Brainwashing: Psychology or Demonology?

Raymond A. Bauer

The reaction of the American public to “brainwashing” demands

almost as much explanation, and is in some ways as disturbing, as the
events to which this term has been applied. An exceedingly small fraction
of American POWs defected to the enemy after the Korean War. Another
group collaborated with the enemy. The size of this latter group can never
be unequivocally defined because of the difficulty of deciding whether a
particular act was or was not collaboration. Granted we have no nicely
standardized measures of what is a “little” or a “lot” of defection or
collaboration under such circumstances; still on the whole, considering the
circumstances, the record of American POWs might well have been
viewed as remarkably good. Yet a sizeable proportion of the American
public and the American press has taken the position that it is unthinkable
for even a single American to ’fall for Communist propaganda or to col-
laborate with the enemy unless he has been subject to unnatural influence.
Nothing less than a combination of the theories of Dr. I. P. Pavlov and
the wiles of Dr. Fu Manchu could produce such results.
I t has been particularly disturbing to find a number of otherwise
responsible citizens accepting the thesis that ‘%brainwashing” is based on
psychiatric principles developed from Pavlovian psychology. Without
exception the evidence is inferential. American POWs and prisoners of
the Soviet secret police were poorly fed, deprived of sleep, and in their
weakened condition often subjected to excessive physical demands. Obvi-
ously-it is argued-Pavlovian principles were being employed, since
Pavlov had demonstrated that the fatigued organism is especially suscep-
tible to influence. Such claims are quite familiar to students of Soviet
affairs. I have read a document in which it was literally asserted that
Stalin created the famine of 1931 in order that his weakened subjects
might be more susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda!
I n the case of any psychiatric or psychological theory that is reason-
ably adequate, it would indeed be remarkable if some of its principles
could not be discerned in any extended sequence of human behavior. I t is
equally remarkabIe that the notion of the “use of Pavlovian principles of
psychology and psychiatry” should be accepted in the absence of direct
evidence, on the basis of only skimpily worked out inferential evidence.
As a student of Soviet affairs, and particularly of the role of psychol-
ogy in the Soviet Union, I have been continually interested in finding any
direct evidence of the systematic employment of psychiatry or psychology
as an instrument of social policy, for either propaganda or eliciting con-
fessions.
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I n the first decade of the Soviet regime, a number of Bolshevik l a d -
ers-including Lenin, it is reputed-were actively interested in the s ~ -
tematic exploitation of Pavlovian and Bekhterevian psychology (1).
Research was supported, and there were broad attempts at application in
education, and to some extent in industry and the Red Army. Once S&
came to power, the role of psychology was systematically and drastically
curtailed, Pavlovian and Bekhterevian psychology were specifically repudi-
ated as models for training and controlling human behavior. The last ref-
erence, as far as I a m aware, to the possibility of using psychology (as a
formal discipline) in propaganda work took place in 1931;and this article
consisted of a bitter complaint that nothing useful had been offered to
political workers by psychologists. I t is possible that Stab’s stimulation of
a Pavlovian revival in the last few years of his life represented a renewed
interest in the political exploitation of psychology. But again there is no
indication that if this were so it went beyond a programmatic stage; and
it has since waned-at least in the intensity with which Soviet 05ciak
have pushed it.l
The absence of a phenomenon is, of course, virtually impossible to
demonstrate, since failure to detect it may reflect merely the lack of dili-
gence of the investigator or the inadequacy of his techniques. Therefore
I am well aware of the fact that there is always the possibility of a secret
corps of psychiatrists and psychologists who have been at work in some se-
cluded comer of the Kremlin; or, as has occasionally been rumored, that
psychoanalysis was practiced in an “Institute for Eliciting Confessions”
after this brand of psychiatry was officially condemned for general pur-
poses. I am inclined, however, to be somewhat impressed by the fact that
with reasonable diligence and a considerable sense of curiosity I have
found no single piece of direct positive evidence-since the early thirties-
that would link Soviet psychologists and/or psychiatrists with work on
political indoctrination or the eliciting of confessions. I have heard of
psychiatrists being physically present during interrogations, but this is
readily subject to less sinister interpretations since it is a matter of record
that both the regular courts and the secret police in the Soviet Union
employ psychiatrists to pass on the legal responsibility of suspects.
Equally persuasive to me is my impression of the general Stalinist
methods of handling human problems. It is quite easy to identify certain
distinctive sets’ of psychological principles that underlie Bolshevik tech-
niques of social control, persuasion and propaganda, and eliciting confes-
sions. But these principles-it seems to me-derive not so much from the
work of academic psychologists, as from established techniques of Com-
munist indoctrination dating back well before Lenin came to power, and
which may be found in the indoctrination practices of Communists of all
IThis opinion has been confinned in private conversation with Mr. Robert
Tucker of the Rand Corporation, who has made an extensive study of the “Pav-
lovian revival.” See his article “Stalin and the uses of psychology.” World Politics,
1956, 8,455483.

42
lands. Other techniques are indistinguishable from the shrewd common
sense practices of journalists and salesmen of all times and places, and
are based on psychological, physiological, and physical principles known
to interrogators regardless of national or political allegiance, or of any
academic persuasion. On this last point I have the welcome, although
unsolicited, support of Comrade Khrushchev, who summarized the
S t a l i t formula for obtaining confessions as “beat, beat, beat.” I shall
refrain from attempting to interpret this within the Pavlovian schema.
My direct evidence for Bolshevik interest in or use of psychological
or psychiatric techniques in political matters pertains to the pre-Stalinist
period. “Brainwashing” dates from the very period for which the weight
of evidence is to the contrary.
The Stalinist approach to manipulation of people was such as to
make it unlikely that the Bolsheviks of that period would turn to academic
psychologists or psychiatrists for principles of propaganda, interrogation,
etc. For this combination of reasons I a m inclined to look for more obvious
(less devious) explanations of the effectiveness of brainwashing. It is not
unprecedented in human affairs that laymen have developed effective
means of coercion and persuasion. Work by a number of scholars has
shown that the effectiveness of Communist techniques of persuasion and
coercion is quite understandable in the light of our own notions of human
behavior, regardless of whether or not they were based on a n explicit
psychological theory.* Furthermore, as Schein has commented in connec-
tion with the Chinese treatment of American POWs, the distinguishing
thing about these techniques is their number and variety, not their appar-
ent derivation from a single theoretical point of view.
At this point I should make clear that when I refer to “brainwash-
ing” I am talking about persuasion as opposed to coercion. No one
appears to be puzzled by the fact that punishment or threats of punish-
ment can induce men to colllaborate or to produce confessions of things
they did not do. Such men are not admired, but they are perceived as
acting from understandable though despised motives. The mysterious
feature of “brainwashing” is that people’s beliefs can be changed. Coercion
can affect behavior, but what can persuade a man to change his beliefs?
I have specifically called attention to the distinction between coercion
and persuasion, and have also treated behavior and belief in the same
way, because we habitually tend to take for granted that these concepts
are in opposition to each other. By doing this,I have intended to set the
stage for introducing the observation that in Communist techniques of
indoctrination, coercion and persuasion, behavior and belief, tend to be-
come indistinguishable. In a recent brilliant article ’ Paul Kecskemeti
makes the very insightful point that the Communists seldom attempt se-
rious indoctrination of a person until they have control over his behavior
( 7 ) . Stalin referred to coercion as “the prerequisite of persuasion” (8).

* Cf. the papers of Lifton and Schein in this issue.

43
If we look over a wide range of situations varying from the forced ex-
action of confessions, through controUed indoctrination under the con-
fined conditions of POW camps or the special institutions with which Dr.
Lifton has dealt, to the ordinary life situation of the citizen of a totali-
tarian state, it is striking what a key role is played by the simple fact that
the “persuaders” have such complete control over the individual’s en-
vironment. If an individual’s behavior can be controlled sufficiently and
the information available to him manipulated to the degree that is pos-
sible in a totalitarian state, a prison, or an indoctrination camp, a remark-
able amount of persuasion can be effected. When coercion or the threat
of coercion is applied, the individual’s motivation to accommodate may
make him a surprisingly willing collaborator in attempting to persuade
himself. A striking earlier example of this in psychological literature is
found in Bettelheim’s study of Nazi prison camps. Bettelheim reported
that prisoners “identified with the aggressor”-adopting the behavior and
beliefs of the camp guards (4).
The work of Asch and others has demonstrated in the psychological
laboratory the extent to which subjects’ perceptions of simple stimuli can
be manipulated by control over their ‘‘social environment” in the form of
having stooges present stacked judgments. Janis and King have shown
that a person’s attitudes can be changed by having him play a role ( 6 ) .
Consider how much more effective enforced role-playing can be in a situ-
ation in which one’s life is at stake if the role is not played persuasively.
Jahoda and Cook (5) found that U. S. government employees enforced
on themselves rules of conformity that restricted their behavior even be-
yond the bounds which loyalty and security considerations seemed to
demand. They gave themselves a margin of safety by overconforming.
But, as lamentable as was the situation of a government employee in the
dark days of the past few years, it was considerably less desperate than
that of his opposite number in the Soviet Union. Researchers-notably
Burdick, McBride, and Kelman-have in a relatively short time in a
psychological laboratory effected opinion changes by the device of en-
forcing overt conformity with group n01-m.~ Imagine then the potential
of enforcing compliance to the nonns and values of a totalitarian state
over the course of years.
Over the past few years I have been concerned with the problem
of political loyalty in the Soviet Union. Despite my thorough indoctrina-
tion in-and acceptance of-the more elaborate psychological principles
which seem to relate to the problem of political loyalty in liberal societies,
my work with Soviet refugees-combined with exploitation of such other
sources of information as were available-has led me to the conclusion
that the key factor in understanding political loyalty in the Soviet system
is relatively simple. It is to be found in the extent of the control which

’This work is reviewed in Leon Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance.

Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957.

44
the Soviet state under Stalin exercised over the life situation of each in-
&dual. I would not for a moment imply that there were not many
persons who would have been spontaneously and “naturally1’ loyal in the
absence of coercion-although after Khrushchev’s recent utterances one
m y indeed be puzzled as to who they were. Nor, would I attempt for a
moment to deny the importance of other psychological processes. But in
my way of W i n g , the most important thing to understand is how the
potentially disloyal person responded to a situation in which he had no
viable alternative except to accommodate-how he not only controlled his
behavior, but began to control his thoughts and attitudes.
To some extent one has to arrive at this inferentially, but a n impres-
sive proportion of the refugees whom we interviewed asserted: “I pushed
my doubts into the background.” Oleg, whose caSe was recently reported
by Helen Beier and me in the lournal of Abnormal and Social Psychology
(3), described eloquently how he found himself trying to convince others
of the rectitude of the Soviet order, only to realize afterward that these
attempts to convince others were really attempts to still his own doubts.
Realizing that one’s livelihood, and in many instances one’s life, depends
on his political propriety, the individual’s own thoughts become dangerous
property. One man complained of life aboard ship because of “the danger
that you might say something against the regime while asleep.” Another
cited as a reason for not returning to the Soviet Union after the war the
fact that because he had seen the countries of Western Europe “it would
be harder for me to keep quiet.” Another says of the doubts he had while
he was still an oficer in the Soviet Army:
“If you kept these things in your head they might come out some day.
You were afraid that you might tell somebody. Therefore, very few people
in the Soviet Union think about these things.”
I said that some of the mechanisms of self-conversion had to be in-
ferred. Some of the strongest inferential evidence came from case histories
of persons who survived many traumatic events while living in the Soviet
system, but reported no predominantly disloyal thoughts or behavior for
the period of their residence under Soviet power. In many instances they
sought out positions of responsibility and privilege and reported their
pride in being accepted as “full-fledged citizens.” These same persons,
however, reported sudden disillusionment and/or antagonism toward the
Soviet order almost immediately after being removed from Soviet jurisdic-
tion-say, by being captured by the German army. One could only con-
clude from these stories that these anti-Soviet feelings which welled up all
of a sudden were feelings which had always been there, but had system-
atically been repressed for as long as they jeopardized the individual’s
chances for survival and accommodation.
Not only does the individual have to control his disloyal thoughts,
but most Soviet citizens are in a position wherein they must affirm their
loyalty positively by appropriate statements and behavior. Again, I am not
contending that there are no loyal Soviet citizens who accept the officiaI
45
ideology easily and naturally. However, I was struck by the corrosive effect
of forced conformity on those whose loyalty had at one time or another
been shaken. The life stories of Soviet refugees reflect what we would
expect from some of the experiments on compliant behavior in small
groups and the work of Janis and King. Where there is a positive motive
for adopting the point of view which one is forced to espouse overtly, he
comes to “accept it” privately.
Of course, all of these effects become exaggerated in persons under
interrogation in prisons. The immediate threat of losing one’s life or a t
least one’s liberty, or of jeopardizing other persons, heightens the desire
to conform if one can do so with a modicum of decency. To this must
be added the effect of excessive fatigue, the confusion engendered by hav-
ing been examined and cross-examined in a detailed fashion on the same
topics many times, and the ability of the interrogators to feed in false and
confusing information. To any one who is curious about reactions to such
conditions, I would suggest reading Russian Purge, by Beck and Godin
( 2 ) . Contrary to the stereotype of books by refugees, this is an extraordi-
narily objective, insightful, and detailed account of a number of inter-
rogations, together with interesting speculations as to the psychological
processes at work among the prisoners. After a while many prisoners be-
came thoroughly confused as to just what they had said and done under
certain circumstances in the past and as to their own motives. Some be-
came at least partially persuaded of their guilt. But, persuaded or not,
they eventually were convinced that there was nothing left for them to do
but to write a confession.
Clearly the life of the ordinary Soviet citizen, and the conditions of
interrogation by the Soviet secret police, are by no means exact equiva-
lents of the situation of American POWs in the hands of the Chinese
Communists, or of the “reeducational institutions” which Dr. Lifton
studied. However, in varying degrees we find essentially the same tech-
niques employed by Communist officials in all these situations, and-again
with variations-the same sorts of reactions on the part of their victims.
Every instance of human behavior is properly the subject of psychological
study. And if any particular batch of behavior attracts our attention in a
special way, I suppose that is all the more reason to study it. The work
of my colleagues on the panel has done much to make psychological sense
out of brainwashing, and has made it clear that it can be understood as
psychology, not demonology. When one considers the trouble to which the
Communists have gone-in these various situations-to produce collab-
oration, confession, or change of ideology, I see little to wonder about the
fact that they are-again in varying degrees-successful. For that matter,
there is more to remark in their lack of success in persuading American
POWs, than in the sinister influence of “brainwashing.”
I find myself personally interested in why the Communists were will-
ing to devote so much energy to the conversion of persons who disagreed
with them, and in why portions of the American public (inasmuch as we
46
can judge from press reports) were so upset at the Communists’ limited
Success in converting a few American POWs. It is possible that we share
in common with the Communists a lack of security in our own ideological
beliefs, even though we both proclaim our confidence that we have the
true way of life. A single American soldier converted to Communism could
arouse feelings of anxiety and guilt over one’s own repressed ideological
doubts. Hence, our eagerness to attribute such conversions to the demonic
machinations of the Doctors Pavlov and Fu Manchu. The Communists,
in the role of proselytizers, assert that any sensible man, once freed of the
crippling influence of bourgeois-capitalist ideology, will accept their view
of things. By devoting vast amounts of energy to converting every heretic,
they attempt to make this a self-fulfilling prophecy. We can continue to
expect this behavior on their part.
I hope that we, however, may change toward a more mature, con-
fident acceptance of diversity of political views.

REFERENCES
(1) Bauer, Raymond A. T h e New Man in Soviet Psychology. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1952.
(2) Beck, F. (pseudonym) and Godin, W. (pseudonym). Russian Purge and the
Extraction of Confessions. New York: Viking Press, 1951.
(3) Beier, Helen, and Bauer, Raymond A. Oleg: A Member of the Soviet ‘‘Gold-
en Youth.’’ Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51, 139-145.
( 4 ) Bettelheim, Bruno. Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations. In
Swanson, Guy E., Newcomb, Theodore M., and Hartley, Eugene L. (eds.).
Readings in Social Psychology. 2nd edition. New York: Henry Holt, 1952.
( 5 ) Jahoda, Marie, and Cook, Stuart. Security Measures and Freedom of Thought.
Yale Law Journal, 1953, 61, 295-333.
( 6 ) Janis, Irving, and King, Bert T., et. al. The Influence of Role Playing on
Opinion Change. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1954, 49,
211-218.
( 7 ) Kecskemeti, Paul. The Soviet Approach to International Political Commu-
nication. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1956, 20.
(8) Studenkin, Semen S., et. al. Soviet Administrative Law. Moscow: 1950, 170.

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