What Is Emotional Intelligence

CHAPTER 1

What Is Emotional
Intelligence?

JOHN D. MAYER AND

PETER SALOVEY
INTRODUCTION
A FOURTH-GRADE BOY was shivering on a school playground when a teacher

asked him if he owned a warmer coat. He replied he did not (and his
friend agreed). That afternoon, the teacher and the school nurse called
the boy's home and offered to buy him a new coat. The boy's mother
was delighted, and so the next morning, they outfitted the boy. Two
boys noticed the child's new coat at recess and accused him of steal-
ing it. When the boy denied it, the accusers launched such a
venomous attack that none of the other children dared to defend the
boy. Teachers and staff arrived and began to break up the
confrontation. One of the accusers yelled ''suck eggs" at the school
nurse. "You suck eggs!" she replied. The teacher who had bought the
coat was disturbed that her gift had caused such pain. The school
nurse wondered how she could have said "suck eggs" to a child. The
teacher whose class contained the troublemakers wondered how her
boys could have acted that way. The staff members discussed what
had happened and tried to determine what to do next.1
3 EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Reasoning about this situation requires sophisticated problem solving: What

social rules were followed or broken? What perceptions were logical or
illogical? Does community support exist for disciplining the children?I
low can such problems be avoided in the fiilure? Implicit in each of
these questions is also the need for information about feelings. Why
were the accusers so angry? What can be «.lone about the nurse's
guilt? A feeling-blind response to the situation is possible: An
administrator could declare that henceforth teachers should not give
gifts to students. Such a response radically de-emphasizes feelings,
however, in that it punishes those who care and would embarrass the
boy who received the coat. Alternative courses of action deal better
with the feelings intrinsic to this situation. Reasoning that takes
emotions into account is part of what we have referred to as emotional
intelligence.
The concept of emotional intelligence has recently received

considerable attention in various books, magazines, and journals. 2
Each new discussion of the concept, however, seems to employ a
different definition or make a different claim for its importance. This
interest has prompted us to clarify further the concept of emotional
intelligence. In the remainder of this chapter we discuss: the general
scope and origin of emotional intelligence; the development of the
concept of emotional intelligence; a revised definition and
conceptualization of emotional intelligence; the assessment of
emotional intelligence; and applications of emotional intelligence in
the schools and beyond.
THE GENERAL SCOPE AND ORIGIN OF EMOTIONAL

INTELLIGENCE
Understanding the concept of emotional intelligence requires exploring its

two component terms, intelligence and emotion. Since the eighteenth
century, psychologists have recognized an influential three-part
division of the mind into cognition (or thought), affect (including
emotion), and motivation (or conation).’ The cognitive sphere includes
such functions as human memory, reasoning, judgment, and abstract
thought. Intelligence is typically used by psychologists (and those who
came before) to characterize how well the cognitive sphere functions.
That is, intelligence pertains to abilities such as the "power to combine
and separate" concepts, to judge and to reason, and to engage in
abstract thought.'*■’
Emotions belong to the second, so-called affective sphere of mental

functioning, which includes the emotions themselves, moods, evalua-
tions, and other feeling states, including fatigue or energy. Definitions
of emotional intelligence should in some way connect emotions with
intelligence if the meanings of the two terms are to be preserved.
Recall that motivation is a third sphere of personality. It refers to
biological urges or learned goal-seeking behavior. To the extent that it
is involved in emotional intelligence, it should be thought of as
secondary.
Not everything that connects cognition to emotion, however, is

emotional intelligence. Over the past 15 years or so, a great deal of
study has been devoted to the mutual interaction of feelings and
thought. This general area of ri'search is called cognition mill affect.

Emotion is known to alter thinking in many ways—but not necessarily
in ways that would make a person smarter. Eor example, research
indicates that moods generally bias people's thoughts: People in good
moods think they are healthier than others, that the economy is
improving, and that Paris is a better example of a city than Calcutta.
People in bad moods tend to think they are sicker than others, that the
economy is getting worse, and that Calcutta exemplifies the present-
day urban condition fairly accurately/ This mood-biasing effect, termed
mood-congruent judgment, occurs when "an affective match between
a person's moods and ideas increases the judged merit, broadly
defined, of those ideas."7 Note that with mood- congruent judgment,
mood and cognition interact without anyone being more or less smart.
The field of cognition and affect also includes studies of emotional self-
control, such as when a person buries her anger. Note that this doesn't
necessarily improve the quality of the person's emotions or
intelligence. It may be smart to be angry at times.
Emotional intelligence, as opposed to more general research,

should in some way refer to heightened emotional or mental abilities.
Although this criterion seems straightforward, some definitions of
emotional intelligence don't really adhere to it. Por example, one
popular definition of emotional intelligence says it involves "self-
control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to motivate oneself.""
This definition focuses on motivational characteristics such as zeal and
persistence rather than on emotion. The concept of a motivational
intelligence has been proposed to incorporate such alternative
definitions."
A slightly abbreviated version of the definition of emotional intelli-

gence that we prefer is: "the ability to perceive emotions, to access
and generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand
emotions and emotional knowledge, and to reflectively regulate
emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth." This
definition combines the ideas that emotion makes thinking more

intelligent and that one thinks intelligently about emotions, both
connect intelligence and emotion.
THE DEVELOPMENT OE THE CONCEPT OE EMOTIONAL

INTELLIGENCE
Inititil Work Relating Emotional Intelligence to Intelligence
The logic for identifying an intelligence within psychology is: (a) to

define it, (b) to develop a means for measuring it, (c) to document its
partial or complete independence from known intelligences, and (d) to
demonstrate that it predicts some real-world criteria. Very simply, one
might define a "vocabulary" intelligence, measure it with a vocabulary
test, show that vocabulary intelligence is different from previously
discovered intelligences, and demonstrate that it predicts success at,
say, studying literature.
Each of these four steps is necessary. Because a great deal of research on

intelligences exists, one of the most important steps in this series
involves demonstrating that a new intelligence is different from those
already known. Knowledge of vocabulary, for example, is typically
indistinguishable from the already established verbal intelligence (to
be discussed shortly).
Two intelligences are said to be the same if they are highly

correlated with one another. A high correlation between two variables
means that the two tend to rise and fall together. For example, the
lengths of a person's right arm and left arm are highly correlated:
some people have long right and left arms; some people have short
right and left arms; and greatly dissimilar arms in the same person are
unusual. Similarly, two intelligences are correlated if the intelligence
levels correspond within each person: that is, both intelligences are
high in person A, low in person B, medium in person C, and so forth. A
complete lack of correlation would mean that one intelligence would
tell you nothing about the level of the other. Most intelligences are
moderately correlated with one another. That is, in a given individual,
the intelligences will tend to operate at levels that are closer together
than one would expect by chance. The correlation among intelligences
is only moderate, as opposed to high (as in the arm length example),
which allows for a moderate amount of difference among intelligences
in the same person. This agrees with everyday experience, because
we know people who are good at some mental tasks but less good at
others.1"
If two intelligences correlate highly then they are considered to

represent the same intelligence. For example, vocabulary size and
reading ability closely coincide in most people and as a consequence
are usually considered part of one broader intelligence (in this case,
verbal-profmsi- lional intelligence). Analogously, rather than discuss a
person's right arm length and left arm length, one could refer simply to
arm length. Ideally, a new intelligence should be low-to-moderately
correlated with earlier intelligences. A low-moderate correlation (as
opposed to a high one) means that the new intelligence is distinct from
old ones and will tell you something new about a person; if it
correlated too highly with the original intelligence, one might be
overfishing the same water. At the same time, a low-to-moderale
correlation is preferable to a nonexistent correlation; no correlation at
all could suggest the now "intelligence" is so different that it is not an
intelligence at all.
The idea of testing whether intelligences correlate (move up and

down together) is the standard way of determining whether an
intelligence exists; this method has been employed throughout the
century." A few alternative methods for establishing intelligence have
been employed, and it is worth mentioning these before returning to
the more influential correlational approach. Some people have tried to
establish the existence of intelligence primarily through theoretical
analysis. J. !’. Guilford and R.
1 loepfner proposed that 120 intelligences existed, on the basis that there
were roughly that number of combinations of basic mental processes.
For example, they considered "memory for single words" as one such
intelligence because it combined processes of memory, word
recognition, and analyses of single units (i.e., words)—each of which
they considered to be a discrete process. This potentially useful model
lost favor because it was difficult to test with the correlational method
(one problem was there were just too many intelligences to track). 12
More recently, Howard Gardner developed his elegant theory of
multiple intelligences, including linguistic, musical, bodily kinesthetic,
and personal intelligences (one of which resembles emotional
intelligence). Gardner argues that his intelligences exist on the basis of
their cultural significance and their correspondence to human brain
structures. He avoids the correlational approach: Although he admits
its utility for studying observed, expressed abilities, he notes that it
provides only an indirect measure of internal brain processes. This is
true, but so little is known about brain structure that Gardner's own
conception has only modest support beyond its original formulation.”
The exceptions of Guilford, Gardner, and some others aside, the

twentieth century has relied on the correlational approach to identify-
ing intelligences.M In fact, researchers have developed measures for as
many intelligences as they could imagine, and there has been a free-
for-all examination of different intelligences and their interrelations
throughout the century. In the 1930s, Tluirstone suggested the
existence of about a dozen intelligences, including verbal

comprehension, word fluency, associative memory, and perceptual
speed.15 Later in the century, the Educational Testing Service published
a reference kit that measured dozens of cognitive intelligences.16
Careful examination of the intelligences suggests that although there
is an overall moderate correlation among them, some intelligences are
more independent of one another than others. One empirically
supportable idea earlier in the century was that the intelligences
seemed to divide into two or three subgroups. The first of these is a
verbal-propositional intelligence, which includes measures of
vocabulary, verbal fluency, and the ability to perceive similarities and
to think logically. The second of these is a spatial-performance
intelligence, which includes abilities of assembling objects anil
recognizing and constructing designs and patterns. The third, more
controversial intelligence, social intelligence, is concerned with
people's skills in relating to one another.
I lislorically, there were serious difficulties in developing the concept

of social intelligence because it seemed so highly correlated with the
first two intelligences as to be indistinguishable from them. That is,
people's reasoning about social situations rises and falls so closely
with their verbal- propositional and spatial-performance skills that the
justification for treating social reasoning as a separate intelligence
seemed uncertain. So, there appeared to be little need for studying
this third, more purely social, variety of intelligence. 17 The major
midcenlury intelligence test, Wechsler's intelligence scales, measured
only the verhal-propositional and spatial- performance portions of
general intelligence. Although both the verbal and performance
measures included social reasoning, social intelligence was not
measured as a distinct entity.
At the outset of our work, we thought that it might make sense to

exchange emotional for social intelligence in this proposed triumvirate
of intelligences. Emotional intelligence would combine a group of skills
that were more distinct from both verbal-propositional anil spatial-

performance intelligence than social intelligence had been and at the
same time would still be close enough to the concept of an intelligence
to belong to the triad. We therefore expected emotional reasoning to
be correlated with but distinct from other intelligences; the evidence to
date supports this position (as we will describe in the section on
measuring emotional intelligence).
One final issue was important to defining emotional intelligence: It

had to be distinguished from trails and talents. Traits can be defined as
characteristic or preferred ways of behaving (e.g., extroversion,
shyness); talents as noninlelleclual abilities (e.g., skill at sports).
Certain recently proposed intelligences seemed more like valued traits
or talents than legitimate intelligences. Scarr has written:
There are many human virtues that are not sufficiently rewarded
in our society, such as goodness in human relationships. ... 'lb
call them intelligence does not do justice either to theories of
intelligence or to the personality traits and special talents that lie
beyond the consensual definition of intelligence.1*
We editorialized in the journal Intelligence that emotional

intelligence could be considered an actual intelligence as opposed to,
say, a highly valued social trait. 1'' Scarr's "goodness in human
relationships" might indeed be composed of the traits of sociability,
trustworthiness, and warmth. But in addition there might exist actual
abilities, such as knowing what another person is feeling, that may
involve considerable thinking and consequently could be considered
an intelligence. In this way, we distinguished a mental skill that could

legitimately be called emotional intelligence (e.g., being able to figure
out one's own and others' emotions) from preferred ways of behaving
(e.g., being sociable or warm).
Initial Work Relating Emotional Intelligence to the Emotions
The conceptual development of emotional intelligence required

relating it not only to intelligence research but also to research on
emotion. We began with the observation that emotion and intelligence
have often been seen as adversaries, with emotions viewed as an
intrinsically irra- lionnl and disruptive force. 2" For example, the idea
that the mind is "hijacked" by intense emotional experiences—
although true in some instances—emphasizes how emotions disrupt
thought. In many instances, however, extreme emotional reactions
promote intelligence by interrupting ongoing processing and directing
attention toward what may be important. In this sense they prioritize
cognition.21 We view emotions of all sorts as potentially contributing to
thought rather than disorganizing it.
Our concept of emotional intelligence is primarily focused on the

complex, potentially intelligent tapestry of emotional reasoning in
everyday life. For most healthy individuals, we assume that emotions
convey knowledge about a person's relationships with the world. 22 For
example, fear indicates that the person is facing a relatively powerful
or uncontrollable threat. Happiness typically indicates one's
harmonious relations with others, and anger often reflects a feeling of
injustice. According to this view, there are certain generalities and laws
of emotions. These general rules and laws can be employed in
recognizing and reasoning with feelings. For example, certain
universals of emotional expression exist and people should be able to
recognize them.2’ Fmolional reasoning therefore extends into questions
about relationships. For example, an insulted person might feel anger,
or if the person was insecure and nonassertive, might feel shame,
humiliation—or repressed anger. Recognizing these reactions requires

some form of intelligence.
What we are getting at is that emotional intelligence requires at

least some "right" answers as to feelings. Of course, some questions
about emotions don't have right answers. For example, the question
"What is the best emotional response to shouting?" has no answer. If
one's parents plainly loved each other but often shouted at one
another, then one may grow up comfortable with shouting. If one's
parents first yelled at one another on the day they decided to get a
divorce, one may be uncomfortable with it. To the first person,
shouting reflects frustration in the context of a loving relationship. To
the second person, shouting represents adult hatreds. So, no right
response exists. An answer to the question can be given, however, if
more information is provided (e.g., if we know something about the
person's individual learning history). We also recognize the need to
consider culture and subculture. For example, individuals in warmer
climates are described and describe themselves as more emotionally
demonstrative than those in colder climates.24
Examining more complex manifestations of emotional intelligence

(beyond that of the simple identification of emotion) often requires un-
derstanding the individual's own cultural framework. Only by knowing
the person's standards can certain "emotional reactions and models ...
be assessed according to their logical consistency, and hence, their
intelligence."25
A REVISED DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
n our earlier work we defined emotional intelligence according to the

abilities involved in it. One of our first definitions of emotional intelli-
gence was "the ability to monitor one's own and others' feelings and
emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to
guide one's thinking and action."3“ but this and other earlier definitions
now seem vague in places and impoverished in the sense that they
talk only about perceiving and regulating emotion, and omit thinking
about feelings. A revision that corrects these problems is as follows:
Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately,

appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or
generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to
understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to
regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth.
We have diagrammed these skills in Figure 1.1. The four branches

of the diagram a re arranged from more basic psychological processes
to higher, more psychologically integrated processes. For example, the
lowest level branch concerns the (relatively) simple abilities of
perceiving and expressing emotion. In contrast, the highest level
branch concerns the conscious, reflective regulation of emotion. Each
branch has four representative abilities on it (in boxes). Abilities that
emerge relatively early in development are to the left of a given
branch; later developing abilities to the right. Because the
developmentally early skills (to the left) are usually poorly integrated
with one another, they most clearly illustrate the distinctions among
branches. Later developing abilities (to the right) emerge within a

more integrated adult personality and are consequently less distinct.
Each ability applies to emotions internally and in others except where
otherwise noted. People high in emotional intelligence are expected to
progress more quickly through the abilities designated and to master
more of them. In the following discussion we will examine each branch
in turn, including the boxed abilities from left to right, referring to them
as Boxes 1 through 4, respectively.
Perception, Appraisal, ami Expression of Emotion

FIGURE
1.1the accuracy with which individuals can identify
Figure 1.1's lowest branch concerns
emotions and emotional content. Infants and young children learn to identify their own and
other's emotional states and to differentiate among those states. The infant distinguishes
emotional facial expressions early on and responds to the parent's expressions. As she
grows she will more accurately identify her own muscular and bodily sensations and social
surroundings (Branch 1, Box 1). A mature individual can carefully monitor internal feelings. If
we ask a grown person whoReflective Regulation of Emotions to Promote
Emotional and Intellectual Growth
MOTIONAL
NTTELLIGENCE
FIGURE
1.1
1
WluiI Is Emotional Intelligence? 17
is staying up late how she feels, she might respond Hunt she is partly full of
energy, partly fatigued, and anxious about whether or not her thinking
is still clear.
Feelings can be recognized not only in oneself but in other people

and in other objects. As a child grows that child imaginatively
attributes feelings to animate and inanimate objects. This imaginative
thinking may help the child generalize from himself to others. For
instance, he may connect times when be is personally anxious and has
a constricted posture to physical constriction observed in pets, other
children, objects, and pictures, enabling him to recognize anxious
expressions in other people and things (Box 2). Suitably developed and
abstracted, the developing person begins to evaluate emotion
wherever it might be expressed—in other people, in architecture, in
artworks, and so on.27 So, when we see Munch's well-known painting
The Scream (of a cartoonish figure howling), not only do we
immediately recognize the face of anxiety but how right it is that in the
painting's background, the world is dissolving into nothingness at the
same time. The individual is also able to express feelings accurately
and to express needs surrounding those feelings (Box 3). Because
emotionally intelligent individuals know about the expression and
manifestation of emotion, they are also sensitive to its false or ma-
nipulative expression (Box 4).
Emotion's Facilitation of Thinking
The next branch up, "Emotional Facilitation of Thinking," concerns

emotion acting on intelligence; it describes emotional events that

assist intellectual processing. Emotion serves as an alerting system
essentially from birth. The infant cries when it needs milk, warmth, or
other care, and laughs in response to smiles and other pleasures.
Emotions thus operate from the start to signal important changes in
the person and in the environment. As the person matures, emotions
begin to shape and improve thinking by directing a person's attention
to important changes. For example, a child worries about his
homework while watching TV. A teacher becomes concerned about a
lesson that needs to be completed for the next day. The teacher, with
his better developed thinking, moves on to complete the task before
his concern overtakes his enjoyment (Box 1).
A second contribution of emotion to thinking is to generate

emotions "on demand" so that they can be better understood. When
asked "How does the character in a story feel," or when deciding how
another person feels, children may generate the feelings within
themselves so as to put themselves in the other's place. 28 This permits
an immediate, real-time inspection of the feeling and its
characteristics. In the growing person, the ability to generate feelings
assists with planning. The individual can anticipate how entering a new
school, taking a new job, or encountering a social criticism might feel.
Anticipating such feelings can help a person decide whether to take a
job or make a criticism. There exists, in other words, an "emotional
theater of the mind," or more technically, a processing arena in which
emotions may be generated, felt, manipulated, and examined so as to
he belter understood. The more accurately and realistically such an
emotional theater operates, the more it can help the individual choose
alternative life courses (Box 2).”
The remaining two abilities of Branch 2 are examples of a larger set

of emotional contributions to more sophisticated, efficient thoughts.
Emotionality may help people consider multiple perspectives. Recall
that mood-congruent judgment involves good moods leading to
optimistic thought; bad moods, to pessimistic thought. A sad high

school senior may feel inadequate and consequently apply to a lot of
colleges with easy admissions standards. Then, as her mood improves,
she might apply to more selective colleges. This individual's shifting
moods led her to consider more possibilities, which will be an
advantage in conditions of uncertainty (Box 3). Close relatives of
manic-depressives are likely to have more mood swings than others,
assisting them to change perspective often. This may explain why such
relatives are rated as exhibiting higher creativity in both their
occupational and nonoccupalional activities.1” The final ability on this
branch recognizes that different kinds of work and different forms of
reasoning (e.g., deductive versus inductive) may be facilitated by
different kinds of moods (Box 4).31
Understanding and Analyzing Emotions; Employing Emotional

Knowledge
The third branch up of Figure 1.1 concerns the ability to understand

emotions and to use emotional knowledge. Soon after the child recog-
nizes emotions he begins to label them and perceive relations among
those labels. For example, many emotions form sets along continua of
intensity. The child begins to recognize similarities and differences
between liking and loving, annoyance and anger, and so on (Box 1). 3J
The child is simultaneously learning what each feeling means in terms
of relationships. Parents teach children about emotional reasoning by
linking emotions to situations. For example, they leach the connection
between sadness and loss by helping a child recognize she is sad
because her best friend won't spend time with her anymore. A formal
philosophy of feelings has developed over the centuries. For example,
Spinoza defined shame as ''pain accompanied by the idea of some
action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others." 33 Some
consensus exists as to these meanings, with anger frequently viewed
as arising from the perception of injustice, sadness arising from loss,
fear from threat, and so forth.34 Emotional knowledge begins in
childhood and grows throughout life, with increased understanding of
these emotional meanings (Box 2).
The growing person also begins to recognize the existence of

complex, contradictory emotions in certain circumstances. The child
learns that it is possible to feel both love and hate toward the same
person.35 Probably also at this level of development, blends (or
combinations) of emotions are acknowledged. For example, awe is
sometimes viewed as a combination of fear and surprise; hope as a
combination of faith and optimism (Box S).36 Emotions tend to occur in
patterned chains: Anger may intensify to rage, be expressed, and then
transform to satisfaction or guilt, depending upon the circumstance.
The person goes on to reason about sequences of emotion: An
individual who feels unlovable might reject another's care for fear of
later rejection. Reasoning about the progression of feelings in
interpersonal relationships is central to emotional intelligence (Box 4).
Reflective Regulation of Emotions to Promote Emotional and

Intellectual Growth
The highest branch of Figure 1.1 concerns the conscious regulation

of emotions to enhance emotional and intellectual growth. Emotional
reactions must be tolerated—even welcomed—when they occur,
somewhat independently of how pleasant or unpleasant they are. Only
if a person attends to feelings can something be learned about them.
For that reason, this highest level branch begins with openness to
feelings (Box 1).
As the child grows, her parents teach her not to express certain feel-
ings: to smile in public even if feeling sad, to go to her room if angry.
Gradually, the child internalizes these divisions between feeling and
acting: The child begins to learn that emotions can be separated from
behavior.37 Parents leach rudimentary emotion control strategies
("Count to 10 when you are angry"). As a consequence, the child learns
to engage and disengage from emotion at appropriate times. Rage
against another or against an injustice may be useful in reasoning
about the situation, but probably less so when the feeling is at its
climax. At those limes the emotionally mature individual will know It)
draw back and discuss matters with more cool-headed confidants.
Later, the emotional insight and energy provided by such experiences
may be applied to the reasoning process, and may both motivate it
and provide a means by which to, for example, elicit others' anger in
opposition to the injustice (Box 2). As the individual matures, there also
emerges a consistently reflective or metaexperience of mood and
emotion. These feelings involve experiences of mood such as "1 don't
fully understand the way I'm feeling," or "This feeling is influencing
how I'm thinking."3* Such thoughts are conscious reflections on
emotional responses, as opposed to simple perceptions of feelings. The
meta-experience of mood seems divisible into two parts: meta-
evaluation and meta-regulation. The evaluations include how much
attention one pays to one's mood, and how clear, typical, acceptable,
and influential one's mood is (Box 3). The regulation concerns whether
the individual is trying to improve a bad mood, dampen a good one, or
leave the mood alone. The meta-experiences of mood appear to be
related to important phenomena, such as how long one dwells on
traumatic experiences. The laws of meta-experiences are not as of yet
well understood, but new measures have been developed to assess
both their ongoing dynamics and dispositional qualities. One quality
that seems important is that emotions are understood without
exaggerating or minimizing their importance (Box 4).
Emotional Intelligence, Emotional Achievement, and Emotional

Competencies
Up to now we have been discussing a concept of emotional

intelligence that is reflected in a set of abilities. Consideration of
emotional intelligence raises the issue of whether there exists
emotional achievement and emotional competence, just as, say,
academic intelligence can be compared to academic achievement and
academic competence.3'' In the sphere of academic intelligence,
intelligence is the aptitude, achievement represents what one has
accomplished, and competency indicates that one's achievement
meets a particular standard. Analogous to such concepts, emotional
intelligence represents the core aptitude or ability to reason with
emotions, Emotional achievement represents the learning a person has
attained about emotion or emotion-related information, and emotional
competence exists when one has reached a required level of
achievement. All things being equal, a person's emotional intelligence

determines her emotional achievement. But things are rarely equal,
and the family in which one grew up, the lessons about emotions one
was taught, the life events one has undergone—all influence how much
one has achieved in learning about emotions.
Many educational psychologists prefer speaking in terms of

competencies rather than intelligences, and the idea of emotional
competencies has already been introduced by Saarni. 4" It focuses on
the knowledge and skills the individual can attain in order to function
adequately across situations rather than on the more difficult to assess
and, in some ways educationally less relevant, issue of emotional
intelligence. Some advocates of competency testing view it as a
safeguard against the misuse of haphazardly administered group
intelligence tests.41 It is plainly more focused on the educational
process than on psychological aptitude. From at least a theoretical
standpoint, it makes sense to develop the ideas of emotional
intelligence, emotional achievement, and emotional competencies
together.
At least part of the excitement with which the concept of emotional

intelligence has been greeted, we think, has been the definite
implication that we understand emotions well enough to speak in
terms of specific emotional abilities and competencies at those
abilities. Without the concept of emotional intelligence, teaching about
emotion must be geared toward the institutionally sanctioned
requirement of behaving "well" or "nicely." Emotional intelligence
provides a more flexible (if less easily defined) criterion for emotional
competence: One increases one's cm«- tional abilities to .an agreed-
upon level. Emotional intelligence is a good goal for a democratic
culture. It does not dictate the outcome of a person's emotional
behavior but rather encourages a process of personal investigation
that can occur in the context of the person's own politics, ethnicity,
religion, and other characteristics.
THE ASSESSMENT OE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Now that we have described emotional intelligence, it is worth considering

the evidence that it exists. As noted at the outset, understanding the
form emotional intelligence takes will require demonstrating that the
abilities included under the term "emotional intelligence" are meaning-
fully different from general intelligence and yet related enough to it to
qualify as an intelligence. The media depiction of a monolithic EQ is
without question premature. The determination of whether emotional
intelligence is, say, one true intelligence, multiple skills unrelated to
general intelligence, or something in between will depend upon its
measurement and assessment.
The Measurement of Emotional Intelligence
Earlier we reviewed a great deal of psychological literature that sug-

gests that some of the abilities on the branches of Eigure 1.1 can be
measured." When we turn to studies that actually speak to the
existence of emotional intelligence, only a small minority of the studies
directly inform us of its existence or nonexistence. This small number
of studies must meet three criteria. First, an ability of the type
described in Figure 1.1 must be measured. Note that this excludes a
great number of important personal qualities, such as optimism and
motivation, which do not specifically involve emotional contributions to
intelligence or intellectual understanding of emotion. 43 A second
criterion is that the studies directly measure an ability rather than a
person's self-description of how emotionally intelligent he or she is.
Self-descriptions of intelligence can be of some research value but are
not dependable enough to demonstrate that the concept exists. In the
realm of academic intelligence, every instructor is familiar with the
bright student who believes she isn't very smart and the not-so-smart
student who believes she is much smarter than she is. Asking people
to solve a problem produces a more valid sample of behavior for study.
The third criterion is that such studies should connect multiple abilities
from Eigure 1.1 to one another, or one or more emotionally intelligent

abilities to an important criterion.
Only a few studies meet the aforementioned criteria. In one study

with Maria DiPaolo,44 we found evidence supporting the idea that there
is a basic skill that accounts for individual differences in recognizing
(consen- snal) emotion not only in faces but in abstract designs and
even in colors. That is, skills at decoding faces, designs, and colors
were either generally high, medium, or low in a given individual.
Moreover, people higher in these skills also obtained higher scores on
a scale of self-reported empathy, a skill also envisioned as part of
emotional intelligence. These findings argue for the existence of
emotional intelligence as described in the first branch of the diagram
(perception of emotion), in that they point to a unity of emotional
recognition in faces, colors, or designs. Mayer and Geher further found
that emotional perception of characters in situations correlates with
SAT scores (a measure of intelligence), with empathy, and with emo-
tional openness (from the highest, "regulatory" branch). At the lime
this chapter went to press, these findings were replicated and
extended using a new scale that measures skills from all four branches
of Figure I.IT'
Important additional information concerning the third, "understand-

ing emotions," branch comes from work by Averill and Nunley on emo-
tional creativity.1'’ In one of their tasks, participants are asked to write
a brief description of a situation in which they might feel three
emotions together (e.g., joy, relief, and distress). As our
conceptualization of emotional intelligence (or theirs of emotional
creativity) would predict, success at this task appears related to but
independent of general intelligence. These few studies suggest that
many of the abilities in Figure 1.1 intercorrelale with one another and
are partly independent of general intelligence. Development of tasks
requires caution because serious theoretical and empirical issues must
be considered. These include, most pressingly, "1 low do we find the
right answer to a test item in emotional intelligence?"—especially as

those answers become more sophisticated. A more detailed discussion
of this issue can be found in the article by Mayer and Geher (1996).
What Emotional Intelligence Predicts
Given that emotional intelligence has been studied so little, not

much is known about what it predicts. Psychologists recognize that
general intelligence predicts some aspects of success—defined as
academic achievement and occupational status. General intelligence is
often said to account for between 1(1% and 20% of such success,
leaving about 80% to 90% of it to be explained by other factors. 47 So
there is certainly room for emotional intelligence to predict a portion of
such achievement. Generally speaking, a single personality factor
explains only a small portion of life outcomes, so even a 10%
contribution of emotional intelligence would be considered very large
indeed. Some observers believe they have identified such
contributions in the workplace. For example, some have argued that
emotional intelligence contributed to success among engineers at bell
Laboratories, in particular their ability to network effectively.4" In the
Bell Labs study "networking" meant that engineers found answers from
one another by bartering with information. This meant:
first becoming a technical expert in a particularly sought-after

area, then letting people know of your expertise, then making
yourself available to others. Once an engineer has developed his
or her bargaining chips, it's possible to gain access to the rest of
this knowledge network.1*
Such bartering seems to us to depend more on understanding the

unwritten demands of the job than on emotional intelligence. 5"
Although the bartering might involve emotional intelligence, we just do
not know because no measures were taken of it. We do believe that
emotional intelligence can contribute to success, at least when success
is defined broadly.
More emotionally intelligent individuals might succeed at making

their workers feel better, at communicating in interesting ways, and at
designing projects that involve infusing products with feelings and aes-
thetics. Emotional intelligence may make the difference between con-
structing the Brooklyn Bridge, with its renowned beauty, and the more
mundane Fifty-ninth Street Bridge.51
As more research is carried out, we can better evaluate what

emotional intelligence contributes to achievement. In the meantime,
the potential gains from teaching emotional intelligence will need to be
considered with caution. It is to those applications we turn next.
APPLICATIONS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE

SCHOOLS AND BEYOND
Emotional intelligence as described here is expected to be involved in the

home, in school, in work, and other settings. In many of these settings,
emotional problems frequently are solved well. The story that opened
this chapter, about the boy who was given a coat, was resolved with
emotional intelligence. At the end of the fight some of the teachers
and staff were already saying something like, "There are often fights
between middle-class and poorer children in this school. Perhaps it was
good that all this is out in the open because now it can be dealt with."
The school principal called in the boys who started the fight, talked to
them, and had them write letters of apology to the boy who received
the coat. The principal chose to have them write letters of apology, he
said, because it required them to think about what happened for a
while. He also decided to devote a staff development day to what had
happened so that the teachers could further understand what was
going on in the school. The boy with the new coat wrote a letter of
thanks to the teacher and the nurse. When the teacher received it, she
said, "I understand it created some problems for you." The boy replied,
"Oh, it's okay, they apologized ... and I really like the coat." This
doesn't totally take care of the problem, of course, but then, human
problems are complex.
Acquiring Emotional Intelligence
If one wanted to improve emotional skills, how would that be done?

Most skills can be improved through education, and it is likely this will
hold true for at least some of the skills related to emotional
intelligence. Emotional skills begin in the home with good parent-child
interaction. Parents help children identify and label their emotions, to
respect their feelings, and to begin to connect them to social
situations. This process may succeed to a greater or lesser degree in
each home. We have come to realize over the course of our study that
individuals operate from different emotional starting places. These can
be considered their emotional knowledge base.52 The opportunities for
learning emotional skills are not always equal. Parents may suffer from
psychological limitations so severe that they are unable to initiate an
emotional-cognitive learning process. A child may learn incorrect
lessons about emotions: Parents may avoid feelings, or a parent may
deny he is angry even while behaving with hostility. As a consequence,
children sometimes develop disorders in which they become far
removed from their feelings or misunderstand them. Sometimes a
psychotherapist will be necessary to correct the problem.

Psychotherapists are trained in empalhic listening, reflection of feeling,
and searching for lost emotions that need to be constructed,
recovered, or acted on in belter ways. Por example, a therapist may
see a client who is consistently taken advantage of, exploited, and yet
denies any anger. The therapist may inquire as to whether anger is
there and help the individual to channel it productively for the
purposes of self- protection and placing limits on others' inappropriate
behavior. It is also possible for some remedial learning to take place in
the schools. Some of the most important learning takes place in the
informal relationships between child and teacher; teachers often serve
in the role of an important and potentially wise adult model. Another
place where emotionally intelligent skills are taught is in the standard
curriculum—-a point to which we turn next.
The Incorporation of Emotional Intelligence in the Standard

Curriculum
2(1 EMOTIONAL DIÍVKI.OPMISNT AND HMOTIONAI. INTI-I.I.ICKNCK
Particularly useful, we believe, is the natural emotional teaching

that comes with many of the liberal arts and with various value
systems as well. In school reading lessons that involve engaging
stories, children begin to learn about feelings of characters. Story
characters have an inescapable tendency to become happy, afraid,
jealous, and so forth, and children can observe both what makes those
characters feel as they do and also how the characters cope in
response to the feelings. This learning proceeds throughout the
educntional system, and as stories become more complex, so does
emotional learning. The ways in which the feelings of characters
motivate their actions, which in turn moves forward the plot, is a
lesson in emotional perception for young adults as much as it is in plot
construction. In fact, one cannot evaluate a plot without asking "What
does this character, with his history and personal style, feel in this
situation," and then, "blow reasonable is it that someone feeling this
way would act as the character does?" Literature is probably the first
home of the emotional intelligences. But so, too, are art programs,
music, and theater.
Nor is the importance of values to be overlooked, as these

determine in part the person's more conscious knowledge of the
emotions. Values are often discussed and taught in such liberal arts
subjects as history, citizenship, and (more often in private schools)
religion. From these we learn about the value systems within which
emotional responsivity occurs. Different styles of emotionality exist
within different systems. One prevalent Western tradition esteems
individual life, democracy, equality among individuals, and education,
while it abhors destruction of life ami property, discrimination, and
ignorance. Such values define expected emotional responses. Cultural
and/or religious observances further define expected emotions. The
Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur requires those who worship to traverse
cycles of repentance for sins during the year. The repentance begins
with a critical self-appraisal with accompanying regret, guilt, and
2(1 EMOTIONAL DIÍVKI.OPMISNT AND HMOTIONAI. INTI-I.I.ICKNCK
shame. Next, the person takes action to remedy those mistakes that
can be repaired. After sincere repentance, there will follow solemnity,
calmness, relief, and perhaps joyousness. 53 Making available these
resources does not always work. The student may not read much, art
courses may be curtailed, the student may reject religious, ethical, or
national value systems. In such cases, should the school system step
in directly with programs focused on emotional competencies? 54
We think it is worth exploring this issue. Keep in mind that courses

directly focused on the topic should be approached cautiously, as there
is little scientific guidance about how they should be designed. To
discuss the "correct" response(s) to a complex social event seems to
stretch our knowledge. We cannot be sure we know all the right
answers. But some discussion of such issues seems reasonable.
Educational Programs Directly Concerning Emotional Intelligence

Wlml Is r.nmtioiml Inlclli^nicc? 31
Emotions have been taught in the schools before the concept of

emotional intelligence was developed. We are impressed with the
inventive ways in which some instructors have arranged affective
curricula, but we also have concerns about them. In some schools and
some programs where such materials are carefully worked out and the
staff is well trained, a unique and potentially valuable program is
undoubtedly being implemented. Just the same, as we examine details
of some programs, we are at times imcomfortable. Tor example,
programs that seem to adopt an "emotions are good" philosophy
untempered by the fact that emotions exist in the context of other
personal characteristics and interpersonal relationships are troubling to
us.
Presumably, those students who need emotional education most

desperately have come from households in which emotional
communication is skewed in some way or another. These individuals
already employ maladaptive emotional responses. We are not sure
such severely damaged children profit from, say, being required to
share their emotions in a class discussion, or whether they will be
overwhelmed by it, or feel coerced.
Another concern is that individuals from different subcultures ap-

proach emotions differently. Although most share Western values,
some will have been taught to "let it all hang out," whereas others may
take a more "stoical" view. Some may emphasize a Christian attitude of
turning the other cheek when confronted, so as to emphasize peace;
others may emphasize a more Jewish attitude of employing anger to
expose injustice and hence repair the world. (These are simplifications
that cannot do justice to the more complete religious teachings.) In
some instances, individuals may be members of discriminated-against
groups and the target of such serious but covert hatred as to feel
unable to participate in exercises that assume a degree of
interpersonal trust.
A more promising starting point is exemplified by some conflict

resolution programs we have seen. Por example, Linda Lantieri, who
runs the Resolving Conflicts Creatively Program in the New York City
public school system, argues that conflict resolution is based on
learning the skills of an emotionally intelligent person. Her program
teaches how to identify the feelings of your adversary, your own
feelings, and the feelings of others involved. 55 Violence reduction is an
important and central goal in schools, where its threat is so salient as
to greatly interfere with learning and concentration. It is more concrete
and easier to agree upon implementing a conflict resolution curriculum
(from our perspective) than a program devoted to increasing emotional
intelligence (should such be possible) per se. The more focused goals
of such a program also prevent it from being misinterpreted as
teaching the "right" (or "best") way to feel.
Teaching basic social skills, or even basic socioemotional skills, if you prefer,
is different from teaching an intelligence. Most beginning cooks who
carefully follow a recipe can produce a good-tasting meal without
necessarily knowing about all the ingredients. Similarly, any student
enrolled in these programs can learn the social recipes without
necessarily learning emotional intelligence. In our experience, many
such school- based programs seem focused on these basic recipes, and
this is to their credit. It makes assessing their outcomes relatively
easy, and it avoids difficult issues like whether emotional intelligence
can be assessed or taught, and by which cultural or multicultural
criterion it will be evaluated. Might these programs teach a bit of
emotional intelligence? Per-Imps; just as gaining experience around the
kitchen might help someone begin to develop as a chef. But whether or

not it occurs doesn't matter. If the program reduces maladaptive
interpersonal distress, we are happy about it.
CONCLUSION
Emotional intelligence is the ability to perceive emotions, to access and

generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and
emotional meanings, and to reflectively regulate emotions so as to pro-
mote both better emotion and thought. It is our belief that the adaptive
use of emotion-laden information is a significant aspect of what is
meant by anyone's definition of intelligence, yet it is not studied
systematically by investigators of intelligence nor included in
traditional school curricula. As we have argued, using the emotions as
one basis for thinking, and thinking with emotions themselves, may be
related to important social competencies and adaptive behavior.
Presently, we are at the beginning of the learning curve about
emotional intelligence; the coming years should bring exciting research
that contributes to our understanding of the concept.
GLOSSARY
Achievement—The level at which a person has learned to perform a

particular skill.
Affect—One of three traditional spheres of mental activity (along with

motivation and cognition), involving emotions, moods, and other
associated feeling states such as liveliness and tiredness.
Cognition—One of three traditional spheres of mental activity (along

with motivation and affect), involving learning, thought, judgment,
memory, and other forms of thinking.
Competence—The condition of meeting a standard of achievement.
Conation—see Motivation.
Correlation—A statistical measure of the degree to which two variables

are related. Correlation coefficients typically take on values from 1.0
to -1.0. A correlation of 1.0 means that variables rise and fall
together with an exact correspondence. When variables are said "to
be correlated," it more often means they rise and fall together
according to a loose pattern; this pattern is represented by a
number between 0.0 and 1.0, where a higher value close to 1.0
indicates a stronger association. Negative correlations involve
movements of the variables in opposite directions (i.e., one rises as
the other falls) and are represented by numbers between 0.0 and
-1.0.
Emotion—Short-term feeling states including happiness, anger, or fear,

that mix varying amounts of pleasantness-unpleasantness and
arousal-calm, among other sensations.
Emotional Intelligence—This intelligence involves the ability to

perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to
access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the
ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the
ability to reflectively regulate emotions in ways that promote
emotional and intellectual growth.
Intelligence—Traditionally, a characterization of how well the cognitive

sphere operates, c.g., how quickly someone can learn, how well
they can judge and think, and so on.
Meta-Experience (or Meta-Mood Experience)—A reflective thought or

feeling about an emotion or mood, such as "I don't like this feeling."
Motivation (or Conation)—One of three traditional spheres of mental

activity (along with affect and cognition) that concerns both basic
urges such as hunger and thirst, and more complex goal-directed
activities such as the pursuit of friendship, achievement, or power.
Talent (and Nonintellectual Talent)—A talent is any human skill or

ability. A nonintellectual talent is an ability that does not involve (or
only minimally involves) human cognition or intelligence, such as
the ability to walk long distances, to eat hot peppers, etc.
Trait—Any fairly consistent behavior or set of behaviors an individual

tends to exhibit such as enjoying being with people, being
conscientious, or trying new things.
NOTES
References
Anastasi, A. (1967). Psychology, psychologists, and psychological

testing.
American Psychologist, 26,1036-1037.
Anastasi, A. (1988). Psychological testing. New York: Macmillan.

Arnheim, R. (1954/1974). Art anil visual perception: A psychology of

the creative eye (new version). Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Averill, J. R., & Nunley, E. P. (1992). Voyages of the heart: Living an

emotionally creative life. New York: Free Press.
Bower, G. 11. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36,129-

148. Buck, R. (1984). The communication of emotion. New York:
Guilford.
Clynes, M. (1977). Sentics: The touch of emotions. Garden City, NY:

Doubledny.
Cronbach, L. J. (1960). Essentials of psychological testing (2nd ed.).

New York: Harper and Row.
Detlerman, D. K. (1982). Does "g" exist? Intelligence, 6,99-108.
Ekinan, P. (1985). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace,

politics, and marriage. New York: Norton.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., O'Sullivan, M., Chan, A., Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis,

I., Heider, K., Krause, R., LeCompte, W. A., Pitcairn, T., Ricci-Bitti, P.
E., Scherer, K., Tomita, M., & Tzavaras, A. (1987). Universals and
cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of
emotion, journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 712-
717.
Ekstrom, R. B., French, J. W., l larman, I I. I I., & Dermen, D. (1976).

Manual for kit of factor-referenced cognitive tests (3rd ed.).
Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.
Emmons, R. A., & Colby, P. M. (1995). Emotional conflict and well-being:

Relation to perceived availability, daily utilization, and observer
reports of social support, journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 68, 947-959.
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The Affect Infusion Model

(AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39-66.
Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist,

43,349-358.
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple

intelligences. New York: Basic Books.
Gardner, 11. (1993). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple

intelligences (Kith Anniversary Edition). New York: Basic Books.
Gardner, H. (1995). Cracking open the IQ box. In S. Fraser (Ed.), The

hell curve wars (pp. 23-35). New York: Basic Books.
Gerrig, R. J. (1993). Experiencing narrative worlds: On the

psychological activities of reading. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Gibbs, N. (1995, October 2). The EQ factor. Time, pp. 60-68.
Goleman, D. (1995a, September 10). Ideas and trends: The decline of

the nice- guy quotient. New York Times (Sunday Week in Review),
p. 6.
Goleman, D. (1995b). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books.
Guilford, J. P., & I loepfner, R. (1971). The analysis of intelligence. New

York: McGraw Hill.
Hilgard, E. R. (1980). The trilogy of mind: Cognition, affection, and

conation. Journal of the Elistory of the Behavioral Sciences, 7
6,107-117.
Jsen, A. M., Shalker, T. E., Clark, M., & Karp, L. (1978). Affect,
accessibility of material in memory, and behavior: A cognitive

loop? journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1—12.
Kelley, R., & Caplan, J. (1993). 1 low Bell Labs creates star performers. I
larvard Business Review, 71,128-139.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford

University Press.
Mandler, G. (1984). Mind and body: Psychology of emotion and stress.

New York: Norton.
Mayer, J. D. (1986). How mood influences cognition. In N. E. Sharkey

(Ed.), Advances in cognitive science (Vol. 1). Chichester, England:
Ellis 1 lorwood.
Mayer, J. D. (1995). A framework for Ihe classification of personality

components. Journal of Personality, 63, 819-877.
Mayer, J. D., & Gaschke, Y. N. (1988). The experience and meta-

experience of mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
55, 102-111.
Mayer, J. D., Gaschke, Y., llraverman, D. L, & IZvans, T. (1992). Mood-

congruent judgment is a genera! effect. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 63,119-132.
Mayer, J. D., & Geher, G. (1996). Emotional intelligence and the

identification of emotion. Intelligence, 22, 89-113.
Mayer, J. ID. & I lanson, E. (1995). Mood-congruent judgment over lime.

Personality and Social Psychology Ihdlelin, 21,237-244.
Mayer, J. D., & Mitchell, D. C. (in press). Intelligence as a subsystem of

personality: Erom Spearman's y to contemporary models of hot-
processing. In W. Tomic & J. Kingma (Eds.), Reflections on Ihe
concept of intelligence. Greenwich, CT: JA1 Press.
Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1988). Personality moderates the

interaction of mood and cognition. In K. Fiedler and J. Forgas
(Eds.), Affect, cognition and social behavior: New evidence and
integrative attempts (pp. 87-99). Toronto: C. J. I logrefe.
Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1993). The intelligence of emotional

intelligence. Intelligence, 17, 433-442.
Mayer, J. ID., & Salovey, P. (1995). Emotional intelligence and the

construction and regulation of feelings. Applied and Preventive
Psychology, 4,197-208.
Mayer, J. D., & Stevens, A. (1994). An emerging understanding of the

reflective (mela-) experience of mood. Journal of Research in
Personality, 28, 351-373.
Mayer, J. ID., Caruso, ID., & Salovey, P. (1997). A lest of emotional

intelligence. Manuscript in preparation.
Mayer, J. ID., IDiPnolo, M. T, & Salovey, P. (1990). Perceiving affective

content in ambiguous visual stimuli: A component of emotional
intelligence. Journal of Personality Assessment, 54, 772-781.
Mayer, J. D., Salovey P, & Caruso, D. (in press). Emotional IQ lest [CD-
ROM versionl- Needham, MA: Virtual Knowledge.
Mendelssohn, M. (1755/1971). Moses Mendelssohn: Gesammelte

Schriften Jubiläum Sausgabe (Band 1: Schriften zur Philosophie
und Ästhetik). Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther 1
lolzboog). (Original work published 1755)
Miller, A. (1990). The drama of Ihe gifted child (R. Ward, Trans.). New
York: Basic Books.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y, & Peake, P. K. (1988). The nature of adolescent

competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 687-696.
Mitchell, D., & Mayer, J. ID. (1997). Empathy and the identification of
emotion. Manuscript.
Nannis, E. D. (1988). Cognitive-developmental differences in emotional

understanding. In E. ID. Nannis & P. A. Cowan (Eds.),
Developmental psychopathology and ils treatment: New
directions for child development (Vol. 39, pp. 31-49). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T.J.,
Boykin, A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern, D. F., Loehlin, J. C.,
l’erloff, R., Sternberg, R. J., & Urbina, S. (1996). Intelligence:
Knowns and unknowns. American Psychologist, 51, 77-101.
Palfai, T. P., & Salovey, P. (1993). The influence of depressed and elated
mood on deductive and inductive reasoning. Imagination,
Cognition, amt Personality, 13, 57-71.
Peli, P. (1984). Solovcitchik on repentance. New York: Paulist Press.
Pennebaker, J. W., Rimé, B., & Blankenship, V. E. (1996). Stereotypes of

emotional expressiveness of Northerners and Southerners: A
cross-cultural test of Montesquieu's hypothesis. Journal of
Personality ami Social Psychology, 70, 272-280.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1969). The psychology of the chilli. New York:
Basic Books.
Plutchik, R. (1984). Emotions: A general psychoevolutionary theory. In

K. R. Scherer and P. Ekman (Eds.), Approaches to emotion (pp.
197-219). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Richards, R., Kinney, D. K., Lunde, 1., Benet, M., & Merzel, A. P. C.
(1988). Creativity in manic-depressives, cyclothymes, their
normal relatives, and control subjects. Journal of Abnormal
Roseman, I. J. (1984). Cognitive determinants of emotion: A structural

theory. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 5, 11-36.
Saarni, C. (1988). Emotional competence: I low emotions and

relationships become integrated. In R. A. Thompson (Ed.),
Nebraska symposium on motivation (Vol. 36, pp. 115-182).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Salovey, P, & Birnbaum, D. (1989). Influence of mood on health-related

cognitions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 539-
551.
Salovey, P. & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. Imagination,

Cognition, and Personality, 9,185-211.
Salovey, P, Hsee, C., & Mayer, J. D. (1993). Emotional intelligence and

the self-regulation of affect. In D. M. Wegner and J. W. Pennebaker
(Eds.), Handbook of mental control (pp. 258-277). Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall.
Salovey, P, Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S., Turvey, C, & Palfai, T. (1995).

Emotional attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional
intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker
(Ed.), Emotion, disclosure, and health (pp. 125-154). Washington,
D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Sattler, J. M. (1982). Assessment of children's intelligence and special

abilities (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Scarr, S. (1989). Protecting general intelligence: Constructs and

consequences for interventions. In R. L. Linn (Ed.), Intelligence:
Measurement, theory, and public policy. Urbana, IL: University of
Illinois Press.
Schaffer, L. F, Gilmer, U., & Schoen, M. (1940). Psychology. New York: I

larper & Brothers.
Scherer, K. R. (1993). Studying the emotion-antecedent appraisal

process: An expert system approach. Cognition and Emotion,
7,325-355.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent

cognitive and self-regulatory competencies from preschool delay
of gratification: Identifying diagnostic conditions. Developmental
Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in

emotion. journal of Personality ami Social Psychology, 48, 813-
838.
Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man: Their nature ami

measurement. New York: Macmillan.
Spinoza, l). (1984) Ethics (Part 111): On the origin and nature of the
emotions. In C. Calhoun & R. C. Solomon (Eds.), Whal is emotion?
Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1675)
Sternberg, R. J. (1988). The Iriarchic mind: A new theory of human

intelligence. New York: Penguin.
Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Commentary: Reforming scluxil reform:

Comments on "Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice."
Teachers College Record, 95,561-569.
Sundberg, N. D., Snowden, L. R., & Reynolds, W. M. (1978). Toward

assessment of personal competence and incompetence in life
situations. Annual Review of Psychology, 29,179-221.
Thorndike, R. L., & Stein, S. (1937). An evaluation of the attempts to

measure social intelligence. Psychological Bulletin, 34, 275-284.
Thurstone, L. L. (1938). Primary mental abilities. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.
Tice, D., & llaumeister, R. E. (1993). Controlling anger: Self-induced

emotion change. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.),
Handbook of mental control (pp. 393-409). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Wagner, R. K., & Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Practical intelligence in real-

world pursuits: The role of tacit knowledge. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 50, 737-743.
Walsh, W. 1)., & lletz, N. E. (1995). Tests and assessment (3rd ed.).
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-l lall.
Wechsler, D. (1958). The measurement and appraisal of adult

intelligence (4th ed.). Baltimore, MD: Williams & Wilkins.
Young, P. T. (1936). Motivation of behavior. New York: John Wiley &

Sons.
Young, P. T. (1943). Emotion in man and animal: Its nature and relation
to attitude and motive. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1 2 3 4
sufficient by itself to characterize intelligence. Many organisms,
such as ants, are well adapted without necessarily being highly
intelligent in the sense employed here.
5. "The power to combine and separate" was suggested by the

philosopher Thomas Aquinas, 1225-1274 (cited in Walsh & Del/.,
llW5); the importance of reasoning and judgment was evident in
the early liinet tests (see Saltier, 1982); Spearman (1927)
emphasized the importance of abstract reasoning.
6. A number of research laboratories have examined mood-congruent

judgment. A few key publications include: Dower (1981); Eorgas
1This is a true story in which a few details have been changed to

protect the privacy of those involved. Similarly, the aftermath reported
later in the chapter is what occurred.
2Discussion of the concept has occurred in academic research settings
(Emmons & Colby, 1995), in popular news magazines such as Time
(Gibbs, 1995), and in a popular book (Goleman, 1995b).
3This three-part division is basic to the modern enterprise of
psychology. Historical reviews can be found in Hilgard (1980) and
Mayer (1995); the origins of the system date from Mendelssohn
(1755/1971).
4Wechsler (1958), for example, defined intelligence as related not only
to cognition but to general adaptation as well. In Mayer and Salovey
(1995), we have examined the distinction between adaptation and
intelligence. Although adaptation is plainly involved in intelligence, it is
in-
(1995); Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978); Mayer and Salovey
(1988); Mayer, Gaschkc, Draverman, and Evans (1992); Salovey
and Dirnbaum (1989).
7. Mayer etal. (1992, p. 129).
8. This brief definition forms one of the several definitions employed

by Coleman (1995b, p. xii). A second definition is similar to ours; a
third definition says that emotional intelligence is "character"
(1995b, p. 285).
9. Motivational intelligences are discussed briefly in the introduction

to Mayer and Geher (|99f>). The view that intelligences might be
divided into cognitive, affective, and motivational sets rather than
the social (and intrapersonal) intelligences, most recently
popularized by Gardner, has been studied under different names
by earlier researchers.
10. When psychologists speak about intelligence they are keeping in

mind the full range of the variable, from its lowest manifestations
in the severely retarded, where most individuals possess very few
skills, to the level of the extremely gifted, where individuals can do
many things with at least some skill. (Eor example, Einstein played
the violin in a chamber group, although always a bit stiffly.)
11. Some psychologists were interested in further interpreting this

cohesion among the various intelligences (i.e., that they rose and
fell together). Eor example, Spearman (1927) believed that their
movement together occurred because they drew on a common
mental resource that, if possessed in quantity, helped a person
excel, and if possessed in poverty, limited a person's abilities. This
general common resource, termed y for general intelligence, could
be estimated for a person according to various mathematical
models that were developed for that purpose. Although there
exists consensus that all the intelligences are empirically
interrelated (i.e., rise ami fall together across individuals), the y
model of intelligence was more controversial. Alternative
explanations for this collective rise and fall of abilities exist (see,
e.g., I lellerman, l')82). Whether one believed in y, or not, the
mathematical models developed with it provided an accurate and
convenient means for keeping track of the degree to which the
intelligences cohered.
12. One of us recalls this critique of Guilford and I loepfner's (1971)

model; If everyone in the field of personality testing joined in, it
could still take 100 years to establish so many intelligences.
Although it attracted some attention in the 1970s, interest in the
theory dropped off. In fact, we could find no coverage of their
model in several contemporary volumes on psychological testing.
13. Gardner's theory (1983, 1993) is beautifully described anil

intuitively compelling. Although he recognizes that all Intelligences
intercorrelate (Gardner, 1993, p. xx), lie wonders whether this may
be an accident of the experimental methods employed (Gardner,

1993, p. xi). Other theorists join him in maintaining a skepticism
concerning the obtained correlations among intelligences (c.g.,
Dellerman, 1982). Still, it leaves no way to test the theory of
multiple intelligences, and the theory is regarded by many experts
in the field (including ourselves) as appealing but lacking in
empirical support as of now (Sternberg, 1994).
14. Another plausible exception is Sternberg's (1988) triarchic theory

of intelligence. Sternberg does sometimes employ the correlational
method, however. The centrality of correlational methods is
supported by a recent task force summary of the status of
intelligence research, reported in the American Psychologist
(Neisser et al., 1996, p. 78).
15. Tluirstone (1938).
16. bkstrom, French, I lamían, anil Dernier (1976).
17. Thorndike and Stein (1937) contributed some of the empirical

findings; Cronbach (I960) presented an influential review arguing
that further examination of social intelligence was unwise.
18. Searr (1989, p. 78).
19. Mayer anil Salovey (ll>93).
20. b’or example, Schaffer, Gilmer, and Sclioen (1940, pp. xii, 521);
Young (1936, pp. 457-458; 1943, p. 263).
21. George Mandler (1984) first popularized this idea as a component

of human information processing.
22. Many philosophers and psychologists have said this before us; our
reasoning is presented in Mayer aiul Salovey (1995).
23. See brijila (1988), for the lawfulness of emotions; also, see bkman,
Friesen, O'Sullivan, Chan et al. (1987).
24. The original hypothesis concerning this dates to Montesquieu; the

modem test was conducted by Pennebakcr, Rimé, and Blankenship
(1996).
25. Mayer and Salovey (1995, p. 197).
26. For example, Salovey anil Mayer (1990, p. 189).
27. For example, Arnheim (1954/1974); Clynes (1977).
28. For example, Piaget and Inholder (1969, pp. 120-122) consider
interpersonal perspective taking as emerging partially within the
concrete-operations stage. See also Gerrig (1993).
29. The arena is a memory location within which symbols are

manipulated by one or more intelligences (Mayer & Mitchell, in
press). In emotional intelligence, the individual would generate a
feeling—sadness, for instance—on command so as to think about

its facets, meanings, and associated thoughts. 1 laving the
emotions in this processing arena can presumably reduce the
requirements on memory for processing.
30. A more elaborate description of how mood swings affect the

college planning process is outlined in Mayer (1986); relevant
evidence for mood-congruent judgment over time is in Mayer and
Hanson (1995); information about the first-degree relatives of
manic-depressives can be found in Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet,
and Merzel (1988).
31. Pa 1 fai and Salovey (1993) present evidence that specific moods
enhance specific forms of mental processing.
32. Plulchik (1984).
33. Spinoza (1984, p. 83).

34. For recent reviews of these ideas, see Lazarus (1991); I’lutc'liik
(1984); Roseman (1984); Scherer (1993); Smith and Ellsworth
(1985).
35. Nannis (1988) considers full understanding of multiple feelings as

requiring fairly sophisticated thoughts—that is, arising late in
development.
36. Plutchik (1984).
37. The parent's ability to suppress feelings in the child is described in

Alice Miller's (1990) book, The Drama of the Gifted Child. Miller
emphasizes, in terms somewhat different from the argument here,
that some children will deny negative feelings in themselves
altogether as a consequence of parental disapproval.
38. Nannis (1988) refers to introspection and levels of consciousness

concerning emotion as occurring very late in development. The
original discussion of meta-experience can be found in Mayer and
Gaschke (1988). The concept is developed more recently in both
Mayer and Stevens (1994) and Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey,
and Pa Ifni (1995). Some actual approaches to mood regulation are
examined by Tice and llaumeister (1993).
39. Anastasi (1988) presents a good introduction to these concepts.
40. Saarni (1988), this volume.
41. Anastasi (1988, p. 264); additional discussion can be found in

Anastasi (1967) and Sundberg, Snowden, and Reynolds (1978).
42. See in particular Salovey and Mayer (1990); Salovey, Llsee, and
Mayer (1993).
43. Research on delay of gratification, an example of which is the

popularly reported "marshmallow test" (see Gibbs, 1995), is
fascinating. We view it, however, as more closely related to
motivation than emotion. The studies in question are by Mischel,
Slmda, and Peake (1988) and Shoila, Mischel, and Peake (1990).
44. Mayer, DiPaolo, and Salovey (1990).

45. A replication and extension of the Mayer and Geher work using a
new scale based on the Figure 1.1 model is reported in Mayer,
Caruso, and Salovey (1997). The new scale is a computer-based
testing instrument (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, in press). The Mayer
and Geher (1996) article illustrates many of the complexities that
will arise in measuring emotional intelligence and that tend to be
swept aside in the present wave of enthusiasm for the concept.
Several criteria were used for the "correct" answer as to what a
character was feeling in a story. One criterion involved the
character him or herself who was in the particular situation (real
situations were used). A second criterion was the overall consensus
of the participants in the study as to what the person was feeling.
These two criteria behaved differently in the study. Interestingly,
however, they both supported the existence of an actual emotional
intelligence. Another replication and extension of the work is
described in Mitchell and Mayer (1997).
46. Averill and Nunley (1992).
47. Howard Gardner (1995, pp. 26-27) has suggested this range, which
seems consistent with the current literature.
48. This was the central illustration employed in the Nexo York Times
coverage of the topic, and appeared in Time and a popular book as
well
(Gibbs, 1995; Golcmnn, 1995a, I9951>). The original slntly was

reported by Kelley and Caplan (1993) in the Harvard Easiness
Review.
49. Kelley and Caplan, 1993 (p. 132).
50. Incidentally, "tacit intelligence" refers to the ability to recognize

the implicit demands of a job. It has been studied in some depth
by Wagner and Sternberg (1985).
51. We do recognize, however, that the Fifty-ninth Street Bridge has in-
spired its own musical lore, notably, "The 59th Street Bridge Song
(Feelin' Groovy)," by Paul Simon of the musical group Simon and
Gar- funkel.
52. See Mayer and Salovey (1995) for a more extensive discussion of
the emotional knowledge base.
53. Peli (1984).
54. It does not seem, to our ear, appropriate usage to talk about
teaching an intelligence. The definition of an ability is that it is a
capacity rather than a topic to be taught. To teach intelligence
sounds to us like exercising a person's sports ability. One
exercises muscles to build strength; similarly, one teaches
emotional skills to build emotional intelligence.
55. This program is described in Goleman (1995b).
AUTHORS' NOTE
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Fetzer Institute,

which sponsored several conferences on emotional literacy that we
attended. Many of the conferees, including the other authors and
commentators of this volume, made valuable suggestions that
improved this chapter. Other educators, psychologists, and like-minded
individuals contributed their comments as well. We are especially
indebted to David Caruso, Kevin M. Carlsmith, Deborah Davis, Karol
DeFalco, Deborah ITirsch, Dan Smith, and Chip Wood. Kevin M.
Carlsmith also helped design and construct Figure 1.1.
Correspondence regarding this chapter may be addressed to John
(Jack) D. Mayer, Department of Psychology, University of New 1
lampshire, 10 Library Way, Durham, N11 03824.Reference: Mayer,
J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is Bnotional
Intelligence? In P. Salovey & D. J. Sluyter (Eds.)
Bnotional Development and Bnotional Intelligence. New
York: Basic Books.

What Is Emotional Intelligence

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Is Emotional Intelligence

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

What Is Emotional Intelligence

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CHAPTER 1

JOHN D. MAYER AND

A FOURTH-GRADE BOY was shivering on a school playground when a teacher

Reasoning about this situation requires sophisticated problem solving: What

The concept of emotional intelligence has recently received

THE GENERAL SCOPE AND ORIGIN OF EMOTIONAL

Understanding the concept of emotional intelligence requires exploring its

Emotions belong to the second, so-called affective sphere of mental

Not everything that connects cognition to emotion, however, is

thought. This general area of ri'search is called cognition mill affect.

Emotional intelligence, as opposed to more general research,

A slightly abbreviated version of the definition of emotional intelli-

definition combines the ideas that emotion makes thinking more

THE DEVELOPMENT OE THE CONCEPT OE EMOTIONAL

Inititil Work Relating Emotional Intelligence to Intelligence

The logic for identifying an intelligence within psychology is: (a) to

Each of these four steps is necessary. Because a great deal of research on

Two intelligences are said to be the same if they are highly

If two intelligences correlate highly then they are considered to

The idea of testing whether intelligences correlate (move up and

The exceptions of Guilford, Gardner, and some others aside, the

existence of about a dozen intelligences, including verbal

I lislorically, there were serious difficulties in developing the concept

At the outset of our work, we thought that it might make sense to

that were more distinct from both verbal-propositional anil spatial-

One final issue was important to defining emotional intelligence: It

We editorialized in the journal Intelligence that emotional

an intelligence. In this way, we distinguished a mental skill that could

Initial Work Relating Emotional Intelligence to the Emotions

The conceptual development of emotional intelligence required

Our concept of emotional intelligence is primarily focused on the

humiliation—or repressed anger. Recognizing these reactions requires

What we are getting at is that emotional intelligence requires at

Examining more complex manifestations of emotional intelligence

A REVISED DEFINITION AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF

n our earlier work we defined emotional intelligence according to the

Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately,

We have diagrammed these skills in Figure 1.1. The four branches

branches. Later developing abilities (to the right) emerge within a

Perception, Appraisal, ami Expression of Emotion

Feelings can be recognized not only in oneself but in other people

Emotion's Facilitation of Thinking

The next branch up, "Emotional Facilitation of Thinking," concerns

emotion acting on intelligence; it describes emotional events that

A second contribution of emotion to thinking is to generate

The remaining two abilities of Branch 2 are examples of a larger set

optimistic thought; bad moods, to pessimistic thought. A sad high

Understanding and Analyzing Emotions; Employing Emotional

The third branch up of Figure 1.1 concerns the ability to understand

The growing person also begins to recognize the existence of

Reflective Regulation of Emotions to Promote Emotional and

The highest branch of Figure 1.1 concerns the conscious regulation

Emotional Intelligence, Emotional Achievement, and Emotional

Up to now we have been discussing a concept of emotional

achievement. All things being equal, a person's emotional intelligence

Many educational psychologists prefer speaking in terms of

At least part of the excitement with which the concept of emotional

THE ASSESSMENT OE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Now that we have described emotional intelligence, it is worth considering