Reading Assignment No.1 EVIDENCE
Reading Assignment No.1 EVIDENCE
Reading Assignment No.1 EVIDENCE
Hosana
G.R. No. 190846, Feb 3, 2016
In Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, the Supreme Court affirms the ruling that the
deed of sale is null and void, but orders Jose to reimburse Tomas
P200,000.00 based on the purchase price indicated in the deed of
sale.
FACTS:
• Respondent Jose G. Hosana and his wife, Milagros C. Hosana,
bought a house and lot in Naga City, Philippines during their
marriage.
• Milagros sold the property to petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. without
Jose's consent and knowledge.
• The sale was evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros
as the attorney-in-fact of Jose.
• After the sale, the title of the property was transferred to Tomas.
• Jose filed a complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of title,
reconveyance, and damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the
Register of Deeds of Naga City.
• Jose alleged that Milagros conspired with Tomas to forge his
signature on the special power of attorney authorizing the sale.
• Tomas claimed to be a buyer in good faith and sought
reimbursement for the purchase price he paid.
ISSUE:
• W/N the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of
consideration paid.
• W/N Tomas' testimony is sufficient to establish the actual
purchase price of the sale.
HELD:
• YES. The Court explained that while a void contract has no
force and effect, it can still be admitted as evidence to prove
matters that occurred in the execution of the contract.
• The deed of sale was declared null and void due to the lack of
Jose's consent, but it can still be used as evidence to determine
the actual amount paid by Tomas.
ISSUE:
• W/N the court of appeals erred in awarding damages to
respondents.
• W/N there is evidence of diversion of the raw sugar allocation
intended for Noah's Ark to other refineries.
RULING:
• The court found that the raw sugar delivered had a lower
polarity rate than claimed by the Republic and that the total
raw sugar delivered was less than the stipulated amount.
• The court further found that the storage of the raw sugar in a
different warehouse while awaiting recalibration of the
weighing scale was an unwarranted diversion.
RATIO:
• Respondents herein prayed in their Answer with Counterclaim
that they be awarded the sum of P52,000,000.00 as damages
for lost and unrealized income and business opportunities from
other clients and customers which they did not accommodate
on account of their Refining Contract with petitioner. They,
however, failed to present any proof whether testimonial or
documentary of their alleged losses. In the same way,
petitioner merely gave an estimate of the value of the bags of
refined sugar in the possession of respondents but likewise did
not offer any testimonial or documentary evidence in support
of the alleged value.
• Both parties, therefore, failed to present any persuasive proof
that they are entitled to the damages awarded by the trial court.
Their claim for damages remained unsubstantiated and
unproven. Well-settled it is that actual or compensatory
damages must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. It is a fundamental principle of the law on damages
that, while one injured by a breach of contract shall be awarded
fair and just compensation commensurate with the loss
sustained because of the defendant's acts or omission, a party
is entitled only to such compensation for the pecuniary loss
that he has duly proven.
• Actual damages cannot be presumed and cannot be based on
flimsy, remote, speculative, and non-substantial proof. Neither
petitioner nor respondent is thus entitled to actual or
compensatory damages in this case. It is significant to note that
the Refining Contract between petitioner and respondent did
not state the amount of the contract which may be a basis for
an award of actual damages.
Spouses Latip vs. Chua
G.R. No. 177809, Oct 16, 2009
The Supreme Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds the Spouses Latip liable for unpaid rentals on the leased
cubicles, deducting the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received as
advance rentals.
FACTS:
• Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip were the lessees of two
cubicles in a commercial building owned by Rosalie Chua.
• The lease contract stated that the monthly rental for the
cubicles was P60,000.00, with a yearly increase of 10%.
• The contract also included provisions regarding the payment
of arrears, subletting, and the condition of the cubicles.
• After a year of occupying the cubicles, Rosalie sent a letter
demanding payment of back rentals to the Spouses Latip.
• When they failed to comply, Rosalie filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer plus damages against them.
• The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ruled in favor of
Rosalie, ordering the Spouses Latip to vacate the property and
pay rent arrearages, monthly rentals, attorney's fees, and costs
of the suit.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the MeTC's decision,
ruling that the lease contract was incomplete and not notarized.
• The RTC also found that the Spouses Latip had already fully
paid the lease rentals.
• The Court of Appeals (CA) later reversed the RTC's decision
and reinstated the MeTC's ruling.
ISSUE:
• W/N the Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased
cubicles.
RULING:
• The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
• The Spouses Latip were held liable for unpaid rentals, minus
the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by Rosalie as
advance rentals.
RATIO:
• The Court of Appeals (CA) took judicial notice of the alleged
practice of paying goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran
area.
• However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the alleged
practice did not meet the requisite of notoriety and that Rosalie
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her claim.
• The Supreme Court held that the lease contract and the receipts
for the amount of P2,570,000.00 should be considered as
advanced rentals on the leased cubicles.
• The court found that there was no evidence to support the
claim that the amount was payment for goodwill money.
• The Spouses Latip were held liable for unpaid rentals on the
lease, but the amount of P2,570,000.00 should be deducted
from their liability.
Arreza vs. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198, Jul 1, 2019
A Filipino citizen seeks judicial recognition of a foreign divorce in
order to remarry, but is denied by the Regional Trial Court due to lack
of authenticated documents, leading to an appeal to the Supreme
Court for resolution of factual issues.
FACTS:
• Genevieve Rosal Arreza, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo,
a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City in 1991.
• After 19 years of marriage, they filed a Notification of Divorce
by Agreement in 2011.
• The Notification of Divorce was received by the Mayor of
Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan.
• Genevieve filed a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry before the
Regional Trial Court.
• She submitted various documents to support her petition,
including a copy of their Divorce Certificate, Tetsushi's Family
Register, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of
Divorce, and an English translation of the Civil Code of Japan.
• The Regional Trial Court denied Genevieve's petition, stating
that she failed to prove the copy of Japan's law as the submitted
documents were not duly authenticated.
ISSUE:
• W/N the Regional Trial Court erred in denying Genevieve's
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry.
RULING:
• The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.
• The Court emphasized that questions of fact, such as the
validity of the divorce decree and the existence of Japan's law
on divorce, are not within its ambit to resolve.
• The procedural restrictions of a Rule 45 petition, which only
entertains questions of law, do not apply in this case due to the
substantial ends of justice.
RATIO:
• In actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment, the petitioner must prove not only the foreign
judgment granting the divorce but also the alien spouse's
national law.
• Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.
• The proof of the foreign divorce decree and the foreign
spouse's national law can be established by complying with the
requirements under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules
of Court.
• The Regional Trial Court found that Genevieve's submitted
documents for the divorce decree complied with the
requirements, but the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its
English translation were insufficient as they were not duly
authenticated.
• The English translation cannot be considered as an official
publication or a learned treatise without proper authentication
and proof of the translator's and advisors' qualifications.
• The Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals to
determine and resolve the factual issues involved.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119288, Aug 18, 1997
The Supreme Court remands a case to the trial court to determine the
specific area of a disputed lot and resolve conflicting claims, after the
government fails to present evidence to support their appeal against
the adjudication of the lot to the private respondent.
FACTS:
• Private respondent Josefa Gacot claimed ownership of Lot
5367 located in Barangay Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan.
• The Regional Trial Court of Palawan adjudicated the lot to
Gacot, finding that her occupation of the lot for 38 years,
which was open and notorious, qualified her as the rightful
owner.
• The government did not object to Gacot's claim during the
hearings.
• During the proceedings, it was discovered that a previous
decision by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos in 1950 declared Lot
5367 as property of the Republic of the Philippines.
• The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
ISSUE:
• W/N the Court of Appeals err in ruling that there was no basis
for the Republic to invoke its claim over the lot.
RULING:
• During the proceedings, it was discovered that a previous
decision by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos in 1950 declared Lot
5367 as property of the Republic of the Philippines.
RATIO:
• The Republic argued that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case due to procedural errors. The Court
of Appeals granted the Republic's motion to reopen the case
and remanded it to the trial court to allow the Republic to
present a previous decision declaring Lot 5367 as government
property.
• However, during the rehearing, the government failed to
present the said order as evidence. The trial court then
rendered a decision upholding Gacot's claim.
• The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of
adhering to procedural rules but emphasized that technical
rules should be construed liberally to serve the cause of
substantial justice.
• The Court also noted that courts are authorized to take
judicial notice of their own acts and records in the same case.
• However, the Supreme Court found that the area of Lot 5367
claimed and awarded to Gacot had not been specified in the
records.
• Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the specific area of the
disputed lot and to resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties.
Degayo vs. Magbanua-Dinglasan
G.R. No. 173148, Apr 6, 2015
A property dispute over a riverbed in the Philippines leads to
conflicting claims between Elsa Degayo and the Magbanua family,
resulting in the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the Magbanuas,
declaring the disputed property as an abandoned riverbed.
FACTS:
• The case involves a property dispute over a riverbed in the
Philippines between Elsa Degayo and the Magbanua family.
• The disputed property is a parcel of land located on the
northeastern bank of Jalaud River.
• Degayo claims that the disputed area is an accretion to Lot No.
861, which she inherited from her deceased parents.
• The Magbanua family argues that the disputed property is an
abandoned riverbed and should rightfully belong to them.
• The Jalaud River changed its course in the 1970s, encroaching
on the Magbanua's land and leaving the old riverbed dry.
• Two civil cases were filed, one by the Magbanua family
against the tenants of Lot No. 861, and another by Degayo
against the Magbanua family for ownership of the disputed
land.
ISSUE:
• W/N the disputed property is an accretion to Lot No. 861 or an
abandoned riverbed.
RULING:
• The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Magbanua family,
declaring the disputed property as an abandoned riverbed and
therefore belonging to them.
• The Court applied the doctrine of res judicata, stating that the
decision in a previous civil case (Civil Case No. 16047)
between the Magbanua family and the tenants of Lot No. 861
constitutes res judicata and is binding on Degayo.
• The Court found that there is an identity of parties and issues
between Civil Case No. 16047 and the present case.
• The Court also held that the Court of Appeals (CA) properly
took judicial notice of the previous case.
• Therefore, the Court denied Degayo's petition for lack of merit.
RATIO:
• The Court applied the doctrine of res judicata, which means
that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction should not be litigated again.
• The Court emphasized the importance of finality of judgments
and the conservation of judicial resources.
• The Court found that the decision in Civil Case No. 16047,
which declared the disputed property as an abandoned
riverbed, constitutes res judicata and is binding on Degayo.
• The Court also held that the CA properly took judicial notice
of the previous case, as Degayo herself repeatedly referred to
it in her pleadings.
• Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the Magbanua family
and declared the disputed property as an abandoned riverbed
belonging to them.
Vergara vs. People
G.R. No. 128720, Jan 23, 2002
A soldier is convicted of robbery based on the positive identification
made by a witness, despite his defense of alibi, leading to his
conviction.
FACTS:
• S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was convicted of robbery based on the
positive identification made by Catherine Manalo.
• The incident occurred on October 19, 1990, involving the
payroll money of J & E Manalo Construction Co., Inc.
amounting to P89,000.
• Vergara, along with his co-accused, C1C Nicolas Custodio and
Leonido Losanes, were charged with robbery in band.
• Custodio and Losanes managed to escape police custody,
leaving Vergara as the only one to face the charges.
ISSUE:
• W/N the positive identification made by Catherine Manalo
overrides Vergara's defense of alibi.
RULING:
• The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Vergara for
robbery.
RATIO:
ISSUE:
• W/N the admission of the exhibits by the BOM was in
accordance with the law and the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court.
RULING:
• The Supreme Court held that a petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy to challenge the BOM's orders.
• The court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
BOM in admitting the exhibits.
• The court emphasized that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in administrative proceedings.
• The fact sought to be proved by the exhibits, the proper
anatomical locations of Editha's kidneys, is covered by
mandatory judicial notice.
• The best evidence rule was inapplicable in this case, as the
subject of inquiry was not the contents of a document but the
liability of the doctors for gross negligence.
• The court rejected Atienza's argument that the exhibits were
hearsay, stating that the anatomical positions of Editha's
kidneys could still be established through other means, such as
a belated ultrasound or x-ray.
• The Supreme Court denied Atienza's petition and affirmed the
decision of the CA.
• The court held that the admission of the exhibits by the BOM
did not violate Atienza's substantive rights and that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.
RATIO:
Discretion in Admitting Evidence in Administrative Proceedings
• The rules of evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings.
• Administrative bodies have the discretion to admit evidence
that may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility.