Sample - Petitioner Memorial

JSSLC INTRA – COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2019

TEAM CODE

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF VINDHYA

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION
W/P NO. OF 2019
Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of Vindhya
MR. HARVEY DENT ........................................................... PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE SPEAKER,
KARUNADU LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY & ORS……... RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
Most Respectfully Submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya
Counsel for the Petitioner Petitioner
Sd/- (Signature) Sd/-
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

JSSLC INTRA – COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sl. No. Particulars Page No.
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
 Books referred
 Dictionaries and Law Lexicons
 Statutes and Rules referred
 Articles Referred
 Websites referred
 Table of Cases
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS
5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable?

II. Whether the Supreme Court can interfere with the
functioning of the speaker of a Legislative Assembly?
III. Whether the date of re-submission of resignation
supersedes the date on which their intended resignation
were originally rendered?
IV. Whether the disqualification proceedings act as a bar on the
speaker to decide on the resignations?
8. PRAYER
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ii

JSSLC INTRA- COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2019
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1. AIR : All India Reporter

2. All. : Allahabad
3. Art. : Article
4. Assn. : Association
5. CJ : Chief Justice
6. Co. : Company
7. Corpn. : Corporation
8. CrLJ : Criminal Law Journal
9. e.g. : Exempli gratia
10. Edn. : Edition
11. HC : High Court
12. Hon’ble : Honorable
13. i.e. : That is
14. ILR : Indian Law Journal
15. Ltd. : Limited
16. MLA : Member of Legislative Assembly
17. Pvt. : Private
18. SC : Supreme Court
19. SCC : Supreme Court Cases
20. SCJ : Supreme Court Journal
21. Sec. : Section
22. u/A : Under Article
23. UOI : Union Of India
24. UP : Uttar Pradesh
25. v. : Versus
26. Vol. : Volume
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page iii

JSSLC INTRA- COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2019
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS REFERRED
i. ABHE SINGH YADAV, “LAW OF WRITS; JURISDICTION AND ITS

EFFICIENCY”, UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING AND COMPANY, 1ST
EDN., 2009.
ii. D.D. BASU: “COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, LEXIS
NEXIS, NAGPUR, VOL.4, 8TH EDN., 2008.
iii. D.D. BASU: “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, LEXIS NEXIS, NAGPUR, 14TH
EDN.,2009.
iv. D.D. BASU: “SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, PRENTICE HALL OF
INDIA PVT. LTD., NEW DELHI, 12TH EDN.
v. D.J. DE, “THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, ASIA LAW HOUSE,
HYDERABAD, VOL. 2, 2002 EDN.
vi. DR. L.M. SHINGHVI, “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, THOMSON REUTERS,
NEW DELHI, VOL.2, 3RD EDN., 2013
vii. DR. SUBHASH C. KASHYAP, “CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA”,
UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO., DELHI, VOL.1, 2008 EDN.
viii. DR. J.N. PANDEY, “CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA”, CENTRAL LAW
AGENCY , 51TH EDN.,2013
ix. H.M.SEERVAI, “CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA”, UNIVERSAL LAW
PUBLICATION, 25TH EDN. (REP 2012)
x. J.C. JOHARI, “THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, N.M. TRIPATHI PVT.
LTD., BOMBAY, 4TH EDN.
xi. JAIN M.P., “INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW”, WADHWA AND
COMPANY, NAGPUR, 5TH EDN. (REP.2005)
xii. JUSTICE BHAGABATI PROSAD BANERJEE, “WRIT REMEDIES”,
WADHWA AND COMPANY LAW PUBLISHERS, NAGPUR, 2ND EDN. 1999
xiii. MADHUSUDAN SAHARAY, “LAW OF WRITS”, PREMIER PUBLISHING
CO., 2009.
xiv. P.M. BAKSHI, “THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, UNIVERSAL LAW
PUBLISHING CO. PVT. LTD., 9TH EDN.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page iv

xv. P.M. BAKSHI, JASWANT SINGH, DEEPAK ARORA, “THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA” VOL. I AND VOL. II., MADRAS JOURNAL LAW OFFICE,
MADRAS.
xvi. V.N.SHUKLA, “CONSTITUTION OF INDIA”, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY,
12TH EDN., 2013.
xvii. ALL INDIA REPORTS.
xviii. SUPREME COURT CASES.
DICTONARIES AND LAW LEXICONS
1. BLACK HENRY CAMPBELL, BLACK ' S LAW DICTIONARY 6TH EDN., 1990
2. BURTON WILLIAM C, LEGAL THESAURUS, 2ND EDN., 1992
3. GARNER BRYAN, BLACK ' LAW DICTIONARY, 7TH EDN
4. GARNER BRYAN, MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 1991
5. PRAMANATHA'S AIYER'S, "LAW LEXICON", 2ND EDN., 1997
6. THE OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER DICTIONARY, 6TH EDN. 2003
7. WHARTON, LAW LEXICON, 14TH EDN. 1993
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page v

STATUTES AND RULES REFERRED
1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

2. KARNATAKA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY(DISQUALIFICATION ON THE
GROUND OF DEFECTION) RULES, 1986
3. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF BUISNESS IN KARNATAKA

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
4. THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1951
5. X SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
ARTICLES REFERRED:
1. JENNA NARAYAN, “DEFECT-SHUN: UNDERSTANDING SCHEDULE X OF

THE CONSTITUTION”, INDIA LAW JOURNAL (2007)
2. JUSTICE Dr.B.S.CHAUHAN, “AN ARTICLE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW”,

PUBLISHED ON 15th SEPTEMBER 2018
3. MEHAL JAIN, “CAN RESGINATION AVOID DISQUALIFICATION? ROHATGI,
SINGHVI & DHAVAN BATTLE IT OUT IN KARNATAKA MLAs CASE”, LIVE
LAW- ALL ABOUT LAW (2019)
4. MONIKA, “INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950”, GAL
BITES – LAW & BEYOND (2019)
5. V.VENKATESAN, “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT”, FRONTLINE- THE
HINDU,2012
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page vi

LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED

 http://www.manupatra.com
 http://www.legalpundits.com
 http://www.lexisite.com
 http://www.judisnic.in
 http://www.cdjlawjournal.com
 http://www.lawteacher.net
 http://www.legalindia.in
 http://www.lawlex.org
 http://www.legalserviceindia.com
 http://www.legalcrystal.com
 http://www.legallyindia.com
 http://www.livelaw.com
 http://www.thehindu.com
 http://www.barandbench.com
 http://www.casemine.com
 http://www.LawyerServices.in
 http://www.mea.gov.in
 http://www.india.gov.in
 http://www.kla.kar.nic.in
 http://www.barandbench.com
 http://www.lawoctopus.com
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page vii

TABLE OF CASES
SL. NO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION

1. MANU/TN/2263/2008
A.K. Bose v. The Speaker
2. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.

3. AIR 1974 SC 1389
Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society &
Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr
4. Algaapuram R. Mohanraj v. Tamil Nadu AIR 2016 SC 863
Legislative Assembly
5. B.N. Bajpai v Ramdayal Uike And Others 2001 (2) MPHT 96 (CG)
6. Balchandra L. Jarkiholi and Ors. Vs. B.S. (2011) 7 SCC 1
Yeddyurappa and Ors
7. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861
8. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu AIR 1993 SC 412
9. Kochunni v. State of Madras AIR 1959 SC 725
10. L.Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
11. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 SCC (1) 248

12. AIR 1980 SC 1789
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India
13 Olga Tellis & Ors. v Bombay Municipal 1985 SCC (3) 545
Corporation & Ors
14.
P.C.George v. The Hon'Ble Speaker 2016 (2) KHC 137
15. Panna Lal Aagyan v. Hon’BleSpeaker AIR 1988 All 167

16. (2007) 3 SCC 184
Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker,
LokSabha and Others
17. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538
18. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549
19. 1992 AIR 1153
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Muncipal
Committee
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page viii
20. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal AIR 2013 SC 1181

Keshari Parida
21. State of West Bengal and other v. The AIR 2010 SC 1476
Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal
22. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75
23.
State of West Bengal v. Committee for the AIR 2010 SC 1476
protection of democratic rights
24. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 409
25. AIR 1968 SC 1138
Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India
26. Vikram Singh v Shri Ram Ballabhji Kasat AIR 1995 MP 140
And Ors
27. Wanglam Sawin, MLA & Another v. The AIR 2016 GAU 43
Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative
Assembly
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ix

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Writ Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Vindhya
under Article 32 of the Constitution of Vindhya, 1949
Wherein, Article 32 reads as under:
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part -
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may
be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS
 The Republic of Vindhya is a sub-continental country having 29 states and 7 union
territories with a quasi-federal setup.
 Karunadu, one of the states in Vindhya has a bicameral legislature and the 15 th Karunadu
legislative elections were held during April-May and the results were announced on May
13th, 2018. VRP emerged as a single majority party and upon the request, Governor
allowed VRP to form the Government.
 Contending this, VCP and PPK entered into post-poll alliance and approached the
Hon’ble Supreme Court to grant stay on the swearing-in ceremony of Mr. Ben Yoda, the
leader of VRP. As a result of the floor test Mr. Kevin Spacey proved the majority and
became the Chief Minister of Karunadu. The new government on failure to provide the
posts to the expected faces led to clashes between the members
 On 11th July disqualification petition was moved against Dr. Stephen and Mr. Harvey
Dent, by leaders of alliance on the ground of anti-party activities. On March 4th, Dr.
Stephen tendered his resignation and the same was accepted by the Speaker Robert Zane
on 1st April. Failure on part of VCP to move the seat of administration to the garden city
arose differences of opinion between the members.
 The rebel MLAs on 6th July handed over their resignations to the personal assistant of
Mr.Robert Zane and flew back to the Imperial City in the State of Devagiri. Several
attempts made to contact the rebel MLAs failed and the whole cabinet including the
Dy.C.M resigned from their portfolios to woo the rebel MLAs which failed.
 On 9th July Mr. Robert Zane gave a press statement that in those resignation letters
submitted by the rebel MLAs only 5 were in correct format and the remaining were not in
the correct format and he asked those letters in incorrect format to be resubmitted to him
by meeting him in person. Responding to the same, on 11th July the 8 MLAs flew back to
meet the Speaker in person and resubmitted those resignation letters to him. Even then the
Speaker refused to take appropriate action for two weeks from the date of resubmission
and fixed two dates i.e., 22nd and 24th July 2019 for hearing disqualification proceedings.
 With this action of the speaker, the MLAs approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Vindhya on 26th July 2019 claiming such delay in decision on resignation is infringing
their constitutional rights to resign from their membership as MLAs.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page x

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
2. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE

FUNCTIONING OF THE SPEAKER OF A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY?
3. WHETHER THE DATE OF RE-SUBMISSION OF RESIGNATION
SUPERSEDES THE DATE ON WHICH THEIR INTENDED RESIGNATION
WERE ORIGINALLY RENDERED?
4. WHETHER THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS ACT AS A BAR ON
THE SPEAKER TO DECIDE ON THE RESIGNATIONS?
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page xi

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindya that the Writ petition
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is maintainable. The Supreme Court of Vindhya has
jurisdiction under Article 32 to issue writ to the respondent. Also, the Fundamental Rights of
the petitioners are infringed and the hence this Writ petition is filed in the interest of
petitioners.
2. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE SPEAKER OF A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya that it can interfere
with the functioning of Speaker of Legislative Assembly. The Doctrine of separation of
power is not strictly construed and hence judicial review falls under the basic structure of
Constitution of Vindhya. If the proceedings are illegal, irrational, violation of constitutional
mandate, malafide, noncompliance with rules of natural justice and perverse then the
privilege given under Article 212 shall not apply.
3. WHETHER THE DATE OF RE-SUBMISSION OF RESIGNATION SUPERSEDES
THE DATE ON WHICH THEIR INTENDED RESIGNATION WERE ORIGINALLY
RENDERED?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya that date of re-
submission of resignation does not supersede the date on which the intended resignation were
originally rendered as the resignation letters submitted on 6th of July 2019 were in the
prescribed format as per Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in
Karunadu Legislative Assembly.
4. WHETHER THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS ACT AS A BAR ON
THE SPEAKER TO DECIDE ON RESIGNATIONS?
It is humbly submitted before the the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya that the
disqualification proceedings does not act as a bar on the Speaker to decide on resignations as
the resignation submitted on 6th of July 2019 were in the prescribed format and there was no
disqualification petition against the petitioners on the said date. Article 190 read with Rule
202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative Assembly
provides for the speaker to accept the resignation if it is voluntary and genuine.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page xii

JSSLC INTRA-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2019
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the petition in the instant case is
maintainable. The Petitioners seek the Art. 32 of the Indian Constitution as the locus standi,
according to which;
(1) The Right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
Rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in
the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may
be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the Rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2),
Parliament may by law empower any other Court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)
(4) The Right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution.1
Dr. Ambedkar Rightly stated that: “If I was asked to name any particular article in this
Constitution as the most important- an article without which this Constitution would be a
nullity— I could not refer to any other article except this one. It is the very soul of the
Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that the House has realized its importance.” 2
According to Article 32, an individual whose privilege (Fundamental Right) is encroached by an

arbitrary administrative action may approach the Court for a suitable remedy. Article 32(2) of the
Constitution of India gives: “The Supreme Court will have the capacity to issue bearings or
requests or writs, incorporating writs in the idea of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto, and certiorari, whichever might be suitable, for the requirement of any of Rights given
by this Part.”
1
The Constitution of India, 1949
2
Dr. V.N SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA., EBC Publishing (P) Ltd., (2019) 13th Ed., p.341
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS Page | 1

In Kochunni v. State of Madras3, the Court held that:
“The Right to move before this Court under Article 32, when a Fundamental Right has been
breached, is a substantive Fundamental Right by itself. In a series of cases, this Court has held
that it is the duty of this Court to enforce the guaranteed Fundamental Rights.”
In the case at hand, the Petitioners in a view to uphold the collective opinion of the citizens in
their constituencies and due to the lack of commitment from the ruling government decided to
withdraw their support from the government. In spite of the resignation being submitted
according to the Rules mentioned, the very act of the Speaker to accept 5 resignation and stating
that the other were not in a prescribed form clearly shows the arbitrary and biased intentions of
the Speaker towards protecting the government.
Further, the Speaker did not take any action on the resignation petition submitted by the
Petitioners but initiated disqualification proceedings against these members. This lackadaisical
attitude by the Speaker has not only led to the violation of the Constitution Right to Resign but
also has violated the Petitioners Fundamental Rights under Article 14, Article 19(1)(g) and
Article 21.
1.1 ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF VINDHYA:
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.” 4
Right to equality is a one of the most important part of our Indian Constitution, which gives
strengthen to all those people who belongs to Indian nationality.
The said Article is clearly in two parts – while it commands the State not to deny to any person
‘equality before law’, it also commands the State not to deny the ‘equal protection of the laws’.
Equality before law prohibits discrimination. The phrase “equality before law” finds a place in
almost all the aspects that guarantees Fundamental Right. Both of these expressions aim at
establishing what is called “equality of status”, while both the expression are kind of identical
3
1959 (2) Supp. SCR 316
4

but they do not give a similar meaning. Hence it is an obligation on the state to treat every person
equally and to provide them with equal protection under law. 5
 Rule of Law in India:
1. Absence of Arbitrary Power or Supremacy of Law:
The First meaning of the Rule of Law is that 'no man is punishable or can lawfully be made to
suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal
manner before the ordinary Courts of the land. It implies that a man may be punished for a
breach of law but cannot be punished for anything else. No man can be punished except for a
breach of law. An alleged offence is required to be proved before the ordinary Courts in
accordance with the ordinary procedure.
2. Equality before Law:-
The second meaning of the Rule of Law is that no man is above law. Every man, whatever be his
rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of
the ordinary tribunals. Everybody under Article 14 is equal before law and have equal
protection.6
 Test of Reasonable Classification:
While Article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons,
objects, and transactions by the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. But
classification must not be “arbitrary, artificial or evasive”. It must always rest upon some real
upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation. Classification to be reasonable must fulfill the following
two conditions
i. Firstly the classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which

distinguishes persons or thing that are grouped together from others left out of the group
5
Evolution of Part III of Indian Constitution (24th February 2015)
6
DR. J. N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Central Law Agency, (2015) 52nd Ed., p.78

ii. Secondly the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the act.
The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the act are two distinct
things. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the
object of the act which makes the classification. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a
classification that legislation making such classification may be declared discriminatory. 7
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras8 it was argued by the Petitioners that whether the validity of
any law shall be decided by the fact that it is a procedure established by law or the law along
with being established by law shall also conform to principles of natural justice. Justice Fazal Ali
opined that the Right to life u/a 21 does constitute Principles of Natural Justice and the Courts
should check that any procedure established by law do not suffer with the problem of
unreasonableness & arbitrariness.
The Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India9 adopted the dissenting view of Justice Fazal Ali
in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras10. Therefore, the Court held that the while the procedure
established by law should be reasonable, just and fair it shall be free from any unreasonableness
and arbitrariness.
In this instant case, the resignation letters submitted by the Petitioners on 6th July 2019 which has
been provided in Annexure has to be looked into. The resignation letters submitted by all the
Petitioners were in the same format and yet the Speaker came to a conclusion that 5 were in
correct format and the rest had to be resubmitted to him in person by Petitioners. If 5 resignation
letters were in correct format then all had to be in correct format and if one was in incorrect
format then all were supposed to be in incorrect format. This classification when subjected to the
test of reasonable classification is neither made on the grounds of intelligible differentia as the
classification is being made by the Speaker on the people who are grouped together by their
profession and duties nor is reasonable in nature as it casts a discriminating shadow between the
members. The act of the Speaker thus can be deemed as unConstitutional, arbitrary, illegal and
7
Shiksha, Reasonable Classification under Art 14 (2010)
8
AIR 1950 SC 27
9
1978 SCC (1) 248
10
AIR 1950 SC 27

biased favoring the ruling government by providing them more time to compromise on the issue
with the Petitioners thus infringing the Fundamental Right of the Petitioners to be treated equally
before law as provided under Article 14.
1.2 ARTICLE 21 OF CONSTITUTION OF VINDHYA:
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
Established by Law”11
Right to Life under Article 21 is Fundamental to our very existence without which we cannot
live as a human being and includes all those aspects of life, which go to make a man’s life
meaningful, complete, and worth living. Thus, the bare necessities, minimum and basic
requirements that is essential and unavoidable for a person is the core concept of the Right to
life. 12
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation13 the Court has held that:
“…which makes life possible to live, must be deemed to be an integral component of the Right
to Life. For if a person is deprived of his Right to livelihood he shall be consequently deprived of
his Right to life, for life- as enshrined under Article 21, meant more than mere animal existence.”
Right to work is the idea that individuals have to take part in productive employment, and may
not be kept from doing as such. It is one such Right that has not only got the recognition of
Indian Judiciary but the same has been revered in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and recognized in International Human Rights law through its incorporation in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, where the Right to work
focuses on financial, social and cultural development.
The ‘Right to work’ subsequently is the most basic component of life to live. To have the basic
needs of food, water, clothing and shelter and furthermore something more than simply the basic
needs of life one must work to earn.
11
12
Riya Jain, Article 21 of Constitution of India - Right to Life and Personal Liberty (13th November, 2015)
13
1985 SCC (3) 545

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the two of which were acceded by India, in Article 23 and Article 6
separately, perceive the Right to work in employment of one’s own choice and the State’s
obligation to protect this Right.14
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration15, the Supreme Court reiterated with the approval that the
“Right to life” included the Right to lead a healthy life so as to enjoy all faculties of the human
body in their prime conditions. It would even include the Right to protection of a person’s
tradition, culture, heritage and all that gives meaning to a man’s life. It includes the Right to live
in peace, to sleep in peace and the Right to repose and health.
Hence it is a well-established fact backed up by the Indian Judiciary that the bare necessities,
minimum and basic requirements that are essential and unavoidable for a person is the core
concept of the Right to life. The Right to Work being one such bare necessities also includes
Right to resign under the said article as compelling one person to work against his will violates
the very freedom provided under the Indian Constitution.
In the case at hand, the Speakers action asking to resubmit the other resignation letter excluding
5 when all were in the same format clearly indicates the arbitrary and biased nature towards the
ruling government in buying them some time. The said action of the Speaker has left the
Petitioners helpless wherein neither their Right to work is being safeguarded and nor their Right
to resign is being recognized which is in direct violation of the principle of personal liberty and
human dignity enshrined under Article 21.
1.3 ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VINDHYA: RIGHT OF TRADE

AND OCCUPATION:
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees that all citizens have the Right to practice any
profession to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Every citizen of the nation has the Right
14
Legodesk, Right to Work in Indian Constitution
15
(1978) 4 SCC 409

to carry on trade, business or occupation of his own choice and what comes under these terms
were iterated in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Muncipal Committee16 where the Court held:
“The word ‘Occupation’ has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job, principal
activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged.”
The same, when applied to the instant case, the work done by the Petitioners can be put under the
purview of the occupation as it is a regular work of service without any expertise or skill done
towards the people of their own respective constituencies upholding the very reason why they
were elected in the first place.
In the instant case, the resignation was submitted by the Petitioners according to the prescribed
format of Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative
Assembly and the very conduct of the Petitioners going to the Speaker’s office within the
working hours to submit the resignation form clearly shows the genuineness and voluntariness
behind the resignation. In spite of that, again the Petitioners presented themselves before the
Speaker to ascertain him about their voluntariness in resigning, yet the Speaker did not take any
decision on the resignation and kept it pending. This indirectly was done to favor the Ruling
Government and to have a bar on the Petitioners to return to the electorate and seek a fresh
mandate as the first and foremost duty of legislators is towards their constituency.
The above said restriction does not pass the test of reasonableness where the restriction imposed
is neither in the interest of the public nor is reasonable in nature and thus infringing the
Fundamental Right of Trade and Occupation.
1.4 ARTICLE 14, 19 AND 21: GOLDEN TRIANGLES OF THE CONSTITUTION:
Article 14, 19 and 21 are regarded as The Golden Triangles of the Constitution. These Rights are
regarded as the basic principles for the smooth running of life for the citizens of our country. The
golden triangle provides full protection to individuals from any encroachment upon their Rights
from the society and others as well.
16
(1989) 4 SCC 155

In the case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India17, the Court concluded that the Articles 14, 19 and
21 are the golden triangles of the Constitution.
Hence before deciding a case the Court should make sure that the golden triangle of the
Constitution is not being violated. In the instant case, the Speaker by rejecting the resignation
letters of the Petitioners which were of the same format of that of the other 5 MLAs whose letters
were accepted is said to have violated Article 14. The said action of the Speaker has left the
Petitioners in helpless position wherein neither their Right to work is being safeguarded and nor
their Right to resign is being recognized which is in direct violation of the principle of personal
liberty and human dignity enshrined under Article 21. The said action of the Speaker also puts a
bar on the Petitioners to exercise their Right to practice any occupation there by infringing all the
three important basic Fundamental Rights provided under Constitution.
17
1978 SCC (1) 248

2. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE FUNCTONING

OF THE SPEAKER OF A LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it can interfere with the
functioning of the Speaker of a Legislative Assembly.
2.1 DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS NOT STRICTLY CONSTRUED:

“Power corrupts and absolute Power tends to corrupt absolutely.” is the best known quotation of
the 19th century British politician Lord Acton.
In India, the Doctrine of Separation of Powers has not been accorded Constitutional status. Apart
from the Directive Principle laid down in Article 50 which enjoins Separation of Judiciary from
the Executive, the Constitutional scheme does not embody any formalistic and dogmatic division
of powers.18
The Supreme Court in Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab19 held:

“Indian Constitution has not indeed recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in its
absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the government have been
sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can be very well said that our Constitution does
not contemplate assumption by one organ or part of the State of functions that essentially belong
to another.” The Court in the above case was of the opinion that the Doctrine of Separation of
Power was not fully accepted in India.
It is the observation of Justice Das in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar20 when he said –
“The Constitution does not express the existence of separation of powers, and it is true that
division of powers of the government into legislative, executive and judicial is implicit in the
Constitution but the doctrine does not form an essential basis of foundation stone of the
Constitutional framework as it does in U.S.A”
18
UpendraBaxi: Developments in Indian Administrative Law, in PUBLIC LAW INDIA
19
AIR 1955 SC 549
20
AIR 1955 SC 549

The Court has categorically stated that the doctrine has not been accepted by our Constitution.21
2.2 JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A BASIC STRUCTURE:

The task to check the Constitutionality of the laws and of the action is done by the judiciary. This
is termed as the ‘judicial review’. Thus, judicial review is defined as ‘the power of the Court to
determine whether the acts of legislature and executive are consistent with the Constitution or the
Constitutional values’. 22
It is submitted that every power has its limitations and power conferred on Parliament is not an
exception to this Rule. It has, therefore, no absolute Right to take any action or make any order it
likes. It was stated that this Court has accepted this principle in several cases by observing that
absolute power is possible 'only in the moon' as observed in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College
Society v. State of Gujarat23
In the case State of West Bengal v. Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights24 the
Supreme Court has laid down the following principles of Constitutional and Statutory
interpretation:.
(3) In view of the Constitutional scheme and the jurisdiction conferred on this Court u/A 32 and
the High Courts u/A 226 of the Constitution the powers of judicial review being an integral part
of the basic structure of the Constitution, no act of Parliament can exclude or curtail the powers
of the Constitutional Court with regard to the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights.
In L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India25, the Supreme Court held that power of judicial review
under Article 32 and 226 is an integral and essential feature of the basic structure of our
Constitution.
21
Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138
22
J. Dr. B. S. Chauhan, Judicial Review (15th Sept 2018)
23
AIR 1974 SC 1389
24
AIR 2010 SC 1476
25
(1997) 3 SCC 261

Judicial review thus formed a specific and special tool in the hands of the judges whereby
unlawful actions of the legislative and executive could be quashed.
2.3 WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWER CURTAIL THE
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW?
In State of West Bengal v. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal26 an
important question arose whether the Doctrine of Separation of Powers curtail the powers of
Judicial Review conferred on the Constitutional Courts even in situations where the Fundamental
Rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged on the ground that exercise of such powers would
impinge upon the said doctrine. In this case Supreme Court held that the guardians and
interpreters of the Constitution, who provide remedy under Articles 32 and 226, whenever there
is an attempted violation of Fundamental Right, cannot be immunized from judicial scrutiny on
the touchstone of doctrine of Separation of Power. Supreme Court or the High Court exercise of
powers under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the Constitution and maintain the Rule of law and this
cannot be termed as violating the federal structure or doctrine of separation of powers.
"The doctrine of Separation of powers cannot curtail of powers of judicial review conferred on
the Constitutional Courts specially in situations where the Fundamental Rights are sought to be
abrogated or abridged under the garb of these doctrines.
Violation of Fundamental Rights cannot be immunised from Judicial scrutiny under Article 226
or under Article 32 on the touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between the legislature,
Executive and the judiciary."
In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu27 submitted that the judicial review being itself the basic
feature of the Constitution, no restriction can be placed even by interference and by principle of
legislative enforcement of Fundamental Rights and protection of the citizens of India. It is
asserted that in exercise of powers either under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the Courts
are merely discharging their duty of judicial review and are neither usurping any jurisdiction, nor
overriding the doctrine of separation of powers. In support of the proposition that the jurisdiction
conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32 as also on the High Courts under Article 226 of
the Constitution is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
26
AIR 2010 SC 1476
27
AIR 2007 SC 861

In Raja Ram Pal v. The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha28, the Supreme Court considered all issues
and laid down in its decision, the parameters of judicial review:
“(s) The proceedings which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or
unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny;
(u) An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the
Court to review the decision but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for
some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of Constitutional mandate, mala
fides, non-compliance with Rules of natural justice and perversity.”
2.4 NON-APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 212:

212. Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature
(1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on
the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure
(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under
this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in
the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him
of those powers29
However, the Article “would not offer a shield when what is at stake is action, which is in
violation of Constitutional guarantees or of mandatory provisions of a statute”, Ruled Justices K
M Joseph and VK Bist of Uttarakhand HC 30
In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India31 the Fundamental Rights and directive principles are
held to be the conscience of the Constitution and disregard of either would upset the equibalance
built up therein.
28
(2007) 3 SCC 184
29
30
Raghav Ohri, How the Courts have dealt with cases challenging decisions of Speakers , THE ECONOMIC
TIMES (Jun 15, 2018, 09.00 AM) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/how-the-courts-
have-dealt-with-cases-challenging-decisions-of-speakers/articleshow/64595860.cms?from=mdr
31
AIR 1980 SC 1789

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India32 case it was held that different articles in the chapter of
Fundamental Rights of the Constitution must be read as an integral whole, with possible
overlapping of the subject-matter of what is sought to be protected by its various provisions
particularly by articles relating to Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution do
not represent entirely separate streams of Rights which do not mingle at many points. They are
all parts of an integrated scheme in the Constitution.
It was held in A.K. Bose v. The Speaker33 that the immunity envisaged in Art.212(1) of the
Constitution is restricted to a case where the complaint is no more than that the procedure was
irregular. If the impugned proceedings are challenged as illegal or unconstitutional such
proceedings would be open to scrutiny in a Court of law.
This Court in the case of Algaapuram R. Mohanraj v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly34, has
held that the principle of the natural justice cannot be violated by the privilege committee.
In the case at hand, the procedure undertaken by the Speaker is indeed illegal and
unconstitutional as the principle of natural justice has not been given any sanctity and sufficient
opportunity for the Petitioners to defend themselves is not given. The arbitrariness in the
Speaker’s conduct is seen as even though the resignation letters were submitted prior to
disqualification proceedings, he went on to decide on disqualification rather than on the
resignations.
There was a clear need for the Speaker to issue a show cause notice under Rule 7 of the
Karunadu Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on the grounds of defection) Rules, 1986 to
the Petitioners before the initiation of the disqualification proceedings.
Rule 7. Procedure.-
(1) On receipt of a petition under Rule 6, the Chairman shall consider whether the petition
complies with the requirements of that Rule.
32
1978 SCC (1) 248
33
MANU/TN/2263/2008
34
AIR 2016 SC 867

(2) If the petition does not comply with the requirements of Rule 6, the Speaker shall dismiss the
petition and intimate the Petitioners accordingly.
(3) If the petition complies with the requirements of Rule 6, the Speaker shall cause copies of the
petition and of the annexures there to be forwarded-
(a) to the Member in relation to whom the petition has been made; and
(b) where such Member belongs to any Legislature Party and such petition has not been made by
the Leader thereof, also to such Leader and such Member or Leader shall, within seven days of
the receipt of such copies, or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause
allow forward his comments in writing thereon to the Speaker.
(4) After considering the comments, if any, in relation to the petition received under Sub-Rule
(3) within the period allowed (whether originally or on extension under that Sub-Rule), the
Chairman may either proceed to determine the question or, if he is satisfied having regard to the
nature and Circumstances of the case that it is necessary or expedient so to do, refer the petition
to the Committee for making a preliminary inquiry and submitting a report to him.
(5) The Chairman shall, as soon as may be after referring a petition to the Committee under Sub-
Rule (4), intimate the Petitioners accordingly and make an announcement with respect to such
reference in the House, or, if the House is not then in Session, cause the information as to be
reference to be published in the Bulletin.
(6) Where the Chairman makes a reference under Sub-Rule (4) to the Committee, he shall
proceed to determine the question as soon as may be after receipt of the report from the
Committee.
(7) The procedure which shall be followed by the Chairman for determining any question and the
Procedure which shall be followed by the Committee for the purpose of making a preliminary
inquiry under Sub-Rule (4) shall be, so far as may be, the same as the procedure for inquiry and
determination by the Committee of any question as to breach of privilege of the House by a
Member, and neither the Speaker nor the Committee shall come to any finding that a Member
has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule without affording a reasonable
opportunity to such Member to represent his case and to be heard in person.
However, the Speaker did not take any decisions on the resignation letters for about two weeks
and meanwhile fixed two dates that is 22nd and 24th of 2019 to hear on the disqualification

proceedings against the Petitioners. This clearly shows that the Speaker is acting arbitrarily and
such act of the Speaker is against the principle of natural justice as reasonable opportunity for the
Petitioners is not provided.
It is also to be noted that the Court's jurisdiction and intervention has been accepted in several of
the judgments and if the Parliament or the Assembly does any act of illegality and acts in
violation of the guarantees given in the Constitution under Articles 14, 20 and 21, certainly
judicial review is permissible as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in in the
case of Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha35. The prohibition contained in Article
212 of the Constitution will be applicable only with respect to “irregularity” and not with respect
to “illegality” and if an Assembly commits an illegality and violates Fundamental Rights,
certainly, the proceedings can be analyzed by means of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution by the High Courts and under Article 32 by the Supreme Court.
It is submitted that the Court can have judicial review by lifting the veil of Parliamentary
privilege as against Fundamental Rights. In this context, a Member of Legislative Assembly like
the Petitioners, like any other citizen, is entitled to have his Fundamental Rights being protected.
Pointing out the provision of the Constitution under Article 212 and paragraph 386 of the
decision of the Supreme Court in above mentioned case, it is contended that any proceedings
leading to illegality or unconstitutionality wherein the principle of natural justice is not being
followed, judicial review is always possible. 36
It was further submitted in said case that the doctrine of natural justice is not merely a matter of
procedure but of substance and any action taken in contravention of natural justice is violative of
Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.37 Reference in this
connection is made in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India38, and Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu39
35
(2007) 3 SCC 184
36
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184
37
38
1978 SCC (1) 248
39
AIR 1993 SC 412

In Jai Singh Rathi v. State of Haryana40 it is clear that in each of the cases the Court found that
the Speaker or the other authorities of the Legislature were acting within their jurisdiction or did
not violate the Constitutional Right of the Petitioners and held that the Court could not interfere
in the decisions taken by the Speaker and other authorities of the Legislature acting within their
jurisdictions on the ground that the procedure laid down under Rules or law had not been strictly
followed.
But in the present case, the act of the Speaker has violated the Fundamental and Constitutional
Rights of the Petitioners and hence the provision in Article 212 does not apply.
The question of extent of judicial review of parliamentary matters has to be resolved with
reference to the provision contained in Article 212. On a plain reading, Article 212(1) prohibits
the validity of any proceedings in Parliament from being called in question in a Court merely on
the ground of irregularity of procedure. In other words, the procedural irregularities cannot be
used by the Court to undo or vitiate what happens within the four walls of the legislature. But
then, “procedural irregularity” stands in stark contrast to “substantive illegality” which cannot be
found included in the former. It is of the considered view that this specific provision with regard
to check on the role of the judicial organ vis-a-vis proceedings in Parliament uses language
which is neither vague nor ambiguous and, therefore, must be treated as the Constitutional
mandate on the subject, rendering unnecessary search for an answer elsewhere or invocation of
principles of harmonious construction.41
It is submitted that the manner of exercise of the power or privilege by Parliament is immune
from judicial scrutiny only to the extent indicated in Article 212(1), that is to say the Court will
decline to interfere if the grievance brought before it is restricted to allegations of “irregularity of
procedure”.42 But in case illegality or violation of Constitutional provisions is shown, the judicial
review will not be inhibited in any manner by Article 212.
40
AIR 1970 P&H 379
41
42
Bhupesh Baghel v. State of Chattisgarh, MANU/SCOR/33826/2017

In the case at hand, an inference can be drawn here stating that the act of Speaker is clearly
unconstitutional and arbitrary as the Speaker kept delaying the acceptance of their resignation
letter on no substantial grounds as the resignation was well in the prescribed form thereby
violating the Petitioners Fundamental and Constitutional Rights. It is also noted that the Speaker
has not adhered to the principle of natural justice which are the foundation stones of any
proceedings.

3.WHETHER THE DATE OF RESUBMISSION OF THE RESIGNATION

SUPERSEDES THE DATE ON WHICH THEIR INTENDED RESIGNATIONS WERE
ORIGINALLY TENDERED?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya that the date of
resubmission of the resignation does not supersede the date on which the intended resignations
were originally tendered.
3.1. FORMAT OF THE RESIGNATION LETTER:
As per Rule 202(1) of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative
Assembly43, the letters tendered by the MLAs on 6th July, 2019 were in the prescribed format.
Rule 202(1) of Rules of Procedures and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative Assembly
is read as follows:
Rule 202: Resignation of seats in the House
(1) A member who desires to resign his seat in the house shall intimate in writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker, his intention to resign his seat in the house in the following form and
shall not give any reason for his resignation.
To
The Speaker
Bangalore.
Sir,
I hereby tender my resignation of my seat in the House with effect from……………..
Yours faithfully,
Place………
Date……… Member of the House
43
Under Article 208(1) of the Constitution of Vindhya

Provided that where any member gives any reason or introduces any extraneous matter the
Speaker may in his discretion, omit such words, phrases, or matter and the same shall not be read
out in the House.
(2) If a member hands over the letter of the resignation to the Speaker personally and informs
him that the resignation is voluntary and genuine and the Speaker has no information or
knowledge to the contrary and if he is satisfied, the Speaker may accept resignation immediately.
This Rule gives the format in which the resignation letter of MLA has to be submitted. Thus the
letter tendered by the MLAs on 6.07.2019 is in the prescribed format according to the Rule
202(1) of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative Assembly.
The format mentioned in the Rule 202(1) is of great importance for considering the validity of
the letter.
3.2. ROLE OF THE PETITIONERS:
The role of the Petitioners is to uphold the collective opinion of the citizen in their constituencies
and to discharge his duties as a leader. The Petitioners in their resignation letter have mentioned
about their inability to discharge their duty as a leader and they have nowhere mentioned the
reason for their resignation as it is well known that the reason for their resignation is the failure
on part of the government to transfer the seat of administration from the Silicon city to the
Garden city.
3.3. ROLE OF THE RESPONDENT:
It is a well-established fact that even if some reason is mentioned in the resignation letters
tendered then a proviso is provided under Rule 202(1) where the Speaker may, at his discretion,
omit such words, phrases, or matter and the same shall not be read out in the House.
The role of the Speaker as mentioned under Rule 202(3) is as follows:
Rule 202(3) of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu Legislative Assembly:
Rule 202: Resignation of seats in the House

(3) If the Speaker receives the letter of resignation either by post or through someone else, the
Speaker may make such enquiry as he thinks fit to satisfy himself that the resignation is
voluntary and genuine. If the Speaker, making a summary enquiry either himself or through the
agency of legislative assembly secretariat or through such other agency, as he may deem fit, it is
satisfied that the resignation is not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept the resignation. 44
In the instant case, the Respondent rejecting the resignation letter tendered before him on 6 th of
July, 2019 which was in the correct format on the ground that it is not in the prescribed format
shows that his act is arbitrary and biased. It can be interpreted that the Respondent is favoring the
Ruling Government and not upholding the value of his Constitutional Position.
3.4. RESPONDENT NOT UPHOLDING THE VALUE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL

POSITION:
Though the letters were resubmitted to the Respondent on 11th of July, 2019 in person, without
taking further steps to enquire into the resignation to determine the voluntariness and
genuineness of the same, he fixed a date for hearing the disqualification petitions which were
tendered to him on a subsequent date.
In Panna Lal Aagyan v. Hon’Ble Speaker45, it was held that it is the discretion of the Speaker to
accept or reject the resignation letter tendered before him only after proper enquiry is made by
him to confirm that those letters submitted before him are voluntary and genuine.
In the instant case, the Respondent even after receiving the letters that were resubmitted to the
him in the correct format, did not take any necessary step to make an enquiry to confirm that
those letters were voluntary and genuine. The act of him fixing the date for hearing the
disqualification petitions shows that the Respondent is clearly favoring the Ruling Government
and took no initiative to decide on the resignation letters submitted before him.
In P.C.George v. The Hon'ble Speaker46, Court held that:
44
Rules of Procedures and Conduct of Business in Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Under Article 208(1) of the
Constitution of India)
45
AIR 1988 All 167
46
2016 (2) KHC 137

“I do not for a moment hold that the Petitioners has not incurred disqualification on account of
voluntarily giving up his membership in his political party in the circumstances obtaining. But I
am of the firm view that a decision on that count was unnecessary and unwarranted in the wake
of the fact that the Petitioners had put in his resignation before. A decision on the question of
W.P.(C). No.37428 of 2015 disqualification of the Petitioners was imminent had the Speaker not
accepted his resignation within the frame work of the proviso to Article 190(3). The principle
that a resignation will not come into effect unless accepted cannot be applied since this is not a
case of a contractual relationship between an employer and employee.”
Court in the above said case allowed the Petitioners Right to resign even though the Petitioners
had submitted his resignation only a day before the decision on disqualification petition was
given by the Speaker.
In the instant case, since the resignation letters were submitted at a prior date, it is the duty of the
Speaker to decide on the resignation letters prior to initiating disqualification proceedings. the
act of the Respondent without deciding anything regarding the resignation letter and fixing the
date for hearing disqualification petition indicates his biased approach. It shows that the Speaker
is acting arbitrarily and he is under the influence of the government.
According to the Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karunadu
Legislative Assembly, it is not mentioned that the MLAs who need to resign must tender their
letters of resignation to the Speaker by meeting him ‘in person’.
But in the instant case, it is given that the Respondent had asked the Petitioners to re-submit the
resignation letter in the correct format by meeting him in person. The Respondent has not
followed the Rules of Procedure as required. It clearly indicated that the Respondent had asked
the Petitioners to meet in person to convince them to withdraw their resignations as without their
support, the Ruling Party would lose the majority in the House. It can also be interpreted that
since the Petitioners had moved to Imperial City in the state of Devagiri, it was not possible for
the senior VCP and PPK leaders to lure them back into the party. Hence, the Respondent issued a
press statement asking them to meet him in person so that an attempt can be made to convince
them in withdrawing the resignations.

3.5. PRIMA FACIE DENIAL OF EQUALITY:
In the instant case, from the given annexure of resignation letters, it is clear that the resignation
letters submitted by all the Petitioners are of the same format. However, the Respondent in his
press statement on 9th of July, 2019, accepted the 5 resignation letters but stated that the
remaining were not in the proper format. The Speaker rejecting the resignations of the remaining
MLAs on no sufficient grounds proves that he is acting arbitrarily as it is against the reasonable
grounds provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of Vindhya.
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution is read as follows:
“The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws
within the territory of law” 47
Hence the Speaker accepting the resignations of five MLAs and rejecting the resignations of
remaining MLAs shows that he is not treating all equally.
In the case at hand, the Speaker by rejecting the resignation letters of the said MLAs, which were
of the same format of that of the other 5 MLAs whose letters were accepted is said to have
violated Article 14 of Constitution of the Vindhya.
Equality before law – The concept of equality does not mean absolute equality among human
beings which is physically not possible to achieve. It is a concept implying absence of any
special privilege by reason of birth, creed or the like in favor of any individual and also the equal
subject of all individuals and classes to the ordinary law of the land.
As Dr. Jennings puts it “Equality before the law means that among equals the law should be
equal and should be equally administered, that like should be treated alike. The Right to sue and
be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action should be same for all
citizens of full age and understanding without distinctions of race, religion, wealth, social status
or political influence”48
47
48
JENNINGS – LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, p. 49 (3rd Ed)

Equal protection of law – This has been interpreted to mean subjection to equal law, applying to
all in the same circumstances.49 It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed by the laws. Equal law
should be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one
person and another. As regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same. 50
Thus the Rule is that the like should be treated alike and not that unlike should be treated alike. 51
Moreover all the resignation letters that were re-submitted by the Petitioners before the
Respondent on 11th of July 2019 were of same format as that of the ones that were submitted on
6th of July, 2019. Therefore there is no substantial ground to state that the resubmission of
resignation letter supersedes the date on which the letters were originally tendered.
49
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., (1910) 220 US 61
50
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
51
DR. V. N SHUKLA – CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, p.27 (5th Ed)

4. WHETHER THE DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS ACT AS A BAR ON THE

SPEAKER TO DECIDE ON RESIGNATIONS?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that in the disqualification proceedings does not
act as a bar to decide on the resignations.
4.1 RELEVANCE OF ARTICLE 190, ARTICLE 191 AND X SCHEDULE:
Pendency of a disqualification is not a bar to the Speaker to act on resignation. The procedure
and the provisions of law for the two are completely different. The role of the Speaker in
disqualification and in resignation under Art.190 is different. To ascertain that disqualification
proceedings is not a bar to decide on the resignations, we have to first look into the provisions
that provides the Speaker with the power to decide on the resignations or disqualifications of the
legislative members.
Article 190: Vacation of Seats
(3) If a member of a House of the Legislature of a State

(a) becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause ( 1 ) or clause ( 2 ) of
Article 191; or
(b) resigns his seat by writing under his hand addressed to the Speaker or the Chairman, as the
case may be, and his resignation is accepted by the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be,
his seat shall thereupon becomes vacant: Provided that in the case of any resignation referred to
in sub clause (b), if from information received or otherwise and after making such inquiry as he
thinks fit, the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, is satisfied that such resignation is
not voluntary or genuine, he shall not accept such resignation. 52
The said Article 190 when read along with Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of
Business in Karnataka Legislative Assembly53 provides a legislative member the Right to resign
voluntarily for appropriate reason without the fear of being prosecuted under defection and the
same has been upheld in B.N. Bajpai v. Ramdayal54, Chattisgarh High Court held that:
52
53
Under Article 208(1) of the Constitution of India
54
2001 (2) MPHT 96 (CG)

“We are afraid that the submission of the Petitioners cannot be accepted because if the word 'or'
is read as 'and' it would mean that a person who wants to resign of his own for any reason
whatever it is, or, which are personal to him, cannot resign.” Court in the said case opined that
the Right to resign of honest legislative member for genuine reasons cannot be taken away.
The same has been reiterated by Gauhati High Court in Wanglam Sawin v. The Speaker,
Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly55:
“..the proviso can be attracted only if there is information or otherwise to raise any suspicion that
the resignation is not voluntary or genuine. We cannot always proceed on the assumption that
every functionary of this republic is a crook and, therefore, cannot be trusted.”
Thus, the resignation if submitted by the legislative member is in the prescribed format as
mentioned under Rule 202(1), 202(2) and 202(3) and there is no apprehension of any
involuntariness of the member in submitting the resignation, the same shall be accepted by the
Speaker. One of the main essentials of Article 190 is that the resignation submitted to the
Speaker shall be voluntary and genuine in nature. Besides resignation, once moved,
notwithstanding the disqualification petition, has to be decided in its own sphere of 190.
Resignation operates on its own terms unless the Speaker has any credible material. In the case at
hand, when the resignation was submitted initially on 6th July 2019 there was no such credible
material with the Speaker thereby casting a responsibility on the Speaker to accept the same. The
Speaker thus has acted as a partisan and in a mala fide manner in the present case in order to
favor the government in power which is in minority and thereby infringing the Right to resign.
In Vikram Singh v. Shri Ram Ballabhji Kasat56, Court held that:
“There is no principle of democracy which compels an elected member to continue to be a

member even if he no longer desires to continue as such or which inhibits him from resigning his
seat. It cannot be that the electorate has the Right to compel an unwilling member to continue or
to be consulted before resignation.”
55
AIR 2016 Gau 43
56
AIR 1995 MP 140

Article 191: Disqualifications for membership:

(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative
Assembly or Legislative Council of a State
(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State
specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by
law not to disqualify its holder;
(b) if he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent Court;
(c) if he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) if he is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, or
is under any acknowledgement of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State;
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament Explanation For the purposes
of this clause, a person shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit under the Government of
India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule by reason only that he is a
Minister either for the Union or for such State
(2) A person shall be disqualified for being a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule. 57
X Schedule: Provisions as to disqualification on ground of defection:

Rule 6 of Karunadu Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on the ground of defection) Rules,
1986 is read as follows-
Rule 6: References to be by Petition.-

(1) No reference of any question as to whether a Member has become subject to disqualification
under the Tenth Schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such Member made in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule.
(2) A petition in relation to a Member may be made in writing to the Chairman by any other
Member.
Provided that a petition in relation to the Chairman shall be addressed to the Secretary.
(3) The Secretary shall :-
57

(a) as soon as may be after the receipt of petition under the proviso to sub- Rule (2) make a
report in respect thereof to the House; and
(b) as soon as may be after the House has elected a Member in pursuance of the proviso to Sub-
Paragraph (1) of Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule place the petition before such Member.
(4) Before making any petition in relation to any Member, the Petitioners shall satisfy himself
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a question has arisen as to whether such
Member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.
(4) Every petition:-
(a) Shall contain a concise Statement of the material facts on which the Petitioners relies; and
(b) Shall be accompanied by copies of the documentary evidence, if any, on which the
Petitioners relies and where the Petitioners relies on any information furnished to him by any
person, a Statement containing the names and address of such persons and the gist of such
information as furnished by each such person.
(5) Every petition shall signed by the Petitioners and verified in the manner laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings.
(6) Every annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the Petitioners and verified in the same
manner as the petition58
The importance of the disqualification petition was explained in Speaker, Orissa Legislative
Assembly v. Utkal Keshari Parida59, Supreme Court has held:
“...we are not inclined to accept the contention that a member of a Legislative Assembly can
alone file the petition... Therefore, we hold that the disqualification petitions filed by the
Petitioners, who is the President of NCP, are maintainable under Rule 6 of the Rules.”
In Balchandra L. Jarkiholi v. B.S. Yeddyurappa60, the Court explained as to what amounts to

defection under X Schedule :
“..deserting the leader and deserting the Government is not synonymous with deserting the party.
If a Minister resigned from the Ministry, it would not amount to defection. What constitutes
defection under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule is deserting the party. The learned
58
Karnataka Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on the ground of defection) Rules, 1986
59
AIR 2013 SC 1181
60
(2011) 7 SCC 1

Judge observed that dissent is not defection and the Tenth Schedule while recognizing dissent
prohibits defection.”
In the instant case at hand, the resignation was submitted by the Petitioners on 6th July 2019 by
visiting the Speaker’s office themselves. It is to be noted that at the time of submission of the
resignation letters, there was no disqualification petition made by any other member and hence
there was no apprehension of the Petitioners indulging in any anti-party activities or to believe
that the resignation submitted is not genuine. As per Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and
Conduct of Business in Karnataka Legislative Assembly61, it mandates the Speaker to accept the
resignation if the same is submitted to the Speaker’s office in person and if there is no such
apprehension of any involuntariness.
The Speaker’s press statement asking to resubmit the resignation forms when they were in
correct format at the first place, can be deemed as a strategy to buy some time for the ruling
government to forward disqualification petitions on the basis of which the Speaker has taken up
the disqualification petitions keeping aside the decision that had to be made on the resignation.
The whole motive behind taking up the disqualification petition by the Hon’ble Speaker depicts
his partisan and favoring attitude towards protecting the government and this defeats the whole
purpose of the Right to resign given by the Constitution to the representatives. Hence the
disqualification proceeding does not act as a bar on deciding on the resignation as it would
uphold the very purpose the statute.
1.2. ARBITRARY USE OF POWER BY SPEAKER:

The arbitrariness doctrine is a well-accepted tenet of determining the scope of Article 14, where
it provides a guarantee against arbitrary State action, whether exercised under authority of law or
in exercise of executive power without making of law62.
The Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India63 adopted the dissenting view of Justice Fazal Ali
in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras64. Therefore, the Court held that the while the procedure
61
62
Gautam Bhatia, Guest Post – Key Constitutional Issues, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY, (25th Feb, 2019) https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/tag/arbitrariness/

established by law should be reasonable, just and fair it shall be free from any unreasonableness
and arbitrariness.
In the instant case, the Hon’ble Speaker on 9th July 2019 asked the Petitioners excluding 5 to
resubmit the resignation stating that it was not in a correct format even though it was in proper
format as per Rule 202 of Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Karnataka Legislative
Assembly65. As per the directions the Petitioners resubmitted the resignations which were the
exact reiteration of the earlier resignation. Yet the Speaker did not take any action relating to the
resignation submitted and has taken up the disqualification petition calling for disqualification
proceedings on 22nd and 24th July 2019.
It has to be noted here that after the coalition government came into power a disqualification
petition was moved by the alliance government against Dr. Stephen and Mr. Harvey Dent on the
ground of indulgence in anti-party activities. Subsequently Dr. Stephen tendered his resignation
on 4th March 2019 which was accepted by the same Speaker on 1st April 2019 even though the
disqualification was still pending.
In this instance, the disqualification petition was moved first and later Dr. Stephen submitted the
resignation. The disqualification petition did not act as a bar to decide on resignation then, hence
the same has to be followed now. The action taken by the Speaker clearly indicates that he is
partisan and biased towards the VCP-PPK alliance government and the acceptance of resignation
amidst the disqualification proceeding was pending is due to the fact that it did not affect the
alliance governments majority seat share.
In P.C.George v. The Hon'Ble Speaker66, Court held that:
“I do not for a moment hold that the Petitioners have not incurred disqualification on account of
voluntarily giving up his membership in his political party in the circumstances obtaining. But I
am of the firm view that a decision on that count was unnecessary and unwarranted in the wake
of the fact that the Petitioners had put in his resignation before. A decision on the question of
W.P.(C). No.37428 of 2015 disqualification of the Petitioners was imminent had the Speaker not
63
AIR 1978 SC 597
64
AIR 1950 SC 27
65
66
2016 (2) KHC 137

accepted his resignation within the frame work of the proviso to Article 190(3). The principle
that a resignation will not come into effect unless accepted cannot be applied since this is not a
case of a contractual relationship between an employer and employee.”
Court in the above said case allowed the Petitioners Right to resign even though the Petitioners
had submitted his resignation only a day before the decision on disqualification petition was
given by the Speaker.
The Speaker in the instant case by refraining himself from deciding on the resignation has in a
way compelled an elected member to continue to be a member even if he no longer desires to
continue as such or which inhibits him from resigning his seat and this defeats the very purpose
of Article 190. The same was held in Vikram Singh v. Shri Ram Ballabhji Kasat67:
‘Sub-section 3(b) is an independent provision providing for a seat becoming vacant on the
acceptance of resignation of a member. The resignation which may be tendered to escape the
consequences of Sub-section (1) or (2), has to be given and accepted in the manner provided in
Sub-section 3(b), but this provision is not limited-to the situations contemplated under Sub-
sections (1) and (2). There is nothing in the language of Sub-section 3(b) which indicates any
such limitation regarding the amplitude of its scope. There is no principle of democracy which
compels an elected member to continue to be a member even if he no longer desires to continue
as such or which inhibits him from resigning his seat. It cannot be that the electorate has the
Right to compel an unwilling member to continue or to be consulted before resignation.”
The actions of the Hon’ble Speaker are not in furtherance of Constitutional Democracy. Any
elected Member of the Legislature is entitled, in consultation with his conscience or other
attendant circumstances to resign his membership of the Legislature. The same is their
Fundamental Right to so as a citizen and as a public representative. The resignation was on the
issue of principle and in public interest. However, the Hon’ble Speaker arbitrarily was allowing
the government some time to entice the Petitioners by hook or crook method thereby not
adhering to the principle of natural justice, which are the foundation stones of any proceedings.
Denial of such a Right is destructive of the principles of democracy and hence violates the basic
structure of the Constitution.
67
AIR 1995 MP 140

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of contentions presented, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
counsel for the Petitioner most humbly and respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Supreme Court
of Vindhya that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The Writ Petition is maintainable.

2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court can interfere with the functioning of the Speaker of a
3. The date of resubmission of the resignation does not supersede the date on which the
intended resignations were originally tendered.
4. The disqualification proceeding does not act as a bar to decide on the resignations.
The Counsel for the Petitioners also prays before this Hon’ble Court to direct the Respondent to
decide on the resignations.
The court may also pass any order as it deems fit in terms of equity, justice and good conscience.
And for the act of kindness, your lordships, Petitioner shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.
Respectfully submitted
……………………….
(Counsel for Petitioner)

Sample - Petitioner Memorial

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sample - Petitioner Memorial

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sample - Petitioner Memorial

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

JSSLC INTRA – COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF VINDHYA

ORIGINAL WRIT JURISDICTION

W/P NO. OF 2019

Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of Vindhya

MR. HARVEY DENT ........................................................... PETITIONER

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

Most Respectfully Submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Vindhya

Counsel for the Petitioner Petitioner

Sd/- (Signature) Sd/-

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

 Dictionaries and Law Lexicons

 Statutes and Rules referred

I. Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable?

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ii

1. AIR : All India Reporter

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page iii

i. ABHE SINGH YADAV, “LAW OF WRITS; JURISDICTION AND ITS

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page iv

DICTONARIES AND LAW LEXICONS

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page v

STATUTES AND RULES REFERRED

1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950

3. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCT OF BUISNESS IN KARNATAKA

4. THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1951

5. X SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. JENNA NARAYAN, “DEFECT-SHUN: UNDERSTANDING SCHEDULE X OF

2. JUSTICE Dr.B.S.CHAUHAN, “AN ARTICLE ON JUDICIAL REVIEW”,

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page vi

LIST OF WEBSITES REFERRED

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page vii

SL. NO. NAME OF THE CASE CITATION

2. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.

11. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 SCC (1) 248

15. Panna Lal Aagyan v. Hon’BleSpeaker AIR 1988 All 167

20. Speaker, Orissa Legislative Assembly v. Utkal AIR 2013 SC 1181

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ix

Wherein, Article 32 reads as under:

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part -

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page ix

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page x

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page xi

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER Page xii

1. WHETHER THE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

According to Article 32, an individual whose privilege (Fundamental Right) is encroached by an

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS Page | 1

In Kochunni v. State of Madras3, the Court held that:

1.1 ARTICLE 14 OF CONSTITUTION OF VINDHYA:

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS Page | 2

 Rule of Law in India:

1. Absence of Arbitrary Power or Supremacy of Law:

2. Equality before Law:-

 Test of Reasonable Classification:

i. Firstly the classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS Page | 3

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS Page | 4