Rabuya Prebar Reviewer Civ Law 2021 2

R52M9UH7

PRE-BAR REVIEWER
in
CIVIL LAW

ELMER T. RABUYA
Professor of Civil Laws and Bar Reviewer
Arellano University School of Law, De La Salle Lipa,
University of Asia & Pacific, University of Perpetual Help-Las Pinas,
Polytechnic University of the Philippines and Philippine Christian University;
Formerly: University of Santo Tomas, University of the East,
Jose Rizal University, Lyceum of the Philippines
and Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Pasay
Jurists Bar Review Center, Recoletos Law Center
Villasis Law Center, Legal Edge, Academicus Review Center
CPRS Bar Review Center, Excellent Bar Review Center
Author: The Law on Persons & Family Relations, Property, Obligations &
Contracts, and Civil Law Reviewer, Volumes 1 and 2
LLB, AUSL, Class Valedictorian
A.B. Management Economics, Ateneo de Manila University

2021 EDITION
Published & Distributed by
S REX Book Store .....
I
$ 856 Nlcanor Reyes, Sr. St
Tel. Nos.: 8736-0567/8733-6746
2161-65 Freedom Bldg., C.M. Recto Avenue
Tel. Nos.: 8522-4521/8522-4107
Manila, Philippines
m
www.rex.com.ph
B ft B B h BB
!
i
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BOOK I. - PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

A. PRELIMINARY TITLE 1
Effectivity and Application of Laws 1
Basic Conflict of Laws Rules 6
B. HUMAN RELATIONS 12
Required Norm of Human Conduct 12
C. CIVIL PERSONALITY 19
Civil Personality 19
FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

D. MARRIAGE 23
Requisites For A Valid Marriage 23
Rules on Validity of Absolute Divorces 33
Void Marriages 36
Voidable Marriages 50
Legal Separation 53
Rights and Obligations of Spouses 58
Property Relations In General 61
Absolute Community and Conjugal Partnership of Gains 64
Separation of Property of Spouses During the Marriage .. 77
Property Regimes Linder Articles 147 and 148 79
Family Relations and Family Home 85
Paternity and Filiation 90
Adoption 106
Legal Support 116
Parental Authority 121
Emancipation and Summary Proceedings Under the
Family Code 133
Funerals 136
Surnames 138
Change of First Name and Surname 145
Change or Correction of Entry in Civil Register 147
Absence 153
vii
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK 11. - PROPERTY

Classification of Property: Immovable and Movable Property 156
Classification of Property: Based on Ownership 161
Ownership in General 167
Accession 172
Quieting of Title and Ruinous Buildings and Trees 183
Co-ownership 186
Ownership of Waters 196
Possession 197
Usufruct 204
Easement 211
Nuisance ............................................. 222
Modes of Acquiring and Transmitting Ownership 225
Donation 232
BOOK III. - SUCCESSION
Basic Principles 241

Wills in General 247
Kinds and Formalities of Wills 251
Codicils and Subsequent Wills 263
Revocation of Wills 264
Republication and Revival of Wills 268
Probate of Wills 269
Testamentary Succession: Legitime 273
Reserva Troncal or Reserva Lineal . 282
Testamentary Succession: Rules Applicable to Disposable
Free Portion 285
Institution of (Voluntary) Heirs 285
Preterition 288
Substitution of Heirs 289
Accretion in Testamentary Succession 292
Condition, Mode, and Term 292
Legacies and Devises 296
Vacancies in Succession................................... •. 298
Predecease 298
Valid Disinheritance 300
Capacity and Incapacity to Succeed 302
Acceptance and Repudiation of Inheritance 306
Modes of Filling Up Vacancies 308
Substitution 308
Accretion 308
Right of Representation 310
viii
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
Intestate or Legal Succession 313

Simplified Rules of Intestate Succession: Estate of
Legitimate Decedent 315
Simplified Rules of Intestate Succession: Estate of
Illegitimate Decedent 329
BOOK IV. - OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

PART 1: OBLIGATIONS
Concept 332
Sources of Obligations 332
Kinds of Obligations: Civil and Natural 341
Kinds of Obligations: Real and Personal 343
Breach of Obligations 346
Kinds of Obligations: Pure, Conditional, and With a Term 350
Kinds of Obligations: Alternative and Facultative Obligations 357
Kinds of Obligations: Joint and Solidary Obligations 360
Kinds of Obligations: Divisible and Indivisible Obligations.... 367
Kinds of Obligations: Obligations with a Penal Clause 368
Extinguishment of Obligations: Payment 370
Extinguishment of Obligations: Loss 382
Extinguishment of Obligations: Condonation or Remission ... 385
Extinguishment of Obligations: Merger or Confusion 386
Extinguishment of Obligations: Compensation 386
Extinguishment of Obligations: Novation 389
PART 2: CONTRACTS
Basic Concepts 395
Perfection and Essential Requisites of Contracts 399
Forms of Contracts, Reformation, and Interpretation of Contracts 412
Defective Contracts 418
Classification of Contracts as to Defects 418
Rescissible Contracts 420
Voidable Contracts 427
Unenforceable Contracts 431
Void or Inexistent Contracts 433
BOOK V. - SPECIAL CONTRACTS

PART 1: CONTRACT OF SALE
Concept 441
Essential Elements and Formalities 444
ix
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
Obligations of the Parties 451

Pacto De Retro Sale and Equitable Mortgage 464
PART 2: CONTRACT OF LEASE
Lease of Things 467

Contract for Piece of Work 473
PART 3: CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIER

Concept 476
PART 4: CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP

Contract of Partnership 480
PART 5: CONTRACT OF AGENCY

Contract of Agency 497
PART 6: CONTRACTS OF LOAN AND DEPOSIT

Contract of Commodatum 514
Contract of Mutuum 519
Contract of Deposit 524
PART 7: ACCESSORY CONTRACTS

Contracts of Guaranty and Suretyship ... 532
Real Mortgage Contract and Antichresis 543
Personal Property as Security 553
Preference and Concurrence of Credit... 559
BOOK VI. - TORTS & DAMAGES

PART 1: QUASI-DELICT
Concept of Quasi-delict 562
Vicarious Liability 571
Special Cases 583
Joint Tortfeasors 586
PART 2: DAMAGES
Kinds of Damages 591
Actual or Compensatory 591
Moral Damages 596
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
Nominal Damages 598

Temperate or Moderate Damages 599
Exemplary or Corrective Damages 600
Liquidated Damages 601
Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses 602
BOOK VII. - LAND TITLES & DEEDS

Classification of Lands 605
Modes of Disposition of Public Agricultural Lands 609
Indefeasibility of Title 618
Certificate of Title Not Subject to Collateral Attack 624
xi
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK II. — PROPERTY
1) Classification of Property: Immovable and Movable Property

1.1 Concept of Property: (a) Definition: Properties are things which
are capable of satisfying human wants and are susceptible
of appropriation, (b) Requisites: (i) utility, or the capacity to
satisfy human wants; (ii) individuality and substance, or having
a separate and autonomous existence; and (iii) susceptibility of
being appropriated.
1.2 Kinds of Immovable Property: (a) Immovable bv nature: Those
which by their essence and nature are immovable or cannot be
moved from one place to another, such as lands, roads,1 mines,
quarries, and slag dumps;2 (b) Immovable hv incorporation:
Those which become immovable by reason of their attachment or
incorporation to an immovable in such manner as to be an integral
part thereof, such as buildings and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil;’ trees, plants, and growing fruits attached to
the land or forming an integral part of an immovable;4 and those
that are attached to an immovable in the manner provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article 415; (c) Immovable hv destination: Those
which are essentially movable, but by the purpose for which they
have been placed in an immovable, partake of the nature of the
latter because of the added utility derived therefrom, such as
those mentioned in pars. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 of Article 415; and (d)
Immovable bv analogy: Those that are mentioned in par. 10 of
Article 415.
1.3 Enumeration of Immovable Property in Article 415: (a) Paragranh
].: Lands, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered
to the soil. (1) Lands and roads: They are always immovable.
'Art. 415(1), NCC.

’Art. 415(8), NCC.
’Art. 415(1), NCC.
4Art. 415(2), NCC.
156
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK II. — PROPERTY 157
(2) Buildings: A building, if permanently attached to the land, is

always immovable.5 Those merely superimposed on the soil or
sold for immediate demolition are considered movable property.6
A building by itself is a real or immovable property, hence, it may
be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built.’ A
building is immovable by incorporation, hence, once the house is
demolished, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as
an immovable likewise ceases.8 Once a building is permanently
attached to the land, it is immovable property, irrespective of
whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner,’ or whether the building is erected by
the owner of the land, or by a usufructuary or lessee.10 However,
if the parties will treat a building as a movable, as between them,
they are estopped from alleging the contrary." The foregoing
principle or view is not applicable to strangers to said contract.1’
As far as third persons, who are not parties to the contract, the
house (or building) is considered an immovable property.13 Even
if the parties treated a building as personal property, the Register
of Deeds (RD) may not refuse the registration of the chattel
mortgage because the duties of the RD are purely ministerial in
character.14 (3) Construction adhering to soil: To be immovable,
the construction must be attached permanently to the land,15 and
it must not be of provisional or temporary character but fixed
or integral, (b) Paragraph 2: Trees, plants, and growing fruits,
while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of
an immovable. (1) Trees and plants: Generally immovable if
incorporated to the soil. Hence, if cut or uprooted they become
movable property, unless they form an integral part of the land, as
in the case of timber which constitutes the natural product of the
’Punzalan, Jr. v. I'da. de Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 331,335 (1983); citing 3 Manresa 20.
‘Bautista, el al. v. Supnad, (C A) 59 O.G. 1575, 1578 (1962).
’Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCR A 390 (1987).
"Bicerra v. Teneza, 6 SCRA 649, 651 (1962).
’Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., 103 Phil. 98 (1958).
'“Ladera v. Hodges (CA), 48 O.G. 5374; cited in Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc., 103 Phil. 401.
"Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (l963);Tumalad v. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143 (1971).
'’Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., supra, al p. 405.
'’Navarro v. Pineda, supra, al p. 636.
'“Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo. 44 Phil. 630 (1923).
153 Manresa 18-19; cited in II Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 17.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
158 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
tenement.16 (2) Growing fruits: For certain purposes, they may be

regarded as personal property pursuant to Article 416(2). Thus,
for purposes of sale,17 attachment and execution, and mortgage,1’
they are regarded as personal property, (c) Paragraphs 3 and
4: (1) Paragraph 3: refers to permanent fixtures, or everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way
that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object. (2) Paragraph 4: refers to
ornaments or statues, reliefs, paintings, or other objects for use
or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner
of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention
to attach them permanently to the tenements. (3) Distinctions
between paragraphs 3 and 4: (i) Paragraph 3 is immovable by
incorporation while paragraph 4 is immovable by destination; (ii)
in paragraph 3, separation from the immovable is not possible
without injury; while in paragraph 4, it is possible; and (iii) in
paragraph 3, it is not important who caused the attachment; while
in paragraph 4, it is necessary that it should be the owner of the
immovable who must place the ornament unto the immovable, (d)
Paragraph 5: refers to machineries, receptacles, instruments, or
implements intended to be used for an industry or works. They are
immovables by destination. (1) Requisites for immovability: (i)
Must be destined for use in the industry or work in the tenement1’
and must be essential and principal elements of the industry or
works.20 (ii) Industry or work must be carried on in a building
or on a piece of land,21 or even on waters.22 Thus, submarine or
underwater communications cables may be classified under the
term “machinery” as real property under Article 415(5).2J (iii)
They must be placed by the owner of the tenement, unless the
tenant acts as an agent of the owner.24 (2) Application of estoppel:
Although the machineries are essential and principal elements
of the industry, they can be proper subjects of a writ of replevin
l63 Manresa, 6th Ed., p.20.

l7M.,p.21.
‘“Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512,524 (1927).
"B.H. Berkenkolter v. Cu Unjieng y Hijos, 61 Phil. 663; Ago v. CA, 6 SCRA 530, 536
(1962).
^Mindanao Bus Co. V. City Assessor and Treasurer, 6 SCRA 197, 200 (1962).
J,/ut; Board of Assessment Appeals v. Manila Electric Company, supra.
^Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, 791 SCRA 272 (2016).
Dld.
24Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709(1935).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK 11. —PROPERTY 159
if the parties have treated the same as personal property.25 (e)

Paragraph 6: refers to animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives,
fish ponds, or breeding places of similar nature. (1) Requisites
for immovability: (i) permanently placed or attached to the land;
and (ii) must be placed by the owner of the land. (2) They must
not be permanently attached to the soil; otherwise, it will become
an immovable by incorporation under paragraph 1 (construction
adhering to the soil) or under paragraph 3. (f) Paragraph 7:
fertilizers actually used on a piece of land, (g) Paragraph 8: refers
to mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof
forms part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant,
(h) Paragraph 9: refers to docks and structures which, though
floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a
fixed place on a river, lake, or coast. (1) They are immovables
by destination. (2) A classic example is a boathouse which, by
its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if
it is tied to the shore and used as a residence, and since it floats
on waters which is immovable, is considered real property.26 (i)
Paragraph 10: refers to contracts for public works, and servitudes
and other real rights over immovable property. (1) They are
immovables by analogy. (2) If the real right is exercised over
an immovable property, like a registered real estate mortgage, it
is a real property.22 If exercised over a movable property, it is a
personal property. However, if it is a personal right, it is always a
personal property, whether exercised over a personal property or
over a real property, except contracts for public works.
1.4 Real Property For Taxation Purnoses: (a) Local Government Code
prevails: As between the Civil Code, a general law governing
property and property relations, and the Local Government
Code, a special law granting local government units (LGUs)
the power to impose real property tax, the latter prevails for the
purpose of determining which property is subject to real property
tax.2" (b) Illustrative cases: (1) In Manila Electric Company v.
City Assessor,1'1 it was ruled that the transformers, electric posts,
25Serg’s Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., 338 SCRA 499 (2000); Makati
Leasing and Finance Corp. V. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., 122 SCRA 294 (1983).
“Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, 791 SCRA 272 (2016).
2,MBTC v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812, 819 (2001); see also Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v.
Aldecoa & Co., 30 Phil. 255,273.
“Manila Electric Company v. The City Assessor, 765 SCRA 52 (2015); Provincial Assessor
of Agusan del Sur v. Pilipinas Palm Oil Plantation, Inc., 805 SCRA 112 (2016).
NSupra.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO

may qualify as “machinery” under the Local Government
Code subject to real property tax. (2) In Capitol Wireless, Inc.
v. Provincial Treasurer of Batangas,10 the Court likewise ruled
that submarine or undersea communications cables entering
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines are akin to electric
transmission lines and may qualify as “machinery” subject to real
property tax under the Local Government Code.
1.5 Movable Property Under Articles 416 and 417: (a) Art. 416(1):
Movables susceptible ofappropriation not included in Article 415.
Interest in business is personal property under this provision,31 as
well as the business itself.33 (b) Art. 416(2): Real property which
by any special provision of law is considered as personalty, such
as growing fruits although attached to the land for purposes
of the sale of the whole crops,33 for purposes of the Chattel
Mortgage Law," or for purposes of attachment or execution.35 (c)
Art. 416(3): Forces of nature which are brought under control by
science, such as gas36 and electricity.37 (d) Art. 416(4): In general,
all things which can be transported from place to place without
impairment of the real property to which they are fixed, such as
vessels.3* (e) Art. 417(1): Obligations and actions which have for
their object movables or demandable sums. However, a mortgage
loan is considered real property because it is a real right over an
immovable property and, therefore, considered real by analogy.3’
(f) Art. 417(2): Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial,
and industrial entities, although they may have real estate.
Membership shares in golf clubs are considered as movable or
personal property." Such share is a property right which a person
cannot be deprived of without affording him the benefit of due
process."
"791 SCRA 272 (2016).

"Strochccker v. Ramirez,44 Phil. 933 (1922).
33Laurel v. Abrogar, 576 SCRA 41 (2009), decided by the En lluuc.
”3 Manrcsa, 6th Ed., 21.
"Sec. 7, par. 3, Act No. 1508; Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512 (1927).
"Sibal v. Valdez, supra.
"US v. Tambunling, 41 Phil. 364.
"US v. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553.
"Rubiso v. Rivera, 37 Phil. 72; Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v. Jarque, 61 Phil. 229.
"Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Aldecoa, 30 Phil. 255.
"Valley Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. I'da. de Caram, G.R. No. 158805, April 16, 2009.
11 Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. V. Reyes, 774 SCRA 214 (2015).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
1.6 Classification of Movable Property: (a) Consumable or non-

consumable: A consumable is a movable which cannot be used in
a manner appropriate to its nature without itself being consumed;
while a non-consumable is a movable which can be used in a
manner appropriate to its nature without itself being consumed.42
The classification applies to movables and to corporeal objects
only, (b) Fungible and non-fungible: A movable is classified
as fungible if, by the intention of the parties, it can be replaced
by another of the same kind; otherwise, it is a non-fungible. In
classifying movables into consumable or non-consumable, the
basis of the classification is the very nature of the corporeal
object itself. On the other hand, the basis of the classification of
movables into fungible or non-fungible is simply the intention of
the parties.
2) Classification of Property: Based on Ownership

2.1 In General: (a) Classification based on ownership: Pursuant to
Article 419 of the Civil Code, property, in relation to the person
to whom it belongs, is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. As such, properties are owned either in a public
capacity (dominio publico) or in a private capacity (propiedad
privado).43 (b) Public dominion: There are three kinds of property
of public dominion: (1) those intended for public use; (2) those
intended for some public service; and (3) those intended for the
development of national wealth.44 (c) Private ownership: In turn,
the Civil Code classifies property of private ownership into three
categories: (1) patrimonial property of the State under Articles
421 and 422; (2) patrimonial property of LGUs under Article
424; and (3) property belonging to private individuals under
Article 425.4S
2.2 Property of the State: (A) Property of Public Dominion: (a)
Kinds of nronertv of public dominion: (1) those intended for
public use, or those the use of which is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public,46 such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constnicted by the State,
42Art. 418, NCC.

■"Republic v. Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336, Oct. 17, 2018.
“Id.
43Id.
“Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110 (2004).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;47 (2)

those intended for some public service,48 or those which cannot
be used indiscriminately by anyone but only by those that are
authorized by proper authority;49 and (3) those intended for the
development of the national wealth.’0 Mere intention to devote a
property to public use, public service, or for the development of
the national wealth is sufficient in order to make it a property of
public dominion and it is not necessary that it must actually be
used as such.’1 (b) Examples of property for public use: (1) The
term "ports " in Article 420( 1) of the NCC includes airports’2 and
seaports.” (2) Aside from shores, foreshore lands are also part
of the public dominion,54 as well as the reclamation of foreshore
lands and submerged areas.” Foreshore land is that part of the land
immediately in front of the shore; the part which is between high
and low water marks, and alternately covered with water and left
dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is indicated by a middle
line between the highest and lowest tides.” The mere reclamation
of foreshore lands and submerged areas do not convert them
into patrimonial property. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying them into patrimonial
property.” (3) All waters belong to the State and are classified as
property of public dominion,’8 including rivers and their natural
beds,” natural lakes,“ and their natural beds, which is the ground
’’Art. 420(1), NCC.

48 Art. 420(2), NCC.
"II Caguioa, Civil Code ofthe Philippines, 1966 Ed., p. 31.
"Art. 420(2), NCC.
’’Manila Lodge No. 761 v. CA, 73 SCRA 162 (1976); Agripino Capitulo, e! al. V. Alejo
Aquino, No. 15488-R, (CA) 53 O.G. 1477, November 19, 1956.
’’Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, 495 SCRA 591,622 (2006); also In Manila
International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay, 583 SCRA 234 (2009) and Maetan-Ccbu Interna-
tional Airport Authority (MCI AA) v. City of Lapu-Lapu, 757 SCRA 323 (2015).
’’Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. CA, 534 SCRA 490 (2007) and Curata v.
Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214 (2009).
’’Republic v. CA, 281 SCRA 639 (1997).
’’Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
“Hacut v. Director of Lands, (CA) 49 O.G. No. 5, p. 1863 (1953); Ponce v. Gomez, G.R.
No. L-21870, February 3, 1965; and Ponce v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. L-22669, June 24, 1966.
’’Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra.
’’Art. 3, Water Code of the Philippines.
’’Art. 5(a), Waler Code.
“Art. 5(c), Water Code.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth,61

and creeks, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.62 (4) Aside from roads,
a road right of way for national highways is also a property of
public dominion.63 (5) Lands classified as reservations for public
or quasi-public uses, such as military reservations, are property
of public dominion.64 (6) Water works system constructed by
the DPWH devoted to public use is also property of public
dominion.63 (c) Alienable and disposable agricultural lands: (1)
Classes of public lands: The 1987 Constitution classifies lands
of the public domain (or public lands) into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral, and national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be
alienated.66 (2) Two types of alienable and disposable lands of the
State: (i) patrimonial lands of the State, without limitation; and
(ii) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only
be agricultural.6’ (3) Still classified as public dominion: Lands
of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable
or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.68 Such declaration merely gives the
State the authority to alienate or dispose the agricultural land, in
accordance with law.6’ To be converted into patrimonial property,
there are two ways: (i) there must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service, or the development of the national wealth, or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial property;
and such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted
by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
61 Art. 74, Spanish Law of Walers of 1866; cited in Republic v. CA, 131 SCRA 532 (1984).
“Mimeclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 161 SCRA 469,471 (1988); citing Mercado
v. Municipal President of Maeabebe, 59 Phil. 592 (1934); see also Maneclang v. 1AC, 144 SCRA
553, 556 (1986); Usero v. Court of Appeals, 449 SCRA 352, 359 (2005).
61Hi-Lon Manufacturing, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, 833 SCRA 540 (2017).
“Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, 764 SCRA 524 (2015), and Republic
v. Bacas, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
63General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. NHA, 750 SCRA 156 (2015).
“Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 704 SCRA 561 (2013).
6’Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra; Republic v. Noval, 840 SCRA 11 (2017).
“Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009).
"Dumo v. Republic, 865 SCRA 119 (2018).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
President is duly authorized by law;™ or (ii) it is actually alienated

and disposed of by the State.’1 (d) Sec. 14 (1) and (2) of Property
Registration Decree: (1) Distinctions: (i) in par. 1, basis of grant
of title is simply possession and occupation; while in par. 2, the
basis is acquisitive prescription;™ (ii) in par. 1, registration is
based on the Property Registration Decree and the Public Lands
Act; in par. 2, it is based on the Property Registration Decree and
Civil Code;” (iii) in par. 1, the land involved is agricultural land of
the public domain already declared alienable and disposable (not
yet patrimonial); in par. 2, the land involved must be patrimonial.
(2) Requisites for registration under par. 1: (i) land is alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, at least at the time
of filing of application; (ii) applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership; and (iii) applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.” If all requisites are present, the land ceases to be part
of the public domain and becomes private property.” This mode
of disposition is referred to as judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
(3) Requisites for registration under par. 2: (i) land is alienable
and disposable patrimonial property of the public domain; (ii)
the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with
just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just
title; and (iii) the land had already been converted to or declared
’"Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 5X7 SCR A 172 (2009).

71 died in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 5X7 SCRA 172 (2009) and Dream
Village Neighborhood Associated, Inc. v. BCDA, 702 SCRA 222 (2013).
’’Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and Development Corp., 719 SCRA 601 (2014), ciliiiH Heirs
ofMario Malabanan v. Republic, 5X7 SCRA 172 (2009), reiterated in Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, X2X
SCRA 77 (2017) and Kawayan Hills Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 203090, Sep. 5, 201X.
™/d.
’■‘Republic v. Alonso, G.R. No. 2I073X, Aug. 14, 2019; Republic v. Science Park of the
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 237714, Nov. 12, 20IX; Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, Nov.
12, 2018; Republic v. Manahan-Jazmines, G.R. No. 227388, July 23, 2018; Dumo v. Republic,
865 SCRA 119 (2018); Republic v. Malijan-Javier, 860 SCRA 443 (2018); Leonidas v. Vargas,
849 SCRA 210 (2017); Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, 828 SCRA 77 (2017); Republic v. The Estate of
Virginia Santos, 813 SCRA 541 (2016); Republic v. Local Superior of the Institute of the Sisters of
the Sacred Heart of Jesus of Raguse, 783 SCRA 501 (2016); Republic v. Dayaoen, 762 SCRA 310
(2015); Republic v. Alba, 767 SCRA 385 (2015); Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and Development
Corp., 719 SCRA 601 (2014).
”Hcirs ofMario Malabanan v. Republic, 704 SCRA 561 (2013).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK II. —PROPERTY 165
as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said

10-year or 30-year period of possession.76 (e) Characteristics
of property of public dominion: (1) They are outside the
commerce of man.77 They cannot be subject to sale, disposition,
or encumbrance; any sale, disposition, or encumbrance of such
property of the public dominion is void for being contrary to law
and public policy.78 They cannot likewise be leased or otherwise
be the subject matter of contracts.” (2) They are not susceptible
to private appropriation and cannot be acquired by acquisitive
prescription.80 (3) They cannot be the subject of an auction sale,
levy, encumbrance, or disposition through public or private
sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution, or auction sale of
any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy.81 (4) They cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easement.82 (B). Patrimonial Property of State: (a) Concept: All
other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
Article 420 of the NCC, is patrimonial property.83 It is property
owned by the State in its private capacity81 or private property
of the government, (b) Sub-classification: (1) “by nature or
use” or those covered by Article 421, which are not property of
public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the
State’s current or intended use; and (2) “by conversion” or those
covered by Article 422, which previously assumed the nature
of property of public dominion by virtue of the State’s use, but
’“Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, Nov. 12, 2018; Espiritu, Jr. V. Republic, 828
SCRA 77 (2017); Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and Development Corp., 719 SCRA 601 (2014).
’’Manila International Airport Authority v. CA, 495 SCRA 591 (2006), citing Municipal-
ity of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 (1915); see also Dacanay v. Asistio, Jr., 208 SCRA 404, 411
(1992).
’"Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, 764 SCRA 524 (2015).
’’Dacanay v. Asistio, supra, citing Villanueva v. Castaileda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142;
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602; Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102
Phil. 869; and Muyot v. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860.
""Dream Village Neighborhood Associated, Inc. v. BCDA, 702 SCRA 222 (2013); Maltese
v. Velasco, 577 SCRA 108 (2009); Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505.
"'Privatization and Management Office v. Court ofTax Appeals, G.R. No. 211839, March
18, 2019; Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority V. City of Lapu-lapu, 757 SCRA 323
(2015); General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. NHA, 750 SCRA 156 (2015);
Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, 590 SCRA 214 (2009); Manila International Airport Authority
v. CA, 495 SCRA 591 (2006); see also Vda. de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
52.
"Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110 (2004).
87Art. 421, NCC.
“Heirs of Leopoldo Delfin and Soledad Delfin v. NHA, supra', Hinunangan v. Director of
Lands, 24 Phil. 124, 127(1913).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose.”

(c) Susceptible to prescription: In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic* the Court ruled that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription, citing Article 1113 of the Civil
Code, (d) Conversion to patrimonial property: There must be:
(1) abandonment or non-use; and (2) affirmative act, either on
the part of executive or the legislative, to reclassify property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property.87 Such affirmative
act need be a law, except in the conversion of agricultural lands
of the public domain which have already been declared alienable
and disposable, where the conversion must be expressly declared
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law."
2.3 Property of Provinces. Cities, and Municipalities: (a) In general:
The property of LGUs is either for public use (public dominion)
or patrimonial.8’ (b) Public dominion: (1) Kinds: The properties
of public dominion of LGUs are the following: (i) those
expressly enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 424 as intended
for public use, such as provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities, or municipalities; and (ii) those not expressly enumerated
in the first paragraph of Article 424 but devoted to public and
governmental purposes, such as local administration, public
education, and public health/'0 (2) Characteristics: Governed by
the same principles as property of public dominion of the same
character.’1 In summary, the property of LGUs devoted to public
use is outside the commerce of man and as a consequence: (i) it
"Republic v. Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336, Oct. 17,2018.

“‘587 SCRA 172 (2009); reiteratedin Republic v. Ching, 634 SCRA 415 (2010), Republic
v. Rizalvo, Jr., 644 SCRA 516 (2011), Republic v. East Silvcrlane Realty Development Corp-, 666
SCRA 401 (2012), Tan v. Republic, 669 SCRA 499 (2012), Republic v. Metro Index Realty and
Development Corp., 675 SCRA 439 (2012), Republic v. Espinosa, 677 SCRA 92 (2012), Heirs
of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 704 SCRA 561 (2013), Republic v. Gielczyk, 708 SCRA 433
(2013), Republic v. Cortez, 715 SCRA 416 (2014), Andres v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development,
Inc., 768 SCRA 56 (2015) and Republic v. Tan, 783 SCRA 643 (2016).
•'Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990).
"Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009).
•’Art. 424, NCC.
’“Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Garcia, Jr., 804 SCRA 629 (2016) and Province
of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).
’'Pilapil v. CA, 216 SCRA 33 (1992).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK H. —PROPERTY 167
is not alienable or disposable; (ii) it is not subject to registration

under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject
of a Torrens title; (iii) it is not susceptible to prescription; (iv) it
cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; (v)
it is not subject to attachment and execution; and (vi) it cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easements.” (c) Patrimonial property:
These are the properties of the LGUs not expressly mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Article 424 and devoted to proprietary or private
purposes, (d) Extent of Congress’control: If the property is owned
by the local government in its public and governmental capacity,
it is public property and Congress has absolute control over it;
but if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity,
then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control, in
which case, the local government unit cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment ofjust compensation.”
3) Ownership in General
3.1 Rights Included: (1) right to enjoy,94 which includes the right over
the fruits (jus fruendi), right to possess (jus possidendi), right to
use (jus utendi), and right to consume or abuse (jus abutendi); (2)
right to dispose;95 (3) right to recover;96 (4) right to exclude others
from the property;9’ (5) right to enclose or fence his property;98
(6) right to compensation in case of eminent domain;99 (7) right to
the surface, the sub-surface, and the space above the land;™ (8)
right to hidden treasure;191 and (9) right of accession.'"
3.2 Right to Eniov: (a) Basic limitation: Principle of abuse of right,
(b) Right to exclude others: (1) Right to fence: A property owner
may enclose or fence his property subject only to the limitations
“Alolino v. Flores, 788 SCRA 92 (2016).

’’Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan v. Garcia, Jr., supra, and Province of Zamboanga
del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, supra.
'“Art. 428, 1st par., NCC.
”M.
“Art. 428, 2nd par., NCC.
’’Art. 429, NCC.
’“Art. 430, NCC.
'"Art. 435, NCC.
'"Art. 437, NCC.
101 Art. 438, NCC.
'“Arts. 440-475, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
and restrictions provided by law.'”’ (2) Doctrine of self-help:

Owner or lawful possessor may use reasonable force to repel
or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property,'”* which can only be exercised
at the time of actual or threatened dispossession and not when
possession has already been lost. In the latter, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
(3) Doctrine of state of necessity: The owner cannot, however,
prohibit interference by another if the same is necessary to avert
an imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to
the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much
greater.'06 The owner may, however, demand from the person
benefited indemnity for the damage to him.'07 (4) Requisites of
state of necessity: (i) there is a situation of grave peril, an actual
or imminent danger, either upon the person of the actor or a third
person or their property; (ii) interference is necessary to avert
such danger; (iii) threatened damage, compared to the damage
arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater;108
and (iv) state of necessity is not brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same.105
3.3 Right to Recover: (a) Basic rule: In no case may possession
be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing
must invoke the aid of the competent court if the holder should
refuse to deliver the thing."" (b) Action interdicted: (1) Concept:
Limited to right to physical possession or possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership. The action is either
forcible entry (FE) or unlawful detainer (UD). (2) Distinctions:
(i) in FE, plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the premises; in UD, plaintiff need not have been
in prior physical possession; (ii) in FE, possession of land by
103Art. 430, NCC; Aneco Realty and Development Corp. v. Landex Development Corp.,
560 SCRA 182 (2008).
'“Art. 429, NCC.
l03German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495.
'“Art. 432, NCC.
'"‘Art. 432, NCC.

'"’People v. Rcbutado, G.R. No. 124058, December 10,2003.
""Art. 536, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
defendant is unlawful from the beginning; in UD, possession of

defendant is inceptively lawful but it becomes illegal by reason
of termination of his right to the possession of the property
under his contract; (iii) in FE, no need for previous demand
to vacate the premises; in UD, such demand is jurisdictional
in nature.1" Hence, in UD the one-year prescriptive period is
counted from the date of the last demand."3 (3) Jurisdiction:
Always with the MTC. (c) Action publiciana: (1) Concept:
An action publiciana, or an action plenaria de posesion is a
plenary action to recover the right of possession, and the issue
is which party has the better right of possession (possession de
jure)."3 The issue in an action publiciana is the “better right of
possession” of real property independent of title. It is also used
to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is
not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
or when possession has been lost for more than one year and the
action can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. The objective of the plaintiffs in action publiciana is
to recover possession only, not ownership."'1 (2) Jurisdiction:
It is an action involving title to or possession of real property.
The MTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value of the property
does not exceed P20,000, or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro
Manila;"5 otherwise, jurisdiction is with the RTC. (d) Action
reinvindicatoria: (1) Concept: It is a suit which has for its object
the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It
involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership."6 (2) Requisites: The claimant must prove two things:
first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto."’
In regard to the first requisite, in an action reinvindicatoria, the
'"Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, 560 SCRA 624 (2008).

"’Mirallosa v. Cannel Development, Inc., 711 SCRA 30 (2013).
"’Martinez v. Heirs of Lim, G.R. No. 234655, Sep. 11, 2019.
,l4/r/. See also Urieta FiZo. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, 623 SCRA 130(2010);Supapo v. De Jesus,
756 SCRA 211 (2015); Estate of Soledad Mananlan v. Soniera, 584 SCRA 81 (2009); Madrid v.
Mapoy, 596 SCRA 14 (2009); Velasquez v. Cruz, 771 SCRA 122 (2015); Canlas v. Tubil, 601
SCRA 147 (2009); Estate of Soledad Mananlan v. Somera, 584 SCRA 81 (2009).
ulFlores-Cruz v. Goli-Cruz, 600 SCRA 545 (2009); see also Supapo v. De Jesus, 756
SCRA 211 (2015) and Hilario v. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815 (2005).
"‘Hilario v. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815 (2005).
"’Art. 434, NCC; Ibot v. Heirs of Francisco Tayco, 755 SCRA 75 (2015); VSD Realty &
Development Corp. v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., 702 SCRA 597 (2013); Jakosalem v. Barangan, 666
SCRA 138 (2012); Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tayag v. Gabriel, 669 SCRA 284 (2012); VSD
Realty & Development Corp. v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., 684 SCRA 470 (2012).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
person who claims that he has a better right to the property must
first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
location, area, and boundaries thereof.118 With respect to the second
requisite, the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendant’s title."’
(3) Jurisdiction: It is action involving title to or possession of
real property. The MTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000, or P50.000, for actions
filed in Metro Manila; otherwise, jurisdiction is with the RTC.
(4) Registered owner’s action imprescriptible: An action by the
registered owner to recover a real property registered under the
Torrens System does not prescribe.120 (e) Not collateral attack:
In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and action
publiciana, the objective of the plaintiff is to recover possession
only, not ownership. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive
on the issue of ownership. Hence, in an action publiciana, the
defense ofownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff,
is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the
plaintiff’s Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution
of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue
of possession.'21 In an action reinvindicatoria, the court where
the reinvindicatory or reconveyance suit is filed has the requisite
jurisdiction to rule definitively or with finality on the issue of
ownership—it can pass upon the validity of the plaintiff’s
certificate of title. Hence, there is no collateral attack.122
3.4 Right to Surface. Sub-surface, and Airspace: (a) Rule: The owner
of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height.123 (b) Limitations: (i) servitudes or easements;124 (ii) special
laws;125 (iii) ordinances,126 (iv) reasonable requirements of aerial
"’Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tayag v. Gabriel, supra: Notarte v. Notarte, 679 SCRA
378(2012).
"’VSD Really & Development Corp. v. Uniwide Sales, Inc., supra.
l:“Aledro-Runa v. Lead Export and Agro-Dcvelopment Corp., G.R. No. 225896, July 23,
2018, citing Heirs of Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, 564 Phil. 674, 679 (2007).
"'Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30,2019.
I22M.
'“Republic v. CA, 160 SCRA 228 (1988); citing Art. 437, NCC.
n'Id.
mId.
mId.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
navigation,12’ (v) rights of third persons;128 and (vi) contracts.129

(c) Right to sub-surface: Rights over lands are indivisible and,
consequently, requires a definitive and categorical classification.
Land cannot, therefore, be classified as half-agricultural and half-
mineral.130 In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated land.131 When
a landowner cannot dig upon his property motorized deep wells
and was prevented from doing so by the authorities, he is entitled
to recover the full compensation for the land because the nature
of the easement deprives the owner of its normal beneficial use.132
(d) Right to hidden treasure: A hidden treasure is: (i) any deposit
of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, which must be
hidden or unknown; and (ii) the lawful ownership of which must
not appear.133 If the finding of the treasure is by chance: (i) if the
finder is the owner of the property on which the treasure is found,
the treasure is all his;134 and (ii) if the finder is a trespasser, the
treasure solely belongs to the owner of the property on which
the treasure is found; but if the finder is not a trespasser, the
finder is entitled to one-half (!6) of the treasure and the other
half goes to the owner of the property.135 If the search for the
hidden treasure is deliberate, “treasure hunting” permit must be
obtained from the National Heritage Commission if the activity
is for the purpose of recovering treasures which are of cultural
and historical values;139 otherwise, the permit must be obtained
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.132
127Art. 437, NCC.

’’“Art. 431, NCC; cited in Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486 (2011).
129Ayala Corporation v. Ray Burton Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 126699, August 7,1998; see also
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa Diana Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 134284, December 1,
2000.
'“Republic v. CA, 160 SCRA 228 (1988) and Republic V. Rural Bank of Kabakan, Inc.,
664 SCRA 233 (2012).
•’’Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabakan, Inc., 664 SCRA233 (2012).
’’’National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, 526 SCRA 149 (2007).
’’’Art. 439, NCC.
”4Art. 438, par. 1,NCC.
’’’Art. 438, par. 2, NCC.
”9R.A. No. 8492, otherwise known as the National Museum Act of 1998.
”’DENR A.O. No. 2002-04, as amended by DENR A.O. No. 2004-2003, in relation to
E.O. No. 35, dated September 15, 2001.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
4) Accession
4.1 Basic Concept: (a) Definition: Accession is the right of the owner
of a thing to become the owner of everything that is produced
thereby or which may be inseparably attached or incorporated
thereto, either naturally or artificially.138 (b) Kinds of accession:
(1) accession discreta is the right of the owner of a property
to whatever is produced thereby or to the fruits of the same;13’
and (2) accession continua is the right to acquire whatever is
attached or incorporated naturally or artificially to our things.'"
(c) Forms of accession continua: Accession continua may refer
to immovable property or movable property. Accession continua
with regard to immovable property may either be accession
industrial or accession natural. Accession industrial may take
the form of building, planting or sowing, while accession natural
may either be alluvion, avulsion, change of course of river, or
formation of islands. Accession continua with respect to movable
property may either be adjunction or conjunction, commixtion
or confusion, and specification. Adjunction or conjunction may
furthermore take place by inclusion or engraftment, soldadura or
attachment, tejido or weaving,pintura or painting, or escritura or
writing.
4.2 Accession Ditcreta-. (a) Basic rule: Accession is the right of
the owner of a thing to become the owner of everything that
is produced thereby or which may be inseparably attached or
intzzrporzted thereto, either naturally or artificially?" To the
owner belongs the natural fruits, industrial fruits, and civil
fruiti.-" (b) Exceptions: (1) in usufruct, the usufructuary shall
be entitled to all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct;1" (2) in lease of rural land, the lessee is
entitled to the natural and industrial fruits of the thing leased
while the lessor is entitled to civil fruits in the form of the rent
paid by the lessee;1** (3) in antichresis, the creditor acquires the
right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing,
'"Art. 440, NCC.

'”3 Sanchez Roman, 89.
'*2 Del Vise 33.
141 Art. 440, NCC.
'"Art. 441, NCC.
'"Art. 526, NCC.
'“Arts. 1654, and 1676, par. 2, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK 11. — PROPERTY 173
and thereafter to the principal of his credit;14’ (4) a possessor

in good faith is entitled to the fruits received by him before his
possession is legally interrupted;'" and (5) fruits naturally falling
upon adjacent land belong to the owner of the said land and not
to the owner of the tree.'47 (c) Three kinds of fruits: (1) Natural
fruits: the spontaneous products of the soil, or those that appear
without the intervention of human labor, such as the wild fruits
in the forest, herbs, and common grass, and the young and other
products of animals, such as milk, hair, wool, horn, hide, eggs,
and animals dung or manure.'48 If the young or offspring is a
product of animals belonging to different owners, "the young
belongs to the owner of the female parent, " in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, based on the maxim partus sequitur
ventrem—the offspring follows the condition of the mother.'4’ (2)
Industrial fruits: Those produced by lands of any kind through
cultivation or labor. ““ (3) Civil fruits: The rents of buildings, the
price of leases of lands and other property and the amount of
perpetual or life annuity or other similar income.1’1 Rent is a civil
fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by
right of accession. Hence, in case of dispute over its ownership
the rightful recipient of the disputed rent should be the owner
of the subject lot at the time the rent accrued.152 Bank interests
also partake of the nature of civil fruits under Article 442 of the
Civil Code. Since these are considered fruits, ownership thereof
should be due to the owner of the principal.'” (d) Expenses in
production. Catherine, and preservation: Where the recipient of
the fruits was not the same person who incurred the expenses
in connection with its production, gathering, and preservation,
the former has the obligation to pay the expenses made by the
latter in the production, gathering and preservation of the fruits,
whether the latter acted in good faith or in bad faith.'54 But
this rule applies only when the fruits are already harvested and
'■“Art. 2132, NCC.

'■“Art. 544, NCC.
'"Art. 681, NCC.
'“Art. 442, par. 1,NCC.
'"US v. Caballero, 25 Phil. 356 (1913).
““Art. 442, par. 2, NCC.
“'Art. 442, 3rd par., NCC.
“2PNB v. Marafton, 700 SCRA 297 (2013).
““Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008.
“‘Art. 443, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
gathered since Article 443 refers to the person "who receives the
fruits."
4.3 Industrial Accession: (A) Article 447: Applies when Landowner
(LO) builds, plants, or sows on his land with materials belonging
to Owner of Materials (OM). Three situations: (1) when both
acted in good faith or in bad faith, LO must appropriate materials
but must pay for its value; (2) when LO acted in good faith and
OM acted in bad faith, the latter will lose his materials without
the right to be indemnified, and he will be liable to pay damages;
(3) when LO acted in bad faith and OM acted in good faith, the
latter has the option of demanding the value of his materials plus
damages, or demanding the return of his accessory thing in any
event, i.e., even if injury is caused thereby to the land, at the
expense of LO, plus damages. (B) Article 448: Applies when
Builder, Planter, or Sower (BPS) builds, plants, or sows on the
land of another (LO) with his own materials and both acted in
good faith, (a) Concept of BPS in good faith: (1) Limited
definition: The builder believes that he is the owner of the land or
that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at
least, he has a claim of title thereto,'55 such as when the builders
constructed their house on the adjacent lot because the geodetic
engineer erroneously pointed to said lot as the one purchased by
the builders.156 (2) Expanded definition: Where the builders knew
that they were not the owners of the land but they constructed
improvements on the land of another with the consent of the
owner,15’ such as when the landowner allowed his or her children
to construct their house on the land he or she owns.15" The
foregoing rule does not apply when the one who gave consent to
the construction was a complete stranger to the builders.15’ (3)
Involving right of repurchase: Article 448 is inapplicable in cases
involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase. When the
"'Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); Republic V. Ballocanag,
572 SCRA 436 (2008); Barbosa v. Hernandez, 527 SCRA 99 (2007); Rosales v. Castelltort, 472
SCRA 114 (2005).
‘“Rosales v. Castelltort, 472 SCRA 114 (2005).
wCited in Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015) and Community Cagayan, Inc. v.
Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); see also Automat Realty and Development Corp. v. Dela Cruz, Sr.,
737 SCRA 395 (2014); Department of Education v. Casibang, 782 SCRA 326 (2016) and Belvis,
Sr. v. Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24,2019.
‘“Macasaet v. Macasaet, 439 SCRA 625 (2004); Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 122
(1984); Javier v. Javier, 7 Phil. 261 (1907).
“’Padilla, Jr. v. Malicsi, 804 SCRA 18 (2016).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
vendee a retro introduced improvements on the subject property

prior to repurchase, Articles 1606 and 1616 require the vendor a
retro to also pay the necessary and useful expenses made on the
thing sold.'“ (4) Involving contract of lease: When the lessee
introduced an improvement on the leased promises, the applicable
law is Article 1678 and not Article 448.161 Under Article 1678, the
lessor has the option of appropriating the useful improvements
by paying one-half ('/:) of their value at that time or to allow the
lessee to remove the improvements. In the removal of the useful
improvements, the lessee can cause damage to the leased
premises so long as the injury is related to the removal. In case of
ornamental improvement, the lessor has the option of
appropriating the ornaments by paying their full value at that
time or to allow the lessee to remove the ornamental objects, if
the removal can be done without damaging the leased premises.
(5) Involving usufruct: When a usufructuary introduced useful
improvements or ornaments on the property subject matter of the
usufruct, the applicable laws are Articles 579 and 580, not Article
448.'“ Under these provisions, the usufructuary may remove the
improvements if it will not injure the principal thing, or he may
offset such improvements against any damage he may have
caused to the property. (6) Involving Condominium Act: When a
condominium unit owner introduced an improvement on his unit,
Article 448 does not apply but the Condominium Act and the
Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation.'"
(7) When ownership of land is lost: Article 448 is applicable
when the landowner loses ownership of his land because of non-
payment of real estate taxes to settle the controversy with respect
to the improvement on the land.1" (8) When builder is co-owner:
Ordinarily, Article 448 does not apply because he is a builder-
owner. By way of exception, the provision applies to one whose
house, despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner,
overlapped with the land of another.165 (9) Successor-in-interest:
‘“Narvaez v. Alciso, 594 SCRA 60 (2009).

"’'Parilla v. Pilar, 509 SCRA 420 (2006), citing Geminiano v. CA, 259 SCRA 344,
351 (1996); see also Programme Incorporated v. Province of Bataan, 492 SCRA 529 (2006);
SulosaNayon, Inc. v. Nayong Pilipino Foundation, 576 SCRA 655 (2009); Mores v. Yu-Go, 625
SCRA 290 (2010).
'“Moralidad v. Femes, 497 SCRA 532 (2006).
'“Leviste Management System, Inc. v. Legaspi Towers 200, Inc. v. 860 SCRA 355 (2018).
‘“Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407 (1995).
'“Spouses del Campo v. Abesia, 160 SCRA 379 (1988); Ignao v. I AC, 193 SCRA 17, 23
(1991); and Heirs of the Late Joaquin Limense v. K/u. de Ramos, 604 SCRA 599 (2009).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
Article 448 can be invoked by the successor-in-interest of the

builder in good faith.166 (b) Two options of landowner: (1) to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing, or planting after
payment to the builder, planter, or sower the necessary and useful
expenses, and in proper cases, expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, incurred by the latter; or (2) to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, if the value of the land is
not considerably more than that of the building or trees, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent.167 Options belong to landowner
because his right is older,166 and such rule is in accord with the
principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around.169 But the option is
preclusive. He cannot for instance, compel the owner of the
building to remove the building from the land without first
exercising either option. It is only when the owner chooses to sell
his land, and the builder or planter fails to purchase it (and its
value is not more than the value of the improvements), that the
owner may remove the improvements from the land.170 (c) Option
of aonronriation: Landowner must pay the necessary and useful
expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or
mere pleasure.171 The basis of indemnity is the current market
value of the improvements at the time of the election of the
option.177 Pending payment of the indemnity, the builder is
entitled to a right of retention of the property.177 Accordingly, the
builder cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of
retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to
'“Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 5 (1997).

167Art. 448 and 453, NCC; See also Tuatis v. Spouses Escol, 604 SCRA 471 (2009) and
Espinoza v. Mayandoc, 828 SCRA 601 (2017).
'“Depra v. Dumlao, 136 SCRA 475,483 (1985), died In Rosales v. Castelllort, 472 SCRA
114(2005).
“’Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol, 685 SCRA 453 (2012); Arangote v. Maglunob, 579
SCRA 620 (2009).
'’Torbela v. Rosario, 661 SCRA 633 (2011); Briones v. Macabagdal, 626 SCRA 300
(2010); Benedictov. Flores, 632 SCRA 446 (2010); Arangote v. Maglunob, 579 SCRA 620 (2009);
see also Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp. V. CA, 268 SCRA 5,17 (1997); citing Ignacio
v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 (1946) and Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 122 (1984).
l71Ballatan v. CA, 304 SCRA 34,46 (1999).
l77Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407,416 (1995); reiterated in Tuatis v. Escol, 604 SCRA 471
(2009) and Benedicto v. Flores, 632 SCRA 446 (2010); Javier v. Concepcion, Jr., 94 SCRA 212
(1979); Sarmiento v. Agana, 129 SCRA 122 (1984); and De Guzman v. Dela Fuente, 55 Phil. 501
(1930).
'’’Pilipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia Timbang, el al., 106 Phil. 247,253 (1959).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
vacate.174 (d) Option of selling land: Can only be exercised

against the builder or planter and only when the value of the land
is not considerably more than that the building or planting;
otherwise, the builder or planter can only be compelled to pay
proper rent. In determining the price of the land, the price must
be fixed at the “prevailing market value” at the time of the
election of the option.”5 In the event the builder or the planter
refuses to pay the price of the land, the landowner does not
automatically become the owner of the improvements without
paying any indemnity.”6 The options available to him are the
following: (i) to choose option of appropriation; (ii) to enter into
a voluntary lease contract with builder or planter;”7 (iii) the
landowner may demand for the demolition of what has been built
or planted;”8 or (iv) to apply for an order from the court for the
sale of the land and improvement in a public auction applying the
proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of the land and
the excess, if any, to be delivered to the owner of the house in
payment thereof?” (C) Articles 449-452: Applies when the
land of another (LO) with his own materials and he acted in bad
faith while the LO acted in good faith, (a) Concept of builder in
bad faith: If BPS knew that he was not the owner of the land at
the time of the building, planting, and sowing and the landowner
had no knowledge of what he did at that time, such as when the
buyers of a parcel of land constructed a house thereon even if
they were not innocent purchasers for value,150 or the builder’s
occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance?81 (b)
Three ontions of landowner: (1) The right to appropriate whatever
has been built, planted, or sown in bad faith without need of
paying indemnity,ls: plus damages,18’ and that the builder in bad
”4Nuguid v. CA, 452 SCRA 243 (2005).

”5P<Za. de Roxas v. Our Lady’s Foundation, Inc., 692 SCRA 578 (2013), citing Ballatan v.
CA, supra', see also Department of Education v. Casibang, supra.
’’“Filipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia Timbang, 106 Phil. 247,253 (1959).
’’’Miranda v. Fadullon, 97 Phil. 801 (1955), cited in Pilipinas Colleges, Inc. v. Garcia
Timbang, supra.
’’"Ignacio v. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605 (1946).
’’’Bernardo v. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 590 (1938).
'“Heirs of Victorino Sarili v. Lagrosa, 713 SCRA 726 (2014).
'"Esmaquel v. Coprada, 638 SCRA 428 (2010); see also Heirs of Cipriano Trazona v.
Heirs of Dionisio Canada, 712 SCRA 300 (2013) and Resuena v. CA, 454 SCR A 42 (2005).
'“Art. 449, NCC.
183Art. 451, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
faith has no right to a refund of any improvement built therein."4

If there are pending fruits, the landowner will likewise be entitled
to appropriate them without need of paying any indemnity.185 (2)
The right to demand the demolition of whatever has been built,
planted, or sown in bad faith in any event186 —even if damages
will be caused by the separation—plus damages.187 (3) The right
to compel the builder or planter in bad faith to pay the price of the
land,188 even if the price of the land is considerably more than the
building or trees, plus damages.189 (c) Only right of BPS in bad
faith: Reimbursement of necessary expenses of preservation of
the land.™ However, being a builder in bad faith, he does not
have the right of retention over the premises.191 (D) Article 453:
Applies when Builder, Planter, or Sower (BPS) builds, plants, or
sows on the land of another (LO) with his own materials and both
acted in bad faith. The bad faith of each other is cancelled out.
Hence, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though
both had acted in good faith.,92As a consequence, the rules in
Article 448 will be applicable. (E) Article 454: Applies when
land of another (LO) with his own materials and he acted in good
faith while the LO acted in bad faith. The provisions of Article
447 of the NCC shall apply.193 As a consequence, BPS has two
options: (1) to demand the value of his materials and reasonable
compensation for his labor, plus damages; or (2) to demand the
return of his materials in any event, plus damages. Bad faith may
only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building,
planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge and without
opposition on his part.194 (Fl Article 455: Applies when Builder,
Planter, or Sower (BPS) builds, plants, or sows on the land of
another (LO) using materials belonging to another person (OM).
There are two scenarios: (1) If OM acted in bad faith, he loses his
'“Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015) and Nil A v. Baello, 703 SCRA 333 (2013).
"“Art. 449. NCC.
'“Art. 450, NCC.
'“’Art. 451, NCC.
"“Art. 450, NCC.
“’Art. 451, NCC.
"“Art. 452, NCC.
1,1 Aquino v. Aguilar, 760 SCRA 444 (2015).
"'An. 453, NCC.
“'Art. 454, NCC.
""Dinglasan-Delos Santos v. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132 (2017), citing An. 453, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
materials in favor of LO without any right whatsoever and he is

liable for damages.195 If BPS acted in good faith, he may claim
from LO a reasonable compensation for his labor; otherwise, he
is not entitled to such compensation. (2) If OM acted in good
faith, he must be paid the value of his materials.196 BPS is
primarily liable to make such payment, while LO is subsidiarily
liable. This subsidiary liability of LO will attach only if the
following conditions are met: (i) BPS is insolvent; and (ii) LO
chooses to appropriate the building, planting, or sowing. If BPS
pays the materials, the rights and obligations of BPS and LO to
each other shall be determined by applying Articles 448-454. If
LO pays the materials, he will have to pay BPS for the latter’s
labor depending on his good faith or bad faith.
4.4 Natural Accession: (A) Alluvium: (a) Distinguished from
accretion: Alluvium is the soil deposited on the estate fronting
the river bank;197 while accretion is the process whereby the soil
is deposited along the banks of rivers.19’ If the process is gradual
and imperceptible, it is alluvium; when the process is sudden
and abrupt, it is a case of avulsion, (b) Rule on alluvium: The
additional soil deposit becomes private property and shall belong
to the owner of the land contiguous to the river, creek, stream,
or lake.199 (c) Requisites: For the foregoing rule to apply, the
following requisites must be present: (1) that the accumulation
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the exclusive result of the action of the waters; and (3) that the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of
the river, creek, stream, or lake shore.206 The drying up of the
river is not accretion.261 The process of drying up of a river to
form dry land involved the recession of the water level from
the river banks. In accretion, the water level did not recede and
’’’Art. 455, NCC.

I96M.
'’’Heirs of Emiliuno Navarro v. I AC, 268 SCR A 74, 85 (1997).
'’"Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan, 856 SCRA 408 (2018).
'"Art. 457, NCC and Art. 84, Spanish Law of Waters.
266Art. 457, NCC and Art. 84, Spanish Law of Waters; Delos Reyes v. Municipality of
Kalibo, Aklan, 856 SCRA 408 (2018); Daclison v. Baytion, 789 SCRA 56 (2016); Republic v.
Santos 111, 685 SCRA 51 (2012); Fernando, Jr. v. Acuna, 657 SCRA 499 (2011); New Regent
Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., 585 SCRA 329 (2009); Heirs of Emiliuno Navarro v. IAC, supra,
at p. 85; PiJa. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 589 (1996); Meneses v. CA, 246 SCRA 374 (1995);
Rcynante v. CA, 207 SCRA 794 (1992); Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374(1991).
’“'Republic v. Santos III, 685 SCRA 51 (2012).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
was more or less maintained.202 Alluvion must be the exclusive

work of nature.202 Where there land was formed with the help of
human intervention, it becomes part of the public domain.204 (d)
Ownership is acquired ipso jure: The right of the owners of the
land adjacent to rivers, creeks, streams, or lakes to the accretion
which they receive by virtue of the action of the waters of the
river is ipso jure.™ However, the accretion to registered land
does not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another
person through prescription.206 (B) Avulsion: (a) Definition: It is
the accretion which takes place when the current of a river, creek,
or torrent segregates a known portion of land from an estate on
its banks and transfers it to another estate.202 (b) Rule on avulsion:
The owner of the land from where the portion is detached retains
the ownership thereof but he is required to physically' remove the
same within two years.202 In case of uprooted trees, a mere claim
by the owner within six months is sufficient to retain ownership
of the tree.20* (c) Requisites: (i) it takes place only along the
banks of rivers, creeks, streams, and lakes; (ii) it is caused only
by the force of the current of the water independently of the act
of man; (iii) the deposit of soil is sudden and abrupt: and (iv) the
detached portion can be identified. In the absence of evidence,
how ever, that the change in the course of river was sudden or that
n occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change
was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion.220 (C) Change
of Co ;rse of R ivers: (a; Rule: Rivers and their natural beds are
property of public dominion of the State.2" (b) Exception: Riser
beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands
are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.2'2
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof.
mld See also Delos Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo, Aklan, supra.

“‘Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514,520 (1984).
204 (Wa De Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 589 (1996), citing Tiongco v. Drector of Lands,
16C.A. Rep. 211.
“’Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408.
’“Reynante v. CA, 207 SCRA 794, 799-800 (1992).
“’3 Manrcsa, 6th Ed., 243.
"An. 459, NCC.
"Art. 460, NCC.
2'"C.N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133.
“'Art. 502, Water Code of the Phil.
2l2Art. 461, NCC; Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 755 SCRA I (2015).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by
the new bed.215 (c) Requisites: The claimant must prove three key
elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the old course of
the river or creek, (2) the new course of the river or creek, and (3)
the change of course of the river or creek from the old location
to the new location by natural occurrence.214 Article 461 will still
apply even if the change in the course of the river was the result
of a deliberate act on the part of the government.215 However,
the provision does not apply when the drying up of the river
was without the intervention of the government but was actually
caused by the dumping of garbage therein by the people of the
surrounding neighborhood.216 (d) When river simply dries up: If
the river simply dries up and did not change its course or without
opening a new bed, Article 461 will not apply.217 Instead, the
/ dried-up river bed continues to belong to the State,218 whether the
I drying up of a river is by reason of nature or a result of the active
intervention of man.21’ (D) Formation of Islands: (a) Article 463:
When the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving
a piece of land or part thereof isolated, thus forming an island,
the owner of the land retains his ownership over the island, (b)
Article 464: Islands formed on the seas within the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, on lakes and on navigable or floatable rivers,
shall belong to the State, as patrimonial property.220 (c) Article
465: An island formed through in non-navigable or non-floatable
rivers shall become private property, as follows: (i) the island so
formed belongs to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to
the island; (ii) if the island is in the middle of the river, it shall
belong to the owners of both margins, in which case it shall be
divided longitudinally in halves; (iii) if, however, a single island
thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the other,
the owner of the nearer margin shall be the sole owner.221
’"Art. 46I.NCC.
’"Halting v. Reyes, 678 SCR A 52.1 (2012).
•’"Baes V. CA, 224 SCRA 562 (1993).
’“Ronquillo v. CA, 195 SCRA 433 (1991).
’’’Republic v. Santos III, 685 SCRA 51 (2012).
’“W. See atm Fernando, Jr. v. Acuna, 657 SCRA 499 (2011), Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA
214 (1984), and Celestial v. Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469 (2003).
’'’Celestial v. Cachopero, 413 SCRA 469 (2003) and Ronquillo v. CA, 195 SCRA 433
(1991).
”°3 Manresa, 6th Ed., 256.
”'Art. 465, NCC.
E
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
4.5 Accession Continua with Respect to Movables: (A) Adjunction:

(a) Concept: It takes place when two movables belonging to
different owners are so inseparable that their separation would
impair their nature, making up thereafter a single object,222
but each preserving its own nature, (b) If effected in good
faith: The owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory
by indemnifying the former of the value of the accessory.223
However, if the accessory is much more precious than the
principal, its owner may demand its separation, even though the
thing to which it has been incorporated may suffer some injury.222
(c) If effected in bad faith: (1) by the owner of the accessory, he
shall lose his thing and he shall be liable for damages;225 or (2)
by the owner of the principal, the owner of the accessory has the
option of: (i) demanding payment for the value of the accessory,
plus damages; or (ii) demanding separation, even if the same will
result in injury to the principal thing, plus damages.226 The second
option, however, does not apply if the same is not practicable
as in the case of paintings (which cannot be separated from
the canvass) or writings (which cannot be separated from the
paper). In such a situation, the owner of the accessory is limited
only to the first option of demanding payment for the value of
the accessory.222 (B) Commixtion or confusion: (a) Concent:
Commixtion or confusion is the mixture of things solid or liquid
pertaining to different owners. If the things mixed are solid, it is
called commixtion; if the things are liquid, it is called confusion,
(bl When co-ownership arises: if the mixture was caused by: (1)
chance or fortuitous event;22* (2) by the will of both owners;22’
and (3) by the will of only one owner acting in good faith.230
In all these cases, each owner shall acquire a right proportional
to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind the value of the
things mixed or confused.“' (c) When caused in bad faith: If the
“3 Sanchez Roman, 98.

223Art. 466, NCC.
“Art. 469,2nd par., NCC.
“Art. 470, 1st par., NCC.
“Art. 470,2nd par., NCC.
“3 Manresa, 6th Ed., 289.
“Art. 472, NCC.
mId.
““Art. 473, 1st par., NCC.
“'Arts. 472-473, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
commixtion or confusion was caused by only one owner acting

in bad faith, he loses the thing belonging to him thus mixed or
confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the damages
caused to the owner of the thing with which his own was mixed
or confused.232 (C) Specification: (a) Concent: Specification is
the imparting of a new form to the material of another.233 (b) If
worker acted in good faith: he shall appropriate the thing thus
transformed as his own, indemnifying the owner of the material
for its value.234 The exception to this rule is when the material is
more precious than the transformed thing or more valuable, in
which case, its owner may, at his option: (1) appropriate the new
thing to himself after paying indemnity for the value of the work;
or (2) demand indemnity for the material.233 (c) If worker acted
in bad faith: the owner of the material has two options: (1) to
appropriate the work for himself without paying anything to the
maker; or (2) to demand of the latter that he indemnify him for
the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered.
The exception is in case the value of the work, for artistic or
scientific reasons, is considerably more than that of the material,
the owner of the material cannot appropriate the work.236
5) Quieting of Title and Ruinous Buildings and Trees

5.1 Quieting of Title: (a) Definition: It is a common-law remedy
for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the
title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective,
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.237 (b) Nature
of action: An action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding
quasi in rem. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership,
or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
2,2Art. 473, 2nd par., NCC.

23j 3 Sanchez Roman 100.
2,4 Art. 474, 1st par., NCC.
233Art. 474, 2nd par., NCC.
”6Art. 474, last par., NCC.
23,De Guzman v. Tabango Realty, Inc., 750 SCR A 271 (2015); Heirs of Margarita Prodon
v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez, 704 SCRA465 (2013); Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp,
v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA327 (2011); Heirs of Enrique Toringv. Heirs of Teodosia Boquilaga, 631
SCRA 278 (2010); Oho v. Lim, 614 SCRA 514 (2010); Divinagracia v. Cometa, 482 SCRA 648
(2006); Calacala v. Republic, 464 SCRA 438 (2005); see also Baricualro v. CA, 325 SCRA 137
(2000); citing Vda. de Aviles v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 473,478 (1996).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties

to the proceedings. Hence, the judgment therein is binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.238 (c) Jurisdiction:
An action for the quieting of title is in the nature of a real
action—that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership
or possession of real property, or any interest in real property.
As such, jurisdiction is dependent on the assessed value of the
property in dispute.23’ (d) Two requisites: For an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite
its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.2" Legal
title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership.241 Thus, if the plaintiffs claim the property
as their own as a result of acquisitive prescription, the same
would give them the requisite equitable title.242 (e) Cloud on title:
A cloud on a title exists when: (1) there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid
or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the
“‘Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp. v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327 (2011); B.E.
San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul, 524 SCRA 402 (2007), citing Realty Sales Enterprises v. IAC, 154 SCRA
328 (1987).
“’Salvador v. Patricia, Inc., 808 SCRA 130 (2016). See also Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha,
Sr v. Lumocso, 540 SCRA 1 (2007).
240Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing Corp. v. Heirs of Basilio Llanes, G.R. No. 194114, March
27 2019; Desiderio Dalisay Investments, Inc. v. Social Security System, 860 SCRA 554 (2018);
Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v. Heirs of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13 (2016); Heirs of Liberato
CasliUcjos v. LaTondcna Incorporada, 797 SCRA 540 (2016); Heirs of Datu Dalandag Kali v. Pia,
759 SCRA232(2015); Aquino v.Quiazon,753 SCRA98 (2015); DeGuzman v. fabango Realty,
Inc., 75° SCRA 271 (2015); Quintos v. Nicolas, 726 SCRA 482 (2014); Heirs of Margarita Prodon
v Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez, 704 SCRA 465 (2013); Mananquil v. Moico, 686 SCRA 123
(2012); National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the Philippines v. Pascual, 676 SCRA 143
(2012): Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corp. v. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327 (2011); Eland
Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, 613 SCRA 66 (2010); Clado-Reyes v. Limpe, 557 SCRA 400 (2008);
■ ucasan v. PD1C, 557 SCRA 306 (2008); Rumarate v. Hernandez, 487 SCRA 317 (2006); Calacala
v Republic, 464 SCRA 438 (2005).
’41Basa v. Loy Vda. de Seryl Loy, 864 SCRA 96 (2018) and Mananquil v. Moico, 686
SCRA 123 (2012).
“’Residents of Lower Atab & Teacher's Village, Barangay Sto. Tomas Proper, Baguio City
Sta. Monica Industrial & Development Corp., 738 SCRA 450 (2014).
v.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
title sought to be quieted.2,1’ Generally, such cloud is not created

by mere verbal assertion of ownership. However, where there
is factual basis, such as a claim of right based on acquisitive
prescription, has been held to constitute a removable cloud on
title.244 (f) Not collateral attack on title: Raising the invalidity of
a certificate of title in an action for quieting of title is NOT a
collateral attack because it is central, imperative, and essential
in such an action that the complainant shows the invalidity of
the deed which casts cloud on his title.24’ (g) Prescriptive period:
(1) If plaintiff not in possession: In an action to quiet title, the
plaintiff need not be in possession of the property.246 If plaintiff is
not in possession, the action is indubitably a real action and shall
prescribe after 30 years.247 (2) If plaintiff is in possession: The
filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed
real property is in the possession of the plaintiff because he may
wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right.248
5.2 Ruinous Buildings and Falling Trees: (a) Rule on ruinous
buildings: Owners of buildings, walls, columns, or other
constructions in danger of falling are obliged to either demolish
it or to execute the necessary work in order to prevent it from
falling.24’ If he does not comply with the foregoing obligation,
the administrative authorities may order the demolition of the
structure at his expense, or to take measures to insure public
safety.2’0 Further, if by reason of lack of necessary repairs, a
building or structure causes damage resulting from its total or
24)Ocnmpo v. Ocampo, Sr., 830 SCRA418 (2017); Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v. Heirs
of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13 (2016); Phil-Ville Development and I lousing Corp. v. Bonifacio, 651
SCRA 327 (2011).
244Tandog v. Macapagal, 532 SCRA 550 (2007).
24’Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing Corp. v. Heirs of Basilio Llanes, G.R. No. 194114, March
27, 2019, citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 507 Phil. 101, 113 (2005). See also OAo v. Lim,
614 SCRA 514 (2010) and Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Fernando v. Soriano, Jr., 671 Phil.
308 (2011).
-’"‘Art. 477, NCC.
^’Republic v. Mangotara, 624 SCRA 360 (2010) and Jamcsv. Eurcm Realty Development
Corp., 707 SCRA 454 (2013).
24"Syjuco v. Bonifacio, 745 SCRA 468 (2015), citing Faja v. Court of Appeals, 166 Phil.
429, 438 (1977). See also Alino v. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, 556 SCRA 139 (2008); Heirs
of Marcela Salonga Bituin v. Caoleng, Sr., 529 SCRA 747 (2007); Rumarate v. Hernandez, 487
SCRA 317 (2006); Ragasa v. Roa, 494 SCRA 95 (2006) and Pingol v. CA, 226 SCRA 118 (1993).
“’Art. 482, par. I, NCC.
2!0Arl. 482, par. 2, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7 3
partial collapse, the proprietor thereof shall be responsible for

the damages?” (b) Rule on falling trees: Whenever a large tree
threatens to fall in such a way as to cause damage to the land or
tenement of another or to travelers over a public or private road,
the owner of the tree shall be obliged to fell and remove it; and
should he not do so, it should be done at his expense by order
of the administrative authorities.252 In paragraph 3 of Article
2191 of the NCC, proprietors are liable for the falling of trees
situated at or near highways or lanes, if the same is not caused
by force majeure. Under Article 483 of the NCC, however, the
owner thereof shall be deemed liable even if the reason for the
fall be fortuitous event, such as typhoon or earthquake, because
in this case the owner is already negligent for failing to take the
necessary measures to insure public safety.
6) Co-ownership
6.1 Basic Principles: (a) Definition: Co-ownership is defined as the

right of common dominion which two or more persons have in
a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided?”
(b) Requisites: (1) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners; (2)
unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single
object which is not materially divided, and which is the element
that binds the subjects; and (3) recognition of ideal shares, which
determines the rights and obligations of the co-owners?” (c)
Consequences: (1) Rule: As a consequence, a co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an “owner of the whole, and over
the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.”2” The
underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made,
the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every
co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership of the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of it?56 (2) Right to use entire thing: A co-owner is
“'Art. 2190, NCC.

“2Art. 483, NCC.
253Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, Jr.. 507 SCRA 94 (2006).
“’Sanchez v. CA, 404 SCRA 540 (2003).
“’Torres. Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646 (2014); Quintos v. Nicolas. 726 SCRA 482 (2014);
gizal v. Naredo, 668 SCRA 114 (2012); De Guia v. CA, 413 SCRA 114 (2003).
“‘Anzures v. Venlanilla, G.R. No. 222297, July 9, 2018; Quijano v. Amante, 737 SCRA
552 (2014); Alcjandrino v. CA, 295 SCRA 536 (1998), and Aguilar v. CA, 227 SCRA 472, 480
(1993).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
entitled to possess and enjoy the entire property. Hence, he cannot

be ejected from the property.”7 (3) Limitations: (i) it is used for
the purpose intended; (ii) it must be used in such a way as not
to injure the interest of the other co-owners; and (iii) such use
does not prevent the other co-owners from making use thereof
according to their own right.”8 Hence, if there is an agreement
to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-
owner who dwells in the house,”’ but the latter cannot be ejected
from the property.2" (d) Cannot claim definite portion: (1) Rule:
By the nature of a co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to
specific portion of the property owned in common as his own
because his share therein remains intangible.241 (2) Exception:
Where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land
allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion
thereof, such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial
partition of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor
to the definite portion which he occupies.242 (3) Effect of sale of
concrete portion: Whether the disposition involves an abstract
or concrete portion of the co-owned property, the sale remains
validly executed. What will be affected on the sale is only his
proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The
co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be
unaffected by the alienation.242 (e) Sources of co-ownership: (1)
law; (2) contract; (3) succession - where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts
of the deceased;244 and (4) occupation - such as when two or
more persons catch a wild pig or get forest products244 or when
a hidden treasure is accidentally discovered by a stranger, who
is not a trespasser, on the land of another.244 If the source of co-
ownership is contract, the law does not make a distinction as to
“’Anzures v. Ventanilla, G.R. No. 222297, July 9, 2018.

"“Art. 486, NCC.
”’De Guia v. CA, 413 SCR A 114 (2003).
’"Anzures v. Ventanilla, G.R. No. 222297, July 9,2018.
“'Dailisan v. CA, 560 SCRA 351 (2008); Vda. de Ape v. CA, 456 SCRA 193 (2005).
242 ft/a. de Cabrera v. CA, 267 SCRA 339 (1997), reiterated in Del Campo v. CA, 351
SCRA 1 (2001)and Inalvez v. Nool, 789 SCRA 489 (2016).
“’Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646 (2014).
244Art. 1078, NCC.
“’Punzalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320.
’“Art. 438, 2nd par., NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity

or through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who
derived his title and was granted co-ownership rights through
gratuity may compel partition.’6’ However, mere construction
of a house on another’s land, in the absence of agreement, does
not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of the house.
Instead, the situation will be governed by Articles 448-454 of
the Civil Code.’61 (f) Share in benefits and charges: The share
of the co-owner in the thing owned in common is determined
by their agreement and, in default thereof, such share shall be
presumed to be equal.’69 As to share in benefits and charges, the
same should be in proportion to his interest in the co-ownership.
Any stipulation to the contrary is void.”0
6.2 Consent Requirement: (a) Action in ejectment: (1) Rule: Any
one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”1 A co-
owner may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the
other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit
of all.”2 (2) Must benefit all: The foregoing rule applies so long
as the suit is instituted for the benefit of all.”3 If the action is
for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner, the other co-owners are indispensable parties who must
be impleaded.”4 (3) Meaning of “ejectment’’: The term "action
in ejectment" includes all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion pttbliciana and a reinvindicatory
action.”3 It will also include an action for revival of judgment if
’’’Logrosa v. Azares, G.R. No. 217611, March 27,2019.

“’Victoria v. Pidlaoan, 791 SCRA 16 (2016).
“’Art. 485,2nd par., NCC.
”°Art. 485,1st par., NCC.
’’'Art. 487, NCC.
’’’Clemente v. Republic, G.R. No. 220008. Feb. 20, 2019; String v. Plaza, 166 SCRA 84,
85 (1988); citing 11 Tolentino, Civil Code ofthe Philippines, 157 (1983 Ed.).
’’’Plasabas v. CA (Special Former Ninth Div.), 582 SCRA 686 (2009) and Adlawan v.
Adlawan, 479 SCRA 275 (2006).
’"Baloloy v. Hular, 438 SCRA 80 (2004). See also Adlawan v. Adlawan. supra: Plasabas
v- CA (Special Former Ninth Div.), 582 SCRA 686 (2009); Heirs of Albina Ampil v. Manahan,
684 SCRA 130 (2012).
’’’Catedrilla v. Lauron, 696 SCRA 341 (2013); Heirs of Albina Ampil v. Manahan, 684
SCRA 130(2012); Plasabas v. CA (Special Former Ninth Div.), 582 SCRA 686 (2009); Wee v. De
Castro, 562 SCRA 695 (2008); Adlawan v. Adlawan, 479 SCRA 275 (2006); Baloloy v. Hular, 438
SCRA 80 (2004); De Guia v. CA, 413 SCRA 114, 125 (2003).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
it results into the recovery of property.276 (4) Effect of judgment:

While a co-owner may bring an action in ejectment without
the others, any adverse judgment cannot prejudice the rights of
the unimpleaded co-owners but any judgment of the court in
favor of the co-owner will benefit the others.277 (b) Repair for
preservation and taxes: (1) Rule: Any repair for the preservation
of the property owned in common may be made at will by one
of the co-owners278 and he has the right to demand contribution
from the others for the expenses of preservation and to the
taxes.27’ (2) Option of co-owner obliged to contribute: Instead
of contributing to such expenses, a co-owner may renounce so
much of his interest in the co-ownership as may be equivalent to
his share of expenses and taxes, unless such waiver is prejudicial
to the co-ownership.280 (3) Illustration: A co-owner who redeems
the property in its entirety during the redemption period does
not make him the owner of all of it. The property remains in a
condition of co-ownership as the redemption does not provide
for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.281 But the one who
redeemed has the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price
and until reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for
the amount due.282 Such advance payments are in the nature of
necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-ownership.2”
(c) Expenses for improvement or embellishment: Must be decided
by the majority.284 The term "majority of co-owners" means the
vote of the co-owners representing the controlling interest in the
object of co-ownership.2” (d) Acts of alteration: (1) Concept: An
act of alteration is one that affects the substance of the thing286 and
changes its essence and nature.287 Alterations include any act of
276Basbas v. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151 (2011) and Clidoro v. Jalmanzar, 729 SCRA 350
(2014).
’’’Plasabas v. CA (Special Former Ninth Div.), 582 SCRA 686 (2009); Tanjuatco v. Gako,
Jr., 582 SCRA 200 (2009); Resuena v. CA, 454 SCRA 42 (2005); Baloloy v. Hular, 438 SCRA
80 (2004).
’’“Art. 489, NCC.
’’’Art. 488, NCC.
’“Art. 488, NCC.
“'Paulmitan v. CA, 215 SCRA 867 (1992), citing Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455 (1988).
“’Cabales v. CA, 531 SCRA 691 (2007), ciling Paulmitan v. CA, supra.
“’Tugboy v. Tigol, Jr., 626 SCRA 341 (2010).
“’Art. 489, NCC.
“’Art. 492, 2nd par.
2863 Manresa, 6th Ed., 447; cited in II Caguioa, 137 (1966 Ed.).
“’ll Tolentino, Civil Code, 192 (1992 Ed.).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition

has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.288 (2) Unanimous
consent required: Consent of all co-owners is required to the
making of an alteration on the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result from such act.28’ However,
the other co-owners may go to court for appropriate relief should
any of the co-owners unreasonably withhold his consent and the
same is clearly prejudicial to the common interest.290 (3) Effect
of unauthorized alteration: The act is illegal and invalid and the
other co-owners can compel the erring co-owner to undo what
has been done, at the latter’s expense, in addition to recovery
of damages, (e) Acts of administration: (1) Concept: Those acts
which do not affect the essence, form and substance, such as
modifications and changes required by the nature of the thing
for its exploitation and enjoyment.291 (2) Requires majority vote:
With respect to acts of administration and better enjoyment of
the thing owned in common, the resolution of the majority of the
co-owners shall be sufficient.292
6.3 Rights Over Ideal Share: (a) Nature of right: A co-owner has
absolute ownership of his undivided and pro-indiviso share in
the co-owned property.292 As such, he has the right to alienate,
assign, or mortgage it, and even to substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights291 are involved.292 In the
same way, he cannot also be forced to sell his ideal share in the co-
ownership by invoking Article 491 of the Civil Code.296 Insofar as
the sale of co-owned properties is concerned, there is no common
interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the co-
owners refuse to sell his or her ideal share.297 (b) Effect of sale of
entire property or sale of concrete portion: As a mere part-owner,
288Arambulo v. Nolasco, 720 SCRA 95 (2014) and Cruz v. Calapang. 544 SCRA 512 (200K).
289Art. 491.NCC.
M/d.
29l3 Manresa 476-477; cited in II Tolentino, Civil Code, 195 (1992 Ed.).
292Art. 492, lstpar.,NCC.
!,)Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646 (2014); City of Mundaluyong Aguilnr, 350
SCRA 499 (2001).
2MThe term “personal rights" refers to the personal relations of one co-owner to the others,
as when the family residence is used by the children as co-owners, [see II Padilla, Civil Code of
the Philippines, 300-301 (1972 Ed.); 11 Tolentino, Civil Code ofthe Philippines, 203 (1992 Ed.)].
292Art. 493, NCC; Nufable v. Nufable, 309 SCRA 692, 700 (1999).
™Arambulo v. Nolasco, 720 SCRA 95 (2014).
297/</.
J9JC9B0M ■■
R52M9UH7
a co-owner cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners.

The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that “no one
can give what he does not have”—nemo dat quod non habet.™
Likewise, a co-owner has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal
portion without any physical adjudication.2” However, a sale of
the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners100 or a sale of a concrete portion of the co-owned
property without the consent of the others,101 is not null and void
for it is well-established that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Quando res
non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest. But the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.102 Stated otherwise, what the
vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the
vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the
shoes of the vendor as co-owner101 and acquires a proportionate
abstract share in the property held in common.™ Consequently,
whether the disposition involves an abstract or concrete portion
of the co-owned property or the sale of the entire property, the
sale remains validly executed.105 However, what will be affected
on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results
of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to
the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation.106 (c) Right of
’“’Mercado v. CA, 240 SCRA 616, 620 (1995); see also Nufable v. Nufabte, supra and
Aromin v. Floresca, 496 SCRA 785 (2006)
’’’Heirs of Roger Jarque v. Jarque, G.R. No. 196733, Nov. 21,2018, citing Carvajal v. CA,
112 SCRA 237 (1982). See also Hagosojos v. CA, 159 SCRA 175 (1987).
’““Republic v. Heirs of Fnuicisca Dignos-Sorono, 549 SCRA 58 (2008) and Bailon-Casilao
v.CA, I60SCRA 738(1988).
101 Lopez v. Vda. de Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601 (1944).
’“’Augusto v. Uy, G.R. No. 218731, Feb. 13, 2019; Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Unchuan, 791 SCRA 581 (2016); Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 742 SCRA 646 (2014);
Republic v. Heirs of Francisea Dignos-Sorono, 549 SCRA 58 (2008); Aguirre v. CA, 421 SCRA
310, 323-324 (2004); Corinthian Really, Inc. v. CA, 394 SCRA 260, 268 (2002); Del Campo v.
CA, 351 SCRA 1, 8 (2001); Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA, 316 SCRA 501 (1999);
Paulmitan v. CA, 215 SCRA 866,872-873 (1992); and Bailon-Casilao v. CA, 160 SCRA 738, 745
(1988).
30iUda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gcrilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013), citing Aguirre v. CA,
421 SCRA 310 (2004).
llwExtraordinary Development Corp. v. Samson-Bico, 738 SCRA 147 (2014), citing Del
Campo v. CA, 351 SCRA 1 (2001).
’“’Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, supra.
MId.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
legal redemption: (1) When available: The law grants a co-owner

the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the
other owners are sold to “a third person.”’07 A third person, within
the meaning of Article 1620 of the NCC, is anyone who is not a
co-owner30’ or a stranger to the co-ownership.309 (2) Requisites:
(i) there must be a co-ownership; (ii) one of the co-owners sold
his right to a stranger; (iii) the sale was made before the partition
of the co-owned property; (iv) the right of redemption must be
exercised by one or more co-owners within a period of 30 days to
be counted from the time that he or they were notified in writing
by the vendee or by the co-owner vendor; and (v) the vendee
must be reimbursed for the price of the sale.”0 For this right to be
exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance
is made by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by
the other co-owner or co-owners.’" (3) Requirement of written
notice: A co-owner desirous of exercising his right of legal
redemption is given a period of 30 days from the notice in writing
by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be.”2
The requirement of written notice is mandatory,”’ but there is
no required form. So long, therefore, as the latter is informed
in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for
redemption start running, and the redemptioner has no real cause
to complain.”4 It can be in the form of a copy of deed of sale,”5 a
copy of the summons,”6 or a copy of the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale.’” (4) Notice must come from vendor: The notice in writing
must come from the vendor and that notice given by the vendee
“’Basav. Aguilar, 117 SCRA 128, 130-131 (1982), cited in Pilapil v. CA, 250SCRA 566,
576 (1995), Fernandez v. Tanin, 391 SCRA 653, 659 (2002) and Galvez v. CA, 485 SCRA 346
(2006); see also Art. 1620, NCC.
»‘W.
’"Gochan v. Maricao, 709 SCRA 438 (2013), citing Reyes v. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171
(1990).
”°Arts. 1620 and 1623, NCC; Calma v. Santos, 590 SCRA 359 (2009); Aguilar v. Aguilar,
478 SCRA 187 (2005).
’"Avila v. Barabat, 485 SCRA 8 (2006); Uy v. CA. 246 SCRA 703 (1995).
’"Art. 1623, NCC.
’’’Pascual v. Ballesteros, 666 SCRA 297 (2012); Barcellano v. Batlas, 657 SCRA 545
(2011); Gosiengfiao Guillen v. CA, 589 SCRA 399 (2009); Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374 (2006).
’"Bayan v. Bayan, G.R. No. 220741, August 14,2019.
’’’Conejero v. CA, 123 Phil. 605 (1966).
’’“Francisco v. Boiser, 332 SCRA 792 (2000).
’’’Bayan v. Bayan, supra.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
(buyer) should not be taken into account.’1’ (d) No pre-emptive

right: What the law grants to a co-owner is a right of redemption
and not pre-emption. By the very nature of the right of “legal
redemption,” a co-owner’s right to redeem is invoked only after
the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or
stranger to the co-ownership.11’
6.4 Extinguishment of Co-ownership: (a) Causes: (1) merger; (2)
prescription; (3) destruction of thing or loss of right; and (4)
partition.”0 Redemption by a co-owner of the property in its
totality during the period of redemption does not vest in him
ownership over it since redemption is not a mode of terminating
a co-ownership.’21 Such redemption will simply entitle him to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners pursuant
to the provisions of Article 488 of the NCC, considering that
redemption entails a necessary expense;’22 and until reimbursed,
he holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.’21
However, when the redemption is made after the period of
redemption, it is actually a repurchase. Hence, the erstwhile co-
owner who purchased the property will become exclusive owner
thereof.’24 (b) Prescription: (1) Rule: A co-owner cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other
co-owners.’25 The reason is that the possession of a co-owner
is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to
the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them.’26
(2) When prescription lies: If the co-owner actually holding the
property asserts exclusive dominion over it against the other
’l’Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526 (1962) and Francisco v. Boiser, 332
SCRA 792 (2000).
’'’Reyes v. Concepcion, 190 SCRA 171 (1990).
”°3 Manresa, 6th Ed., 486; 2 Castan, 8th Ed., 318.
Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455 (1988); see also Paulmitan v. CA, 215 SCRA 866 (1992),
Mariano v. CA, 222 SCRA 736 (1993), Cruz v. Leis, 327 SCRA 570 (2000), Cabales v. CA, 531
SCRA 691 (2007), and Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr., 626 SCRA 341 (2010).
’’’Adille v. CA, supra; Cabales v. CA, supra; Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr., supra.
’’’Cabales v. CA, supra; Taghoy v. Tigol, Jr., supra.
”4Tan v. CA, 172 SCRA 660 (1989).
’’’Art. 494, NCC; Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gcrilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013); Heirs
of Juanita Padilla v. Magdua, 630 SCRA 573 (2010); Mariano v. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 (1987);
Mariategui v. CA, 205 SCRA 337 (1992).
’’’Heirs of Feliciano Yambao v. Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao, 789 SCRA 361 (2016);
Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. v. Reyes, 626 SCRA 758(2010); Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, 531 SCRA
486 (2007); Galvez v. CA, 485 SCRA 346 (2006); and Salvador v. CA, 243 SCRA 239 (1995).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole

title to it after tire lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period.327
Thus, prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-
ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation of the co-
ownership;328 and absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership,
a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners.32’ (3) Requisites of effective repudiation: (i) the co-
owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster ofthe cestui que trust or the other co-owners; (ii) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui
que trust or the other co-owners; (iii) the evidence thereon must
be clear and convincing;330 and (iv) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.331 Filing by a trustee
of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property,
or for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the
former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the trust reposed
on him by the latter.332 Likewise, the issuance of the certificate of
title solely in the name ofthe co-owner possessor would constitute
an open and clear repudiation of the co-ownership,333 unless he
allowed the other co-owner to build her house on the subject
property without any opposition from him. Such act constitutes
an implied recognition of the co-ownership, which in turn
negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the ousted
co-owner.334 However, the sole fact of a co-owner declaring the
land in question in his name for taxation purposes and paying the
land taxes did not constitute an unequivocal act of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the other co-owner and could not
constitute adverse possession as basis for title by prescription.335
327Pangan v. CA, 166 SCRA 375,382 (1988).

328Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455 (1988).
’’’Heirs of Segunda Maningding v. CA, 276 SCRA 601 (1997).
330Heirs of Feliciano Yambao v. Heirs of Hermogenes Yambao, 789 SCRA 361 (2016);
Vda. de Figuration v. Figuracion-Gerilla, supra', Heirs of Juanita Padilla v. Magdua, supra',
Fangonil-Herrera v. Fangonil, 531 SCRA 486 (2007); Salvador v. CA, 243 SCRA 239 (1995);
Delima v. CA, 201 SCRA 641.
331 Vda. de Figuration v. Figuracion-Gerilla, supra-. Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. v. Reyes, 626
SCRA 758 (2010) and Galvez v. CA, 485 SCRA 346 (2006).
332Pangan v. CA, 166 SCRA375,382 (1988).
333Pangan v. CA, supra.
mVda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013).
335Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr. v. Reyes, 626 SCRA 758 (2010), citing Laguna v. Levantino,
71 Phil. 566 (1941), Guillen v. CA, 179 SCRA 789, 798 (1989), Bicarme v. CA, 186 SCRA 294
(1990).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
(c) Partition: (1) Concept: Partition is the separation, division,

or assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom
it may belong.336 Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.337 (2) Rule:
A co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.338 As a
consequence, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches.33’ In the event that there is a conflict
between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court and the right granted to co-owners to demand
partition at any time under Article 494 of the Civil Code, the
latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the
substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
procedural rules.340 (3) When action no longer for partition: As
long as the co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel
partition will not prescribe and may be filed at any time agains
the actual possessor by any of the other co-owners.341 From th
moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute ano
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but
of ownership.342 In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action
for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of
the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive
owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.343
(4) Prescriptive period: (i) If by acquisitive prescription, a co-
owner acquires ownership of real property after 30 years;344 or (ii)
if by extinctive prescription (statute of limitations), it has been
held that the action for reconveyance by a co-owner of his share
prescribes in 10 years, the action being based on an implied or
336Art. 1079, NCC.

337Art. 1082, NCC.
338Art. 494, NCC.
339Monteroso v. CA, 553 SCRA 66 (2008); Fangonil-Herrera V. Fangonil, supra; Salvador
v.CA.243 SCRA 239.
"’Quintos v. Nicolas, 726 SCRA 482 (2014).
"'Pangan v. CA, 166 SCRA 375, 382 (1988).
"2Delima v. CA, 201 SCRA 641 (1991).
343M.
344Art. 1137, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
constructive trust,1" counted from the date of the issuance of the

title in the name of the co-owner possessor?16 (5) When partition
not allowed: (i) By agreement-An agreement among the owners
to keep the thing undivided is valid.147 However, such agreement
must not exceed 10 years;118 otherwise, the agreement shall be
void but only as to the period beyond such maximum.11’ However,
the period of 10 years may be extended by a new agreement.1’0
(ii) By will of grantor-A donor or testator may prohibit partition
for a period not exceeding 20 years."' (iii) By law - such as the
partition of a family home unless there is a compelling reason to
do so.1’2 (iv) When partition would render the thing unserviceable
for the use for which it is intended.1’1 (v) Whenever the thing is
essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall
be sold and its proceeds distributed.1’1 This is resorted to when:
(1) the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the
co-owners, but because of the nature of the property it cannot be
subdivided, or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the
co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon
proper reimbursement of the co-owners.1’’
7) Ownership of Waters
7.1 Property of Public Dominion: (a) Ownership: All waters in
their natural beds are considered property of public dominion,1’6
whether or not the waters are found on private lands,1” including
’"Delimav. CA, 201 SCRA641 (1991); Segura v. Segura, 165 SCRA 368 (1988); Heirs of
Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 330 (1993).
"‘Jaramil v. CA, 78 SCRA 420 (1977).
"’Art. 494,2nd par., NCC.
"'W.
"’Oliveras v. Lopez, 168 SCRA 431 (1988).
’’“Art. 494,2nd par., NCC; see also Art. 1083, NCC.
"'Art. 494,3rd par., NCC.
’"Art. 159, FC; Patricio v. Dario III, 507 SCRA 438 (2006).
’"Art. 495, NCC.
"’Art. 498, NCC.
"’Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 473 (1993).
"‘Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Phil. Constitution; Art. 3, Water Code of the Philippines; See II
Tolentino, Civil Code oflhe Philippines, 219 (1992 Ed.).
"’Arts. 5 and 6, Water Code of the Philippines.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
subterranean or ground waters.”8 (b) Appropriation of watnrc- The

privilege to appropriate and use water is one which is exclusively
granted and regulated by the State through water permits issued
by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB). Once granted,
these water permits continue to be valid save only for reasons
spelled out under the Water Code itself.”’ Conversely, the power
to modify, suspend, cancel, or revoke water permits already
issued also rests with NWRB.360 (c) Water permit: Appropriation
of water is not authorized without a "water permit," which is
a privilege granted by the government to appropriate and use
water and evidenced by a document known as “water permit.”36'
A water permit, however, need not be secured in the following
instances: (1) for use of waters found on private lands by the
owner thereof but only for domestic purposes;362 and (2) use of
natural bodies of water for any of the following: (i) appropriation
of water by means of hand-carried receptacles; and (ii) bathing
or washing, watering, or dipping of domestic or farm animals,
and navigation of watercrafts or transportation of logs and other
objects by floatation.363
8) Possession
8.1 Concent and Kinds: (a) Definition and requisites: (1) Definition:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.361
(2) Object: Only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession.363 (3) Requisites:
In order that there be possession, two things are paramount: (i)
there must be occupancy, apprehension, or taking; and (ii) there
must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).M (b) Possession
in one’s own name or in that of another: It is not necessary that
the owner or holder of the thing exercises personally the rights
of possession. Rights of possession may be exercised through
’’“See Art. 6(d), Water Code of the Philippines.

’’’City ofBatangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corp., 826SCRA297 (2017).
’“/</.
36lSee Art. 13, Water Code of the Philippines.
362&e Art. 6, id.
363SeeArt. 14, id.
364Art. 523, NCC.
363Art. 530, NCC.
366Yu v. Pacleb, 512 SCRA 402 (2007), citing II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
239 (1992 Ed.); see also So v. Food Fest Land, Inc., 617 SCRA 541 (2010).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
agents.367 Hence, possession may be exercised in one’s own

name or in that of another.368 Possession in another’s name is
possession by a person without any right of his own and one
which is strictly of an agent; while possession in one’s own
name embraces all kinds of possession anchored on a juridical
title or right, e.g., possession by the owner himself, possession
by a lessee, or a mere usufructuary, (c) Possession in concept
of owner or in concept of holder: (1) Concept: A possessor in
the concept of holder acknowledges in another a superior right
which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong;369 while a possessor in the concept of an owner may be the
owner himself or one who claims to be so,370 provided he does not
acknowledge in another a superior right. (2) Effects of possessor
in concept of owner: (i) it raises a disputable presumption of
ownership;371 (ii) it creates a disputable presumption that the
possessor has just title, which he cannot be obliged to show;372 and
(iii) it may ripen into ownership thru acquisitive prescription373
upon compliance with the other requisites mentioned in Article
1118 of the NCC. (d) Possession in good faith or in bad faith:
(11 Concept: A possessor is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.376 On the other hand, a possessor in
bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his title
thereto is defective.373 Thus, a possessor by mere tolerance is not
a possessor in good faith.376 One whose interest is merely that
of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent, or usufructuary, is not
qualified to become a possessor in good faith.377 (2) Presumption
of good faith: Good faith is always presumed378 and continues
36TSanlos v. Manalili, 475 SCRA 679 (2005).

368Art. 524, NCC.
’‘’Carlos v. Republic of the Phil., 468 SCRA 709 (2005).
”*Art. 433, NCC.

372Art. 541, NCC.
’"Art. 540, NCC.
373Art. 526, NCC; PNB v. De Jesus, 411 SCRA 557 (2003); see also Heirs of Marcelino
Cabal V. Cabal, 497 SCRA 301 (2006); Ochoa v. Apeta, 533 SCRA 235 (2007).
’’’Escritor, Jr. v. IAC, 155 SCRA 577 (1987).
’’“Resuena v. CA, 454 SCRA 42, 53 (2005); Pada-Kilario v. CA, 322 SCRA 481 (2000);
Refugia v. CA, 258 SCRA 347 (1996).
’’’Parilla v. Pilar, 509 SCRA 420 (2006); Macasaet v. Macasaet, 439 SCRA 625 (2004).
’’“Art. 527, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
to subsist until facts exist which show that the possessor is

already aware that he wrongfully or improperly possesses the
thing.37’ Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it can
be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of
his title or mode of acquisition, it must be considered sufficient
to show bad faith.380 (3) Effects upon fruits already received
bv possessor: A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits
received by him before his possession is legally interrupted;’"1
while a possessor in bad faith has the obligation to reimburse the
legitimate possessor for everything that he may have received
and those which the legitimate possessor could have received.”2
But whether the possessor is in good faith or in bad faith, he is
entitled to recover from the legitimate possessor the expenses
he incurred in the production, gathering, and preservation of
the fruits upon return of the same.353 (4) Effects upon fruits still
pending: If the possessor was in good faith, the possessor and
the owner shall have a right to a part of the net harvest and each
shall divide the expenses of cultivation, both in proportion to the
time of their respective possessions. If the owner does not want
to pay his share of the expenses, he may, at his option, allow the
possessor to finish the cultivation and gathering of the growing
fruits (in lieu of his part of such expenses), in which case, the
owner will not have any share in the harvest. If the owner chooses
this option and the possessor refuses to accept the concession
"for any reason whatever," the latter shall lose the right to be
indemnified in any other manner.354 If he was a possessor in bad
faith, he will lose the fruits in favor of the legitimate possessor,35’
without the right to be indemnified. However, he is still entitled
to recover the necessary expenses he incurred or the preservation
of the land.350 (5) Effects unon necessary expenses: Necessary
expenses are those incurred not for improvement but for the
preservation of the thing and are intended not to increase the
value thereof but to prevent it from becoming useless.38’ Whether
’’’Art. 528, NCC; Lacap v. Lee, G.R. No. 142131, December 11,2002.
’“Wong v. Carpio, 203 SCRA 118 (1991).
’“'Art. 544, NCC.
’“Art. 549, NCC; NHAv. Manila Seedlings Bank Foundation, Inc., 794 SCRA 1 (2016).
383Art. 443, NCC.
354Art. 545, NCC.
385Art. 549, NCC.
’“See Art. 452, NCC.
’"’Rivera v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 40 Phil. 717.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
in good faith or in bad faith, a possessor is entitled to the refund

of necessary expenses incurred by him.’88 The only difference is
that only a possessor in good faith is entitled to retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.’8’ (6) Effects upon useful
expenses: Useful expenses are those incurred to give greater
utility or productivity to the property.”0 These expenses increase
the value of the thing and results in improvements, called useful
improvements.”1 Only the possessor in good faith is entitled
to the refund of useful expenses.”2 In making the refund, the
owner (or the person who has defeated the possessor in good
faith in the possession) has the option: (i) to refund the amount
of the expenses; or (ii) to pay the increase in value which the
thing may have acquired by reason of the useful expenses.’” The
possessor in good faith may, in lieu of reimbursement for the
useful expenses, remove the useful improvements but subject to
compliance with the following requisites: (i) The removal can be
done without damage to the principal thing;”4 and (ii) The owner
does not choose to appropriate the improvements by refunding
to the possessor in good faith the useful expenses in the manner
discussed above.’” A possessor in bad faith, on the other hand,
has no right in relation to the useful expenses that he incurred.
He is not entitled to its refund and he has no right to remove
the useful improvements.”6 (7) Effects upon expenses for pure
luxury: Whether in good faith or in bad faith, a possessor is not
entitled to a refund of the expenses incurred by him for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, called “ornamental expenses.”’” Both
kinds of possessors are entitled, however, to a right of removal
of the ornaments with which they embellished the principal
thing, provided that such principal will suffer no injury.”8 If the
388Art. 546,1st par., NCC.

mld.
”°II Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 Ed., 294.
”'&eArt.547,NCC.
mArt. 546,2nd par., NCC.
mId.
394Art. 547, NCC.
’’’Art. 547, NCC.
3WMWSS v. CA, 143 SCRA 623 (1986); citing Paras (1984) Vol. 11, pp. 436-437; Padilla
(1972) Vol. 11, PP- 457-458; Caguioa (1966) Vol. 11, p. 201; Jurado (1981) Civil Law Reviewer,
p. 250; Tolentino (1972) Vol. 11, p. 547.
P ’’’Arts. 548 and 549, NCC.
”*/</.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
owner, however, exercises his option to retain possession of the

ornaments by reimbursing the value thereof to the possessor, the
latter’s right of removal may not be exercised. If the possessor is
in good faith, the extent of the refund shall be the actual amount
expended.3” If the possessor is in bad faith, on the other hand, the
extent of the refund shall be limited to the value of the ornament
at the time the owner enters into the possession of the property,400
irrespective of the amount actually spent by the possessor in bad
faith.
8.2 Acquisition and Loss of Possession: (a) Modes of acquisition:
(1) By material occupation - applicable only to corporeal ob-
jects, including tradition brevi manu and tradition constitution
possessorium; (2) By exercise of right - applicable to acquisition
of possession over rights; (3) By subjecting the thing or right to
the action of our will - not involving material apprehension but
connotes a degree of control sufficient to subject the thing to the
action of one’s will, including tradition simbolica and tradition
longa manu; and (4) By proper acts and legal formalities - any
juridical act by which possession is acquired or to which the law
gives the force of acts of possession, such as donations, succes-
sion, execution, and registration of public instruments, inscrip-
tion of possessory information titles, and the like.40' (b) Doctrine
of constructive possession: (1) Concent: The possession and cul-
tivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership of all
is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the
adverse possession of another."2 (2) Requisites for annlication:
(i) the alleged possessor must be in actual possession of a portion
or part of the property; (ii) he is claiming ownership of the whole
area; (iii) the remainder of the area must not be in the adverse
possession of another person; and (iv) the area claimed must be
reasonable, (c) When possession not acquired: (1) If acquired
through force or intimidation, as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto;"' (2) acts which are merely tolerated;404 and (3)
3”Art. 548, NCC.

40°Art. 549, NCC.
"'Mangaser v. Ugay, 744 SCRA 13 (2014); Bunyi v. Factor, 591 SCRA 350 (2009);
Quizon v. Juan, 554 SCRA 601, 612 (2008); Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer,
Inc., 454 SCRA 653 (2005).
""Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918).
""Art. 536, NCC.
404Art. 537, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
acts which are executed clandestinely and without the knowledge

of the possessor of a thing.405 (d) Conflict in possession de facto:
(1) Present possessor shall be preferred; (2) if there are two pos-
sessors, the one longer in possession is preferred; (3) if the dates
of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and (4) if
all the foregoing conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in
judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or own-
ership through proper proceedings.406 (e) Modes of losing pos-
session: (1) By abandonment,407 which requires two requisites:
(i) the spes recuperandi (hope of recovery or recapture) must be
gone; and (ii) the animus revertendi (intent to recover) must be
finally given up;408 (2) by assignment,400 (3) by destruction or loss
of the thing;410 and (4) by possession of another4" - if the posses- .
sion of another lasts for more than one year, only possession de
facto is lost but not the real right of possession (possession de
jure), which is not lost until after the lapse of 10 years.412
8.3 Possession of Movables: (a) Doctrine of irrevindicabilitv of
movables: Possession of movables acquired in good faith does
not only create a presumption of ownership but it is already
equivalent to title.4" For possession of movables to be considered
equivalent to title, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the movable property must be acquired in good faith;414 and (2)
the possession must be in the concept of owner. As a consequence,
possession of the movable cannot anymore be recovered from the
present possessor, (b) Exceptions to irrevindicabilitv: (1) When
the owner has lost the thing, or (2) when he has been unlawfully
deprived thereof.415 If the owner has lost a movable, or if he has
been unlawfully deprived thereof, he has a right to recover it, not
only from the finder, thief, or robber, but also from third persons
who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief,
40!An. 537, NCC.

“Art. 538, NCC.
“’Art. 555(1), NCC.
“US v. Rey, 8 Phil, 500(1907).
“Art. 555(2), NCC.
"°Art. 555(3), NCC.
‘"Art. 555(4), NCC.
‘"Art. 555(4), NCC.
‘"Art. 559,1 st par., NCC.
"‘Art. 559, 1st par., NCC.
‘"Art. 559, par. 2, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
or robber,416 without need of reimbursing the price paid therefor.

However, if the third person acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price paid therefor.417 The term “unlawful deprivation” in Article
559 is not limited to cases of theft or robbery (or unlawful taking)
but includes cases where there has been abuse of confidence.418
But the term “unlawful deprivation” may not be unduly stretched
to cover situations where there is a contract of purchase and
sale between two persons and the buyer therein fails to pay
the purchase price but nonetheless alienates the thing sold in
favor of the present possessor who acted in good faith.41’ (c)
Possession over animals: (1) Kinds of animals: (i) wild animals
— those which are found in their natural freedom, such as wild
boars and horses roaming the forest; (ii) domesticated or tamed
animals - those which were formerly wild but which have been
subdued and retained the habit of returning to the premises of the
possessor or owner;470 and (iii) domestic animals - those which
are bom or reared under the control and care of man. (2) When
possession over animals is lost: (i) As to wild animals - they are
considered possessed only while they are under one’s control and
once they recover their natural freedom they cease to be under
one’s possession, (ii) As to domesticated or tamed animals -
they will be regarded as such so long as they retain the habit of
returning to the premises of the possessor and possession thereof
is not immediately lost by the simple fact that the animals are
no longer under the control of the possessor. Under the law, the
possessor or owner of domesticated animals has a period of 20
days counted from the occupation by another person within which
to reclaim them. After the expiration of this period, the animals
can no longer be recovered from its present possessor, (iii) As to
domestic animals - they are considered personal property and the
rules on personal property will apply.
4l6Aznar v. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486 (1965).

4l7Art. 559, par. 2, NCC.
4"Cntz v. Pahati, 52 O.G. 3253; Aznar v. Yapdiangco, 13 SCRA 486 (1965).
4l’EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos, 184 SCRA 614 (1990); Asiatic
Commercial Corp. v. Ang, Vol. 40, O.G. S. No. 15, p. 102; Tagatac v. Jimenez, Vol. 53, O.G. No.
12, p. 3792.
420Art. 560, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
9) Usufruct
9.1 Basic Principles: (a) Definition: It is the right to enjoy the
property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi
and the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi
or the power to alienate the same.421 (b) Object of usufruct: It may
be constituted over a corporeal object or rights. With respect to
rights, it may be the object of usufruct provided that: (1) it is not
strictly personal;422 (2) it is not intransmissible;423 and (3) it has
its own independent existence.424 Hence, a servitude cannot be
the object of usufruct because it has no existence independent of
the tenements.425 (c) Characteristics: (1) it entitles the holder of
the usufruct (called the “usufructuary”) to exercise the rights to
enjoy the property (jus utendi)426 and to receive the fruits thereof
(jus fruendi)','11 (2) it is a right enjoyed over another’s property, a
jus in re aliena', (3) it is a real right, which may be exercised over
a real or personal property; (4) it is of a temporary character128
since, as a rule, the right is extinguished upon the expiration
of the period for which it was constituted42’ or upon the death
of the usufructuary;430 (5) it ordinarily obliges the usufructuary
to preserve the form and substance of the thing subject to
usufruct, except in the following instances where there is no
such obligation: (i) when the law or the title creating the usufruct
provides that the usufructuary is not so obliged;431 (ii) when
the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed,
gradually deteriorate through wear and tear;432 and (iii) when
the usufruct includes things which cannot be used without being
consumed.433 (d) Classifications of usufruct: (1) As to manner of
42lMoralidad v. Femes, 497 SCRA 532 (2006), citing Hemedes v. CA, 316 SCRA 309
(1999).
422Art. 564, NCC.
m!d.
424II Tolentino, Civil Code, 1992 Ed„ 318.
,2sld„ citing 2 Valverde 412.
426Art. 562, NCC.
427Art. 566, NCC.
428De Buen, Derecho Comitn, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1,255.
429Art. 603(2), NCC.
4’°Art. 603(1), NCC.
n,Id.
432Art. 573, NCC.
433Art. 574, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
creation: (i) legal usufruct - that which is constituted by law,"

such as those existing in favor of parents over the property of their
minor children living in their custody and under their parental
authority;4” (ii) voluntary - that which is constituted by the will
of private persons expressed in acts inter vivos, such as contracts
and donations, or expressed in a last will and testament;4’6 and
(iii) mixed - that which is constituted by prescription.4’7 (2) As to
subject matter: (i) proper or normal - when it is constituted over a
non-consumable thing; or (ii) improper or abnormal - when it is
constituted over a consumable thing,4’9 or over a non-consumable
which gradually deteriorates.
9.2 Rights of Usufructuary: (a) Rights included: Usufruct includes
the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including
both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi.*” Hence, he may lease
the object held in usufruct which the owner must respect so long
as the usufruct exists.440 However, the owner of the property
retains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber,
transform, and even destroy the same.441 Hence, the owner may
validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person;442 may
impose, without the consent of the usufructuary, a voluntary
easement upon the tenement or piece of land held in usufruct;44’
and may construct any works and make any improvements of
which the immovable in usufruct is susceptible, or make new
plantings thereof if it be rural.444 He may not, however, exercise
such right in a manner that will have an adverse effect upon the
usufructuary, (b) Extent of usufructuary rights: If the usufruct is
over a woodland, the usufructuary may cut trees on the land as the
owner was in the habit of doing or in accordance with the custom
of the place, as to the manner, amount, and season.44’ In case of
4,4Art. 563, NCC.

"’Art. 226, FC.
•'“Art. 563, NCC.
•”M.
•'*2 Castan, 9th Ed., 492-494; Art. 574, NCC.
•’’Moralidad v. Sps. Femes, 497 SCRA 532 (2006), citing Hemedes v. Court of Appeals,
316 SCR A 309 (1999).
440N 11A v. CA. 456 SCRA 17 (2005), citing Art. 572, NCC.
■“'Hemedes v. CA, 316 SCRA 309 (1999).
442M.
u,See Art. 689, NCC.
"Art. 595, NCC.
■“’Art. 577, 2nd par., NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
usufruct over fruit-bearing trees and shrubs, the usufructuary has

the full and unfettered right to gather the fruits from the tree but
he does not have the right to cut trees. However, he may make
use of the dead trunks, as well as those uprooted by accident,
but with the corresponding obligation to replace them with new
plants.4* If the usufruct is over an action to recover property, be it
real or personal, the usufructuary has the right to bring the action,
and to oblige the owner thereof to give him the authority for such
purpose and to furnish him whatever proof the owner may have.44’
As to the fruits, the usufructuary is entitled to all the natural,
industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct.*4’ Natural or
industrial fruits which are still pending or ungathered at the time
that the usufruct begins belong to the usufructuary, and he has no
obligation to refund to the owner of any expenses incurred by the
latter in connection with the cultivation and production of such
fruits.44’ With respect to natural or industrial fruits which are still
pending or ungathered at the time the usufruct terminates, the
same shall belong to the owner of the property but the latter shall
be obliged to reimburse the usufructuaiy the ordinary expenses
of cultivation, for seeds and other similar expenses incurred by
the usufructuary.4” (c) Right to improvements introduced: He has
no right to reimbursement, for if the rule were otherwise, then the
usufructuary might improve the owner out of his property.4’1 He
may, however, at his option: (1) remove the improvements if such
removal is possible without damage to the property;4” or (2) he
may set-off the improvements against any damage he has caused
to the property held in usufruct.4” The right of the usufructuary to
remove the improvements is potestative with him. He cannot be
prevented from choosing it or he may not be compelled to do it.
(d) Right to alienate usufructuary right: (1) Rule: A usufructuary
may alienate or encumber his right of usufruct without the
consent of the owner of the property whether by onerous or
gratuitous title.4’4 All such contracts, however, shall terminate
"‘Art. 575, NCC.

"’Art. 578, NCC.
"’Art. 566, NCC.
"’See Art. 567, NCC.
4”M.
4”Moralidad v. Pemes, 497 SCRA 532 (2006), citing Arts. 579 and 580, NCC.
4”Art. 579, NCC.
4”Art. 580, NCC.
454 Art. 572, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
upon the expiration of the usufruct.4” The transfer or alienation

of the right of usufruct does not result in the termination of the
relation between the usufructuary and the naked owner.4” Hence,
the former shall be personally liable to the latter for any damage
to the thing in usufruct caused by the fault or negligence of the
transferee or lessee.457 (2) Usufructuary right which may not be
alienated: (i) the legal usufruct of the parents over the fruits and
income of the property of unemancipated children pursuant to
Article 226 of the Family Code, since the same is to be devoted
primarily to the child’s support and secondarily to the collective
needs of the family; (ii) the usufruct granted to a usufructuary
in consideration of his person to last during his lifetime, since
the usufruct is a matter of personal quality;458 and (iii) when the
enjoyment of the property held in usufruct is acquired through
caucion juratoria, inasmuch as the basis is the need of the
usufructuary.45’
9.3 Obligations of Usufructuary: (A) At Commencement of
Usufruct: (a) Obligations: (1) to make an inventory of all the
property covered by the right of usufruct; and (2) to give security
or bond.460 (b) Effect of failure to comnlv: It will only prevent
usufructuary from exercising his right of usufruct but it will not
result in the termination of the usufruct. The owner may, if he
so desires, retain in his possession the property in usufruct as its
administrator.461 If the owner prefers not to retain possession of
the property, he may demand instead: (1) that the immovables be
placed under administration; (2) that the movables he sold and its
proceeds be invested in safe securities; (3) that the public bonds,
instruments of credit payable to order or bearer be converted into
registered certificates or deposited in a bank or public institution;
or (4) that the capital or sums in cash be invested in safe
securities.467 (c) Effect of compliance: Aller compliance with the
foregoing obligations, the effects thereof shall relroact, however,
to the day of the constitution of the usufruct.4''1 (d) Exflltplioil
455W.
456ll Tolentino, Civil Code ofdie Phil., 325 (1992 Ed.).
‘’’Art. 590, NCC.
45,1I Caguioa, Civil Code ofdie Phil., 234-235 (1966 Ed.).
‘557<Z
‘“'Art. 583, NCC.
“‘Art. 586, last par., NCC.
467Art. 586. 1st par., NCC.
‘'•'Art. 588, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
D8 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
from obligation to give security: (1) when the donor has reserved
the usufruct of the property donated;461 and (2) in case of legal
usufruct of the parents over the property of their minor children
living in their custody and under their parental authority, except
when the parents contract a second marriage165 or when the market
value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000.166 (e) When usufructuary may be relieved of obligation
to give security: (1) when no one will be injured thereby;46’ and
(2) when the enjoyment of the property subject of the usufruct is
to be acquired through caution juratoria.** Caution juratoria
refers to the promise under oath made in court by the usufructuary
who has not given security for the purpose of acquiring the use
of the following: (i) furniture necessary for his use; (ii) dwelling
house; or (iii) implements, tools, and other movable property
necessary for an industry or vocation in which he is engaged.169
In this kind of usufruct, the usufructuary has no right to alienate
his usufructuary right or lease the same for that would mean that
he does not need the house or the furniture or the implements.170
(B) During Life of Usufruct: (a) In general: (1) the obligation
to preserve its form and substance;171 (2) in the performance of
the foregoing obligation, he is required to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family;472 and (3) to further carry out the
foregoing obligation, the law specifically tasks the usufructuary:
(i) to make ordinary repairs on the property held in usufruct;175
(ii) to pay the annual charges and taxes which are imposed on
the fruits of the property held in usufruct;174 (iii) to notify the
owner of the need of urgent extraordinary repairs;475 (iv) to
pay the expenses, costs, and liabilities for suits involving the
usufruct;176 and (v) to notify the owner of any act of a third person
161Art. 584, NCC.

“5W.
166Art. 225, Family Code.
“’Art. 584, NCC.
“'Art. 587, NCC.
“’Art. 587, NCC.
™II Tolentino, Civil Code ofthe Phil., 337 (1992 Ed.); citing 4 Manresa 473-474,479.
171 Art. 562, NCC.
172Art. 589, NCC.
175Art. 592, NCC.
171Art. 596, NCC.
175Art. 593, NCC.
176Art. 602, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
that may be prejudicial to the rights of the owner.4” (b) Ordinary

and extraordinary repairs: It is the obligation of the usufructuary
to make the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in
usufruct,4’8 while extraordinary repairs, on the other hand, shall
be made at the expense of the owner.4” Repair is “ordinary” if
two requisites are satisfied: (i) it is required by the wear and tear
due to the natural use of the thing; and (ii) it is indispensable for
the preservation of the thing.480 If both requisites are not satisfied,
the repair is “extraordinary.” If the need for extraordinary repairs
is urgent and indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the
law imposes an obligation upon the usufructuary to notify the
owner of the need of such repairs.481 If after such notice, the owner
still fails to make the extraordinary repairs, the usufructuary is
then authorized to make them, in which case, he acquires the
following rights in connection therewith: (1) the right to demand
of the owner, at the termination of the usufruct, the increase in
value which the immovable may have acquired by reason of the
repair;482 and (2) the right to retain the property held in usufruct
pending the reimbursement by the owner of such expenses.481 (c)
Payment of annual charges and taxes: Payment of annual charges
and taxes and of those considered as a lien on the fruits, shall be
at the expense of the usufructuary;484 while taxes imposed directly
on the capital shall be at the expense of the owner,481 such as real
estate taxes.486 If the taxes directly imposed on the capital are
advanced by the usufructuary, he is entitled to recover the same
from the owner at the termination of the usufruct,487 with the right
to retain the property held in usufruct until he is reimbursed.488 (d)
Obligation to notify owner of prejudicial acts: The usufructuary is
4”Art. 601, NCC.

4,8Art. 592, 1st par., NCC.
4”Art. 593, NCC.
4“Art. 592,2nd par., NCC.
48IW.
482Art. 594, 2nd par., NCC.
“'See Art. 612, NCC.
484Art. 596, NCC.
481Art. 597, NCC.
486See Mercado v. Rizal, 67 Phil. 608 (1941); Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. v. Provincial
Government of Surigao, 100 Phil. 303 (1956); Board of Assessment Appeals of Zamboanga del
Sur v. Samar Mining Company, Inc., 37 SCRA 734 (1971).
mld.
488See Art. 612, NCC.
I
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which

he may have knowledge, which may be prejudicial to the “rights
of ownership.”'” If he fails in this obligation, he shall be liable to
the owner for damages, as if such act had been cause through his
own fault.450 (C) At termination of usufruct: (a) Return of thing:
Upon the termination of the usufruct, he is obliged to deliver the
same to the owner unless the usufructuary is entitled to exercise
the right to retain the property.4’1 (b) Right of retention: Upon the
termination of the usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to a right
of retention until payment of the following: (1) sums that may
have been advanced by the usufructuary for payment of taxes
which are imposed directly on the capital;492 and (2) the increase
in the value which the immovable acquired by reason of the
extraordinary repairs paid for by the usufructuary.4”
9.4 Causes of Extinguishment of Usufruct: (1) By the death of
the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) by expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or
by fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title
creating the usufruct; (3) by merger of the usufruct and ownership
in the same person; (4) by renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) by total loss of the thing in usufruct; (6) by the termination
of the right of the person constituting the usufruct; and (7) by
prescription.494 In cases where the usufruct is granted for the time
that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, the
usufruct shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if the
third person should die before the period expires.4” For example,
if “0” creates a usufruct over his property in favor of “U” to last
until the child of “U” (“C”), who is five years old, reaches the age
of 18 years old, the usufruct will continue for another eight years
even if “C” dies at the age of 10. Exception: When such usufruct
has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence
of the third person, the usufruct is extinguished upon the latter’s
death. In the foregoing example, if the usufruct was constituted
“’Art. 601, NCC.
"'An. 612, NCC.

''“Arts. 597 and 612, NCC.
"'Arts. 594 and 612, NCC.
''“Art. 603, NCC.
"’Art. 606, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
BOOK 11. — PROPERTY 211
by “O” to help “U” pay for the support of “C,” the usufruct is
extinguished upon the death of the latter. However, a usufruct is
not extinguished by bad use of the thing held in usufruct.496
10) Easement
10.1 Concept: (a) Definition: Easement is a real right on another’s
property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the
latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do
or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another
person or tenement.497 Servitude, on the other hand, is defined as
an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of
another immovable belonging to a different owner498 or for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.499 (b) Characteristics: (1) It is
a real right that falls upon the property itself and inseparable from
the estate to which it actively or passively belongs;500 therefore,
it cannot be alienated or mortgaged separately from the estate
to which it forms part;501 (2) the right consists of a limited use
and enjoyment of the thing without possession and gives rise to
an action in rem in favor of the owner of the tenement of the
easement and against any possessor ofthe servient estate;5" (3) the
right is always enjoyed over an immovable property—the term
“immovable" in Article 613 of the NCC should be understood in
its ordinary or vulgar connotation, i.e., referring to those which
are, by their nature, cannot be moved from one place to another
such as lands, buildings, and roads;505 (4) it is a right which is
enjoyed over another’s property, orjura in re aliena,m hence: (i)
it is impossible to have an easement over one’s own property; (ii)
if there is a merger in the same person of the ownership of the
496Art. 610, NCC.

“Pilar Development Copp- v. Dumadag, 693 SCRA 96 (2013); Heirs of the Late Joaquin
Limense v. Krfa. de Ramos, 604 SCRA 599 (2009); Privatization and Management Office v.
Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., 593 SCRA 382 (2009); Unisource Commercial and Development Corp,
v. Chung, 593 SCRA 230 (2009); Valdez v. Tabisula, 560 SCRA 332 (2008); Private Development
Corp, of the Phil. v. CA. 475 SCRA 591 (2005); see also Arts. 613 and 614, NCC.
“Art. 614, NCC.
i0“Art. 617, NCC.
501 Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading Co., 195 SCRA 748 (1991).
5O!I1 Caguioa, Civil Code ofdie Phils., 262 (1966 Ed.).
Caguioa, Civil Code ofthe Phils., 263 (1966 Ed.).
5<MAmorv. Florentino, 74 Phil. 403 (1943).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
dominant and servient estates, the easement is extinguished;’”

and (iii) an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that
the property belongs to another;’06 and (5) it is indivisible, even
if the servient and dominant estates are divided between two or
more persons, the easement or the servitude continues to attach
to the estates originally affected.’07 (c) Kinds of easement: fl) As
to recipient of benefit: (i) Real or praedial easement - where the
easement is for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner,W! the immovable in favor of which the easement
is established is called “dominant estate”; that which is subjected
thereto, the “servient estate;”’” or (ii) Personal easement - where
the easement is for the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong,510 or the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate.”' (2) As
to source: (i) Legal or compulsory easement - those constituted
by law which has for its object either public use or the interest of
private persons;’12 or (ii) Voluntary easement - those constituted
by will or agreement of the parties;”3 but it is only the owner
who can create a servitude that will bind the servient estate. (3)
As to manner of exercise: (i) Continuous easement - if its use
is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of
man, like the easement of drainage”4 or easement of light and
view; or (ii) Discontinuous easement - if it is used at intervals
and it depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way;’1’ (iii) Apparent easement - those which are made known
and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the
use and enjoyment of the same,”6 such as a road (which reveals
a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light
and view); or (iv) Non-apparent easement - those which show
505Art. 631(1), NCC; Salimbangon v. Tan, 610 SCRA 426 (2010).

’“Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 407 SCRA 518 (2003).
Art. 618, NCC.
’“Art. 613, 1st par., NCC.
’"Art. 613,2nd par., NCC.
’’“Art. 614, NCC.
’"Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc., 195 SCRA 748 (1991).
’"Pilar Development Corp. v. Dumadag, supra-. La Vista Association, Inc. v. CA, 278 SCRA
498(1997).
’l3La Vista Association, Inc. v. CA, 278 SCRA 498 (1997).
’"Arts. 615,646, NCC.
’’’Arts. 615,646, NCC.
"‘Art. 615,4th par., NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
no external indication of their existence,’" such as an easement

of not building beyond a certain height;’"1 (v) Positive easement
- that which imposes upon the owner of the servient estate the
obligation of allowing something to be done on his property
(servitutes in patendo), such as an easement of right of way; or
(vi) Negative easement - that which prohibits the owner of the
servient estate from doing something on his property which he
could lawfully do if the easement did not exist (servilities in non
faciendo),in such as an easement not to build higher (altius non
tollendi).™
10.2 Acquisition of Easement: (a) Modes of acquisition: Either
by title or by prescription. All kinds of easements, whether
continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent, positive
or negative, can be acquired by title.”1 "Title” refers to a juridical
justification for the acquisition of a right, such as law, a will,
a donation, or a contract.”’ As to prescription, only continuous
and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue thereof.”' In
other words, the easement must be both continuous and apparent.
For example, an easement of right of way is not acquirable by
prescription because it is always a discontinuous easement.”4
However, an easement of light and view can be acquired through
prescription counting from the time when the owner of the
dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from
blocking the view of a window located within the dominant
estate.”’ (b) Through prescription: (1) Period: 10 years;”6 (2)
When easement is positive: Period is counted from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate commenced to exercise it
upon the servient estate;”713) When easement is negative: Period
is counted from the day on which the owner of the dominant
’"Ari. 615, 5lh par.. NCC.

”KBogo-Mcdellin Milling Co. v. CA, siipni.
’"'Art. 616, NCC.
”°.SW Amor v. Tolentino, G.R. No. L-48384. October 11, 1943.
"'Arts. 620 and 622. NCC.
’•’’Alolino v. Flores, 788 SCRA 92 (2016).
“’Art. 620, NCC.
“’Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. CA, 4(17 SCRA 518 (20(13); Bicol Agro-Industrial
Producers Cooperative, Inc. (BAPCI) Obias, 603 SCRA 173 (2009); Alolino v. Flores, 788
SCRA 92 (2016).
’“Alolino V. Flores, 788 SCRA 92 (2016).
“'■Art. 620, NCC.
’“An. 621, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary

public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
which would be lawful without the easement.528 To illustrate, if
easement of light and view is made upon one’s own wall, the
easement, being a negative one, is acquired by prescription
only after the lapse of 10 years counted from the day on which
the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient
estate, from executing an act which would be lawful without the
easement.529 If made on the wall of the neighbor, being a positive
easement, the 10-year prescriptive period commences from the
time of the opening of the window, (c) Easement bv annarent
sign or legal presumption: (1) Situation applicable: Article 624
applies in situations wherein two or more estates were previously
owned by a singular owner, or even a single estate but with two or
more portions being owned by a singular owner.530 At that time,
or prior to the division of ownership, there exists between the
two estates an apparent sign of easement. Originally, therefore,
there is no true easement that exists as there is only one owner.531
Hence, at the outset, no other owner is imposed with a burden.”2
Subsequently, one estate or a portion of the estate is alienated
in favor of another person, wherein, in that estate or portion of
the estate, an apparent visible sign of an easement exists. (2)
When easement exists: According to Article 624, there arises a
title to an easement of light and view, even in the absence of
any formal act undertaken by the owner of the dominant estate,
if this apparent visible sign, such as the existence of a door and
windows, continues to remain and subsist, unless, at the time the
ownership of the two estates is divided: (i) the contrary should
be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (ii)
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the
deed.513 (3) Requisites for application of Article 624: (i) there
exists an apparent sign of servitude between two estates; (ii) at
the time of the establishment of such sign, the ownership of the
two estates resides in one person; (iii) the sign of the easement is
mSupra.
,2,See Cortes v. Yu-Tibo, supra.
’“Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, June 17,2019.
”'M.
mld.
™!d.
I
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
established by the owner of both estates, because the article will

not apply when the easement is established by a person different
from the owner;534 (iv) that the ownership over the two estates
is later on divided, either by alienation or partition; and (v) that
at the time of division of ownership, nothing is stated in the
document of alienation or partition contrary to the easement nor
is the sign of the easement removed before the execution of the
document. Under Article 624 the existence of the apparent sign
has for all legal purposes the same character and effect as a title of
acquisition of the easement.535 (4) Exception to rule on negative
easement: Jurisprudence has recognized that Article 624 is an
exception carved out by the Civil Code that must be taken out of
the coverage of the general rule that an easement of light and view
in the case of windows opened in one’s own wall is a negative
easement that may only be acquired by prescription, tacked from
a formal prohibition relayed to the owner of the servient estate.531’
(d) Proof of easement: The absence of a document or proof
showing the origin of an easement which cannot be acquired by
prescription may be cured by a deed of recognition by the owner
of the servient estate or by a final judgment.537
10.3 Rights and Obligations: (a) Effect on owner of servient estate: An
easement gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest
on the property but grants no title thereto.535 Hence, the owner of
the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which
the easement is established, and may use the same in such a
manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.53’ However,
he may not exercise some of his property rights for the benefit
of the person who was granted the easement of right of way;5"
hence, he may not enclose his property, nor obstnict or hinder
the free passage over the servient estate, (b) Rights of owner
of dominant estate: Upon the establishment of an easement, all
the rights necessary for its use are considered granted.541 The
534ll Ciiguioa, Civil Code of die Phil., 1966 Ed., 276, citing the Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of May 27, 1899.
535Amor v. Tolentino, 74 Phil. 404 (1943).
’“Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019.
533Art. 623, NCC.
’’’Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. CA, 407 SCRA518 (2003).
’’’Mercader, Jr. v. Bardillas, 794 SCRA 387 (2016); Art. 630, NCC.
““Reyes v. Valentin, 750 SCRA 379 (2015).
“'Art. 625, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
owner of the dominant estate shall have the right to make any
works on the servient estate if the same be necessary for the
use and preservation of the servitude,542 subject to the following
limitations: (1) the work must be necessary for the use and
preservation of the servitude; (2) the work is done at the expense
of the owner of the dominant estate; (3) the work can be done
without altering the servitude or rendering it more burdensome;
(4) the owner of the servient estate is first notified of the intended
work; and (5) the time and manner of making the work should
be the most convenient to the owner of the servient estate or it is
done in such a manner that it causes the least inconvenience to
the owner of the servient estate.545 (c) Limitations upon rights of
owner of dominant estate: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary
for the use of the easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for
the benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; (3) it cannot
exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not
necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; (5) it cannot
alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the
servient estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on
the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the most convenient
time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least
inconvenience to the owner of the servient estate. Any violation of
the above constitutes impairment of the easement.544
10.4 Modes of Extinguishment of Easement: (1) Merger - because
easement is a right enjoyed over another’s property; hence, ifthere
is a merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant
and servient estates, the easement is extinguished;545 (2) non-use
- for easement to be extinguished under this mode, it is necessary
that the non-use must have lasted for a period of 10 years;546 if the
easement is discontinuous, the 10-year period is computed from
the day on which the easement was not used, and if the easement
is continuous, in which case the use of the easement does not
depend upon the acts of man, the 10-year period is counted from
the day on which an act contrary to the easement took place;547
wlArt. 627, NCC.

545Art. 627, NCC.
^Goldcrest Realty Corp. v. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp., 584 SCRA435 (2009).
M5Art. 631(1), NCC; Salimbangon v. Tan, 610 SCRA426 (2010).
546Art. 631(2), NCC.
547Art. 631(2), NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
(3) impossibility of use; (4) expiration of term; (5) fulfillment

of condition; (6) renunciation; (7) redemption - it is the release
of the servient estate from the servitude upon agreement of the
owners of both and upon payment by the owner of the servient
estate of the corresponding consideration to the owner of the
dominant estate; (8) annulment or rescission of title constituting
the easement; (9) termination of the right of the grantor; (10)
abandonment of the servient estate; and (11) eminent domain.548
10.5 Legal or Compulsory Easement: (A) Easement of drainage of
waters: (a) When easement exists: When, based on the physical
condition of two estates, waters descend naturally and without
the intervention of man from a higher estate (the dominant estate)
to a lower estate (the servient estate).54’ (b) Obligation of lower
estate: To receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which they carry with them.550 (c) Obligations of
higher estate: The owner of the higher estate may not construct
works which will increase the burden or increase the natural
flow.551 (B) Easement for public use: The banks of rivers and
streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three meters in urban areas, 20
meters in agricultural areas and 40 meters in forest areas, along
their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing, and salvage.552
But no person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than
what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing, or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.553 (C) Easement of
Aqueduct: (a) When easement exists: If a person wishes to use
upon his estate any water of which he can dispose, he shall have
the right to make it flow through intervening estates.554 (b)
Requisites: (1) that he who wants to establish the easement of
aqueduct must be able to prove that he can dispose of the water;
(2) he must also prove that it is sufficient for the use for which it
is intended; (3) the proposed right of way is the most convenient
5484 Manrcsa, 5th Ed., 590.

!4’Ongsiako v. Ongsiako, G.R. No. L-7510, March 30, 1957.
’’“Art. 637, 1st par., NCC; Art. 50, Water Code of the Phil.
’’’Art. 637, 2nd par., NCC; Art. 50, Waler Code of the Phil.
”!Art. 51, Water Code of the Phil.
’«/</.
”4Art. 642, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
and the least onerous to third persons affected; and (4) he must
indemnify the owners of the servient estates (intervening estates),
as well as the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters
may filter or descend.555 (c) Nature of easement: The easement of
aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and apparent, even
though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use
depends upon the needs of the dominant estate, or upon a schedule
of alternate days or hours.556 Hence, an easement of aqueduct
may be acquired either by title or by prescription.557 (D)
Compulsory Easement of Right of Wav: (a) Requisites: (1) that
the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has
no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1); (2)
there must be payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3)
that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate (Art. 649, par. 4); and (4) that the right of way
claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art.
650).55’ In A MA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents’ Association,
Inc.,™ the Court cited an additional requisite: that the right of
way must be absolutely necessary for the normal enjoyment of
the dominant estate by its owner. However, in Reyes v. Ramos,™
the Court explained that while the aspect of necessity may not be
specifically included in the requisites for the grant of compulsory
easement under the Civil Code, however, this goes into the
question of “least prejudice.” (b) Requirement of isolation: An
owner cannot, by his own act, isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent
estate.561 However, the mere fact that the purchaser of a parcel of
land knew that the property he was buying was already surrounded
by other immovables, leaving him no adequate ingress or egress
’’’Arts. 642 and 643, NCC.

556Art. 646, NCC.
517Art. 620, NCC.
’“Williams v. Zerda, 820 SCRA 497 (2017); Calimoso v. Roullo, 781 SCRA 624 (2016);
Reyes v. Valentin, 750 SCRA 379 (2015); Diclioso, Jr. v. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495 (2011);
Quintanilla v. Abangan, 544 SCR A 494 (2008); Lee v. Carreon, 534 SCRA 218 (2007); Woodridge
School, Inc. v. ARB Constmction Co., Inc., 516 SCRA 176 (2007); Mejorada v. Vcrtudazo, 535
SCRA 578 (2007); Francisco v. IAC, 177 SCRA 527 (1989), citing Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc. v. Capital Subdivision, Inc., 17 SCRA 731, 735-736.
’”831 SCRA 328(2017).
’“750 SCRA 379 (2015).
’"'Francisco v. IAC, 177 SCRA 527 (1989).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
to a public highway, cannot prevent him from demanding later on

a compulsory right of way.562 (c) Requirement of inadequacy of
outlet to public hiehwav: The convenience of the dominant estate
has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of
way. The true standard for the grant of the legal right is
adequacy.561 Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, even if the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need
to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.56* (d) At point
least prejudicial: The least prejudice criterion must prevail over
the shortest distance criterion.565 Least prejudice is about the
suffering of the servient estate, not of the dominant estate.566 (e)
Who may claim right of wav: It is the owner, or any person who
by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons,
who is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates.56’ While a usufructuary is entitled to demand a right of
way pursuant to Article 649, a mere lessee does not enjoy the
same right. With respect to the latter, his action is against the
lessor who is bound to maintain him in the enjoyment of the
property.568 (f) Effect of opening adequate outlet: The opening of
an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements.56’ (E) Easement
of Light and View: (a) Concept: It is an easement whereby the
dominant estate enjoys the right to have free access to light, a
little air, and a view overlooking the adjoining estate, i.e., the
servient estate.570 It has two components. The easement of light or
jus luminum has the purpose of admitting light and a little air, as
in the case of small windows, not more than 30 square centimeters,
at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the
’“Williams v. Zcrda, 820 SCRA 497 (2017).

’“Reyes v. Ramos, 750 SCRA 379 (2015) and Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, 647 SCRA 495
(2011).
’“/</.
’“Williams v. Zerda, 820 SCRA 497 (2017); Calimoso v. Roullo, 781 SCRA 624 (2016);
Quimen v. CA, 257 SCRA 163 (1996).
’“Reyes v. Ramos, 750 SCRA 379 (2015).
’6,Art. 649, NCC.
’6,1I Tolentino. Civil Code ofthe Phil., 387 (1992 Ed.).
’“Unisource Commercial and Development Corp. v. Chung, 593 SCRA 230 (2009), citing
La Vista Association, Inc. v. CA, 278 SCRA 498,514 (1997).
’’“Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, June 17, 2019, citing II Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 17 cd., 2013, p. 715.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
220 PRE-3AR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
ceiling.57' On the other hand, the easement of view or servid

timbre prospectus has the principal purpose of affording view, as
in the case of full or regular windows overlooking the adjoining
estate.572 As held by jurisprudence, the easement of light and view
is intrinsically intertwined with the easement of the servient
estate not to build higher or altius non tollendi. These two
necessarily go together “because an easement of light and view
requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not build to a
height that will obstruct the window.”573 (b) Two kinds of
windows: (1) regular or full or direct view windows — those
openings which are made on a wall parallel or almost parallel to
the line that divides the estates, in such a way that the neighboring
tenement can be seen without putting out or turning the head; or
(2) restricted, or oblique or side view windows - those openings
in a wall which form an angle to the boundary line, and therefore
of necessity requires in order to see the neighboring tenement to
thrust the head out of the opening and look to the right or left.574
(c) Observation of certain distances in direct views: (1) General
rule - when a window or any similar opening affords a direct
view of an adjoining land, the distance between the wall in which
such opening is made and the border of the adjoining land should
be at least two meters:575 (2) Exception - in a situation wherein an
easement is established or recognized by title or prescription,
affording the dominant estate the right to have a direct view
overlooking the adjoining property, i.e., the servient estate, as in
the case of Article 624, the owner of the servient estate cannot
build thereon at less than a distance of three meters, not two
meters, from the property line.’76 (d) Distance requirement in
oblique views: with respect to the side or oblique views upon or
towards such conterminous property, the law requires that the
distance be 60 centimeters.577 (F) Easement of Drainage of
Buildings: (a) Concept: The easement of drainage ol buildings is
the right to divert or empty the rainwaters from one’s own roof or
shed to the neighbor’s estate, either drop by drop or through
"'Supra.
mld.
'"id.. citing Amor v. Tolentino, supra.
’"Garcia v. Sanios, G.R. No. 228334, June 17,2019.
’”/</; see Art. 670, NCC.
”‘/d; jccArt. 673, NCC.
577Art. 670, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
conduits.5™ (b) Requisites: An easement of drainage may be

demanded subject to compliance with the following requisites:
(i) the yard or court of a house must be surrounded by other
houses (“the dominant estate”) and it is not possible to give an
outlet through the house itself to the rain collected therefrom; (ii)
the outlet to the water must be at the point of the contiguous lands
or tenements (“the servient estate”) where its egress may be
easiest; (iii) the conduit for the drainage must be established in
such manner as to cause the least damage to the servient estate:
and (iv) proper indemnity must be paid to the owner of the
servient estate.5” (G) Intermediate Distances for Planting: (a)
Required distances: (1) that required by local ordinances; (2) in
default thereof, two meters from the dividing line of the estate in
case of tall trees and at least 50 centimeters in case of shrubs or
small trees.580 (b) Right to cut branches: If the branches of any
tree should extend over a neighboring estate, the owner of the
latter does not have the right to cut the branches extending on his
property. Instead, he may demand that the protruding branches be
cut off by its owner. If his demand is not acted upon, he has to go
to court to seek authority for the cutting of the protruding
branches.581 (c) Right to cut roots: with respect to the roots of a
neighboring tree which penetrated into the land of another, the
owner of the latter may himself cut off the roots found within his
property. (H) Easement of Lateral Subjacent Support: (a)
Concept: The right of lateral and subjacent support is the right to
have land supported by the adjoining land or the soil beneath.585
Support is lateral when the supported and the supporting lands
are divided by a vertical plane. Support is subjacent when the
supported land is above and the supporting land is beneath it.581
(b) Obligation ofservient estate: The law prohibits any excavation
upon one’s land if the same will deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.584 In addition,
the law prohibits any stipulation or testamentary provision
57"2 Caslan, 9lh Ed., 594.

’’’Art. 676. NCC.
’““Art. 679, NCC.
’“'Art. 680, NCC.
>>2Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 795.
m Restatement ofthe Law of Torts, Vol. 1V, p. 184.
’“Art. 684, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
allowing such kind of excavation.’85 Any such stipulation or

testamentary provision is expressly declared to be void.584 (c)
Annotation not necessary: An annotation of the existence of the
subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists
whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of
property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the
property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-
interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to
court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support
registered in order for it to be recognized and respected.587
10.6 Voluntary Easement: (a) Concept: A voluntary easement may
only be constituted upon the will of the owner of the servient
estate, (b) If property held in usufruct: The naked owner may
impose any servitude on his property even without the consent of
the usufructuary.588 (c) If co-owned property: Unanimous consent
of all co-owners is required in order to constitute a voluntary
easement upon the same.589
11) Nuisance
11.1 Concept and Kinds: (a) Definition: A nuisance is defined as “any
act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety
of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs
or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use
of property.””0 For example, a house constructed on a vacant
barrio road is a nuisance per se because any establishment
that obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water is a nuisance.”1 The law
on nuisance is a restriction or limitation upon ownership and a
manifestation of the principle that every person should so use
his property as not to cause damage or injury to others—"sic
’“Art. 685, NCC.

584M.
’•’Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486 (2011).
’••Art. 689, NCC.
’•’Art. 691,1st par., NCC.
”°Art. 694, NCC; Rana v. Wong, 727 SCRA 539 (2014), citing AC Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frabcllc Properties Corp., 506 SCRA 625 (2006).
59lAlolino v. Flores, 788 SCRA 92 (2016).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. "in (b) Kinds of nuisance: (1)
As to object it affects: (i) Public nuisance - that which affects
a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger, or damage
upon individuals may be unequal;’” (ii) Private nuisance - that
which violates only private rights and produces damages to but
one or a few persons;”4 (iii) Mixed nuisance - that which is both
public and private in its effects, public because it injures many
persons or all the community, and private in that it also produces
special injuries to private rights;”’ (2) As to susceptibility to
summary abatement: (i) Nuisance per se (or nuisance at law) -
that which is a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because
it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for
that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity;”6 (ii) Nuisance per accidens (or nuisance in fact) - that
which will become a nuisance depending upon certain conditions
and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact,
it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal
authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a
nuisance.’” The traditional test for determining the existence of a
nuisance perse is whether the nuisance has become dangerous at
all times and under all circumstances to life, health, or property.”’
(c) Doctrine of attractive nuisance: One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting
thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.’”
11.2 Remedies Attains! Nuisance: (a) Remedies in general: (1)
abatement, either judicial or summary; (2) civil action for
’’‘Lebaycn v. A.S. Diaz Electric Service, Inc., I CA Rep. 178.

’’’Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, inc., 778 SCRA 385 (2016).
”4Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc., supra; see also Rana v. Wong, id, citing AC
Enterprises, Inc. v. I'rabclle Properties Corp., id.
Black s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 961.
’’’Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, 737 SCRA 145 (2014).
’’’North Greenhills Association, Inc. v. Morales, 837 SCRA 28 (2017), citing Rana v.
Wong, supra. See also Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc., supra.
’’“Suddeth v. Knight, 280 S.C. 540, 545, 314 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1984); Blacks Law
Dictionary, 1094 (7th Ed., 1999).
’’’’Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. Balandan, 48 O.G. 2641 (1932) and Taylor v. Manila
Electric, 16 Phil. 8.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
recovery of damages, in case of injury to a private person; and (3)

criminal prosecution, in case of public nuisance, (b) Summary
abatement: Unless a nuisance is a nuisance perse, it may not be
summarily abated.600 In a number of cases,60' the Supreme Court
clarified, however, that the abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se.
Unless a thing is a nuisance perse, however, it may not be abated
via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings.602 Such ordinance
is null and void because it violates the guarantee of due process
under the Constitution.605 Generally, LGUs have no power to
declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.m For example, the Court struck down the
ordinance passed by the City Council of Manila prohibiting the
operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels, and inns within the Ermita-Malate area because these
establishments are not a nuisance per se.™ However, mayors
are empowered to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary
building permits, whether the building constituted a nuisance
per se or a nuisance per accidens."* (c) Who may abate- Under
Article 700 of the NCC, it is the City and/or the Municipal Health
Officer who is charged with the responsibility of abating public
nuisances. The chief executive of the local government, like the
Punong Barangay, is not authorized to determine the propriety of
a summary abatement.607 A private person may likewise abate a
public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing,
or if necessary, by destroying the thing if it is a nuisance per se;
prior to the abatement, it is necessary: (1) that demand be first
made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance; (2) that such demand has been rejected; (3) that the
v. Wong, supra.
No - 'p°raynov. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 185(2006); City of Manila v. Judge t acuio ir r n
'■ “c L~-
^Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. Jac Liner, Inc., supra.

^Salao v. Santos, supra.
^Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, 737 SCRA 145 (2014).
^City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, Jr., supra.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, supra.
’cniz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc., 778 SCRA 385 (2016).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed

with the assistance of the local police; and (4) that the value of
the destruction does not exceed P3,000.“3
12) Modes of Acquiring and Transmitting Ownership

12.1 Modes of Acquisition of Ownership: (a) Seven Modes: (1)
Occupation; (2) Law; (3) Donation; (4) Tradition; (5) Intellectual
Creation; (6) Prescription; and (7) Succession - OLDTIPS.™ (b)
Original and derivative mode: (1) Original mode - when they
result in the independent creation of a new right of ownership,
independent of the ownership of a definite third person, such
as occupation, acquisitive prescription, law, and intellectual
creation; (2) Derivative mode - those which depend on the
existence of the right of another person, such as succession,
donation, and tradition.
12.2 Law as Mode: (a) Concept: Those special legal provisions which
directly vest ownership or real rights in favor of certain persons,
independently of the other modes of acquiring and transmitting
ownership or other real rights, (b) Examples: (1) Fruits naturally
falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of said land;610
and (2) When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires
title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or
grantee.6"
12.3 Tradition or Delivery: (a) Mode distinguished from title: Mode
is the legal means by which dominion or ownership is created,
transferred, or destroyed, but title is only the legal basis by which
to affect dominion or ownership.612 Title is every juridical act,
right, or condition which gives a means to the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights but which in itself is insufficient
to produce them.611 (b) Contracts only create title: Contracts,
under our laws, only constitute titles or rights to the transfer
or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the
“"Art.712.NCC.
““Art. 681, NCC.
‘"Art. 1434, NCC.
‘"San Lorenzo Development Corp. v. CA, 449 SCRA 99 (2005), citing Villanueva,
Philippine Law on Sales, 1995 Ed., 5.
6II3 Sanchez Roman 200.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
mode of accomplishing the same.614 It is tradition or delivery, as

a consequence of contracts, that actually transfers ownership.615
(c) Concept: (1) Definition: Tradition (traditio) or delivery,
as a mode of acquiring and transmitting ownership and other
real rights, refers to the transfer of possession accompanied
by an intention to transfer ownership or other real rights. (2)
Requisites: (i) pre-existence of the right to be transmitted in
the estate of the grantor, the same being a derivative mode of
acquiring ownership; (ii) just cause or title (causa traditionis)
for the transmission, such as sale; (iii) intention on the part of
the grantor to grant and on the part of the grantee to acquire;
(iv) capacity to transmit (on the part of the grantor) and capacity
to acquire (on the part of the grantee); and (v) an act which
gives it outward form, physically, symbolically, or legally. (3)
Importance of intention to deliver: In all forms of delivery, it is
necessary that the act of delivery, whether constructive or actual,
should be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The
act, without the intention, is insufficient.616 The critical factor in
the different modes of effecting delivery, which gives legal effect
to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and
its acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no
tradition.617 (d) Kinds of tradition (delivery): (1) Real tradition
(physical or actual delivery) - it takes place when the thing is
placed in the control and possession of the grantee, which, if it
is movable, is when the thing is transferred from hand to hand
and, if immovable, by certain material and possessory acts by
the grantee in the presence and with the consent of the grantor,
such as gathering fruits or entering upon the property which are
generally called taking possession.6"1 (2) Constructive (feigned)
tradition - delivery may likewise exist even when the change of
possession is not actual or material but represented by other signs
or acts indicative thereof, in which case the tradition is classified
as a constructive one. (3) Quasi-tradition - Used to indicate the
transfer of rights or incorporeal things through the exercise of
the rights by the grantee with the acquiescence of the grantor,
(e) Forms of constructive delivery: (1) Traditio simbolica - the
6USan Lorenzo Development Corp. v. CA, supra.

t,sld.
616Union Motor Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 117817, July 20, 2001, citing Norkis
Distributors, Inc. v. CA, 193 SCRA 694,698 (1991).
bnld.
6I“2 Caslan, 9th Ed., 227-228.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
transfer of ownership is effected by the delivery of symbols or

things which represent those to be delivered. Thus in the second
paragraph of Article 1498 of the NCC, it is provided that "with
regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by the
delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored
or kept." In case of immovable property, symbolic delivery is
effected by the execution of a public instrument. The execution
of a public instrument is recognized by law as equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract.61’
Exception: There is no delivery notwithstanding the execution
of a public instrument when: (i) the instrument itself expresses
or implies that delivery was not intended; or (ii) by other means
it is shown that such delivery was not effected, because a third
person was actually in possession of the thing, in which case
fiction yields to reality—the delivery has not been effected.620 (2)
Traditio longa manti- the transfer of ownership is effected by the
grantor by simply pointing out to the grantee the things which
are being transferred and which at the time must be within their
sight. (3) Traditio brevi manti - where the grantee has already
acquired actual control or possession of the thing, as when the
thing is leased to him, in which case, a mere declaration on the
part of the grantor that the grantee shall now hold the thing which
is already in his control and possession, as owner, operates as
a form of delivery. (4) Traditio constitution possessorium -
where delivery is effected by a mere declaration on the part of
the transferor that he will hold the thing for the transferee, and
this may take place when the owner of the thing alienates it but
continues possessing it under another contract or capacity, such
as a lessee for example.
12.4 Acquisitive Prescription: (a) Concept and requisites: Prescription
is a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights through
the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse.621
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious,
“’Addison v. Felix and Tioco, 38 Phil. 404,408 (1918).

"20M.
""Heirs of Bicnvcnido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, 669 SCRA 284 (2012); Tan v.
Ramirez, 626 SCRA 327 (2010); Imuan v. Cereno, 599 SCRA 423 (2009); Aguirre v. Heirs of
Lucas Villanueva, 505 SCRA 855 (2006); Heirs of Marcelino Cabal v. Cabal, 497 SCRA 301
(2006); see also Arts. 1106 and 1118, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
22K PR I -BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW
and not clandestine/'” It is continuous when uninterrupted,

unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional;625 exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;624 and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.625
(b) Two kinds of acquisitive prescription: It is either ordinary
or extraordinary. (1) Ordinary - requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.626 For
purposes of prescription, the law requires that just title must be
proved; it is never presumed.627 (2) Extraordinary - does not
require just title and good faith.625 (c) Period of prescription: (1)
Movable - four years if ordinary; eight years if extraordinary.62’
(2) Immovable - 10 years if ordinary'; 30 years if extraordinary.650
(d) When prescription does not lie: (I) In case of registered land:
Prescription does not run against registered land. Thus, under
Sec. 47 of P.D: No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, it is specifically provided that "no title to
registered land in derogation ofthat ofthe registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. ”‘JI However,
in Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto v. Municipality of Meycattayan,
Bulacan,1,12 the Court recognized the jurisprudential thread
that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right
to recover possession of his registered property by reason of
laches.6” (2) In case of property of public dominion: It is clear that
“Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214, 224 (1992).
mld.
a,ld.
''"Id.', see also Republic v. Northern Cement Corp.. 861 SCRA 50 (2018); Heirs ol
Bicnvenido and Araceli Tayag v. (Jabriel, supra; Heirs of Marcelina Ar/adon-Crisologo v, Ration,
532 SCRA 39) (2007); I’elbcl Manufacturing Corp. v. CA, 497 SCRA 185 (2006).
626Art. 1117, NCC.
“’Art. 1131, NCC.
“•Art. 1137, NCC.
“’Art. 1132, NCC.
““Art. 1137, NCC.
“'Heirs ol Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. CA, 288 SCRA 574 (1998); see also Pangasinan v.
Disonglo-Abnazora, 761 SCRA 220 (2015); Lausa v. Quilaton, 767 SCRA 399 (2015).
“’540 SCRA 100, 107(2007).
'•"CiliiiK De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, 468 SCRA 506, 5)8 (2005); Heirs of Juan and Ines
Panganiban v. Dayrit, 464 SCRA 370, 379-380 (2005); and Vila, de Cabrera v. CA. 335 Phil. 19,
34(1997).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
property of public dominion, which generally includes property

belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man?'4 However, where
lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription, pursuant to Article 1113
of the NCC.“S (3) In case of trust: A trustee cannot acquire by
prescription the ownership of property entrusted to him.“‘ That
rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is
that the possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not being adverse,
he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust?”
The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property
held in trust may possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as
the trustee has not repudiated the trust?35 Exception: Acquisitive
prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held
in trust where (i) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust;
(ii) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to
the cestui que trust; and (iii) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive?39 (4) In case of following relationships: Prescription
does not nin between husband and wife, even though there be a
separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements
or by judicial decree.““ Neither does prescription run between
parents and children, during the minority or insanity of the latter,
and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the
guardianship."1
12.5 Pectination: (a) Concept and requisites: (1) Concept: It is a
mode of acquiring ownership by the seizure or apprehension
of things corporeal which have no owner with the intention of
acquiring them and according to the rules laid down by law."2
(2) Requisites: (i) the thing must be res nullius—that is. a thing
which either never had an owner, or which, by virtue of a previous
abandonment (dereliction), has not an owner at the time of its
“"Heirs ol'Murio Mulubanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009).

“’/</.
“‘Brian Vda. de Esconde v. CA, 323 Phil. 81. 89 (1996).
““Buan Vda. de Esconde v. CA, supra.

‘"Id.
““Art. 1109, lstpar.,NCC.
“‘Art. 1109, 2nd par., NCC.
"23 Sanchez Roman 209.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
occupation; (ii) it must be appropriable by nature or one that can

be seized or apprehended (or it must be corporeal); (iii) it must be
brought into the actual possession or control of the one professing
to acquire it; and (iv) the person must acquire it with the intention
of acquiring ownership. He must therefore have the necessary
capacity to consent.”3 (b) Hunting or fishine: However, the right
to hunt and to fish is regulated by special laws.644 This mode does
not apply to animals classified as rare, threatened, or endangered
species.”3 (c) Swarm of bees: The owner of a swarm of bees has
a right to pursue them to another’s land, with the obligation of
indemnifying the possessor of the latter for the damage.”6 In case
the owner of the swarm of bees fails to pursue the swarm, or if
he initially makes a pursuit but he ceases to do so within two
consecutive days, the law considers him as to have abandoned
ownership of the swarm of bees,”7 in which case, the swarm
becomes res mdlius and ownership thereof may now be acquired
by the owner of the estate by way of occupation.”8 (d) Wild and
domesticated or tamed animals: (1) Rule as to wild animals:
Those which are found in their state of natural freedom. They are
without an owner or res nullius. Hence, ownership thereof may
be acquired by occupation. However, once they recover their
natural freedom or once they are restored to their original state of
being free, they cease to be under one’s possession and will again
become res nullius. (2) Rule as to domesticated or tamed animals:
Those which were formerly wild but have been subdued and
retained the habit of returning to the premises of the possessor.”’
So long as they retain the habit of returning to the premises of
the possessor, the ownership over these animals is not affected
by the simple fact that they are no longer under the control of the
present possessor-owner. The possessor-owner of domesticated
animals has a period of 20 days counted from the occupation
by another person within which to reclaim them. If after the
expiration of this period the possessor-owner fails to reclaim
”’3 Sanchez 210; 2 Castan 140.

6+4Art. 715, NCC.
”’R.A. No. 9147, otherwise known as the “Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection
Act”; R.A. No. 8550, otherwise known as the "Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998”; and Fisheries
Administrative Order Nos. 202 and 208.
”6Art. 716, NCC.
“’Art. 716, NCC.
utld.
“’See Art. 560, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
them, the ownership over these animals is considered to have

been abandoned and the animals become res nullius. (e) Hidden
treasure: A hidden treasure is any hidden and unknown deposit of
money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership
of which does not appear.630 It is considered, in law, as res nullius
and may thus be acquired by occupation. The treasure belongs
wholly to the finder if found upon one own’s ground; but if found
or discovered by chance in another’s property and the finder is
not a trespasser, the treasure is equally divided between the finder
and the owner of the ground.631 (f) Abandoned and lost movable:
(13 Abandoned movable: The property is considered abandoned
if the spes recuperandi (hope of recovery or recapture) is gone
and the animus revertendi (intent to recover) is given up.63’ It
becomes res nullius and may be acquired by occupation. (2)
Lost movable: Where the property is not abandoned but it is now
under the control of another person. In order to acquire ownership
through occupation, there are rules to be followed. The finder, far
from becoming owner of the thing found, is bound to return it
to its previous owner, if known, or to immediately deposit the
same with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding
has taken place, if the owner is unknown.633 If the finder fails to
comply with these procedural requirements and appropriates for
himself the movable property he found, he shall be liable for the
crime of theft.634 If the lost property is turned over to the mayor,
the latter is then required to make a public announcement of such
finding for two consecutive weeks in a manner he deems best.633
If after six months, the owner does not appear, the thing found,
or its value, shall be awarded to the finder, with the obligation to
reimburse the expenses incurred in the publication.636 It is only
after compliance with the foregoing rules that the finder shall
acquire ownership of the thing found by occupation. If the owner
appears on time, he shall be obliged, however, to pay, as a reward
to the finder, one-tenth (1/10) of the sum or of the price of the
thing found.637
‘"Art. 439, NCC.

651 Art. 438, NCC.
“U.S. v. Rey, 8 Phil. 500 (1907).
634Art. 308(1), RPC.
“’Art. 719, 2nd par., NCC.
636Art. 719,4th par., NCC.
“’Art. 720, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
12.6 Intellectual Creation: (a) Concent: Intellectual property refers

to creations of the mind: inventions, literary and artistic works,
and symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce.6’*
(b) Time of acquisition of ownership: The author, the composer,
the painter, the sculptor, or other artists, the scientists, and the
inventors acquire ownership over their works from the moment of
their creation6” even before the same are published, copyrighted,
or patented.660 Being the owner thereof, the creator has absolute
control over his work and he may do anything with it as he
pleases, including the right to share it with others. He also enjoys
the exclusive right to its publication—but this exclusive right is
limited only to the first publication."' Unless placed under the
protection of the Intellectual Property Law, once published,
the work is dedicated to the public, and the author loses the
exclusive right to control subsequent publications by others."2 (c)
Ownership over letters: (1) Ownership over material or physical
object (the letter itself) - it is owned by the person to whom it is
addressed and delivered; (2) Ideas or contents - it is owned by
the author or writer (the sender). As a consequence, while the
recipient may have the control and possession of the physical
letter itself by virtue of his ownership of the same, the author’s
consent is required in case of publication or dissemination of the
letter."’ In addition, the copyright also belongs to the author or
writer (the sender).66*
13) Donation
13.1 Concent and Requisites: (a) Definition: It is an act of liberality
whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it."’ It may also be defined as “a
gratuitous contract whereby the donor divests himself, at present
and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of the donee.”6"
(b) Requisites: (1) essential reduction of the patrimony of the
“Bwww.wipo.int/about-ip/en/-Relrieved date: June 29,2017.

6MArt. 721, NCC.
660Art. 722, NCC.
“'Santos v. McCullough Printing Co., 12 SCRA 321; Filipino Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, Inc. v. Tan, 148 SCRA 461.
MId.
“’Art. 723, NCC.
“*Sec. 178.6, R.A.No. 8293.
“’Art. 725, NCC.
“‘Concurring opinion of J. Antonio in Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245, 266.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
donor; (2) increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (3) intent
to do an act of liberality or animus donandi.1*1 Donative intent
is presumed present when one gives a part of one’s patrimony
to another without consideration, and it is not negated when
the person donating has other intentions, motives, or purposes
which do not contradict donative intent “8 For a donation to
exist, however, the intent to donate must be effectively carried
out. Hence, a mere declaration of an intention or desire to donate
is not a donation.669 (c) Donation is a mode of acquisition: Our
Civil Code treats donation as a contract that transfers ownership.
As explained by the Court in Liguez v. Lopez,m donation does
not need to be completed by tradition since Article 712 prescribes
that ownership and rights therein are acquired and transmitted by
donation, succession—and in consequence of certain contracts—
by tradition, thereby implying that donation is not one of the
contracts requiring tradition.
13.2 Classifications of Donation: (a) As to time of effectivitv: (1)
Donation inter vivos - When the donation takes effect during the
donor’s lifetime or independently of the donor’s death or when
the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor’s lifetime, not
by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation.671 (2)
Donation mortis causa - When the donation takes effect only
upon the donor’s death or when the full or naked ownership of
the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of
the donor’s death.6’7 (b) Donation mortis causa: (1) Concept: It
is in reality a devise, if it involves real property; or a legacy,
if it involves personal property. (2) Formalities: It partakes of
the nature of a testamentary provision. As such, the same must
be executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of
wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code; otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no
“’Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio v. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, 425 SCRA
447, 458-459 (2004); citing Republic v. Guzman, 326 SCRA 90, 95 (2000). See also Abello v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 452 SCRA 162, 168 (2005).
“’Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 452 SCRA 162, 170(2005).
“’See Jutic v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 269 (1987); and Aldaba v. Court of Appeals,
27 SCRA 263.
6,“G.R. No. L-l 1240, February 13, 1958.
671 Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245,253; citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil.
481.
mId.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
effect. Unless and until the donation is probated, i.e., proved and
allowed in the proper court, no right to the subject property has
been transmitted to the donee.673 (3) Characteristics: (i) Conveys
no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive; (ii) Before his death, the transfer should also
be revocable by the transferor at will, adnutuum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and (iii) The
transfer is void if the transferor should survive the transferee.6’4
(4) Determination of nature of donation: Crucial in determining
whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa is the
determination ofwhether the donor intended to transfer ownership
over the properties upon the execution of the deed.675 If the donor
intends to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon
the execution of the donation, as reflected from the provisions
contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is
merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death.676 (c)
Classification of donation inter vivos: (1) pure or simple donation
- Where the underlying cause is plain gratuity677 or pure liberality
(no strings attached);67* (2) remuneratory or compensatory
donation - made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past
services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt;‘”
(3) conditional or modal donation - where the donation is made
in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes
certain conditions, limitations, or charges upon the donee, the
value of which is inferior than that of the donation given;66" and
(4) onerous donation - that which imposes upon the donee a
reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of
‘’’Bascara v. Javier, 759 SCRA 105 (2015).

‘’’Villanueva v. Branoco, 640 SCRA 30« (2011); Del Rosario v. Ferrer, 630 SCRA 683
(2010); Ganuelas v. Cawed, 401 SCRA 447, 455-456 (2003); citing Auslria-Magai v. CA, 375
SCRA 556. See also Bonsalo v. CA, supra, and Alejandro v. Geraldez, supra, 254-255.
675Reyes v. Mosqueda, 187 SCRA 661, 671 (1990). See also Auslria-Magai v. CA, 375
SCRA 556; ciling Geslopa v. CA, 342 SCRA 105, 110.
6 ‘Castro v. CA, 27 SCRA 1076, 1082 (1969); cited in National Treasurer of the Phil. v.
Prfa. de Meimban, 131 SCRA 264, 269 (1984).
‘’’Republic v. Silim, 356 SCRA I; ciling Art. 725, NCC.
‘’"Lagazo v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 18, 24. Also in De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA
150,155(1999).
"“Id.. citing An. 726, NCC.
““Republic v. Silim. supra, citing Arts. 726 and 733, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is

equal to or more than the thing donated.6*1 Of all the foregoing
classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most
distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the
validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved
in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law
on donations but by the law on contracts.6*2 (d) Governing law
of donation inter vivos: (1) Simple and remuneratory donations
— both are true donations because the underlying consideration
is the pure liberality of the donor; hence, they are both governed
by the law on donations, as follows: (i) as to formalities, both
shall be governed by Articles 748 and 749; (ii) as to effect of
impossible condition, the condition is simply considered not
imposed and the donation remains valid (Art. 727). (2) Onerous
donations - it is completely governed not by the law on donations
but by the law on contracts,6*2 as follows: (i) as to formalities,
it is obligatory in whatever form it may have been entered into
(Art. 1356); (ii) as to effect of impossible condition, the donation
becomes void (Art. 1183). (3) Conditional or modal donations -
the rules of contract govern the onerous portion of donation; the
rules of donation only apply to the excess, if any.6*4
13.3 Perfection. Capacity of Parties, and Formalities: (a) Effects
of perfection: (1) the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated;6*2 and (2) it is generally considered
irrevocable.6*6 (b) When acceptance must be made: The
acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor. Upon
the death of either the donor or the donee prior to the perfection
of the donation, the offer of donation becomes ineffective.6*7 (c)
Capacity of donor: (1) Requisites: (i) he must be in possession
of the capacity to contract; (ii) he must have the capacity to
dispose of his property;6** and (iii) he must not be specifically .
prohibited to make a donation.6*9 (2) Cannot donate future
’/</., citing Art. 733, NCC. See also De Luna v. Abrigo, supra, p. 156.
"W See also Art. 733, NCC.
"Art. 733, NCC.
"Calanasan v. Dolorito, 710 SCRA 505 (2013).
“’Del Rosario v. Ferrer, 630 SCRA 683 (2010).
'“‘I'da. de Arceo v. CA. 185 SCRA 489; cited in Quilala v. CA. 371 SCRA311.
"Art. 1323, NCC.
“*Art. 735, NCC.
"See Art. 739, NCC and Art. 87, FC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
property: Donations cannot comprehend future property.650 The

law requires that the donor be the owner of the property donated
at the time of the donation; otherwise, such donation is void,
even if accepted, following the rule that “no one can give what he
does not have”—nemo dat quod non habet. (3) Reckoning period
of donor’s capacity: The donor’s capacity shall be determined as
of the time of the making of the donation.651 (4) Double donation:
Not legally possible in this jurisdiction652 because donation
is a mode of acquiring ownership, (d) Capacity of donee: (1)
Mere juridical capacity is sufficient. (2) Prohibited donations:
(i) donations between those who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation;653 (ii) donations between
those who were found guilty of the same criminal offense, if the
donation is made in consideration thereof;™ (iii) those made to
public officers or their spouses, descendants, and ascendants, if
the donation is made by reason of their office;653 (iv) donations
made to those who are incapacitated to succeed by will;656 (v)
donations between the spouses during the marriage, whether
the donation be made directly or indirectly, except moderate
ones given on the occasion of any family rejoicing;6” and (vi)
donations between those who are living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, whether the donation be
made directly or indirectly."6 In the first, no previous criminal
conviction is necessary since the guilt of the donor and the donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in a civil action
for declaration of nullity of the donation;655 while in the second,
a previous criminal conviction is necessary, (e) Formalities
in donations of personal property: If the value of the donated
property does not exceed P5.000, there is no required form. If
the donation is made orally, there must be simultaneous delivery
of the thing or of the document representing the right donated;
"“Art. 735, NCC.

"'Art. 737, NCC.
"'Separate (Concurring) Opinion of Justice Vitug in Hemedes v. CA, 316 SCRA 347,
376-377.
“Art. 739(1), NCC.
“Art. 739(2), NCC.
“Art. 739(4), NCC.
“Art. 1027( I), (2), (3), (5), and (6), NCC, in relation to Art. 740, NCC.
“Art. 87, FC.
"‘Art. 87, FC.
“Last paragraph. Art. 739, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
otherwise, the donation is void.’"" If the value of the donated

property exceeds P5,000, both the donation and the acceptance
must be in writing; otherwise, the donation shall be void.’’1 (I)
Formalities in donations of real property: Regardless of its value,
the donation and the acceptance of the same should be in a public
instrument; otherwise, the donation is void.’” The acceptance may
be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument.
If the acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor
shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both instruments must
state the fact of such notification.’” There are, therefore, three
requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a real property,
to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must
be accepted, which acceptance may be made either in the same
Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument; and (3) if
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must
be notified in an authentic form, and the same must be noted in
both instruments.7” The purpose of the formal requirement for
acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly
communicated to the donor.’” Hence, even if the requirements
of notification and notation are not complied with in cases
where the acceptance is made on a separate instrument, the
donation remains valid if the donor is nonetheless aware of the
acceptance™ or the donor had actual knowledge of the same.’”
On the other hand, in the absence of evidence whatsoever that
the claimed donation had been accepted, the requirements of
notice and notation should be strictly applied.™ It is enough,
between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that
the donation be made in a public instrument but, in order to bind
third persons, the donation must be registered in the Registry
of Property.™'’ However, such registration in the Office of the
’““Art. 748. 2nd par., NCC.

’"'Art. 748, 3rd par., NCC.
’“’Art. 749, NCC,
’“Arungote v. Maglunob, 579 SCRA 620 (2009).

’“’Homeowners Association ofTalayan Village, Inc. v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 774 SCRA
315(2015).
’““Pajarillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 340 (1989).
’"’Republic v. Silim, 356 SCRA 1 (2001)
’““Legasto v. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766, and Santos v. Robledo, 28 Phil. 245.
’"“Shopper's Paradise Realty & Development Corp. v. Roque, 419 SCRA 93, 98 (2004).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
Register of Deeds or in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for

the donation to be considered valid and official.710
13.4 Reduction and Revocation: (a) Extent of donation: A donation is
subject to the following limitations: (1) The donor cannot give
by donation more than what he can give by will,7" or it must
not impair the legitimes of his compulsory heirs. If he does, so
much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is
deemed “inofficious” and the donation is reducible to the extent
of such excess, though without prejudice to its taking effect in
the donor’s lifetime or the donee’s appropriating the fruits of the
thing donated.717 (2) He must reserve, either in full ownership or
in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself and all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance, are by law entitled
to be supported by the donor,713 otherwise, the donation is subject
to a corresponding reduction at the instance of “any person
affected" and only to the extent necessary for the support of
the donor and his relatives entitled to be supported by him. (b)
Generally irrevocable: As a rule, once the donation is accepted (or
perfected), it is generally considered irrevocable.714 Exceptions: A
donation inter vivos may be revoked only on grounds allowed by
law, as follows: (1) subsequent appearance of a child;71’ (2) non-
fulfillment of charges imposed in the donation;716 (3) ingratitude
of the donee;717 and (4) the fact that the donation is inofficious.711
(c) Subsequent appearance of child: (1) Requisites: (i) when
the donor made the donation, he had no child; and (ii) after the
donation, he had a child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, or the child whom he believed to be dead turned out to
be alive.719 (2) Extent of reduction or revocation: The provisional
legitime of the child should be computed at the time of the
child’s appearance and the donation should be correspondingly
’"Heirs of Roscndo Sevilla Florencio v. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla de Leon, 425 SCRA 447,
459 (2004).
’"Art. 752, NCC.
7l7Fda. deTupas v. Br. XLIII, RTC of Negros Occidental, 144 SCRA 622,624-625, clllng
Art. 771, NCC; see aha Santos v. Alana, 467 SCRA 176 (2005).
’"Art. 750, NCC.
’"Gestopa v. CA, 342 SCRA 105,114.
’"Art. 760, NCC.
"‘Art. 764, NCC.
7l7Art. 765, NCC.
’"Art. 752, NCC.
,19Art. 760, NCC.
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
reduced or revoked to the extent that the provisional legitime of

the child, at that time, has been impaired. (3) Prescriptive period:
The action for reduction or revocation is subject to a four-year
prescriptive period from the time of the appearance of the child.720
(d) Acts of ingratitude: (1) Instances of acts of ingratitude: (i) If
the donee should commit some offense against the person, the
honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children
under his parental authority; (ii) If the donee imputes to the donor
any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
Mr
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been
committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under
his authority; or (iii) If the donee unduly refuses to give support
to the donor when the former is legally or morally bound to give
support to the latter.’21 (2) Prescriptive period: One year, counted
from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was
possible for him to bring the action.’22 (e) Inofficious donations:
(1) Concept: A donation is inofficious if it exceeds what the
donor may give by will, or when it prejudices the legitimes of the
donor’s compulsory heirs. (2) Extent of reduction or revocation:
In determining whether the donation is inofficious or not, recourse
must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the
determination of the legitime and, by extension, of the disposable
portion, taking into consideration the estimated net value of the
donor’s property at the time of his death.’22 (3) Who may revoke:
Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to
the legitime and their heirs and successors-in-interest may ask for
the reduction of inofficious donations.724 (4) Prescriptive period:
The action for reduction or revocation of an inofficious donation
prescribes in 10 years following Article 1144 of the New Civil
Code.’25 (f) failure to comply with conditions: (1) Meaning of
condition: According to the Court, the condition referred to in
Article 764 refers to obligations or charges imposed by the donor
on the donee,720 making the donation onerous.727 (2) Prescriptive
’-’"Art. 763, NCC.

”'Art. 765, NCC.
’’-’Art. 769, NCC.
”’IZ</<1. de Tupas v. Br. XL1II, RTC of Negros Occidental, 144 SCRA 622,626.
724Art. 772, 1st par., NCC.
’"Imperial v. CA, 316 SCRA 393 (1999) and Santos v. Alana. 467 SCRA 176 (2005).
’’"Dissenting Opinion of J. Davide in Central Philippine University v. Conn of Appeals,
246 SCRA 511, 520, citing 11 Tolentino, Civil Code. 1983 Ed.. 535.
”’De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA 150, 156(1990).
J9JC9B0M
R52M9UH7
period: 10 years counted from the time within which the donee
must comply with the conditions/obligations of the donation.™
(3) When to count 10-vear period: The accrual of the cause of
action is from the expiration of the time within which the donee
must comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation.™
Where the donee is burdened with the obligation to utilize the
land donated for school purposes, the Court ruled that from
the nature and circumstances of the condition of the subject
donation, a period is contemplated by the donors, except that if
no period was fixed in the donation, resort to Article 1197 of the
New Civil Code is necessary.730 However, resort to Article 1197
will no longer be applicable if more than a reasonable period has
already been allowed to the donee to avail of the opportunity to
comply with the condition, even if it be burdensome, to make the
donation in its favor forever valid, but the donee still failed to
do so.731 (4) When donation provides for automatic revocation: A
donation that provides for automatic revocation in case of failure
to comply with the condition imposed is valid.732 A judicial
finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the
other party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of
challenging the propriety of the revocation.”3
™Supra.
™Secrctary of Education v. Heirs of Ruftno Dulay, Sr., 480 SCRA 452 (2006).
73OW.
731/d See also Central Philippine University v. CA, 246 SCRA 511 (1995).
732De Luna v. Abrigo, supra, and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. CA, 198 SCRA
300 (1991); Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas, 475
SCRA 458 (2005); Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata, 567 SCRA 163
(2005); and Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware, 821 SCRA 295 (2017).
mld.
J9JC9B0M

Rabuya Prebar Reviewer Civ Law 2021 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rabuya Prebar Reviewer Civ Law 2021 2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rabuya Prebar Reviewer Civ Law 2021 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

R52M9UH7

Published & Distributed by

S REX Book Store .....

BOOK I. - PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

BOOK 11. - PROPERTY

BOOK III. - SUCCESSION

Basic Principles 241

Intestate or Legal Succession 313

BOOK IV. - OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

BOOK V. - SPECIAL CONTRACTS

Obligations of the Parties 451

PART 2: CONTRACT OF LEASE

Lease of Things 467

PART 3: CONTRACT OF COMMON CARRIER

PART 4: CONTRACT OF PARTNERSHIP

PART 5: CONTRACT OF AGENCY

PART 6: CONTRACTS OF LOAN AND DEPOSIT

PART 7: ACCESSORY CONTRACTS

BOOK VI. - TORTS & DAMAGES

Nominal Damages 598

BOOK VII. - LAND TITLES & DEEDS

BOOK II. — PROPERTY

1) Classification of Property: Immovable and Movable Property

'Art. 415(1), NCC.

BOOK II. — PROPERTY 157

(2) Buildings: A building, if permanently attached to the land, is

158 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

tenement.16 (2) Growing fruits: For certain purposes, they may be

l63 Manresa, 6th Ed., p.20.

BOOK 11. —PROPERTY 159

if the parties have treated the same as personal property.25 (e)

160 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

transmission lines, insulators, and electric meters of MERALCO

"791 SCRA 272 (2016).

BOOK II. — PROPERTY 161

1.6 Classification of Movable Property: (a) Consumable or non-

2) Classification of Property: Based on Ownership

42Art. 418, NCC.

162 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;47 (2)

’’Art. 420(1), NCC.

BOOK II. — PROPERTY 163

covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth,61

164 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

President is duly authorized by law;™ or (ii) it is actually alienated

’"Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 5X7 SCR A 172 (2009).

BOOK II. —PROPERTY 165

as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said

166 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose.”

"Republic v. Alejandre, G.R. No. 217336, Oct. 17,2018.

BOOK H. —PROPERTY 167

is not alienable or disposable; (ii) it is not subject to registration

“Alolino v. Flores, 788 SCRA 92 (2016).

168 PRE-BAR REVIEWER IN CIVIL LAW

and restrictions provided by law.'”’ (2) Doctrine of self-help:

'"‘Art. 432, NCC.

BOOK II. — PROPERTY 169

defendant is unlawful from the beginning; in UD, possession of