Karl Popper

The myth of the common framework – Chap. 4: “Science: problems, objectives,

responsibilities”
Science and philosophy 2020-2 – Josimar Castilla

“That there are always an infinite number of

logically possible solutions to all problems is
a decisive fact for the philosophy of science.
It's one of the things that makes science the
exciting adventure that it is. Well, it makes all
merely routine methods inefficient. It means
that scientists must use their imagination
and have bold ideas, although they must
always be moderated by severe criticism and
severe contrasts” (pp. 108-109).

Yo
Intellectual history of man = History full of fanaticism
Admirable that there are many men willing to defend their ideas.
Man as ideological animal
In the history of science: Francis Bacon
Prophet of science as a secularized religion
“God,” as a theological concept, is replaced by the omnipotence of nature and the
omniscience of natural science .
Science aims to know the nature of things. The laws of nature are accessible to
human beings ; This requires a “mind free of pre-judgments.”
He was not exactly a scientist. Naive optimism. The true founder of modern
experimental science would be Galileo.
Bacon's main dogma : Observationism : observation of nature against
philosophical speculation.
Observation, thus, would determine for Bacon the demarcation between natural
science and traditional theology/philosophy:
Speculation = method of anticipation (false method, leads to prejudices).
The ideas of the mind anticipate observation to make universal judgments
about reality. The impure mind is the origin of deception, not nature.
Only with the pure mind can the book of nature be accessed without
distortions. Patient observation is required.
Bacon opposes Copernicus' hypothesis for not observing but
speculating/theorizing. On the contrary, Galileo defends Copernicus and
Aristarchus because they have made it possible to formulate theories (such
as the heliocentric theory) that go beyond mere observation and even
contradict it: “by the sheer force of intellect, they preferred what reason
told them.” to what sensible experience showed them.” Therefore, as
Popper himself would later defend, these cases show that speculation can
also free us from the prejudices to which observation can lead us.
Bacon as a prophet: he foresaw and inspired the industrial revolution, “the age of
science and technology.” Promise of a better world for man (science must make it
possible to reach heaven on earth). Knowledge is power : man's dominion over
nature, man as a new god.

II
Criticism of Bacon's idea of science:
1. It is naive to think that we can purify the mind of all prejudice before all
discovery and research , because it will be research that will allow us to
recognize some of our preconceived ideas as prejudices, which - according to
Popper - is a form of progress in knowledge. Before that “progress,” there are no
criteria to distinguish our prejudices.
2. Stubborn observation can lead to more prejudice .
3. There is no empty mind: you cannot purge the mind of ALL theory .
4. We always operate with theories , even if we are not fully aware of it. What
needs to be done is to make these theories explicit in order to find alternative
theories or critically discriminate between them.
5. There is no such thing as pure observation , without some theoretical
component. Observation = interpretation of facts according to some theory.
6. For Bacon, the researcher who bases knowledge on speculation could make the
mistake of resorting to observation only to confirm or strengthen his prejudices.
Prejudices prevent learning from experience.
For example:
Whoever believes in Zoroastrianism could make the mistake of observing
in experience only the corroboration that the world is a terrain of conflict
between a good principle and an evil one.
Marxism: All history is the history of class struggle. Modern history =
struggle between virtuous proletarians and evil capitalists. If held
dogmatically, all information about reality will only reinforce that
prejudice.
Psychoanalysis: “Clinical observations” help to substantiate the theory. But
these observations are always interpreted in advance and from an already
psychoanalytical basis.
In these cases, the observation never seems to reveal anything new but rather, for
every observation, it is assumed that it corroborates or should corroborate the
theory. What observation can find is previously determined by what the theory
states. Popper considers that Bacon is right to oppose this prejudiced attitude.
However, faced with the problematic claim that theory can explain any
phenomenon (or that every phenomenon is interpretable in the light of the
assumed theory), Bacon only managed (mistakenly) to contrast the idea of
purifying the mind of prejudices and Base research on pure observation .

III .
If, as Popper points out, observation always presupposes a theoretical or categorical
framework, then how is it possible to have an observation that starts from a (explicit)
theory but that, at the same time, does not dogmatically propose only the
verification or strengthening of that theory? ?
According to Bacon, the answer is to purify the mind of all theory. But Popper shows that
this is impossible. How to get out of this problem?
Popper offers a two-part solution , which basically seeks to establish conditions for
critically linking observation and theory in scientific research:
1. Establishment of a demarcation criterion between what types of research can
legitimately be considered scientific and what cannot.
For Popper, this criterion will be the so-called principle of falsifiability
(also called the “principle of refutability” or “principle of testability”, which
is the basis of the falsificationism that the author defends): if it is not
possible to find a way to refute a theory, it may be adverse to empirical
observation and, in that sense, it should be considered a non-scientific
theory.
“Only if I can say how my theory could be refuted or falsified can I claim
that it is an empirical theory.”
It is also called the principle of contrast: “contrasting a theory […] means
wanting to make it fail.”
A theory is scientific if it is susceptible to being falsified or contrasted
by observation.
In the history of science there are cases in which some theories were not
refutable or testable until a time after their validity (e.g. atomic theory).
2. Only observations or experiments that are the result of rigorous and serious
efforts to test the theory can be accepted.
Thus, in general, Popper states that: “The solution is the following. Agreement
between theory and observation should not be taken into account at all unless the
theory was testable and unless that agreement resisted rigorous attempts to
contradict it. But testing a theory means trying to find its weak points. It means trying
to refute it. And a theory is testable only if it is refutable (in principle)” (p. 93).
IV
Examples of theories:
Psychoanalytic theory of the subject
Newtonian theory of gravity
Darwinian theory of evolution
Synaptic transmission theory
“The idea presented here could be summarized by saying that, in science, the decisive
function of observation and experiment is criticism […] there is no doubt that
observation and experiment play an important role in the critical discussion of Scientific
theories […] help us eliminate weaker theories […] they corroborate, even if only
momentarily, the theory that survives” (p. 94)
If a theory is not susceptible to criticism, it is not scientific. It is not the purpose of
science to find irrefutable statements that adequately describe reality.

V
That science is fallible is the result of the Einsteinian revolution : by destroying Newton's
authority he also destroyed authoritarianism in science .
“Einstein was clear from the first moment about the essentially conjectural nature of
his theories ” (p. 96).
Science shares the fallibility of all human endeavors .

SAW
The move from authoritarian theory to anti-authoritarian and critical theory of
scientific knowledge is very recent .
There continues to be resistance to the “method of critical discussion and critical
examination of competing conjectures or hypotheses.”
There are still those who believe that experimental laboratory work goes beyond
the hypothetical.

VII
Summary of Popper's position on scientific knowledge:
1. All scientific knowledge is hypothetical
2. Increase in scientific knowledge = learning from our mistakes.
3. This method involves daring to make mistakes and then systematically
investigating the mistakes made.
4. Experimental examination, as a condition of falsification, constitutes an important
argument in the critical discussion of scientific theories.
5. Experiments are permanently guided by theory.
6. Scientific objectivity = critical approach.
7. A scientist should always be ready to try to refute his own theories himself.
8. Objectivity is constituted by science itself, that is, by the critical discussion
between members of the scientific community.
9. Theories criticized (or that withstand the rigor of criticism) must be defended with
determination to know their real power.
10. A distinction must be made between falsifiable and non-falsifiable theories.
11. Only a theory that asserts or implies that certain conceivable events will not occur
is testable.
12. Every testable theory prohibits certain events from occurring; to that extent it
refers to empirical reality.
13. Testable theory = “such and such cannot happen”
14. Only testable theories can refer (polemically) to the empirical world (experience).
15. There are degrees of testability. The more a theory affirms, the better it is to test
than a theory that affirms very little.
16. TO
17. Authoritarianism = test, verify theories / Critical approach = contrast (try to
refute) theories

VIII
Science does not begin with observation (Bacon). Science begins with problems
(practical or theoretical)—science begins at the moment when the myth or conjecture
stops meeting our expectations.
Expectation = conjecture (about an imminent event) or theory.
A problem is a theory that has gone through difficulties and has disappointed
expectations.
Faced with a problem
a. We try (conjecture) a solution
b. We criticize our solutions
Guesses can only partially solve problems. And even the best guesses can give way
to new difficulties or problems.
Knowledge increases when we move from old problems to new problems through
conjecture and refutation.
The problem is not necessarily a result of previous observations (empiricism:
there can be nothing in the intellect that had not previously been in the senses).
Before the problem there is an unconscious innate knowledge, which generates a
problem when it stops meeting our expectations.
Observation does not completely precede all expectations and all problems: “to
observe, we must have in mind a definite question that we could answer through
observation” (p. 101).
Questioning observation -> questioning the inductive method.

IX
We become familiar with a problem through trial and error : “understanding a
problem means understanding why it has no easy solution, why the most obvious solution
does not work” (p. 101).
This is the “best method”. Such a thing is “working out a problem”: “we begin to see the
ramifications of the problem, its subproblems, and its connection to other problems” (p.
102).
The trial and error method is different from the “repetition induction method”

x
Importance of problems for scientific methodology.

XI
What does it mean to understand a scientific theory? -> It means understanding it as
an attempt to solve a certain problem.
“Without understanding the problematic situation that gave rise to the theory, the
theory has no meaning, that is, it cannot be understood” (p. 105).
Newton's theory of the force of gravity: attempt to solve the problem of explaining
the laws of Kepler and Galileo.
Bohr's theory of the hydrogen atom: an attempt to solve the problem of combining
Rutherford's atomic model with Einstein's theory of the photon and the
discontinuity of atomic spectra.

XII
What does it mean to “accept” a theory?
An “accepted” theory is not a “verified” theory, if by such we mean a theory that
has achieved some type of immunity from empirical testing (has become
“irrefutable”). In that sense, Popper will say that, properly speaking, verification
does not exist.
Some philosophers of science seem to want to say that an accepted theory is a
theory that can be believed in or is worth believing in.
But the determination of beliefs is not a matter of science according to Popper:
“this merit, this 'worthiness' does not concern science. For science does not
attempt to positively justify or establish this merit. On the contrary, science is
above all interested in criticizing it” (p. 106).
In that sense, he states that “ science should be considered more as a growing
system of problems than as a system of beliefs.” And for a problem system,
tentatively accepting a theory or a conjecture means little more than considering it
worthy of further criticism” (p. 107).
Thus, we accept a theory or conjecture because, after a series of efforts to falsify and
criticize it, its explanatory capacity appears to be solid enough to address the problems
that science formulates and seeks to solve.

XIII
Against the so-called “inductive method” (positivism).
It was always assumed that induction was the method that allowed us to
establish a theory : a general statement is inferred from the observation of
particular phenomena or facts.
Because of the logical impossibility of inferring something universal from the
particular (i.e., something necessary from the contingent), the verdict of induction
invariably remains “not proven.”
For Popper, “what is pursued in science is much more than that. Our goal is to discover
new worlds [microscopic, subatomic, gravitational, electrical, etc.] behind the world of
ordinary experience. It is the discovery of these new worlds, of these new possibilities not
even dreamed of, that adds so much to the liberating power of science” (p. 109).

XIV
Practical proposal to develop an “inductive style”.

XV
About scientific responsibilities.