The International Journal The International

The International Journal The International

Journal
of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148
of the
Platonic Tradition
brill.com/jpt
Self-Knowledge as Non-Dual Awareness:

A Comparative Study of Plotinus and Indian
Advaita Philosophy
Binita Mehta
Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Texas State University
601 University Dr., San Marcos, TX 78666, USA
[email protected]
Abstract
The paper examines the problem of self-knowledge from the perspectives of Plotinus
and the Indian Advaita (non-dual) school. Analyzing the subject-object relation, I
show that according to both Plotinus and Advaita thinkers, full self-knowledge de-
mands complete absence of otherness. Plotinus argues that if self-consciousness is
divided into subject-object relation then one will know oneself as contemplated but
not as contemplating (V.3.5) and no real self-knowledge obtains in this case. Śaṅkara,
who constitutes an important representative of Advaita thought, points out that the
self cannot know itself as an object because what is called an object to be known be-
comes established when it is separated from the self, the subject. I argue that at the
level of the One, similar to the state of ātman consciousness in Advaita framework, the
soul experiences itself in expansive non-dual consciousness. Lastly, I examine the role
of non-duality as the foundation of knowledge.
Keywords
Plotinian mysticism – Indian Advaita thought – non-discursive cognition – philosophy

of self – mind and consciousness
Introduction
Plotinus and Indian Advaita (non-dual) school of thought investigate a ques-

tion of fundamental importance: in what condition can the human self come
to possess knowledge of itself. In this paper, I examine the reasoning employed
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��7 | doi 10.1163/18725473-12341375

118 mehta
by Plotinus and Indian Advaita thinkers in their discussion of the nature of

self-knowledge. Though a number of comparative studies on Neoplatonism
and Indian philosophy exist, so far a detailed analysis of the manner in which
Plotinus and Advaita thinkers elucidate the problem of self-knowledge has not
been carried out. I focus on the analysis of the subject-object relation at differ-
ent cognitive levels and show that Plotinus and Advaita thinkers are aligned in
their understanding about the necessary condition for achieving true and com-
plete self-knowledge. According to both, the full reality of the self is brought to
oneself in a mystical awakening constituted by the non-dual awareness.
I address the question regarding the nature of the union with the One, in
particular, about the status of the self that has ascended to the One. Lawrence
Hatab (1982), in a perceptive comparative study, has shown a parallel struc-
ture between the Plotinian and the Upaniṣadic metaphysical schemes. The
Plotinian and the Advaita Vedantic framework—founded upon the worldview
of the Upaniṣads—may be seen as complementary to each other, with cer-
tain aspects presented more explicitly in one and certain others in the other.
Drawing also upon the Advaita view of self-consciousness, I argue for an en-
compassing consciousness rather than the loss of self-awareness in the state of
union.1 At the end of the paper I examine the epistemological significance of
the non-dual mode of awareness. While fully activated at the level of the One
and in the state of Brahman (or ātman), the non-dual mode I suggest is also
reflected in more circumscribed contexts as the power of recognition and is
involved in all forms of valid knowledge exercised by the soul.
I will present the Plotinian and the Advaita frameworks individually in the
first and the second sections respectively. In the first section, I discuss Plotinus’
analysis of cognitive acts associated with the soul and the Intellect and ex-
plain why according to Plotinus self-knowledge demands transcendence of the
subject-object duality. In the second section, I analyze the Advaita view that
the self can truly be known only as the subject and show how this entails the
non-dual mode of awareness. The third part examines their views in a com-
parative fashion, analyzing the parallels in their understanding of the self’s
experience of the ultimate union (with the One and Brahman) and in their
assessment of the cognitive faculties.2
1 Bussanich (1994) too indicates that union with the One “means an unlimited expansion, not
an annihilation, of the self” (p.5326). This paper will further support this type of view that the
highest mystical experience is constituted by “unlimited” self-awareness.
2 I do not consider the question of cross-cultural historical influences in this paper. This paper
focuses on an examination of the structural similarities between Plotinus and the Advaita
framework regarding the problem concerning self-knowledge. Vishwa Adluri addresses
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

Self-Knowledge as Non-Dual Awareness 119
1 Plotinus
In Ennead V.3 Plotinus discusses the problem concerning the nature of self-
thinking. The opening chapter poses the question whether something com-
plex that divides itself into a subject and object could think itself. In a situation
where something is a compound such that “with one of its constituents” it
thinks the rest of the constituents then that thing cannot know the whole of
itself, if the constituent that thinks of other constituents did not also “think it-
self” (V.3.1). Self-thinking requires that the knowing element in its act of know-
ing simultaneously apprehended itself. A compound in which the knower
and the known belong to different centers or to distinct parts cannot possess
self-thinking. Plotinus in this chapter (V.3.1) indicates that true self-thinking
belongs to an entity that is sufficiently simple. He first notes that the abso-
lutely simple might not be able to “return to itself” and hence think itself. I will
discuss the implications of the One’s perfect simplicity to the problem of self-
knowledge towards the end of this section. In this first chapter of V.3 Plotinus
the issue of Plotinus’ Orientalism in a recent work (2014). Adluri suggests that the Indian
epic Mahābhārata has greater likelihood of direct influence than the Upaniṣads given that:
“whereas the Upaniṣads were esoteric texts, and thus guarded within a lineage of pedagogi-
cal succession, the Mahābhārata was freely circulated and actively propagated” (p.92). If this
has been the case, then the similarities between the Plotinian and the Advaita philosophies
point in the direction of universal structures of human consciousness, a position which
Hatab and R. Ciapalo (2002) both support.
The likelihood of more wide-ranging influences also cannot be conclusively ruled out
given that the exact nature of exchanges in the ancient world could be difficult to pin down
and the interactions could have taken place in a variety of ways. Armstrong (1979) mentions
a curious fact about Plotinus’ articulation of the One. According to him, Plotinus is the first
philosopher in the West “to attempt any serious treatment of the question of the Divine
Infinity” (p.48). Plotinus clarifies the distinction between true infinity (what is without lim-
its) and the “unboundedness” of “indefinite, vague material multiplicity” (p.58); i.e. he draws
a clear demarcation between infinity and indefiniteness. When the term “unbounded” is ap-
plied to the Intellect, it is in a restricted sense as what is “unbounded in one way but limited
in another” (p.53). Plotinus carefully delineates the notion of absolute infinity and resorts
to “negative theology” to express the reality of the One (p.53). The idea of highest reality as
infinite is explicitly articulated in the Upaniṣads; this raises the question about the probabil-
ity of transmission of the notion of infinity from the Indian sources. In the case of Plotinus,
there is a tendency to address the problem of influences in binary terms, but the situation
could be more complex. Influence need not imply passive reception. It could be that Plotinus
was attracted towards Indian thought due to the fact that he saw his philosophical views and
experiences as being resonated in it. Thus even if one argues for some Indian influence on
Plotinus, this does not necessarily preclude inspiration or dilute originality.

120 mehta
refers to something that is qualifiedly simple, the Intellect. In what follows, I

discuss the cognitive functions characteristic of the soul and the Intellect to
determine their status with respect to self-thinking.
The acts of the (embodied) soul are associated with the faculties of sense
perception and discursive thought. In sense-perception there is an awareness
of external things or of the phenomena that occur within the body, but in both
the cases the apprehension is of something that is outside of the perceptive
elements (V.3.2). Reason analyzes the impressions provided to it by sense-
organs. The reasoning faculty is illuminated by Intellect and in making a judg-
ment about a particular thing it relies on the Intellect. In determining certain
qualities of objects perceived through the senses, the reasoning part makes
use of the standards that originate in the Intellect. This means that reason in
its act of apprehension employs norms that lie outside of itself (V.3.3). Plotinus
concludes that the reasoning element does not “return upon itself” (V.3.2)
and self-thinking cannot be granted to it (V.3.3). The reasoning part does not
wholly think itself given that its act of knowing proceeds from the duality of
the knower and the known; that is, reason maintains a relation of separation
between itself and the objects it thinks. In the case of reason, the knowing act
is also not fully contained within itself. The existence of externality or other-
ness in the operation of sense perception and discursive reason renders them
incapable of carrying out genuine self-thinking.
Next in V.3.5 Plotinus proceeds to show how self-thinking could be posited
of Intellect. The thinking or the seeing of Intellect is not on the basis of one
part of itself grasping another part of itself. If this were the case then we have
a situation where one part of the Intellect will be the seer and the other the
seen. Such a relationship of duality between the seer and the seen, as Plotinus
showed earlier, cannot constitute self-thinking. But because there is identity
of the Intellect, intellection and the intelligible (V.3.5), the Intellect thinks that
which is itself or contemplates itself with itself.3
… it (i.e. Intellect) will think with the intellection which it is itself and
will think the intelligible, which it is itself. In both ways, then, it will think
itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is itself which
it thinks in its intellection and which is itself (V.3.5).
The “Intellect itself is its objects,” (V.4.2) and hence when the Intellect sees the
intelligibles it sees itself. Unlike the soul whose thinking draws from some-
thing else, Intellect’s thinking is “from its own nature” (V.3.6). The Intellect,
3 All translations of the Enneads are from the Loeb translation by A.H. Armstrong.

whose being is activity, has its thinking entirely self-directed (V.3.7). Plotinus
likens Intellect’s thinking to light seeing itself. The Intellect sees or thinks not
through a medium different from itself, but its seeing operates through itself
(V.3.8). “Thinking itself,” the Intellect “is thus with itself and holds its activity
directed to itself” (V.3.7). The true Intellect, in contrast to the practical rea-
son, which concerns itself with external world, does not look to the “outside”
(V.3.6); the true Intellect carries out contemplation of what is within itself.
Plotinus’ initial analysis in V.3 construes the self-thinking of Intellect as di-
vested of otherness and as fulfilling the requirement for self-knowledge. But
his examination in the latter sections of V.3 seems to bring the self-knowledge
of Intellect into question. Regarding the self-thinking of Intellect, Plotinus
says: “… Intellect needs to see itself, or rather to possess the seeing of itself,
first because it is multiple, and then because it belongs to another, and must
necessarily be a seer, and a seer of that other …” (V.3.10). Intellect is a complex
whole since it contains plurality of forms or intelligibles; it is a “unity with
internal differentiations”.4 Though Intellect thinks itself, its thinking is still a
unity-in-duality:
The thinking principle, then, when it thinks, must be in two parts, and
either one must be external to the other or both must be in the same,
and the thinking must be in otherness, and necessarily also in sameness;
and the proper objects of thought must be the same and other in relation
to the intellect (V.3.10).
The relation between the thinker and the object of thought in the intelligible
realm is not that of perfect unity.5 Hence Intellect’s thinking necessarily in-
volves a movement towards the object: “… the intellect has its intellectual ef-
fort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it
thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought” (V.6.2). It is
only through the act of reaching out to the object that Intellect thinks itself or
4 J. Bussanich (1997) 194.

5 Certain passages in the Enneads suggest that Intellect is unified while some others indicate
it to be a multiplicity. According to Bussanich (1997, p.194), this is Plotinus’ manner of high-
lighting both the unity and the plurality of the intelligible world. The identity of the Intellect,
intellection and the intelligible asserted in the passage cited above (V.3.5) must be under-
stood qualifiedly because ultimately the Intellect is a one-many, which is again indicated by
the following statement: “And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be
double and not single and so not the one …” (VI.9.2).

122 mehta
sees itself.6 This implies that there is a degree of disjunction between Intellect
and the apprehension it has of itself and which means that Intellect does not
possess an immediate knowledge of itself.
The One is the source of Intellect’s existence and thinking power. In V.3.7,
Plotinus suggests that Intellect’s knowledge of itself relies upon its knowledge
of the One. Intellect strives towards the One but it continually fails to fully at-
tain the One; Intellect does not apprehend the One in itself, in its simplicity.7
If there remains a certain degree of cognitive gap between Intellect and the
One, then Intellect does not perfectly satisfy the condition of the identity of
the subject, the object and also the act of knowing which Plotinus in V.3.5 saw
as essential for the exercise of complete self-knowledge. In the relation of dual-
ity with the One, Intellect would possess imperfect vision of the principle on
which it is dependent and this would consequently limit Intellect’s grasp of
itself. Henri Oosthout characterizes the self-knowledge of Intellect as a “defi-
cient form of self-knowledge.”8
Now the soul when it ascends to the Intellect comes to be assimilated to the
intelligible world (VI.7.36); “A man has certainly become Intellect when he lets
all the rest which belongs to him go and looks at this with this and himself with
6 I am indebted to H. Oosthout for clarifying this particular critical point about the way in
which Intellect’s apprehension of itself takes place through cognitive movement (1991, p.133).
7 Intellect is actualized through contemplation upon the One. Intellect’s contemplation of the
One though emerges as a pluralized vision (V.3.11). When Intellect looks towards the One, it
apprehends not the absolute unity but an image of multiplicity (See Bussanich (1996) 52).
8 H. Oosthout (p.131). He observes based on V.3.7.9 that when Intellect’s “seeing, the act or
the activity of seeing, is likely to be identical with the thing seen,” then Intellect’s object of
contemplation “cannot be a god outside” of Intellect (p.116-117). That is, otherness between
Intellect and the One would disallow Intellect to completely realize the identity of the object
and the act of knowing.
Intellect attains more unified intuition, as compared to intellection, in its supra-intel-
lectual vision. There are differing viewpoints about whether Intellect achieves complete
identification with the One in the supra-intellectual intuition. According to John Phillips,
Intellect is brought in more immediate presence of the One, but even in this mode of ap-
prehension Intellect does not entirely bridge the relationship of duality with the One (1990,
p.79). Bussanich notes that Intellect’s (mystical) vision seems to fall “short of identity” but
then adds that the presence of “‘non-Intellect’ might indicate that unification is imminent”
(1987, p.171); the term ‘non-Intellect’ is in reference to the passage in V.5.8: “… because it is
Intellect, it sees him, when it does see him, with that of it which is not Intellect.” The critical
point for my analysis is that Intellect in its activity of intellection does not attain complete
self-knowledge and hence the soul would need to transcend the noetic level in order to sat-
isfy the condition for self-knowledge.

himself: that is, it is as Intellect he sees himself” (V.3.4). Since the Intellect and
individual souls derive from the One, the noetic life of the soul does not yet af-
ford complete awareness of its reality. Only when the soul reaches the level of
the One that it fully grasps the root of itself. The soul “… when it comes to be
there [with the One] it becomes itself and what it was …” (VI.9.9).
Plotinus speaks of the One as beyond thinking. For Plotinus, thinking nec-
essarily implies a dual structure, or the presence of otherness. He states that
“… existence of something else is a necessary condition of seeing, and if there
is nothing else seeing is useless” (V.3.10), and that “all thinking … is of some-
thing” (VI.7.40), i.e. it involves two things that are distinguished to some de-
gree. There is thinking in Intellect, which is a differentiated whole. But the One
is completely simple, beyond all differentiation; it encompasses all things in
absolute unity without them being dispersed into diverse things (V.5.9). The
One “does not think, because there is no otherness” (VI.9.6); it has “nothing to
which to direct its activity” (V.3.10). It is an “object of thought to the intellect,
but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, au-
thentic sense …” (V.6.2).
Though Plotinus attributes no thinking to the One, he does attribute con-
sciousness to it.9 He also states that the One “will have a simple concentration
of attention on itself”, and that its attention is not other than itself due to there
being “no distance or difference in regard to itself” (VI.7.39). This suggests that
the One is the state of non-dual consciousness without an object, rather than
a state where consciousness is absent. The One is in complete union with itself
and immediately present to itself and hence according to Plotinus the One has
no need to think itself (VI.9.6). For Plotinus, thinking is also intertwined with
the need to get an intimate understanding of oneself.
For it seems likely that thinking has been given as a help to the natures
which are of the more divine kind, but lesser, and as something like an
eye for their blindness. But why should the eye which is itself light need
to see real being? But what does need to seeks light through the eye be-
cause it has darkness in itself. If then thinking is light, and light does not
seek light, that ray which does not seek light would not seek to think, and
will not add thinking to itself … (VI.7.41).
9 “It is completely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and all things in itself, and its think-
ing of itself is itself, and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness, in everlasting rest
and in a manner of thinking different from the thinking of Intellect” (V.4.2).

124 mehta
The One transcends thought because it has no ignorance about itself due to
the absence of all duality (VI.9.6). The One undergoes no cognitive movement
within itself and can be said to be fully established in the self-awareness de-
void of any degree of distinction between itself and its awareness.10
The soul attains the One by eliminating all otherness (VI.9.8). In the state of
union with the One the soul is one and simple, “with no distinction in himself
either in relation to himself or to other things” (VI.9.11). It so completely fuses
with the One that the One is not apprehended as a “seen,” or as an object of
cognition, but as the very existential reality of its being.11 The soul’s awareness
of the One is experienced as a “presence”, which is not an extension of rea-
soned knowledge or noetic perception (VI.9.4), but superior to both. In this
non-dual awareness of the One, where all thought and consciousness of dual-
ity have been transcended, the soul comes to achieve perfect self-knowledge.
10 Now there are passages, such as the following, which seem to suggest that the One does
not possess self-consciousness: “… the multiple might seek itself and wish to converge on
and be conscious of itself. But by what way will that which is altogether one go to itself?
At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is one and the same thing which is
better than self-consciousness and better than all thinking” (V.6.5). Gary Gurtler (1988)
analyzes the use of the term synaisthesis in the Enneads and argues that Plotinus em-
ploys it with two distinct meanings. The primary meaning of this term is associated with
the “moment of self-abiding” of the One and of the Intellect in their respective states of
completeness, when each is “most of all what it is” (p.53-54, 58). This is the sense in which
synaisthesis is used in V.4.2, in which the self-consciousness of the One is affirmed. In the
above passage however, the term has a different implication. It signifies a “power moving
from multiplicity to unity” and which means that Plotinus is speaking of a consciousness
that results from a unifying activity (p.54, 58). This type of consciousness cannot be at-
tributed to the One. Based on Gurtler’s analysis it can be concluded that when Plotinus
denies consciousness to the One, he denies that consciousness which is associated with
the movement towards unity.
See also Bussanich (1987) who argues for the presence of undifferentiated self-
awareness at the level of the One; Phillips speaks of the “highest degree of intuitive aware-
ness” as the state of the One “in which the One is its own intuition of itself” (p.100, foot-
note 39).
11 “Since, then, there were not two, but the seer himself was one with the seen (for it was not
really seen, but united to him (the One)) …” (VI.9.11).

2 Indian Advaita Thought
Now I turn to Śaṅkara (8th-9th CE), who in this paper will serve as one of the
chief representatives of the Indian Advaita thought.12
Śaṅkara carries out an investigation of the human self on the basis of the
principle of “negation.” In this method, the multifarious aspects of our being
are subjected to a type of phenomenological analysis for the purpose of ar-
riving at that which cannot be negated or excluded.13 An element constitutes
a remainder if it is not superseded by something else or cannot be cancelled
out or invalidated by another experience. Śaṅkara locates the real Self in the
remainder, which survives the process of negation and which cannot be elimi-
nated. He speaks of the Self as the very limit beyond which negation cannot go.
For Śaṅkara, the reality of the Self is manifested in the fundamental aware-
ness of “I am,” which we possess about our very existence. He points out that
the experience of one’s self is evident given that we have a constant sense of
“I exist” or “I am” (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya I.1.1).14
The “I am” awareness does not represent the complete consciousness of
the Self, as I will explain later in the section, but it qualitatively expresses the
nature of the real Self in the ordinary waking state and hence could be said
to participate in the real Self. This basic consciousness of the reality of my
own being is beyond negation. Moreover, it doesn’t depend on any external
means of knowledge to establish itself; the sheer fact of my existence requires
no proof and is known immediately, without my having to resort to any dis-
cursive judgment. This fundamental ‘I am’ awareness is thus self-evident or
self-authenticated. Śaṅkara characterizes it as self-luminous because it reveals
itself by its own power, i.e. it does not require another level of awareness to
12 Śaṅkara is the first systematic expositor of the Advaita Vedānta doctrine. The Upaniṣads,
the Brahma Sūtras, and the Bhagavad Gītā constitute the foundational texts, or the start-
ing-points (prasthānatraya) of the Vedānta school. Śaṅkara composed commentaries on
these texts. Śaṅkara may have written a number of independent works, but only the text
called Upadeśa Sāhasrī has been established with certainty by modern scholarship as
an authentic work of Śaṅkara. See Alston’s introduction in vol.1 (2004), chapter 1 on the
sources of Śaṅkara’s doctrine.
13 “Because the Self cannot be negated, it is that which remains after saying ‘not thus, not
thus’ (to all else)” (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.2.1). All excerpts from the Upadeśa Sāhasrī are from
the translation by A.J. Alston (1990) except when indicated otherwise. Alston had con-
sulted Sengaku Mayeda’s (1979) translation in preparing his own translation.
14 See Alston (2004, vol.1) 125.

126 mehta
illuminate itself or to make itself known.15 Such consciousness is not identi-

fied with the mental, psychological or bodily phenomena. This fundamental
awareness continues to abide amidst the fluctuating mental and bodily events;
whether a particular mental or bodily state is present or not, the basic “I am”
consciousness remains in the waking state. That is, the “I am” consciousness
is not intertwined with or dependent upon the activities of the mental-bodily
complex. But rather it is on the basis of this consciousness that we come to
observe mental or bodily phenomena or know an object.16
The Self for Śaṅkara is ultimately the knower itself. He speaks of it as the
“Seer” that beholds the perceptions and other mental phenomena of the wak-
ing state (and also the images of the dream state) with its self-luminous light.17
In the Advaita framework, the mind is not in itself conscious but functions on
the basis of the light of the Self (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.18.83). Śaṅkara states that
“all cognitions in all minds in all bodies are illumined” by the Self (Upadeśa
Sāhasrī II.14.7). In section 3.2, I will discuss in some detail the Advaita view
about the structure of the mind.
The Self as the fundamental knower consciousness cannot become an ob-
ject of its own knowing given that it is the very means by which something is
known. Hence one cannot step outside of the Self to observe it as an object or
as the known, as Śaṅkara very well explains below:
And another reason why the knower (the Self) cannot be an object of
knowledge is that he is in no way separate from himself. For it is the gen-
eral rule in the world that an object of knowledge is possible if it is some-
thing separate from the knower and mediated for him by the rise of desire
to know, memory, effort and means of knowledge. Knowledge bearing
upon an object is only found in these circumstances. But no one can sup-
pose that the knower is in any way separate from himself as knower and
mediated through desire or any of the other factors. Memory concerns
an object of memory, not the rememberer. And in the same way, desire
15 With respect to the real Self, in which the “I am” consciousness participates, Śaṅkara says
the following: The Self, which is “of the very nature of knowledge and light … requires no
other knowledge to be known by” (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.15.40), and further: “The sun does
not need the help of any other light to illumine itself. Because it is self-luminous, [Self]
consciousness, likewise, requires no other consciousness to illumine itself” (Upadeśa
Sāhasrī II.15.41).
16 The analysis of self-consciousness in this section is drawn from my dissertation (2012,
p.49-51).
17 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya I.4.10, in Mādhavānanda (1950) 158-159.

has for its object something desired, not the desiring person. And even if
the rememberer or the desiring person could be the objects of memory
or desire, the aforementioned infinite regress (when we tried to make the
knower dependent upon means of knowledge) would in any case be un-
avoidable (Upadeśa Sāhasrī I.2.99).18
One cannot know the Self as an object because it is never the case that one
is ever separate from one’s own self. What is called an object to be known be-
comes established only when it stands over and against oneself in a distinctive
mode. According to Śaṅkara’s analysis, whatever appears as an object is an “ad-
junct” and does not belong to the essential reality of the self: “The Self should
ever be apprehended as the bare knower to the exclusion of the knowable.
Even that which is known objectively (i.e. in the object mode) as ‘I’ must be
rejected” (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.6.4). The mental and bodily phenomena belong
to the object pole since they could potentially serve as objects of cognition.
Śaṅkara states: “I (i.e. the real Self) am not of the nature of the elements com-
posing the physical body nor of the nature of the organs of knowledge, wheth-
er taken individually or collectively. For the ultimate knower (my true Self) is
different from all these since they are objects of knowledge and instruments of
action” (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.15.20). Here Śaṅkara highlights the distinction of
the real Self from the body, sense-organs and mental processes and faculties,
and reiterates the idea that the Self is truly experienced in the subject mode.
Now in the ordinary state of consciousness there is a certain degree of
awareness of oneself as the self, but the full nature of the Self remains veiled in
our ordinary experiences for two fundamental reasons. First, our sense of self
comes to be conjoined with what appears in our consciousness on the object
side, i.e. with the bodily and mental states. According to Śaṅkara, ordinarily an
individual fails to properly distinguish the real Self from the non-self (i.e. the
bodily and mental phenomena) and erroneously transfers the properties of
the real Self on the non-self and vice versa. Because of the mutual superimpo-
sition (adhyāsa) of self and non-self, the person comes to identify her “I” with
the attributes of the body and the mind (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, Introduction).19
Secondly, even though the “I am” awareness is a manifestation of the real
Self, it is a curtailed form of the real Self. The true Self in the Advaita framework
18 Alston’s translation of this passage is more lucid compared to Mayeda’s (1992/1979, p.244),
though essentially the same idea is expressed in both the translations.
19 In Gambhīrānanda (1977). The ego constitutes the individualized awareness associated
with the bodily and the mental and psychological states; i.e. the sense of oneself as an ego
is brought about by a misplaced identification with the ‘non-self’.

128 mehta
is signified as the ātman and is identical to the Brahman, the Absolute reality.
The ātman is all-pervading (sarvaga), undivided or without parts (niṣkala),
free from “the pairs of opposites” (dvandva-vivarjita);20 it is the Witness or the
Seer “present in all beings” and “always and everywhere the same” (Upadeśa
Sāhasrī II.15.36, 37). The ātman-Self as the subject is to be understood as the
state of consciousness where nothing is experienced outside of or against the
Self. Since the ātman as Brahman pervades all things, the realization of identi-
ty with ātman entails the state in which the yogi by immediate awareness sees
that everything is ātman, that is, perceives all that exists as her own Self.21 The
basic awareness of ‘I am’, which is ordinarily limited to one’s own individual
existence, comes to be extended to include everything in the undifferentiated
self-consciousness. Thus, complete self-knowledge implies obliteration of all
duality in the Advaita framework.
Based on the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Śaṅkara defines Brahman as ‘Reality (or
Truth), Knowledge, Infinity’ (satyam jñānam anantam).22 For Śaṅkara, the
definition of a thing has the purpose of differentiating that thing from other
things. The term satya indicates that which “does not change the nature that
is ascertained to be its own”; according to this meaning of the word satya, a
“mutable thing” or a thing that undergoes change is said to be “unreal”.23 The
term jñāna, which connotes knowledge, when employed in conjunction with
the term ‘infinity’ implies not an “agent of knowing”, i.e. it denies the notion
of a subject carrying out an act of knowing towards an object from which the
subject is separated in some fashion. Śaṅkara reasons that what is infinite is
not restricted by anything. If Brahman “be the agent of knowing, It becomes
delimited by the knowable and the knowledge, and hence there cannot be
infinitude …”24 The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘infinity’ together thus negate the
types of knowledge that procced from the duality of the knower, the known
and the act of knowing. Knowledge as pertaining to Brahman rules out par-
ticular factors related to the distinctive mode of knowing. Knowledge, which
Śaṅkara considers as the very nature of the Brahman or the Self, is understood
not in terms of Brahman sustaining any cognitive movement but as its intrin-
sic state. The term infinite establishes the infinitude of Brahman from the
20 Mayeda translates as “free from duality” (p.145).

21 According to Śaṅkara’s formulation, at the level of supreme identity “the one ātman is re-
alized as existing in all beings and all beings are seen (non-discursively and immediately)
as existing in ātman” (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya 3, translation by Nikhilānanda).
22 Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya (II.1.1); translation by Gambhīrānanda (1989).
23 In Gambhīrānanda (1989) 308-9.
24 Ibid., 309.

“point of view” of space, time and objects. Brahman is not limited in space or
time. Brahman is “non-different from everything” and since there is nothing
ultimately distinct from it, no thing acts as a limitation to it. Hence it is infinite
with respect to substance too.25
The above three terms mark Brahman off from things having opposite
characteristics. The above definition thus differentiates Brahman from all
conditioned objects or beings. The way the term knowledge is applied in the
definition, it serves to distinguish Brahman from all the familiar modes of
knowing consisting of knowledge obtained in the object mode. The definition
of Brahman for Śaṅkara has the function of revealing the incommensurabil-
ity of Brahman with what is ordinarily understood as reality or existence, and
knowledge.26 According to him, this definition only indirectly indicates the na-
ture of Brahman; it does not directly designate Brahman or elucidate Brahman
as it is. Ultimately Brahman or the ātman cannot be construed through lan-
guage and thought. Brahman, Śaṅkara explains, is “beyond all concepts and
all words”.27 Ordinary language and thought operate within the category of de-
terminate or particularized entities. Brahman (or the ātman), which is the all-
embracing reality, devoid of all distinctions and actionless, cannot enter into
the types of functional relationships conveyed in syntactic structures.
3 Comparative Analysis
Important parallels can be drawn between Plotinus and the Advaita philosophy
regarding the nature of the ultimate union and the role of non-dual awareness.
3.1 The One, the Brahman, and the Self

The One, Plotinus says, is “ineffable” (V.3.13). What is simple and absolutely
without parts cannot express itself in a linguistic statement (V.3.10). A state-
ment contains at least two elements, a subject and a predicate, that is, the
subject-object structure is basic to language in general. Hence any statement
will compromise the absolute unity of the One and will end up describing the
One as a many. The One does not carry out an act of self-apprehension and
25 Ibid., 319-20.
26 Ibid., 312-5.
27 Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya II.9.1; in Gambhīrānanda (1989) 387. In his Upadeśa Sāhasrī,
Śaṅkara cites from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad (II.4.1, II.9.1): “Without attaining [It-the Self],
words turn back together with the notions [of the intellect] …” (II.15.31; translation by
Mayeda (1979)).

130 mehta
hence it cannot even proclaim “I am existent” (V.3.13). For Plotinus, “knowledge

is a kind of longing for the absent, and like the discovery made by a seeker”
(V.3.10). If there is no split between the One and its apprehension of itself, then
it cannot explicate itself or think itself. Śaṅkara’s analysis, as discussed above,
concludes that no act of thinking or knowing can happen in the state of abso-
lute non-duality. This particular idea is again articulated in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad:
… when there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees
something, one hears something, one speaks something, one thinks
something, one knows something. (But) when to the knower of Brahman
everything has become the Self, then what should one smell and through
what, what should one see and through what … what should one think
and through what? (II.4.14)
Śaṅkara explains that the possibility of seeing or knowing something results

from an otherness between the agent and the object.28 Where everything is
apprehended as the Self, there no separation obtains between the Self and
anything else. The Self is also not dependent upon any means outside of it-
self or on a distinctive instrument for its inherent nature as knowledge or as
the knower (which in the context of the Self is understood not as an agent of
action). In the state of ātman there is immediate all-encompassing apprehen-
sion; hence the experience of the Self precludes dualistic thought processes or
any consciousness of duality.
The non-dual mystical experience, I argue, should not be seen as the disso-
lution of the self; rather the self here is experienced in infinite expansiveness.
The following quote of Plotinus suggests that selfhood persists in the state of
union with the One, though in a highly transformed fashion: “There one can
see both him and oneself as it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible
light—but rather itself pure light—weightless, floating free, having become—
but rather, being—a god …” (VI.9.9).29
28 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya, II.4.14, translation by Mādhavānanda (p.373-375).

29 Bussanich (1987) discusses the significance of the metaphor of ‘seeing’ in the context of
the soul’s union with the One. The image of vision is frequently used by Plotinus to de-
scribe the thinking activity of Intellect and thus it often has the connotation of duality
(of the subject and object). However, when Plotinus employs the language of vision in his
accounts of the mystical experience of the One, it is in the unitive sense that the soul’s
‘seeing’ must be understood, according to Bussanich. Drawing attention to VI.8.16, which
makes reference to the One’s self-vision, he argues that if the soul’s vision persists in the

Here the analysis of consciousness provided by another well-known figure

of the non-dual school named Abhinavagupta30 (10th-11th CE), is illuminating.
He characterizes consciousness in terms of two aspects as ‘light’ (prakāśa) and
‘self-reflexivity’ (vimarśa).31 The light aspect refers to the very presence of the
consciousness, and with respect to the ultimate Reality or the Absolute (termed
also as Śiva, Bhairava), the light denotes its capacity as the ontological ground
of existence. Consciousness also possesses the power to revert back on itself or
to become aware of itself.32 At the level of the highest reality, there is perfect
mystical union, this does not mean that the soul “continues to exist as a distinct entity”
but implies the merging of the soul’s vision with the self-vision of the One (p.180). The
passage such as: “… he (i.e. the soul) will know that he sees principle by principle …”
(VI.9.11) is also suggestive of the presence in the ascended soul of self-awareness that is
non-distinct from the One’s self-awareness.
30 Abhinavagupta technically belongs to the non-dual Kashmiri Śaiva tradition, which
represents another important Advaita framework within Hindu thought. This school
accepted the set of texts known as Śaiva Tantras or Āgamas as authoritative scripture.
The Pratyabhijñā (‘recognition’) and the Spanda (‘vibration’) doctrines, which did not di-
rectly originate from the Āgamas, also played an important role in the formation of the
non-dual Kashmiri Śaiva school. (See Mark Dyczkowski’s Introduction in The Doctrine of
Vibration (1987)). Abhinavagupta was a great synthesizer of the diverse trends of Śaivite
and tantric doctrines, and a highly prolific writer, having composed more than sixty
works. He also wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā. Abhinavagupta’s non-dual
viewpoint, I have argued (in an unpublished paper) to be compatible with Śaṅkara’s non-
dualism. I must mention that a number of scholars of Kashmiri Śaivism see Śaṅkara’s and
Abhinavagupta’s views as essentially different. But their assessment is by no means based
on an in-depth analysis of Śaṅkara’s framework; they tend to consider certain passages
in isolation and misconstrue the import of what Śaṅkara articulates (Dyczkowski (1987),
for instance). My claim is not that Śaṅkara’s and Abhinavagupta’s frameworks are exactly
identical; each has its own peculiarity but ultimately both are aligned in the fundamental
principles of non-dualism.
31 A detailed presentation of the concepts prakāśa and vimarśa can be found in
M. Dyczkowski (1987) 59-75, and P. Muller-Ortega (1989) 96-98.
32 That the world of diverse forms is manifested at all is due to the “light” of Śiva
Consciousness, and the appearing of the world is itself this light; i.e. the phenomenal
world is contained within this “light.” Vimarśa is identified with śakti, which is the power
of Śiva or the power of Consciousness. Śakti is essentially one with Śiva and is also the
power by virtue of which finite phenomenal objects appear as self-manifestations of the
infinite Śiva (Muller-Ortega, p.96).
“The light is one, and it cannot ever be divided, and for this reason there is no possible
division capable of sundering the non-duality, the Lord, beautiful with light and bliss.
But (someone might object) space, time, forms, knowledge, qualities attributes, distance,
and so on are usually considered to be diversifying elements. Not so (we reply), because

132 mehta
identity between light and self-reflexivity and which means that the reversion
of the Absolute Consciousness on itself is not a distinct moment or a distinct
act but intrinsic to the very nature of this Consciousness.33 In other words,
the Absolute possesses an immediate and direct awareness of itself.34 The self-
reflexivity of the Absolute is inherently devoid of otherness. The self-reflexivity
in human self ordinarily functions in an attenuated state and the goal of yogic
practices is to harness this capacity in its fullness.35 In the condition of perfect
self-awareness of vimarśa, one achieves complete entry into his own true na-
ture and experiences the state of the supreme Śiva. Self-knowledge then is the
attainment of the non-dual consciousness where what initially was seen in a
differentiated form as idam (‘this’) is fully resolved in the Self-consciousness.36
that which so appears is nothing but the light. If the light were not such, then non-duality
would be useless … But even if we admit a portion of reality to differences, then according
to what we have said, it will have its basis only in non-duality. This is a pot, this is a cloth,
the two are different one from the other. The two are different from other cognizing sub-
jects, the two are different even from me. All these notions are nothing but the one light,
which by its own intrinsic nature displays itself in this way. (Quoted in Muller-Ortega
(1989) 97 from Abhinavagupta’s Mālinī-vijaya-vārtika 1.620b-630.)”
33 Muller-Ortega (1989) 119.
34 Now Śaṅkara does not explicitly speak of Brahman or ātman as possessing the two as-
pects of light and self-reflexivity the way Abhinavagupta does. Nonetheless, both these
aspects and their identity are implicit in his conception of self-luminous ātman. The
self-luminosity of ātman means that ātman is the conscious principle of the nature of
illuminating light and the ground of all manifestation, and at the same time it possesses
full awareness of itself. R. Sewnath (1996) states this point as follows: “To say that the Self
is self-luminous or internally conscious is to say that it reveals not only the world and its
objects, but it also reveals itself to itself without becoming an object of experience to it-
self” (p.109). The advantage of Abhinavagupta’s formulation is that it is more amenable to
showing the possibility of non-discursive (or trans-discursive) and non-dual experience
of the all-pervasive reality in the mode of enhanced or pure “I”.
35 Muller-Ortega (1989) 96.
36 See Raffaele Torella’s note to the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā (‘Stanzas on the Recognition
of God’) of Utpaladeva, verse III 2.20 (2002, footnote 35, p.209). Utpaladeva (10th CE)
is another important representative of the non-dual Kashmiri Śaiva school who
gave a systematic exposition of the Pratyabhijñā doctrine. In the commentary to his
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā verse IV.14, Utpaladeva states: “when the cognizable (that is,
the object) is entirely dissolved within him and there is the full consciousness of the
I, the state of Śiva is attained” (translation by Torella, p.217). The Pratyabhijñā doctrine
provides the philosophical foundation to the principles of non-dual Kashmiri Śaivism
(Dyczkowski, p.19). Abhinavagupta wrote two commentaries on Utpaladeva’s work; in
these commentaries, Abhinavagupta closely follows the views of Utpaladeva (Torella,
p. xliii).

In the Advaita view, the light of supreme reality is always present in human
self, but because self-reflexivity is not fully active, there is no complete aware-
ness of it. Plotinus echoes similar idea when he says that the “One is not absent
from any, and absent from all, so that in its presence it is not present except to
those who are able and prepared to receive it …” (VI.9.4). Here the light could
be seen as referring to the omnipresence of the One and self-reflexivity as the
condition of receiving the light of the One and uniting with it. Thus Plotinus’
above statement could be expressed as follows using the Advaitic terminology:
the real is always present but whether it is apprehended or not depends on the
degree to which self-reflexivity is exercised.37
When vimarśa is not fully developed, the individual views herself as a limit-
ed subject, or an ego, and relates to objects in the distinctive mode of cognition
(vikalpa).38 In this condition one’s consciousness is dominated and constrained
by the mental states associated with the manifold of objects, which because
of the subject’s sense of incompleteness and separation causes attachment.39
A text called Vijñāna-Bhairava Tantra, which Abhinavagupta held in high es-
teem, teaches a method of fixing one’s attention on the interval (madhya) be-
tween two mental events for the purpose of extricating self-awareness from its
entanglement with objects, both internal and external, so as to experience the
underlying fullness of the essentially non-dual Self-consciousness. “When the
mind of the aspirant that comes to quit one object is firmly restrained (nirud-
37 John Bussanich (2005) sees a difference in the way the Advaita school and Plotinus con-
strue the reality of the self. In his view, the true self for Plotinus is nous and not the One
(p.17). He notes that whereas the Advaita texts emphasize the identity of the self and
Brahman, Plotinus does not explicitly identify the soul with the One (p.16). Nevertheless
the Enneads provide clear indications that the self’s reality must be sought at the level of
the One. Plotinus employs the imagery of a center to refer to the One and terms the soul’s
movement in a circle around this center as its natural movement (VI.9.8). This passage
suggests that the true identity of the self lies at this center (See Gurtler, p.119-121). There
also cannot be a strict identity of the soul with the nous because as Bussanich himself
points out: “The infinite, indeterminate nature of the Good requires a capacity or activity
on the part of the soul that is infinite and undefined in order to be united with it” (1996,
p.57). Bussanich considers the noetic level as the level at which self-knowledge is per-
fected. But noetic awareness does not bring full vision of the source of the soul’s being. As
the close analysis of V.3 shows, the condition of the identity of the subject, object and the
of knowing ascertains complete and true self-knowledge and this is satisfied in the state
of union with the One.
38 See Dyczkowski (1987) 70-71.
39 In Plotinus, the soul’s forgetfulness of its divine origin causes it to become preoccupied
with material life; “unaware of its dignity, soul is fascinated by externality: the body, the
sensible” (G. Aubry (2014) 312).

134 mehta
dha) and does not move towards any other object, it comes to rest in a middle
position between the two and through it (i.e. the middle position) is unfolded
intensely the realization of pure consciousness in all its intensity” (verse 62).40
This practice, whose purpose is to crystalize an awareness unencumbered with
intentional quality, resembles Plotinus’ method for attaining the One: “… the
soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within,
and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did for-
merly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignor-
ing itself, come to be in contemplation of that One …” (VI.9.7). For Plotinus
too it is necessary to develop an object-free, nonrelational consciousness be-
cause “the soul must be without form” (VI.9.7) in order to be illuminated by the
formless One.
In the Advaita framework, complete self-reflexivity implies the absence of
otherness. At the level of the ātman, the object pole has been fully dispelled
such that there is no awareness of being an ego separate from the ātman. From
the perspective of the ordinary ego consciousness, the state of identity with
the ātman appears as the loss of “self-consciousness” since there is no distinc-
tive ego consciousness, but from the standpoint of the identity with the ātman,
the self abides in the all-encompassing, undifferentiated awareness. The state
of union with the One could be understood in terms of the identity of light
and self-reflexivity.41 The following passage again suggests the presence of self-
awareness in the soul when it attains the One.
40 Translation by J. Singh (1979) 59.

41 Pierre Hadot (1993) characterizes the higher states of the soul as being devoid of self-
consciousness: “we only are that of which we are aware, and yet we are aware of having
been more fully ourselves precisely in those moments when, raising ourselves to a higher
level of inner simplicity, we lose our self-awareness” (p.32). He associates the presence of
consciousness with our ordinary state of being that operates in the mode of duality. He
says that “our consciousness is only an inner sensation: it requires us to split into two, for
there must be a temporal distance—however infinitesimal—between that which sees
and that which is seen. Consciousness is thus more of a memory than a presence” (p.32).
His analysis of consciousness draws upon an example that Plotinus presents:
“One can find a great many valuable activities, theoretical and practical, which we
carry on both in our contemplative and active life even when we are fully conscious,
which do not make us aware of them. The reader is not necessarily aware that he is read-
ing, least of all when he is really concentrating … Conscious awareness, in fact, is likely to
enfeeble the very activities of which there is consciousness; only when they are alone are
they pure and more genuinely active and living; and when good men are in this state their
life is increased, when it is not split out into perception, but gathered together in one in
itself (I.4.10).”

When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see him-
self as like this, or rather he will be in union with himself as like this
and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and
simple (VI.9.10).
Hadot concludes that self-consciousness weakens in proportion to the intensity of an

activity (p.33). Jean-Marc Narbonne interprets this passage to imply that consciousness is
not involved when an activity is carried out in a perfectly focused manner (2002, p.13-14).
A different phenomenological analysis can be presented here. It is true that when I am
fully engrossed in an activity such as reading, I do not have the thought “I am reading” lin-
gering in my mind and if such a thought were to break into my mental space, this would
compromise my concentration. But this simply shows that no distinctive ego awareness
is present in a focused activity, or that the appearance of the consciousness of ego has a
diluting effect on our activities. The example could also be understood in terms of the im-
mediate merging of one’s awareness with the activity. It would be much more appropri-
ate to characterize the self’s immersion as ego-transcending, non-dual self-awareness (in
the given circumscribed context) rather than as a state unaccompanied by consciousness
because if consciousness is absent unqualifiedly, then no processing of the act of reading
or of the words is possible.
Hadot and Narbonne take the above example as an analogy for the status of the true
self and consequently they are led to argue for the loss of consciousness (or for the pres-
ence of “only a confused self-consciousness”; Hadot, p.33) in the higher states of the soul.
In my account though, a different type of awareness is present that does not operate dual-
istically and the loss is only that of a strict awareness of myself as a subject separate from
the activity or the object. Hadot also asserts that the soul’s experiences of the Intellect
and the One are unstable, since he attributes consciousness to the mode of duality and
assumes that “we are, irremediably, conscious beings, split into two” (p.33). Thus for him
the states of unitive experiences cannot be prolonged: “It is just for a few, fleeting mo-
ments that we can identity ourselves with our true self, for the spiritual life which our
true self constantly lives represents a higher level of tension and concentration than what
is appropriate for our consciousness” (p.32). The problem of instability is a pseudo prob-
lem that disappears if one recognizes the possibility of expansive self-awareness either
as unity-in-duality or as absolute non-duality. This is not to deny that long-lasting unitive
experience of the One is very difficult to achieve. In VI.9.3, Plotinus alludes to a hindrance
faced by the soul in its journey towards the One: “… in proportion as the soul goes towards
the formless, since it is utterly unable to comprehend it because it is not delimited and,
so to speak, stamped by a richly varied stamp, it slides away and is afraid that it may have
nothing at all. Therefore it gets tired of this sort of thing, and often gladly comes down
and falls away from all this, till it comes to the perceptible and rests there as if on solid
ground; …” Ordinary awareness is habituated to concreteness and hence the necessary
reorientation for solidifying the formless awareness is an extremely arduous task. I am
inclined to accept Bussanich’s position, which favors the idea of the soul’s permanent
unification with the One (1994, 5325-28).

136 mehta
Such self-consciousness is in the non-dual mode with no gap between the self
and its awareness of itself as the One.42
3.2 The Cognitive Faculties

In the Advaita framework, a distinction is made between the mind and the
ātman consciousness. Mind (antaḥkaraṇa) includes two aspects: the higher as
buddhi (intellect) and the lower as manas (“inner sense”). The relationship be-
tween the two aspects of the mind and the ātman consciousness is expressed
as follows:
The intellect (higher mind as buddhi) receives a reflection of the light

of the Self as pure Consciousness first, since it is transparent and stands
in immediate proximity to the Self … Consciousness next illumines the
lower mind (manas), as the next inmost principle, mediately through its
contact with the intellect. Next it illumines the sense-organs mediately
through its contact with the mind (manas), and next the body through its
contact with the sense-organs.43
Manas—the lower mind—is the faculty of deliberation. It is the mode of the

mind in the process of considering alternate notions or reflecting on ideas.44
The acts of manas are associated with the consciousness of duality and with
42 Paulina Remes (2007) raises the question of whether we can meaningfully speak of the
subject of experience or a sense of self at the level of the One. Remes characterizes the
state of union as a “transformation into something richer than one’s limited self” (p.250)
and as an “experiential summit not only of goodness, happiness and beauty but also of
two aspects crucial for selfhood, namely unity and self-sufficiency” (p.253). But at the
same time she refers to “self-conscious separateness” as the prime feature of selfhood
(p.253). She notes that “for the self, the limits are essential” (p.252). According to her
analysis, there is a certain degree of ambivalence between existing as a self, which entails
being the “subject of thinking and acting”, and being possessed by the One (p.251). Now if
we take our ordinary sense of the self as paradigmatic, the unitive experience will render
itself as alien to the natural state of the self or as not fully reachable in a permanent fash-
ion. Thus Remes says that “in order to reach it (i.e. the One), the self needs, as it were, to
borrow this nature (of absolute unity, independence and self-sufficiency) from the One”
(p.252). But as Gary Gurtler (2005) argues, for Plotinus the self is essentially a “unity be-
yond the distinction between subject and object” (p.122) and hence defining the essence
of selfhood in terms of the features of (determinate) subject or of individual thinker and
agent misconstrues the Plotinian view of the self.
43 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya IV.3.7, translation by A.J. Alston in A Śaṅkara Source-
Book (2004) vol. 3, 60.
44 See Alston, vol.3, p.93, note 72.

discursive thinking. Buddhi (intellect) is the supreme faculty of discernment

through which proper understanding is achieved. Because of its very close
proximity to ātman it holds special position in the path of Self-realization. In
the context of the meditative practice of adhyātma yoga, involving gradual dis-
solution of the activities of the body and mind in the ātman consciousness,
Śaṅkara speaks of the attainment of subtle and refined buddhi (Brahma Sūtra
Bhāṣya I.4.1). According to the Advaita framework, there are different manifes-
tations of buddhi. Ordinarily the mental awareness is drawn towards external
objects and what appears in the mental space such as thoughts, feelings, de-
sires etc. have their basis in an individualized consciousness. In this situation,
the functioning of buddhi is reflected in the individual in an attenuated fash-
ion. Buddhi comes to be applied for the purpose of promoting the aims and the
goals of the ego or the empirical self. A more sophisticated manifestation of
buddhi could contribute to the process of obtaining knowledge but if the con-
sciousness is limited to individualized state, the buddhi in this case brings only
a partial or relative understanding of an object. The practice of adhyātma yoga
involves releasing the mental space from preoccupation with the sense objects
and from the relative notions and ideas achieved through dualistic outlook.45
Pure buddhi manifests itself when one’s awareness is made completely free of
individual desires and thoughts. Such buddhi fully and integrally receives the
light of ātman, enabling an immediate awareness of the presence of the ātman
consciousness; its apprehension of reality arises not as a propositional under-
standing, or in a third person perspective, but through direct contact with the
ātman. In the Indian Advaita school, one does not find a detailed analysis of
the cognitive structure of pure buddhi. But it is a faculty that operates non-
discursively through actualization of a different type of awareness. At the level
of pure buddhi there is an unveiling of the reality of ātman, effecting an over-
arching, synthetic comprehension about the truth of existence “without any
thought process on the part of the [lower] mind”.46 The hierarchical relation of
the lower mind (along with ordinary buddhi) and pure buddhi corresponds to
45 See Raphael (2006) 106-113 who provides an insightful discussion of the Advaita Vedantic
view of buddhi.
46 Raphael, 177. Pure buddhi is also associated with the emotion of higher love. Such love
derives from the cognizance of the presence of the ātman reality in all things (R. Ravindra
(1982) 68-71). Buddhi has a transformative effect on one’s self-consciousness. It brings the
transition from the opaque and separative egoistic consciousness to an awareness of a
penetrating and transcendent consciousness. The emotion of love blossoms in the aware-
ness of unity. The perception of oneness with others generates spontaneous sympathy
for others. A person whose consciousness of selfhood extends to all beings cannot not
have compassionate disposition towards everyone. Hence Śaṅkara says: “Whoever sees

138 mehta
the gradation of the discursive and the noetic faculties in the Plotinian frame-
work. Moreover, both Plotinus and Advaita philosophy trace a similar path of
ascent from the sensible realm to the One and the Brahman through the full
exercise of noetic activity and pure buddhi respectively.
In the context of Plotinus, Eric Perl (2007) speaks about continuum of cog-
nition with respect to the faculties of sense-perception, discursive reason,
and intellection. According to him, these faculties access not different sets of
objects but the same reality in differing degrees of unity and depth. He says:
“Discursive reason … apprehends the same content as intellection, but in great-
er multiplicity. As the unfolded representation of intellection in soul, discur-
sive reason functions as a mean between the unity of the forms in Intellect and
the still greater dispersion at the level of sense” (p.87). Since the sensible and
the intelligible realms are the manifestations of the One, what also follows
is the idea that “all cognition is the apprehension, at higher and lower levels,
of the One” (p.92).
The Advaita framework embodies a similar type of viewpoint regarding
cognitive faculties. Brahman is the only Reality in the sense that there is no
other reality that stands opposed to Brahman. The world of determinate ob-
jects does not exist separately from Brahman; that is, the manifestation of the
world takes place within Brahman Itself.47 This implies that what presents it-
self even before an ajñānī—a person operating in the state of ignorance, es-
pecially through the senses and the lower mind—is essentially not anything
his own Self located in all beings and also sees an enemy of that Self is like someone trying
to make fire cold” (Upadeśa Sāhasrī II.14.32).
In Advaita framework, the Absolute is also conceived as bliss (ānanda). In Self-
knowledge, or knowledge of Brahman, a person becomes fully established in bliss
(Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya III.6). As compared to the temporary and finite bliss of mun-
dane life, the bliss of Brahman is absolute.
“… worldly bliss is a particle of the Bliss that is Brahman, which becomes transmuted
into impermanent worldly bliss … when the division of subject and object (on which
worldly bliss relies), created by ignorance is eliminated by enlightenment, there is only
the intrinsic all pervading Bliss that is one without a second” (Taittirīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya
II.8.1-4; translation by Gambhīrānanda (1989)).
Brahman is thus the supreme goal of erotic desire and its final consummation.
Such understanding of the relation of eros with Brahman is congenial with Plotinus’
perspective.
47 In Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, Śaṅkara states: “The water and other features of a mirage are
nothing over and above the stretch of desert on which they appear … In the same way, it
should be seen that this world of experiencers and experienced objects is nothing over
and above the Absolute” (II.1.14; translation by Satchidānandendra (1989) 118).

other than Brahman, but as the result of curtailed cognitive power, instead
of seeing the reality of Brahman, he only apprehends distinct phenomenal
entities or particularized beings, i.e. a world of duality. Śaṅkara holds that in
the state of ignorance “it is invariably real Being (referring to Brahman) that is
perceived, only it is perceived under the distinctions of duality and hence as
different from what it really is”.48
Ascending to the level of pure buddhi, one comes to have perception of
unity of all beings. Because buddhi functions through intimate contact with
Brahman or ātman, the activation of pure buddhi as compared to the lower
mind brings a much more integrated vision of the same reality, the Brahman.49
3.3 Non-Dual Mode as the Principle of Knowledge

In the Advaita framework, the ātman is the light that illuminates the mind,
implying that the ātman consciousness constitutes the essential principle that
enables the perceptual, mental and intellectual activities to take place. The
epistemological import of the idea that the light of consciousness is present in
48 Quoted in Satchidānandendra (1989) 116; from Chāndogya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya VI.2.3.

Satchidānandendra (p.116) makes a penetrating remark about Śaṅkara’s framework that
“from the standpoint of the highest truth Advaitins should not be considered and spoken
of as people who proclaim the falsity of the world. They should be considered, rather, as
people who proclaim the sole existence and (undifferentiated) reality of the Self (i.e.,
Ātman or Brahman).”
49 In Advaita Vedānta, the phenomenal world is presented as māyā. The word māyā is com-
monly translated as ‘illusion’ but without proper qualification the word ‘illusion’ could
lead to a misconstrual of the concept of māyā as Śaṅkara expounds it. In his commentary
to Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā, Śaṅkara states:
“… non-duality which is the Supreme Reality appears manifold through Māyā, like the
one moon appearing as many to one with defective eye-sight and the rope appearing (to
the deluded) as the snake, the water-line, etc … the changeless (unborn) Ātman which is
without parts cannot, in any manner, admit of distinction excepting through Māyā or the
illusion of the perceiver (III.19; translation by Nikhilānanda, p.169-170).”
Māyā relates to perceptual error because it makes reality appear not in the way it re-
ally is. The phenomenal manifold derives its existence from Brahman and cannot subsist
without it. The world has “illusory” character when it is taken as the ultimate, self-sub-
sistent reality due to one’s limited range of awareness. The sense in which māyā is as-
sociated with our experience of phenomenal existence is very well expressed by Ananda
Coomaraswamy: “… Vedantic māyā-vāda doctrine must not be understood to mean that
the world is a “delusion,” but that it is a phenomenal world and as such a theophany and
epiphany by which we are deluded if we are concerned with nothing but the wonders
themselves, and do not ask “Of what?” all these things are a phenomenon” (1977, p.538,
footnote 41).

140 mehta
all cognitions can be stated to mean that all forms of perception and knowing
are a participation in the ātman consciousness. According to Śaṅkara, all acts
of mind are pervaded by the ātman light; that is, this light is manifested in all
sensible or mental awareness and intellectual understanding. The significance
of the illuminating light of atman is very aptly explained by Shah-Kazemi in
his comparative study involving Śaṅkara, Ibn Arabi and Meister Eckhart. He
explains as follows:
It is thus the unique light of the consciousness of the Self … through suc-
cessive degrees of relative awareness … Thus, all awareness, from bodily
to sensible, mental, and intelligible, is at one and the same time both
the absolute consciousness of the Self—in its essential nature—and also
relative knowledge, in the measure that it is identified with its particular
faculty.50
In Indian Advaita, the identity between the knower, the known and the pro-
cess of knowing is characterized as “intuitive” knowing (anubhava), and intu-
ition as immediate non-dual awareness is seen as the very essence of the Self
(ātman).51 What the above quote suggests is that a mode reflecting intuition or
a direct, non-discursive knowing is involved in any type of understanding. As
an example, consider an analytical proof in logic or mathematics. I understand
the proof only when I recognize its validity; but this recognition is not based
on another proof, rather it comes through an insight or a direct understanding
which does not rely simply on the deductive correctness of the sequence of
steps leading to the proof. Intuitive realization in this case functions in an at-
tenuated form. Abhinavagupta employs the term pratibhā to refer to the pure
intuitive light of the ātman.52 Pratibhā is the power of recognition or self-illu-
mination and is the very basis of the subject’s knowledge since it underlies all
modes of cognition.
In Plotinus’ framework, the One or absolute non-duality is the foundation
of all knowing. The One shines upon the intelligible world (VI.7.36) and the
light of Intellect illuminates the soul and makes it intelligent (V.3.8). The mode
in which the subject bridges duality with the object is of critical significance
50 R. Shah-Kazemi (2006) 32.

51 In the context of Plotinus, the term intuition is generally employed to refer to noetic
thinking, but the way it is defined in the Advaita framework, it would correspond to the
state of the One. John Phillips refers to One’s self-awareness as ‘simple intuition’ (p.100).
The intuition, or intuitive knowing, in Advaita would then be equivalent to the simple
intuition of the One.
52 G. Kaviraj (1966) 2.

in cognitive acts. Intellect “possesses the real beings” or “is the same as the
real beings” (V.3.5) and as a result noetic knowledge is infallible. Truth is ascer-
tained in the mode of identity of the subject with objects. The reasoning soul
cannot acquire absolutely true knowledge, but it could be argued that even
partially valid knowledge (gained by the embodied soul) requires participation
in the known, that is, it entails certain degree of unity between the knower and
the known. The role of direct mode of cognition is revealed in scientific knowl-
edge, particularly in the context of discoveries.
A scientific theory or scientific laws do not logically follow from experi-
mental findings or observations, that is, they are not deduced simply through
empirical generalizations on the basis of conventional induction or logico-
analytical reasoning.53 The well-known logical empiricist Carl Hempel says
that the rules of inductive inference do not provide “effective canons of scien-
tific discovery”, and that there is no general and mechanical inductive proce-
dure available which would allow us to infer scientific laws and theories from
the sets of observation statements.54 Deductive logic too does not furnish the
rules of discovery. The function of deductive logic is retrospective; it provides a
set of standards for checking the validity of a proposed proof once a new theo-
rem or a law is presented. The influential philosopher of science Karl Popper
states that “there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas,
or a logical reconstruction of this process”.55 Some form of direct illuminative
insight seems to be involved in the formation of truly constructive ideas.56 The
physicist Wolfgang Pauli emphasizes a “preliminary stage of figurative and in-
tuitive viewing” as integral to scientific conceptualization.57 In order to have
53 See the Introduction by F.S.C. Northrop in Heisenberg (1958) 1-26.

54 See H. Brown (1977) 130-1.
55 Quoted in Brown, 131.
56 We have intriguing examples of a number of famous mathematicians such as Fermat
(1601-1665), Riemann (1826-1866) and Galois (1811-1832), who provided correct mathemat-
ical results but whose proofs lay beyond the scope of the mathematical development of
their times (See J. Hadamard (1954) 116-121). For example, Galois in a letter to a friend
states a theorem on the “periods” of a certain kind of integrals. Hadamard, who himself
was a distinguished mathematician, points out that this theorem could not have been
conceived in terms of the available mathematical knowledge, but became comprehen-
sible only years later after the discovery of certain principles in the theory of functions.
These are clear cases of discoveries which cannot be explained purely as an end product
of analytical-inferential thinking.
57 See S. Gieser (2005) 346. Pauli, who won the Nobel prize in physics in 1945, sought to
develop an expanded framework that would transcend the distinction between the
‘objective, physical, scientific’ and the ‘subjective, psychic, religious’ and allow an inte-
grated understanding of various facets of human experience (Gieser, 341).

142 mehta
apprehension of the inner features of an object, there must be participation

in the object. In the condition of the alignment of self-awareness with the es-
sential character of the object, the object is grasped from within. Pauli speaks
of a level of understanding where the scientist’s “internal images and the struc-
tures of external objects come into congruence and overlap.”58 The moment of
this “congruence” can be seen as a manifestation of unitive knowing founded
upon instantiation of the qualitative principles of the known in the self-space
of the knower.59
In the Plotinian framework, proper judgement by the soul about the nature
of objects derives from the contact with Intellect. Reason applies the notions
and concepts that it receives from Intellect to the study of external objects.60
Participation may be considered as the recognition of the structural features of
objects in the light of what Intellect has imprinted on the soul. Because of its
relation with Intellect and ultimately with the One, the soul possesses certain
degree of possibility of developing participatory knowledge. If everything is an
emanation of the One, then at no level of reality is there complete ontological
separation between subject and object. This would mean that the operation
of the soul’s cognitive faculty is not limited to the third person perspective or
to the strict subject-object duality.61 If discursive thinking is conceived, as is
58 Gieser’s formulation, p.347.

59 Here I incorporate the analysis of the influence of “non-rational” factors and participatory
cognition in scientific discoveries which I developed in my dissertation (2012, p.105-110).
I also want to note that I accept the position of Seyyed Nasr, who has articulated a pen-
etrating analysis of modern science and of traditional sciences (Islamic in particular).
According to him, modern science presents to certain extent a true picture of physical
reality and cannot be “reduced to a subjective or simply “mental” mathematical pattern
imposed upon physical reality” (p.466). At the same time he advocates the view that there
could be multiple sciences, each corresponding to a “true picture of reality” but not in an
exclusive fashion (p.466). Illuminative insights then are a genuine participation in the
architectonics of the sensible world. Nasr’s assessment also implies that scientific knowl-
edge is not fully equivalent to noetic knowledge and draws mainly from the cognitive
capacities of the embodied soul.
60 H. Blumenthal (1971) 107.
61 Riccardo Chiaradonna (2012) notes that the same essential structures or forms exist both
in nature and in the embodied soul; these forms ultimately depend on Intellect. The soul
in carrying out an analysis of the sensible world activates these “a priori forms” (p.194-6).
Since these forms are also instantiated in the sensible world, this allows the discursive
soul to have participatory grasp of properties of objects. Building upon the work of
Eyjólfur Emilsson, Chiaradonna also argues that Plotinus’ perspective accords with the
realist model of sense perception. According to him, perceptual judgements could be
“conceived as acts through which our soul immediately realizes that the qualities per-

generally the case in contemporary thought, as the mode where the knower is
existentially removed from the object of study, then this conception does not
exactly correspond to Plotinus’ view of dianoia. Plotinus’ framework suggests
that analytical thinking becomes productive when it works in conjunction
with participatory awareness. Propositions possess efficacy, i.e. power to truly
point to the nature of objects, when their formulation comes forth on the basis
of realization of the qualities manifested by objects. Things themselves are at-
tained, even if in a partial or fragmentary fashion, in an act of knowing that
reflects to some degree non-dual relation between the subject and objects.62
From the points of view of Plotinus and the Advaita school, the depth in
which reality is grasped is the function of the development of non-dual aware-
ness. Thus movement towards self-knowledge goes hand in hand with stages of
greater comprehension of existence.
4 Concluding Remarks
According to both Plotinus and Advaita philosophy, the self can be known
only in an immediate awareness or as immediate presence that transcends the
ceived via sensory affections belong to, and qualify, a certain object” (p.193). Our percep-
tions (acquired in proper conditions) relate directly to objects themselves; it is not via the
intermediary of mental representations that we access the world. For Plotinus, the sense
qualities do have the status of “images” but this is because the sensible reality is derived
from and dependent upon higher metaphysical principles; this notion of “images” then
does not correspond to the representationalist theory (p.194). Perceptual experience is a
unifying experience, though clearly the relation enacted between the subject and object
is much less intimate as compared to what is attained at the level of Intellect. See also
Emilsson’s discussion of ordinary vision; (2007) 191-198.
62 A notion in order to be a valid notion cannot be entirely severed from objects. In the
context of discursive soul’s cognitive activity, Riccardo Chiaradonna makes a percep-
tive observation that “a clear-cut distinction between objects and propositions may be
somewhat misleading” (p.202, footnote 49). In physical sciences, ideas are presented in
propositions or mathematical formulas but this need not imply that knowledge of these
ideas is to be reduced to propositions. It could be argued that the reason the study of
physical sciences poses a challenge to students is because the understanding of the sub-
ject matter is not achieved just through learning the rules of logical relations between
propositions. Until the truth of the structural configuration of objects is not recognized
through assimilation of objects by the subject, the significance of the propositions (or
formulae) remains rather vague. Reflection on propositions would facilitate the direct
insight, but without attaining the insight, or “possessing” objects to certain extent, proper
knowledge of the concepts cannot be gained.

144 mehta
subject-object duality. Even self-reflection or introspection does not constitute

genuine self-knowledge because in this case the object of reflection is separat-
ed from the subject that carries out introspection. Any notion of the self which
arises from the object pole does not belong to the essential selfhood. As Sara
Rappe points out, the self cannot know itself through representation: “If self-
knowledge is to be valid, it must be able to circumvent the intentional struc-
ture in which objects are normally represented to consciousness. For Plotinus,
any conceptual representation of the self or subject of consciousness can never
be complete and can never succeed in conveying the self that it purports to
represent.”63 A representation is something that is cast against the subject and
is thus an objective determination.64 By grounding non-duality in the nature of
self-knowledge, the Plotinian and Advaita frameworks provide an avenue for
a fruitful reassessment of non-discursive modes of knowing in contemporary
context.
Also, the essence of mystical experiences in these frameworks is constituted
by states of integrated self-consciousness. Such a manner of understanding
would allow the unifying mystical modes to be seen without any connotation
of irrationality, and the discursive mode , which in its fruit bearing operation
participates in the non-dual mode, not as opposed to non-dual awareness but
as a dispersed form of it.65 In the modern philosophical outlook, the ordinary
63 S. Rappe (1996) 252-3.

64 Both Plotinus and Advaita thought furnish an indirect critique of the constructivist
strain in the contemporary theories of self. Such theories tend to conflate the distinction
between the subject and the object of cognition. Two representatives of the idea that
the notion of the self is merely a construct can be mentioned here. For example, Daniel
Dennett claims that “a self, according to my theory, is not any old mathematical point,
but an abstraction defined by the myriads of attributions and interpretations (includ-
ing self-attributions and self-interpretations) that have composed the biography of the
living body whose Center of Narrative Gravity it is.” Susan Blackmore says “our sense of
self came about through the body image we must construct in order to control behavior,
the vantage point given by our senses and our knowledge of our own abilities—that is
the abilities of the body-brain-mind. Then along came language. Language turns the self
into a thing and gives it attributes and powers.” (Dennett and Blackmore are quoted in
Deikman (1996) 15-16). From the perspective of Plotinus and Advaita school, the matrix
where Dennett and Blackmore are locating the self belongs to the realm of object and
hence the conclusions they draw are erroneous.
65 Lloyd Gerson draws a strict distinction between the mystical mode and the discursive
knowing. He seems to consider them as having separate spheres of operation. According
to him, “much of what Plotinus has to say about the One is inspired by Plato and based on
arguments which have a lot more to do with scientific realism than they do with mysti-
cism. The elements in Plotinus’ thought that can usefully be labeled “mystical” are rather

waking awareness is taken as the primary mode of awareness. Since the waking
state is experienced predominantly in dualistic terms, the possibility of non-
dual consciousness then becomes difficult to conceive.66 But if the idea of mul-
tiple states of consciousness is recognized, then the discursive and the mystical
or non-dual modes become functions of different levels of self-consciousness.
Acknowledgements
I express gratitude to Deepa Majumdar and Vishwa Adluri for their construc-
tive feedback on the initial draft of this paper. I also want to heartily thank
John Finamore. This paper could not have been conceived without his encour-
agement to participate in the annual ISNS conference while I was a graduate
student at the University of Iowa.
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The International Journal The International

Self-Knowledge as Non-Dual Awareness:

Plotinian mysticism – Indian Advaita thought – non-discursive cognition – philosophy

Plotinus and Indian Advaita (non-dual) school of thought investigate a ques-

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi 10.1163/18725473-12341375

by Plotinus and Indian Advaita thinkers in their discussion of the nature of

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

refers to something that is qualifiedly simple, the Intellect. In what follows, I

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

4 J. Bussanich (1997) 194.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

2 Indian Advaita Thought

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

illuminate itself or to make itself known.15 Such consciousness is not identi-

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

20 Mayeda translates as “free from duality” (p.145).

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

3.1 The One, the Brahman, and the Self

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

hence it cannot even proclaim “I am existent” (V.3.13). For Plotinus, “knowledge

Śaṅkara explains that the possibility of seeing or knowing something results

28 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya, II.4.14, translation by Mādhavānanda (p.373-375).

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

Here the analysis of consciousness provided by another well-known figure

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

40 Translation by J. Singh (1979) 59.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

Hadot concludes that self-consciousness weakens in proportion to the intensity of an

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

3.2 The Cognitive Faculties

The intellect (higher mind as buddhi) receives a reflection of the light

Manas—the lower mind—is the faculty of deliberation. It is the mode of the

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

discursive thinking. Buddhi (intellect) is the supreme faculty of discernment

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

3.3 Non-Dual Mode as the Principle of Knowledge

48 Quoted in Satchidānandendra (1989) 116; from Chāndogya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya VI.2.3.

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50 R. Shah-Kazemi (2006) 32.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

53 See the Introduction by F.S.C. Northrop in Heisenberg (1958) 1-26.

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apprehension of the inner features of an object, there must be participation

58 Gieser’s formulation, p.347.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

subject-object duality. Even self-reflection or introspection does not constitute

63 S. Rappe (1996) 252-3.

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 11 (2017) 117-148

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© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��7 | doi 10.1163/18725473-12341375