Miller - Developmental Theories Past, Present, Future
Miller - Developmental Theories Past, Present, Future
Miller - Developmental Theories Past, Present, Future
Developmental Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/dr
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Keywords: This article examines the state of the art in developmental theorizing today and identifies shifts in
Developmental theory direction needed for further progress. Developmental psychology’s robust empirical base calls for
Developmental issues new directions in theorizing. The historical context of theorizing shows how developmental
Biological approaches
theoretical issues arose from a series of developmental theories and the challenges to these
Developmental contexts
Cognitive development
theories. Several trends in developmental theorizing in recent years indicate how the theoretical
landscape is changing. A look at the current state of theorizing reveals ways in which existing
theories are limited, especially in light of new research findings and psychologists’ increasing
awareness of the influence of the world views in which theories are developed. Suggested future
directions for developmental theorizing include decentering individual minds by considering
larger socio-cultural contexts, developing diversity-informed theories, and keeping a focus on
core developmental principles.
It often seems to me that’s all detective work is, wiping out your false starts and beginning again…And it is just what some
people will not do. They conceive a certain theory, and everything has to fit into that theory. If one little fact will not fit it, they
throw it aside. But it is always the facts that will not fit in that are significant.
Agatha Christie, Death on the Nile
Developmental psychology has flourished in the last half century. The field has redefined itself as it moved from child psychology to
developmental psychology to developmental science. A large part of this story can be seen in the dominating developmental theories,
past and present. The purpose of this article is to provide a perspective on the state of the art in developmental theorizing today and to
identify shifts in direction needed for further progress. After a brief orientation to theorizing, the paper outlines changes in devel
opmental theories in recent decades, to provide a historical context and to identify the main developmental issues these theories raised.
Next, a discussion of recent trends in theorizing leads to a snapshot of the current landscape of developmental theories. Finally,
limitations in developmental theories thus far, plus important recent research and new directions in theories of knowledge in phi
losophy, provide a roadmap for new directions in future theorizing. To keep the scope of this paper manageable, the emphasis is on
theories of cognitive development in the last half century.
Theories attempt to organize, and make sense of, a set of data. Some theories involve a formal system—a set of interconnected
axioms, postulates, hypothetical constructs, intervening variables, laws, and hypotheses. More commonly in psychology, theories are
☆
his research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
E-mail address: [email protected].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2022.101049
Received 29 July 2022; Received in revised form 17 September 2022;
Available online 6 October 2022
0273-2297/© 2023 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
P.H. Miller Developmental Review 66 (2022) 101049
less ambitious. They include a set of principles or a framework providing a perspective, or even just a model. Thus, this paper examines
these informal frameworks–both broad, abstract accounts (e.g., Piaget’s theory, dynamic systems) and more delimited accounts (e.g.,
information processing, biological approaches drawing on neuroimaging) that share certain assumptions.
Empirical findings alone provide limited progress in science. Theories are needed to (a) organize findings into a meaningful map
that provides a coherent description of these findings, (b) explain the findings by offering underlying mechanisms or structures, and (c)
generate hypotheses for future research. For example, the theoretical notion of “stage” brings coherence to a set of behaviors that
otherwise might seem unrelated. Thus, a theory identifies what questions are important to ask and which types of new data are needed
for understanding human behavior.
On the negative side, a theory necessarily biases research. Theorists are products of their culture, and thus hold implicit beliefs and
assumptions that lead them towards particular questions, explanations, hypotheses, and interpretations of data. This point is illustrated
in later sections on theories’ assumptions of what is worth studying (e.g., individuals more than societal institutions) and their in
terpretations of differences across cultures or social categories (e.g., race, gender, class) within a culture. Critiques of science have
strengthened science by sensitizing researchers to these sources of bias and by trying to increase the presence of scientists from less
represented backgrounds.
Developmental theories are unique among psychological theories in their focus on change over short and long periods of time.
These theories describe children at various developmental times, but more importantly offer explanations for change in terms of what
drives and constrains change. A later section addresses the need for developmental theorists to stay focused on core developmental
principles about sequences (e.g., the timing of acquiring a set of concepts), the timing of experiences, and the shape (trajectories) of
development.
Historical context
The history of developmental theories provides a context for the current state of theorizing, in part by showing the core theoretical
issues about development introduced by each theory. To start, here is a snapshot of developmental theories at the end of the 1970’s.
Piaget (1950) stage theory still dominated the subfield of cognitive development and arguably even the larger field of developmental
psychology. At the same time, the cognitive revolution in psychology increased the prominence of the information processing
approach in developmental psychology (Miller, 2016). This approach, with its focus on cognitive processes rather than cognitive
structures and stages, provided an alternative perspective on children’s thinking. Various challenges to Piaget’s theory, especially to
his earlier strong claims about the stage-like course of development, increased the attractiveness of both information-processing
approaches and accounts of domain-specific conceptual systems (e.g., concepts of math). Learning theories, which had dominated
the 50’s and 60’s, already had been found wanting as theories of development. However, social learning theorists (e.g., Bandura, 1977)
modified their theories in light of Piagetian and information-processing theories, and thus maintained some influence in the field,
especially regarding the cognitive components of social behaviors. Two other developmental theories of interest in the late 70’s include
Gibson (1969) theory of perceptual learning and ethology (primarily from European observers of animal behavior, e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt,
1970). A major challenge to all theories at that time was the finding, across various research areas, that social influences impact
cognitive development. Thus, theorists were searching for ways to address such influences theoretically.
Since that time, some of these theories have waxed, while others have waned. Theories, like the children they describe, change, and
some theories have remained influential by being modified in response to new theories or data. Many key theoretical issues remain
much the same, though often the framing of the questions has changed as new findings and technologies emerge.
In the 1970’s and 80’s, empirical tests of Piaget’s theory had identified several limitations, which led to modified Piagetian the
ories. One challenge to Piaget’s theory was the finding that children’s knowledge tends to be specific to a particular domain, such as
mathematical understanding, rather than a general, stage-like set of concepts. Thus, Piagetian-like theories smaller in scope, limited to
a particular domain but still proposing structured knowledge, emerged (e.g., “theory theory” approaches, Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). A
particularly successful one, which emerged in the 1980’s and remains strong today, concerns theory of mind—children’s coherent
understanding of the representational nature of mind, including beliefs, desires, and intentions (e.g., Wellman, 1992). Another
example is domain-specific theories of problem solving in academic topics such as mathematics, science, and reading (e.g., Siegler,
2016). In a second challenge, new methods for testing infants and young children suggested that some concepts begin their devel
opment months or even years earlier than Piaget had proposed (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016). Discovering infants’ surprising
understanding of the physical and social world remains a strong area of research today, and researchers are attempting to develop
theories of this ability. Third, Piaget’s hypothesized processes for moving from one stage to the next—assimilation and accom
modation—proved too general to be useful. Thus, neo-Piagetian theorists (e.g., Case, 1987) turned to information-processing theory
for specific processes of development.
In short, Piaget’s theory per se has waned in influence over the last 40 years. However, theories in the spirit of Piaget that focus on a
system of knowledge and processes of change, though typically limited to a particular domain, remain strong. Piaget’s theory shaped
the course of the field up to the present by not only providing a coherent account of cognitive development, but also by stimulating
criticisms that opened up important new research areas such as domain-specific knowledge, young infants’ cognitive competencies,
and processes of development. In addition, many Piagetian claims that originally were controversial became part of the assumptions of
the field, for example, the idea that children are active contributors to their own development rather than passive consumers of ex
periences that shape cognition.
Moreover, Piaget and the challenges to his theory introduced core theoretical issues of cognitive development that continue to drive
research and theorizing today: How do biologically-based cognitive processes interact with experience with the physical and social
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world to produce development? Why does the sequence of acquiring knowledge matter? That is, how are later cognitive acquisitions
derived from earlier ones? At any moment in time, how are various elements of knowledge related to each other? This is the issue of the
structure of knowledge. What determines when a child is ready to move to another state of knowledge or thinking? Is there a universal
endpoint to cognitive development that drives the course of development? Piaget pointed to logical, scientific reasoning as the
endpoint; not everyone agreed. What is the relationship between cognition and learning? By what processes is cognitive competence
expressed in performance? This period of the 1970’s and1980’s was arguably the height of theoretical discussion in the field of
cognitive development.
One theory that clearly has waned since the 1970’s and 1980’s is social learning theory as an account of development. Bandura
(1977) focus on imitation, and observational learning more broadly, stimulated important early research on children’s aggression,
gender development, self-regulation, moral development, learning from media (particularly television), and self-efficacy. Research on
these topics continues today, and has expanded to include gender nonconforming children (e.g., Dunham & Olson, 2016), moral
reasoning about social inequalities (e.g., Rizzo & Killen, 2020), impacts of video games on social competence (e.g., Lavertu et al.,
2022), and imitation in infants (e.g., Meltzoff, 1988). However, the cognitive revolution in psychology directed researchers’ attention
to the cognitive changes underlying social development. Although Bandura’s social learning theory became increasingly cognitive
over the years, its failure to construct an adequate account of cognitive development led researchers to turn to social-cognitive ap
proaches to social development. The most active social-cognitive approach studied children’s understanding of minds—their theory of
mind (e.g., Wellman, 1992).
Social learning theory is still relevant today, because it is an important reminder that children’s minds are connected to their
behaviors as children navigate their social settings. The theory also is a reminder that a core developmental theoretical issue is how
new skills or concepts are acquired. Bandura proposed that children can gain new behaviors and skills by simply imitating others, or in
more complex ways, such as inferring rules or general principles from observing other people and engaging with media. Researchers
have turned to other mechanisms (e.g., Legare, 2019), but the source of new acquisitions remains a central topic.
Another developmental theory that was influential in the 70’s and 80’s and has waned in influence over the years is Gibson (1969)
theory of perceptual learning. This theory was attractive because it showed how perceptual experience, without parents’ feedback,
leads children to notice important features or dimensions differentiating a set of objects, whether letters of the alphabet or flavors of ice
cream. Like Piaget, Gibson emphasized how children actively teach themselves about the world through exploring it. Her focus on
perceptual learning as adaptation to the environment highlighted the close connection between perception and action, and between
developing humans and their environments. Thus, this theory made important theoretical contributions to current work on how
perceptual learning occurs as infants and children move about and explore their environments. More generally, the core theoretical
issue she raised about how learning occurs when an organism engages in activities such as looking, walking, and feeling is a vibrant
topic today (e.g., Adolph & Hoch, 2019). Opportunities for learning change; crawling infants mainly see the ground in front of them,
standing infants can see a whole room, and walking infants can explore large spaces, often without their caretakers.
Another theory entering developmental psychology in the 1970’s and 80’s, but waning subsequently, was ethology, from the field
of zoology. The greatest impact on research concerned infants’ social attachments, largely through the work of Bowlby (1969) and
Ainsworth (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Ethology also was applied to a range of social behaviors and cognitive problem
solving (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970). Developmentalists were intrigued by evolutionary aspects of development, by innate social behaviors,
and by parallels in the behaviors of humans and other animals. Although ethology’s influence on developmental theorizing has waned
since the 1980’s, the focus on biological influences on development continues today, as described later. Also, evolutionary psychology,
with historical ties to ethology, continues to offer theoretical frameworks to developmentalists today. The core developmental
theoretical issues introduced are: What is the function of each cognitive skill or behavior within a species’ environment? That is, how is
it adaptive? Which skills and behaviors have strong biological influences and thus are found in all members of the species? How are
biological predispositions expressed in particular environmental niches?
While Piagetian, social learning, Gibsonian, and ethological theories were waning in their direct (though not indirect) influence
over the years, information processing approaches (Miller, 2016, chapter 7) became increasingly influential in developmental psy
chology in the 1980’s. The dissatisfaction with classical learning theory’s neglect of cognitive processes, the limitations of Piaget’s
account of cognitive change, and new perspectives provided by computer science converged to generate interest in information-
processing theory. Researchers now had a language for theorizing about the mind (e.g., encoding, parallel processing, algorithms)
and examples of how to construct models of cognition (e.g., in boxes and arrows). For developmentalists, the theory provided a more
precise and researchable alternative to Piaget’s theorized cognitive processes. The core developmental theoretical issue raised was:
How does information flow through the cognitive system, become organized, and generate solutions to the problem at hand, and how
does this change developmentally? These cognitive processes happen in real time.
Information processing theorizing generated a large body of research (Miller, 2016, chapter 7; Siegler & Alibali, 2019), and was a
major part of the movement towards developmental psychology becoming an experimental science. Main topics were children’s
memory, attention, strategies for learning, and problem solving—all still active areas of research today. Within an information-
processing framework, Siegler (1996) revealed differences in the use of strategies both between individuals and within an individ
ual over time, and tried to account for this variability theoretically. Variability seems to be the rule, rather than the exception, and a
child often performs differently, even on the same problem, from one time to another. In Siegler’s overlapping-waves theory, the
development of strategies seems like a series of waves as each strategy emerges and then wanes, but overlaps with a more advanced
strategy. That is, at any developmental point, the strategy a child selects from several available strategies might not be the best one, the
most recent one, or even one that has led to the correct answer recently. Eventually, the most useful strategy is produced most of the
time. This view of development as variable, and regressive as well as progressive, is a departure from earlier views of children moving
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A main trend in theorizing over the years is the movement away from large, grand theories, such as Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s. Newer
theoretical approaches involve small, focused theories that are energizing research in specific areas, such as theory of mind (e.g., core
knowledge or “theory theory” approaches) or attachment. Some are even just frameworks sharing a set of theoretical assumptions,
such as social information processing (e.g., Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, & Brown, 1986) or cognitive neuroscience approaches.
A main exception to the current focus on domain-specific theories is dynamic-systems theory, described above. This very broad
theory attempts to capture the complexity of human behavior over a wide range of behaviors. In fact, developmental systems theory (e.
g., Gottlieb, 2000; Overton, 2013), based on the dynamic systems approach, has been proposed as a metatheory—a perspective,
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broader than a single theory, with a coherent set of general principles, beliefs, and assumptions. Another proposed metatheory is
evolutionary developmental psychology (Bjorklund, 2020).
Biological approaches have emerged as part of the increasing focus on developmental processes underlying change, and the need to
depict multiple levels of influence on development. As mentioned earlier, ethology and evolutionary psychology have a history within
developmental theorizing. However, today the biological trend is most clearly seen in the large body of research on cognitive
neuroscience, and its nascent theoretical work. Other areas with a biological emphasis or biological historical origins are executive
function, epigenetics, and cognitive competencies in young infants.
Cognitive neuroscience
One of the most rapidly expanding areas of developmental research in recent decades is cognitive neuroscience, in part because of
new technologies for measuring brain structure and activity that became widely available in the 1990’s. Thus far, the developmental
cognitive neuroscience trend appears in empirical work more than in theorizing, but some theorizing is emerging (e.g., Crone &
Ridderinkhof, 2011). The first wave of neuroimaging research focused on identifying the location in the brain that is activated during a
particular cognitive activity, such as reading or recognizing a face. At that time, many developmentalists questioned whether such
results contributed to theorizing about cognitive development. That is, can neuroimaging be used to test existing theories or point the
way to new ones? Or does it simply add another layer of data to correlate with behavioral data? More recently, as neural research has
shifted to mapping pathways and patterns of activation across the brain, the possible contribution to theorizing seems more promising.
For example, the finding that cognitive tasks activate both motor and cognitive-control areas of the brain suggests connections between
motor behavior and thinking, as suggested in Piaget’s theory (Diamond, 2000). As another example, one issue relevant to develop
mental theorizing about levels of understanding of a concept is whether a particular pattern of brain activity might suggest some
understanding of a concept in children who do not yet show this understanding in their behavior. In these ways, cognitive neuroscience
can go beyond simply adding biological data to earlier psychological findings.
In response to the criticism that cognitive neuroscience seemed to reduce thinking to biological processes inside the head, stripped
of connections to the environment, new theoretical directions depict the brain in context. In fact, cognitive neuroscience approaches
have revealed as much about the influence of environments on brains as about the brain per se. Although the level of brain maturation
constrains, and advances, what can be learned at each developmental point, equally important is brain plasticity, as social-cultural
factors affect the brain. This two-way influence advances our understanding of the issue of nature versus nurture. Some theorizing
has focused on the larger context in which the brain develops, and addresses the effects of culture, poverty, and discrimination on the
developing brain. Cultural differences associated with brain differences can clarify the bidirectional relations between cultural and
brain development (e.g., Qu, Jorgensen, & Telzer, 2021). Theorizing addresses how poverty can “get under your skin” (Lupien, King,
Meaney, & McEwen, 2001) and, through mediators such as stress and reduced resources, alter brain function during development
(Hyde et al., 2020).
Cognitive neuroscience approaches stimulated new ways to depict learning and cognitive development, sometimes as a metaphor,
as in connectionist models (Yermolayeva & Rakison, 2014). Closely related to information-processing approaches, such models depict
how experience changes neural connections, strengthening some and weakening others, and interactions among neural levels lead to
new learning. For example, the concept of a dog may develop as a child experiences certain dog-like features tending to occur together.
Thus, knowledge is a pattern of activation. This approach addresses several issues: How do biology (i.e., structure and functioning of
the brain) and experience interact during development? How, specifically, do new concepts emerge?
Executive function
Children draw on executive function to solve problems, especially in novel situations. This topic historically came from early work
in clinical neuropsychology. For decades, tests had been developed to assess brain damage or decline, often regarding the effects on
executive function, generated in the prefrontal cortex. Thus, this topic is far from new, but in recent years has exploded to become one
of the most active research areas in cognitive development. Much of this work draws on the classic work by Miyake et al. (2000), which
identified three components of executive function. Working memory keeps relevant information in mind, mentally manipulating this
information, and updating the relevant information during problem solving. Inhibition refers to the suppression of prepotent re
sponses, such as inhibiting the tendency to sort objects by size after doing so for several trials and instead switching to sorting by shape
when directed to do so. Cognitive flexibility involves switching from one way of thinking about a situation to another way, for example,
sorting items by color and then by shape. These three separable, but connected and sometimes overlapping, components are useful
tools for adapting to novel situations. Some of the theoretical issues are: How separable are these components at various ages? How are
earlier versions of each component transformed into later versions? Does executive function generalize across contexts? Theories of the
development of executive function range from a focus on the structure of domain-general executive function components (Miyake
et al., 2000), to the construction of a hierarchical set of rules (Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovitch, 2003), to the acquisition of
knowledge, beliefs, and values that shape skills in using control in specific ways to achieve certain goals in particular contexts (Doebel,
2020).
The development of executive function is an exciting area in part because it predicts to so many positive outcomes, even those
emerging years later. The fact that executive function predicts academic achievement (e.g., Spiegel, Goodrich, Morris, Osborne, &
Lonigan, 2021) has inspired new theories of how learning occurs and has suggested that high achievement might be enhanced through
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training executive function. One appeal of executive function approaches is that in their focus on cognitive actions and self-regulation
they complement theories of cognitive development that focus on concepts and their organization, such as Piagetian and theory-of-
mind approaches. Executive function theories address how children use cognitive actions to solve a problem in real time. One limi
tation of this approach thus far is that it does not yet offer a picture of how this cognitive self regulation relates to emotional and social
self regulation, though theoretical work in this area is emerging.
Epigenetics
A newer biological model for psychology involves epigenetics, which is of special interest to developmentalists because it addresses
a longstanding developmental issue—how nature and nurture interact to produce development. Epigenetics shows Gene × Envi
ronment interactions in how children’s genetic makeup influences the impact of experience on development, and how experience
modifies the expression of genes by activating them or keeping them suppressed. For example, parents’ child rearing practices can
affect whether a gene known to predispose children to certain behavioral problems actually is expressed in their children (Brody,
Beach, Philibert, Chen, & Murry, 2009). New technologies for genetic analysis have led to more nuanced models of Gene × Envi
ronment interactions, which contribute to developmental theorizing. Epigenetics models also depict the importance of timing—a core
principle of developmental psychology. For instance, a given environmental event might activate a gene during one phase of devel
opment but not others. In this way, epigenetics underlines the importance of a developmental perspective on the relations between
nature and nurture. Some developmentalists have tried to incorporate this work into their theorizing. For example, there are models of
individual differences in how sensitive children are to the environment (Ellis, Boyce, Belsky, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & VanIJzen
doorn, 2011). One limitation is that the epigenetic framework is just beginning to develop precise models of specifically how a child’s
current point in development affects whether an event activates a genetic tendency.
Infant competencies
The trend towards biological explanations also is seen in researchers’ great interest in demonstrating seemingly advanced cognitive
and linguistic competencies in young infants. These early competencies are interpreted by some as suggesting a strong biologically-
based impetus to development because young infants have limited experience. For instance, core knowledge theories posit innate,
domain-specific processing systems that enable very fast learning, with little experience, about objects, space, number, and people (e.
g., Spelke, 2016). In the social realm, surprising infant competencies include acquiring language without direct instruction, predicting
others’ actions based on their perceived intent, and favoring morally positive behaviors (e.g., Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 2018).
These competencies typically are inferred from infants’ looking behavior, interpreted as indicating expectations, surprise, or prefer
ences. For example, infants’ longer looks are interpreted as a violation of their expectations (i.e., surprise). This type of research has
generated much debate as to whether what infants look at, and for how long, actually reflects cognitive concepts or a more rudi
mentary process, such as predicting behavior based on perceptual structures or empirical regularities in the environment or on an
implicit understanding of action (e.g., Ruffman, 2014). In any case, one important theoretical issue raised by this work concerns how
earlier versions of a concept develop into more advanced versions. For instance, how does an infant’s expectation that a person will try
to achieve a goal eventually develop into a deeper understanding of human intentionality?
Other theorizing about infants’ biologically based tendencies posits seemingly sophisticated statistical learning about regularities
and patterns in their environment (Saffran, 2020). For example, part of language learning involves learning the probability that certain
phonemes occur together (e.g., st, gr in English) and some do not (qa, gz in English), and that certain words tend to occur together (e.g.,
“the” before a noun). Infants also can use information about co-occurrences to make apparent causal inferences. For instance, 8-month-
olds show, with their eye movements, that they can infer that one event always leads to one particular outcome, but not consistently to
a different outcome (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006).
Evolutionary origins
A final biologically-focused perspective addresses the evolutionary origins of cognition. Evolutionary developmental theories (e.g.,
Bjorklund, 2020) both explain, and generate hypotheses about, similarities and differences between humans and other primates. One
influential theory proposes that humans’ need to cooperate and communicate in order to survive selected for social-cognitive skills
necessary for these skills (Tomasello, 2019). Humans could hunt collaboratively, to acquire enough food, because they could recognize
others, engage in joint attention, infer others’ intentions, communicate, and develop long-term social relationships. It became
necessary for people to distinguish ingroups from outgroups, and prefer the former, an ability found in at least rudimentary form in
human infants. Importantly, infants’ evolutionary heritage enables them to develop precursors, such as joint intentionality with others,
attachment, and engagement in cultural learning. Such skills became possible when ape psychological development was transformed
into human psychological development. Part of this story is infants’ brain plasticity, which allows them to adapt to a wide range of
environments.
Another main evolutionary developmental approach is life history theory, which addresses the connection between evolution and
features of the life cycle, such as age of puberty, mating, and number of children (Ellis, Figueredo, Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009). A
main theme is that a species or group tries to maximize its fitness through the efficient allocation of resources for these life events. Thus
a harsh and unpredictable environment with poor resources might speed up lifespan development (e.g., earlier puberty at the expense
of continued growth) as a strategy for adapting to the environment during evolution.
The evolutionary approach has its limitations. For example, just as sociohistorical influences on development are difficult to study
within Vygotsky’s theory, so are the adaptation pressures on earlier humans during evolution.
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The neglect of social influences in most early theories of cognitive development led developmentalists to address such influences.
Social influences became clearer as researchers examined differences and similarities across cultures. Developmental theorizing had
been limited by the fact that research mostly has examined children from a very limited slice of world cultures–Western, middle class,
educated populations in industrialized, democratic countries (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Moreover, as psychologists
became more aware of how culture permeates all aspects of psychology and development, theories focused on culture have moved
from a cross-cultural approach to a cultural approach in recent years. A cross-cultural approach focuses on differences and similarities
between cultures. In contrast, a cultural approach focuses on how culture operates in all settings, particularly in how children learn to
participate in the cultural settings of their daily lives (e.g., Gauvain, 2022).
Cultural perspectives in theories of cognitive development have been especially influential in the area of autobiographical
memory—children’s memories about personally-experienced events (e.g., Fivush, 2022). Autobiographical memory is social in its
influences, content, processes and outcomes. A main social research topic is parental conversational styles. A style involving asking
children yes–no questions is associated with slower autobiographical memory development than is a style of asking open-ended
questions and expanding on children’s answers (Fivush, 2022). As for social content, children remember experiences shared with
their parents or other significant others. Social processes include remembering an event together with a parent, with both parent and
child contributing to the remembering. As for social outcomes, the development of autobiographical memory is associated with more
advanced social competencies, such as better understanding of emotions. In these ways, memory occurs in, with, and through
culturally constructed human interactions.
Work across cultures has identified not only cultural differences and similarities, but also has advanced our understanding of
processes of cognitive development. For instance, the differing patterns of attention (e.g., what children look at during learning) of
Guatemala Mayan and European American children suggest that cultural beliefs influence ways of learning through differing atten
tional processes (Correa-Chávez & Rogoff, 2009). Such work is important because it addresses a criticism of cultural approaches—that
they need to fill in the steps between culture and a child. That is, they need to further specify exactly how (by what developmental
mechanisms) culture influences learning and development in children’s daily lives.
A recent socially-focused approach addresses children’s early awareness of social categories (of self and others) and the importance
of obligations and allegiance to one’s group (e.g., Rhodes, 2013). Because children perceive members of each social category to be
fundamentally similar, they use these categories to predict and explain the behavior of category members (e.g., typical behaviors of
males and females, helpfulness towards ingroup members, and hostility towards outgroup members). This theoretical approach is
important because it shifts the focus from others’ personality traits and intentions to larger social groups, as discussed later.
A main goal of developmental psychology is to trace pathways from early childhood throughout the lifespan. Modeling trajectories
reveals times of rapid change and times of relative stability, and permits prediction of the long-term impact of various early experi
ences, behaviors, skills, or traits. New sophisticated statistical methods and large data sets have made it possible to identify these long-
term predictors and to develop new theoretical models of developmental change. Importantly, they permit researchers to test theorized
developmental causal relations among various skills or events. For instance, A might be associated with C through B, as when a child’s
difficult temperament elicits angry, ineffective responses from the parents, which in turn increases the child’s aggression. Or B might
moderate the relation between A and C, as when effective parenting dampens the effects of a traumatic event on a child. One important
theoretical notion is that of a developmental cascade—a causal pathway involving a series of developments, such that early experi
ences or skills lead to a chain of events or changes over many years. In this way an early development can have a very delayed impact
on a somewhat different phenomenon. For instance, toddlers’ fine motor skills lead to visuospatial reasoning in childhood, which in
turn impacts reading and math performance during adolescence (Cortes, Green, Barr, & Ryan, 2022).
In contrast to Piaget’s focus on developmental change that is universal, invariant, and linear, which dominated the field for de
cades, models of developmental trajectories are important for theoretical accounts of individual differences in developmental path
ways. Pathways with different starting points may end up in the same place, pathways with similar starting points may end up in
different places, and individual difference in pathways may become larger with increasing age (e.g., Hinnant, Schulenberg, & Jager,
2021). Theoretical issues about these individual differences include: What environmental events change a child’s developmental
pathway? What seem to be the limits of the range of possible human developmental pathways? How does neurodevelopmental di
versity result in different developmental pathways?
The changes and trends in theorizing described in the above history and trends sections can be seen in the changes across six
editions in a book on developmental theories, from 1983 to 2016 (Miller, 2016). The 1983 edition included chapters on Piaget,
psychoanalytic approaches (Freud, Erikson), learning theories, information processing, ethology, and Gibson. Chapters added to later
editions were one on Vygotsky and other cultural approaches, and one on emerging contemporary theories (e.g., dynamic systems
theory). Chapters that gradually were shortened include learning theory, Piaget, psychoanalytic approaches, and Gibson. The ethology
chapter expanded to other biological approaches such as evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and genetics. This book also shows
how critiques of each theory resulted in other theories.
The above sections lead to a discussion of the state of the art in developmental theorizing today. Are there generally agreed upon
theoretical assumptions that guide the field? Is there progress in addressing key theoretical issues?
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Several theories have waned in influence, in that research today rarely explicitly tests them—Freud, Erikson, Piaget, Vygotsky,
social learning, and Gibson. However, all have contributed major theoretical ideas that have been so assimilated into the field that their
impact is invisible. In particular, much current cognitive developmental research includes many Piagetian assumptions: Children are
self-modifying systems that learn by actively exploring their environment, thereby contributing to their own development. Children
develop a conceptual system of somewhat organized knowledge (though perhaps limited to one domain), rather than simply absorb
unconnected facts. Cognitive change is gradual, and a child must be ready to learn a new concept before it can be acquired. That is,
there are constraints on cognitive development and learning. Also, Vygotsky’s focus on culture permeates nearly every area of research
on cognitive development. It is assumed that concepts and cognitive skills are acquired within a social-cultural context that shapes both
what is developed (concepts and skills valued by the culture) and how it is developed (influences from parents, peers, media, etc.).
Moreover, early experience and social attachment are very important (Freud), and children learn by watching other people (social
learning) and actively engaging with their surroundings (Gibson).
No one theory currently dominates the field. Certain theories currently are influential for specific topics, such as information
processing for memory and problem solving, approaches inspired by Bowlby for attachment, models of gene-environment interaction
for genetic and brain influences, and dynamic systems theory for infant motor development. Other active theories in particular do
mains include Piagetian-inspired “theory theory” (e.g., theory of mind) and core knowledge theory for conceptual development, as
well as Vygotskian/cultural-inspired accounts of autobiographical memory (e.g., Fivush, 2022) and the role of active participation in
daily activities in various cultures (Gauvain, 2022).
Many of the theoretical issues of 50 years ago are still key issues today. What are the main processes driving development? What is
the two-way interplay between nature and nurture? How does early experience affect later development? What is the relation between
quantitative and qualitative change and how do they work together to drive development? How do new knowledge and skills emerge?
How, and to what degree, is knowledge structured? How is new information integrated into old?
Some of these issues have been reframed, and are more nuanced today, in light of research findings. For example, the question of
how much of development is explained by biology and how much by environment has changed to the more complex question of how
and when intertwined biological and environmental processes produce a particular developmental outcome. Epigenetics has revealed
the mechanisms by which nature and nurture work together to impact behavior, for example, when particular experiences or events
suppress or trigger a genetic predisposition. As another example, developmentalists now talk about the issue of the relation between
early experience and later development in more complex and subtle ways, such as in the notion of cascades, described earlier.
One indicator of theories’ major impact on the field can be seen in significant progress in the empirical base about development.
Theories set the agenda for what is important to know about development and suggest research paradigms for studying it. Piaget’s
theory has led to current research on theory of mind, moral reasoning, and mathematics. Vygotsky’s theory stimulated current work on
cultural influences. Information processing energized research on memory and problem solving, which continue as active research
areas, and focused attention on cognitive activity from moment to moment. Social learning theory laid out important issues about the
acquisition of aggression (and now, bullying), self-efficacy, gender roles, and morality. The biological approaches of neuroimaging and
executive function are two of the most active areas of cognitive development research today. The strong current interest in attachment
across the lifespan came from both ethology and Freud’s (and Bowlby’s) theory, with its emphasis on early experiences, especially with
the mother. Finally, the current active research area of self-regulation has roots in both social learning and Vygotskian theories.
Despite theoretical guidance that has generated our rich knowledge base about development, the empirical landscape is uneven.
Each theory focused on particular topics and issues, while ignoring other phenomena. What has been missed? This section addresses
limitations to our theorizing so far that have restricted our topics of study and our perspective on development. Addressing these
limitations in future theorizing and research would lead to more accurate and complete theories of development. Also, the emergence
of new theories has not kept pace with significant new findings in the field. These findings, plus psychologists’ increasing awareness of
the influence of the world views of the culture in which theorists operate, leads to several needed directions for future theorizing.
Cultures’ world views, belief systems and patterns of thinking inevitably influence the sorts of theories constructed. It is not
surprising then, that Western cultures valuing individualism, autonomy, and mastery of the environment would produce develop
mental theories focused on individuals, especially decontextualized ones. It can be truly difficult for Westerners to conceptualize
humans as embedded in and constituted by culture rather than just an entity influenced by culture. Although researchers are giving
more attention to social-cultural contexts, viewing a child as a child-in-context is not fully assimilated into current theorizing and
research.
This Western emphasis on individuals and the developmental goal of achieving autonomy has produced much important infor
mation about children, but it does direct attention away from other questions. The earlier discussion of contexts provides many ex
amples of the fruitfulness of focusing more broadly than on an individual, such as studying how children acquire cognitive skills
through observing, and participating in, various everyday activities with others. Children think along with other minds, as when
children and significant adults recall an event together or co-construct the meaning of an event (Fivush, 2022). Still, we need more
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theorizing about development within even broader, higher-level cultural contexts, such as legal, education, and economic institutions
that set policies and priorities that affect children’s lives. We also need a better understanding of how social changes related to
globalization, immigration, expanded technology, war, and natural disasters bring changing contexts to changing children (Greenfield,
2018).
Similarly, cognitive theories have focused on children’s understanding of individual objects (e.g., their color and shape) or of one
other person. For example, in the area of theory of mind, theories and research focus on an individual child’s understanding of another
individual child’s mind. Relatively ignored are children’s developing understanding of psychological connections among a group (e.g.,
obligations to the group), or larger contexts involving social inequities, poverty, privilege, and political institutions (e.g., Barrett &
Buchannan-Barrow, 2005). Children’s “intuitive sociology” (Rhodes, 2013) is important because their developing knowledge of these
social structures helps them understand that others’ social roles and social locations within social categories such as race, ethnicity,
social class, and gender affect their behavior. Recent research shows that young children have the foundations of political thought.
They understand, and have strong feelings about, group boundaries, hierarchies, and norms (Reifen-Tagar & Cimpian, in press). For
example, their response to another person’s aberrant behavior may lead them not only to infer a personal negative attribute, the topic
of previous research, but also to make a negative judgment about such behaviors because they violate group norms. Such work suggests
that theories of social cognitive development need to expand to address this awareness of social forces larger than individuals and how
such forces affect children’s thinking about others’ behavior.
Future theorizing can make great progress in decentering individual minds not only by centering various levels of social contexts,
but also by centering connections between minds and bodily interactions with the environment. Cognitive developmental theories
have tended to focus on concepts and cognitive skills a child acquires, while slighting the important question of how children use this
knowledge to move through their environments and how such movement shapes the mind. That is, to a great extent cognition still is
seen as something a child “has” rather than as something a child “does.” Instead, one could ask “How does this new cognitive skill
enable children to navigate their environments? In the other direction, from behavior to mind, a new motor skill often advances
cognitive development by setting in motion a series of cascades of development over days, months, and years. Causality flows in both
directions. For example, the correlations between children’s social-cognitive development and their social behavior (e.g., Bosacki,
2021) leads to a next step of theorizing the specific processes by which children translate this knowledge into behavior in a particular
setting and, in the other direction, use their social behavior to advance their social cognition. In these ways, a theory of the individual
mind would become a theory of mind–body-environment connections.
For theorizing less centered on individuals and more centered on contexts and children’s interactions with the environment, two
theories with a strong presence in the 60’s and 70’s but little presence today—social learning theory and Gibson’s perceptual learning
theory—are useful. They offer mechanisms of development centered on behavior, connections between children and the objects and
people in their environments, and the use of cognition to adapt to environments. Bandura theorized links between mental processes
such as attending to salient models, encoding them, and evaluating feedback, and behaviors such as aggression and sharing. These
behaviors are dependent on both the specific context and on the particular social rules and expectations for that context at each age.
Similarly, Gibson’s focus on how children’s perceptual learning comes from active motor exploration of their environment could add to
current theorizing about the interplay between mind and motor behaviors. For example, evidence that a new motor skill, such as
walking, cascades into increased knowledge about the world could be interpreted in terms on Gibson’s focus on affordances—chil
dren’s learning about the potential uses of an object, such as a structure affording support or climbing, as they attempt to adapt to their
environment (Adolph & Hoch, 2019). Finally, information processing approaches could provide cognitive processes for translating
knowledge into motor behavior—attention, working memory, semantic categories, and transfer of learning. In short, mental processes-
in-action-in-context is an important gap in our knowledge to be addressed by future research and theorizing.
In summary, rethinking what to center could provide more complete theories of development. Broader and more balanced theories
also would come from decentering white, middle-class, Western populations, to be discussed next.
Developmental theories, especially Piaget’s, have tended to emphasize universal aspects of development, to the neglect of varia
tion. Thus, one recommendation for future theorizing is to make developmental theories more balanced by giving more attention to
human diversity. Such work would sharpen our understanding of what is universal in the development of the human species and what
is not. For instance, specific behaviors may differ across cultures, but many developmental processes appear to be universal.
The Society for Research in Child Development lists “integrating diversity” as one of the goals of its strategic plan because “Human
development is inextricably linked to, and shaped by, the diversity of human biology, society, and culture. Understanding and
investigating this diversity is an essential requirement for building an accurate and more complete knowledge base in developmental
science” (Society for Research in Child Development, 2022). Although cultural theories have addressed human differences across
cultures, work outside of psychology has taken such theorizing one step further. In particular, within women’s studies, theories of
knowledge (e.g., Garry, Khader, & Stone, 2017) propose that diversity flowing from membership in social categories such as gender,
race, class, sexuality, and ethnicity provides a new analytic lens for viewing knowledge acquisition. This section describes how such
perspectives could enrich and broaden cognitive developmental theorizing (see also Miller & Scholnick, 2000).
Specifically, this diversity-informed lens focuses on three related theoretical concepts—a person’s intersecting social categories, the
perspective from a person’s social location within societal hierarchies, and the impact, on knowledge, of the varying power across
these locations. A person’s social location is defined by intersections of categories such as gender, race, and class (Crenshaw, 1989;
McCormick-Huhn, Warner, Settles, & Shields, 2019). Social locations lie within social systems with their hierarchies and systems of
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power. These economic, political, legal, and educational systems, with their power structures, are experienced differently by people in
different social locations and lead to inequalities among developing children. The degree of power in a child’s social categories shapes
access to resources such as a quality education and parents’ job opportunities. A social location with limited access to resources
impacts the structure and stability of the family and their housing situation (e.g., homelessness, crowded homes), which affects
children’s experiences and thus their cognitive development. In short, an accurate theory of cognitive development would
acknowledge that it matters who the child knower is. The child’s social location affects what is valued, noticed, thought about, and
explored, and what options for action are available (due to privilege or discrimination) and likely to be successful.
This concept of intersecting, rather than additive, memberships means that categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, social class,
nationality, age, sexual orientation, nation, and citizenship status, each with the potential for social inequity, interlock. In other words,
the impact of each membership on a child’s identify, beliefs, behaviors, and development is affected by the other memberships.
Developmentalists cannot understand children’s experience of one of their group memberships (e.g., ethnicity) without referring to
their other group memberships (e.g., gender, class, citizenship status). Moreover, an adequate developmental theory would address
how, and why, an intersecting position has different impacts at different ages. Being an African American female, versus an African
American male, plays out differently during childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and aging. For instance, African American adolescent
females may have a unique set of experiences, world view, stressors, and oppressions that goes beyond simply adding together racism
and sexism.
Current theories of development rarely address how a child’s intersecting social categories affect that child’s understanding of the
world. However, research on children’s developing conceptions of social categories described earlier (e.g., Rhodes, 2013) suggests that
these conceptions are influenced by intersecting categories in other people. Because any person a child interacts with holds mem
bership in several social categories, looking at how children integrate information about multiple categories would broaden theories
focused on children’s categorizations of others based on race alone or gender alone (Lei & Rhodes, 2021). For example, the intersection
of race and gender is seen in the finding that young children’s gender stereotype that males are more brilliant than females only holds
when children think about white people, not when they think about African Americans (Jaxon, Lei, Shachnai, Chestnut, & Cimpian,
2019). As another example, young children are slower to categorize African American women as women than white or Asian women as
women and African American men as men (Lei, Leshin, & Rhodes, 2020). This work raises the possibility that children’s perceptions of
these intersecting social categories impact how they behave towards a person in each of these social locations. Thus, theories focused
on intersecting social categories would raise new questions about children’s developing understanding of others and how this is related
to stereotyping and social behavior.
It is important to note that children’s intersecting identities are not simply personal traits; they are embedded in social institutions,
belief systems, and social hierarchies. This perspective thus would facilitate theories’ decentering of individuals discussed earlier.
Related to intersecting social categories, a focus on social location and power raises new questions about how children in social
locations differing in power and resources might differ in their attention, concept formation, and problem solving. One strategy from
feminist theories of knowledge is to build a theory by starting with the experiences and perspectives of children in locations in the
margins of society, because most theories of knowledge start from the perspective of people in the center. A focus on the experiences of
children in the margins may identify cognitive strengths that have been considered weaknesses when compared to children in more
privileged social locations. Theories based on research on middle-class, white, Western children tend to examine cognitive skills that
are successful in such environments. These skills may not be successful in more adverse, less predictable environments with less access
to resources. Instead, other cognitive strengths, better adapted to such environments, may develop (e.g., Garcia Coll et al., 1996).
Cognitive strengths might include skilled detection, learning, memory, and problem solving related to detecting dangers (e.g., po
tential violence) and finding scarce resources (Frankenhuis & de Weerth, 2013). For example, it may be adaptive to learn to detect and
select small immediate rewards, rather than larger later ones that might never materialize (e.g., Suor, Sturge-Apple, Davies, & Cic
chetti, 2017). Other cognitive strengths might be related to immigrant children’s functioning in two cultures (e.g., practice at inte
grating two belief systems) and coping with discrimination. Another strength of marginalized children could be heightened awareness
of, and understanding of, those in power in a situation, because they affect their lives. Thus, looking at marginalized children’s
cognition in context, rather than in comparison to more privileged children, could advance developmental theorizing.
One emerging area of research on diversity that is not yet well integrated into developmental theorizing is diversity in gender
identity—children whose identity does not fit into a gender binary scheme of male and female, transgender children whose gender
identity differs from their gender assigned at birth, and gender-fluid children (e.g., Dunham & Olson, 2016). Such work challenges
theories of gender that assume dichotomies of male and female, and provides an opportunity for theories to broaden their accounts of
developmental pathways. For example, one might ask new questions such as whether gender nonbinary children develop less rigid
social categories during social-cognitive development compared to gender binary children.
In conclusion, although existing developmental theories conceptualize culture and contexts, and address topics such as the impacts
of poverty, discrimination-based stress, racial and gender stereotyping, access to quality schools, and social class differences in
parenting practices, they have had limited success at theorizing the larger structures impacting children varying in race, gender, class
and other categories. Epistemologies that theorize the impact of social locations, intersecting category memberships, and power
differentials on development are useful for theorizing the route from broad social institutions, to the daily experiences of children and
families, to cognitive development. This approach addresses theoretical issues in development about the sources of differing experi
ences and inequities among children (social location), a “difference” versus “deficit” model of children in adverse environments, the
nature of difference (i.e., intersecting memberships), and processes of social influences (broadened to include institutionalized hier
archies of privilege and power).
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Developmental psychology has borrowed theories fruitfully from many disciplines, such as biology, cognitive science, neurosci
ence, physics, sociology, and anthropology. As this borrowing continues, it is important to not lose focus on key principles of
development. One such principle is timing. Many of the theoretical issues in developmental psychology involve this principle. The
impact of any internal or external event depends partly on the child’s current point in development. As discussed earlier, epigenetic
research underlines the importance of developmental timing, because a particular environmental event may trigger the expression of a
gene during one phase of development but not another. Similarly, As Piaget emphasized, children’s learning is constrained, and
enabled, by their current level cognitive system and their physical (including brain) maturation. Theoretical concepts such as critical or
sensitive periods, readiness, and early brain plasticity express this core focus of developmental psychology.
Another principle is that developmental trajectories can take various shapes, depending on the particular aspect of development,
the particular child, and the particular environment. As seen in the trend toward long-term mapping of development discussed earlier,
many issues are addressed: What is the typical shape of these trajectories and what variations are possible (see Adolph, Robinson,
Young, & Gill-Alvarez, 2008, for examples)? A child may acquire a new concept gradually at first, followed by its rapid development,
and finally a slow, gradual fine tuning. Or a child may show regressions before finally mastering a skill. Developmental change may be
qualitative at some times and quantitative at other times.
Some issues concern the breadth, or generality, of any developmental change: Is development domain-general or domain-specific?
When a child acquires a new concept or skill, how broadly can it be transferred and what are its implications for other current concepts
or skills? Which aspects of development are universal and which are culture specific, and what can this tell us about the plasticity of
human development?
One theoretical issue mentioned earlier that has to do with the timing, shape, and generality of development concerns sequences. A
key principle of development is that often certain changes must happen in sequence. Studying sequences is important, because they
often provide clues for developmental processes, such as biological maturation or social supports, that stimulate movement through
development. Flavell’s (1972) pioneering theoretical work on types of sequences suggested various ways in which an early devel
opment could be a precursor to later ones. For example, the development of a more advanced concept might supplement, strengthen,
replace, or transform an earlier concept. Or the earlier acquisition might be a building block for a later one, as when acquiring the
ability to names objects may contribute to the later memory strategy of verbal rehearsal. Or a set of related concepts may become more
differentiated and hierarchical in its organization. Given the more advanced statistical analyses and modeling today, the time is right to
revisit these topics with a powerful new set of tools. For example, statistical models can differentiate causes from correlations, as well
as mediating variables from moderating variables in acquiring a sequence of skills.
An example of how attention to sequences can contribute to theorizing comes from theory of mind. Some sequences of acquiring
aspects of theory of mind (e.g., understanding diverse beliefs earlier than understanding false beliefs) appear to be universal and some
seem to be culture-dependent (e.g., Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). The observed differences have led to theorizing
about the cultural processes that cause such differences.
Closely related to theoretical work on sequences is the issue of developmental concurrences (Flavell, 1971), which is relevant to the
issue of the changing organization of knowledge. Some concurrences indicate close connections among concepts or skills.
Theorizing in other research areas also could profit from work on sequences and concurrences. For example, finding that the
components of executive function emerge in a particular order would suggest possible developmental mechanisms underlying this
sequence, such that an earlier component might contribute to the development of a later one. In contrast, finding concurrences in their
emergence would suggest that they are part of the same cognitive structure. Or tracing the developmental steps between infants’
understanding that a person intends to obtain an object and adults’ understanding of intentionality could suggest a more nuanced
theory of social cognition.
Renewed theoretical attention to these notions of sequences and concurrences would address some of the limitations of devel
opmental theories described earlier. Are there sequences not only in an individual’s development but also in the types of contexts
children encounter? Do different developmental pathways reflect cultural or gender diversity?
In short, core developmental principles concerning the timing, shape, generality, and sequence of development make the discipline
of developmental psychology unique. A renewed focus on these principles, particularly the developmental mechanisms involved,
would strengthen future developmental theorizing.
Conclusions
In conclusion, no one theory has provided a satisfactory account of development. However, each theory has generated important
research concerning development and has raised important theoretical issues about development. New models of the flexibility and
constraints of the developing brain, more nuanced accounts of Gene × Environment interactions, a greater focus on the broader social-
cultural contexts of development, more sophisticated mapping of developmental pathways, and the increased awareness of diversity
within, and across, cultures, races, ethnicities, nationalities, gender, and social class provide new lenses for revisiting the longstanding
theoretical issues of development. Efforts to decenter individual minds, develop diversity-informed theories, and keep a focus on
developmental principles can lead to more complete and balanced theories of development.
The emergence of broad theories of development, such as Piaget’s, in the future is much less likely than smaller, more focused
theories. What is most obtainable is a developmental psychology that is more theoretical in that future research is framed in terms of
the core theoretical issues of development generated by existing developmental theories and principles of development. We have a
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huge information base about development, but we need the theoretical perspective that developmental issues and principles bring to
give coherence and meaning to these data. The various developmental theories, and the reactions to them, have contributed an
important set of developmental theoretical issues. Developmentalists used to give these issues more attention, as the discipline was
defining itself, but they are equally important now.
One lesson from the changes in theorizing described in this paper is that development can be understood only by including multiple
levels, ranging from biological to psychological to cultural processes. Although interdisciplinary (e.g., psychology, biology, anthro
pology, sociology, economics) empirical work is emerging in “big science” teams of researchers, we also need interdisciplinary teams of
theorists to construct a more complete theory of development. Given this possibility, along with the exciting new findings, methods,
and perspectives in developmental psychology, there is reason to be optimistic about future theory-building.
Let us keep making theories. We may eventually get the right one.
Eleanor J. Gibson (2003, p. 295)
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
influence the work reported in this paper.
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