EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-6486. March 2, 1911.]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL B. CATOLICO, Defendant-

Appellant.

B. Pobre for Appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRESUMPTION OF CRIMINAL INTENT. — In

order to constitute a crime the act must, except with respect to crimes made such by
statute, be accompanied by criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime i not committed if the mind of the person
performing the accomplained of is innocent.

2. ID., ID.; ACT COMPLAINED OF MUST BE UNLAWFUL. — The presumption of criminal

intent does not arise from the proof of the commission of an act unless the act itself be
unlawful. And where the facts proven for the purpose of raising the presumption of
criminal intent are accompanied by other facts which show that the act complained of
was not unlawful, the presumption does not arise.

3. ID.; ACT NO. 1740; MALVERSATION; "PRIMA FACIE" CASE; PRESUMPTION. — While
Act No. 1740 provides that: "In all prosecutions for violations of the preceding section
(sec. 1), the absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such person to
produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on demand of any officer
authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or depositary shall be
deemed to be prima facie evidence that such missing funds or property have been put
to personal use or used for personal ends by such person within the meaning of the
preceding section," yet such a presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a
prima facie case against the accused person, and when the prosecution in presenting its
case against the accused, introduces evidence showing that the money or property had
not been put to personal use by the defendant, the presumption of guilt does not arise.

DECISION

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the defendant of the crime of
malversation of public funds and sentencing him to two months’ imprisonment, to
perpetual disqualification to hold public office or public employment of any kind, and to
the payment of the costs.

It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as justice of the peace of
Baggao, Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of October, 1909, had before him sixteen
separate civil cases commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals,
each one for damages resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases were all
decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff; that each one of the defendant in said
cases appealed from the decision of the justice of the peace and deposited P16 as
required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50, each one of which was
approved by the court; that on the 12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases
presented a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the
sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later demonstrated this to the
satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered the cancellation of the
said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the appellants to file another bond
within fifteen days, that, inasmuch as none of the appellants in said causes presented
new bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as
said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen
cases and commanding the execution of the same, at the same time asking that the
sums deposited by the defendants in said actions be attached (so called in the record)
and delivered to him in satisfaction of said judgments; that the accused acceded to the
petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and delivered same to the plaintiff,
at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50 for each attachment,
conditioned that he would respond for the damages which should result from such
attachment.

After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen
cases presented a complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance, by
virtue of which said court ordered that the plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of
the Court of First Instance the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions.
Canillas obeyed the order of the court and made the delivery as required.

Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the acquittal of the accused.
We are in entire accord with that recommendation. The case made against the
appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by law to be present in the
crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert the money to his
own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he feloniously permit anybody
else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief that he was
acting judicially and correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his
hands by the defendants appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached for the
benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had been dismissed and the
judgments in his court had become final, and that he delivered the said sums to the
plaintiff in satisfaction of the judgment which he held in those cases, can not be
considered an appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No.
1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had
a perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it was clearly shown to him that
the sureties thereon were insolvent, to require the filing of new undertakings, giving the
parties ample time within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said
undertakings were not filed, and to declare the judgment final. He believed that after
said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final, the sums
deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the judgments in the actions in
which said sums had been deposited and that he was acting judicially and legally in
making such applications.

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit
reum, nisi mens rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of be innocent.

In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the functions of a court of
justice of the peace. He had jurisdictions of the actions before him. He had a right and
it was his duty to require the payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of
a proper undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and
delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases, he may have exceeded his
authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of his jurisdiction and power, a
question we do not now discuss or decide, it was, so far as appears from the record, at
most a pure mistake of judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of facts.
Giving the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the appellant, it,
nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous exercise of the judicial function,
and not an intention to deprive any person of his property feloniously. His act had back
of it the purpose to do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that
honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally and justly due, and not
to enrich himself or another by criminal misappropriation. It was an error committed by
a court, not an act done by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime.

It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of the
commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is proved that the
accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done
with criminal intention, and that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it
must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be a
criminal act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an error;
it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would have been declared
erroneous and set aside on appeal or other proceeding in the superior court. It may
well be that his conduct was arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as
properly to subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office. But,
from the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result no presumption of
criminal intention arises from the act.

Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act complained of,
even though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of malversation of public funds
as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all
prosecutions for violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of the public
funds or property of which any person described in said section has charge, and any
failure or inability of such person to produce all the funds and property properly in his
charge on the demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such
missing funds or property have been put to personal uses or used for personal ends by
such person within the meaning of the preceding section." Nevertheless, that
presumption is a rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case against the
person accused. If he present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds
or property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and the prima facie
case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the accused to offer any such
evidence, for the reason that the people’s own pleading alleged, and its own proofs
presented, along with the criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said
money had not been put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other words,
the prosecution demonstrated, both by the allegations in its information filed against
the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that the absence of the funds in question was
not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively and completely
negativing the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the absence of the
funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The facts which were
presented for the purpose of creating such presumption were accompanied by other
facts which absolutely prevented its creation.

On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of estafa, as defined
in paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, then the presumption just referred to
does not arise. Mere absence of the funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither
is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to
make even a prima facie case. (U. S. v. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. v.
Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by
direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows.
(U. S. v. Morales, supra.)

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered discharged from
custody forthwith.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the transactions
herein set out, but in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon this point I
concur in the judgment of acquittal of the crime charged in the information.