Reporters

Jared – Inductive Reasoning in Law, People vs. Paguntalan

Kirsty – Inductive Generalizations
Gerard – Evaluating Inductive Generalizations
Zahara – Analogical Arguments
Carlo – Evaluating Analogical Arguments
Lea – Kilosbayan vs Morato

Chapter 4
Inductive Reasoning in Law

“When you steal from one author, it’s plagiarism; if you steal from many, it’s
research.” – Wilson Mizner

In the beginning of Chapter Three, we briefly discussed what

inductive arguments are and differentiated them from deductive arguments.
Now we can get a closer look at inductive arguments and how important
are they in legal reasoning. Inductive arguments are arguments in which
the premises are intended to provide support, but no conclusive evidence,
for the conclusion.

Unlike deductive arguments which draw out truth or information

already contained in the premises, inductive arguments give us truth or
information more than what the premises are saying. In an inductive
argument, what is claimed in the conclusion goes beyond the evidence
found in the premises. It is for this reason that inductive arguments do not
claim that their conclusion is certain or that their premises guarantee the
truth of the conclusion. What inductive arguments claim is that their
conclusion, based on the premises, is likely or probably true.

The absence of complete certainty, however, does not dilute the

importance of induction in the law. Deductive reasoning is not applicable in
cases where there is no established law, or binding precedent, or clear
statue to provide the major premise of our legal argument. And there are so
many cases of this in law. Here, the lawyer must build the major premise
himself. He has to draw upon the cumulative experience of the judiciary,
the specific holdings of other cases. When he has gathered a sufficient
case law, he will then formulate a general norm that supports his claim. It is
inductive reasoning that is needed here.

Aside from enabling us to fashion a general rule when such is not

readily available, inductive reasoning is what we chiefly employ in
determining the facts of the case. Indeed, disputes in court are most often
not about laws, but about matters of fact. Was the person accused present
in this place where the crime was committed or was he in a different place
as he is claiming? Did the act of A cause the injury of B? The court must
first determine the facts before rules or statutes are applied to those facts.
To accomplish this, we primarily rely on inductive reasoning.
Decisions on cases are often derived from inductively inferring that
given the truth of a set of particular circumstances a claim about the case is
justified. Jurisprudence of recent vintage teach us that conviction can be
had even upon circumstantial evidence given that the circumstances
proven should constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing the the accused to the exclusion of all
others, as the author of the crime.

People vs. Paguntalan

Charged with a crime, Paguntalan and his companions were convicted by

the court based on bits and pieces of circumstances shown by the
prosecution during trial. These pieces of evidence collectively indicate that
Paguntalan and his companions acted in concert, had a common design
and understanding to kill the victim. Though no direct evidence of
conspiracy was shown in the evidence, this did not detract from the fact, as
argued by the prosecution, that the act of Paguntalan in killing his victim
was also an act of his co-conspirators. The prosecution also argued that
the time honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number indefinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that there was.

Inductive Generalizations

There are many types of inductive reasoning, and the simplest and
most common of these types is called “inductive generalization.” An
inductive generalization is “an argument that relies on characteristics of a
sample population to make a claim about the population as a whole.” This
claim is a general claim that makes a statement about all, most, or some
members of a class, group, or set. The following are some example of
general claims:

All law students are required to study taxation.

Every performance-enhancing drug is banned in Tour de France.

Hearsays are not admissible in courts.

Most congressmen are against the legalization of divorce.

Although the style of each of these four claims differ, all are general
claims. Since the first two use the words “all” and “every”, we can recognize
without much trouble that they refer to all members of a class, group, or
set. The first refers to all members of the group law students; the second
refers to all members of the group performance-enhancing drugs. Even
though the third claim does not use the words every or all, it too is general
claim. Further, this claim is no less general just because it tells us what
hearsays are not rather than what they are. The final example specifically
mentions most congressmen, but it should be understood to refer to the
entire class of congressmen because it claims that most are against the
legalization of divorce and implies that the remainder are not against it.

An inductive generalization uses evidence about a limited number of

people or things of a certain type (the sample population), to make a
general claim about a larger group of people or things of that type (the
population as a whole). Inductive generalizations have the following form:

Z percent of observed F’s are G.

It is probable, therefore, that Z percent of all F’s are G.

For example, we want to know what percentage of students at a

particular college are in favor of abolishing the death penalty. Clearly, it
would be extremely difficult to ask every student at the college whether
thay favor abolishing the death penalty. What we can practically do is to
select a sample of students and determine their position on the issue, and
then to generalize the results to the whole student body. An inductive
generalization could be written out as follows:

Sixty-five percent of students at X College who were questioned are in

favor of abolishing the death penalty.

It is probable, therefore, that sixty-five percent of all students at X College

are in favor of abolishing the death penalty.

Evaluating Inductive Generalizations

There are two important questions we must ask when it comes to

determining whether inductive generalizations are strong or weak:

Is the Sample Large Enough?

The size of the sample population is an essential factor in

determining whether the conclusion about the population as a whole is
justified or not. A sample is “large enough” when it is clear that we have not
rushed to judgment, that we have not formed a hasty generalization.
Admittedly, this business of specifying what we mean by “enough” is not
easy, but oftentimes our common sense can help us decide when the
sample is large enough.

As a rule of thumb, the more examples you find, the stronger your
argument becomes. In O’Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., a federal
judge in Illinois lambasted an expert witness for attempting to formulate a
universal medical rule based on his observation of only five patients. Based
on th five patients (Dr. Scheribel) has observed with cataracts induced by
radiation therapy, he developed his “binding universal rule” that he applied
to O’Conner, thus committing the logical fallacy known as Converse
Accident (hasty generalization). It occurs when a person erroneously
creates a general rule from observing too few cases. Dr. Scheribel has
illogically created a “binding universal rule” based upon insufficient date.

One thing that we need to consider in determining the sufficiency of

the quantity of the sample is the quantity of the whole population. In our
example regarding the students’ position on death penalty, we must know
around how many students are there in the college. Suppose there are
around three thousand students, a sample of twenty students is clearly
insufficient. A hundred students, however, may already be enough. Adding
fifty more will increase the strengthe of our argument.

Suppose we have three hundred students for our sample, will that
make the conclusion of our generalization acceptable? Not necessarily,
although the sample is definitely large enough, there is another factor we
need in evaluating the strength of inductive generalization. Thus, we need
to ask another question.

Is the Sample Representative?

Although there were three hundred students who were interviewed for
the survey, the generalization may be weak if the three hundred students
only represent a particular portion of the whole student population.
Suppose these three hundred students are all members of Christ Youth in
Action (CYA), a Catholic organization of young people, they may not
actually represent the whole student population if a significant number of
students in that college is not a member of that organization. This will make
our conclusion questionable since such membership to that organization
greatly influences one’s view on death penalty for the Catholic Church
strongly opposes such kind of punishment. We call that kind of sample a
biased sample.

A sample is representative if there is diversity in our sample (that is,

the various subgroups of the whole population are represented in the
selected respondents). In the case of the students, the sample should
reflect the same percentage distribution in the entire student body of X
College as regards course, year, grade average, age, sex, organization,
religion, to name a few variables. Thus, if our sample comes from the
different subgroups, it is a representative sample. This basis for evaluating
the strength of our generalization is especially important when the
population we are dealing with is heterogeneous.

One way to ensure sufficient relevant diversity is by making the

sample random. A random sample is “one in which all members of the
target have an equal opportunity to be in the sample.” For instance, you
could interview members randomly by choosing every fifth or tenth name
on the membership list. Another possibility would be to randomly interview
people in a common meeting place. The aim of creating a random sample
is to ensure that the diversity of the target is reflected by the sample. It will
not be a random sample if it excludes part of the target. For example, a
sample of college students in a particular university chosen from the
students coming out from men’s locker room would not include any female
students in the sample.

This has been the problem in the classic polling blunder that
happened in the United States. In 1936, Literary Digest magazine
conducted a massive polling effort to predict the outcome of the
Presidential election between Alf Landon and Franklin Roosevelt. The
Digest polled well over two million people, and the vast majority indicated
they would vote for Landon (keep in mind that modern news organizations
base their polls on the responses of 1,000 people). In the actual election,
however, Roosevelt won 523 electoral votes and Landon received only
eight. How did Literary Digest get it so wrong when it had crafted its rule
from a massive number of particular examples? The problem was the
Digest composed its polling list from telephone directories. In 1936, only
about 40% of households owned a telephone, usually those who are in the
upper class. This, even if they used random sampling in picking the
individuals to call and ask for their presidential preference, the sample
population is an unrepresentative group of the American public at that time.

Samples may also be biased when surveys require participants to

initiate contact rather than using a survey taker to actively solicit responses.
For example, surveys requiring that participants respond by sending a text
message, going online, phoning in their response are likely to get
unrepresentative results sine the respondents are self-selected. Only
people who are particularly interested in the issue are likely to respond to
the survey. To make matters worse, unless surveys prevent respondents
from contributing their answers more than one, the data is likely to be
skewed by unscrupulous repeat respondents who are trying to influence
the outcome.

We can observe that when established survey companies in the

Philippines (like SWS, Pulse Asia) conduct opinion polls, they usually have
only around 1,000 to 1,200 respondents to represent the whole Filipino
population (which is more than 90 million at present). But these surveys are
usually reliable since the sample taken is random representing different
sectors or groups of the whole population, that means, the respondents
come from different regions of the country, socio-economic classes, age
groups, and so on.

When we cannot do much about our sample (such as increasing it),

we can make our generalization acceptable by formulating an appropriate
conclusion. A good inductive argument should make a conclusion that is
appropriate to the evidence offered by its premises. The conclusion should
not claim more than its premises can support. For example:

All ten of the Malaysians I met are good in business.

So, most Malaysians are good in business.

Here the conclusion claims that most Malaysians are good in

business. But its premise only cited ten Malaysians who are good in
business. We could make the argument strong by making our conclusion
less sweeping, that is, the conclusion could cover less ground. For
example, if we instead say:

All ten of the Malaysians I met are good in business.

So, many Malaysians are good in business.

The argument would be strong. Given our premise, the conclusion is more
likely to be true if its claim is more limited, restricting itself to many rather
than most Malaysians. Other phrases that could soften the conclusion are
possible, probably, and likely. Remember that inductive generalizations
should not overstate their conclusions. Let us take another example:

None of the ten teachers I met in this school knows how to speak Spanish.

So, no teacher in this school knows how to speak Spanish.

We can see that the conclusion is so sweeping that the argument is

not strong. After all, if there is just one teacher in that school who knows
how to speak Spanish, the conclusion will easily be falsified. To play it safe,
then, we might conclude instead that “Very few, if any, teachers in this
school know how to speak Spanish.” This is still a sweeping conclusion, but
it allows for the possibility of a few exceptions. This makes the conclusion
likely to be true, and this the argument is strong.

Analogical Arguments

Another type of inductive argument most commonly used in law is

analogical argument. Analogy is “a comparison of things based on
similarities those things share. We find analogies everywhere.” In college
entrance examination, analogies are often given. Brother is to sister as
uncle is to? If your answer is “auntie,” you are correct because the
relationship is one of opposites. We also encounter analogies in poems
and songs.

Perhaps love is like a resting place,

A shelter from the storm,
It exists to give you comfort,
It is there to keep you warm…

Indeed, most of our everyday reasoning is based on analogy. Joan

reasons that her new pair of shoes will be durable on the grounds that her
other shoes with the same brand and make have been durable. In the
same way, Victor infers that he will enjoy the action movie he is going to
watch tonight because it has the same director and leading actors as the
past action movies he enjoyed. Analogy is at the basis of these simple,
ordinary arguments we make.

It can be noticed that none of these arguments is certain or

demonstratively valid. None of their conclusions follow with logical
necessity from their premises. It is logically possible that Joan’s new pair of
shoes will not last long or Victor will not enjoy that action movie. Just like
any inductive argument, there is no mathematical certainty in analogical
arguments. However, the claims of these arguments may still be
reasonably accepted.

What makes an argument by analogy? Analogical arguments depend

upon an analogy or a similarity between two or more things. Analogies
compare two or more things; arguments by analogy go one step further.
They claim that another similarity exists, given the similarities already
recognized. Whereas analogies simply point out a similarity, arguments by
analogy claim that certain similarities are evidence that there is another
similarity (or other similarities). This type of reasoning has a simple
structure: A and B have characteristic X. A has characteristic Y. Therefore,
B has characteristic Y.

Analogical reasoning is very useful in law particularly in deciding what

rule of law to apply in a particular case and in settling disputed factual
questions. Let us go to the first application of analogical reasoning in law.
Legal counsels employ it in coming up with a new legal claim based on
firmly established precedents. Typically, this means that a current case is
compared to an older one, and the outcome of the new case is predicted
on the basis of the other’s outcome. Edward Levi, the foremost American
authority on the role of analogy in the law, described analogical reasoning
as a three step process: 1) establish similarities between two cases, 2)
announce the rule of law embedded in the first case, and 3) apply the rule
of law to the second case. This form of reasoning is different from
deductive logic or inductive generalization. Recall that deduction requires
us to reason from universal principles to smaller, specific truths. And the
process of generalization asks us to craft larger rules form a number of
specific examples. Analogy, in contrast, makes one-to-one comparisons
that require no generalizations or reliance on universal rules. In the
language of logicians, analogy is a process of reasoning from the particular
to the particular.

Let us look at an example to illustrate the distinction.

Suppose you are to defend a legal claim that the use of marijuana
should be allowed by the state. The issue pertaining to this matter is hinged
on two opposing legal opinions – one that asserts marijuana is a healing
herb and the other that claims marijuana is a dangerous drug. Which of
these two positions is to be followed? Without a clear universal rule or past
cases on point, deductive logic and inductive generalizations are of little
help. Instead, you must rely on the power of analogy to convince the court
that marijuana is to be treated as a healing herb. To defend your stand, you
must assert that marijuana, like other herbs that are not prohibited by law,
is non-toxic. It does not contain substances that kill brain cells or increase
risks of cancer. There have been no deaths associated with marijuana use.
On the contrary, like legal herbs, marijuana provides more health benefits
than risks. It helps in curing rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, PTSD, epilepsy,
antibiotic-resistant infections and neurological disorders. The process of
drawing these comparisons and explaining why they are important is the
heart of reasoning by analogy. The idea is to find enough similarities
between the case at hand and existing rules or precedents to convince a
court that the treatment or judgment must be the same.

Legal practitioners also rely heavily on analogical reasoning when

settling disputed factual issues. Was an incorrect diagnosis, and
subsequent injury to the patient, the result of the physician’s carelessness?
Other doctors may testify that the symptoms relied upon in that case almost
invariably do lead, in other cases, to the diagnosis given; in this very similar
case, it is concluded, the physician did precisely what is normally done, and
what should have been done, in spite of the unfortunate result. Arguments
having this analogical structure are also the ones presented by
psychiatrists when testifying about what normally is the mental health
condition of a person given the behaviors being exhibited. Most expert
testimony has precisely this form: The expert would say: “In my
experience, circumstances of such-and-such kind have usually led (or
rarely lead) to results of the kind encountered here. Therefore, as an expert
in these matters, it is my judgment that in this case the result was (or was
not) the probable effect of just such cause.” The expert draws an analogy;
an argument based upon that analogy leads to the conclusion about causal
connection that aims to resolve the dispute at hand. Analogical reasoning is
also the basis of what we know as “circumstantial evidence.”

In prosecuting a defendant for a crime of theft, for instance, the legal

counsel may not be able to provide direct evident proving that the accused
personally stole the item but he may present evidences that are entirely
circumstantial such as the defendant’s fingerprints at the scene of the crime
and the fact that the defendant was found with a large amount of money
without being able to give any acceptable reason. The judge will draw
conclusion from such evidences about who has stolen the item based upon
his/her knowledge of the history of people’s actions in other cases.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: a) There is more than
on circumstance; b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and, c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Evaluating Analogical Arguments

Just as there are good or bad analogies, there are also good and bad
analogical arguments. One of the fallacies of reason is called fallacy of
false analogy. It results from comparing two (or more) things that are not
really comparable. It is a matter of claiming that two things share a certain
similarity on the basis of other similarities, while overlooking important
dissimilarities.

How can we determine if an analogical argument is good? There are

certain criteria that can guide our evaluation of the argument’s soundness.

The first criterion to be considered in the evaluation of an analogical

argument is the relevance of similarities. Consider, for example, the
following analogical argument:

Arizona signed into law the toughest bill on illegal immigration in

generations, making the failure to carry immigration documents a crime.
We can expect that New Mexico will soon pass a similar law. After all, New
Mexico is a lot like Arizona, given that both have a large population of
immigrants, and both are bordered by Mexico.

In this example, New Mexico is compared to Arizona. The arguer has

identified two ways in which they are similar: they both have a large
population of immigrants and are bordered by Mexico. In evaluating this
analogical argument, we must consider whether the similarities cited
between the two states are relevant or irrelevant to the conclusion of the
argument. The issue is whether New Mexico will likely pass a similar
immigration law. With respect to this issue, the similarities identified by the
arguer are relevant to the conclusion of the argument. However, suppose
one will make the same conclusion based on the premise that Arizona and
New Mexico are both under a Republican governor and both have several
national forests and parks. This will not be a good argument because,
though there are cited similarities between the two states, these similarities
have little bearing on the issue of passing a strict immigration law.

Consider another example. In a previous case (Case 1), Roger stole

Sonny’s bicycle and sold it to Cesar who know that it had been stolen.
Sonny sued Cesar to recover the bicycle. Sonny won. In a case at hand
(Case 2), Giovanni bought Mike’s bicycle giving as payment counterfeit
money. Giovanni knew it was a phony money. Mike discovered the fraud
and sued Giovanni for the return of the bicycle. Will Mike also win the
case? Yes. What is the similarity in the two cases? The two persons being
sued both dishonestly acquired possession of another’s property. This
similarity is relevant on the question of whether or not the defendant has
acquired ownership rights of the property.

Another important criterion by which analogical argument may be

judged has to do with the relevant dissimilarities between the entities being
compared. Consider this example:
President Clinton’s actions are “not just about sex,” but constitute
“obstruction of justice,” just as former President Nixon’s actions were.
Both Nixon and Clinton lied about their conduct in trying to cover up
an improper conduct, and Clinton even did it under oath. If Nixon’s
actions were impeachable, Clinton’s should also be.

This seems to be a good analogical argument as the similarity cited

has a bearing on the issue of whether or not Clinton’s actions are
impeachable. However, one can refute an analogical argument by citing a
relevant difference that exists between the entities compared which can
weaken the argument’s conclusion. In the case above, Clinton’s side can
argue that Nixon’s lies were made in an attempt to cover up a criminal
action, break-ins, destruction of property, and other acts related to abuses
of presidential power or abuses of the presidential office, whereas Clinton’s
actions are related to consensual sex, were not an abuse of presidential
power, and everyone lies about sex, so that his acts did not rise to an
impeachable offense.

Let us put a twist regarding the issue of the bicycle owner’s attempt to
recover this property.

This will be Case 3. Quite similar to Case 2, suppose Giovanni

obtained the bicycle by fraud, misrepresenting some important facts that
induced Mike to transfer the title of the item, but before Mike can sue to
recover the bicycle, Giovanni sold it to Mervin who did not know of
Giovanni’s fraud, and Mervin paid Giovanni the market value of the bicycle.
Mike sued Mervin for the return of his property. Can an analogical
argument succeed in defending the claim that Mike should win the case
and recover the bicycle as in the two precedent cases? Comparing this
present case with the previous cases, although there are similarities among
the cases, the present case has a relevant difference from the previous
cases – Mervin has no knowledge that the item was fraudulently acquired
by Giovanni.

In the previous cases, the legal battle was between the innocent
owner and the wrongdoer (the thief or the defrauder). But in the present
case, the battle is between two innocent persons – it is between the
innocent owner and the innocent buyer. That is a relevant difference that
can justify the buyer’s ownership of the bicycle.

Let us put another twist.

In Case 4, suppose that, like in Case 1, Roger stole Sonny’s bicycle,

except that, like in Case 3, before Sonny can sue for its return, Roger sold
it to Cesar. Also like in Case 3, Cesar was unaware that it was stolen and
paid Roger its full market value. Sonny sued to recover the bicycle. Will
Cesar also be free of any liability or Sonny can win the case and recover
the item? Although there are similarities between Cases 3 and 4, the
outcome can be different. The original owner can recover the bicycle from
the buyer despite the fact that the buyer had good faith in buying the item
and was unaware of its dishonest acquisition.

What relevant difference do Cases 3 and 4 have?

The relevant difference was how the bicycle was acquired from the
original owner – theft and fraudulent inducement. In the case of theft
(Cases 1 and 4), the original owner never intended to transfer the title to
Roger; the property was taken without Sonny’s knowledge and without his
intent to pass the title. That means that no title ever passed, and Roger
acquired no title.

Or stated differently, he acquired a void title. And he could not pass

on to someone else a better title than he himself had.

In the case of fraudulent inducement (Cases 2 and 3), Mike did intend
and act to transfer the title, although the owner was misled by Giovanni’s
fraudulent inducement. So, Giovanni did acquire the title, though it was a
“voidable” (as opposed to “void”) title. This means that Mike can still
recover the bicycle if he acted quickly while Giovanni still had the item
because he could still “avoid the title.”

But if, before Mike acted to avoid the title, Giovanni sold it to an
innocent buyer who paid full value (a Bona Fide Purchaser), the title that he
had transferred to the BFP became a good title. It no longer could be
“avoided.”

Here we see that in the examples given, it is important in analogical

reasoning to check how similar and how different the facts are in various
cases. If the facts are substantially similar the outcomes of the cases will
not be different. But if the facts have relevant differences, the outcome in
one case will not be the same in another case.

Arguing that the conclusion of the analogical reasoning follows

despite relevant differences between the entities being compared leads to
the fallacy of false analogy as the following case example would show.

There is no ulterior motive as implied in the statement of the

petitioner. There is conviction on the part of the five remaining justices who
dissented on the first case, and the two new members that the previous
ruling was erroneous. The question of the petitioners of “why should this be
so?” is equally rebutted by the question “Why should this not be so?”
because, as explained in the decision, the first decision was erroneous and
no legal doctrine was in the way of its reexamination.

Kilosbayan vs. Morato

In 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement

wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO
wherein thirty percent of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease
was for 8 years and PCSO was to employ its own personnel as well as
responsible for the facilities.

Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for
P25 million. The following month, a petition was filed to declare the
agreement invalid because it is violative of PCSO’s charter and the law
regarding public bidding. More importantly, it violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D
of the 1987 Constitution and that standing can no longer be questioned
because it has become the law of the case.

The respondent answered that the agreement is different from the

Contract of Lease and there is no bidding required. The power to determine
if the agreement is disadvantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO.
Do petitioners have standing?

The High Court held in the negative declaring that stare decisis
cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners
is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved.

Moreover, the law of the case cannot also apply since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona – the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of
this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. Thus, the Rule
on Conclusiveness cannot still apply.

The petitioners asked a question to which they made up an answer.

Their attempt at psychoanalysis, detecting a Freudian slip where none
exists, may be more revealing of their own unexpressed wish to find
motives where there are none which they can impute to some members of
the Court.

An issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a

former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different cause of action.

But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding
involved an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal
matters at issue.

Since the matter in question is different contract, the previous

decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner’s standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the
petitioners are real parties in interest.