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From The Unconscious To The Conscious

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From The Unconscious To The Conscious

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josephstaton08
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS

TO THE CONSCIOUS by
GUSTAVE GELEY : Director of the International
Metapsychical Institute, Parts. Translated from the
French by STANLEY DE BRATH, m.inst.c.b.,
FORMERLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT

PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM COLLINS SONS


AND CO. LTD. : 48 PALL MALL, S.W. 1
GLASGOW : MELBOURNE : AUCKLAND
Copyright 1920
TO
Signor Professor Rocco Santoliquido,
ITALIAN COUNCILLOR OF STATE, DEPUTY,
GRAND OFFICER OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR,
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK
WITH RESPECT, GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION
G. Geley
TRANSLATOR’S NOTE
In the opening chapter of the Origin of Species Darwin
states that the ‘variability,’ on which selection and
adaptation have to work, ‘ is governed by many unknown
laws.’
In translating a book which fills this gap in the
Evolutionary Theory by assigning a psychic cause as
the origin of Variation (thus traversing the arguments
of later biologists who refer that origin to chance or to
the pressure of the environment); a book which modifies
the conclusions of many schools of thought, both new
and old; which replaces Bergson’s famous elan vital
by a concrete energy, and defines that energy as an
influence forming all the varieties of cellular tissue out
of one primordial substance, and moulding those tissues
into organic form under the impulsion of a Directing
Idea, the translator has a most responsible task.
One duty, and one only, lies upon him—to be
faithful to the author’s meaning. No attempt at literary
finish can palliate or excuse the slightest departure from
that duty in a work which, however scientific in essence,
is necessarily somewhat controversial in form. When
to this duty there are added the obligations which the
honour of personal friendship involves, faithfulness in
rendering the idea becomes doubly imperative. To
this all other considerations must give place.
The Italian adage, ‘Traduttori—traditori,’ is one
which the translator must ever bear in mind if he would
not be a traitor also. He has therefore kept a number
of words which, though used by classical English writers
on philosophy, may seem more or less uncouth and
foreign to those who are unfamiliar with such authors.
It is quite inevitable that a book which presents an
entirely new application and extension of psychology
Translator's Note
should compel the use of a terminology which some may
find obscure.
4 Psychism,’ 4 Dynamo-psychism,’ 4 Representation,’
4 Transformism,’ are words of this kind, and arc all
used to express ideas which, even when not absolutely
new, are strange to the unaccustomed ear.
4 Psychism ’ is a word which is, or should be, well-
known; meaning the animating psychic energy which
is the subject-matter of psychology.
4 Dynamo-psychism * is considered cumbrous, but
what other word is there that expresses a psychic energy
acting as forming and motive power ? It is of the very
essence of the theory put forward.
4 Representation ’ in ordinary use, means the delinea¬
tion of an actuality existing elsewhere: the philosophical
sense is the same, but the actuality is in the Unseen;
the representation is in, and by, Matter, Knergy, or
Idea. It is used by Sir Wm. Hamilton (Logic), by
G. H. Lewes, by Herbert Spencer, and by J. Ward
(Entycl. Brit.) in this way.
Transformism,’ t.e. the doctrine of transforma-
bility of individuals or species, is used by Huxley.
(Crayfish.)
4 Palingenesis ’ is used in its correct meaning
(t£Ku> = again + ytvtm = production), a new or second
birth: the equivalent 4 reincarnation ’ has been spoiled
by those who ignore the profound distinction between
the Person and the Self, and has been intentionally
avoided by the author.
4 Modality ’ is used as it is by Caird, in the logical
sense of modes hypothetically necessary on the pre¬
supposition of something else. The list might be
extended: but in every case where a word seems to
carry an unusual meaning, reference has been made to
standard authors for its justification.
___ _. S. D8 Braih.
Weybridgb, February, 1920.
PREFACE

OBJECTS AND METHOD

This work is the logical sequel to my study of The


Subconscious Being. Its intention is to include both
collective and individual evolution in a larger and more
complete synthesis. Its form is governed by the same
procedure : to express the ideas with the utmost
simplicity, the greatest clarity and conciseness that
may be possible; to avoid lengthy analyses and develop¬
ments; and above all to put aside easy digressions of
an imaginative or poetical character.
My primary aim was to make the work a synthesis,
and this synthesis should be considered as a whole,
without reference to details which have been omitted
or intentionally set aside. In fact, an exhaustive study
of any single one of the questions treated would be a
life work, but this is for those who devote themselves
to analysis, and I leave it to them; my purpose is
different, it aims at the ideal quest of a wide philosophical
generalisation, based on facts.
Obviously such a philosophy, in the actual state
of human knowledge and consciousness, can claim to
be no more than an endeavour, a sketch, or as it might
be called, a general plan, in which only main outlines
and a few details are clearly drawn.
Necessarily incomplete, this philosophy cannot claim
to be entirely original. Most of the solutions proposed
are naturally to be found here and there, more or less
sharply defined and more or less varied, in other natural¬
istic or metaphysical systems.
The general idea of this work is that which has
ix
Preface
inspired most of the great metaphysical systems, and
finds its clearest and most concrete presentment in the
works of Schopenhauer. Its premises are the same;
but the developments and the conclusions are totally
different; my endeavour has been to bridge the chasm
that Schopenhauer leaves between the Unconscious
and the Conscious. Thence follows an entirely different
interpretation of the evolution of the individual and
of the universe. This interpretation, instead of leading
to pessimism, leads, I will not say to optimism (the
term being loose and questionable), but to the abiding
ideal of Humanity, an ideal which is built on its highest,
calmest, and most lasting hopes of justice, of joy, and
of individual persistence.
But the real originality of the idealist philosophy
here outlined, the only originality that is claimed, is
that it is scientific. Unrestricted by dogmatic or mystical
forms, and resting on no a priori or intuitional formula;,
it is based on positive demonstration. It is on the
ground of scientific philosophy, and on this ground alone,
that this work should be studied or discussed.
To build up my demonstration I have endeavoured
to take account of all known facts whether in the natural
sciences, in general biology, or in admitted data relating
t° ^physiological and psychological constitution of
the individual man. In the choice of the main cxplana-
tory hypotheses I have sought those which present the
double character of being logical deductions from fact**,
and adaptable to all the facts of a group. My constant
aim has been to reach wider and more comprehensive
generalisations, until there should issue, if txtssible, a
hypothesis sufficiently wide and general to present a
single interpretation of the evolution of the individual
and of the universe.
a, .T^s S£nerali method is scarcely open to criticism.
u* j have been led, little by little, by the subject-matter,
to adopt at first tentatively, and then systematically, a
X
Preface
method of treatment, secondary indeed but still important,
concerning which it is necessary to enter into some detail.
In considering the different biological and psycho¬
logical sciences, and in studying the inductions, deduc¬
tions, and received hypotheses founded on their data
and accepted by most contemporary men of science,
I was struck by serious and obvious errors due to a
tendency to forget of the general method of treatment
above referred to.
There is no single one of the main academic
hypotheses on evolution, on the physical or psychological
constitution of the individual, or on life and conscious¬
ness, which is capable of adaptation to all the facts o£
evolution, of physiology or of psychology; nor, a fortiori,
is there one which can embrace general and individual
evolution in a synthetic whole.
Further, most of these hypotheses are, as I shall
demonstrate, certainly in opposition to at least some
well-established facts.
In seeking the first origin and cause of these errors
in generalisation I have been led to discover them
pre-eminently in the choice of the primary facts on which
the framework of contemporary scientific philosophy
is based.
In all sciences, and especially in biology and
psychology, facts selected with a synthetic conclusion
m view, may lead to antagonistic method, and con¬
sequently to concepts which may be divergent or
even opposed. Two principal methods may be out¬
lined, each resulting from the selection of primary
facts.
The first of these methods starts from the principle
that science should always proceed from the simple to
the complex. This method, therefore, takes as its
point of departure the most elementary facts, endeavours
to understand them, then passes on to rather more
complex facts of the same order, applying to them the
Preface
explanatory formula derived from an exhaustive study
of the simpler, and so onwards from the base to the
summit. .... c
The second starts from the principle that for any
given order of facts there can be no true explanation
which is not capable of application to all the facts of
that order. This method seeks first for an explanation
capable of covering the most complex phenomena; and
this being easily extended a fortiori, to the simpler and
lower ones, will necessarily be conformable to all the
available data.
This method thus proceeds from the summit to
the base.
It frequently happens, we must concede, that the
second method ends in an impossibility, it will do
so whenever the data of fact are insufficient. It must
then be admitted to be inapplicable, and should he
held in reserve, disregarding minor points in which
it may be satisfactory, such details being necessarily
inadequate as a basis of reasoning since they refer to
only one aspect of the problem.
Of these two methods, the former being primarily
analytic, pertains to pure science. The second, primarily
synthetic, pertains to pure philosophy.
Now when questions arise which pertain both to
philosophy and to science, it is necessary to consider
which of these two methods should be adopted.
Once a general truth has been established it matters
little whether the explanation of different phenomena
leading to a known conclusion starts from the base or
the summit; the line of synthesis being known, it is
not possible to stray. But when the task before us is
to ascertain truth and to establish a synthesis, it becomes
necessary to choose and to consider with care which
method is likely to prove the more sure and fruitful
of results. The first method is the one almost exclusively
employed as the foundation for current theories. Its
xii
Preface
use follows on an unquestioned dogma of contemporary
science. Before deciding which method to employ, let
us now look somewhat closely at some of the established
results to which this method has actually led.
In a philosophic study of the phenomena of life,
if we proceed from the apex to the base, from man to
the superior animals, and from them to inferior types,
we are constrained to admit that Consciousness is that
which js most important in all life, because it is that
which is most important in man. We are then led to
discover that consciousness, with all that it implies,
extends, with a narrowing held, down to the least
evolved animals, in which it exists merely in outline.
If, on the contrary, we proceed from the base to
the summit, the conclusion that we draw from the
phenomena of life is an opposite one. It is the con¬
clusion that Le Dantec, among others, has endeavoured
to bring out.1
The chemical reactions of their environment suffice
to determine the vital phenomena of animals very low
down in the scale. The ‘ ascending ’ method therefore
permits of the affirmation that in all the phenomena
of life, even those of the superior animals, it is use¬
less to seek for anything but the result of chemical
reactions. Even the specific form of an animal is for
Le Dantec, as we shall see, merely a function of these
reactions.
The pjastidia show rigid chemical determinism,
and there is no reason to attribute to them either will
or liberty of action. It would follow that bio-chemical
determinism is the same in the entire animal series;
and will or liberty, even in man, is but illusion.
The notion of an animal consciousness is superfluous
for the plastidia; if therefore it exists for superior
animals it can be only an epiphenomenon * resulting
1 Le Dantec: Diterminisme Biologique-
* A sequential or a secondary phenomenon,
xiii
Preface
from the chemical reactions which are the essential
phenomena.
In fine, as according to all evidence, animals as low
in the scale as the sponges and the corals, are but a
mere complex of elementary lives, the inference follows
that even a very complex and highly evolved animal
apparently highly centralised, is but an analogous
complex, existing and maintaining itself by affinity or
molecular cohesion, without the aid of a superior and
independent dynamism.
Such is the reasoning and such are the conclusions
of the ‘ ascending * method. Are these conclusions
true or false ?
The reasoning is rigorous and flawless. If the
conclusions are false, it can only be that the method is
bad.
We shall see by all that follows in the present work,
that in spite of the rigour of the reasoning, the results
of the method are such as cannot be accepted, and are
often absurd.
It is easy to establish this without going outside
the domain of biology. As an example of an induction
at once absurd and inevitable from the ascending method,
take sensibility.
We know by experience that we possess sensibility.
We infer that sensibility pertains to humanity. Taking
this apex as our point of departure, we judge that
superior animals also possess this sensibility because
their manifestations of pain or pleasure resemble our
own.
If we descend the animal scale, the manifestations
are less defined, and, in the lower animals, are of doubtful
interpretation.
‘ The signs of pain,’ says Richet,1 * do not suffice
for the affirmation that there is pain. When the foot
of a decapitated frog is pinched, the animal struggles
1 Ricihet: Psychologic OSnSrcdo,
Preface
with all the external signs of pain, just as if it were
suffering. When an earthworm is cut in two both
pieces move convulsively. Are we to say that both are
suffering, or what appears to me much more rational,
rather to think that the traumatism1 has set up a
violent reflex action ? ’
Therefore if we attribute sensibility to animals low
in the scale, it is by a descending induction. Our
reasoning goes from the summit to the base.
Let us proceed inversely : if, setting aside our own
personal experience, we consider the very inferior animals,
we shall be logically obliged to deny them sensibility,
since all their reactions can be explained by reflexes.
Sensibility to pleasure or pain is for them an unnecessary
hypothesis, and conformably to the principle of method¬
ology known as economy of hypothesis, it should be
put aside.
_ But then, why admit this sensibility in the highest
animals? Here also everything can be explained by
reflexes.. As Richet observes, the yelp of a beaten dog,
may, strictly speaking, be only a reflex movement 1
And this reasoning is not absurd, since it is Cartesian.
Nevertheless, pushed to the negation of human sensi¬
bility it becomes untenable. It impels us to place man,
as did Descartes, outside animal life; which is evidently
a gross and dangerous mistake.
Thus the method which consists in starting from
the base in order to explain one of the essential vital
principles is convicted of flagrant error. It is therefore
under suspicion for all the rest. No doubt it will be
objected that the contrary method may also lead us
astray: as, for instance, says Le Dantec,8 ‘the famous
observation of Carter, in which an amoeba lay in wait
for a young Acineta about to detach itself from the

1 Traumatism—the state of being wounded.


* Le Dantec: Le JDtterminisme Biologique.
XV
Preface
maternal body. The Acineta is a protozoon armed in
its adult state with venomous tentacles particularly
dangerous to the amoeba} but these tentacles are not
found on the young Acineta, and the amoeba observed
by Carter knew that the young one about to leave
the maternal body would be eatable during the early
days of its existence.’
The error is comical: but every one must see that
it is entirely insignificant from the philosophic point
of view, and disappears automatically before the new
knowledge relating to instinct. This error, bearing
only on a point of detail, does not in any way attaint the
descending induction which allows a relative conscious¬
ness to all animal life. Even if the extension of the
induction to the lower animals were arbitrary, it would
have no importance: there is no serious drawback in
attributing to them, even arbitrarily, rudimentary con¬
sciousness and sensibility.
On the other hand, the errors of the ascending
method are flagrant, since they would go so far as to deny
that consciousness and sensibility to superior animals!
The justice of Auguste Comte’s remark is evident: * A*
soon as we are dealing with the characteristics of animal
life, we ought to take Man as our starting point, and
see how his characteristics lower in the scale little by
little, rather than start from the sponge and seek how
they develop. The animal life of man helps us to
understand that of the sponge, but the converse is not
true.’
Passing from biology to psychology, let us consider,
for instance, the phenomena attributed to subconscious¬
ness which will have so large a place in the present work.
There, more than anywhere else, the contrast between
the two methods will be manifest.
In a study which appeared in the Annales des Sciences
Psychtques I recommended the synthetic method as
applicable to the philosophy of the phenomena of
xvi
Preface
subconsciousness. I endeavoured to show that only
the study of the more complex phenomena would admit
of a generalisation; while a study, however profound, of
the elementary phenomena would always remain incapable
of leading to any clear view of the whole. I concluded
that from the specially philosophic standpoint, the study
and comprehension of the higher phenomena alone can
be of capital importance.1
This statement of methodology has brought on me
some lively attacks, especially from M. Boirac.*
M. Boirac affirms, as Le Dantec does with regard
to biological phenomena, that one should study and
interpret from the base to the summit, first dealing
with elementary phenomena and then with those more
and more complex.
In support of his idea he adduces the following
analogy: to seek to understand the higher subconscious
phenomena before understanding the elementary ones
xs as illogical as to seek to understand the phenomenon
of globular lightning before grasping elementary electrical
principles.
To this I might reply that it is one thing to study
electrical phenomena and even to apply them practically,
and quite another to understand the essential nature of
electricity. Our understanding of electricity, that is
our philosophical comprehension of it, rests, and mil
continue to rest, on provisional hypotheses until we have
understood its most complex manifestations.
Further, nothing is more easy than to oppose one
analogy to another! Here is one which I borrow from
J. Loeb :—
1 It is expressly to b« noticed, however, that in all matters concerning
the subconscious, the elementary and the complex phenomena are equally
unexplained. Whichever we take as our point of departure, we proceed
from the unknown to the unknown. The Cartesian principle therefore
cannot be advanced against our method.
* Boirac: Annates des Sciences Psychiques/ and VAvenir des Etudes
Psychiques,
xvii B
Prejace
‘Physicists are lucky never to have known the
method of sections and dyes. What would have
been the result if by chance a steam engine had
fallen into the hands of a histological physicist ?
What thousands of sections horizontal ana vertical,
stained in various ways, how many diagrams and
figures might have been made, without arriving at
an indubitable conclusion that the machine is a
heat engine and is used to transform heat into
motion! * (Quoted by Dastre.)

This comparison places the characteristics of the


two methods in a strong light
The method of restricted analyses and profound
study of details is extremely useful in scientific rescan h,
but is without, philosophical value. The method of
general synthesis is the only one suitable to scientific
philosophy for it alone can bring out what is really
important in a given order of facts. The boiler ami fix*
motor mechanism are the truly important parts in the
steam-engine.. When this mechanism has cieen under¬
stood there will be no difficulty in understanding the
part played in the accessory details, the wheels and the
brakes. But it would be folly to seek to understand
the locomotive by a study, however complete, of a
detached bolt or the spoke of a wheel 1
Psychologists who rest in the systematic study of
small facts are obviously like to the ‘ histological
physicists : both end in similar impotence.
I conclude: From the philosophical point of view,
1 confine myself) and in a given
order of facts, only the comprehension of the higher
fecte is important, for it includes, a fortiori, that of ail
23 ®- .Consequently the descending method only,
starting from those higher facts, is the fruitful one. *
Moreover, we judge the tree by its fruit: it is as
we shall see, by that method alone that all the phenomena
xviii
Preface
of life and consciousness, all collective and individual
evolution, and even the meaning of the universe, can
be understood.
By the analytical and ascending method, on the
contrary, we reach nothing but the serious errors in
generalisation which have vitiated all contemporary
philosophy, if, indeed, we do not lose ourselves in an
unmeaning verbalism.
In seeking to draw general conclusions from elemen¬
tary phenomena we are driven to deny sensibility to
animals and to reduce consciousness to an epiphfenom-
enon. By taking minor hypnotoid or hysteriform
manifestations as our starting point in the study of
psychological facts, we end by reducing the whole of
subconscious psychology, even the highest, to automatism
or suggestibility.
Worse still, by blind fidelity to a barren method,
some very fine minds are doomed to impotence, and
waste their time and trouble in inventing or changing
mere labels; and failing to capture the general idea
they fall back on the invention of * Pythiatism ’ or
‘Metagnomy ... '1
The method here chosen offers two essential criteria
as guides—one critical, the other practical.
The critical criterion will permit us to consider as
false and to reject without further examination, every
explanation or hypothesis which in a connected order
of facts, is adapted to a part only of these facts, and not
to all, especially to the more complex.
The practical criterion will prescribe the systematic
and immediate study of the highest and most complex
in any given order of connected facts.
Whether the matter in hand be universal evolution
and naturalistic theories, physiological or psychological
individuality, or even questions of high philosophy, we
‘Pythiatism: pertaining to the Pythian Apollo. Metagnomy: (from
Gr. thought)*beyond thought.
Prejaee
shall therefore begin by first attacking the more complex
facts, these being really the only important ones; putting
aside for the moment the mere trivialities of elementary
and simple facts, which, in the sequel, will explain
themselves.
Instead of plodding through this dust of elementary
facts which by beclouding our ascent, retard it, we
shall advance to the heights, from whence, after a wide
view over the whole accessible area, we may descend
at leisure to explore local particulars.
The present work falls naturally into two principal
parts :—
Book I. is a critical study of the classical theories
relating to evolution, to physiological individuality, to
psychological individuality, and to the principal evolu¬
tionary philosophies, and at the same time it is a forecast
of the essential inductions of Book II.
Book II. is the actual statement of our scientific
philosophy.

xx
CONTENTS
PASS

NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR vii


PREFACE—OBJECTS AND METHOD ix

BOOK I
THE UNIVERSE AND THE INDIVIDUAL ACCORDING
TO THE CLASSICAL SCIENTIFIC AND PHILO¬
SOPHICAL THEORIES—A CRITICAL STUDY

PART I

Classical Naturalistic Theories of Evolution

foreword 5
CHAPTER X-FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS OF
ADAPTATION AND SELECTION TO EXPLAIN THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES 9
CHAPTER II-FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS TO
EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF INSTINCTS I8
CHAPTER III-FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS
TO EXPLAIN ABRUPT TRANSFORMATIONS CREA¬
TIVE OF NEW SPECIES 23
CHAPTER IV—FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS
TO EXPLAIN THE IMMEDIATE AND DEFINITIVE
‘ CRYSTALLISATION ’ OF THE ESSENTIAL CHAR¬
ACTERS OF NEW SPECIES AND NEW INSTINCTS 27
CHAPTER V—THE TESTIMONY OF THE INSECT 29
xxi
Contents
mob
CHAPTER' VI—FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS
TO EXPLAIN THE GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL
DIFFICULTY RELATING TO EVOLUTION, HOW
THE COMPLEX CAN PROCEED FROM THE SIMPLE
AND THE GREATER FROM THE LESS 32

PART II

The Classical Psycho-Physiological Concept of the


Individual

foreword 37

CHAPTER I—THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF PHYSIO¬


LOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 40

§ I. DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO THE POLY-


ZOIST CONCEPT 40
§ 2. DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO THE SPECIFIC
FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE
BUILDING, THE MAINTENANCE, AND
THE REPAIR OF THE ORGANISM 41
§ 3. THE PROBLEM OF EMBRYONIC AND POST-
EMBRYONIC METAMORPHOSES 46
§ 4. THE HISTOLYSIS OF THE INSECT 48
CHAPTER II—THE PROBLEM OFtSUPERNORMAL PHYSI¬
OLOGY $I
§ I. MATERIALISATIONS
§ 2. THE UNITY OF ORGANIC SUBSTANCE 63

§ 3. THE EVIDENCE OF A SUPERIOR DYNAMISM 6$


§ 4. THE CONDITIONING OF THE DYNAMISM
BY THE IDEA 5g

§ 5. THE SECONDARY MODALITIES OF SUPER¬


NORMAL PHYSIOLOGY
xxii
Contents
PAGE

§ 6. THE NEW AND THE CLASSICAL CONCEPT OP


THE INDIVIDUAL COMPARED: SUMMARY 71
CHAPTER III-PSYCHOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY 74
§ I. THE SELF CONSIDERED AS A SYNTHESIS OF
STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 74
§ 2. THE SELF AS A PRODUCT OF THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM-PSYCHO-
PHYSIOLOGICAL PARALLELISM 77
§ 3. FACTS OF NORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AT ISSUE
WITH THE THESIS OF PARALLELISM 78
CHAPTER IV—SUBCONSCIOUS PSYCHOLOGY 84
§ I. CRYPTO-PSYCHISM 84
§ 2. CRYPTOMNESIA 88
§ 3. ALTERATIONS OF PERSONALITY 94
CHAPTER V—THE SO-CALLED SUPERNORMAL SUB-
CONSCIOUSNESS 95
§ I. SUPERNORMAL PHYSIOLOGY IS CONDI¬
TIONED BY SUPERNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 95
§ 2. MENTO-MENTAL ACTION 95
§ 3. LUCIDITY 98
§ 4. SPIRITOID PHENOMENA IOO
CHAPTER VI-CLASSICAL THEORIES OF THE SUB¬
CONSCIOUS 102
PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORIES-
§ I. THE THEORY OF AUTOMATISM 102
§ 2. THE THEORY OF MORBIDITY I°7
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES—
§ 3. PETITIONES PRINCIPII 111
§ 4. ARTIFICIAL DISJUNCTIONS AND VERBAL
EXPLANATIONS 1*3
§5. PROFESSOR JASTROW’S THEORY 117
§ 6. M. RIBOT’S THEORY 118
xxiii
Contents
§ 7. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY OF
CLASSICAL PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY 120
CHAPTER VII—RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INFERENCES
BASED ON THE SUBCONSCIOUS 122
§ I. THE SUBCONSCIOUS IS THE VERY ESSENCE
OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 122
§ 2 . THE IMPOTENCE OF CLASSICAL PSYCHO¬
LOGY TO EXPLAIN CRYPTO-PSYCH ISM
AND CRYPTOM NESIA 12 }
§ 3. ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM 8FTWK8K THE
SUBCONSCIOUS ON THE ONE HA NO,
AND THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF
THE BRAIN, HEREDITY, AND SENSORIAL
AND INTELLECTUAL ACQUIREMENT ON
THE OTHER IJtH

3 4’ ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE


MANIFESTATIONS OF SUBCONSCIOUS AND
CEREBRAL ACTIVITY It}U
§ $. ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN
CRYPTOM NESIA AND CEREBRAL PHYSI¬
OLOGY 1.12
§ 6. ABSENCE OF CEREBRAL LOCALISATIONS FOR
THE SUBCONSCIOUSNESS Mi
§ 7* ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE
SUBCONSCIOUSNESS AND ORGANIC OR
SENSORIAL POWERS
*33
§ 8. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN
ORGANIC CAPACITY AND THE SUPER¬
NORMAL SUBCONSCIOUSNESS
*3.1
§ 9* THE SUBCONSCIOUSNESS OUTRANGES THE
ORGANISM AND COMPLETELY CONDI¬
TIONS IT
§ 10. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS OF RATIONAL
ns
PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY
*36
xxiv
Contents

PART III

Philosophical Theories of Evolution


MOB

FOREWORD 141
CHAPTER I-EVOLUTION UNDER PROVIDENCE
ACCORDING TO DOGMA 144
§ I. TENTATIVE RECONCILIATIONS OF EVOLU¬
TIONARY AND DOGMATIC IDEAS 144
§ 2. THE OBJECTION BASED ON THE EVIDENT
GROPINGS AND ERRORS IN EVOLUTION 146
§ 3. OBJECTIONS BASED ON EVIL IN THE
UNIVERSE 147
§ 4. NEO-MANICHEISM I 54
CHAPTER II-MONISM 157
chapter hi—m. bergson's * creative evolution * 161
% I. SUMMARY OF THE BERGSONIAN THEORY l6l
§ 2. CRITICISM OF THE BERGSONIAN THEORY
-ITS METHOD 173
§ 3. BERGSONIAN DOCTRINES WHICH ARE IN
ACCORD WITH FACTS 176
§ 4. UNDEMONSTRATED OR UNDEMONSTRABLE
DOCTRINES 177
§ 5. CONTRADICTIONS AND INEXACTITUDES' 178
§ 6. DOCTRINES CONTRARY TO WELL-ESTAB¬
LISHED FACTS CONTRARY TO THE BERG-
SONIAN THEORY, THE FACTS OF SUB¬
CONSCIOUS PSYCHOLOGY PROVE THE
NATURE OF ANIMALS AND MAN TO BE
IDENTICAL 180
CHAPTER IV—THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
—GENERAL SUMMARY 188
§ i. Schopenhauer’s demonstration 189
§ 2. Schopenhauer’s pessimism 193
XXV
Contents
rviK
§ 3. von hartmann’s systematisation kjO

§ 4. CRITICISM OF THE SPECIFIC DISTINCTION


BETWEEN THE CONSCIOUS AND THE
UNCONSCIOUS *97

BOOK II
FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS TO THE CONSCIOUS

FOREWORD S03

PART I

Individual Evolution—The Transition from Unconscious¬


ness to Consciousness in the Individual

CHAPTER I—THE INDIVIDUAL CONCEIVED OF AS AN


ESSENTIAL DYNAMO-PSYCHISM AND REPRESEN¬
TATIONS an
§ I. THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR THE CONCEPT 2II
§ 2. THE INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERED AS REPRE¬
SENTATIONS 214
§ 3. THE SELF CONSIDERED AS AN ESSENTIAL
DYNAMO-PSYCH ISM 2I7
CHAPTER II—THE ESSENTIAL DYNAMO-PSYCHISM
PASSES BY EVOLUTIONARY REPRESENTATIONS
FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS TO THE CONSCIOUS 421
§ I. THE CONSCIOUS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
MUTUALLY INTERPENETRATE AND CON¬
DITION EACH OTHER 222
§ 2. THE UNCONSCIOUS DYNAMO-PSYCHISM
TENDS TO BECOME A CONSCIOUS
DYNAMO-PSYCHISM 423
CHAPTER III—SYNTHESIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 228
xxvi
Contents
§ I. PRIMORDIAL AND SECONDARY REPRESEN¬
TATIONS OR OBJECTIFICATIONS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL DYNAMO-PSYCHISM 228
§ 2. VITAL DYNAMISM AND ORGANIC REPRE¬
SENTATION 229
§ 3. MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS AND THE REAL
SELF 234
§ 4. METAPHYSICAL INFERENCES ON THE
ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF INDIVIDUALITY 238
CHAPTER IV—INTERPRETATION OF PSYCHOLOGY BY
THE NEW IDEAS 242
§ I. NORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 24a
§ 2. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 244
§ 3. NEUROPATHIC STATES 245
§ 4. NEURASTHENIA 250
§ 5. HYSTERIA 25I
§ 6. THE ESSENTIALS OF DEMENTIA 252
§ 7. HYPNOTISM 254
§ 8. ALTERATIONS OF PERSONALITY 255
§ 9. INTELLECTUAL WORK AND ITS MODALITIES
—GENIUS 258
§ IO. THE SUPERNORMAL 26l
§ II. MEDIUMSHIP 263

PART II

The Evolution of the Universe—Transition from the


Unconscious to the Conscious in the Universe

CHAPTER I—THE UNIVERSE CONCEIVED OF AS AN


ESSENTIAL DYNAMO-PSYCHISM AND REPRESEN¬
TATION 275
XXVll
Contents
n-if

§ 2. ITS EVOLUTION IS ONLY THE ACQUISITION


or consciousness 27$
§ 3. EVOLUTIONARY LAWS—THE SUCCESSION
OF SPECIES—THE FINALITY ACQUIRED 2 JU
CHAPTER II—EXPLANATION OF THE EVOLUTIONARY
DIFFICULTIES 2H.J

PART III

The Consequences: Optimism or Pessimism?

CHAPTER I—REFUTATION OF THE PESSIMIST VIEW OF


THE UNIVERSE BY THE TRANSITION FROM THE
UNCONSCIOUS TO THE CONSCIOUS 2</I
CHAPTER II—REALISATION OF THE SOVEREIGN CON¬
SCIOUSNESS 2 tft)
CHAPTER III—REALISATION OF THE SOVEREIGN
JUSTICE 31^

CHAPTER IV—REALISATION OF THE SOVEREIGN GOOD 3 I (/

CONCLUSION „,
APPENDIX
3s.l8
ILLUSTRATIONS ' ‘
»J*,v

xxvlii
BOOK L

THE UNIVERSE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

ACCORDING TO THE CLASSICAL SCIENTIFIC AND


PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES

(A CRITICAL STUDY)
PART I
CLASSICAL NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF EVOLUTION
FOREWORD

Although evolution, considered as a whole, constitutes


to-day the most firmly established of all the great scientific
hypotheses, it nevertheless presents some serious diffi¬
culties in its systematisation and its philosophy.
The principle of evolutionary theory, based as it is
on leading facts of the natural sciences, defies any
honest attempt at refutation.
Nevertheless, there are, in the doctrine of trans-
formability as taught up to the present, weak points
and serious lacuna, on which its enemies base their
hopes. No longer daring to attack it from the front,
they hope to turn its flank.
It would be therefore, not only puerile, but also
dangerous from a philosophic point of view, to deny
or to dissimulate these weak points and defects. It is
well on the contrary to seek for their origin and their
explanation by placing them in full light.
The objections to the evolutionary theory put
forward in this work are not, I repeat, objections to the
principle. They do not aim at the fact of evolution.
They are, however, serious because they displace the
two pillars on which transformability has been erected,
that is to say, the classical notions of ultimate cause and
manner of effect.
The mechanism of evolution is now found to need
revision. This mechanism, as is well known, arose
from two great hypotheses—those of Darwin and
Lamarck.
The Darwinian hypothesis assigned an essential
function to natural selection, that is, the survival of the
fittest in the struggle for life; the fittest being those
5 c
Foreword
which distinguish themselves from their congeners by
some physical or psychological advantage relative to
the vital necessities of the environment, this advantage
having appeared by chance.
The Lamarckian hypothesis assigned a primary
function to the influence of the environment, to the use
or disuse of organs; making the environment (at need)
even the origin of new functions and new organs.
These two classical causes, perfectly reconcilable
or even complementary, necessarily implied the notion
of slow, imperceptible, and innumerable modifications
leading to tne progressive formation of diverse species
from one or more primitive forms up to man.
To. these two general hypotheses, there have been
added in our day, countless secondary theories intended
either to establish special laws, such as those of heredity,
or to combat the ceaselessly renewed and multiplied
objections which a rigorous analysis of facts has brought
against the classical concept of transformism.
Among these theories, some connect with Darwin,
some with Lamarck, others eclectically with both
systems.. Some carry purely mechanical explanations;
others rise to dynamical concepts; a few even trench
on the domain of metaphysics.1
On all of them the same general judgment may 1ms
passed: they show prodigious ingenuity and an even
more prodigious impotence.
I shall not discuss these theories nor their claims
explain the difficulties of transformism.*
The innumerable arguments which have been in¬
voked in various connections for or against transformism,
for or against the classic naturalism, relating as they
1Cf, sped » and Goldsmith : Les Theories d$ Vftv*4utinn
Led by >n), and Deperret, les Transjormathns du Mmd§
.
^ Huxtoy to
Foreword
do to secondary matters, do not carry conviction or
lead to a conclusion.
Conformably to the method explained above, I shall
neglect these arguments on details and only consider
immediately and directly the essential and primordial
difficulties, which are the only real difficulties, of
transformism. The secondary imperfections of the
naturalistic edifice matter little; the essential is to
ascertain whether the body of this edifice, its framework
and keystones, are strong or weak.
There are five capital difficulties in classical trans¬
formism, viz.:—
1. The failure of the classical factors to explain the
origin of species.
2. The failure of the classical factors to explain the
origin of instincts.
3. The failure of the classical factors to explain the
abrupt and creative transformations of new
species.
4. The failure of the classical factors to explain the
immediate and definitive * crystallisation * of
the essential characteristics of new species or new
instincts—the fact that these characteristics, in
their main outlines, are very rapidly acquired
and once acquired, remain immutable.
5. The failure of the classical factors to resolve the
general philosophic difficulty with regard to
evolution, which makes the complex proceed
from the simple and the greater from the less.
Let us now study these five essential difficulties.

7
CHAPTER I
THE CLASSICAL FACTORS ARE POWERLESS TO EXPLAIN THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES

It is not difficult to show that neither the Darwinian


nor the Lamarckian hypothesis enables us to understand
the origin of characteristics that constitute a new
species.'" “
Let us take the Darwinian hypothesis first.
Natural selection, considered as an essential factor of
transformism, has grave obstacles to overcome, obstacles
of principle and obstacles of feet. It is unnecessary
to discuss them all, for one alone, the gravest, suffices to
demonstrate the impotence of the system. It is this
In order that any given modification occurring in
the characteristics of a species or an individual, should
give to that species or to that individual an appredable
advantage in the struggle for life, it is evident that this
modification must be sufficiently marked to be utiltsable.
Now an embryonic organ, a modification merely
adumbrated, appearing by chance in a being or a group
of beings, can be of no practical use and give them no
advantage.1
The bird comes from the reptile. Now an embryonic
wing, appearing by chance, one knows neither how nor
why, in the ancestral reptile, could not give that reptile
the capacity or the advantage of flight, and would give
it no superiority over other reptiles unprovided with the
unusable rudiment. It is therefore impossible to attribute
to natural selection the transition from reptile to bird.
The batrachian comes from the fish. There is no
i It is needless on tiie other hand to emphasise farther how alien to
science and philosophy alike it is to make chance the principal factor of
evolution.
9
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

doubt of this, since we see this evolution renew itself


in the life of the tadpole by a series of changes, perfecting
tie heart, causing lungs to appear, and developing legs.
But rudiments of legs and lungs would give no
advantage to a fish which might possess them. . In ^order
to have an advantage over its congeners, it is indispen¬
sable that its heart, lungs, and organs of locomotion
should be already sufficiently developed to allow it to
live out of the water; as the tadpole does, once its evolu¬
tion is complete, but not till then.
The embryonic transformations of insects are more
striking still. There is such an abyss between the
anatomy and the physiology of the larva and that of the
perfect insect^ that it is evidently impossible to find in
natural selection the explanation of its ancestral cvolu-
tion.1
Alive to the validity of this objection, certain neo-
Darwinians have not hesitated to call in the Lamarckian
theory of the influence of the environment and to refer
such modifications as are creative of new species to the
joint,influence of adaptation and selection.
"^’T'his theory, known as organic selection, has been
formulated by Baldwin and Osborn in America, and
by Lloyd Morgan in England. It may be summed up
as follows:—.
If the variation appearing by chance should coincide
or agree with an identical variation due to the environing
conofitions, this variation will be reinforced by the double
influence. Thenceforward it may be sufficiently marked
to allow selection to come in.
Delage and Goldsmith raise the objection, that 4 if
the inborn variation is at first too slightly marked

* Tie larva of the insect does not exactly represent the primitive
toseet, for the larva has undergone important changes following on
adaptations necessitated by its modes of existence. But even if wt tenure
these secondary modifications, there is still undeniably a vast abyss
betvreea what the primitive insect was and the evolved insect is.
ZO
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
to give, any advantage, and if in the definitive
constitution of the animal, ontogenetic1 adaptation
plays the greatest part, this adaptation will be pro¬
duced both in the individuals possessing the inborn
variation in question and in those devoid of it.
Would then the premium due to general variation
suffice to ensure survival of the one at the expense
of the other ? Most probably not, for, were it
otherwise, that variation alone would have sufficed.’

To this theory a still more definite objection may be


made: even admitting that the original variation might
be reinforced and doubled, or even tripled, it will none
the less be a very small variation. It will therefore never
explain the appearance of certain forms of life, such as
the bird form. An embryo wing, even exuberant in
.type, would none the less be unusable, giving no
superiority to the ancestral reptile.
Indeed this theory of organic selection adds nothing
to the Lamarckian doctrine which we will now examine.
According to this doctrine it is adaptation to new
conditions that brings about the formation of new species.
The origin of the creative modification is not due to
chance, but to need. The ultimate development of new
and characteristic orgafis comes by the repeated use of
these organs, and their atrophy by disuse.
Thus a series of adaptations produces a corresponding
series of minor variations, at first very small, but cumula¬
tive till they produce major transformations.
The Lamarckian theory has been adopted by the
great majority of contemporary naturalists, who endeavour
to reduce all transformism to the influence of the
environment.
The systems of Cope* and Packard* in America,
1 Ontogenetic. Gr. rA 6rra, existing things; yiv&n*, generation;
individual development as distinguished from genealogical development.
*Cope; The Primary Pacior of Organic Evolution.
1 Packard: Lamarch, the Founder of Evolution; His Life and Work.
II
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of Giard and Le Dantec in France, are Lamarckian
systems.
Packard has summed up the causes of variation as
seen by him as follows.

Neo-Lamarckism acknowledges and unites the


factors of the school of Saint Hilaire and those of
Lamarck as containing the most fundamental causes
of variation; it adds to these geographical isolation,
or segregation (Wagner and Guhck), the effects of
weight, of currents of air and water, the mode of
life, fixed, sedentary, or per contra, active; the results
of tension and of contact (Payder, Cope, and Osborn),
the principle of a change of function as bringing
about the appearance of new structures, (Dohrn), the
effects of parasitism, commensalism1 and_symbiosis,*
in short, of the biological environment,” as well as
natural and sexual selection and hybridism. In
fine, all conceivable primary factors.

Cope has made a special endeavour to explain the


appearance of variations bjr the action of these primary
factors. He refers variations to two essential causes.
The first is the direct effect of the environment, and
to all the factors above enumerated Cope gives the
general name ofphysiorgnesis. The second is the influence
of the use or disuse of organs, the physiological reactions
produced in the animal in response to exciting causes
in the environment. Cope calls this kinetogenesis.

This second cause would be of the first importance,


and Cope brings this out by his study of palaiontology.
He adduces innumerable examples in supjjort of his
thesis. One of the best known is the formation of the
foot by adaptation to speed, in plantigrade, and more
especially digitograde, quadrupeds, with the characteristic
»Identity of food. * UvJng togothor.
12
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
progressive reduction in the number of the digits
in the latter. The horsey for example, by its adaptation
to speed, has but one digit, the median, much hyper¬
trophied and terminated by a thick layer of horn, and two
rudimentary metacarpals accessible only by dissection;
but the reduction in the number and size of the lateral
digits is seen in the evolutionary series of its ancestors.
The formation of the articulations of the foot and
hand of mammals is equally typical. He observes
as follows:

The articulation of the foot, which is very strong,


presents two processes of the astragalus, the leading
bone of the foot, which project into two corresponding
sockets of the tibia, and a process of this latter fitting
into a socket of the astragalus. This structure does
not (as yet) exist either m the inferior vertebrates,
such as reptiles, or in the ancestral mammals of each
of the great living branches; it has been formed
little by little, by reason of a certain mode of move¬
ment and a certain attitude of the animal.
The external walls of these bones being formed
of stronger material than their central parts, the
sequence of development would seem to be_ as
follows: the astragalus is narrower than the tibia
which rests upon it, therefore the peripheral parts
of the former bone, being in contact not with equally
resisting parts of the latter but with portions relatively
softer, these, under this pressure, have suffered a
certain absorption of their substance, and two
depressions corresponding to the two edges of the
astragalus have been formed. This is precisely what
would be produced in more or less plastic, inert
substances under continuous pressure.
The central depression in the upper edge of the
astragalus arises mom a similar cause. Here the
inferior extremity of the tibia, having a relatively
13
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
slight resisting power, rests on a similarly weak
portion of the astragalus and is liable to continual
shocks. The consequence of such shocks must cause
the malleable parts of the bones to take the form
corresponding to the direction in which the weight
acts; a protuberance above and a depression below
will be formed. This is exactly what has resulted
in the tibia and the astragalus. From the tertiary
period up to our own day we can follow the formation
of this articulation: first, as in the Periptychns
rhabdodon of Mexico, a flat astragalus; then a slight
concavity more and more accentuated into an actual
socket {Poebrotkerium labiatum of Colorado), and
finally a protuberance penetrating into a concavity
of the tibia completes the articulation appears in
the Proihippus sejunctus, the ancestor of the present
horse. (Quoted by Delage and Goldsmith.)

Cope, however, does not confine himself to mechanical


concepts. He admits in evolution a kind of ‘ energy
of growth ’ not well defined, which he calls' bathmism,’1
an energy which would appear to be transmitted by the
germinal cells, and would constitute that true vital
dynamism which alone can enable us to understand
how function makes the organ.’
Dantec, on the other hand, who also maintains the
lamarckian doctrine, adheres to pure mechanism. 1 Ic
bases evolution on what he calls ‘ functional assimilation.’
According to this system, living matter, instead of being
used up and destroyed by functioning, as was taught

SS^3^SfSs^^&
[Translator's note.] ' D" M,th- °f Cnatirn, p. ao. -
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
by physiologists of the school of Cl. Bernard, develops
by functioning. That which is worn and expended is
merely reserve material, such as fat, the sugar of the
tissues, etc.; but the living matter itself, such as muscle,
increases by use.
. Jpaifttains that it is in virtue of this * functional
assimilation * that adaptation to environment and con¬
secutive progress take place.
However this may be, it is evident that the Lamarckian
doctrine is infinitely more satisfying than the Darwinian,
But is it completely so ? By no means.
It can account for the appearance of a number of
secondary organic details and more or less important
modifications, such as the atrophy of the eye of the
mole, the hypertrophy of the median digit in the
Equidae, or the special structure of the articulations of
the foot; but, as a general theory, it is assuredly false,
because it is powerless to explain the more important facts.
It does not explain the major transformations which
have been considered in our criticism of the Darwinian
hypothesis.
Confronted with these, Lamarckianism is as power¬
less as Darwinism, because these transformations imply
radical, and so to speak immediate, changes, and not an
accumulation of small and slow modifications.
The transition from an aquatic to a terrestrial mode
of life, and from a terrestrial to an aerial, can by no
means be regarded as results of adaptation.
The ancestral species, adapted to very special
surroundings, had no need to change them, and had
they felt the need, would have been unable to meet it.
How could the reptilian ancestor of the bird adapt
itself to surroundings which were not its own and
could only become its own after it had passed from the
reptilian to the bird form ? Before possessing usable
(not embryonic) wings, it could not have an aerial life
to which to adapt itself.
15
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The same line of reasoning applies, of course, to the
transition from the fish to the batrachian.
But it is in the evolution of the insect that the
impossibility of transformation .by adaptation is yet more
obviousT There is no connection between the biology
of the larva, which represents, to some degree at any
rate, the primitive state of the ancestral insect, and the
biology of the perfect insect form. One cannot even
conceive by what mysterious series of adaptations an
insect, accustomed to larval life, underground or in
water, could succeed in gradually creating for itself
wings for an aerial life, closed to it and doubtless unknown.
When, further, one considers that this mysterious
series of adaptations would have had to take place, not
once, by a kind of ‘ natural miracle,’ but as many times
as there are genera of winged insects, it becomes as
hopeless to deduce the appearance of these species from
Lamarckian as from Darwinian factors.
This point is in fact self-evident. Plate himself
perfectly understood the impossibility of explaining these
major transformations by ‘ adaptation,’ when he wrote
that * by the very feet that an animal belongs to a certain
group, the possibilities of variation are restrained, and in
many cases, restrained within very narrow limits.’
Therefore Lamarckianism and Darwinism are alike
incapable of giving a general explanation applicable to
all cases, of the appearance of new species. If the
majority of biologists who hold to transformism do
not yet admit this, there are, nevertheless, those who do,
and endeavour to find elsewhere a superior factor in
evolution which may get over the difficulties inherent in
the classical evolutionary theories.
Some neo-Lamarckians, such as Pauly, attribute to
the constituent elements of the organism, to the organism
itself,, to plants, and to minerals, a kind of profound
consciousness which might originate all modifications
and all adaptations. At all steps of the evolutionary
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
scale they see a continuous and intentional effort towards
adaptation.
Nageli is still more precise: according to him the
organism includes two kinds of plasm: the nutritive,
common to all species and not differentiated; and the
specific, or idio-plasm.
This idio-plasm would contain not only the micellian
fasciculi which characterise it, but also an internal
evolutionary tendency with all the capacities and poten¬
tialities for transformation and perfectibility. This
potentiality must have existed in the first living forms
from the very beginnings of life. External factors hence¬
forth would only facilitate adaptation; but would of
themselves be incapable of initiating evolution. They
would but aid and favour evolution, and bring it under
their special rhythm.
These concepts of NSgeli’s arc extremely interesting.
They eventuate in the conclusion that evolution has
come about, not by the influence of the environment,
but conformably to it.
Adaptation appears in all cases as a consequence,
sometimes as a determining factor, but never as a
sufficient and essential cause.
An impartial study of the modifications which
originate species leads necessarily to this conclusion.
But such a concept is absolutely contrary to classical
naturalism.

17
CHAPTER II

FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS TO EXPLAIN TIIF


^ORIGIN OF INSTINCTS

It is well known that the instincts of animals arc as


innumerable as they are marvellous. They have in
common the characteristic that they allow the creature
to act spontaneously, without reasoned thought, without
hesitation or groping, and to attain the desired end with a
certainty with which neither reason, nor training, nor
impulse, can compare.
Thanks to instinct, an animal of any given species
always acts conformably to the genius of its kind, some¬
times in a very complex manner, for attack, defence,
subsistence, reproduction, and so forth. The essential
instinct is identical in all the individuals of the same
species, and seems as refractory to variation as the
species itself. For each species it constitutes a psyi Ideal
characteristic as well defined as the physical.
Now the origin of instincts is no more explicable
by natural selection or by the influence of the environ*
ment than the formation of species. This can he best
observed in the insect. Fabre has done imperishable
work in this.direction, and it is to his writings that we
must refer in order to understand the characteristic
variety, complexity, and sureness of these instincts, as
well as the impossibility of explaining them by the
classical notions.
A few examples will suffice. Take, for instance, the
Sitaris, quoted by Bergson as one of the most remark
able.
‘The Sitaris deposits its eggs at the entrance of the
holes which a certain species of bee, the Anthophora,
18
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
digs in the earth. The lam of the Sitaris, after a long
w,ait, seeks the male anthophora as he leaves the gallery,
fastens on him and remains attached until his nuptial
flight; it then profits by the occasion to pass from the
male to the female and waits until the latter lays her
eggs. It then fastens on the egg, which will support
it in the honey, devours the egg in a few days, and
resting on the empty shell, undergoes its first trans¬
formation.
* Now organised to float on the honey, it becomes
first a grub, and then a perfect insect. Everything
happens as if the larva of the Sitaris when hatched knew
that the male anthophora will emerge first from the hole,
that the nuptial flight will give an opportunity of passing
to the female, that this latter will convey it to a reserve
of honey fit for its nourishment when transformed, and
that previous to that metamorphosis it will have fed on
the egg, so that the empty shell may float with it on the
surface of the honey, and incidentally that it will suppress
the rival which would have come from the egg. And
similarly everything comes to pass as if the Sitaris knew
that its lam would know all these things.’
Another classical example is that of the hunting
hymenoptera. The lam of these insects requires a
motionless and living prey; motionless, because any
defensive movements might imperil the delicate egg
and afterwards the tiny grub developing in one part
of the caterpillar; and livmg, because this grub cannot
subsist on dead matter.
To realise this double necessity for its larva, the
hymenopteron must paralyse the victim without killing
it. If the insect acted from reason this operation would
need extraordinary knowledge and skill. It would first
have to proportion the dose of poison so as to administer
just enough to paralyse without killing; and further,
still more important, it should have a knowledge of the
anatomy and physiology of the caterpillar and an infallible
19
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
sureness of action to strike at once on the right spot
by surprise, for the prey is often formidably armed and
stronger than the aggressor.
The poisoned sting must therefore be directed with
certainty on the motor nervous centres, and there only.
One, two, or several stabs are needed, according to the
number or concentration of the nerve-ganglions. This
function, so unerringly exercised by the insect, has not
been learned. When the hymenopteron tears its cocoon
and emerges from underground, its parents and prede¬
cessors have been long dead, and the insect itself will
perish without seeing its progeny or its successors. The
instinct cannot therefore be transmitted by example nor
by training. It is innate.
How can the origin of this instinct be explained by
any of the classical factors of evolution ?
Instinct, we are told, is but a habit acquired little by
little and transmitted by heredity.
Fabre laid himself out to demonstrate the impossi¬
bility of this concept.

Some sand-wasp in the long distant past, would


have reached, by chance, the nerve-centres of a
grub, benefiting by the act partly herself by avoiding
a struggle not devoid of danger, and partly for her
larva, provided with fresh game, alive but Karmless.
She must then have endowed her race, by heredity,
with the propensity to repeat these advantageous
tactics. The maternal gift would not have favoured
all her descendant’s equally . . . then would have
followed the struggle for life ... the weaker
would have succumbed, the strong would have
prospered, and from age to age, selection in conjunc¬
tion with life would nave transformed the fugitive
impression of the first act into the deep, ineffaceable
instinct at which we marvel in the hymenoptcra of
to-day.
20
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
That selection (Darwinian hypothesis) or re¬
peated exercise (Lamarckian hypothesis), may have
reinforced and perfected these instincts is possible
or even probable. But according to Fabre, neither
the one nor the other can explain the origin of the
instinct itself.
Neither chance nor need can explain how the
sting of the primitive insect found at once, without
trials, the nerve-ganglion, and was able to paralyse
without killing. Actually 4 there was no reason
for a choice: the stabs had to be given on the upper
surface, on the lower surface, on the side, from the
front, from behind, at random, according to the
chances of a struggle . . . and how many points
are there on the skin and interior of a gray cater¬
pillar ? Rigorous mathematics would reply: An
infinity.’ Nevertheless the sting must strike once
and infallibly: ‘the art of provisioning the lam
requires a master, and cannot admit apprenticeship.
The wasp must excel from the first or make no
attempt ... no middle term, no half-success ■mill
suffice.’ Either the caterpillar is operated upon
exactly, or the death of the aggressor and therefore
of her descendants ensues. But this is not all:
4 Let the desired end be attained; only half the
work is done. A second egg is required to complete
the future pair and give progeny. Therefore, at a
few days’ or hours’ interval, a second stab must be
given as luckily placed as the first. This is to repeat
the impossibility and raise it to the second power 1 ’

It is true that these conclusions by Fabre have


recently been impugned as too, absolute. Researches
by Marchal, byPeckham, by Perez, and by most con¬
temporary naturalists, seem to demonstrate that the
primary instincts, in some of their details at least, are
variable and perfectible.
21
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
But the primordial difficulty—the origin of the
primary instinct—still remains in its entirety. Even if
it be possible to attribute the appearance or secondary
instincts or the various modes or primary ones to the
operation of the classical factors, the origin of these
primary instincts is as difficult to discover as the origin
of species.
The instinct to use the poisoned sting puts the
same problem as the origin of the sting itself. Neither
the organ nor the instinct can play a useful part as agents
of adaptation or selection till sufficiently developed and
perfected. 'Jherefore, as for species, so for instincts,
neither adaptation nor selection can be an essential or
creative factor.

22
CHAPTER III

FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS TO EXPLAIN ABRUPT


■ TRANSFORMATIONS, CREATIVE OF NEW SPECIES.

Lamarckism, like Darwinism, lays down the thesis of


very small, slow, and innumerable modifications as
necessary to the progressive genesis of species.
This concept, which has been accepted as a dogma,
would seem above controversy. When, recently, De
Vries made known his observations on what he called
I mutations,’ *V._the_abrupt appearance ofjiew vegetable
species from the ancestral species, witEput any Inter¬
mediate'transitional forms^ he threw all those interested
in philosophical naturalism into confusion and disorder.
For several years a curious spectacle was presented.
The fact of mutation supplied the doctrine of
transformability with the only proof that was lacking
—experimental verification. Nevertheless it was seen,
on the one hand, that transformists endeavoured to
minimise the importance of the new facts and the scope
of the new theory; and on the other, naive adversaries
adopted it with enthusiasm, both imagining that the
ruin of the classical teaching would involve the ruin of
the evolutionary idea alsol
Le Dantec, in his book, La Crtse du Transformisme,*
thus expresses himself.

‘ A new theory based on verified experiments has


seen the light a few years sincg, and has made
numerous converts in the-domain of the natural
sciences. But this theory of mutations or abrupt
variations is the negation of Lamarckism; I might
1 Published by F61ix Alcan (Paris).
23
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
almost say that it is the negation of transformism
itself.’
He adds, * In fact, from a philosophical point
of view, transformism is the system which explains
the progressive and spontaneous appearance of mar¬
vellously co-ordinated living mechanisms, such as
those of Man and the higher animals.’

It will be seen in the sequel that the spontaneous


appearance of living beings is a philosophical impossi¬
bility. The progressive appearance of such beings is in
no way traversed by the theory of mutations.
It is only the hypothetical machinery, the supposed
genesis of progressive transformations, which is in
Formal opposition to the new frets.
Le Dantec, and the naturalists of his school who
identify transformism with its classical factors, are in
some measure logical when they seek to limit as much
as possible the area of mutations. But the evolutionary
idea itself has nothing to fear from the new discoveries;
rather the contrary, as I shall endeavour to prove.
Moreover, Le Dantec is almost alone in his opinion
when he affirms that mutations affect secondary, and
mainly ornamental, characteristics only, ‘leaving the
hereditary patrimony intact.’
Since the experiments by De Vries, very many new
observations have been published, and the palmary
importance of mutation is no longer denied, or indeed
deniable.1
The only question that remains is to ascertain whether
mutation is, in fact, the rule, or an exception. De Vries
states dearly that abrupt transformation is the rule, for
animals as for plants; and he may well be right. In
fret if the whole history of transformations on the
evolutionary scale is dosely examined, it will be found

(PubPnSS1'i^.)rranS/W”fl<<0ni *** hm Vivants-


24
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
that the theory of mutations is strikingly confirmed.
By its light, and with closer study, truths which have
been ignored or unconsciously slurred over become
immediately obvious.
These truths had, however, been already stated by
great naturalists such as Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire; but
they made no way, and the thesis of slow transformations
found no one to contradict it until the work of De Vries
appeared.
Starting from his theory of mutations, Cope resumed
the study of fossil forms, more especially of the
batrachians and mammals of America, and he found
no difficulty in demonstrating the probability of their
progressive variation by abrupt mutations.
It is, moreover, easy, on the data of the palaeonto¬
logical records which are ‘ the archives of creation/ to
verify that the appearance of most of the main species,
always seems to be abrupt.
Batrachians, reptiles, birds, and mammals suddenly
appear in the geologic strata. Once there, they seem
very rapidly to acquire the characteristics which they will
subsequently retain without any essential modification
as long as the species remains in existence..
No doubt, palaeontology presents transitional forms.
But these are rare, and (a more serious matter) they
seem to be intermediary rather than transitional.
For example, let us take the archeopteryx, the most
remarkable of these intermediate species. We see. a
bird-reptile, having affinities with each. But its species
is determinate and clearly specialised. The archeopteryx
has the constitution of the reptile, but it has also well-
developed wings, capable of flight, bird’s, wings..
A reptile with embryonic wings, or wings indicated
at the beginning of their development, has never been
found.
What is true for the archeopteryx is equally true for
all known intermediate forms; they are all well marked,
*5
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
special, and very distinct types, allowing of the use of
the organs characteristic of each species.
Whilst palaeontology presents many rudimentary
organs, residues of those which are useless and dis¬
carded, it never shows organs outlined but as yet
unusable.
It seems, therefore, that abrupt transformations may
well be the rule in evolution.
But it is evident that the abrupt appearances of new
species can be explained neither by natural selection
nor by the influence of the environment. Le Dantcc
recognises this when he exclaims, ‘ a mutation produced
under my eyes is a lock to which I have no kcyl ’1
1 La Crise du Transfommme.

26
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
have been convinced by the preceding demonstration
of the impotence of the classical factors, to turn his
thoughts to the precise and unanswerable evidence
which Nature seems to have specially put forward to
guard us from error. This is the testimony of the
Insect.

28
CHAPTER V

THE TESTIMONY OF THE INSECT

To consider the insect attentively is to be convinced of


the emptiness of ancient and modern theories on the
creation or'cae evolution of species.
The insect, appearing in the first ages of terrestrial
life, and showing in all cases the essential stability of
its species once they have appeared, bears strong testi¬
mony against the concept of continuous transformations
by innumerable slow variations.
The chasm which separates the perfect insect from
its larva—an abyss in which the Darwinian and
Lamarckian theories are hopelessly lost—is testimony
against its evolution by the classical factors of selection
and adaptation. The disconcerting and marvellous
spectacle of its primary instincts, which those factors
are powerless to explain, is another argument against
them.
The radical, and (so to speak) spontaneous trans¬
formations in a closed chrysalis almost isolated from
the action of external agencies, is opposed to the concept
of evolution by such agencies.
The transformations and metamorphoses, and the
progressive or regressive changes of its larval existence
are equally opposed to the concept of a continuous and
uninterrupted evolution by functional assimilation.
Yet more opposed to these is the amazing pheno¬
menon of histolysis1 in the chrysalis, by which most
of its organs are reduced to an amorphous emulsion,
preparatory to the coming transformation.
* Histolysis.—Gr. I»r4t= tissue, XiSaws* solution the solution of tissue.
29
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

This stupefying testimony, teaching us that neither


the radical changes in the larva, nor the mysterious
histolysis, compromise in any way the future morphology
of the perfect insect, upsets all our concepts on the
• building up of the organism and of the transformations
of species.1 jBy.its whole biology, the. insect presents
the. symbol of what evolution really is, and as we shall
sg.e. later, it proves that.the essential cause of evolution
should be sought neither in the influence of the environ-
'ment, nor in the reactions of organic"'matter to that
'environment; but in a dynamism4 independent of that
' organic matter directing it and superior to it.
It shows us evolution taking place primarily by an
internal jmpulse entirely distinct from" surrounding
influences, for, a-primotdiaLeffort unerring but still
mysterious and absolutely inexplicable by classical
naturalism.
Not only so: this incomparable testimony, while it
is the negation of contemporaneous naturalistic theories,
contradicts also the antiquated concept of Providential
creation.
From the psychological point of view, the leading
.characteristic of the insect is that it possesses pure
instinct almost without a trace of intelligence. Further,
we find that this pure instinct, which has remained
such for ages, is marked by a refined and cruel ferocity
without counterpart in the rest of the animal world, but
nevertheless perfectly innocent.
This ferocity then, if there were a responsible
Creator, would be the pure, the immaculate work of

nt ^ te8bmo"y °f the insect is that of certain species


of molluscs aadcrustaceans. Before arriving at the adult form, animate
speolf?r unl*r3° extraordinary modification*, by very diverse
adaptations. NeyerUtSess the future development of these animate
continues m despite of their metamorphoses, as if governed by an uxuUter*
able and immanent directive pt™«rfr, 6 *

* J£?5f!;,nl8m!?^5FS!® means of power: holding the same relation


to dynamics aa ‘mecEaS&m*-to meclWs.-[Xraii»fator?8 note.]
30
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
that Creator, whose creation would then appear to be his
faithful reflexion.1
It is evidently worth while to consider the insect
and to give its testimony due weight. If this testimony
had not been so neglected, it would have saved philosophy
from many errors. Unfortunately, as Schopenhauer
says; * We do not understand the language or Nature,
because it is too simpIeU '
i We shall see that philosophical idealism, based on facts, is com¬
pletely detached from the old concepts of dogmatic theology.

31
CHAPTER VI

FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL FACTORS TO RESOLVE THE


GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTY RELATING TO
EVOLUTION, HOW THE COMPLEX CAN PROCEED FROM
THE SIMPLE, AND THE GREATER FROM THE LESS

This difficulty has been entirely neglected or evaded


by classical transformism. It is nevertheless a formidable
one.
The spontaneous appearance of forms superior to
the originals is a pure impossibility, alike from the
scientific and from the philosophic point of view.
There is no escape from the dilemma: either there
is no evolution, or it implies a potential immanence in
the evolving universe.
Evolution being demonstrated, we are compelled to
admit that all the progressive and complex transforma¬
tions that have been realised .existed potentially in the
primitive_elejnentary forms or form.
This in no way means that evolution, as it has actually
come to pass, existed in germ in such and such a primi¬
tive form in like manner as the living creature exists
in germ in the egg from which it will be hatched.
Such pre-established finality seems very highly
improbable. The meaning is that the primitive form
contained all potentialities, those which have, and those
which as yet have not been realised; in the past, the
present, and the future.
In this philosophical concept what function is
assigned to the classical evolutionary factors ?
■ Simply that they are secondary and accessory.
They have played an obvious part; they have
3a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
imposed a particular rhythm on evolution, and have
favourecHt, but they have not produced it.
One might, strictly speaking, imagine evolution
proceeding -without the intervention of selection or
adaptation; but -we cannot conceive it as proceeding by
them alone.
This is the main conclusion to which we are irre¬
sistibly led.
Thus, classical naturalism, travelling by a very long
road, which it has vainly explored in every direction,
finds itself willingly or unwillingly, brought back to
seek the first cause which it has sought to avoid. Its
avowed inability to find the essential factors of evolution
allows of no more fresh starts on the same road.
Fiske said that transformism had restored to the
world as much ‘ teleology ’1 as it had taken away.
This is not happily expressed, for it implies the kind
of finality which would fix arbitrarily and in advance
the trend of evolution.
But what is indubitable, and results clearly from a
thorough study of transformism, is the conclusion, that
evolutionary science cannot dispense with philosophy.
1 Teleology “the doctrine of adaptation to purpose.

33
PART II

THE CLASSICAL PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL


CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL
FOREWORD

In the foregoing chapters the insufficiency of the classical


concept of evolution as a whole has been clearly brought
out. We shall now endeavour to show the insufficiency
of the classical concept of the individual.
This concept rests on two principal notions: Unicism,1
and the negation of the unity of the Self.
Unicism rejects the ancient spiritualist, animist, and
yitalist theories which advanced the claim that there are
in the individual dynamic or psychic principles different
in essence from the organism.
It bases its conclusion on the chemical and morpho¬
logical unity of living forms; on the absence of any
positive discontinuity between living and inert matter;
on the laws of biological energy, as clear and precise
as those of physical energy and m agreement with them.
The negation of the unity of the Self is similarly
based on the negation of the spiritualist, animist, and
vitalist principles, which, in the old psycho-physiological
concepts separated human from animal life, and that
from the mineral. These notions being put aside,
the conclusion is that the Self is but the synthesis or
the complex of the elements constituting the organism.
Fundamental to a living being, says Dastre,® we
find ‘the activity proper to each cell—elementary or
cellular life; above that, the forms of activity resulting
from the association of cells, the collective life, the sum,
or rather the complex, of the partial lives of its elements.’
But these two notions—naturalistic unicism and
negation of the unity of the Self—are only connected
by a philosophical misunderstanding or by a mere error
* Unicism**the doctrine of the uniformity of all matter.
* Dastre; La Vie et la Mort,
37 *
Foreword
of reasoning. The monistic philosophy does not neces¬
sarily imply the conception of the Self as a mere cellular
complex, it even (as we shall see) agrees better with the
opposite concept of its central unity. .
If, abandoning for the moment all metaphysical
ideas on the constitution of the individual, we keep
strictly to the data of fact, we are confronted with a
leading verity: there are in the individual different
modalities1 of energy, and these modalities, even though
theoretically conceivable as proceeding from a single
energy, are not equivalent.
There are in the living being * material energy,’
* dynamic energy,’ as it may be termed, and ‘ psycho¬
logical energy’; and these modalities of energy appear
to us to be both distinct in themselves and graded with
respect to each other. Such are the data of fact.
Starting from these verified facts we can, without
losing our way among metaphysical notions, conceive of
the living being in two different ways.
The first sees the individual only as a complex of
partial and elementary individualities. In this concept,
the apparent grades observable in a living being, are
simple functions of orientation and relative position.
This is the classical concept.
The second sees the individual as a complex yet
more complex, in which the elements form autonomous
and distinct cadres—a graded hierarchy. These cadres
or hierarchic series are not, let us repeat, necessarily
different in essence; but they have different activities
and capacities, or if the expression is preferred, are at
different evolutionary levels.
We may thus conceive of a dynamic and psychological
complex above the material and organic complex,
organising and centralising it; which psychological
complex might itself be capable of rational sub-division
1 Modalities=modes in the logical sense, distinguishing between
various modes.
38
Foreword
up to the discovery of the central entity, the real Self,
one and indivisible.
These two modes of regarding the individual remain
the same, under whatever mode, monist or pluralist,
we may regard things at large.
The former concept has in its favour, simplicity
and the methodological principle of economy of causation.
Against it there is the diversity between physio¬
logical and psychological facts, and the insurmountable
difficulty of subordinating the latter to the former; and,
more especially, its flagrant insufficiency in explaining,
not merely psychic activity, but even vital activity.
Methodical analysis of the classical concepts of
physiological and psychological individuality will bring
this out.

39
CHAPTER I
THE CLASSICAL NOTION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY

The concept of the physical Self as a mere complex of


cells comes into collision with serious difficulties. We
may classify these like those of the evolutionary theories.
They are: difficulties relating to the general concept of
polyzoism;1 those relating to the specific form of the
individual, to the building, the maintenance and the
repair of the organism; those relating to embryonic
and post-embryonic metamorphoses; and those relating
to the so-called supernormal physiology.

I.—DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO THE POLYZOIST CONCEPT.

The description given by Dastrc» of physical


individuality is as follows.
‘ We imagine the complex living being, whether
plant or animal, with its form that distinguishes
it from all others^ as a populous city, distinguished
by a thousand traits from a neighbouring city. Its
elements are independent and autonomous by the
same title as the anatomical elements of the organism.
Each has in itself the springs of life, which it neither
borrows from its neighbours nor draws from the
community. All these inhabitants have a definite life,
and even breathe and are nourished after the same
manner, possessing all the same general human
faculties; but each has, over and above, his own
trade, industry, aptitudes, and talents by which he
contributes to the social life, and in his turn depends
^/Pdy«ism*a constitution similar to a colony of livln# cclh or
*Dastre; La Vie at h Mori.
40
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
upon it. The statesman, the mason, the baker, the
butcher, the manufacturer, the artist, all perform
different tasks and supply different products, more
numerous and varied as the social state is more
perfect. The living being, whether plant or animal
is a city of this kind.’
The grave objections to this theory are immediately
apparent.
The picture set before us as that of a living being
is that or an animal colony pure and simple. Possibly
correct for some forms which have only the outward
show of individualisation, for inferior animals of the
type of zoophytes, it cannot be considered true for
animals sharply marked off from other orders of life.
In the city described by Dastre the most essential
feature is missing: a centralised direction, which alone
is able, first to unite, and then to maintain, to order, and
to direct the State for the common welfare.

2.-—difficulties relating to the specific form of


THE INDIVIDUAL, TO THE BUILDING, THE MAIN¬
TENANCE, AND THE REPAIR OF THE ORGANISM.

The classical concept leaves unexplained all that


relates to the life, the formation, the development, and
the maintenance of the organism. To it, physiology is
an entire mystery. That this mysteriousness is not
immediately apparent, is due to a well-known illusion of
the human mind, which is always prone to think that it
understands a thing merely because it is familiar. The
philosophical mind naturally reacts against this pendency;
the many are irresistibly carried away by it. ‘The
more unintelligent a man is,’ Schopenhauer writes, ‘ the
less mysterious existence seems to him. Everything
qiwna to him to carry in itself the explanation of its
How and Why.’
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Now nothing is more familiar in its main outlines
than the functioning of our own organism, and nothing
seems simpler to the vulgar mind; but in reality nothing
is more mysterious.
What life is in itself involves a mystery as. yet
impenetrable. The vital mechanism, and the activity
of the great organic functions, are equally unexplained.
This activity, which lies outside the conscious will of
the Self, is elaborated and completed unconsciously,
exactly as we shall see is the case in so-called super¬
normal physiology. Normal function is just as * occult ’
as that which is called supernormal.
Even the constitution of the organism and all that
pertains to it, birth, growth, embryonic development,
maintenance of the personality throughout life, organic
repair (which in certain animals goes as far as the repro¬
duction of lost members and even of viscera), all these
are so many insoluble enigmas if the classical concept of
individuality be accepted.
Let us tty, by the light of this concept, to understand
the building up and the functioning of the anatomico-
physiological individuality, leaving purely philosophical
and even psychological questions on one side. I -et us
look only at the physical being, the physiological
individual, considered as a cdlld£E_complcx. Whence
and how does the complex of cells that makes up a
living being draw its specific form ? How docs it keep
that form throughout its life ? How is its physical
personality formed, maintained, and repaired ?
It is not admissible, let us remark, to invoke an
organising dynamism, for that is rejected by classical
physiology. We cannot even resort to the ‘directing
idea * of Claude Bernard, which is held to be antiquated.
How, then, does the cellular complex, by the mere fact
of the association of its constituent elements, acquire this
vital and individualising power ?
Whence? How? why? Once more, so many
4a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
mysteries! Dastre characterises as ‘unfathomable’
the mystery by which in embryonic development ‘the
ovum-cell, drawing to itself external material, succeeds
in building up the marvellous structure which is the
body of an animal, the body of a man, even of a
particular man.’ Nevertheless explanations have been
sought and found. They are disconcertingly feeble.
Le Dantec, for instance, declares that the form of a
creature, and its whole constitution, necessarily depend
on its chemical composition, on the relation established
between the specific form and this chemical composition.
He writes in all seriousness : * The form of a greyhound
is simply the condition of equilibrium of the greyhound
chemical substance.’
‘ This,’ remarks Dastre ‘ is saying a great deal too
much, if it means that the body of the dog is “ a
substance ” which behaves after the fashion of
homogeneous isotropical masses like melted sulphur
or dissolved salt: it is better, but means much less,
if it signifies in the mind of the physiologist that
the body of the greyhound is the condition of
equilibrium of a heterogeneous, non-isotropic, material
system under infinitely numerous chemical and
physical conditions. The idea of attributing form
—and therefore organisation—only to chemical com¬
position, has not had its birth from the mind of
chemists, nor from that of physiologists.’
In reality the supposed explanation by Le Dantec is
nothing but a verbal explanation, which substitutes qq£_
difficulty for~ another.' InsteacT of "the question: How
is the specific form realised ? we are led, if we admit
Le Dantec’s hypothesis, to ask: How is the condition
of chemical equilibrium which is the basis of the specific
form, realised and maintained ? The mystery is just
as great as before. But even taken as it stands, the
hypothesia—cannot bs__a.ualaiafid» for it can give
no account, as we shall see later on, of the changes
43
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
undergone by the organism during embryonic develop¬
ment.
As the classical concept of the Self cannot account
for the building up of the organism and its specific
form, so also it cannot explain how this organism main¬
tains and repairs itself during life.
Nothing is more curious than the efforts of naturalists
and physiologists to explain individual permanence in
despite of perpetual cellular renewal.
Claude Bernard sought to demonstrate that vital
functions are necessarily accompanied by organic destruc¬
tion and regeneration.
‘ When there is movement,’ he says,1 ‘ in a man
or an animal, a part of the active substance of the
muscle is destroyed or burned; when sensation and
will are manifested, the nerves are used up; when
thought is exercised, the brain is consumed in some
measure. It may be said that the same matter is
never used twice during life. When an act is
accomplished, that portion of living matter which
has served to produce it exists no longer. If the
phenomenon is repeated, it is by the rid of new
patter. . . . In a word, physico-chemical destruction
is everywhere conjoined with functional activity, and
we may regard as a physiological axiom the proposi¬
tion : Every manifestation of action in a living being
is necessarily connected with organic destruction.’
But this axiom is impugned by contemporary
physiologists. In opposition to Claude Bernard, their
efforts tend to establish, that really living substance,
protoplasm, is much less destroyed during fife than was
imagined. Cellular renovation, according to them, is
very slight. (Chauveau, PflUger.)
Certain physiologists (Mannesco) have not hesitated
to ascribe indefinite duration to the cerebral cells.
Finally, Le Dantec, going further still, declares that
1 Claude Bernard: Lts Pkinominss it la Via.
44
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
not only is living matter not destroyed by use, but that
it increases.
It would seem that nothing should be easier than
to decide experimentally the problem of cellular destruc¬
tion, by quantitative analysis of the nitrogenous waste
in the urine. In fact it is very difficult to distinguish
between the part that comes from the albuminoids in
food, and that which comes from waste of the organism;
and the best conducted researches such as those of Igo
Kaup still give uncertain results.
But in default of proof from the laboratory, reasoning
suffices to prove the perpetual destruction and restora¬
tion of cellular protoplasm.
At the outset and, a priori, without need of demonstra¬
tion, it seems that such a tiny element as the living cell
should necessarily have short life; much shorter in any
case, than that of the organism to which it belongs. It
would therefore be renewed x times during the life of
that organism.
Further, the imperious necessity for ingestion by the
living being of nitrogenous elements in considerable
quantity can be explained only by the needs of cellular
regeneration. Otherwise we should be driven to the
absurd supposition that the nitrogen is ingested to be
immediately eliminated, and is not an indispensable
nutriment, while the contrary is well established.
Therefore, even if further research should prove
that the living cell remains intact, as a framework,
throughout life, that would by no means imply that it
remains intact as to its constituent molecules.
The problem of molecular renewal replaces that of
cellular renewal, and the question remains neither more
nor less mysterious. Thus the * directive idea ’ neces¬
sarily presides over the maintenance of the personality as
it presides at its building up.
The difficulties which we have rapidly reviewed are
already considerable; but they are as nothing compared
45
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
with those that we shall now examine. The problems of
embryonic and post-embryonic metamorphoses, and the
problem of so-called supernormal physiology, if we take
the trouble to look at them conjointly, enable us to affirm
that the classical concept of physical individuality is
erroneous, and that the living being is quite other than
a cellular complex.
We shall probe to the quick the fundamental defect
of the ascending method which strives to adapt an
explanation to simple or relatively simple facts, while
evading the inherent difficulties of complex or relatively
complex facts.
If we look at physiology as a whole and synthetically,
without putting aside these primordial difficulties; and,
a fortiori, if we give weight to them, then the concept
that results is undeniably and evidently quite opposed
to that which some have sought to deduce from mediocre,
narrow, and tentative analytical researches.

3-—the problem of embryonic and post-embryonic


METAMORPHOSES.

. It is well known that embryonic and post-embryonic


development, far from being uniform, proceeds by a
series of metamorphoses. These sometimes retrace the
previous evolutionaty changes of the species, and some¬
times reflect the divergent adaptations realised during
larval life. Metamorphoses are common to all animals!
but are specially remarkable among those which have
a prolonged larval life after leaving the egg, such as
batrachians, molluscs, and annelids. By these changes
the development of the animal assumes successive forms
jeV fr°m one another, before reaching the
definitive adult shape. These facts are a complete
negation of the classical theories on the building ud of
the organism. 6 v
46
From the \Jnconscious to the Conscious
Let us return to Le Dantec’s explanation of specific
form. Are we to admit that the conditions of chemical
equilibrium, which is its supposed basis, continually
change during the development of an animal, and change
in a given sense following a pre-determined direction
leading to the adult form ? So be it; but this is once
more to have recourse to the ‘ directing idea,’ in other
words, to restore to physiology all the finality which it
claimed to discard.
The tadpole has all the organs, the constitution,
and the mode of life of a fish. Suddenly, without change
of environment or mode of life, its conditions of chemical
equilibrium are about to alter. They will be modified
in such a manner, according to Le Dantec, that legs
will appear, that lungs will replace gills, that
the heart with two cavities will become one with
three cavities; in short, that the fish will become a
frogl
Consider the medusa. Its successive larval forms are
so different from each other that they were long taken
for distinct animals.
How is the genesis of these successive forms to be
explained by modifications in the chemical equili¬
brium ?
In these metamorphoses of embryonic life there is a
double problem. First the problem of the metamorphoses
themselves. How do they come about ? How do they
recall either the transitional forms of the evolutionary
ancestry, or the details of divergent larval adaptations ?
Where, and how, is the ineffaceable imprint of .these
ancestral forms and adaptations preserved ?
Then there is the problem of the individual expansion.
How is it that these changes do not interfere with its
reaching the definite adult form ? How is it that this
form is always attained, certainly and without fail ? If
we sec nothing in the individual but a cellular complex,
the double problem cannot be solved.
47
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The mystery becomes clearer only if it be admitted
that above the metamorphoses, above the organic and
physiological modifications and the revolutions in the
chemical equilibrium of life, there exists the directive
dominant of a superior dynamism.

4.—THE HISTOLYSIS OF THE INSECT

It is in the post-embryonic development of certain


insects that the evidence 0$, thisjiominant appears in
the most striking manner. As is well known, certain
insects undergo their last and greatest transformation
in the chrysalis. They are then subject to an extremely
curious change—histolysis..
In the protective envelope of the chrysalis, which shuts
off the animal from light and from external perturbing
influences, a strange elaboration takes place, singularly
like that which will presently be described unaer the
head of the so-called supernormal physiology. The
body of the insect is dematerialised. It is disintegrated, and
melts into, a kind of uniform pap, a simple amorphous
substance in which the majority of organic and specific
distinctions disappear. There is the bare fact in all its
import.
Doubtless the question of histolysis is far from being
fully elucidated. Since its discovery by Weissmann in
1864, naturalists have not been able to come to entire
agreement on the extent of the dissolution nor on its
mechanism. It is, however, well established, * that when >
the larva becomes immobile and is transformed into a '
pupa, most of its tissues disappear by histolysis. The
tissues thus destroyed are the hypodermic cells of the
first four segments, the breathing tubes, the muscles,
the fatty body and the peripheral nerves. Of these
there remain no visible cellular elements. At the same
48
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
time the cells of the middle intestine assemble in a
central mass, making a sort of magma/1
Then a new generation of tissue takes place, partly
from the magma resulting from the histolysis, partly
from the proliferation of special corpuscles called image¬
bearing discs. The newly-formed portions of die
organism thus seem to have no direct filiation with the
destroyed parts of the larval organism.
Whether we like it or not, die evidence of such facts
upsets all the classical biologic concepts—chemical
equilibrium as conditioning specific form, cellular
affinity, functional assimilation, die animal as a cellular
complex, all become so many vain formulas and non¬
sense!
Either we must be content to bow before the mystery
and declare it impenetrable, or we must have the
Gourage to avow that classical physiology has lost its
way.
In order to understand all these—the mystery of
specific form, embryonic and post-embryonic develop¬
ment, the constitution and maintenance of the personality,
organic repair, and all the other general problems of
biology—it is necessary and sufficient to accept a notion,
which is certainly not new, but is placed in a new light,
the notion of a djjwmism_supenor .to_the..organiam^ad.
conditioning TET
This is not the ‘ directive idea ’ of Claude Bernard, -)
which is a kind of abstraction, an incomprehensible
metaphysico-biological entity. This is a concrete idea
—that of a directing and centralising dynamism, domin¬
ating both intrinsic and extrinsic contingencies, the
chemical reactions of the organic medium, and the
influences of the external environment.
We shall find the existence of this dynamism affirmed
in like manner, not more certainly, but more evidentially,
in the so-called supernormal physiology. There indeed
* Fttix Henneguy: L$s Insteies.
49
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the manifestations of the physiological dynamism pass
outside the limits of the organism, are separate from it
and act outside it. Yet more, it can partially disintegrate
the organism and with its substance, can reconstitute
new organic forms exterior to it, or, to use the correct
philosophical formula, can make new representations.1
» Vida Translator's Note, p. vni.

50
CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF SUPERNORMAL PHYSIOLOGY

No one nowadays is ignorant of what is meant by the


so-called supernormal physiology. It is manifested in .
persons'b'fspecial gifts and constitutions, called mediums,
"by dynamic and material effects inexplicable'by the
regular play of their organs and transcending the field,
ot organic action.
'Hie most important and complex phenomena of
this so-called supernormal physiology are those called
materialisation and dematenalisation. Conformably to
our method, these are the only ones which we shall first
endeavour to understand, in order, later, to apply the
solution of the problem to other less important facts
of the same order, such as the movements of objects
without contact.

I.-MATERIALISATIONS

I have no intention of malting here a historical or


critical study, of materialisations, a study which the
reader will find in the special works named below.1 I
shall only bring my personal contribution to the analysis
and synthesis of this phenomenon, which is of primary
iWorks to consult: Aksakofi: Animisms si Spiritisms; T. Bisson:
Lss Pkinominss dits is Matinalisahon; •.^Researches mm
Phenomena of Spiritualism ; Ddanne: Lss Apportions MatiHahsiss,
D’Espcranco: Au Pays ds I’Ombrs ; Elammanon: Lss Forsss Naturalise
Inamnues; Maxwell: Psychic Phenomena, Richet:
Materialisations ds la Villa Carmen; Dr Sdirenck-Notaang. Materialisa¬
tions Phinomines ; De Rochas: (Envrss Computes.
51
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
importance since more certainly than any other it reverses
the very foundations of physiology.
The sequence of materialisation may be summed up
as under :—
From the body of the medium there exudes, or is
exteriorised, a substance at first amorphous or poly¬
morphous. This substance takes on diverse* forms,
usually representations of more or less complex organs.
We may therefore consider in turn:—
1. The substance which is the substratum of the
materialisations;
2. Its organised representations.
This substance may be exteriorised in a gaseous or
vaporous form, or again as a liquid or a solid.
The vaporous form is the more frequent and the
best known. Near the medium there is outlined or
amassed a kind of visible vapour, a sort of fog, often
connected with the body of the medium by a thin link
of the same substance. In different parts of this fog
there then appears what resembles a condensation,
which M. Le Cour has ingeniously compared to the
supposed formation of nebulae. These areas of con¬
densation finally take the appearance of organs, whose
development is very rapidly completed.
This, substance of materialisation is more amenable
to examination under its liquid or solid forms. Its
change into organs is then sometimes slower. It remains
longer in the amorphous state, and allows of a more
precise notion of the genesis of the phenomenon.
It has been observed under this form, from several
mediums, especially from the famous medium Eglinton.1
But it is from the medium Eva that this solid substance
is generated with astonishing completeness. The reader
should refer to the books of Mme Bisson and of Dr
Schrenck-Notzing for the description of the innumerable
forms that it takes.
1 Delaune: Les Apparitions MaUrialisits, vol. if. j>p. 64 a st stq.
52
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Having trained and educated Eva, Mme Bisson
has been able during long years of research to study
at her leisure this phenomenon whose scientific import
has long remained unrealised. Her book is therefore
a mine of documentary evidence generously offered to
scientific and philosophic minds.
The work of Dr Schrenck-Notzing is a methodical
and complete account of his studies on the same medium;
it is drawn up with skill, it is clear, exact, and provided
with references; it contains also the record of similar
experiments with another medium having the same
faculties as Eva.
Thanks to the complaisance and goodwill of Mme
Bisson, I had the honour and privilege of studying
Eva with her for a year and a half, at bi-weekly stances, >
held at first in her house, and afterwards, for three
consecutive months, exclusively in my own laboratory.1
After my study of Eva, I was able to verify
analogous though elementary phenomena in new subjects
from whom I endeavoured Jo induce materialisations.
I shall now give a synthetic risumi of my experiments
and records; and it is my own testimony only that I
give in this book, a testimony in complete accord with
that of a very large number of men of science, chiefly
physicians, who are to-day completely convinced of the
authenticity of this phenomenon, although for the
most part starting from absolute scepticism.
I have been able to see, to touch, and to photograph
the materialisations of which I am about to write.
I have frequently followed the event from its
beginning to its end; for it was formed, developed,
ana disappeared under my own eyes. However unex¬
pected, strange or impossible such a manifestation may
1 The results were the subject of a conference at the College de France,
published under the title, La Physiologic dtte Superanormale, This will
tie found, illustrated by 24 photogravures m the Bulletin de rinshtut
Phyiioloqique of January-June, 1918, published at No. 143 Boulevard
Samt-Michcl, Paris. Now reproduced m the Appendix, p. 328.
53 *
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
appear, I have no right to put forward the slightest
doubt as to_its reality^ With Eva, the mode of operation
necessary to"obtain materialisations is very simple: the
medium, after having been seated in the dark cabinet, is
put into the hypnotic state, sightly, but enough to
involve forgetfulness of the normal personality. This
dark cabinet has no other purpose than to protect the
sleeping medium from disturbing influences, and specially
from the action of light. It is thus possible to keep the
stance-room sufficiently well lit for perfect obser¬
vation.
The phenomena appear (when they do appear) after
a variable interval, sometimes very brief, sometimes an
hour or more. They always begin by painful sensations
in thp medium; she sighs and moans from time to time
much like a woman in childbirth. These moans reach
their height just when the manifestation begins, they
lessen or cease when the forms are complete.
There first appear luminous liquid patches from the
size of a pea to that of a crown-piece, scattered here ami
there over her black smock, principally on the left side.
This constitutes a premonitory phenomenon, appear¬
ing sometimes three-quarters of an hour to an hour
before the other phenomena. Sometimes it is omitted,
and sometimes it appears without being followed by
anything more.’ The substance exudes specially from
the natural orifices and the extremities, from the top
of the head, from the nipples, and the ends of the fingers.
The most frequent and most easily observed origin
is from the mouth; the substance is then seen to proceed
from the interior surface of the cheeks, the roof of the
palate, and the gums.
The substance has variable aspects; sometimes, and
most characteristically, it appears as a plastic paste, a
true protoplasmic mass; sometimes as a number of fine
threads; sometimes as strings of different thickness in
narrow and rigid lines; sometimes as a wide band;
54
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
sometimes as a fine tissue of ill-defined and irregular
shape. The most curious form of all is that of a wide¬
spread membrane with swellings, and fringes, whose
general appearance is remarkably like that of the
epiplo&n (caul). In fine, the substance is essentially
amorphous, or rather, polymorphous.
The quantity of the substance exteriorised is very
variable; sometimes there is extremely little, sometimes
it is abundant, with all intermediate degrees. In certain
cases it covers the medium completely, like a doak.
It may show three different colours: white, black, or
gray. The white seems the more frequent form, perhaps
because it is the easiest to observe. The three colours
are sometimes seen simultaneously. The visibility of
this substance is also very variable. Its risibility may
wax and wane slowly and repeatedly. To the touch it
gives very different sensations, usually haring some
relation to the form of the moment; it seems soft and
somewhat elastic while spreading; hard, knotty, or
fibrous when it forms cords.
Sometimes it feels like a spider’s web touching the
hand of the observer. The threads of the substance
are both stiff and elastic. It is mobile. Sometimes it
is slowly evolved, rises and falls, and moves over the
medium’s shoulders, her breast, or her lap with a crawling,
reptilian movement; sometimes its motion is abrupt and
rapid, it appears and disappears like a flash.
It is extremely sensitive, and its sensitiveness is
closely connected with that of hyperaesthetised medium;
and touch reacts painfully on the latter. If the touch
should be at all rough or prolonged the medium
shows pain which she compares to a touch on raw
flesh.
The substance is sensitive even to light-rays; a
light, especially if sudden and unexpected, produces a
painful start in the medium. However, nothing is more
variable than the light-effects; in some cases the substance
55
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
can stand even full daylight. The magnesium flashlight
causes a violent start in the medium, but it is borne,
and allows of instantaneous photographs.
In the effects of light on the substance, and its
repercussion on the medium, it is difficult to distinguish
between real pain and mere reflex; both, whether pain
or reflex, impede investigation. For this reason the
phenomena have as yet not been cinematographed. To
its sensitiveness the substance seems to add. a kind of
instinct not unlike that of the self-protection of the
invertebrates; it would seem to have all the distrust of
a defenceless creature, or one whose sole defence is to
re-enter the parent organism. It shrinks from all con¬
tacts and is always ready to avoid them and to be
re-absorbed.
It has an immediate and irresistible tendency towards
organisation; not remaining long in its first state. It
often happens that this organisation is so rapid as not
to permit of the primordial substance being seen. At
other times the amorphous substance may be observed
with more or less complete representations immersed
in its mass; for instance, a finger may be seen hanging
in the midst of fringes of the substance; even heads
and faces are sometimes seen enwrapped by it.
I now come to the representations; they are of the
most diverse character. Sometimes they are indeter¬
minate, inorganic forms; but more often they are organic,
of varying complexity and completeness.
Different observers—Crookes and Richet among
others—have, as is well known, described complete
materialisations, not of phantoms in the proper sense
of the word, but of beings having for the moment all
the vital particulars of living beings; whose hearts beat,
whose lungs breathe, and whose bodily appearance is
perfect.
I have not, alas, observed phenomena so complete,
but, on the other hand, I have very frequently seen
56
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

complete representations of an organ, such as a face, a


hand, or a finger.
In the more complete cases the materialised organ
has all the appearance and biologic functions of a living
organ. I have seen admirably modelled fingers, with
their nails; I have seen complete hands with bones and
joints; I have seen a living head, whose bones I could
feel under a thick mass of hair. I have seen well-
formed living and human faces!
On many occasions these representations have been
formed from beginning to end under my own eyes.
I have, for instance, seen the substance issue from the
hands of the medium and link them together; then,
the medium separating her hands, the substance has
lengthened, forming thick cords, has spread, and formed
fringes like epiploic fringes. Lastly, in the midst of
these fringes, there has appeared by progressive repre¬
sentation, perfectly organised fingers, a hand, or a nice.
In other cases I have witnessed an analogous organisation
in substance issuing from the mouth.
Here is one example taken from my notebook:
‘ From the mouth of Eva there descends to her knees a
cord of white substance of the thickness of two fingers;
this ribbon takes under our eyes varying forms, that
of a large perforated membrane, with swellings and
vacant spaces; it gathers itself together, retracts, swells,
and narrows again. Here and there from the mass appear
temporary protrusions, and these for a few seconds
assume the form of fingers, the outline of hands, and
then re-enter the mass. Finally the cord retracts on
itself, lengthens to the knees, its end rises, detaches
itself from the medium, and moves towards me. I then
see the extremity thicken like a swelling, and this terminal
swelling expands into a perfectly modelled hand. I
touch it; it gives a normal sensation; I feel the bones,
and the fingers with their nails. Then the hand con¬
tracts, diminishes, and disappears in the end of the
57
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
cord. The cord makes a few movements, retracts, and
returns into the medium’s mouth.'
It is possible to observe the vaporous form of the
substance at the same time as its solid form; it emerges
from the body of the medium invisible and impalpable,
no doubt through the meshes of the clothing, and
condenses on the surface of this latter, appearing as a
small cloud which develops into a white spot on the
black smock, at the level of the shoulders, the breast,
or the knees. The spot grows, spreads, and takes on
the outlines or the reliefs of a hand or a face.
Whatever may be the mode of its formation the
materialisation does not always remain in contact with
the medium; it may sometimes be observed quite
detached: the following example is typical in this
respect:—
‘A head appears suddenly, about three-fourths of
a yard from Eva’s head, above, and to her right. It is
the head of a man, of normal size, well formed and in
the usual relief. The top of the head and the forehead
are completely materialised. The forehead is large and
high, the hair short and abundant, brown or black.
Below the brows the contours shade off; only
the top of the head and the forehead are clearly
seen.
‘ The head disappears for a moment behind the
curtain, then reappears as before; but the face, incom¬
pletely materialised, is masked by a band of white
substance. I put my hand forward and pass my fingers
through the tufted hair and feel the bone of the cranium
... an instant, later everything has vanished.’ The
forms have,, it will be observed, a certain independence,
and this independence is both physiological and
anatomical.
The materialised organs are not inert, but biolosicallv
alive.. A well-formed hand, for instance, has the
functional capacities of a normal hand. I have several
58
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
times been intentionally touched by a hand or grasped
by its fingers.
The most remarkable materialisations which I have
myself observed are those produced by Eva in my
laboratory, during three consecutive months of the
winter of 1917-1918. In the bi-weekly stances in
collaboration with Madame Bisson, the Medical Inspector
General,—M. Calmette, M. Jules Courtier, and M. Le
Cour, we obtained a series of records of the greatest
interest. We saw, touched, and photographed repre¬
sentations of heads and faces formed from the original
substance. These were formed under our eyes, the
curtains being half-drawn. Sometimes they proceeded
from a cord of solid substance issuing from the medium,
sometimes they were progressively developed in a fog
of vaporous substance condensed in front of her, or at
her side. For reproductions of some of these photo¬
graphs see the Appendix, p. 328.
In the former case, when the materialisation was
fully formed, traces more or less marked of the original
cord of substance could be seen.
The materialised forms, photographs of which were
given in my study on so-called Supernormal Physiology
and are reproduced at the end of this volume, were
remarkable from several points of view.
t. They were always three-dimensional. During the
stances I could convince myself of this by
sight, and on several occasions by touch.
Moreover, the relief is evident in the stereo¬
scopic pictures taken.
2. The different faces in this series presented some
similarities together with great differences:—
Differences in the features;
Differences in the size of the forms, some
less than natural size, but of dimensions variable
from one stance to another, and in the course
of the same stance;
59
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Differences in the perfection of the features,
these being sometimes quite regular, in other
cases defective;
Differences in the degree of materialisation,
which was sometimes complete; sometimes
incomplete, with rudiments of substance; some¬
times merely indicated.
I wish to call attention to the interesting nature, from
every point of view, of these rudiments of substance.
The importance of rudiments in ‘ metapsychical embry-
ology ’ is comparable with their importance in normal
embryology. They give evidence as to the origin and
the genesis of the formations.
The better materialised the forms were, the more
power of self-direction (autonomie) they seemed to have.
They evolved round Eva, sometimes at some distance
from her. One of these faces appeared first at the opening
of the curtain, of natural size, very beautiful and with a
remarkably life-like appearance.
At another stance, through the curtain of the
cabinet, I could feel with my hands the contact of a
human body which caused the curtain to undulate.
(Eva was stretched out in the arm-chair, in full sight,
and her hands were held.)
It is needless to say that the usual precautions
were rigorously observed during the stances in my
laboratory. On coming into the room where the stances
were held, and to which I alone had previous access,
the medium was completely undressed m my presence,
and dressed in a tight garment, sewn up the back and
at the wrists; the hair, and the cavity of the mouth were
examined by me and my collaborators before and after
the stances. Eva was walked backwards to the wicker
chair in the dark cabinet; her hands were always held
in full sight outside the curtains; and the room was
always quite well lit during the whole time. I do not
merely say, * There was no trickery ’; I say ' There
60
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
was no possibility of trickery.*1 Further, and I cannot
repeat it too often, nearly always the materialisations
took place under my own eyes, and I have observed
their genesis and their whole development.
Well constituted organic forms having all the appear¬
ance of life, are often replaced by incomplete formations.
The relief is often wanting and the forms are flat. There
are some that are partly flat and partly in relief, I have
seen in certain cases, a hand or a face appear flat, and
then, under my eyes assume the three dimensions,
entirely or partially. The incomplete forms are some¬
times smaller than natural size, being occasionally
miniatures.
Instead of being apparent by an alteration in
height, breadth, or thickness, the incompleteness of the
formations is often manifest by deficiencies: the materiali¬
sations are of natural size, but show gaps in their
structure.
Dr Schrenck-Notzing, by taking simultaneous stereo¬
scopic photographs from the front, the side, and the
back, has seen that usually only the first reveal a complete
materialisation; the dorsal region being in the condition
of a mass of amorphous substance.
I have personally remarked the same thing.
It is not improbable that the loose veils, turbans,
and similar drapery with which * phantoms ’ so often
appear, mask defects or gaps in the newly-formed
organism.
There are all possible gradations between the com¬
plete and the incomplete organic forms, and they
develop under the eyes of the observers.
Along with these complete and incomplete forms it
is necessary to mention another strange category which
*1 am, moreover, glad to testify that Eva has always shown, in my
presence, absolute experimental honesty. The intelligent and self-
sacnflcmg resignation with which she submitted to all control and the
truly painful tests of her mediumshrp, deserve the real and sincere grati¬
tude of all men of science worthy of the name.
61
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
covers imitations of organs. They are true simulacra.
There are simulacra of fingers, having the general form
but ■without warmth, flexibility, or joints; simulacra of
faces like masks, or as if cut out of paper; tufts of hair
adhering to undefined formations, etc.
These simulacra, whose reality is undeniable (a
point which is of great importance) have disconcerted
and perplexed many observers. ‘ One would think,’
said M. de Fontenay, ‘ that some kind of malicious sprite
was mocking the observers.’
But really these simulacra may be easily explained.
They are the products of a force whose metapsychic
output is weak and whose means of execution are weaker
still. It does what it can. It rarely succeeds, precisely
because its activity, directed outside the normal lines,
has no longer the certainty which the normal biologic
impulse gives to physiological activity.
The fact that normal physiology also has its simulacra
enables us to understand tins better. Besides well-
developed organic formations and complete foetal growths
there are miscarriages, monstrosities, and aberrant forms.
Nothing is more curious in this respect than the dermoid
cysts in which are found hair, teeth, viscera, and even
more or less complete foetal forms. Like normal
physiology, the so-called supernormal has its complete
and aborted forms, its monstrosities, and its dermoid
cysts. The parallelism is complete.
The disappearance of materialised forms is at least
as curious as their appearance. This disappearance is
sometimes instantaneous, or nearly so. In less than a
second the form whose presence was evident to sight
and touch, has disappeared. In other cases the dis¬
appearance is gradual; the return to the original
substance and its reabsorption into the body of the
medium can be observed by the same stages as its
production. In other cases again the disappearance
takes place, not by a return to the original substance,
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
but by progressive diminution of its perceptible charac¬
teristics, the visibility slowly lessens, the contours are
blurred, effaced, and vanish.
_ During the whole time that the materialisation lasts
it is in obvious physiological and psychological relation
with the medium. The physiological connection may
sometimes be perceived as a thin cord of the substance
linking the form to the medium, a link which may be
compared to the umbilical cord that unites the embryo
to the mother. Even when this cord is not seen the
physiological relation is close. Every impression received
by the ectoplasm1 reacts on the medium, and vice versa;
the extreme reflex sensitiveness of the forms is closely
connected with that of the medium. Everything goes
to prove that the ectoplasm isj .itj.a.wordTthe medium
herself,’ partially exteriorised. I am speaking, of course,
only from the physiological point of view and not at
present of the purely psychological side of the matter.
Such are the facts. It remains to interpret them, if
possible. Of course, no claim can be advanced to define
m a few words and off-hand what Life isl It is sufficient
at the outset to state the terms of the problem clearly.

2.-THE UNITY OP ORGANIC SUBSTANCE

The first term of that problem relates to the actual


constitution of living matter. The study of supernormal
physiology from this point of view confirms the results
of profound research in normal physiology; both tend
to establish the concept of the unity of organic substance.
In the foregoing experiments we have seen first of all,
exteriorised from the medium’s body, a single unique
substance, from which were derived different ideo-
plastic * forms. This unique substance we have seen
1 Gr. iicrfo, outside; ir\&r/ia, a thing formed; the exteriorised substance.
* Ideoplastic =moulded by an idea.
63
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
many times organise and transform itself under our eyes.
We have seen a hand emerge from a mass of the sub¬
stance; we have seen a white mass become a face; we
have seen in a few moments the representation of a
head give place to that of a hand; we have been able,
by the concordant evidence of sight and touch, to
perceive the passage of the inorganic amorphous sub¬
stance into a formal organic representation having for
the moment all the attributes of life—in flesh and bone,
to use a popular expression. We have seen these repre¬
sentations disappear, melt into the original substance
and be re-absorbed into the body or the medium.
Therefore, in supernormal physiology there are not
diverse substances, bony, muscular, visceral, or nervous,
as the substrata of different organic formations; there
is simply one substance, unique and basic, as the sub¬
stratum of organic life.
It is precisely the same in normal physiology; though
tins is less apparent. It is nevertheless evident in certain
cases. The same phenomenon takes place, as has already
been said, in the closed chrysalis of the insect as in the
dark cabinet at the stance. Histolysis reduces the
greater part of its organs and its different parts into
a single substance which will materialise into the organs
and different parts of the adult form. The same
phenomenon belongs to both physiologies; the parallel
is legitimate and complete.
Only ordinary semblances can be set in opposition to
tins concept of the unity of organic matter. First the
commonplace physiology of daily experience; this
superficial semblance proves nothing, and observation
shows that it is illusory. Physico-chemical appearances
are just as misleading.
Analyses of the exteriorised substance are, of course,
not to be had. The moral impossibility of amputating
from the medium's^ ectoplasm a portion whichi might
grievously injure or Tall her, will always prevent this.
64
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
We therefore are ignorant of the exact chemical com¬
position of this substance. Is it decomposable into the
various simple substances which we find, in the living
body—carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, iron, nitrogen, phos¬
phorus ? Does it imply an absolute unitary atom?
We do not know, and it matters little. What we do
know is that it shows biologic unity.
In fine: everything in biology takes place as if the
physical being were formed of a single primordial
substance; organic forms are mere representations.
Therefore, the first term of the biological problem
is the essential unity of organic substance.

3._the evidence of a superior dynamism

The second term is implied by the necessity of


admitting a superior, organising, centralising, and direct¬
ing dynamism. „„ , , , .
The necessity of this notion follows from the whole
of our physiological knowledge. .
It has already been said that only this notion explains
the mechanism of life, the specific form, the maintenance
of the personality, and its organic repair. This notion ot
a superior dynamism is forced upon us by a study or
embryonic and post-embryonic development, and especi¬
ally by a consideration of animal metamorphoses.
Finally, it has been definitely and absolutely demon¬
strated by the dematerialisations and rematenalisations
of the insect in its chrysalis and of the medium in her
dark cabinet. „ . , , ,.
In the two latter cases no further doubt or discussion
is possible: the facts prove that the constituent molecules
of the organic complex have no absolute specificity; that
their relative specificity proceeds entirely from the
dynamic or ideal mould which conditions them, and
65
Front the Unconscious to the Conscious
makes from them visceral, muscular, or nervous sub¬
stance, etc., and gives to them definite form, position,
and functions.
In a word, everything takes place, in normal and
supernormal physiology as if the organic complex were
built up, organised, directed, and maintained by a
superior dynamism. This is the second term of the
biologic problem. "*

^ 4.—THE CONDITIONING OF THE DYNAMISM BY THE


IDEA.

There is a third term, the most important of any;


the directing dynamism itself obeys a directing idea.
This directing idea is found in all biological creations,
whether in the normal constitution of an organism or in
the abnormal, and more or less complex, materialisation.
It reveals a well-defined goal. The directing idea does
not always reach this goal; the result of its activity is
often imperfect. As may be seen both in normal and
supernormal physiology, it sometimes produces fully
developed forms, sometimes abortions or monstrosities,
sometimes even simulacra; but whether it attains com¬
pleteness or not, the directing idea is always manifest.
This is so evident that the right word, applicable tq the
phenomena of materialisation, has been found instinc¬
tively. That word is ‘ideoplasticity.’ to which has been
added ‘ teleplasticity ’ &> describe the same phenomenon
when occurring at a distance from the decentralised or
dematerialised organism.
What is the mil meaning of this word ? It
the^modelling pf living matter by an idea. The notion
of ideoplasticity forced upon’us by theTacts is of con¬
spicuous importance; the idea is no longer a product
of matter. On the contrary, it is the idea that moulds
matter and gives form and attributes to it.
66
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
In other words, matter—the unique substance—is
resolved by. final analysis into a superior dynamism
which conditions it, and this dynamism is itself dependent
on the idea.
This is nothing less than the complete reversal of
materialist philosophy. As Flammarion says in his
admirable, book, Les Forces Naturettes Inconnues, these
manifestations * confirm what we know from other
sources: drat the purely mechanical concept of nature
is insufficient; and there is more in the universe than
matter. It is not matter that governs the world, but
a dynamic and psychic element.’ This is so, the ideo-
plastic materialisations demonstrate that the living being
can no longer be considered as a mere cellular complex.
It appears primarily as a dynamo-psychism, and the
cellular complex which is its body appears as the ideo-
plastic. product of this dynamo-psychism. Thus the
formations materialised in mediumistic stances arise
from the same biological process as normal birth. They
are neither more nor less miraculous or supernormal;
they are equally so. The same ideoplastic miracle makes
the. hands, the face, the viscera, the tissues, and the
entire organism of the foetus at the expense of the
maternal body, or the hands., the face, or the entire organs
of a materialisation.
This singular analogy between normal and so-called
supernormal physiology extends even to details; the
ectoplasm is linked to the medium by a channel of
nourishment, a true umbilical cord, comparable to that
which joins the embryo to the maternal body. In
certain cases the materialised forms appear in an ovoid
of the substance. The following instance taken from
my notebook is characteristic. * On the lap of the medium
there appears a white spot which very rapidly forms an
irregular rounded mass like a ball of snow or cotton
wool. Under our eyes the mass partly opens, divides
into two parts, united by a band of substance; in one
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of them appears the admirably modelled features of a
woman. The eyes especially have an intensely living
expression. At the end of a few moments^ the phenotn-
enon fades, diminishes in visibility, and disappears.* I
have also seen, on several occasions, a hand presented
wrapped in a membrane closely resembling the placental
membrance. The impression produced, both as to
sight and touch, was precisely that of a hand presenta¬
tion in childbirth, when the amnion is unbroken.
Another analogy with childbirth is that of pain.
The moans and movements of the entranced medium
remind one strangely of a woman in travail.
The proposed assimilation of normaTtd*supernonnal
physiology is therefore legitimate, for it results from
the examination of facts. It raises, however, some serious
objections, which we shall briefly examine.
In the first place, it may be objected, that if normal
and supernormal physiology both result from the same
biologic process, whence comes their apparent diversity ?
Why is the one regular, and the other exceptional, cut
off from the usual accessories of time, space, generative
conditions, etc. ? We reply that normal physiology is
the product of organic activity such as evolution has
made it. The creative and directing idea normally
works in a given sense, that of the evolution of the
species, and conforms to the manner of that evolution.
Supernormal physiology, on the other hand, is the
product of ideoplastic activity directed in a divergent
manner by an abnormal effort of the directing idea.
To explain this activity, divergent from the usual
conditions, there is no need to invoke a miraculous or
supernormal agency. Science and philosophy are logi¬
cally harmonised by an explanation at once more simple
and more satisfying. These abnormal ideoplastic possi¬
bilities, these apparently mysterious powers over Matter,
simply prove that the laws which preside over the
material world have not the absolute and inflexible
68
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
rigour which they were thought to have; they are only
relative. Their action may be temporarily or accidentally
modified or suspended.

5.-THE SECONDARY MODALITIES OF SUPERNORMAL


PHYSIOLOGY

These notions as to the sequence and the facts of


materialisation being established, it will be easy, con¬
formably with our method, to understand the less complex
facts of so-called supernormal physiology, which are so
inexplicable when considered apart from other facts.
The phenomena of telekinesis (movement of objects
without contact) are explicable by the action of the vital
dynamism exteriorised and obeying a subconscious
impulse.
The experiments by Ochorowicz1 have clearly
established the genesis of this phenomenon. They show
the meaning, from this point of view, of the elementary
forms of materialisation, the threads of substance and
rigid rods, sometimes visible, sometimes invisible, pro¬
ceeding from the fingers of the medium and serving as a
substratum to the exteriorised dynamism. The facts
of telekinesis, though less complex, are of no less
importance than those of materialisation. I do not
think it necessary to describe them, but simply refer
the reader to special works on the subject.*
1 Annales des Sciences Psychiques.
* See especially the luminous report of M. Courtier on the experi¬
ments made by title Psychological Institute with the medium Eusapia
Palladino in 1905, 1906, 1907, on the premises of the Institute, by MM.
D’Arsonval, Gilbert Ballet, M. et Mme Curie, Bergson, Ch Richet, and
de Gramont. Here, for instance, are the accounts given by M. Courtier
of two of these experiments:—
1. * At the fourth stance of 1905, a table weighing 15 lb. with a weight
of la lb. placed on it, was twice completely raised for several seconds.
This was also done at the sixth stance, when the feet of the table near
the subject were encased in a sheath . . .
‘ At the moment of the raising of the table, M. D’Arsonval and M
Ballet were completely controlling the hands and knees of Eusapia, and
69 G
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
'The phenomena of stigmatisation and affections of
the skin effected by suggestion or auto-suggestion, are
but elementary ideoplastic effects much more simple
than materialisations, though of the same order.
Miraculous healings so called, is a result of the same
ideoplasticity directed by suggestion or auto-suggestion
in a sense favourable to organic repair, and concentrating
for this purpose all the energies of the vital dynamism.
It is to be remarked that this subconscious and recupera¬
tive ideoplastic force is much more active in the lower
animals than in man; no doubt because with him cerebral
activity engrosses the greater part of his vital activity.
There is no miracle in ascribing to the human organism
some part of the dynamic and ideoplastic action which
is the rule in the lower grades of the animal scale.
The phenomena of mimetism so frequent in animal
forms and so mysterious in their mechanism, may also he

no contact was made with the legs of the table. ... We moat also
remember the complete levitations of tables at the end of sfcmws when
every one was standing up, under conditions of control of which i>nu.,i:
and circumstantial stenographic notes wore taken.
‘the tables were then raised to greater heights than (luring the Nfanmt.
as much as 80 centimetres to a metre horn the floor, the hands ami fret
of the subject being rigorously controlled,
^°ven*ents the small table towards and away from th<* medium,
retr?.ats ; • • when it advances tow.mis
bJ that in SP*° °* stringent precautions again,-** fraud,
she uses a thread fine enough^ to be invisible and draws the table by
this means. . . , But how can its retreat be explained? Jjtt suppoho
°ae OnFT^/hovld P^pm's and act by ordinary
means. Only one procedure can be imagined—to hold a mid rod ami
push and pull the table by its means. But a rigid rod, however (bin
couM not escape the sight of ciosehr attentfve X-rvI^ Tlirro
could be no question of retreat obtained by passing the thmul <w*r a
*l0m ^ 'W2JI- w"ich involve prrp,'»r(*
fec?rdl?8 apparatus was, of course, entirely motioithw,; nml
supposition of collective hallucination mm.tlw
8 cylinder recorded the displacements of ihi* t.iblo

I have cited these observations of the skilled exnerim«‘ni#*r« e,t ti.*


Psychological Institute, not for their special value, which is

safRRjffbi sisiH 70
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
explained by subconscious ideoplasticity. Instinct would
direct the ideoplasticity in a riven direction and the
effects would be fixed by selection and adaptation.1
The table below shows in a striking manner the
contrast between the new and the classical concepts.

6—the physiological concept of the individual

Summary.
Classical Concepts. New Concept.
The organism is a mere The organic complex, its
cellular complex. The vital physiological functions,
dynamism is. but the result- and all the vital process,
ant synthesis of biologic are conditioned by a
sequence and physiological superior dynamism,
functions.
Primordial vital fact: All these phenomena are
mysterious, easily explicable by the
Specific form: mysterious, action of a superior dynam-
Formation.of the organism: ism, generating, directing,
.mysterious. centralising, preserving,
Maintenance of the organ- and repairing the organ¬
ism: vague and insuffi- ism. The concrete notion
dent hypotheses. . of this dynamism must be
Repair of the organism: substituted for the abstract
vague and insuffident notion of a directive idea,
hypotheses.
Embryonic development:
mysterious.
Post-embryonic develop¬
ment: mysterious.
Metamorphoses:
mysterious.
Histolysis of the Insect:
mysterious.
1 See, in this connection, Les Miracles da la Volontt, by E. Duchatel
and War collier,
71
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Sensorial manifestations All these phenomena are
outside the organs of explicable by the action
sense: mysterious. of the vital dynamism act-
Motor manifestations out- ing outside the organism,
side the muscular sys- This dynamism conditions
tern: mysterious. . the organism in place of
Ideoplastic manifestations: being conditioned by it.
mysterious. It can therefore separate
Materialisations: itself from. it, and even
mysterious. partially disorganise^ and
reorganise it in diverse
forms and representations.

It is dear that the mystery in which physiology


was enveloped is in some measure dispelled; the triple
concept of the unity of substance, the organising
dynamism, and the conditioning of this latter by the
Idea, enables us to make a decided step towards truth.
But how much still remains unknown I
What are the origin, the end, and the exact nature
of this dynamo-psychism which organises, centralises
and directs the cellular complex ? How docs this
mysterious dynamo-psychism exist potentially in the
fertilised ovum, in the cutting, or in the bud, whence a
new creature will grow ? What, in a word, is its exact
relation to all vital process ? We have spoken of ideo¬
plastic power. But what exactly is this power ? The
directing idea, and the ideoplastic capacities which
normal and supernormal physiology reveal, do not
depend on the consciousness in which we are accustomed
to sum up and localise our ' Self.’ They arise from the
depths of a mysterious and impenetrable unconscious¬
ness.
The conscious directing will of our being has no
action on the great organic mnctions, and does not come
into play for the ideoplastic materialisations. These,
produced at the expense of the substance of the organism,
7a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
seem, nevertheless, often if not always, to be directed
and formed outside that organism by entities distinct
from it.
Will it then be said that to speak of ideoplasticity,
the modelling of matter by the Idea, and of an organising
dynamo-psychism is only to push the mystery further
back, not to solve it ? Will it be said that the enigma
is not less insoluble for being put back one step ?
Insoluble 1 By no means 1
The truth is, once more, that starting from the
elementary but essential data which have emerged from
our demonstration, the biological problem becomes
terribly complex.
It is not related to physiology alone, but to psychology,
to all the natural sciences, and to philosophy.
In a word, we are dealing no longer with Life alone,
but with the whole constitution and evolution of the
universe and the individual.
Before closing the reference to physiology we must
enter upon a new and larger application of the synthetic
method. We must interrogate first psychology, and
then philosophy; the partial answers which we now
feel the want of, will be given by the general answer to
the great enigma, which is the aim of the present work.

73
CHAPTER III

PSYCHOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALITY

The bankruptcy of the classical concept of physiological


individuality has now been demonstrated. We shall
next show that the classical psychological concept is
equally defective.
It is based on two principal notions:—
1. The notion of the Selr as a synthesis of states of
consciousness.
2. The notion of the close dependence of all that
constitutes a thinking being on the functions
of the nervous centres.
These two essential propositions will now be
successively examined.

I. THE SELF CONSIDERED AS A SYNTHESIS OF STATES


OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In succession to the physiological concept quoted


from M. Dastre (Ch. I.), let us consider the psychological
concept which we borrow from M. Ribot*

The organism, and the brain which is its supreme


representation, are the real personality, containing in
itself the remnants of what we have been and the
possibilities of what we shall be. The individual
character in its entirety is inscribed there, its active
and passive aptitudes, its sympathies and anti-,
pathies, its genius, its wisdom, or its foolishness, its
virtues and its vices, its torpor or its activity. That
1 Bibot: Lts Maladies is la PersonnaHU. (Italics arc Dr Celcy's.)
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
part which emerges into consciousness is slight in
comparison with that which, though always acting,
remains buried. The conscious is always but a small
part of the psychic personality.
4 The unity of the Self is not therefore that single
entity claimed by spiritualists, manifest in many
phenomena, but the co-ordination of a number of states
perpetually renewed, having as their only link the
vague sensations of our bodies. This unity does
not proceed from above downwards, but from below
upwards; it is not an initial but a terminal point. . . .’
* The Self is a co-ordination. It oscillates between
two extreme points at each of which it ceases, to
exist—perfect unity or absolute lack of co-ordination.
4 The last word in all this is; that the consensus
of consciousness being subordinate to the consensus
of the organism, the problem of the . unity of the
Self is, in its simplest form, a biological problem.
It is for biology to explain, if it can,, the genesis of
organisms and the solidarity of their parts. The
psychological interpretation can but follow.’
Le Dantec comes to the same conclusions.1 Indi¬
vidual consciousness, according to him, is but the sum
of consciousness of all the neurons, so that 4 our.Self
will be determined by the number, nature, dispositions,
and reciprocal connections among the elements of our
nervous system.’
It appears then that for the contemporaneous classical
psycho-physiology the conscious Self has no essential
unity; it is a mere co-ordination of states, just as the
organism to which it is linked is a mere co-ordination of
cells.
The objections which arise to this are the same as
those which hold with regard to the physiological concept
of the individual; they take no account of the need for
*Le Dantec: Le Diterminlsme BiologuueetlaPersonnaliUConsoient;
L’lndtmdualtU ; TMorie notmlle de la Vie.
75
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
a directing and centralising principle, creating the Self
and maintaining its permanence.
Le Dantec thus explains the permanence of the
Self.

‘Individual consciousness/ he says, ‘is not


invariable; it is slowly and continuously modified
along with the incessant changes produced in our
organism by the functional assimilation which accom¬
panies all our acts; it is this which constitutes the
variation of our personality; but in accordance with
the laws of assimilation and the specific coherence
of plastic substances, there mill be continuity in
time between these successive personalities; and it
is for this reason that the psychological Self accom¬
panies the physiological individual through all its
unceasing modifications from birth to death.’

By a reaction against the old vitalist or spiritualist


hypotheses, this concept of the Self as an elementary
synthesis is accepted by the vast majority of contem¬
porary psycho-physiologists, all their efforts being
directed to force it into agreement with the usual con¬
sciousness of personal unity. Hoeffding,1 Paulhan,*
Wundt,* and many others have rivalled each other in
this impossible task. To get over the difficulty they
sometimes have recourse to psycho-metaphysical entities.
Claude Barnard in physiology invoked the ‘Directing
Idea._ Wundt, in psychology, attributes the unifying
function to what he calls ‘ apperception.’
These subtleties have not advanced the matter a
single step. ‘ Whatever point of view we take/ says
Boutroux, * multiplicity does not contain a reason for
unity. *

* IS? '-ihltim
•Wundt: Physiohgische Psychologia.
Fo*m "” ****"•
Boutroux: Da la ConUngence das Lots da h Naiura.
76
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
This is obvious, and the time has come to draw the
logical inference from this aphorism. To do this it is
necessary to get rid of all abstractions, preconcaved
ideas, and vain disputes over names.
The question is very simple and admits of no
equivocal answer: Is the Self merely a synthesis of
elements, or is it not ?
Is this synthesis the sum of the consciousness of
neurons closely and exclusively linked to the functioning
of the nervous centres, or is it not ? Yes, or No ?
This is what we have to examine by the light of all
psychological facts.

2.-THE SELF AS A PRODUCT OF THE FUNCTION OF THE


NERVE-CENTRES

The classical concept is based on the old notion of


psycho-physiological parallelism, in support of which
the following arguments are adduced.
The development of conscious intelligence accom¬
panies the development of the organism, and its later
progressive diminution is parallel with senile decay.
Psychological activity is proportional to the activity
of the nervous centres.
Psychological activity disappears in the repose of
those centres in sleep or in syncope.
Psychological activity implies the normal. function
of the nervous centres; lesions of these centres, infection,
or serious intoxication affecting the brain, disturb,
restrain, or suppress psychic action altogether.
This psychic action is closely conditioned by the
extent of the organic powers and is inseparable from
them. The materials which the intellect uses come from
the senses: * Nihil est in intellectu quod non print. fuerit
in sensu.’ Therefore the range of the senses limits the
range of conscious intelligence.
77
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
A
Finally, all psychological faculties arise from clear
and definable cerebral localities. The destruction of
one of these centres extinguishes the corresponding
faculty.
Such is the classical teaching so long considered
unquestionable, and generally unquestioned. Neverthe¬
less serious difficulties have recently arisen and forced
themselves on our attention.

3.—FACTS OF NORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AT ISSUE WITH THE


THESIS OF PARALLELISM

In the first place the parallelism, analysed by the


light of new facts does not seem so close as was thought;
the attempts at cerebral localisation which promised
so well, have been checked if not ended. The work of
Pierre Marie, and the thesis of Moutier have proved
that the best established localisation, that of speech in
the third frontal on the left side is not rigidly correct.
Speech, like all other functions, requires that several
centres should work together.
Certain pathological cases have proved that the
excision of large portions of the brain m the very parts
which were thought essential, may be followed by no
grave psychic disturbance, and no restriction of per¬
sonality. 1
Here is an abstract of the principal cases, quoted
from the Annales des Sciences Psychiques of Jan*, V) 17.1

M. Edmond Perrier brought before the French


Academy of Sciences at the session of December
22nd, 1913, the case observed by Dr R. Robinson:
of a man who lived a year, nearly without pain, and
without any mental disturbance, with a brain reduced
“ t0 PulP b7 a purulent abscess. In July, 1914,
x Summary by M, do Venn*.
78
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Dr Hallopeau reported to the Surgical Society an
operation at the Necker Hospital, the patient bang
a young girl who had fallen out of a carriage on the
Metropolitan Railway. After trephining, it was
observed that a considerable portion of cerebral
substance had been reduced literally to pulp. The
wound was cleansed, drained, and closed, and the
patient completely recovered.’

The following report of the session of the Academy


of Sciences at Paris, March 24th, 1917, appeared in the
Paris newspapers:—
‘ Partial removal of the brain.—Following on
previous communications on this operation, which
runs counter to ideas generally received, Dr A. Gudpin
of Paris communicates a fresh study on this question.
He mentions that his first patient, the soldier Louis
R-, to-day a gardener near Paris, in spite of
the loss of a very large part of his left cerebral hemi¬
sphere (cortex, white substance, central nuclei, etc.),
continues to develop intellectually as a normal subject,
in despite of the lesions and the removal of con¬
volutions considered as the seat of essential functions.
From this typical case, and nine analogous cases by
the same operator, known to the Academy, Dr Gudpin
says that it may now safely be concluded:—
(1). That the partial amputation of the brain
in man is possible, relatively easy, and saves certain
wounded men whom received theory would regard
as condemned to certain death, or to incurable
infirmities.
* (2). That these patients seem not in any way
to feel the loss of such a cerebral region.
‘ This study is referred to Dr Laveran for a
separate report.’

This question is obviously of such importance in


79
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the present connection and from the general human
point of view, that we think it useful to translate and
reproduce here, part of an address by Dr Augustin
Iturricha, President of the Anthropological Society of
Sucre (Chuquisaca, Bolivia), at a session of that
society:—

* Here, moreover, are facts still more surprising


from the clinic of Dr Nicholas Ortiz, which Dr
Domingo Guzman has had the kindness to com¬
municate to me. The authenticity of the observations
cannot be doubted, they proceed from two authorities
of high standing in our scientific world.
‘The first case refers to a boy of 12 to 14 years
of age, who died in full use of his intellectual faculties
although the encephalic mass was completely detached
from the bulb, in a condition which amounted to real
decapitation. What must have been the stupefaction
of the operators at the autopsy, when, on opening
the cranial, cavity, they found the meninges heavily
charged with blood, and a large abscess involving
nearly the whole cerebellum, part of the brain ana
the protuberance. Nevertheless the patient, shortly
before, was known to have been actively thinking.
They must necessarily have wondered how this could
possibly have come about. The boy complained of
violent headache, his temperature "was not below
39°C. (ioa..2°F.); the only marked symptoms
being dilatation of the pupils, intolerance of light,
and great cutaneous hyperesthesia. Diagnosed as
meningo-encephalitis.
‘ The second case is not less unusual. It is
that of a native aged 45 years, suffering from cerebral
contusion at the level of Broca’s convolution, with
fracture of the left temporal and parietal bones.
Examination of the patient revealed rise of tempera¬
ture, aphasia, and hemiplegia of the right side. The
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
director and physicians of the clinic undertook an
interesting experiment in re-education of speech;
they succeeded in getting him to pronounce con¬
sciously and intelligibly eight to ten words. Unfor¬
tunately the experiment could not be continued,
tihe patient after twenty days showed a great rise
in temperature, acute cephalalgia, and died thirty
hours later. The autopsy revealed a large abscess
occupying nearly the whole left cerebral hemisphere.
In this case also we must ask, How did this man
manage to think ? What organ was used for thought
after the destruction of the region which, according
to physiologists, is the seat of intelligence ?
‘ A third case, coming from the same clinic, is
that of a young agricultural labourer, 18 years of
age. The post mortem revealed three communicating
abscesses, each as large as a tangerine orange,
occupying the posterior portion of both cerebral
hemispheres, and part of the cerebellum. In spite
of these the patient thought as do other men, so
much so that one day he asked for leave to settle
his private affairs. He died on re-entering the
hospital.’

Psycho-physiological parallelism is therefore entirely


relative. This is not all. Many other objections arise
counter to the classical concept, without going outside
commonplace and”’ordinary- psychology. M. Dwel-
shauvers has summed up clearly the chief of these
objections in his book, L'Inconscient.
In the first place the localisations are simply and
solely anatomical.

* To start the cerebral cells of the localised centres


into action, presupposes a preliminary excitation, and
this excitation arises from a psycho-physiological act
which cannot be localised.
8x
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
‘ There are no psycho-physiological localisations;
localisation is purely fantastic.
‘ And if it is impossible to localise the least
sensation, it is much more so to assign determinate
areas in the cerebral cortex to what used to be termed
“faculties”; abstraction, will, sensation, imagina¬
tion, and memory.'

Therefore the materialist hypotheses which made


thought a secretion of the brain, and would assign
centres to'mental faculties, are erroneous.

‘ There are no special nervous centres, _ one


presiding over abstraction, another over the emotions,
another over memory, another over imagination.
This cerebral mythology is given up; our spiritual
activity does not obey local divinities erected by
credulous scientists in the different corners of their
cerebral schemes.’
Further, it seems really impossible ‘ to explain
mental by cerebral activity, and to reduce the former
to the latter.’ In fact, * each time that the thinking
being is not limited to repetition, but acquires some
new thing, he transcends the mechanism resident in
him ... the effort goes beyond the acquirement;
he combines what has already been acquired with
the new impressions; and this implies an increase
of activity on his part. The cerebral mechanism lags
behind the intelligence. ... In this activity, which
is really progressive and characteristic of human
effort, there is a synthesis perpetually renewed which
is not a repetition of what has already been acquired.
This effort, which is proper" to mental life, is to be
observed among animals also, when, bring placed
in unusual conditions, they modify their habits and
adapt themselves to the altered circumstances. . . .’
8a
.From the Unconscious to the Conscious
'Therefore, there is no strict parallelism between the
biological and the psychological sequence; the latter transcends
the former'1
There is a final and important argument.

‘ Education, from first sensations up to the


grouping of ideas, consists (as to its anatomical and
physiological conditions) in the association of numer¬
ous elements, none of which is in itself, properly
speaking, psychological, but which are, in fact,
exceedingly complex movements. In reference to
them psychological activity appears indeed as a
synthesis, but this synthesis is different from the elements
of which it is composed, it is other than those elements'1

The arguments we have now reviewed displace the


old absolute psycho-physiological parallelism. They
displace it even without going outside current common¬
place psychology, which is to-day known to be only a
part, and the less important part, of individual psychism.
We have kept our summary of the difficulties of the
classical theory within the limits of its own method,
by keeping to the analysis of elementary facts. We shall
now see what results are given by the opposite method
adopted in this work; we shall consider first the highest
and most complex qualities of the psychological being,
namely, its subconscious psychism.
1 My italics, G. G.

83
CHAPTER IV

SUBCONSCIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

I.—CRYPTOPSYCHISM

It has been said that * the subconscious is the. problem


ofpsychologjj rather thanji psychological problem/
This is profoundly true; every investigation, every
theory, every philosophical concept which does not
allow to the Unconscious its legitimate part (which is
the weightier part), is at once falsified in its essence
and in its teaching. Facts immediately rise up against
it and nullify it.
It is only in our own day that subconscious psychology
has forced, itself on scientific criticism. Entirely dis¬
regarded till the nineteenth century, it was then con¬
sidered only as the anomalous outcome of disease or
accident; it now asserts its increasing importance, and
henceforward all researches and all new discoveries form
parts of its domain and extend its reach.
. We are compelled to allow to the Unconscious a
primary function in. instinct, in inborn character, in
latent psychism, and in genius. In every modern work
that appears, subconscious psychism takes a larger and
larger place and is seen to be infinitely complex and
varied.. Its functions are shown to be clearly prepon¬
derant m all the departments of intellectual and affectional

The N-kaown work of Dr Chabaneix, Le Sub-


consaent ckez. les Artistes, les Savants, et les Ecrivains
gives a certain number of striking examples. Indeed
examples are innumerable; it may be said that there is
84
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
no artist, man of science, or writer of any distinction,
however little disposed to self-analysis, who is not aware
by personal experience of the unequalled importance of
the subconscious.1
This subconscious influence is_ sometimes imperative
and supreme; it is .then .called * inspiration/.
Under its influence the artist or the inventor pro¬
duces his work (sometimes a masterpiece) at one stroke,
without pondering over it or reasoning about it; it ,
often transcends nis design without effort on his part.
The subconscious inspiration is sometimes experienced
in sleep in the form or lucid and connected dreams. _
More frequently the Conscious and_the_Ut?co.nscious
woulcTseem Jx> collaborate. The work is initiated by
an act of the will, and completed partly by considered
effort and partly by spontaneous and involuntary inspira¬
tion. This collaboration sometimes ends in results quite
different from those at first intended. It is very, rarre
that any great artist or writer draws up the plan of his
work and follows it faithfully, from beginning to end,
composing regularly and without interruption, as a
mason builds a house.
A great artist works irregularly; the plan as first
conceived undergoes great and sometimes complete
alteration. The outlines do not follow one from another
regularly from the beginning to completion; they vary
according, to the inspiration of the moment. In fact
the”artist is not malter of his inspiration ;"Tt is sometimes
absent; and if he persists, he will on that day produce
only moderate work which he will afterwards reject.
If he is wise enough not to persist, he will find
himself able on some other day to complete die work
as if by enchantment, for the subconscious activity has
proceeded during repose; especially during sleep.

* I think it needless to cite well-known examples Besides the work


of Dr Chabaneix, M. Dwdshanvem’ UIncanscient may be referred to;
and generally, other works on the same subject.
85 H
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
An artist is quite aware whether he is inspired or not.
If he is, the work proceeds easily, almost without check,
to his complete satisfaction or even exultation. If he
is not, he experiences fatigue not only of mind, but of
body also; he makes constant false starts, and his
wearisome and painful efforts are accompanied with a
sense of powerlessness and discouragement. Inspiration
does not come from effort; on the contrary, it comes
often when least expected, and especially when the mind
is at ease; not during the times of connected work.
There are writers and artists who always keep a
notebook handy in order to note down whatever the
caprice of. inspiration may whisper, some verses to a
poet; a philosophic point to a thinker; the solution of
some problem vainly attempted, to a man of science;
a happy phrase to a literary man, etc., etc. Thus they
keep on the watch for the beneficent action of inspiration;
in the study, or during a walk; alone or in a crowd; in
bed, or in the train which takes them on a journey; in
the carriage on the way to business; in the midst of
some social reunion; in the course of some common¬
place conversation to which 'they are barely listening
and answering by monosyllables; sometimes in conscious
dreams.
In the most remarkable cases of subconscious
collaboration, it seems that the work consciously begun
is elaborated little by little in the subconsciousness, with
a definite plan, with all its divisions and details, till it
reaches completion. But these divisions and details
come only by degrees and not in a regular order and
sequence. It is only when the work is far advanced
that the^ plan and the arrangement of its parts appear.
The action resembles putting together a kind of sub¬
conscious puzzle, and the artist or the writer (and it is
more especially to writers that we refer) has to make an
effort to allocate correctly the pages or the phrases
which have been subconsciously inspired.
86
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
When the work is finished it is found to be quite
different from the plan sketched out; but it may give
an impression of beauty and order above the writer’s
own powers; it seems to be partly strange to him and
he may even admire it as if it were not his own.
There are all possible degrees and modes in this
collaboration of the conscious and the unconscious.
Certain artists and writers, usually (but not always) of
moderate ability, do not perceive this. They quite
sincerely think that all they produce is the result of
their own endeavours. Others perceive it more or less
and use it without questioning its origin. Others again,
understand it so well that they restrain effort, and are
quite aware whether or not they are making progress
or are straying into byways.
Inspiration, however, except in very rare cases, does
not dispense from effort. It simply fertilises .effort, apcL
reduces "it" to a minimum. Effort, however, cannot dis¬
pense with inspiration, and it is in the collaboration of
both that the highest and best work is produced.
Without rationalised effort and conscious control, even
the inspiration of genius is liable to stray. Disordered
and uncontrolled inspiration may result in fine work
disfigured by want of proportion, by want of order, by
redundance, errors, and mistakes.
Just as a virgin forest presents magnificent foliage
against the sky, and dark impenetrable thickets stifled by
parasitic vegetation, so in a powerful work the beauty
of genius may disappear under clumsy errors and aberra¬
tions resulting from creative inspiration unrestrained by
sane and healthy consciousness.
Side by side with inspiration must be placed Intuition,
also subconscious and all-powerful, on the one condition
that it is under due control by reasoned judgment.
The data of intuition lie beyond facts, experiences,
and reflection, and surpass them all. Intuition is the,
very essence of subconsciousness. Outlined only in
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the animal, where it appears as instinct, it acquires in
man the higher aspect of genius.
The subconscious reveals itself not by inspiration
and intuition alone, but also by frequent intrusions of
emotional, aesthetic, or religious thought. Unexpected
decisions, abrupt changes of opinion, many unreasoned
feelings, originate largely in subconsciousness or from
subconscious collaboration.
Who can say if even some ideas which seem to us
the result of reason, may not be the flowering of an
invisible and subconscious growth?
Finally, all the foundations of our being, that which
is the principal part of the Self, innate capacities, good
or bad dispositions, character—all that makes the
essential difference between one mind and another—all
tha± i§ .nftt. thp, results of.personal effort, of education^
or of surrounding examples, are modes of subconscious¬
ness - .
Effort, education, and surrounding examples may
develop that which is inborn and essential, they cannot
create it. The,.subconsciousness whose activity con¬
stitutes that cryptopsychism, whose far-reaching effects
we have reviewed, is the innate and essential groundwork
of our being. .

2.—C RYPTOM NESIA

.Cryptomnesia—-the subconscious memory—-follows


naturally on ciyptopsychism.
In point of fact, the subconscious not only contains
that which.;? psychically essential in the Self;' it also
pres£CTesTand.cpnceals_all_that_the Self seems to' have
acqpjred.by conscious psychic'action in the course of
existence. * -•
^..49?s_.nSt.forget;,.it keeps all, integrally*
Cryptomnesia may be observed both m normal and
88
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
in abnormal psychology; but it is naturally more
prominent in the latter.
Flournoy1 is perhaps the psychologist who of all
others has studied cryptomnesia most thoroughly.
The fact of the re-emergence of forgotten memories
which the mind wrongly takes to be new and unpub¬
lished matter, is, he says, much more frequent than is
supposed.
* Plain men, as well as great geniuses, are subject
to these lapses of memory, bearing not on its actual
content, since that very content reappears with
distressing and treacherous accuracy, but on the
local and temporary associations which would, if
remembered, have caused its recognition as matter
already seen, and would have prevented the user
from decking himself in borrowed plumes. Helen
Keller—theramous blind "deaf-mute—who, at eleven
years old, composed her story of the Frost-king,
found herself most unjustly and cruelly accused of
plagiarism because this story presented a marked
likeness to a story which had been read to her three
years before. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has been
discovered to contain little details coming, unknown
to him, from a work of Kerner’s which he had studied
when 12 to 15 years old. But it is among persons
most disposed to mental dissociation and duplicate
personality that cryptomnesia reaches a climax.’
A classical example of cryptomnesia in normal
psychology is the instantaneous recollection of latent
impressions at a time of violent psychological disturbance,
such as may be produced by the sudden danger of
accidental death. Cases have been cited in which all the
events of a lifetime; all its acts and thoughts, even those
which were insignificant and quite forgotten, are said
to have passed through the mind.
1 Flournoy: Esprits et Mediums,
89
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Cryptomnesia may also appear in dreams.
The classical case of Delboeuf1 is quite characteristic
in this respect: in a complicated dream he saw, among
other things, a plant with its botanical name, Asplenium
ruta muraria. Now Delboeuf was totally ignorant of
this name, or thought he was. After long search he
found that two years before he had turned over the
leaves of a botanical album and there had seen both the
plant and the name, of which he had not thought again.
In hypnosis and connected states cryptomnesia some¬
times is strikingly manifested. If the subject is carried
back, spontaneously or by suggestion to a remote period
of his life, all the forgotten impressions reappear and
the psychism manifested is precisely that which he had
at that age. The experiments of Janet* and, subsequently,
those of de Rochas, on the regression of memory have
brought this out clearly.
Sometimes the subject, in this state of regression to
a former age, shows knowledge totally forgotten, such as
a language learned in childhood. Pitres2 cites the case
of a patient, Albertine M., who thus used the patois
of Saintonge, which she had only spoken in childhood.
During this recessional delirium, says Pitres, ‘she
expressed herself in patois, and if we begged her to speak
in French she invariably answered, always in patois,
that she did not know the talk of the townspeople.'
Take, also, the famous case of one of Flournoy’s
subjects, who, in a state of mediumistic somnambulism,
spoke in Sanskrit, a tongue of which he was completely
ignorant, and had never learned. Flournoy, in spite of
all his investigations, could never discover the origin of
this phenomenon.*
It is in mediumship that cryptomnesia shows a climax.
It may be the unsuspected source of quite stupefying
messages.
1 Quoted by M. Dwelshatrvers.
‘Pitres. L’Hysierie tt I'Hypnotisme.
‘Flournoy: Dts Indts A la Plemite Mors.
90
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
M. Flournoy cites a number of facts which he
attributes entirely to cryptomnesia,—mediums giving
biographical details of persons unknown to them but
which they may have unconsciously known from a
forgotten glance at a newspaper which contained those
details; mediums speaking fragments of a language
of which they are ignorant simply because these phrases
have fallen under their eyes on some forgotten occasion,
etc., etc.
‘ In fine,’ Flournoy concludes, ‘ by whatever mode the
mnemonic content has been received, whether by
reading, conversation, etc., it emerges in sensorial
automatisms (visions, voices, etc.), in motor automatisms
(raps or automatic writing), or in total automatisms
(trances, controls, or somnambulistic personifications).
This diversity, of course, is further complicated by the
embroidery which the fancy of the medium adds to
fragments properly referred to cryptomnesia.’
Among the examples given by Flournoy there are
some of the most remarkable kind. Some are here
quoted.
Case of Eliza Wood.—Mrs Wood, ■widowed in the
previous week, received a visit from a friend, Mme
Darel (the well-known authoress of Geneva), who
possessed remarkable mediumistic faculties. Mme Darel
brought to her, on behalf of the defunct, the following
message, obtained at her table: * Tell her to remember
Easter Monday.’ It was a striking allusion to an event
known only to Mr and Mrs Wood, referring to a walk
kept secret from their families, prior to their engagement,
which had left an ineffaceable, memory. This striking
proof of identity convinced Mrs Wood, who soon had
a second, still more valid, at the stances which she
attended at Mme Darel’s house. Mr Wood had died
not long after their wedding trip, his widow thought
he had left no will, and the search which she made was
fruitless, till the day when she and Mme Darel were
9i
.From the Unconscious to the Conscious
at the table, which, on the part of the defunct, rapped
out: * You will find something from me under a saucer
in the drawer of the washstand.’ She found there a
sheet of paper constituting the document in question.
She then remembered that when they were just starting
on their journey, her husband had made her wait a
moment while he returned on some pretext to their
bedroom, evidently to write and hide his will there.’
‘ Now,’ says M. Flournoy, ‘ there is nothing to prove
that Mme Darel or one of her people, out for a walk
on Easter Monday (which is a holiday) in the environs
of Geneva, had not met the pair, or seen them from a
distance, and this forgotten impression may have been
the source of the message which so impressed the young
widow; similarly the second message regarding the
hidden will may well have been due to reminiscences
and subconscious inferences of Mrs Wood’s.’
Case of the Cur£ Burnet.—Flournoy’s subject pro¬
duced one day a message claiming to be from one Burnet,
who had died a century previously, the cur<£ of a commune
in the department Haute Savoie. The researches of the
professor showed the absolute identity of the writing
and the signature to the message with that of the deceased
clergyman.
How can this be explained? The medium, M.
Flournoy supposes, had once, in childhood, passed
through the commune where the cur6 had lived^ He
had (on Flournoy’s hypothesis) seen on some document,
such, for example, as an old marriage contract, the
writing and the signature of the cur£. He had not,
however, the slightest recollection of this journey. It
was therefore a question of some impression received
without conscious knowledge forgotten, but yet intact,
which, in the hypnotic state, had awaked this strange qt'd
perfect reminiscence. 0
Along with these remarkable examples which spiritu¬
alists attribute, not to cryptomnesia but to post-mortem
9a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
manifestations, Flournoy gives many others, which,
equally mysterious in appearance, certainly proceed
from pure cryptomnesia; mediums giving from supposed
defunct persons proofs of identity found on inquiry to
be erroneous, but conformable to records which had
appeared in such and such a newspaper which had
evidently fallen under the eyes of the medium at some
moment or other without arousing conscious attention.

However little philosophical thought one may bring


to the study of subconscious psychology, what strikes
one most forcibly is that it does not fall under any known
physiological law. The same question inevitably recurs
to the mind of the inquirer—why, and how, is it that
the portion of the psychism which constitutes the more
important part of the Self, remains cryptoid ? Why, and
how, does it come to pass that the consciousness and
the will of the living being, without which there would
be no Self, let go the major part of that Self ? Whether
the matter is cryptopsychic or cryptomnesic, the mystery
is equally profound. It is physiologically impossible to
understand how the conscious memory, under the control
and the direction of the person, should be weak, untrust¬
worthy, and decrepit, while the subconscious memory,
only accessible incidentally or in abnormal or super¬
normal states, should seem both extensive and un¬
failing.
Nevertheless this is what everything tends to
prove.
Yet more, the weakness and impotence of the normal
memory is sometimes such that the subconscious know¬
ledge or powers which escape from the direction of the
Self appear totally strange to the individual and constitute
a secondary consciousness.
In the bewildering complexity of the subconscious,
there arise not only duplicate, but even multiple,
personalities.
93
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

-ALTERATIONS OF PERSONALITY

The chief problems which are presented by the


appearance of secondary personalities, are two, both
equally difficult.
i. The problem of the psychological differences
from the normal personality, differences not
only of manner and will, but of general
character, inclinations, faculties, and knowledge;
differences occasionally so radical that they
imply complete opposition and even hostility
between the normal and the secondary per¬
sonality.
a. The problem of the supernormal powers which
are frequently linked with the manifestation of
secondary personalities.
Now although there are numerous works on multiple
personality, which have brought to light the frequency,
the importance, and the many forms of these manifesta¬
tions, they have done nothing towards the elucidation of
these two problems.
. ^ave °nly succeeded in showing the abyss that
exists between the commonplace personalities of hypnotic
suggestion, devoid of originality of any kind, and the
psychic changes arising from pathological or traumatic
causes on the one hand, and the autonomous and complete
personalities which sometimes seem to occupy the whole
psy^ic field of the subject, on the other.
nf abT a1!’ 4own the complete inability
.oi 75 87 “I"*

94
CHAPTER V

THB SO-CALLED SUPERNORMAL SUBCONSCIOUSNESS

Supernormal psychology is a world whose exploration


is hardly begun. Without entering here on an analytical
description which the reader will find in special works,
it is expedient to examine its principal aspects as a whole.

I*—■SUPERNORMAL PHYSIOLOGY IS CONDITIONED BY


SUPERNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Imprimis, supernormal physiology is conditioned by


the supernormal psychology which has already been
described.
All the phenomena of exteriorisation, telekinesis,!
mysterious action on matter, materialisation and ideo4
plasticity, in no way depend on the conscious will of the)
subject. They are always produced subconsciously;/
either, as it would seem, by the external -will of an entity,
or by a subconscious idea, or by a subconscious per¬
sonality.
. I do not, for the moment, insist further on this truth
which is obvious to all observers in the supernormal
domain. As I have shown in my book, IlfLtre Sub-
consdent, supernormal physiology is merely an aspect
and a province of supernormal psychology. It is
inseparable from it, and cannot be observed or understood
apart from it.

2.-MENTO-MENTAL ACTION

In the second place, supernormal psychology includes,


mento-mental action, by which is to be understood those.
95
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
effects which are produced from mind to mind without
'any appreciable physical intermediary, such as thought-
'reading,‘mental suggestion, or telepathy. I see nothing
to add to the summary of these reactions given in L’Btre
Suhonsctent} here reproduced. Thought-reading seems
"well established in hypnotic and mediumistic states. It
is the convenient, (much too convenient since much-
abused), explanation of many facts. It seems, up to a
certain pointy to be possible in the waking state;, or at
least in a state of hypnosis or auto-hypnosis so slight as
to pass unperceived.
Outside hypnosis and mediumship, thought-reading
is rarely observable in any satisfactory manner. Cases
of alleged thought-reading obtained by contact between
the agent and the subject, must be excluded, for these
are often the results of divination by unconscious muscular
movements.
Mental suggestion.—The possibility and reality of
mental suggestion have been proved in the most rigorous
manner.1
An order suggested by the magnetiser can be trans¬
mitted by a mere effort of the will, without any external
manifestation, when the patient is in the hypnotic state.
Mental suggestion may be effected at a distance,
sometimes at very considerable distances, and across
material obstacles.
JTelepathy.*—Telepathy consists essentially in the
fact of a strong psychic impression generally unlooked
for, produced in a normal person (either asleep or awake),
which is found to coincide with a real distant event.
Sometimes the psychic impression constitutes the

1 Vide the standard work of Dr Ochorowics: La Suggestion Menials;


all required proofs will be found therein.
* Phantasms of the Living, by Messrs Gurney, Myers, and Podmoro,
which contains 700 cases all well described and authenticated. See also
Hammanon's book: L’lnconnu et les Problimes Psychiqucs; also the
me of Revues Psychiques, and more especially the Annates dss Sciences
Psychtques, which contains numerous very remarkable cases of telepathy,
96
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
whole fact. Sometimes it is accompanied by a vision
which appears objective and external to the percipient.
Telepathy may be spontaneous or experimental.1
Spontaneous telepathy may be:—
(a) Relative to some event in the immediate future,
e.g. presentiments, premonitions, premonitory
visions, apparitions of the dying.
(b) Relating to the present or the recent past.
Cases of* second sight * or intimations of distant
events to persons in the normal state; appari¬
tions of the dead a few moments, hours, or
days after decease; cases of apparitions of a
living person usually then in abnormal or
pathologic sleep (lethargy, febrile delirium, or
nervous disturbance, etc).
Most frequently the phenomenon refers to some
person united to the percipient in more or less dose bonds
of affection. The cases usually relate to misfortunes;
rarely to happy events; very rarely to indifferent ones.
The telepathic manifestation is usually unexpected.
It often occurs to persons alien to the marvellous both
by tastes and occupations, and who are seldom so
influenced more than once in their lives.
It occurs either in waking life, or in sleep, which
it interrupts.
As to the phenomenon itself, two important charac¬
teristics should be noted:—
(a) The telepathic vision is generally very precise;
the details relating to the event and the sur¬
rounding drcumstances are quite exact.
(b) Neither distance nor intervening obstacles seem
to have any appredable effect.
A third characteristic (exceptional) is the following.
The vision may affect several persons either at the same
time or successively—it seems able to affect animals
i We shall not analyse experimental telepathy, which as yet
covers only elementary facts.
97
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
—sometimes it leaves physical traces. Finally, the
telepathic impression may not affect sight alone, as in
the case of a seemingly objective vision, but hearing and
touch also.

*' 3.-LUCIDITY1

Lastly, supernormal psychology includes all the


infinite varieties of lucidity; presentiments, sensorial
impressions beyond the range of the senses, the precise
vision of distant or past events, and even prevision of
the future.
Lucidity may be described as that subconscious
faculty which permits the acquisition of knowledge
without the assistance of the senses, and outside the
conditions which, in normal life, regulate the relation
of the Self with other selves or with the external world.
(«) ‘Without the assistance of the senses.’ The
senses do not, in fact, intervene. The subject
is asleep or anaesthetised; the events described
are beyond the sensorial range; they are often
far distant and shut off by physical barriers;
the knowledge acquired relates sometimes to
events which have not yet come to pass. The
whole evidence shows that the senses are not
in action.
Nevertheless, by a psychological habit, the subject
gives to his perceptions a sensorial semblance and refers
them to sight or hearing; even in cases when neither
sight nor hearing could possibly have been their cause.
One subject, for instance, self-hypnotised by a glass
of water or a crystal globe, claims to see therein past,
future, or distant events. He is but projecting, exterior¬
ising, and objectifying, a sensation abnormally received.

™ *rtm**m and
98
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
In another, the abnormal perception may cause an
auditory illusion which may run to hallucination.
(£) * Outside the conditions which in normal life
regulate the relation of the Self with other
selves or with the external world.’
In fact these perceptions proceed neither from
reasoning, nor from any of the normal modes of expressing
thought, neither from language, nor writing, nor sight,
nor hearing. They require neither induction nor
deduction, reflection, research, nor effort.
In its more perfect instances lucidity appears like a
flash which suddenly illuminates the recipient and gives
him, it may be, knowledge of an unknown fact removed
from all possibilities of sensorial perception, or complex
knowledge which would normally require much intricate
work on many points of research.1 As lucidity shows
itself to be beyond psychological conditions, whether
sensorial, dynamic, or physical, so it also shows
itself as being outside the conditions of time and
space.
Neither space nor material obstacles east for it,
and time seems to be unknown.
The event which it reveals and the knowledge it
gives, are not placed in Time at all. When, for instance,
m the famous case of lucidity by Dr Gallet, he announces
the election of M. Casimir Perrier to the Presidency of
the Republic * by 451 votes,’ this is given in the present
and not in the future; ‘ M. Casimir Perrier est elu . . .’
Similarly the Sonrel prediction of the wars of 1870-71,
and 1914-18, given in 1868, shows extremely precise
and true details on both wars, but gives them in the
present and not in the future. The visionary describes
the disasters of 1870, S<5dan, the siege of Paris, the
Commune; the war of 1914, beginning by a disaster

* Psychic manifestations which suddenly bring out a calculation of


probability or a result of subconscious reasoning are not to be confounded
with lucidity. Such cases have only the semblance of lucidity.
99
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and ending in complete victory ... as if these were
events he were actually witnessing.1

4.—SPIRITOID PHENOMENA

Under this title may be grouped all the phenomena


which seem to be produced and directed by an external
and autonomous intelligence acting through the physical,
active, or psychic powers of a medium. I shall not enter
here on the description of these, which the reader will
easily find elsewhere,8 but will content myself with a
few remarks.
In the first place, a very large part of supernormal
psychology puts on these spiritoid semblances. The
simplest as well as the most complex phenomena, from
automatisms and telekinesis, up to predictions of the
future, are very often attributed by the subject to spiritist
influence.
The alleged personalities frequently make affirmations
agreeing in this respect with those of the medium; and
often endeavour to give proofs of their identity. These
proofs are sometimes very simple, sometimes very
intricate, as in the cases of cross-correspondence.
Very often no other objection can be made to these
spiritoid assertions except the possibility that they may
all be explained by the supernormal faculties of the
medium. In that case very large extensions of the
frculties of crypto-psychism, cryptomnesia, second-sight,
mento-mental action, lucidity, and teleplasticity must
be admitted.
For all the details of supernormal subconsciousness
I must refer the reader to special works, for at the present
moment I am not presenting these frets descriptively,
t 1 These astonishing cases, certainly true, were reported in detail,
after minute investigation, in the Annales des Sciences Psychiques.
1 For the philosophic discussion of these facts, see Book II,
IOO
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
or as data, but regarding them from a strictly philosophic
point of view.
From this standpoint what lesson can and ought to
be drawn ? Surely that the subconscious everywhere
outstrips and transcends the categories of sensorial and
cerebral capacity; that in all essentials it is beyond all
representations,1 outside even the category of repre¬
sentations, that is to say, outside Space and Time. This
will be brought out with all necessary clearness in
a future chapter.
But before doing this it is needful to examine the
attempts that have been made to reconcile the phenomena
of the Unconsdous with the classical concept of the
Self as a synthesis of states of consciousness and as a
product of cerebral activity.
1 * Representation' is used by Dr Geley in the strictly philosophical
sense; **the energy of the mind in holding up to contemplation what
it is determined to represent.”—Sir William Hamilton, Metaphysics, xnv.
—[Translator's note.]

101
CHAPTER VI

CLASSICAL THEORIES OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS

It would seem that the recent influx of ideas on the


Subconscious should have disconcerted the classical
psycho-physiology.
Nevertheless many attempts have been made to
reconcile the new facts with the old theories.
Most are based on very conscientious work, but
none has attained its object. We shall examine each
in turn and endeavour to show wherein they are insuffi¬
cient and inadmissible.
Classical theories of the subconscious may be placed
in two categories: the physiological and the purely
psychological.

Physiological Themes.

There are two physiological theories: the theory


of Automatism and the theory of Morbidity.

I.—THE THEORY OF AUTOMATISM

For the tentative interpretation of the subconsdous,


tiie first hypothesis was that of psychological automatism,
following naturally on that of physiological automatism.
In each case what is observed is held to be merely a
passive manifestation; and unconsdous psychiatry accor¬
ding to this, is simply a result of the automatic activity
of the brain—unconscious cerebration.
To support this theory P. Janet speaally studied
102
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
certain pathological conditions, such as minor epilepsy,
elementary symptoms of hysteria, hypnosis, somnam¬
bulism, and mediumship.
The psychological automatism in these cases was
beyond doubt, and to generalise from these data, extend¬
ing automatism to the whole area of subconsciousness,
was but one step. It was soon taken.
But when, leaving the lower and commonplace
order of phenomena, higher subconscious manifestations
had to be examined, insurmountable difficulties arose.
The physiological automatism with which psychic
automatism was compared, is of two kinds—innate and
acquired.
Innate automatism is shown by the activity of the
main organic functions such as circulation of the blood,
or digestion. . This is the same from birth to death, if
not quantitatively at least qualitatively. It always
remains within the limits proper to these functions and.
initiates nothing new. Besides the fact that tins auto¬
matic dynamism is, as we have seen, unexplained, it
is clear that it cannot help us to understand a subconscious
psychism that innovates and creates.
Acquired automatism is the result of complicated
interactions,—certain modes of activity, needing at first
attention and continued exercise of the will, come by
habit to be performed without continuous attention,
and with a minimum of effort.
This acquired automatism also remains within the
limits prescribed by habit, and does not go beyond
them. But the higher subconscious manifestations are
usually sporadic, and in no case do they resemble habits.
This is obvious in the case of supernormal manifesta¬
tions; these can never become customary. Even for
the less mysterious phenomena, automatism is no
explanation.
Multiple personalities brought to light in certain
individuals show spontaneity and self-directing will.
103
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
They do not act according to some autonomous habit,
but take an original direction. The will manifested is
not only sharply defined; it also differs from that of the
subject, and may be opposed or even hostile to it, as
in the case of Miss Beauchamp, studied by Dr Morton
Prince.1
In mediumship, this spontaneity, will, and autonomy
of the so-called secondary personalities appear still more
remarkably; they sometimes show a quite Complete
psychism of their own, with their own faculties of willing,
knowing, and reasoning; with acquirements often very
different from those of the conscious subject, such, for
instance, as the knowledge of a language unknown to
the latter. In the more notable cases, there would seem
to be really nothing in common between the two person¬
alities. How can the term ‘ automatism * be applied
to these facts ?
Let us now pass to subconscious productions of an
artistic, philosophic, or scientific order. Only defective
reasoning can attribute inspiration and genius to cerebral
automatism.
Let us analyse what happens in these subconscious
productions.
To take a typical case, a man of science, an artist,
or a thinker undertakes a certain work. Confronted
with some unexpected, difficulties, he is discouraged, and
stops. To his surprise, some time later, the solution
which he had vainly sought comes to him without effort,
and the work he had^planned is easily completed.
This, it is said, is because the brain has continued
to work automatically in the direction of the original
impulse; but it is impossible to find in physiology an
analogous example of automatic function,
i When, for instance, one learns to ride a bicycle, a
long series of voluntary efforts have to be repeated to
reach the stage of automatic direction. If the learner
1 Dr Morton Prince: The Dissociation of a Personality*
104
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
were to break off discouraged, no amount of waiting
would find him more advanced for a second attempt.
In the interval there would have been no ‘latent
physiological work * allowing a cessation of the effort
necessary for learning, and standing in lieu of that
effort.
Again, when in training, a man habituates not only
his muscles, but his lungs and heart to endure the
fatigue of running; a single effort can never take the
place of methodical and continued training. When,
then, * latent work by the brain ’ is alleged, that is a
mere guess contrary to all that physiology teaches; it'
is a hypothesis which involves an entirely new and
purely gratuitous notion; that the cerebral organ
works in a manner essentially different from all other
organs.
Let us now take another case:—
The artist, thinker, etc. . . . does not foresee the
work he means to do, and does not prepare it. He
produces under the influence of an ‘ inspiration ’ inde¬
pendent of his desire and will, sometimes contrary to
them. There is not in this case the original impulse
for the supposed automatism. Here he does not
direct the inspiration, he is directed by it. How, then,
can we speak of psychological automatism?
‘ The unconscious sequence here,’ says M. Dwel-
shauvers, ‘ is not an automatism but a vital action.’
M. Ribot also says, ‘ Inspiration reveals a power
superior to the conscious individual, strange to him
though acting through him—a state which many
inventors have described by saying of their work—I
had no part in it.’
M. Dwelshauvers, in his recent study of sub¬
conscious production, has abundantly shown that above
the psychological automatism (which is but a common¬
place and inferior form of the Unconscious), there is an
active latent unconsciousness which ‘ serves as an arsenal
105
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
for creative synthesis and aids a man in producing his
most perfect mental work.’
What are we to conclude ? Simply that the theory
of psychological automatism is applicable only to a small
number of the less important facts and cannot claim to
furnish any general explanation.
P. Janet finds himself obliged to admit this, and he
admits it reluctantly and ungraciously when he writes
as follows.

‘ Since the time when I used this word “ subcon¬


scious ” in a clinical and commonplace sense, other
authors have used the word in a very much higher
one.’
_ ‘This word has been used to designate marvellous
activities which exist, so it would seem, within
ourselves without our suspecting their presence; it
has been used to explain sudden enthusiasms and the
divinations of genius. ... I shall not venture to
discuss theories so consoling, which may perhaps
be true.’
‘ I shall limit myself to the observation that I
am busied with quite other things. The poor sick
folk that I was studying had no kind of genius;
the phenomena which in them had become sub¬
conscious, were very simple matters which are part
of the consciousness of other men without giving
any cause for surprise. They had lost personal
consciousness and the power of self-direction; they
had sick personalities—that is all.’1

This,, in fine, is all that is covered by automatic


subconsciousness properly so called. The higher active
subconsciousness, being entirely different in essence
and nature, must be clearly distinguished from the
former.
*P. Janet, Preface to J. Joatrow'a SuUomcme*.
10b
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

2.-THE THEORY OF MORBIDITY

Another general explanation which, although still


less logical and. more vain and arbitrary than the first,
has had, and still has much currency, is the explanation
by morbidity.1
One hesitates to avow it, but it is this poverty-stricken
explanation to which the majority of psychologists
to-day are not afraid to appeal. According to mem
everything which, from the psychological point of view,
departs from the average, must proceed from disease.
They would have subconscious powers to be morbid
products; hypnotism, akin to neurosis; multiple per¬
sonality, a pathological disintegration of the Self;
supernormal phenomena, symptoms of hysteria; and
as for the works of genius, they are simply results of
madness.
At the base of all these morbid manifestations they
always discover an essential pathological cause—‘ degen¬
eration.’ This factor of ‘degeneration’ is the more
convenient in that it is elastic; it is supposed to rule both
ordinary and hysteriform neuropathic cases (inferior
degeneration), and the manifestations of genius (superior
degeneration).
Thus everything that from the intellectual point
of view is either above or below the normal, must be
the result of disease.
The label * morbid ’ is affixed with more or
less discretion or indiscretion by different schools of
psychiatry;2 but its use is nearly general.
Dr Chabaneix speaks of auto-intoxication and over¬
pressure among the predisposed: ‘The more an organ
works,’ he writes, ‘the more it develops, and at the
1 The chief psychological review in France is entitled: Revue de
Psychologic Normale et Pathologtque.
* Mental therapeutics; treatment of insanity.
107
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
same time, the more liable it becomes to disease. One
of the diseases of the brain is automatism, or the appear¬
ance of the subconscious. And this subconsciousness,
instead of being a trouble to the mind, is often a ferment
of creation, when it is not itself creation.*
A curious disease, which, instead of being a cause
of * trouble ’ and of diminution to the individual,
increases his capacities and powers 1
Lombroso, for his part, boldly invokes madness.
Others define differently, they reduce talent and
genius to arthritism. But the record in this respect is
held up to the present by Dr Pascal Serph.1 He takes
no hair-measures and has the courage of his opinions.
According to him the origin of genius is looked for
much too far away—genius is purely and simply the
product of ... . hereditary syphilis!
‘ If syphilis,* Dr Serph gravely concludes, * does the
harm which medical men are unanimous in recognising
and fearing for mankind, it nevertheless gives, as a set-off,
by its hypertrophic action on the brain, the possibility
of perfecting human action, and being thus creative
of the special ideas of genius, it compensates to some
extent for its ravages.’
It is scarcely possible to restrain some impatience
when men of science maintain such theories, and one
feels a certain disgust at having to refute ideas which
deserve only contempt.
It is, however, necessary to do this.
Let us remark, in the first place, that among the
various morbid factors invoked, one only—-neuropathy
-—seems to be coincident with facts, if not supported
by them.
It is true that men of great talent- or genius are
almost invariably neuropathic. But what is neuro¬
pathy ?
Medical science does not know. Neuroses, and
1 Gazette Medicate ie Petris, July is, 191$.
108
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
even madness are pure enigmas from the point of view
of pathological anatomy.
We shall see that, far from explaining the mechanism
of abnormal or superior psychism, neuroses receive
their explanation from the deeper study of the essential
nature of the subconscious.
But this is not all, even if we suppose the theories of
morbidity justified, they in no way solve the problems
which the manifestations of subconsciousness set before
us. To say ‘ genius is neurosis or madness ’ does not
help us to understand the mechanism of the works of
genius. The great thinker, artist, or man of science,
brings something new to humanity; he creates. You
say—he is mad 1 So be it, but how is madness creative ?
Until you have laid before our eyes the mechanism of
the subconscious psychism, you have only put the
difficulty one step back by affixing the epithet ‘ morbid'
to it.
To say that secondary personalities are only products
of the disintegration of the Self, is not to make them
comprehensible, rather the contrary. The disintegration
of a psychic entity may give the key to alterations of
personality, but only to those alterations which diminish
the personality. ....
This diminution of personality is evident in certain
cases of amnesia1 following on cranial wounds, on
great emotions, severe infection, epilepsy, etc.
Diminished personality appears also in the psycho¬
logic automatism described by P. Janet. But in the
cases of complete and autonomous secondary personalities
it is not observable. When these secondary personalities
occupy the whole psychic field of the subject, when they
show a very original will, and give proof of powers and
knowledge different from those of the patient and some¬
times much above those which he normally possesses,
one can no longer invoke the disintegration of the Self
1 Loss of memory.
109
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
as a complete explanation. It is impossible to admit that
the secondary personality, the fraction of the Self,
should be as extensive, or even more extensive than the
total Self. The part is never equal to or greater than
the whole.
Psychological disintegration must therefore be given
up as a general explanation of modifications of the
personality.

It is not by saying that such and such a medium is


hysterical that we can understand the action at a distance
of her motor faculties and her intelligence; apart from
her muscles, her senses and her brain; or can acquire
the key to the difficult problem of supernormal psycho¬
physiology involving the faculties of thought-reading,
lucidity, and ideoplastic or teleplastic action.
There is. this fin^j argument against the theory of
morbidity—it is contrary to the logic of facts. It is
contrary to the whole teachings of physiology to
declare that a diseased organ can produce results
superior to those of a healthy one, especially when
those results occur in a constant and semi-regular
manner.
There is an untenable contradiction in declaring
physical power a function of health, and the mental
power of genius a function of disease.
Is it now necessary to speak of other less general
theories of morbidity, restricted to one or another group
of subconscious phenomena ? It will suffice briefly to
indicate them.
Azam explained the duplication of personality by
the separate action of the two cerebral lobes; a thesis
which, since the manifestation of multiple, and not
merely double, personalities in the same individual, has
only a historic interest.
Dr Sollier explains hysteria by disjunctions among
the cerebral cells; all the symptoms of the neurosis
no
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
being explained by the non-activity or the hyper-activity
of certain among these neurons.
Professor Grasset thinks to explain subconscious
manifestations by a disjunction between the functioning
of Charcot’s schematic ‘polygon’ and a certain centre
O, localised somewhere in the gray matter of the brain.
To all these theories the same objections can be
raised:—
1. They are adapted only to a few facts, leaving out
of account the very thing which is most impor¬
tant in subconsciousness—the higher crypto¬
psychism, and the supernormal.
2. Even for the limited facts which they cover they
are insufficient, since they assign as cause the
very thing which has to be explained—the why,
and how, of these disjunctions.
Leaving the physiological, we will now pass on to
the psychological theories of the subconscious.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS

These theories are many and of unequal value.


There are some which start from vicious reasoning, they
are petitiones principii, or verbal explanations. We will
discuss them briefly.

3.-PETITIONES PRINCIPII

A petitio principii consists in carrying back a mysterious


occurrence to another not less mysterious, but previously
known and more familiar. Among supernormal phenom¬
ena for instance, telepathy and thought-reading are the
most familiar and the best known, which gives them a
kind of priority of privilege, so that it is sought,. by any
and every means, to reduce all intellectual mediumship
to them; which is absurd, and only complicates the
whole subject, for thought-reading and telepathy are
in
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
as contrary to known laws as are clairvoyance or trans¬
cendental xnediumistic communications.
Professor Pouchet1 writes as racily as he does
logically when he says:—
‘ To demonstrate that a brain by some kind of
gravitation acts at a distance on another brain like
a magnet on iron, the sun on the planets, or the
earth on a falling body! To arrive at the discovery
of an influence, a nervous vibration propelling itself
without any material conductor! The amazing
thing is that those who believe, more or less, in
something of the sort, seem, poor fellows! not
even to suspect the importance and the interest of
the novelty which is involved, and what a revolution
this would be for the social world. Prove that, my
good people, and your names mil stand higher than
that of Newton; and I can assure you that the
Berthelots and the Pasteurs will take off their hats
to you!’
A still more familiar begging of the question consists
in explaining hypnotism by hysteria, or hysteria by
hypnotism. ‘ What is there astonishing in manifes¬
tations under hypnotism ? Analogous and spontaneous
occurrences are known in hysteria! Why marvel at
hysterical manifestations ? Similar manifestations
be brought about by hypnosis.’
Then jet another step is taken in the way of begging
the question, when both hysteria and hypnotism are
referred to suggestibility or to Professor Babinsky’s
* Pythiatism.’
But suggestion, a usual and convenient factor in
hypnosis or hysteria, is absolutely valueless and of no
import, as a philosophic explanation.
We have demonstrated as much in L'fctre Sub-
consdent.
1 Quoted by M. de Rochas: ExiSriorisaHon de la Moiricitt,
1X2
Prom the Unconscious to the Conscious
has ^ ^^^ ^

discuS'?00^"!^”S ’’T fr°® *' ^


consists in explaining coSte^U”'?°d 1wHch
terms, such as “ sugglstion » hj abstract
appears to us highlyunscientific d% .^S&^tibility,”
old scholastic method—a recourse t “ * rfHc of
Jaimes, and virtues. Ini wi n ^ enTtities>
induce at will the most unhtl^ i,pa^ent 1 ca“
paralyse his organs as 1

ampler; it is 'C^T-> NotW”g

ssfSSif cor ^
a dormitive virtue.’ ^ ^ saying that opium has

dasj^l *> «a the


metajpsychic and supernormal. Phenomena, both

caDed^pS^W ^Wd.'sf”^5 whi<* “7 bo


WcholSe7ia,/|S,j“ns»bonnd u. the dasLl

4- ARTIFICIAL DISJUNCTIONS AND VERBAL


explanations

disjuncdons^ong'the^ubcoiisr™ reCours' t0 artificial


oSbr* are S£t&»£
B™“: ”8 tte
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
facts they have classed. They thus give themselves
the illusion of understanding them.
Among the facts of subconsciousness there are some
quite familiar and well known—the facts of inspiration,
so these are made into a class apart, the active sub¬
consciousness, opposed to the automatic subconsciousness
spoken of by P. Janet. But the classification goes
neither higher nor further; this main class is sub-divided
into secondary classes—unconscious invention; uncon¬
scious memory; unconscious tendencies; unconscious
association or ideas; unconscious emotional states;
religious unconsciousness, etc. ...
The main class of multiple personalities is divided
into sub-classes, labelled infra-consciousness, super¬
consciousness, co-consciousness, etc., etc.
In the same order of ideas eminent psychologists
distinguish subconscious psychism properly so called
from what they term * metapsychism, ’ between which
there are, however, only analogies, and no essential
distinctions.
The normal subconsciousness and the metaphysic
subconsciousness are manifested in very closely allied
states:—
The state of ecstasy, of rapture, of absent-mindedness,
in a poet, an artist, or a philosopher composing under
the influence of inspiration, is, at bottom, identical
with the secondary state of the medium. Let it not
be said that the medium speaks, acts, and writes quite
automatically, whilst the artist, even when his conscious
will does not intervene, nevertheless knows what he is
producing. This distinction does not always obtain.
Many mediums know quite well what is about to be
given through them; just as the artist knows bit by
bit what he will produce under an inspiration of which
he is neither the master nor the guide.
Rousseau covering pages of writing without reflec¬
tion or effort, in a state of rapture which drew tears,
X14
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Musset listening to the mysterious * genius * who dic¬
tated his verses, Socrates listening to his daemon,
Schopenhauer refusing to believe that his unexpected
and unsought postulates were his own work, all behaved
exactly like mediums.
Moreover, it is not infrequent that mediumship
co-exists with manifestations of artistic inspiration.
Musset, for instance, was a sensitive and almost a
visionary.
It is needless to remark that cryptomnesia and crypto¬
psychism are the foundation both of mediumship and
of normal subconscious psychism. In fact it is not
always easy to distinguish one from the other. Will it
be said that the distinction between subconscious psychism
properly so called, lies in the appearance of the super¬
normal element ?
But where does the supernormal begin ? The empti¬
ness and futility of this term * supernormal ’ has been
shown in the chapter on physiology. It was there
demonstrated that normal and so-called supernormal
physiology are equally mysterious and involve one and
the same problem. The case is the same for psychology.
The subconscious, as a whole, is incomprehensible by
classical psychology.
All that classical psychology has been able to do
with the supernormal is to multiply the number of labels.
The more numerous the labels the greater the illusion
of understanding. We shall then have exteriorisation
of sensation, exteriorisation of motor power, exteriorisa¬
tion of intelligence, telesthesia, telepathy, telekinesis,
teleoplasticity, ideoplasticity, etc., etc.
M. Boirac, finding this nomenclature still too
poor, proposes to add hypnology, psychodynamics,
telepsychism, hyloscopy, metagnomy, biactinism, dia-
psychism, etc.1
These classifications, indeed, answer to an innate
1 Boirac: La Psychologie Incomue and L’Avtnir its Jttudes PsycMqwss.
115
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
need of the human mind, and in one sense are legitimate.
But their danger lies in the fact that they come to mean
something more than classifications, they come to mean
a quite illusory interpretation; they turn aside the
logical endeavour to understand and reason, or put it
to sleep. They have yet another danger,. they mask
the essential unity of psychological synthesis, and lead
to the notion that the diverse subconscious, manifesta¬
tions may be susceptible of isolated and partial explana¬
tion. Thus they mislead the investigator and retard all
philosophical progress.
The question of the Subconscious is passing through
the stage which all important questions of scientific
philosophy have passed through. Sooner or later the
common link between all questions of the same order
is found, and then a harmonious synthesis is con¬
structed, which is capable of explaining, if not all the
minor difficulties of detail (which will finally be resolved
little by. little under the direction and control of the
general idea), at any rate all the major difficulties. But
before reaching the synthetic phase, the human mind
struggles painfully through a long analytical phase,
during which it only observes facts and classifies them
more or less skilfully.
Nevertheless, from the beginning of this phase it
endeavours to find explanations, but these are based
on a small, number of facts specially studied by this or
that investigator, and hastily generalised upon by him
by the help of an arbitrary and forced adaptation to other
groups or analogous facts.
Then one of two things happens.
Either these hasty and superficial theories are also
vague and inexact, and end in an insidious and deceptive
verbalism; or they are exact but cover only a small
number of facts, and cannot stand the test of general
application.
Theories of these two categories are already
«6
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
numerous in the domain of the philosophy of the sub¬
conscious.
We have already dted the partial theories of Janet,
of Grasset, and of Sollier.
Two more may be dted, both of a general character,
but still insuffident.

5.-PROFESSOR JASTROW’s THEORY

The vague, inexact, and merely verbal type of theory


is represented by that of Professor Jastrow. The con¬
clusion of his long study on Subconsciousness is as
follows:—1

* The impression left on us by this study is


that the mental life of Man does not rest on his
consciousness alone. Below consciousness there
exists a psychic organisation anterior to it? which is
doubtless the source whence it has been derived.
* It is to be presumed that the origin of con¬
sciousness is due to the necessity of satisfying some
need which otherwise would not have been com¬
pletely satisfied.
‘ Its birth marks the beginning of a greater
co-ordination of functions. Its duty consists primarily
in integrating experiences, and thus establishing
the unity of the mind. Morbid dissociations3 only
bring into higher relief that unity which the normal
mind retains during its whole development, by
which it resists all the vidssitudes through which it
passes.
* We have explained the different psychic
phenomena by the light of evolutionist concepts.
. . . The interpretation of the different varieties of
1J. Jastrow: La Subconscienct (Alcan). 1 My italics, G. G.
117 K
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
subconscious activities1 ought to be considered as
pertaining to a system founded on mental evolution.
Subconsciousness should appear as a natural pro¬
duct of mental constitution. It should also b
shown that in proportion as the complexity of the
mind increases, the subconsciousness is mouincu
so as to continue to fill the function which it bolds
in that mind. But all evolution implies arrest,
weakening, decadence, and dissolution; ^ and in
examining the products of the dissolution of a
function we often come to understand its normal
development better; and it is for this reason that
we have in this work studied the alterations of the
mind with so much care.’
This theory of Dr Jastrow’s, if it explains nothing,
at least gives a very clear idea of the state of mind of
contemporary psychologists. It appeals to differentia¬
tions which are not essential differences, to impotent
and vain * morbid factors,’ and to a mere verbalism
still more impotent. Finally it is absolutely and system¬
atically inexact. It seems from time to time to have a
glimpse of a part of the truth, but is incapable of rising
to a free flight above the classical routine and the medley
of commonplaces. It sheds absolutely no light on the
nature, the origin, or the essence of subconsciousness.
It in no way explains how the subconsciousness, together
with a far-reaching cryptomnesia, can contain so many
marvellous and powerful faculties, so much unexpected
knowledge, latent, unused, unusable, and necessitating
a morbid disintegration of the Self in order to be
apparent!

6.—M. rxbot’s theory

There is a recent theory which may be considered


as the last word in the classical concept of the
1 My italics, G. G.
1X8
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
subconscious; it is by M. Ribot.1 M. Ribot finds it
quite simple: there is no unconscious Self.

‘ This term and the concept which it implies,


are an abuse of language, and inadmissible. The
Self, the person, is a whole, composed of constantly
varying elements, which in their perpetual “ becom¬
ing ” preserve a certain unity. But nothing similar
is found in this imaginary Self, no principle of unity,
but on the contrary a tendency to disperse and to go
to pieces. . . .
‘ To sum up, this supposed Self is a fraction,
made up of motor elements and mechanisms. When
it becomes active, it is an orchestra without a con¬
ductor.
' Unconscious function does not differ from
conscious activity except by the want of order and
unity. Its structure is made up of “ psychic
residues,” that is to say, of “ isolated or associated
elements which were once states of consciousness
. , .it is extinct consciousness, frozen and crystal¬
lised as to its motor elements.*

Nevertheless, M. Ribot admits there is in the


unconscious ‘ some impenetrable basal matter.’

' This fact—however it majr be explained—that


there is in us a buried life which appears only by
glimpses and never in its entirety, is far-reaching;
the fact is that this self-knowledge ««*•*-)
is not merely difficult, but impossible. We must
recognise our “absolute incapacity to know with
any certainty our own individuality in its entirety.” ’

In fine, according to M. Ribot, the conscious Self is


a co-ordination of states; and the unconscious Self is
* Ribot: La Vie Inconsciente et U$ Mouvements.
119
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
a residue of former states of consciousness. The activity
of the former reveals a certain unity, while that of the
latter is entirely anarchic and disordered. No doubt,
he admits, there are obscurities, but these, cannot be
helped; what we do not understand in psychic individu¬
ality is only that which it is impossible, to understand.
We can take note of this avowal of impotence. As
to M. Ribot’s actual theory, its insufficiency puts it
beyond discussion. The data on which it rests take
no account of what we may, with M. Dwelshauvers,
call the latent active subconsciousness, nor of the
supernormal. It has, therefore, no claim to be considered
a general theory.

7.—CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY OF CLASSICAL


PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY

Such are the classical explanations of subconscious


phenomena.
The entire and flagrant insufficiency of these explana¬
tions is obvious. The classical concept of physiological
and psychological individuality appears on examination
yet more limited and deficient than the classical concept
of evolution.
The latter has, at all events, succeeded in bringing
to light the secondary factors; and if mistaken as to
their import, if it has not been able completely to explain
transformism, it has, at any rate, placed its reality
beyond question.. The former, on the contrary, has not
succeeded in solving any one of the problems which it
undertakes.
Shut in by the narrow limits of polyzoism and poly¬
psychism, which hide from it the essential reality of
things, it is faced by riddles on all sides; the riddle of
the formation and the maintenance of the organism,
the riddle of Life, the riddle of personality, the
120
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
riddle of consciousness, and the riddle of sub-
consciousness.
Incapable of a synthetic outlook, its analyses have
resulted in the factitious generalisations of a sterile
method, which only escape from insufficiency to fall into
absurdity. The classical concept of the individual carries
on it the brand of lamentable impotence in what we
may call the contemporary official academic psycho¬
physiology.
Devoid of originality, depth, and truth, this official
psycho-physiology presents a striking contrast to the
other sciences which form a part of the marvellous
developments of our age.
Deprived of their light, it makes as it were a dark
zone in which the best minds blindly grope and
struggle in vain. ... It is time that a strong wind of
pure air should blow away the thick and heavy fog of
petty ideas linked to petty facts.

X2X
CHAPTER VII

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INFERENCES BASED ON THE


SUBCONSCIOUS

Our study of classical psycho-physiology has enabled


us to probe to the quick the errors and illusions due to
the ascendingTnetEdcTwhich, starting from elementary
facts, claims to interpret complex ones.
Let us now boldly use the opposite, descending
method; and consider first and foremost the most
complex facts of psychology; i.e. the subconscious
phenomena.
This method will give in the psychic domain the
results it has given in the physiological; a new and
brilliant light on our path, making our investigations
simple, easy, and fruitful.

i.—the subconscious is the very essence of


INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

Starting without preconceived ideas, and proceeding


to the study of subconscious psychology without heed
to the formulse and dogmas of classical teaching, we
experience a great surprise.
The subconscious appears as the very essence of
individual psychology.
That which is most important in the individual
psychism is subconscious. The foundation of the Self,
its characteristic qualities, are subconscious. All the
innate capacities are subconscious; likewise the higher
faculties—intuition, talents, genius, artistic or creative
inspiration. These faculties are cryptoid in their origin,
122
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
cryptoid in their manifestations, the greater part of
which escape from the •will, from the normal and regular
direction.of the individual, and show their existence only
by bringing to light intermittent and apparently spon¬
taneous results.
This subconscious psychic activity, powerful in
itself, is reinforced by a still more potent and infallible
memory which leaves the feeble and limited conscious
memory far behind.
By the side of the subconscious, the conscious
seems but a restricted, limited, and truncated psychism;
and even this psychism in its more important manifesta¬
tions is conditioned by that cryptoid portion of the Self
which is its foundation.
In a word, everything happens as though the
conscious were but a part, and that the smaller part,
of the Self; a part, moreover, entirely conditioned by
the more important part which remains cryptoid in the
ordinary circumstances of normal life.
Such a declaration is an insoluble mystery for the
classical psychology which considers the Self to be the
sum of the consciousness of its neurons. Starting from
that concept it is impossible to understand either crypto¬
psychism or cryptomnesia, or even to attempt any but
purely verbal explanations of them.

2.—THE IMPOTENCE OF CLASSICAL PSYCHOLOGY BEFORE


CRYPTOPSYCHISM AND CRYPTOMNESIA

From the point of view of individualist psychology


cryptopsychism appears nonsense. How can a part of
the mental activity escape from the control of the
individual or be accessible to him only irregularly and
fortuitously ? How can this involuntary, and latent
mental activity be superior to that which is voluntary
and conscious ? How can all the higher powers, not
123
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
only the supernormal faculties, but also creative inspira¬
tion, genius, and all that is essential in the intellect from
the psychic point of view, be for the most part inaccessible
and unknown ? Why, in a word, are they subconscious
and not conscious ? Once more this is impossible to
understand from the data of classical psychology.
Basing his reasoning on these arguments, Myers had
no difficulty in demonstrating the impossibility of making
cryptopsychism a product of normal physiological evolu¬
tion. There is, in fret, an absolute contradiction in
establishing the existence of faculties at once very
powerful and very useful, but at the same time mostly
unusable in the normal life of the individual.
Let us now pass to cryptomnesia.
This, as we have seen, seems to have an immense
power, a reach which seems limitless. It seems to
register faithfully everything which has come under our
senses, whether consdously or unknown to us, and to
register indelibly.
Such a concept differs in toto from all the classical
concepts of memory.
The ordinary memory is most precise when the fact
has forcibly arrested the attention and is also recent.
If the fact registered by the memory is of little or
no importance to the individual, it soon disappears for
ever, unless it should chance to be retained by reason of
an association with more important ideas. Similarly if
the fact registered is distant in time, remembrance
becomes vague, and in the end disappears, often entirely.
This is a regular and normal sequence conformable to
all that physiology teaches.
The impression produced on the brain is superficial
and ephemeral for states of consciousness of moderate
intensity, and even for more important states this
impression tends to disappear in time. Le Dantec1
thus sums up his psychological theory of memory,
1 Le Dantec: Le Determinism Biologique.
I24
.From the Unconscious to the Conscious
* There are two things to consider in memory
from the objective point of view :—
‘ i. The fact that we have not really forgotten
anything which it is possible for us to recall.
‘ a. The operation in which this recollection
consists.
‘ The former is a histological1 peculiarity, the
latter is the correlative of a physiological fact.
‘ If we execute any operation, mental or other,
a certain number of times, the path traversed by the
corresponding reflex will be beaten into a thorough¬
fare by that reflex in accordance with the law of
functional assimilation. In our nervous system,
therefore, there will be a certain number of histo¬
logical modifications correlative to the operation in
question. As long as these histological modifications
persist, the histological memory of the operation
will persist; it will suffice to repeat it from time
to time to maintain this histological memory by
functional assimilation. If a long time passes
•without repetition, the plastic destruction which
accompanies the repose of an organ will destroy
this particular path in the nervous system; there
will be forgetfulness.
* When the forgetfulness is complete and absolute
it is irremediable. The histological memory having
vanished, no psychological memory can remain.
This seems obvious, and seems to be, in fact, the
sequence and the condition of the ordinary memory/

Now cryptomnesia is entirely different; it retains


not only important facts but unimportant ones, even
those which have not claimed the conscious attention of
the person.
Further, the registration of states of consciousness
* Histological, Gr. Ms**tissue, pertaining to the tissue (of the
brain).
1^5
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
by the occult memory is not affected by the lapse of
time. The registration seems indelible.
The range of latent memories extends from the most
insignificant details, even those unconsciously registered,
to the most important facts of conscious lire. The
remembrance, even when it seems to have wholly
vanished, and is inaccessible to the normal self, can
reappear in its entirety as the foreground of abnormal
slates, especially in somnambulism or mediumship.
Cryptomnesia records not only external experiences
but internal ones also. It retains not only real impressions
but also those of an imaginative order. Imagination,
which plays so large a part in normal psychism, creates
and realises fictitious positions, and these, as ^ well as
real frets, are registered by cryptomnesia. Similarly,
of course, all the emotions and states of the soul.
In fine, everything which has occupied the psychic
field, consciously or unconsciously, remains indestructibly
even when it seems for ever lost. No matter whether a
very long time has elapsed since the sensorial or psychic
impression was made, no matter that the cerebral cells,
which vibrated synchronously, have doubtless since then
been many times renewed,1 in despite of time and
change the remembrance remains integrally and indelibly
graven in the Subconscious.
How ? Why ? To classical physiology the mystery
is insoluble.
The entire subconscious memory seems, therefore,
to be independent of cerebral contingencies. Cases have
even been quoted in which it has reappeared by flashes,
in spite of the loss of normal memory through injuries
to the brain. Such is the case of Mr Hanna, a very
characteristic one in this respect.* Mr Hanna, by reason
of a fall on his head, forgot entirely the whole of his
1 In any case the impression made on them has been effaced and
has disappeared.
* Sidy and Goodhart: Multiple Personality.
126
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
past life, all his knowledge and all his acquirements, and
returned to the psychological state of a new-born babe
who has everything to learn. But curiously enough,
though the memory had disappeared, the capacity to
learn was intact. Now during this process of re¬
education, M. Flournoy records, * he had dreams and
virions, incomprehensible to himself, which he described
with astonishment to his relations, and in which they
recognised very exact recollections of places where the
patient had been before his accident.’ There was,
therefore, a latent memory, also clearly shown by his
power of very rapid learning.
In fine, the study of cryptomnesia clearly brings out
that everything happens as though the psychic state
which we call a remembrance, registered by the cerebral
cells,—ephemeral as they and destined soon to disappear
with them,—were at the same time registered in ‘a
something ’ permanent, of which this remembrance
will henceforward be an integral and permanent part.
Let us clearly retain this conclusion; its importance
will appear later. It will suffice at present to establish
a first inference from the facts.
There are in the living being powerful and extended
but subconscious faculties which, although cryptoid and
not in the main within the consciousness nor under the
normal and direct control of the will, yet condition the
individual psychism.
There is a subconscious memory different from the ,
normal memory, more certain and more extensive than
it and seeming almost illimitable.
These facts take us far beyond the limits of classical
notions on the Self, its origin, its end, and its destinies.
There is nothing in the academic knowledge which we
have thought definitely established by the natural
sciences, by physiology or psychology, that can account
for subconscious phenomena, or which is not in flagrant
opposition to them.
127
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
In a word, this truly far-reaching induction puts a
question more far-reaching still. We are imperatively
led to ask ourselves whether the whole classical psycho¬
physiology is not a mere monument of errors ?
From this point forward it becomes a duty to
reconsider all its teaching, and above all to examine by
the light of facts the main dogma on which the whole
structure is founded, the dogma of psycho-physiological
parallelism.
It is important to investigate this parallelism wherever
it is affirmed to exist, and verify whether it can be
adapted to the subconscious facts.

3.—ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE SUBCON¬


SCIOUS ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE STATE OF
DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAIN, HEREDITY, AND
SENSORIAL AND INTELLECTUAL ACQUIREMENT ON
THE OTHER HAND

To begin with, we. are taught that psychic develop¬


ment accompanies quite regularly the development of
the. brain, and is proportional to that development
during childhood and up to maturity.
But subconscious psychism has, among its other
characteristics, that of appearing, often in all its
force, long before the complete development of the
brain.
Without here, speaking of the supernormal sub-
consciousness, which is more frequent in children than
in adults,, the precocious manifestation of genius,
especially in art, is a commonplace, and it is needless
to cite instances of what is so well known. This emer¬
gence of genius in advance of the complete development
of the brain is one fact at issue with the theory of psycho-
physiological parallelism.. Another point, still more
important, is that psychic development, as far as it
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
concerns the subconscious, appears to be independent
of hereditary conditions, independent also of sensory
acquirement, and of the effort necessary for conscious
intellectual acquirement.
Whence, indeed, do the subconscious powers come ?
These powers, manifest as talent, genius, or inspiration,
are not acquired, they are innate. Work, enthusiasm,
or repeated effort, may, to some degree, develop them;
it cannot create them.
How can we comprehend these innate powers ?
The failure of all attempts at interpretation, whether by
heredity or cerebral conformation is now definite.
The examples adduced of well and clearly established
psychic heredity are quite exceptional.
The best known is that of the family of John
Sebastian Bach, which, between 1550 and 1846, pro¬
duced twenty-nine eminent musicians. But is this
entirely due to heredity ? To be sure of this, the other
factors—surrounding influences, education, family tradi¬
tions, collective enthusiasm, and so forth, should be
eliminated.
What is extraordinary is not that here and there
we should find cases of seeming psychic heredity, but
rather that, having regard to the frequency and triteness
of physical inheritance, we meet with so few. The fret is
that tiie function of heredity is as indistinct and secondary
in psychology as it is important and predominant
in physiology. Certain predispositions, especially the
artistic, are sometimes hereditary, but, as is well known,
high psychic faculties—talent and genius—are not
traceable to ancestry ofitener than they are transmitted
to posterity.
The differences between physical and psychical
inheritance are too distinctive to be referred to physio¬
logical causes. How can we explain why two brothers
may resemble each other outwardly, and morally have
nothing in common ?
129
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The very marked psychic inequalities between
persons of the same parentage and of similar life and
education, are in no way correlative to their physical
inequalities. , , . r
Physiologists, indeed, no longer seek the cause of
these psychic inequalities in the weight, size, or con¬
formation of the brain; they invoke imperceptible and
inappreciable variations in the cerebral tissue, unPer“
ceived causes, diverse influences (pathological or other)
during intra-uterine life, unknown conditions con¬
ception, genealogical combinations, etc. . . •all of
them hypotheses without even the beginnings of proof.
To sum up: from the fact that it is inborn and not
hereditary, the subconscious appears to be as indepen¬
dent of the anatomical organisation of the brain as it is
of intellectual acquirements and the efforts these require.
From the fact that it often appears from infancy,
it seems independent of the complete development of
the brain.
Here, then, is one point established. There is no
psycho-physiological parallelism between the appearance
or the development of the subconscious, and the indi¬
vidual development of the nerve-centres.

4.—ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE SUBCON¬


SCIOUS AND THE CEREBRAL ACTIVITY

‘Psychic activity,’ we are next taught, ‘is pro¬


portional to the activity of the nerve-centres.’
There the reasoning is simple and clear. If there is
one _ axiom, which physiology cannot deny without
stultifying itself, it is that ‘ the output of an organ of
given power is proportional to the degree of its activity.*
The analytical study of conscious psychism, taking the
seeming psycho-physiological parallelism as its basal
130
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
fact, was led to the conclusion that the Self is a
function of the brain, or, at least, cannot exist apart
from it.
‘We can no more,’ writes Haeckel, ‘separate our
individual soul from the brain, than the voluntary move¬
ment of the arm can be separated from the contraction
of our muscles.’1
Now in subconscious psychism, this parallelism
no longer exists. If, for the moment, we ignore the
results of the automatic activity of the brain (which
constitutes a land of inferior subconsciousness), no
connection can be found between the active or superior
subconsciousness and the degree of cerebral activity.
On the contrary, the less active the cerebral organ,
the greater the activity of the superior subconsciousness.
It appears in full strength, not by a voluntary psychic
effort, but in the inaction or the repose of the brain; in
states of distraction, reverie, or even of natural or induced
sleep.
Beaunis * who has studied the subconscious, not as
a psychologist, but as a physiologist, remarks as follows.
* Subconscious work does not produce weariness like
conscious work . . . and I would say to all those who
live by the work of their brains, to those who follow
science, literature, and art, “ let the subconscious do
the work, it never gets tired.” ’
After that, one wonders how a physiologist of the
standing of Beaunis has failed to see the. momentous
inference from such a declaration. This inference is,
however, inevitable—subconscious psychism is entirely
and specifically distinct from voluntary effort.
Effort can do nothing to create subconscious psychism.
At most it can start its activity and guide it in a given
direction, that is all. Far from continued effort helping
it, cessation of effort is the condition for the successful
realisation of intuitive and artistic works of genius.
* Haeckel: Lt Monism. * Quoted by M. Dwelshauvers.
131
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

Moreover, while intellectual effort is intermittent,


and cerebral function demands long periods of repose,
the capacities of the subconscious remain permanent.
Not only does it not disappear in this repose of the
brain, but it takes its highest flights in states of cerebral
torpor, reverie, and distraction. It is in these very various
states, all characterised essentially by the absence of
work and effort, that inspiration reveals its full powers
and spontaneity.
The dissociation of subconscious output from activity
of the brain and voluntary effort cannot be over¬
emphasised.
In this subconscious output everything happens as
if it were entirely independent of cerebral physiology.

5. —ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN CRYPTOMNESIA


AND CEREBRAL PHYSIOLOGY

Parallelism is as absent from cryptomnesia as it is


from cryptopsychism. As has already been shown at
length, the registration, the retention, and the recollcc-
tiojp of states of subconscious memory, do not depend
on effort, and, strictly speaking, are independent of the
conditions and contingencies of the normal cerebral
memory.
Further, the subconscious memory is vastly more
extended and. deeper than the normal memory; and,
above all, it is as indelible as the normal memory is
ephemeral, like the neurons with which it is associated.
Nowhere can there be found any trace of psycho-
physiological parallelism for the subconscious.

6. ABSENCE OF CEREBRAL LOCALISATIONS FOR THE


SUBCONSCIOUS

We are told that ‘psychological faculties proceed


from clearly defined (cerebral) localisations.’
132
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Is it necessary to point out that it is impossible to
find cerebral localisations for subconscious faculties ?
When the entire want of psycho-physiological parallelism
in all subconscious action is borne in mind, even the
search for it in this instance will seem absurd, a priori.
Let us pass on.

7.—ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN THE SENSORIAL


AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS POWERS

It is affirmed that * psychical activity is narrowly


conditioned by the extent of organic capacity. It is
strictly inseparable from it. The material which the
intelligence uses comes to it from the senses. The range
of the senses therefore limits the range of psychism.’
There are as many errors as words in this, so far as
the subconsdous is concerned.
The origin of subconscious capacities is not sensorial,
for these capadties are inborn. The range of sub¬
consdous capacities transcends in every direction the
categories or the sensorial powers.
The higher inspiration, intuition, and genius, are
totally independent of acquired knowledge.

8.—ABSENCE OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN ORGANIC


CAPACITY AND THE SUPERNORMAL SUBCONSCIOUS¬
NESS

Supernormal facts prove finally that the subconsdous


psychism outranges all the organic capadties, since it
manifests itself without their aid or even altogether
externally to them.
The phenomena of materialisation, described in
Chapter II., show a dynamo-psychism actually separable
from the organism. We have here the absolute negation
of classical parallelism.
133 L
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
There is no psycho-anatomical parallelism, for
sensorial action may appear completely outside the
organs of the senses; motor actions may be exercised
outside the muscles; psychic action may develop outside
the brain!
There is no psycho-physiological parallelism, for all
apparent sensorial, motor, or intellectual action may be
suppressed or inert. The body of the subject whose
sensibility is exerted at a distance, is usually during the
whole time profoundly ansesthethetised. Her muscles
do sometimes make vague assodated reflex movements
during motor exteriorisations, but these synergetic
contractions (not always present) never represent an
effort corresponding to the effect. As to her nervous
centres, they are in a state of annihilation varying from
torpor to a spedal land of trance, a kind of transitory
coma, during which all functions except those of vege¬
tative life are completely suppressed.
The more profound this functional annihilation, the
more remarkable are the metapsychic manifestations.
The more complete the exteriorisation and its separation
from the organism, the more complex and advanced are
the phenomena.
As to vision at a distance and telepathy, the most
remarkable cases are those that go furthest, and in the
most incredible degree, beyond the range of the senses.
As to ideoplastic materialisation, the more distinct,
and the further they are separated from the medium,
the more self-activity and apparent autonomy do they
show. 1
In fine, as I have set forth in t'&rn Sulconscient\ the
classical demonstration in favour of psycho-physiological
parallelism in the so-called normal function of the person,
turns entirely against the existence of any such parallelism
in the so-called supernormal functions.
This negative demonstration may be summed uo in
a triple formula. r
134
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
1. No correlation between anatomic physiology and
metapsychic manifestations.
2. Metapsychic activity is in the inverse ratio to
functional activity.
3. Metapsychic activity (sensorial, dynamic, motor,
intellectual, or ideoplastic) is separable from
the organism.
It may be affirmed without reserve, that everything
happens as if there were no psycho-physiological parallel¬
ism for the supernormal subconsciousness.

9.-THE SUBCONSCIOUS OUTRANGES THE ORGANISM AND


CONDITIONS IT

The subconscious carries internal proof of this


truth. Not only do its manifestations, in fact, transcend
all dynamic and material contingencies, but it also
conditions them.
We have seen this in psychology, for the conscious
psychism is but the smaller part of the whole, and is
actually conditioned by that subconscious psychism
which is the very foundation of the thinking being and
his essential characteristic.
This is still more evident in physiology. It has
already been demonstrated that the organic substance
is resolvable into a superior dynamism, which has its
directive Idea in the subconscious. The subconscious
directive Idea shows itself even able, in supernormal
states, temporarily to disintegrate organic substance and
to reorganise it in new representations. It is therefore
certain that the organism, far from bring generative
of the Idea, as the materialist theory teaches, is, on the
contrary, conditioned by the Idea. The organism
appears as only an ideoplastic product of that which is
essential in the being, that is, of its subconscious psychism.
But even this is not all.
135
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
This subconsciousness, which contains within itself
the directive and centralising capacities of the Self in
all its representations, has also the power to rise above
even these representations.
The faculties of telepathy, of mento-mental action,
or lucidity, are faculties which transcend representation
because they transcend the dynamic or material con¬
ditions which rule representation.
In intuition, genius, and lucidity, the subconscious
stands above the category of representation, that is, of
time and space.
Thus the thesis which Carl du Prel maintained in
works that are admirable in intuition; which Myers based
on solid documentary proofs; which we have advanced
on reasoning which has not been refuted, is now offered
in its fullness to all thinkers and men of science who
will examine it in good faith.
It may be affirmed without reserve that there is in
the living being a dynamo-psychism constituting the
essence of the Self, which absolutely cannot be referred
to the functioning of the nervous centres. This essential
dynamo-psychism is not conditioned by the organism;
on the contrary everything happens as though the
organism and the cerebral functions were conditioned
by it.

10.—CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SYNTHETIC EXAMINATION


OF PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY

Such are the first essential conclusions of an inclusive


psycho-physiology, based on all the facts, but more
especially on the higher and more complex facts,
enforced by the deeper study of the subconscious, yet
easily adaptable, as we shall show further on, to the
simplest facts, upon which it throws full light.
Science thus offers materials of high quality, which
X36
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
if collated, co-ordinated, and classified, will suffice to
replace the indescribable chaos of classical psycho¬
physiology by a harmonious edifice upheld on two
pillars.
These are, first the notion of a superior dynamism
conditioning the organic complex; and second, the
notion of a superior psychism independent of cerebral
contingencies, and co-ordinating the multiple states of
consciousness.
But before entering upon the work of synthesis, it
is necessary to investigate what is offered to us by
known systems of philosophy.

137
PART III

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF EVOLUTION


FOREWORD
THE SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY
PHILOSOPHIES

The philosophies that are founded on known facts


bearing on general and individual evolution, reach
widely different conclusions according as they recognise
a larger or smaller number of these facts, and go more or
less beyond them.
And as the physical sciences steadily progress,
philosophy has to adapt itself to new discoveries, and
must therefore undergo successive modifications, which
are sometimes very radical.
The general questions raised by evolution can be
reduced to three:—
Is there an evolution ?
What is it that evolves ?
How, and why, does evolution act ?
Is there an evolution ? This question can be con¬
sidered as scientifically disposed or. Yes, there is, an
uninterrupted progress from the simple to the complex.
What is it that evolves ?
This question is vastly more complicated and
difficult. Present scientific notions tend to establish the
unity of substance. They tend moreover to analyse this
single substance into atoms. They tend, to-day, to
view the atom, not as (strictly speaking) material, but
as a centre of force.

‘Matter,’ writes M. Gustave le Bon,1 ‘has


passed through widely differing phases. The first
carries us back to the very beginning of the universe
1M. Gustave le Bon: V Evolution de la Matitre.
141
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and is beyond the reach of experiment. It is the
period of chaos of ancient legend. That from which
the universe was to develop was but formless clouds
of ether.
‘Directed and condensed by unknown forces
acting for unknown ages, the ether finally organised
itself into atomic forms. Matter, as it exists on
our earth, or as we can observe it in celestial bodies
at different evolutionary stages, is an aggregation
of these atoms.
‘During this period of progressive formation
the atoms stored up the energy which, under the
modes of electricity, heat, etc. . . . they gradually
expend as time goes on.
' In thus slowly losing their accumulated energy,
they underwent diverse evolutionary change, and
have put on diverse aspects.
‘ When they have radiated all their energy under
the forms of luminous, calorific, or other vibrations,
they must return, by the very feet of this radiation,
to the dissociated state—to the primitive ether whence
they were derived. _ This, therefore, represents the
final nirvana to which all things must return after
a more or less ephemeral existence.
__1 These summary glances over the origin of our
universe and its end are obviously but feeble lights
thrown on the darkness which enshrouds our past
and veils our future. They are very insufficient
explanations. Science can put forward no other,
and cannot catch a glimpse of the true first reason
of things, nor even reach the real cause of any single
phenomenon. It must leave to philosophy and
religion the task of imagining systems wliich can
satisfy our need to know.’

We shall endeavour, in the course of this work, to


sho^that our actual knowledge allows us to go much
142
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
further than M. le Bon thinks, in seeking the meaning
of evolution.
Let us first analyse the systems as yet proposed in
answer to the third question: How, and why, does
evolution act ?
Philosophical theories of evolution may, strictly
speaking, be reduced to two—the Deistic or Providential,
and the Pantheistic.
Pantheistic metaphysics are infinitely complex, since
they include all systems which locate beginning and
end in the universe itself. These systems, both in their
development and in their conclusions, are widely different
one from another, and cannot be blended into a single
study.
We could not, within the limits of this work, review
them all. We are constrained to make a choice, and
that choice is naturally determined by the end at which
we sum. We shall therefore only consider:—
i. The philosophy of Providential evolution accord¬
ing to dogma.
a. Contemporary pantheistic or monistic theories.
3. M. Bergson’s theory of ‘ Creative Evolution.’
4. The philosophy of the unconscious, according to
Schopenhauer and von Hartmann.

143
CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION UNDER PROVIDENCE

I.—TENTATIVE RECONCILIATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY AND


DOGMATIC IDEAS

After having struggled long and desperately against


the evolutionary idea, some partisans of theological and
dogmatic philosophy, have come, little by little, willingly
or unwillingly, to admit it. They are aware, in fact, that
the dogma of creation is not more satisfying than
materialist teaching.
As Vogel very well says,1—
1 From a strictly rational point of view it comes
to much the same to proclaim that man is the result
of chance, or to affirm that his creation is due to
the arbitrary act of a personal God. From the
moral point of view, that a human being, after a life
determined by chance, and without any sanction for
his acts, should cease to be, is equivalent to his
judgment by absolute and eternal decree on the
basis of material acts of infinitesimally small import
and duration proceeding from an equally limited
freedom of action.. But this equipoise of proba¬
bilities and absurdities which the materialist schools
and the Western religions bring to the solution of
the cosmic problem vanishes before the evolutionary
theory/ 3

According to religious believers who have accepted


evolutionism^ the universe has evolved by the will and
under the guidance of a supremely powerful, supremely
‘ Vogd: La, Religion it FSvolutlomism (FisclUin, Brussel*).
144
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
just, and supremely good Providence. Transformism
is said to be in no way incompatible with the idea of a
Divine plan and with traditional teaching disencumbered
of puerile and obsolete dogmatic impedimenta.
Far from being contrary to the providential idea,
they say, the evolutionary formula would remove the
grave objections arising from the imperfections of the
universe. These imperfections, too marked to be recon¬
cilable with the notion of a responsible Providence and
a definitive creation, are, on the contrary, easily compre¬
hensible in a world in process of evolution. They would
then appear only as necessities inherent in an inferior
state, and even as the measure of the inferiority of that
state at the moment.1
It is not without some hesitation that I discuss the
cogency of this reasoning.2 Such discussions must seem
useless and wearisome alike to partisans and opponents
of the idea of Providence, for all that can be said on this
subject has already been said; also the question is one
of those that go with unshakable convictions or beliefs.
But as soon as men claim to substitute logical argu¬
ments for an ancient act of faith apart from any criterion,
it is necessary to follow them into the domain of facts,
and to set forth once more the objections which inevitably
rise up against their thesis.
These objections can be reduced to two leading
ones:—
(a) That based on the evidence of gropings and
errors in evolution.
(i>) That based on the prevalence of evil in the
universe.
4 See the curious collection of Conferences of the Rev. F. Zahn, trans¬
lated under the title, & Evolution et U Dogme, by the Abb6 Flageolet,
published by Lcthcllieux, xo rue Cassette, Paris.
* This chapter must on no account be considered apart from the rest.
Those which precede it and those which follow, prove that there is no
need to have recourse to the providential idea in order to recognise an
ideal harmony in the universe. We shall endeavour to demonstrate
that evolution tends towards the realisation of sovereign consciousness,
sovereign justice, and sovereign good.
145
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

2.—THE OBJECTION BASED ON THE EVIDENT GROPINGS


AND ERRORS IN EVOLUTION

An evolution proceeding on a Divine plan or


constantly governed by a sovereign and perfect Provi¬
dence, cannot involve gropings or errors. But these
gropings and errors are innumerable. They arc not
the exception, they seem almost the rule.
Thousands and thousands of species have disappeared
in the course of the ages. In these evolutionary forms
there has been what looks like reckless squandering of
•vital force and energy.
Everything in evolution shows a creative force that
is not sure of itself; which produces to excess in order
to reach concrete results in selected forms.
These gropings are very clear in the lower phases of
evolution. Germs of species, as of individuals, are
produced by thousands ; a small number only succeed
in growing at all; among these privileged ones only a
few reach the adult state.
How can we attribute to a divine plan a wastage
which appears useless and inexplicable ?
Everything happens, in fact, as if there were no
appreciable plan. De Vries has shown that among
vegetable species mutations arise quite independently
of the vital factors; suddenly, anarchically, and in
different directions, without reference to the utility of
this or that new character. Selection then operates.
The classical factors come into play to repress or to
develop the characters that have appeared, causing the
survival or the disappearance of the new species. Iiut
the interior creative impulse, in plants and no doubt
in inferior animals also, is a blind impulse, a land of
incoherent and disorderly explosion.
In the higher animals, even if the impulse is less
blind, if it corresponds with a need, or witn something
146
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
resembling an obscure aspiration towards higher forms,
it nevertheless still shows gropings and errors.
In the history of the reptiles of the Secondary epoch
how can we fail to see a groping after the higher evolu¬
tionary series of mammals ? Is the whole of evolution
anything but a series of such gropings ?
These gropings and errors are found in details as
well as in the mass; useless organic characters which
do not fit into any plan are in no way exceptional.
Delage and Goldsmith cite many instances.
‘ The diverse colouration of the wings of insects,
of the shells of molluscs, characteristics which, to
follow the expression of Eimer, are no more useful
to them than the brilliant colour of gold to that
metal, or its iridescent tints to the soap bubble. The
exaggerated dimensions of the antlers of the fossil
Irish elk; the curved and practically unusable tusks
of the mammoth; the extraordinarily developed
fangs of the modern babiroussa; the eyes of certain
crustaceans placed at the end of over-long pedicles ?
etc. ... It would seem as if the development once
begun is carried on by a kind of inertia.’
There are even organs which are not only useless,
but even injurious, such as the appendix in man.
Instincts also sometimes go astray; deceived by their
instincts some game-birds, such as woodcock, always
return to the same places, where they meet their death;
migratory fish are unable to avoid certain dangerous
zones where they perish by thousands; etc.

3.—OBJECTIONS BASED ON EVIL IN THE UNIVERSE

If the existence of errors and gropings is hardly


compatible with a Divine plan, there is another considera¬
tion even less so. It is the prevalence of evil in the
universe.
147
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
In fact we find evil everywhere. It seems that the
extinction of the feeble dominates human and animal life.
Earth, air, and water are just immense and incessant
fields of war, compared to which the battles of Man seem
slight and intermittent.
The most beautiful birds, and the most delicate
insects are very often more ferocious than the large
carnivora.
Why should there be this instinct of refined ferocity
in the insect, even though it be devoid of thought or
responsibility ?
There is no unavoidable necessity that animals should
devour one another, since certain of the more powerful
among them are entirely vegetable feeders.
Why so much sickness, epidemics, and so many
cosmic catastrophes ? Why, always and everywhere,
so much suffering and evil ?
_ The prevalence of evil is really the most serious
objection that can be raised against the idea of creation
by an all-wise and all-good Providence. The old irre¬
futable argument inevitably recurs to the mind: If
there is a Creator, that Creator must have been wanting
either in the knowledge, or in the will, or in the powe£
to prevent evil; therefore that Creator cannot be at once
supremely wise, or supremely good, or supremely
powerful.
The strength of this argument is manifest by the
futility of the refutations which have been attempted.
It has been said that if there were no evil, the creature
would be the equal of the Creator. This sophism cannot
hold. Unless xt were the work of a Demiurgus of but
moderate power, and not of a true Providence, creation
could not be based on universal suffering. It should
involve the minimum, not the maximum of suffering.
It has also been said that evil is the consequence of the
liberty given by God to his creatures. But it is evident
that great epidemics, most infirmities and diseases.
M iO ’
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
great cosmic catastrophes, etc. . . . have nothing to do
with human liberty.
Finally, ‘ original sin ’ has been alleged. This dogma
does not absolve Providence from responsibility. Guyau
has put this in a masterly way in his Irrehgion de
VAvenir'.—

‘ The great resource of Christianity and of most


religions is the idea of a Fall. But this explanation
of evil by a primitive failure comes to explaining
evil by itself; necessarily there must, before the
fall, have been some defect in the supposed freedom
of the will or in the circumstances which caused it
to weaken; no fruit is really primal. A man who
is perfect and walks under God’s eye does not fall
when there are no stones on the road. There can
be no sin without temptation, and thus we come back
to the idea that God was the first tempter; it is
God himself who fails morally in a failure which He
Himself has willed. To explain the primal fell—
the source of all others—the sin of Lucifer, theolo¬
gians have imagined a sin of the intelligence instead
of a sin of the flesh; it is by pride that the angels
fell from their first estate, and that sin arises in the
deepest element of being. But Pride, that sin of
the mind, arises in fret from short-sightedness; the t
highest and most complete knowledge is that which *
best knows its own limitations. Pride, therefore,
involves to restricted knowledge, and the pride of
angels can only proceed from God, Evil is desired
ana wrought only because of reasons for it; but
there are no reasons against reason itself. If,
according to the apologists of Free Will, human
intelligence by its interior pride and perversity can
create and arouse motives for ill-doing, it can at
least only do that when its knowledge is limited,
doubtful, and uncertain. There is hesitation only
X49 m
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
in matters concerning which there is no complete
evidence to the understanding—one cannot err in
the light and against the light. A Lucifer was
therefore by his very nature impeccable. In a hypo¬
thetically perfect world the desire of evil could arise
only from the opposition which an imperfect intelli¬
gence would mistakenly think existed between his
own good and the general good. But if God and
his work had been really perfect, the opposition
between personal and general good would have been
impossible. Even to the best human minds this
opposition appears merely temporary and provisional;
much more would it seem so to the archangel of
Intelligence itself—the Light-bearer of thought.
To know, is to participate in a measure in the supreme
Truth—the Divine Consciousness—to have all know¬
ledge would be to be able to reflect the very conscious¬
ness of God: how could a Satanic mentality emanate
from the all-divine ? ’

Moreover, the doctrine of original sin is only applicable


to Humanity. Disciples of Descartes have grasped this
argument so thoroughly that they have put the objection
aside by declaring that animals are automata.

‘ If animals could think,’ they said, * they would


have a soul. If this soul is mortal, that of man may
easily be so. If it is immortal, it is impossible to
understand how or why the animals should suffer.
Have the beasts also eaten forbidden fruit ? Do
they also await a Redeemer ? ’

In these days when the existence of an ‘ animal


soul is no longer doubted, the Cartesian argument
necessarily turns against the existence of any divine
plan. As a last resource the dogmatists are reduced to
deny man s capacity to understand the Divine plan.
130
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Doubtless human judgment is still very weak, but
to deny it the right to pronounce judgment on the
G ainful conditions of earthly life is to disparage it unduly,
'hat judgment has been given as follows.
Evolution cannot be the work of a supremely wise,
just, good, and powerful divinity, whether that divinity
had laid down its smallest details in advance, or would
intervene from time to time to correct errors.
Endeavours have, however, been made to reconcile
the idea of Providence with the facts. It has been said
that gropings and errors might be comprehensible after
the following manner: Providence, in creating the
primitive universe, with a progressive impulse and all
potentialities contained within it, would have set bounds
to Itself. The impulse once given would proceed auto¬
matically, and its objectifications would develop freely,
outside any pre-established plan, and without intervention
on the part of Providence.
This is more or less what is expressed by the Rev.
F. Zahn in his book, Evolution and Dogma.

‘ For the old school of natural theology God


is the direct cause of all that exists. For the evolu¬
tionist He is the cause of causes—causa causarum
—of the world and all that it contains. The old
theories were that God created everything directly
in the state in which it at present exists. According
to Evolution, creation, or rather the development of
living creatures, has been a slow and gradual process
needing vast periods of time to transform the chaos
into a cosmos, and to give to the visible universe
the beauty and the harmony which it now shows.
, . . This is the true meaning of Evolution; and so
understood, Evolution, to borrow Temple’s expres¬
sion,1 “ teaches us that the execution of the Divine
plan derives more from the primordial act of
tTemple: Relations between Religion and Science.
151
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
creation, and less from the ulterior acts of providential
governance; there is thus, on the one hand, more
of God’s foresight, and on the other fewer interven¬
tions; and what is taken from the latter, is added
to the former.’

On this theory the responsibility of the Creator for


evil is diminished but not abolished, for it cannot be
admitted that God in His omniscience would not have
foreseen the future predominance of evil.
Deists are then led to the conclusion that evolution
could not have been directed differently because evil is
the condition under which evolution acts, containing
in itself the germ of future good.
This involves a curious restriction of Divine omnipo¬
tence, although, by definition it cannot be conditioned
by anything.
Further, it is by no means demonstrated that evil
is an indispensable factor in evolution. Many con¬
temporary naturalists think differently, basing their
conclusion on the impartial examination of frets, and
not on preconceived ideas.
What do these frets prove ? That new variations
appear and prosper most readily where the surrounding
conditions demand the least effort to survive. e
Kropotkine, studying the Siberian regions, remarks
that life there is scanty, and that periods of hard climatic
conditions are followed, not by progressive evolution
but by regression in all directions.
The Russian botanist Korschinsky1 reaches similar
conclusions New forms do not appear under adverse
conditions of life, or, if they do appear, they immediately
perish. Variation is most frequent when the environ¬
ment is favourable, and inclement conditions, far from
favouring evolution, slow it down by restraining
Ha Hterogsnise et Evolution, Contribution k In ThifcvU
de lOngine des Espies (Mem. Acad. Petrograd, ix, X89$>). Ia ™°™
*52
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
variation and eliminating new forms which have
begun to develop.
Another botanist, Luther Burbank,1 a grower in
California, after much research, concludes that a rich
soil and generally favourable conditions encourage
frequent variations and assist them, while rigorous
conditions of life arrest variation and bring about general
regression.
For humanity, as for the lower forms of life, years
of famine, of epidemics, and of war, give rise to an
enfeebled and inferior generation.
Two things therefore are certain^ (a) evil, when
too pronounced, does not favour evolution, but impedes
it. It is no longer a spur, but a curb; and (h)
evil is not an indispensable condition of evolution, since
life is more abundant and varied in regions which are
favoured by conditions of climate, food, and well¬
being.
Another decisive consideration is, that since adap¬
tation and the struggle for life are secondary factors, and
since evolution can be conceived to take place without
them, it is clear that evil can no longer be considered
as the sine qua non of evolution.
It is plausible that evil should be inevitable in the
lower phases of evolution, and should then appear as
the measure of their inferiority; but it cannot be so
considered in all cases, unless we imagine the worlds
evolving under a primitive impulse which is both blind
and unconscious. This will not fit with any hypothesis
of a divine plan.
No arguments, however subtle, can hold against
this evidence: ‘ a Creator U a Being in whom all things
have their reason and their cause, and consequently
supreme and final responsibility vests in Him. He thus
bears the weight of all that there is of evil in the universe.
In the degree that the ideas of infinite power and supreme
1 Delage et Goldsmith: Let Thiories tie Involution.
153
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
liberty are inseparable from our ideas of God, He loses
all excuse, for the Absolute depends on nothing, and
has no joint liability with anything; on the contrary,
everything depends on Him and has its reason in Him.
Therefore all culpability carries back to Him; His
work, by reason of the interdependence of its effects,
no longer appears to modern thought as anything but
a single act; and that act is amenable to moral
judgment, and by the same right we judge any other
act it is permissible to judge its author; the condition
of the world itself is for us the verdict on God. And
as, with the increase in moral perception, the evil and
immoral tendencies in the universe shock our sensibilities
more and more, it seems more and more clear that to
affirm a' Creator ’ of the world, is, so to speak, to bring
all evil to z focus in Him, to centralise all this immorality
in one being, and to justify the. paradox that ‘ Evil is
God.’ To affirm a Creator is, in fret to transfer evil
from the world to God as its primary source; it is to
absolve Man and the universe, and to lay the onus on
its author who in freedom of action created it.’1

4.-NEO-MANICHEISM

A last resource remains in order to absolve not only


man and the universe, but God also from responsibility:
it is to refuse to see in God an untrammeled Creator, snd
to attribute the creation of the world to a demigod or an
evil daemon;. to see in the universe ‘ a dual principle,
good and evil struggling on an equality and victorious
by turns.
However complicated, absurd, and foolish, the
Mamchean concept may appear to the philosophic mind,
it is not dead, It would seem to be still current in the
mystical sects which have inherited mediaeval teaching.
‘Guyau: L'lrreligion it l'Avenir.
154
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The echo of these old traditions is heard elsewhere. It
is not without profound surprise that we find Manichean
ideas in minds imbued with Christian tradition. Flournoy1
who has not hesitated to put forward such ideas,
endeavours to avoid the inevitable objections to them
by a subterfuge:—
‘ If God exists He has been from the beginning
in conflict with some independent Principle whence
Evil is derived. He is therefore not the Absolute,
the All-powerful, the omnipotent Creator of this
universe, and we revert inevitably to the ancient
Manichean doctrine. I admit that I am not enough
of a theologian or of a philosopher to clear up me
mystery! But this, perhaps, would not be the first
time that a heresy condemned by the Councils might
be found to have reason on its side, and to be more
conformable to the thought of Christ than received
tradition. However that may be, the notion of a
God, limited, no doubt, but entirely good, cease¬
lessly working to bring the greatest possible good
out of evils which He has not created, and striving
to establish His reign of Love in primeval chaos
(which would be the cause and the last word on
evolution); and this notion, I say, which seems to
me to be the inference from the whole life of Jesus,
appears infinitely more generous than the current
concept of a vindictive God awarding death, visiting
the sins of the fathers on the children, and heaping
on His creatures (and by choice on the best of
them) trials for which it is their duty to thank Him! ’
Is there any need to discuss Manicheism or
neo-Manicheism any further? Evidently not. It is
sufficient to point out that both are ineffectual and
complicated, and therefore contrary to all scientific or
philosophical method.
1 Flournoy: Le GSnie ReHgieu*.
155
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Manicheism appears only as a striking proof of the
impossibility of reconciling the hypothesis of a Provi¬
dential creation with the problem of evil. It cannot
meet the argument—that the hypothesis of a First
Cause external to the universe is a useless hypothesis.
Since, in spite of ourselves, we must always come
to the concept of a First Cause, itself uncaused, it is
unnecessary to place this primal cause anywhere else
than in the universe itself.
The notion of creation ex nihilo gives no solution to
the inherent difficulty that attends the search for a
First Cause. It only reveals that difficulty and increases
it by superadding the terrible problem or evil.

156
CHAPTER II

MONISM

Monism, which is an adaptation of pantheism to the


natural sciences and to the evolutionist hypothesis, is
a very attractive theory. On the one hand it simplifies
high philosophy conformably to scientific principle and
method, by reducing it to a single hypothesis; and, on
the other, it is in evident agreement with the evolutionary
synthesis as a whole, as applicable to the universe ana
the individual.
The pantheistic philosophy presents an aspect of
undeniable probability, and in the sequel will be seen
to be supported by the new psychological concepts.
Without going outside the natural sciences it can
be stated that the mechanical, determinist, and teleo¬
logical concepts which have been the subject of endless
philosophical controversy are easily reconciled in the
pantheistic synthesis; while apart from that synthesis
they are without positive foundation and remain vain
and sterile speculations. Apart from the pantheistic
philosophy, all concepts of the universe which claim to
be scientific, come to this:—
That * the evolution of the universe is determined
by the mechanical addition of new elements, to the
primitive elements, these increments giving rise to a
more and more perfect and complex whole.' .
Facts, however, are against this hypothesis. As
M. Bergson remarks, ‘a single glance at the develop¬
ment or an embryo shows that lire does proceed by the
association and addition of new elements, but by the
fission and dissociation of the old.’
15 7
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
And, as we have seen, the greater cannot
proceed from the less unless potentially contained
in it.
Teleological ideas, unless they are founded in
pantheistic ideas and start from them, necessarily end
m the commonplace and childish theories, so easy to
turn into ridicule, according to which all the components
of the universe must have been made for each other.
To dismiss this idea it is only necessary to point out,
as Russel Wallace does, that every adaptation necessarily
presents the semblance of an intentional design.
Starting^ from pantheism on the other hand, both
the mechanical means and the teleological end are of a
different kind, involving as they do a single meta¬
physical hypothesis. They imply the idea that our
comprehension of Space and Time is relative to our
understanding; and that when we rise above these
relative ideas, we see,.and ought to see, neither beginning
nor end, neither origin, termination, nor arrival; neither
past, present, nor future, but simply a harmonious
whole. It must not be said that the universe has been
constructed for a given end by stated means; nor that
the means necessarily determine the end.
Mechanical and teleological distinctions are vain.
They vanish in the absolute. As Bergson says, we thus
come to *a metaphysical system in which the totality
of things is placed in eternity, and in which their
apparent duration expresses merely the infirmity of a
mind which cannot know everything at once.’
This is what Laplace had previously expressed in
the well-known dictum that ‘ to an intelligence, which,
at a given moment, should know all the forces which
move Nature and the relative situations of all beings:
and lfj moreover, that intelligence were powerful enough
to analyse these data, it would comprise under the same
formula the movements of the greatest bodies in the
universe and those of the smallest atom; nothing would
158
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

be uncertain to its view, and the future, like the past,


would be present to its eyes.’
What does M. Bergson object to in this ? That
we cannot eliminate Time: * Nothing in all our experi¬
ence is more unquestionable than Duration. We
perceive duration like a river which cannot change its
flow. It is the foundation of our being, and, as we are
well aware, the very essence of things with which we
are in relation.’

This objection is certainly insufficient: if Time and


Space are but illusions of our limited understanding, it
is obvious that these illusions may be imposed on our
understanding without therefore ceasing to be illusions.
It seems, then, to be true that mechanical or teleo¬
logical metaphysics can neither be demonstrated nor
refuted, because they are outside our modes of reasoning.
Nevertheless they seem to receive unexpected support
by the facts of prophetical lucidity, and a certain number
of these facts are well established.
But even admitting the abstract and metaphysical
possibility, this theory brings no concrete addition to
the doctrine of evolution. Questions of transcendental
ends and means are inseparable from consideration of
the Absolute. It is above our intelligence, and cannot
be discussed to any profit. We must be content to
admit the necessity for a single evolutionary principle
containing within itself all evolutionary possibilities,
and merely endeavour to understand how these possi¬
bilities come into realisation.
Now it is quite certain that the classical naturalistic
pantheism, or Monism, does not aid us here.

‘ This supreme law of Nature,’ writes Haeckel,1


4being laid down, and all other laws made subord¬
inate to it, we have convinced ourselves of the
* Haeckel: Tht RUtdk of th» UiUvtrst.
159
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
universal unity of Nature, and of the eternal validity
of natural laws. From die dark problem of Matter
there issues the clear lam of Matter, . . .’

In these words he only enunciates a formula which


is very incomplete if not actually valueless.
The clear law of matter has in reality nothing clear
about it except its affirmation of unity. It is quite dark
as to all that concerns the essential factors and meaning
of evolution.

160
CHAPTER III

m. bergson’s ‘creative evolution’

I have already, on several occasions, had to quote M.


Bergson. It is now desirable to undertake a methodical
study of his work with the view of ascertaining whether
it brings us nearer a solution of the problem of evolution.
Although I wish to consider here only those ideas
of M. Bergson which deal with evolution, I shall not
be able to avoid some references to his general philo¬
sophical system. His theory of Creative Evolution is,
no doubt, his masterpiece; but its leading idea cannot
be grasped apart from his other works.
1 shall therefore endeavour faithfully to reproduce
the main outlines of his system without taking sides
either with its obstinate detractors, or its devout
disciples.

I.—SUMMARY OF THE BERGSONIAN THEORY OF


EVOLUTION

M. Bergson admits transformism, he considers


its proof sufficient and unquestionable. But, he adds,
even if they were not, the evolutionary concept could
not be put aside. He endeavours to demonstrate this
necessity in pages which are certainly the most powerful,
the most profound, and the most noteworthy of any
that he has written.
‘Let us suppose that transformism were con¬
victed of error. Let us suppose that by inference
or experiment, species were shown to arise by
i6x
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
a discontinuous process of which we at present
have no idea. Would this invalidate transformism
in its most interesting parts—those which have
most importance for ourselves ? The main outlines
of classification would remain unchanged, there
would be the same relations between comparative
anatomy and comparative embryology. Thence¬
forward we could, and should, still maintain the
same relations—the same parentage—between living
forms as transformism presents to us to-day.
‘These relations would, no doubt, be more
of a parentage of idea than of a material filiation.
But as the actual data of palaeontology would remain,
it would have to be admitted that the forms between
which this parentage of idea subsists, have appeared
successively and not simultaneously. Now the
philosophical mind asks no more than this of the
evolutionary theory. It is the function of that theory
t0 relations of parentage in idea, and to
maintain that where there is what may be called
a logical filiation between diverse forms, there is
also a chronological sequence between the species
in which those forms appear. This double proposi¬
tion would remain, whatever causes might be in
operation. And thenceforward it would still be
necessary to suppose an evolution somewhere. This
might be in creative thought in which the ideas of
different species would have successively engendered
each other, just as transformism maintains the
species themselves to have been engendered on the
earth. Or it might be in a scheme of vital organisa¬
tion immanent in Nature, gradually becoming more
distinct; the relationship of logical and chrono¬
logical filiation between abstract forms being precisely
those which transfonnism presents to us as the
relationship of real filiation between living creatures.
Or again, the same sequence would be seen in some
163
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
unknown cause of life developing its effects as if
one did actually engender another. Evolution
would then only have been transposed. It would
have passed from the visible to the invisible. Nearly
everything that transformism asserts to-day would
remain intact, only it would be interpreted in a
different manner.
‘ Is it not well then to keep to the letter of
transformism, as understood almost unanimously by
men of science ? . . . For this reason we consider
that the language of transformism is necessary in
all philosophy, as its positive teaching is necessary
in science.
Evolution being definitely established with all the
weight of sure feet, it is incumbent upon us to seek to
understand how it is effected. For M. Bergson evolution
is due to none of the factors to which it is ascribed by
naturalists; these are all secondary.
‘We in no way dispute that adaptation to
environment may be a necessary cause or evolution
. . . but it is one thing to acknowledge that external
circumstances are forces of which evolution must
take account, and another thing to maintain that they
are its directing forces. . . . The truth is that
adaptation explains the minor windings of evolu¬
tionary progress but not the general direction of the
movement, still less the movement itself. The road
which leads to a town is certainly compelled to go
up lulls and down slopes, it adapts itself to the
ground, but the accidents of the ground are not
the causes of the road, nor do they assign its general
direction.’
What, then, is the essential factor ?
This essential factor is a land of interior impulse,
an original and undefined * vital surge ’ (Sian vital).
163
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
This vital impulse pertains to an immanent principle
which is life, intelligence, and matter. It transcends
them all, in the past, the present, and the future. It
presupposes them, contains them, and precreates them,
so to say, in proportion as they come into realisation.
This immanent principle, however, has no final
completeness in itself; it comes into existence progres¬
sively as it creates the evolving universe. It constitutes
what M. Bergson calls * Duration.’ This * Duration ’
is not very easily understood. An eminent disciple of
M. Bergson describes it as follows.
‘ It is a melodious evolution of moments in
which each has the resonance of the preceding
moment and foretells that which will succeed it;

g
it is an amplification which never stops, and a
erpetual origin of new manifestations. It is a
ecoming, indivisible, qualitative, organic, beyond
Space, and not amenable to number. . . . Imagine
a symphony which should be conscious of itself
and creative of itself: it is after this manner that
Duration is best understood.’1
It is duration, with its vital impulse, which is the
essential cause of evolution, and not Darwinian or
Laiharckian adaptation.
. How are we to concave of evolution from ‘dura¬
tion r Everything happens as if there were a centre
whence worlds are thrown off like fireworks in a vast
illumination.
?ut this centre is not a concrete thing; it is ‘a
continuity of outflow.’
This centre is God; but ‘ God, thus defined, has
n°. completed existence: He is ceaseless life, He is
action. He is liberty. Creation, thus conceived of, is
no mystery : we experience it in ourselves as soon as
we act freely.’
1 Le Roy: Une Philosophis Nouvelh,
164
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Therefore there is no pre-determined finality; no
scheme of evolution laid down in advance; there are
only objectifications which involve and succeed each
other; ‘ a creation which proceeds without end in virtue
of ai. initial impulse.' This creation brings forth, not
only the forms of life, but the ideas which allow the
intellect to understand it, and the terms by which it is
expressed. Its future goes beyond the present and
cannot be described by any existing idea.’
M. le Roy1 has summed up as clearly as may be
the thought of M. Bergson on the creative -processus
and on the concepts of spirit and matter issuing from
that processus.

‘ In this concept of Being, consciousness is omni¬


present as the original and fundamental reality,
always there under a thousand different degrees of
intensity or of sleep, and under an infinitely diverse
rhythm.
’ * The vital surge consists in an impulse to create.
Life, in its humblest stages is a spiritual activity;
and its efforts start a current of ascending objectifica¬
tion, which in its turn directs the counter-current
of matter. Thus all Reality appears as a double
movement of ascent and descent. The former alone,
revealing an interior energy of creative impulsion,
has endless duration; the latter might be said to
be almost instantaneous, like the recoil of a spring,
but each imposes its rhythm on the other. From
this point of view Spirit and Matter do not appear as
opposed entities—the statical terms of a fixed anti¬
thesis—but rather as movement in inverse directions;
and in certain relations it would be better to speak
of spiritualisation and materialisation, rather than
of Spirit and Matter, the latter process of materiali¬
sation resulting automatically from an interruption
* Le Roy: Une Philosophic Nouvellc.
165 N
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of the former. 44 Consciousness ” or “ Supercon¬
sciousness ” is the rocket whose extinguished remains
fall to earth as Matter.
4 Under what metaphor is the course of the
evolution of the universe presented to us ? Not
that of a deductive flow, nor of a series of stationary
pulsations, but as a fountain, which, expanding as
it rises, partially arrests or delays the drops which
fall back. The jet itself—the reality disclosed—is
the vital activity of which spiritual activity is the
highest form; and the drops that fall back
are the creative movement which descends with
its reality dissipated—they represent Matter and
Inertia/
According to M. Bergson, * Matter is defined as a
species of descent; this descent is defined as the inter¬
ruption of an ascent, the ascent itself as a growth, and
thus a creative principle is inherent in all things.’1
We are then faced with the question of origin. How
can the universe have come from nothing ? How can
that which is have sprung from the void,—from that
which is not ?
According to M. Bergson that question should not
be asked.
* The idea of nothingness in the sense of being
an opposite to existence, is a pseudo-idea.’ In
fact, 4 nothingness is unthinkable, for to think of
“nothing” is.necessarily to think in some way;
the representation of the void is always the repre¬
sentation of a plenum, which can be analysed into
two positive elements——the idea, more or less distinct,
of a substitution; and the sensation, real or imagined,
of a desire or a regret.’
Hence4 the idea of absolute nothingness (under¬
stood in the sense of the abolition of everything) is
*M. le Roy: Ibid,
166
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
an idea destructive of itself, a pseudo-idea, a mere
word.’
‘ When I say, “ there is nothing,” it is not that
I perceive “ a nothing,” I can perceive only what is;
but I have not perceived that which I sought for and
expected, and I express my disappointment in the
language of my desire.’

In fine, it is only by an illusion of reason that the


idea of Void is opposed to that of All. It is to ‘ oppose
a plenum to a plenum,’ and ‘ the question why a certain
thing exists is consequently a meaningless question—
a pseudo-problem built on a pseudo-idea.’
The creative processus cannot therefore not exist,
and there is no mystery in verifying the existence of
matter, life, or consciousness. They are functions of
* duration.’ _ .
The only mystery lies in the relations between
Creative Evolution, matter, life, and consciousness.
M. Bergson rejects materialist theories. Conscious¬
ness is not the result of the working of the brain:—

‘ Brain and consciousness correspond because


each measures the amount of choice which the living
being has at disposal, the one by the complexity of
its structure, the other by the intensity of its awake-
ness. But this correspondence is not an equivalence
or a parallelism. Precisely because a cerebral
condition merely expresses the action nascent in the
corresponding psychological condition, the psycho¬
logical condition vastly outstrips the state of the
brain.’

M. G. Gillouin1 says:— . .
‘ M. Bergson’s writings abound in ingenious
and striking similes to bring out the solidarity sui
• Bssai sur Us Donnies Immiiiates de la Conscience.
167
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
generis of the consciousness and the organism.
Because, he says, a certain bolt is necessary to. a
given machine, which works when the bolt is in
place and stops if it be removed, no one will main¬
tain that the bolt is the equivalent of the machine.
But the relation of the brain to consciousness may
well be that of the bolt to the engine. Again, _M.
Bergson says, the consciousness of a living being
is in solidarity with his brain in the sense that a
pointed knife is in solidarity with its point. The
brain is the sharp point by which consciousness
penetrates the dense fabric of events, but it is no
more co-extensive with consciousness than the point
is co-extensive with the knife.*

Therefore the consciousness that resides in us is


not bound to the organism, but enjoys liberty. But this
word ‘liberty’ must be taken in a very wide sense:
that which is free, is the interior, complete self, rather
than the individualised person.

* We are free;,’ says M. Bergson, ‘ when our acts


emanate from our whole personality. Liberty is
therefore a function of our power of introspection.
. . . Liberty is something which continuously arises
in us; we are liberable rather than liberated; and
in the last analysis, it is a matter of duration, not
of space and number, nor of our improvisation or
decree; the free act has been long prepared, it is
weighted with our whole past, and falls like a ripe
fruit from our previous life.1
‘What are we, in fact,2 what is our character\
if it is not the condensation of our history since birth,
or even before birth, since we bring pre-natal
dispositions with us ? No doubt it is but a small
part of that past that enters into our thoughts, but
1 Le Roy: Ibid. * VEvolution Cr&atrict.
168
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
we desire, and will, and act, from the whole of that
past, including the original bent of the soul.’
These general ideas being admitted, let us examine
more thoroughly the mechanism of Creative Evolution.
This evolution does not take place in a direct line.
From the centre of origin there flow out many lines, at
first interpenetrating, close, and parallel, which, according
to their degrees of evolution, men separate and diverge
like the trail of a group of rockets.
On the earth the chief lines of evolution end in the
creation of plant life, of instinctive animal life, and
intellectual human life. These forms are absolutely
distinct; there is a chasm between the plant and the
animal, and between the animal and Man.
M. Bergson writes:—
* The capital error which has vitiated naturalistic
philosophy since the time of Aristotle, has been to
see in vegetative, instinctive, and rational life three
successive degrees of one and the same tendency,
whereas they are three divergent directions of one
activity which has become tripartite in process of
its increase. The difference between them is one
of essential nature, not of degree,’
He says, further:—
‘ Intelligence and instinct represent two divergent
and equally elegant solutions of one and the same
problem; . . . between animals and Man there is
no longer a difference of degree, but of kind.
To meet the objection that intelligence is discoverable
in animals and instincts in Man, M. Bergson says:—
* Having at first interpenetrated one another,
Intelligence and Instinct retain something of their
common origin. Neither the one nor the other are
169
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
found in their pure state; there is no intelligence
in which traces of instinct are not to be found; and,
more especially, no instinct without a fringe of
intelligence.’

But the essential characteristic of the animal is


instinct, and that of the man is intelligence.
What is the part assigned to Man in the creation ?
His function is unique, he represents that which is
essential in evolution as actually realised, vegetable
and animal life being merely gropings after the human.

* Everything,’ says M. Bergson, * comes to pass


as though an undecided and impressionable being,
call him Man or Superman, as you will, had sought
to realise himself, and had succeeded in doing so
only at the price of leaving a part of himself by the
way. These residues are represented by the animal,
and even by the vegetable world.’

Man only has been able to acquire consciousness.

* In Man, consciousness breaks the chain (of


material needs); in Man and in Man alone, it is
freed. Till this point was reached life had been an
effort of consciousness to raise matter, and con¬
sciousness was more or less crushed out under its
weight. . . . The task to be accomplished was to
use matter (which is necessity), to create an instru¬
ment for liberty, to make machinery which would
triumph over mechanism, and to employ the deter¬
minism of Nature to pass through the meshes of
the net which that determinism had spread. But
in all cases except that of Man, consciousness
been caught in the net through which it would fain
have passed.
‘ ^ has remained captive to the mechanism which
170
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
it invented. From the springboard whence Life
took its leap, all the others failed to reach the bar;
Man alone has leaped high enough/

Is the human consciousness, thus formed and freed,


indestructible or does it cease at death ?
To this grave question, which dominates all religions
and philosophies, M. Bergson merely replies:—

‘All Humanity is an immense army which


presses forward in Space and Time, before, behind,
and by the side of us all, in an impulsive charge that
can overcome every resistance and dear many an
obstacle, perhaps even death/

Such is the summary of M. Bergson’s chief teaching.


We have now to discuss the method on which this
teaching is founded.
M. Bergson’s method for the solution of philoso¬
phical problems is to appeal to the intuition and not to
the understanding.
He allots to intelligence the task of finding solutions
of all problems which have to do with the relations of
the Self to the universe, and with the knowledge of
material and inorganic existence, nothing more. This
is the domain of science.
As for the world of Life and the soul, it is amenable
neither to thought nor to scientific knowledge, but to
intuition.
What, then, is intuition, according to M. Bergson ?
The intuition is nothing else than instinct consdous
of itself, able to consider its purpose and enlarge that
purpose indefinitely.

* If the consdousness which sleeps in instinct


were to awake; if it were to interiorise itself in
knowledge instead of exteriorising itself in action; if
171
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
we could question it, and if it could reply, it would
give up to us the most intimate secrets of life, for
it does but continue the work by which Life organises
Matter.’

Unfortunately, as a consequence of the evolution


of the animal to man, intuition is vague and discon¬
tinuous; ‘it is an expiring lamp which burns up at
long intervals and for a few moments only ... it sheds
but a feeble and flickering light on our personality,
on the place which we hold in Nature, on our origin
and destiny, but its rays scarcely penetrate the darkness
in which our reason leaves us.’
The intuition, however, cannot dispense with reason,
we must inevitably reckon with reason in some measure,
and taking account of the lessons of fact, must submit
them to the control of reason.
But ‘the proper task of philosophy is to absorb
reason into instinct, or rather to reintegrate instinct in
Intelligence.’ Thus understood ‘ philosophy includes,
pre-supposes, and rests on science; and it further involves
tests by experimental verification,’1
It has been objected that this concept of intuition
and its relations to intelligence is paradoxical, the reason¬
ing being in a vicious circle. Bergsonians have been
told—‘you claim, on the one hand, that intuition goes
beyond intelligence in a domain proper to itself, and
on the other you reserve to intelligence a right of control
in this domain which is not its own! ’
. Bergsonians reply that the answer is that the
intelligence to which they refer is not ‘ the critical and
discursive intelligence, guided by its own power . . .
and enclosed in an inviolable circle. We are speaking of
something quite different—that intelligence should take
the risk, of a plunge into the phosphorescent water
around it, which is not altogether strange to reason
1 Le Roy: Ibid.
172
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
since reason arose from it, and since it contains the
powers complementary to understanding. The intelli¬
gence can therefore adapt itself, and will have been only
lost for the moment, that it may become greater,
stronger, and enriched.’1
To break through * the inviolable circle ’ the intelli¬
gence must set aside its habitual methods of reasoning
and give itself up to the magic power of intuition.
Renewed, vivified, elated, and transformed by intuition,
the intelligence will become a super-intelligence capable
even of judging the results of intuition.

2.—CRITICISM OF THE BERGSON IAN PHILOSOPHY

The Bcrgsonian philosophy presents to criticism a


method and a doctrine.
Let us examine the method in the first place.
According to Bergson the great philosophical, prob¬
lems on life, the nature of being—and of the universe,
lie outside Science, and their solution depends entirely
on intuition.
Intuition, as he understands it, is both instinctive
inspiration and introspection. It admits of check by
the intelligence, but only if super-intelligent, , so to say
—an intelligence exalted and vivified by intuition.
This method alone admits of our going beyond
known facts and scientific ideas.
The first questions that arise are:—
1. Is this Bergsonian ‘intuition’ something new,
and does it inaugurate a new method not
previously published ?
2. Must this method be specially, retained for
philosophy as philosophy specialises in this
fend or method r
‘Le Roy: Ibid.
173
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The answers to these two propositions are by no
means established.
It is dear that all men of genius, all inventors, all
the great minds which have added something new to
human resources, were intuitive by nature.
But intuition cannot be reserved to philosophy. It
belongs to many departments of life—philosophical,
artistic, industrial, and sdentific. Science depends on
intuition as much as on reasoning. The great scientific
discoveries existed in the understanding of men of
genius before being adapted to the facts and shown to
be true. There is as much intuition in the genius of
a Newton or a Pasteur, as in that of a great metaphysician.
The distinction, and the only distinction, between
philosophical and scientific method, is that men of
science keep as much as possible within the limits of
feet and take as their criterion concordance with facts
or with rational inferences; whilst philosophers, although
endeavouring to keep their intuitions in accord with
facts, sometimes allow themselves to propose bold
hypotheses which go beyond them.
This, and no more, is exactly what Bergson has
done.
I know very well that some persons see in the
‘ Bergsonian intuition ’ something heretofore unpub¬
lished to the world. I humbly avow that I do not
comprehend the discussions which have arisen on this
matter between the partisans and the antagonists of M.
Bergson, and I even find them tedious.
. It is well to bring out clearly that this ‘ new ’ method
which consists in putting intuition in contrast with
reason and in referring to the former the sole origin
of philosophic truths, has previously been definitely
claimed and severely criticised, just as it is to-day.

‘An endeavour is being made to smuggle


palpable sophisms in place of proofs; appeal is rpgd*
m
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
to intuition. . . . Thought, that is to sav, reasoned
knowledge, judicial deliberation, and sincere demon¬
stration—in a word the proper and normal use of
reason—is disliked: a supreme contempt is pro¬
claimed for rational philosophy; meaning by that,
all the series of linked and logical deductions which
characterise the work of previous philosophers.
‘ Then, when the dose of impudence is sufficient,
and encouraged by the ignorance prevailing in these
times, we shall soon hear something of this sort:
“ it is not difficult to understand that the ' manner¬
ism’ which consists in enunciating a proposition,
giving the reasons which support it and similarly
refuting its antithesis, is not the form under which
truth should be presented. Truth is the movement
of itself by itself.” ’

By whom is this biting apostrophe ?


No doubt, it will be thought to be one of Mr
Bergson’s detractors, criticising the philosophy of
‘ Duration.’ . . . Not at all: it is Schopenhauer on
Hegel.1
But the question of the novelty and the originality
of the Bergsonian ‘ intuition ’ is a quite secondary matter.
Let us, for the moment, admit the novelty and content
ourselves with a valuation of the method by what it
teaches us. Our judgment will go by the results
obtained.
If it is demonstrated that the teachings of M.
Bergson’s are of value only within the limits within
which they can be checked by facts; that when they
go beyond facts they are insufficient or erroneous, that
will suffice to prove that the ‘ Bergsonian intuition ’ has
no special validity.
ft will then be no longer permissible to contrast the
intuitive to the scientific methods. It will be established
i Schopenhauer: Parerga et Parahpomem.
175
.From the Unconscious to the Conscious
(yet once more) that there is one only method of reaching
truth, that which brings the results of intuition into
accord with logic and the study of facts. This is the
positive method which admits only rational inductions
as valid. M. Bergson’s teachings may be placed in
three categories :—
(a) Those which are in accord with facts, and are
therefore within the limits of scientific method.
(b) Those which are not deduced from facts, and
are undemonstrable.
(c) Those which are opposed to well established
facts, and are therefore erroneous.
We will now examine these three categories.

3.—TEACHING IN ACCORD WITH FACTS OR DEDUCED


FROM THEM

This is the teaching relating to the proof of evolu¬


tion as a general theory, and to the principle of the
essential causality in evolution.
The reality of transformism and the impossibility
of explaining it by the classical factors of selection and
adaptation are brought into full light by M. Bergson
with flawless logic and an irresistible power of per¬
suasion. To those synthetic reasons which have been
set forth in the earlier chapters of this work, he adds
certain reasons of an analytical and special order, which
vail be found scattered here and there throughout
his Creative Evolution.’ He finds new proofs of the
impotence of the classical theories in the study of certain
details of comparative anatomy, such as the eyes of some
molluscs compared with those of the vertebrates.
. Bergson’s analytical work is extremely con¬
scientious, and the reasoning on the facts before him
es\a.ct.a^ rigorous. If it is not of a kind to convince
the disciples of naturalism (for discussion may continue
176
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
indefinitely without reaching absolutely unanswerable
conclusions), that is of little moment, since the synthetic
study of evolution proves undeniably that the classical
factors are secondary and there is some essential factor
as yet unknown.
The necessity for this essential factor, being some
kind of internal creative impulse giving rise to the
* vital surge ’ is evident from the study of the facts. M.
Bergson’s teachings on this head, are strictly rational
inferences which do not transgress the limits of scientific
method. As such, and apart from other doctrines, they
ensure a unique place to his philosophy in the higher
walks of contemporary thought.
The notion of the ‘vital surge’ may be seen, in
germ, in some naturalistic systems such as Nageli’s,
and in ancient and modern pantheistic philosophies,
but the special merit of the Bergsonian system consists
in the rigorous application of this idea to the facts, and
in a presentment which is truly a work of genius.

4.—DOCTRINES WHICH ARE NOT DEDUCED FROM FACTS


AND ARE NOT DEMONSTRABLE

These include the teaching on God, the non-existence


of void, the nature of matter and spirit, the relations
of consciousness" to the organism, the _ independence
of consciousness and matter, on human liberty, and on
the hope of survival.
All these-are given without being based on facts,
even when (as we shall see later) the facts are such as
might be used partially to confirm the doctrines. The
teaching on these points is of the intuitive order. There
is no need to demonstrate their impotence. The classical
physiological ideas which make consciousness dependent
on the brain will never be upset by arguments drawn
from the intuition. As long as the experimental idea of
177
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
a psycho-physiological parallelism subsists in modern
science, all the beautiful reasoning of a spiritual kind
or the highest idealist hopes (apart from an act of faith),
•will alike be entirely inoperative against them.
M. Bergson’s efforts to buttress intuitive arguments
by ingenious similes will not do. He may compare
evolution to a sheaf of rockets with God at its centre;
intelligence to the ascending energy of the fireworks,
and matter to the dead sticks felling back to earth;
he may imagine many comparisons to make it understood
how, in spite of a seeming psycho-physiological parallel¬
ism, consciousness is not limited by the organ of con¬
sciousness ... all these similes, however ingenious,
can only give a superficial and fugitive satisfaction—they
prove nothing.
Not merely do they prove nothing, they are dangerous,
because they bring errors in their train and give the
illusion of proof to an investigation which is wanting
in thoroughness.
_ The chief error in the Bergsonian philosophy, an error
which we_ shall presently expose—its anthropocentric
concept—is probably due to the initial simile comparing
evolution to a sheaf of diverging rockets.

S'—CONTRADICTIONS AND INEXACTITUDES

Besides these illusory or dangerous similes, M.


Bergson’s philosophy shows obvious contradictions and
inexactitudes posing as a system. The contradictions
are striking.
M. Bergson makes out intuition to be a kind of
dethroned instinct, a residue of the animal evolution.
But he also makes it the basis of philosophic method;
so much so, that, according to his system, Man, the
privileged member of creation, can know truth only by
the faculty which (again according to his system)
I78
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
characterises animal evolution! Then, in order to
palliate the insufficiency of the former idea, he makes it
a superhuman faculty, which nevertheless, is still only
instinct.
lie rejects the control of the intelligence in philoso¬
phical matters, but then finds himself obliged to have
recourse to some kind of super-intelligence, different
from intelligence itself.
He contrasts intuition and intelligence, but by most
subtle reasoning, endeavours to bring them into unity;
he places the criterion of truth in the intuition controlled
by intelligence which is at the same time vivified by
the intuition; so that in the last analysis the intuition
is both advocate and judge.
He denies to logic the right to know that which
deals with life and high philosophical problems, but
in his work erudition and reasoning take a very pro¬
minent place.
He invents a new metaphysical entity—‘duration,’
but it so happens that this entity is founded on that
which is least certain, most subjective, and most relative
to our understanding—the concept of time!
The inexactitudes are yet more serious; through
them M. Bergson’s work leads to a vague idealism—an
idealism which does not express itself frankly and
dearly.
Difficulties seem eluded rather than solved. The
old contradictions are not reconciled by a higher synthesis,
which, whether true or not, might at least be precise;
they are (we must venture to say) subtilised under
confused and plastic formulae.
This quasi-systematic lack of predseness causes the
earnest reader of M. Bergson’s work to feel a discomfort
which neither his genius nor his skill can dispel. It is
hard to know whether one perceives the truth through a
mirage, or is simply the dupe of illusion and paradox.
The impression that remains is that of a splendid but
179
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
phantasmal edifice, of gorgeous tapestries hiding an
imperfect and defective structure whose foundations are
insecure. We lie under the magic spell and fear to
awake disillusioned.
M. Gillouin1 says: * M. Bergson carries us along
with him round ana over all obstacles, with an ease
which makes us think of some high intellectual school
of thought.’ Unfortunately it also makes us think of
skilful sleight of hand. . . .
The want of preciseness in Bergsonian philosophy
makes it appear conformable, at least on a superficial
survey, to the most opposite doctrines. It would be
comical, were it not saddening, to see men who stand
for the most opposed ideas placing themselves under
M. Bergson’s aegis. Deists and pantheists, orthodox
and theosophists, neo-occultists, and even it would seem
neo-syndicalists2 all invoke his authority.
As for the philosophers, they are simply disconcerted
by a system so pliable as, on the one hand, to allow of
the assertion that8 * whatever may be the deepest essential
nature of things we are a part thereof’ (which seems
a profession of pantheist faith conformable to the general
spirit of Bergsonian metaphysics); and, on the other
hand, to affirm that the whole of this metaphysic ‘presents
the idea of a God freely creating both matter and life,
whose creative work is continued by the evolution of
species and by the constitution of human personalities,’
and also, that ‘ this work is the categorical refutation of
both monism and pantheism! ’4

6. DOCTRINES CONTRARY TO WELL-ESTABLISHED FACTS

One of M. Bergson’s principal doctrines is that the


distinction between the animals and man is one of
nature, not of degree.
* Idem.
1911.

180
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
This distinction is not supported by any facts, and
contradicts the most certain data of contemporary
psychology.
According to M. Bergson, the divergent lines of
evolution have produced on the one hand, the animal
instincts,, and on the other, the human intelligence.
Animal instinct has retained * fringes of intelligence,’
and human intelligence has kept a residue of instinct.
But instinct and intelligence are separated by an impas¬
sable abyss, and Man alone is the essential and superior
product of evolution, while the vegetable and animal
world are its residual products.
This theory is profoundly distasteful to naturalistic
philosophy which secs in it a return, whether sincere
or disguised, to old anthropocentric ideas. If it were
established on any positive data, it would profoundly
disturb the whole evolutionary synthesis.
But these data do not exist and M. Bergson’s
teaching rests on an omission fatal to his theory. The
concept of Creative Evolution takes no account of sub¬
conscious psychism.
The study of this subconscious psychism proves to
the point of demonstration, as we shall see, the identity
of the nature of animals and man.
There is no need to seek to discover whether there
are in animals more than fringes of intelligence; com¬
parative psychology is not sufficiently advanced to permit
of this being established with any . certainty. It will
suffice to demonstrate that there is in man much more
than residues of instinct; there is a.vast subconscious
domain which is instinct much more highly developed..
To this domain belong, the automatism of the main
functions of life which are identical in animals, and men;
the great instinctive impulses of self-preservation, repro¬
duction, etc., equally potent in animals and Man though
frequently masked in the latter; and finally the higher
active subconsciousness, of which animal instinct is
i8x o
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
but the first manifestation, which has in human mental
life a much larger field than that of the consciousness by
which it is concealed from view.
Subconscious psychology dominates human and
animal life alike, and consciousness appears only as an
acquisition growing with evolution ana proportional to
the level of that evolution. There is therefore no differ¬
ence in the essential nature of animals and man; from
the psychic point of view both are governed by the
subconscious. There is between them only a difference
of degree, which is marked by the amount of conscious
realisation.
The demonstration of this truth is of capital import,
for it involves the failure of one of the chief doctrines
of the Bergsonian system, and therefore invalidates its
whole method.
This demonstration falls into three parts.
(a) Animal instinct is but the first manifestation of
unconscious psychism, and is of an inferior
kind.
(b) Human subconsciousness is the animal instinct
developed, expanded, and enriched by pro¬
gressive evolution.
(c) The degree of conscious realisation in the animal
and in man, and from the animal to man, is
purely and simply a function1 of the evolutionary
level attained.
(*) THE ANIMAL INSTINCT IS BUT THE FIRST
MANIFESTATION OF SUBCONSCIOUS PSYCHISM OF
AN INFERIOR KIND

Instinct, for the most part, obeys neither logic nor


conscious reasoning, nor will. Its characteristics are
those of human subconsciousness. It attains marvellous
‘'Fraction': here nsed in the mathematical sense-—a quantity
v£SS£^£hSSei nXf °a °f °ther quantitie8
l82
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
results superior to those of intentional and conscious
thought; and this is precisely the case with human
subconsciousness. It is essentially mysterious, and
follows no known psychological laws; just like human
subconsciousness. Finally it is connected to the human
subconsciousness by that supernormal psychology which
at the present time must always be taken into account.
In the manifestations of what is called accidental
instinct a very marked and striking transition from
instinctive subconsciousness properly so called, to super¬
normal subconsciousness may be observed.
Guided by this accidental instinct, animals some¬
times behave with the certainty and lucidity which
pertain to human somnambulism.
Pabre cites the following instances from his own
observation.
A cat was taken from the house where it had lived
to quite the other side of the town of Avignon, without
any means of seeing the road by which it had been
conveyed. It escaped, and very shortly afterwards
reached its old home, having traversed the town nearly
in a straight line, taking no account of any obstacles
not absolutely impassable. It had to pass through a
labvrinth of populous streets and did not appear to
notice any of the dangers of the way from boys and
dogs. It swam the river Sorguc, ignoring the bridges,
which did not happen to be just on its line: in short,
it acted just as if in the somnambulic state.
Another cat was taken by train from Orange to
Serignan (over four miles). For the first few days it
seemed to be getting used to its new abode, showing
no tendency to escape. Then suddenly it showed an
irresistible desire to return, and went back to its old
home by the shortest line, crossing the river Aygues
by swimming. A - .
Many analogous cases of dogs^ returning to tneir
masters' house after long and intricate journeys have
183
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
often been reported. In these cases we touch what has
been called ‘metapsychic phenomenology.’
True supernormal manifestations, as well as hypnotic
or somnambulic phenomena have been observed in
animals. Some have strange premonitions; the ‘death-
howl ’ of a dog, once heard in tragic circumstances, can
never be forgotten. I have myself heard it on more than
one occasion, and have been vividly impressed by it.
For instance, I was one night watching, in my medical
capacity, by a young woman who, in the midst of health,
had been stricken down that very day by mortal illness.
She was dying, and the death rale was in her throat.
The family was present, silent and deeply distressed.
The time was i a.m. (She died at daybreak.)
Suddenly from the garden which surrounded the
house came the ‘ death-howl ’ of the house-dog—a long,
lugubrious wail on one note, at first loud then falling
diminuendo slowly to a close.
For some seconds there was silence, then the wail
began again, as before. The dying woman had a gleam
of consciousness and looked at us with an anxious expres¬
sion. She had understood. Her husband went out
in haste to silence, the dog. At his approach the dog
fled and hid, and in the darkness it was impossible to
find it. As soon as the man returned to the house the
wails began again, and continued for more than an
hour till the animal could be seized and taken away.
Dr A. R. Wallace, and others have cited many
cases of a metapsychic kind, still more mysterious, in
which animals, especially dogs and horses, have been
the agents. In this connection the case of the Elberfcld
calculating horses may be mentioned; these have been
observed and the facts verified by several men of science,
among others Professor Clapardde of Geneva. All
agree m authenticating the facts. M. de Vesme* has
shown that the solutions (to mathematical questions
1 Annettes ttes Sciences Psychiques,
X84
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
given by these horses) cannot be reasoned or conscious,
but are of the metapsychic and subconscious order. I
think it needless to insist on these and analogous facts
known to all specialists of the subconscious.
Yon Hartmann has already pointed out the similarity
between instincts and supernormal manifestations in the
case of presentiments, second-sight, and clairvoyance.
Instinct, he remarks, and the unconscious, intrude
their results on consciousness in each case with the
same suddenness and precision.
To sum up, the final results of the analysis of animal
instinct are, that it is of the subconscious order; that
it is in essence the same as human subconsciousness;
and that it is obviously only the first and lower manifes¬
tation of the subconscious psychism.
If it occupies the whole, or what appears to be the
whole, of the psychological field of the animal, that is
merely because in the animal consciousness is as yet
undeveloped.

('l) HUMAN SUBCONSCIOUSNESS IS THE ANIMAL INSTINCT


DEVELOPED, EXPANDED, AND ENRICHED BY PRO¬
GRESSIVE EVOLUTION

This law is the corollary of the last, and rests, on


the same arguments. All that essentially, characterises
human subconsciousness is found in animal instinct.
M. Ribot says of inspiration that ‘primarily it is
impersonal and involuntary, it acts like an instinct, when
ana how it will.’1 ,
It only remains to show that all particulars in which
subconsciousness is superior to instinct, can be simply
explained by difference in the evolutionary level. For
this demonstration we must refer the reader to Book II.
We shall there show the frocessus by which the
1 Ribot: Psychologic its Sentiments. The italics are Dr Geley’s.
185
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
progressive enrichment of the subconscious has come
about, and how the inspiration of genius, with its higher
intuition and creative faculty, is visible and already
outlined, in the animal instincts.
It will be difficult for M. Bergson’s partisans to
revolt against this law, since they admit that intuition
is essentially instinctive. Intuition can be very much
better understood as an expansion and enrichment of
instinct, than by considering it as a residue of an animal
faculty.

(f) THE DEGREE OF CONSCIOUS REALISATION IN THE


ANIMAL AND IN MAN, AND FROM THE ANIMAL TO
MAN, IS PURELY AND SIMPLY A FUNCTION OF THE
EVOLUTIONARY LEVEL ATTAINED

The demonstration of this law also is deferred to


Book II., but the importance of this demonstration is
lessened by reason of the fact that the major portion
of psychology, whether animal or human, is subconscious
and essentially the same in both. From this it follows
that the capital distinction between animal instinct and
human intelligence which M. Bergson labours to
establish loses all importance.
Considering only the evolution of consciousness
(taken separately), it obviously is merely a function of
the evolutionary level, and equally obviously there is no
impassable abyss between animal and human intelligence.
It appears profoundly illogical and erroneous to say
that there are in the animal only ' fringes of intelligence.’
From the lowest to the highest evolutionary types
the conscious intelligence is observable as a dcvelon-
ment by stages. It is potential only in plants and in
very inferior animals; sketched out in higher species;
distinctly active in the highest animals, in which it
begins to play an important part; still more distinct
186
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and active in the lower grades of Humanity; and
expanded and developed in the highest human types.
It now only remains to draw a general conclusion
from this study of M. Bergson’s concepts as set forth
in UInvolution Creatrice.
Of all its doctrines the only ones which can stand
criticism are those which are based on the study of
facts or drawn by reasoned inference from the examina¬
tion of facts. These are the teaching on the primordial
cause of evolution, on the insufficiency of the classical
factors of selection and adaptation, and on the need for
recognising an essential and creative vital impulse.
The other doctrines, based on an alleged new notion
of intuit/on, are either insufficient or inexact or, worse
still, are contrary to the facts.
"Whatever may be thought of M. Bergson’s method,
and however great our admiration for his incomparable
talent of exposition and his persuasive eloquence, we
cannot find in the system of Creative Evolution a
solution to the great enigma. The truths which that
system contains are eclipsed by a proved error bearing
on an essential point, an error which radically vitiates
all his metaphysic.

187
CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE UNCONSCIOUS

It has been shown that the principal error of M. Bergson’s


Creative Evolution and, generally, of his whole system,
consists in his disregard of the psychology called sub¬
conscious or unconscious.
We shall now examine a philosophy which, in
contrast with M. Bergson’s, is based on the unconscious.
The expression, * The Philosophy of the Uncon¬
scious,^ was invented by von Hartmann; but the
foundation of that philosophy, the notion of a creative,
immanent, and omnipresent unconsciousness belongs
to all ages and all civilisations.
The numerous metaphysical concepts of the human
understanding on the nature of things come in the
end to two classes, apparently contradictory; if indeed
the contradiction is not really due to the limitations of
our intellectual and intuitional faculties.
The one class admits a Creator and a creation, and
understands the latter as the carrying out of the design
of a sovereign and conscious will. These theories raise
irreconcilable contradictions; such as the co-existence
of providential foresight with the prevalence of evil;
and of the soul of man as immortal but not eternal,
having a beginning but no end. The other class places
the Divine Idea in the universe itself; its theories seek
to disentangle the one sole permanent divine essence
from the infinite varieties of passing and ephemeral
phenomena.
Those who belong to the latter class consider that
the universe of matter, energy, and mind is made
up of representations’ or ‘objectifications’ of the
188
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
creative immanence, but that these do not necessarily
proceed from a deliberately willed design, because
consciousness does not appear as a primordial attribute
of Unity.
The One, the Real, as opposed to the many and the
illusory, is the divine principle of the religions of
India. It is the single principle of pantheism and
Monism. It is the ‘ Idea ’ of Plato, the * Active
Intellect ’ of Averroes, the Natura naturans ’ of Spinoza,
the ‘ Thing in Itself’ of Kant; it is the ‘ Will ’ as under¬
stood by Schopenhauer, and it is the ‘ Unconscious ’
of von Hartmann.

i.—Schopenhauer’s demonstration

Until modern times this great concept rested on


intuition alone. It was of a metaphysical nature, and
was consequently enmeshed in obscurities and contra¬
dictions.
Only in our own day has it been more and more
conformed to facts and has entered into the domain of
scientific philosophy. It adapts itself to facts so well,
that it is doubtless destined to reconcile the genius of
the East and the West; to bring the highest truths
within our reach; and to be the foundation and die
framework of a structure both scientific and. philo¬
sophical which will extend its shelter to all aspirations
and ideals. . . - .
Schopenhauer has the high merit of being the first
who sought to adapt this system to facts. No doubt his
system contains serious errors,^ referable to the insum-
cient biological and psychological data at his disposal;
but by the clarity and precision of his mind and by the
depth of his genius, his work deserves to be taken as
the point of departure for every modern study on the
nature of things.
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
In order to understand the remainder of the present
work, it is necessary that Schopenhauer’s thesis should
be kept in mind.
But ‘ The World as Will and Representation ’
cannot be given in a summary. It must be studied and
meditated upon as it stands. The primary idea which
reduces the innumerable appearances of things to one
single, essential, and permanent principle, cannot be
detached from its intuitive and logical demonstration
and its development by a masterly inspiration; in
a word, from the magical framework in which this great
philosopher has set it. This framework is necessary
to the comprehension of its power and to the manifesta¬
tion of its value and beauty.
An analytical summary is, however, indispensable,
as I am well aware. I must, however, beg the instructed
reader to pardon its inevitable insufficiency, and to
excuse what seems to me like a profanation.
Schopenhauer’s system does not claim to explain
everything. He declares that certain questions of high
metaphysics, such as the beginning and end of things,
are incapable of complete solution. He does not ask
whence came this world nor how it will end. He only
inquires what it is.
To him the world is at once will and representation;
a real will and an illusory and factitious representation.
Why does he select the designation of * Will' to
describe the real essence of things ? Because Will—

1 is something that we know directly; something


that we know and understand better than anything
else . . . the concept of Will is the only one among
all known concepts which does not take its rise
from phenomena and intuitive representations, but
comes from the depths of the individual conscious¬
ness which recognises itself essentially, directly,
without any forms, even of subject and object, seeing
From the Unconscious to tke Conscious
that here that which knows and that which is known
coincide.’

Will is the sole thing which really easts. It is the


Divine Absolute. It is one, indestructible, eternal,
outside Space and Time. It implies neither individual¬
isation, nor beginning, nor end, nor origin, nor
annihilation.
Will, in objectifying itself produces the diverse and
innumerable appearances of things. ‘ In the multiplicity
of phenomena which fill the world, which co-east or
succeed one another as the succession of events, it is
Will only that is manifested. All these phenomena do
but make it visible and objective; it remains immovable
in the midst of all these variations. It is the Thing in
Itself; and, to take the words of Kant, every object is
manifestation and phenomenon.’1
Will is primitively and essentially unconscious. It
needs no motives for action. We see it active in animals;
active without any kind of knowledge, under the im¬
pulsion of blind instinct. In man, Will is unconscious
in all the organic functions, indigestion, secretion,
growth, reproduction, and all vital processes. * It is
not only the actions of the body, it is the whole body
itself which is the phenomenal expression of Will, it is Will
objectified and become concrete; therefore everything
which happens in it must have emerged from Will; and
here, however, this will is not guided by consciousness
nor regulated by motives; it acts blindly . . .’
Will shows itself as unconscious in the vast majority
of its representations; in the whole inorganic world, in
the plant-world, and in nearly the whole animal world.
That which we call consciousness has nothing m
itself of an essential nature. It does not belong insepar¬
ably to will. It is but a temporary realisation, ephemeral
and vain. •
i The World as Will and Representation.
191
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
* Will, without intelligence (and in itself it is
no other), blind, irresistible, as we see it. in the
inorganic and in the vegetable world and in their
laws; as we see it also in the vegetative life of our
own bodies, this Will, I say, thanks to the objectified
world which lies open to it and develops in order
to serve it, comes to know that it desires, and what
it desires; and this is the world as it is, it is life
as realised in the world.’

But this limited consciousness which the will thus


acquires is still more ephemeral, and does not overstep
the temporary boundaries of individualisation. It is
only whilst individualisation lasts that it has a part to
play, and this part is only to substitute an intentional
and limited activity for its unconsidered and boundless
impulses.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish accurately
between the unconscious will and its conscious expres¬
sion. That which is really superior in man, his eternal
essence, his genius, his inspiration, his creative power,
all these are impersonal, all belong to the unconscious
wiil.
The domain of consciousness, created by the objecti¬
fication of the attributes of the will, attaches to the
cerebral psychism only. Consciousness in the higher
animals and man is bound to their organic representa¬
tion, it is born and dies with it.
Death brings it to annihilation. As a set-off, that
which is the essence of Being, the Will, is not affected.

* When we lose intellect by death, we are thereby


carried back into the primitive state, devoid of
knowledge, but not absolutely unconscious. It is
doubtless rather a state superior to the state of
unconsciousness, in which the distinction between
subject and object disappears. . . .
192
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
‘Death shows itself openly as the end of the
individual; but in this individual there is the germ
of a new being. Therefore nothing that dies in it,
dies for ever; but nothing that is born receives an
essentially new existence. That which dies, perishes;
but a germ remains whence arises a new life which
enters on existence without knowing whence it
comes, nor why it is what it is. This is the mystery
of -palingenesis (re-birth).
* The human being may therefore be considered
from either of two opposite points of view. From
the first he is an individual beginning and ending
in Time, a transitory phenomenon. . . . From the
other he is the original indestructible being which is
objectified in every existing person. No doubt such
a being could do better than manifest himself in a
world like this—a finite world of suffering and
death. That which is in him and_ proceeds from
him must end and die. But that which never leaves
him nor desires to leave him goes through him like
a lightning stroke and then knows neither Time
nor Death.’1

Thus, then, the individual consciousness, like the


universe, has no real and proper existence. It is a
temporary function of will, ft is born of the "will to live.
And the will to live is the consequence of an unfor¬
tunate illusion of the will.

%.—schopbnhauer’s pessimism

This pessimism, which is expressed in pages of great


eloquence, follows with rigorous logic on his premises.
If individualisation and consciousness are but passing
illusions soon to disappear, all effort, troubles, and
sufferings end in nothing. The injustices endured are
1 Schopenhauer: Religion.
193
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
without compensations. Life is objectless. The hopes
of religion are absurd, since, apart from their dogmatic
difficulties, they are all based on the insensate concept that
the individual soul, a thing which had a beginning,
should nevertheless have no ending.
There is therefore no hope, neither in a future world,
nor in this present one.
The will to live does but engender effort without
a goal and suffering without result.

' In considering inanimate nature we have already


recognised as its inmost essence continuous, object¬
less, reposeless effort; but in animals and man the
same truth is even more obvious. For every act
of willing starts from a need, from a lack, and there¬
fore from a pain; it is therefore a necessity of nature
that the creatures should be a prey to pain. But
when will comes to have no object, when prompt
satisfaction removes all motive for desire, they fall
into emptiness and weariness; their nature, their
mere existence weighs on them intolerably. Life
then, swings like a pendulum from right to left,
from suffering to weariness: and, in fine, these are
the two elements of which life is composed. Hence
comes a very significant feet, the more significant
by its. strangeness—man, having placed all pain
and misery in hell, has found nothing to put in
heaven but monotony 1
* Now this incessant effort, which is fundamental
to all forms which Will puts on, finds at last, at the
top of the scale of its objective manifestations, its
real general principle; there Will is revealed to
itself in a living body which imposes an iron law
—to provide it with nourishment; and that which
enforces this law is just the will to live, incarnate.
; • • Add a second need, which the first brings in
its train, that of perpetuating the species. At the
194
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
same time unending perils assail man from all sides,
perils from which he escapes only by perpetual
watchfulness. . . .
‘ For the most part, life is but a continuous
struggle for mere existence, with the certainty of
being defeated in the end. . . . Life is a sea full
of reefs and perils; man, by dint of care and prudence
avoids them, but knows all the while that his success
in steering between them by skill and energy does
but bring him nearer to the great total and find
shipwreck, for he cannot escape death.’
Efforts, sufferings, and death! It is of these only
that will acquires knowledge, and it is for these that
after having * affirmed itself,’ it comes to negation.
This is the fruit of individual existence.
‘ What a difference,’ exclaims Schopenhauer,
* between our beginning and our end. Its opening
scenes are characterised by the illusions of desire and
the transports of voluptuousness; its close by the
destruction of all our members and the odour of
the gravel The road that separates these is a
descending slope of lessening happiness and well¬
being: the happy dreams of childhood, the gaiety of
youth, the work of manhood, the decrepitude of
age, the tortures of the last illness and thfe final
struggle with death! ’
The pessimism of Schopenhauer is not only the
logical consequence of his philosophic premises; it is
founded also on a dear insight into life. This insight
fills him with an immense pity: pity for the animals
which, when they are not devoured by each other, suffer
untold miseries in ‘ a hell where men are the demons! ’
Pity for men, whom the will to live leads to trouble and
sufferings not compensated for by sparse pleasures
which are mostly illusory.
How, too, should man take pleasure in these brief
195
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
joys when he has attained consciousness of his essential
identity with a world in which evil reigns supreme?
How should he not suffer in sympathy with the v&st and
general pain ?
How is it that he does not understand that the will
to live is a misfortune, and should be annulled by the
abdication of desire and by renunciation of the illusory
motives with which intelligence rocks itself to sleep,
in order to find a sufficient reason for living ? It is
only by attaining to this, that the reason for life and
suffering can be understood.
The sufferings of animals are explained * by the
feet that the will to live, finding absolutely nothing
beyond itself in the world of phenomena, and being a
famished will, must devour its own flesh.’ For the
higher consciousness of man ‘ the value of life consists
entirely in learning not to desire it.’ Existence is
nothing but a kind of aberration of which a better
knowledge of the world should cure us.

3*—von hartmann’s systematisation

Von Hartmann has taken up Schopenhauer’s thesis,


adding thereto certain data derived from the natural
sciences and psychology.
Besides and above the causes admitted by the
mechanical concept of nature, he finds a superior principle
which he calls, the Unconscious. The Unconscious
is that which is essential and Divine in the universe.
In it will and representation exist potentially. Every¬
thing therefore that comes into realisation does so by
the will of the unconscious. 1
In evolution the unconscious plays the primary part:
natural selection does not explain the origin of new
forms: it is but a means, one of the means by which the
unconscious attains its ends.
196
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The unconscious has the predominant part in the
vital phenomena of the individual; in it is the essence
of life; it forms the organism and maintains it, repairs
internal and external injuries, and is the ultimate guide
of its movements.
It plays an essential part in psychological phenomena.
It is the source of instincts, of intuition, of the aesthetic
sense, and of creative genius.
Finally, the unconscious is the basis of * supernormal
phenomenology,’ which is a mere manifestation of its
divine power, independent of contingencies relating to
time, space, psychological, dynamic, and material repre¬
sentations.
For Von Hartmann, as for Schopenhauer, there is an
abyss between the unconscious and the conscious.
The former is divine, and the latter purely human.
Nevertheless, consciousness (when sufficiently
developed) permits us to pass judgment on the universe
and on life. And this judgment is not favourable.
As consciousness is both ephemeral and unproductive,
it cannot participate in the divine infinite.
It suffers from a limitation without compensations
and without hope, from many painful contingencies,
more painful in proportion to its degree of development,
in individual existence. Its last resource would be self¬
extinction; but perhaps even this sacrifice would be
useless, as the indestructible unconscious creator would
no doubt recommence another evolution destined to end
in the same conscious realisation with the same desolating
results.

4.—CRITICISMS OF THE SPECIFIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN


THE CONSCIOUS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Two things strike one at the outset in the systems


of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann, in the first place
the clarity of the reasoning and its quasi-scientific rigour;
197 p
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
in the second, the pessimistic conclusions which seem to
flow naturally and of necessity from it.
This conclusion does, in fact, necessarily follow if
it be admitted, as Schopenhauer and von Hartmann
maintain, that there is an impassable abyss and an
essential difference between the unconscious and the
conscious.
This essential difference takes away all ideal purpose
and all meaning from the universe and from life.
And while the other postulates of the German
philosophers are deduced with mathematical precision,
the alleged essential difference between the unconscious
and the conscious rests on nothing.
The assimilation of consciousness to a mere ‘ repre¬
sentation ’ is not logical.
Why should consciousness be exclusively bound to
the temporary semblances which make up the universe ?
Why should not all that falls within its domain be
registered, assimilated, and preserved by the eternal
essence of being ?
Whatl The divine principle, the will or the
unconscious, is to be allowed all potentialities except
one, and that the most important of all—the power to
acquire and retain the knowledge of itself.
How much more logical it is to presume that this
real and eternal will which is objectified in transitory
and factitious personalities, will keep integrally the
remembrances acquired during these objectifications,
thus by numberless experiences passing from primitive
unconsciousness to consciousness.
Certainly the human personality which covers the
period from birth to death of the body is destined to
perish and to have an end as it had a beginning; but
the real ‘ individuality,’ that which is the essential being,
keeps and assimilates to itself, deeply graven in its
memory, all states of consciousness of the transitory
personality.
. 198
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
When, conformably to the palingenesis of which
Schopenhauer speaks, it builds up another living per¬
sonality, it brings to the latter all its permanent gains,
and is further enriched by those of the new objectification.
It is thus that the will, originally unconscious,
becomes a conscious will.
It is curious to note that Schelling and Hegel, whose
systems preceded those of Schopenhauer and von
Hartmann, but are much less precise, had nevertheless
declared this progress from the unconscious to the
conscious and had drawn idealist and optimist conclusions
from it. The metaphysics of the two last-named
philosophers though more precise and better supported
from the scientific point of view, show an unfortunate
regression regarded from the idealist standpoint.
Schelling’s universe is the result of an * activity *
essentially unconscious. This activity becomes at least
partially self-conscious in man.
For Hegel the essential unconscious activity, how¬
ever, possesses some kind of reason. The creation which
it brings into existence is rational, and we may find
in evolution and the progress it implies, some
reasonable finality. Thus reason gradually grows
into consciousness. Evolution is the means which
the universal and creative reason uses to acquire self-
consciousness.
No positive objection can be taken to this concept,
but that does not suffice for its acceptance; it is necessary
to co-ordinate it with facts.
In the light of the new facts the errors, the contra¬
dictions, and the lacunae, as well as the heartrending
pessimism, all disappear. These new facts and the
inferences they carry with them, allow us to replace the
Philosophy or the Unconscious which, though marred
by these errors and omissions, is a truly great work of
genius, by another, similar indeed in its premises and
its essence, but leading by a different development to
199
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
conclusions quite other than the pessimism of Schopen¬
hauer.
Different in its development, because it takes note
of all the available facts, and conforming strictly to
reason while avoiding dogmatic assertion, it assigns a
place to all that can be explained, and to that which
necessarily transcends our powers of understanding and
knowledge.
Different in its conclusions, which are diametrically
opposed to Schopenhauer’s distressing pessimism, because
it fills in the artificial chasm which he has made between
the unconscious and the conscious.

200
BOOK II

FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS TO THE


CONSCIOUS

SKETCH OF A RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF


EVOLUTION AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL
FOREWORD

We can now attempt to outline a general theory of


collective and individual evolution based on all facts
at present known, whether of the naturalistic or the
psychological order, and on the deductions they involve.
We shall also draw certain inferences that are strictly
dependent on the facts.
We shall put aside, systematically, everything which
pertains to pure metaphysics: the question of God, of
the Infinite, of the Absolute, of beginning and end, and
of the essential nature of things.
We shall consider only what it is permitted to us
to know and understand on the destiny of the world and
of the individual according to the degree of intuitive
and intellectual faculty which evolution has actually
attained.
This is relatively little, but it is much more than
the classical naturalistic philosophy teaches.
It is henceforward possible to understand the
mechanism and the general trend of collective and
individual evolution; the degree to which individual
consciousness is dependent on, or independent of, the
material organism; and the * wherefore* of life.
When these notions are clearly established they
carry with them a lesson of idealism which is no longer
vague, but precise, and is based, not on an act of faith,
nor on a supposed * intuition,’ but on an estimate of
probabilities.
The preliminary limitation which we have here laid
down, is not founded on the old and obsolete distinction
between 4 the knowable and the unknowable,* but only
on the verification of the relative incapacity of our
actual powers of knowing and understanding.-
203
Foreword
Strictly speaking, there is nothing that is unknowable.
That which is called the region of the unknowable is
continually being lessened as evolution proceeds. The
simplest metereological laws were unknowable to our
cave-dwelling ancestors; the laws of gravitation, the
physical constitution of the stars, and the origin of animal
species were unknowable before the development of
modern science. It must be the same for the great
laws of life and destiny, whether of the universe or of
the individual.
As for the problems which are necessarily still above
all attempts at explanation, they can be resolutely and
systematically put aside; they will constitute the philos¬
ophy of a more highly and ideally evolved humanity.
The sacrifice which modern scientific philosophy
makes in thus limiting its aims to that which falls within
the bounds of reason, has great compensating advantages.
To begin with, this sacrifice, resolutely and courage¬
ously accepted, clears out of our way those two stones
of stumbling—mysticism and despondency—which en¬
cumber the path of idealism. The thinker will avoid
mysticism, for he will be able to avoid that intoxication
of the personal imagination which is always most
luxuriant when dealing with the subliminal. He will
be released from ancient and modern forms of dogmatism,
and will no longer look for a Messiah or a Magus to
guide him, nor yield to the puerile attractions of so-called
initiations into occult mysteries.
He will be saved from despondency, and will not
be led to say, like Herbert Spencer, who has paraphrased
and extended a celebrated dictum of Pascal:—

* Then comes the thought of this universal matrix^


itself anteceding alike creation or evolution, whichever
be assumed, and infinitely transcending both, alike in
extent and duration; since both, if conceived at all,
must be concaved as having had beginnings, while
204
Foreword
Space had no beginning. The thought of this blank I
form of existence which, explored in all directions as
far as imagination can reach, has, beyond that, an
unexplored region compared with which the part which
imagination has traversed is but infinitesimal—the
thought of a Space compared with which our immeasur¬
able sidereal system dwindles to a point, is a thought
too overwhelming to be dwelt upon. Of late years
the consciousness that without origin or cause infinite
Space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces
in me a feeling from which I must shrink.’1

The mental vertigo produced by consideration of


the Infinite and the Absolute does not affect the philoso¬
pher who has clearly recognised the actual limitations
of his work. On the contrary, he finds serenity of mind
in resignation to these limitations, and to the wholesome
and fruitful discipline which they impose upon him.
This sacrifice has also the supreme advantage of ruling
out all those vain and pretentious discussions, the sterile
formulae and contradictory systems, by which the highest
minds have entered the lists against each other. All
such systems have now only a historical or a literary
interest.
This resignation to the actual limitations of
human intelligence enables him to dispense altogether
with metaphysical entities—‘ the Thing in Itself,’ * non-
Being,’ ‘Will,’ ‘the Unconscious,’ ‘Duration,’ etc.,
etc.—which in the end are but empty words.
For these factitious entities and pure abstractions
we propose to substitute a concrete thing—the notion
of an essential concrete dynamo-psychism, which can
be verified as a reality, even though its metaphysical
nature cannot be formulated, and though research into
its metaphysical essence may even be inadvisable.
To this concept, the objection will at once be made
1 Herbert Spencer: Facts and Comments (1902. Ultimate Questions).
205
Foreword
that this essential dynamo-psychism, by the very fact
that it is something concrete and conceivable and that
we can in a measure understand it, is no longer the
thing in itself, abstracted from all representation, which
is, as Kant finally proved, essentially inconceivable.
We reply that the same objection can be raised
against all systems based on the distinction between the
divine essence of the universe and its phenomenal
manifestations. Schopenhauer thought to elude this
difficulty by making the Thing in Itself a ‘ Will ’
unconscious of itself, having neither substratum nor cause
nor end, because it is ‘ outside the realm of pure reason.’
Thus deprived of all attributes the ‘Will,’ which knows
not what it wills, nor how, nor why it wills, nor even
the fact of its willing, is an abstraction as inconceivable
as the ‘ Thing in Itself.’
Hartmann’s Unconscious is more conceivable simply
because our understanding naturally, spontaneously, and
necessarily, attributes to the unconscious a concrete
substratum, and makes of it the very thing that we
here unequivocally advance—an unconscious dynamo-
psychism.
This dynamo-psychism also is, if we will have it
so, a * representation,’ but it is the only means by which
we can understand ‘ the nature of things.’ For a relative
intelligence to endeavour to understand the Absolute
is, we must always remember, to limit the Absolute.
What docs it matter that the thing in itself should be
inaccessible to us ? We can at least reach it under a
first limitation. Under the immeasurable variety of
transitory and phenomenal appearances which constitute
the physical, dynamic, and intellectual universe, there
is one essential, permanent, and real dynamo-psychism.
Its immanent activity is revealed to us in the immense
series of facts which evolution presents; and Evolution
itself is, as we shall see, nothing else than the transition
from unconsciousness to consciousness.
206
Foreword
The two bases and primordial postulates of the
philosophy which this second part of our work will
set forth and sustain, are the following:—

1. That which is essential in the universe and the


individual is a single4 dynamo-psychism ’ primi¬
tively unconscious but having in itself all
potentialities, the innumerable and diverse
appearances of things being always its repre¬
sentations.
2. The essential and creative dynamo-psychism
passes by evolution from unconsciousness to
consciousness.

These two propositions rest on facts. They can


to-day be made subjects of exact demonstration, first
in the individual, and can then, by an extended induction
be referred to the universe.

207
PART I

THE INDIVIDUAL, AND INDIVIDUAL


EVOLUTION

OR

THE TRANSITION FROM UNCONSCIOUSNESS


TO CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE
INDIVIDUAL
CHAPTER I

THE INDIVIDUAL CONCEIVED OF AS AN ESSENTIAL DYNAMO-


PSYCHISM AND AS REPRESENTATION

I.-THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THIS CONCEPT.1

Our physiological study of the individual, starting from


all known facts, has demonstrated the distinction between
his essential and real dynamo-psychism and its visible
representations.
We have established by those facts, the illusory
nature of the appearances on which the general concept
of classical physiology is built—the concept of the
living being as a simple cellular complex, organising
itself by means of specifically distinct tissues, and having
in itself the reason for its being, its origin, and its end,
the cause for its form, its mechanism, and its functions;
all these properties arising only by heredity from
generative cells.
At the outset we have shown that it is not possible
to find the cause of specific form, nor the origin, the
essential cause, nor the purposes of its different modes
of activity, either in the organism itself or in the fact of
its cellular association.
We have been obliged to admit that the corporeal
form is but a temporary illusion; that organs and tissues
have no absolute specificity; that these organs and
tissues, even though proceeding from the single prim¬
ordial substance of the ovum, can even in tins life be
disintegrated into a unique primordial substance, which
1 The whole of this and succeeding chapters are closely connected
with the physiological and psychological demonstrations of Book I.
They will not bo understood apart from this connection.
2X1
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
can then reorganise itself into new and distinct forms
and build up temporarily different and distinct organs
and tissues.1
In a word, we have been compelled to surrender to
the evidence, that the body, the organic complex, has
neither definitive and absolute qualities nor a specificity
proper to itself. Its origin, its development, its embryonic
and post-embryonic metamorphoses, its normal functions
and supernormal potentialities, the maintenance of its
normal form, and the possibilities of metapsychic
dematerialisation and re-materialisations, all show that
this organism is separable from a superior dynamism
which conditions it.
It no longer appears as the whole individual, but as
.an jdeoplastic product of that which is essential in the
individual—a dynamo-psychism which conditions all,"
"and essentially is all.
In philosophic language, the organism is not the
individual; it is but his representation.
By this concept all the physiology of the physical
being and all its normal or so-called supernormal
capacities can be understood; whereas, without this
concept the most familiar organic functions and the
most unexpected phenomena of mediumship are alike
mysterious.
In reality there is neither normal nor supernormal
physiology. All is limited by representations; some
usual, some exceptional, both equally conditioned by the
essential dynamo-psychism which is the reality. If
embryonic metamorphoses and the histolysis of the
insect seem to us mysterious; if the interpenetration of
solid matter by other solid matter, and organic materiali¬
sations and dematerialisations seem impossible, this is
only because we attribute final reality to the characteristics
and properties by which we represent matter to our¬
selves. If, on the contrary, we understand that these
1 Vide Part I., Chapter II.
212
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
*

characteristics and properties are factitious and unreal, the


mystery and the impossibility—disappear; or become
merely correlatives of our.ignorance and weakness.
The changes presented by both normal and supernormal
physiology have no other philosophical meaning than
changes in the external appearance of things. _The
causality which makes them what they are, and the
explanation by which they are'understood, lie in the
dynamo-psychism which conditions them.
What is true in this matter from the physiological
point of view, is even more decisively true from the
psychological standpoint: the supernormal only becomes
comprehensible when we"~ "distinguish the essential
'Bynamo-psychism from its representations. In order
-to conceive of the possibility of action from mind to
mind it is necessary first to admit the reality of a superior
psychic mechanism (psychism) detached from the usual
contingencies which pertain to psychological representa¬
tions.
In order that vision at a distance beyond the range
of the senses, or the lucidity which presents the past,
the present, or the future, may no longer seem incredible
miracles, it is indispensable that we should first under- t
stand that time and space are but the means of our
representations and are as artificial and illusory as the
representations themselves.
Thus the concept, which has found its best expression
in the works of Schopenhauer,1 must henceforth quit
the realm of metaphysics for that of science.
That which is real and permanent in the individual,
which Schopenhauer called Will, we designate as.
essential dynamo-psychism, ancTtKe distmctionbetween
“this" andits "temporary representations is founded on
frets. At least everything occurs as if this were so.
1 Schopenhauer had already seen the importance of the phenomena
known as supernormal to his metaphysical scheme* (Parerga and
ParaHpomena.)
213 Q
Fr°m the Unconscious to the Conscious

for ^fthCan n?W,make a step forward in our search


ror truth; and, keeping steadily to facts and within
the limits of the possible, we can distinguish that which
frotfiLt \e-efentla .d7namo-psychismin the individual
om that which pertains to its representation.

2.—THE INDIVIDUAL CONSIDERED AS REPRESENTATIONS

currenf°Eh/Uer’ adoPti?S fhe biological ideas then


AnfffV d t°wn a Ve7 sl.mPIe concept of individuality.
£part fr°m his metaphysical theory, his concept wYs
m accord with the materialist thesis7 which taught that
the organism is the individual. To this Schopenhauer
added that the individual is Will objectified in an
indhddml t a”d h*.re?arded tbe organism as the unique
individual representation of that will. For Schopen-
haSaS f°* th° matcnaIistic physiologists, the organism
—that unique representation—contains within itself all

2«T . ^ Il™ts of time and space which


ind^i rnl hc ])ody* They are born and die With the
individual, and cannot transcend the range of his
nuLS1<^lnd sc?sorial capacities. His psychfsm is the
andT?imp C PrPduct of.% activity of his nerv£
centres. The consciousness that belongs to him is a
function of that activity. All the attributes of die
indlvI^al ?-e PfslI?& and ephemeral attributes created
being °hjectification of ‘will’ in an organised

c?ncept f Schopenhauer’s was in agreement


hLr Tte £* knfLwlcd^e of his da7. It is so no
. The facts now known traverse this simple aspect
of the individual; ^ they prove that individual activity
ThLsuEth? “!?■and $c 'r"™1 of
They prove, in philosophic language, that there are’
2X4
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
in the individual, ‘ representations ’ of the creative
dynamo-psychism which differ from the organism itself,
are superior to that organism and condition it, in place
of being conditioned by it.
In fact, as we shall show, everything occurs as if
the wse^aljdynamojjsychism objectified itself to create
the individual, not in one unique representation—the^
organism—but in a series of graded representations
successively conditioning one another.
In treating of physiology we have seen that the
organism is directed by an organising, directing, and
centralising dynamism able_to_act outside the organism,,
to disintegrate it and reconstitute it in new and distinct
forms. Therefore we can, and should, conclude that
the organic representation is itself conditioned by a
higher representation—the vital dynamism.1.
Physiology, considered by itself alone, does not
admit of any other inference.
But the study of the psychology of the individual
allows of new and larger ideas.
These ideas may be summed up as follows.
The semblances, according to which the psycho¬
logical individuality would seem to be merely the sum
of the consciousness of its neurons and its cerebral
psychism, are false.
In reality the cerebral psychism, like that of the
whole organism, has its origin, its ends, and its most
intimate conditions of function, in a superior dynamo-
psychism, which is, for the most part, subconscious. It
has been demonstrated that in the psychological indi¬
viduality there is a superior psychism independent of the
functioning of the nerve-centres and free of all organic
contingencies, and that this superior psychism forms
the very foundation of the living being; it centralises
and directs the psychic whole; it binds together all
1 Schopenhauer admitted the existence of a 'vital force* out he did
not make it a distinct and superior objectification.
215
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
present states of consdousnesSLigLan activity,. .which is.
Tmmanent~th'ough mostly latent, and. links thgro.tojhe
"past* by its., cryptic memory; in fine, it possesses the
so-callecl supernormal facilities.
If we would express the new psycho-physiological
concept in philosophical terms, we must say that the
organic representation, far from constituting the whole
individual, is only the lower and coarser objectification of
his essential dynamo-psychism. Above the. organic
representation (i.e. the organism) and conditioning it, is
a superior representation—the ‘ vital dynamism.’ Above
the representations known as the ‘ organism ’ and the
‘ vital dynamism ’ there is a third and yet higher repre¬
sentation belonging to the mental order.
These concepts are not new. Pythagoras and
Aristotle distinguished between the body ana the vital
dynamism which they called the psyche, and between
the psyche and the mental dynamo-psychism which they
called the Nous. Similarly animists and spiritualists of
the old school admitted analogous categories. But
there is a great difference between the old and the new
ideas. In the first place the new idea is based on facts
mid demonstrated by facts. As we shall see more clearly
in the sequel, it rests also upon reasoning—everything
occurs as though things were thus.
Then further, the new idea does not imply differences
of essence between the body, the vital dynamism, and
the mental dynamo-psychism. All are graded representa¬
tions of the same essential principle. Their differences
are.only in degree of evolution, of activity, and of
realisation.
But this cannot be fully understood till we have
completed our study of the Self. Let us therefore put
aside for the moment the analysis of the representations,
and pass on to the investigation of the Self considered
as essentially a dynamo-psychism.

216
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

3.—the self considered as essentially a dynamo-


psychism

Is the Self distinct from its representations ? Where


is the Self apart from its representations ? Until now
the answers to these questions could only be of a meta¬
physical nature.
Let us consult the facts alone and see what they
tell us.
Taking into account only facts the question takes
shape as follows.
Is the Self, as taught by classical psychology, the
sum of the states of consciousness, or is it separable ?
Can it be conceived of as separate from those states of
consciousness ?
We shall see that the answer is not in doubt—the
Self is not to be confused with states of consciousness.
But a certain effort is needful before this can be under¬
stood. We can admit without much difficulty that the
Self cannot be identified with the material body, but
it is much more difficult not to identify it with the
mentality. It is much less easy to distinguish oneself
from the mental, than from the organic representation.
This can be done only by modifying our habitual and
inveterate intellectual nabits, and by applying the whole
power of reason to get beyond the Cartesian axiom—
‘ I think, therefore I am,' and to admit another—* I
am, even apart from my thoughts; they represent me,
but my mental representations are not the whole of
Myself.’
Nevertheless facts prove that nothing is more certain.
The induction is exact: if the Self were but the sum of
states of consciousness it would be incomprehensible
how, these states of consciousness being intact, the
Self, which is by the hypothesis their synthesis, could
lose that which is most essential and important—the
317 '
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
notion of its unity and the possibility of control over
the psychic whole. Now it is a commonplace fact that
this integrity of states of consciousness coexists with
the disappearance of the synthetic unity and the central¬
ising directive power.
The diminution or the disappearance of control
by the Self is the fundamental fact in all supernormal
psychology and of all the psychological anomalies which
nevertheless coexist with the unimpaired anatomo-
physiological condition of the nerve-centres.
Whether we consider a pure neurosis such as hysteria,
or insanity, or double personality, or mediumship, the
first fact observed is always the disappearance of the
control and centralising direction of the Self. In hysteri-
fonn disturbances and in dementia, the states of con¬
sciousness are intact and remain so for long periods;
the faculties, taken separately, are not affected—memory,
imagination, feelings, etc. ... are the same, but the
central direction is replaced by anarchy or polyarchy.
In hypnosis, double personality and mediumship,
we find that faculties and knowledge, and the most varied
states of consciousness—in fact all the mental sequences
—persist integrally. But hare also the habitual central
direction by the Self has disappeared and is replaced
by a heterogeneous direction. In a word, the states
or consciousness, faculties, and knowledge can be
dissociated and separated from that which is essential
in the Self—the consciousness of its unity and reality.
Therefore the Self is distinct from the constituent
states which represent it.
The most typical phenomenon from this point of
view is that of alterations of personality. These modi¬
fications of the personality prove two things:—
i. The existence of mental groups nf
"'as^'Jastrow1 puts it, constituting as many
subconscious formations.
* Jastrow: La Subconscience.
2l8
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
2. The existence of a centralising psychic direction
of these mental groups, since it is precisely the
failure and the want of this central direction
that is the basis and sine qud non for alter¬
ations of personality and for the appearance of
secondary states.
Jastrow says, ‘ When the dominant Self abandons
any considerable part of its sovereignty, it may be that
the organised activities are freed.’ ... It is then seen
that ‘ the altered Self maintains relations so special, so
incomplete, and so indirect, with the normal Self, that
we must admit that the mind is dissociated. The psychic
autocracy is overthrown and gives place to an enfeebled
rule exercising power over a reduced areal1
To sum up: The real Self conditions and directs the
mental dynamo-psychism. _ ' ~
Therefore that which is essential in the Self must
not be confounded with subordinate and secondary
states of consciousness.
As in the organism, so in the mentality the per¬
manent essence must be distinguished from temporary
‘ representations.’ The states of consciousness are but
representations of the Self. But the Self—an individual¬
ised portion of the universal dynamo-psychism—cannot
be confounded with its representations.
Moreover, there is a further proof of this assertion.
Facts show that there are in the Self capacities which
outrange the limits of states of consciousness and
dominate all its representations.
Intuition and creative genius very greatly transcend
the intellectual faculties. In these there is nothing like
the linked sequences which mark logical deductions,
they are superior faculties, deriving evidently from the
divine essence of the Self.
Still more obviously the supernormal psychic faculties,
and more especially lucidity (which is independent
* Italics we mine, G. G.
219
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of all contingencies) cannot be attributed to the
intellect.
Therefore, once more, the real and essential Self is
distinct from the states of consciousness and the mental
processes which represent it at any moment.
But it will be said:—‘so be it; but what are we to
understand by the real Self apart from its representations ?
‘ Is it the Creative Essence, Will, the Unconscious,
the essential dynamo-psychism (the name matters little),
but is it the Creative Essence devoid of any individuali¬
sation, acquiring this individualisation only in and by
representations, and losing it when these representations
cease ?
‘ Is it a part of the essential dynamo-psychism which
retains individualisation, remembrance, and self-con¬
sciousness even after the cessation of the representations
which it has passed through ? ’
To answer this question, let us consider the second
part of our demonstration, viz., that the essential
dynamo-psychism passes by individual evolution from
unconsciousness to consciousness. ""
CHAPTER II

IN INDIVIDUAL EVOLUTION THE ESSENTIAL DYNAMO-


PSYCHISM PASSES FROM UNCONSCIOUSNESS TO CON¬
SCIOUSNESS '

Up to this point our demonstration has been rigorously


scientific and rests entirely on facts, or on inferences
closely following on the facts. In that which follows
we shall be obliged, though keeping to the same method,
to allow a slightly larger margin for hypothesis. But
we must ask the reader to hold judgment in suspense
till the whole theory developed in this work has been
completed. None of its details should be considered
separately or apart from the general synthesis. This
synthesis, as we shall see further on, is such that, as a
whole, it appeals with all the weight of truth.
For Schopenhauer and von Hartmann consciousness
is inseparable from its representations. Between the
conscious, on the one hand, and the will or the uncon¬
scious on the other, there is, according to them, an abyss
which cannot be filled; there is an essential differen¬
tiation.
We desire to establish on the contrary:—
1. That there is no such abyss between the conscious
and the unconscious, for, in the individual, they
constantly interpenetrate and mutually condition
each other.
2. That there is an uninterrupted transition from
unconsciousness to consciousness; and that the
primitive unconsciousness tends more and more
to become conscious by an undefined and
uninterrupted evolution.
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

I.—THE CONSCIOUS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS INTER¬


PENETRATE AND MUTUALLY CONDITION EACH OTHER

To consider the Unconscious first:—


In the analytical study of its constituent elements ,
we find some that are innate,, which we shall consider
further on, and some that a£e_acguired. These latter
were at first conscious; then they passed from the
field of consciousness into subconsciousness and became
cryptomnesic. Part of the subconscious-cryptomnesia
is made up of former states of consciousness. There
is, therefore, a_current, setting continually from the
conscious to the unconscious.
Let us now consider the Conscious:—
In the analytical study of its constituent elements
we found that there are acquired elements which we
know well, and innate elements which are more obscure.
These latter are at first subconscious, then they pass
from the field of subconsciousness and become conscious;
from being cryptopsychic they become psychic.
Thus the very structure or the conscious being—his
essential character—is made up of subconscious capacities.
The conscious psychism, is therefore in main part
constituted by the subconscious which conditions and
directs it. There is therefore a continuous current
setting from the unconscious to the conscious.
In fine, there is a double, reciprocal, and continuous
influence from the unconscious to the conscious, and vice
versa—a complete interpenetration.
Not only is there no impassable abyss, but the
connection is close and direct.
In conditioning the conscious the unconscious
partly loses its character of unconsciousness, and acts
not as unconsciousness but as a cryptoid consciousness,
sometimes active, sometimes latent.
In its turn the conscious partly conditions the
222
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
unconscious by pouring into it the stream of psycho¬
logic^ acquisitions. Finally, these acquisitions, once
conscious and now become subconscious, may, under
favourable conditions, re-emerge into consciousness.
What are we to conclude ? Simply this:—
That which we in daily experience call 4 conscious¬
ness ’ is but a part of the conscious—the part immediately
accessible within the given limits of time and space;
but a large part of the conscious normally remains
latent.
That which we in daily experience call4 unconscious¬
ness ’ is but a part of the unconscious, of the true
unconscious—that which remains inaccessible and
unfathomable. The greater part of the unconscious
rises daily into consciousness; it makes that conscious¬
ness and directs it. It is not even occult, it is merely
anonymous: its activity from day to day is constant ana
cryptoid.
From this point our demonstration will proceed
easily.

2.—THE UNCONSCIOUS OR SUBCONSCIOUS DYNAMO-


PSYCHISM TENDS TO BECOME A CONSCIOUS DYNAMO-
PSYCHISM

The leading proposition may be established by a


reasoned study of the individual psychism.
Analysis of the higher subconsciousness permits us
to distinguish in it two main categories of powers and
knowledge.
(a) The first category has no analogy in conscious
powers and conscious knowledge. It includes
the so-called supernormal faculties, which are
creative and are able to bring to the living being
knowledge independently or his habitual means
of cognisance and understanding.
223
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
This category, this portion of the Self, necessarily
remains mysterious; it is of the very essence of the
unconscious, and brings the individual into touch with
that which is divine in the universe. It eludes investi¬
gation by reason, and is incapable of any complete
interpretation.
(b) The second category includes those faculties
and that knowledge which are essentially
analogous to the conscious faculties and know¬
ledge, differing from them only by variety and
extent. This category is more easily inter¬
preted.
We can verify in the first place that it is composed
partly of psychological experiences acquired consciously
or even unknown to ourselves, which have passed,
integrally, below the threshold of consciousness.
Everything occurs as though the multitude of daily
experiences had as their end or their result, an uninter¬
rupted enrichment of our subconsciousness during the
whole of life.
No remembrance, no vital or psychological experience
is lost. In the course of life the organism undergoes
immense modifications, and is doubtless renewed several
times molecule by molecule. States of consciousness all
more or less different, succeed one another. A life is
really made up of a series of lives; the life of infancy,
of childhood, of adolescence, of adult age and of old
age; quite distinct lives though united by a substructure
common to them all.
These successive lives are more or less affected by
seemingly complete oblivion, so that for the living being
they are like so many partial deaths.
But throughout the renovation of organic molecules,,
and of renewed states of consciousness, there persists a
deep, superior psychism which has registered these states
of consciousness and retains them indelibly.
They are therefore not lost though they are in great
224
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
part latent. But this is not all. The subconscious
psychism which is thus enriched throughout life, by all
these states of consciousness, does not merely register
them, it also assimilates them.
All conscious acquisitions are assimilated and transmuted
into faculties. This is noticeable in the course of existence.
The being ‘ develops,’ and acquires new or extended
powers of feeling, knowing, and understanding. Psycho¬
logical progress can be the result only of this transmuta¬
tion of knowledges into faculties. And this transmutation
is subconscious. It does not take place among the
unstable and ephemeral cerebral molecules; it necessi¬
tates a deep-seated and continuous elaboration in the
essential and permanent part of the being; that is, in
his subconscious dynamo-psychism.
Thus the perpetual disintegration of the conscious
personality is of small importance. The permanent
subconscious individuality retains the indelible remem¬
brance of all the states of consciousness which have built
it up. From these states of consciousness which it has
assimilated it constructs new capacities.
During the course of life the individual subcon¬
sciousness has made a new stride towards consciousness.
We have henceforth a firm basis whence to proceed
higher and further in our discovery of truth.
Cryptopsychism is only in minor part composed of
the experiences of this present life. The greater part
is inborn. Whence does this come ?
The most natural and reasonable hypothesis is that
which is based on facts. Since cryptopsychism and
cryptomnesia are both partially constructed out of daily
experiences which have passed into the subconsciousness
which they enrich, it is legitimate to infer that they are
entirely constructed from past experiences.
Since then in the course of our existence we find
the origin of a part only of the contents of subconscious¬
ness, it is at least permissible to seek the remainder in
225
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
anterior experiences and to push back the cryptomnesia
and the cryptopsychism of the individual beyond the
present existence.
Obviously this is a very wide inference to draw. To
many readers it will at first sight seem, if not absurd, at
all events out of proportion to the facts on which it is
based.
It must not, however, be considered by itself, but in
conjunction with all the preceding demonstrations.
It then has more weight. It is not hard to under¬
stand how the essential dynamo-psychism objectifying
itself in new organic representations should retain the
deep memory of experiences realised in previous repre¬
sentations. If in place of a single existence, we include
a series of successive existences, the acquisition of con¬
sciousness by the primitive unconsciousness can readily
be understood.
Each of these innumerable and various experiences
would have been impressed on the essential dynamism
of the being, and would be transformed into a state of
consciousness; that is into a remembrance and a capacity.
It is thus that the living being passes little by little
from unconsciousness to consciousness.
Against this inference of re-birth, no objections of a
scientific kind can be raised. We may seek in vain for
a single one in the whole stock of knowledge. Forget¬
fulness of previous existences has but slight importance
for modern science. Remembrance plays but a secondary
part in normal psychology; forgetfulness is habitual
and is the rule.
In the course of a lifetime, the greater part of our
experiences disappears. During regular and normal life
the personal memory of the brain—memory—is altogether
weak, unreliable, and fails us continually; it is still
more defective in abnormal cases caused by ' secondary
states ’ whether spontaneous, hypnotic, or mediumistic.
On the other hand, above this cerebral memory is
226
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the subconscious memory—the infallible memory of the
true and complete individuality, as indestructible as the
being itself.
In this essential memory there are engraved per¬
manently all the events of the present life, and all the
remembrances and conscious acquisitions of the vast
series of antecedent lives.
In the light of the two propositions just stated,
individual evolution can be understood and all naturalistic
and philosophical problems relating to the individual can
be resolved.
No doubt from the metaphysical point of view the
concept gives a large range to hypothesis, but from the
psychological standpoint, there is no enigma on which
it does not shed light.

227
CHAPTER III

THE SYNTHESIS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

^ I.-PRIMORDIAL AND SECONDARY REPRESENTATIONS

The rational concept of the individual in accord with all


the facts is as follows.
For the genesis of the individual the essential
dynamo-psychism objectifies itself by graded primordial
representations successively conditioning one another.
According to our present knowledge the jprimordjal
representations are:—
1. "TKe~purely mental;
2. The Vital Dynamism;
3. The single organic substance.1
These primordial representations constitute them¬
selves into secondary representations: the mental, by
states of consciousness and thoughts; the unique
substance by cells and organs. These primordial repre¬
sentations arg ‘ cadres * which remain the same from the
birth. _tQ._ the death of the grouping which constitutes
the individual. ..~~
The secondary representations, on the contrary,
jire perpetually renewed. The cells of the organic com¬
plex, are born, die, and" succeed each other very rapidly.,
The states of consciousness and thoughts follow on one
another in the same way, associating, opposing, con¬
verging or diverging in a chaos which is co-ordinated
only by the directing Self.
1 It is curious that the schools of thought called occultist have reached
by intuitive or mystical paths a systematisation not unlike this, and
describe each of the primordial representations as having each a concrete
presentment, by means of an organic or fluidic substratum.
22s
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The last terms of these representations, whether
cells or thoughts, have a collective self-activity, a
dynamism proper to themselves, and the rudiments of
consciousness. Cells and thoughts are ‘ wholes,’ frag¬
mentary dynamo-psychisms, or monads.1 The graded
‘ hierarchies ’ which east between the primordial repre¬
sentations exist also in principle between the secondary
representations. There is a hierarchy of the tissues and
a hierarchy of mental groups; and in the * cadres ’ of
primordial representations which are fixed and unchange¬
able during the continuance of the life-group, there
exists a possibility of representations different from the
normal secondary representations. Thus, the tissues
and organs of the unique substance can be reconstituted
by metapsychic materialisation into new forms, and
the mental representations can be reconstituted into
secondary personalities by an abnormal psychism.
This clears up the concept of the individual both
as such and in the many details of his physiology and
his psychology.
We will now return to the analysis of the individual
and his representations, in detail.

^ 2.-THE BODY AND THE VITAL DYNAMISM

The body, which is the lower objectification and the


ideoplastic representation of the self, can no longer be
considered as playing the primordial and essential part
that was assigned to it by classical psycho-physiology.
The known facts of supernormal physiology seem
to establish definitely that the diverse anatomical modali¬
ties of the organism are reducible to a unique representa¬
tion—-tiie primordial substance, which is not nervous,
1 The celebrated experiments of Dr Carrel have positively demon¬
strated this as regards the cells.
229 R
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
muscular, or osseous, etc. ... but is substance pure
and simple.
This opens a vast field; and the study of organic
modality must be resumed on an altogether new basis._
This organic substance is built up, developed, main¬
tained, and repaired by the higher active principle—
the vital dynamism—which conditions it.
In our study of physiological individuality we have
sufficiently demonstrated the reafityofthis vital dynairusm
considered as independent oFlEe organic complex, and
as an organising and directing principle. There is no
need to revert to this demonstration.
The vital dynamism, moreover, has its own proper,
autonomous existence^ shown by its limitations in time
j and space, as distinct from the higher dynamp^psychic
principles in the individual, which are above time and
space. The apparent manifestations of its organising,
directive, and reparatory powers do not extend beyond
the birth and death of the organism which it conditions.
All available evidence shows that these manifestations
are restricted within narrow limits.
In building up the organism the vital dynamism is
under a double influence: the influence of the higher
dynamo-psychism of the Self, and the hereditary
influence which seems to be linked to substance, i.e,
the active ideoplastic influence of the living being, and
the passive ideoplastic influence which is the mental
imprint given to the substance by progenitors.
Schopenhauer had already conceived of the sequence
of organic edification as really proceeding from the
active ideoplastic power.

‘ The different parts of the body must correspond


perfectly with the principal appetites by which the
Will is manifest; they must be their visible expres¬
sions in being. The teeth, oesophagus, and intestinal
canal are hunger objectified; similarly the genital
230
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
organs are the objectified sexual instinct; the hands
which grasp, the feet which move, correspond to the
less urgent desires of the Will which they represent.
As the human form jas a whole corresponds to the
"human wil^as a whole, so the form of the individual
body (which is consequently very characteristic and
very expressive) corresponds to the individual modi¬
fications of the will and to a particular character.’

To this concept of the ideoplastic activity we have


only to add that the objectification of the essential
dynamo-psychism is not primarily and immediately an
objectification in matter.. It is primarily mental. Then
the mental objectification is transferred into dynamic
objectification, and this again into organic representation.
The passive ideoplastidty is the mental "imprint '
received from progenitors, and is the sum total of heredity.
It plays an important part in the building up of the
organism, because the directive will of the Self is not
powerful enough at the existing level of evolution to
modify the main physiological functions. The body
and the vital dynamism form a hind of lower self, having
a will of its own, over which the control of the higher
Self is only a partial and relative.
The influence of the active ideoplastidty is none the
less the preponderant influence. It determines the
destiny and the purpose of the organism and adapts
human cerebration to its normal use.
Deprived of this higher direction, the action of the
vital dynamism in highly evolved creatures, and especially
in man, may be perverted, warped, or weakened, and
may produce abortions and monsters.
The embryonic growth of an organism is manifest
as a regular and normal * materialisation,’ while meta- ,
psychic materialisation is only an irregular and abnormal
ideoplastic growth.
The building up of an organism, moreover, can occur
231
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
normally, otherwise than under the usual conditions
which govern generation in highly evolved creatures.
In parthenogenesis, in reproduction by budding, the
grouping of organic and dynamic monads takes place
otherwise than by the conjunction of an ovum and
spermatozoSn. These facts, which seem disconcerting,
can easily be explained by the new ideas; they simply
prove that the conditions which govern cellular and
dynamic groups are not restricted to fertilisation.1
Once constituted, the vital dynamism represents a
storage of power, confined within narrow limits both
as to its duration and its potentialities.
In its duration, because the powers of organic repair
diminish with maturity and do not prevent the body
from slow disintegration under the wastage of old age.
In its potentialities, for an organic injury may be
beyond the power of repair and may bring about the
premature end of the corporeal grouping.
It is to be remarked that the limitations of the vital
dynamism are more pronounced in the higher than in
the lower forms of life. It may be, however, that in
these latter the case is rather one of less restricted
specialisation than of greater power.
In any case, a special study of the vital dynamism
in the lower grades of life, suen as plants and protozoa,
will be necessitated by reason of the great differences
in its qualities and modes of action as shown in them.
It seems certain, however, that in the more highly
evolved forms the reparative action of the vital dynamism
1 We may remark, passim, that there is a curious analogy between
reproduction by cuttings, and especially by buds, and the metapsyohic
materialisations Materialisation often proceeds (as we have seen) by a
kind of budding or prolonging of the primary substance exteriorised by
the medium, this bud developing into a being or the fragment of a being.
The difference is in the duration, and that is only a matter of time and
modality. There is nothing to prove that m the end the materialisation
may not prove to be separable from the medium, and given a separate
existence, just as the cutting or the bud is scpaiated from the parent
stock Impossible 1 it will be said. By no means. The rashness would
lie with those, who, knowing what we now know, affirm the impossibility,
233
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
is very much more restricted than in the lower forms
because of the high centralisation in the former which
monopolises the greater part of the energy for the
functions of the nervous system.1 Certainly in these
more evolved forms it has far less than the amazing
{sower observable in the invertebrates and even in some
ower vertebrates; a power which extends to the renewal
of members or even of viscera.
Even such as it is, it is capable of unexpected
marvels, and if it is premature to anticipate a new
system of medicine based on a deeper study of
the vital dynamism, at least its possibility may be
foreseen.
The function and purpose of the body and the
vital dynamism which, together constitute the lower
self of the individual, seem to be to limit the activity
of the Self and give it a specific direction—to specialise
it, so to speak. Everything occurs as though each
terrestrial existence, each organic objectification, each
* incarnation ’ if the term is preferred, were for the real
being a limitation in time, space, and means. It would
seem to resemble a compulsion to a restricted and
specialised task, an effort directed to a single aim exclu¬
sive of others. Sharply defined as this is from the
physiological point of view, this limitation is still more
strict psychologically.
This limitation is the cause of the impotence of the
supernormal faculties. It trammels the manifestation of
the inspiration of intuitive and creative genius. It is the
cause of the forgetting during organic life of the immense
majority of acquired experiences in their quality of
remembrances as distinct from capacities developed; it

1 It is not absurd to surmise that prolonged artificial quiescence of the


nervous system, say by a long period of special hypnosis, might render
possible a quite unexpected extension of the healing and reparatory
power of the vital dynamism.
This power is actually shown, exceptionally, in abnormal states and
in the cures wluch are called miraculous.
233
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
is the dominant cause of ignorance in the individual
of his real position in the evolutionary, scale.
The cerebral organ is, of course, indispensable for
psychological function in relation to the external world.
But this organ is capable only of a restricted activity
and has but a limited amount of that storage power
which we call memory. As the passing impressions
which it has received are effaced, the memory .of these
impressions tends to disappear from normal consciousness.
This is very obvious in the normal course of life,
and, a fortiori, the brain when newly acquired cannot
vibrate in harmony with impressions long past, which,
even in normal life, only occasionally reach the threshold
of consciousness.
This forgetfulness, however, is only apparent, since
the remembrance remains in the essential memory of the
Self; and in the lower phases of evolution it is salutary,
for it necessitates a multiplicity of experiences under
continually changing conditions. This forgetfulness,
moreover, allows the Self to pursue its line of develop¬
ment without being embarrassed or turned aside from
its aim. Like death itself, it is a factor favouring
evolution.1
And further, the usual inaccessibility of the faculties
of instinct, intuition, and the supernormal powers
generally (which pertain to the unconscious), compels
constant considered effort, and thus it also favours
evolution.

3-—THE REAL SELF AND ITS MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS

We have now considered the body and the vital


dynamism which constitute the lower self of the indi¬
vidual. We shall now study the higher group—the
mental dynamo-psychism and the Self.
1 See Part III.
234
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Everything that is essential in the being—the innate
faculties, the intellectual aptitudes, and the primordial
powers—belong to this group.
The central monad, the real Self, is the source and
principle of creative genius and inspiration. Its function
is to centralise and direct the psychological whole. It
ensures individual permanence in spite of the perpetual
renewal of states of consciousness during one life and
the changes of personality in successive lives. It retains
integrally the remembrance of all its acquisitions, and
assimilates them to itself. By this assimilation of past
states of consciousness, the consciousness which repre¬
sents and synthetises all past realisations, develops
little by little. In it resides the whole of the latent
consciousness, made up of a vast mass of experiences,
acquisitions, and realisations.
The mentality which the Self directs is made up
of states of consciousness not as yet assimilated, but
which it regulates and uses. There is in it an extensive
group of intellectual monads—* elementary dynamo-
psychisms,’ at a high evolutionary level and possessing
a marked degree of self-activity, autonomy, and individ¬
ualisation.
In the psychic whole these elements form secondary
groups determined by affinities and associations which
all tend to independence. Thus there are in the psychism
two constant currents—the one centrifugal and decen¬
tralising in its action, tending to anarchy or polyarchy;
and the other centripetal, tending to centralisation
and governance by the Self.
The general grouping is determined by affinities;
the psychic elements which form a new being are grouped
by the tendencies and the aspirations which mark the
evolutionary level reached by the Self.
We are here dealing with a primary fact, on which
special stress is to be laid, that the total psychism is
closely bound up with and limited by the cerebral
235
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
psychism for all manifestations in its relations with the
external world. The expression of thought, and all
manifestations of mental activity have to flow along the
cerebral channel; and this channel, which is both narrow
and fixed in its direction, limits and determines the
whole activity of the Self in that same direction.
The close association of the Self with the lower
group implies a restriction of the activity of the Self;
whereas all dissociation from the lower group implies
its extension. The total psychism therefore differs from
the psychism of normal life, which is limited by the
cerebral conditions.
In this concept there is one point to which we must
call special attention in order to avoid false and mis¬
leading interpretations; this concerns the subordination
of the cerebral to the higher psychism. This concept
must by no means be understood in the sense that there
are in the individual two beings, distinct in their essence
and destiny. This misapprehension is, unfortunately,
nearly universal. It dominates the systems both of
Schopenhauer and von Hartmann.

‘ We may be consoled,’ writes Von Hartmann,


for having minds so low and absorbed in material
things, so devoid of poetic and religious sense; there
is deep within us a marvellous subconsciousness
which dreams and prays while we work for our
livelihood.’

Certain mystics fall into the same error when they


gravely teach that all acts, both those which are most
meritorious or most guilty, have little importance because
they do not proceed from the real Self, and have no
effect upon it.
This is radically false.
The Self is not a duality, it is a unity. But during
terrestrial life cerebral conditions only allow of a restricted
236
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and truncated manifestation of the total psychism. This
limitation hides from the person not only his meta¬
physical essence, but also the greater part of his conscious
realisations.
In abnormal states, when the subconscious part
manifests itself more or less distinctly, this creates the
illusion of duality, just because being outside and above
temporary limitations, it appears quite different from
the normal psychism.
But the conscious and the unconscious constitute
one and the same individuality in which the interplay
from one to the other is correlative and unceasing.
It is, moreover, extremely difficult, for want of a
definite criterion, to state exactly what are the limits of
contribution by the subconscious, and in what measure
this contribution is conditioned by organic factors and
cerebral heredity.
According to the notions put forward above, there
are constant alternations of ‘ associated life ’ and ‘ dis¬
sociated life ’ in the permanent and indestructible
existence of the individual.
The phases of associated life—the association of the
Self with organic and material life—imply a process
of analysis, a perfecting of detail, a progress towards
consciousness by restricted efforts directed in a special
sense which is imposed by the present objectification;
efforts which are concurrent with those of the other
‘ monads ’ constituting the dynamic and material
organism.
The phases of dissociated life imply a progress by
contemplation, by deep inward assimilation, working
towards synthesis.
Myers believed also in a special development of the
faculties called supernormal during these phases of
' discarnate ’ life. These faculties, however, which
pertain to the divine essence of the unconscious, must
really be immutable; but it is quite possible that the
237
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Self, passing beyond terrestrial existences, may learn to
use these supernormal faculties, and to understand them
sufficiently to bring them little by little under the
dominion of its will.
The hypothesis is a large one, but its study must
be left to future research in the metapsychic domain,
by which it may, perhaps, be confirmed.. With more
certainty we may infer that the being in its discarnate
phases, freed from cerebral conditions, can and should,
when it has reached a sufficiently high level of con¬
sciousness and liberty, know itself better, and better.1
Its past should be accessible to him within the limits
of its evolution as actually realised, and it might even
be able consciously to prepare its future.

4.-METAPHYSICAL INFERENCES ON THE ORIGIN


AND END OF INDIVIDUALISATION

This paragraph has no claim to be scientific; the


hypotheses which it puts forward are only intended to
offer matter for discussion.

THE ORIGIN OF THE INDIVIDUAL

At the beginning of evolution, as far as we may be


able to conceive of such beginning, there is neither
consciousness nor individualisation. Schopenhauer
expressed this as follows:—

* Thus in the lowest forms of life we have seat


Will appearing as a blind impulse, a dumb and
mysterious effort far from any direct consciousness.
It is the simplest and weakest of its objectifications.
1 We have shown in UEtre Subconscient that liberty and consdotWMM
are correlative to each other.
238
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
It is manifest as a blind impulse and an unconscious
effort in all inorganic nature and in all the primary
forces whose laws it is the task of physics and
chemistry to seek out. Millions of phenomena,
show each of these laws as altogether similar and
regular, bearing no trace of any individual character.’

It may be admitted that wherever a rudiment of


consciousness appears in the primitive unconscious,
individualisation has begun. This rudiment of con¬
sciousness is at first extremely minute and inappreciable.
It existed, however, doubtless, as soon as the universe
showed a trace of organisation—sooner, perhaps, than
Schopenhauer thought.
However this may be, once this rudiment of con¬
sciousness has been acquired, it will be indelible, and
will henceforward continue to increase without limit.
Thus are constituted individual ‘ monads ’ by rudi¬
mentary accessions of consciousness. This old term
‘ monad ’ may be kept, restricting it to the general
meaning of a dynamo-psychic individuality—a part of
the universal creative dynamo-psychism; having, like
it, all potentialities of realisation and the characteristic of
divine permanence.
The objectification of these monads, and their subse¬
quent evolution, are the resultant of the continuous
effort of the unconscious dynamo-psychism in its tendency
towards consciousness—an effort which necessitates an
immense total of sensations and acquisitions.
From this continual work of analysis and acquisition
there result groups of monads which constitute the whole
organised representation of the universe.
In the universality of things there are therefore only
everlasting monads, and temporary groupings of them
in ephemeral ‘ representations.’
That which is called the formation of a living being,
would thus be only the complex association and formation
239
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of a group. That which is called its death would be in
reality only the dissociation of the group. Tt is not the
annihilation of the constituent monads, which, according
to affinities determined by the past or by the necessities
of future evolution, go to form a new being by a new
grouping.
These individual monads are identical in potentiality
but not in realisation. By reason of the rudiments of
consciousness they have acquired, the evolutionary
impulse becomes more and more susceptible to the
influence of acquisitions. The factors of adaptation and
selection come into play; they make effort obligatory—
an effort which is at first purely reflex, then instinctive,
then reasoned; and effort necessarily causes inequalities
of consciousness and consequent inequalities in realivifb >».
These inequalities of evolving parts are, however, kept
within limits by the original and essential solidarity of
those parts.
Thanks to that all-powerful solidarity, the growth into
consciousness cannot be purely individual, it is mv -
sarily in very great measure, collective. Thus the
evolution of the more conscious monads favours the
evolution of the less conscious; and the retardation of
these latter slows down the evolution of the former.
This solidarity which is evident in the sum to'al
of beings and in the whole universe, is esjH'cially visible
in those complex associations which constitute animal
colonies and still more so in those graded (hierarchised)
associations which we have already studied as constituting
living beings.

THE FUTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

If now, having considered past and present evolution,


we seek to predict what its future will be, we are led
to an important inference.
240
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
As the reversion from the conscious to the uncon¬
scious illuminates the latter more and more, there will
necessarily come a time when nothing will be mysterious
or obscure.
At what we will call the summit of evolution, as far
as it is possible to conceive of this, the apparent separa¬
tion and the temporary scission between the conscious
and the subconscious will no longer exist. All the
capacities and all the knowledge that go to make up
the living being, all its vast past, will henceforward be
integrally, directly, regularly, and normally accessible.
Similarly the supernormal powers will be under the
control of the conscious will.
The subconscious being will have disappeared and
only the conscious being will remain. Then, but only
then, the essential dynamo-psychism will deserve the
name of Will.
If we did not fear to lose our way in the metaphysical
realm, we might permit ourselves another inference, but
one which we can merely indicate with caution and with
large reservations.
This infinitely vast expansion of consciousness
should necessarily result in the disruption of those
factitious and transitory groupings which make individu¬
alisation.
The monads would then return to the original
unity from whence they were derived.
But this unity, this synthesis of all consciousness,
will absorb them all into itself, while leaving each
indelible and eternal.
Arrived at its summum, each individual consciousness
will be expanded to total consciousness; it will have
become the total Consciousness Itself.
The * summit ’ of evolution may then be imaged as
a kind of ‘ conscious nirvana.’

241
CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATION OF PSYCHOLOGY BY THE NEW I DIAS

It remains now to adapt the preceding notions t<>


psychology as a whole.
The simplicity of this interpretation compared with
the lamentable impotence of classical psychology, will
afford a conclusive and palmary proof of its truth. To
the classical psychology all the states and all the facts
which we are about to discuss are so many pure mysteries,

I.—THE PSYCHOLOGY CALLED NORMAL

Let us imagine a certain person in whom the synthesis


of the different constituent principles is well established.
They are linked together by satisfactory affinities ami
none is out of harmony.
The centralisation is strong and the homogeneity
obvious.
The central monad—the Self—directs the mental
dynamo-psychism, and has complete control over all
its elements. _ Through the mental dynamo-psychism if
directs the vital dynamism and the body, within the
limits prescribed by the evolutionary level attained. It
must be remembered that this evolutionary level does not
allow of consciousness of the vital functions and does
not give the power to act on the main bodily functions—
activity dynamiSm ret^n‘n8 a fefg* measure of sclf-
The individual so constituted is in stable equilibrium.
His psychic health is perfect. But at the same time he
finds himself severely limited by organic condition*.
24a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The solidarity of his superior psychism with his cerebral
psychism being absolute, all the activities of the former
are limited by the extent of the latter and restrained
•within its conditions.
Such an individual cannot be conscious of his latent
powers, nor of anything which concerns his higher
psychism. In him the products of higher inspiration
and of his brain are closely unified and make a harmonious
whole. His psychology is normal—typical—marked by
the equilibrium of his faculties and their regular output,
but also by their narrow limitations.
These well-balanced individuals may be at very
different evolutionary levels. There are among them
many mediocrities, but also some very intelligent men.
Their intellectual output is regular and contains no
surprises. They never perceive any subconscious contri¬
butions, these being too closely connected with the
results of voluntary effort. They know nothing of
intuition; they are never original. If they understand
art they are never artists in the higher sense of the word;
still less are they inventors or creative. They have no
genius, and none of the higher kind of inspiration.
Well-balanced minds play a useful part in science
and social life by their poise and the correctness of their
reasoning on ordinary matters; they are also detrimental
by their hatred of innovation and their immovable
attitude.
Their opinions are generally those of their surround¬
ings. They do not seek to improve on these, and are
inclined to accept any prevalent idea, which seems to
them established by the mere fact that it is prevalent. ,
They are impervious to philosophy, or are satisfied with
a dull commonplace philosophy conformable to estab¬
lished ideas. They tend strongly towards materialism,
for the close fusion* of the constituent principles and
their limitation by matter do not allow? them to look
beyond material things. That in them which is above
243
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
material limitations, is entirely unknown to them; and
they have no real philosophical curiosity. To them
everything is relatively simple because they avoid going
to the bottom of anything.

2.—ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

In place of the previously described harmonious


and well established synthesis and the perfect blend of
the different constituent principles of the Self, let us
now suppose an unstable synthesis, having some lack
of union or affinity between the 4 cadres,* involving
a disharmony. The whole phenomena of abnormal
psychology result from such conditions.
Where there is a break of equilibrium or want of
harmony between the body and the vital dynamism
which directs and conditions it, we have the origin of
all hysteriform manifestations of a physiological kind.
Where there is a break or want or harmony between
the mentality and the Self, we have the cause of all
kinds of mental instability from simple neuroses to
disintegration into multiple personalities, or dementia.
Theoretically, want of equilibrium could only exist
between any two of the constituent principles of the
Self; but in fact no want of balance is partial only; by
reason of the essential solidarity of the individual group¬
ing, every cause of disharmony between any two4 entires ’
reacts on the whole of the groups forming the individual.
This is the reason why there is no hystero-physiological
disturbance without mental disturbance, and no mental
trouble without some hysteriform repercussion.
The same causes which produce abnormal psychology
—a want of perfedt equilibrium between the constituent
principles of the individual grouping—permits of the
isolated manifestation of one or other of these groups
by its4 secession ’ or even its 4 exteriorisation.’
244
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
It has one good result; it diminishes the limitations
of the higher psychism, and permits it to appear.
Thus the same factor is the source of psychological
morbidity, and of high psychic manifestations: it opens
the door to mental disorder, but also to crypto-psychism,
cryptomnesia, to the manifestations of genius, to intuition,
and to supernormal states. It allows the individual flashes
of insight into his real state and his destiny.
These general notions being admitted, we can now
enter more fully on detail, and shall successively con¬
sider:—
Neuropathic states;
Neurasthenia;
Hysteria;
Dementia;
Hypnotism;
Alterations of personality;
Intellectual work by the higher subconscious psychism
and genius;
Crypto-psychism and cryptomnesia;
The Supernormal; and
Mediumship.
All these abnormal psychological states have reciprocal
relations and inevitable points of contact, both by their
original nature and by their particular conditions. They
often interpenetrate.

3.-NEUROPATHIC STATES

Instability in the equilibrium of the individual


grouping is at the root of all neuropathic states, causing
a relative and partial disorder which is the origin of all
nervous troubles.
Contrariwise to what we have noted in the well-
balanced man, we find a want of homogeneity, and
dependence between the different constituent principles.
245 s
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The centralising direction is imperfect; there is no
harmonious fusion between the Self and the mentality,
between the mentality and the vital dynamism, anti
between this last and the organism.
This state of unstable equilibrium allows of momen¬
tary and partial decentralisations which arc indeed
sources of disorder, but are also conditions in which the
lessened limitations imposed by the body, allow of the
possibility of bringing to light everything which in the
normal psychic being is cryptoid or occult, whether of
the nature of faculty or of knowledge. But this mani¬
festation is never regular; the intellectual output is
occasional and sporadic; it requires a collaboration of
the conscious and the subconscious; and the modalities
and difficulties of this collaboration are well known.
Persons so constituted are, like the well-balanced, at
very various levels of evolution.
There are among them mediocrities, in whom,
however, a tinge of originality corrects psychological
monotony.
. There are inferior neuropaths who drag out a morbid
existence of semi-insanity or semi-imbecility, showing
me mental and physical defects which are now called
degeneracy.
There are also superior neuropaths whose talents or
genius are inseparable from similar defects. These
defects cause great suffering; the superior neuropath
finds it hard to govern his grouping, to direct his body
and even his mentality. Often this mentality escapes
3 flV^ then skirts the
dge of total disequilibrium or insanity. Over and
above his psycho-physiological defects, he feels dimly
““f08**1 011 him b? Hs nerves and brain,
3X136 hlsr^test sufferings, even though hi
is not fully aware of their cause. ®
• suffering is involved in these limitations,
“ the intuitive perteptioMrf genuine intuitive 3,
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
which nevertheless are not at Ms free disposal; in the
desire to reduce large abstract perceptions to concrete
analytical work; in the effort to express in words that
wMch he conceives of so well without words; in the
necessity which obliges him to submit the work of his
highest and conscious Self to the lower organic
mechanism.
Guyau has described this state very vividly.

* We suffer from a kind of hypertrophy of the


intellect. All those who are in travail of thought,
all who meditate on life and death, all those who
pMlosophize, end by experiencing the same pain.
And so there are great artists who pass their lives
in the endeavour to bring to realisation an ideal
which is more or less inaccessible to them. They
are attracted from all sides, by all the sciences, by
all the arts; they desire to enter into all, and are
obliged to refrain and to divide themselves. A
man feels the greedy brain draw to itself the energy
of the whole organism, and he is impelled to subdue
it, and to resign himself to vegetate instead of living.
He does not so resign himself, but prefers to give
himself up to the inner fire wMch consumes him.
His thought becomes enfeebled, it stresses the
nervous system, feminizes Mm; though it does not
touch his will wMch remains virile, unsatisfied, and
always on the stretch. From all this arises a long
struggle of Mmself against himself, a weary conflict
between the alternative of muscle or nerve, to be
a man or a woman. The tMnker, the artist, is
neither the one nor the other.
* Oh, if we could only once, and by one huge
effort, give birth to the whole world of thought and
feeling that we carry within, with what joy would
we welcome that power even though the whole
organism were to be broken and destroyed in the
247
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
pangs of creating. But nol We must give our¬
selves by small fractions, spend ourselves drop by
drop, and endure all the trammels of life. Little by
little the whole organism is wearied out in this struggle
between the body and the ideal, then the intellect
itself is obscured and fails—it is a living and suffering
flame which flickers in a wind which blows ever
more strongly till the vanquished spirit is borne
down/

. The. co-existence of neuropathic disturbance, or even


of insanity, with the inspiration of genius does not then
prove that this latter is derived from the former. It
simply proves that the want of equilibrium in the
individual grouping which is the first condition of the
decentralised manifestations, is at the root of genius.
And indeed this psychological decentralisation in a
man of genius is sometimes pushed so far that he may
behave as avisionary, may exteriorise his inspirations and
objectify them till they become hallucinations.
Another type of neuropath not less curious than
the man of genius is the medium.
The essential characteristic of this type is an excessive
tendency to decentralisation in the individual grouping.
It is. by reason of this tendency that phenomena of
extenonsation, the isolated action of constituent elements,
the activity of cryptoid faculties, and the incursions of
the supernormal become possible.
The decentralising tendency is the origin of most
neuropathic defects, but in this, more than in other
neuropathic types, it withdraws the individual grouping
from the directive action of the Self. The medium is
not master in his own house; and thence, from the
psychological point ofview, three characteristics follow:—
He is extremely impressionable;
He is very suggestible;
He is very unstable in his temper and his ideas.
248
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
These characteristics are found, more or less, in
all mediums of whatever intellectual level.
The psychological instability of mediums does not
prevent strength of will and perseverance, at least among
those of a superior type, but both strength of will and
perseverance only appear when supported by a suggestion
or an auto-suggestion. If these are not present, a
strange falling off may be manifest; the opinions of the
medium are unstable and eminently open to surrounding
influences when he is not on his guard. One may hear
him with the utmost good faith from one day to another,
sustain quite diametrically opposed opinions; indeed
it often happens that in a short space of time he passes
from one extreme of opinion to another.
The want of regulating power of the Self on his
mentality is shown by marked tendency to disjunctions
in the latter. These disjunctions sometimes end in
the formation of secondary personalities, following a
sequence which we shall study later on, and more
frequently to incipient duplications; owing to which
the medium is essentially complex, difficult to judge,
and capable of extremely contradictory words and acts.
In daily life the sudden predominance of some single
pervading idea, impression or feeling, may constantly
be observed; and then, all the psychological powers
escaping from the control of the Self, group themselves
round the usurping idea and give it unexpected force.
It is for this reason that mediums make exceedingly
good actors.
This dominance by a single idea may have fruitful
results; but in most cases the pseudo-centralisation
round the idea lasts but a short time. A new idea takes
the place of the former, and determines a new grouping
and a new impulse. Being at the mercy of the momen¬
tary impressions, the medium is liable to a sudden
throwing out of gear of the psychic forces, thus producing
a disproportionate effect m the sense given by the
*49
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
impression which has brought about the disturbance.
He then is impervious to any exterior influence and to
all reasoning. At such times an external contradiction
is never accepted. . ,
When mediums are persons of high intellectual type
the concentration of the psychic powers on ideas succeed¬
ing one another rapidly and reinforced by this concen¬
tration, makes them brilliant speakers and wonderful
improvisers; but the quality of their intellectual output
is extremely diverse, varying from high inspiration to
commonplace fluency, and mere incontinence of thought.
Just as the neuropathic defects of men of genius
do not explain genius, so the characteristics or defects
of mediums do not explain mediumship, they are its
accompaniments.

4.—NEURASTHENIA

It may seem strange to refer neurasthenia to a dis¬


equilibrium in the individual grouping, but nothing is
more true.
Neurasthenia is essentially due to a want of corre¬
spondence between the vital dynamism and the organism.
This disturbance can hardly exist without a congenital
predisposing cause, but it may be provoked by some
proximate cause, a slight infection or toxic influence, a
defect of glandular secretion, some organic defect or a
reflex action. Whatever the immediate cause may be,
there is no proportion between it and the symptoms
produced.
The defective action of the vital dynamism appears
first as a feeling of fatigue. The vital functions, the
regular play of the organs, all which normally take place
unnoticed and regularly, require a painful effort in the
neurasthenic.
His sleep is disturbed, there is always insomnia, or
hypo-somnia, which does not completely arrest the
250
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
activity of the brain, so that sleep does not renovate, and
fatigue is experienced on awaking. During the day
cerebral work is slow, laborious, and marked by a diffi¬
culty in associating ideas and concentrating attention.
The want of equilibrium between the organism and
the vital dynamism reacts more or less on the whole
grouping.
Thus neurasthenia is not the consequence of nervous
exhaustion; that is secondary; it arises from a disturb¬
ance in the action of the vital dynamism on the body.
To cure it, * tonics ’ are useless; what is required is
to regularise the relations of the body with the vital
dynamism, while suppressing also the immediate organic
cause.
This latter is readily accessible to medical science,
and neurasthenics are always benefited when the imme¬
diate cause is known and treated. But the more
important point—the regularising of relations between
the body and the vital dynamism—should be studied
with a view to more precise knowledge of this latter
and its essential nature. It would be well to try physical
agents whose dynamism is powerful. Already the
sun-cure, and life in the open air have produced dis¬
tinctly good results, and indicate a wide field for
experiment.
Curative mediumship deserves to be thoroughly
studied. Some persons seem to be able to exteriorise
part of their own dynamism to reinforce the failing
powers of the sick. Some surprising cures have been
thus effected, some of which seem to go beyond the
class of nervous ailments.

5.—HYSTERIA

Hysteria is brought about by want of harmony


between the constituent principles of the individual
*5i
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
grouping and the want of subordination to the central
direction of the Seif.
From the physical and physiological point of view
this disharmony, this want of affinity and concord between
the organs and the vital dynamism, explains all the
varied symptoms and morbid localisations of hysteria
—anaesthesia, hyperesthesia, cramps, paralysis, and
nutritive troubles.
The symptoms of this neurosis are unstable and
changeable, just because they are not of organic origin
but result from imperfect regulating power of the vital
dynamism.
From the psychological point of view, the disharmony
between the mentality and the Self and imperfect control
by the latter, explains all those psychic defects which
are so common and well known. The hysteric is usually
an * inferior neuropath,’ incapable of fulfilling his duties
—an engineer who cannot control his machine.
Suggestibility and * pythiatism ’ are consequences of
the feeble control of the Self; they are not the causes,
but the results, of the hysterical condition.

6.—DEMENTIA

If we take one step farther and imagine a want of


equilibrium which is not merely relative but absolute
or nearly absolute—a total or nearly total want of direction
—we have dementia.
Dementia is primarily anarchy of the mental elements,
on which the Self has no longer any action; not even
the limited, enfeebled, and intermittent control which
it stall retains in the hysteric.
What comes to pass when mental anarchy is firmly
established by the absence of control by the Self ?
The psychic functions and faculties, the acquired
knowledge are intact but undirected. They may show
252
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
only incoherence, but more frequently some idea, some
feeling, some elementary psychic grouping, is formed
and tends to become permanent, producing fixed ideas
and systematic delirium.
The mental disharmony is not an isolated symptom,
but by reason of the fundamental solidarity of the con¬
stituent principles, it is always accompanied by a total
want of equilibrium of the individual grouping. Mania
may be ascending or descending, it may arise in the
mentality or it may end there. Very often it is started
by some toxic, infectious, or reflex trouble attacking
the brain. In these cases the symptoms are often mental
confusion, maniacal excitement, or melancholia, some¬
times alternating with circular delirium. The frequent
inheritance of insanity proves the importance of the
physical factor in its genesis.
In other cases the origin may be purely mental,
and when that is so the insanity is generally partial
only; a certain amount of control by the Self persists;
not sufficient to arrest the tendency to delirium and the
abnormal grouping round a predominant idea, but
enough to leave some appearance of reason and to permit
the continuance of psychic function.
There are many degrees in the insanity which has
a mental origin and we find every grade between mere
mental instability and complete dementia. There are
not only the half-mad, but' quarter and one-tenth mad.’
The control of the Self over the mentality at the
actual evolutionary level that humanity has reached is
so imperfect that it is seldom perfectly regular; and in
this sense there is no man who is completely free from
some mental disequilibrium. Some mental irregularity
is almost the rule, perfect psychic health the exception.
Whether the exciting cause be of organic or of
mental origin, essential insanity is not strictly speaking
a disease of the brain. It is simply the partial or complete
absence of the control of the Self over its mentality.
253
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The elementary groups of the latter are intact and long
remain so; but if the superior control is not re-established
the prolonged disorganisation reacts on cerebral function
and ends in the brain lesions of degeneracy.

7.—HYPNOTISM

Hypnotism and its modalities are capable of very


simple explanation. Its manifestations are analogous
to those of hysteria, with this difference—-that they are
artificial and generally wider in scope. Hypnosis demands
a certain predisposition to decentralisation, such as the
mediumistic temperament. It comes about by a factitious
rupture in the equilibrium of the individual grouping.
The real and true cause and primary condition is the
decentralisation of the individual grouping.
All the usual phenomena are then easily understood
—automatism,. suggestibility, modifications of person¬
ality, the substitution of an inner or outer direction for
the central control, mono-ideaism, etc, etc.
The isolated cerebral psychism is remarkably sug¬
gestible and automatic. Its manifestations appear as
a kind of inferior subconsciousness, very passive, and
unable to go beyond its acquisitions and habits.
The extra-cerebral psychism shows itself in cryptom-
nesia and cryptopsychism, and its grouping into very
diverse personalities. Sometimes it will reveal higher
powers and supernormal flashes due to decentralisation,
and therefore to the momentary and relative release from
organic limitations. Hypnotism resembles a half-opened
door on the cryptoid portion of the Self.
What part is to be referred to suggestion in the
genesis of hypnosis ? Simply that it is a frequent and
useful, but by no means an indispensable factor. Sugges¬
tion, by itself, explains nothing; it is a secondary reaction
resulting from lessened or suppressed control by the
254
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
higher direction of the Self over the decentralised
individual grouping. Hypnotism may act, exceptionally,
on the mental elements, but it seems unnecessary to
point out that it acts chiefly on the cerebral psychism.
The commonplace hypnotic state referred to in
classical theory is primarily due to the secession of the
lower group (the vital dynamism and the body) from
the higher group (the mentality and the Self). This
lower group acts as an automaton, slavishly, under the
suggestion of the magnetiser. The automatism and the
extreme suggestibility are thus easily comprehensible.
Both in hypnosis and somnambulism the automatism
acts with remarkable precision.
In U&tre Subconsdent I explained this precision of
action by the fact that all the vital forces grouped round
a single idea without consideration or distractions give
great power and sureness of action. This, no doubt, is
true, but there is more in it than this; there appears
to be a curious regression towards animality. The lower
group, deprived of conscious direction, seems to recover
for the time the sureness characteristic of animal instinct.

8.—ALTERATIONS OF PERSONALITY

Nothing puts the truth of our concept of the individual


in a clearer light than the ease with which it enables
us to understand alterations of personality.
These manifestations have, up to the present, been
either absolute riddles or have received pseudo-inter¬
pretations which have been crude or meaningless when
they have not been empty verbalism—distinguishing
the subconsciousness from infra-consciousness, super¬
consciousness, or co-consciousness 1
The root and original cause of the phenomenon is
the setting aside of the central direction of the Self.
The factitious personalities are due to isolated
255
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
manifestations in the psychological groups detached from
the Self.
Isolated activity of the cerebral psychism is shown
by automatism; or by pseudo-personalities aroused by
suggestion—personalities of a commonplace kind anu
inferior order, devoid of originality.
Isolated activity of the mental elements of the extra¬
cerebral psychism is the origin of the multiplication of
personalities of higher and more complex kinds.
The phenomenon of incipient mental dissociation
with a tendency to duplication, is frequent in normal
life, by reason of the complexity of the mentality, of the
alternating predominance of certain groupings which
may be rivals or antagonistic, and the inability of the
Self to bring them into harmony.
But in abnormal states and in certain predisposed
persons this duplication of personality goes to unexpected
lengths.
That true multiple personalities should appear, two
conditions are essential.
Firstly, a liability to decentralisation, and a certain
instability of the central direction—a weakness in the
individual * autocracy.’
Secondly, a detect in assimilation of the mental
elements by the Self. This second condition is a chief
one. Without this defect of assimilative power, there
may be decentralisation, but no * personality ’ worthy of
the name will appear. 1
We have seen that the Self retains the complete
knowledge of states of consciousness and assimilates
them. If this assimilation is imperfect, these states of
consciousness retain an irregular and centrifugal self¬
activity which tends towards isolated and distinct
manifestations.
.gw*8 °f a secondary personality is then easy to
follow. _ To begin with, there is abnormal activity,
a parasitic budding’m the mentality. An ill-assimilated
256
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
grouping takes place round some specially active thought,
some emotion, tendency, impression, suggestion, or
auto-suggestion, as a nucleus. This primary group
partly escapes from the directing centralising control,
and collects round it secondary and weaker mental
elements.
From this point there arises in the depths of the
mentality a silent struggle between the parasitic per¬
sonality and the Self. Most frequently the former is
vanquished, disintegrates, and is assimilated by the
Self. But sometimes by reason of insufficient directing
power in the latter, because its evolutionary level is
low, or through a want of affinity (original or acquired),
or through a congenital tendency of the grouping to
decentralisation, the parasitic personality prospers and
develops.
It groups around itself a larger and larger part of
the mental activities, annexes imaginative elements,
strengthens by daily use, and soon a rupture becomes
possible; a new confederation is formed in the mentality
and there is a secession from the Self.
Thenceforward there begins open strife, with variable
results, with alternations of failure and success, between
the Self and the factitious personality or personalities
for the possession of power, for the integrity or the
disintegration of the whole, for domination of the
psychological field.
There is no known case of secondary personality
which cannot be explained as the result of this process.
It might be possible to go further still, and to suppose
a defect in assimilation of the mental elements by the
Self not only within the period since the birth of the
actual vital group, but in some anterior grouping. On
this hypothesis (which would have to be brought to the
test of facts), the possibilities connected with the genesis of
secondary personalities would be greatly enlarged.
Such a one or another of these secondary personalities
257
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
might be the unassimilated * representation ’ of the Self
in a preceding life. . . .

Among secondary personalities mediumistic per¬


sonalities should be placed in a distinct class. By their
self-activity, their originality, their permanence, and
their definite affirmations as to their origin, and finally
by the supernormal powers they sometimes manifest,
they must be made the subject of a special and separate
study. We shall consider them last.

9.—THE MODALITIES OF INTELLECTUAL WORK—


GENIUS

Ordinary intellectual work is essentially the result


of close collaboration between the cerebral and the
superior psychism.
In the normal man during waking hours, the two
psychisms are fused, united, and homogeneous, and
their output is regular, but limited as to quality by the
cerebral capacity. The superior faculties are manifest
only _ by innate proclivities, general capacity, and
individual character.
. During the repose of the brain the superior psychic
activity persists, out it is not perceived or remains
entirely latent. Its action is manifest however in the
well-known mechanism of subconscious elaboration,
which is wrongly attributed to automatism of the
brain. This latter automatism only produces ordinary
incoherent, and futile dreams of a commonplace kind. *
Logical, coherent dreams, and those which show
genius, are due to accidental repercussion on the cerebral
psychism of the superior psychism which is always active*
though unperceived. *
We may place reverie side by side with dreams.
Kevene means the relaxation of all intellectual effort
258
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and of the full control by the Self. Ideas pass through
the mind according to habitual associations and affinities,
and the Self looks on as at a play; not interfering unless
to set aside a disturbing idea from time to time, to direct
ideas _ in a prescribed sense, or to make imaginative
additions.
In order that intellectual work may reach its greatest
output and to ensure the full collaboration and direction
by the superior and extra-cerebral psychism, it is neces¬
sary that there should be some relaxation in the centralised
direction of the individual grouping.
It is for this reason that the extension of sub¬
conscious collaboration and the occurrence of inspiration
are nearly always associated with the abnormal and
neuropathic states which this momentary and relative
decentralisation brings about.
Now and then it seems that the limitation imposed
by cerebration is broken through; then the higher
faculties appear, but these will always be impeded or
even diverted by the alternations between effort (i.e.
centralised action), and relaxation of the synthesis,
which latter implies relaxation of cerebral limitations.
Crypto-psychism and cryptomnesia, so incompre¬
hensible as mere cerebral faculties, are readily explained
by the fact of the higher subconscious psychism. Though
not directly accessible to the will and knowledge of the
person, which are normally bounded by cerebral limita¬
tions, they none the less contribute greatly, though in
an occult fashion, to the extension of the field of
psychic activity, of which they constitute the main
part.
Innate proclivities, powers which are not inherited,
inspiration, talent, or genius appearing apart from
voluntary work, are all explicable by the essential nature
of the subconscious psychism and the part it plays in
the origin, the development, and the functioning of the
normal individual.
259
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Inspiration is the result of the free activity, increased
by liberation, of this higher extra-cerebral psychism. But,
by the very fact of the decentralisation which liberates
it, this activity only reacts on the normal consciousness
by flashes, intermittently or fragmentarily, in an incon¬
stant and irregular manner.
That which is called ‘ unconscious work ’ is, more¬
over, rarely pure inspiration. Most frequently it is,
we repeat, the result of a kind of collaboration of the
conscious with the higher subconscious psychism.
Consciousness elaborates or starts the work; but
the limitations of cerebral capacities do not allow of its
satisfactory conclusion, whatever efforts may be made.
Then the collaboration of the subconscious sets in by
a latent process. It is continued during, and especially
during, tiie repose of the brain ; for the subconsciousness
is then detached from the physiological contingencies
which affect that organ, and transcends its limitations.
The fact that this collaboration is unperceivcd causes
its results to appear sometimes like a revelation.
Genius takes its creative power from the very
essence of the Self. It is well to observe that theoreti¬
cal genius does not necessarily imply a high degree
of mental evolution for its manifestation. But practi-
cally, in order that its creations may be durable, genius
requires an extended knowledge of the mutual relations
of things, and this conscious or subconscious knowledge
implies a high evolutionary level. It must also be
remarked that genius does not imply perfection. The
diverse manifestations of genius—scientific, philoso¬
phical, artistic, religious, and so on—are not protected
from disharmonies and errors. Reasoned control is
indispensable, as we have before observed. It is for
this reason that a man of genius can produce nothing of
tod0 humanity unless he is also at a evolutionary

260
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

IO.-THE SUPERNORMAL

The appearance of the supernormal resembles that


of creative inspiration and genius—it is conditioned by a
degree of decentralisation sufficient to break for the
moment the cerebral limitation of the individual. From
the depths of the subliminal consciousness there will
sometimes issue, as from a window suddenly opened in
the opaque enclosing envelope, dazzling flashes of
divination, powers of action from mind to mind, or
powers superior to matter, released from the contin¬
gencies of Time and Space.
This lucidity, these apparently unlimited powers, are
not really marvellous; or at least they are neither more
nor less marvellous than all the phenomena of life and
thought.
There is no hard and fast line between the normal
and the supernormal; both have their origins in the
vital processus, and the only difference is that the one
is familiar to us and therefore gives us the illusion of
understanding it, while the other derives its occult
character from the fact that it is unusual.
Supernormal physiology presents exactly the same
mystery as normal physiology: the normal formation of
a living being is neither more nor less marvellous, neither
more nor less comprehensible than the abnormal forma¬
tions which mediumship presents to our view. It is,
we repeat, the same ideoplastic miracle which forms the
hands, the face, the tissues, and the whole organism of
the child at the expense of the maternal body; or the
hands, face, and organism of a ‘ materialisation ’ at the
expense of the body of a medium.
The psychological supernormal is but one aspect, a
hidden aspect, of ttie normal conditions of the individual,
whose apparent consciousness is only the limited reflection
of his total consciousness. There is the same mystery
261 T
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

in the creations of genius as in lucidity, the same


independence of contingencies, the same divine
reflection.
In the sum total of the phenomena of life, of con¬
sciousness, and of the evolution of the individual,
either one apprehends nothing or one apprehends all.
We apprehend nothing when we seek to refer the whole
being to one of its principles, more especially to the
crudest—the material body; we apprehend everything
when we consider the divine and permanent Self in
its passing and diverse objectifications.
In fine, there is no supernormal, as there are no
miracles! The supernormal is but the unusual manifesta¬
tion of the Self, released by decentralisation, revealing
itself by all its powers, even those that arc highest ami
most latent; in contrast with normal psychic life which
only allows of narrow manifestations, strictly confined
within bounds of material ‘ representation.’
Emergence of the ‘ supernormal ’ merely proves that
there are in the Self higher powers which are unused
and unusable during terrestrial objectification; powers
of action from mind to mind (mcnto-mental), extra-
sensorial powers of divination and clairvoyance, anti
finally powers of dominating matter.
We may admit, with Myers, that these higher
faculties which, escape our will during earth-life, and
are accessible in a relative and fragmentary manner in
proportion to the abnormal decentralisation of organic
limitations, are more completely accessible to us after
the final rupture of those limitations by death. Especially
does it seem reasonable that these faculties now in process
of development should, some day, be fully available to
the Self. Thar regular and normal use will denote the
supenor and ideally evolved life in which consciousness
will have won its final triumph over the original uncon-
sciousness. Then there wifi be no ‘ limitation ’ of the
Self by the individual grouping which it directs. The
202
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Self will know all and have power over all. It will have
realised its diverse and unlimited potentialities.

II.—mediumship

Mediumship puts great problems before us; but


these become relatively easy in the light of the preceding
ideas.
The mechanism of mediumistic action may be
summed up as decentralisation of the individual grouping
of the medium and isolated manifestations of the
decentralised portions.
Sometimes these isolated manifestations are carried
on in the grouping itself, intrinsically; sometimes they
take place extrinsically, by an actual exteriorisation. It
can be seen how vast is the field covered by mediumistic
action:—
Motor, sensorial, dynamic, and intellectual exteriori-
sations;
Different kinds of automatism;
An immense variety of manifestations of a psycho¬
logical order;
Isolated action of the cerebral psychism; mental
disjunctions and personifications of very various
natures and levels; Pythian or suggested
phenomena; crypto-psychic or cryptomnesic
manifestations, and those called supernormal.
Thus understood, mediumship is a whole world;
one that defies any partial and fragmentary exploration
and is concealed from those who merely look into a few
details, but which reveals itself to the high and clear
vision that contemplates the sum total of the complex
factors of Being.
To seek to explain mediumship, as some psychologists
do, bv a. series of fragmentary hypotheses adapted
to a few of its phenomena, is useless. None of these
263
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
partial explanations on points of detail can have any
value at all. Mediumship, in all its prodigious diversity
can be understood only by the knowledge of the actual
psychological constituents of individual man, what the
individual grouping consists of, and its possibilities of
relative and momentary dissociation; and, especially,
by knowledge of its metaphysical essence, and of tiie
creative dynamo-psychism objectified in it.
If, and only if, we take our stand on this new concept
of the. Self, it becomes easy to comprehend the endless
diversity of mediumistic action. Nevertheless, even if
we take these precise notions on the constitution of the
individual as. our point of departure, there will always
remain questions open to controversy on the subject of
mediumship.
Among these reserved questions two, more especially,
are open to discussion—the personalities manifested,
and the teachings, given by these personalities.
i. Mediumistic personalities. In all manifestations
of mediumship is to be observed a marked tendency to
personification.* The mental disjunctions, cxteriori-
sations, cryptomnesic and crypto-psychic phenomena, and
powers over matter, are not usually anarchic or incoherent;
they denote a purpose and show direction. This
mrection is by a secondary personality distinct from
the Self.
Often this secondary personality is insignificant and
ephemeral. Just as elementary exterionsations and
incipient mento-mental action or clairvoyance—the 'small
change of mediumship—are usual in the normal existence
or mediums, so also the tendency to disjunctions and
autonomous personifications appears as a commonplace
and uninteresting phenomenon.
But in the favourable atmosphere created by spiritist
seances, or following on frequent use or impulse, or
sometimes spontaneously, these manifestations become
more precise and accentuated, and the directing
'From the Unconscious to the Conscious
personification then sometimes acquires truly remarkable
power, and deserves the closest attention.
What is the origin and nature of these mediumistic
personalities ? In ordinary disjunctions, the secondary
personalities which appear as a consequence of mental
decentralisation behave as usurpers of the place of the
Self. They seem to aim at replacing the legitimate
government; they declare themselves to be the true
Self. In mediumship, their behaviour is different—they
declare themselves foreign to the Self; they claim to
be distinct entities. Usually, at least in our day and
in the west, they claim to be the * spirits ’ of the dead,
and say that they only borrow from the medium the
vital dynamism and organic elements which they need
in order to act upon the material plane.
The proofs given by them in support of their state¬
ments are generally vague and will not bear examination;
but sometimes they are singularly dear; they recall
the personality of the deceased, they give minute and
unknown personal details, his native language, his
features (in teleplastic cases), his signature, etc.
What are we to think of these affirmations ? . Are
they always false ? Is mediumship but the domain of
deceit and illusion? Many students of psychism do not
hesitate to say so. Let us reproduce some of their
arguments. They say:—

* Mediumistic personalities may well, in spite


of their affirmations, be only secondary personalities,
their genesis being analogous to these latter. As they
start from a suggestion or an auto-suggestion, whether
conscious or subconsdous, their development and
their acquirements would be under the same
mechanism.
* None of the proofs of autonomy and indepen¬
dence can be formal. The psychological differences
in faculties and knowledge from those of the
265
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
medium can be explained simply bjr the complex
nature of mentality and the extension of crypto-
psychism; the contradictions in ideas, character,
and mil, may represent merely interior tendencies
repressed by daily life and escaping violently by the
safety-valve of mediumship. The supernormal may
belong to the mediumistic subconsciousness.
' None of the proofs of identity can be com¬
pletely convincing; the origin of all knowledge,
even the most unexpected and secret, even that of
a language of which the medium is ignorant, may
be in cryptomnesia, thought-transference, or clair¬
voyance.
‘ The new tests invented by English and American
investigators (cross-correspondences, communications
of the same entity to different mediums who have no
relations with one another) are evidently at first sight
somewhat disconcerting to our thesis. It is dear
that facts as precise and extraordinary as those for
instance, observed by Madame de W.,1 seem to
indicate an independent and autonomous directing
will. But is not that another illusion? Who can
say if the personality may not acquire by mediumistic
culture, besides great autonomy, a transitory
dynamism, at all events while the experiment lasts,
a. dynamism borrowed from the medium and giving
it the power of acting on other mediums at a distance ? ’
?f course, anything may be possible. But when
arguing on mediumship, all the notions which we have
established on the constitution of the individual must
be borne in mind. These notions which (accepted in
their entirety) have extricated us from the chaos of
1 Annates des Sciences PsycMquss: 'Contribution a drat ww*.

T h0ur; ^epart*«MMngr»0«iSuurwmbi,|4i^
266
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
classical psycho-physiology, and have enabled us to
understand the general meaning of the individual and
the universe, also permit the affirmation of the survival
of the Self, and its endless evolution from unconscious¬
ness, to consciousness. It should be beyond doubt that
the Self both pre-exists, and that it survives the grouping
which it directs during one earth-life; that it more
particularly survives its lower objectification during
this life. This may at least be admitted, if not as a
mathematical certainty, at least as a high probability.
If so, the manifestation of a ‘ discarnate spirit ’ on
the material plane by the aid of dynamic and organic
elements borrowed from the medium then appears an
undeniable possibility.
In face of a fact apparently of a spiritist nature, one
attitude only befits the instructed investigator—to
take good sense as his guide. It is for good sense
and sane judgment to appraise the statements of the
communicator.
It is in the name of good sense that English and
American investigators, weary of strife, and well aware
of the disconcerting subtleties which have been advanced
to explain the mental side of mediumship, have ended by
accepting, with striking unanimity, the categorical ana
repeated affirmations of the communicators.
After Hodgson, who, storting from absolute scepti¬
cism, declared after twelve years of study that there was
in his mind no room for even the possibility of doubt
of survival and on the reality of communication between
the living and the dead, Hyslop, Myers, and more
recently Sir Oliver Lodge, have plainly given utterance
to the same conviction.
I refer the reader who desires to form a reasoned
opinion, to the publications of these psychologists, that
he may weigh the value of their arguments.1
i See the Proceedings of the English and American Societies for
Psychical Research, and Sir Oliver Lodge's recent book, Raymond.
267
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
For my own part, if I may give a personal impression
of what I have observed in the domain of mediumship,
I should say that even if in a given case spiritist
intervention could not be affirmed as a scientific certainty,
one is obliged, willingly or unwillingly and on the aggre¬
gate of cases, to admit the possibility of such interven¬
tion. I think it probable that there is, in medium-
ship, an action of intelligent entities distinct from the
medium. I base this opinion not only on the alleged
proofs of identity given by the communicators, which
may be matters of controversy, but on the high and
complex phenomena of mediumship. These frequently
show direction and intention which cannot, unless very
arbitrarily, be referred to the medium or the experi¬
menters. We do not find this direction and intelligence
either in the normal consciousness of the medium, nor in
his somnambulistic consciousness, nor in his impressions,
his desires, or his fears, whether direct, indirect, suggested,
or voluntary. We can neither produce the phenomena
nor modify them. _ All happens as though the directing
intelligence were independent and autonomous.
Even this is not all. This directing intelligence
seems to be deeply aware of much that we do not know;
it can distinguish between the essence of things and their
representations; it knows these sufficiently to be able
to modify at its will the relations which normally govern
these representations in space and time. In a word
the higher phenomena of mediumship seem to indicate,
to necessitate, and to proclaim direction, knowledge,
and abilities which surpass the powers—even the sub¬
conscious powers—of the mediums.
Such is the deep impression resulting from my
own experiments as well as from the reports of expert-
ments by other metapsychologists* If my impressions
are correct it can readily be understood why certain
senes of celebrated experiments (such as those ofCrwkes
and Kichet), seem to have had but one outcome: to
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
bring these eminent men to an unexpected conviction
by the methods most likely to produce a strong impres¬
sion.
2. In what concerns the * teaching ' given by the
communicators, the difficulties of an estimate are no
less considerable.
These teachings are too variable in nature and value
to be made the basis for rational beliefs.
The contradictions which M. Maxwell1 has taken
pains to set forth are very disconcerting to any one who
thinks to base his beliefs on them. But it is not less
obvious that these contradictions are both natural and
inevitable.
Bearing in mind the notions which have been demon¬
strated above, a mediumistic communication may be
conceived to have either of two origins:—
(a) The communication may come entirely from the
medium.
In this case it may be due to cerebral automatism,
or to a mental disjunction and a factitious personality,
or it may be a manifestation of crypto-psychism or
cryptomnesia. . . . Obviously then its value will be very
variable. Intellectual mediumship will be sometimes
the source of wonderful foreknowledge or revelations;
or sometimes, and more frequently, or platitudes, false¬
hoods, and errors. It may show a superior inspiration;
it may also display a disconcerting and silly incoherence.
There are all degrees and categories in the products of
mental disjunction; and only those who are ignorant
can be surprised or moved by them.

‘We are incarcerated prisoners,' Maeterlinck2


exclaims poetically: ‘with whom he (the real Self,
the unknown guest) does not communicate when¬
ever he will. He prowls round the walls, he cries,
1 Maxwell: Les PJUnornenes Psyckiques.
* Maeterlinck: VH6te Inconnu.
269
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
he warns, he knocks at all doors; but nothing
reaches us but a vague disquiet, an indistinct
murmur which is sometimes translated to us by
a jailer only half awake, and, like ourselves,
captive till death. ... In other words, ami without
metaphor, the medium draws from his habitual
language, and from that which the sitters suggest to
him, materials wherewith to clothe and identify the
presentiments and the unwonted visions which come
he knows not whence.*

This unknown guest, this subconscious person is


not in reality a single and homogeneous being. It
would be better named ‘the subconscious complex,*
which can reveal itself to us under the most diverse
forms and attributes.
Unity belongs to the real Self only, as distinct from
the mental process as from the organic form, but retaining
in itself the memory-total of all representations.
In order that the Self, abstracted from organic
limitations, should be able to reveal its higher powers and
the immensity of its latent conscious acquisitions, it
must be able sufficiently to master its own decentralised
mentality.
Such a condition rarely comes about, and it is for
this reason that crypto-psychic manifestations are usually
fragmentary and erratic.
(Jb) Even if the communication proceeds from an
intelligence distinct from the medium, it may
itself be imperfect or falsified, frequently botfi
and in varying degrees.
Passing through the mediumistic channel it will
necessarily be limited by the mentality and the cere¬
bration of the medium; and as the intrinsic subconscious
inspiration has such difficulty in reacting accurately on
the brain, there is all the more reason why an extrinsic
inspiration should be limited, lessened, or deformed.
270
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Not only so; by the very fact of communicating,
the communicator experiences a psychic disturbance;
a fact which has been specially noted by English and
American investigators. In borrowing substance from
the medium, the bring takes on limitations as it does
at birth by taking on a body of the substance of his
mother. By the fact of communication on the material
plane he undergoes a kind of relative and momentary
reincarnation; accompanied, as in normal reincarnation,
by oblivion of his real situation and by the suppression
of the greater part of his conscious acquisitions.
If the spiritist explanation be accepted, one is
obliged to suppose that during the time of manifestation
through the intermediary of a medium, the communicator
finds himself irresistibly brought under conditions which
were characteristic to him in earth-life. For these
reasons, and because of these primary difficulties,
communicators may abound in details of their identity
but find great difficulty in giving precise notions of
their actual conditions.
These ideas, if they were capable of proof, would
tend to establish the existence of an ' other side ’ not
very dissimilar to this side. The ‘ representation ’ which
the discarnate spirit would make of it would at least
recall the ‘representation’ which the incarnate Self does
actually make of the material world, though on * planes ’
more subtle and related to all we have previously noted
of the individual constitution of Man.

The information given relating to evolution and


the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness are
more precise.
If, as is logical, we take account only of the messages
which bear marks of high inspiration and superior will,
most of the contradictions disappear.
All the higher communications without exception,
affirm the survival of that which is essential in the Self,
271
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and also unlimited evolution towards greater conscious¬
ness and greater perfection. They all place the ideal
and the purposes of Humanity above any dogmatisms.
All proclaim a high morality of goodwill and justice.
Progressive evolution from the unconscious to the
conscious is not however always referred to palingenesis.1
The plurality of existences is never denied in the higher
type of communications, and it is often implied. It is
so in the admirable messages received by Stainton
Moses.*
But this is of small importance. It will evidently
be wise to take account only of facts and reasoned
deductions from facts in constructing a philosophy of
individual evolution. It is on them only that the
sovereign beauty and the shining truth of evolution
by palingenesis should be based. It needs no other
revelation.
* Palingenesis. Gr. again; yivean =production. TTarrt in
modem biology for hereditary evolution not modified by adaptation.
Here used in its philological meaning of re-birth.—'[Tianblator^s juoUt.J
* Stainton Moses; Spirit Teachings.

273
PART II

EVOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSE


CHAPTER I

THE TRANSITION FROM THE UNCONSCIOUS TO THE


CONSCIOUS IN THE UNIVERSE

I.—THE UNIVERSE CONCEIVED OF AS AN ESSENTIAL


DYNAMO-PSYCHISM AND AS REPRESENTATION

We can now, by a wide induction, refer back to the


Universe what we know of the individual; for what is
demonstrated for the individual—the microcosm-—cannot
but appear true for the universe—the macrocosm.
like the individual, the universe should be conceived
of as a temporary representation and an essential and
real dynamo-psychism.
Just as the individual organism is but an ideoplastic
product of his essential dynamo-psychism, so the universe
appears as a vast materialisation of the creative principle.
Finally, like the individual, the universe passes by
evolution through the fact of experiences acquired by
and in representations, from unconsciousness to con¬
sciousness.

a,—evolution is the acquisition of consciousness

Let us consider the universe under this aspect:—_


In the livingbeingwehaveseen the original andcreative
unconscious dynamo-psychism enriched and enlightened,
so to speak, by conscious acquisitions. We have noted
the progressive and unlimited tendency to unification, (
to harmonious fusion of unconsciousness with conscious¬
ness, and have been able to infer that the multitude of
m
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
evolutionary experiences integrally retained and trans-
/ muted into new capacities, has, as its result, the greater
and greater realisation of consciousness which absorbs
the primitive unconsciousness.
In the evolving universe the process is the same. At
first it represents a very ocean of unconsciousness; then,
from that ocean, there emerge islets or icebergs of
consciousness. These are at first very small, very few,
and isolated; the waves of unconsciousness frequently
submerge them. But the evolutionary impulse con¬
tinues; the islets grow, are multiplied, and join. _ They
form great continents whose summits shine in full
consciousness; but their base and foundations lie deep
in the Unconscious whence they arose and of whose
nature they partake.
Later on, in higher evolutionary phases, the domain
of consciousness will in turn have absorbed into itself
the primitive ocean of unconsciousness whence it was
derived.
That these propositions are of the philosophic order
is undeniable; but they are not metaphysical in the
proper sense of that word, because their data are
scientific and rational.
When it is said that evolution is the transition of a
potential and unconscious dynamo-rPSYchism &La.£fia3ifigd-
and conscious dynamo-psyrhisrri^^ iuthis—is—not—aaeta«
physical: it is only the expression in philosophic language
of an obvious scientific truth. It is a general conclusion
of a higher order drawn from verified facts.

3.-EVOLUTIONARY LAWS, AND THE PROBLEM OF


FINALITY

If we consider the details of evolution we shall see


that the transition comes to pass very simply.
The primitive evolutionary impulse which is manifest
in the first appearance of vegetative forms and those of
276
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the lowest animals, is obviously unconscious. The
experiments of De Vries show that it is anarchic and
without order. There is an exuberance of life in all
directions.
But the secondary factors, especially adaptation and
selection appearing at the same time as the forms them¬
selves, come into play. They do not cause evolution,
but evolution takes place conformably to their influence.
They bring about the persistence or the extinction of
the forms which have appeared. They aid the evolu¬
tionary process by regularising it.

To this primitive phase, a second succeeds: as soon


as a rudiment of consciousness appears, it also has a
part to play. The acquired consciousness reverts to
unconsciousness; which it fertilises and enlightens.
Thenceforward the creative impulse is not anarchic,!
little by little it becomes regular and concentrated; it
obeys in some measure environing necessities in order
to facilitate adaptation.
It is, however, not yet conscious in any way: even
the appearance of the main species, the transition from
the fish to the batrachian, from the reptile to the bird,
from the anthropopithecus to the man, were not transi¬
tions deliberately planned. The fish could not have
understood that the batrachian is a relatively higher
form; the reptile did not consciously desire to acquire
wings and become a bird; the anthropopithecus did
not understand that the species Man would involve a
higher total of psychic realisations.
But these transitions came to pass as if by the obscure
influence of a need; as if the function, potentially
anterior to the organ, had conditioned the organ which
was to appear; as if, in a word, evolution had obeyed
a marvellous instinct. ...
If there are still gropings and errors in this evolu¬
tionary phase, that is because instinct is not infallible.
277 u
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Instinct represents the first manifestation of the
subconsciousness collectively, as it does in the individual.
As in the individual, so collectively, the subconsciousness
appears as the intermediary between the primitive
unconsciousness and the still future consciousness.
The subconscious is no longer a dark and chaotic
unconsciousness; it is the unconscious already illumined
by the reflection of realised consciousness.
From the unconscious it holds all potentialities;
from the conscious it draws the general knowledge
acquired through vital ‘ experiences * and instinctive or
intentional aspirations towards the light.
The reversions from consciousness to unconscious¬
ness which we have studied in the individual, greatly
transcend the limits of individuality. By reason of the
essential solidarity of all, the consciousness individually
acquired reverts both into individual unconsciousness
and into the collective unconsciousness.
. Thenceforward evolution, even of inferior species,
is in some degree guided by a superior and deep-seated
influence which causes them to participate in the general
progress that has already come into realisation.
The appearance of principal species and principal
instincts, seemingly conforming to some kind of terminal
state, which is not pre-established but acquired, can thus
be understood.
At the beginning of these principal species and
principal^ instincts there is a seeming effort of ‘ lurid ’
subconscious activity which creates them with a given
form, and with. characters having certain capacities,
but also with their special limitations in space and time.
This effort of lucid subconscious activity by reason of
the acquired purpose (finaRte), is always largely accordant
with the demands or the environment in which new
species will be evolved. The creation of a new species
appears, u a word, as a result akin to genius in the
unconscious, working towards consciousness.
278
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Acquired purpose—this is the key to the enigma
of transformism.
The totality of evolution, like its details, reveals
an obvious purpose which neither selection nor adapta¬
tion nor any of the classical factors can sufficiently
explain. But this evident purpose is certainly not a
pre-established purpose, for if it were, the plan on which
it proceeds would not allow of gropings or errors.
It is an acquired finality, relative, and explicable
by the reversions from the conscious to the unconscious,
and is simply proportional to the level of consciousness
collectively attained.
By reason of the ideal adaptation which it implies,
this acquired purpose alone allows of the complete
operation of the classical factors—natural selection,
influence of the environment, sexual selection, segrega¬
tion, migrations, etc. Only this can explain how,
wherever life is possible—in water, earth, and air, the
most diverse forms of life appear; only this can explain
the infinite variety in the forms of life and their narrow
specialisation. Only this allows of comprehension how
the appearance and the development of new organs
corresponds exactly with precise needs.
Only this also can explain how the development
of these organs sometimes goes beyond the need and
is effected outside of adaptation, as we see in ornamental
characteristics.
The tendency towards consciousness is not only a
tendency towards intelligence, but a tendency towards
all that constitutes a conscious psychism, including the
affectional and the aesthetic senses. Affectional and
aesthetic instincts which are realised in the more highly
evolved individuals, revert into the collective uncon¬
sciousness, and reappear as an instinct towards organic
perfection in the acquired finality and thus have important
functions.
Finally, it is only the purely relative power of acquired
m
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
finality that enables us to understand the reasons for
errors, gropings, and regressions..
In this lengthy phase of evolution, pure unconscious¬
ness is represented by the automatism of the main vital
functions, and (more especially) by its infinite poten¬
tialities. . . , ■ u i.
Subconsciousness predominates in the invertebrates
in which it plays an almost exclusive part. They act
practically without any thought and are guided almost
entirely by instinct.
Among vertebrates there appear large fringes or
intelligence, but these fringes are not, as Bergson would
have them, a ‘relic’ abandoned in the transition.from
the animal to the man; there are.no cast-off relics in
this evolution. These fringes of intelligence are con¬
sciousness in rough draft.
Consciousness develops little by little as vital and
psychological experiences accumulate and revert into
the unconscious which they illuminate.
In the superior animals—the horse, the dog, the
monkey, the elephant, etc. . . . realisation of con¬
sciousness has made immense progress; the logical and
reasoning faculties already play, an important part.
Simultaneously the function of instinct seems to diminish,
its manifestations are no longer continuous and dominant,
they have become limited and intermittent. Conscious¬
ness, in fact, tends by its gradual realisation, to break
the bonds wherein the tyranny of instinct confines the
activity of the being, and to become the substitute for
instinct. The predominance of the logical and reasoning
faculties over instinct is indispensable to the evolution
of consciousness, for the exclusive use of instinct, or
even its predominance, implies stagnation in intellectual
progress.
The testimony of the insect which we have already
had occasion to invoke from another point of view, again
illustrates our position; it proves that organic progress
280
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and bodily complexity are not closely associated with
mental progress. Physically, the insect is very highly
evolved, but its consciousness is very greatly in arrear.
The exclusive predominance of instinct has put the
brake on its progress towards consciousness. There has,
in this case, been what looks like a spurring of nature
on a wrong road.
It is. indispensable that instinct, sure but limited,
should give place to reason, which is indeed hesitating
and fallible, but contains infinite capacities for develop¬
ment.
It is also indispensable that instinct, fertilised by
conscious acquisitions, should evolve by transformation.
This is what has occurred in the transition from animality
to humanity.
In Man, accordingly, instinct is duplicated. There
remains in him an animal and physiological instinct
which plays a less and less important part. There is
also a higher instinct which is but another name for
intuition.
Intuition is instinct renovated, idealised, and trans¬
formed.
As soon as this has appeared, consciousness has
played a great part. Conditioned by the subconscious,
it conditions it in turn. From the subconscious it
receives its principal capacities and to the subconscious
are returned the acquisitions of consciousness; leaving
to subconsciousness the duty of preserving these ana
transmuting them into new capacities.
But consciousness is still very limited by the condi¬
tions of cerebral organisation, which is the instrument
for psychic activity on the material plane. It can only
partly utilise the unconscious potentialities. It can
know scarcely anything of the cryptomnesic reserves.
It does not know itself.
The result of this limitation and ignorance is to
favour evolution by causing many efforts in all kinds
281
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
of directions, thus producing a multiplicity of new
experiences; whilst knowledge of its real state and full
remembrance of the past would, in the present phase
of evolution, be a restraint and an impediment to the
thinking being, as likewise the regular use of the higher
subconscious capacities would limit effort.
But this limitation and this ignorance must be
passing: all past phases of evolution remain deeply
imprinted on the parts as on the whole.
The interpenetration of the subconscious and the
conscious, which is becoming more and more marked, will
necessarily bring about a perfect fusion between them
in higher evolutionary phases. The complete memory
of the evolutionary, past, the free disposal of original
and acquired capacities, an extended knowledge of the
universe, and the solution to the highest metaphysical
problems, will all. become regular and normal.
The unconscious will then have become the
conscious.
If we would take a comprehensive view of evolution
such as it is. presented by the new notions, we shall sec
organic realisation proceeding according to the classical
simile, as an immense tree of life, not as Bergson would
have it, as a sheaf of diverging rockets.
Its principal and secondary branches represent the
diverse groups of plant and animal life, all derived from
the trunk common to all.
The realisation of consciousness is effected from
complete unconsciousness to. complete consciousness
by a series of broken lines, which, starting from the base
converge to a common summit.
These broken lines represent the perpetual passing
and repassing from life to death and from death to
life of the essential ’ in the psychological elements
individualised in the Self. The theory of palingenesis
enables us to understand the return, by death, of the
individualised monad to the central energy, and its
2*8 2
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
restoration by life to the place which it fits according
to its rising degrees of conscious realisation.
The infinite series of broken lines thus rises directly
and logically from the primitive unconsciousness to
consciousness.
The human form represents to-day the top of the
evolutionary scale. How will future realisations of
consciousness appear ?
Will they be correlative to a new complexity in the
present physical organisation ? Or will they necessitate
new ana more perfect forms ?
Will the ‘ superman ’ retain the present human form ?
To such questions it is impossible to reply. There
are as many arguments to be found for as against any
answer that can be given.
The fact that we cannot discover any outline of a
future organisation, carries no weight if the theory of
mutations is true. There may be in our subconscious¬
ness or in the subconsciousness of the universe, some
latent preparation, some slow elaboration of a new form
which will appear suddenly when the favourable con¬
ditions obtain.
This new form would be in conformity with all our
conscious aspirations carried back into the subconscious.
It would appear with an organism less gross, less subject
to material needs, more free in time and space and
reflecting at last our ideals of intelligence, balance,
youth, strength, and health, our hopes of liberty,
beauty, and love.
This form of life and consciousness would dominate
matter instead of being as it is now, in servitude to it.
But is a more subtie organisation than the human body
compatible with the needs of the terrestrial environment ?
Will it be realised only in other worlds? Is it
already realised elsewhere ?
These are insoluble problems, and more tempting to
poetical than to philosophic minds.
283
CHAPTER II

EXPLANATION OF THE EVOLUTIONARY DIFKKTI,TirS

If we look back at the difficulties in explaining evolution


by the theories of classical transformi.sm we shall see
them disappear in the light of the concept which has now
been set forth.
We may understand that the birth and evolution of
a world is a vast materialisation of the universal dynamo*
psychism.
We may understand how the greater can proceed
from the less, since the creative Immanence whi» h is
necessarily the essence of all things, contains all potential
capacities for realisation.
We may understand the origin of species ami instincts
by the^ vital surge of creative evolution. Involution is
thus distinguished as a genuine materialisation of the
Idea, a materialisation which is progressive, and dis¬
continuous; an impulse at first anarchic ami unconscious,
then subconscious and ‘ lucid,’ conforming to evolutionary
necessities, and coming about according to a kind of
acquired (though unreasoned) purpose, finally developing
in the future into one which is consciously willed.
We may understand the sudden transformations
which create species, and the immediate ant! definite
crystallisation of the essential characteristics of new
species, by the fact that the creative impulse, if not
actually discontinuous, is (at least apparently) inter¬
mittent. It is easy to answer the question, Why should
the creative impulse be intermittent ? it is so only in
its visible manifestations; it is continuous, though latent,
in the intervals between manifestations. “Thus the
appearance of a new species is prepared and determined
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
by a subconscious elaboration which passes unperceived.
It ripens in the directing idea before being abruptly
transferred to matter.
This fact is not extraordinary. If nature does not
actually proceed per saltutn, it is not the less certain
that in nature all manifestations of activity seem inter¬
mittent, being preceded and followed by seeming repose,
during which a renewal of activity is obscurely prepared.
The work of nature may be compared to that of
an artist; and the comparison is not idle or illusory,
but really instructive because the works of nature,
like those of the artist, are founded in the subconscious.
Both put on modalities of the same order.
Case i. The artist welcomes all his varied sub¬
conscious inspirations without seeking, controlling, or
judging any. His productions will be characterised
by a luxuriant, unco-ordinated, and disordered exuber¬
ance. It will be the task of the critic to select among
them; only a few will go to posterity; the greater part
will be forgotten or will remain imperfect or abortive.
This is what comes to pass in nature in the primary
phase of evolution; the creative impulse is at first
anarchic and disordered; there is an exuberant appear¬
ance of primary forms both in the plants and among the
lower animals. Then the natural forces, represented
by the classical evolutionary factors, do their work of
selection, and permit only a part of the primitive forms
to survive.
Case 2. The artist does not always consciously direct
most of his inspirations, he is subject to them. But
these inspirations are no longer anarchic, they obey in
great measure the many unperceived suggestions of the
environment in which the artist lives, his considered or
unconsidered intimate desires, his ambitions and his
needs. They are subject to a thousand contingencies
of time, place, and racial proclivities by which he is
governed unawares. The subconscious work of the
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
artist in this case, even if it is not directed by a precise
effort of his will, is nevertheless in great measure ordered
and regularised; concentrated, so to speak. There will,
however, still be room, side by side with magnificent
realisations, for errors, exaggerations, and omissions,
and trials of effect which bear no fruit. And further,
surrounding influences will necessitate long subcon¬
sciousness brooding over new works which will come
to realisation. His work will be intermittent and
unequal.
It is the same in Nature after the first degree of
conscious realisation. Her creations are no longer
exuberant and anarchic. The intermittent appearance of
chief species and instincts are in conformity with environ¬
ing necessities and vital needs, they obey the purpose
acquired. But as in the work of the artist, side by
side with the realisations which genius bring to perfec¬
tion, there will be errors, imperfections, omissions,
exaggerations, and gropings. . . .
Case 3. Lastly let the artist control his productions,
and let them be perfectly conformed to the esthetic
sense, to high moral and intellectual purpose, to superior
knowledge, to all that makes genius luminous, creative,
and conscious.
Such a one does not yet exist. In the same way
this ideal phase is not yet realised in Nature.
Conscious genius and the higher creation truly
penetrated by the divine, will be the result of future
evolution when the unconscious shall have been absorbed
into the. conscious. It will bring into realisation forms
of life rigorously in conformity with the higher law, at
last. released from restrictions and precise in aim;
it will avoid all gropings, errors, and evil; it will know
all and accomplish all.
In fine, collective evolution, like individual evolu¬
tion, may be summed up in the formula—transition
from the unconscious to the conscious.
286
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The individual—the visible person—subject to birth
and death, limited in powers, ephemeral in duration, is
not the real being; he is only its attenuated, fragmentary,
and illusory representation.
The real being, learning little by little to know
itself and the universe, is the divine spark on the
way to realise its divinity, of unlimited potentialities,
creative and eternal.
In the manifested universe, the different appearances
of things are only the illusory, attenuated, and restrained
representation of the divine unity coming into realisation
by endless evolution.
Thus the constitution of worlds and individuals alike,
is but the progressive realisation of eternal consciousness
in the progressive multiplicity of temporary creations
or objectifications.

287
PART III
THE INFERENCES
PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM
CHAPTER I

UNIVERSAL PESSIMISM AND ITS REFUTATION

A great Arab prince of the tenth century, whose reign


marked the climax of the Caliphate of Cordova, thus
began his last will and testament:—

‘ I have now reigned more than fifty years, always


victorious, always fortunate: cherished by my
subjects, feared by their enemies, and surrounded
by general reverence. All that men desire has been
lavished on me by Heaven; glory, science, honours,
treasure, riches, pleasures, and love; I have enjoyed
all, I have exhausted all!
* And now, on the threshold of Death, recalling
to remembrance all the past hours in this long period
of seeming felicity, I have counted the days in
which I have been truly happy: I have been able
to find only eleven!
* Mortals, appraise by my example the exact
value of life on earth 1 ’
This appalling cry of pessimism from one of the
great and exceptionally privileged ones of earth enables
us to understand the constant and monotonous complaint
of the intellectually highest and best of mankind.
M. Jean Finot has collected from all epochs and
all civilisations, the testimonies to the endless pessimism
which seems to oppress him also with its irresistible
gloom.1
‘ Behold a cheerful nation with an easy philosophy.
It passes for being a generous purveyor of remedies
1 J. Finot: Progris et Bonheur.
291
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

against the ill-humour from which its neighbours


suffer. To this nation is attributed a smiling and
harmonious concept of life.
' This nation is France. Nevertheless, to read
the words of its most representative minds is to see
them oppressed by ill, beginning with the suffering
of thought, and ending with the suffering of love.
Whether we take Musset, Taine, Baudelaire, Maupas¬
sant, Dumas fils, Renan, Zola, the Goncourts, Leconte
de Lisle, Anatole France, or Sully Prudhomme;
Parisians or provincials; cosmopolitans, poets,
thinkers or philosophers; all show us a troubled
soul behind their melodious phrases and their
conventional smile. . . .
‘ Their predecessors, Chateaubriand, Sainte-
Beuve, Lamartine, show similar tragedies present
to their consciousness. What are we to say of
Bossuet, Racine, Corneille, and so many other
illustrious writers ? From all the heights of French
thought comes the same note of sadness. Voltaire,
of all men the most poised and attached to life,
says somewhere quite seriously, “ Happiness is but
a dream, but pain is real.” Elsewhere he says,
“ I do not know what eternal life may be, but this
life is a bad joke.”
‘ For Diderot “ we exist only amid pain and
tears. ... We are the playthings of uncertainty,
of error, of necessity, of sickness, of ill-will, and
of passion; and we live among rogues and charlatans
of every land.”
, The moralists join in the chorus of disgust
with life. Larochefoucauld, Charron, La Bruybre,
Chamfort, and Vauvenarges, all make the same
complaint: “ Life is not worth the trouble of
living! ” And the writers of other lands are
marked by a despair which is perhaps louder and
less musical. . . .’
293
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
M. Finot takes in turn the dominant note in the
state of mind evidenced by the literatures, the philosophies
and the religions of all times and all places, and finds
everywhere and always the same pessimism out¬
weighing the optimism of the few who are happy or
illusionised.
The works of Schopenhauer merely condense all this
general pessimism. His philosophy, which sums up the
truths known to his time, and is their natural and true
expression, could not but be pessimist. ‘ To work and
suffer in order to live; to live in order to work and
suffer,’ seemed to him the emblem, not of humanity only,
but of all life.
Since Schopenhauer, new truths have illuminated
natural philosophy; evolution has been the leading idea.
What are its conclusions to be P Will they also
yield to pessimism ? Do they allow us a rational antici¬
pation of a reign of happiness ?
For von Hartmann, evolution and pessimism go
together.
M. Ilarald Hoffding1 remarks:—

‘ The ethic of Hartman is closely connected with


his pessimistic theories. He sees an inevitable
incompatibility between civilisation and happiness.
The progress of civilisation is marked by a reduction
of happiness. The more complicated the mechanism
of life becomes, the more chances of misfortune
there are. Sensibility to pain becomes greater, and
increasing capacity for thought only perceives
illusions the more surely. Civilisation increases
wants more rapidly than the means of satisfying
them. Therefore it becomes necessary to choose
between civilisation and happiness—between the
theory of civilisation and that of happiness. Happiness
presupposes calm and peace, and for this reason
i Harald Hoffding: Histoire it la Philosophic Moderns.
m x
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
brings stagnation and extinction; Evolution leads
us on until all possibilities are exhausted.’

M. Jean Finot has ■vigorously traversed the concepts


of pessimistic evolution. He thinks that evolution,
properly understood, leads to optimism; not the sancti¬
monious optimism of Sir John Lubbock, but a rational
optimism, based on the progress of humanity from all
points of view. Indeed, if we consider all the aspects
of progress—social, individual, scientific, legal, medical,
hygienic, etc. ... we see clearly a very considerable
reduction in the causes of suffering as time goes on.
Humanity has carried on a more and more successful
struggle against harsh nature, against cold, heat, hunger,
distance, sickness, and so on. Above all, customs nave
become more humane. Everything shows this; and
concurrently with a diminution of suffering, evolution
implies an increase in the power of knowing and in the
capacity for feeling.
Joy—the predominance of happiness*—ought to
result mathematically from this double and inverse
movement—enlargement of the field of consciousness
and the faculties of sensation, and consequently of the
sources of happiness; and a correlative reduction in the
causes of pain.
We have then before us two opposite theses, both
based on evolution. Which of them is true ?
An impartial examination of the facts can alone
decide.
_ If we consider only the actual state of humanity,
it is clear that the pessimistic theory is still the only
one that can be sustained. There is no need of pro¬
longed reasoning or pathetic rhetoric in its support.
We need not even appeal to the present spectacle of
the limitless folly of man, putting the whole power of
science into the service of Evil in a world-wide war
destructive of all beauty and all joy; nor even the
394
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
individual catastrophes which are the common events
of life.
It will suffice to take an average normal human life,
that of a man placed in ordinary circumstances and of
ordinary understanding; and to consider it coolly.
What does his existence consist in ?
During one quarter of a century he works to acquire
the means of livelihood; for another quarter he struggles
amid perpetual anxieties to make these means of life
give a sufficient return; then he dies without knowing
exactly why he has lived at all. ‘ To will without motive*
always suffering, always struggling, then to die, and
so without end, century after century, until the crust
of the planet breaks into pieces ! ’ cries Schopenhauer.
What pains and sorrows, what anxieties and disap¬
pointments during the short quarter century during
which the man * enjoys ’ his gains; ephemeral youth
with its short-lived illusions; a life worn down by
preparation for living; hopes always disappointed and
always renewed; a few flowers culled by the wayside
of life and soon faded; a few instants of repose, and
then the weary march forward again. Personal anxieties;
family worries; heavy and ceaseless work; vexations,
disillusions, and deceptions; such is the common lot
of mortals. For those who have an ideal it is even
worse; some intoxications in the pursuit of illusions
and heart-breaking discovery of impotence to attain
them. Where is the man who, like the great Caliph, on
reckoning up his days of complete happiness could
count on finding eleven ? Who is he who could find
one single day of undiluted happiness.
If we consider life as it actually is to be the summit
of evolution, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is justified, a
thousand times over. Yes, it is replied, but humanity
and life have as yet realised but a small part of their
possibilities of happiness. . Progress is continuous.
Comparison with past centuries gives a glimpse of future
295
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
ones. Better still, it is not forbidden to hope from human
evolution a triumph over matter itself—an organism
less liable to sickness, and the incidence of old age put
back; a psychism more conscious, more detached not
from ignorance only, but above all from the base, and
wicked sentiments which still pervade humanity as it is.
We may hope for an era with fewer sufferings, less
poverty, and fewer repulsive diseases, hrom the night
of misfortunes and sufferings, lightened by a few passing
rays of joy we may catch a glimpse of a dawn of happi¬
ness in which the pale shadows of residual pain will but
bring into relief bright and harmonious beauty.
We may hope all this! We may imagine humanity
one day reaching this ideal; but such a humanity will
establish its victory only on hecatombs of vanished men.
Thus for centuries and centuries men will have suffered
in order that their privileged descendants may at last
reach happiness; a happiness which they will have deserved
no more than their progenitors had deserved their
miseries!
All the efforts, the sorrows, the infinite pains of the
former will have ended in this single result—the
monstrous building up of this privilege for their
posterity.
There is in this concept such injustice as would
suffice to bring us irresistibly back into philosophic
pessimism.
But this is not all. Even the concept of an. ideally
privileged humanity, highly evolved and happy, is weak
in its foundations. This humanity would see its happy
life poisoned by the idea of inevitable and approaching
annihilation. The thought of death as the end of all
would be unendurable to hypersensitive beings unpre*
pared by daily trials for the renunciation of life itself.
The man of the future, we are told, will travel on
a wide and easy road through a dream-country in which
every one of his senses will bring him joy I Vanity!
296
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
He will but catch a glimpse of that dream-country
between the tombs which border the way—tombs of
ancestors, of parents, of dearest friends, sometimes of his
children, and straight before him there will be Ids own,
which will gape, great and terrifying, growing larger
at every step he takes and hiding the view and the
horizon. At every turn and stage of life, in the midst
of every joy, his ear will hear the knell—‘ Brother,
thou must die.’
In order that the vision may change; that the thought
of death may lose its sterilising character and its apparent
curse, the evolutionary idea must receive its natural
complement—the teaching of re-birth. Then all becomes
clear—the tombs are no longer tombs; they are but
transitory harbours after the voyage of life,—beds of
repose for the closing day. They will neither inspire
fear nor hide the horizon; they only mark a stage accom¬
plished in the blessed ascent towards consciousness and
life. Beyond the tomb, with unfailing prescience we
see henceforth the march resumed, less weary, with new
horizons, a larger outlook in a more intimate, purer,
happier communion with the Infinite.
And as with the idea of palingenesis the funereal
attributes of death disappear, so also the monument of
injustice raised by classical evolution crumbles down.
In evolution there are no longer those who are sacri¬
ficed and those who are privileged. All the efforts,
both individual and collective, all the sufferings will
have ended in the building up of happiness and the
realisation of justice; but a happiness and a justice for

The end and purpose of life are henceforth com¬


prehensible, and we find them conformable to our dearest
hopes.
In our concept of the universe there is no place for
a pessimist philosophy which was derived only from a
*97
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
false outlook on things. Nol the Single Essence, by
whatever name it may be called, creative of numberless
representations, does not end in materialising itself in
a vain phantasmagoria of worlds, of forms, of beings—
without past and without future, absurd representations,
incoherent, nonsensical worlds, empty phantoms gone
almost as soon as created, and vanished without leaving
a trace!
Nol And, a fortiori, that essence does not materialise
worlds of pain serving no purpose but as theatres for a
drama of universal, undeserved, useless, and fruitless
suffering!
The fugitive representations are neither incoherent
nor unfortunate; it is through them and by them that
the one essence which is the sole reality, comes at last
to self-knowledge, through the innumerable experiences
which it brings with it, individually and collectively, in
its parts and as a whole.
These representations, at last understood, reveal a
governing harmony; from them issues the supreme
end, a purpose truly divine. This harmony is the
immanent concord of each with others, the close solidarity
of the individualised parts of the one principle, and their
inviolable union in the All. The aim is the acmiisition
of consciousness, the unlimited transition from the
unconscious to the conscious; this transition is the
release of all potentialities; it is the realisation in
evolution of Sovereign Intelligence, Sovereign Justice, and
Sovereign Good.

298
CHAPTER II

THE REALISATION OF SOVEREIGN CONSCIOUSNESS

That which is ‘ essential ’ in the universe is eternal and


indestructible \ -permanent through all the transitory appear¬
ances of things.
That which is essential in the universe passes, by
evolution, from the unconscious to the conscious.
Individual consciousness is an integral part of that
which is essential in the universe, and itself indestructible
and eternal, it evolves from unconsciousness to consciousness.

The first of these three primordial data of our philosophy


is unanimously admitted. At all events it is the founda¬
tion of all the great philosophical systems belonging to
all ages of the world.
To deny it would imply the absolute bankruptcy of
the philosophical mind; it would be to deny philosophy
itself. This premise,, moreover, is no longer an a priori,
a postulate by the mind of genius: it rests, as we have
demonstrated, on a solid and positive basis.
Intuition, reason, and facts, show us with one accord
under innumerable formal representations which are
temporal and spatial and therefore (like Time and Space)
illusory, a dynamo-psychism which alone is endowed
with unity and permanence; that is to say, which alone
is real.
The second idea, though more open to question,
is really forced upon us by all considerations relating
to evolution. The transition from unconsciousness, to
consciousness is the one thing which is most striking
and undeniable in evolution. The procession of forms
of life admits of gropings, mistakes, arrest, and even
299
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
retrogression; but the development of consciousness as
a whole is continuous. There is more general conscious¬
ness in the reptiles of the secondary epoch, than in the
invertebrates and fish of the primary epoch; still more
general consciousness in the mammals of the
tertiary; and yet more in the quaternary when man
appears.
Comparing one species with another, there is only
one certain criterion of evolutionary superiority—the
degree of consciousness acquired. That superiority
consists neither in organic complexity nor in its perfec¬
tion; it is not physical power; nor adaptation to some
privileged function such as flight; it is only the degree
of consciousness acquired.
To evolve is really to develop consciousness of one’s
real state, of the state of the environing world, of the
relations established between the living being and his
surroundings, between the immediate surroundings and
the whole environment.
The development of the arts and sciences, the
perfecting of the means, to diminish pain or to satisfy
human needs, are not in themselves the purposes of
evolution. They, are but consequences of the realisation
of the essential aim, which is the acquisition of a larger
and larger sphere of consciousness; and all general
progress has the enlargement of the field of consciousness
as its preliminary condition.
All this is undeniable and undenied, and it is only
a perfectly legitimate inference that the summit of
evolution, in the measure that we can conceive of this
summit, should be the realisation of a general conscious¬
ness unbounded and. quasi-omnisdent—-a consciousness
truly divine and bringing with it the solution of all
problems.
. province of the Conscious to subdue to
itself, little by little, the vast area of the Unconscious
from which it arose.
300
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
If the two first data, of our philosophy are undeniable
and generally undenied, this is not the case with the
third. The. permanence and unlimited development
of the individual consciousness are denied by most
philosophers, even by those who have admitted our
general concept of things.
Averroes and Schopenhauer are in agreement with
contemporary materialists on this point. For them,
personal consciousness is a cerebral function appearing
with the organism and disappearing with it. Like the
body, that consciousness is a passing and ephemeral
phenomenon indissolubly linked to its proper repre¬
sentation.
We maintain on the contrary that the individual
consciousness is an integral part of that which is essential
and permanent in the living being, that it pre-exists
and survives all successive organisations—all objecti¬
fications or representations of the eternal essence;
keeping the entire remembrance of these representations,
and growing step by step with all the experiences which
they involve.
Doubtless the permanence of the individual con¬
sciousness is contrary to appearances, because the major
part of its gains remains subconscious and latent during
the period of a terrestrial life; and it is not surprising
that this should appear an absurdity to the vulgar crowd,
unless indeed it be made into an article of faith for
them.
On the other hand, it is as regrettable as it is sur¬
prising that a philosopher of Schopenhauer’s genius
should have shared the opinion of tie crowd without
discussing it.
The permanence of the individual consciousness has
a double demonstration to support it—the scientific and
the metaphysical.
It is quite natural that the scientific demonstration,
being based on facts still unknown in Schopenhauer’s
301
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
day, should have escaped his notice, but it is all the
more difficult to understand his blindness to, or his
prejudice against the metaphysical demonstration.
The metaphysical proofs for the permanence of the
individual consciousness are two.
The first is presented to our view by the field of
nature. Schopenhauer remarks^ that nature seems
everywhere and always to consider death, which is
apparently so much to be dreaded, as an unimportant
incident. She expresses this

‘ by delivering over the life of every animal and


of man himself to the most insignificant accident*.,
without interfering to save any. Think of the insei t
placed on your path; the least deviation, the nu»st
involuntary movement of your foot decides its life
or its death. Look at the slug, deprived of all
powers of fleeing, resisting, defending itself, or
hiding—a prey to the first enemy that comes. I ,ook
at the fish playing unconscious in the net about to
close; the rrog, whose mere indifference is the bar
to its escape; look at the bird unconscious of the
hawk that hovers over it; the sheep whom the wolf
watches from its hiding-place. Provided with only
the shortest foresight, all these creatures play in
the midst of dangers which menace their every
moment. These creatures, made with such con¬
summate art, are abandoned, without hope of return,
not only to the violence of the stronger, but to the
merest chance, to mischievous instinct of the first
comer, to the waywardness of children.
‘Does not this amount to a declaration by
Nature that the annihilation of the individual is a
matter of indifference. Nature very plainly declares
this, and she never lies. Well, if the Mother of all
things cares so little as to throw her children into
the midst of a thousand environing dangers, that
30a
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
must be only because of the certainty that if they
fell, they fall back on her own breast, where they are
in shelter; so that their fell is but a jest. ... If
our sight could penetrate to the foundation of
things we should think as Nature does. Fortified by
this thought, we should explain the indifference of
Nature to the death of individuals, by the feet that
the destruction of phenomena in no way touches
the true and real essence.'

The argument of this great thinker does not concern


life alone; it adapts itself wonderfully to consciousness.
Personal consciousness is as ephemeral as the earthly
life to which it seems to be linked. Yet more, nature
seems to set no special value on theperfection or the
extent of personal consciousness. The intellectuality
of the senseless crowd, of the formless mass and mere
dust of humanity are under the same chances as the
higher intellectuality of the great men who seek to
guide the masses; the rudimentary consciousness of
the Russian peasant, little above, if it is at all above,
animal consciousness, and that of a Newton, a Pasteur,
or a Schopenhauer, are treated alike. If these marvellous
intelligences whose entrance on life has required inde¬
scribable efforts of evolution prolonged through centuries
—intelligences that actually sum up all the perfection
that evolution has as yet engendered, are abandoned
without hope of return to the merest chance, to con¬
tamination of the body by a microbe, or even to senile
decay, does not this amount to a declaration of Nature
that the disappearance of personal consciousness, however
elevated it may be, is a matter of indifference, or,. which
comes to the same thing, that this disappearance is only
seeming disappearance?
Yesl If the Mother of all things cares so little
for her highest realisation—personal. consciousness
—that can be only because of the certainty that when
303
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
this personal consciousness seems to vanish, it returns
to the shelter of her own breast. f ,
If our insight penetrates far enough to the t< (muta¬
tion of things, we think as Nature does.
We then know how to explain the absolute confidence,
this complete indifference of Nature to the disappearance
of personal consciousness; the seeming end is not really
the end, for it cannot touch the true and real essence ut
the individual, nor his realised consciousness, which,
litfft that essence and with that essence, the divine
spark—is pre-existent, surviving, and eternal.
What, then, does death matter? It destroys only
a semblance, a temporary representation. I he true
and indestructible individuality assimila'es and so pre¬
serves all the acquirements of the transitory personality;
then bathed for a time in the waters of Lethe, it material-
ises anew in personality and thus continues its evolution
indefinitely. Yes, that is what Nature teaches us very
clearly and Nature never lies.
To this first metaphysical proof, another, not !«*.•«
remarkable, may be added. It the realisation of con¬
sciousness is really the undeniable end of evolution, it is
not possible to imagine the disappearance and annihila¬
tion of individual consciousness.
Let us imagine general evolution very far advanced;
let us suppose it ideally developed to a point not far
removed from omniscience, as it must necessarily l>«
some day. Nothing in time or in space could escape
such a universal consciousness, to which time and space
would be relatively meaningless.
Would this universal consciousness have all know¬
ledge with the one exception of the individual states
which it had passed through in its evolution ? That is
impossible; the universal consciousness must necessarily
contain the sum of individual consciousnesses, it would,
in fact, be their sum and totality.
We have then the choice of alternative—either
304
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
evolution is not the realisation of consciousness, or, if it
is, it necessarily implies the remembrance and the
knowledge of all past states of consciousness.
It matters little from the philosophic point of view
that this remembrance and knowledge should be acquired
late and at the ideal summit of evolution; the essential
thing is that they be not destroyed. Time does not
affect the question. Philosophy may maintain no
more than this—that the consciousness of individuality
may be lost temporarily by the destruction of the organism
but that it cannot be annihilated; that it becomes latent,
and remains latent, till the height of .consciousness
attained revives it by awakening it from its
sleep.
This concept differs from the one which has been
set forth in the preceding chapters only.under the mode
of time, which is of no philosophical importance.
Essentially, both concepts are the same.
These are the metaphysical proofs for the permanence
of the individual consciousness. They have obviously
no more weight than attaches to metaphysical proofs
generally; however undeniable their cogency, they
cannot stand in lieu of scientific demonstration..
The whole of this book in its entirety is that scientific
demonstration. By referring to the preceding chapters
the reader will see the steps by which we have been able
to deduce clearly and positively, at least as a rigorous
estimate of probabilities, that the individual conscious¬
ness is indestructible and permanent, even when it
becomes latent in subconsciousness.
Every new life necessarily implies a temporary
restriction of the individuality. Every embodiment, or
representation on the material plane implies a limitation
of all psychic activities by the field of cerebral action
and its organic memory.
But below that cerebral memory, the profound
memory remains indelible and permanent, retaining all its
305
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
past acquisitions, though these are for the most part
cryptoid.
This has been demonstrated and there is no need
to go back to that demonstration.
From the point of view treated of in this chapter,
which is the contrast between an optimist or a pessimist
concept of the universe, we have only to ask ourselves
whether the limitation of being, in and by reason of
material representation, is for the better or the worse.
We do not doubt that it is for the better. It is so if
we consider the whole being in his past, his present,
and his future.
For the present, ignorance is an advantage. It is
necessary that a man should think his field of action
limited to the period between birth and death,
and that he should be ignorant in the main both
of Ms anterior acquisitions and of his latent
capacities.
To begin with, the fear of death concurrently with
ignorance of the real position, is indispensable. Without
this salutary fear a man would not exert his best efforts
in actual life. He would only too readily look for change.
Any check, or disease would be unendurable; suicide
would be of daily occurrence.
Ignorance of anterior acquisitions is not less indis¬
pensable. In its absence the man would have an
irresistible inclination to work always in the same
direction, to follow the line of least resistance. He
would hardly bend Ms mind to new tasks involving an
increase of labour, and would almost inevitably be led
into a one-sided evolution which would end in an
abnormal and hypertrophied specialisation.
Ignorance of the faculties which are called trans¬
cendental is a yet more imperative necessity; for the
regular, normal, and daily use of these faculties would
virtually eliminate effort. The workings of instinct are
exceedingly instructive on this point. Instinct is only
306
F,torn the Unconscious to the Conscious
the lower and primary form of intuition; like the latter
it implies a kind of divination.
Now what do we see in the comparative psychology
of animals ?
That wherever instinct predominates it has arrested
intellectual evolution. Insects possess marvellous
instincts which they obey blindly. The insect has
evolved perfectly steadily, but its evolution has led
it into a blind alley where all conscious progress seems
absolutely shut out.
On the other hand, consider the vertebrates. In¬
fallible instinct has given place to thought; fallible
indeed, but fruitful in that it implies and necessitates
effort. In them accordingly, the progress towards
consciousness is uninterrupted and allows all things to
hope. That which is true of instinct is still more true
of the mysterious faculties which are independent of
time and space. Imagine a man who could avail him¬
self of these faculties in drily life, exercising at will the
power of reading the thoughts of others, of vision at a
distance, and or lucidity. Where would be the need
for reflection; why should he calculate the effect of his
actions, foresee or strive? He would make no errors
but also no efforts; and without effort there is no pro¬
gressive consciousness. Like the insect, the man
would become but a marvellous piece of mechanism.
An evolution thus impelled would not have resulted
in a higher degree of consciousness, but in some kind of
hypersensitive somnambulism allowing of man knowing
everything without understanding anything: the super¬
man so produced would have been a kind of transcendental
automaton. At the present stage. of evolution it is
therefore not merely well, but indispensable, that the
highest faculties, and. all other psychological wealth
accumulated by man in his evolution should remain
subconscious and latent. Their latency does not prevent
these subconscious faculties from playing a considerable,
307
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
and even a primary part in man. They are the very
foundation or his being—they make its essential charac¬
teristics. Their manifestations are sufficiently latent
not to impede effort while sufficiently active to aid and
guide it.
This marvellous equilibrium is rarely perfect. Most
men ignore these faculties too much, and leave them
lethargic. Others know them too well; they suffer
from the conscious inability to realise their highest
aspirations.
This suffering is the price paid for genius.
Ignorance of the past is as great a blessing as
ignorance of the present. Only the ideally evolved being
will find no drawback in knowing all the vast accumula¬
tion of experiences—sensations and emotions, efforts and
struggles, joys and pains, loves and hates, high and
low impulses, self-sacrificing or selfish acts—all, in
fact, which has gone to build him up through the multiple
personalities which have each specialised in some
particular way.
If the commonplace man had hut a flash of this
knowledge he would be dumbfounded by it. I {is present
errors and anxieties are as much as he can bear. 1 low
could he endure the weight of past troubles, of his follies
and meannesses, of the animal passions which have
swayed him, of the endless monotony of commonplace
lives, the regrets for privileged existences, and the
remorse for criminal ones.
Oblivion, fortunately, allows hatreds and barren
passions to die down and equably loosens the links
which bind men too closely together and limit their
freedom of action.
Remembrance of the past could but impede present
effort.
Ignorance of the future is yet more indispensable
and salutary in the lower stages of the evolution of
consciousness. For the many, this ignorance is a great
308
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
blessing. Their mediocrity is fitted to the conditions
of life as it is, they are adapted to its petty passions, its
mean desires, its short pleasures and its long procession
of suffering.
Even when the stammering voice of Art reaches
them, it cannot awaken them to a vision or an idea of
a higher world. They find it quite natural (fortunately)
to live in a world of strife and suffering, and thanks to
their ignorance, they do not vainly revolt against the
inevitable. Providentially, they find it normal that their
activities should be almost entirely taken up in seeking
maintenance and in the struggle against hostile condi¬
tions. Their interests are of a low order, like the
character which creates them. It is well that they
should have no other outlook than that of present effort;
they could not bear the prospect of efforts to which they
could see no end.
Even for the select few ignorance of the future is
a benefit. Without this unconsciousness they would
suffer more by seeing humanity and life as they are
—the scanty results of so much effort, the. seeming
uselessness of so much pain. How small a thing is the best
that has yet come into full realisation in the course of
human evolution—the ideal charm of feminine beauty,
the genius of the thinker, are chained to the base and
repugnant functions of a weak body, to all its defects
and diseases. Contentment in such a world is only
consistent with ignorance of a higher world of light
and love. Some few, very few, have this intuition
more or less clearly. In the present state of evolution
they are not privileged beings. The sadness of the
best among men has often no other origin than a glimpse
from the unconscious on too bright a future, so distant
that it seems but an empty dream . . . confronted with
tangible realities all that remains when the entrancing
vision fades is discouragement, a disdain for the present,
and the shadow of a great sadness over all life.
309 y
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
But this ignorance which holds man back from
knowledge of his past, his present, and his future, docs
not involve pessimism; it is part of necessary and
inevitable, but fruitful evils. .
Moreover, according to our philosophy, ignorance
is essentially transitory and belongs only to the lower
phases of evolution. It is lessened or in fitting measure
broken through, even now in the course of that evolution,
and it will one day give place to completed and perfected
knowledge.
If it is true—as everything goes to prove—that
bodily life implies a restriction and limitation of the
conscious individuality in a definite direction, it seems
obvious that release from the organism should extend
the limitations of that individuality. When that release
takes place, the Self can then grasp those realities which
the limitations of the brain now hide from him, in the
degree that his evolutionary level and his acquired con¬
sciousness permit of. That release from limitations
already takes place by metapsychical decentralisation;
and it should, a fortiori^ also take place by death. Accord¬
ing to all probabilities the sequence of events is as
follows:—
For animals, and men of very low grade, the phase
of existence which follows on death is short and dark.
Bereft of the support of the physical organs, conscious¬
ness, still ephemeral, is weakened and obscured. The
call of matter asserts itself with irresistible power, and
the mystery of re-birth is soon brought alwut.
But for the more highly evolved man, death bursts
the narrow circle within which material life has
imprisoned a consciousness which strained against the
bounds imposed by a profession, family, and country.
He finds himself carried far beyond the old habits of
thought and memory, the old loves and hatreds, passions
and mental habits.
To the degree that his evolutionary level permits,
310
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
he remembers his past and foresees his future. He
knows the road by which he has travelled, he can judge
of his conduct and his efforts. Many things which, in
life, appeared to him very important, now seen from a
higher point of view, seem small and petty.
Great joys and great sorrows, mental storms out of
all proportion to their causes, the passions which devastate
a life, and the ambitions which consume it—all these are
reduced to their true values, and hold but a very small
place in the chain of conscious remembrance.
Some of the links with the past are easily broken;
they pass away like the mists of dawn. Some are strong;
they are part of the unbreakable chain of destiny and
can be unwound only little by little. This time out of
the body is not only a phase of recollection, of synthesis,
and of self-judgment; it is also a time of active psycho¬
logical assimilation. In calm consideration the fusion
of old with new experiences takes place and the Self
identifies itself with the states of consciousness which
memory has stored up during life.
Such assimilation is indispensable to unification of
individuality and to harmony of soul. As we have
already shown, it seems to be the fret that some curious
and mysterious disorders of personality are. due only
to defective psychological assimilation anterior to the
present life, and to a decentralising and divergent
tendency among mental elements ill-assimilated by the
Self.
In fine, the successive phases of organic and extra-
organic life seem to play distinct and complementary
parts in evolution.
Organic life shows analytical activity, limited to a
given direction, and permitting the maximum of effort
in that direction; with a temporary beclouding of all
in the living being which is outside the immediate
purpose and the framework of present life. _ .
To extra-organic life pertains synthetic activity,

From the Unconscious to the Conscious
comprehensive vision, the work of mental assimilation,
and preparation for fresh effort. The relative importance
of one earth-life in the series of existences is no greater
than that of a day in the course of that earth-life. One
life—one day; the life bears much the same ratio to
the course of evolution that the day bears to a single
life. They are analogues.
There are good days and bad days; good lives ami
bad lives; days and lives which are profitable; days
and lives that are lost. A single day and a single life
cannot be appraised apart from preceding days and
lives: they form a chain of consequences. No one limits
his labours or his cares exclusively to one day in a life.
No one plans the work of a day nor of a life without
reference to the days that are past, and to those that
are to come. It is the same with our lives—in the
interval between two existences the Self that is sufficiently
evolved prepares its plan for the future. Lives, as well
as days, are separated one from another by a period of
seeming _ repose which is nevertheless one of useful
assimilation and preparation; and as on waking we find
many problems solved as if by magic, so it is at the
dawn of another life. The first steps of the Self seem
to be guided; it walks securely as if led by a hand in
the path which it has indeed chosen, but which, once
bom, it follows blindly.
Thus, from one existence to another, the Self comes
slowly and by the vast accumulation of stored and
assimilated experiences, to the higher phases of life
that are reserved to the complete development of its
consciousness—to the completed consciousness that
realises all.
Ideally, full consciousness should extend to the
present, the past, and the future. This implies a species
of divination, now incomprehensible. But this much
we can logically infer: that it must be a state of know¬
ledge of the Self and the universe sufficiently extended
31 z
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
to restore the past from oblivion, to permit the
regular and normal use of faculties that are now trans¬
cendent and metapsychic, and to allow some insight into
a free and happy evolution enfranchised at last from the
darkness of ignorance, the bonds of necessity, and the
pangs of suffering.

313
CHAPTER III

THE REALISATION OF SOVEREIGN JUSTICE

In the concept of palingenesis the ultimate realisation


of sovereign justice is assured with absolute and mathe¬
matical certainty.
The individual never being other than he has made
himself in the course of his evolution by the immense
series of representations he has gone through, it follows
that everything that is within his field of consciousness
is his own doing, the fruit of his own work, his own
efforts, his own sufferings, and his own joys.
Every act, even every desire and inclination, has
an inevitable reaction in one or other of his existences.
This is the consequential interplay of inherent,
fateful, and unavoidable justice. This inherent justice
usually begins in the course of a single life taken by
itself; but it is then seldom truly equitable. Regarded
in this restricted manner justice often seems fallible and
disproportioned.
But by considering a long chain of existences it is
seen to be mathematically perfect. The balance is struck
between favourable and unfavourable circumstance and
only the sure results of his conduct remain as the man's
assets.
This inherent justice is not only individual; it is
also collective. It is so by the essential solidarity of the
individual .monads. By reason of this essential solidarity,
the reversions of consciousness to unconsciousness are
never entirely personal. Conscious acquisitions and
their transmutation into capacities are necessarily collec¬
tive. The degree to which this is so does not lend itself
to analysis, but is none the less certain. Similarly,
314
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
individual acts have inevitable though undefinable
reactions on the conditions of all other lives. A certain
general collaboration in evolution is thus assured, by
which every effort that conforms to or opposes the moral
law has a collective reaction over and above its reaction
on the individual.
This point cannot be too strongly emphasised.
There is no exclusively individual responsibility for any
particular act, good or bad, and for no such act can
an exclusively individual warrant be pleaded.
Everything that is done or thought for good or evil;
everything that each one feels by emotions of joy or
sorrow, reacts on all and is assimilated by all. Therefore
the acts of an individual or a group, of a family, a nation,
or a race, cannot be appraised in their moral or social
aspects as having reference only to that individual or group.
No doubt this collective solidarity seems continually
lessened as we pass from the family to the nation, from
the nation to the race, from the race to humanity,
and from humanity to the entire world; but these
diminishing reactions, as seen in their effects, are integral
parts in the actual constituent essence of things.
Therefore all the devices of selfishness by persons,
families, or nations, are mere aberration.
This great law of solidarity has been proclaimed
by philosophers and moralists in every age, but has
found small response. It is to be hoped that the voice
of science may receive a better hearing and have more
influence on suffering humanity 1
The concept of justice inherent in palingenesis
involves great and far-reaching consequences.
From the metaphysical and religious standpoint,
it abolishes the puerile notions of supernatural sanctions
and a Divine judgment. The least that can be^ said
of these notions is that they are useless and artificial.
From the moralist standpoint, it gives a solid founda¬
tion for moral (i.e. idealist) teaching. Its practical
315
From the Unconscious to the Conscious

bearing is immediately understood; it enjoins before


all else, work and effort; not isolated effort, the selfish
struggle for life, but co-operative effort.
All the lower order of feelings—hatred, the temper
of revenge, selfishness, and jealousy, are incompatible
with the idea of solidarity in evolution and inherent
justice. The man who has attained to the knowledge
of palingenetic evolution will quite naturally avoid any
act which can injure another, and will assist him to the
best of his power.
Trusting to the internal sanction of duty, he will be
able to forgive misdeeds against himself, and will look
upon the foolish, the malicious, and the criminal as
beings on a lower plane or as sick persons. He will
know how to resign himself to natural anil passing
inequalities which are the inevitable result of the law of
individual endeavour in evolution, but will do his best
to remove the excessive inequalities, the artificial
divisions, and the mischievous prejudices of mankind.
He will extend kindness and pity to animals, and save
them, as far as may be, from suffering and death.
Nevertheless, some moral objections have been made
to the idea of palingenesis.
It has been alleged that oblivion of previous existences
must suppress the conviction of moral causes and effects.
How can that be ? Oblivion of a fact does not niter
the consequences of that fact.
Moreover, as we have seen, the forgetfulness is
relative and temporary, pertaining to the cerebral
memory only; it does not touch the subconscious memory
pertaining to the true Self. The oblivion is but pro¬
visional. The whole of its past belongs to the Self,
and though now latent in the higher consciousness, it
will some day be fully and regularly accessible to the
man.
-After all it matters little that man, during his earth-
life should be in ignorance of the deeper reasons for
316
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
the conditions in which he finds himself. He has full
responsibility and has to take its full consequences.
Another objection which has been alleged against
the palingenetic theory is the existence of pain among
creatures too backward in evolution to have any know¬
ledge of moral causes. What crime can a horse, beaten
by a drunken brute, or a dog tortured by vivisection,
have committed in a previous existence ?
In this reasoning there is a fundamental error. Evil
is not necessarily justified by the past. It is more often
the consequence of the low general level of the present
evolutionary state. To see in the sufferings of a creature
nothing but the consequences of its previous acts, is
grossly illogical. What may be affirmed is that the
real knowledge of good and evil—the moral sanction—
arises from inherent justice and is always proportionate
to the degree of free choice which the creature enjoys,
that is to say, to its moral and intellectual level.1
Responsibility for their acts can only be attributed
to beings who have reached a high degree of evolution.
The higher the evolution the greater the responsibility;
for their considered conduct will have more and more
influence on their progress and on their conditions of
life according to the measure of their advancement.
A last objection, also of a moral nature, has been
made to the idea of justice inherent in the idea of palin¬
genesis : it is, that if an act is not followed by a rigorously
similar retribution, there is no justice, but only half¬
justice. If it is followed by rigorously similar retribution
there can be no evolutionary progress, but only a linked
series from evil by evil to evil, which amounts to an
assertion of unending reactions of evil in a vicious logical
circle* j
This objection is really only a matter of words.
Absolute justice can perfectly well be imagined as fulfilled
by retributions which fit the crime though perhaps are
> See L’Mtre Subcomcitnt.
3*7
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
not equal to it. Inherent justice clearly implies wide
margins of incidence. A bad action will not be automati¬
cally shown to be such by a similar bad action done by
another against the first sinner; nor by any kind of lex
talionis which would be none the less odious for being
a natural result.
Action and reaction are always equal, but by the
very feet of evolution the reaction becomes refined and
spiritualised in proportion to the progress of conscious¬
ness. It passes from material to spiritual penalties; and
repentance, remorse, and efforts to repair the. injury
or to amend the life, take the place of physical retribution.
Thus the concept of evolution by palingenesis gives
us the assurance of the ultimate sovereignty of justice
as it also assures the development of sovereign conscious¬
ness. It reveals in the universe an orderly harmony under
seeming incoherence, and absolute justice under seeming
injustice. Thus understood, this concept is so beautiful
and satisfying that we can say with M. Ch. Lancelin:
‘ If this had not been instituted by God, if it had not
been the essential reality, then man would have shown
himself greater and better than God by the mere fact
of having imagined it.’1
1 Charles Lancelin: La RtincamaUon.

318
CHAPTER IV

THE REALISATION OF THE SOVEREIGN GOOD

In evolution as thus understood, the evidence for the


progressive realisation of sovereign good is over¬
whelming.
Rationalistic pessimism follows naturally on a view
of the universe, which, being only partial, is also false.
A more extended and complete view leads to the quite
opposite conclusion of optimist idealism.
This synthetic outlook solves, once and for all, the
problem of evil.
In the first place, the definite, positive, and absolute
character ^ attributed to evil is inconsistent with the
whole palingenetic idea. Evil has only a relative meaning
and is always reparable.
Take, for instance, the greatest of seeming evils—
Death.
Not only is Death no longer ‘ the King of Terrors,’
but it is no longer the ‘ curse ’ which man, limited by
the physical body and blinded by the illusion of matter,
has made it.
In palingenetic evolution death is an evil only when
it is premature and traverses or retards individual
evolution.
Intercalated between successive lives, and. coming at
its due time when the organism has given all it can give,
Death is the great minister of orderly evolution. As
has been already explained, the individual is thereby
afforded many successive fields of action, thus avoiding
a one-sided development of consciousness. Death has
also another function not less useful, though the blindness
of man generally refuses to understand its necessity or
319
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
even revolts against it; it breaks the links that would
otherwise keep him within the associations of this, the
single life he has last quitted and within the limitations
of which he has last received impressions.
Doubdess this rupture is painful; it cuts him off
roughly from his customary habits and affections; but
this relative and reparable sacrifice is indispensable to
progress.
The rupture, moreover, is far from being always
an evil, for while it deprives him of his power of action
for good, it also removes him from occasions of jealousy,
hatred, disease, and impotence, or even from an environ¬
ment in which his development is impeded. It obliges
him to relinquish along with the worn-out body, the
habits which have become a sterile routine.
Another seeming evil of the same kind as. death is
the ignorance by incarnate man of his real position and
his oblivion of past lives. Like death this ignorance
and oblivion are essential conditions of evolutionary
progress.
What is true of death and ignorance is true of all evils.
It cannot be too strongly emphasised that under the
palingenedc scheme, evil loses the absolute and irreparable
character which makes it so unbearable. By the light
of this idea the earth—that vale of pain and tears—takes
on quite another aspect.
Doubdess. pain is still present everywhere, but
permanent pain has vanished. There are no more
hopeless disasters. As there is no annihilation so also
there is no final evil in palingenetic evolution. There
are evil lives as there are bad days in a single life; but
in the total, good and evil fortune fairly balance and
are more or less equal for all.
Henceforward the cause and the function of evil
is perfeedy understandable. Evil does not arise from
the will, nor the impotence, nor the want of foresight
of a responsible Creator.
320
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
Nor is it the result of a Fall.
It is the inevitable accompaniment of awaking
consciousness. The efforts required for the transition
from unconsciousness to consciousness cannot but be
painful. Chaos, gropings, struggle, suffering—all are
the consequences of primitive ignorance and of the
effort to leave it behind.
Evolutionary theory is only the statement of these
gropings, these struggles, ana these sufferings: and
if evolution has its foundations in unconsciousness, in
ignorance, and in evil, its summit is in light, in know¬
ledge, and in happiness.
Evil, in short, is but the measure of inferiority; alike
for worlds and for the living beings they contain. In
the lower phases of their evolution it is the price of this
supreme good—the acquisition of consciousness.
As evil is strictly provisional, we can form some idea
of the future good which the higher phases of evolution
have in store. In the first place the idea of annihilation
will have disappeared. Death will no longer be feared
either for ourselves or for those we love. It will be
looked upon as we look upon rest at the end of day—
a preparation for the activities of the morrow.
There will be no reason to desire it prematurely,
for life will show a great predominance of occasions for
happiness and a diminution of occasions for pain.
Disease will be vanquished, accidents will be rare; old
age will no longer devastate and poison existence with
its infirmities, but instead of coming as it now does even
before full maturity, it will come only in the closing
years, leaving physical and intellectual strength, health,
and energy untouched up to the end.
In proportion to the development of consciousness,
the organism will be perfected and idealised if not
actually transformed. Physical beauty will be the rule,
though with diversities of type that will exclude all
sameness and monotony.
321
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
The causes of pain due to nature, to vital and
physiological necessities, to social conditions only worthy
of savages, will be greatly reduced under progress of
every kind.
Moral suffering also will diminish in frequency and
prevalence. It is hard to imagine an evolved humanity
subject to the numberless troubles which are now due
to hatred, jealousy, and love. Love will be what it
ought to be—a source of joy only; it is now the greatest
source of pain and too often resembles the worst mental
diseases.
The sufferings which have been called the malady
of thought, win disappear by the single fact that
humanity will have a clear view of its own destiny
and purpose, and of those of the universe.
Concurrently with the lessened causes of suffering
there will be, naturally and inevitably, an accession of
causes for happiness.
The development of intuition and consciousness, of
psychic and metapsychic faculty, of the a;sthetic and
moral sense will multiply tenfold the emotions of joy
and will make possible a harvest of contentment of
which we can as yet scarcely form a notion.
The realisation of sovereign good, in a word, will
necessarily and inevitably accompany the realisation of
sovereign consciousness and sovereign justice.

322
CONCLUSION

If now, at the end of our labours, we cast a backward


glance over the path we have travelled, we shall find
additional grounds for trust in an optimist interpretation
of the universe, and in the truth of the interpretation
whose main outlines we have given.
One single hypothesis—that of an essential dynamo-
psychism objectified in representations and passing, by those
representations, from unconsciousness to consciousness, suffices
to explain everything, with no other limitations than
those natural to the faculties we now actually possess.
Ixt us look back on what this hypothesis allows

* In Physiology, by the demonstrated thesis of a


centralising and directing dynamism, it explains the
building up of the organism, its specific form, its functions
its maintenance, its repair, its embryonic changes, the
laws of heredity, extra-corporeal dynamic action, the
phenomena of exteriorisation and ideoplastic materiali¬
sation. . .
In Psychology, by demonstration of a superior
psychism independent of cerebral function and by
distinguishing the Self from states of consciousness, it
gives a clear interpretation of the complexities or men¬
tality and differentiates between consciousness apd
unconsciousness; it explains the enigmas which anse
from dissociations of personality, the various modes
of subconscious psychism, innate proclivities, crypto-
nsvehism, cryptomncsia, inspiration, genius, instinct, and
intuition. In interprets hypnotism, _ the
mediumship, action from mind to mind, telepathy and
lucidity. It even gives a clue to neuropathic states and
323
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
essential dementia, states whose obscure pathology
has been the reproach of medical science.
In the natural sciences it reveals the primordial
and essential factor of evolution and relegates to their
proper places the classical factors of selection and
adaptation. It explains the origin of species and dis¬
entangles the laws of natural from those of acquired
finality.
In philosophy, it gives an interpretation of the
universe and of the individual, of tneir destiny and
their purpose, which covers all the facts, disencumbered
of verbalism and abstractions. It sketches out the
demonstration of a great metaphysical hypothesis on
the nature of things.
To the problem of evil—that stone of stumbling to
all theologies—it brings a solution which is simple,
clear, and fully satisfying. While showing the individual
the causes of his sufferings, it warrants his hopes of
justice and happiness, and affirms their realisation
by the unlimited development of undying conscious¬
ness.
Of course in all these explanations and demonstrations
only the main outline of a general synthesis is to be
looked for. An immense mass of detail remains to be
investigated, and the whole of the analytical work still
remains to be done. But this analysis, which seems at
present to be beyond human powers, will be facilitated
by the general ideas laid down.
Once the general doctrine of the transition from
the Unconscious to the Conscious is systematically
established, it will be, like the clue of Ariadne, a slender
guide but a sure one.
Doubtless the great metaphysical enigmas still
remain unexplained, but at least the illusion of ‘ the
unknowable ’ is at an end.
The human mind knows its weakness, but it also
knows its potentialities. It will no longer seek the
324
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
answer to these enigmas from an intuition that is neces¬
sarily limited and fallible, not in puerile ‘initiations,’
nor in obsolete dogmas. It will await the complete
answers from the continuous development of conscious¬
ness. It knows that there will come a time when this
consciousness, grown to its full stature, will be able
to transcend all its limitations, to attain to what is now
inaccessible, to understand what is now incomprehensible
—the thing in itself—the Infinite—and God.
For the present and henceforward the mind may
find in this sketch of a scientific philosophy a satisfaction
as yet unknown, for this outline results from a calculation
of probabilities based on facts, and in accord tmth all the
facts.
It seems impossible that the concurrence of so many
facts should result in an error in generalisation, that
so many well-established and irrefutable premises should
lead to a false conclusion.
As Schopenhauer wrote:—

‘ The theory which can decipher the relations


between the world and all things that it contains,
should find the warrant of its truth in the unity so
established between the many different natural
phenomena—a unity which is not apparent apart
from that theory. When we have to deal with
an inscription whose alphabetical characters are
unknown, we make successive trials until we
reach a combination that gives intelligible words and
coherent sentences. No doubt then remains that
the decipherment is correct, for it is impossible to
suppose that the unity established among the written
signs could be due to chance, or could come about
bv assigning any other value to the letters. In the
same way the reading of the world-cipher should
carry its own proof. It should shed its equal light
on all terrestrial phenomena, and bring the most
325 z
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
heterogeneous into accord, so that all contradictions,
even between the most diverse, disappear.
‘ This intrinsic proof is the criterion of inter¬
pretation.’

Like Schopenhauer, we demand for our book the


test of this criterion. It is indeed the logical sequel
to his work, and the extension of his theories by adapta¬
tion to all the new facts. We have made no essential
change in his philosophy, and we bring to it only the
sketch of a scientific demonstration of its truth. We
offer it as the natural complement to that philosophy
as a readjustment which modern discoveries render
obligatory.
Thus understood, our book, ‘From the Unconscious
to the Conscious,’ could necessarily be no more than a
ground-plan, a plan which will need many amendments
before the superstructure is complete. But it claims
to indicate* and give a forecast of that which once
completed will be a monument of scientific philosophy
by the exactitude of its proportions, the harmony of
its general effect and its own intrinsic beauty.
This beauty and harmony are the symbols of Truth
and hold out a greater promise than comfort of mind
and heart: they carry more than a scientific or meta¬
physical satisfaction; they minister to deep and intense
religious conviction in the best meaning of those words.

‘The special religion of the philosopher,’ says


Averroes, ‘ is in the study of that which is; for the
highest worship he can render to God is to seek the
knowledge of His works which leads us to know¬
ledge of Himself in all His fullness. In the eyes
of God that is the noblest of pursuits; while the
most debased is to tax with error and vain presump¬
tion him who renders to the Deity a worship nobler
326
From the Unconscious to the Conscious
than any other, and venerates Him by this religion
which is the best of all.’

Under the aegis of these words I offer my book with


confidence to believers, to philosophers, and to men of
science alike. It disregards all differences of opinion
and method, and appeals to all who have at heart a
love of the Ideal.

Taourirt—Paris,
1915-1918.

327
APPENDIX

The photographs here reproduced give a very clear idea


of the processus of materialisations described in the
second part of Book I. Chapter II. on the problems of
supernormal physiology.
I -wish to draw special attention to No. 7. It is
one of the most remarkable that I have obtained; and
was taken during the formation and prior to the terminal
phase. . The eyes are perfectly materialised and very
expressive. Other parts of the face, and more especially
the lower portions are far from being as complete. A
thick rudiment of substance frdm the original ‘ cord * is
still attached to the corner of the' lips. The features
are crossed by streaks, some of jvhich are disposed
geometrically; these indicate the centres of force for
materialisation. They may bp compared to the nervurcs
of a leaf. •>' .
A mass of beautiful dark hair, of which a tress passes
between the neck and the rudiment above-mentioned,
is not visible against the black background, but is quite
visible on a stereoscopic plate which I was able to secure.
This fine materialisation took place under my eyes
and I could follow its whole development.
G. Geley.

328
1 her . ion of

The photograph does not show the hiir writ 'Vhh'** ^ T* !,l,m UT !'*wrf r°ni ,(U
the rUdlmMt »»< the nZk doe. 5 U’r
but missed the opportunity of taking a photograph.)
’* Hie same, in another position.
*7» The same, from another standpoint.
■ii* ''
Enlargement or No. 16. of the heads represented in Nos.
curtain remained widely open.)

En’ irg.ment ot No. 9. 23. Enlugement of a female head materialised during
the s tme se tnce as No. 8.
GLASGOW : W COLLINS SONS AND CO LTD.

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