Dr.

Ambedkar’s View on Discrimination:

 Discrimination poses a serious threat to fundamental rights. In a country like India,

where large-scale and relentless discrimination was possible based on race, creed, or
social status, Fundamental Rights would be meaningless without protections against
such practices.

Historical Background:

 Non-discrimination clauses were proposed by Munshi and Ambedkar during the

drafting of the Constitution.
 These ideas were earlier seen in the Nehru Committee Report of 1928 and the
Karachi (1931) and Tripura Congress (1933) resolutions.
 Articles 9 to 12 in the Draft Constitution dealt with non-discrimination.

Article 15 – Application of Equality (Art. 14):

 Article 15 is a specific application of the general principle of equality under Article

14.
 Article 14 condemns discrimination but does not use the words "discriminate" or
"discrimination". Article 15, however, does.
 The expression “discriminate against” means making unfavorable distinctions
based on a comparison, specifically on grounds like religion, race, caste, sex, or
place of birth.

Scope of Article 15:

 Article 15 focuses on citizens only, whereas Article 14 applies to all persons.

 The prohibition under Article 15 is limited to discrimination only on the grounds
mentioned (religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth).
 If discrimination is based on other factors (e.g., social reform), Articles 15(1) and
15(2) may not apply.

Key Provisions of Article 15:

1. 15(1): The State cannot discriminate against any citizen based only on religion, race,
caste, sex, or place of birth.
2. 15(2): No citizen shall face discrimination based only on these grounds when it comes
to:
o Access to shops, restaurants, hotels, and public entertainment places,
o Use of wells, tanks, roads, and public places funded or maintained by the
State.
3. 15(3): Allows the State to make special provisions for women and children.
4. 15(4): Permits the State to make special provisions for socially and educationally
backward classes, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes (added by the 1st
Amendment, 1951).
5. 15(5): Allows the State to make special provisions for the admission of backward
classes, SCs, and STs to educational institutions, including private ones (other than
minority institutions), introduced by the 93rd Amendment in 2005.
Summary:

 Article 15 specifically addresses discrimination based on certain grounds and ensures

protection for vulnerable groups through special provisions.
 It extends the principle of equality found in Article 14, but with a focus on citizens
and certain protected categories like women, children, backward classes, SCs, and
STs.

Key Cases on Discrimination and Article 15:

1. Nain Sukh Das v. State of UP (1953):

o The Court held that any law providing for elections based on separate
electorates for different religious communities violates Article 15(1), as it
constitutes discrimination based on religion. Such laws must be declared void
as they are unconstitutional.
2. State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Pratap Singh (1960):
o The exemption of Harijans and Muslims from paying for additional police
force costs in certain villages violated Article 15(1), as it discriminated
against law-abiding members of other communities based only on caste or
religion.
3. D.P. Joshi v. Madhya Bharat (1955):
o The Court upheld a rule that imposed capitation fees on non-residents of
Madhya Bharat for admission to medical colleges. The Court ruled that
residence and place of birth are distinct concepts, and discrimination based
on residence is not prohibited under Article 15(1).
4. Paradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984):
o The Court held that reservations based on residence for medical and dental
admissions cannot exceed 70% of open general seats. The Constitution
recognizes only one domicile, that of India, and reservations based on state
domicile violate Article 14.
5. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1952):
o The Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act was
challenged as discriminatory against Hindus. The Court ruled that the Act was
not discriminatory because it addressed social customs and aimed at social
reform. It did not violate Article 15.
6. Srinivasa Aiyar v. Saraswathi Ammal (1952):
o The Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act was challenged
but upheld as it did not discriminate between Hindus and Muslims based on
religion. The Court ruled that it did not violate Article 15 or 25.
7. State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society:
o Article 15 provides protection against discrimination by the State, while
Article 29(2) protects against denial of admission to educational institutions.
Article 15 applies broadly to all citizens, whereas Article 29(2) focuses on
specific wrongs like educational discrimination.
8. R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India (1993):
o The Court upheld the reservation of seats for Bhutias-Lepchas in the Sikkim
Legislative Assembly. Article 371F allowed for a departure from Article
332 to preserve Sikkim’s unique situation. The Sangha seat in the assembly
was also upheld, as the Sangha was historically a political and social
institution and not merely religious, making it constitutional.
Conclusion:

 Article 15 is a key protection against discrimination based on religion, race, caste,

sex, and place of birth, but the courts have allowed reasonable classifications based
on factors like residence or social reform. In cases where discrimination is claimed,
courts analyze whether the classification serves a legitimate social or public
purpose.

Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001)

Issue:

 Sections 3 and 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,

1986 were challenged as being violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The concern was whether Muslim women were being denied rights that
other women enjoyed under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

Key Propositions:

1. A Muslim husband is liable to make a reasonable and fair provision for the future
of his divorced wife. This includes her maintenance and extends beyond the iddat
period (waiting period). The husband must make this provision within the iddat
period.
2. The husband's liability to pay maintenance under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act is not
confined to the iddat period alone.
3. A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and is unable to maintain
herself after the iddat period can seek maintenance from her relatives (children,
parents, etc.), based on their inheritance from her. If no relatives can pay, the State
Wakf Board can be directed to provide maintenance.
4. The Court ruled that the provisions of the Act do not violate Articles 14, 15, or 21 of
the Constitution.

Conclusion:

 The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act was held to be

constitutional. It provided a similar benefit to Muslim women as Section 125
CrPC, ensuring they are not left in vagrancy. Thus, depriving them of Section 125
does not render the Act discriminatory or unconstitutional.

John Vallamattam v. Union of India (2003)

Issue:

 Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which imposed restrictions on
Indian Christians from making deathbed bequests for religious or charitable
purposes, was challenged as being discriminatory and violating Articles 14, 25, and
28 of the Constitution.

Key Findings:

1. Section 118 was deemed discriminatory as it only restricted Indian Christians from
making deathbed wills for religious or charitable uses, while allowing other forms of
deathbed gifts. The section had no intelligible differentia and no clear connection
between the 12-month rule and the purpose of the will.
2. The Court held that Section 118 violated Article 14 as it was arbitrary and had no
reasonable basis.
3. With respect to Article 15, the Court found that the discrimination forbidden by
Article 15 is based on the individual's personal rights, not on broader religious
group restrictions. Since Section 118 restricted the right of a class of citizens
(Christians) in matters of testamentary disposition, it was not violative of Article
15.

Conclusion:

 Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act was held to be unconstitutional due to its
violation of Articles 14, 25, and 28. However, the Court clarified that Article 15
does not apply to this case as it protects individual rights, not restrictions imposed on
groups by their religion.

Article 15(2): Protection against discrimination in public spaces

 No citizen shall face discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of
birth regarding:
1. Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public
entertainment.
2. The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and public places maintained
by the state or for public use.

This clause is broad and applies not only to the State but also to individuals. It prevents
discriminatory practices by private entities as well.

In the case of Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982):

 The Supreme Court held that whenever fundamental rights are violated, it becomes
the state's obligation to take steps to prevent and rectify those violations.

Article 15(3): Special provisions for women and children

 The State can make special provisions for women and children.

Key Points:
 The term "special provision for" means making provisions in favor of women and
children.
 Children are included to show the commitment of the Constitution, and age is not a
prohibited ground under Article 15(1).
 Various Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) and laws secure special rights
for women, including Constitutional Amendments (73rd and 74th) that provide for
women's representation in local governance.

In the case of Govt. of A.P. v. P.B. Vijaykumar (1995):

 The Supreme Court ruled that making special provisions for women in employment
or posts under the State is a valid exercise of power under Article 15(3).
 This provision is not limited by Article 16, which deals with equality of
opportunity in public employment.
 The Court upheld a rule providing preference to women in direct recruitment,
considering it within the scope of Article 15(3).

Relation to Article 16:

 Article 16 also guarantees equality in matters of public employment.

o Article 16(3) allows the State to prescribe a requirement of residence for
certain jobs through parliamentary legislation.
o Article 16(4) allows reservation of posts for backward classes.
o Article 16(5) allows laws that require a person to belong to a particular
religion if they hold an office connected to religious institutions.

In summary:

 Article 15(2) focuses on public spaces and ensures no discrimination in accessing

those spaces.
 Article 15(3) allows the State to take affirmative actions to favor women and
children in areas such as employment, education, and social welfare.

Key Concept:

Article 15(3) allows the State to make special provisions for women and children. This
provision is meant to promote gender equality by ensuring affirmative action and support
for women, including in areas like employment, education, and public participation.

While Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, Article 15(3) acts as an
exception, allowing positive discrimination in favor of women.

Case Summaries:

1. Anjali v. State of W.B. (1952):

o Order of Director of Public Instruction that women should attend classes in
a new women’s college, while they were still allowed to take courses at an
affiliated college. This was considered a special provision under Article
15(3) for the benefit of women and thus did not violate Article 15(1).
2. Dattatreya Motiram v. Bombay (1953):
o Reservation of seats for women in municipal elections was valid and did not
offend Articles 14 or 15. The Court held that special provisions like these,
under Article 15(3), promote women’s representation in public bodies.
3. Savitri v. K.K. Bose (1972):
o Special provisions under Article 15(3) must be made for women as a class,
not for individual women. The court voided the decision of granting a liquor
license to a woman just because of her gender, as it did not align with the
principles of Article 15(3).
4. Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay (1954):
o Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (which deals with adultery) was
challenged for gender discrimination as it exempted women from
punishment. The court upheld the provision, stating that sex-based
classification is allowed under Article 15(3), and Articles 14 and 15 together
validate the protection for women under Section 497.
5. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985):
o Section 497 was further challenged, arguing that it discriminated between men
and women in terms of adultery prosecution. The court rejected the argument,
stating that the law assumes men are the seducers in adultery cases, and any
changes to this law would be the legislature’s job, not the court’s.

Main Points to Understand:

 Article 15(3) provides a constitutional basis for making special provisions to

promote women's empowerment in different spheres, including education,
employment, and public representation.
 Positive discrimination in favor of women under Article 15(3) is considered a
necessary step to correct historical inequalities and to promote gender equality.
 The courts have interpreted Article 15(3) to allow for special measures, but they
must benefit women as a class, not based on individual gender-based advantages.
 Sex-based classification for the benefit of women has been upheld as valid, as long
as it does not infringe on fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 15(1).

Section 497 IPC - Adultery Law (Before It Was Struck Down):

Section 497 of the IPC made adultery a criminal offense, but it applied only to men.
According to the law, if a man had sexual relations with a married woman without the
consent of her husband, the man could be prosecuted for adultery. However, the woman
involved was not considered guilty or an abettor of the offense.

Main Points from the Court’s Explanation:

1. Women are Not Punishable: The court explained that adultery, as defined in
Section 497, can only be committed by a man. The wife involved in the relationship
was seen as a victim, not a criminal. This is why women were not punishable under
the law, even as an abettor of adultery.
2. Protection of the Matrimonial Home: The purpose of Section 497 was to protect
the sanctity of marriage. The law considered the offense to be an attack on the
marriage by an outside man rather than by the wife. So, the law brought only men
into its scope of punishment for adultery.
3. No Right for Wives to Prosecute Husbands: The court also clarified that wives
could not prosecute their husbands for committing adultery under this section.
However, unfaithful husbands were still subject to civil action like separation or
divorce initiated by their wives.
4. No Freedom for Husbands to Act Immorally: While Section 497 did not allow
prosecution for relationships between a husband and an unmarried woman, it
didn’t mean that the law gave husbands the freedom to behave immorally. It only
focused on the relationship between a man and a married woman, where the man
was treated as the offender.

Revathi v. Union of India (1988):

In this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of Section 497 IPC along with Section
198(2) of the CrPC, which allowed only the husband of the adulterous woman to
prosecute the adulterer. It did not allow the wife of an adulterous husband to prosecute her
husband or the other woman. The court reasoned that the law was intended to encourage
reconciliation between spouses rather than encouraging them to drag each other to court.

Summary of the Court’s Views:

 Section 497 was designed to protect the institution of marriage by punishing the
man involved in adultery with a married woman, not the woman.
 The law was gender-specific and focused on men, based on the idea that it was
generally the man who was the seducer.
 The court upheld the law as constitutional multiple times, justifying that it sought to
maintain social harmony by avoiding situations where husbands and wives would
prosecute each other.

Article 15(4) was added through the 1st Constitutional Amendment in 1951 as a direct
response to the Supreme Court's decision in the case of State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan, 1951.

Case Summary: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951

 The Government of Madras (now Tamil Nadu) issued a Communal Government

Order (G.O.), which reserved seats in State-run educational institutions based on
communities. The communal G.O. allocated seats in the following manner for every
14 seats in colleges:
o Non-Brahmins (Hindus): 6 seats
o Backward Hindus: 2 seats
o Brahmins: 2 seats
o Harijans (Scheduled Castes): 2 seats
o Anglo-Indians and Indian Christians: 1 seat
o Muslims: 1 seat
 Champakam Dorairajan, a Brahmin woman, was denied admission to a medical
college due to these communal reservations, despite having higher qualifications than
some candidates from other communities. She challenged the constitutionality of the
communal G.O., arguing it violated Article 15(1) and Article 29(2) of the Indian
Constitution, which prohibit discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or
place of birth.

Supreme Court's Ruling:

 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Champakam Dorairajan and held that the
Communal G.O. was unconstitutional. It violated the principle of equality
guaranteed under Article 15(1), which prohibits the state from discriminating on the
grounds of religion, race, caste, or place of birth. It also violated Article 29(2), which
guarantees that no citizen shall be denied admission into educational institutions
maintained by the state or receiving state funds, on the grounds of religion, race,
caste, or language.

Impact of the Ruling:

 The Madras government’s communal reservations were declared invalid. This

judgment created a significant hurdle for states that wanted to provide affirmative
action for socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes, and
Scheduled Tribes.

Constitutional Response: The First Amendment (1951)

 To overcome the Supreme Court’s ruling and ensure that the state could continue to
make special provisions for backward classes, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and
Scheduled Tribes (STs), the First Constitutional Amendment was introduced.
 Article 15(4) was added to the Constitution, which allowed the state to make special
provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens, as well as for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This
provided constitutional backing for affirmative action and reservations in
education and public employment.

Key Takeaways:

 State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) invalidated communal

reservations based on caste and religion, deeming them unconstitutional.
 Article 15(4) was introduced through the First Amendment to allow reservations
for backward classes, SCs, and STs.
 This amendment enabled affirmative action to be constitutionally valid, helping
socially and educationally backward classes access educational and employment
opportunities.
n the case of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court
made it clear that Fundamental Rights (Part III of the Constitution) take precedence over
Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV). The court ruled that the Communal G.O.
issued by the Madras government, which reserved seats in educational institutions for
different communities, violated Article 15(1) and Article 29(2), which prohibit
discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.

The argument that the Directive Principle under Article 46 (which urges the state to
promote the educational and economic interests of weaker sections) could justify the
Communal G.O. was rejected by the court. The court held that Directive Principles cannot
override the Fundamental Rights and that the Chapter of Fundamental Rights is
"sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any legislative or executive act."

As a result of this ruling, Article 15(4) was introduced by the First Constitutional
Amendment (1951), allowing the state to make special provisions for the advancement of
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, as well as for the Scheduled
Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs).

Post-Amendment Cases:

1. M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963):

o The Mysore government issued a G.O. reserving 68% of seats in medical and
engineering colleges for different communities (Backward Classes, More
Backward Classes, and SCs/STs).
o The Supreme Court laid down key propositions:
 Caste may be a factor for determining backwardness but cannot be the
sole or dominant factor. Backwardness must be both social and
educational.
 Reservations should not exceed 50%.
 No artificial classification between backward and more backward
classes.
o The court held that the G.O. was unconstitutional for violating Article 15.
2. Heggade Janardhan Subbaraya v. State of Mysore (1963):
o This case confirmed that the ruling in M.R. Balaji applied only to socially
and educationally backward classes, not to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and
Scheduled Tribes (STs). Thus, reservations for SCs and STs continued to be
valid.
3. R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore (1964):
o The court upheld the classification of socially and educationally backward
classes based on economic conditions and occupation rather than caste.
o Caste was deemed a relevant factor but not the only or primary criterion for
determining backwardness.
4. K. S. Jayasri v. State of Kerala (1976):
o The court ruled that the exclusion of candidates from backward classes whose
family income was above a certain threshold was constitutional.
o The court emphasized that social backwardness is often linked to poverty,
but poverty alone is not the determining factor for backwardness.

In the case of P. Rajendran v. State of Madras (1968), the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of reservation in the selection of candidates for admission to the first-year Integrated
M.B.B.S. course. The rules promulgated by the State of Madras provided for reservations for
socially and educationally backward classes, as specified in an appendix, which listed
certain castes. The court held that this classification was valid as long as the castes listed
were, as a whole, socially and educationally backward, and thus reservation was not a
violation of Article 15. However, the court struck down the district-wise allocation of seats,
ruling that it had no rational nexus to the object to be achieved and thus violated Article 14.

Key Cases and Rulings:

1. State of A.P. v. U.S.V. Balaram (1972):

o The court emphasized that if members of backward classes were securing
more seats on merit, the state should review the need for further reservation.
Article 15(4) is an exception to Articles 15(1) and 29(2), and backward
classes must be comparable to Scheduled Castes and Tribes in terms of
backwardness.
2. State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon (1975):
o The reservation for candidates from hill and Uttarakhand areas was upheld,
as these areas were considered socially and educationally backward.
However, reservation based on rural areas was struck down, as it was based
on place of birth, which violates Article 15.
3. Suneel Jatley v. State of Haryana (1984):
o The court found that the reservation of 25 seats for candidates educated in
rural schools was arbitrary and irrational, as it lacked an intelligible
differentia and rational nexus to the object of promoting education.
4. State of M.P. v. Kumari Nivedita Jain (1981):
o An Executive Order by the State of Madhya Pradesh, which relaxed
qualifying marks in the Pre-Medical Examination for SC/ST candidates,
was upheld as valid and not violative of Article 15 or the relevant regulations.
5. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. (1999):
o The court ruled that there should not be a significant disparity in qualifying
marks for reserved and general candidates in medical education. The
Medical Council was entrusted with the responsibility of deciding appropriate
standards.

Key Points:

 Caste can be a factor in identifying socially and educationally backward classes,

but it should not be the sole criterion.
 Reservations based on place of birth or regional imbalances without concrete data
can violate Article 15.
 Relaxation of qualifying standards for SC/ST candidates is permissible, but the
difference in qualifying marks should not be too large to maintain standards.

The court has consistently held that reservations for candidates from reserved categories
must adhere to certain guidelines to ensure that they do not violate Articles 14 and 15(4) of
the Constitution. Key observations in this area are:

1. Reservation Limits and Benchmarks:

o Qualifying Marks for reserved category candidates cannot be lowered to less
than 25% of the qualifying marks for general category candidates. Diluting
the benchmarks beyond this would violate Articles 14 and 15(4) because it
would transform the selection process from a short-listing to a long-listing of
candidates based purely on their reserved status, which is unconstitutional.
2. Caste and Conversion:
o In cases where individuals from upper castes convert or reconvert to a
Scheduled Caste (SC) religion, the Supreme Court has held that such
persons must be accepted by the community they are claiming membership in.
Merely converting or marrying into a SC family does not automatically confer
the status of a Scheduled Caste unless there is community recognition. This
principle was upheld in cases like:
 Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava.
 Principal, Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao (1976), where
the court ruled that acceptance by the community is necessary for
reconverted individuals to claim SC benefits.
3. Marriage and Reservation Status:
o The court has ruled that marriage alone does not change a person's caste
status for the purpose of reservations. For example:
 Meera Kanwaria v. Sunita (2006): An upper-caste Hindu woman
married to a Scheduled Caste man could not claim SC status simply
because her husband's family accepted her. Community acceptance,
beyond familial acknowledgment, is required to acquire SC status for
reservation purposes.
 Dr. Neelima v. Dean of P.G. Studies, A.P. Agricultural University:
A Reddy woman who married a Scheduled Caste man was not
entitled to SC reservation benefits based on her husband's caste.
4. Reservation for Special Categories:
o Narayan Sarma v. Pankaj (2000) and Parents Association v. Union of
India (2000) dealt with the allocation of seats in educational institutions for
special groups. For instance:
 Reservation of seats for North Eastern Council (NEC)
recommended candidates was upheld because candidates from areas
without medical colleges constituted a separate class.
 Reservation of seats for rural doctors was deemed unconstitutional
because the rural setting alone did not form a valid basis for
classification.
5. Merit as the Sole Criterion:
o The court emphasized that merit should remain the primary criterion for
selecting candidates from reserved quota seats. For example:
 In Parents Association v. Union of India, the court quashed the rule
exempting NEC candidates from appearing for entrance examinations,
upholding the importance of merit-based selection.
6. Lowering of Qualifying Marks:
o In cases involving in-service candidates applying for medical courses, the
lowering of qualifying marks was ruled impermissible. The Medical
Council of India’s regulations, which hold statutory force, mandate that
qualifying marks must be adhered to for all candidates, including those from
reserved categories.

Key Principles:
 Reservation quotas and qualifying marks for reserved category candidates must
strike a balance between affirmative action and constitutional guarantees of
equality.
 Community acceptance is critical for individuals claiming SC status post-conversion
or marriage.
 Merit and fairness remain essential criteria, even within reserved categories, to
ensure that reservations serve their purpose without undermining educational and
professional standards.