The historiography of Mughal-Rajput relations is a complex and multifaceted topic that has

been explored by historians over the years from various perspectives. These relations evolved
over several centuries, and historians have offered different interpretations and analyses of
this dynamic.

Traditional Perspective (Pre-20th Century): Early historical accounts of Mughal-Rajput

Colonial Historiography (19th-early 20th century): During the British colonial period, many
British historians emphasized the Mughal-Rajput relationship as a symbol of Hindu-Muslim
antagonism. They often portrayed the Rajputs as passive victims of Mughal imperialism,
conveniently ignoring the complex and multifaceted nature of these relations.

Nationalist Historiography (Mid-20th Century): Post-independence Indian historians sought

Revisionist and Marxist Approaches (Late 20th Century): Some historians, influenced by
Marxist and revisionist perspectives, examined Mughal-Rajput relations through the lens of
class struggle and economic factors. They argued that the alliances between the Mughals and
Rajputs were driven by economic interests and the dynamics of power and hegemony.
Cultural and Social Historiography: Another strand of historiography delves into the cultural
and social aspects of Mughal-Rajput relations. Scholars have explored how the exchange of
art, architecture, and traditions between these two groups influenced each other's cultures.
Postcolonial Perspectives (Late 20th Century to Present): More recent historiography on
Mughal-Rajput relations often focuses on postcolonial discourses, considering the impact of
colonial rule on historical narratives and identities. Scholars have attempted to reevaluate
these relations in light of contemporary politics and national identity in India.
The Mughal policy towards the Rajputs contributed to the expansion and consolidation of the
Mughal Empire under Akbar and his successors. For long it has been held that the Mughal
alliance with the Rajputs was determined by personal religious beliefs of the individual
rulers. On this basis, Akbar's liberalism and Aurangzeb's orthodoxy were considered the
touchstone of their policies and its impact on the political scene. However, recently the
Mughal-Rajput relations are being studied within the framework of-Mughal nobility as well
as the tensions within the different segments of the nobility itself.
A centralised bureaucratic empire like that of the Mughals was confronted with the problem
of distribution of power between its various components. The political vicissitudes of the
Mughal Empire were governed to a large extent by the struggle for supremacy or autonomy
by the aristocratic elements, i.e., the Mughal bureaucracy and, the autonomous rajas and
zamindars.
The socio-cultural factors and the geostrategic context of the country are equally important to
be taken into account. Rajasthan (which was the connecting link between the Gangetic valley
and the coastal belt of western India) and Malwa in Central India played a pivotal role in
determining the early course of political events in North India.
The Mughal-Rajput conflict cannot be understood independently but should be seen as part of
a conflict which had a past history. It developed against the backdrop of the decline of the
Delhi Sultanate and the emergence of a new state system in Rajasthan, Malwa and Gujarat.
With the decline of Jaunpur and the weakening of Malwa towards the end of the 15th century,
a new situation developed in North India. There was the contest between Rana Sanga of
Mewar and the Lodis for domination over eastern Rajasthan and Malwa. Sanga feared the
strengthening of Lodi power and therefore opened negotiations with Babur against the Lodis.
As Babur progressed in accordance with the agreement, Sanga retraced his steps. He had not
envisaged Babur's arrival in the Gangetic valley. His plan was to detain Babur in the Punjab
while he confronted the Lodis in the Gangetic valley. The ascendancy of Babur in the
Gangetic valley took Sanga by surprise.
These developments led to the formation of.an alliance between the Afghans, Rana Sanga and
a host of other Rajput princes. The aim was to hold back the advance of Babur towards Delhi
and the surrounding areas. So far, no Rajput ruler had been successful in mustering support as
such disparate groups as Rajputs and Afghans. The conflict between Sanga's coalition and
Babur at Khanwa was not a contest between Hindus and Muslims, This is amply borne out by
the very nature of the composition of Sangh's coalition.
Babur condemned the Afghan chieftains who collaborated with Sanga as kafirs infidels and
also proclaimed the contest against Sanga as jihad. These actions do not suggest religious
zeal but reflect the attempt to meet the challenge by appealing to the religious
sentiments of his soldiers. Later on, Babur concentrated more on countering the Afghan
danger than fighting the Rajputs. He tried to secure his control over the region adjoining
Delhi-Agra zone.
Outposts such as Bayana, Dholpur, Gwalior were firmly brought under control. Mewat and
Chanderi in Malwa were taken. The death of Rana Sanga settled the problem as far as
Rajasthan was concerned. Babur wished to follow a forward policy in Mewar and Malwa but
his practical
understanding prevented him from taking up this policy till the Afghan problem in the east
had been solved.
During Babur’s time, the relations between the Mughals and Rajputs did not develop along
definite and positive lines, rather it was in consonance with the political needs. When
Humayun ascended the throne, the political scene in Malwa and Rajasthan had changed
considerably. Bahadur Shah, the ruler of Gujarat, had captured Malwa after defeating its ruler
Mahmud Khalji. Rana Ratan Singh of Mewar had sided with Bahadur Shah against Malwa
for which he was generously rewarded. This was an act of political expediency.
However, a rupture between Rana Vikramjit of Mewar and Bahadur Shah led to siege of
Chittor by the latter. Though Humayun was aware of the threat posed by the augmentation of
the power of Bahadur Shah in Malwa and Rajasthan, he was hesitant to get involved in the
conflict with Bahadur Shah till the Afghan threat had been sorted out.
Humayun's stance as regards Rajasthan was essentially defence oriented: an offensive policy
was postponed for a later date. He also realised that due to internecine warfare in Mewar its
power was waning. Therefore, for Humayun, its military importance as an ally was
inadequate. Humayun who joined the struggle on Chittor's side had not anticipated the power
of Gujarat’s artillery and had overestimated the military strength of Chittor in the wake of the
siege. Bahadur Shah, on the other hand, had not expected Humayun to counter him in a
contest against a Hindu ruler. Chittor was devastated but Bahadur Shah's success was short-
lived.