no t actu -
ally experienced , s o i n wha t sens e ca n the y b e sai d t o b e real , unles s w e
employ the "real" in a purely subjective , impressionisti c way of speaking ?
In spit e o f thi s theoretica l ambiguity , Freu d insiste d tha t realit y wa s a n
outside, hostile force, represente d b y the father's interferenc e i n his child's
libidinal striving s towar d hi s (o r her? ) mother . Ye t thi s positio n appar -

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Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety1 7

ently conflict s wit h Freud' s observatio n i n Civilization and Its Discontents

that " I canno t thin k o f any need i n childhood a s strong a s the need fo r a
father's protection " (1961a , 72) . Loewald sai d tha t thi s apparentl y posi -
tive view of the fathe r "hark s bac k to Totem and Taboo where the longing
for th e father i s described a s cthe root o f every religion 5 " (1980 , 8). Also,
in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud suggeste d that "the origins of the
religious attitud e ca n be traced bac k i n clear oudine s a s far as the feelin g
of infantil e helplessness " (1961a , 72) . Loewald conclude s tha t "religiou s
feelings, thus , ar e understood a s originating i n a n attemp t t o cop e wit h
hostile reality forces. . . . The longin g fo r th e father , seekin g hi s hel p an d
protection, i s a defensive compromise i n order t o come to terms wit h thi s
superior, hostile power" (9; emphasis added) .
Understand tha t "castration"— a concept—i s suppose d t o symboliz e
in som e concret e wa y the child's encounte r wit h reality , implemente d b y
the fea r o f a threatening father . Accordin g t o Freud, th e ego was initially
formed ou t of the infant' s experienc e o f frustration. Th e ego is suppose d
to protec t th e infan t fro m (a ) it s ow n wishe s an d (b ) th e realit y o f the
world's potentia l opposition . Afte r Freud' s adoptio n o f th e structura l
model, th e eg o wa s conceive d a s the sea t o f identit y tha t come s unde r
assault fro m thre e sides : (a ) the id (tha t is , the ego's libidinal yearnings) ,
(b) th e supereg o (its—tha t is , its parents'—morality , righ t an d wrong ,
conscience an d ideals) an d (c ) the outside world , i n other words—othe r
people—what Freu d calls "external reality." Where is the rest or sanctuary
for a n existence so essentially at sea, at war with its environment an d with
itself, whe n eve n a son' s longin g an d positiv e regar d fo r hi s fathe r i s
merely a way of protectin g himsel f fro m tha t ver y father ? Freu d wa s so
confident tha t anxiet y i s alway s provoke d b y a n external threa t tha t h e
came t o vie w ou r wishe s a s "external " also . I n The Ego and the Id, h e
observed tha t "al l th e experience s o f lif e tha t originat e fro m withou t
enrich the ego; the id, however, is its second external world, which it strives to
bring int o subjectio n t o itself" (196Id , 55 ; emphasis added) . And again,
"Psychoanalysis i s an instrument t o enabl e th e ego to achiev e a progres-
sive conquest of the id" (56 ; emphasis added) . But , in wha t wa y can the
id b e conceived a s real unles s (a ) realit y i s not objectiv e o r external , bu t
rather experience d a s such; an d (b ) realit y i s a metaphor? An d why was
Freud s o insisten t tha t (a ) realit y i s always external ; (b ) tha t thi s reality ,
external o r no , i s alway s dangerous ; an d (c ) tha t th e prototypica l em -
bodiment o f this realit y i s the father? Loewal d summarize s Freud' s view :

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18 Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety

Reality, then, is represented b y the father wh o as an alien, hostile, jealous

force interferes with the intimate ties between mother and child, forces the
child into submission, so that he seeks the father's protection. The threat of
the hostil e realit y i s met b y unavoidable, i f temporary, submissio n t o it s
demands, namel y t o renounc e th e mothe r a s a libidina l object , an d t o
acknowledge and submit to paternal authority. (1980, 7)

How di d Freu d becom e convince d tha t realit y account s fo r neuroti c

conflict? Wha t did he actually mean b y reality? Remembe r th e impact, th e
near-crippling effect , o n Freu d whe n h e discovere d tha t hi s patients '
accounts o f seductio n weren' t "real, " afte r all . Yet , whe n Freud , year s
later, wa s continuin g hi s searc h fo r th e caus e o f repression , h e wa s stil l
looking fo r somethin g tha t reall y happens , somethin g tha t concretel y
threatens th e chil d i n a n actua l way . Freud' s conceptio n o f castration , i n
its specifically anatomica l context , i s insupportable, an d ever y psychoana -
lyst knows that . I t become s eve n more untenable a s a universal symbol o f
anxiety when w e search fo r castratio n fear s i n girls, who, afte r all , haven't
a peni s t o lose . Sometime s Freu d characterize s he r anxiet y a s essentiall y
envious; an d sometime s h e attribute s he r anxiet y t o th e "los s o f he r
mother." In fact, Freu d could never finally determine the nature of anxiety
in girl s becaus e h e neve r determine d it s sourc e i n boys , th e standar d b y
which h e continue d t o compar e an d contras t th e natur e o f feminin e
anxiety.
What i s it about castratio n anxiet y that can be said to be real? Does th e
father actuall y threate n t o cu t of f hi s son' s peni s becaus e h e covet s hi s
mother? Doe s th e fathe r ever , directl y an d unequivocally , confron t hi s
son abou t thei r "rivalry" ? Freu d say s th e answe r t o thes e question s i s
"no." Th e boy , h e suggests , mor e o r les s put s i t together . H e take s
this piec e o f evidenc e ("Don' t pla y wit h you r penis" ) an d tha t ('That' s
naughty!"), an d anothe r ( ccWhy don't girl s have penises?") an d interpret s
these (presumed ) experience s an d (possible ) observation s and , i n hi s
imagination, conclude s h e i s at risk becaus e th e world, hi s father, forbid s
him fro m enactin g hi s sexua l phantasies . Bu t i f th e experienc e o f thi s
prohibition isn' t actuall y conveye d t o him , the n o n wha t i s th e child' s
intuition founded ?
Freud hope d t o couc h hi s theories i n scientific terms , seeking to prov e
his "findings " throug h a scientific—in th e mai n empirical—definitio n o f
reality. We can see the problem h e faced whe n tryin g to defin e hi s notio n
of realit y logistically , a s thoug h situatin g i t "outside " settle s th e matter .

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Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety 1 9

The distinctio n betwee n "internal " an d "external 55 ma y b e vali d i n scien -

tific experiments concerne d with physic s or mechanics, or even chemistry .
But i t fall s shor t when applie d t o a specifically huma n reality , becaus e fo r
us ther e i s n o wa y o f existing "outside, 55 strictl y speaking . Tha t whic h
exists beyon d ou r imaginatio n i s social , no t "external. 55 The y aren' t th e
same thing . Althoug h ther e i s a n insid e an d outsid e t o a house, ther e i s
no insid e an d outsid e t o a person. This i s only ap t i n terms o f anatom y o r
physiology, bu t no t i n term s o f experience . Th e socia l worl d isn' t "out -
side55 of me . I n fact , I a m i n a social world. I inhabi t tha t world . Freud' s
depiction o f a n externa l realit y tha t presumabl y cause s castratio n anxiet y
in boy s i s actually the socia l world t o whic h boy s belong . I t isn' t danger -
ous becaus e i t pose s a n "externa l threat 55—it's threatenin g becaus e boy s
are involve d i n a settin g tha t include s fathers , a situatio n tha t interfere s
with—and t o tha t degre e endangers—wha t the y wan t t o b e t o thei r
mothers, that is, the object of unrealizable phantasy. Trying to distinguis h
between interna l an d externa l aspect s o f realit y onl y confuse s th e actua l
sources of anxiety: the world t o which on e belongs .
Reality, i n essence , is social. I t i s life. Thi s conceptua l proble m elude d
Freud becaus e h e insiste d o n couchin g hi s observation s abou t huma n
nature i n scientifi c terms . Thi s proble m wa s onl y compounde d late r b y
object relation s theorist s suc h a s Melani e Klei n (1937) , wh o base d he r
conception o f anxiet y o n th e notio n o f interna l an d externa l "objects. 55
How i s one to reconcil e the differenc e i f the on e i s always "invading 55 th e
other? When human experienc e is conceived a s a mere reflection o f "inter-
nal" phantasies, i s it an y wonder tha t som e analyst s rejec t th e concep t o f
reality entirely , replace d wit h "operations " tha t purportedl y determin e
our experience s fo r us ? Thes e development s ar e a fa r cry fro m Freud' s
efforts t o determine what is real and why we're so afraid o f it.
The worl d t o whic h w e belon g include s ou r thoughts , feelings , an d
beliefs abou t it . Whe n Freu d finall y trace d th e sourc e of castration anxie -
ties to th e belief s tha t children hav e about thei r fathers, h e was describin g
a social—actually, a n existential—conception o f reality, not a "scientific "
one. This i s a conception o f reality that scienc e has no acces s to. It has t o
be thought, experienced , an d eventually realized. What threaten s childre n
most ar e th e limitation s societ y impose s o n them . Transforme d int o
phantasies, thei r unbridle d wishe s becom e treasure s the y ar e afraid they'l l
lose if discovered. The realit y they encounter doesn' t merel y conflict wit h
their desires—i t threaten s t o displac e them . Realit y challenge s the m t o

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20 Realistic and Neurotic Anxiety

accept the limits to what is obtainable through their experience of frustra-

tion. Reality isn't inherently ominous; it entices and threatens at the same
time. It s blow s can b e harsh, bu t the y als o transform. Freu d discovere d
that childre n haphazardl y experienc e these disappointments throug h an -
ticipation an d belief . If his term fo r thi s experience—castration—seem s
so literal , w e shoul d remembe r tha t ou r mos t tangibl e experienc e o f
reality is contained in that moment of knowing that something precious—
however much we may want it—eludes us.

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