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http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924084259872
A TREATISE
ON
Suits in. Chancery:

SETTING FORTH
THE PRINCIPLES, PLEADINGS, PRACTICE, PROOFS AND PROCESSES

OF
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUITY;

AND GIVING
NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIVE FORMS
OF
PLEADINGS, WRITS, ORDERS, REPORTS, DECREES AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN SUITS IN CHANCERY
FROM THEIR BEGINNING TO THEIR ENDING;
BESIDES MANY PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS

FOR
SOLICITORS AND MASTERS.
Cursus Curies est Lex Curia.
HENRY R. GIBSON, A.M., LL.D.,

CHANCELLOR OF THE SECOND CHANCERY DIVISION
OF TENNESSEE
SECOND EDITION:
REVISED AND ENLARGED
BY
THE AUTHOR.
KNOXVIIXE, TENN.:
GAUT-OGDEN CO., PRINTERS AND BINDERS
1907
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year, 1907, by
HENRY R. GIBSON,
In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
>
TO
MY WIFE,
FRANCES REED GIBSON,
THIS BOOK
IS
DEDICATED,
AS
a to;ken of my appreciation
OF
HER SYMPATHY AND ASSISTANCE
DURING
ITS. PREPARATION
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
While there is a general family resemblance between the systems of jurispru-

dence prevalent in the various States of the Union, the differences and peculiarities
in their systems of pleading and practice are, nevertheless, so great that no work,
dealing with the procedure in Courts, is of much practical value to the practitioner,
unless it is adapted to the jurisprudence and practice of the particular State in

which he lives. Books of general practice, with foot-notes of the diverse rulings
in various States, are often more confusing than enlightening. What the practi-
tioner needs is a book on Court procedure that omits everything that is not the
law in his own State, and contains everything that he is likely to need in the
progress of a suit. Such a book I have endeavored to make this, so far as the
Chancery practice is concerned.
What ordinarily happens in a litigation can well be compressed into one Volume
but what very seldom happens, the unusual and the possible, would fill several
volumes. What happens in matters of pleading and practice in 99 out of every

100 suits, I have labored to give; what«may happen in the hundredth suit, I have
not striven to forecast. The ordinary law is comparatively small in compass it is :
the exceptional and the uncommon that necessitate a multiplicity of books, and fill
libraries. And while I have not attempted to give what is exceptional and uncom-
mon, my purpose has been to give everything likely to prove of value, to be found
in our statutes, decisions, and rules of practice, and in standard authorities on the
subject.
1. In Matters of Equity Jurisprudence, this work is based mainly on Pomeroy,

Story, and the statutes and judicial decisions of our own State.
2. In Matters of Chancery Pleading, I have followed Story, in so far as con-

sistent with our statutes. Daniel and Barbour have, also, been drawn on, quite
largely. The many differences, between our system of pleading and that of the
English Court of Chancery, are clearly pointed out, where necessary to prevent
confusion.
3. In Matters of Chancery Practice, the works of Daniel and Barbour have
been relied on when consistent with our statutes, decisions, rules of practice, and
system of jurisprudence.
VI PREFACE.
4. In Drawing the Forms, Pleadings, Orders, and Decrees, brevity, simplicity,
perspicuity and precision have been constantly kept in view; and surplusage and
prolixity have been avoided and reprehended.
•
5. In the Arrangement cf the Contents of the Book, everything has been given
in the order of time in which it usually takes place in the progress of a suit, when
. possible so to do.
6. In Providing Means for Finding any Particular Matter in the Book, a full
index has been given in the back part of the book, and a complete table of contents
in the front part of the book and the
; titles of the chapters and articles have been
given in the top margins of the book, and many cross references will be found in
the foot-notes. Each section begins with a statement of its subject, in bold face
type.
The object of this work is to aid those who minister in the Chancery Courts;
and to contribute somewhat to the improvement of the pleadings and practice in
those Courts.
HENRY R. GIBSON.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.
Whatever a man does he flatters himself he can improve on, and so the author
of the first edition of this work, better aware of its deficiencies than anyone else,
began the preparation of what he hoped would be an improved edition before the
first had been fully printed.
The main object of the original edition was expressed in its Title, and Preface;
but it left many suits- in Chancery unconsidered, and left others very imperfectly
considered. To supply these deficiencies is the main object of the present edition.
The deficiencies in the first edition were caused, first, by an apprehension

that the necessary additional matter would make too unwieldy a volume ; and
second, by the author's duties as Chancellor engrossing too much of his time.
Tn preparing this edition, the author has had adequate time, and the suggestions
of a considerable proportion of the lawyers of the State, besides the use of the Law
Library of Congress for over ten years: so he hopes the deficiencies have been
reduced to the minimum consistent with one volume.
The present edition, (which contains 20 per cent more matter 1 than the original,)
treats of every kind of suit in Chancery the average lawyer will be called on to
bring, or defend, in an average lifetime, 2 the suits oftenest brought being most
fully considered.
The author cannot forbear expressing his gratitude to the Judges and Chan-
cellors of the State, and to the members of the bar, for their kind reception of the
first edition : it largely compensated him for the drudgery devoted to its compilation
and publication. In this connection it may not be out of place to say, that none
of the references to reports and text books in either edition are second-hand, but
are the results of original investigation, and can be implicitly relied on.
The Code references are, unless otherwise noted, to the Code of 1858 : the
reasons for this are, 1st, it is the only Statutory Code of the State ; 2d, all subse-
quent Codes contain it, so far as extant ; and 3rd, this work may outlive the tem-
porary Codes of individuals, (of which there have already been four,) but cannot
hope to outlive the Code of the State. Statutes passed since the Code of 1858
are usually referred to by the date and chapter of the Act.
The quotations of maxims to illustrate the text will, it is believed, prove helpful.
No book that treats of Equity is complete without- them. They are not the mere
gewgaws of pedantic lore, but the crystallized wisdom of the law, polished and
preserved by the masters of jurisprudence.

HENRY R. GIBSON.
Knoxville, Tenn.,
March 4, 1907.
1 61 old sections have been omitted or consolidated, I 2 Ad ea quce frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur.
and 244 new sections added. Over 1,000 of the old sec-
tions have been re-written, or revised. I
CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE CHANCERY COURT: ITS HISTORY, JURISDICTION, AND

PRINCIPLES.
CHAPTER I.
THE HISTORY OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

SECTIONS
Article I. The Origin and Evolution of Equity Jurisprudence 1-9
II. The History of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee 10-15
CHAPTER II.
JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

Article I. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts Generally Considered 16-22
II. Equitable, or Inherent, Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court 23-25
III. Statutory Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court 26-30
CHAPTER III.
MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY.

Article I. Maxims and Principles of Jurisdiction 31-40
II. Maxims and Principles of Adjudication 41-60
III. Maxims Applicable to the Court, and to its Practice and Pleadings 61-64
CHAPTER IV.
NOTICE, LIS PENDENS, ESTOPPEL, ACQUIESCENCE, NEGLIGENCE, LACHES,

WAIVER AND CONSENT.
Article I. Notice, Lis Pendens, Estoppel, Acquiescence, Negligence, and
Laches 65-70
II. Waiver and Consent 71-72
CHAPTER V.
PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 73-76

X • CONTENTS.
PART II.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM ITS PRELIMINA-

RIES TO THE APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT.
CHAPTER VI.
SECTIONS
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO A SUIT. 77-79
CHAPTER VII.
PARTIES TO SUITS IN CHANCERY'.

Article I. who May Sue in Chancery 80-85
II- Who May be Sued in Chancery • 86-89
HI. General Rules as to Parties 90-95
IV. Who Should be Complainants 96-99
V. Who Should be Defendants '.
100-102
VI. Next Friends and Guardians ad Litem 103-108
VII. Mis-joinder and Non-joinder of Parties 109-112
VIII. Effect of Death or Marriage of Parties, or Assignment of their
Interests 113-116
IX. Parties in Particular Suits 117-127
X. Parties in Suits by and against the State, Counties, Cities, and
Corporations 128-131
CHAPTER VIII.
ORIGINAL BILLS IN CHANCERY.

Article I. Original Bills Generally Considered 132-138
II. Frame of an Original Bill 139-152
III. Form of an Original Bill 153-164
IV. Practical Suggestions as to the Drawing of Bills 165-173
CHAPTER IX.
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO PROCESS.

Article I. Proceedings Preliminary to Extraordinary Process 174-176
II. Filing of the Bill 177-179
III. Proceedings in Reference to Costs 180-183
CHAPTER X.
ORIGINAL PROCESS IN CHANCERY.

Article I. Original Process Generally Considered 184-186
II. Subpoena to Answer 187-195
III. Process by Publication 196-200
IV. Attachment to Compel an Answer 201-204
CHAPTER XI.
PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN PROCESS AND APPEARANCE.

Article I. Pro Confessos, and Proceedings Thereon 205-213
II. Motions by the Complainant 214-221
CONTENTS. Xt
PART III.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE APPEARANCE

OF THE DEFENDANT TO THE CLOSE OF THE PLEADINGS.
CHAPTER XII.
APPEARANCE AND DEFENCE.

SECTIONS
Article I. Appearance by the Defendant 222-228
II. Defences Generally Considered 229-232
III. Preliminary Motions by the Defendant 233-239
CHAPTER XIII.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT.
Article I. Pleas in Abatement Generally Considered 240-243
II. Pleas in Abatement to the Process 244-246
III. Pleas in Abatement to the Bill 247-252
IV. Frame and Form of Pleas in Abatement 253-254
V. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Suits 255-259
VI. Proceedings Upon a Plea in Abatement. . .
.
'
260-265
CHAPTER XIV.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILLS. 266-274
CHAPTER XV.
DEMURRERS.
Article I. Demurrers Generally Considered , 275-280
II. Demurrers by Allowance 281-288
III. Demurrers of Right 289-300
IV. Rules Governing Demurrers 301-308
V. Frame and Form of Demurrers 309-312
VI. Action of the Court on Demurrers 313-316
VII. Practical Suggestions Concerning Demurrers 317-319
CHAPTER XVI.
PLEAS IN BAR.
Article I. Pleas in Bar Generally Considered 320-324
II. Kinds of Pleas in Bar 325-334
III. Frame and Form of Pleas in Bar 335-340
IV. Pleas Supported by an Answer 341-349
V. Proceedings upon a Plea in Bar , 350-354
Xll CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVII.
ANSWERS AND DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS.

SECTIONS
Article I. The Answer as a Pleading • . 355-360
II. The Answer as a Deposition 361 367
III. Matters Common to all Answers 368-376
IV. The Frame and Form of an Answer 377-386
V. Practical Suggestions as to Answers 387-392
VI. Disclaimers to Bills 393-398
CHAPTER XVIII.
CROSS BILLS. 399-401
CHAPTER XIX.
THE JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES TO A BILL 402-405
CHAPTER XX.
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PLEADINGS.
Article I. Rationale of Pleadings 406-410
II. Different Defences Distinguished 411-415
CHAPTER XXI.
HOW PLEADINGS ARE TESTED.
Article I. Testing the Sufficiency of Pleadings 416-419
II. Exceptions to Answers 420-424
III. Suggestions as to Testing Pleadings 425-426
CHAPTER XXII.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS.
Article I. Amendments to Pleadings Generally Considered 427-429
II. Amended and Supplemental Bills 430-431
III. Amended Demurrers and Pleas 432-433
IV. Amended and Supplemental Answers 434-437
PART IV.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, EROM THE CLOSE OF

THE PLEADINGS TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING.
CHAPTER XXIII.
HEARING A CAUSE ON BILL AND ANSWER. 438-440
CONTENTS. Xlll
CHAPTER XXIV.
EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY.
SECTIONS
Article I. Evidence Generally Considered 441-451
II. When Proof is, and is not, NeCessary 452-457
III. Pleadings when Evidence 458-462
IV. When Proof Must be Filed 463-468
V. Practical Suggestions concerning Proof 469-473
CHAPTER XXV.
DEPOSITIONS IN CHANCERY.
Article I. Depositions Generally Considered 474-479
II. Notice to Take Depositions 480-482
III. Depositions Taken on Interrogatories 483-485
IV. Formalities of a Deposition 486-491
V. Powers and Duties of Commissioners, and Rights and Duties of
Witnesses • 492-496
VI. Exceptions to Depositions 497-501
VII. Amendment of Depositions 502-504
VIII. Practical Suggestions about Depositions 505-513
CHAPTER XXVI.
MOTIONS PREVIOUS TO THE HEARING.
Article I. Motions Before the Case is Called 514-518
II. Motion for a Continuance 519-522
III. Motions to Dismiss the Bill '.
523-525
IV. Suggestions How to Prevent Delays, Arising From Amendments
and Continuances 526-529
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE HEARING, OR TRIAL OF THE CAUSE.
Article I. The Hearing; by the Chancellor 530-538
II. Incidents of the Hearing 539-546
III. Trial by Jury 547-554
PART V.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE CONCLUSION

OF THE HEARING TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE DECREE.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
DECREES ON THE MERITS.
Article I. Nature and Extent of the Relief Granted 555-563
II. Decrees Generally Considered 564-574
III. Kinds of Decrees 575-579
IV. Practical Suggestions as to Decrees 580-581
XIV CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXIX.
DECREES AS TO COSTS.
SECTIONS
Article I. Costs Generally Considered 582-S8S
II. The Adjudication of Costs . 586-593
CHAPTER XXX.
REFERENCES TO THE MASTER AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. When References are Necessary, or Proper 594-602
II. Proceedings upon a Reference 603-610
III. The Master's Report '
611-614
IV. Proceedings upon a Master's Report 615-620
CHAPTER XXXI.
DECREES OF SALE AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Sales Generally Considered 621-627
II. Report of Sales, and Proceedings Thereon 628-633
III. Opening of Biddings 634-639
IV. Purchasers' Duties, Rights and Liabilities 640-643
V. Payment of Money under a Decree to Parties Entitled 644-645
, CHAPTER XXXII.
HOW DECREES ARE ENFORCED.
Article I. Final Process Generally Considered 646-648
II. Transfer of Title by Decree, or Deed 649-650
III. Final Process Against the Person 651-652
IV. Final Process Against Property 653 657
V. Sequestrations to Enforce Decrees 658-661
VI. Proceedings in Enforcement of Decrees on Remandment. 662-665
PART VI.
BILLS IN CHANCERY RELATING TO ORIGINAL BILLS.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS.
Article I. Amended Bills 666-679

II. Supplemental Bills 680-692
III. Defences to Amended and Supplemental Bills 693-697
CHAPTER XXXIV.
ABATEMENT AND REVIVOR.
Article I. Bills of Revivor 698-709
II. Statutory Methods of Revivor 710-716
III. Bills Akin to Bills ofRevivor 717-719
IV. Defences to Proceedings to Revive 720-722
CONTENTS. XV
CHAPTER XXXV.
SECTIONS
BILLS TO CARRY DECREES INTO EXECUTION. 723-724
CHAPTER XXXVI.
CROSS BILLS. .
725-738
PART VII.
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS IN SUITS IN CHANCERY, AND

PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
MOTIONS IN COURT, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Motions Generally Considered 739-743
II. Motions by the Complainant 744-749
III. Motions by the Defendant 7S0-7S2
IV. Motions Common to Both Parties 753-762
V. Motions by Strangers and Quasi Parties 763-764
VI. Motions About Paying Money Into, or Out of, Court 765-769
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
MOTIONS AT CHAMBERS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers , 770-775
II. Proceedings before the Chancellor at Chambers 776-783
CHAPTER XXXIX.
AFFIDAVITS. 784-790
CHAPTER XL.
PETITIONS. 791-799
CHAPTER XLI.
SUITS FOR INJUNCTIONS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.

Article I. Injunctions Generally Considered 8C0-803
II. In WhatCases Injunctions will be Granted 804-826
III. How Injunctions are Obtained, Issued, and Served 827-837
IV. Pleadings in Injunction Suits, and Reliefs Granted 838-844

Violations of Injunctions, and Remedies Therefor 845-848
V.
The Dissolution of Injunctions 849-858
VI.
Injunction and Refunding Bonds, and their Breach 859-863
VII.
CHAPTER XLII.
SUITS PRAYING NE EXEATS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN. 864-868

fXvi CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLIII.
SUITS IN CHANCERY FOR ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY.

SECTIONS
Article I. Attachment and Proceedings Thereon
Bills, . . 869-883
II. Defences, Decrees, and Subsequent Proceedings 884-890
CHAPTER XLIV.
SUITS FOR RECEIVERS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.
Article I. Receivers Generally Considered 891-894
II. In What Case a Receiver will be Appointed 895-902
III. Time and Manner of Appointing Receivers 903-909
IV. Powers, Duties, and Liabilities, of Receivers 910-913
V. Settlements, Removal, and Discharge, of Receivers 914-917
CHAPTER XLV.
ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. 918-924
PART VIII.
PARTICULAR SUITS IN CHANCERY SPECIALLY CONSIDERED.

CHAPTER XLVI.
SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS.
Article I. Suits in Relation to Express Trusts 925-929
II. Suits in Relation to Resulting and Constructive Trusts 930-931
CHAPTER XLVI.
SUITS ARISING FROM FRAUDS, ACCIDENTS, AND MISTAKES
Article I. Suits Arising from Actual Frauds 932-935
II. Suits Arising from Constructive Frauds 936-9'S
III. Suits Arising from Accidents and Mistakes 939-941
CHAPTER XLVII.
SUITS TO SET UP, REFORM, AND RESCIND WRITINGS.
Article I. Suits to Set up Written Instruments 942-944
II. Suits to Reform Written Instruments . . 945-946
III. Suits to Rescind Written Instruments 947-948
CHAPTER XLVIII.
SUITS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 949-951
CHAPTER XLIX.
SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. 952-958
CONTENTS. XVU
CHAPTER L.
SECTIONS
SUITS IN RELATION TO PARTNERSHIPS. 959-961
CHAPTER LI.
SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION.

Article I. Suits for Exoneration 962-963
II. Suits for Subrogation 964-965
III. Suits for Contribution 966-967
CHAPTER LII.
SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY.

Article I. Suits Where the Chancery Court Acts as Guardian 968-971
II. Suits to Sell or Lease the Property of Infants and Wives 972-979
III. Suits Relating to Persons of Unsound Mind 980-984
CHAPTER UII.
SUITS TO ADMINISTER THE ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.
Article I. Suits to Appoint an Administrator 985-987
II. Suits to Sell a Decedent's Land to Pay His Debts 988-996
III. Suits to Administer Insolvent Estates 997-1004
CHAPTER LIV.
SUITS BY CREDITORS WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW.

Article I. Suits where Judgment at Law Cannot be Obtained 1005-1008
II. Suits where Judgment at Law Has been Obtained, but Execution
at Law Cannot be Levied 1009-1018
III. Suits where Judgment at Law Has been Obtained, but a Discovery
of Property is Necessary 1019-1024
IV. Suits where a Creditor Has Obtained a Judgment in Another
State, and Has Exhausted his Legal Remedy 1025-1027
V. Suits where Judgments at Law May be Had, but Execution at
Law Cannot be Levied '.
1028-1029
VI. Suits by General Creditors for their Pro Rata of an Insolvent
Debtor's Property 1030-1035
CHAPTER LV.
SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. 1036-1041
CHAPTER LVI.
SUITS TO PROTECT AND RECOVER REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Article I. Suits to Protect Interests in Land 1042-1044
II. Suits to Recover Interests in Land 1045-1050
III. Suits to Recover Escheated Property 1051-1052
IV. Suits to Recover Personal Property 1053-1057
xviii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER EVIL
SUITS TO PARTITION LANDS, OR THEIR PROCEEDS.
SECTIONS
Article I. Partition by Division 1058-1064
II. Partition by Sale 1065-1069
III. Gross Value of Life Estate 1070 1072
CHAPTER LVIII.
SUITS IN CHANCERY IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. 1073-1080
CHAPTER LIX.
SUITS IN THE NATURE OP A QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING. 1081-1083
CHAPTER LX.
SUITS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS. 1084-1087
CHAPTER LXI.
SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY.
Article I. Matters Relating to the Jurisdiction 1088-1091
II. Pleadings and Procedure 1092-1098
III. Trial, Orders, and Decrees 1099-1105
CHAPTER LXII.
SUITS WHERE NO RECOVERY IS SOUGHT.
Article I. Suits for an Interpleader 1106-1115
II. Suits for a Discovery 1116-1124
III. Suits to Perpetuate Testimony : 1125-1132
IV. Suits to Take Testimony de Bene Esse 1133-1135
PART IX.
THE OFFICERS AND RULES OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

CHAPTER LXIII.
THE CHANCELLOR: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES.

Article I. The Qualifications and Powers of the Chancellor 1136-1138a
II. Duties of the Chancellor 1139-1141
III. Provisions when the Chancellor is Incompetent 1142-1147
IV. The Etiquette of the Chancery Court 1148-1152
CHAPTER LXIV.
THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 1153-1172
CHAPTER LXV.
SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES
: AND LIABILITIES. 1173-1184
CONTENTS. xix
CHAPTER LXVI. SECTIONS

THE SHERIFF: HIS DUTIES. 1185-1188
CHAPTER LXVII.
RULES OF THE COURT. 1189-1205
PART X.
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS.
CHAPTER LXVIII.
NEW TRIALS AND REHEARINGS.
Article I. New Trials After Judgment at Law 1205a-1209
II. New Trials After Verdict in Chancery 1210-1214
III. Rehearings in Chancery 1215-1222
CHAPTER LXIX.
BILLS OF REVIEW.
Article I. Bills of Review Generally Considered 1223-1231
II. Bills of Review for Errors of Law 1232-1236
III. Bills of Review for New Proof 1237-1239
IV. The Leave to File a Bill of Review 1240-1243
V. Frame and Form of a Bill of Review 1244-1248
VI. Defences to a Bill of Review 1249-1253
CHAPTER LXX.
WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. 1254-1261
CHAPTER LXXI.
APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. 1262-1269
CHAPTER LXXII.
WRITS OF ERROR, AND OF SUPERSEDEAS.
Article I. Writs of Error 1270-1276
II. Writs of Supersedeas 1277-1279
CHAPTER LXXIII.
TRANSCRIPTS FOR APPEALS, AND WRITS OF ERROR. 1280-1286
CHAPTER LXXIV.
THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS ITS HISTORY
: AND JURISDICTION. 1287-1291
CHAPTER LXXV.
THE SUPREME COURT : ITS HISTORY AND JURISDICTION. 1292-1293a
XX CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
PROCEEDINGS AND PRACTICE IN THE APPELLATE COURTS.
SECTIONS
Article I. Matters Relating to their Jurisdiction and Powers 1293b-1301
II. Briefs in the Appellate Courts '
1302-1307
III. Motions in the Appellate Courts 1308-1312
IV. The Hearing and Decrees in the Appellate Courts 1313-1323
PART XL
CHANCERY SUITS IN THE CIRCUIT AND COUNTY COURTS.
CHAPTER LXXVII.
CHANCERY SUITS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. 1324-1326
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
CHANCERY SUITS IN THE COUNTY COURT.
Article I. Chancery Suits in the County Court Generally Considered 1327-1328
II. Assignment of Homestead and Dower 1329-1333
III. Suits to Settle Insolvent Estates 1334-1342
PART XII.
INDEXES.
PAGES
GENERAL INDEX. 1085-1171
INDEX TO FORMS. 1172-1203
INDEX TO BRRATA. 1203

PART I.
THE CHANCERY COURT: ITS HISTORY, JURISDICTION

AND PRINCIPLES.
CHAPTER I.
THE HISTORY OE THE CHANCERY COURT.

Article I. Origin and Evolution of Equity Jurisprudence.
Article II. History of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee.
ARTICLE I.
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.

§ 1. The Civil Law its Development.
: § 6. Some of the Deficiencies of the Common
§ 2. Evolution of Equity in England. Law.
§ 3. Character of the First Chancery Suits. § 7. How the Law has Followed Equity.
§ 4. Principles on which the Early Chancel- § 8. The Divine Law of Justice the Rule of
lors Acted. Decision.
§ 5. The Common Law as Compared with § 9. Other Causes Contributing to the Estab-
the Civil Law. lishment of the Chancery Court.
§ 1. —
The Civil Law: Its Development. The system of jurisprudence called
Equity was originally largely derived from the civil law of the Romans and its ;
early development in England was similar to the development of an analogous

system in the jurisprudence of Rome. Therefore, in endeavoring to trace the
origin of the Chancery Court, it may be well to notice, briefly, the development
of the civil law.
The early laws of Rome, like the old common law of England, were exceed-
ingly stern, rigid, formal and arbitrary, paying little attention to abstract right
and justice. 1 Their judicial proceedings were technical to the last degree.
Absolute accuracy was required in complying with the established phrases and
acts in the enforcement of civil rights. Any omission, or mistake, of a word or
a movement was fatal. 2 As civilization, however, progressed in Rome, subtle
technicalities gave way to simpler methods of pleading but even then it was ;
found that cases occasionally arose to which the improved formulas were inad-
equate. These extraordinary cases were decided by the praetor without being
referred to the ordinary tribunal, and without being hampered by any technical
requirements as to the proper formula, or kind of action, he himself determining
both the law and the facts of the case. The complainant stated the facts of his
1
case, the defendant set up his defense, the praetor decided. This extraordinary
method of determining suits, so simple, so free from technicalities, so easily
moulded to the exigencies of every case, was found so superior to even the
1 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 7. •
$ |
2 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., § 3.
§2 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EQUITY.
improved formulas, that eventually superseded them, and became the only
it
mode of procedure, —much many
of the States and in England, the pro-
as, in
cedure by bill and answer has supplanted the rigid formulas of common law
actions. 3 Not only were the pleadings thus simplified by the Roman jurists,
but the law was correspondingly improved; and a deliberate and persistent
effort was made to bring their jurisprudence into perfect harmony with an
absolutely impartial equity, that should do equal and perfect justice to all. 4 And,
thus, was perfected that system of jurisprudence known as the civil law, from
which are derived many of the maxims, principles and doctrines of Equity, now
followed and enforced in the Chancery Courts. 5
§ 2. —
Evolution of Equity in England. The development of the extraor-
dinary jurisdiction of the Chancery Court of England was similar, in its causes,
progress and results, to the development of the system of Equity in the Roman
law, as already intimated. 6 In England, the King was regarded as the foun-
'
'
tain of justice;" and, when any person conceived that he had been wronged,
either in court or out of court, he had the privilege of petitioning the King for
redress. The King, being unable to hear and determine all of these complaints
because of their number and complexity, generally referred them to his chief
secretary, who was called his Chancellor. This officer was an ecclesiastic,
trained in the law and theology of Rome, 7 and was sometimes called the
"keeper of the King's conscience." 8 When thus directed to adjudicate the
rights, and determine the remedies, of those petitioning the King for justice,
the Chancellor naturally had recourse to the civil law of Rome, being most
familiar therewith; and, also, finding therein a diviner sort of justice, and a
simpler and more efficient form of procedure. Besides, these Chancellors, who
were generally very able and very learned men, were no doubt, disposed to
regard the English common law as a barbarous code compared with the Roman
civil law. 9 The Chancellor 's office was one of great trust and confidence he :
was the King's adviser and confidant, the chief member of his eouncil, and
the keeper of his great seal of State. He is spoken of, at a very early day, as
one who "annuls unjust laws, and executes the commands of a pious prince,
and puts an end to what is injurious to the people or to morals." 10
§ 3. —
Character of the First Chancery Suits. The Chancellors, following the
example of the Roman praetors, 11 applied the equitable principles of the civil
law to the determination of all suits referred to them by the King. The suits
thus referred were, generally 1, applications to obtain redress for injuries and
:
acts of oppression where from the power of the offender, or for any other cause,
a fair trial in the ordinary courts could not be had 2, cases where there were ;
fraud, deceit and dishonesty beyond the reach of the common law; 12 and 3.
eases where the common law was inadequate to the requirements of justice.
In those times of disorder and oppression, many were the appeals to the King
by the poor and the weak for protection against the rich and the strong, the
local magistrates being often overawed and many were the complaints of want
;
of remedy at law. The King, unable to give personal attention to so many

petitions, finally, conferred upon the Chancellor full authority to give relief in
all matters of "Grace," as these applications for redress were termed; and
from this period petitions began to be addressed to the Chancellors themselves,
and not to the King. This delegation of authority was made in the year 1348
3 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 6. See post, § lo. shall ever pray, etc.," the full sentence being,
4 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 8. "and your orator shall ever pray for you."
s 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 23; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 14. Barton's Suit in Equity, 40, note; see also, Sto.
6 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1-9; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 50. Eq. PI., § 14; and Lube's Eq. PI., 260. This
7 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 23. The fact that the first- antiquated conclusion is still sometimes used.
Chancellors were ecclesiastics, generally bish- 8 Snell's Pr. Eq., 10. The Chancery Courts
ops or achbishops, accounts for and explains of Tennessee represent the conscience of the
-various words and phrases found in the old State, as the Chancery Court of England rep-
forms of bills, such as: (1) "Orator," one who resented the conscience of the King.
prays; (2) "doings contrary to conscience," the o 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 17.
bishop being bound to act according to con- 10 Bouvier's Law Die, "Equity."
science; and being also, the keeper of the 11 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 50.
King's conscience; and (3) "and your orator 12 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 31.
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EQUITY. §4
and, in the next fifty years, the Equity jurisdiction of the Chancellor was
clearly established. 13
§ 4. Principles on which the Early Chancellors Acted. When matters of —
Grace were thus referred to the Chancellor, he issued a writ commanding the
party complained against to appear and answer the complaint, and abide by
the order of the Court. 14 The principles on which the Chancellor based his
decisions were those of Honesty, Equity and Conscience. 15 By "Conscience"
was meant those obligations one person is under to another to exercise that
good faith the other has a right to expect. 18 On an application to Parliament
for redress, the petition was referred to the Chancellor, with the command:
"Let there be done, by authority of the Parliament, that which right and
reason, and good faith and good conscience, demand in the case. 17 '
Matters of Grace being thus brought before the Chancellor, as the keeper of
the King's conscience, and he being required to do justice in the King's name,
he felt under no obligation to determine the rights of petitioners by that law
from which they had fled to the King for relief and, for reasons already stated,
;
the Chancellors, at an early day, adopted the equitable principles and simple
procedure of the civil law of Rome, adapting them, with wisdom and prudence,
to the emergencies of the particular cases. The matters referred to them being
matters of Grace and of conscience, the Chancellors felt bound to decide the
cause according to conscience. The jurisdiction of the Chancellor being thus
established upon Grace and conscience, and his judgments being in the name
of the King, and by his authority, whenever the Courts of common law were
inadequate to the demands of justice, the party unable to obtain relief therein
would have recourse to the Chancellor, who in his Court, called the High Court,
of Chancery of England, undertook, like the praetor of Rome, to administer an
equity not found in the law, himself determining all questions both of law and
fact, and rendering a decree adapted to all the exigencies of justice. 18
§ 5. The Common Law as Compared with the Civil Law. The common law —
was then utterly incapable of doing complete justice in many cases and, in not ;
a few cases, it furnished no remedy or relief whatever. It had certain rigid

molds or formulas, into some one of which every cause of action had to be cast
and if the cause could not be run into any of these molds, there was no re-
dress; and if it could be run into one of the molds, only such redress as
the formula gave could be had, regardless of the equities of the case, and the
real rights of the parties. The fictions, formalisms and arbitrary technicalities
of the common law, and its dialectical refinements, were inexplicable and incom-
prehensible jargon to the public, and often a costly mockery of justice to the
litigants. Those who asked for bread were often given a stone, and those who
applied for a fish sometimes received a serpent.
Equity, on the other hand, disregarded forms, ignored fictions, subordinated
technicalities to the requirements of justice, and indulged in no dialectical re-
finements. Its pleadings were simple and natural, and its doctrines were
founded upon the eternal principles of right as interpreted by a lofty Christian
morality. Its great underlying principles, the constant sources, the never
i ailing roots of its particular rules, were the principles of equity, justice, mor-
13 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 44; 46. rested upon a person, who, from the circum-
14 This writ was the subpoena. stances in which he was placed towards an-
15 1 Spenoe Eq. Jur., 338-339. other, and the relations subsisting between
16 Ibid, 411. Fides est obligatio conscientiw ali- them, was bound to exercise good faith in his
ening ad intentionem alterius. (Good. faith is an conduct and dealings with that other person.
obligation binding the conscience of one party 1 Spence Eq. Jur. 411. The early Chancellors
to a transaction according to the understand- decided, as a rule, according to this conscience,
ing of the other party. but, in process of time, a system of rules and
it Ibid, 346. The matters thus brought before general principles, based on reason and con-
the King were decided according to reason and science, were evolved from the adjudications of
conscience; and when matters were referred to the Court, or were adopted by the Chancellors
the Chancellor, either by the King or by Par- from the jurisprudence of the Civil Law, as
liament, he was required to do "that which formulas to specify the nature and limit the
right and reason, and good faith, and good con- extent of their equity jurisdiction. 1 Pom. Eq
science demanded in the case." The term 'con- Jur., §§ 43-58. See post, % 58.
science" embraced all those obligations which is 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 5; Bisph. Pr. Eq., §§ 6-8.
§ 6 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EQUITY. 4
ality and honesty, enforced according to conscience and good faith, and so
adapted to the requirements of each case and the complications of business
affairs, that the rights and duties of all the parties were fully determined. 19
§ 6. Some of the Deficiencies of the Common Law. The common law then —
was not what it has since become under the benign inspiration of the Chancery
jurisprudence. 20 At common law, 1, a vendor's lien could not be enforced; 2,
a fraudulent conveyance could not be set aside 3, a defective instrument could ;
not be reformed; 4, a mistake or accident could not be effectually relieved

against; 5, a debt, note or account could not be assigned; 6, a resulting trust
could not be set up 7, a beneficial interest in property could not be enforced
;
8, a void instrument could not be cancelled 9, a will or trust could not be con-
;
strued in advance of action thereon; 10, testimony could not be perpetuated;

11, a trust fund could not be impounded 12, a specific performance could not
;
be decreed 13, an equitable partition of land could not be had 14, a deed could
; ;
not be declared a mortgage 15, title to land could not be effectually quieted
;
16, waste, trespasses and other violations of rights could not be stayed; 17, a
forfeiture or penalty could not be relieved against; 18, a set-off could not be
obtained 19, land could not be redeemed from a mortgagee 20, a lien on realty
; ;
could not be enforced 21, a lost instrument could not be set up 22, the estates
; ;
of minors and lunatics could not be administered 23, a pro rata distribution of ;
assets could not be had 24, a contract could not be apportioned 25, a cloud
; ;
could not be removed from one 's title 26, securities could not be marshalled
;
27, a partnership could not be wound up; 28, a subrogation or contribution

could not be obtained; 29, trusts were not recognized, and could be violated
with impunity; 30, a wife's equities did not exist; 31, a title bond was no de-
fence to an action of ejectment; 32, an injunction could not be had in any case,
or for any purpose, however great the wrong 33, receiverships were unknown ;
34, equitable rights and interests were not recognized, and, 35, frauds could
not be adequately remedied. 21
§ 7. —
How the Law has Followed Equity. Under the influence of the princi-
ples of Equity as administered in Chancery, the rugged features of the common
law have grown constantly more and more smooth and humane, and its capacity
to do justice has constantly increased. The evolution of the law in England
and in America has been on the lines marked out by Equity, 22 until, in the lan-
guage of Lord Hale, "by the growth of Equity on Equity the heart of the
common law has been eaten out." 23 To show the effect of the principles and
doctrines of Equity upon our own statutes the following illustrations are cited
24
1, the law in reference to gambling and wagering contracts 2, the whole law ;
of landlords', mechanics', laborers' and other liens; 25 3, the law of notice

through registration of deeds 26 4, the pro rata distribution of insolvent es-
;
tates; 27 5, the apportionment of rents; 28 6, the provisions for the benefit of

married women; 29 7, the guardianship over the estates of infants and persons
of unsound mind; 30 8, the allowance of set-offs; 31 9, the right to sue upon a
debt, note or account purchased from the original creditor 32 10, the statutory ;
remedy of interpleader 38 11, the right to set aside the satisfaction of a judg-
;
ment; 34 12, the proceeding by garnishment; 35 13, the right to a sale of land
19 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 49-56; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., 23 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1180, note.
§§ 25-30. 24 Code, §§ 1769-1775.
20 The present common law of England is as 2.1 M. &
V.'s Code, § 2739-2799; 4280-4305.
dissimilar from that of Edward III as is the 26 Code, §§ 2071-2075.
present state of society. Jacob v. State, 3 27 Code, §§ 2311-2397.
Hum., 493; Box v. Lanier, 4 Cates, 408. Equity 28 M. & V.'s Code, § 3289.
jurisdiction was established in England in the 29 Code, §§ 2478-2488.
reign of Edward III. Green v. Allen, 5 Hum., 30 Code, §§ 2489-2546; 3681-3719.
197. Edward III was born in 1312, and died in 31 Code, §§ 2918-2925. Nashville Trust Co.
1377. Bank, 7 Pick., 336.
21 See 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 40; 43-88; 97; 102- 32 Code, §§ 2795-2797.
117; 137; 162; 155; 175; 182; 279-280; 340; 370- 33 Code, § 2800.
406; 430; 912; 1098; 1121; 1179-1180; 1270; 1280. 31 Code, §§ 2990-2996.
22 Case, trover and assumpsit were invented
35 Code, §§ 3087-3103.
to give quasi equitable remedies, in the Courts
of law. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 24-29.
5 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF EQUITY. §8
for partition; 36
14, the proceding at law to remove a cloud from title by suing
a claimant not in possession, in ejectment; 37 15, the right to defend by title bond
as by deed 38 16, the power to sell the property of infants and lunatics for rein-
;
vestment or support; 39 17, the right to impound the property of absconding

debtors; 40 18, the remedies by motion allowed sureties; 41 19, the removal and
appointments of trustees 42 20, giving the right to take depositions at law 43
; ;
21, making parties witnesses 44 22, providing for the perpetuation of testimony
;
and the taking of evidence de bene esse; 45 23, allowing lost instruments to be
proved 46 and authorizing lost records to be supplied. 47 All of these statutes are
;
mere enactments of rights recognized and enforced, remedies employed, de-

fences allowed, and procedures used, in the Chancery Court by virtue of its in-
herent jurisdiction, and were wholly unknown to the common law, their recog-
nition in our Courts of law depending exclusively upon the statute, and
the statute being suggested by the practice in Equity.
§ 8. The Divine Law of Justice the Rule of Decision. The statement, often —
made, that the Court of Chancery was established to mitigate the rigor of the
common law, and to supply its defects, is not wholly true. 48 This Court was
established to do justice, regardless of any and all law. The King deemed it a
duty imposed upon his conscience, both by his oath and by religion, to "decree
justice," and in decreeing justice he deemed himself bound rather by the
Divine Law than by human law 49 and, when the Chancellor acted in his stead,
;
he based his decisions, not upon the law of the land, but upon honesty, equity
and conscience, for so was he commanded to do in exercising the King's pre-
rogative of Grace. 50 In short, the Chancery Court was established rather as a
Court based on the precepts of Religion than as a Court based on the rules of
Law. 51
It is unquestionably true that the harshness of the common law, its unfitness
to cope with fraud, its incapacity to do justice in many cases, the defects in
its remedies, the opportunities it gave the strong to oppress the weak, and its
general inadequacy to meet the requirements of equity, greatly contributed to
perpetuate the existence of the Chancery Court, and to enlarge and justify its
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the vital principle from which the Court sprung
was the prerogative doctrine that the King was the "fountain of justice ;" and
that, when a citizen could not get justice in the ordinary Courts, he might come
to this fountain. 52 The King, in administering justice in such cases, deemed
himself above all the laws and customs of his realm, and bound only by his
conscience and his will. As it was not a matter of right in a citizen to draw on
this reserve source of justice, when remedy was given it was deemed "granted
as of Grace." 53
§ 9. Other Causes Contributing to the Establishment of the Chancery Court.
— As the Chancery was the office out. of which all writs at common law issued,
the Chancellor retained cases for his own disposition when the facts were such
that no common law writ was adapted to the requirements of the case, or when
the common law Courts were unable to furnish adequate relief and some con- ;
tend that herein originated the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Chancellor.

In this class of cases, the Chancellor determined the matters in dispute, so that
the court of the King might not be deficient in doing justice. 54 But it is
believed that the equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor originated mainly, if
36 Code, §§ 3262-3322. 46 Code, §§ 3901-3906.

37 Code, § 3231. 47 Code, §§ 3907-3908.
38 Code, § 3243 a. 48 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 16-17.
39 Code, §§ 3323-3340; 3708-3719. 49 By MeKings reign, and princes decree
40 Code, 3455. This was
§ a substitute for the justice. Proverbs, 8:15.
writ of ne exeat in Equity. See Cox v. Breed- 50 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 35; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 21.
love, 2 Yerg., 516. 51 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 55.
41 Code, §§ 3620-3635. 52 Bisph. Pr. Eq., § 7; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§
4i' Code, §§ 3648-3664. 33-37
" "~rie. 88 3836-3870. 53 i Pom. Eq. Jur., §§32-35; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur.,
44 Code, §§ 3813 a. §44.
45 Code, §§ 3876-3885. 54 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 43-44,
§ 9 ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OP EQUITY. 6
not exclusively, from the reference to him by the King of petitions for justice
and redress, as already stated. BB It is unquestionably true, however, that, had
it not been for the deficiencies of the common law, the number of these petitions
to the King would have been comparatively few.
When the lay Chancellors succeeded the ecclesiastics, no material changes
were made in the jurisdiction of the Court. Its system of jurisprudence was,
however, enlarged and made more comprehensive, precedents were more
closely followed, and the decisions of the Chancellors more carefully preserved.
But the equitable principles of the civil law were as fully enforced, and the
peculiar proofs and practice of the Court in all things continued, the lay Chan-
cellors being greatly aided herein by the Masters in Equity, who were per-
manent officers of the Court. 66
Thus was established the High Court of Chancery of England; and thus
originated that grand system of jurisprudence known as Equity; both main-
taining their existence by virtue, alone, of their inherent merits, and their won-
derful fitness for the purposes of administrative justice. 57 It may be well here
to remark that, by an Act of the British Parliament, which went into operation
in 1875, all the great Courts of England, including the High Court of Chancery,
were consolidated, and a system of pleading and practice adopted similar to
those in use in Chancery. The Act of Parliament also provides that "in all
matters in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of Equity
and the rules of the common law, with reference to the same matter, the rules
of Equity shall prevail. And thus in England the triumph of the righteous
1
'
principles of Equity over the rules of the common law is complete, and, no
doubt, final. 68
55 Ibid, §§ 39-50; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 33-35. law, or to do more perfect justice than could
56 1 Spence Eq. Jur., §§ 712-713. It will be be done through the common law.
57 And under its beneficent influence the
seen from this review that Equity may be de- common law has become so transfigured that it
fined to be that system of jurisprudence, based no more resembles the common law of Coke
on good reason, good conscience, and the Civil than the image of Moloch stained with the
Law, introduced and developed by the Chan- blood of butchered babes resembles the living
cellors of England, by authority of the King Jesus blessing the little children of Judsea.
and acquiescence of the Parliament, to do jus- 58 Bisph. Pr. Eq., §§ 1; 11; 1 Pom., Eq. Jur.,
tice where justice was denied by the common § 12.
HISTORY OF OUR CHANCERY COURTS. §10
ARTICLE II.
THE HISTORY OF THE CHANCERY COURTS OF TENNESSEE.
10. The Chancery Court of North Carolina. § 13. How our Chancery Courts were Finally-
11. Introduction of Courts of Equity into Established.
Tennessee. § 14. Growth of the Court in Public Favor.
12. Development of our Chancery Courts. § 15. Equity Jurisprudence, Pleadings, and
Practice, in Other States.
§ 10.
—
The Chancery Court of North Carolina. "When North Carolina was
colonized by the English, they brought with them, as part of their jurispru-
dence, the principles and practice of the English Court of Chancery, and incor-
porated them into their judicial system. As early as 1713, we find a Court of
Chancery in existence in North Carolina; and it is safe to say that this Court
was coeval with the first legal institutions of the colony. The Court of Chan-
cery is referred to in the Acts of 1720, ch. 6 of 1723, ch. 10 of 1746, ch. 2 of
; ; ;
1748, ch. 2 and of 1762, ch. 5. The court thus established by the Lords Pro-
;
prietors of North Carolina, under the general power given them by the Charter
of King Charles II, was similar to the Chancery Court, of England, and was.
held by the Governor and Council. 1
This court continued until the outbreak of the American Revolution but no ;
provision having been made for its re-establishment under the State authority,
it ceased to exist, for a few years —
the struggle for Independence and the con-
flict of armies absorbing public attention. The people of North Carolina, how-
ever, in their Constitution of 1776, expressly provided for Courts of Equity, 2
and thus recognized the jurisprudence administered by the Chancery Court
as a fundamental part of the law of the new State. Although no Court of
Chancery was established, equitable rights continued to exist, notwithstand-
ing; 3 and in 1782 the people discovered, and through their Legislature sol-
emnly declared, that "the Courts of law were not equal to the redress of all kinds
of injuries, that many innocent men were withheld of their rights, and some de-
prived of them, altogether, for want of a Court or Courts of Equity."* It was
1 Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks N. C. Rep. 97, established, are not equal to the redress of all
132; Green v. Allen, 5 Hum., 235. The decree in kinds of injuries, but many innocent men are
the case of William Duckinfleld v. John Ar- withheld of their rights, and some deprived of
derne's heirs, pronounced May 13, 1713, is prob- them altogether, for want of a Court or Courts
ably the most ancient memorial of the Chan- of Equity.
cery Court of North Carolina in existence. 2 II. "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
Rev. Stats, of N. C. (by Iredell & Battle,) 528. State of North Carolina, and it is hereby enacted
This decree was confirmed in August, 1720, by by the authority of the same, that from and after
the Provincial Legislature. Iredell's Laws of the expiration of the present session of the
N. C. 36. In Locke's Fundamental Constitu- General Assembly, each Superior Court of Law
tions of North Carolina, made in 1669, it was in this State shall also be, and act as, a Court
provided that: "§35, The Chancellor's Court, of Equity for the same district, and possess all
consisting of one of the Proprietors and his six the powers and authorities, within the same,
councellors, who shall be called vice-Chan- that the Court of Chancery which was formerly
cellors, shall have the custody of the seal of held in this State under the late Government
the Palatine. * * To this Court, also, belong used and exercised, and that are properly and
all invasions of conscience." Iredell & Battle's rightfully incident to such a court, agreeable
Rev. Stats, of N. C, 454. to the laws in force in this State, and not in-
2 Const, of North Carolina, §§13; 21; 29. The consistent with our present Constitution." This
meaning of the term "Equity" was not defined. statute also made the Courts of Equity courts
The Constitution assumed that it was known, of record. Hayw. & Cobb, 173.
as in case of other words used without defini- It will thus be seen that the Courts of Equity
tion; and we are, therefore, to look to the ju- of North Carolina, established in 1782, were
risprudence then in existence for a proper un- Courts of general Equity jurisdiction. This
derstanding of the term. Franklin v. Armfield, was not only so declared by the statute re-
2 Sneed. 353. ferred to, but was also a necessary implication
3 Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 132. from the language of the Constitution itself.
i Acts of 1782, ch. 11, § 1. The 1st and 2nd And from the date of that Act down to the ces-
sections of this Act are as follows: sion of Tennessee to the United States, the
I. "Whereas the Courts of Law as at present powers and jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity
§11 HISTORY OF OUR CHANCERY COURTS. 8
accordingly enacted in that year by the Legislature of North Carolina that
each of the Superior Courts of Law should also be Courts of Equity, and possess
all the powers and authorities formerly held by the Court of Chancery under
the Colonial government, and that were properly and rightfully incident to
such a Court, and not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the State. 5
This Act prescribed a procedure for the Court, and granted subpcena, and
such process to enforce decrees as belonged to Courts of Chancery. All mat-
ters of fact were triable by jury, as in suits at Law; costs were to be paid by
either party at the discretion of the Court the proceedings of the Court were
;
to be kept distinct from those of the Law Court and it was expressly declared
;
that the Court should be " a Court of record. 6 The English Court of Chancery
'
'
was not a Court of record, and the statement in some of our reports that "by
our Acts of 1787 and 1801, our Court of Equity is a Court of record," 7 while
true, ignores the previous Act of 1782.
§ 11. Introduction of Courts of Equity into Tennes&ee. When counties —
were created in the territory now Tennessee, by the Legislature of North Car-
olina, they were at first made parts of adjoining Judicial Districts in that
State but in 1784, the counties of Washington, Sullivan, Greene and Davidson
;
were constituted a separate Judicial District, and named the District of Wash-
ington. This District covered the whole of the territory now Tennessee but, ;
in the following year, Davidson county was given a separate Court. The
Courts thus established in this territory by North Carolina, were vested with
general jurisdiction in Law and Equity. 8
•
In 1787, the two-fold Court of Law and Equity was divided, and it was en-
acted that the Chancery branch of the Court should be styled the "Court of
Equity;" and a "Clerk and Master in Equity" was appointed for each Court
of Equity. But both Courts continued to be held by the same Judge. This
Act authorized publication as to non-resident and absconding defendants; and
provided that executions to enforce money decrees might issue as at law,
instead of the then mode of enforcing money decrees by "attachment, habeas
*
corpus, attachment with proclamation, and commissions of rebellion." 9
In 1790,. the territory now Tennessee was deeded to the United States by
North Carolina; and the Act and Deed of Cession provided that "the laws of
North Carolina should continue in full force within the territory until repealed,
or otherwise altered, by the legislative authority of the territory."
In 1793, by an ordinance of William Blount, Territorial Governor, the coun-
ties of Knox and Jefferson were formed into a Judicial District, called the
District of Hamilton, and the Courts of Law and Equity therein were ordered
lo be held at Knoxville. 10 The first session of the 1st Territorial Legislature
met in Knoxville in 1794; and the first Act passed by it declared that the
North Carolina Act giving Equity jurisdiction to the Superior Courts of Law
should be in full force and effect. 11 This same Legislature created the Judicial
Districts of Washington, Hamilton and Mero, and vested in the Courts thereof
the general Equity jurisdiction conferred by the Act of 1782; and thus the
peculiar powers, pleadings, proofs and practice of the Chancery Court were
formally made a part of the jurisprudence of the new Territory. 12
§ 12. —
The Development of our- Chancery Courts. In 1796, this system of
Equity jurisprudence was incorporated into the Constitution of the new State, 13
and thus imbedded in the very foundations of the government. In 1801, an Act
was passed to regulate the proceedings of the Court of Equity: this Act pre-
of North Carolina were, in and for their re- 9 1 Scott's Rev., 389.
spective districts, identical in kind and com- 10 1 Scott's Rev., 454.
mensurate in extent with the powers and ju- n1 Scott's Rev., 484. The North Carolina
risdiction of the English Court of Chancery at statute referred to was the famous Act of 1782,
the time of the American Revolution. (Ch. 11.) above mentioned, establishing Courts
5 1 Scott's Rev., 261. of Equity.
6 1 Scott's Rev., 264. 12 1 Scott's Rev., 457-484.
7 Carson v. Richardson, 3 Hay., 231. 13 Art. V, §§ 1, 2.
8 1 Scott's Rev., 328; 350.
9 HISTORY OF OUR CHANCERY COURTS. § 13
scribesj in detail, the practice of the court; and a large proportion of the
provisions of the Act are in force today. Among the changes made in the prac-
tice by this Act was the power conferred on the Chancery Court to divest title
to land, instead of requiring parties to convey, as had hitherto been the prac-
tice. 14
In 1809, the Superior Courts of Law and Equity were abolished, and Circuit
Courts established in their stead, and invested with all of their powers and
jurisdiction both at common law and in Equity. 15 A Supreme Court of Errors
and Appeals was created by the same statute, to be composed of two Supreme
Judges and one of the Circuit Judges. By the Act of 1811, 10 this Supreme
Court was given "exclusive jurisdiction in all Equity causes arising in the
Circuit Courts," and either party was given the right to take depositions. Pre-
vious to this Act, the evidence in Equity suits was generally oral. The Act of
1811, repealed so much of the Act of 1809 as authorized Circuit Judges to sit
with the Supreme Judges. 17
In 1813, the Circuit Judges were given concurrent jurisdiction with the
Supreme Court in all Equity causes, and the Circuit clerks were made Clerks
find Masters in Equity. 18
In 1817, it was provided that Equity causes, wherein a Circuit Judge was
incompetent, might be adjourned to the Supreme Court, and there heard on the
original papers, as though brought there originally. 19
In 1819, the old practice allowing witnesses to give oral evidence in Chancery
suits, and the law compelling their attendance, were repealed; and it was
enacted that depositions should be taken in all Chancery cases. 20 In this Act,
"
the Circuit Courts sitting in Equity causes, are styled ".Courts of Chancery. 21
In 1822, it was enacted that the Chancery Courts should be held by one of the
Judges of the Supreme Court and in 1824, a Chancery Court was required
;
to be held twice a year in each circuit. Finally in 1827, the laws giving the
Supreme Judges original Chancery jtirisdiction were repealed, and two Chan-
cellors were appointed to hold the Chancery Courts. At the same time the
State was laid off into two Chancery Divisions, the Eastern and the Western,
with one Chancellor for each. The Chancellors were declared to be Chancellors
for the State, and were given authority to interchange. 22
§ 13. How our Chancery Courts were Finally Established. In 1834, a new —
Constitution was formed, which recognized "the several Courts of Equity" as
part of the judicial power of the State, and authorized the establishment of
Courts of Chancery, and the appointment of Chancellors and Clerks and Mas-
ters. 23 This Constitution continued all laws and ordinances then in force and
24 The first Legislature under this Constitution
use, until altered or repealed.
increased the number of Chancellors to three, and vested them with "the same
powers, privileges and jurisdiction in all respects that the Chancellors then
had by existing laws, and that were properly and rightfully incident to a
Court of Chancery, agreeably to the laws then in force in the State, not incon-
26 This statute, in substance, re-enacts the
sistent with the Constitution."
North Carolina Act of 1782; and is in force today. 26
The number of Chancellors was increased to three by the same statute, and
a Middle Division established. The Act required Chancellors to make rules
'
' with a view to the attainment of the following improvements in the practice
14 1 Scott's Rev., 685; Dibrell v. Eastland, 3 instead of a transcript as now. Car. & Nich.,
Yerg., 534. 220.
is 1 Scott's Rev., 1148. 20 2 Scott's Rev., 485; Hardin v. Stanly, 3
10 Ch. 72, § 4. Yerg., 381.
17 2 Scott's Rev., 36. 21 2 Scott's Rev., 485.
is 2 Scott's Rev., 146. 22 1 Hay & Cobb, 175.
19 Ibid, 361. And we learn from Dibrell v. 23 Art. VI, §§ 3, 13.
Eastland, 3 Yerg., 535, that, in 1832, this law 24 Art. XI, § 1.
was then in force. By the Act of 1822, ch. 14, 25 Acts of 1835, ch. 4.
on an appeal to the Supreme Court, in a Chan- 20 Code, § 4279. Whenever the Code is re-
cery cause, the original papers, including the ferred to, the Code of 1858 is meant, unless
depositions, were filed in the supreme Court, otherwise stated.
§ 14 HISTORY OF OUR CHANCERY COURTS. 10
1st, the abbreviating of bills and answers and other proceedings 2d, the expe- ;
diting of the decision of causes; 3d, the diminishing of costs; and, 4th, the
remedying of such abuses and imperfections as may be found to exist in the
practice." 27 Bach Chancery Division was subdivided into Districts, each Dis-
trict composed of from one to four counties, and the Court was held at some
one place in each District.
The number of Chancellors and the number of Chancery Divisions have been
increased from time to time down to the present but no further changes were;
made in the status of the Chancery Courts, until 1870, when the present Consti-
tution was adopted. By it the Chancery Courts are made Constitutional Courts,
and thus put beyond the reach of the Legislature. 28 In 1877, the jurisdiction
of the Chancery Courts was so enlarged as to " include all civil causes of action
triable in the Circuit Courts, except for injuries to person, property or char-
acter, involving unliquidated damages." 29 The far-reaching effect of this
statute is hardly yet fully comprehended; but the Courts are giving it that
liberal construction evidently intended by the Legislature, and the result is
not only a great increase in the power of the Chancery Courts to do full justice,
legal as well as equitable but a great increase in their prestige and popularity.
;
§ 14. —
Growth of the Court in Public Favor. The Chancery Court has been
struggling, for over five hundred years, to justify its existence, and to vindicate
the superiority of its jurisprudence. Having had a foreign origin when origi-
nally established in England, and its jurisdiction interfering with the common
law, these circumstances naturally created a prejudice against the Court. The
fact that its proceedings were out of sight of the people, that it had no juries,
that no witnesses were examined before it, and that its decrees were pro-
nounced by a single Judge, all tended to strengthen this prejudice. The Court,
too, laid a heavy hand on great and rich men, and exposed and righted the
wrongs committed by designing and crafty men, and required guardians, trus-
tees and even husbands and fathers to do right towards those depending on
them and above all, was quick to detect and correct frauds and unconscientious
;
conduct. Wicked men, thus thwarted in their schemes of wrong-doing, endea-

vored to justify themselves by abusing the "one man" Court. But, notwith-
standing these adverse influences, the Chancery Court of England continued
to grow in power and popularity as the English people grew in civilization and
intelligence, until now its principles are supreme in all the Courts of that
country. 30
As in England, so in Tennessee, the Chancery Court has had its adversaries,
and has had its triumphs. Its history, as already briefly shown, demonstrates
the fact of its constant growth in popular favor, from the beginning of our ex-
istence as a State down to the present. By various Acts of the Legislature, its
jurisdiction has been greatly increased, 31 its powers have been much enlarged,
its practice has been simplified and improved, and its process made more effica-
cious. In the language of Judge Freeman, "The Chancery Court has been
steadily advancing and widening the boundaries of its jurisdiction from its
earliest history to the present day." 32 In Tennessee, these extensions of the
boundaries of the Court have been made by the people, through their legisla-
tures, thus giving conclusive evidence of the growth of the Court in public favor.
And now, by the Constitution of 1870, it is made a Constitutional Court, and by
the Act of 1877, it has been given jurisdiction of all civil actions triable in the
Circuit Court except actions for injuries to person, property or character,
involving unliquidated damages, thus making its vindication complete, and
its triumph perfect and permanent.
Equity, founded upon the eternal verities of right, justice and morality,
27 Acts of 1835. ch. 4. 20 Acts of 1877, oh. 97.
28 Const, of 1870, Art. VI, § 1; Halsey f>. 30 Ante, §9.
Gaines, 2 Lea, 319; Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 31 Nolen v. Woods, 12 Lea, 615.
597. 32 Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 604.
11 HISTORY OF OUR CHANCERY COURTS. § 15
rather than upon arbitrary customs and rigid dogmas, and acting according to
the dictates of reason and good conscience, rather than unadjustible formulas,
has the capability to reach and cover every civil case which can possibly arise
out of the transactions of mankind, its doctrines and rules furnishing a sure
means of accurately and justly determining the rights and duties of all the
parties, and its flexible remedies inherent and statutory, adjusting and adapt-
ing themselves to all the intricacies of every emergency 33 so that in oiir Courts
;
of Chancery there is now absolutely nothing wanting that man can devise for
the perfect administration of complete equity; and there can never be any
failure to do adequate justice, in any suit, unless the proof fails to disclose the
real facts and circumstances of the transaction, or the Chancellor fails to com-
prehend the doctrine, or apply the remedy, applicable to the case.
§ 15. Equity Jurisprudence, Pleadings, and Practice, in Other States.—
The jurisprudence of Equity, and its pleadings and practice prevail in all the
States of the Union and in many of the States have completely supplanted the
;
pleadings and practice of the common law. There is an opinion, somewhat

prevalent, .that there is no Equity jurisprudence in those States of the Union
which have abolished Chancery Courts. This is a gross misconception. The
doctrines, principles and remedies of the Chancery Court are in full force in
every State and while, in many of the States, there are no separate Chancery
;
Courts, in all of them the jurisprudence of Equity is, nevertheless, recognized

and administered as fully as though special courts of Equity were in existence,
in those States that have adopted the "code practice," or "reformed proced-
ure," as it is variously termed, instead of the principles, pleadings, practice
and remedies of the Chancery Court being abolished, in fact the common law
practice pleadings and remedies have been abolished, or greatly conformed
'
to those in Chancery. Under the so-called
'
code practice, the principal plead-
' '
ings are 1, The petition or complaint, which is identical with a bill in Chan-
:
cery 2, ; A
special demurrer, and 3, An answer, which are the same in form and
substance as the like pleadings in Chancery. In short, those States that have
' '
adopted the code practice, ' have, in effect, by statute substituted the simple
'
and pliable pleadings of Chancery for the stiff and cumbrous forms of the
common law. And so, although in many of the States there are no separate
Chancery Courts, yet in those very States the pleadings, practice and principles
of Chancery are prevalent, and well nigh supreme, although to some extent
under new names. 34 And in the Federal Courts the principles, pleading and
practice of Equity remain wholly unimpaired.
33 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §59. I
Si Ibid, §§282-288.
§16 JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT. 12
CHAPTER II.
JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

Article I. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts Generally Considered.
Article II. Equitable or Inherent Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.
Article III. Statutory Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.
ARTICLE I.
JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURTS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 16. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts of § 20. Statutory Changes in the Powers and
North Carolina. Jurisdiction of the Court.
§ 17. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts of 21. Effect of the Act of 1877, Generally
Tennessee. Considered.
§ 18. Our Chancery Practice Founded on that
of Matters of Equitable
22. Classification
of England.
Jurisdiction.
§ 19. Powers and Jurisdiction of the Chan-
cery Courts.
§ 16. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts of North Carolina. The Article —

devoted to the History of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee plainly indicates
the character and extent of their jurisdiction. The Act of 1782 1 vested the
'
Courts of Equity in North Carolina with all the powers and authorities within
'
their respective districts that the Court of Chancery, formerly held under the
Colonial government, used and exercised, and that were properly and rightfully
incident to such a Court." 2 This Act was continued in force in Tennessee by
the Deed of Cession 3 by the Territorial Legislature 4 bv the Constitution of
; ;
1 796
5
by the Constitution of 1834 6 by the Act of 1835 7 by the Code of 1858 8
; ; ;
and by the Constitution of 1870. 9

The question then arises "What were the powers and authorities used and
:
'
'
exercised by the Chancery Court of North Carolina" at the time of the American
Revolution? This question can be answered only with approximate accuracy,
no records, ordinances or statutes defining the jurisdiction of that Court being
in existence, so far as known. 10 The Court was established by the Lords Pro-
prietors under the general power given them by the Great Charter of .King
Charles II. it was held by the Governor and his Council, and there can be no
:
doubt that its model was the Court of Chancery in England. 11 The Supreme
Court of North Carolina held, in the case of Griffin v. Graham, 12 that the Equity
system of England was a part of the common law of North Carolina in force
and use within its territory at the time of the American Revolution, which
common law was, in 1778, declared by the legislature of North Carolina to be
in "full force within the State." 13 Chancellor Kent, in Manning v. Manning,
l Chap. 11. !) Art. XI. § 1.
i 1 Scott's Rev., 261. Green v. Allen, 5 Hum., 205.
io See also,
3 Ibid, 438. Griffinv. Graham, 1 Hawks, (N. C) 97; 132.
i Acts of 1794, Ch. 1, § 77; 1 Scott's Rev., 457. ii See Judge Gaston's argument in Griffin v
5 Art. X, § 2.
e Art. XI, § 1.
Graham, 1 Hawks, (N. C.) 103.
i Chap. 4.
12 Ibid.
8 Code, § 4279. 13 Acts of 1778, ch. 5, § 1; 1 Scott's Rev., 226.
13 JURISDICTION OF THE) CHANCERY COURT. §17
held that the English system of Equity jurisprudence at the commencement of
'
the Revolution formed an important and very essential branch of the common
'
law." 14
§ 17. Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee. The same conclu-—
sion was reached by Judges Turley and White, in the great case of Green v.
Allen, 15 Judge White holding that the powers of our Chancery Courts "are no
doubt as ample as those of the Chancery Court of England, with no other differ-
ence except that which grows out of the difference of our institutions. Judge '
'
Green in Oakley v. Long, 18 concedes to our Chancery Courts "the jurisdiction

'
which was exercised by the Chancery Court of England as a Court of Equity ;
and in Dickson v. Montgomery, 17 he states that "our Court of Chancery has

jurisdiction in all cases where, in England, the Lord Chancellor in the exercise
of his extraordinary jurisdiction, 18 could have afforded relief." And Judge
Cooper, in Lake v. McDavitt, 19 says: "The Chancery Court is vested with "all
the powers, privileges and jurisdiction incident to a Court of Equity by existing
laws, that is, by the statutory and common law of the State. It is a Superior
'
Court as contra-distinguished from a Court of peculiar, special and limited

jurisdiction. It possesses, except where changed by statute, the jurisdiction
which was exercised by the Lord Chancellor of England as an Equity Judge,
denominated his extraordinary jurisdiction." In this case Judge Cooper rec-
ognizes the Equity jurisprudence as a part of the "common law of the State,"
thus concurring with the Judges heretofore cited on this point.
§ 18. Our Chancery Practice Founded on that of England. Not only are —
the principles and doctrines of the English Chancery Court in force in the
Chancery Courts of this State, but, before the passage of the Act of 1801, we
were governed by the English rules in Chancery practice almost exclusively,
and our Equity proceedings had the force and effect of proceedings in the Eng-
lish Court. 20 And as late as 1822, the Rules adopted by the Supreme Court for
the regulation of the practice of the Chancery Court provided that "in all
cases where the Rules prescribed by Act of Assembly, or those Rules heretofore
adopted, do not apply, the practice of the Courts of Chancery shall be regulated
by the practice of the High Court of Chancery in England." 21 The U. S. Cir-
cuit Courts in this State, in their Equity proceedings, are also governed by the
practice of the English Chancery, as it existed in 1842. 22
In Tennessee, while the pleadings and practice, in the main, conform to the
pleadings and practice of the English Court of Chancery prior to 1875, there
are, nevertheless, many material modifications, all of which will appear in their
appropriate places in this treatise. 23
§ 19. Powers and Jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts. It will thus be —
seen that both the jurisprudence and the practice of the English Chancery
14 1 Johns. Ch., 531. The "common law" of utory system and the preceding system; and
the English colonies in America embraced the our Supreme Court rulings on the subject have
whole body of the laws the colonists brought oscillated between the two, sometimes conform-
with them from England, including the Chan- ing to the requirements and spirit of the stat-
cery Court and its jurisprudence. See note 19, utes; and, at other times, ignoring the statutes,
infra. and reasserting the supremacy of the ancient
15 5 Hum., 206; 239. rules, according as the judges have been in-
10 10 Hum., 259.
spired with admiration for the new or venera-
tion for the old.
IT 1 Swan, 361.
was the As a result of our statutory enactments on
18 This "extraordinary Jurisdiction" the subjects of pleading and practice, the text
Equity jurisdiction. Lake
McDavitt, 13 Lea,
v. books that treat of Chancery Practice and
30; Pom. Eq. This extraordinary
Jur., §§ 33-35. Pleading, while in the main valuable guides,
jurisdiction embraces the whole field of Equity are, nevertheless, liable at times to mislead
treated of in Story's Equity Jurisprudence. in matters wherein, by direct enactment or by
19 13 Lea, 30. See note 14, supra. necessary imnlication, the former practice has
20 Dibrell v. Eastland, 3 Yerg., 535. been repealed or modified. And one of the
21 Cooke, (Appendix,) 444. main purnoses of this book is to give so much
22 Rules of Practice. U. S. Courts of Equity, of the old practice as is in force, and to sub-
§ 90; see also, Cooke, 392; 415. stitute the new practice for so much of the old
23 The practice in the Chancery Courts of as is no longer in force, thus presenting to the
Tennessee is a modified practice, partaking of practitioner the whole of the practice, old and
the code features to a considerable extent. See new, now prevailing in our Chancery Courts,
Code §§ 4305-4494. And in Tennessee, as in oth- and omitting so much of the old practice as
er States, there has been a struggle between has become obsolete, or has been repealed or-
—
the two systems of pleading between the stat- modified by statute.
§20 JURISDICTION OP THE CHANCERY COURT. 14
Court are in force in our State, except in so far as changed by our Statutes
and Rules. So that, in summarizing the "powers, privileges and jurisdiction"
conferred on our Chancery Courts by the Code, 24 it may be safely stated that
the powers and jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts of Tennessee, in and for
their respective districts, are, except as changed by statute, identical in kind,
and commensurate in extent, with the Equity powers and jurisdiction of the
High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the American Revolution. 25
And it may be added, the statutory changes in the powers and jurisdiction of
our Chancery Courts have greatly enlarged those powers and jurisdiction, and
proportionately increased their efficiency and beneficence.
§ 20. Statutory Changes in the Powers and Jurisdiction of the Court. As —
has been already stated, the statutory changes in the powers and jurisdiction of
the Chancery Courts have mainly been additions, and not limitations. "Juris-
diction" means the authority possessed by a Court to determine a controversy;
and the "powers" of a Court are its right and ability to enforce its deter-
minations.
1. The Principal Additions to the Powers of the Court are the following, given
in order of time
1. Power to order a bill to be taken for confessed. 26
2. Power to issue an execution to enforce a money decree. 27
3. Power to bring defendants before the Court by publication. 28
4. Power to divest and vest title to property by decree. 29
5. Power to issue attachments to impound property. 30
6. Power to appoint a commissioner to execute a conveyance, release or
acquittance, in the name of either the parties or of himself. 31
7. Power to appoint administrators ad litem when necessary in the progress
of a cause. 32
2. The Principal Additions to the Jurisdiction of the Court are the following,
given in chronological order
Jurisdiction to empanel a jury to try an issue of fact. 33
1.
Jurisdiction to proceed against non-resident and absconding defendants,
2.
by publication. 34
3. Jurisdiction to decree a divorce and alimony. 35
4. Jurisdiction to proceed in rem against the estates of non-residents by
attachment and publication. 36
5. Jurisdiction to proceed against the real and personal property of non-
resident defendants. 37
6. Jurisdiction to proceed by attachment and publication against the
estates and persons of non-resident absconding debtors. 38
7. Jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, and wind up his intestate's
estate. 39
8. Jurisdiction to keep corporations in the line of their duties, and to
decree a forfeiture of their charters. 40
9. Jurisdiction over the persons and estates of idiots, lunatics and persons
of unsound mind. 41
10. Jurisdiction to consent to, and decree, a sale of the property of infants
24 Code, § 4279. All references to Code sec- 31 Acts of 1838, ch. 176.
tions are to the sections in the Code of 1858. 32 Acts of 1889, ch. 137.
25 See cases cited in the preceding sections. S3 Acts of 1782, ch. 11
See also. 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., §§ 282-288: 1 Sto. Eq. 34 Acts of 1787, ch. 22
Jur., § 57. 35 Acts of 1799, ch. 19.
26 Acts of 1782, ch. 11. 36 Acts of 1801, ch. 6.
27 Acts of 1787, ch. 22; Deaderick v. Smith, 6 37 Acts of 1801, ch. 6.
Hum., 146. 38 Acts of 1836, ch. 43.
28 Acts of 1787, ch. 22. 39 Acts of 1842, ch. 177.
29 Acts of 1801, ch. 6; Dibrell v. Eastland, 3 40 Acts of 1846, ch. 57
Terg., 534.
30 Acts of 1801, ch. 6, § 3.
A
trlss 7
t
He°L
185 1 52
4 33
' ^ 163; FentreSS
* Fen "
15 JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT. §21
and married women. If the Court had inherent jurisdiction 42 to do this, the
statute certainly settled all doubts and enlarged that jurisdiction. 43
11. Jurisdiction to prevent the usurpation of office, and to declare an office
forfeited. 44
12. Jurisdiction of all civil causes of action triable in the Circuit Court,
except for injuries to person, property or character, involving unliquidated
damages. 45
§ Effect of the Act of 1877 generally Considered.— In 1801, it was
21.
'
enacted that after answer filed and no plea in abatement to the local jurisdic-
'
tion of the Court, no exception for want of jurisdiction shall ever afterwards
be made." 46 It has been uniformly held ever since the passage of this Act, that
on failure of the defendant to object to the jurisdiction of the Court before
answering, the Court had the right, and it was its duty, to determine the con-
troversy, unless the matter was unfit for a Court of Equity. Under the opera-
tion of this holding, the Chancery Court had, for seventy-five years, been in
the habit of entertaining demands, and causes of action, purely legal in their
nature. The Act of 1877 is only one step further than the law was before, as
Judge Freeman, in Jackson v. Nimmo,47 very conclusively shows. The Chan-
cery Court has long had jurisdiction, in attachment cases, of "debts or demands
of a purely legal nature, except causes of actions founded on torts." 48 Thus,
it will be seen, the Act of 1877 is by no means as revolutionary as was at first
supposed. Every enlargement of the Chancery jurisdiction for five hundred
years, in England and America, has been the signal for an alarm; but the
enlargements have continued, until, both in England and a majority of the
American States, the Chancery methods of pleading and the principles of the
Chancery jurisprudence have, in a large measure, superseded, the unbending
formalities and the harsh doctrines of the common law. 49
The Act of 1877 goes far to settle the ancient controversy, between the
Chancery and the Common Law Courts, with respect to the boundary line
between their respective jurisdictions; and it includes not only the disputed
territory, but also all the territory adjacent thereto, within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Chancery Court. 50
In the English Judicature Act, passed in 1873, it is provided that generally,
'
'
in all matters in which there is any conflict or variance, between the rules of
Equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter,
42 Brown, ex parte, 8 Hum. 200; Mason v. and sometimes to defeat, the jurisdiction! what
Tinsley, 1 Tenn. Chy. 154; Greenlaw v. Green- clamors were raised against interfering with
law, 16 Lea, 435; Williams v. Williams, 10 the jurisdiction of the common law Courts, and
Heisk. 570. the sacred right of trial by jury! what invoca-
43 Code of 1858,
§ 3323. tions of Magna Charta, and the inviolable Bill
44 Code of 1858,
§ 3409. of Rights! what appeals to the Chancellor to
45 Acts of 1877, ch. 97. stretch forth the strong right arm of his ben-
40 .Acts of 1801. ch. 6, § 16; 1 Scott's Rev., 688. eficent power, and take jurisdiction, that
47 3 Lea, 597, 610. Equity might be administered, and iniquity
48 Code, § 3461. overcome! what references to the Master, re-
49 In those States which have what is termed ports, exceptions, recommittals,and decrees in
the "Code Practice," the procedure is based the lower Court; and what appeals, writs of
largely on the ordinary Chancery Practice; and error, remandments, and reversals, to and by,
although the names of their Courts have been the Supreme Court! And then, perhaps, the
changed, the substance of the Equity jurispru- complainant, thus Anally denied justice in a
dence and procedure remain, while common Court of Equity, went to the Circuit Court for
law forms and procedures have, in the main, redress, and there, after multitudinous mo-
been abrogated. tions, demurrers, pleas, continuances, trials,
50 It is safe to say, that the Act of 1877, ch. new trials, bills of exceptions, appeals, rever-
97, gave to the Chancery Courts a practically sals and more trials, and perhaps more appeals
supreme sovereignty over all the really debata- and reversals, he was at last informed by a
ble territory that formerly existed on the com- new set of Judges, that the suit was one
mon law frontiers; and forever terminated the that should have been brought in the Chancery
disputations, with which our Courts had re- Court! All such unseemly and costly contro-
sounded, for a hundred years, as to where the versies over questions of disputed jurisdiction,
elastic domain of Equity really ended, and and the consequent scandal on the Courts of
where the rigid realm of Law inviolably began. Justice, are happily and forever ended by the
What struggles the Chancery records dis- beneficent Act of 1877. And no more will Jus-
close, over attempts to get the Court to detei- tice weep in her own temple to see her suitors
mine cases, in which the jurisdiction was de- torn to pieces by her own ministers contending
batable! what contrariety of rulings on demur- for the jurisdiction over them. See Hay v.
rers in such cases! what subtle dialectical dis- Marshall, 3 Hum., 6*23; Hale v. Hale, 4 Hum.,
tinctions were drawn, sometimes to sustain. 183; and Taylor «. Tompkins, 2 Heisk., 89.
§22 JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT. 16
the rules of Equity shall prevail." The effect of this provision is to make the
rules of Equity supreme, in all litigation, in all the Courts of England. It is
believed the Tennessee Act of 1877 has the same effect in all common law rights
of action sought to be enforced in Chancery. When the jurisdiction of a Court
is enlarged, the new subjects of jurisdiction should not be treated as aliens,
and discriminated against; nor should the parties to such suits be held in dis-
favor, or denied any equitable right, benefit or privilege, accorded by the
Court in the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction. The Act of 1877 was mani-
festly intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court as a Court
of Equity, and not to make it, as to this enlargement, a mere 'Common Law
Court; 51 and hence, in all suits brought under the Act of 1877, the pleadings,
practice and principles, of Equity jurisprudence will control. 52
§ 22. Classification of Matters of Equitable Jurisdiction. —
The importance
formerly attached to a proper classification of the subjects of Equity jurisdic-
tion no longer exists in this State, and it is now immaterial whether the matter
In controversy is within the equitable or the statutory jurisdiction of the Court
and if within the equitable, it is unimportant whether the jurisdiction be exclu-
sive or concurrent. As a result, all the abstruse learning in the books on the
lines of demarcation between the different grounds of jurisdiction has ceased
to be of much practical value. The legal niceties, the complex technicalities
and the dialectical discriminations on the subject of jurisdiction, with which
the great jurists of England and America wrestled in the last five centuries, no
longer perplex either the student or the practitioner in this State.
For convenience of consideration, the jurisdiction of our Chancery Courts,
as now constituted, may be divided into 1, The Equitable, or Inherent, and 2,
:
The Statutory
1. The Equitable, or Inherent, to include all of those matters, whether purely
equitable in their nature or having characteristics both equitable and legal,
jurisdiction over which is derived exclusively or chiefly from their inherent
powers as Courts of Equity and ;
2. The Statutory, to include all of those matters, whether equitable in their

characteristics or purely legal in their nature, jurisdiction over which is derived
exclusively or chiefly from our statutes.
si Lenoir v. Mining Co., 4 Pick, 168. In this whether such party be complainant or defend-
case it was decided that when a suit based on ant, and whether the obligations be between
claims purely legal is tried in the Chancery complainants and defendants, or between co-
Court the maxims and principles of Equity complainants or between co-defendants. And
will be applied. it has been clothed with unlimited power to
5:2 The Chancery Court in Tennessee is now use any kind of process, legal or equitable, to
equipped with full power to do complete and enforce its orders and decrees and if an emer-
;
speedy justice in all suits within its juris- gency should arise necessitating a process not
diction, however numerous the parties, or hitherto used, the Court would, when abso-
complicated their rights and duties. It is lutely necessary to prevent a failure of sub-
vested with authority to so shape and mould stantial justice, so modify one of the cus-
its decrees as to meet every exigency required tomary legal or equitable processes as to adapt
either by Law or Equity, and to adjust all mat- it to the exigencies of the emergency. The Act
ters in controversy, legal as well as equitable, of 1877 is liberally construed, Simmons ». Leon-
so as to give each party his exact rights, ni'd,5 Pick., 622.
and to require of each party his exact duties,
I'/ THE EQUITABLE, OR INHERENT JURISDICTION. §23
AKTICLE II.
THE EQUITABLE, OR INHERENT, JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT.
§ 23. The Equitable, or Inherent Jurisdiction § 24. The Equitable, or Inherent Jurisdiction
of the Chancery Court Generally Con- Generally Stated.
sidered. § 25. The Equitable, or Inherent Jurisdiction
Specially Stated.
§ 23. The Equitable, or Inherent, Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court gen-

erally Considered. —
The jurisprudence and procedure of the Chancery Court
constituted a part of the law our ancestors brought with them from England,
when they founded the Colony of North Carolina. When that Colony became
a State, this jurisprudence was recognized, and its administration provided for,
in its Constitution and in 1782, its Legislature conferred this jurisdiction upon
;
'
the Courts. Tennessee being then a part of North Carolina, that jurisprudence
became a part of our law; and, when we became a State, both the Deed of
Cession and the Act of Admission by Congress, made the laws of North Carolina
our laws, until we saw fit to change them. In our first, and in all subsequent,
Constitutions, the jurisprudence and procedure of the Chancery Court were
fully recognized, and their administration abundantly provided for. While the
procedure has been modernized, simplified and improved, in many particulars,
as already fully shown, the jurisprudence has in no particular been changed,
except in so far as it has been extended and enlarged on the lines of its legiti-
mate development. 1
This original jurisdiction, thus derived, through the Colony and State of
North Carolina, from the Equity Jurisprudence of England, is called the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court, to contradistinguish it from the statutory
jurisdiction and it is to this original and inherent- jurisdiction that our statute
;
refers when it says The Chancery Courts shall continue to have all the powers,
: '
'
privileges and jurisdiction, properly and rightfully incident to a Court of

Equity, by existing laws." 2
The inherent powers, privileges and jurisdiction of our Chancery Courts,
within their respective local and personal jurisdictions, are identical in kind
and commensurate in extent, with the Equity powers, privileges and jurisdic-
tion of the High Court of Chancery in England, at the time of the American
Revolution. 3
The Chancery Court is a Superior Court 4 of general original jurisdiction of
1 See Article on the History of the Chancery (3) to appoint and remove trustees, Code, §§
Courts of Tennessee, ante, §§ 10-14. The Chan- 3648-3664; Watkins v. Specht, 7 Cold., 594; I
cery Court, under its inherent jurisdiction, Perry on Trusts, §§ 280-282; and (4) to aid a
deals only with property and the rights and judgment creditor after a return of nulla bona.
duties of parties incident thereto; and every Code, §§ 4282-4285.
affirmative decree either affects the property of 3 See the following Article; also, Lake v. Mc-
some party, or some right or duty of some Davitt, 13 Lea, 30.
party in reference to property. Its juris- 4 Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 254; Lake v. Mc-
diction over infants, non compotes, and married Davitt, 13 Lea, 30. The rule of jurisdiction is,
women arises out of their property and prop- that nothing shall be intended to be out of
erty rights. Its jurisdiction in suits for di- the jurisdiction of a Superior Court but that
vorce, mandamus, habeas corpus and other suits which specially appears to be so; and, on the
formerly triable exclusively in Courts of Law, contrary, nothing shall be intended to be with-
is oureiy statutory. As to what property is. in the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but that
and what are rights of property, see post, § 56. which is so expressly alleged. Kilcrease v.
2 Code, § 4279. In some cases the statute has • Blythe, 6 Hum., 378. The Chancery Court is
given the Court jurisdiction of matters over a Superior Court within the sense and mean-
which it had inherent jurisdiction already, as ing of the term as contradistinguished from an
(1) in case of partition. Hopper v Fisher, 2 Inferior Court. Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 253;
Head. 254; (2) in proceedings to sell the lands Robertson v. Winchester, 1 Pick., 187.
of infants, Gray v. Barnard, 1 Tenn. Ch., 298;
§24 THE EQUITABLE, OR INHERENT JURISDICTION. 18
all cases of an equitable nature, where the debt or demand exceeds fifty dollars
and every matter of equitable cognizance above said amount is presumed to be
within its inherent jurisdiction as a Court of Equity. 5
§ 24. The Equitable, or Inherent, Jurisdiction generally Stated. The whole —
inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Court, aside from its injunctive powers,
may be briefly summed up in these four propositions.
1. If a lawful and equitable contract be the subject matter of the suit, all
the Court can do is (1) to equitably enforce the contract, or (2) to award com-
pensation for its breach, or (3) to require the party in default to do such act
relative thereto as he, in good reason and good conscience, ought to have done
without suit. 8
2. If there be no contract, or the contract be inequitable, and the parties
disagree as to their rights and duties, all the Court can do is (1) to require
the party in default to do, or refrain from doing, what good reason and good
conscience require, or (2) where injury has been done, to make the defendant
atone therefor.
3. If any of the parties are under disability, and (1) their interests will be
promoted by a sale of their property, or by a conversion of their money into
other property, or by using a portion or all of the corpus of their estate for
their maintenance, education or support; or (2) if their rights need protection
or enforcement on the application of a guardian, or next friend, the Court will
;
(1) by decree do for them what they in reason and conscience would themselves
have done if under no disability, or (2) will require the parties who are sui
juris to do to or for those under disability, what in good reason and good
•conscience, they should have done without suit.
4. If the parties are sui juris, whatever they consent to during the progress
•of the suit will, if violative of no law, be binding on the Court and if it is to
;
the interest of an infant or lunatic party to join in any lawful consent, and the
state of the pleadings permit, the Court can consent for such infant or lunatic.
And, generally, where there is consent, the parties bind the Court 7 and where ;
there is no consent, the Court binds the parties.

§ 25. The Equitable, or Inherent, Jurisdiction, Specially Stated. The —
equitable or inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Court includes all cases
of an equitable nature, where the debt or demand exceeds fifty dollars. 8 These
cases include the following
1.All suits resulting from accidents and mistakes.
2.All suits resulting from frauds, actual, and constructive.
3. All suits resulting from trusts, express, constructive, and resulting.
4. All suits for the specific performance of contracts.
5. All suits for the reformation, re-execution, rescission, and surrender of
written instruments.
6. All suits for an accounting, and for surcharging and falsifying accounts.
7. All suits between partners, and to wind up an insolvent partnership.
8. All suits for the administration and marshaling of assets.
9. All suits for subrogation and substitution.
10. All suits for the enforcement of liens created by mortgages, deeds of
trust, sales of land on credit, or other equitable considerations.
11. All suits by married women against their husbands, except for divorce. 9
12. All suits against married women and minors in reference to their estates,
not cognizable at law.
13. All suits by wards against guardians, executors, administrators and
5 Code, §§ 4279-4281. As to the fifty dollar in reason and conscience to occupy. Hancock
limit, see§ 26, post, note 5. v. Bryant, 2 Yerg., 478.
a Equity compels a defendant to do that And so the maxims declare: Consensus faeit
T
which an upright and conscientious man would legem. Conventio vindt legem.
have done without compulsion. White, J., In 8 Code, § 4280. See post, § 26.
Perkins v. Hays, Cooke, 166. Equity delights » Suits for divorce are brought under the
in placing parties in the situation they ought statutory jurisdiction of the Court.
19 THE EQUITABLE, OR INHERENT JURISDICTION. § 25
others, where an accounting, or surcharging or falsifying an account, is
necessary.
14. All suits for an apportionment and contribution.
15. All suits for the marshaling of securities.
16. All suits for relief against forfeitures and penalties.
17. All suits for the redemption of land or other property.
18. All suits to have absolute deeds or bills of sale declared to be mortgages.
19. All suits for the construction and enforcement of wills and trusts.
20. All suits to obtain a set-off against a judgment in favor of a non-resident
or insolvent.
21. All suits for the discovery and perpetuation of testimony.
22. All suits to compel claimants to interplead.
23. All suits for equitable attachments and receivers.
24. All suits where a ne exeat republica is sought.
25. All suits where an injunction is a substantial part of the relief sought.
26. All suits to remove clouds and quiet titles.
27. All suits for the establishment and execution of charities.
28. All suits for a new trial after a judgment at law.
29. All suits to have void judgments so declared, and to avoid voidable
judgments.
All suits to execute decrees, and to impeach decrees and judgments.
30.
All suits to prevent the doing of an illegal or inequitable act to the
31.
injury of complainant's property rights, or interests, quia timet.
32. All suits for the exoneration or protection of sureties.
33. All other suits where the defendant has done, or is doing, or is threaten-
ing to do, some inequitable act to the injury of the complainant, and there is
no adequate remedy therefor in any other court.
§26 STATUTORY JURISDICTION. 20
ARTICLE III.
STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURTS.

26. Statutory Jurisdiction of the Court § 28. Jurisdiction Concurrent with the Cir-
generally Considered. cuit Courts.
27. Jurisdiction Concurrent with the Coun- § 29. The Act of 1877 Specially Considered.
ty Courts. § 30. Exclusive Statutory Jurisdiction of the
Chancery Courts.
§ 26. Statutory Jurisdiction of the Court generally Considered. With per- —

haps the single exception of the Act prohibiting interlocutory injunctions
against the collection of State taxes, 1 all of the statutes now in existence rela-
tive to the powers, privileges and jurisdiction, of the Chancery Court are either
declaratory or augmentative, as has been shown in a preceding Article. The
Statute declares that the Court has all the powers, privileges and jurisdiction
properly and rightfully incident to a Court of Equity, by existing laws. 2 The
effect of this statute is to make the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, in a sense,
also statutory. The statute further declares that the Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction of all cases of an equitable nature, where the debt or
demand exceeds fifty dollars, unless otherwise provided by the statute. 3 The
Court has no jurisdiction of any debt or demand of less value than fifty dollars, 4
except upon an ejectment bill to recover land, or on a replevin or detinue bill,
or on a bill to aid a judgment creditor, 5 or on a bill to enforce the statutory
rights of a purchaser of realty at a tax sale. 6 The Court cannot enforce a
vendor's lien when the amount of the demand is less than fifty dollars. 7
The statutory jurisdiction, while including matters also belonging to the
inherent jurisdiction, may for convenience be divided into 1, Jurisdiction :
concurrent with the County Court 2, Jurisdiction concurrent with the Circuit
;
Court and 3, Jurisdiction exclusive of all other Courts.

;
Jurisdiction Concurrent with the County Courts. The Chancery

§ 27. —
Court has jurisdiction concurrent with the County Court
1. Of the persons and estates of idiots, lunatics, and other persons of un-
sound mind. 8
1 Acts of 1873, ch. 44. defendant, without pleading in abatement, an-
Code, § 4279. See preceding Article, §§ 16-22.
2 swers the bill, he cannot, at the hearin,, re-
Code, § 4280. What is meant by "cases of
3 sist a decree on the mere ground that the
an equitable nature" is the whole body of amount of the debt, as ascertained by the
Equity Jurisprudence as a remedial system. proof, is less than fifty dollars. Spurlock r.
Pomeroy and Story are authors of works on Fulks, I Swan, 289; Birmingham v. Tapscott, 4
Equity Jurisprudence recognized by our Su- Heisk., 382; Wagstaff v. Braden, 1 Bax,, 304;
preme Court; and their treatises have been Smets v. Williams, 4 Paige (N. T.) 364.
largely used in the compilation of this book. o Acts of 1903, ch. 258, § 78.
4 Code, §§ 4280-4281. 7 Malone Dean, 9 Lea, 336. After this de-
v.
The Court has jurisdiction in a mandamus
5 cision, the
Legislature clothed the County
suit where the amount in controversy is under Courts with jurisdiction to enforce vendors'
fifty dollars; State, ex rel., v. Alexander, 7 liens when the amount is under fifty dollars.
Cates, 156; and in suits to recover land which Acts of 1887, ch. 141. Why the jurisdiction
is of less value than fifty dollars. Frazier v. was not conferred on the Chancery Courts, it is
Browning, 11 Lea, 253. The Chancery Courts hard to understand, inasmuch as the rules of
have jurisdiction, also to aid a judgment cred- practice and pleading in the Chancery Court
itor after a return of nulla bona, when the are required to be followed in tne County Court
amount of his judgment is less than fifty dol- in such cases, and the costs in the two Courts
lars; Putnam v. Bentley, 8 Bax., 84; State v. in such cases are precisely the same The pro- I
Covington, 4 Lea, 58; but they have no juris- ceedings in the County Courts in suits to sell
diction to enforce a vendor's lien when the lands are often so inartificial as to be unintelli-
amount is less than fifty dollars. Malone r. gible, and often so defective as to convey no
Dean, 9 Lea, 336. If the debt or demand as title to the purchaser.
set forth in the bill exceeds fifty dollars, the 8 Code, § 4298.
Court prima facte has jurisdiction; and if the
21 STATUTORY JURISDICTION. §28
2. Of the persons and
estates of infants, and of the appointment and re-
moval of guardians. 9
3. Of suits for the partition, 10 or sale, of estates, by heirs or tenants in
common. 11
4. Of suits for the sale of a decedent's land at the instance of his personal
representatives or creditors, if the personal property is insufficient to satisfy
the debts of the estate. 12
5. Of suits for the allotment of dower. 13
6. Of suits for the appointment of an administrator of a decedent's estate,
when six months have elapsed since his death, and no person will apply to the
County Court, or can be procured, to administer in the usual way, 14 and
7. Of suits to enforce the payment of legacies and distributive shares. 15
§ 28. Jurisdiction Concurrent with the Circuit Courts. The Chancery —
Court has jurisdiction concurrent with the Circuit Court in the following
cases 16 :
1. Of suits for divorce and alimony. 17

2. Of suits for the partition, or sale, of estates by heirs or tenants in
common. 18
3. Of suits for the sale of a decedent's land at the instance of his personal
representatives or creditors, if the personal property is insufficient to satisfy
the debts of the estate. 19
4. Of suits for the allotment of dower. 20
•
5. Of arbitration and agreed cases. 21

6. Of suits for the abatement and recovery of usury. 22
7. Of suits to enforce the payment of legacies and distributive shares. 23
And, under the Act of 1877, the Chancery Court has jurisdiction, concurrent
with the Circuit Court, in the following cases: 24
8. Of all suits to recover money due for work or labor done, or services
rendered, or for the hire, rent, use, price or value of property, real or personal. 25
9. Of all suits to recover money expended for the defendant's use and bene-
fit, or at his instance and request.
10. Of all suits to recover money the defendant has received from or for the
complainant, without the right to retain it against him.
11. Of all suits to recover money agreed, or adjudged, to be paid.
12. Of all suits to recover money due on any contract, express or implied;
or due on any judgment or award or lost at gaming. ;
13. Of all suits to recover penalties, 26 or liquidated damages, or damages

liquidated or unliquidated, for breaches of contracts, expressed or implied;
27
or for breaches of any obligation or legal duty.
14. Of all suits to recover damages in all other cases, 28 except damages for
injuries to person, property or character, involving unliquidated damages.
9 Code, § 4299. The Code following the North ir Code, §§4301; 2451. See Chapter on Di-
Carolina Act of 1762, ch. 5, expressly provides vorce and Alimony.
that the powers of the Chancery over the es- 18 Code, § 3266.
tates of infants are not to be abridged by the 19 Code, §§ 2233; 2267.
concurrent jurisdiction conferred on the Coun- 20 Code, §§ 4302; 4233.
ty Court, § 2493. As to the power of the Chan- 21 Code, §§ 4303; 3432-3454.
cery Court to appoint guardians for infants, 22 Code, § 4300.
see Lake v. McDavitt, 13 Lea, 26. 23 Code, § 2312.
10 The Chancery Court has inherent jurisdic- 24 Acts of 1877, ch. 97.
tion of partition. Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 25 Even if the property has been tortiously
253. converted, the tort may be waived and the
11 Code, §§ 4302; 4201; 3266. value of the property sued for in Chancery.
12Connell v. Walker, 6 Lea, 709; Burgner v. Baker v. Huddleston, 3 Bax., 1. And the suit
Burgner, 11 Heisk., 729; Kindell v. Titus, » may be brought against the administrator of
Heisk.. 727. the tortious converter. Elrod v. Alexander, 4
Heisk., 342.
13 Code, §§ 2407; 4302. 26 McCreary v. .First National Bank, 1 Cates,
14 Code, §§ 4304, 2209-2219. See Article on 128.
this subject, post, §§ 985-987. 27 Damages for breach of warranty. Wil-
15 Code, § 2312; Stewart *. Glenn, 3 Heisk., liams v. Burg, 9 Lea, 455; or for breach of a
581. bond, Glenn v. Moore, 11 Lea, 256.
16 For cases at law where the Chancery 28 Such as for negligence, Kirkeys v. Cran-
Court has no jurisdiction, see post, §§ 290-298. dall, 6 Pick., 532, and fraudulent conduct.
§ 29 STATUTORY JURISDICTION. 22
15. Of all suits to recover land, or any interest therein, or any rent or profit
thereof.
Of all suits to recover specific personal property.
16.
Of all such "special actions and proceedings" 29 as ejectment, 30 forcible
17.
entry and detainer, replevin, 31 detinue, mandamus, 32 habeas corpus, 33 sum-
mary proceedings by motion, and proceedings to change names, and to legiti-
mate and adopt children; and
18. Of all other civil causes of action triable in the Circuit Court, except
for injuries to person, property or character, involving unliquidated damages. 34
The Chancery and Circuit Courts have also concurrent jurisdiction
19. Of all suits in the name of the State against corporations, and to pre-
vent the usurpation of office; 35 and
20. Of all suits commenced by attachment against the property of the de-
fendant. 38
21. Of all suits to enforce mechanics' liens, 37 landlords' and furnishers'
liens, 38 liens on boats, 39 liens of cotton sellers, 40 liens for wharfage, 41 liens of
employes of corporations and partnerships, 42 liens of farm laborers, 43 liens of
contractors and laborers on railroads, 44 and liens on personal property. 45
22. Of all suits brought in the name of the State or County to enforce liens
for taxes, 46 and
23. Of all appeals from the judgment of the County Court on an account
stated by the County Court Clerk with an administrator, or executor. 47
§ 29. Act of 1877, Specially Considered.—The Act of 1877, ch. 97, was at
first regarded with disfavor by the Courts and the Bar, and even its constitu-
tionality questioned. When recognized at all, it was done grudgingly, and
attempts were made by both Judges and Solicitors to limit its application, and
construe it as though it made a law Court out of the Chancery Court. But the
Act gained steadily in favor its constitutionality was recognized, and its wis-
;
29 They are so denominated in the Code. See 2. "Injuries to property, involving unliquidated
"Title 2, of Special Actions and Proceedings," damages" include injuries to property, real or
between § 3228 and § 3229. personal, arising from trespasses, vi et armis,
30 Even when the land is worth less than nuisances, negligence, and torts.
fifty dolars. Frazier v. Browning, 11 Lea, 253; 3. "Injuries to character involving unliquidated
Smith v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 743. damages" include (1) slander, (2) libel, and (3)
31 See Womack v. Smith, 11 Hum., 478; Lee i>. malicious prosecution: the last is often for in-
Cone, 4 Cold., 392; Chesney v. Rodgers, 10 juries to both person and character.
Heisk., 542. By the 2nd Section of the Act of 1877, no de-
32 Hawkins v. Kercheval, 10 Lea, 542. murrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of
The Chancery Court is given jurisdiction
33
action shall be sustained in the Chancery
of habeas corpus suits by the Act of 1877, ch. Court, except in cases of unliquidated damages
97; but it would seem that this Act does not for injuries to person, property or character.
give the Chancellor the powers of the Circuit
Judge in habeas corpus cases at chambers. The Liquidated damages are (1) such as are
habeas corpus "cases of equitable cognizance," agreed upon by the parties either before or
referred to in the Code, § 3723, include only niter the breach. Bouv. L. Die, "Liquidated
cases where a party has been committed by Damages;" Winters v. Fleece, 4 Lea, 550; or
(2) such as are definitely fixed by some rule of
the Chancery Court, or Chancellor, for some
contempt. law. See Glenn v. Moore, 11 Lea, 256; State v.
See Code, §§4108-4109; 4482-4483, Keller, 11 Lea, 399; Williams v. Burg, 9 Lea,
and the Article on Contempt, post, §§ 203; 922. 460. But the Chancery Court in a suit to enjoin
Acts of 1877, ch. 97. The scope of this Act
34
injuries to property will go further and award
is broader than has sometimes been thought. damages for the injury done. See §§ 36; 38.
By it the Chancery Court is given jurisdiction
"of all civil causes of action triable in the Cir- 35 Code, § 3411. See Article on these suits,
cuit Court, except for injuries to the person, post, §§ 1081-1083.
property or character, involving unliquidated 36 Code, §§3455; 3460; 3461. See Chapter on
damages." The exception is confined to "inju- Attachment Suits.
ries to person, property or character,
involving 37 Code, §§ 1987; 3543; Acts of 1S73, ch. 19;
unliquidated damages." Hence, these three Acts of 1889, ch. 103, § 2.
elements must co-exist in the suit to bring it 38 Code. § 3541; Sharp
Fields, 1 Heisk., 571.
v.
within the exception. 1st, the suit must be for an Any attachment suit, except for torts, may be
injury; 2nd, the injury must be to person, prop- brought in Chancery. Code, §§ 3455; 3461; 3507-
erty or character; and 3d, the injury must in- 3508.
volve unliquidated damages. If a civil cause of 30 Code, § 3550; Casey v. Weatherly, 13 Pick.,
action does not cover all three of these ele- 297.
ments, then the suit may be brought in the *o M. & V.'s Code, § 2762.
Chancery Court. Nearly all of the excepted 41 Code, § 1993. '
cases are included in the following three 42 M. & V.'s Code, § 2769.
classes 43 M. & V.'s Code, § 2772.
1. "Injuries to person involving unliquidated 44 M. & V.'s Code, § 2776; Acts of 1877, ch. 97,
damages" include, (1) assault, (2) battery, (3)
false arrest, (4) false imprisonment, (5) injury 45Acts of 1889, ch. 12.
to the person from negligence, nuisances, se- 40Acts of 1887, ch. 2, § 64; Grundy County v.
duction, and malpractice, and (6) malicious Tenn. Coal Co., 10 Pick., 297.
prosecution involving an arrest. 47 Code, §§ 2302-2304.
23 STATUTORY JURISDICTION. §30
dom and usefulness appreciated. It is being more and more liberally construed,
its far-reaching and beneficent effects are more and more fully understood, and
its extensions of remedial powers and processes more and more generally
appreciated and applied.
This Act places at the disposal of the Chancery Court all the powers and
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, in civil causes of action, except a few involv-
ing unliquidated damages so that when a suit is being tried in Chancery, the
;
Chancellor has at his disposal all the weapons and machinery of justice con-
tained in the armories of the common law as well as those in the armories of
Equity, thus enabling him to do full, complete and adequate justice in the
suit before him, unhampered by the formalities and technicalities of the com-
mon law, and unhindered by the former statutes conferring exclusive jurisdic-
tion of common law matters upon the Circuit Courts. The Act of 1877 did not
carry the Chancellor into a Law Court to try the lawsuit, but carried the lawsuit
into the Chancery Court to be heard by the Chancellor, and clothed him with all
of the powers of the Circuit Court in addition to those of the Chancery Court,
so as to enable him not only to administer the law applicable to the case, but
at the same time, to apply any powers or principles of Equity necessary to deter-
mine all the questions involved in the controversy, 48 and render any further
litigation not only unnecessary but improper.
While the maxim, When Chancery has jurisdiction for one purpose it will
take jurisdiction for all purposes, has always been a favorite one, nevertheless
the Court was formerly so hampered by not having a jury of its own to deter-
mine a controlling question of fact when the evidence was conflicting and the
credit of witnesses to be weighed, or to assess unliquidated damages, that it
often, perhaps too often, after deciding the equitable matters in controversy,
refused to go further and remitted the complainant to the Courts of law in
order to obtain the remainder of the redress he was entitled to. But now,
clothed with law powers by the Act of 1877, and having full power to empannei
a jury of its own, our Chancery Court can give full effect to the said maxim, and.
in one and the same suit determine every question of Equity, law or fact in-
volved, including unliquidated damages where such damages are incidental to
the main object of the suit. 49
§ 30. Exclusive Statutory Jurisdiction of the Chancery Court. The Chan- —
cery Court has exclusive statutory jurisdiction of the following suits, some of
which, however, belong, also, to its inherent jurisdiction
1. Of all suits to aid judgment creditors, when the property of the defend-
ant cannot be reached by execution. 50
2. Of all suits to set aside fraudulent conveyances, and subject the property
so conveyed to the satisfaction of complainant's debt. 51
3. Of all suits to subject the property of corporations to the payment of
'
their debts, when the corporate franchises are not used, or have been granted to
others, in whole or in part. 52
4. Of relating to controversies between the State and incorporated
all suits
companies, their stockholders and creditors, growing out of the internal im-
provement laws of the State. 53
5. Of all suits to enforce foreign judgments against the property of the non-
resident defendant when the creditor has exhausted his legal remedy. 54
6. Of all suits to sell the property of infants and married women, for their
support, education and maintenance, and when manifestly for their interest. 55
7. Of all suits to partition, sell and re-invest the property of lunatics, when
for the manifest interest of the lunatic or his family. 56
48 Lenoir v. Mining- Co., 4 Pick., 168. 52 Code, §§ 4294-4295.
49 See post, § 36, where this maxim is fully 53 Code, § 4296.
considered. 54 Code, § 4297.
50 Code, §§ 4282-4286. 55 Code, §§ 3323-3340.
51 Code, §§ 4288-4293. 5G Code, § 3708-3719.
§ 30 STATUTORY JURISDICTION. 24
8. Of an equitable nature, where the debt or demand exceeds
all suits of
fifty dollars, unlessotherwise provided by the Code of 1858. 57
Each of these suits is considered at large, under appropriate headings, in
subsequent sections. 58
57 Code, § 4280. I
ss See Index, and Table of Contents.
25 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP JURISDICTION. §31
CHAPTER III.
MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP EQUITY.

Article I. Maxims and Principles of Jurisdiction.
Article II. Maxims and Principles of Adjudication.
Article III. Maxims Applicable to the Court, and to its Practice, and to
Pleadings.
ARTICLE I.
MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION.

§ 31. Maxims generally Considered. § 37. Chancery never Loses its Jurisdiction by
§ 32. Equity Acts upon the Person. Implication.
§ 33. Equity will not Suffer a Wrong Without § 38. Equity Delights to do Complete Justice,
a Remedy. and Not by Halves.
§ 34. Equity Acts Specifically, and Not by § 39. He who Seeks Equity must Do Equity.
Way of Compensation. § 40. Courts of Equity will not Tolerate any
§ 35. When Parties are Disabled to Act Interference with their Officers, Pro-
Chancery will Act for Them. cess or Decrees, by the Courts of
§ 36. When Chancery has Jurisdiction for Law.
One Purpose, it will Take Jurisdic-
tion for' All Purposes.
§ 31. —
Maxims generally Considered. There are certain great underlying
principles, often called Maxims, 1 which are the fruitful sources of a vast num-
ber of particular rules concerning both rights and remedies. These principles
are a component part of Equity jurisprudence. 2 They lie at the foundation
of universal justice are the sources of municipal law and have been worthily
; ;
—
and aptly called 'legum leges the laws of the laws. 3 These maxims are, in the
strictest sense, the principia/ the beginnings, out of which has been developed
the entire system of Equity jurisprudence, by a process of natural evolution.
The student who has made these principles a part of his mental habit, who has,
as it were, incorporated them into his very intellectual being, has already
mastered the essence of Equity and has made the acquisition of its particular
;
rules an easy task. 5

1 Maxim ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas dent for every case, even if it existed; but he
et certissima auctoritas atque quod maxime omnibus who has -the maxims mastered is saved much
probetur. Co. Lit., 11. (A maxim is so called of the drudgery of hunting precedents. Out of
because its dignity is maximum and its author- the twenty-six letters of the alphabet, by per-
ity the most certain, and because approved at mutations and combinations, are made the
the maximum by all.) countless multitudes of words and sentences
2 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 120. written by earth's millions since writing was
3 2 Kent's Com.,
553. So fundamental are invented. So, out of a few fundamental max-
these that he who disputes their au-
maxims ims can be deduced the rules which, by proper
thority regarded
is as beyond the reach of application, will determine the, equities of the
reason. Contra negantem principia non est dis- vast proportion of equitable suits instituted in
putandum. Coke says, "Maxims of law arenolden Chancery. Melius eH petere fontes quam sectari
tor law." Coke, Litt, 11, 67; and Bacon says, rivulos. (It is better to seek the fountains [the
"They are the fountains of justice from which maxims of the law] than to follow the rivers
flow all civil laws." In Box v. T,anier, 4 Cates, [hunt for adjudications based on maxims.]
409, Beard, Ch. J., says, "Maxims have their The maxims and principles contained in this
foundation in universal law; they are embodied Chapter are not all strictly maxims and prin-
in the common law, and are an essential part ciples of Equity; many of them are maxims
of its warp and woof." and principles of the common law. Neverthe-
4 Principia prooant, non prooantur. (Maxims less, they have all been adopted into the fam-
are proof, and need no proving.) ily of equitable doctrines and are constantly
5 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 121; 360. So vast is the used and applied by our Chancery Courts. The
number and variety of suits in Chancery, that author has long been convinced that no one
it is impossible for a Solicitor to find a prece- can master the jurisprudence of Equity who
§32 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP JURISDICTION. 26
§ 32.
—
Equity Acts upon the Person. 6 "When the Chancellors first began to
exercise judicial functions, they refrained from using common law, or statutory
processes, probably to avoid conflicts with the common law Courts, which were
jealous of the extraordinary powers exercised by the Chancery Court. 1,
Instead of commanding the Sheriff to make the money, decreed the complain-
ant, out of the defendant 's property, the Chancellor commanded the defendant
to pay the money 2, Instead of empowering the Master to divest the title to
;
land out of the defendant, and vest it in the complainant, or the purchaser, the
Chancellor required the defendant to execute a deed to the complainant, or to
the purchaser; 3, Instead of forbidding a Court of law to proceed in a suit,
or to enforce its judgment in a given case, the Chancellor forbade the plaintiff
from proceeding in the suit, or doing any act towards obtaining an execution;
and, 4, In general, the decrees of the Chancery Court were enforced through
the personal act of the party himself. 7 If the party failed or refused, to do
what the Chancellor by his decree required him to do, compulsory process was
issued. But no compulsory process issued until the party had been served
with a mandate, commanding him to do what the Court required of him. 8 If
he then disobeyed, he was adjudged in contempt, and was committed to prison
until he complied with the orders of the Court. If he still refused, his property,
real and personal, was sequestered and applied to the satisfaction of the decree.
This was formerly the practice in North Carolina and Tennessee but in ;
1 787, in consequence of the then mode of

'
carrying into effect the decrees of
'
the Court of Equity by attachments, habeas corpus, attachments by proclama-

tion and commissions of rebellion being in many cases dilatory, oppressive and
inadequate," the Legislature of North Carolina authorized executions to issue
on Chancery decrees, as at law and in 1801, the Legislature of Tennessee en-
;
acted that "instead of decreeing parties to convey lands, as theretofore prac-

ticed in equity," the Court was given power by decree to divest the title out
of the person against whom the decree was pronounced. 9 Since the passage
of these two acts, our Courts of Chancery have not acted, ordinarily, in
personam. The vast majority of Chancery decrees are now enforced by execu-
tions, attachments of property, writs of possession, divestiture of title, and
orders of sale so that it may now be said that our Courts of Chancery do not
;
act, ordinarily, in personam.

Nevertheless, the maxim that Courts of Equity operate on the person, is true;
and most important results follow from the maxim; and although in practice,
our Chancery Court acts ordinarily on the property of the party, yet it has all
of its original authority to act on the person of the party, as will be seen by
inspecting the Code, §§ 4478-4488 and as will be more fully shown hereafter. 10
;
The principal cases in which Equity now operates on the person in Tennessee
are the following
1. Where the Parties Beside within the Jurisdiction of the Court, but the land, or
other subject matter in controversy, is not. In such case, if Equity so require,
the Court may, by attachment, compel one party to convey the* land to the
other. 11 Hence, a specific performance will be decreed as to lands in a foreign
country so, a trust will be declared and enforced, or a mortgage foreclosed or
;
redeemed, or a fraudulent judgment overhauled, and even the sales under such
a judgment, when the lands, or the judgment, are in a foreign country. 12 But
has not thoroughly comprehended that subtle s 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1043.
alchemy in its maxims whereby the most dif- o 1 Scott's Rev., 389; 692.
ficult problems are readily solved; and, so be- 10 See Chapter on the Enforcement of De-
lieving, no little space has been devoted to crees.
them. These principles and maxims constitute 11 Miller v. Birdsong, 7 Bax., 537. It is not
a system of jurisprudence based on good rea- enough that a subpoena to answer was served
son and good conscience; and are designed to on the defendant: he must be an actual resi-
enable the Courts of Equity to do complete dent within the territorial jurisdiction of the
justice between all the parties in any litiga- Court. Wicks v. Caruthers, 13 Lea, 353.
tion, however novel, abstruse, complicated or 12 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 1291-1294. In general
numerous, the questions involved may be. the fact that the property is not within the
6 JEquttas agit in personam. Code, § 430.j. jurisdiction constitutes no bar to a proceeding
7 1 Pom, Eq. Jur., § 428. in a Court of Equity, if the person is within
27 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION. §33
where, in order to give the relief sought, it is necessary to deal directly with the
land itself, without the agency of the parties, then the fact that the land is out-
side of the jurisdiction of the Court would debar the Court from granting the
relief, because the Court will not make a decree that it cannot enforce by its
own authority. 13 Thus, a bill cannot be brought for a partition of land outside
of the jurisdiction, for the Court cannot send commissioners there but a bill ;
may be maintained for rents and profits of land outside of the jurisdiction. 14
2. Where a Discovery of Facts, or of Property,isor the delivery of documents, or
the surrender of personal property, or trust funds, is commanded. 16
§ 33. Equity will not Suffer a Wrong Without a Remedy. This maxim, —
and the maxim that "Equity operates upon the Person," are two of the prin-
ciples most active in originating and moulding the Chancery jurisprudence.
The King, as the "fountain of justice," with an oath resting upon his con-
science to see that right was done to all his subjects, 17 and believing that he
had the prerogative power, as the Supreme Judge of England, to do what-
soever he deemed was right and just as between man and man, without refer-
ence to laws, customs, statutes, precedents or Courts and prompted, no doubt, ;
by his ecclesiastical Chancellors, was not willing to see a wrong done to a sub-
ject, and to be told that there was no power in his kingdom to right that wrong,
that the common law furnished no remedy therefor and that, as a consequence, ;
the wrong-doer, in that particular, was superior to law, and mightier than the
King.
Hence was it, that the King, deeming such a state of facts derogatory to
himself, disparaging to his prerogative, disgraceful to his kingdom and a dere-
liction of duty under his oath, took personal cognizance of such matters when
petitioned to so do and when petitions became too numerous for his personal
;
attention, he referred them to his Chancellors, who were the "keepers of his
conscience," with authority to do whatever good conscience and good reason
required in the premises.
The common law had a maxim, Ubi jus, ibi remedium, (Wherever there is a
right there is a remedy for the violation of that right ;) but the maxim was too
general to be true. Had it been true, there would have been no need for a
Chancery Court. To support this maxim it was held that if there was no
remedy then there was no right, which was the same as saying that the right
depended on the remedy and, unfortunately for the common law, this was true.
;
For, under the common law, every cause of action had to be adapted to some
one of its technical and arbitrary forms of suit, and if this could not be done,
then the suit could not be brought so that, at common law, the right had to be
;
adapted to the remedy, thus violating at the same time, both reason and justice.
In the Chancery Court, the opposite rule was adopted and enforced, and the
remedy was adapted to the right, and thus made to assume any form the right
required.
This maxim, or, as it is sometimes expressed, Equity will not suffer a right to
be without a remedy, is the original source of the entire equitable jurisdiction
the jurisdiction; for a Court of Equity acts 16 On the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court
uoon the person; or, to use the appropriate to act in personam, see Pom. Eq. Jur., §5 135;
phrase, Mquitas agit in personam. But ques- 170; 1317-1318.
tions may arise under a hill respecting funds, 17 The Constitution of our State, which may
or other things, in a foreign country, so purely be called our "fountain of justice," provides
local, that a Court of Equity in another coun- that "every man, for an injury done him in
try might very properly decline to interfere, his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
and remit it to the domestic forum. Sto. Eq. have remedy by due course of law, and right
PI., I 489. See also Johnson v. Kimbro, 3 Head, and justice administered without sale, denial
557. or delay." Const. Tenn., Art. I, § 17. For
13 Extra territorium jus dicenti non paretur im- every injury, the Constitution declares there
pune. (The decree of a Judge who undertakes shall be a remedy; and the Chancery Court has
to exercise jurisdiction beyond his State may had. from its foundation, the inherent right to
be disobeyed without punishment). Telegraph provide, or adopt, a remedy for any case or
Co. v. Railroad, 8 Bax., 61. injury wherefor no remedy clearly appears. 1
14 2 Sto. Eq. Jur.. §§ 1292-1300. Pom. Eq. Jur., 21-20; Bisph. Pr. Eq., 88 6-7;
8,8.
15 Code, §§ 4283-4285. 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 39-44.

§ 33 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP JURISDICTION. 28
of the Chancery Court, exclusive, concurrent and auxiliary; and a full expla-
nation of the scope and meaning of this maxim would require a discussion of
the whole system of Equity. 18 And now that the jurisdiction of the Chancery
Courts has been so greatly enlarged by statutes in Tennessee, the force of the
maxim and its beneficence have been proportionately enlarged.
The wrong that Equity will not suffer to be without a remedy, must be a civil
injury to the complainant's rights or interests, legal or equitable. There are
some duties Equity does not attempt judicially to enforce, such as charity,
gratitude and kindness and some wrongs with which Equity does not interfere,
;
such as violations of honor, or of truth, or of morals, involving no question of

property, and no question of pecuniary liability but any wrong done to a legal
;
or equitable right will be redressed in Equity, unless some other Court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
This maxim was originally intended to mean that, in all civil cases within the
scope of judicial action, where a wrong had been done, or was threatened to be
done, and a full, complete, adequate and certain remedy could not be had in
the common law Courts, a remedy would be provided, and enforced, in the
Chancery Court and all jurisdiction assumed necessary for that purpose. And,
;
in order to enable the Court to adequately exercise this jurisdiction, and to

make its remedies effective, without coming into conflict with the powers or
processes of the common law Courts, the plan was devised of compelling the
defendant himself to execute the decree of the Court of Chancery by impris-
oning him, if necessary, until he did so. Hence, the maxim, Equity acts upon
the person and it might be said that on these two maxims hang all Equity.
;
In pursuance of these two maxims, the Court of Chancery has devised, or

adopted, from the Roman, or civil law, the following remedies, none of which
existed at common law: (1) Specific performance of contracts; (2) Injunctions
to restrain the violation of rights, to stay unjust proceedings at law, to quiet
title, and prevent wrongs; (3) The re-execution of instruments lost or de-
stroyed (4) the re-formation of deeds, or contracts, erroneously drawn by ac-
;
cident, or mistake; (5) The rescission and cancellation of agreements and con-
veyances obtained under circumstances of surprise, fraud or mistake; (6) the
re-opening of settlements, and adjudication of complicated accounts; (7) The
method of winding up all the affairs of a partnership; (8) The marshaling of
securities; (9) The redemption and foreclosure of mortgages; (10) The parti-
tion of land between tenants in common; (11) The enforcement of trusts and
fiduciary obligations; (12) The exoneration, contribution and subrogation of
sureties; (13), The administration of estates; (14) The winding up of the
(states of insolvent debtors, and insolvent corporations; (15) The enforcement
of liens; (16) The protection of the persons and estates of infants; (17) The
establishment of a wife's equity; (18) The remedy by interpleader; (19) The
perpetuation of testimony and (20) A
discovery in aid. of legal proceedings.
;
Thus, upon these two maxims, Equity will not suffer a wrong without a
remedy, and Equity operates upon the person, was builded that grand struc-
ture of jurisprudence called Equity and although by means of the improve-
;
ments in the processes of the Courts, aided largely by wise legislation, remedies
for every civil wrong known to the Courts, have been devised, and enforced,
j et if, in the progress of civilization, if, in the complicated net-work of mercan-
tile business, if, through the ingenuity and subtlety of the human mind bent
on schemes of personal or pecuniary advantages, or intent on devices for
aggrandizement, new remedies should be required to circumvent circumvention
and to overcome the insidiousness of any sort of machiavelism, the Court of
Chancery, operating in obedience to this maxim, will devise a remedy adeqiiate
to the emergency, and vindicate the beneficence and capacity of its inherent
powers to do justice in any case, and to right every wrong, however intricate
18 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 423.
29 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION. § 34
the ease, however great the wrong, or however powerful the wrong-doer. 19
The powers that lie dormant in this potent maxim will awaken, as the necessi-
ties for their action arise; and they will be found commensurate with every
necessity.
It must not be forgotten, however, that this remedy may be forfeited or lost
by the party wronged: forfeited, (1) by some fraudulent, illegal, or unconscien-
tious conduct in connection with the wrong he complains of, whereby his hands
have become stained with iniquity; or (2) by having, through his fault or neg-
ligence, occasioned, or contributed to, the loss complained of for, when one of
;
two persons must suffer, the loss must be borne by him whose act caused it. 20
Or the remedy may be lost, (1)' by the fact that the adverse party has an equal,
or a superior, equity; or (2) by laches, or acquiescence; or (3) by subsequent
contract, or estoppel.
§ Equity Acts Specifically, and Not by Way of Compensation. 2011 This
34. —
principle runs through the whole system of Chancery jurisprudence. Equity
aims at putting the parties exactly in the position they ought to occupy, giving
them in specie what they are entitled to enjoy; and putting a stop to injuries
which are being inflicted. Thus, Equity decrees the specific performance of a
contract, instead of giving damages for its breach. So, Equity restrains the
commission of a trespass, instead of compensating the aggrieved party by dam-
ages. In some cases, also, a party will be compelled to specifically make good
his representations by which another has been misled. 21 So, Equity will declare
a person who has knowingly acquired trust property, a trustee and will make ;
property purchased in his own name by a fiduciary with trust funds, trust
property; will construe and enforce wills and other express trusts; and will
set up lost or destroyed instruments and records; and will cancel fraudulent
deeds, and remove clouds on title, and will, by injunction, protect a party in
his rights, or restrain a party in his wrongs. In all the foregoing cases, the
common law either gave no remedy, or else merely allowed damages for the
wrong, the latter remedy when allowed being often wholly inadequate, and
sometimes, from the poverty of the defendant, wholly worthless.
§ 35. When Parties are Disabled to Act the Chancery Court will Act for
—
Them. 21a Persons of unsound mind are disabled to act for themselves by
nature; infants are disabled both by nature and by law, and married women
;ire disabled by law alone. As a rule, none of these three classes can of them-
selves enter into any important contract, especially contracts relative to lands.
But it is often of great importance to their welfare, to convert their property
into another form, or to expend it for their urgent necessities; and the law
would be greatly defective in this important matter if it furnished no remedy
for such emergencies. The Chancery Court gives this remedy, and has full
jurisdiction to do everything necessary for the welfare of persons under disa-
bility it may sell,lease or exchange, their lands convert personality into realty,
: ;
or realty into personality; order the expenditure of any part of the principal
of their estates for their education, or maintenance; and, in general, do any
act indispensable to their welfare, the Court at all times having in view the
best interests of the parties; and acting as would a prudent and considerate
parent. 22
19 Chancery has been the handmaid of all 22 Ridley v. Halliday, 22 Pick., 607. It is the
courts in affording process to meet exigencies. peculiar province of Courts of Equity to give
She has done so in the face of tyranny, to all needed and appropriate relief in case of in-
break loose the iron hand of power when fants whose rights have been sacrificed. Couy
grasping against conscience. Peck, J., in Cox v. Roane Iron Co., 21 Pick., 515. The Chan-
v. Breedlove, 2 Yerg., 499; 520. Before the cery Court acts as guardian for all persons
establishment of the Chancery Court in Eng- under disability; and, on proper application,
land it might have been often said, Be legibus will protect them from the cupidity of faithless
non curat maasimus. guardians and relatives, and the rapacity of
20 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 387. unscrupulous strangers. But while accorded
20a Snell's Pr. Eq., 47. full protection they are not entitled to have
21 Bisph. Pr. Eq., § 51. technicalities strained in their behalf, especi-
2ia while this is not a maxim, it is never- ally against a stranger guilty of no uncon-
theless a fundamental principle of Equity. scientious conduct.
§36 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP JURISDICTION. 30
§ 36. When Chancery has Jurisdiction for One Purpose, it will Take Juris-
diction for All Purposes. —
This maxim is not always so broadly stated in the
reports and text books, but in the light of the Act of 1877, extending the
common law jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts, there can be no doubt about
the correctness of the rule as given. Pomeroy states the rule thus: "Where
a Court of Equity has obtained jurisdiction over some portion or feature of a
controversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to decide the whole issues,
and to award complete relief, although the rights of the parties are strictly
legal, and the final remedy granted is of the kind which might be conferred
by a Court of law. 23 The reason of the rule is, the duty of Courts to prevent
'
'
a multiplicity of suits and Courts of Equity delight to do complete justice, and

;
not by halves. Our Chancery Court acted in accordance with this rule prior to
the Act of 1877 24 and it may now be considered as an invaluable rule, and one
;
attended with very beneficent results. 25

Where suits are brought to enjoin the further prosecution of a pending action
at law, or the enforcement of a judgment recovered at law, either on the ground
of some equitable defense not cognizable by the law Courts, or on the ground of
some fraud, mistake, accident, or other incident of the trial at law, which ren-
dered the legal judgment inequitable, in such cases a Court of Equity, having
obtained jurisdiction for the purpose of an injunction, will decide the whole
controversy, and render a final decree, even though the issues are legal in their
nature, and capable of being tried by a court of law; and the legal remedies,
therefore, are adequate. This rule is general in its operation, and extends to
all suits brought to obtain the special relief of injunction, and is not confined
to suits for the purpose of enjoining actions, or judgments, at law. It may be
stated as a general proposition, that wherever the Chancery Court has jurisdic-
tion to grant the remedy of injunction for some special purpose, even though
the injunction covers only a portion of the controversy, it may go on and decide
all the issues, and make a final decree, granting full relief in the same manner
as could a Court of law, decreeing damages for the wrongs enjoined when
proper. 26
Particular instances of the operation of this general rule concerning the
remedy of injunction may be seen in cases' of waste, of private nuisance, and of
continuous or irreparable trespasses, where, the Chancery Court having ob-
tained jurisdiction by injunction, will complete the relief the complainant is
entitled to, by decreeing him damages for the injuries done. 27
If the Chancery Court obtains jurisdiction of a suit for the purpose of grant-
ing some distinctively equitable relief, such, for example, as a discovery, or
the specific performance of a contract, or the rescission, or cancellation, of
some instrument, and it appears from facts disclosed on the hearing, but 'not
mown to the complainant when he brought his suit, that the special relief
prayed for has become impracticable, and the complainant is entitled to the
only alternate relief possible, that of damages, the Court then will, instead of
compelling the complainant to incur the double expense and trouble of an
action at law, retain the cause, decide all the issues involved, and decree the
payment of compensatory damages. 28
fundamental rule of Equity jurisprudence, that the Court of Chancery,
It is a
in any cause coming before it for decision, if the circumstances of the case
permit, and all the parties in interest are or can be brought before it, will
23 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 231. Pick., 705; Pearl v. Nashville, 10 Yere 179- 1
24 Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 41 Johnson v. ; m -
UT - S 224-228; 236-237; 1 Sto. Eq.
F%A J
Cooper, 2 Yerg., 524; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg., ?,?
Jur., § 64 ft. Equity will not decree
59. where it may decree a remedy. Fran. aMax., suit
MoHaney Caw-
i. Tjustice
25 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64 ft; v. he ™axim, Equity delights to do com-
thorne, 4 Heisk., 508; Hudgins v. Fanning, 4 plete
.
and not by halves, is similar in

1° thf m axim above treated, and
Bax., 574; Smith v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 744. e at 10 n
26 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 181. See post, § 826. much £
£L°,F that* is found
<
under tt-a head might have
27 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 181. been pertinently incorporated here.
28 Rich! v. Chattanooga Brewing Co., 21
See post.
31 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION. § 37
determine the entire controversy, and award full and final relief; and thus do
complete justice to all the litigants, whatever may be the amount or nature of
their interest or liability, and thus to bring all possible litigation over the
subject-matter within the compass of one judicial determination. By virtue
of this rule, and in order to promote justice, the Court, having obtained juris-
diction of a controversy for one purpose, will extend its judicial cognizance
over rights, interests, and causes of action which are- purely legal in their
nature, and will award remedies which could have been adequately bestowed
by a Court of law. 29 All this could have been done before the Act of 1877 and ;
since that act the rule herein stated has become one of the ordinary jurisdiction
of the Court.
§ 37. The Chancery Court never Loses its Jurisdiction by Implication.—
Exactly what effect our Constitution has, on the stability and jurisdiction of
the Chancery Court, has not been determined. That this jurisdiction can be
increased is certain 30 but it is doubtful whether its equitable jurisdiction can be
;
taken azvay, or even seriously impaired. The system of Equity jurisprudence is

tacitly recognized by the Constitution as a part of the fundamental law of the
land. Hence, all the stronger in Tennessee is the rule that a Court of Equity
never loses its jurisdiction by implication. In all cases where the Court had,
originally, jurisdiction because of some want of adequate remedy at law, that
jurisdiction is not lost by the fact that the Courts of law now give a remedy.
The jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts cannot be made thus to ebb and
flow. Their jurisdiction must be permanent, and must remain fixed until
changed by a new Constitution, or by the Legislature acting within the
present Constitution. 31 The common law Judges cannot diminish the in-
herent jurisdiction of a Court of Equity by enlarging their own jurisdiction;
and when the Legislature enlarges the jurisdiction of the common law Courts,
the rule is well settled that, unless the statute shows a clear legislative intent
to restrict, or abolish, the jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts, such jurisdiction
will continue unabridged, 32 for, ..without some positive act, the just inference is
that the Legislature desires the jurisdiction in Equity to remain upon its old
foundations. 33
§ 38. Equity Delights to do Complete Justice, and Not by Halves. This —
maxim has grown out of the desire of the Chancery Court to so completely
decide every matter involved in the litigation that there will be no roots of
controversy left out of which other suits may spring. 34 Hence, the Court re-
quires that all persons interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-
matter of the suit shall be made parties to it, either as complainants or as de-
fendants, so that there may be a decree that will bind them all. By this means,
the Court is enabled to make a complete decree between all the parties inter-
ested in the controversy, and thus not only to prevent future litigation by
taking away the necessity of a multiplicity of suits, but to make it perfectly
certain that no injustice has been done to any party interested in the subject-
matter of the suit. 35 This, too, is one of the purposes of the Court in enforcing
the maxim, He who seeks equity must do equity; for, by giving the defendant his
rights in a cause, the Court not only does justice in full and not by halves, but
the defendant is relieved from the necessity of instituting a suit in his own
behalf. It is the constant and zealous aim of the Chancery Court to so frame
its decrees as to adjust and compose all disputes as to all matters, legal and
equitable, involved in the controversy, A
Court of Equity will always do
29 1 Pom. Eg. Jur., § 242. last case the paragraph on page 171, beginning
30 Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 597; Nolen ». with "If one," should read It is one," &c.
34 Boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite
Woods, 12 Lea, 616. oriatur. (It is the duty of a good Judge to put
31 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64 i. an end to controversies, and not allow one suit
32 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 278-279. to grow up out of another.) Interest reipublicce
33Womack v. Smith. 11 Hum., 482; Bright v. ut sit finis Utium. (The State is interested in
Newland, 4 Sneed, 442; Smith v. Taylor, 11 having an end put to litigation.)
Lea, 744; Bedwell v. Jones. 9 Lea, 168. In this 35 Sto. Eq. PI., § 72.
§ 39 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP JURISDICTION. 32
directly what can be done indirectly or circuitously, and will strive to prevent
a multiplicity of suits. 30
Formerly the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court ended where that of the
Circuit Court began, and, as a consequence, it was often unable to do complete
justice but after doing half justice, was obliged to remit the complainant to
;
the Circuit Court for the other half. This was especially true »
1. On bills to remove a cloud, or recover land, the complainants after re-

covering the land in the Chancery Court, were obliged to go to the Circuit Court
to collect the rents and profits.
2. On bills to enjoin a nuisance, the complainants, after having the nuisance
enjoined,' were remitted to the Circuit Court to recover their damages.
3. On bills for a new trial, the parties complaining, after proving their case
in Chancery, were remitted to the Circuit Court, if plaintiffs there, in order to
obtain a recovery.
4. On bills to set up lost deeds, notes of hand, or other contracts, the com-
plainants, after having their lost instruments set up in Chancery were obliged
to resort to the Circuit Court to have them enforced.
5. On bills to enjoin waste, after a perpetual injunction was had in Chan-
cery, the complainants were remitted to the Circuit Court to get compensation
for the waste committed.
6. On bills to reform instruments, after getting them reformed in Chancery,
the complainants were obliged to go to the Circuit Court, -to obtain damages for
their breach, or recover what was due on them.
7. On bills to enjoin a defendant in the Circuit Court from making an in-
equitable defence, or to enjoin a plaintiff from asserting an inequitable claim,
after obtaining such relief the suits in the Circuit Court were often left pending.
8. On bills to declare the defendant a usurper, the complainant was given
the office, but remitted to further litigation to recover his fees.
In most of the above instances the Chancery Court now administers full jus-
tice, its hand being no longer stayed by the fear of trespassing on the domains
of the law Courts 37 and the disposition of the Chancellors now is to disregard
;
decisions and precedents absolete since the Act of 1877, and administer justice-
to the full extent of their jurisdiction, and no longer remit a party to the Cir-
cuit Court, or force him to institute a second suit, when all the questions in-
volved in the litigation, or incidental to it, can be effectually determined in the
suit pending in the Chancery Court 3S so that partial or half justice is now very
;
seldom administered. 89
§ 39. He Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity. Under the operation of this —
maxim, Courts of Chancery are enabled to adjust the equities of the complain-
ant to the equities of the defendant, and thus do complete justice between the
parties. Formerly, it was the practice of the Court to refuse relief to the com-
plainant, unless the complainant would acknowledge, or concede, or provide
for, the rights, claims and demands justly belonging to the defendant, and
growing out of, or necessarily connected with, the subject-matter of the con-
troversy. The ecclesiastical Chancellors sought to enforce in their Courts the
divine injunction of doing unto others as we would have others do unto us ;
which is only*another form of the maxim. But now, the Court of Chancery
does not wait for the complainant to offer to do equity, but acts on the supposi-
tion that, knowing the rule of the Court, he is willing to do whatever equity
towards the defendant the Court may require of him. (1), If a borrower of
money upon usury seeks the aid of the Chancery Court to have cancelled the
30 Two suits are a multiplicity. Pearl v. is the duty of a good judge to amplify his ju-
Nashville, 10 Yers\. 179, 185. risdiction, when necessary to do full justice.
3T The Act of 1877 gives the Chancery Court This maxim in its operation is similar to
30
a free hand in dealing with most matters for- the maxim, When Chancery has jurisdiction
merly cognizable exclusively in the Courts of for one purpose, it will take jurisdiction
Law. for all purposes. See ante, § 36.
38 Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem. It
S3 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION. § 40
usurious contract, the Court will require him to do equity by paying the lender
what is legally due him (2) If a taxpayer seeks relief from an over-assessment,
;
,
le must pay what is justly due; (3), If a party seeks to have a tax-deed
declared a cloud, he must pay all the taxes paid by the holder of the deed (4), ;
[f a person asks for partition, he must pay his proportion of any incumbrance
removed by the defendant; 40 (5), If a husband seeks the aid of a Chancery
3ourt to reduce his wife's personal estate to possession, he will be required to
io equity to the wife by allowing the Court to settle upon her, for the sole and
separate use of herself and children, a reasonable portion of the proceeds of
said estate; (6), If the owner of land allows another to make improvements
thereon under the belief that he has the right, a Court of Chancery will compel
«uch owner, seeking to assert his title, to pay for such improvements; 41 (7),
Where a complainant seeks to have a certain fund decreed to him, he will be
required, if insolvent, to pay the defendant what he owes him; 42 (8) Where a
complainant has his deed declared a mortgage he must pay the consideration
he received; (9), Where the complainant obtains the rescission of a contract,
or the cancellation of an instrument he must make the defendant whole; (10),
Where a married woman avoids a sale she must restore the consideration she re-
ceived (11),
;
Amortgagor will not be allowed to redeem, without paying an in-
cumbrance discharged by the mortgagee; 43 (12), A
judgment will not be en-
joined, unless complainant pays what he owes the judgment creditor, 44 and,
(13), In general, whenever a complainant seeks to recover property from which
the defendant has removed an incumbrance, or to the value of which the defend-
ant has added in good faith, relief will be granted the complainant only on con-
dition that the defendant be reimbursed to the extent the complainant has been
by him benefited.
It will thus be seen that, in giving the complainant relief, a Court of Chan-
cery will require of him whatever the defendant may, in good reason and good
conscience, be entitled to in reference to the subject-matter of the suit, although,
this requirement may be one the Court would not otherwise enforce. 45 The
condition thus imposed on the complainant is, as it were, the price of the decree
the Court gives him. Under this maxim, an equitable right may be secured to
the defendant which could not be obtained by him in any other manner which —
be could not have secured by a suit brought for that purpose. The equity the
complainant is required to do must, however, be connected with the subject-
matter of the suit, or grow out of the very controversy before the Court and ;
conditions must not be arbitrarily imposed. 46

The principle contained in this maxim enlarges the powers and jurisdiction
of the Court when equities arise, in favor of the defendant, out of the subject-
matter of the controversy; and hence, this might be termed a jurisdictional
maxim. It, also, enables the Chancellor to determine the whole controversy in
all is branches, and, if necessary, to make a sort of equitable compromise de-
cree, giving to each party what, in good reason and good conscience, he ought
to have and requiring of each what, in good reason and good conscience, he
;
—
ought to do; thus fulfilling that other maxim, Boni judicis est litcs dirimere,
tie lis ex lite oriatur. (It is the duty of a good judge to so thoroughly decide a
fuit that another suit will not arise out of it.) *
§ 40. Courts of Equity will not Tolerate any Interference with their Officers,
—
Process or Decrees, by the Courts of Law. This is an old and well-settled rule,
and was adopted in the infancy of the Court of Chancery as a sort of law of
self-preservation. For, if the Courts of common law could ha,ve had their way,
they would have throttled the Chancery Court in its cradle. In those semi-bar-
barous times the beauties of Equity and Christian ethics were not appreciated ;
40 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64. 44 Creed v. Scruggs, 1 Heisk., 590.
41 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 389-390. 45 Wilson v. Carver, 4 Hay., 90.
42 Alexander v. Wallace, 10 Yerg., lOo. 46 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§386-387.
Wood
43 Wilson v. Carver, 4 Hay., 90; v. Chil-
coat, 1 Cold., 423.
§40 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION. 34
and the rude, stern, arbitrary code of the common law was deemed the perfec-
tion of reason, and no higher or better law was deemed possible, or desirable.
It is manifest, that, from the necessity of the case, one Court cannot allow
another Court to question its proceedings, to interfere with its process, to dis-
turb its officers, or to thwart its decrees. All the authorities concur in con-
sidering it as settled law that a Court of Chancery will protect its own officers
against any suit brought against them for acts done under its process. 47 This
rule applies to Receivers, Sequestrators, and al| other officers acting under the
orders of the Court and any interference with them will be deemed a contempt
;
of Court, and punished as such. 48 Even a stranger to the suit, who has been dis-
possessed, must apply to the Court for redress, and cannot bring a forcible
entry and detainer suit in another Court. 49 A
party wrongfully dispossessed
should file a petition for a writ of restitution. 50
Every Court must have an inherent power of enforcing its judgments and
decrees and surely to no tribunal can this power more properly belong than
;
to the Chancery Court. 51 And, in general, if any person suffers any injury, in
consequence of any order, or proceeding, of the Chancery Court, or by reason
of anything which has occurred in the execution of its process, he must apply
to that Court for redress, and not to a Court of Law. If the matter complained
of involves a question of jurisdiction, or of the validity or effect of its order
or process, the Chancery Court will never allow such a question to be carried
for decision to a Court of Law; but will, at its discretion, either itself give
redress to the party aggrieved, or permit him to proceed at Law, as justice and
convenience may require. 52
47 Turner v. Breeden, 2 Lea, 713. 50 ntd.
48 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1056; 2 Sto. Bq. Jur., § 51 Deaderick v. Smith, 6 Hum., 146.
833, a. 52 Smith's Bq. Jur., 32.
49 Scott u. Newsom, 4 Sneed, 456.
MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. §41
ARTICLE II.
MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION.

41. Maxims of Adjudication Generally § 51. No one Can Take Advantage of His
Considered. own Wrong.
42. He who Comes into Equity must Come § 52. Where One of Two Persons must Suf-
with Clean Hands. fer a Loss, He
should Suffer whose
43. Equity Looks to the Intent rather than Act or Neglect Occasioned the Loss.
to the Form. § 53. Equity Follows the Law.
44. Equity Imputes an Intention to Fulfil § 54. Where there is Equal Equity the Law
an Obligation. must Prevail.
45. Equity Regards that as Done which § 55. Where there are Equal Equities, the
First in Order of Time shall Prevail.
Ought to be Done.
46. No Person Bound to Act for Another
§ 56. To Protect and Enforce Rights to
Property the Object of Suits in
can Act for Himself.
Chancery.
47. Equity Delights in Equality. § 57. Equity Regards the Beneficiary as the
48. Equity will Undo What Fraud has Real Owner.
Done. § 58. Equity Enforces What Good Reason
49. Equity Aids the Vigilant, Not Those and Good Conscience Require.
who Sleep upon their Rights. § 59. No One Should be Condemned With-
50. So Use your Own as Not to Injure out a Chance to be Heard.
Another. § 60. Stare Decisis, et Non Quieta Movere.
§ 41. Maxims
of Adjudication Generally Considered. In the adjudication —
f the questions that arise in Equity it is seldom that any statute is determina-
ive, and not always that any decision of our Supreme Court is applicable and ;
Lence the Chancellor is forced to rely on the rules of practice and pleading, and
he maxims and principles of law and Equity, as his guides. These rules, max-
ms and principles are generally so thoroughly incorporated into his judgment
hat he uses them unconsciously in making a decision. But, if his opinion is
written and analyzed, it will often be discovered that these rules, maxims and
irinciples controlled the decision.
The principal maxims on which the Chancellor acts in adjudicating an equita-
ile matter are the following, which might be designated as
THE TWELVE TABLES 1 OP EQUITY.

1.Equity acts upon the person, (forcing him to do what conscience requires.)
2.Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.
3. Equity imputes an intention to fulfil an obligation.
4. Equity acts specifically, and not by way of compensation.
5. Equity regards that as done which ought to be done.
6. Equity requires him who seeks equity to do equity.
7. Equity regards the beneficiary as the real owner.
8. Equity delights to do complete justice, and not by halves.
9. Equity acts for those disabled to act for themselves.
10. Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form.
11. Equity delights in equality.
12. Equity requires diligence, clean hands and good faith.
Some of these maxims have been considered in the preceding Article, being,
,lso, maxims of jurisdiction.
lln analogy to the Twelve Tables of the Roman Law.
§ 42 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. 36
He who Comes into Equity must Come with Clean HanSs. This
§ 42.
2
—
maxim declares that a complainant, who has been guilty of unconscientious
conduct or bad faith, or has committed any wrong, in reference to a particular
transaction, cannot have the aid of a Court of Equity in enforcing any alleged
rights growing out of such transaction. The Court of Chancery was regarded
by the ecclesiastical Chancellors as a Temple into which none could come except
those who had "clean hands and pure hearts." In the origin of the jurispru-
dence, the theory was adopted that a Court of Equity interposed only to enforce
the requirements of good conscience and good reason, as to matters not equita-
bly determinable in the Law Courts; and this interposition being deemed a
matter of Grace, it would not be exercised in favor of a person, whose conduct,
in the matter he had complained of, had been unconscientious, or in bad faith
or who had violated any of those principles of Equity and righteous dealing,
which the Court had been constituted to enforce. But the operation of the
maxim is confined to misconduct connected with the particular matter in litiga-
tion and does not extend to any misconduct, however gross, which is uncon-
;
nected therewith, and with which the defendant is not concerned. 3 Under the
operation of this maxim, the complainant must show that the transaction from
which his claim arises is fair and just, that there is nothing unconscientious in
his conduct relative thereto, and that the relief he seeks is equitable, and not
harsh or oppressive upon the defendant. Hence, a specific performance will be
refused when the complainant has obtained the agreement by sharp and un-
scrupulous practices, by over-reaching, by concealment of important facts, by
taking undue advantage of his position, or by any unconscientious means or, ;
when the contract itself is unfair, one-sided, unconscionable, or affected by any

other such inequitable circumstance or, when the specific enforcement of the
;
agreement would be oppressive upon the defendant, or would, in any other

manner, work injustice. 4 So, if a contract is affected with fraud, or has a fraud-
ulent purpose, none of the parties to such fraud can have the assistance of the
Court either to compel the execution of such contract, or to have it cancelled,
or to have the property or interests, transferred thereunder, restored. Equity
will leave such parties where they have placed themselves, and will refuse all
affirmative aid to either of the fraudulent participants. It is on this principle
that the door of a Court of Equity is always shut against a debtor when he
seeks to recover back property he has conveyed to hinder, delay or defraud
his creditors. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. (No right of action arises out of a
fraud.) Agreements and transfers, the consideration of which is based on a
violation of chastity, or on compounding a felony, or on gambling, or on the
commission of any crime, or on any breach of good morals, are all deemed
illegal, and no participant therein can get any relief, in the Chancery Court,
whether the relief sought is an enforcement of the agreement, or a rescission of
5
it. In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. ("Where parties are equally in
the wrong the condition of the defendant is the stronger.) But where the
parties are not in pari delicto, and where public policy is promoted thereby, the
more excusable of the two may be granted relief by the Court setting aside the
agreement and restoring him to his original position. A
Court of Chancery will
not enforce an usurious contract even when the defence of usury is not made
but will relieve against usurious contracts; and will also restore money or
property lost upon any game or wager.
§ 43. Equity Looks to the Intent rather than to the Form. —This maxim is
2There are several maxims akin to this: ness of complainant's hands will defeat his
He who hath committed iniquity shall not suit whenever and however it appears Sim-
have equity; Ex turpi causa non oritur actio, mons Medicine Co. Mansfield Drug Co., 9
t>.
(No right of action arises out of an immoral Pick., 84. See, Horton v. Lyons, 13 Pick., 180.
transaction;) In pari delicto potior est conditio 4 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 400. Horton r. Lyons, 13
rlefetiijentis, (Where both parties are equally in Pick., 180.
fault, the situation of defendant is the strong- 5 1Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 401-402.
er.) o Code, §§ 1771; 1954; Bank v. Mann, 10 Pick.,
3 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 398-399. The unclean -
37 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. §43
connected with the one that says, Equity regards that as done which in good con-
science ought to have been done; for it is only by looking at the intent, rather
than at the form, of a transaction that Equity can treat as done what ought to
have been done. The two maxims act together and aid each other; 7 and with
the further help of the maxim, that Equity imputes an intention to fulfil 'an obli-
gation, a Court of Chancery will not only hold a resulting trustee, or a construc-
tive trustee, liable as such, but will impute to him an intention to act as such,
regardless of the form of the transfer, or conveyance.
Equity heeds not forms, but strives to reach the substance of things and to ;
ascertain, uphold and enforce rights and duties which spring from the real rela-
tions and the actual transactions of the parties. Looking to the intent rather
than to the form, whenever a penalty is designed merely to secure the payment
of a given sum of money, or the performance of some act, Equity will relieve
the obligor from the penalty, upon his paying the debt, or the actual damages,
resulting from his default. So, if a lease has been forfeited for non-payment
of rent, or for breach of some, but not all of the covenants contained in the
lease, if the lessor can be adequately compensated for the breach of the contract,
Equity will regard the forfeiture clause as merely a means of securing the ob-
servance of the contract, and a Court of Chancery will relieve from the for-
feiture. 8 So, looking at the intent rather than at the form of the contract,
Equity will consider the forfeiture clauses in mortgages and trust deeds as' u
merely means of enforcing the payment of the money contracted to be paid,
and will relieve from forfeitures incurred, upon the payment of the debt. 9
Equity will, also, upon parol evidence, convert an absolute deed into a mort-
gage and will, in general, unless prohibited by some statute, set up and enforce
;
the real contract of the parties, regardless of the form, or of the want of form;
for Equity looks not at the outward form, but to the inward substance of every
transaction, recurring to principles and disregarding ceremonies, 10 looking
upon forms as made for justice, and not justice made for forms. Where there
is substance for the Court to act on, the want of form will be disregarded, for
Equity regards substance and not ceremonies. This is true not only in adjudi-
cating the equities of the parties, but is true in matters of pleading, also. Thus
if the bill makes out a case for relief, any want of formality, or any misnomer
of the bill, or any eccentricity of phraseology, will not defeat the complainant's
right to relief on the facts alleged and proved. 103. So, if the necessary parties
are before the Court, and a case for relief is alleged and proved, the fact that
parties are made complainants who should have been made defendants, or
vice versa, will not prevent the Court from decreeing according to the equities
of the parties and this is so even when persons under disability are to be
;
affected by the decrees. The fact that the proper facts are alleged, and the
proper parties are before the Court, is substance the manner of alleging the
;
facts and the position of the parties in the suit is ceremony.

No one is presumed to give something for nothing, and no one can in reason
and conscience expect to receive something for nothing. Whenever a person
parts with a consideration he is presumed to intend to acquire whatever that
consideration pays for and he who acquires the legal title to property for which
;
another's money has paid, is bound in reason and conscience to hold it subject
to the orders of the person whose money went into it. Reduced to the last
analysis, the property acquired by another's money is only that money in an-
7 Pom. Bq. Jur., § 378. parties, to tie its hands, or shackle its feet,
8 Pom. Bq. Jur., § 381. or dim its sight, in searching for the real
9 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 382. truth of the transaction under investigation.
10 Bond v. Jackson, 3 Hay., 191. Equity looks Courts of Equity act upon the circumstances
beneath the veil of form, and discerns the and justice of the particular case, whereas
real features of the transaction, acting on Courts of law rather regard precedents, forms,
the maxim, Non quod dictum est, sed quod fac- rules of procedure and the strict letter of the
tum est. inspicitur. Snell's Pr. Eq., 41. Equity law.
considers the real and the substantial, and al- 10* See post, §§ 139, note 19; 269; 431, note;
lows no rule of evidence at law, no fiction of 681; 719; 64, sub.-sec. 4.
Courts of law, and no acts or subterfuges of
§44 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION. 38
other form; and property conveyed without receiving another's money therefor,
continues, in Equity, the property of the conveyor. Hence, it is the passing of
a consideration and not the form of the contract that in Equity passes title u ;
and whatever the form of the transaction, if no consideration passes, in Equity

no title passes. 12
§ 44. Equity Imputes an Intention to Fulfil an Obligation. Court of Con- —A

science will not hastily conclude that an unconscientious act has been done, if
the conduct of the actor is susceptible of a more charitable construction. The
Court will presume an innocent intention, if such presumption will not hazard
the equitable rights of the complainant. This maxim, therefore, is a mere state-
ment of the general presumption upon which a Court of Equity acts; and it
means that, whenever a duty rests upon an individual, in the absence of all
evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that he intended to do right rather
than wrong to act conscientiously rather than in bad faith to perform his duty
; ;
rather than to violate it. 13 Thus, when a person covenants to do an act, and he
afterwards does something which is capable of being considered either a total
or a partial performance of that act, he will be presumed to have done it with
the intention of performing his covenant, although no such intention was ex-
pressed. So, whenever a trustee, or other person in a fiduciary position, acting
apparently within the scope of his powers {that is, having authority to do what
he does do), purchases lands, or personal property, with trust funds, and takes
the title to such property in his own name, without any declaration of a trust, a
trust with respect to such property at once results in favor of the beneficiary
of said funds, and the purchaser becomes with respect to such property, a trus-
tee. A
Court of Equity assumes that the purchaser intended to do his fiduciary
duty, and not to violate it and he will not be heard to dispute this assumption.
;
All the evidence the Court needs to create the trust is the proof that the trust
funds were actually used in the purchase.
This maxim is applied to trustees proper, to executors and administrators, to
directors and managers of corporations, to guardians of infants or of persons
of unsound mind, to agents using the money of their principals, to partners
using partnership funds, to husbands purchasing property with the separate
estate of their wives, and generally, to all persons who stand in fiduciary rela-
tions to others. 14 And when it is shown that such persons have used money, by
them so held in trust, in the purchase of any property, real or personal, taking
the title in their own name, a Court of Chancery will impute to them an inten-
tion to fulfil their obligation, namely, to make the purchase for the benefit of
the person entitled to the use of the consideration money; and they will be
decreed to hold such property as trustees for the benefit of the parties whose
funds were used in the purchase.
§ 45. Equity Regards that as Done which Ought to be Done. In a Court —
of Chancery ought to be becomes is; and whatever a party ought to do, or ought
to have done, in reference to the property of another, will, ordinarily, be re-
garded as done; and the rights of the parties will be adjudicated as though, in
fact, it had been done. 15 This maxim is far-reaching in its operation, and full of
beneficent consequences the doctrines and rules creating and defining equitable
;
estates or interests being, in a great measure, drived from it. 16

As between the party by whom, and the party for whom, an act ought, in good
conscience, to be done, or to have been done, Equity will consider it as done.
For the purpose of reaching exact justice, Equity will frequently consider that
property has assumed certain forms with which it ought, in justice, to be
11 Solutio pretii emptionis loco habetur. (The that good faith be observed in all transactions
payment of the purchase-money is equivalent between man and man. Craddock v. Cabiness,
to a purchase.) 1 Swan, 483.
12 This is the reason a purchaser without a 14 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., §§ 421-422.
valuable consideration has no equity. See 16 Stephenson v. Tandle, 3 Hay., 115; Wavnee.
post. §§332; 390. Pouts, 24 Pick., 145.
13 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 420. The law requires is 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., § 364.
39 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION. § 45
stamped, 17 or that parties have performed certain duties which they, in justice,
ought to fulfill and will regulate the ownership of estates and interests accord-
;
ingly. 18 In such matters another maxim is sometimes invoked: Equity' regards

the substance, not the forms of things. Thus, (1) the vendor of land is regarded in
Equity as the owner of the purchase-money, and the vendee is looked upon as
the owner of the land; (2) the purchaser of a possible interest in land becomes
the equitable owner of the interest (3) the sale of a chattel not yet in existence,
;
or not yet the property of the seller, becomes effective in Equity as soon as the
thing comes into existence", or becomes the property of the seller (4) the as- ;
signment of a thing in action gives the assignee all the rights of the assignor
and (5) in general, whenever a party, for a valuable consideration transfers,
or contracts to transfer, any interest in any property, or in any rights of
property, a Court of Chancery places the assignee, or vendee, in the shoes of the
vendor as to all. the interests and rights transferred, or agreed to be trans-
ferred. 19 when an agent invests his principal's money in land, and
So, (1)
takes own name or (2) a partner uses partnership funds to buy land
title in his ;
in his own name or (3) when a guardian uses his ward's funds in the purchase
;
of property in his own name or (4) an executor, administrator, or any other

;
trustee, uses trust money to buy property in his own name, in all such cases
Equity will regard that as done which the purchaser ought to have done, that,
is, will regard the purchaser as holding the legal title for the benefit of the
party who was entitled to the purchase money, and will decree accordingly.
So, when a party acquires the legal title to property by fraud, he will be decreed
to hold it as trustee for his vendor. And where an act is prevented from being
done, by fraud, Equity will consider the act as done, in order to avoid the effects
of the fraud. 20 Thus, a widow prevented by fraud from dissenting to a will,
in Equity will be given all the rights she would have acquired by a dissent
in due time. 21 And if a son pretend to destroy deeds to enable his father to
devise the lands, but destroys only copies, Equity will treat the deeds as de-
stroyed. 22 Equity, treating that as done which ought to have been done, will
consider land as redeemed when the redeemer has done all that was required
of him, and the purchaser refuses to re-convey, or to take the redemption
money. This maxim is nearly allied to another maxim, No one can take advan-
tage of his own wrong. To prevent a party deriving advantage from his own
wrong, Equity regards that as done which, in good reason and good conscience
ought to have been done. Hence, agreements based on a valuable consideration
are, in Equity, considered, in the interests of the person entitled to their per-
formance, as performed, and performed at the time when, and in the manner in
which, they ought to have been performed. 23 And the same consequences at-
tach to the agreement as though it had actually been performed, so that the
party in default shall not benefit by his wrong, nor the other party suffer
thereby. 24
So where land is ordered to be sold by a will, it is considered as personalty
and where land devised by a will is afterwards contracted to be sold, it is
deemed converted, 25 and the devisee gets nothing but the naked legal title
without any beneficial interest in the property. 26 Money directed by a will to
be invested in land is considered as land, and descends to the heirs of the origi-
nal beneficiary, and not to his personal representatives and, on the other hand,
;
land directed by a will to be converted into money goes to the personal repre-
sentatives of the original beneficiary, or is included in the general term "per-
'
2T
sonal property. '
it Wheless v. Wheless, 8 Pick., 293. 25 The doctrine of equitable conversion is

18 Bisph. Pr. Bq., § 44. firmly fixed in the jurisprudence of Tennessee.
19 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., §§ 368-369. Wayne v. Fouts, 24 Pick., 145.
20 Townsend v. Townsend, 4 Cold., 83. 26 But the contract of sale must be one that
21 Smart v. Water-house, 10 Yerg., 93; 1 Sto. is enforceable. Blair v. Snodgrass, 1 Sneed 24
Bq. Jur., §§187; 256. 27 McCormick v. Cantrell; 7 Terg., 615; Green
22 Belcher v. Belcher, 10 Yerg., 120. v. Davidson, 4 Bax., 488; Jones v. Kirkpatrick
23 Cook «. Cook, 3 Head, 719. 2 Tenn. Ch., 696; 1 Pom. Bq. Jur., § 371; 1 sto'
24 1 Sto. Bq. Jur., § 64 g. Eq. Jur., §§790-793; 1212-1214.
But an administrator has no power to make a conversion and if he does, the ;
money put into land will be deemed personality, at the election of those entitled
to the money. 28
In reference to agreements the maxim is sometimes stated thus What is :
'
'
agreed to be done is considered as done," 29 and sometimes thus, "Equity treats

that as done which is agreed to be done upon sufficient considerations." 30 But
it must be borne in mind that this maxim seeks no more than to enforce an
equitable obligation. There must be a right on one side and a corresponding
duty on the other side. Equity does not regard as done what might have been
done, or what could have been done, but what ought, in good reason and good
conscience, to have been done. Nor does this rule operate in favor of any one
except him who has the equitable right to have the act performed, and those
standing in his shoes nor does it operate against any one except him upon
;
whom the duty has devolved, and upon those who stand in his place. 31
§ 46. No Person Bound to Act for Another in any Matter can, as to that
—
Matter, Act for Himself. This, while not a maxim, is a fundamental doctrine
of Equity, and one fruitful of many most beneficent consequences. 32 In the
first place, whoever undertakes to act for another 's benefit, impliedly contracts
that in every matter affecting the other, he will do for him all that good reason
and good conscience require. In order to avoid any possible contention, and
to leave absolutely no room for casuistry, Courts of Equity lay it down as a rule,
without exception, that no trustee shall in any case, or under any circumstances,
directly or indirectly, acquire any personal interest or title in or to the trust
property, or its proceeds, or make any personal profits out of the trust, or by
means of his trust character, without the full consent of the beneficiary, given
under circumstances that leave no room whatever to question the perfect fair-
ness and good faith of the whole transaction. Even then, a Court of Equity
acts hesitatingly in confirming such transactions and when they are questioned,
;
requires conclusive evidence of the fullest good faith on the part of the trustee,
and the most thorough understanding of the facts, and the most absolute free-
dom of action, on the part of the beneficiary. When a relation of confidence is
once shown, a Court of Chancery will presume that the dominion or influence
arising therefrom was exercised. 33 Of course, if the beneficiary is a minor, or
person of unsound mind, he is utterly incapable of giving any such consent.
This rule is potent of consequences in matters of implied trusts, and construc-
tive frauds and, under its operation, all trustees and quasi-trustees are kept in
;
the strict line of their true and full duty; and when such duty is violated,
Equity will, as far as possible, deal with them and their doings as though they
were really intending to do their duty, and act for the beneficiary's benefit;
28 Roberts v. Jackson, 3 Yerg., 77. discharge the duties he undertakes, with an
29 The maxim is sometimes generalized thus: eye single to the welfare of the party trusting
Equity looks on that as done which ought him; and before he can act for himself in any
to have been done, or which has been agreed matter, affecting the interests of the person
to be done, or which has been directed to be trusting him, he must surrender the relation
done. Snell's Pr. Eq. Stephenson v. Yandle,
; in good faith, and acquaint such person with
3 Hay., 115. all the facts in his possession necessary to a
so Griffey Northcutt, 5 Heisk., 755.
v. complete understanding of those matters.
31 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 365. No greater business wrong can be commit-
32 Cannon v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 570-580. ted, under the form of a contract, than the
33 Bayliss v. Williams, 6 Cold., 441. No per- acquisition of the property, or taking other
son who undertakes or assumes to act for advantage, of a person by the betrayal of
another's welfare in any matter, can, without his confidence. Such an act is a sort of trea-
violating good reason and good conscience, so son against good faith, and shocks the con-
act in that matter as to obtain an advantage science of all mankind. In order to remove the
for himself, at the expense of the person for temptation to such gross treachery, and there-
whom he assumes to act. A party who takes by more effectually to prevent such wrongs,
advantage of the trust or confidence reposed Courts of Equity consider all contracts be-
in him by another, and thereby benefits him- tween the person trusting and the person
self to the other's injury, is guilty of the trusted as voidable at the election of the
grossest possible breach of good faith. A performer. This rule applies to all persons who
son who undertakes to act for another implied- undertake or assume to act for others, or to
ly contracts with him to give him the full ben- become their confidential advisers, and to
efit of his wisdom, skill and diligence; and to every case where influence is acquired and
prefer his principal's or ward's interest to his abused, or confidence is reposed and betrayed.
own. A person holding a relation of trust, Se» Searcy «. Kirkpatrick, 1 Overton, 423; post,
confidence or agency, is bound by every consid- § 57.
eration of reason and conscience to loyally
and will accordingly give the beneficiary all the benefits accruing to the
trustee, or the quasi-trustee, by means of the transaction in question; will
give the beneficiary the property or profits acquired, and will require the
trustee, or quasi-trustee, to make good any loss caused by his conduct in the
matter.
The reason of the rule, that a trustee can never act for himself in any trust
matter, is the necessity of absolutely removing from him any temptation to
violate his full duty, and the imminent peril of allowing him to occupy a situa-
tion wherein he may have occasion to doubt when he might, or might not, act
for himself, and when he must, or may, act for the beneficiary or person confid-
ing in him. 34
In the meaning of this section, and also, wherever used in this book, the
general term "trustee" denotes and includes executors, administrators, Clerks
of Courts, Receivers, Special Commissioners, Sheriffs, constables, and all
guardians, officers and persons who give bonds for the faithful discharge of
their duties, and all other persons on whom fiduciary or trust duties are con-
ferred by any instrument of writing, or by any statute, ordinance or by-law,
public, corporate or private; and the term "quasi-trustee" denotes and includes
husband, wife, parent, person in a parental situation, attorney, guardian ad
litem, next friend, partner, agent, business manager, clerk, steward, secretary,
treasurer, book-keeper, auctioneer, consignee, bailee, physician, spiritual ad-
viser, the promoters, president, directors and other officers or managers of a
corporation or association, vendor, creditor, principal debtor in cases of surety-
ship, and, in general, all other persons who undertake, or assume, the character
of confidential advisers, or managers of another 's affairs, or who occupy a posi-
tion or relation that enables them to greatly influence the action of those rely-
ing upon them, or who in any way acquire influence and abuse it, or possess
another's confidence and betray it. The term trustee includes both trustees
and quasi-trustees, and the term beneficiary denotes and includes every one who
expressly or impliedly confides or trusts his property, business or affairs, to
another, and every one for whose benefit an express or implied trust arises, or
a constructive fraud can be declared. 35
§ 47. —
Equity Delights in Equality. This maxim is sometimes more strongly
•expressed thus Equality is Equity. 36
: The common law delighted in prefer-
ences it was the law of a people fond of distinctions, distinctions in personal
;
rank, in social positions, in forms of procedure, in evidences of debt, and in

forms of actions. But the Chancery Court, early in its history, endeavored to
break down these distinctions in so far as property was concerned. Joint obli-
gations were made several liens were apportioned contribution was enforced
; ;
among co-contractors, co-sureties and co-legatees and the estates of debtors

;
were divided ratably among their creditors. These changes in the common
law, thus enforced originally in Equity, have long since, by statute or other-
wise, become a part of the general law of the land.
In accordance with this equitable maxim, a Court of Chancery will divide
a common fund equally between those entitled and if the fund is not sufficient
;
to pay all in full, a pro rata distribution will be ordered. So, when a common
34 A man cannot serve two masters at the and cestui que trust, inadequately express the
same time, especially case of conflicting
in entire class of persons, for whose benefit im-
trusts. Denning v. Todd, 7 Pick., 427. Quit-quid plied trusts are created, and implied frauds
ncquiritur servo acquiritur domino. (Whatever constructed. Inasmuch, as in almost every
is acquired by the servant is acquired by the variety of trust there is an express or implied
master.) Whatever profit a trustee makes out relation of confidence, it is with reluctance
of trust property is the profit of the benefi- and misgivings suggested that the word con-
ciary. The parable of the talents well illus- ficlor appropriately and not inadequately de-
trates this rule of Equity. Matt., ch. 23. v. 20. notes and includes every one who. expressly
a.-fOur legalnomenclature is deficient in sat- or impliedly, confides or trusts; and the word
isfactory terms to express the relations of a confides equally as well denotes and includes
general trustee and a general correlative to every one in whom confidence or trust is ex-
•such trustee. The term trustee, while a good presslv or impliedlv reposed.
one, has been largely appropriated to denote 36 Also, thus: JEquitas est quasi (equalitas.
an express trustee, and the terms, beneficiary (Equity is equality, as it were.)
liability restsupon several persons in favor of a single claimant, as where sev-
eral persons owe the same debt, a Court of Chancery will require each person,
so liable, to discharge an equal proportion of the liability; or, if any one of
them should pay more than his share, Equity will require the others to con-
tribute enough to make good the excess.
Where an insolvent partnership, an insolvent corporation, or an insolvent
wound up inChancery, the Court always proceeds upon the
estate, is principle
that equality is equity, and apportions the assets pro rata among all the cred-
itors,preferring none unless they have prior liens. The same rule prevails,
when, in any case, any creditor files a bill, on behalf of all other creditors, to
wind up the business of a debtor under a general assignment. So, where there
is hot enough money to pay all the legacies in full, Equity will make a pro
rata deduction from each. 37 And so it may be stated, in general terms, that
whenever there is a common burden, it must be borne equally by all and when ;
there is a common benefit, it must be shared equally by all. Of course, this

maxim will not prevent parties, by contract among themselves, changing the
operation of this general rule.
§ 48. —
Equity will Undo What Fraud has Done. Fraud, 38 in the sight of a
Court of Equity, vitiates every contract or transaction into which it enters, at
the election of the injured party; 39 and the Court will not only undo what
fraud has done, but will treat acts as done which fraud prevented from being
done.
All Courts require good faith in dealings between men, and reprobate bad
faith. 39a But as the Courts of common law respected forms and ceremonies,
and would not look beneath a seal, nor behind a writing, nor beyond the verdict
of a jury, nor allow a judgment to be questioned, fraud took advantage of these
rules, and made forms, writings, seals, verdicts, and judgments its instrument-
alities and agencies in effecting its nefarious schemes for the undoing of the
weak, the inexperienced, the trusting and the needy. When, however, Equity
established her Courts, she disregarded forms, discredited ceremonies, peered
beneath the seal, looked behind writings, questioned the verdicts of juries, and
did not hesitate to set aside the solemn judgments of Courts, when found to be
unjust and procured by fraud. Courts of Equity set aside deeds or converted
ihem into mortgages, set aside the verdicts of juries in Courts of law and
awarded new trials, and forbade the enforcement of judgments, when good
reason and good conscience required. Whatever fraud touched was declared
to be vitiated, wherever fraud trod was declared unholy ground, and whatever
fraud did was pronounced null and void. All the haunts of fraud were laid
bare, all of its paths, however crooked, were sign-boarded, all of its subterfuges
pointed out, all of its false coins branded, and all of its allies detected and
marked with badges. Fraud has been so crippled and hedged about by the
Chancery Court that its power to deceive and do evil has been much weakened,
and the remedies for its rascalities much increased, but it has not yet gone out
of business.
37 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 405-411. In Equity, no then blue, then in black despair. He always
one gets the lion's share, unless he has supe- wore a smile on his face, and curls in his hair;
rior rights, or prior liens. carried a purse in his hand, and was generally
38 Fraus (fraud) was one of the names of in a hurry. The metal, mercury, named for
Mercury, the god of speech, traffic and theft; him, is very bright, but very elusive, hard to
and it is curious, if not instructive, to note find, difficult to seize, impossible to hold; and
how his history and offices, in -ancient myth- is used by miners to gather gold, and by
ology, illustrate the appropriateness of this quacks to salivate their patients.
alias. Mercury's first act was to cheat Apollo so Gwinther v. Girding, 3 Head., lf»7. See
out of a herd of cattle by means of a lyre; he maxim, Equity regards that as done which
lulled the hundred-eyed Argus to sleep, and ought to be done, ante, § 45.
then murdered him; he overcame Prometheus, soa The law requires good faith to be ob-
the wise, and bound him to Mt. Caucasus; he served in all transactions between man and
invented astrology, was the go-between of man. Craddock v. Cabiness. 1 Swan, 483. See
gods and women; the gull was his favorite ante, § 4; and post, 58.
bird, and he was worshiped, and prayed to for In the grand temple to Jupiter on the Capi-
luck, by thieves and schemers. His wand was toline Hill in ancient Rome, the statue of Fiaes
gilt at the point, blue in the middle, and black stood on one side of Jupiter's and the statue
at the handle, and so his victims first felt rich, of Victoria on the other, thus proclaiming that
43 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION. §49
As physicians diagnose internal disease by certain external signs, so Courts
of Chancery diagnose the existence of fraud by certain signs termed "badges
of fraud," which are treated of elsewhere. 40 In Courts of law it is a maxim
that "Fraud is odious and not to be presumed," 41 by which is meant that
before so detestable a crime can be imputed to anyone it must be proved. But
Courts of Chancery, while considering fraud mpre odious than do Courts of
law, they nevertheless in certain cases presume fraud; that is, certain states
of fact are considered in Chancery incompatible with an honest purpose, and
when proved or admitted, fraud is presumed. 42 Courts of Chancery will, or-
dinarily impute fraud to a party on less evidence than is required in Courts
of law; 43 and they allow a much greater latitude of proof in the search for
fraud, and a more minute examination of witnesses. 44 And whatever the
shapes and disguises fraud has invented in the refinements and diversities of
commerce and the progress of civilization, the Courts of Equity have, always,
been able to detect and expose it, to redress the wrong done by it, and to keep
it odious, regardless of the rank or wealth of the perpetrator. 43
§ 49.Equity Aids the Vigilant, not Those who Sleep upon their Rights. 46 —
This maxim is designed to promote diligence on the part of suitors. Equity
requires a party to assert his rights in a reasonable time after he discovers that
he has been wronged. A person who delays suit, not only by his negligence
makes the proof of his wrongs more difficult, but induces the other party to
believe that he acquiesces in the situation. Besides, if Courts allow suits to be
delayed, a party may wait until an adverse witness dies, or moves away, before
he brings suit. A party in the wrong may be so misled by the non-action of the
party wronged as do such acts, and otherwise so change his situation, that it
would embarrass the Court in granting relief. He who seeks equity must keep
himself in a condition to do equity; and if, by his own delay, he is disabled
from doing equity he will be debarred from receiving equity. It is bad faith
for a party wronged to delay suit until the wrong cannot be righted without
doing another wrong. Good conscience requires a party to do no act that will
mislead another to his detriment, even though that other may have done him
wrong. Hence, it has been said that "nothing can call a Court of Chancery into
activity but conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence." 47 In many
cases, equitable relief depends upon the discretion of the Chancellor, and the
laches of the complainant is often one of the most important of the elements
taken into consideration when that discretion is exercised. 48 This maxim is
good faith among; the people is as important them. See 1 Sto.Bq. Jur., § 185; 1 Pom. Bq.
in peace as is victory in war. Jur., § i
31-37. The following are some of the
40 See Article on "Fraudulent Conveyances,"
post, §§ 1009-1017. Maxims and Sayings Relating to Fraud:
41 Fraus est odiosa et non prwsumenda. 1. Dolosus versatur in generalibus. (A person
42 See post, §§ 449; 1011. By "presumption" who intends to perpetuate a fraud uses gen-
in such cases, inference is meant. eral terms.)
43 Ibid. 2. Fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant. (Fraud
a Post, §§448; 1010. and justice never dwell together.)
45 Frauds are viewed with great horror and 3. Fraus est celare fraudem. (It is a fraud to
indignation by Courts of Equity, as destruct- conceal a fraud.)
ive of that honorable confidence necessary for 4. Dolus circuitu non purgatur. (Fraud is not
human intercourse, and as constituting a sort purged by indirect action.)
of treason against society itself. The subtle 5. Suppressio veri suggestio falsi. (The sup-
character of these violations, the great difficul- pression of the truth is the suggestion of
ty in making the proof, the absolute necessity, what is false.)
oftentimes, for probing the conscience of the 6. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. (A right of
alleged offender by searching interrogatories, action cannot arise out of a fraud.)
the discerning intelligence required to ferret 7.Fraus latet in generalibus. (Fraud lurks in
out the wrong and to detect fraud in its man- general expressions.)
ifold and cunning disguises, the strong sense .8. Once a fraud, always a fraud.
of equity necessary for the correction of se- 9. Fraud poisons all it touches.
cret acts of bad faith, and the inadequacy of 10. Fraud has the outward visible sign of
the common law remedies to meet the mani- honesty, but lacks the inward soiritual grace.
fest demands of justice, made it necessary for 11. The knot that fraud ties, Equity delights
parties who had been defrauded to apply to a to untie.
Court of Conscience in order to obtain com- 12. Fraud strives to cover-up its tracks.
plete redress; and to this fact the Chancery 46 Vigilantibus non dormientibus osquitas sub-
Court largely owes its existence and its juris- venit.
diction; and the altars of this Court have al- 47 Lafferty v. Turley, 3 Sneed, 177; 1 Pom.
ways been the favorite refuge of parties seek- Eq. Jur., § 419.
ing relief against those who have defrauded 48 Bisph. Pr. Eq., § 39; Snell's Pr. Eq., 39.
§50 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. 44
constantly applied where a party delays too long before he applies for an
injunction, or to be relieved against a fraud, or seeks a specific performance of
a contract, or the rescission of a contract. It applies, also, to persons who
do not inquire after being put upon inquiry; to purchasers at public sales
vv'here there are no warranties of quality or title and to those whose duty it ;
is to take necessary steps to perfect their rights by giving notice of an assign-

ment to them of a non-negotiable chose in action; or by having their instruments
duly registered. Equity delights in diligence, and is slow to aid the slow.
It not only requires clean hands and a pure heart, but also swift feet. But
if the defendant has caused the complainant to sleep he can not complain of it,
tor that would be to take advantage of his own wrong.
§ 50. So Use Your Own as Not to Injure Another. —While this is a law
maxim it is often applied in Equity. The Chancery Court frequently enforces
this maxim by enjoining the erection, or commission, of nuisances to the
complainant on the land of the defendant because, although a man may own
;
the land, he has no right to so use as to prevent his neighbors from enjoying
it
their land. A
man may be driven from his home by bad smells, noxious vapors,
unbearable noises, shocking spectacles, and other intolerable nuisances upon
his neighbor's land, quite as effectually as though driven away by physical
force. A
man cannot so divert a stream on his own land as to turn water
injuriously upon a neighbor's land; and he cannot dig so near the land of his
neighbor as to cause the latter 's land to cave in, or so near as to endanger his
neighbor's wall; he cannot pollute a stream that flows through his neighbor's
land nor can he so stop, or change, the current of a stream as to prevent its
;
ordinary flow through the land of another. 49

A
creditor, having his choice of two funds, ought to exercise his right of
election in such a manner as not to injure other creditors, who can resort to
only one of these funds. 50 And it may be laid down as a general rule, that no
one can so exercise a right as to impair the right of another, especially if the
latter right is. of equal dignity in the sight of the law. The rights of life,
liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness, must all be so used and exercised
as not to impair or injure the equal enjoyment of these rights by another.
The Chancery Court will, on due application, enjoin the defendant from so
using his property, or so exercising a right, as to injure the property or rights
of the complainant.
§ 51. No one Can Take Advantage of His Own Wrong. 51 In vain should —
he seek the aid of Equity who has violated equity. 52 Such a person, in the
sight of a Court of Chancery, has unclean hands. If a person could take advan-
tage of his own wrong it would be a direct bribe to cdmmit the wrong. This
maxim applies where a trustee buys property in his own name with trust funds
where a trustee makes a profit by means of his trust; where any fiduciary
obtains a good bargain by means of his position of confidence or influence;
where a tenant or trespasser cuts down timber where a party stands by and ;
does not object to his own goods being sold as another's; where the true owner
allows a bona fide purchaser to make improvements; and where a defend-
ant fraudulently conceals the cause of action from the complainant and then
pleads the statute of limitation. Where a party, by his words or conduct wil-
fully causes another to believe in the existence of a certain state of facts, and
induces him to act on that belief, the former is concluded by his words or
conduct; as also is one who negligently allows another to contract on the
faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict. In brief, this
49 Terminal Co. . Jacobs, 1 Cates, 741; Cox 52 Equity has a two-fold meaning: it means
v. Howell, 24 Picfo 130. Sic utere iuo ut alienum (1) that system of jurisprudence administered
non Imthts. exclusively in Chancery, and (2) a right, or
so Parr v. Fumbanks, 11 Lea, 395. claim, recognized by a Court of Equity as just.
si NuUus comm-odum capere potest de injuria When used in the former sense it begins with a
sua propria. capital.
maxim operates to estop all persons, whose words, acts or silence, have misled
another to his injury. 53
§ 52. Where One of Two Persons must suffer Loss He should Suffer whose
—
Act or Neglect Occasioned the Loss. The reason of this maxim consists in the
tact that the equity of the one, whose act caused the loss, is less than the
equity of the other party; for the latter is entirely without fault and wholly
innocent. 54 This maxim applies where a loss happens to a trust fund by the
failure of a bank, or the misconduct of the trustee's agent or attorney, or the
insolvency of the borrower. In such, cases, the loss must be borne by the
trustee, for he deposited the money in the bank, he chose the agent or attorney,
and he loaned the money. The maxim applies, also, to cases where an agent
has been given apparent authority to sell goods, or do any act, and, taking
advantage of this apparent authority, sells the goods, or does the act, in fraud
of the principal's rights, and misapplies the proceeds. 55 In such cases the
loss falls not on the party who deals with the agent, but on the principal. 58
So, if a fraudulent vendee sell to an innocent purchaser before the vendor take
steps to disaffirm the sale, such a sale will be good, because the act of the
vendor enabled the vendee to make the sale. 57 Where a party signs a forged
note as surety, believing the principal's signature thereto genuine, and the
payee parts with value for such note, the party so signing as surety must bear
the loss. 58 The intrinsic equity of this maxim is similar to that of the maxim,
No one can take advantage of his own wrong; and it applies to a party who stands
by and allows his property to be sold as another's; to any person who, even
innocently, misleads, or who innocently enables another to mislead, a third
party to his detriment and, in general to all cases of estoppel, and to all other
;
cases where one has innocently acted on the faith of another's acts or words.
The maxim is often expressed thus Where one of two persons must suffer
:
loss by the acts or fraud of a third party, he who enabled that third party to
occasion the loss, or to commit the fraud, ought to be the sufferer. 59
§ 53. —
Equity Follows the Law. Equity follows the law in the following
particulars: 00 (1) In adjudicating questions affecting legal estates, rights,
interests or duties, Equity applies those rules of law the Circuit Courts would
apply in like cases; (2) In adjudicating questions affecting equitable estates,
rights, interests, or duties, Equity will follow the analogies of the law where
any analogy clearly exists, especially the law in reference to the descent and
distribution of estates, and the husband's right to his wife's chattels, but
subject to her equity; (3) Where the Legislature has passed an act not ex-
pressly applicable to proceedings in Equity, nevertheless the Courts of Chan-
cery will follow such statute, unless it contravenes some fundamentable equit-
able right or some equitable remedy; (4) Where the Courts of law and of
Equity have concurrent jurisdiction, the statutes of limitations will be enforced
in Chancery. 61 Indeed, it may be generally said that a Court of Chancery in
enforcing a legal right, or in applying a legal remedy, will follow the law when
no fundamental rule of Equity is thereby violated. Were it otherwise, a man's
legal rights, or legal duties or liabilities, might, to some extent, depend on the
Court in which the suit was pending. This remark, however, must not be so
construed as to intimate that, when a legal cause of action is pending in Chan-
53 Broom's Leg. Max., 276-295. creditor, who has obtained a secret and undue
54 Coles v. Anderson, 8 Hum., 493; Whitby v. advantage, signs a composition and thereby
Armour, 4 Lea, 686; Bank v. Wolf, 6 Cates, induces other creditors to sign it. Snell's Pr.
255. Eq., 474-473.
55 King v. Fleece, 7 Heisk., 281. oo By "law," in this section, is meant the
56 Walker Skipwith, Meigs, 509.
v. common and statutory law.
57 Arendale v. Morgan, 5 Sneed, 704. ci Nicholson r. Lauderdale, 3 Hum., 200; Pee-
58 Trevathan v. Caldwell, 4 Heisk., 535. bles v. Green, 6 Lea, 473; Hughes v. Brown, 4
59 Walker v. Skipwith, Meigs, 509; Susong v. Pick., 586. But Chancery will not enforce
Williams, 1 Heisk., 631; Trevathan v. Caldwell, the statute of limitations when the defendant
4 Heisk., 538. He who enables another to com- fraudulently concealed the cause of action.
mit a fraud is answerable for the consequences, Smart v. Waterhouse, 10 Yerg., 104; Vance v.
as (1) where the owner knowingly permits his Matley, 8 Pick., 310.
property to be sold by another; or (2) where a
eery, the Court has not the power to apply the maxims and principles of
Equity, and to enforce any equities that may exist in the case and especially ;
the power to compel the complainant to do equity. 62

But this maxim must not be too broadly interpreted; for, as a rule, instead
of Equity following the law, it widely departs from the law. Courts of Chan-
eery follow the law as to the competency of witnesses, and the methods of ob-
taining testimony, 63 but contravenes the rules of law as to the admissibility
and force of evidence, especially in cases of fraud, and in cases where parole
evidence is heard to explain, vary, contradict or nullify a written instrument,
or to assail a judgment or decree. 64
§ 54. Where there is Equal Equity the Law must Prevail. If two persons —
have equal equitable claims as to the same subject-matter, and, as to their
equitable interests therein, are equally entitled to the aid of the Court, but
one of them has the legal estate to said subject-matter, then he will prevail. 65
In cequali jure melior est cmtditio possidentis et defendentis. (Where the right is
equal the condition of the possessor and of the defendant is the better.) 66 The
equity is equal between persons who are equally innocent and have been
equally diligent. It is upon this account that the Chancery Court constantly
refuses to interfere, either for relief or discovery, against a bona tide purchaser
of the legal estate for a valuable consideration without notice of the adverse
title, if he avails himself of this defence at the proper time and in the proper
mode. In such a case, the equities being equal, the legal title prevails. 67
§ 55. Where
there are Equal Equities, the First in Order of Time shall
Prevail. —This maxim
is generally given in its Latin form, Qui prior est tempore
potior est jure. (He who is prior in time is superior in right.) The maxim is
sometimes misunderstood and misapplied. Its true meaning is this: As be-
tween persons having equitable interests only, if their interests are in all other
respects equal, priority in time gives superiority in right. And, in a contest
between persons having only equitable interests, priority of time will give su-
periority of right, provided there is not other sufficient ground of preference
between them. 68 Por, # if the equities are equal, and one of the parties has, in
addition, the legal title, then another maxim would apply: Where there is
equal equity the law must prevail? 9 In a Court of Chancery, in a conflict of
equities, the party having the superior equity will prevail and if the equities
;
are equal, and neither party has the legal title, then priority prevails; and if
no priority the defendant prevails.
Under the operation of this maxim, grantees and incumbrancers take and are
ranked according to the dates of their securities. Parties claiming liens or hav-
ing judgments, or attachments, or execution liens, or assignments, all hold in
order of time, provided there is no other ground of preference. 70 In a race of
diligence between creditors having equal rights in law, or equal rights in
Equity, he who is first in time becomes first in right, 71 for Equity rewards ac-
cording to diligence.
§ 56. To Protect and' Enforce Rights to Property the Object of Suits in
—
Chancery. The term "property," as used in this section, includes everything
that is the subject of exclusive individual ownership; or, to be more specific,
includes not only lands, houses, goods and chattels, rights and credits, but, also,
a man's person, and his wife and minor children, and his right to work, and to
sell and acquire property, and engage in any lawful business, and his and their
62 Courts of Equity will not, in a case of 65 Perkins v. Hays, Cooke, 163.

purely legal cognizance, grant relief contrary 66 Broom's Leg. Max., 690.
to the settled maxims and principles of Equity 67 l Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64 c; Reeves v. Hager, 17
jurisprudence; but will apply and enforce those Pick. 712.
maxims and principles even in cases where the 68 1 Poni. Eq. Jur., §§414, 678-734.
rules of the Circuit Court are otherwise. Le- go Perkins v. Hays, Cooke, 163.
noir v. Mining Co., 4 Pick., 168. 70 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 414; 415, 678-734; and
63Code, § 4455. see Priorities, post, §§ 73-74.
64See ante, §§ 6-7, for cases where law fol- 71 Hillman v. Moore, 3 Tenn. Ch., 460; Jordan
lows Equity. v. Everett, 9 Pick., 396.
47 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. § 57
reputation, health and capacity to labor, and his and their right to enjoy the
senses of sight, smell, hearing and taste, and his and their right of speech and
iocomotion, and his and their right to enjoy their sense of moral propriety when
normal.
As men live by their labor and property, no man is presumed to part with
either without receiving or expecting an equivalent in value. Hence, when-
ever one person has obtained either the labor or proprty of another he should
pay or account therefor, unless he can prove it was a gift; and so, whatever
injury one person does to another's property or capacity to labor should be
made good.
To declare and define the rights of property, and regulate its tenure, posses-
sion, enjoyment and transfer, is the business of the Legislature; and to protect
and enforce those rights, compel atonement for their violation, and conform
the tenure, possession, enjoyment and transfer of property to the requirements
of law and Equity, so that each person may have his own, and no person have
what is another's, is the business of the Courts.
Questions involving partisan politics, denominational religion, ecclesiastical
controversies, scientific theories, mere breaches of moral rectitude and viola-
tions of criminal law, are not within the domain of Equity Jurisprudence, and
the Chancery Court has no jurisdiction of them, unless they involve rights of
property, and then only as to such rights.
§ 57. Equity Regards the Beneficiary as the Real Owner. In a Court of —
taw in case of an express trust, the beneficiary is not recognized, and has no
rights the trustee is bound to respect. On the face of the deed the legal title
is in the. trustee, and the Courts of law will look no further, and will hear no
proof in behalf of the beneficiary. Indeed, if the beneficiary is in possession
the trustee can eject him by suit in a Court of law. In short, in the eye of the
law the beneficiary is not known. 72
But in Equity, where the intent- of the grantor and not the form of the grant
prevails, the beneficiary is regarded as the real owner and the trustee is con-;
sidered as a mere manager of the trust property for the benefit of the bene-
ficiary, 73 and liable to the beneficiary for any and every breach of. the trust.
If the trustee fail to do his duty, the Chancery Court will remove him, on
proper application.
And all this is true not only of trusts created by wills, deeds or other instru-
ments in writing, but is also true of trusts created by law. Thus every admin-
istrator, executor, and guardian, and, to a less extent, every Court Clerk,
Receiver, Sheriff, County Trustee or other public officer entrusted with the
money of others, by the law, and especially where he has given bond to secure
those entitled, is liable to be called by the beneficiaries to account in Chancery
and, in all such cases, the Court regards the beneficiary as the real owner of
the property, although the legal title is in the officer having it in possession.
But while the Chancery Court regards the beneficiary as the real owner in
order more fully to guard his interests and assert his rights, it, also, regards
him the real owner as to his liabilities, and, except in cases where the trust is
declared by a will or deed duly. registered, 74 will subject his interest in the
trust property to the satisfaction of his debts, on a proper bill filed for that
purpose, as hereafter shown. In dealing with the beneficiary's interest in
the trust property Equity follows the law, and treats such property as descend-
76
ible, devisable and alienable.
In all cases of trusts, including trust deeds, assignments for the benefit
of creditors, and even constructive and resulting trusts, the Chancery Courts
72 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 964, 968; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., 74 Code, § 4283.
§ 979.
75 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 974; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §
73 4 Kent's Com., 303-304; Lewin on Trusts,
572; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 989. Quicquid aeqmritur
servo aeqmritur domdno. See ante, § 46.
are ever ready to lend a helping hand to the beneficiary as against him who
holds the legal title.
§ 58. Equity Enforces What Good Reason and Good Conscience Require. —
Whatever good reason and good conscience require a party to do or refrain
from, in a matter affecting another's property or rights, that a Court of Chan-
cery requires of him, unless the other party has forfeited his right to relief by
his negligence or participation in the wrong done. Conscience itself might
make too refined or too unstable a standard for the determination of human
conduct in the Courts; and reason of itself might give too wide a range for
sharp practices in matters of trade, or other dealings. Indeed, conscience
without reason might degenerate into fanaticism, or gross eccentricity and, on ;
the other hand, reason without conscience might become trickery, or even
downright knavery. 76 Hence, in the administration of justice, conscience must
be conformed to reason and thus become good conscience, and reason must be
conformed to conscience and thus become good reason and whatever good eon- ;
science and good reason unite in approving is the nearest approach to perfect
justice man is able to attain. 77 This union of good reason and good conscience
is what in a general way is meant by the term Equity in the administration of
justice.
Whenever anyone is about to do, or has done, any act which in good reason
and good conscience he ought not to do or have done, or is about' to fail or has
failed to do any act which in good reason and good conscience he ought to do,
or have done, whereby another person is about to be or has been injured in
his estate or rights, such person has the right to invoke the aid of the Courts
to prevent the injury threatened, or obtain compensation for the wrong done
and if the Courts of law are inadequate to afford a sufficient remedy the Courts
of Equity have inherent power to take full jurisdiction and adminster complete
relief.
All obligations enforceable in Chancery, arise from contracts express or im-

plied, or are imposed by statute. Implied contracts are both general and
special. 1. The general implied contract is the agreement every member of the
community impliedly makes with every other member of the community that
in every relation he may occupy as citizen, husband, father, confidant or bar-
gainor, he will, in every transaction connected with such relation, do whatever
good reason and good conscience require. 2. The special implied contract is that
each person who has business relations with another will, in all matters of
business, do all that good reason and good conscience require'; and that every
person having relations of trust or confidence with another, will, in reference
to all matters connected therewith, do whatever good reason and good con-
science require, and will refrain from doing whatever good reason and good
conscience forbid. Each party to.any matter of business has both the moral
and legal right to expect and require the observance of this implied contract
by the other party. This just expectation constitutes the foundation of all
liuman intercourse, on it is built the superstructure of all business dealings,
and Courts of Chancery will not allow it to be disappointed.
The implied contract surrounds every express contract, and fills all the in-
terstices thereof. As the atmosphere pervades all spaces not occupied by other
substances, so the implied contract pervades the whole world of legal rights
and duties not occupied by express contracts and under this all comprehensive
;
implied contract, conclusively presumed by law, every person is held to act, in

word and deed, and to it every person is bound to conform. This implied con-
tract is, in substance, what in the Roman or civil law is called "bona tides;" and
7G Judex Jifihri-c debet duos sales, mlcin supicntiw foolish, and the salt of conscience that he mav
ne sit insipidus et salem consrieutiw ne do nothing wicked.) Coke, 3 Inst., 147.
sit diabolus. (A Judge ought to have two salts, 77 Lube's Eq. PI., 17; 286; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
the salt of wisdom that he may do nothing §§ 55-57; see note 17 to § 4, ante.
it isthe foundation of a large proportion of the adjudications in the Chancery
Court. 78
§ 59. Stare Decisis et Non Quieta Movere. (Adhere to the decisions, and—
do not unsettle questions put at rest.) It is more important to a people to
have their laws known and fixed than to have them precisely just for our con- ;
ceptions of justice differ, but what is fixed is certain, and can be conformed
to. T9 The decisions of our Courts are like sign-boards whereby we shape our
course and keep on the road of safety. The law must run on straight lines, and
cannot be crooked to suit supposed exceptions. 80 Fluctuations of judicial de-
cisions have an effect similar to the shifting of the magnetic needle no one is ;
sure that he is travelling in the right direction, .and no one can give safe coun-
sel. Hence it is that Courts deem a decision which has become a rule of prop-
erty as binding on them as a legislative enactment, 81 and this is so whether the
decision was originally correct or not, 32 or whether it affects property, or a
point of practice. 83 Laws are made for the greatest good of the greatest
number, and must necessarily be general. It is better that the individual con-
form to the law than that the law conform to the individual; and it is better
that a particular case of hardship be unredressed than that the law be violated,
when the violation would occasion much mischief, 84 and especially would un-
settle the foundations of property rights, and disturb the landmarks of the
law. 85
But the rule of stare decisis is not so inflexible when the decision is recent,
and has not given satisfaction. 86
And what is true as to precedents about property is equally true as to prece-
dents about pleadings, practice, proof, and procedure. 87 Courts abhor innova-
tions in pleadings or procedure, 88 and delight with measured step to tread the
'
'
beaten path of precedent." 89 A

Solicitor who departs from established pre-
cedents in pleadings, proofs and procedure violates his duty both to his clients
and to the Court: he needlessly endangers the success of the former, and per-
plexes the mind of the latter. Such innovations are mischievous and should not
be tolerated.
78 The propositions laid down in the text in many but ruin some. The frost stays the pes-
regard to implied contracts are fully sustained tilence, but shortens the crops.
by the best law writers. Blackstone says, 81 McKinney Stacks, 2 Heisk., 284.
v.
"Implied contracts are such as reason and jus- 82 Case Co.
Joyce, 5 Pick., 337; Steedman v.
v.
tice dictate, and which therefore the law pre- Dobbins, 9 Pick., 397; Wilkins v. Railroad, 2
sumes every man undertakes to perform, and Cates, 422. Where a decision lays down a rule
upon this presumption makes him answerable of property, it is as much law as an Act of the
to such persons as suffer by his non-perform- Legislature, and should remain until changed
ance." Vol. 3, 158. Implied contracts arise by the Legislature. Courts should adhere to
from natural reason and from the general im- the old landmarks of the law, and not be
plication and intendments of the Courts that swayed or confused by new decisions of other
every man hath engaged to perform what States. Jackson Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 9 Heisk.,
his duty or justice requires. Ibid, 161. See 1 300.
Spence Eq. Jur., 411. Parsons, in his great ssThompson v. French, 10 Yerg., 458; Smith
work on Contracts, says, "The law of contracts v. Harris, 3 Sneed, 553, 557.
in its widest extent, may be regarded as in- Neal v. Cox, Peck., 449; Franklin v. Mc-
84
cluding nearly all the law which regulates the Corkle, 16 Lea, 629.
relations of human life; * * * for out of ss Smith v. McCall, 2 Hum., 163; Wilkins v.
contracts, express or implied, declared or un- Railroad Co., 2 Cates, 420. In the latter case,
derstood, grow all rights, all duties, all obli- Neil, J., reviews the Tennessee authorities in
gations, all law." 1 Parsons' Cont. 3. Whatever an exhaustive opinion.
a man ought to do, that the law supposes him 86 Sherfy v. Argenbright, 1 Heisk., 143; Bar-
to have promised to do. * * * Implied con- ton v. Shall, Peck, 233. But even in such a
tracts form the warp and woof of actual life case it is better to let the Legislature change
* * * Implied contracts are co-ordinate and the law than for the Courts to change it. Cocke
commensurate with duties. Ibid. 4. Every v. McGinnis, Mart. & Yerg, 364. The Legisla-
member of society has impliedly contracted to ture can repeal statutes passed by it, but
do whatever the law requires of him. Walker's Courts are not vested with repealing power,
Am. Law. 468. This implied contract arises and a decision once made is made forever.
from man's nature as a social animal, and Clouston Barbiere, 4 Sneed, 339.
v.
without itsociety could not exist, and men 87 Thompson v. French, 10 Yerg., 458; Smith
would become beasts of prey: See post, § 932. ». Harris, 3 Sneed, 553, 557.
88 Omnis innovatio phis novitate perturbat quam
79 Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut in-
utilitate prodest. (Every innovation disturbs
certum. (Miserable is the servitude where the more by its novelty than benefits by its utility.)
law is vague, or uncertain.) Atkinson v. Dance, 89 Coke has said, Via trita, via tutissima. (The
9 Terg., 427. road that is worn by travel is the safest.) And
so Bank v. Skillern, .2 Sneed, 698, 701; Frank- Chancellor Kent has declared that the old way
lin v. McCorkle, 16 Lea. 629. The laws of na- is the safe way via antiqua via est tuta. Man-
ture cause individual hardships. Kains bless ning v. Manning, 1 Johns, Ch. 527.
§60 MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OP ADJUDICATION. SO
§ No One Should be Condemned without a Chance to be
60. This Heard. 90 —
is fundamental maxim of Equity jurisdiction, and has always been sacredly
a
observed. Indeed, it is a principle founded in natural justice, and of universal
application, that no man can be proceeded against in Court without notice. 9oa
The inherent love of fair play contained in the maxim, Audi alteram partem? 1
has always and everywhere been recognized by all Judges and Courts and the ;
practice of all tribunals is to render judgment against no one without giving

him a chance to be heard in his own behalf. The law delights in giving to every
man a day in Court to make his defence. 92 Were the law otherwise no right
would be certain, no property safe, no possession secure fraud would revel in ;
triumph, and trickery be supreme over good faith. No principle of the common
law is more sacred than that no man shall be deprived of his property by the
judgment of a Court without personal notice that he has been impleaded
therein. 93
Where the defendant cannot be personally notified of the suit against him,
but has property within the jurisdiction of the Court, the law deems it not just
that he should enjoy his property, or its proceeds, free from the just' claims of
his creditors, and so the Court will substitute a seizure of his property, 94 and
a notice to him printed in a local newspaper that he has been sued, in place of
direct personal notice of the suit. But even in such a case, so anxious are the
Courts to do everything in their power to give the defendant actual notice
of the suit against him that they require his property to be actually attached,
and due publication thereof to be made, before they will dispense with the
service of a subpoena upon him. In such a case the attachment of his property
and the published notice are substituted for an attachment of his person in the
cause, or at least substituted for actual notice by service of a subpoena, 95
The notification to the defendant that he has been sued, made by service of
subpoena, or by attachment of his property, and publication, or, in some specific
cases, by publication without attachment, is essential to the jurisdiction of the
Court over his person, and if the Court has no jurisdiction over his person,
actual or constructive, it has no power to render any (Jecree against him in
personam, nor against his property, even when the property is within its juris-
diction; but any such decree will be absolutely void. 96
90 Nemo inauditus nee summonitus condemnare de- erty, motions against public officers of the
bet si non sit contumax. (No one ought to be State, and of sureties against their principals;
condemned unheard and unsummoned, if he be and such violations are watched with great
not contumacious.) If the defendant evade or jealousy, and the statutes authorizing them
attempt to evade the service of the subpoena, are strictly construed. Ibid.
the officer shall leave a copy at the usual resi- 04 A
man's property is, in a sense, a part of
dence of the defendant, which shall be a suffi- himself, and when his property is seized by
cient service. Code, § 4346. The defendant will another he is presumed to know it, the proper-
not be allowed to take advantage of his own ty being in the possesion of himself or agent,
contumacy. and the knowledge of the agent being consid-
9oa Ridgeway v. Bank, 11 Hum., 523. ered the knowledge of the principal. See post,
91 Hear the other party. § 65, sub-sec, 2.
02 Peck, J., in Roberts & Phillips v. Stewart, 95 Walker v. Cottrell, 6 Bax., 273; Ingle v.
1 Yerg., 392. McCurry, 1 Heisk., 26; Rains v. Perry, 1 Lea, 39.
03 Gasget &
Co. v. Scott, 9 Yerg., 244. This 9G See
authorities next above ciled; also,
great principle, which has always been con- Foggr. Gibbs, 8 Bax., 467; Finley v. Gaut. 8
sidered so important to the safety of the citi- Bax., 152; Walker v. Day, Ibid. 80; Bell v. Wil-
zen, has been violated in but few instances, liams, 1 Head, 229; Kinzer v. Helm, 7 Heisk.,
and in those only where the evils resulting 675; Barrett v. Oppenheimer, 12 Heisk., 302;
from requiring the notice would more than Sherrill v. Goodrum, 3 Hum., 430; Hughes v.
counterbalance those arising from proceeding Bryant, 6 Yerg., 471.
without it, as in cases of attachments of prop-
51 MAXIMS 'OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING. §61
ARTICLE III.
MAXIMS APPLICABLE TO THE COURT, AND TO ITS PRACTICE AND
PLEADINGS.
§ 61. Maxims Applicable to the Court, and § "63. Maxims Applicable to Pleadings.
Orders.
its 64. Other Principles and Maxims.
§ 62. Maxims Applicable to the Practice of
the Court.
§ 61. Maxims Applicable to the Court, and its Orders. —The following are
some of the maxims applicable to the Court, and its orders
. 1. Actus Curia ncmincm gravabit. (An act of the Court injures no one.)
Whenever the Court makes some order, or does some act, on its own motion,
during the progress of a cause, such order or act will not be allowed to work an
injury to any of the parties. Where a decree has been delayed by the act of the
Court, it will, if necessary to justice, be entered nunc pro tunc.
2. Actus judiciarius coram non jxtdice irritus habetur. (A judicial act outside
of the Judge's authority is null and void.)
3. Consensus facit legem. (Consent makes law.) Whatever the parties agree
to, during the progress of a suit, is binding upon the Court, if (1) the parties
i-onsenting are under no disability, and if (2) the consent is in violation of no
law. Every person sui juris can do what he pleases with his own, so long as he
violates no law and injures no one else. The agreements of parties during the
progress of a suit are favored, and the Court cannot go behind them, or revise
them, or disregard them, or set them aside, except for fraud, accident or
mistake. Where parties consent, they bind the Court where they do not, ;
or cannot consent, the Court binds them. Conventio vincit legem. 1

4. Cursus Curia est lex Curia. (The practice of the Court is the law of the
Court.) Rules of procedure are indispensable to the orderly administration of
justice, and all Courts have such rules, and require strict obedience to them.
They are a part of the means whereby the law is enforced. Law would be of
no value if there were no means of enforcing it. Another maxim is, Quando
aliquid mandaiur, mandatur et omne per quodpervenitur ad Mud. 2 (When any-
thing is commanded, every means of accomplishing it is also commanded.) So
when Courts were created, by necessary implication, power was given them to
make such rules of practice as are necessary to enable them to apply and admin-
ister the law. These rules when established have all the force and effect of law,
as well upon the Courts themselves, as upon their officers and litigants, until
duly changed on due notice.
5. Fieri non debet, factum valet. (What ought not to have been done is valid
when done.) Thus, a decree that is erroneous is, unless duly reversed by the
Supreme Court, as binding on the parties as though in strict accordance with
the law and the facts. So, an injunction that should not have been granted
must be obeyed as implicitly as though fully warranted by the facts. All irreg-
ular procedures are valid, unless the irregularities are duly questioned and
corrected. In brief, every judicial act is binding so long as it is not appealed
l The agreement of the parties is stronger Art. I, sec. 20. As to the effect of consent,
than the law; that is, the law cannot violate see post, § 72.
or loosen the agreement, if it be a lawful one. 2 Or, as it is otherwise expressed, Cui juris-
Courts are established to enforce contracts, not dictio data est, ea quoque concessa esse viilentur
to -make them. It is not even in the power of nine quibus jurisdictio cxplieari non potest. (When
the Legislature to violate, or set aside, a con- jurisdiction is given, those things, also, are
tract. The inviolability of contracts is required deemed to be given which are necessary to the
by the Constitution of the United States. Art. exercise of that jurisdiction).
I, sec. 10; and the Constitution of the State.
§62 MAXIMS OE PRACTICE AND PLEADING. 52
from, or reversed by writ of error, however irregular or full of errors the act
may be. But a judgment or decree that is void binds no one, benefits no one,
and protects no one void things are no things.
:
6. Omnia prasumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta. (All things are presumed
to be rightly and regularly done.) The Courts presume that whatever is done
by a Court, or by an officer of the law, is properly done. Whatever is done
by the Legislature is presumed to have been correctly 'done. The Courts pre-
sume that when a Court of general jurisdiction pronounces a decree that every
necessary step preliminary thereto was duly taken. All presumptions are in
favor of the regularity of the proceedings of all sworn officials.
7. Qui jussu judicis aliquod fecerit non videtur dolo malo fecisse, quia parere
neccsse est. (He who does anything by command of the Judge will not be
deemed to have acted from an improper motive, because it was necessary for
him to obey.) This rule protects a Clerk who pays out money, or does any
other act, by order of the Court it protects the Sheriff in the proper execution
;
of the orders, decrees and process of the Court and protects Receivers, Special ;
Commissioners and others, who do any act in pursuance of an order or decree

•of a Court. The party dissatisfied with any such order or decree must take the
proper steps to have it suspended, corrected or reversed.
§ 62. Maxims Applicable to the Practice of the Court. The following are —
some of the principal maxims that may be applied to questions of practice
1. De non apparentibus et non e.vistentibus eadem est ratio. (What does not
appear in the record, and what does not exist in fact, are one and the same in
law.) Courts can act upon nothing that does not duly appear in the record.
Courts of law may hear and determine, but Courts of Chancery must see and
determine they cannot take cognizance of oral statements unless and until
:
reduced to writing in due form and made part of the record. The Chancellor
cannot regard his personal knowledge of men, character or facts, for these are
not in the record: non refert quid notum sit judicii, si notum non sit in forma ju-
dicii. 3 This maxim is sometimes more tersely expressed thus -.Quod non apparet
non est. (What does not appear [in the record] does not exist [so far as the
suit is concerned] .)
2. In judicio non creditur nisi juratis. (In a judicial proceeding, nothing is
believed unless proved upon oath.) This is one reason why the Chancellor, the
Clerk and Master, the Solicitors and the Sheriff are all sworn. No witness can
be heard unless sworn, or unless his oath is expressly waived. Statements of
fact made in Court by parties, or on behalf of parties, will not be heeded unless
sworn to, or agreed to by the opposite side. The Court cannot credit any-
thing not verified by the oath of the proponent, and this is the reason why
affidavits are required in support of motions.
3. Melior est conditio defendentis. (The situation of defendant is preferable
to that of complainant.) The reason of this rule is that the burden of proof
usually rests upon the complainant and, ordinarily, the defendant need make
;
no proof until the complainant has made out a prima facie case. The complain-
ant must satisfy the Court that he has a right to the thing in dispute and, ;
until he does so, the defendant can keep his arms folded, and his mouth closed. 4
So, where each party is equally at fault, the Court will not aid either, as a rule,
for in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. -Both the defendant and the
possessor may stand still until the complainant has proved a right. 5 Melior est
conditio possidentis, et rei quam actoris.
4. Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest. (Every
3 See post, §§ 451, 1141, sub-sec. 10. It mat- to see, and no ears to hear, and no mind to
ters not what is known to the Judge, if it be consider, anything not in the record of the
not known to him judicially. The Judge, as a cause. Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et
may\, may know facts pertinent to the case probata.
which do not appear of record, but he can no * Pinson v. Ivey, 1 Yerg., 308. See post, § 64,
more consider such facts than can a juror un- sub-sec. 20.
der like circumstances. The Judge has no eyes 6 See post, § 453.
53 MAXIMS OP PRACTICE AND PLEADING. ,'§ 62
innovation disturbs more by its novelty than benefits by its utility.) This is
especially true in matters of pleading and practice. Solicitors, from inexperi-
ence or carelessness, are constantly departing from the proper form of plead-
ings, orders and decrees and are constantly making innovations on the regular
;
practice of the Courts. 6 Stare decisis et non movere quieta. 7 This maxim ap-
plies as well to questions of pleading and practice as to property rights.
5. Qui facit per alium facit per se. (He who does any thing by another, does
it himself.) The act of the agent is the act of the principal; and among part-
ners each one is the agent of all the others. If the principal, or master, ratifies
an act of his agent or servant, the effect is the same as though such act was
expressly authorized before it was done; for omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et
mandato atquiparatur. 8 Delegated power, however, cannot be delegated. Rep-
resentation in Courts is indispensable, and litigants will be as fully bound by
the acts of their Solicitors as though such acts had been done by themselves in
person. When the Court is once satisfied that a Solicitor is authorized to. ap-
pear, it will not question his authority to bind his client in any way, or by any
act, or agreement, in the progress of the cause. And as Solicitors are sworn
well and truly to demean themselves in Court, the Court will presume they
have authority to appear when the opposite side, or the client himself, does
not dispute that authority.
6. Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto. (Any one can waive
a law made for his benefit.) No one is obliged to act on, or make use of, all the
rights he is entitled to he may waive any of them. And the failure to exercise
:
a right in due season will generally be deemed a waiver; and if, in conse-
quence of a seeming waiver, the opposite party has taken a legitimate step,
the party making the waiver will be concluded and estopped from recalling his
waiver. 9 This rule is strictly enforced in practice. 10
7. Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus. (He who enjoys the benefit
ought also to bear the burden.) This rule is enforced by requiring the party
who obtains a benefit in a judicial proceeding, to pay a part, or all, of the
costs, when they cannot be otherwise made. 11
8. Ubi lex aliquem cogit ostendere causam, necesse est quod causa sit justa et
legitima. (Where the law requires any one to show cause the cause must be just
and legal.) In Court a party is frequently required to show cause: (1) Why
he did so and so; or, (2) why he did not do so and so; or, (3) why he should
be allowed to do so and so or (4) why the other party should not be allowed to
;
do so and so. It may be stated generally that what is meant by "showing cause"
is showing good cause, that is, showing a good, legal, substantial and meritorious
reason or reasons, justifications, or excuses, for the action in question. The law
despises trifles and quibbles, 12 and when the law or the Court requires a party to
"show cause," such party must, in good faith, make such a showing as to-
demonstrate that justice is clearly on his side. If he is showing cause to be
relieved, or to shield himself, he must make it clearly appear that he has been
guilty of no inexcusable laches or negligence, and of no acts of bad faith or
disregard of duty, and that he has a meritorious claim or defence. In a word
he must show good cause. 13 If he is showing cause to obtain the right to do an
affirmative act which should have been done or applied for in due season, he
must likewise show good reason or excuse for his delay, and show that he acted
e Chancellor Kent has declared that the old O'Bryan Bros. v. Glenn Bros., 7 Pick., 106. See
way is the safe way via antiqua via est tuta. Article on Estoppel, post, § 67.
Manning v. Manning, 1 Johns. Ch., 527. io See Article on Waiver and Consent, post,
7 Stand by what has been decided, and do §§71-72.
not disturb what is settled. See ante, § 59, 11 See post, §§ 587, 593.
where this maxim is fully considered. 12 See maxims: (1) De minimi? non curat lex;
s Every ratification of what has been done is (2) Apices juris non sunt jura; (3) Lex non favet
equivalent to a prior command to do it. deVnUorum votisHi) Lex non prwcipit inutilia ; (5)
9 Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch., 242. Lex neminem coffit ad vana sen inutilia peragenda;
Itfemo potest mvtare consilium swim in alterius in- (6) Aurupia veroorum sunt judire indigna; and (7)
juriam. (No one can change his plan to the Qui Itrrret in litem- liwret in cortice.
injury of another). So, if one has two rights 13 And "good cause" means merits. Cain v
or remedies, and he repudiates one or elects
' Jennings. 3 Tenn. Ch. 131; Gill v. Wvatt 6
one, he is estopped to change his action. Heisk., 88.
§63 MAXIMS OP PRACTICE AND PLEADING. 54
as soon as he had knowledge and an opportunity. Good faith, diligence and
merits must be shown by every party who comes into the Chancery Court for
relief. A party applying for leave to do something in Court which should have
been done before, must show not only a good excuse for his failure to act in
season, but must set forth such merits as will show that he has the right on his
side, and these merits must be shown not by general allegations but by specific
facts. 14 A party required to show cause is ordinarily a suppliant for the
mercy of the Court, 15 and he should realize his extremity and conform to every
requirement of the law, the practice and good reason; 18 and this "cause," or
"good cause," should be shown (1), in due season, which means at the first
opportunity after its necessity became known; (2) in due form, that is in the
manner required by the practice of the Court; and (3) by due particularity,
that is by a full disclosure of all the facts and circumstances bearing on the
matter in question. And the writing setting forth this good cause thus shown
should be verified by the oath of the party, or of his Solicitor when the facts
are in the latter 's personal knowledge, but not otherwise.
The most usual cases where a party is required to show good cause are (1) :
for not answering in season; (2) for leave to withdraw an answer and demur
or plead; (3) for not amending his bill in season, or not sooner applying so
to do; (4) for setting aside a pro confesso; (5) for amendment to answer; (6)
for leave to re-examine a witness; (7) for a continuance; (8) for recommitment
of a Master's report; (9) for setting aside a sale; (10) for leave to file an
amended or supplemental or cross bill (11) for extension of time to take proof;
;
and (12) for doing or having done any act in Court out of course, or for un-
doing any act in Court that was done in course.
§ 63. —
Maxims Applicable to Pleadings. The following maxims apply to
pleadings, and their interpretation
1. Allegans contraria non est audiendus. (He who makes assertions that are
contrary to each other will not be heard.) This maxim applies both to plead-
ings and proof. A
bill or answer containing contradictory statements becomes
a nullity as to such statements nor will the Court allow a pleading to be
;
amended, when the amendment is contradictory or repugnant to the pleading.

So, testimony that is contradictory destroys itself, and a witness who contra-
dicts himself is not to be heard.
2. Allegari non debuit quod probatum non relevat. (That ought not to be
alleged which, if proved, would not be relevant.) No useless allegations should
be made, and no surplusage inserted, in pleadings. Poetry, rhetoric, sarcasm,
—
pathos all are alike irrelevant and impertinent, and will be stricken out on
motion.
3. Benigne facienda sunt interpretationes chartarum, ut res tnagis valeat quam
pcreat- (Written instruments should be liberally construed so that they may
stand rather than fall.) This is our rule in dealing with bills, the Court mak-
ing every reasonable presumption in their favor, when assailed by a demur-
rer, or a motion to dismiss. 17 The English rule is the reverse, following
the maxim, ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra proferentem. 18 In
Tennessee, a liberal interpretation is given to all writings, the purpose of the
Court being to ascertain, and give effect to, the intention of the makers of the
instrument. The intention is the substance, the words are but the shadow;
14 See post, §§ 235; 511; 960-961. General alle- M. & C. Railroad, 9 Heisk., 879; same case, 12
gations in such cases are mere vox et pr.rteren Heisk., 531; French v. Dickey, 3 Tenn. Ch., 302;
nihil. Montgomery v. Olwell 1 Tenn. Ch., 172. Gregory v. Hasbrook, 1 Tenn. Ch. 218.
15 Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 66S. is An ambiguous pleading ought to be in-
10 If you have merits, and the inclination of terpreted against the party pleading it. This
the Chancellor is against you, make your pre- maxim is properly applied in England, where
sentation so clear, strong and equitable that he all solicitors are thoroughly trained and skilled;
will be obliged to yield; if his inclination is fa- but in Tennessee, where solicitors are admitted
vorable, give him good grounds to grant your to practice without thorough preparation, a
application. liberal interpretation of pleadings, and other
17 Code, § 2884; Thompson v. Paul, 8 Hum., legal instruments, is necessary and equitable.
117; Lincoln v. Purcell, 2 Head, 143; Hobbs f\ See Quinn !>. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch. 71.
55 maxims op practice; and pleading. § 64
and so the intention is the only infallible touchstone for the interpretation of
contracts. 19 In construing wills, the intention of the testator is the polar star
by which >the Court should be guided. Animus hominis est anima scripti, 20 the
intention of the writer is the soul of the writing, or, as it has otherwise been ex-
pressed, words are the body, the meaning is the soul. The office of interpreta-
tion is to deduce the true sense from the words, and not to inject a false sense
into them. Expositio, quae ex visceribus causa nascitur, et aptissima et fortissimo,
in lege. 21 And while the words are deemed of less importance than the meaning
of the entire instrument, .nevertheless it is only by means of the words that this
meaning can be ascertained. Divinatio non interpretatio est quae omnino recedit
a litera. 22 Neither bad writing, bad punctuation, nor bad grammar will, in the
least, prejudice the instrument, for mala grammatica non vitiat chartam. 23
4. Falsa demonstratio non nocet. (A false description does no harm.) This is
a maxim of frequent application, and applies to cases where the wrong name
is given to a person, or thing, otherwise sufficiently described in the instru-
ment. Where a bill is misnamed, the Court will disregard the name, if it con-
tain an equitable ground of suit.
5. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. (The useful is not vitiated by the useless.)
Surplusage works no injury, and may be ignored. This rule applies to unnec-
essary words and phrases in deeds, contracts and pleadings; they are deemed
mere trifles which the law disregards. De minimis non curat lex. The Court
will order surplus matters in pleadings to be stricken out, or will ignore them.
§ 64. —
Other Principles and Maxims. For the convenience of Chancellors
and Solicitors, the following additional maxims and principles are here inserted.
1. Accusare nemo se debet, nisi coram Deo. (No one is bound to criminate
himself, except before his God.) No man can be forced to criminate himself in
any Court, except the Court of his own conscience.
2. Actus Dei vel legis nemini facit injuriam. (The act of God, or of the law,
causes a loss to no one.) As in eases of accident and forfeitures caused by flood,
pestilence and sickness or an act of the Legislature put in force from and after
;
its passage operating on contracts by parties before the law was made known.
3. Actus judiciarius coram non judice irritus habetur. (A judicial act outside
of the Judge's authority is null and void.) As a decree or order not war-
ranted by the pleadings, or a decree in a case over which the Court has no'
jurisdiction.
4. Causce dotis, vita, libertatis, fisci, sunt inter favorabilia in lege. ( Suits in-
volving dower, life, liberty and revenue are favored in law.)

5. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. (That is deemed certain which can
be made certain.) As when one instrument calls for a second, and the latter
contains what was deficient in the former.
6. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. (When the reason for the law has
ceased, the law itself ceases.) 24 As the laws in the Code of 1858, never re-
pealed, relating to slaves and free negroes.
7. Debitum et contractus sunt nullius loci. (Neither a debt nor a contract are
19 Officer v. Sims, 2 Heisk., 506. 6. Verba ita sunt intelligenda ut res magis
The following are some of the principal valeat quam pereat. (Words should be so inter-
preted that the subject-matter may be pre-
Maxims of Interpretation: served rather than destroyed).
1. Maledicta expositio qum corrumpit textum. 7. Verba relata inesse videntur. (Words re-
(Accursed is the exposition which destroys the ferred to are considered as inserted).
text). 8. A meaning should be drawn out of the
2. Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima words and not forced into the words.
imterpretatio. (The best interpretation is made 20 The intention of the party is the life of the
by considering both what precedes and what instrument.
follows the matter in doubt). 21 That interpretation, which is born of the
3. Qui hmret in litera hceret m cortice. (He who bowels of the case, is, in law, the fittest and
sticks to the letter sticks to the bark). most powerful.
4. Nimia suotilitas in jure reprobatur. (Too 22 It is a guess, not an interpretation, which
much subtlety is reprobated in law). disregards the words of an instrument.
Nihil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel 23 Brown v. Hamlett, 8 Lea, 732.
5.
persona constat). An error in the name amounts 24 Battell'e & Co. v. Youngstown Co., 16 Lea,
to nothing when there is certainty as to the 360.
thing or person).
§ 64 MAXIMS OP PRACTICE AND PLEADING. 56
local in their nature.) Suits to recover debts, and suits based on contracts,
are called transitory actions, and may be brought wherever the debtor is
,
found.
8. De fide et officio judicis non recipitur qucestio: sed de scientia, sive error sit
juris aut facti. (The good faith and office of a Judge cannot be called in ques-
tion, but his knowledge of the law, or facts of the case, may be.)
9. De minimis non curat lex. (The law pays no attention to trifles.) Very
small errors are always ignored.
10. Dies dominicus non dies juridicus. (The Lord's day is not the Court's
day). 25
11. Bx nudo pacto non oritur actio. (No suit can be brought upon a contract
without a supporting consideration.)
12. Bx dolo malo non oritur actio. (No suit can be brought to enforce a fraud.)
A complainant must have clean hands.
13. Bx pacto illicito non oritur actio. (No suit can be brought to enforce a con-
tract in violation of law.)
14. Bx facto jus oritur. (The law arises out of the transaction.) The law
is the shadow which the facts cast.
15. Bxpressio unius persona vel rei est exclusio alterius. (The express men-
tion of one person or thing in a written instrument is equivalent to the express
exclusion of all other persons or things.) Thus, a deed to is a deed to him A
alone, and to no other person and a devise to B in effect excludes all others.
;
16. Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat. (It is useless to prove any-
thing which, when proved, would be immaterial.)
17. Hceres est eadem persona cum antecessore. (The heir and his ancestor are
one and the same person.) That is, one in right, the heir succeeding to the
rights of his ancestor just as the king never dies.
;
18. Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia juris non excusat. (Ignorance of the
fact excuses, but ignorance of the law does not excuse.) Ignorance of the law
does not excuse in criminal cases, but may excuse in civil cases.
19. In consimili casu, consimile debet esse remedium. (In similar cases the
remedy should be similar.)
20. In aquali jure melior est conditio possidentis.
*
(Where the rights of the
parties are equal, the claim of the party in possession is preferred.) If neither
party has any title to the property, real or personal, in dispute, the Court will
refuse to disturb the possession of the defendant. Possession is a sufficient
defence against every one except him who has the legal right to the possession.
Possession is a sort of inchoate title, and may ripen into a perfect title, if
continued.
21. In jure, non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur. (In law, the proximate
and not the remote cause is to be considered.)
22. Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata. (It is the duty of a
Judge to decide according to the allegations of the pleadings and the pertinent
proof.) A decree that is not supported by the pleadings is void; a decree not
supported by the evidence is voidable, on appeal or writ of error.
23. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. (The law does not require any one to do
what cannot be done.)
24. Melior est conditio possidentis ubi neuter jus habet. (The situation of the
person in possession is better than that of the claimant, where neither has any
title to the property.')
25. Necessitas, quod cogit, defendit. (The necessity is a defence to what nec-
essity compels one to do.) As when houses are blown up to stay a conflagration.
26. Nemo cogitur rem suam vendere, ctiam justo pretio. (No one can be forced to
sell his own property even for a fair price.) But it may be taken for a public
purpose on just compensation being paid therefor.
25 A judgment rendered on Sunday is void. Styles v. Harrison, 15 Pick., 128.
57 MAXIMS OP PRACTICE AND PLEADING. § 64
27. Noscitur a sociis. (It is known by its associates.) "Writing may be de-
ciphered by using known letters or words in the same writing as guides. So,
the meaning of doubtful words may be made plain by the context. Ex antecedent-
ibus e,t consequentibus fit optima inter pretatio. (The best interpretation is obtained
by considering what goes before and what follows.)
28. Nulla impossibilia aut inhonesta sunt prcesumenda; vera autem et honesta et
possibilia. (What is improbable or dishonest is never to be presumed on the :
contrary, the law presumes in favor of truth, honesty and probability.)

29. Omne majus continet in se minus. (The greater always includes the less.)
An authority to do a greater thing will authorize the doing of a less thing.
30. Principia probant non 'probantur. (Maxims have an inherent probative
force, and need not to be proved.)
31. Ratio legis est anima legis. (The reason of the law is the soul of the law.)
The reason for the law being known, its interpretation is known.
32. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. (No one ought to suffer because
of what others have said or done.)
33. Res per pecuniam cestimatur. (The value of anything is -estimated accord-
ing to its worth in money.)
34. Res perit suo domino. (When property perishes the loss falls upon
its owner.) When property dies, is burned, or otherwise destroyed or impaired
riuring litigation, without any one being to blame therefor, the owner of the
property must bear the loss. 26
35. Salus populi est suprema lex. (The welfare of the people is the supreme
law.) The rights of the individual must be subordinated to the public good.
36. Sublato fundamento cadit opus. (When the foundation is removed the
superstructure falls.)
37. Sublato principali, tollitur adjunctum. (When the principal is removed
its adjuncts are, also, removed.) The accessory follows the principal; and
what is incident to a thing goes with it.
38. SuperHua non nocent. (What is superfluous works no injury.) Surplusage
does not vitiate.
39. Suppressio veri suggestio falsi. (The suppression of a truth is equivalent
to the suggestion of a falsehood.)
40. Tantum bona valent quantum vendi possunt. (Property is worth only what
it can be sold for.)
41. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem lex; et de similibus idem est judicium. (Where
the reason is the same, the law is the same and where the facts are alike, the
;
decree of the Court will be the same.)

42. Volenti non fit injuria. (He who consents to what is done cannot com-
plain of it.) No right of action accrues to a person who agreed to what was
done, even though it injured him.
43. Verba relata inesse videntur. (Words referred to are considered as in-
serted.) When a deed, pleading, or any written instrument refers to another
writing, the latter is deemed incorporated in the former. 27
26 Top v. White, 12 Heisk., 191; Lewis v. ing and scope of the maxims found therein.
Woodfolk, 2 Bax., 46; Planters' Bank v. Van- These maxims are not, as some ignorantly af-
dyck, 4 Heisk., 617. fect to believe, mere ostentatious displays of
2T The maxims contained in this book are pedantic lore; but, on the other hand, they are
the most valuable, and those oftenest quoted. the very fountains out of which the science of
No man can ever become an accomplished law- jurisprudence flows, and the sources of all that
yer unless he fully masters the leading maxims is beautiful, majestic, and divine in either Law
of the law, and makes them entirely his own. or Equity. Without the maxims, the law would
They constitute no inconsiderable portion of be an
interminable medley of disconnected
the technical nomenclature of jurisprudence; cases, which no memory co.uld hold. But great
and a thorough understanding; of them is indis- minds, by compressing multitudes of individual
pensable to a lawyer's education. They contain cases, have obtained therefrom their essence,
not only the very quintessence of law and as it were, the logic of the rulings, the ration-
Equity, of good reason and good conscience; ale of the adjudication, the rationes decidendi,
but they, also, greatly tend to broaden the the very laws that govern the laws,, the leges
comprehension, and strengthen the apprehen- —
leflum; and this is the origin of maxims, by
sion, of legal and equitable principles. No whose aid order took the place of confusion,
lawyer can readily understand much of the system marshalled the cases into harmonious
very best legal reasoning, found in the reports ranks the law became a science, and jurispru-
and treatises, unless he understands the mean- dence a philosophy.
§65 NOTICE, AND ITS EFFECTS. 58
CHAPTER IV.
NOTICE, LIS PENDENS, ESTOPPEL, ACQUIESCENCE, NEGLIGENCE,
LACHES, WAIVER, AND CONSENT.
Article I. Notice, Lis Pendens, Estoppel, Acquiescence, Negligence and
Laches.
Article II. Waiver, and Consent.
ARTICLE I.
NOTICE, LIS PENDENS, ESTOPPEL ACQUIESCENCE, NEGLIGENCE AND

LACHES.
§ 65. Notice, and its Effects. 68. Acquiescence, and its Effects.
§ 66. Rule of Lis Pendens. 69. Negligence, and its Effects.
§ 67. Estoppels, and Their Effects. 70. Laches, and its Effects.
.§ 65. —
Notice, and Its Effects. No one can transfer to another a greater
right to a thing than he himself possesses; and no one can, in reason and
conscience, expect to acquire a greater right than the vendor could rightfully
sell. 1 He who buys with notice of another's rights is bound in good conscience
to hold what he buys, subject to those rights, for otherwise he would be taking
advantage of his own wrong, and would be enriching himself at another's
expense, neither of which acts is permitted by a Court of Conscience. 2 But the
Court, imputing to the purchaser an intention to do the honest thing, will
presume that he made the purchase with the intention of holding the property
la subordination to those rights of which he had notice at the time of his pur-
chase. 3 To presume otherwise would be to presume the purchaser was acting
in bad faith, and was intending to perpetrate a fraud on the person of whose
rights he had notice.
Besides, a purchaser with notice has no right to complain when the third
person, of whose claims he had notice, demands his own for the purchaser was ;
lThe following are some of the principal ership of the property in litigation so as to
Maxims Relative to Transfers of Property: affect the rights of the parties to the suit.)
9. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus.
1. Alienatio est omnis actus per quern dominium (He who takes the benefit must take it with
transfertur. (Alienation includes every act by its burden.) A partner who shares in the pro-
which the right to property is transferred.) fits must share in the losses; and he who takes
Assignatus utitur jure auctoris.
2. (The as- title to property must take it with its encum-
signee is entitled to the rights of the assignor.) brances.
3. Caveat emptor: qui ignorare non debuit quod 10. Qui in jusdominiumve alterius succeedit
jus alienum emit. (Let the purchaser beware: litre ejus utl debet.(He who takes the place of
he who buys what is another's is bound to another as to any right or property holds it
know what he is buying.) This maxim applies subject to all the rights of the assignor.)
to Court sales. See post, §§ 640-641, notes.
11. Quod meum est, sine facto meo vel defectu
meo, amitti vel in alhtm transferri non potest.
Cuicvnque aliquis quid concedit concedere vi-
4. (What is mine cannot be lost to me or trans-
detur sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit. (Who-
et id ferred to another, without my deed or default.)
ever transfers anything to another is deemed 12. Res accessaria sequitur rem pHncipalem.
to transfer that without which the transfer (Whatever belongs to a thing goes with it.)
would be void.) Or. as our lawyers sometimes translate it, the
5. Dominium non potest esse in pendenti. (The tail goes with the hide.
title toproperty cannot be in pendency.) The 13. Transit terra cum onere. (He who buys
title may be in dispute, but it nevertheless land takes it subject to all liens and encum-
rests in him who is adjudged to be the owner. brances resting upon it.)
6. Duo non possunt in solido nnam. rem possi- 14. Ubi aliquid conceditur, conceditur et id sine
dere. (Two persons cannot exclusively own quo res ipsa non potest. (When anything is
the same thing.) granted that also is granted without which
7. Nemo potest
plus juris ad alium transferre the grant itself cannot be made effectual.)
quam ipse habet. (No one can transfer to an- 2 Notice of the prior right cuts un by the
other a greater right than he himself has). roots any claim of the subsequent purchaser.
8. Pendente lite nihil immovetur. (While a suit 3 See Maxim, Equity imputes an intention to
is pending no change can be made in the own- fulfil an obligation; §44, ante.
59 NOTICE, AND ITS EFFECTS. §65
under no compulsion to buy, and if he paid more than the vendor's interest in
the property was worth, or if the third person's claims prove greater than he
supposed when he bought, he deliberately assumed these risks, and cannot, in
reason and conscience, be heard to complain. Any loss resulting from the
prior and superior equities of the third party, the purchaser with notice must
charge to his own negligence or wilfulness for, when one of two persons must
;
suffer a loss, he shall suffer whose own act or negligence occasioned such loss.
It would be manifestly contrary to reason and conscience to require the inno-
cent third person to bear this loss.
In conformity with these general doctrines, the rule is clearly established that
a purchaser with notice of another's rights, in or to the thing purchased, is,
in Equity, liable to the owner of those rights, to the same extent and in the
same manner as the person from whom he made the purchase. On the other
hand, a person, who acquires title to property in which another has an equity,
and pays a valuable consideration for it, without any notice of such equity, may
hold the property freed from the equity. 6
1. Notice Defined. Notice is such information concerning a fact, actually com-
municated to a party by an authorized person, or actually derived by a party
from a proper source, or presumed by law to have been actually acquired by
him, as is equivalent in its legal effects to full knowledge of such fact. Notice,
therefore, is of two kinds 1st, that actually communicated or derived and 2d,
: ;
that presumed by law to have been acquired. The former is called actual notice,
the latter is called constructive notice. Actual notice includes all those instances
in which positive personal information of a matter is directly communicated to
the party, and this communication proved as a fact. Constructive notice in-
cludes all other kinds of notice, being those in which the information is conclu-
sively presumed from certain facts, or is implied as a presumption of law in
the absence of contrary proof. 4 There is no difference in their consequences
between actual and constructive notice. 5
2. Notice to an Agent when Notice to his Principal. Notice to an agent in the
business or employment which he is carrying on for his principal, is a con-
structive notice to the principal himself, so far as the latter 's rights and liabili-
ties areinvolved in, or affected by, the transaction. This rule alike includes
and applies to the positive information or knowledge obtained or possessed by
the agent in the transaction, and to actual or constructive notice communicated
to him therein.
The general rule, that notice to the agent is notice to the principal, will oper-
ate with equal force and effect, whether the notice to the agent be actual, or
constructive. Actual knowledge may be brought home to the agent by the
most direct evidence, or he may be chargeable with constructive notice by a
lis pendens, by a registration, by recitals in title deeds, by possession of the
property by a stranger, or by circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man
upon inquiry in all such cases the effect upon the principal is the same as
;
though the information or notice to the agent had been to him in person.
So, notice to one partner is notice to the other as to partnership matters; 6
but not as to individual matters. 7 And notice to one or more directors is notice
to the corporation. 8
3. Effect of Being Put on Inquiry. Whenever a party has information or know-
ledge of certain extraneous facts, which of themselves do not amount to, nor
tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put a reasonably
prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right and ;
the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with
reasonable care and diligence, would lead to a discovery of the truth, to a
4 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 593-594; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., 6 Arnold v. Linaweaver, 3 Head, 51.
§§ 399-400 a.
T Boiling v. Anderson, 4 Bax., 550.
5 Pinson v. Ivey, 1 Yerg., 339. Constructive 8 Raht v. Mining Co., 5 Lea, 63.
notice is further considered, post, § 76.
§66 US PENDENS AND ESTOPPELS. 60
knowledge of the interest, claim, or right which really exists; then the party-
is absolutely charged with a constructive notice of such interest, claim, or right.
The presumption of knowledge is then conclusive. 9
4. Circumstances from which Notice may be Inferred, Among the facts and cir-
cumstances from which actual notice may be inferred are the following:
1. Close relationship, personal intimacy, or business connections, existing
between the purchaser and the party with whom he is dealing, or between him
and the holder of the adverse claim.
2. Great inadequacy of price, which may arouse the purchaser 's suspicion, and
put him upon inquiry as to the reasons for selling the property at less than its
apparent value; and
3. The sight, or knowledge, of visible material objects upon or connected with
the subject-matter, which may reasonably suggest the existence of some ease-
ment, or other right, belonging to a third person.
§ 66. —
Rule of Lis Pendens. During the pendency of a suit in Equity,
neither party to the litigation can so alienate or encumber the property in
dispute as to affect-the rights of his opponent. This rule of lis pendens is based
both on necessity and on notice. 1, It is based on necessity, 10 because, did it
not exist, any litigation might be indefinitely prolonged in consequence of
successive alienations of the property in dispute, making it necessary to be con-
stantly bringing the successive alienees before the Court. 2, It is, also, based
on notice; because the records of the Court are notice to the world; and it is
mainly from this standpoint that the subject will be considered. 11
The lis pendens and the consequent notice begin from the service of a sub-
poena or other process after the filing of the bill, 12 (for the Court must have
acquired jurisdiction of the defendant before he can be bound,) and continue
through the entire pendency of the suit, and end only when the suit is really
ended by a final decree. In order, however, that a purchaser pendente lite may
be thus affected, the suit must be prosecuted in good faith, with all reasonable
diligence, and without unnecessary delay. 13
Lis pendens is notice of everything averred in the pleadings pertinent to the
issue or to the relief sought, and of the contents of exhibits filed and proved.
In order that the notice may thus operate, the specific property to which the
suit relates must be pointed out in the pleadings, in such a manner as to call the
attention of all persons to the very thing, and thus warn them not to inter-
meddle. 14 It is not necessary that the land should be described by metes and
bounds certainty to a common intent, reasonable certainty, is sufficient.
;
§ 67. —
Estoppels, and Their Effect. Whenever A, by acts, words, or silence,
intentionally causes or permits B to do a thing he would not otherwise have
done, it would be manifestly inequitable for A, by repudiating the very conduct
by which he induced B to act, and by setting up rights of his own, inconsistent
with his said conduct, to compel B to incur a loss by undoing the very thing
A's conduct caused him to do. Courts of Equity will not permit such inequita-
ble action on A's part, and will not allow him to set up any claims inconsistent
with those acts, words, or silence, of his, which induced B to do what he did.
This doctrine of Equity is termed Estoppel and when fully considered will be
;
found to rest upon three maxims (1) When one of two persons must suffer a
:
Joss, it must be borne by him whose conduct occasioned it; (2) No one can
take advantage of his own wrong; and (3) He is not to be heard who alleges
2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 608; Covington v. Ander-
f> 11 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 632; see Lis Pendens, in
son, 16 Lea, 319. In this case, the rule upon our Digests.
the question of notice is thus laid down: What- 12 Tharpe v. Dunlap, 4 Heisk., 674; Staples «.
ever is sufficient to put a person upon inquiry White, 4 Pick., 30. But in attachment suits
is notice of all the facts to which that inquiry the lien begins at the filing of the bill, if the
will lead, when prosecuted with reasonable dil- property is mentioned in the bill. Code, §§
igence and in good faith. 3507; 4286.
10 Shelton v. Johnson, 4 Sneed, 672; 1 Sto. Eq. 13 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 634; Mann v. Roberts,
Jur., § 406. Mann p. Roberts, 11 Lea, 57. Pen- 11 Lea, 57.
dente lite nihil immovetur. 14 Boshear v. Lay, 6 Heisk., 163.
61 ESTOPPELS. §67
what is contrary to his former statements. 15 It is also a principle of Equity
that every person is to make
bound good those intentional representations
whereby he induces another to act.
It is sometimes said that equitable estoppels result from fraudulent conduct
on the part of the person estopped. While this statement is rather broad, it is
nevertheless true that, when B has acquired rights, or incurred liabilities, or
parted with a consideration, on the faith of A's conduct, it would be fraudulent
in A to repudiate such former conduct, or to set up claims inconsistent with
his former conduct, to B's injury. 10
The word conduct when used in reference to the person estopped means
conduct in its broadest sense, and includes words and silence, positive acts
and negative omissions. 17
The general rule of estoppel in cases of land is, that if a person interested in
an estate knowingly misleads another into dealing with the estate as if he
were not interested, he will be postponed to the party misled, 18 and be com-
pelled to make his representation specifically good. It applies (1) to one who
denies his own title, or encumbrance, when inquired of by another who is
about to purchase the land, or to loan money upon its security; (2) to one who
knowingly suffers another to deal with the land as though it were his own;
(3) to one who knowingly suffers another to expend money in improvements
without giving notice of his own claim, and the like; 19 but in all such cases,
there must be intentional deceit, or gross negligence equivalent to fraud.
The tendency of the law is to give married women enlarged rights, and dis-
enthrall them of many of the disabilities under which they formerly labored.
With an extension of rights is coupled an extension of duties and liabilities.
A married woman is not privileged to perpetrate frauds, or to mislead people
to their hurt; 20 and she may be estopped by her words, silence or conduct in
the same manner, and nearly to the same extent, as though she was under no
disability, especially when her conduct has been both fraudulent and very in-
jurious to the other party. 21
An infant may, also, be bound by an estoppel when it would operate as a
fraud upon the other party to allow the infant to repudia-te his conduct, fraud
not being one of the privileges of infancy. 22
The measure of the operation of an estoppel is the extent of the representa-
tion made by one party and acted on by the other. The estoppel is commensu-
rate with the thing represented, and operates to put the party entitled to its
benefit in the same position as if the thing represented were true. With respect
to the persons who are bound by, or who may claim the benefit of, the estoppel,
it operates between the immediate parties and their privies, whether by blood,
by estate, or by contract. 23
is Allegans contraria non est audiendus. So, if "Fifth —The upon
other party must have been in-
a person is silent when in conscience he ought duced to act it."Taylor v. Railroad Co.,
to speak, Equity will not hear him speak when 2 Pick.. 244.
in conscience he ought to be silent. Brashears' A party setting up an equitable estoppel is
Bxrs. v, Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch., 249. himself bound to the exercise of good faith and
16 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 803; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § due diligence to ascertain the truth, 2 Sto. Eq.
1543. On estoppels by conduct, see Taylor v. Jur. § 1553 o.
N. & C. Railroad Co., 2 Pick., 228. Morris v. is Butlerv. Williams, 5 Heisk., 241.
Moore, 11 Hum., 433. 19 Patton v. McClure, Mart. & Yerg., 339;
17 A party having- two rights or remedies is Moses Sanford, 2 Lea, 655.
v.
bound by his election of one of them, and es- 20 Pilcher v. Smith, 2 Head, 211; Latimer v.
topped to repudiate his action. O'Bryan Bros. Rogers, 3 Head, 692.
v. Glenn Bros., 7 Pick., 106. Nemo potest mutare 21 Galbraith v. Lunsford, 3 Pick., 89; Howell
consilium swum in alterius mjuriam. (No one can
v. Hale, 5 Lea, 405; Hanks v. Polsom, 11 Lea,
change his mind to another's injury). 562; Fogg v. Yeatman, 6 Lea, 580; 2 Pom. Eq.
Bigelow on Estoppel, 480, thus sums up the Jur., § 814; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1536.
requisites of an estoppel by conduct:
—
"First There must have been a representa-
22 Barham v. Turbeville, 1
cases there cited; Adams v. Pite, 3 Bax., 69;
Swan, 437, and
tion or concealment of material facts.
"Second— The representation must have been Galbraith v. Lunsford, 3 Pick., 103; 2 Pom. Eq.
made with knowledge. Jur., § 815. An infant who obtains money
"TMrd— The party to whom was made
it from his trustee, or guardian, by fraudulently
representing himself to be of age, is estopped
must have been ignorant of the truth of the
to recover this money when he attains his
matter. „,
— ,
"Fourth It must have been made with the
,.
majority. Snell's Pr. Eq.. 39.
23 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 813.
intention that the other party should act upon
it.
§ 68 ACQUIESCENCE, AND ITS EFFECTS. 62
§ 68. Acquiescence, and Its Effects. —A party who has a right of action may
lose that right either (1) by a confirmation of the voidable transaction, 24 or
(2) by acquiescing in the transaction, or (3) by mere delay, or laches, in bring-
ing suit. If a party, with full knowledge of the facts and of his rights, freely
and deliberately ratify a voidable transaction, such an act forever terminates
any right he may ever have had to question the transaction thus ratified and
confirmed. So, if a party, with like knowledge of the facts and of his rights,
freely and deliberately acquiesce in a voidable transaction, and take or claim
benefits under it, he will be estopped to question the validity of such transaction.
Mere delay, mere suffering time to elapse without doing anything, is not ac-
quiescence although it may be, and often is, strong evidence of an acquies-
:
cence and it may be, and often is, a ground for refusing equitable relief. In
;
order to constitute acquiescence there must be (1) some act which, though not
deliberately intended as a ratification or confirmation of the voidable transac-
tion, nevertheless recognizes it as existing, and claims or obtains some benefit
resulting from it; and (2) this act must be done with knowledge of the material
facts, and of the actor's rights under those facts; and (3) without any undue
influence or restraint. 25 Rights, once valid, are often lost by delay, and the
implied acquiescence resulting from such delay. 20
Acquiescence consisting of mere silence may also operate as a true estoppel
in Equity, to preclude a party from asserting legal title and rights of property,
real or personal, or rights of contract. The requisites of such estoppel have
been described. A fraudulent intention to deceive or mislead is not essential.
All instances of this class, in Equity, rest upon the principle "If one maintain
:
silence when in conscience he ought to speak, Equity will debar him from
speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent." This principle in-
cludes all cases where an owner of property stands by, and knowingly, and
without interposing any objections, permits another person to deal with the
property as though it were his own, or as though he were rightfully dealing
with it, as by expending money upon it, making improvements, erecting build-
ings, and the like. Of course, it is essential that the person in possession should
be acting in ignorance of the real condition of the title, and in the supposition
that he was rightful in his dealings with the property. 27
Parties who have long acquiesced in settlements of accounts, or of other mu-
tual dealings, will not be permitted to reopen them and this is true even though
;
the parties stood in confidential relations toward each other, as trustee and
cestui que trust, principal and agent, and the like, and the settlement embraced
matters growing out of such relations. So, corporations may be estopped by
acquiescence, like natural persons, either in their dealings with third persons
or with their own stockholders and, conversely, stockholders may, by acquies-
;
cence, be estopped from objecting to the acts of the corporation. If a mort-

gagor, obligor, or other debtor, by keeping silence under circumstances when he
ought to speak, leads the intended assignee to believe that there is no defence,
he will be estopped from afterwards setting up any defence, which might
otherwise be available, as against the assignee who has thus been induced to
purchase the demand. 273 "
In all these cases, the Courts enforce the maxim, "Equity aids the vigilant,
not those who sleep upon their rights." The neglect to do a thing in proper
season is called laches, and is one of the unpardonable sins in the sight of a
Court of Equity.
24 Wherever any contract or conveyance is will be valid. 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 306; 2 Pom. Eq.
void, either by a positive law or upon princi- Jur., § 964.
ples of public policy, it isdeemed incapable of 20 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 964-965.
confirmation; it being a maxim, Quod ab initio 2i!2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1534. The cases of acqui-
won valet in trarfu temvorU non convnlescit. But escence in our reports are numerous. As illus-
where it is merely voidable, or turns upon cir- trative of this fact, the following are all in 1
cumstances of undue advantage, surprise, or Pickel: Owens v. Dunn, 131; Barnard i». Roane
imposition, there, if it is deliberately and upon Iron Co.. 153; Robertson v. Winchester, 171.
full examination, confirmed by the parties, it 27 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 818.
27a 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 819-820.
63 NEGLIGENCE, AND ITS EEFECTS. §69
§ 69. Negligence, 28 —
and Its Effects. It has often been said that, in general,
nothing can force a Court of Equity into activity but conscience, good faith,
and reasonable diligence.
Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Laches,
delay, indifference and passive acquiescence, when not in any way caused by the
other party, are hurtful, if not fatal, to complainant's rights in a Court
of Equity. The doctrine that Equity requires good works as well as good
faith, is especially enforced against trustees, and all other persons, who act in
a capacity of trust for others especially in a fiduciary capacity, such as execu-
tors, administrators, guardians, agents, receivers, clerks of courts and of indi-
vidiuals, secretaries, treasurers, and other officers of firms, societies and corpo-
rations, book-keepers, guardians ad litem, next friends, attorneys and confi-
dential advisors. 29 Any of these persons, when acting for others in reference
to matters of property or business intrusted to their care and management, is
to that extent a trustee, and subject to all the obligations imposed by Courts
of Equity on trustees, and held chargeable for all losses resulting from their
want of due diligence, equally with losses resulting from downright bad faith.
, The compensation ordinarily allowed trustees will be reduced, or entirely disal-
lowed, in case of loss resulting from their negligence. Of persons acting as
trustees, Equity requires good works as well as good faith.
Equity never interferes in behalf of a party whose negligence, or delay, has
caused, occasioned, or contributed to, the injury of which he complains. No
one can take advantage of his own wrong and when one of two persons must
;
suffer a loss, that one shall suffer it whose act, or neglect, occasioned it. Clean
hands, a pure heart and swift feet are required of him who seeks the aid of a
Court of Conscience and if, in any case, it appears that the injury complained
;
of might not have happened, had the complainant, or his agents, or attorneys,
been duly diligent, the Court will stay its hand and decline to interfere. 30
This doctrine runs all through both the practice and the jurisprudence of the
Court. The Court will not relieve against negligence in pleading, or in taking
any step in Court, or in taking proof, unless upon the payment of compensatory
costs. So, the Court will not relieve against a forfeiture, or an accident, or a
mistake, that is the result of negligence. Equity will not relieve against a
judgment at law, nor rehear nor review one of its own decrees, when the wrong
complained of could have been prevented, or the new evidence brought forward
could have been obtained, by reasonable diligence at, or before, the former trial.
Nor can he who is put upon inquiry escape the consequences thereof, by declin-
ing to make the proper investigations. In Equity, every man is chargeable with
all that due diligence, in the particular matter, would have resulted in. Equity
requires a party to do all that, in good reason and good conscience, he should
have done; and a failure to do what it was a party's duty to have done, will
not relieve him from the penalties of his neglect.
Besides, negligence in acting when one's rights have been invaded, may be
deemed evidence of an acquiescence, or may become laches, and thus bar a
party from asserting what would, on due diligence, have been a clear right
of action. 31
§ 70.
—
Laches, and Its Effects. The neglect of a person to make complaint,
or bring suit in due season, he being sui juris and knowing the facts, or having
the means of knowledge, is called laches; and where there has been gross laches
in prosecuting rights, or long and unreasonable acquiescence in adverse rights,
28 Negligence is (1) the omission to do some-

stances. Negligence is not absolute or intrin-
thing which a reasonable man, guided by those sic,but always relative to some circumstances
considerations which ordinarily regulate the of time, place, or person. Broom's Leg. Max..
conduct of human affairs, would have done un- 359.
der the circumstances; or (2) the doing of 20 See ante, § 46.
something which a prudent and reasonable 30 See ante, § 49.
man would not have done under the circum- 31 See Waiver, post, § 71.
§70 LACHES, AND ITS EFFECTS. 64
Courts of Equity refuse to interfere, they acting either by analogy to the
statutes of limitations, or upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging an-
tiquated demands. 32 The Court realizes the difficulty of doing entire justice,
when the original transaction has become obscured by time and the evidence
lost, and deems it good public policy to allow claims and titles long acquiesced
in to remain in repose. Nevertheless, when there are circumstances excusing
or justifying the delay, Courts of Equity will not refuse their aid. 33
It has been said that "nothing can call a Court of Equity into activity but
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence." 34 The Court never lends its
a.id to one who, with knowledge of his rights and with opportunity to assert
them, delays unreasonably so to do. Equity aids those who are vigilant, not
those who sleep upon their rights, and always discourages stale demands. Time,
in Equity, is a witness that, what has long been acquiesced in, must originally
have been founded on some right. 35 In this respect, it is wholly independent of
the statute of limitations. 36 The Court frowns upon attempts to unsettle what
lias long been at rest, first, because of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
making proof; second, because, in uprooting an ancient matter, innocent per-
sons are liable to be injured; third, because the defendant, even if originally
in the wrong, may, as a result of the complainant's laches, have acquired such
affirmative rights that he cannot be placed in statu quo; and fourth, because the
delay raises a presumption that originally there was, if not a good defense, at
least a better one than can now be made. If a party have knowledge of his
rights, his delay will not be excused because of poverty, or want of evidence. 37
Laches will bar suits (1) to open accounts and settlements long acquiesced
in 38 (2) to change a boundary line long recognized 39 (3) to correct an alleged
; ;
fraud, accident or mistake long submitted to 40 (4) to have a nuisance abated

;
that has long existed; 41 (5) to have a contract either rescinded or specifically
enforced, when by delay the parties cannot be placed in statu quo;'12 (6) or to
have any transaction uprooted, or any business unravelled, when, in conse-
quence of long acquiescence, the chances are that material evidence has been
lost, that the memory of the facts has become dimmed, that parties or witnesses
have died or removed, and that new rights have sprung up that should not be
unsettled. 43
But no delay will prejudice a defrauded party as long as he was ignorant of
the fraud 44 and, especially, if the defendant concealed the facts which it was
;
his duty to disclose, or deceived the complainant by misstatements, or otherwise

lulled his suspicions. The sleep of the complainant cannot be used as a defence
by him who caused that sleep, for that would be to take advantage of his own
wrong. 45
32 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1520. See maxim, Equity Hay., 210; Patton v. Cone, 1 Lea, 14; 2 Pom.
aids the vigilant, and not those who sleep Eq. Jur., § 820.
upon their rights. Ante, "§ 49. 39 Roane County v. Anderson County, 5 Pick.,
33 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 529 Laff erty v. Turley, 3 259.
Sneed, 176; Lane v. Farmer, 11 Lea, 577. Pre- 40 Underhill v. Nelson, 1 Lea, 98; Henderson
witt v. Bunch, 17 Pick., 723. v. Conway, 9 Lea, 410; 2 Pom. Bq. Jur., §§
34 Lafferty v. Turley, 3 Sneed, 177. 897; 965.
35 Hammonds Hopkins, 3 Terg., 529; Roane
v. 41 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 817; 1359; 1 High on
Co. Anderson
v. Co., 5 Pick., 259. Injunc., § 756; Caldwell v. Knott, 10 Yerg., 209.
36 Hammonds Hopkins, 3 Yerg., 528; Lewis
v. 42 Smith v. Christmas, 7 Yerg., 565; 3 Pom.
v. Brooks. 6 Yerg., 166; 185; Haynes v. Swan, 6 Eq. Jur., § 1408.
Heisk., 560; Parkes v. Clift, 9 Lea, 531. 43 Whitby v. Armour, 4 Lea, 683; Bolton v.
37 1 Perry on Trusts, § 230. Laches based on Dickens, 4 Lea, 577.
lapse of time alone is not generally a bar. 44 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 917.
Parker v. Bethel, 12 Pick., 252. 45 Vance v. Motley, 8 Pick., 310; Nicholson v.
38 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 529; Love u. White, 4 Lauderdale, 3 Hum., 200.
65 WAIVER. §71
ARTICLE II.
WAIVER AND CONSENT.

$ 71. Waiver, and Its Effects. 72. Consent, and Its Effects.
§ 71. —
Waiver, and Its Effects. A litigation is a legal combat in which each
party has the right to take every lawful advantage of his adversary, and
when a party fails or declines to exercise this right, in any given case, he is
deemed to have waived it, for reasons satisfactory to himself. 1 The various
steps taken, and various pleadings filed, in the progress of a litigation, are
not always taken or filed in strict accordance with the practice or pleadings
of the Court, and so, many errors of omission and commission, important and
unimportant, often happen between the filing of a bill and the execution of the
final decree. The practice of the Court allows the parties to object to any error
committed by their adversaries; but inasmuch as objection made long after the
error is dommitted causes confusion and delay in the orderly progress of a
litigation, and often imposes undue hardship on the party in error, the Court
requires the adverse party to interpose his objection in due season; and if he
fail so to do, he will be deemed to have waived his right to object and he will ;
not be allowed subsequently to withdraw his waiver and claim the right
waived, 2 on the plea that he overlooked it, for that would be to let him take
advantage of his own wrong; besides Equity aids the vigilant, and not those
who sleep on their rights. 3 A party who remains silent when he should object
will not be allowed to object when he should remain silent for silence, under ;
such circumstances is consent, and waiver is a quasi consent. 4

The party who is deemed to have waived his right to object has no just cause
io complain of this rule of the Court for he is conclusively presumed to know
;
the rule, and to have intentionally ignored the error in question. What a man
consents to he cannot complain of, and this consent may be inferred from
silence, or from conduct. 5
The doctrine of waiver is a wholesome one, and greatly facilitates the dis-
patch of business in the Courts, and promotes the prompt and orderly progress
of a suit to final decree. If parties were allowed to go back and take advantage
of a right or opportunity overlooked, neglected, or deliberately disregarded, no
party could take a forward step in a litigation without danger of being com-
pelled to retrace it in order to. enable his adversary to make an attack or a
defence on a ground long since passed, or to make some motion, or exercise
some right or privilege he neglected to make or exercise when the opportunity
was duly presented.
The doctrine of waiver promotes diligence, prevents trickery and bad faith, 6
and preserves rights acquired in consequence of the waiver.
The doctrine of waiver is not only applied to one party in reference to the
action of the other, but it is applied to one or both parties in reference to the
i remmciare jure pro se introducto.

Quilitet potest done to him who consents).Non refert an quis
Seifred v. Peoples' Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., 17;
2 assensum suum prcefert verbis, an rebus ipsis et
and 1 Bax., 200. factis. matters not whether a party gives
(It
3 ante, § 49; and §§ 68-70.
See his assent by his words, or by his acts and
4 tacet ronsentire videtur.
Qui (He who is deeds.) See post, § 72.
silent [when he ought to object] is considered c Brasher's Executors v. Van Cortlandt, 2
as consenting [to what is done].) Johns., Ch., 248. Seifred v. Peoples' Bank, 2
5 Volenti non fit injuria. (No legal injury is Tenn. Ch., 17.
§71 WAIVER. 66
officers of the Court; and if a party fail to object to the Chancellor, 7 or the
Clerk and Master, or the Sheriff, acting in a matter because of the incompetency
of such officer from kinship or interest, such party knowing of such incompe-
tency, he will be deemed to have waived the incompetency, and is bound by
such waiver. Indeed, any party, who with knowledge of the grounds of objec-
tion to any act or proceeding in Court by any other party, or by an officer or
witness, fails in due season, 8 to avail himself of such grounds of objection, is
deemed to have waived his objection to such act or proceeding, and to have
acquiesced therein, and is estopped by his conduct. 9 One of the reasons of this
ruling is, that if the objection is made in season the party in default may, by
amendment or otherwise, correct the defect or irregularity, whereas if not then
made, and especially if made at the hearing, he is absolutely deprived of such
opportunity. 10 So the Courts rule that a party who will not object when he
should, shall not object when he would.
If one party was allowed to ignore a slip, defect, or other error or omission of
his adversary, in pleading, proof or procedure, until after the time or oppor-
tunity for supplying the deficiency or curing of the error had elapsed, it would
not only often defeat the real justice of the case on its merits, or delay the trial
by requiring the Court to continue the hearing in order to give due opportunity
to supply the deficiency or cure the error, but it would also enable crafty parties
to lie in ambush, as it were, and strike their opponents unawares, and in their
back, after they had passed the point when attention should have been called
to the error; and this, too, in a Court consecrated to good faith and fair play. 11
Hence it is, that if a party fail to object to some slip, omission, defect or other
error, in pleading, proof or procedure, at the proper time and in the proper
manner, he will be deemed to have waived his right to make such objection;
and this is especially true if after such right of objection accrued, he, himself,
instead of objecting, take some step that implies his assent to or acquiescence
in what his adversary has done. 12
There are many small things done in Court, or left undone, which ought not
to have been done or left undone, but which become valid when done, 13 if not
duly objected to, or which if left undone do not affect the merits of the con-
troversy. After such things have been done, or left undone, and objection
waived, the Court acts on the maxim, Stare decisis, 14 and refuses to reopen
tliem. Indeed, the Court regards with little favor the sparring of adverse
parties by the wayside, and is anxious only to do what it rightfully can to
facilitate a speedy determination of the controversy on its real merits, and the
doctrine of waiver greatly aids the Court in so doing, and thus promotes the
administration of justice.
7 Wroe r. Greer, 2 Swan, 172; Crozier v. Good- ferred not to do. sit the proper time in the or-
win, 1 Lea, 125; Holmes v. Bason, 8 Lea, 754. derly progress of the suit, according to the prac-
8 Due season, in such a case, is ordinarily at tice of the Court.
the time of the act or proceeding, or as soon 10 Seifred v. Bank, 1 Bax., 203 Pillow v.
;
as it comes to the knowledge of the party hav- Shannon, 3 Yerg., 508.

ing the right to object, and before any other n Brasher's Executors r. Van Cortlandt, -
act done or proceeding had which would not Johns., Ch. 248; Cowman v. Lovett, 10 Paige, 561.
have been done or had if such objection had Chancellor Kent, in Brasher's Executors r.
been duly made. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns., Ch., 248, severely rep-
9 Non revert an quis assensum suum prtefert ver- rehended a party, who "laid low," so to speak,
bisan rebus ipsis et factis. (It matters not whether while his adversary went on step by step in
a man gives his assent by his words, or by his the preparation of his case, and then sprung
acts and deeds.) an objection he thought was fatal, (and would
The doctrine of waiver operates somewhat as have been if made in due season,) and the
does the doctrine of laches, or the statute of Chancellor applied the doctrine of estoppel, and
limitations, or an estoppel. It prevents wrang- held that as the party would not object when
les between parties, or their Solicitors, in he should, he should not object when he would;
which even the Chancellor and the officers of and overruled the objection.
the Court may become involved; and thus il 12 Jones i\ Carper, 2 Tenn. Ch., 627; Stad-
prevents much unseemliness. If it were not ler v. Hertz, 13 Lea, 317. A
party has no right
for this doctrine, all the labor and money to complain of the action of the Court in hold-
and time expended in preparing a suit for final ing him estopped by his conduct. Volenti non
hearing would often be totally wasted, on the fit injuria. (He who consented has no right to
demand of one party or the other that he be complain of what he consented to).
allowed to go back to the beginning of the suit, 13 Fieri non debet factum- valet. (What ought
and make a motion, or file or amend a plead- not to be done is valid when done.) See ante,
ing, or introduce some proof on a preliminary § 61, sub-sec, 5.
issue, which he neglected or deliberately pre- 14 stare decisis, el non movcre quieta. (Stand
67 WAIVER. § 71
1. Waivers when Operative on the Complainant. A complainant is expected to

be especially vigilant in his efforts to win his suit, and when he fails to take
advantage of an opportunity to cripple his adversary he is deemed to have
satisfactory reasons for waiving the opportunity, and so the Court holds him to
his choice in the matter, and will not allow him afterward to claim what he had
waived.
Thus, the failure of a complainant to object in due season (1) to a plea
because not duly sworn to, 15 or because deficient in substance 18 or form, or (2)
to an answer because not signed, 17 nor duly sworn to, 18 nor in proper form,
nor sufficiently full, or (3) to an answer filed as a cross bill without a prosecu-
tion bond, or (4) to require money tendered to be paid into Court when the plea
of tender is filed, he is deemed to have waived such deficiencies, and if he lets a
plea go to issue by filing a replication, or a plea or an answer go to issue by
the lapse of twenty days, and more especially if he takes proof or cross-exam-
ines a witness as to either the plea or the answer, he is conclusively deemed to
have waived all deficiencies in their form or substance, and to have admitted
their sufficiency. 19 When an insufficient defence is thus waived, the defective
pleading has, at the hearing, all the force and effect of a sufficient pleading. 20
So if the complainant allows an execution to be awarded to enforce a decree
in an attachment suit he is deemed to have waived his right to have the at-
tached property sold to satisfy his recovery. 21
So, in case of appeals to the Supreme Court, a failure to point out errors
in the record will be deemed a waiver of such errors 22 and going to trial is a ;
waiver of any deficiency in the record. 23

A positive step in pleading or proof by the complainant, based on the assump-
tion that the previous pleading is regular, waives any irregularity in such pre-
vious pleading. 24 Thus
1. Allowing a cause to go to issue waives the signature to the answer, 25
or any other insufficiency in it.
2. Taking proof on an unsworn answer waives the oath, 2 or any other de- ' 1
ficiency in it.
3. Filing a replication to a plea, or allowing it to go to issue without a repli-
cation, or taking proof on a plea, waives any insufficiency in the plea.
2. Waivers when Operative on the Defendant. The parties to a litigation are
adversaries, and when either of them, and especially the defendant, fails to take
advantage of an opportunity to weaken his adversary, or strengthen himself,
the Court, acting as umpire, concludes that, for reasons satisfactory to himself,
he waives such opportunities. Therefore, the failure of the defendant to have
the bill dismissed because not signed, 27 or not properly sworn to, 28 or because
of the want of a prosecution bond, 29 or some fatal defect therein, or in the
pauper oath, or for want of jurisdiction of the person, or local jurisdiction of
to what has been decided, and do not disturb a plea of nil debet, and payment to a sworn ac-
what has been settled.) See, 59, ante, where
§_
count, is a waiver of the right to have the
this maxim is fully treated. account denied under oath. Loeb v. Nunn, 4
15 Seifred v. Peoples' Bank, 1 Bax., 201; Wil- Heisk, 449. Objection to the affidavit of a di-
son v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 33. vorce bill because made by a next friend, is
16 HarrisSmith, 14 Pick., 286, citing § 337,
v. waived if not made before the hearing. Hack-
now § of this Treatise. The plea in this
332, ney v. Hackney, 9 Hum., 453. But see §§ 1094-
case was that of innocent purchaser. 1095, post.
17 Jones v. Carper,. 2 Tenn. Ch., 627; Stadler 21 See post, § 887, note.
22 Supreme Court Rule 20, §4- See post, § 1302.
v. Hertz, 13 Lea, 317.
In such a case the answer only makes an
18 23 Ibid. Rule 26. See post, § 1311, note 16.
Chester »>. Canfleld, 2 Shan. Cas., 300. 21 Harmon r. Crook, 2 Terg., 127; Hargis r.
issue.
In New York it had the force of an answer Ayres, 8 Yerg., 467; Cooke v. Richards, 11
sworn to, under a statute similar to ours. See Heisk., 711; and Seifred v. People's Bank, 2
Reed v. Warner. 5 Paige, 654. Tenn. Ch., 17; Seifred v. People's Bank, 1
19 Seifred v. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., 17; Bax., 201; Dan. Ch. Pr., 512.
25 Jones v. Carper, 2 Tenn. Ch., 627; Stadler v.
Dan. Ch. Pr. 512. ^ .
20 The insufficiency of, the defence of inno- Hertz, 13 Lea, 317.

26 Wilson v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 33.
cent purchaser, set up in a plea or answer, is
issue with- 27 Wilson v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 34.
waived by letting the cause go to
28 Hackney %'. Hackney, 9 Hum., 453.
out exception to its insufficiency. Stainback v.
Junk Bros. & Co., 14 Pick., 306. Issue taken on 29 Hall v. Fowlkes, 9 Heisk., 753.
§71 WAIVER. 68
the subject-matter, or because the bill is multifarious, or there is a misjoinder of
parties complainant, or because of failure of complainant to comply in due
season with some statutory requirement, or order or rule of the Court, or to
take some step at the right time, or to do some other thing in the orderly prose-
cution of his suit, will be regarded as a waiver of his (the defendant's) right
to do so, he not having taken advantage thereof at the proper time and in the
proper manner. 30
The defendant's failure to file in due season a plea in abatement, or a demur-
rer, or a plea in bar, or an answer, 31 or a cross bill, or to have a demurrer, filed
with his answer, acted on at the right time, or his failure to plead payment, or
an accord and satisfaction, a tender, or a set-off, or a former adjudication, or
non est factum, or the statute of limitations, 32 or the statute of frauds, or that
be was an innocent purchaser, 33 or that the suit was prematurely brought, or
any other defence that must be specifically pleaded, will be deemed a waiver
of his right to take any such step, or file any such pleading. 34
So, a defendant may waive one right or privilege of his own, by asserting
or using another right inconsistent therewith. Thus, (1) the filing of a demur-
rer is an abandonment or waiver of a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction; 35
(2) the filing of an answer is an abandonment, or waiver, of a demurrer; 36
(3) where a demurrer has been filed with an answer, going into a final hearing
of the cause on the merits, without having previously invoked the action of the
Court on the demurrer is a waiver of the demurrer 37 (4) the adoption of any
;
one of the defences set out in the Code, § 4386, is a waiver of those preceding; 38
(5) neglecting to rely on an injunction enjoining the suit, until the hearing, is
a waiver of the injunction. 39
Taking a forward step in pleading or procedure is a waiver of the right to
insist on the action of the Court on the step last taken. Thus
1. Filing a demurrer to the bill while a motion to dismiss for want of a
cost bond is pending, is a waiver of the motion. 40
2. Obtaining time to answer after plea to local jurisdiction is overruled,
waives action on the plea in the Supreme Court. 41
3. Going to trial on the merits is a waiver of the demurrer filed with the
answer and not acted on. 42
4. Failure to invoke the action of the Court on a demurrer incorporated
in an answer, at the first term after it is filed, is a waiver of the demurrer. 43
5. Filing an answer, or plea in bar, is a waiver of action on a demurrer
undisposed of. 44
6. Filing an answer which sets up a defence, or a denial of complainant's
claim, waives action on a plea in bar previously filed, making the same
defense. 45
A
defendant may waive his right to object to a portion of the purchase-
price of his land being paid in cash when the land is sold for debt by decree
30 Wilson
v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 34; Falls v. Associa- demurred to. Read v. Street Ry. Co., 2 Cates, 316.
tion, 21 Pick., 18. So, at law, a motion to dismiss An estoppel not relied on in the answer is waived.
a certiorari must be made at the first term or it will Read v. Street Ry. Co., 2 Cates, 316.
be considered as waived; and a motion to dismiss an 35 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk., 711.
appeal in the Supreme Court for irregularities is 36 Lowe v. Morris, 4 Sneed, 69. And was an
waived if not made at the first term. Tedder v. abandonment of a plea in abatement, but see post,
Odum, 2 Heisk., 50; Snyder v. Summers, 1 Lea, 481. §§ 260-261.
31 Mitchell v. McKinny, 6 Heisk., 83. 37 Pritchett v. State, 2 Sneed, 285; Kyle v. Riley,.
32 Johnson v. Cooper, 2 Yerg., 533; quoting the 11 Heisk., 230.
maxim, quisquis juri pro se introducio renunctat. 38 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk., 711. But, see
33 Harris v. Smith, 14 Pick., 286; citing §337 post, §§ 260-261, as to pleas in abatement.
[now § 334] of this treatise. 30 Tipton v. Bank, 11 Heisk., 151.
34 Complainant's failure to take a preliminary step 40 Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Donaldson, 1 1 Pick.„
before filing his bill is waived by the defendant an- 322.
swering and not demurring. Falls B. & L- Asso., 21 41 Union County v. Knox County, 6 Pick., 541.
Pick., 18. When
the notice required to fix a lien, 42 Kylev. Riley, 11 Heisk., 230; Stephens v. Mar-
it not given, but defendant answered, and no ques-
_
tin, Pick., 278.
1
tion as to the lien raised until the hearing, such 43 Caruthers v. Caruthers, 2 Lea, 77; Harding v.
notice is waived by the defendant. Noll & Thomp- Egin, 2 Tenn. Ch., 39.
son v. Railroad, 4 Cates, 140. A bill of interpleader 44 See post, § 232.
claiming interest in a fund sustained .because not 45 See post, §§ 232; 413.
69 waiver. § 71
in bar of redemption 46 and he may waive his right to plead over or answer,
;
after his plea in abatement has been found against him on the facts, by failing
to plead or answer, or to apply for leave so to do. 47
3. Waivers when Operative on Either Party. Either party will be deemed to
have waived his right, if, in due season, he fail to except to depositions, or to
have the Clerk and Master act on his exceptions, or to appeal from his action
thereon when adverse, or to have the Chancellor act on such appeal or if either ;
party fail to object to a question propounded to a witness, or fail to object to

any answer to a question, or to any paper, deed, or other writing or other evi-
dence offered as proof, 48 or fail to notify the opposite party to produce a paper
at the hearing, or fail to except to the Master's report, or to have an account
opened to enable him to file additional evidence or to have the action of the
;
Chancellor on exceptions to the Master's report, or fail to require the opposite

party to file some particular paper, or do some particular act required by the
practice or order of the Court 49 or fail to move that some pleading, deposition,
;
or other paper be stricken from the file because not filed in season, or not entitled
to be filed for any other reason, or because not marked filed by the Clerk and
Master 50 or fail to demand a trial by jury, 61 or fail to take any action in any
;
other matter proper in preparing for trial on his part, or proper to prevent his
adversary obtaining any undue advantage, or fail at the hearing to renew ex-
ceptions to evidence, or to call the attention of the Chancellor to a particular
piece of proof, or to a particular averment or admission in the pleadings or in
the argument of the opposite party, or to a particular decision or point of law
or to fail, after the hearing, to see that the decree gives him all he is entitled to,
or is no harder on him than the Chancellor's holding requires, or fail to file a
bill of exceptions, or to pray an appeal, or give an appeal bond, or do any other
act necessary to enable him to go to the Supreme Court under as favorable cir-
cumstances as possible. In each and all of these instances, if the party having
the right to do the particular act, or to object to the particular act, fail to so do,
or so object, in due season and proper manner, he will be deemed to have waived
his right so to do, or so to object.
Indeed, it may be safely laid down as a general rule, that all pleadings,
proofs, motions^ exceptions, attacks, defences, and objections must be filed or
made in due season and manner and all exceptions to pleadings, proof, attacks
;
and defences must be made in due manner and season and all steps necessary
;
in the litigation either to attack, defend or assert rights must be taken at the
proper time and in due form; and, above all, that every objection based on
technical grounds and not going to the substance of the issue involved, must be
made in the right way and at the right time and that if any of these acts are
;
not done in due form and season they will be deemed to be waived, and the right
to do them will be denied by the Court. Where a rule of Court requires a
motion for a new trial to specify the grounds therefor, all grounds not so speci-
62
fied are deemed to be waived, and cannot be assigned in the Supreme Court.
So, either party may waive a right or benefit (1) by taking an inconsistent
right or benefit, or (2) by doing an act or taking a step inconsistent therewith,
or (3) by ignoring such right or benefit until the adverse party has taken a
step inconsistent therewith, as above more fully shown. Thus, cross-examining
a witness is a waiver of notice, or of any defect in the notice, to take his depo-
sition; 523 and obtaining a reference to the Master is a waiver of a trial by jury
'
previously demanded. 5213

4. Waivers when Not Operative. But while a party may have failed to do an
46 McBee v. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558; Hodges v. 50 Fanningv. Fly, 2 Cold., 486.
But see post, § 626, notes. 51 Garrison v. Hollins, 2 Lea, 686; Coulter u.
Copely, 11 Heisk., 335.
47 Sewell w. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271. Sewing Machine Co., 3 Lea., 116.
48 Objections to testimony not made in the Chan- 52 Railroad V. Johnson, 6 Cates, 632. And going
cery Court are waived, and cannot be made in the into a hearing in the Supreme Court is a waiver of
Supreme Court. Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerg., 508. all defects in the record. Set post, § 1311, note 16.
49 Such as to file money in Court when tendered. 52a Bradford v. Ingram, 5 Hay., 155.
Rogers v. Tindell, IS Pick., 356. 52b Harris v. Bogle, 7 Cates, 701
§72 CONSENT, AND ITS EFFECTS. 70
act in due season, he will not be deemed to have waived the right to do it, if
his failure was caused by the wrongful act of the adverse party. party will A
not be allowed to insist that a right to, do a particular act is waived by non-
action when his own conduct misled the other party, or put him to sleep, 53 or
when he expressly agrees that the right may continue. 54
It must, also, be understood that, while a waiver, or even an express consent,
may be binding on a party to a suit, it may at the same time not be binding on
the Court, for the Court will not allow a party, either by action or non-action,
to violate a rule of the Court, or do an act contrary to law or public policy.
Thus, while the failure of the defendant to object or demur, when the Court
has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, 55 or when the bill on its
face claims usury, or seeks to enforce an illegal or immoral contract, or to
obtain a pro forma or collusive decree, or one against public policy, 58 or to sell
a homestead, or to sell exempt personal property, 57 will bind such defendant,
the Chancellor may refuse to entertain the suit, and, on his own motion, dismiss
the bill.
Waivers are not operative on persons of unsound mind and are not ordi- ;
narily operative upon minors 58 and married women nor are they operative ;
upon a party who was ignorant of the right in question, especially if such igno-
rance was the result of the conduct of the other party, or of an officer of the
Court. But if this ignorance was the result of his own negligence or mistake
he will be bound, for he cannot take advantage of his own wrong.
§ 72. —
Consent, and Its Effects. Consent 59 is the concurrence or agreement
of two or more persons as to any matter of fact or opinion. Courts are estab-
lished to provide for cases of dissent, cases where there is disagreement instead
of agreement. Where there is agreement between parties there is no need of
60 provided
a Court, indeed when there is agreement there is no need of law,
always the agreement is between parties capable of contracting, in no way
injures any other person, and violates no rule of law or public policy. 111 Laws
are made to provide for cases of disagreement, and it is the business of Courts
to apply these laws to the facts attending such disagreements, and thereby
ascertain which of the disagreeing parties is in the wrong, and in what way, and
to what extent, he shall atone therefor.
To show the force of the maxim that consent makes law, it is only necessary
to recall that consent controls nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thou-
sand transactions between man and man, in the business world and in social life.
A formal agreement binds not only the parties thereto, but every one else,
provided, of course, it interferes with no third person's rights or property, and
violates no law or public policy and it continues to bind the parties thereto
;
until it has accomplished its purpose, or been set aside or. changed by another
agreement between the same parties,' or their privies in estate. If, however, one
or more of the parties to an agreement should violate the agreement, the other
party could apply to the Courts, either to prevent any further violation, or for
the damages resulting to him by reason of the violation, or for a specific per-
formance of the agreement.
While a litigation is a sort of legal war in which the parties are the adversa-
ries, nevertheless through the agency of counsel representing the parties, agree-
ments are often made in the progress of a suit; and these agreements are
greatly favored by the Courts, 1st, because they lessen the labors of the Judges
53 Merchant v. Preston, 1 Lea, 280; Gillespie v. 59 In the Latin language, (from which the word
Goddard, 1 Heisk., 777. See maxims, ante, §§49; 51. consent is derived) it means thinking together or
54 Rogers v. O'Mary, 11 Pick., 514. alike, a union of minds, as to any matter.
55 Baker v. Mitchell, 21 Pick., 610; see post, § <i<> Consensus facit legem. (Consent makes law;)
290. that is, the law for the particular matter covered
58 Ottenheimer v. Cook, 10 Heisk., 309. by the agreement.
57 Mills v. Bennett, 10 Pick., 651. 61 Conventio privatorum non potest publico juri
58 Preston v. Golde, 12 Lea, 271; Farrow v. Far- derogare. (The agreement of private persons can-
row, 13 Lea, 120. An infant cannot waive his not annul a public law.)
homestead rights. Ibid.
71 CONSENT, AND ITS EFFECTS. §72
2d, because they lessen the asperities of the litigation; and 3d, because
they facilitate the dispatch of business and they are firmly enforced, except
;
in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, which cases very seldom happen. It is,
indeed, a maxim that where parties consent they bind the Court, 02 and where
they do not consent the Court binds them. The agreement of the partfes makes
the law for the contract. 03
What a party agrees to in the course of a litigation is so binding upon him
that he cannot appeal from it, or if an appeal should be granted, the Supreme
Court will not hear him, even if his agreement is contrary to what the Court
would have decided on a contest. 04 What a party consents to in Court he cannot
complain of. 05 For this reason an erroneous order or decree, when consented to,
will bind the parties consenting both in the Court where the consent was made,
and in the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court will not look behind
a consent to see whether it was reasonable or not, if it violate no law or public
policy. 60
Agreements in regard to pleadings, proofs, references, reports, orders, de-
crees,and other proceedings in litigation, are binding and will be enforced.
Consent may not only be shown by the words or writings of the parties, but
may be inferred from their silence or conduct under circumstances, 07 for he
who is silent when he ought to object, will not be allowed to object when he
ought to be silent. 08 But, as elsewhere shown, no consent is binding on a party
not sni juris.
There are many implied consents enforced in Court during the progress of
a litigation, most of them based on the failure of the party to object to some
pleading, proof or proceeding in due season, but these have already been con-
sidered in the section devoted to waivers, and will not be repeated.
62 Modus et conventio vincunt legem. (Agree- 6T Non refert an quis assensum suum prwfert ver-
ments control the law.) Neither the Courts nor the bis an rebus ipsis et factis. (It makes no difference
legislature can set aside a valid agreement. They whether a man gives his assent by his words, or by
are protected by the Constitution of both the State his acts and deeds.)
and the United States. 68 Quis potest et debet vetare jubet si non vetat.
63 Contractus legem ex conventione accipiunt. (He who can and ought to object, commands the
64 Consensus to Hit errorem. (Consent does away thing to be done if he fails to object.) And there
with any error in the agreement.) is another maxim applicable. Qui tacet consenttre
65 Volenti non fit injuria. (What a man consents videtur. (He who is silent is considered as con-
to he cannot complain of.) senting.) There are similar maxims among all civ-
66 A consent decree can only be changed or an- ilized nations, showing the consensus of mankind
nulled on a bill filed for that express purpose, and that silence gives consent when a party deliberately
on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake. fails to object.
§73 PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. n
CHAPTER V.
PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.
73. Priorities, and Equities Relating There- § 75. Bona Fide Purchasers, and Their Equi-
to. ties.
i 74. Assignments, How Affected by Priori- § 76. Equities of Purchasers, How Affected
ties. by Notice of Prior Claims.
§ 73. and Equities Relating Thereto. When the owner of a legal

Priorities, —
estate conveys in good faith all of his interest in it to another, it is manifest
that he cannot, by a second conveyance of the same estate to a third person,
vest any title thereto in such third person. No one can transfer to another
a greater right than he himself possesses and, at the time of his second con- ;
veyance, the conveyor had no right or interest to convey. Hence, as between

two vendees of the same property, the first in order of time prevails, except
in so far as the effect of this rule is changed by the registration laws and the
doctrine of notice.
A
similar rule of priorities prevails in reference to the acquisition of equita-
ble interests, the rule being expressed in the maxim, "Where there are equal
equities the first in order of time shall prevail." This doctrine of priorities
in Equity is based on good reason and good conscience. It is manifestly both
reasonable and right that he, who first acquires an interest in any property,
should be protected in his acquisition otherwise the law of force must prevail,
;
and instead of priority of time giving superiority of right, the maxim would
read "Superiority of Might gives Superiority of Right;" and he would hold
the property who could bring to bear the greatest force, or the shrewdest
strategy.
The equitable doctrine of priority in time giving superiority in right applies
only as between persons having equitable interests, and only then when
those equitable interests are in all other respects equal for priority in time ;
does not give a superiority in right if the prior equity is, in other respects than
in point of time, a superior equity. 1
1. The Fundamental Rules of Priority. The equitable doctrine concerning pri-
orities is embodied in the three following general rules 1st. Among successive :
equitable estates, or interests, where there exists no special claim, advantage,

or superiority, in any one over the others, the order of time controls. Under
these circumstances, the maxim, "Among equal equities, the first in order of
time prevails," furnishes the rule of decision. 2 2d. Between a legal and an
equitable title to the same subject-matter, the legal title in general prevails, in
'
pursuance of the maxim, Where there is equal equity the law must prevail.
'
'
3d. The legal title being outstanding and not involved in the controversy,
where there are successive unequal equities in the same subject-matter, as where
there is a complete or perfect equitable estate in the one party and an incom-
plete or imperfect equitable estate or a mere equity in the other party; or,
where among equitable interests of a like intrinsic nature, one is affected by
some incident or quality which renders it inferior to another, then the prece-
1 1 Pom. Eq. Jur„ §§ 413-417; 678; 1 Sto. Eq. ment thereof, but before notice to the debtor, will
Jur., § 64 d. defeat the assignment. Clodfelter v. Cox, 1 Sneed,
2 An attachment of a chose in action after assign- 330. This is a leading case.
73 PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. § 73
dence resulting from order of time is defeated, and the superior equitable
estate or interest prevails over the others; as is manifestedly implied in the
maxim, "Where there are equal equities, the first in order of time must pre-
vail." 3
2. Priorities of Attachments, Judgments, and Executions. Priority, in order of
time, prevails to the same extent when liens are acquired by the filing of
attachment bills, or the levy of attachment writs. In all such cases, where the
right of the complainant attached either directly by the filing of an attachment
bill, or indirectly by the levy of the attachment writ for his benefit, that right
operates as a lis pendens, and, if perfected by a sale, the title of the purchaser
will relate back to the filing of the bill, or to the levy of the writ, as the case
may be 4 and, if there be several bills or several levies, their priorities will be
;
in the order of time, beginning with the oldest lien, if the equities of the parties
are otherwise equal. If two or more levies by attachment are made at the same
time, they will be treated-as one levy, and a pro rata distribution of the proceeds
will be made. 5
The priorities of judgments and decrees, and of the liens thereby created, are
determined by their respective dates, or registration 6 the priorities of different
;
levies by execution on the same tract of land are regulated by the order of
time in which the levies are made; 7 and the priorities of different levies by
execution on the same personalty are determined by the priorities of the dates
of their respective testes. 8
And in conflicts between attachment liens, judgment liens, and execution
liens, the first in order of time will prevail.
3. Equities and Liabilities of Purchasers. In applying these rules, it becomes,
important to know when one equity is superior to another. Courts of Equity
recognize no inequality based on form, or mode of creation, provided the equita-
ble interest is perfected and is based upon a valuable consideration. The
following rules will aid in determining this question:
1. The equitable interest created by a trust, or by a contract in rem, made
upon a valuable consideration, is superior to the equity arising from a mere
voluntary transfer, or from the satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. 9
2. The equity acquired by a party who has been misled, is superior to the
interest in the same subject-matter of the one who wilfully procured or suffered
him to be misled. An equity, otherwise equal or even superior, may, through
the gross laches, or the intentional deceit of the holder, be postponed to the
equity of another acquired as a result of such laches or deceit. Any conduct
which Equity regards as constituting fraud, either an actual intention to mis-
lead, or that gross negligence which produces all the effects, and merits all the
blame, of intentional deception, will operate to postpone the equity of the
person guilty thereof as against the equity of the person thereby misled.
3. Aparty taking an estate or interest with notice of another's equity there-
in, takes subject to that equity that is, the purchaser of an estate or interest,
;
legal or equitable, even for a valuable consideration, with notice of any existing
equitable estate, interest, claim or right, in or to the same subject-matter, held
by. a third person, is liable in Equity to the same extent, and in the same man-
ner, as the person from whom he made the purchase. 10
A purchaser with notice of a trust, either express or implied, becomes himself
a trustee for the beneficiary as to the property purchased, and is bound in the
same manner as the original trustee from whom he purchased. A purchaser
or mortgagee with notice of the express equitable lien of a vendor for unpaid
3 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 682; see "Assignments" in 7 Parker v. Swan, 1 Hum., 80; Knight v. Oeden,
our Digests. 2 Tenn. Ch., 476.
4 Parker v. Swan, 1 Hum., 80. 8 Cecil v. Carson, 2 Pick., 139.
5 Lea v. Maxwell, 1 Head., 365; Stone v. Abbott, o Anderson v. Ammonett, 9 Lea, 1 ; 2 Pom. Eq
3 Bax., 319; Allen v. Gilliland, 6 Lea, 534; Relfe v. Jur., § 685.
McComb, 2 Head., 558. 10 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 688; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§
Code, §§2980-2981. 395-398.
§74 PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 74
purchase price, takes the land subject to that lien. A purchaser or mortgagee
of the legal estate, with notice of an equitable lien by a prior defective
mort-
gage, or by any other means from which an express equitable lien can arise,
is
bound by the lien. A purchaser with notice of a prior contract to sell or' to
lease, takes subject to such contract, and is bound in the same manner as his
vendor to carry it into execution. 11
4. Exceptions to the Rules of Priority. While, as between successive pur-
chasers or assignees of an assignable interest, the general rule is that he is en-
titled to the preference who first gives notice of the assignment to the debtor; 12
the following are the exceptions to the rule :
1. All negotiable instruments, whether negotiable by the law merchant or by

statute, may be transferred either by written endorsement, by delivery, or
otherwise, without any notice to the maker. 13
2. Certificates of stock in a corporation may be assigned without notice to
the corporation. 14
3. Life insurance policies may be assigned without notice to the company, in
the absence of any contract to the contrary. 15
§ 74. Assignments, How Affected by Priorities.— What has been said in
reference to the manifest equities arising out of several conveyances of the
same property by the same vendor to several vendees, 1 applies with equal force
to successive assignments of an unnegotiable chose in action by the same as-
signor to different, assignees; but, as there are facts in the latter case different
from those in the former case, some important modifications of the rules of
priority in sales of realty become necessary.
Where/there are successive equitable assignments of a fund to different par-
ties, it would seem, on first thought, that, as the legal estate is outstanding, and
as the interests of all the successive assignees are similar in their essential
nature, the first in order of time should prevail, under the maxim Qui prior est
tempore potior est jure. On fuller deliberation, however, important considera-
tions will appear sufficient to take such assignments out of the operation of the
general rule. Where an equitable interest in land is created, the holder thereof
can protect himself by having it registered. Where an equitable interest in
chattels is obtained, it can be secured by a transfer of the possession, or by re-
ducing the agreement to writing and having it registered. But no such safe-
guards exist in case of assignments of a chose in action. The legal title, which
is analogous to the possession, remains vested in the debtor, trustee or holder
of the fund; while the creditor or beneficiary, even after one or more assign-
ments of all his interest, continues clothed with full apparent right to make
further assignments.
1. Notice to Debtor when Necessary to Perfect an Assignment. It is, therefore,
settled law that, while, as against the assignor himself, no notice of the assign-
ment of a non-negotiable chose in action, or fund, need be given to the debtor,
trustee or other holder of the fund, nevertheless, that, as against subsequent
assignees for a valuable consideration, notice to the debtor, trustee, or holder
of the fund is necessary in order to perfect the assignment and render
it valid and effectual and that, among successive assignees of the same thing in
;
action who have paid a valuable consideration, the assignee in good faith and
for value who first gives notice, obtains a precedence over the others, even though
they may be earlier in time. The equities of the successive assignments being-
otherwise equal, the priority among them is determined by the order of the
dates of the notices, rather than by the order of the dates of the assignments.
112 Pom. Kq. Jur., §§685-688; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 221; Perkins v. Perkins, 1 Tenn. Ch., 540; Smith v.
395-398; see "Notice" in our Digests. Hubbard, 1 Pick., 312.
12 This general rule, laid clown in Clodfelter y. 14 Cornick v. Richards, 3 Lea, 1.
Cox, 1 Sneed, 330, has been uniformly followed in 15 Mutual P. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 5 Sneed, 269.
Tennessee. l Ante, § 65.
13 Code, §§ 1956-1967; Sugg t: Powell, 1 Head.,
75 PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. §74
Giving notice is regarded as equivalent, or as least analogous to, the act of
taking possession and until notice is received by the debtor, payment by him
;
to the assignor would be valid, and bind the assignee. 2

It should be carefully observed, however, that to enable a subsequent as-
signee to obtain a priority in this manner, by giving the first notice to the
debtor or legal holder, he must be an assignee in good faith, and for a valuable
consideration. If he has parted with no consideration he is a mere volunteer,
and stands in the same position as his assignor. If he had notice of the earlier
assignment, then he took subject thereto. 3
2. Cases Where Notice is Not Required. The foregoing rules in reference to
the need of notice in case of assignments of choses in action, do not apply in
the following cases:
1. All negotiable instruments, whether negotiable by the law merchant, or
made so by statute, 4 may be transferred without any notice to the makers.
2. Certificates of stock in a corporation may be assigned without notice to
the corporation. 5
3. Life insurance policies may be assigned without notice to the company,
in the absence of any contract to the contrary. 6
To Whom Notice Must be Given.
3. Notice may be given to the debtor, trus-
tee, or holder of the fund, either in writing, or verbally, if the latter form is
explicit, definite and certain. 7 Notice to one of two or more co-trustees, or
joint debtors is, in general, notice to all; but it ceases to be operative when
such trustee, or debtor, dies, or such trustee gives up his position. No notice
to the assignor is necessary to make him liable when the debtor refuses to pay
the debt assigned, except in case of negotiable paper, to which the rules con-
cerning notice do not apply. These rules, requiring notice to the debtor or
holder of the fund, are confined to transfers of personal property, debts, money
claims arising from contracts, accounts and the like but not to equitable inter- ;
ests in land, or to negotiable paper.

The assignee must not only notify the debtor, but he must do so promptly,
and obtain possession of the chose in action if in writing, and if not take such
steps as are equivalent to actual possession. A prior assignee may lose his
priority by any laches which injures a subsequent bona Me assignee. 8
4. Equities of the Debtor against the Assignee. The assignee of a thing in action not
negotiable, takes the interest assigned subject to all the defenses, legal and
equitable, of the debtor who issued the obligation, or of the trustee or other
party upon whom the obligation originally rested. 9 That is, when the original
debtor, or trustee, in whatever form his promise or obligation is made, if it
is not negotiable, is sued by the assignee, the defenses, legal and equitable,
which he had at the time of the assignment, or at the time when notice of it
was given, against the original creditor, avail to him against the substituted
creditor. This rule applies to all forms of contract not negotiable, 10 and to all
defenses which would have been valid between the debtor party and the orig-
inal creditor. These defenses may (1) arise out of, or be inherent in, the very
terms or nature of the obligation itself, as that it was conditional, and the con-
dition has not been performed by the assignor, or the failure or illegality of the
consideration, and the like or, (2) they may exist outside of the contract, as
;
set-off, payment, release, the condition of accounts between the original parties,
and the like. 11 It is essential, however, that the equity in favor of the debtor
2 Clodfelter v. Cox, 1 Sneed, 330; and an attach- 7 Clodfelter v. Cox., 1 Sneed, 330.
ment of the debt, after assignment but before notice 8 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 696-698.
thereof to the debtor, will defeat the assignment. I) 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 703.
Ibid; Trabue v. Bankhead, 2 Tenn. Ch., 412. 10 It applies, also, to negotiable paper when as-
3 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 695-702. signed after maturity, or after notice of defence, or
4 Code, §§ 1956-1967; Smith v. Hubbard, 1 Pick., for a pre-existing debt. Ford v. Thompson, 1 Head.,
312. 265.
5 Cornick v. Richards, 3 Lea, 1. 11 Young v. Atkins, 4 Heisk., 531.
6 Mutual P. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 5 Sneed, 269.
should exist at the time of the assignment, or before notice thereof; for, after
receiving notice, he can not, by a payment, release, obtaining a set-off, or any
other act, defeat or prejudice the right of the assignee. The debtor, who would
have been entitled to equities under this rule, may, by actual misrepresenta-
tions, or by conduct, or even by silence, towards the assignee, estop himself
from setting them up and he may release them. 12
;
§ 75. Bona Fide Purchasers, and their Equities, Where a person owns a —
valid subsisting interest in property, his" right thereto should be superior to
another's who subsequently acquires possession of the same property, (1) with-
out acquiring the legal title thereto, or (2) without paying any valuable con-
sideration therefor, or (3) with notice of the prior adverse interest, or (4)
without good faith. On the other hand, where a person's interests, though
valid, are not so evidenced as to give notice thereof, his right thereto should
be inferior to another's who acquires possession of the same property (1) with
a conveyance of the legal title, (2) paying therefor a valuable consideration,
(3) without any notice of the prior adverse interest, and (4) in good faith.
This defence of innocent purchaser 1 is founded on the maxim, "Where the
equities are equal, the law will prevail;" and the defendant having both the
possession and the legal title, while the complainant has only an equitable title,
it is manifestly just to prefer the defendant, his equities being fully equal to
complainant 's, and he having in addition both the possession and the legal title.
Where the equities are equal, superior is the condition of the defendant. 2
Besides, the complainant was guilty of negligence in not having his interests
so evidenced as to give purchasers notice of his rights; and his case conse-
quently falls under the ban of the maxim, When a loss must fall on one of two
'
'
persons, it should be borne by him whose act or negligence caused it." Were
the law otherwise, no man would ever be safe in making a purchase.
In order, then, that the defence of bona fide purchaser may be effectual, all
of the following essentials must appear: 1, There must have been a purchase;
2, There must have been a valuable consideration paid; 3, The conveyance must
have been taken and the consideration paid before notice of the prior adverse
equity; and 4, the whole transaction must have been characterized by good
faith. 3 These essentials will be considered separately.
1. There Must Have Been a Purchase. The very corner-stone of this defence is
the fact of a purchase. The purchase must have been fully consummated before
notice, so fully consummated that nothing was left to be done in order to effect-
uate it. If the purchase had not been completed before notice, the defendant
had the right to abandon the proposed purchase, or to obtain indemnity against
the alleged equity; and if he did neither, it was his own negligence or wilful-
ness, and he has no right to complain of any, loss caused by the alleged equity,
of which he had notice. 4 The fact that the consideration was valuable, and
12 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 704; Moore u. Weir, 3 (Where rights are equal the person in possession
Sneed, 47. will prevail.)
1 See Plea of Innocent Purchaser, post, § 332. 3 And plea must aver that the vendor was
the
The rationale of this defence is, that the equities seized in fee, or pretended to be so seized. The
of the parties being equal, a Court of Conscience vendor must be in possession and the vendee must
will not interpose to aid the complainant, there being believe that he was acquiring the fee. Craig v. Lei-
no reason in conscience for preferring him to the per, 2 Yerg., 196; Rhea v. Allison, 3 Head, 177;
defendant. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 738. In such a case Jarman v. Farley, 7 Lea, 141.
the Court will withhold its hand, and remit the par- 4 Pomeroy thus qualifies the rule laid down in
ties to the Courts of law, where legal rights an. the text:
administered without the restraints imposed by con- Where the estate subsequently purchased is the
science. Where, however, a Court of Chancery has, legal estate, a notice, in order to be binding, must
also, common law jurisdiction, and can enforce legal be received before the purchaser pays the price, or
rights, the question arises whether it will apply the parts with other valuable consideration. In other
maxim, Where the equities are equal the law must words, if he has actually paid the valuable consider-
prevail; and deny the defence of innocent purchaser. ation without any notice, a notice afterwards given
Pomerov seems to have reached the conclusion that does not preclude him from completing the transac-
this defence cannot be interposed to an eiectment tion by obtaining a conveyance, of the legal title,
bill in a Chancerv Court, such as ours, having com- and thereby securing the precedence due to a bona
mon law iurisdiction. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 739-743. tide purchaser for a valuable consideration and with-
But, see Lenoir v. Mining Co., 4 Pick., 168. Snell out notice. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 691; 755. See, also,
concurs with Pomeroy, Snell's Pr. Eq., 26-28. 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64 c; Womack v. Smith, 11 Hum.,
2 In a-quali jure melior est conditio possidentis. 483; Livingston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 66.
that was actually paid, will not avail if the purchaser had notice before the
it
deed was delivered, or the purchase otherwise absolutely consummated. 5
2. There Must Have Been a Valuable Consideration Paid. A valuable consider-
ation means, and necessarily requires, under every form and kind of purchase,
something of actual value, capable, in the estimation of the law, of pecuniary
measurement, such as parting with money or money's worth, or an actual
change of the purchaser's legal position for the worse. The amount of the
purchase price, if otherwise there is good faith, is not generally material. As
examples of what clearly amount to a valuable consideration are the following
(1) A contemporaneous advance or loan of money, (2) or a sale, transfer, or
exchange of property, made at the time of the purchase, or execution of the
instrument; (3) or the surrender or relinquishment of an existing legal right,
or the assumption of a new legal obligation which is in its nature irrevocable.
An antecedent debt is not deemed a valuable consideration, because the pur-
chaser parts with nothing, and will lose nothing if the sale to him is set aside
he can be put in statu quo. 6
Not only must there be a valuable consideration in fact, but it must be paid
before notice of the prior claim. Notice after the agreement for the purchase
is made, but before any payment, will destroy the character of bona fide
purchaser. 7
Where a part only of the price or consideration has been paid before notice,
either the defendant should be entitled to the position and protection of a
bona fide purchaser pro tanto; or the complainant should be permitted to enforce
his claim to the whole land only upon condition of his doing equity, by re-
tunding to the defendant the amount already paid before receiving the notice. 8
The payment must have been actually made, or what, in law, is tantamount to
actual payment, must have been done, before any notice. Payment may con-
sist of (1) a transfer of money, property, or things in action, or (2) an absolute
change of the purchaser's legal position for the worse, or (3) the assumption by
him of some new irrevocable legal obligation. It follows, therefore, that his
own promise, contract, bond, covenant, bond and mortgage, or other non-nego-
tiable security for the price, will not render the party a bona fide purchaser,
nor entitle him to protection; for upon failure of the consideration he can be
relieved from such obligations in Equity, even if not at law. Payment of
actual cash is not indispensable. The absolute transfer of notes, bonds, or
other securities made by a third person, will, however, constitute a good
consideration. 9
3. Have Been no Notice of Prior Equities.
There Must The purchaser must
have completed his purchase and paid the consideration without any kind of
notice, actual or constructive, of prior adverse rights in or to the subject-matter
of his purchase. The rules of notice, and their underlying principles, have al-
ready been fully considered elsewhere, 10 and need not be repeated; and only
the time and effect of notice will be stated in this section. The rule is universal
that if a purchaser receive notice of prior adverse rights in and to the subject
matter of his purchase, before he has completely perfected his purchase, or
11
paid the purchase price, he is not a bona fide purchaser.
If, however, a second purchaser for value and without notice purchases from
a first purchaser who is charged with notice, he thereby becomes a bona fide
Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerg., 508; Pinson v. Ivey,
5 1 Tenn. Ch., 442; Finnegan v. Finnegan, 3 Tenn.
1 Yerg., 302; Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sneed, 305; 1 Sto. Ch., 515; O'Neal v. Smith, 10 Eea, 340.
Eq. PL, §§ 805-807; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., 753. It would Merril v. Johnston, 1 Yerg., 73; High v. Jiatte,
7
seem that the doctrine of innocent purchaser without 10 Yerg., 335; Smitheal v. Gray, 1 Hum., 491; Tar-
notice, does not apply between equities; and that the man v. Farley, 7 Lea, 141; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 750.
purchaser of a chose in action, or of any equitable 8 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.,' § 750.
title, must always abide by the case of the person 9 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 751.
from whom he buys; and that, in such cases, the rule 10 See Notice, ante, % 65.
is, He who is first in time best in right.
is Pinson v. 11 Pillow v. Shannon, 3 Yerg., 508; Aiken v.
Ivey, 1 Yerg., 302; Craig v. Eeiper, 2 Yerg., 193, Smith, 1 Sneed, 305; Otis v. Payne, 2 Pick., 663;
and cases cited in the head lines. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.; § 753.
6 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 747-749; Anderson v. Taylor,
purchaser, and is entitled to protection as such. Or, if a second purchaser with
notice acquires title from a first purchaser who was without notice, and bona
fide, he succeeds to all the rights of his immediate grantor. But if a person hold-
ing a title affected with notice, conveys to a bona fide purchaser and afterwards
takes a reconveyance to himself, he will hold the land subject to all the equi-
ties against it at the time he conveyed it. 12
4. There Must Have Been Good Faith in the Whole Transaction. As this de-
tense is based largely on the alleged good faith of the purchaser, and as he
specially avers this good faith in his plea, it necessarily results that if any act
of bad faith appear, the defense of innocent purchaser will not avail. This bad
faith may consist in: (1) a completion of the purchase after notice; (2) fraudu-
lent conduct towards the vendor in the transaction; (3) participation in an in-
tended fraud on the creditors of the vendor; (4) or any other matter showing
that in the purchase the purchaser has not kept his hands absolutely clean. 13
§ 76. Equities of Purchasers, How Affected by Notice of Prior Claims. —
The law of notice and its effects has been heretofore considered somewhat gen-
erally, 1 but a further consideration with special reference to the effect of
notice upon purchasers is appropriate here.
Notice is either actual or constructive 1. Actual notice is positive personal
:
information of a fact directly communicated to the party, or directly acquired

by him 2. Constructive notice is the sort the law presumes the party to have
;
acquired.
1. What Constructive Notice Includes. Constructive notice includes all kinds
of notice not shown to have been actually given it assumes that no information
:
concerning the prior fact, claim, or right, has been directly and personally com-
municated to the party or at least, that the communication of such information
;
is not shown by evidence, but is only inferred by operation of legal presumption.

It embraces all those instances, widely differing in their external features, in
which either from certain extraneous facts, or from certain acts or omissions of
the party himself, disclosed by the evidence, the information is conclusively
presumed to have been given to or received by him, or is inferred by a prima
facie presumption of the law in the absence of contrary proof.
2
2. What is Meant by Being Put Upon Inquiry. A purchaser, or person obtain-

ing any right in specific property, is not affected by vague rumors, hearsay
statements, and the like, concerning prior and conflicting claims upon the same
property, because he thereby acquires no positive information, and obtains no
tangible clue, by means whereof he may commence and successfully prosecute
an inquiry into the truth. On the other hand, if the party obtained knowledge
or information of facts which tend to show the existence of a prior right in
conflict with the interest which he is seeking to obtain, and which are sufficient
to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, then it may be a legitimate,
and perhaps even necessary, inference that he acquired the further information
which constitutes actual notice. This inference may be defeated by proper
evidence. If the party shows that he made the inquiry, and prosecuted it with
reasonable diligence, but still failed to discover the conflicting claim, he thereby
overcomes and destroys the inference. If, however, it appears that the party
obtained knowledge or information of facts, which were sufficient to put a
prudent man upon inquiry, and which were of such a nature that the inquiry,
if prosecuted with reasonable diligence, would certainly have led to a discovery
of the conflicting claim, then the inference that he acquired the information
constituting actual notice is necessary and absolute for this is only another
;
mode of stating that the party was put upon inquiry, that he made the inquiry
will be held to be not an innocent purchaser. Snell's
1= 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 754. Pr. Eq., 34.
13 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 762. Where the proof shows '
1 See ante, § 65.
that the purchaser designedly abstained from making 2 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 604; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 400-
inquiry for the very purpose of avoiding notice, he 400 a.
and arrived at the truth. Finally, if it appears that the party has knowledge or
information of facts sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry, and that he
wholly neglects to make any inquiry, «r having begun it, fails to prosecute it
in a reasonable manner, then, also, the inference of actual notice is necessary
and absolute. 251
3. What Facts will Put One on Inquiry. A purchaser may be put on inquiry
by visible objects, structures, or easements upon, or connected with, the land
with which he is dealing. So, a purchaser or incumbrancer of an estate, who
knows, or is properly informed, that it is in the possession of a person other
than the vendor or mortgagor with whom he is dealing, is thereby charged
with a constructive notice of all the interest, rights and equities which such
possessor may have in the land. But, in order that possession may put a pur-
chaser on inquiry and operate as notice, it must exist at the time of the trans-
action by which his rights and interests are created.
Possession by a lessee is constructive notice to a purchaser, not only of the
tenant's rights and interests directly growing out of, or connected with, the
lease itself, but also of all rights and interests which he may have acquired by
other and collateral agreements, as, for example, a contract to convey the
land, or to renew the lease, and the like. 3
4. Notice by Recitals in Deeds. Whenever a purchaser holds under a convey-
ance, and is obliged to make out his title through that deed, or through a
series of prior deeds, the general rule is firmly established that he has con-
structive notice of every matter connected with or affecting the estate, which
appears, either by description of parties, by recital, by reference, or otherwise,
on the face of any deed which forms an essential link in the chain of instru-
ments through which he must derive his title. 4 »
Any description of the parties, as married women, trustees, executors, ad-

ministrators or the like, any recital of fact, or reference to other documents,
puts the purchaser upon inquiry and he is bound to follow up this inquiry step
;
by step, from one discovery to another, from one instrument to another, until
the whole series of title-deeds is exhausted, and a complete knowledge of all
the matters referred to in their provisions and affecting the estate, is obtained. 5
5. Effect of Notice of a Deed, or Other Instrument. If a purchaser or encum-
brancer, dealing concerning property of which the record title appears to be
complete and perfect, has information of extraneous facts or matters in pais,
sufficient to put him on inquiry respecting some unrecorded conveyance, mort-
gage, or encumbrance, or respecting some outstanding interest, claim, or right
which is not the subject of record, and he omits to make a proper inquiry, he
will be charged with constructive notice of all the facts which he might have
learned by means of a due and reasonable inquiry.
Where a purchaser has notice of a title-deed, he is presumed to know all its
contents and is bound thereby and if any conveyance, of which he has notice,
;
should contain a recital of, or reference to, another deed otherwise collateral
and not a part of the direct series, he would by means of such recital or refer-
ence, have notice of this collateral instrument, of all its contents and of all
the facts indicated by it which might be ascertained through an inquiry pros-
ecuted with reasonable diligence. This rule applies to both registered and un-
registered instruments. 7
6. Notice by Registration. Our statutes authorize the registration of certain
instruments, relating to the sale, incumbrance, lease and devise of real and
personal property; and they make such instruments when duly probated and
noted for registration, notice to all the world of their existence and contents.
2a 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 597; Gage v. Epperson, 2 in an instrument are considered as incorporated in
it.)
Head, 669.
3 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 611-625. 5 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 626.
4 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 400; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 626. (i Ibid, § 613.
Verba relata in esse videntur. (Words referred to 7 Ibid, § 628.
§ 76 PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 80
The statutes give priority to these instruments in the order of their notation 8
for registration and they declare that any registrable instrument not properly
;
probated or registered or noted for registration, shall be null and void as to

existing or subsequent creditors of, or bona fide purchasers from, the makers
without notice.
The objects
of our registration laws are: (1) to preserve the muniments of
title; perpetuate the evidence of their valid execution; (3) to give the
(2) to
community notice of the changes in the ownership of property; and (4) to
prevent frauds both upon the bargainor and upon his creditors. 10
In order, therefore, that a registered instrument may be notice to the world
it must be (1) an instrument authorized to be registered; (2) it must be prop-
:
erly proven, or acknowledged and certified; (3) it must be registered, or noted,

for registration and (4) this registration must be in the proper county.
;
The record operates as a constructive notice only when the instrument itself
is one which the statute authorized to be registered. The voluntary recording,
therefore, of an instrument, when not authorized by the statute, would be a
mere nullity, and would not charge subsequent purchasers with any notice of
its contents, or of any rights arising under it.
For the same reason, the operation of a record as constructive notice is limited
territorially. A record is not a notice with respect to any tract of land situated
in a different county from that in which the registration is made. The statute
requires the instrument to be registered in the same county in which the land,
or a part of the land, is situated; a record in a different county is, therefore,
inoperative as a constructive notice.
A record is a constructive notice only when, and so far as, it is a true copy,
substantially, of the instrument which purports to be registered, and of all its
provisions. Any material omission or alteration will certainly prevent the
record from being a constructive notice of the part omitted or altered, although
the instrument may appear, on the registry books, to be perfect and operative
in all its parts. Nor will the record be a notice unless it, and the original in-
strument of which it is a copy, correctly and sufficiently describe the premises
which are to be affected.
"When all the foregoing requisites to a valid registration have been complied
with when an instrument is (1) one entitled to be registered and (2) has been
;
duly executed and acknowledged or proved and certified, and (3) has been
registered or noted for registration in the proper manner, and (4) in the proper
county, then such record becomes a constructive notice, not only of the fact
that the instrument exists, but of its contents, and of all the estates, rights,
titles and interests, legal and equitable, created or conferred by it, or arising
from its provisions. 11
8 Flowers v. Wilkes, 1 Swan, 400. I
11 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 651-655; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§.
9 Code, §§2030-2075. 403-404; Code, §§ 2072-2075. See "Registration,'*
10 Tate v. Lawrence, 11 Heisk., 511. I
in our Digests.
81 PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO A SUIT. 77
PART II.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM ITS PRE-
LIMINARIES TO THE APPEARANCE
OF THE DEFENDANT.
CHAPTER VI.
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO A SUIT.
§ 77. The First Preliminary to a Suit § 79. Matters to be Considered in Reference
Chancery. to the Bill.
§ 78. In What Court to Bring Suit.
§ 77. The First Preliminary to a Suit in Chancery. The first step taken by —
a Solicitor, preliminary to filing a bill in the Chancery Court, is to obtain the
probable facts of the case from his client. This is sometimes no easy matter.
Clients, when they seek to bring a suit, are often so strongly prejudiced, and
so indignant, as to be downright incapable of giving a trustworthy history of
their case. A
vigorous cross-examination is often necessary to uncover im-
portant facts in the controversy. You should know not only your client's side
of the proposed suit, but, also, the defences that the other side will, in all proba-
bility, interpose. 1
It is never safe to institute a suit, without knowing the facts your client will
be able to prove, according to the laws of evidence. As a rule, however, com-
plainants are in the right. A person does not ordinarily seek a Solicitor to have
a suit brought, unless he feels that a great wrong has been done him; and
that an appeal to the Courts is his only method of obtaining what is justly
his due. For this reason, when time presses, and the suit must be brought at
once, or great risk be run, a Solicitor will, as a rule, be safe in bringing the
suit on a prima facie case being made out by his client. Injunction and attach-
ment bills must often be drawn with the greatest possible dispatch, the success
of your client, in the race of diligence, often depending on a question 61 a few
minutes. In such ease, consume no time in sifting the facts, but begin to draw
the bill as soon as you discover that an attachment, or injunction, is essential
to your client 's success. In such a case, however, investigate the facts fully at
your earliest opportunity after the bill is filed, so that, if you discover
that you have omitted any matter of importance, you may make an amendment
before the defendant answers, which amendment you may then make without
leave of the Court, or Chancellor, and without paying any costs, except for the
copy of the amendment, and for serving the same on the defendants. 2
§ 78. —
In What Court to Bring the Suit. Having obtained possession of all
the facts of the case from your client, the next question for you to determine
is In what Court to bring the suit. The Chancery Court has exclusive juris-
:
diction of all cases of an equitable nature, and if the suit be of such a nature,
the only question will be: In what particular Chancery Court to bring this
-
suit. In solving this problem you must consider the law in reference to the local
1 One of the best ways to ascertain what defence the matters so concealed. But if you ask him what
will be made to a suit, is to ask your client what plea, pretext, or excuse, the defendant sets up, he
plea or pretext the defendant sets up, in excuse of will almost invariably at once disclose the whole of
bis conduct. Clients are so anxious to appear the probable_ defence; and you will then be able to
right in the eyes of their Solicitor that they will contest its validity.
ceal important facts favorable to the other side, and Code, §§ 4332-4333.
2
searching questions will sometimes fail to discover

§ 79 PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO A SUIT. 82
jurisdiction of theChancery Court, both as it respects the county where the
defendant may be found, and as it respects the locality of the property, where
property is sought to be attached, or where realty is sought to be reached, or
affected. 3
If the suitis legal in its nature, you will then be called on to determine
whether better to bring it in Chancery, or in the Circuit Court. If the
it is
suit be for an injury to person, property, or character, involving unliquidated
damages, you are bound to bring the suit in the Circuit Court but, if the suit ;
be for any other legal matter, you may sue in either Court. In deciding which
Court to institute proceedings in, the following considerations are important:
1. If your case is plain, and your client is content with exact justice, unmixed
and uncorrupted with local prejudice, sue in Chancery. If, on the other hand,
your cause is doubtful, and you need the aid of the artifices and devices incident
to a jury trial, if you sue at all, go into the Circuit Court.
2. If your case is just, but your success depends on your crushing or paralyz-
ing a dishonest and hostile witness, whom you wish to cross-examine in pres-
ence of a jury, and whose reputation you wish to attack, it may be better to
sue in the Circuit Court, although a jury trial may be had in Chancery, also.
3. If your suit involves an account, or depends upon the construction or
effect of writings, the Chancery Court is the better forum.
4. If your title to land depends upon the force and effect of your title papers,
sue in Chancery but if the suit is about the location of a line, or involves the
;
question of adverse possession, then sue in the Circuit Court, unless you wish,
also, to recover rents and the value of waste committed.
5. Where the witnesses are numerous, and the question is purely one of
fact, and the proof is conflicting, the Circuit Court is preferable.
6. Where the whole matter, including its incidents, cannot be ended in the
Circuit Court by one suit, as when your client is entitled (1) to land and its
rents and profits, and value of timber cut; or (2) to personal property and its
hire; or (3) to a debt that is a lien on property which you can have sold in
satisfaction thereof; or (4) to a partition and adjustment of equities between
the tenants in common in such cases it is better to file a bill in Chancery and
;
have all the various matters connected with the controversy adjudicated in one
suit.
As a rule, if your cause is just, you are more certain of success in Chancery
than in the Circuit Court. You run much less risk of witnesses failing to attend
or being tampered with, or suddenly forgetting the essential facts, or being in-
extricably confused by cross examination and you run no risks of unaccounta-
;
ble verdicts, or of unexpected or controvertible evidence being sprung on you.

All in all, the Chancery Court is the safer Court, much the cheaper and equally
as speedy, in the disposition of suits of a legal nature, where the jurisdiction
is concurrent. Besides, if you win in Chancery there is far less danger of re-
versal by the Supreme Court, many Circuit Court suits being reversed because
of errors committed by the Judge in charging the jury, or in admitting or
rejecting evidence on the trial, in cases where the verdict would have been the
same no such error had been committed.
if
§ Matters to be Considered in Reference to the Bill. The first question

79. —
to be considered in obtaining facts for framing the bill is Who are necessary, :
and who proper, parties to the suit. This is often a matter of no little per-
plexity, and in the next chapter is treated of at length. Where there is doubt,
whether a particular person can be properly made a complainant, make him a
defendant, and pray that his rights may be declared and enforced along with
those of the complainants, if he is deemed thereunto entitled. If it is doubtful
whether a person should be made a defendant, it is better to include him in
3 The local jurisdiction of the Chancery Court will be hereafter fully considered. See, post, 177.
83 PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO A SUIT. § 79
the bill, and let the Court determine the doubt : the additional cost is insignifi-
cant.
Having ascertained who are the proper parties, the next question to be ascer-
tained is, whether the parties to the suit have any relations, 4 such as husband
and wife; parent and child; guardian and ward; personal representative and
creditor, distributee or legatee principal and agent landlord and tenant
;
;
bargainor and bargainee; creditor and debtor; trustee and beneficiary, and
the like and if so, the rights and duties of the parties incident to that relation,
;
and wherein those rights have been violated, and those duties not discharged.
The ascertainment of these matters will enable you to frame your bill in a
logical and orderly way, by stating: (1) the relation of the parties, and the
dates, and facts; (2) the obligations the defendants incurred to complainant
by reason of those relations (3) wherein, when and how, those obligations have
;
been violated, including any circumstances of atrocity, or special iniquity and ;
(4) by prayers for process and appropriate relief. The subject of bills is
fully treated in a subsequent chapter.
If you ascertain that there are no relations between the parties, your bill
will ordinarily begin by stating fully the right and title of the complainant, and
when, and wherein, and under what circumstances, that right has been violated,
and that title invaded or endangered.
By keeping the doctrine of relations in mind while obtaining the facts of
his case from your client, you will find it much easier to elicit the essential
matters and you can begin the drawing of the bill at once, giving its parts in
;
the order above stated.

When the bill has been drawn, if a verification is necessary, have your client
make the oath. This is well for two reasons first, it is his duty, and not yours,
:
to verify his bill and second, it is evidence of your retainer. Have your client
;
sign the prosecution bond, for like reasons. It is no part of a Solicitor's duties
to swear to his client's bill, or to secure the costs of his client's suit; and, as a
rule, Solicitors should do these things only in exceptional cases.
And it will'be well for the complainant's Solicitor to keep in mind these
general rules
1. The case must be within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court
2. It must be adequately set forth in a proper bill
3. It must be substantiated by pertinent legal evidence
4. It must be established by an appropriate decree and, ;
5. It must be enforced by adequate final process.
4 The doctrine of relations is fully explained inthe Chapter on Bills, post, §§ 165-169; 408.
§80 WHO MAY SUE IN CHANCERY. 84
Article
85 WHO MAY SUE IN CHANCERY. § 81
§ 81. Suits by Alien Enemies, and Foreign Administrators and Executors.

—Alien enemies are the citizens of a nation with whom the United States are
at war. .Such enemies, while residing out of the United States, can neither
sue nor be sued in any Court within the United States but if they reside here,
;
and are not forbidden by the General or State governments to remain, they
are under no disability to sue or be sued, and have the same rights in Court
as alien friends. 5 An executor or administrator appointed in another State
can neither sue nor be sued in this State, 6 as such but if he brings assets into
;
this State he may be held liable therefor as a constructive trustee. 7

§ 82. How Minors and Persons of Unsound Mind Must Sue. Minors and —
persons of unsound mind, in consequence of their mental incapacity to attend
to their business affairs, as well as their inability to bind themselves for the
costs of the suit, or to make any contract relative thereto, are not allowed to
institute a suit directly in their own names, and on their own motion. But as
these persons frequently need the active interposition of the Court to protect
their interests, the Court allows their guardians to institute suits in their
behalf, to assert their rights, or to vindicate their wrongs. And if they have
no guardian, or if the guardian himself neglects his duties, or is the person to
be sued, the Court will permit any person who is sui juris to bring suit in their
behalf this person is styled the next friend, or prochein ami, of the infant or
:
person of unsound mind in whose behalf he sues. 8 A

person of unsound mind
may sue by next friend, either before or after an inquisition of lunacy, 9 but
if he have a guardian he must sue by the guardian, unless the latter has vio-
lated his trust, in which case the non compos may sue by next friend, making
his guardian a defendant.
Abill may even be filed on behalf of an infant unborn, (in ventre sa mere,)
by its next friend, when its interests demand 10 and in such a case, an injunc-
;
tion will be granted to stay waste on lands that will belong to the infant at its
birth. A
guardian appointed for a minor, or non compos, in another State, can-
not in strict practice sue here as such. 11 Should he sue as such, however, the
Court will not repel him, but will recognize him as the next friend, and allow
the suit to proceed to final decree and then take the proper steps to secure to
;
the infant the recovery, if any be decreed it. 12

A person of unsound mind may file a bill and prosecute a suit in his own
name, if the defendant fail to object thereto at the right time, and in the right
manner. The Court will not dismiss a suit brought by a person of unsound
mind, at any stage, if a competent person will assume the office of next friend
for him. 13
§ 83. —
How Married Women Must Sue. On her marriage, many of a married
woman's rights become vested in her husband, and as to many of her interests
he becomes as sort of guardian, or next friend. 14 Hence, in all ordinary cases,
where it becomes necessary to bring suit for the protection of the wife 's rights,
she sues along with her husband. Besides, being unable to bind herself for the
costs of the suit, it is necessary to have some one joined with her as complain-
ant, who can be held responsible for the costs. Whenever there is no conflict
between the interests of the wife and those of the husband, she must, ordinarily,
sue jointly with her husband; but whenever there is a conflict, whenever the
husband is asserting, or has asserted, claims inconsistent with his wife's rights,
or has, by his own act, or neglect, debarred himself from protecting her rights
5 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 51-54; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 49; Rod- 10 Maclin v. Haywood, 6 Pick., 201. See Article
gers v. Dibrell, 6 Lea, 69; Walker v. Day, Griswold on Next Friends, post, §§ 103-105.
& Co., 8 Bax., 77. 11 Sto. Eq. PL, § 59, note 2; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 67.
6 Sto. Eq. PI., § 179; Young v. O'Neil, 3 Sneed, 12 McClelland v. McClelland, 7 Bax., 210; Hick-
55; 2 Meigs' Dig., § 682; Campbell v. Hubbard, 11 man v. Dudley, 2 Lea, 375; Simpson v. Alexander,
Lea, 6. 6 Cold., 630.
7 Beeler v. Dunn, 3 Head, 88. 13 Rankin v. Warner, 2 Lea, 302; Davis v. Nor-
8 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 57-66. vell,3 Pick., 36.
9 Parsons v. Kinzer, 3 Lea, 342. Or, he may sue n See Article on Next Friends, post, §§ 103-105.
in his own name, and a next friend appointed after-
ward. Rankin v. Warner, 2 Lea, 302.
§84 WHO MAY SUE IN CHANCERY. 86
in all such cases he stands in the position of a guardian who has violated his
trust duties and his wife may file a bill by a next friend, making her husband,
;
and all others who have wronged her, parties defendant. So, whenever the
wife sues in reference to her separate property, she should sue by next friend,
and her husband should be made a defendant. 15 "When the joint right of action
of husband and wife to recover land belonging to the wife is barred, she may
sue by next friend, and recover, making her husband a defendant. 16
But no person can act as next friend for a married woman without her
consent, 17 unless she be a minor, also. 18
§ 84. When Woman May Sue, or Be Sued, Alone.—The law of
a Married
Tennessee is married women, and has emancipated them from some
liberal to
burdensome bonds of servitude. By the common law, on her marriage, all her
legal rights became vested in her husband, and she could do nothing without
his consent and guidance. 19 The Court of Chancery first extended a helping
hand to married women, by allowing them to sue by next friend and now, by ;
the aid of the statute, where a husband has deserted his family, his wife may
prosecute, or defend in his name, any action, which he might have prosecuted
or defended and she may also sue, or be sued, in her own name, for any cause
;
of action accruing subsequent to such desertion. 20 She may, also, sue and be
sued alone, when her husband has been declared insane by the verdict of a
jury 21 and when it becomes necessary for her to file a bill of divorce, she may
;
do so in her own proper person, and without any next friend. 22 She may, also,
sue or be sued alone, if her husband has permanently left the State or, is eon- ;
fined in the penitentiary, or is otherwise civilly dead. 23 If a married woman

is engaged in the mercantile or manufacturing business in her own name, or
by agent, or as partner, she may be sued as a feme sole for debts incurred in
such business, and cannot plead her coverture in such cases. 24
It would se^m from a general survey of our decisions and statutes, that it
may be laid down as a general rule in Tennessee, that, whenever the wife is
living separate from her husband without her fault, she may sue and be sued
as a single woman. 25 But if a married woman, who could otherwise sue or
be sued alone, is a minor, or of unsound mind, she must sue by guardian or next
friend, and must defend by guardian, or guardian ad litem, like any other minor,
or non compos.
§ 85. Suits by Persons under a Quasi Disability. Deaf and dumb persons,—
if also very ignorant and incapable of being fully communicated with as to
their property rights, may be allowed to sue by next friend. So may persons
in their dotage, or imbecile adults, or any person not strictly a non compos and
yet not able to manage his business affairs. 20 If a person has religious scruples
against being a party to a suit, he may sue by next friend. 27
15 See cases in 3 Meigs' Dig., § 1617; Sto. Eq. PI., wife, or the wife the husband, in Equity, notwith-
§§61-63. standing, at law, neither of them can sue the other.
16 McCallum v. Pettigrew, 10 Heisk., 394; Moore Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 61-62.
v. Walker, 3 Lea, 656. 18 Phillips v. Hassell, 10 Hum., 198.
17 Sto. Eq. PL, § 61. In such a suit she cannot 10 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 87.
act under the advice or protection of her husband, 20 Code, § 2805. But not accruing before deser-
and, therefore, she is allowed to seek the protection tion. Smith v. Smith, 14 Pick., 101.
of some other person, who acts as her next friend; 21 Code, § 2486.
and the bill is accordingly exhibited in her name by 22 Code, § 2451.
such next friend. But in this respect she is differ- 23 Bottoms v. Corley, 5 Heisk., 12.
ently placed from an infant; for no person can =4 Acts of 1897, Ch. 82. She is liable for the rent
exhibit a bill as her next friend, without her con- of the store-house in which she carries on her bus-
sent; whereas, an infant's consent to a bill filed in iness. Persica v. Maydwell, 18 Pick., 207. And
his name is not necessary. Where a suit is brought when her interests require she may sue her husband
by the husband in his own name and in that of his and the parties in possession to recover her lands.
wife, it is considered as his suit only, and, accord- Key v. Snow, 6 Pick., 663.
ingly, it will not be absolutely binding on her. In 25 Code, §§ 2485; 2486; 2451; 2805; Cooper v.
like manner, the husband may sue the wife in Maddox, 2 Sneed, 136; Bottoms v. Corley, 5 Heisk.,
Equity, for the purpose of enforcing his own mar- 12; Yeatman v. Bellmain, 1 Tenn. Ch., 589; and
ital rights against her property, whether such rights same case in 6 Lea, 488.
result from her ante-nuptial agreement, or from 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 86; Parsons v. Kinzer, 3 Lea,
the general principles of Law or Equity; or when- 342, and, see Fentress v. Fentress, 7 Heisk., 428;
ever he seeks relief upon some claim adverse to or in Code, § 3683.
opposition to his wife; for (it has been well said) it 27 Malin v. Malin, 2 John. Ch., (N. Y.), 238; 1
is constant experience, that the husband may sue the Dan. Ch. Pr., 86.
87 WHO MAY BE SUED IN CHANCERY. §86
ARTICLE II.
WHO MAY BE SUED IN CHANCERY.

86. General Rule as to Parties Defendant. § 89. Suits against Counties, Cities and
87. Suits against Infants and Lunatics. Other Corporations.
88. Suits against Married Women.
§ 86. —
General Rule as to Parties Defendant. In general, it may be stated
that every person, who may sue in the Chancery Court, may also be sued x and, ;
in addition, all persons who may or must sue, by guardian or next friend, may
be sued, for they cannot plead their disability in their defense. 2 The only
persons, natural or artificial, who cannot be sued, are (1) the State of Ten-
nessee, 3 (2) alien enemies residing out of the State in time of war, (3) foreign
executors and foreign administrators, 4 and (4) public corporations created
by and in another State for governmental purposes. 5
It is sometimes said that bankrupts cannot sue, or be sued. The reason of
this is, their estate, by operation of law, has become vested in their assignees,
and they, therefore, cannot legally sue, or be sued, because they have no in-
terest in the subject-matter of the suit, and no decree can, consequently, be
pronounced against them. What is meant by bankrupts not being able to sue,
and not being subject to be sued is, that if they sue no decree can be rendered
in their favor and if they are sued, no decree can be rendered against them 8
;
,
if the fact of their assignment or discharge duly appear. But if a defendant

fail to plead the bankruptcy of the complainant, or fail to plead his own dis-
charge in bankruptcy, the suit will proceed as though no bankruptcy existed.
§ 87. —
Suits against Infants and Lunatics. Minors, married women, and
persons of unsound mind, may be sued but, as they are incapable of defending
;
a suit by themselves, they must make their defense through others not under
any disability. Minors and persons of unsound mind defend a suit by their
regular guardians, if they have such but if they have no guardian, or if the
;
guardian is a complainant, or is adversely interested, they defend by a guardian

ad litem, appointed by the Chancellor, or the Master, for that purpose. 7 "Where
a minor is, also, a married woman, it is nevertheless necessary that she should
defend by a guardian ad litem, the practice being to appoint her husband to be
her guardian ad litem, when he is a co-defendant, and there is no conflict of
interest. 8
Perhaps, however, a failure to have a guardian ad litem appointed for a mar-
ried woman, who was a minor, but who joined with her husband in answering
the bill, would not make the proceedings void as to her, if it appeared that she
had full defense made for her, and was, in no way, prejudiced by not having
a guardian ad litem. In such a case her husband would, no doubt, be deemed a
de facto guardian ad litem. 9
§ 88. —
Suits against Married Women. In regard to married women, ordi-
narily their husbands must be joined with them as defendants in the suit,
1 Sto. Eq. PL, § 67. 5 Board of Directors v. Bodkin Bros., 24 Pick.,

2 Sto. Eq. PL, § 68. 700. And the jurisdiction in such cases cannot be
3 State v. Bank, 3 Bax., 395. See, Article on waived, being to the subject-matter. Ibid.
How the State Sues and is Sued, post, §§ 128; 6 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 58; 157.
815-816. 7 Sto. Eq. PL, § 70.
4 See Ante, % 121. But foreign executors and f 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 163.
foreign administrators may be sued here as trustees 9 See Kindell v. Titus, 9 Heisk., 743.
for effects in their hands. Beeler V. Dunn, 3 Head,
§ 89 WHO MAY BE SUED IN CHANCERY. 88
and their answer must
also be joint. There are exceptions, however, to the
rule, in requirements.
both of its A
married woman may be made a defendant,
and answer as a single woman as, for example, whenever her husband is com-
;
plainant in the suit, and sues her as defendant for, in such a case, he elects to
;
treat her as a single woman for the purposes of the suit. But, generally, a
married woman cannot answer separately, when her husband is joined, or
ought to be joined, as a defendant in the suit, without an order of Court for
that purpose, founded upon special circumstances. Thus, where a married
woman is sued in respect to her separate estate, or where she elaims as a de-
fendant, in opposition to her husband, or lives separate from him, or disap-
proves of the defense which he wishes her to make, she may obtain an order
of the Court for liberty to answer and defend the suit separately; and in such
a ease her answer may be read against her. If a married woman obstinately
refuses to join in a defense with her husband, the latter may obtain an order
to compel her to make a separate defense. If the husband has, upon leave,
answered separately, the wife may, upon order, afterwards file her separate
answer. If the husband be abroad, and not answerable to the jurisdiction, the
complainant in the suit may obtain an order, that she shall answer separately.
Except under circumstances of this and a similar nature, a married woman can
defend a suit only jointly with her husband, 10 unless she is living separate from
him in some of the cases stated in a preceding section. 11 But if she is engaged
in the mercantile or manufacturing business in her own name, or by an agent,
or as partner, she may be sued as a feme sole for the debts incurred in the con-
duct of such business, and no plea of coverture will avail in such eases. 12
Where the married woman is, also, a minor, she must defend by guardian ad
litem, as before stated. 13
But if a married woman is sued as a single woman, and fails to plead her
coverture, a judgment or decree against her will be valid, and may be enforced
against her general property, but not against her separate estate. 14
§ 89. Suits against Counties, Cities and other Corporations. Names stand —
for the things named, and we know things by their names. The law recognizes
this, and allows all persons, natural and artificial, to be sued by those names
whereby they are known. 15 Counties are sued by their statutory names, as
"'Shelby county," "Davidson county," "Knox county," and the like. Cities
and incorporated towns are generally sued by their corporate names, being the
name given them in the Act or charter of incorporation but, as the complainant ;
may not know the exact corporate name of a city or town, he may sue it by the
name it is generally known by. Thus, if its proper name is "The Mayor and
City Council of Nashville, the city may nevertheless be sued as The City of
' '
' '
Private corporations may be sued by their corporate names, or by

'
Nashville. '
the names by which they are generally known in the community where they do
business. 10 The officers of a corporation may be made defendants along with
their corporation, and required to answer under oath, when a discovery is
sought. 17
io
Sto. Eq. PI., § 71; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 178-185. known in the community, Railroad v.
he, is generally
11
Ante, § 84. Reidmond, 11 Lea, 205; Young v. S. Tredegar Iron
12
Acts of 1897, Ch. 82. Co., 1 Pick., 189; E. T., V. & G. Railroad Co. v.
Ante, § 84.
13 Evans, 6 Heisk., 607. It is sometimes said in our
Woodfolk v. Lyon,
14 H
Pick., 269: Embry v. reports that a misnomer may be taken advantage of
Hoge, 3 Shan. Cas., 101; Jackson v. Everett, Ibid, by plea in abatement in the Chancery Court. No de-
811; Flanagan v. Grocery Co., 14 Pick., 599. cision to that effect can be found by the author of
15 When a name is mentioned, if we know the per- this work. Neither Daniel, Story, Maddock, Beames,
son, or thing, his or its image, characteristics and nor Barbour refer in any way to such a plea, in the
personality, at once rise up before our mental vision. Chancery Court; on the other hand, both Daniel and
Thus, names are the symbols of things. Nomina sunt Barbour give forms of titles of answers in case of
symbola rerum; and, as is said in Coke, Nomina si the misnomer of the defendant, 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 412;
nescis perit cognitio rerum —
(If you know not the 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 681; 731; 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 2109- The
names of things, the knowledge of them is lost.) The form is as follows: The joint and several answer of
law deals with things and persons by the names they J. D., in the bill called W. D„ and of C. F., in the
are known by. bill called G. F., defendants, to the bill of complaint
16 Corporations, like other persons, are supposed of A. B. complainant.
to know their baptismal names, but third persons are 17 Smith v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 3
not; and so, third persons may sue a corporation, as Tenn. Ch., 599-
well as a natural person, by the name by which it, or
89 GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES. §90
ARTICLE III.
GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES.
§ 90. Principles Applied in Determining the § 93. Who are Proper, and who Necessary
Proper Parties. Parties.
§ 91. General Rules as to Who Should be § 94. Who are Not Proper Parties.
Parties. § 95. Summary of the Rules as to Parties.
§ 92. Exceptions to the General Rules as to
Parties.
§ 90. Principles Applied in Determining the Proper Parties. Courts of —

Equity adopt two leading principles for determining the proper parties to a suit.
1. One of them is that the rights of no man shall be finally decided unless
he himself is present, or at least has had a full opportunity to appear and
vindicate his rights.
2. The other is, that, if the decision of any part of the subject-matter of the
suit will affect the present or contingent rights or interests of any person or
persons, or, if a complete decree cannot be made upon all the matters involved,
without having certain persons, or the interests of certain persons, before the
Court, then all such persons must be made parties, or their interests otherwise
duly represented.
It is the constant aim of Courts of Equity to do complete justice, by deciding
upon and settling the rights of all persons interested in the subject-matter of
the suit, so that the performance of the decree of the Court may be perfectly
safe to those who are compelled to obey it and also, that future litigation may
;
be prevented. Hence the maxim, that Courts of Equity delight to do complete

justice, and not by halves. And hence, also, it is a general rule in Equity, (sub-
ject to certain exceptions, which will hereafter be noticed,) that all persons
materially interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of a
suit, must be made parties to it, either as complainants or as defendants, how-
ever numerous they may be. By this means the Court is enabled to make a
complete decree between the parties, and to prevent future litigation by taking
away the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. When all the parties are before
the Court, the whole case may be seen and full and complete justice done to
;
all and in every particular, however various and conflicting their interests
may be. 1
§ 91.General Rules as to Who should be Parties. It may, therefore, be —
stated as a general rule, that all persons who have any interest in the subject-
matter of the suit, or who are liable to be affected by the decree prayed for, are
proper parties to the suit. It matters not how small the interest, or whether
that interest be legal or equitable, direct or remote, 2 so that it is an actual exist-
ing interest; a mere possibility or probability of a future interest will not be
sufficient. 3 It must be borne in mind, however, that parties are necessarily
made according to the charges in the bill, and not according to the result of
the decree. 4 If the bill show the parties to be proper, that is sufficient.
All persons are proper parties who have any interest, legal or equitable, in
the recovery sought, or who are in any way liable to be called on to satisfy
the demands of those who complain. Persons who have the legal title to prop-
2 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 138; 510; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 317;
1 Sto.Eq. PL, §72; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 19; Allen v. Dechard v. Edwards, 2 Sneed, 99.
Baugus, 1 Swan, 404; Browder v. Jackson, 3 Lea, 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 316-
156- .
4 Cocke v. Evans, 9 Yerg., 294.
§ 92 GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES. 90
orty in litigation, even though they have no beneficial interest therein, must be
made parties; 5 and so must all persons without whom a complete decree, dis-
posing of all the various parts of the controversy, could not be made. Equity
delights to do justice in full and not by halves, and acting on this maxim, the
Court requires the complainants to bring before it every person necessary to
enable it to so completely determine the matters in dispute that no further liti-
gation will be necessary. This requirement is the price of the relief to be
granted.
Whenever
a person, if living, would have been a proper party, his privies in
estate must be made parties; if his personal estate is involved, his personal
representatives must be made parties. So, if a person would have been a proper
party had his interests continued in him, his privy in estate must be made a
party in his place, whether such privy be an assignee, or a purchaser at an exe-
cution, or other, sale.
Whenever a trust estate is liable to be affected by the decree, both the bene-
ficiaries and trustee should be made parties and whenever the rights of a ;
wife are involved in the litigation, she and her husband must both be made
parties, unless the husband has wrongfully abandoned the wife, in which case she
may sue or be sued alone.
Inasmuch as the wife has an interest in the homestead, which she may assert
in Court, both against her husband and his bargainees and creditors, it is
always prudent to make her a defendant, along with her husband, in all
suits brought to recover possession of the homestead, or to divest the title
thereof out of him, or to sell the same, or to enforce any lien, claim or right
thereto. If she is not made a party, no decree against her husband will bind
her, and she may relitigate the question of homestead, or any other right in, or
to the land, after final decree against her husband. 7
A an equity in land or personalty must make the holder of the
bill to affect
legal title a party and, on the other hand, a bill to affect the legal title must
;
make the owner of the equitable title a party, if any there be. 8
§ 92. Exceptions to the General Rules as to Parties. In the first place, it —
must be always remembered that Courts of Equity observe general rules, only
in so far as they contribute to the attainment of justice; and they struggle
against technical rules which impede its power to do justice. 9 It is mani-
fest that a general rule, established for a proper administration of justice, ought
not to be adhered to in cases where it would defeat justice, for then it would
destroy the very purpose for which it was established. 10 Therefore, the general
rule that all persons interested must be made parties, is not adhered to
1. Where the Parties are Unknown, and cannot be ascertained upon diligent
inquiry; 11 in which case they must be made defendants by description, as here-
after shown.
2. Where the Parties are Numerous, but the general rights of those entitled to
relief are the same, in which case one or more of them rnav sue on the behalf
of all. 13
3. Where
the Parties are Very Numerous, SO that it Would be impracticable to
make them all parties, without thereby causing almost interminable delays, 12
by reason of deaths, marriages and transfer of interests but in such case pro- ;
vision is made to secure the rights of those not actually made parties.
5 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 192; Willingham r. Leake, 7 12 Sto. Eq. PL §94; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 272; Lowery
Bax., 455. v. Francis, 2 Yerg., 534; McCaleb v. Crichfield, 5
o 1Dan. Ch. Pr., 192. Heisk., 291- But in such cases the bill must allege
7 Hawes on Parties, §§ 26; 27; 66; 69; 110- See, that the suit is brought against the particular de-
also, Williams v. Williams, 7 Bax., 116; Mash v. fendants, as representatives of the numerous class
Russell. 1 Lea, 543. to which they belong. If the bill proceeds against
8 Jackson v. Coffman, 2 Cates, 271- the defendants sued, as individuals, and not as rep-
9 Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 301; 1 Pom. Eq. resentatives of a class, then the proceedings in the
Jur., §§ 59-60; Sto. Fn. PI., §§76c-77. cause will not bind those not made parties. Brown
io Sto. Eq. PL, § 96- v. Brown, 2 Pick., 277-
li Code, §§4352; 4358; Sto. Eq. PL, § 92; Mc- 13 Sto. Eq. PL §99; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 237-245;
Caleb v. Crichfield 5 Heisk., 291. Code, § 4288- Nance v. Busby, 7 Pick., 315-
91 GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES. § 93
4. Where Parties not in Being are Liable to be Affected. It sometimes happens

that persons not in being, (not in esse,) are interested in property which the
interest of parties in being require to be brought before the Court. In such a
case the bill may be filed by or against the interested persons in being, (in esse,)
and the decree will be binding on those not in being. 14 All the interested per-
sons in being must be made parties, both life-tenants and remainder-men: if
no remainder-man be in being then the life-tenant must be made a party, in
which case the remainder-men will be bound by the decree, they being repre-
sented by the life-tenant. Thus a decree of partition among tenants for life,
with remainder to unborn sons, will be binding on the sons when born. In all
such cases, however, all the parties interested who are in being must be before
the Court. 15
But in all these exceptional cases, so solicitous is the Court to attain the
purposes of substantial justice, that it will generally require the bill to be filed,
not only in behalf of the plaintiff, but also in behalf of all other persons inter-
ested, who are not directly made parties, so that they may come in under the
decree, and take the benefit of it, or show it to be erroneous, or entitle them-
selves to a rehearing. The Court will go further, and in such cases it will en- :
tertain a bill, or petition, which shall bring the rights and interests of the absent
parties more distinctly before the Court, if there is any certainty, or even
danger, of injury or injustice to them. 18
In all the foregoing cases, the bill should show a state of facts bringing the
suit within one of the exceptions to the general rule. 17
It may here be remarked, that the general rule requiring all persons inter-
ested to be made parties, is not so much a right of the parties brought before
the Court, as a rule prescribed by Courts of Equity, themselves, founded on
their notions of public policy, on their anxiety to do justice to all persons inter-
ested in the subject-matter of the litigation, and on a desire to prevent future
controversies. 18
§ 93. Who are Proper, and who Necessary Parties. —A
distinction exists
between proper parties, and necessary parties: proper parties are those whose
interests in the matters involved in the litigation are such that a decree may be
properly pronounced without their being before the Court whereas, necessary ;
parties are those without whom no complete decree can be made. 19

1. Necessary Parties are 1, Those who are entitled to share in the benefits"
:
of the relief sought; 2, Those who are indebted to the complainants, or who
are withholding from them their legal or equitable rights, or property 3, ;
Those who are doing, or attempting to do, complainants some injury 4, Those ;
who have legal or equitable titles or claims adverse to those set up by the com-
plainants; 5, Those who hold titles or interests which, if not bound by the
decree, might cloud the title of the complainants, or that of the purchaser at
the Master's sale; and 6, Those having any interest in the subject-matter of
the litigation, present or contingent. 20
2. Proper Parties are 1, Those against whom some of the defendants, if
:
held liable to complainants, would be entitled to judgment over; 21 2, Those

whose rights in the subject-matter of the controversy have terminated, but no
proper evidence thereof has been given, and the complainant's desire to con-
clude those rights by the decree; 22 3, Those who, while not liable to com-
plainants or to their co-defendants, have claims, admitted to be inferior to
14 Parker v. Peters, 2 Shan. Cas., 636. 20 Katzenberger v. Weaver, 2 Cates, 620; Craig v.
15 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 144-146; Gray v. Barnard, 1 McKnight, 24 Pick., 690.
Term. Ch., 198. See Wilson v. Schaefer, 23 Pick., 21 Sto. Eq. PI., §§153; 169; 175; 176; Code, §§
300. 3620-3635-
10 Sto. Eq. PI., § 96- 22 As (1) where a mortgage debt has been paid,
it Sto. Eq. PI., § 95- but the mortgage appears of record to be unsatisfied;
18 Birdsong Head, 291.
v. Birdsong, 2 and (2) where a tenant in common has conveyed his
19 High v. Battle, 10 Yerg., 186; 189, Cooper's share to a complainant, but the deed has not been
Note; Rowan v. Mercer, 10 Hum., 359; Browder v. registered.
Jackson, 3 Lea, 158; Aiken v. Tuttle, 4 Lea, 103;
Mullinix v. Perkins, 2 Cold., 87-
§94 GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES. 92
those of complainants, which should be bound by the decree to clear up the
title,or adjust all equities. 23
In determining whether a particular person is a necessary party or not, it
must be considered 1, Whether, if he should be omitted, the complainant could
:
obtain all the relief he seeks 2, Whether, if he should be omitted, he could re-
;
litigate any of the matters the bill seeks to have adjudicated; and, 3, Whether,
if he should be omitted, and the property in dispute is sold, he could, either at
law, or in Equity, disturb the title of the purchaser. If either of these ques-
tions be answered in the affirmative, such person is a necessary party; other-
wise he is not. 24
Where there is doubt whether a certain person is a necessary party, the
safer rule is to make him a defendant, and thus leave the question to him and
the Court to determine.
§ 94. —
Who are Not Proper Parties. As a rule, a person who has no interest
whatever, legal or equitable, in the subject-matter of the controversy, and for
or against whom no decree in reference thereto can be pronounced, is not a
proper party. To constitute a person a proper party, he must be so connected
with the matter in dispute as: (1) to be entitled to have something beneficial
decreed him, some relief granted him; or, (2) to be under some obligation to
the complainant capable of being enforced; or, (3) to have some estate in him,
legal or equitable, real or apparent, liable to be divested out of him for the
complainant's benefit; or, (4) to be doing some act to complainant's injury sub-
ject to injunction; or, (5) to have some right involved in the controversy neces-
sary for him to protect or enforce, or necessary to be determined.
Persons against whom no relief is prayed are not proper parties; nor are
mere servants, agents, auctioneers, attorneys, arbitrators, sheriffs, clerks, con-
stables, or other officers 25 issuing or executing process, proper parties, unless
they have done, or are doing, acts entitling the complainant to affirmative relief
against them. 26 It sometimes, however, becomes necessary to make such per-
sons parties in order to give them authoritative notice of an injunction restrain-
ing them. Tenants claiming under a party to the suit, 27 and mortgagors who
have conveyed all their legal and equitable interests in the estate, 28 are not,
ordinarily, proper parties.
But there is a class of persons who have an interest in the property before
. the Court, and yet who are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit.
This class includes persons who have an interest in the subject-matter of the
suit, but whose title is paramount to that of the complainant, and against whom,
or whose title, the complainant is entitled to no relief and seeks no decree such ;
as (1) prior mortgagees in a foreclosure suit; 29 (2) owners of the fee in a suit
for possession between tenants and sub-tenants; 30 and (3) the remainder-man
in a suit between the tenants for life relative to their rights. 31 The persons
having these paramount titles are neither necessary nor propr parties. Subse-
quent mortgagees are proper parties, but not necessary parties 32 nevertheless, ;
it is well to make them parties in order to conclude their rights and extinguish
their claims by the decree. 33
§ 95. —
Summary of the Rules as to Parties. The following is a summary of
the general rules as to parties in equitable suits
1. All persons may sue and be sued but persons under disability must sue
;
23 Such as subsequent encumbrancers, and tenants 28 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 261. Nevertheless, when there
of the defendants. is any question as to the tenancy, or as to the trans-
24 Sto. Eq. PI., § 76 a. fer by the mortgagor, it is prudent to make parties
25 Sto. Eq. PI. § 231. But, see post, § 815. of the tenant, or mortgagor, as the case may be, in
26 If an officer has made a levy on personalty he order to bind them by the decree.
is a necessary party when the personalty levied on is 29 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 193; 230; Rowan v. Mercer, 10
in question. Buckner v. Abrahams, 3 Tenn., Ch., Hum., 359.
348. Money in a clerk's or other officer's hands may 30 Code, § 3354.
be garnished, but in such a case the owner or claim- 31 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 209.
ant of the fund must be made a party. See, post, 32 Rowan v. Mercer, 10 Hum., 359; 1 Meigs' Dig.,
§881. § 560, sub-sec, 13.
27 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 263. 33 Sto. Eq. PI., § 193.
93 GENERAL RULES AS TO PARTIES. § 95
and be sued through persons not under disability, with some exceptions in ease
of married women.
2. All persons having any interest or title, legal or equitable, in the subject-
matter of the suit, or liable to be beneficially or injuriously affected by the
relief sought, are proper parties, unless they are very numerous in which case
;
some may sue or be sued in behalf of all, when it can be done without injustice
to any.
3. All persons beneficially interested in the relief sought may join as com-
plainants; all other persons should be made defendants. Persons under disa-
bility should ordinarily be made defendants, unless they are specially complain-
ing of violations of their rights.
§96 WHO SHOULD BE COMPLAINANTS. 94
ARTICLE IV.
WHO SHOULD BE COMPLAINANTS.

96. General Rules as to Parties Complain- § 98. All Parties having Concurrent Interests
. ant. should be Co-complainants.
97. Who should be Complainants when the § 99. How Husband and Wife Sue and are
Parties are Very Numerous. Sued.
§ 96. General Rules as to Parties Complainant. All persons who have a —

beneficial interest in the relief to be sought may join as complainants. It is not
necessary that the interest of the complainants should in every instance be
identical; a community of interest is, generally, all that is requisite. 1 There
must, however, be no incongruity in their claims, for a joinder of complainants
with distinct, inconsistent and hostile claims and grounds of relief, would lead
to much inconvenience and confusion, and will not be allowed by the Court. 2
Neither can complainants join in a suit on the ground that if some of them are
not entitled to recover, the others are entitled s but the bill must show on its
;
face that each and all of the complainants are interested in the relief sought,
and have a right to the same, although their proportions of the recovery may
be different. A
mere spark of right in a party, without any beneficial interest
whatever, will justify making him a co-complainant when the little right he has
is consistent with the rights of the other complainants. 4
All persons having the same interest, or seeking the same relief, may join as
complainants in the same bill 5 indeed, they should join, if the consent of all can
;
be obtained, unless their number is too great, and then, as elsewhere shown,
one or more may sue in behalf of all. Whenever a person who may, or should
be, a complainant refuses to join in the suit, or is out of reach so that he cannot
be consulted, he must be made a defendant. 7
The rule that persons claiming under different titles cannot be joined as com-
plainants in the same suit does not apply to cases where their titles, though dis-
tinct, are not inconsistent with each other. Thus, all the creditors of a decedent
may join as co-complainants to have his assets properly administered, although
they claim under distinct titles. 8 So, two or more persons may unite to enjoin
a nuisance injurious to all. 9
§ 97. Who Should be Complainants when the Parties are very Numerous. —
As already shown, the Court does not require all of the persons interested in
a suit to be made parties, when it is impracticable. 10 If the persons interested
are too numerous to be all brought before the Court, the Court will not insist
on their being made parties, 11 but will allow one or more to sue in behalf of
their entire class. Cases of this character may be divided into three classes
i Tillman v. Seaicy, 5 Hum., 487. of the individual interests. If the various interests
2 Ibid. be very small, it is suggested that ten or more would
3 Sto. Eq. PI., § 510. be too numerous, as ten is a multitude in law, Bou-
4 Henderson v. Peck., 3 Hum., 247. vier's L,. Die., "Multitude." In McCaleb v. Crichfield,
5 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 191. 5 Heisk., 289-, thirty-nine legatees were held to be
6 Post, § 97. too numerous. In an English case, twenty creditors,
7 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 190, notes. interested in real estate, were held not to be too nu-
8 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 235. merous, 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 237; see, also, Sto. Eq. PI.,
9 Madison v. Copper Co., 5 Cates, 331. § 131 a- Finney v. Garner, 2 Cates, 67- The com-
10 Ante, § 92. plainant who undertakes to represent a class must
11 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 94; 135 a. The question may have a good ground of suit, or the suit may be dis-
arise: What number would be too numerous to make missed. Nance v. Busby, 7 Pick., 315; 1 Dan. Ch.
them all parties? No
doubt the answer to this ques- Pr., 244-
tion would be governed somewhat by the magnitude
95 WHO SHOULD BE COMPLAINANTS. § 98
1. Where the Question is one of Common or General Interest. In such a case
one, or more, interested in the relief sought, may sue for the benefit of all. This
13
class includes creditors of a decedent, 12 creditors of a fraudulent vendor.
creditors who are parties to a deed of trust, 14 legatees under a will, 15 distribu-
tees of the estate of a decedent, 16 and creditors of an insolvent partnership, or
of an insolvent corporation, and indeed, all persons interested in the distribu-
tion of any fund, especially a trust fund.
2. Where the Persons Interested are Members of a Voluntary Association. This
association may be for either public or private purposes. In cases of this sort,
a few may sue for the benefit of themselves and all the others, care being taken
to have a due representation of all substantial interests before the Court. 17 This
class includes literary and social clubs, unincorporated insurance, labor, ..po-
litical, charitable, and religious associations and all sorts of voluntary societies
;
for Dleasure or improvement; partaking somewhat of the character of a partner-

ship. In cases under this sub-division, suits may be brought against a few of
very many members of such societies, clubs and associations, care being taken
to make defendants of those who fairly represent the interest of all. In such
case it would be well to make defendants, (1) of the managers, executive com-
mittee, or other directory of the society, if any exist; or, (2) of the committee
who incurred the liability sought to be enforced. The bill should charge that
the members of the society are numerous, and many unknown, and should give
the reason for suing the defendants in particular. 18
3. Where the Parties are Numerous, but have Common Eights or Interests.
In this- class there is usually a privity of interest between the parties; but such
privity is not essential. There must, however, be a common interest, or a com-
mon right, which the bill seeks to establish, and enforce, or a general claim,
or privilege, which it seeks to establish, or to narrow, or to take away. In
such cases, a few may sue in behalf of themselves, and all others standing in
the same predicament, the Court taking care that sufficient persons are before
it to fairly and fully ascertain and determine the general right in contest. 19
§ 98. All Parties Having Concurrent Interests Should Be Co-complainants.

All persons who have a right to partake of a general recovery should join
as complainants in prosecuting a suit to obtain such recovery. 20 There are
several reasons for this rule 1, It simplifies the examination and cross-examina-
:
tion of witnesses to have the parties all properly marshalled, those having the
same interests all standing on one side 2, It makes the argument and the hear-
;
ing more orderly 3, It enables a decree to be drawn more logically and with
;
less verbiage 4, It has the effect to better apportion the burdens of the litiga-
;
tion, and to lessen the costs and, 5, It enables both sides to prepare their cases
;
with more accuracy, speed, and general satisfaction.

In suits to recover personal property, all of the joint owners must join as
complainants, 21 and in suits to enforce any joint right, joint obligation, or joint
claim, all the joint owners must join as complainants or give some good reason
for not so doing, in which latter case the joint owner not suing must be made
a defendant. 22 All the joint owners of a fund should join in a suit for its re-
covery; all partners, joint trustees, joint executors, and joint administrators
must join in a bill filed to assert their claims as such. 23
§ 99. How Husband and Wife Sue and are Sued. Husband and wife, —
although one in law, 24 are two in Equity, especially when the separate property
of the wife is concerned. In law the husband may sue alone, and in his own
12 Sto. Eq. PI., § 99; Code, § 2368; Dulles v. Read, 19 Sto. Eq. PI., § 120; Hunter v. Justices, 7 Cold.,
6 Yerg., 53- 49; Lowery v. Francis, 2 Yerg., 534.
13 Code, § 4288. 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 190, note 5.
14 Sto. Eq. PL, § 102- 21 Barrow v. Nave, 2 Yerg., 228; Collier v. Year-
15 Sto. Eq. PL, § 104; McCaleb v. Cric'ifield, 5 wood, 5 Bax., 581.
Heisk., 288- 22 Sto. Eq. PI., § 159.
16 Sto. Eq. PL, § 105- 23 Sto. Eq. PI., § 210; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 221-227-
• T Sto. Eq. PI., § 107. 24 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 87.
18 Sto. Eq.' PI., § 116
§99 WHO SHOULD BE COMPLAINANTS. 96
name, for all personal property or contract rights accruing to the wife, or to
the husband and wife jointly, during marriage but in Courts of Equity, in all
;
cases in which the husband seeks to recover the property of his wife, he should
join her with him as co-complainant, whether the right to the property accrued
before or during marriage. The reason of this rule is the parental care Courts
of Equity exercise over persons under disability, and the necessity of guarding
the wife's equity to a settlement. 25
But when it is necessary for her to sue alone, as stated elsewhere, 26 she must
sue, ordinarily, by next friend, making her husband a defendant. Whenever
there is any antagonism of interest between her and her husband, whenever
her husband, by his acts or negligence, is estopped or barred of his right to
sue along with his wife for the assertion of her rights, she may sue by next
friend, making the husband a defendant. 27 When the husband has deserted his
wife, or has been adjudged a non compos, she may" both sue and be sued as a
single woman. 28
Whenever the wife is sued, her husband must ordinarily be made a defendant
along with her, 29 even if she is sued as an executrix, 30 unless he has deserted
her, or is adjudged a non compos, or she is sued on a debt incurred by her in a
mercantile or manufacturing business, 31 when she may be sued as a feme sole.
And as a wife can sue her husband in the Chancery Court whenever her sepa-
rate interests require, so a husband may sue his wife in the same Court when
his, separate interests so require. 32
25 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 89-92. 29 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 178.

26 Ante, §§ 83-84. 30 i Dan. Ch. Pr., 253-
27 Ante, § 84; see, also, cases cited in 3 Meigs' 31 Acts of 1897, Ch. 82-
Dig., §§ 1617-1619; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 109- 32 i Dan. Ch. Pr., 109; 179.
28 Ante, §§84; 88-
97 WHO SHOULD BE DEFENDANTS. §100
ARTICLE V.
WHO SHOULD BE DEFENDANTS.
100. General Rule as to Parties Defendant. § 102. Suggestions as to Whom to make De-
101. When Parties under Disability should fendants.
be made Defendants.
§ 100. All persons against whom

General Rule as to Parties Defendant. —
relief is sought, or who
are interested in resisting the relief sought, must nec-
essarily be made defendants; as must, also, all others whose interests in the
subject-matter of the suit are adverse to, or inconsistent with, the interests of
the complainants. All persons claiming any title, legal or equitable, to the
property in controversy, must be made defendants, if such title is in conflict
with the title set up by the complainants. All persons whose rights are con-
current with those of the complainants, but who have not consented to become
complainants, must be made defendants. 1 And, in general, all persons inter-
ested, in the subject-matter of the suit, or liable to be affected in any way by
the decree sought, whether their interest or liability be legal or equitable,
who do not join as complainants in filing the bill, should be made defendants. 2
§ 101. When Parties under Disabilities should be made Defendants. Al- —
though lunatics may appear by attorney when suing or being sued, 3 neverthe-
less, when there is a choice of position in suits affecting their interests, they
should be made defendants, and should defend by guardian ad litem when they
have no regular guardian. The same rule applies to minors, with, perhaps,
even greater force. The reason of this rule is, the Court can better guard the
interests of minors when defendants than when complainants and, besides, the ;
attitude of a defendant in a suit in Equity is, in various respects, more advan-

tageous and safe for infants than that of a complainant. 4 Nevertheless, it is
not reversible error to join a non compos or a minor as complainant in a suit
necesary to assert their rights, they, of course, suing by guardian, if they have
one, otherwise by next friend. A lunatic may sue, or be sued, in person, and
may appear or defend by a Solicitor of the Court, like a person sui juris? but
the more prudent course is to have them sue by next friend when they are com-
plainants, and defend by guardian ad litem when defendants.
§ 102. Suggestions as to Whom to make Defendants. In determining —
who should be made complainants and who defendants to a suit in Chancery,
the draftsman of the bill should ascertain 1, Who are the persons to be bene-
:
fited by the relief sought; 2, Who are the persons against whom the relief is
sought, and 3, Who are the persons, if any, having rights, legal or equitable,
without beneficial interests, liable to be affected by the decree.
1. The First Class includes all who have a right to be benefited by the decree
prayed for and if there be no conflicts in their respective interests, they may
;
all be joined as complainants, and should be so joined, if their consent can be

obtained. If such consent cannot be had, they must be made defendants.
2. The Second Class includes all persons against whom relief is sought all ;
1 Cook v. Hadley, Cooke, 465- others in a bill, and it appears that it will be more
2 Adams' Eq., 312- for his benefit that he should be made a defendant,
3 McDowell v. Morrell, 5 Lea, 286; Rankin v. an order to strike his name out as a complainant,
t
Warner, 2 Lea, 302. and make him a defendant, may be obtained upon
, „
i Davidson v. Bowden, 5 Sneed, 130 McGavock v.;
motion. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 72.
Bell, 3 Cold., 521; Thompson v. Mebane, 4 Heisk., 5 5 Lea, 286; 2 Lea, 302, cited above.
379. If an infant is made a co-complainant with
§ 102 WHO SHOULD BE DEFENDANTS. 98
persons liable to the complainants' demands, primarily or secondarily; all
persons charged with doing complainants some wrong, or withholding some
right. This entire class must be made defendants, unless there be some special
reason for not suing them, such as their death, insolvency, or absence from the
State, which reason should be stated in the bill. If there be any remainder-
men not in being, or any other person not in being, having a contingent interest,
the life-tenant must be made a defendant to represent them.
3. The Third Class includes all those having dry titles, legal or equitable,
without any beneficial interest, to the property in litigation; such as holders
of the naked legal title; dry or naked trustees, absolute assignors of a non-
negotiable thing mortgagors, who have informally assigned their entire equity
;
of redemption mortgagees under an absolute deed whose debt has been fully
;
paid, or wholly transferred; and, in short, all persons who, while in no particu-
lar default, are nevertheless so connected with the subject-matter of the litiga-
tion that they should be bound by the decree, either to wholly determine all
the various branches of the controversy, or to perfect the title to the property
before the Court. All persons belonging to this third class may be made de-
fendants; if, however, there be no conflict between the rights and interests of
the first and third classes the persons in the latter may be joined as co-com-
plainants but, as a rule, the better course is to make all persons in the third
;
class parties defendant.

If the persons seeking benefits under the decree sought have adverse or
conflicting interests in the subject-matter of the suit, or in the relief sought, they
cannot join as co-complainants; and one set or the other of those having con-
flicting interests must be made defendants; for, in a law-suit, as in a battle,
assailants cannot engage in a conflict between themselves, and make a success-
ful assault on their adversaries, at the same time. There must be a community,
or, perhaps more correctly speaking, a congruity of interests among the com-
plainants and their cause of action, or right of recovery, must be substantially
;
the same, although their proportions of the recovery, or their interests therein,
may be unequal. And, as a rule, there must be a common source of title or
interest, or at least some bond of union, between the various complainants,
such as exists between joint heirs between partners between tenants in com-
; ;
mon; between joint trustees; between joint executors, or joint administrators;

between the creditors of the same estate between the wards of the same
;
guardian between the beneficiaries under the same trust between the legatees
; ;
or devisees under the same will; between the sureties on the same instrument;
between the payors or payees of the same obligations between the parties to
;
the same contract, bond, or deed; between members of the same association, or
corporation, and, generally, between the persons subject to the same general
burden, or entitled to share in the same general benefit.
On the other hand, there need be no community or congruity of interests
among the defendants; they may, and often are, adversely concerned among
themselves, or liable in different amounts, in different degrees, and on different
accounts indeed, some of the defendants may have the same rights of recovery
;
and general relief as some of the complainants, or may have other affirmative
rights against some of their co-defendants, and may be entitled to a decree
against some of them, either in the first place, as though they were suing as
complainants or, in the second place, because they are only liable to com-
plainants in case of default by their co-defendants. To illustrate this: One
of several wards, who has had several guardians, may sue all of his guardians,
and all of their sureties, in one suit, and may make the other wards defendants:
in such a case, the Court may decree in favor of the defendant wards, as well
as the complainant and may, also, decree the primary liability of the obligees
;
on some of the bonds, and decree against them in favor of the obligees only
secondarily liable, the pleadings so permitting.
99 who should be; defendants. § 102
Sometimes, it cannot be ascertained at the institution of a suit whether a
certain person is a necessary party or not, his rights, or liabilities depending
for their existence upon the adjudication itself: in all such cases, the person
should be made a defendant. 6
6 Thus, on a bill to enforce a vendor's lien, after I because there may be a surplus after the debt and
the vendee's death, the widow may have an interest, |
costs are paid. Edwards v. Edwards, 5 Heisk., 123.
§103 NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM. 100
ARTICLE VI.
NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM.
103. Next Friends, Generally Considered. § 107. Powers, Duties and Liabilities of
104. Next Friends of Married Women. Guardians ad Litem.
105. Next Friends of Minors and Lunatics. § 108. Some Practical Suggestions to Guard-
106. Guardians ad Litem generally Consid- ians ad Litem.
ered.
§ 103. Next Friends, Generally Considered. A next friend, or, as he is —

frequently termed, a prochein ami, is a sort of self-appointed guardian who
assumes the duty and responsibility of bringing a suit in behalf of a person
under some disability, legal or natural. 1 The person thus under disability,
is generally (1) a married woman, or (2) a minor, or (3) a person of unsound
mind. These persons not being able to bind themselves by contract for costs of
suit, and, in case of minors and persons of unsound mind, not being of sufficient
mental capacity and business experience to comprehend their rights and how
to protect them, it becomes necessary for some friend to intervene in their
behalf, whenever their interests require the interposition of a Court. 2 This
friend is called the next friend, because formerly he was the nearest (or next)
kinsman of the person under disability. But, now, any person may act as next
friend, provided he is acting in good faith, 3 and secures the costs. 4
The object of the rule requiring a next friend in the prosecution of suits for
the benefit of persons under disability, is to have some one responsible for costs
and liable to judgment therefor and to have some one upon and against whom
;
the Court may make and enforce its orders, and who will be subject to punish-
ment for contempt in case of disobedience to, or violation of, the mandates of
the Court; and for the more especial purpose of having some one before the
Court capable of looking after and caring for the interests of those incapable of
understanding and defending their own rights. 5
It is the duty of a next friend seduously to watch and protect the interests of
his ward 6 involved in the litigation. He is, in the conduct of the suit, subject
to the control of the Court and if he fail to do his duty, or if any other suffi-
;
cient ground be brought to the knowledge of the Court, as, if he have an

interest in the litigation antagonistic to the interests of his ward, the Court not
only has the power, but it is its duty, to remove him, and appoint another, who
may be more faithful, or not subject to a similar temptation. 7
Were the rule otherwise, the ends of justice might be defeated, and iniquities
perpetrated by a party, whose interests are antagonistic to those of his ward,
assuming the office of next friend, and bringing his ward before the Court, in
order, through the forms of law, to rob it of its just rights and at the same time
accomplish his own avaricious purposes. 8 The next friend is deemed an officer
of the Court, and the minor a ward of the Court. 9 If two suits are brought by
different persons, acting as next friends, the Court will allow that one of them
1 Kirkman, ex parte, 3 Head, 519. is not, technically, his "ward," but this word ex-
2 Rankin v. Warner, 2 Lea, 302; Leftwick v. Ham- presses their relation better, perhaps, than any
ilton, 9 Heisk., 313- other.
3 Sto. Eq. PI., § 57- ^ Simpson v. Alexander, 6 Cold., 630; 1 Dan. Ch.
i Miles v. Kaigler, 10 Yerg., 17. Pr., 75-
5 Rankin v. Warner, 2 Lea, 302; Leftwick v. Ham- * Ibid. : Sto. Eq. PI., 5 59-
ilton, 9 Heisk., 313. » Sto. Eq. PI., § 57. Stewart v. Sims, 4 Cates, 29ff.
6 The person in whose behalf a '
next friend sues
101 NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS AD My y§io4
to be proceeded in which, on inquiry, appears most to eVal#^ben/fit, and
will stay proceedings in the other. 10
If the ward's disability should terminate during the petfd'ejattjfij^Fihe suit,
he may elect whether he will continue it, or abandon it but ^tl-ie-atiandons it ;
he will be taxed with the costs, unless the Court should, be of opinion that the
bill was improperly filed, in which case the costs will be adjudged against the
next friend. 11 The next friend of a minor cannot receive the money on a
judgment he recovers for his ward, nor can he confess satisfaction thereof. 12
A
next friend cannot elect for a person under disability, and the Court will
13
not, unless the record enables it to make an intelligent and effectual election ;
nor can a next friend compromise a suit, or receive or receipt for the amount
due his ward, or collect or compound the debt recovered by suit, 14 or submit a
case, pending in Court, to arbitration. 15
The next friend generally signs and swears to the bill, unless his ward better
knows the facts, and then the latter may sign and swear to it. 16
If a next friend dies or becomes incapacitated to act, pending a suit, a new
next friend may, on motion, be substituted in his stead with the consent and
approval of the Court.
§ 104.- —
Next Friends of Married Women. The general reasons already
given for requiring a married woman to sue by next friend, and the reasons
stated in the books, show that the principal, if not the sole, object is to secure
the payment of the costs that may be adjudged against her. 17 A next friend of
an infant may sue without obtaining the latter 's consent, but the next friend
of an adult married woman cannot. 18 The married woman may change her
next friend, on giving bond to indemnify him against the costs he has in-
curred, 19 provided she be of age and the Court consent.
In view of this state of the law, and of our statutes in behalf of married wo-
men, and considering the fact that the next friend of an adult married woman is
generally appointed by the wife, and is often a mere nominal party except as to
costs, it is suggested that an adult married woman, who gives security for costs,
may prosecute a suit in her own name, when it is necessary to do so to protect
her separate interests against her husband. 20 Courts of Chancery regard sub-
stance, not form.
§ 105. Next Friends of Minors and Lunatics. Although the practice of—
allowing infants and persons of unsound mind to sue by their guardian, describ-
ing him as such, prevails in this State, still he is in all respects a next friend;
and is charged with all the duties and liabilities, is subject to the same re-
straints, and bears the same relation to the infant, or non compos, and to the
suit, as though he had been described as his next friend. 21 The distinction,
however, is more formal than material if it be to the interest of the ward to
:
have the guardian considered as a next friend, he will be so deemed. The

Chancery Court of this State has full and original jurisdiction of the persons
and estates of minors and persons of unsound mind, and may appoint, or
remove, guardians whenever the interests of the minor, or non compos, require
such action. 22
10 Sto. Eq. PI. § 60. If the next friend of an in- 14 Miles v. Kaigler, 10 Yerg., 10.
fant does not do his duty, or if any other sufficient 15 Tucker v. Dabbs, 12 Heisk., 18.
round be made out, the Court will remove him. 16 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 361.
f hus, when the next friend will not proceed with 17 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., HI.
the cause, the Court will change him. And although 18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 110; Sto. Eq. PI., §61-
a next friend may not have been actually guilty of 10 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 112; Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9
any impropriety or misconduct, yet if he is connected Heisk., 313; and see Phillips v. Hassell, 10 Hum.,
with the defendants in the cause in such a manner 198; Murphy v. Green, 2 Bax., 403; Cheatham v.
as to render it probable that the interest of the Huff, 2 Tenn. Ch. 616.
complainant will not be properly supported, the Court 20 Under the old English practice, a wife could
will remove such next friend and appoint another in sue alone, and without next friend, on making affida-
his place. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 75. vit that she could not get a person to act as her
ill Dan. Ch. Pr., 78- next friend, who was good for the costs. 1 Dan. Ch.
12Cody v. Roan Iron Co., 21 Pick., 515- But a Pr., 39; 111; and see Rankin c. Warner, 2 Lea, 305.
next friend may
appeal his ward's case to the Su- 21 Simpson v. Alexander, 6 Cold., 630.
preme Court. Loftis v. Loftis, 10 Pick., 232. 22 Code, §§4298-4299; Lake v. McDavitt, 13 Lea,
13 Parsons v. Kinzer, 3 Lea, 347. 26.
§106 next Friends and guardians ad litem. 102
While it is certain that a minor must sue by guardian, or next friend, the rule
that the same necessity exists in case of a person of unsound mind is not so
inflexible. The reason seems to be, the difficulty that sometimes exists to deter-
mine whether a particular person is of sound or unsound mind. 23 If no objection
is interposed, a non compos may maintain a suit in his own name, and without
guardian, or next friend and if the objection should be made, and no one will
;
assume the role of guardian, or next friend, the Court would hesitate long before
dismissing a meritorious bill for want of a next friend, 24 especially if the
costs were secured, and a Solicitor of the Court was acting as counsel for the
non compos complainant.
Where a bill has been filed in the name of an infant, his coming of age is no
abatement of the suit but he may elect whether he will proceed with it, or not.
;
If he goes on with the cause, all future proceedings may be carried on in his
own name, and the bill need not be amended or altered. He will also be liable
to all the costs of the suit, in the same manner that he would have been had
he been of age when the bill was originally filed. If he chooses to abandon
it, he may move to dismiss it on payment of costs by himself but he cannot com- ;
pel the next friend to pay the costs, unless it be established that the bill was
improperly filed. Thus, when an infant, on attaining the age of twenty-one
years, moved to dismiss a bill filed on his behalf, with costs to be paid by the
next friend, the Court refused to make the order, but directed the bill to be
dismissed on the late infant, plaintiff giving an undertaking to pay the costs of
the next friend. 26
No doubt, the same rule would apply in case of a bill by a next friend of
any other person under disability, in case such person 's disability should termi-
nate while the suit was pending.
§ 106. Guardians ad Litem Generally Considered. Defendants who are —
minors, or of unsound mind, are the wards of the Court, which must represent
them in the procurement of counsel; and in discharging this duty the Court
should select men learned in the law, and capable of taking care of the interests
of their wards 26 and the person so chosen should, of course, have no interests
;
antagonistic to those of his ward. 27 If the minor, or non compos, has a regular
guardian, he must appear and defend by such guardian. 28
No step can be taken against a minor, or non compos, until after the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem; the appointment must not only be made, but it
must be accepted. The complainant is not a proper party to nominate a guar-
dian ad litem; but he may move the Chancellor, or Master, to make an appoint-
ment. 29 No appointment can be made until after the minor, or non compos,
has been duly brought into Court by service of process, or by publication; 30
and he is not in Court until the return day.
It is not necessary for the minor to actually appear in Court, in person, when
sued, unless the bill is filed by his guardian to sell his property, and he is over
fourteen years of age. 31 If, at the appearance term, or at the appearance rule
day, no friend of the minor moves to have a guardian ad litem appointed for
him, such guardian may be appointed by the Chancellor, or Master, on applica-
tion of the complainant, supported by an affidavit that the minor has no general
guardian. 32 Where a married woman is a minor she must defend by a guardian
23 McDowell v. Morrell, 5 Lea, 286- 32 Code, § 4420; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 162. If the bill
24 Rankin v. Warner, 2 Lea, 305. alleges there is no general guardian, and it is sworn
25 1Dan. Ch. Pr., 78. to, no further affidavit is necessary. The guardian ad
26 Kerbaugh v. Vance, 5 Lea, 114. litem ordinarily puts in a general answer, submitting
27 Elrod Lancaster, 2 Head, 572.
v. the rights of the infant to the protection of the
28 Britain Cowen, 5 Hum., 315; Code, §4420.
v. Court; but it is his duty to ascertain what these
29 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 162. rights are, and if a special answer is necessary or
30 Taylor v. Walker, 1 Heisk., 739; Wheatley V. advisable for the purpose of bringing such rights
Harvey, 1 Swan, 485. before the Court, he should put in such an answer.
31 In such case the minor must answer the bill in 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 148; and may apply for leave so to
person. Code, § 3325; see Chapter on Suits to Sell do after having filed a formal answer.
Property of Persons under Disability; post, §§ 972-
979-
103 NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM. § 107
ad any other minor, but in such case her husband may be appointed
litem, like
when he an adult and a co-defendant. 38
is
§ 107. Powers, Duties, and Liabilities of Guardians ad Litem. The powers, —

and duties of a guardian ad litem are limited, and strictly confined to the defense
of the particular suit in which he is appointed. He is to defend the suit in the
Court from which he derives his authority, according to the rules and principles
of law applicable to the case, as adminstered in that tribunal, and in conformity
with the ordinary mode of trial and practice of the Court in similar cases. It
is not within the scope of his authority, or duty, to consent to change the tri-
bunal for the trial, or that the decision shall be upon principles other than
those applicable to like cases, in the forum in which the suit is pending. He
has no power to submit the case to an arbitration, but he may exercise a sound
discretion in reference to mere matters preliminary to a trial, and which cannot,
ordinarily, affect or prejudice the merits of the case, or the interest of the
minors, such as waiving notice of copy of bill, and agreeing to a revivor. 34 He
cannot, however, waive service of process on his wards, nor make them parties
to the suit, 35 because there can really be no lawful appointment of a guardian
ad litem until the return day after service of process on the minor, or non
compos. 86
A guardian ad litem is not expected to assume any affirmative responsibilities.
His duty is to guard the interests and rights of his ward. The Court in appoint-
ing him gives him a shield, but no sword and if in the progress of the suit he
;
thinks a cross bill should be filed, or other affirmative step taken, he should
by affidavit, petition, or, if the facts are already of record, by motion, take
counsel of the Court in the matter, and get the Court's leave before he acts
further. On filing a cross bill the guardian ad litem, pro hac vice, beeomes next
friend of the infant.
He cannot bind his ward by admissions, 37 but may consent to any hearing
at Chambers, and may waive formalities. 38 He may consent to take evidence
without the usual notice, and may consent to other matters relating to the
conduct of the cause. But he should be cautious about such consents, and
should submit to the Court every question involving the rights of his ward. He
must make as vigorous a defense as the law, and facts, and his ward's interests
will justify; and should not delay the cause by failing to put in his pleading,
or nis proof, or to take other proper steps. Courts expect of guardians ad
litem a faithful and diligent compliance with their duties, and for any gross
failure therein they may be held liable to their wards for all damages sustained,
and may be taxed with costs. 39
§ 108. Some Practical Suggestions to Guardians ad Litem. The first thing —
a guardian ad litem should do, after his appointment, is to examine the subpoena
or publication notice, to see whether his ward is properly in Court because, if ;
the ward is not properly before the Court, the appointment of the guardian
ad litem is a nullity, and all the proceedings in the cause, so far as the ward is
concerned, are absolutely void. The guardian ad litem owes this duty: (1) to
the Court, whose trusted officer he is: (2) to his ward, whose interests he is
bound to guard and (3) to himself, as an evidence of proper diligence on his
;
part, and as a precaution against the humiliation that would result to him>from
proceeding in the cause when his ward is not before the Court.
The second duty of the guardian ad litem is to thoroughly possess himself
of the facts of the case, so that he may know what are the rights, what the
duties, and what the interests of his ward. This duty is not performed by
merely reading the bill, and making some general inquiries of the complainant's
33 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 163- Swan, 75; Bruce v. Bruce, 11 Heisk., 765; Kelley v.
34 Hannum v. Wallace, 9 Hum., 129. Kelley, 15 Lea, 199.
35 Frazier v. Pankey, 1 Swan, 78; Robertson v. 37 Lewis & Lenoir v. Outlaw, 1 Tenn., (Overt.)
Robertson, 2 Swan, 199; Rucker v. Moore, 1 Heisk., 141.
279; Taylor v. Walker, Ibid. 738- 38 Acts of 1903, Ch. 248, sec. 1.
38 Taylor v. Walker, 1 Heisk., 739; Hannum «. 30 i Dan. Ch. Pr., 160-163.
Wallace, 9 Hum., 134-135; Frazier v. Pankey, 1
§ 108 NEXT FRIENDS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM. 104
Solicitor; he should consult persons who are friendly to the ward, and who
know the facts of the case. If the ward is old enough to understand the matters
in litigation, and is accessible, and his interests, rights and duties are proper
matters to be submitted to him considering his age and judgment, the guardian
ad litem may consult him, especially if he is near his majority.
Having ascertained the facts, the guardian ad litem will then take such steps
as will best promote his ward's welfare. If the object of the bill is promotive
of that welfare, he should not put any obstacles in the way of the relief sought
but should rather co-operate with the Solicitor of the complainant in expediting
the cause and making the costs as light as possible, especially if the ward
may be liable for any part of such costs. If, on the other hand, the relief
sought is detrimental to the rights and interests of the ward, the guardian ad
litem should vigorously resist that relief, and in every proper way assert the
rights and protect the interests of his ward, using for that purpose every
available defense, admissible in Equity and should rally to his aid the relatives
;
and friends of his ward, and should take every other step that is incumbent
on a faithful, diligent, skilful and zealous Solicitor and guardian.
105 MIS-JOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES § 109
ARTICLE VII.
MIS-JOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES.
§ 109. Who are Parties to a Suit in Chancery. I § 111. Effect of the Non-joinder of Parties.
§ 110. General Rules as to Defect of Parties. | § 112. Effect of the Mis-joinder of Parties.
§ 109. Who are Parties to a Suit in Chancery. The general rule is that no —
persons are considered parties to a suit except the complainants and the persons
against whom the process is prayed. 1 The mere naming a person as a defend-
ant does not, however, make him a party: he must also be served with a
process, 2 unless he puts in a voluntary appearance. 3 In drawing bills, the
names of the parties, and their position as complainants and defendants should
be clearly stated. In some bills it is difficult to ascertain who are intended to
be made parties. The Code form of giving the names should be adhered to it :
is better than any yet devised by inexperienced draftsmen. 4

§ 110. General Rules as to Defect of Parties. It is manifestly impossible —
for a Court to do full justice in a given case, unless the proper parties are
before the Court in that particular case. The Court must both have jurisdiction
and must hear, before it can determine and how can it hear or determine when
;
the person entitled to speak has never been brought before the Court ? This de-
ficiency of proper parties is termed non-joinder.
On the other hand, the complainants may be setting up a joint right of re-
covery against the defendants when not entitled to a joint recovery. Some
of the complainants may have a right of recovery in the given case, but the
others may have no right whatever to share in that recovery as joint owners
thereof along with their co-complainants. Or, some of the complainants may
have a right to recover on one account, and other complainants may have the
right to recover on another and wholly different account, neither set of com-
plainants having any interest in the other's cause of action, and no privity or
community of interest existing between them. This failure of all the complain-
ants to have a community or congruity of interest entitling them to share in
the recovery, or the relief sought, is termed mis-joinder of parties complainant.
Again, persons may be joined as defendants for or against whom no relief
can be granted, they being neither necessary nor proper parties, having no
interest of any sort and being in no way chargeable. In such case there is a
mis-joinder of parties defendant.
The rules, therefore, are
1. That no person should be made a complainant, who has no community or
congruity of interest with the other complainants in the general relief sought.
2. That no person should be omitted as a party, when no complete decree
adjudicating all the matters in controversy can be made without him, either as
complainant or defendant.
3. That parties representing interests wholly inconsistent cannot join as com-
plainants co-complainants must have some general community of interest in the
:
subject-matter of the suit and ;
4. That no person can be properly joined as a defendant, for or against whom

no relief can be granted, nor decree rendered.
1 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 286; Sto. Eq. PL, § 44; Majors I 3 Pugsley v. Freedman, 2 Tenn. Ch., 138.
v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 300. 4 Code, §4313.
2 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 237; 390. I
§111 MIS-JOINDER AND NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES. 106
Mis-joinder of parties is a matter closely allied to multifariousness, and will
be further considered under that head. 5
§ 111. —
Effect of the Non-joinder of Parties. If all the parties, who should
be be-fore the Court, are not made parties, upon the question being raised by-
demurrer, plea- or answer, the Court will allow the bill to be amended; or may
pronounce a decree saving the rights of the parties not before the Court 6 and ;
it would be reversible error for the Court not to permit an amendment, so as to

bring in the necessary parties, even after allowing a plea, or demurrer, for
want of parties. 7 When such plea, or demurrer, is sustained, the complainant
has the right, as a matter of course, to so amend his bill as to cure the defect
in it.
at the hearing, it appears that persons interested have not been made
If,
parties, the Court, as already shown, may allow the bill to be amended, or may
render a decree, saving the rights of persons not made parties. 8 The general
rule, requiring all persons in interest to be made parties to the suit, is, in most
cases, not a right of the parties brought before the Court, but rather a rule
prescribed by Courts of Equity for their own government, a rule founded in
their anxiety to do justice among all parties having an interest in the subject-
matter, or in the object of the suit, and thereby to prevent future controversy
and litigation. 9 Courts of Chancery struggle against technical rules which
impede the attainment of substantial justice and will allow new parties to be
;
made at almost any stage of the suit. 10 Nevertheless, the Chancellor should be
exceedingly slow to pronounce a decree, without having all the necessary
parties before him, and should require the necessary amendments to be made to
bring into Court all the parties omitted, to the end that a complete decree may
be pronounced, settling all the various legal and equitable rights involved in the
litigation. 11
§ 112. Effect of the Mis-joinder of Parties. When a defendant is mis-—
joined as a party, the nature of the controversy being such that no relief can be
granted for or against him, he can have the suit as to himself dismissed, on
motion or on demurrer but no other party can object. 12
;
If there is a mis-joinder of complainants, however, any or all of the de-

fendants may demur and the bill, under the old rule of practice, would, there-
;
upon, have been dismissed. 13 But this rule is now greatly modified, and under
the liberalized practice and rules of pleading of the present day, it requires a
very flagrant case of multifariousness or mis-joinder of parties to defeat, on
demurrer, a clear equity; 14 and the better practice in a doubtful case of mis-
joinder of complainants now is, to retain the cause in Court until the hearing,
and then dismiss it as to those complainants only not entitled to share in the
recovery 15 'or, the Court may, in a proper case, authorize amendments, or even
;
direct separate bills to be filed, without new process as to the parties before
the Court. 16 It is now harshness, almost arbitrariness, for a Chancellor to
dismiss a bill on a demurrer for mis-joinder of parties when a clear equity, or
legal cause of action, appears on the face of the bill, 17 in favor of some of the
complainants.
5 Post, § 149. 12 Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn., Ch., 154.
6 Code, §§4337-4338. 13 Sto. Eq. PI., § 509; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 302, note
7 Gray v. Hays, 7 Hum., 588; Franklin 7/. Frank- 4; Tillman V. Searcy, 5 Hum., 487-
lin, 2 Swan, 522. See Code, § 2798- 14 Dechard v. Edwards, 2 Sneed, 99.
8 Code, § 4337- 15 Henderson )'. Peck, 3 Hum., 248-
9 Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 291- io Code, §§4325-4327; 4338; Jefferson );. Gaines,
10 Ibid.; Britain V. Cowen, 5 Hum., 315. 7 Bax., 368-
11 Boni judicis est lites dirimere ne lis ex lite ori- 1' Post. § 283-
atur; et interest reipublicw ut sint fines litium.
] 07 DEATH, MARRIAGE, OR ASSIGNMENT, OE PARTIES. §113
ARTICLE VIII.
EFFECT OF DEATH OR MARRIAGE OF PARTIES, OR ASSIGNMENT OF THEIR

INTERESTS.
113. Effect of the Death of a Party. § 115. General Rule Applicable to Assign-
114. Effect of the Marriage of a Female ments of Property in Litigation.
Party. § 116. Effect of Voluntary Alienation of
Property Pending a Litigation.
§ 113. —
Effect of the Death of a Party. Inasmuch as some confusion some-
times arises in the mind of junior counsel, by reason of the death, or marriage
of parties, or a transfer of their interests, either before or after the bringing
of a suit, it may be well to consider the effect of such occurrences. On the death
of a person, who, had he lived, would have been a proper party, those who
succeed to what would have been his rights or duties, must be substituted for
him. 1 If his personal estate would have been benefited or injured by the litiga-
tion, the representative of his personal estate, (his executor or administrator,)
must be made a party. If his real estate would have been lessened or increased
by the litigation, the representatives of his real estate (his heirs) must be
made parties or if he left a will devising to any one the particular real estate
;
involved in the litigation, such devisee must be made a party instead of the
heirs if the real estate be devised for any purpose to the executor he must be
;
made a party; if the real estate is devised in trust, both the trustee (executor,
or other person,) specified in the will, and the beneficiaries must be made
parties. In short, if the suit is to recover a debt, or personal property only, for
or from the decedent, then his personal representative, (administrator or ex-
ecutor) must be substituted for him 2 if the suit is to recover, or clear up title
;
to, land only, claimed by the decedent, then his real representative, (heir, de-
visee, or trustee and beneficiaries) must be made parties in his place. Of course,
if the suit involves both the personal and the real estate, as it often does, then
both the personal and the real representatives must be made parties. Thus, the
heirs are necessary parties in a suit to recover the land, 'and the administrator
is, also, a necessary party if the same suit seeks to recover rents accrued in
the decedent's life. These same rules apply when a party dies pending the
suit, in which ease the suit must be revived against the same persons (succes-
sors in interest and estate) as would necessarily have been made defendants
had the death occurred before the bringing of the suit.
When personal or real representatives are made defendants in place of a
decedent, they must all be made the defendants, as less than all do not repre-
sent him. 3 If a party dies, whose personal estate is involved, and no one will
administer on his estate, his heirs may revive if he was complainant, or the
suit may be revived against his heirs if he was a defendant: when a suit
is so revived all the heirs must be made parties.
4
But, as elsewhere shown, 5
a foreign administrator or foreign executor can neither sue nor be sued, as
such, in this State.
Where real estate belongs to a partnership, on the death of one of the
1 Such persons are frequently called his privies,'or 4 Code, §2849; Campbell v. Hubbard, 11 Lea, 6;
those who stand in his shoes. As to who are privies, or the Court may appoint an administrator ad litem.
see post, § 165. Acts of 1889, ch. 137.
2 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 249; 255. 5 Ante, § 81.
3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 252; Campbell v. Hubbard, 11
Lea, 6; Code. §§2849-2859.
§114 DEATH, MARRIAGE, OR ASSIGNMENT, OF PARTIES. 108
partners the title vests in the survivors, and does not go to the heirs, the law
regarding the partnership as a person that lives as long as any member lives."
Hence, in a suit affecting partnership realty, the death of a partner does not
affect the litigation, but it proceeds without the necessity of any revivor. 7
§ 114. Effect of the Marriage of a Female Party. Upon the marriage of —
a female party, her husband, by operation of law, 8 becomes the owner of her
personalty, and succeeds to all her rights thereto. Hence, he must be brought
before the Court, in order to enable him to assert or defend those rights. If
the marriage take place before the suit is brought, it is not necessary to make
the wife a party, unless the property involved in dispute is of such a character
that it will survive to the wife in case of the husband's death.
But as to the wife's real estate the law is quite different. Marriage alone
gives the husband no legal or equitable interest in her realty, unless a live
child is born of the marriage, and then the husband acquires a life estate in
his wife's realty, known as a tenancy by the courtesy. While at common law
the husband was, in effect, the absolute owner of his wife's realty during his
life, the Courts of Chancery and the statutes have so stripped him of his
common law rights, that, while his wife lives, he is but little more than her
agent, or overseer. In all suits affecting her real estate, whether it be legal
or equitable, the wife must be a party, and if her husband has not abandoned
her, he, also, must be a party. If, however, as elsewhere shown, the husband
has estopped, himself by his own acts, or is debarred by lapse of time, from
aiding his wife in recovering her realty, she may sue alone, by next friend,
making her husband a defendant.
On the death of the husband, intestate, his widow becomes reinvested with all
thoses in action belonging to her at marriage, and not reduced to possession by
the husband; and they belong to her absolutely, and do not go to his adminis-
trator but if he die, testate, and specifically bequeaths them, they go to the
:
legatee. Hence, in suits affecting choscs in action not reduced to possession or

bequeathed by the husband, the widow must be a party.
So, on the death of the husband, the widow becomes as completely the owner
and controller of her realty as though she had never been married, and her
rights and duties in reference thereto are those of a single woman. 9
General Rule Applicable to Assignments of Property in Litigation.
§ 115. —
Whoever succeeds to another's rights or property, whether by contract or by
operation of law, ordinarily holds such rights or property subject to all the
liabilities and burdens attaching to such rights or property while belonging to
the former owner. 10 The assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor. When
a woman marries, the law assigns her personalty to her husband when a man ;
dies intestate the law assigns his personalty to his administrator, and his
realty to his heirs; when he dies testate, his will points out the persons to
whom he has assigned his estate. If a person is declared a bankrupt, under a
Bankruptcy Statute, the law assigns his estate to the assignee in bankruptcy,
and such assignee is alone entitled to sue and be sued as to such estate, or to
continue a suit begun by a bankrupt. 11 So, if a person, prior to suit brought,
transfer his interest in the property, or debt in dispute, he ceases to have any
further interest in it, and his transferee must sue or be sued in his place.
Hence, the general rule, before stated, which, when well considered, renders
6 Code, §2011; Salomon V. Fitzgerald, 7 Heisk., See Chapter on Abatement and Bills of Revivor,
552. Post, §§ 699-700.
7 Hammond John, 4 Yerg., 107.
v. St. See Chap- 10 Qui sentit commodum debet et onus.
sentire
ter on Abatement and Bills of Revivor, post, §§ 698- (He who takes the benefit ought to take the burden.)
722. Qvi in jus dominiumve altenus succedit jure ejus uti
8 While the law gives the husband all of his wife's debet. (He who becomes owner of another's right
personalty, nevertheless, when her personal estate or' property takes it subject to his liabilities.)
gets into Chancery before it passes into the posses- 11 Moffit V. Cruise, 7 Cold., 137; Northman v. In-
sion of her husband, the Court will, on application surance Cos., 1 Tenn. Ch., 312; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 256-
of a next friend, vest it in her as a separate estate. 256.
Phillips v. Hassell, 10 Hum., 197; Cheatham v. Huff.
2 Tenn. Ch., 619; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 90-109.
109 DEATH, MARRIAGE, OR ASSIGNMENT, OE PARTIES. §116
all other rules on the subject mere corollaries, readily ascertained and applied
by reason. 12
§ 116. Effect of Voluntary Alienation of Property Pending a Litigation. —
The voluntary alienation of property, pending a suit, by any party to it, is not
permitted to affect the rights of the other parties, if the suit proceeds without
a disclosure of the facts, except so far as the alienation may disable the party
from performing the decree of the Court. Thus, if pending a suit by a mort-
gagee to foreclose the equity of redemption, the mortgagor makes a second
mortgage, or assigns the equity of redemption, an absolute decree of foreclosure
against the mortgagor will bind the second mortgagee, or assignee of the equity
of redemption, who can only have the benefit of a title so gained, by intervening
or filing a bill for that purpose.
Generally, in cases of alienation, pendente lite, the alienee is bound by the
proceedings in the suit after the alienation, and before the alienee becomes a
party to it and depositions of witnesses, taken after the alienation, but before
;
the Alienee became a party to the suit, may be used by the other parties against
the alienee, as they might have been used against the party, under whom he
claims. 13
The same rule prevails where a vendee files a bill for a specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of land against the vendor, and pending the suit
he (the vendee) should sell to one or more sub-purchasers. In such a case, the
sub-purchasers need not be made parties; and they would be bound by the
decree in the suit. 1 *
Generally speaking, an assignee, pendente lite, need not be made a party to a
bill, or brought before the Court for every person, purchasing pendente lite, is
;
treated as a purchaser with notice, and is subject to all the equities of the
persons under whom he claims in privity. 15 And it will make no difference
whether the assignee, pendente lite, be the claimant of a legal or of an equitable
interest, or whether he be the assignee of the complainants or of the defend-
ants. 16 Still, however, it is often important to bring such assignees before the
Court, as parties, by a supplemental bill, in order to take away a cloud hanging
over the title, or to compel the assignee to do some act or to join in some con-
veyance, or to divest the title out of him, or to enjoin him from asserting such
title. So that such assignee, although not a necessary party, may, at the same
time, be a proper party at the election of the complainant. And an assignee
after the bill was filed, but before the subpoena was served, has been held to
be a necessary party. 17
So, if the interest of a defendant is not determined, and only becomes vested
in another by an event subsequent to the institution of a suit, as in the case
of alienation by deed or devise, or by bankruptcy, the defect in the suit may be
supplied by a supplemental bill, or a bill in the nature of a supplemental I bill,
whether the suit has become defective merely, or is abated 18 as well as become
defective. For, in these cases, the new party comes before the Court exactly in
the same plight and condition as the former party, is bound by his acts, and
may be subject to all the costs of the proceedings, from the beginning of the
suit. But in case of a voluntary alienation by a defendant, pendente lite, the
complainant has the right to ignore the transfer, and continue the prosecution
of the suit as though no change in the defendant's interest had occurred.
If the transfer is made by a complainant, and takes place after the bill was
filed, the transferee may either continue the suit in the name of the original
complainant for his benefit, or he may prove the transfer and have the suit
revived in his name. If the transfer is made bv a defendant after the bill was
12 See Code, §§ 2845-2862, which are all affirma- 16 Fitzgerald v. Cummings, 1 Lea, 239.
tory of this general rule. 17 Sto. Eq. PI., § 156-
13 Sto. Eq. PI., § 351- IS The term abated^ in Chancery pleading, means
14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 351 a. suspended. In law, it means dead. Sto. Eq. PI., §
15 Dillard & Coffin Co. v. Smith, 21 Pick., 372- 20, note; §354.
§116 DEATH, MARRIAGE, OR ASSIGNMENT, OF PARTIES. 110
filed,and after subpoena to answer was served on him, the complainant need
pay no attention to it, the doctrine of lis pendens applying, as shown elsewhere. 19
But while a person can, either before or after suit, transfer a right, and thus
relieve himself from all obligation to protect or enforce it any longer, never-
theless he cannot assign a duty or liability, so as to escape responsibility there-
tor. He can transfer a right, because that belongs to him, and is his property
but he cannot transfer a duty or a liability, for they belong to another, to
whom he must render them. 20 He may be indemnified against such liability,
but the indemnifier can not be made a party, on that account alone.
A person who acquires an entirely new right or interest in the subject-
matter of the suit, by purchase during the litigation, may bring such right or
interest before the Court by supplemental bill, or original bill in the nature
of a supplemental bill 21 and unless he does so he will not be allowed to take
;
any benefit from the suit without the consent of the parties thereto. 22
"When a sole complainant, suing in his own right, loses all his rights in the
litigation by an event after suit brought, by alienation, or otherwise, his as-
signee may file an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill in order to
assert and protect his rights. 23
19 See, ante, § 66. 22 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1516, note.
20 Rights are what others owe us; duties are what 23 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1518. On the subject of Lis
we owe others. Pendens, see, ante, § 66-
21 Trabue V. Bankhead, 2 Term. Ch., 412.
Ill PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS. §117
ARTICLE IX.
PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS.
117. Parties to Suits in Cases of Trust. § 123.Parties where Several are Liable for
118. When Administrators, Executors and the Same Debt.
Guardians, Should be Parties. § 124. Parties to Suits to Collect Debts where
119. Parties to Suits on Official Bonds. Other Creditors have Concurrent
120. Parties in Suits concerning Mortgages, Rights.
Trust Deeds and other Liens on S 125. Parties to Suits to Recover Land.
Land. § 126. Parties to Suits to Partition or Sell
121. Parties in Case of Assignments. Lands.
122. Parties ,to Suits on Written Evidences § 127. Parties to Suits Affecting Equitable
of Debt. Property.
§ 117. —
Parties to Suits in Cases of Trust. There are ordinarily four con-
stituents in a trust: 1, a duty to be performed; 2, a person expressly or
impliedly charged with that duty, called a trustee 3, a person for whose ;
benefit the duty is to be performed, called the beneficiary and 4, some prop- ;
erty, the legal title to which is vested in the trustee, to enable him to effectually
discharge the duty imposed on him. And in all suits affecting the trust, or the
trust property, or the trustee's rights or duties, or the beneficiary's interests,
both the trustee and the beneficiary must be made parties. The trustee must
be made a party, first, because the legal title to the property is in him; and
second, because it is his duty both to defend his title and to protect the trust
and the beneficiary and the beneficiary must be made a party because, in
:
the eye of a Court of Equity, he is the real owner of the property, and is the
person most interested in defending both the property and the trust. In suits
by or against executors and administrators, (who are express trustees,) relative
to the personal property vested in them, and in which the legatees, distributees,
and creditors are beneficially interested, it is not ordinarily necessary to make
such legatees, distributees or creditors, as the case may be, parties, if the suit
relates exclusively to the personal estate, because the personal representative
is authorized to sue or be sued alone 1 but if the suit relates to real estate,
-,
in which the devisees or heirs have an interest, legal or equitable, then the
heirs or devisees interested must be made parties.
In suits to set up and enforce an implied trust, if the implied trustee has
acquired the absolute legal .title his vendor need not be made a party, but if
the vendor has retained either the legal title or a lien, to secure the purchase
money, or for any other purpose, then the vendor must be made a defendant
along with the implied trustee.
In suits by or against executors, administrators, or other express trustees,
all should be joined, except such as may have declined to qualify, or have died,
or left the State.
§ 118. When Administrators, Executors, and Guardians Should be Parties.
— The general rules as to when administrators, executors, heirs, devisees, and
iegatees should be made parties, have been already given. Some special rules
will now be given, applicable to administrators, executors, and guardians
1. Administrators are the Proper Persons to Sue: (1) for all debts due their in-
testates^ of every character 'whatever (2) to recover all the personal property
;
belonging to their intestates, at their death, and not exempt by law; (3) to
l The personal representative not only represents all who are interested in the personal assets of the
the estate of the decedent, but he, also, represents estate; Sto. Eq. PI., § 141.
§ 119 PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS. 112
enforce all mortgages, trust deeds, or other liens to secure debts to their intes-
tates.
2. Administrators are the Proper Persons to be Sued: (1) when a creditor seeks
to recover any debt due from the intestate; (2) when there is a dispute
as to the ownership of any personal property claimed by the intestate; (3)
when a creditor seeks to have the land of a decedent sold to pay debts; (4)
when damages are claimed for some breach of contract by the decedent; (5)
when it is claimed that they have wasted the assets of the decedent, or not ac-
counted for all the assets, or have failed to pay the creditors and distributees
the amount due them, or in other respects have failed to do their duty, in which
cases the sureties, on their official bond, may, also, be joined as defendants, and
charged as such.
3. Executors are the Proper Persons to Sue and be Sued: (1) in cases where, if
there had been no will, the administrator of the same estate would have been
a proper person to sue or be sued; and (2) in all cases affecting land devised
to be sold where, if there had been no will, the heirs would have been the
proper persons to sue or be sued. (3) If the executor fails to account for all
the estate that came and should have come into his hands, fails to pay the
legatees, distributees and creditors, having sufficient assets so to do, or in any
other way violates his trust, he, and the sureties on his bond, are liable to the
party or parties injured, and they may all be sued by such party or parties.
4. Guardians are Necessary Parties to All Suits affecting the real or personal
estate of their wards, whether such wards be minors, or persons of unsound
mind. The guardian is the proper person to bring and defend all suits to which
his ward is a party. If the suit affects only money of the ward which the
guardian has loaned, the guardian may sue for it without joining his ward as a,
eo-complainant and if the suit be against a guardian for debts by him con-
;
tracted, or for necessaries furnished the ward, the guardian should be sued
alone, describing him as guardian. 2 If the suit be to recover any specific
personal property, or any realty, belonging to the ward, the suit should be in
the name of the ward by his guardian, who in such suits is a next friend. And
if the suit be brought to recover personalty, or realty, claimed by the ward,
he and his guardian should both be parties, whether the suit be by them, or'
against them. Sometimes one guardian is compelled to sue his predecessor:
in such case he can sue alone, describing himself as guardian, and need not join
his wards as co-complainants in such suits he may sue his predecessor or pre-
:
decessors, and the sureties on his or their bond, or bonds, in the same suit.
But frequently guardians violate their trust by failing to collect all of their
ward's estate, or by failing properly to care for it, or failing to properly
account for it. In all such cases, if the ward is a minor, he must sue by next
friend, or by a new guardian, making the defaulting guardian and his sureties
defendants, as shown in the next section. If the guardian has given more than
one bond, the sureties on all the bonds may be made co-defendants. If the
ward has attained majority, he can, of course, sue his guardian and sureties.
in his own name.
§ 119. Parties to Suits —
on Official Bonds. For any breach of an official
bond of any executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other person,
officer,
required to be given by law for the security of the public generally, or of par-
ticular individuals, the party aggrieved may, by statute, without assignment
bring suit thereon for his use, giving security for costs, and being liable there-
for as if the suit had been brought in his own name. 6 The effect of this statute
is equivalent to an assignment of the bond to the person aggrieved to the extent
of his damage, not exceeding, of course, the penalty of the bond.
By both statute and judicial interpretation, the person for whose use the
=In such cases, however, the description would be | 5 Code, § 2797- See, also, Code, § 2231.
a mere descriptio personw, and, therefore, not es- I
sential. !
113 PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS. 120
suit isbrought is the real complainant of record, and, in Chancery, is the real
complainant in fact. While technically a suit on any of the above mentioned
bonds should be in the name of the State for the use of the party aggrieved, 7
nevertheless the practice of suing directly in the name of the real complainant,
and not in the name of the State, has long prevailed, and been directly sanc-
tioned by the Supreme Court of the State. 8
"When, therefore, a ward, or a guardian or next friend for him, sues for the
breach of his guardian's bond, or a distributee, legatee, or creditor sues for a
breach of an executor's or administrator's bond, or any party aggrieved sues
lor a breach of any official bond, the party so suing will name himself as com-
plainant, and make the party in default and the sureties on his bond defendants.
If any of the sureties are dead, removed from the State, or insolvent, they may
be left out of the bill, the bill so explaining, and the personal representative of
a deceased surety may be made a defendant in his decedent's place.
Where a defaulting officer, executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or
other person required by law to give bond for the security of the public gen-
erally, or of particular individuals, gives more than one bond, he can in case
of his default, be sued on all of his bonds, the bill describing the several bonds
and dates thereof, and naming the several sureties on each, and making them
defendants, so the Court may determine the relative liability, if any, of such
sureties.
§ 120. Parties in Suits Concerning Mortgages, Trust Deeds, and other Liens
—
on Land. All persons having any interest, legal or equitable, in the land, or in
the encumbrance thereon, are necessary parties, unless the object of the bill is
a special foreclosure, in which case the complainants may omit both prior and
subsequent encumbrancers. The holders of encumbrances are proper persons
to sue: (1) whenever it is necessary to enforce their liens, in which case the
mortgagor, vendor, or other giver- of the lien, if living, and his heirs if he is
dead, must be made defendants; and (2) whenever necessary to protect their
liens against adverse claimants, in which case the same persons must be made
defendants, and also the adverse claimants. Whenever a mortgagee of the
absolute fee dies, his heir is a necessary party to a suit to enforce the mort-
gage debt, and his administrator is a proper party: if the mortgagor dies,
his heirs are necessary parties defendant to a bill to foreclose, but his admin-
istrator is not. 9 On a bill to foreclose a mortgage or enforce a trust deed,
neither prior nor subsequent encumbrancers are necessary parties, but subse-
quent encumbrancers are proper parties and if the prior encumbrance is over-
;
due, its holders are proper parties. If the prior encumbrancers are not made
parties, their rights will remain unaffected. 10 As a rule, it is the better course
to make parties of all encumbrancers, prior as well as subsequent, to the end
that the mortgaged premises may be sold with a clear title, and the proceeds
divided according to priority of interests. If prior encumbrancers object,
(which they will seldom do,) the bill can be dismissed as to them, on their
motion or demurrer, if the Court so adjudge. It is often necessary to make
6 Code, §2795; Wolfe v. Tyler, 1 Heisk., 313; to the administrator, he would be the proper person
Enly v. Nowlin, 1 Bax., 164; Kyle v. Ewing, 5. Lea, to foreclose the mortgage, making the mortgagor,
580; 583- and the heirs of the mortgagee defendants, or mak-
7 Brannon v. Wright, 5 Cates, 692. For form of ing the heirs of the mortgagee co-complainants. In
commencement of such a bill, see, post, §§ 156, sub- Atchison ». Surguine, 1 Yerg., 400, it was expressly
sec. 10; 971- See other bills, §§927; 957. decided that the heir of the mortgagee or his as-
8 Johnson v. Molsbee, 5 Lea, 444, 447; Brandon signee, may alone, without joining the personal rep-
v. Mason, 1 Lea, 615, 628; Brannon v. Wright, 5 resentative, bring a bill to foreclose a mortgage; and
Cates, 692- Courts of Chancery have regard to the that if the heir of the mortgagee receive the money,
substance of a bill, and not to technical forms; and he holds it as trustee for the personal representative,
the use of the name of the State in such a bill is a who may recover it by suit. The personal represen-
mere empty formality, makes the averments of the tative certainly has an interest in the suit, and be-
bill awkward in expression, and savors bf the tech- sides, by joining him in the suit, a second suit is ob-
nicality of the old common law pleading. For forms viated. See 2 Jones on Mortgs., § 1388- A Court of
of bills, see, post, §§ 927; 957; 971- Equity, in all cases, delights to do complete justice,
9 Aiken v. Suttle, 4 Lea, 127; Harris v. Vaughn, and not by halves. See ante, §§38; 36-
2 Tenn. Ch., 484; Slo. Eq. PI., §§ 196-200- It would 10 Sto. Eq. PI., §§182-201; Rowan v. Mercer, 10
seem, on general principles, that, inasmuch as the Hum., 359; Mims v. Mims, 1 Hum., 425.
mortgage debt, on the death of the mortgagee, goes
§121 PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS. 114
prior encumbrancers parties, in order to test the bona fides of their lien, and
to ascertain whether all, or any part of their debt, remain unpaid.
It must be borne in mind that while a suit to enforce a lien on real estate is
a suit that deals with particular property, it is not a proceeding in rem, but
in personam; and, therefore, no person is bound by the proceeding unless a party
thereto, complainant or defendant. 11
In a suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage, after the death of any party to the
transaction, his administrator will, of course, stand in his shoes, whether as
debtor or creditor.
When a vendor's lien is in issue, both the party or parties claiming the lien,
and the party or parties claiming the land, must be made parties, the former,
or some of them, being made complainants when the object of the suit is to
enforce the lien. If the vendor be dead, his heirs are necessary parties where
the vendor retained the legal title otherwise, they are neither necessary nor
;
proper parties. If the vendee be dead, his heirsi 2 and widow 13 are necessary
parties in any event, but his administrator is not. 14 The administrator is the
proper person to enforce a lien on the death of the vendor, but if the legal title
was in the latter at his death, his heirs must also be made parties 15 if otherwise,
;
they are not proper parties.

A recurrence to general principles will settle all doubts as to who are proper
parties in case of liens, but the following general rules will aid: (1) the persons
entitled to the proceeds of the debt secured by the lien are necessary parties,
and should ordinarily be complainants: (2) the persons entitled to the residue
of the proceeds of the sale of the property after the lien debt has been satisfied
therefrom, are necessary parties; and (3) any persons interested in disputing
the right of any of the complainants to the debt, or the right of any of the
parties to have the land sold, are necessary parties.
In suits to enforce mortgages, trust-deeds-, and other liens, it may be stated
generally (1) all of the persons in any way interested, either ki the particular
:
lien sought to be enforced, or in the property charged with the lien, must be
made parties ; (2) those entitled to the benefit of the lien, if their interests are
harmonious, should join as complainants, making all others interested defend-
ants; (3) if any who should be complainants do not give their consent to the
suit, they must be made defendants (4) all persons having a legal or equitable
;
title to the property or the proceeds of the property charged with the lien,
should be made parties, so that when the property is sold the purchaser may
get a perfect title, and the proceeds of the sale be properly distributed among
those thereunto entitled, according to their respective rights.
But in all suits to enforce mortgages, trust deeds, vendors' or other liens
against real estate, whenever it is necessary to make their heirs of the debtors
parties, his widow, if living, must, also, be made a party, because she has an
interest in the surplus for her dower, 16 and also for her homestead. If the lien
is on a tract of land to which homestead rights may exist, the wife should
always be made a co-defendant along with her husband, so that she may be
bound by the decree, and thus be precluded from relitigating her homestead
rights. 17
§ 121. —
Parties in Case of Assignments. There are two sorts of assignments
to be considered in this section: 1, assignments of choses in action; and 2,
assignments for the benefit of creditors; and for convenience and clearness of
statement they will be considered separately.
1. Parties in Case of Assignments of Choses in Action. —
The general rule pre-
vails here, as in all other cases, that every party having an interest in the
11 2 Jones on Mortg., § 1396. 16 Edwards v. Edwards, 5 Heisk., 123.

12 McCoy v. Broderick, 3 Sneed, 203- 17 Hawes on Parties, %% 26; 27; 66; 69; 110; Wil-
13 Edwards v. Edwards, 5 Heisk., 123. liams v. Williams, 7 Bax., 116; Mash v. Russell, 1
14 Ibid. Lea, 543.
15 Alexander v. Perry, 4 Hum., 391.
115 PARTIES IN PARTICULAR SUITS. §122
assigned debt when recovered, and every person liable to pay the debt, is a
necessary, or proper party. If the debt be assignable by statute, or the law
merchant, the assignee may sue in his own name, and his assignor is not a
proper party, unless it is sought to set aside the assignment, or to hold him ex-
pressly liable for the debt, in which case he must be made a defendant. If, how-*
ever, the debt is not so assignable, the assignor must be made a party, because
the legal title is in him; 18 and he may be joined as a complainant. 19 If, how-
ever, the assignment is absolute, leaving no interest or title in the assignor, he
need not be made a party. 20
Bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds and bank checks, are all negotia-
ble 21 and bonds with collateral conditions, bills or note for specific articles,
;
or for the performance of any duty, are assignable by statute the assignees :
of all these instruments may sue thereon in their own names. 22

2. Parties in Case of Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors. Where an as- —
signment is made by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors, if any creditor
seeks to enforce the trusts, he cannot sue alone but he must make all the other
;
creditors, provided for in the assignment, parties, either by name, or by bring-

ing the suit on behalf of himself and all the other creditors who may choose to
come in and take the benefit of the decree. But the assignees themselves may
file a bill relative to the trust estate, and to enforce its objects, without making
the creditors parties for the assignees, in such a case, are the proper represen-
;
tatives of them. 23
§ 122. Parties to Suits on Written Evidences of Debt. In an ordinary ac- —
tion of debt, brought by a bill in Chancery, whether such debt be based on an
express, or an implied, contract and whether the contract be verbal, or written
;
and whether the debt be original, or obtained by assignment from another, the
person or persons entitled to recover the money must sue as complainants, and
the person or persons liable to pay the money, whether principals, endorsers,
guarantors, or sureties, must be made defendants.
If the debt is evidenced by a negotiable instrument, such as a promissory
note, due bill, bill of exchange, or by an instrument assignable by statute, such
as a bond with collateral conditions, or a bill or note for specific articles, or for
the performance of any duty, 24 an assignee may sue thereon in his own name
but if a debt not so evidenced is assigned, the assignee must join the assignor as
a co-complainant, if he consent; otherwise he must be made a defendant, for
the legal title to the debt is in the assignor. If, however, there be several as-
signments of a non-negotiable debt, only the original assignor need be made
a. party, unless the suit is brought to hold an intermediate assignor liable on
some independent guaranty or contract to pay, in which case such intermediate
assignor must be made a defendant.
The payee of an order on another for money, may sue thereon, in his own
name, either the person who drew the order, or the person on whom it is
drawn. But he cannot sue the latter on the order unless he accepts it, and he
cannot sue the drawer of the order, as such, without demand, protest and no-
tice. 25 He may, however, sue the drawer of the order on the original liability. 28
18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 199 : 201; Sto. Eq. PL, § 153- sought against him; for, in many cases, a person
19 Wilson V. Davidson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 546- If, the may be made a party, although he is not an indis-
assignment is questioned, is irregular, or insufficient, pensable party. But, where the assignment is not
it may be prudent to join the assignor as a co-com- absolute and unconditional, or the extent or validity
plainant, stating the question made on the assign- of the assignment is disputed or denied, or there are
ment. remaining rights or liabilities of the assignor, which
20 Ibid. The true principle would seem to be, may be affected by the decree, there he is not onlv
that, in all cases where the assignment is absolute a proper, but a necessary party. Sto. Eq. PI., § 153.
and unconditional, leaving no equitable interest 21 Lawrence v. Dougherty, 5 Yerg., 436.
whatever in the assignor, and the extent and_ validity 22 Code, §§1956-1967; 2787-2790. Eooney v. Pink-
of the assignment is not doubted or denied, and ston, 1 Tenn., (Overt.,) 385; Sugg V. Powell, 1 Head,
there is no remaining liability in the assignor to be 221; Perkins v. Perkins, 1 Tenn. Ch., 540; Smith V.
affected by the decree, it is not necessary to make Hubbard, Pick., 312.
the latter a party. At most, he is a mere nominal 23 Sto. Eq. PI., § 157-
or formal party m such a case. It is a very differ- 24 Code §§1956-1967; 2787-2790-
ent question, whether he may not properly be made 25 Code, §§ 1959-1961.
a party, as the legal owner, although no decree is 20 Harwell v. McCullock, 2 Tenn., (Overt.,) 275-
In suits on promissory notes, due bills, checks and bills of exchange, all or
any of the makers, including both principals and sureties, and all or any of the
endorsers, may be sued by the holder of the instrument. 27 And in suits for
breaches of contract, any or all of the parties in default may be sued in the
same suit; but all the persons injured by such breach must be parties, those
not consenting to join as complainants being made defendants.
When the obligation is to pay a sum of money to more persons than one,
jointly, all of the payees must join in the suit as complainants, or if some refuse
so to join, they must be made defendants; for, while the obligation is several
as to the makers, it is joint as to the payees. However, in suits on obligations
executed to one person for the benefit of others, such as suits on official bonds
executed to the State, by officers, executors, administrators or guardians, and
the like, any person belonging to the class intended to be secured by such an
obligation, may sue thereon in the name of the payee, for his own use and
benefit. 2S In suits on bonds payable to the State, any person entitled to sue
thereon may sue in his own name. 29
§ 123. Parties where Several are Liable for the Same Debt. When several —
persons, either as principals or as sureties, or as both principals and sureties,
are bound for the same debt, or duty, even though bound by different bonds
or other instruments, they may all be sued, or any part of them may be sued,
in the same suit and all persons, or any of them, entitled to said debt or duty,
;
or to any part thereof, may join as complainants in such suit and if a part only ;
of those entitled to sue, they may, (and if an account 30 is necessary, or if any

trust is involved, should) make the remainder of those entitled defendants.
Hence, in suits against trustees, executors, administrators, guardians, public
officers and others who have given bonds and security for the proper discharge
of their duties or contracts, all or any part of the sureties, on all or any of the
bonds, on a default by the principal, may be made joint defendants to the same
bill; 31 and any or all of the parties secured by such bonds may be joint com-
plainants in the same bill but if a part only of those entitled to sue by reason
;
of the particular default join in the bill, the remainder of those entitled should
be made defendants. If any of the obligors on said bonds are dead or insolvent)
they, or their personal representatives need not be sued, but the fact of death
or insolvency should be stated in the bill as a reason for not suing them, or their
personal representatives.
§ 124. Parties to Suits to Collect Debts, where Other Creditors have Con-
—
current Rights. In suits to collect a debt from a fund in which other creditors
have concurrent rights, the parties who sue must file their bill in behalf of them-
selves and of all others entitled to share in the fund. This is one of the few ex-
ceptions to the general rule, requiring all persons having an interest in the
subject-matter or object of the suit to be made parties. The reasons for this
exception are: (1) the difficulty, and often the impossibility, of ascertaining
all who are interested; (2) the increased costs that would result from allowing
each creditor to institute a separate suit; and (3) inasmuch as the bill is filed
in behalf of all the creditors, those not named as such can have themselves made-
parties on petition at any time before the fund is distributed, and, as a con-
sequence, are not injured by the proceeding.
Accordingly, when bills are filed by a creditor or creditors (1) to sell the
lands of decedent to pay debts, or (2) to distribute a trust fund, or (3) to wind
up an insolvent estate, an insolvent partnership or an insolvent corporation, or
32
(4) to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property made by a decedent;
or (5) to have an administrator appointed, in any and all such cases, the bill
27 Code, §§ 1958; 2787. sureties are not necessary parties; Gross V. Davis, it
28 Code, § 2797. Pick., 230.
20 Johnson v. Molsbee, 5 Lea, 444. 32A bill may be filed on behalf of complainant
30 i Dan. Ch. Pr., 216- and other creditors to set aside a fraudulent con-
31 Johnson v. Molsbee, 5 Lea, 444. In a suit for veyance by a living debtor. Code, § 4288-
contribution, the insolvent principal and insolvent
must be filed on behalf of all other creditors entitled to be paid out of the pro-
ceeds of the fund, or property, sought to be thus administered in the Chancery
Court.
All persons having the legal title to the said fund or property must be made
defendants. 1, If the suit is brought to sell the lands of a decedent to pay debts,
his heirs and administrators should be made defendants and if the bill, also, ;
seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by the decedent, the fraudulent

vendee must be made a defendant. 2, If the suit be brought to wind up an
insolvent partnership or insolvent corporation, in case of a partnership all of
the partners, and in the case of a corporation, all of the officers and directors,
must be made defendants. 3, If the suit is brought to distribute a fund in the
hands of a trustee, he should be made a defendant, and if his official sureties are
sought to be charged, they, also, must be joined as defendants.
It must be remembered, however, that whenever one person sues on behalf of
himself and others, care must be taken that this person has a clear right in
himself; for, if he is not really entitled to sue, the suit cannot proceed, and
must be dismissed. In suits of this nature, inasmuch as the complainant acts
on his own motion, and at his own expense, he has the absolute control of the
suit, and can dismiss it at his pleasure, 33 at any time before a reference to the
master, or before the rights of others in the suit have vested in consequence of
some affirmative act on their part approving the suit, joining in it, or accepting
its benefits.
A suit by one in behalf of himself and others in the same right, will be
dismissed as to all if dismissed as to the one in whose name it is brought; 34
unless some one in the same right, who has become a party by petition to take
advantage of the bill, offers to continue the prosecution of the suit, and tenders
a proper prosecution bond to cover all costs accrued and to accrue. 35
§ 125. Parties to Suits to Recover Land, and to Remove Clouds. The Chan- —
cery Court now having jurisdiction to determine the legal title to land, in a suit
concerning the legal title only, the rule as to parties in similar suits at law will,
no doubt apply in Chancery. Hence, in suits to recover land in the Chancery
Court, on the strength of the complainant's legal title alone, no party having
an equitable interest is a necessary party. For this reason, a trustee, he having
the legal title, may sue alone to recover the land conveyed to him in trust, and
the beneficiaries are unnecessary parties. If, however, he should refuse to sue
in a proper case, the equitable owners may sue, using his name as complainant. 36
So a mortgagee may sue either the mortgagor or a stranger in order to recover
the land mortgaged but in the former case, he would probably be met by the
;
mortgagor's equities.
In suits to recover real estate, all who claim the property under the same
title should join as complainants, and those in adverse possession and all others
who claim adversely to the complainants, should be made defendants. Ordi-
narily, a mere claimant not in possession need not be sued when not exercising
any acts of ownership, btit if his claim constitutes a cloud on the title of the
complainant, he may be sued, even though not in possession, and not actually
exercising any visible acts of ownership. So, a remainder-man may maintain
a bill to remove a cloud from his title. 37 None but tenants in common, and
their privies in estate, can join in bringing an ejectment bill. Persons claiming
under conflicting titles cannot join in such a suit. 38 In a Court of law, a com-
plainant, in order to avoid the question of champerty, may join his grantor,
or his grantor's grantor, or both, or any other privy in estate, as co-plaintiff,
33 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 244- The complainant is domi- 36 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 17; 328; 520.
nus litis (master of the suit.) 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 648a. 37 Code, §3231; Langford v. Love, 3 Sneed, 308;
But see post, §§ 523-524. Wiley v. Bird, 24 Pick., 168.
34 Stamback v. Junk, 14 Pick., 306. 38 Slattery v. Lea, 11 Lea, 9.
35 Falls v. B. & L. Association, 21 Pick., 26.
with their consent, 39
but this cannot be done in Chancery, as it would make the
bill champertous on its face. 40
In an ejectment bill, the complainants will not all suffer defeat, if it appear
at the hearing that some of them have no title, or are barred, or estopped. 41
In such case, the bill will be dismissed only as to those who fail, and a decree
will be rendered in favor of those who make out their case. 42 This sort of suit
is both joint and several, and all the owners, if more than one, may sue, or any
one or more of them may sue and where less than all sue, it is not necessary
;
to the other tenants in common defendants. But if the bill seeks both to
make
recover the possession and clear up the title, and also to have the land sued
for partitioned, then all the tenants in common must join in the suit as com-
plainants, or, those not joining as complainants must be made defendants, 43 the
bill setting forth the rights of the latter, and praying the same relief for them
as is prayed for the complainant. 44 This is the better practice, as it removes
all grounds for any future litigation, and determines all matters of controversy
in one and the same suit. 45
In suits to recover land, the tenants of the defendant are not necessary par-
ties, but they are proper parties 46 and, if they are in actual possession and the
;
landlord is not, they are necessary parties. If there is any danger of a tenant
resisting the enforcement of a decree against his landlord, or if there is any
doubt about his being really a tenant, he should always be made a co-defendant
with the landlord.
Inasmuch as the wife has an interest in the homestead that Courts will en-
force, and especially Courts of Equity, it is often prudent to join the wife as co-
defendant with her husband, in any suit brought to recover land that would be
a homestead if the title, legal or equitable, were in the husband. So, in suits to
enforce all liens, except ven'dors' liens, it is the better practice to join the wife
as defendant with her husband, if any homestead rights are involved. 47
§ 126. —
Parties to Suits to Partition or Sell Lands. In suits for the partition
of land, or for its sale because incapable of advantageous partition, all the
tenants in common must be made parties. 48 If any of them are married women,
their husbands, also, must be made parties and if any are minors or of unsound
;
mind, their guardians, if they have any, must, also, be parties. In a bill for
partition, or for sale for partition, persons who have liens, encumbrances, life
estates, remainder interests, dower or homestead rights, or other claims on the
property, must be made parties: 49 they or any of them may join as complain-
ants, but if they do not consent so to do, they must be made defendants. The
object the law and the Court have in requiring all persons to be made parties
who have legal or equitable interests in lands to be sold, is to give a good title
to the purchaser, and thereby not only realize the largest possible price for the
property, but also prevent any further litigation over the title. The holder
of the legal title in a case of trust, and the contingent remainder-men, if any,
must be made parties. 50 Sales for partition, however, may be made without
reference to the encumbrances and subject thereto, in which case the rights of
the encumbrancers are not affected in any way by the sale. 51
Those desiring to have the land partitioned, or sold for partition, should all
join as complainants, making all the other parties interested, defendants. Ordi-
narily, minors and persons of unsound mind should be made defendants. "When
39 Code, § 3236; Augusta v. Vertrees, 4 Lea, 75. 47 Hawes on Parties, §§ 26; 27; 66; 69; 110; Wil-
40 Lenoir v. Mining Co., 4 Pick., 168. But see, liams V. Williams, 7 Bax., 116; Mash v. Russell, 1
Key v. Snow, 6 Pick., 663. Lea, 543.
41 Wade v. Johnson, 5 Hum., 117. 48 Code, §§ 3270-3271. The statute is only de-
42 Code, § 3246. claratory of the general rule of Chancery practice.
43 Code, § 3270. 49 Code, § 3309. See Chapter on Suits for Par-
44 Burks v. Burks, 7 Bax., 359. tition, post.
45 Leverton v. Waters, 7 Cold., 20; Carter v. Tay- 50 Glasscock V. Tate, 23 Pick., 486.
lor, 3Head, 30. 51 Code, § 3314.
46 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 262-263; Sto. Eq. PI. § 151.
52
a married woman
is non compos, she must be made a defendant. Minors, how-
ever, may be complainants. 53
A bill to sell the real or personal estate of a minor or married woman for
their education or maintenance, or for reinvestment, and not for partition, must
be filed by the husband of the married woman, and by the guardian of the
minor, the wife and the ward being, respectively, made defendants. In such
case the infant, if over fourteen years, and the married woman, must answer
the bill in person the married woman must be represented by next friend, and
:
the minor by a guardian ad litem, both to be appointed by the Court. The Court
will also appoint counsel for them, if they have none. 54
§ 127. Parties to Suits Affecting Equitable Property. In equitable prop- —
erty the legal title is generally in one person called a trustee, and the equitable
title, or beneficial interest, in another person called the beneficiary and, in all ;
suits in Chancery to reach such property, both the trustee, (or legal owner,)
and the beneficiary (or equitable owner,) must be made parties. The trustee '
can sue alone, generally, when it is necessary to protect the legal title but in ;
any suit affecting the equitable title, or the beneficial interest, he must join
the beneficiary with himself as a co-complainant, or must make him a defendant.
So, on the other hand, the beneficiary must always make the trustee a party in
any suit he may bring affecting such property. 55
A creditor who seeks to reach an equitable interest, or estate, or to enforce
a lien or equitable interest of his own, must make the owner of the legal title
a party, as well as the owner of the equitable interest. 56
52 Stephens v. Porter, 11 Heisk., 341. 984. The Code, § 3324, says the wife must be rep-
53 Burks v.Burks, 7 Bax., 353. It is far better resented by "next friend," meaning, of course, by
practice, however, to make them defendants, as the guardian ad litem.
Court can better guard their interests when they are 55 See, ante, § 91.
asking its protection. See, ante, § 101. 56 See, generally, as to this section. Jackson V.
54 See, Code, §§3324-3330; and Chapter on Suits Coffman, 2 Cates, 271; Railroad v. Todd, 11 Heisk.,
Relating to Persons under Disability, post, §§ 972- 556; 8 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 1116-1128; ante, § 91.
ARTICLE X.
PARTIES IN SUITS BY AND AGAINST THE STATE, COUNTIES, CITIES AND
CORPORATIONS.
128. Parties in Suits by and against the § Parties in Suits by and against Mu-
130.
State. nicipal Corporations.
129. Parties in Suits by and against Coun- § 131. Parties in Suits by and against Private
ties. Corporations.
§ 128. —
Parties in Suits by and against the State. No court of the State has
any jurisdiction of any suit against the State, or against any officer of
the State, acting by authority of the State, with a view to reach the State, its
treasury, funds or property and if any such suit should be brought it shall be
;
dismissed as to the State or such officers, on motion, plea or demurrer of the

law officer of the State, or counsel employed for the State. 1 Suits by the State
are instituted in her name, by her Attorney General, or by her District Attor-
ney, as occasion may require, without security for costs. If a suit is brought
by the State in the interest of any person the bill so states, such person being
named as relator. 2 Where any person has been aggrieved by the breach of any
bond executed to the State to secure the performance of official duty, he may
sue thereon for his use in the name of the State, on giving security for the
costs. 3
The State not responsible for any of the wrongs or defaults of her officers
is
or agents. 4 officers of the State may be sued when her property is not
But
sought to be reached; 5 and a county trustee may be enjoined from collecting a
State tax under a void process. 6
§ 129. —
Parties in Suits by and against Counties. Every county is a corpora-
tion, and the justices in the County Court assembled are the representatives
of the county, and authorized to act for it. 7 A county sues in its own name
as does any other corporation, and does not sue in the name of its justices. 8
Suits may be maintained against a county for any just claim, as against
other corporations, 9 and process is served on the presiding officer of the County
Court, who is authorized to employ counsel to defend such suits. 10 But a
county is not liable for the neglects of duty of its officers. 11
Suits for the use and benefit of a county against a delinquent officer, or his
sureties, are brought in the name of the State for the use of the county. 12
If the suit against a county seeks to prevent a county warrant being issued
or paid, the county trustee should be made a defendant along with the chair-
man or county jtidge.
130.
§ Parties in Suits by and against Municipal Corporations. Corpora- —
tions are of two kinds under our laws: 1, Municipal; and, 2, Private. Both
kinds are creatures of the Legislature, directly or indirectly, and neither sort
1 Act of 1873, ch. 13; Watson V. Bank, 3 Bax., 398 8 But if a suit should be instituted in the names
and 5 Bax., 1; Lynn V. Polk, 8 Lea, 121. of the justices, it would be regarded as the suit of
2 See, post, § 156, note. The relator must secure the county, the names of the justices being regarded
the costs. as surplusage. Ezzell v. Justices of Giles county,
3 Code, § 2797. See, also, Code, §§ 2231-2234. 3 Head, 586.
Ante, § 119. Code, § 403. Can a county be sued in a Court of
4 State v. E. & K. Railroad, 6 Lea, 362; State v. another county? See Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates,
Ward, 9 Heisk., 120; Memphis v, Kimbrough, 1? 432.
Heisk., 136. ' ii>Code, § 520.
5Insurance Co. v. Craig, 22 Pick., 621. 11 Wood V. Tipton, 7 Bax., 112.
6Alexander v. Henderson, 21 Pick., 431. 12 Code, § 461 (M. & V.) Acts of 1875, ch. 27.
7Code, § 402. The justices are to the County
what the directors are to a private corporation.
has any powers which the Legislature has not, directly or indirectly conferred,
and, in case of municipal corporations, may not take away. 13
Municipal corporations include all the cities, towns and taxing districts char-
tered under the laws of the State. They sue, and are sued, in their corporate
name; 14 and their power to sue, and their liability to be sued, are funda-
mental. 15 Their power to sue is coextensive with their rights, and their lia-
bility to be sued is coextensive with their duties. When sued, the subpoena
is served on the Mayor, or other head of the corporation; 16 and they cannot
be sued out of the county in which they are situated. 103,
§ 131. Parties to Suits by and against Private Corporations. A private cor- —
poration is a person in law, 17 and is sometimes called an artificial person to dis-
tinguish it from a natural person. Its charter and the general laws circumscribe
and define its rights, powers, duties and liabilities. A private corporation has a
legal name, and sues and is sued by such name'; 18 but, like a natural person,
it may have another name by which it is known, and if sued by such other
name the proceeding is valid. 19 A private corporation, like a natural person,
may sue any one indebted to it, or having its property in possession, or inter-
fering with its property, rights or duties and may be sued by any one to whom
;
it is liable ex contractu or ex delicto, in the same manner a natural person is sued,

and the subpcena is served ordinarily upon its chief officer, if he is within the
jurisdiction, and if not the statute makes other provision for service of process,
as hereafter fully shown. 20
13 Governor v. McEwen, 5 Hum., 279; McCallie v. 18 Maryville College V. Bartlett, 8 Bax., 232.
Chattanooga, 3 Head, 320; Memphis v. Water Co., 5 19 E. T. & Va. R. R. v. Evans, 6 Heisk., 609. The
Heisk., 522; O'Connor v. Memphis, 6 Lea, 731. defendant may in his answer call attention to the
14 See ante, §§ 89; 131. misnomer. See, post, § 385, sub-sec. 3. See Trus-
15 Mayor v. McKee, 2 Yerg., 167. tees v. Reman, 2 Swan, 99 ; Bank v. Burke, 1 Cold.
16 See, post, § 193. 625; Railroad v. Johnson, 8 Bax., 333.
loa Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432. 20 See, post, § 193.
it Code, § 50.
§132 ORIGINAL BILLS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 122
CHAPTER VIII.
ORIGINAL BILLS IN CHANCERY.

Article I. Original Bills Generally Considered.
Article II. Frame of an Original Bill.
Article III. Form of an Original Bill.
Article IV. Practical Suggestions as to the Drawing of Bills.
ARTICLE I.
ORIGINAL BILLS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
132. Suits in Chancery Contrasted with § 135. General Nature of a Bill.
Suits at Law. S 136. Different Kinds of Bills.
133. How a Suit in Chancery is Com- § 137. Original Bills.
menced. § 138. Bills not Original.
134. Necessity and Object of Pleadings.
§ 132. Suits in Chancery Contrasted with Actions at Law.

7
litigation in —A
the Chancery Court is properly termed a "suit,' while a contest in a Court of
law is properly denominated an "action." 1 The party who institutes a pro-
ceeding in a Court of law is ordinarily called plaintiff, while he who begins
'
'
'
'
a suit in a Court of Chancery is generally called "complainant." The person

' '
sued is called defendant, in each Court, unless he responds to a discovery in
' '
Chancery, in which case he is sometimes denominated "respondent." In a

Court of law an action is begun by filing a bond for costs and suing out a sum-
mons, but in a Court of Chancfiry a suit is commenced by filing a bill, the cost
bond not being essential to the beginning of a suit, as it is in the Circuit Court.
In a Court of law, the first pleading is a declaration filed at the return term,
couched in formal and technical phraseology, full of bombastic verbosity, and
teeming with blood-curdling descriptions of imaginary barbarities inflicted by
the wicked defendant, upon the innocent and outraged plaintiff; while in
Chancery, the bill is filed before the subpoena issues, and is ordinarily a plain
statement, in ordinary language, of complainant's rights in the premises, and
of their retention, or violation, or threatened violation, by the defendant. In-
deed, a bill would be correctly phrased which described the grounds of suit in
the manner and language which one unprofessional person would use in writing
about them to another; and such was the character and frame of bills in the
early history of the Court. 2
In an action at law, the evidence is mainly given by witnesses examined
orally in open Court; whereas, in a Chancery suit, the evidence is mainly con-
tained in depositions taken in vacation. In an action at law the issues of fact
raised by the pleadings are ordinarily decided by a jury under instructions by
the Judge, while in Chancery the issues of fact are ordinarily heard and de-
termined by the Chancellor. A
Court of law regards forms, rules, and prece-
1 Rap. & Law. L. Die, "Suit." See Code titles to The declaration in an action at common kw deals
chapters precedin" §2746; and Code, §§2754; 4312. in categorical statements and technical platitudes,
2 In Tennessee, and many other States, the declar- the bill in a suit in Chancery details the circum-
ation is now required to be in plain language. See stances of the case in narrative^ style. The declara-
_
forms in Code, § 2939. These forms are as different tion is a graven image, the bill is a living being.
from those in Chitty as laconism is from pleonasm.
123 ORIGINAL BILLS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. §133
dents, while a Court of Chancery regards the circumstances of the case, ignores
iorms, and prefers good reason and good conscience to rules and precedents.
In an action at law, the decision, is termed a "judgment," arid it either awards a
sum of money or the possession of property to the plaintiff, or taxes the plain-
tiff with the costs of the suit while the decision in a Chancery suit is called a
;
2a
'
decree,
' and it may not only award money or property to one or more of the
'
'
complainants, but may at the same time award money or property to one or
more of the defendants, or may require a party to do some particular act, or
may prohibit him from doing some particular act, and may tax any of the
parties with the costs, or may divide the costs among the parties. In an action
at law, all property to satisfy a judgment is sold by the Sheriff under an
execution, and he receives and pays over the money; but in a Chancery suit,
the sales of property, and especially real property, are usually made by the
Clerk and Master, and confirmed by the Chancellor, and the proceeds of the
sale are paid out by the Clerk and Master. In an action at law, an equitable
interest in property is not cognizable, and an equity cannot be levied on or sold
whereas, in Chancery, equitable interests are dealt with, and may be sold, or
transferred, or converted into a legal estate.
And the reliefs the two Courts grant are very dissimilar. Courts of law
have a distinct form of action to redress each wrong and assert each right;
whereas, in Chancery several wrpngs may be redressed and several rights as-
serted in one and the same suit. Thus, in the same suit the Chancery Court
may 1, stay waste 2, impound the proceeds of the waste 3, award damages
: ; ;
for the waste committed 4, adjudge the land to the complainant 5, give him
; ;
a decree for back rents, and 6, put him in possession of the property whereas, ;
a law Court would require four different actions, and an injunction in Chancery
besides, to accomplish the same results. In an action at law the plaintiff must
sue for either property or money in a suit in Chancery the complainant may
;
sue for both the property and its money value, in the alternative, and if he- fail
to get the property the Court will in a proper case, award a money equivalent.
In an action at law you get what the law allows, in a suit in Chancery you
get what is just and right, according to Equity and good conscience. The law
may be right, Equity is right itself. 3
§ 133. How a Suit in Chancery is Commenced. —A

suit in Chancery is com-
menced, 1, by bill or petition, addressed to the Chancellor of the Division in
which it is to be filed, and specifying the particular Court in which it is to be
filed; or 2, by motion in open court, where that mode of procedure is allowed
3a
by law.
1. By Bill, or Petition. A
bill is a complaint, in writing, addressed to the
Chancellor, containing the names of the parties complaining and complained of,
and their respective places of residence, and setting forth a clear and orderly
statement of the complainant's rights, and how and wherein those rights have
been denied, interfered with or violated, by the party complained of, and con-
cluding with a prayer for process to bring the latter party before the Court to
answer the complaint made, and a prayer for appropriate relief. 4
A
bill is sometimes called a petition, especially when filed to obtain; 1, a
divorce 2, dower 3, a partition of land 4, a sale of lands for partition 5, a
; ; ; ;
sale of lands to pay a decedent 's debts 6, the removal of a trustee 7, a man-
; ;
damus 8, a habeas corpus and 9, an inquisition of lunacy.

; ; petition, however, A
is ordinarily, a written statement made to the Chancellor during the progress
2a The word "judgment," (the act of a Judge,) is 4 Bouvier's Law Die, "Bill;" Sto. Eg. PI., §7;
a harsh word, and implies force, and has the signifi- Code, § 4314. This bill must be in the English lan-
cance of doom; whereas, the word "decree" simply guage. Bills in Chancery have always been in the
means discernment, a separation of the true from the English language. When the language of the law
false, according to reason and conscience, and a de- Courts in England was in Norman French and after-
cision in accordance therewith. wards in Eatin, the language of the Chancery Court
3 Mquitas lucet ipsa per se. (Equity shines by her was English. Sto. Eq. PI., § 7. This grew out of
own light.) the fact that the Chancery Court began as the Court
3a Code, § 4312. of the common people, whose language was English.
$134 ORIGINAL BIHS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 124
of a suit, in order to bring before the Court, or the Chancellor, some matter con-
nected with the suit affecting the petitioner's rights, and not otherwise suffi-
ciently appearing, or to obtain some relief in the cause not otherwise obtain-
able. 6
When commenced by petition, the petition must contain the names
a suit is
and residences of the parties, and a sufficient statement of the facts to show that
the petitioner is entitled to relief and must pray for process, 6 and for relief.
;
2. By Motion. Suits commenced by motion in the Chancery Court are con-

ducted in a summary way, without formal pleadings, the motion being entered
on the minutes of the Court. This entry is in the nature of a pleading, and
should contain sufficient facts to give the Court jurisdiction, and to authorize
the judgment.
As, however, all ordinary original suits in Chancery are commenced by bill,
the nature, substance and forms of bills, and the practice and pleadings conse-
quent on the filing of a bill, will first be considered; and suits commenced by
petition and by motion will be treated of hereafter.
The party who institutes the suit is generally termed the complainant, because
he complains of some wrong done him the party against whom the suit is in-
;
stituted is called the defendant, because he defends against the complaint made. 7
§ 134. —
Necessity and Object of Pleadings. In every system of jurispru-
dence, some forms of proceeding must be established to bring the matters in
controversy between parties before the tribunal by which they are to be adju-
dicated. 8 These forms of proceeding are devised in order that the litigants may
have a fair opportunity of presenting their respective sides of the controversy,
and to enable the Court to determine the questions in issue with accuracy and
dispatch. The written complaints made by the complainant, and the written
defences made "thereto by the defendant, are termed pleadings, 9 and to exhibit
the present system of Equity Pleading in Tennessee is one of the main purposes
of the present treatise. 10 Such portions of the old system of pleading as are ob-
solete will' be wholly omitted, and much of that which is unnecessary or unim-
portant mainly disregarded.
§ 135. General Nature of a Bill. —A
bill is a written statement of such mat-
ters as the. complainants desires to bring to the attention of the Court. These
matters must be such as are within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.
That jurisdiction generally extends to the final decision of the subject-matter
of the suit but sometimes it is only ancillary to the decision of a suit pending
;
in the same Court, or of a suit brought, or to be brought, in another Court;

sometimes it is merely of a precautionary or preventive nature, to ^vert a medi-
tated or threatened wrong and, sometimes, it is merely to require that the par-
;
5 Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 490. 10 Pleading may be denned to be the formal state-
6 Majors v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294. ment, in writing, of the matters on which a litigant
7 The term "complainant" is used in this book to relies to obtain, or to defeat, the relief sought: these
designate the party who institutes a suit; and the matters may be matters of fact, to be established by
term "defendant," to designate the party against proof; or matters of law, to be sustained by statute
whom a suit is brought. In the Code, the term, or precedent; Sto. Eq. PI., § 4, and note.
"complainant," is generally used: Code, §§4285; The pleadings in Equity were probably borrowed
4289-4292; 4313; 4323; 4332-4334; 4360-4361; 4366: from the civil law, or from the canon law, (which is
4372-4374; 4380; 4382; 4387; 4391-4393; 4400; 4403: a derivative from the civil law,) or from both._ The
4405-4409; ,4426; 4430; 4439; 4447; 4453: 4457; early Chancellors were, for the most part, if not
4464; 4489. The term, "complainant," is uniformly altogether, ecclesiastics, and many of them were bred
used in the Chancery Rules. This may be deemed up in the jurisprudence of the civil and canon law;
authoritative. The term "plaintiff" is, however, used and it was natural for them, in the administration
in the following sections of the Code, in lieu of com- of their judicial functions in the Court of Chancery,
plainant, §§4292; 4317; 4324; 4328: 4338; 4369: to transfer into that Court the modes of proceeding
4393; 4401; 4432; 4444; 4492; 4494. The party who with which they were most familiar. Hence, at
is sued, is uniformly termed "defendant," in the almost every step, we may now trace coincidences
Code, the term, "respondent," not being used. between the pleadings and practice in Chancery, and
8 Sto. Eq. PI., § 1. the pleadings and practice in a .Roman suit, and in
9 Equity pleading is a controversial science, based an ecclesiastical suit; Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 13-14.
on law and logic, and designed to so formulate the Story's Equity Pleadings, Daniel's Chancery Plead-
contentions of litigants as to best develop the issues ings and Practice, and Barbour's Chancery Practice,
of law and fact involved in the controversy, to the being recognized as standard authorities in Tennes-
end that the Court may be thereby adequately ena- see, have been largely followed in this work when
bled to apply the principles of Equity to their de- consistent with our statutes, and our system of plead-
termination. ing and practice.
125 ORIGINAL BILLS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. § 136
ties really interested in a controversy should be compelled to litigate their
rights, without peril or expense to a mere stakeholder having no interest
therein. The bill may either complain of some injury, which the party, exhibit-
ing it, suffers, and pray relief according to the injury or, without praying ;
relief, it may seek a discovery of matter necessary to support or defend another

suit or it may seek to preserve or perpetuate testimony or it may complain of
; ;
a threatened wrong or impending mischief, and, stating a probable ground of

possible injury, it may pray the assistance of the Court to enable the party ex-
hibiting the bill to protect or defend himself from such wrong or mischief
whenever, it shall be attempted or committed. Or it may relate to some
defect in a pending suit in the same Court, or may seek to introduce some new
or additional matter into a pending suit, or to obtain the benefit of, or change,
or reverse the proceedings in, a pending suit. 11
§ 136. —
Different Kinds of Bills. Bills in Chancery are of two general kinds
1, Original bills; and 2, Bills not original. Original bills are those which relate
to some matter not before litigated in the same Court, by the same persons,
standing in the same interest and making the same allegations. Bills not origi-
nal are those which relate to some matter already litigated in the same Court by
the same parties, or their privies, but which seek to make some addition to, or
to obtain some benefit from, the original bill, or to supply some defect in it.
There is another class of bills, which is of a mixed nature, and partakes of the
character of both of the others. Thus, for example, bills, brought for the pur-
pose of cross litigation, or .of controverting, or suspending, or reversing some
decree or order of the Court, or of obtaining the benefit of a former decree, or
of carrying it into execution, are not considered as strictly a continuance of the
former bills, but in the nature of original bills. And, if these bills require new
facts to be stated, or new parties to be brought before the Court, they are, so
far, strictly of the nature of supplemental bills. For all the objects of the pres-
ent work, this last class may be treated as included in that of bills not original. 12
§ 137. —
Original Bills. Original bills are divided into those which pray re-
lief, and those which do not pray relief. Original bills praying relief are sub-
divided into two kinds: 1, Bills praying the decree or order of the Court,
touching some right claimed by the party exhibiting the bill, in opposition to
some right, real or supposed, claimed by the party against whom the bill is
exhibited, or touching some wrong done in violation of the complainant's right.
This is the most common kind of bill. 2, Bills of interpleader, where the per-
son exhibiting the bill claims no right in opposition to the rights claimed by the
persons, against whom the bill is exhibited, but prays the decree of the Court,
touching the rights of those persons, for the safety of the person exhibiting the
bill. 13
Original bills, not praying relief, are also of two kinds: (1) Bills to perpetu-
ate the testimony of witnesses, or to examine witnesses de bene esse; and (2)
Bills of discovery, technically so called; that is to say, bills for discovery of
facts, resting within the knowledge of the party against whom they are exhib-
ited, or for the discovery of deeds, writings, or othei? things, in his custody or
power 14 and praying no relief on the merits.
;
§ 138. Bills not Original. — an addition to, or a

Bills not original are either
continuance of, or they are for the purpose of cross litigation,
an original bill ;
or of controverting, or suspending, or reversing some decree or order of the

Court, or of carrying it into execution. The former kind includes 1, supple- : A
mental bill, which is merely an addition to the original bill, to supply some de-
fect in its frame or structure. 2, A
bill of revivor, which is a continuance of the
original bill, to bring some new party before the Court, when, by death, or
uSto. Eq. PI., §§9; 20. I l3Sto. Eq. PI., § 18, 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 306.
12 Sto. Eq. PL, § 16. I
i* Sto. Eq. PI., § 19.
§ 138 ORIGINAL BILLS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 126
otherwise, the original party has become incapable of prosecuting or defending
the suit, and the suit is, as it is in Equity technically called, abated, that is, sus-
pended in its progress. 3, A
bill both of revivor and supplement, which con-
tinues a suit upon an abatement, and supplies defects which have arisen from
some event subsequent to the institution of the suit. 15
Bills, not original, for the purpose of cross-litigation, or of controverting, sus-
pending or reversing some decree or order of the Court, or carrying it into exe-
cution, are 1, : A
cross bill exhibited by the defendant in the original suit against
the complainant in that suit, touching some matter in litigation in the first bill
2, Abill of review which is brought to examine and reverse a decree made upon
a former bill, at a former term of the Court, and, for that reason, not subject
to a change on a rehearing 3, ; A
bill to impeach a decree upon the ground of
fraud 4, ; A
bill to suspend the operation of a decree in special circumstances, or
to avoid it on the ground of matter which has arisen subsequent to it 5, A bill
;
to carry a decree, made in a former suit, into execution 6, And lastly, a bill,
;
partaking of the qualities of some one or more of these bills, such as a bill in the
nature of a bill of revivor, or in the nature of a supplemental bill, or in the
nature of a bill of review, and others of a like character. 18
15 Sto. Eq. PL, § 20. |
10 Sto. Eq. PL, § 21.
127 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BILL 139
ARTICLE II.
FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BILL.
§ 139. An Original Bill generally Considered. § 147. Bill Must Set up Matters in Avoid-
§ 140. What Facts Must be Alleged in a Bill. ance, When.
§ 141. How Facts Must be Alleged in a Bill. § 148. Bill in Case of a Tender by the Com-
§ 142. Necessity for Fulness and Particu- plainant.
larity in Alleging the Facts. § 149. Bill Must Not be Multifarious, or Re-
§ 143. Complainants Must Show an Interest pugnant.
in the Subject-matter of the Suit. § ISO. Bill Must be Free from Scandal and
§ 144. Bill Must Show a Ground of Suit. Impertinence.
§ 145. Bill Must Show a Case within the Ju- § 151. Prayers for a Discovery, and for Pro-
risdiction of the Court. cess.
§ 146. Bill Must be Brought for the Whole § 152. Prayer for Relief.
Matter.
§ 139. An Original Bill generally Considered. An original bill is a written —

statement addressed to the Chancellor of the Court in which it is to be filed, set-
ting forth facts and circumstances, which, if true, show that the complainant is
entitled to the assistance of the Court in obtaining the relief he seeks against
the defendant, or defendants, and praying for such assistance and relief. 17 The
bill sets out the complainant's rights, shows wherein those rights have been in-
jured, denied or withheld, by the defendants, makes out a case within the
jurisdiction of the Court, and invokes the Court to exercise that jurisdic-
tion by requiring the persons complained of to do what in Equity and
good conscience they ought to do towards the complainant. Every bill must
show clearly, on its face, 1, that the complainant has a right to the particular
relief he seeks, or to some other relief 2, that he has this right as against the
;
defendants and 3, that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce this right. If the
;
bill is defective in either of these three essentials, the defendants may have it
dismissed. 18
Every bill should clearly set forth a state of facts showing, not only that the
complainant has a right to the relief he seeks, but that every defendant has
(1) a claim, interest, or title, in or to the subject-matter of the suit, or (2) is
in some way illegally interfering with, or withholding, complainant's rights or
property, or (3) owes the complainant a debt or duty cognizable in a Court of
Chancery. 19
§ 140. What Facts Must Be Alleged in a Bill. Every bill must contain a —
statement of facts showing that complainant is entitled (1) to equitable or legal
relief, (2) in the Court in which the bill is filed, and (3) against the defendant
charged. In the language of the Code, The bill should contain a clear and or-
'
'
derly statement of the facts on which the suit is founded, without prolixity or
17 Sto. Eq- PL, § 23. relief complainant is entitled to on such facts, is suf-
18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 314. ficient, although complainant's theory of the case is
19 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 325; Sto. Eq. PL, § 262. Noth- faulty. Peterson v. Turney, 2 Ch. Apps. 519; Dodd
ing is properly before the Court for its determination v. Benthal, 4 Heisk., 601. And although he gives
except what is submitted to it in the pleadings; and, his bill the wrong name. See §§ 43; 269; 431, note;
to entitle a complainant to a decree (1) his bill must 681; 719; 63, sub-sec, 4. The Court will adjudicate
present such a state of facts, as, if true, will give according to the allegations, and will regard the
him a right to the relief sought; and (2) the mate- misnomer as immaterial, and mere surplusage. See
rial facts alleged must be proved, unless admitted. sections and cases above cited, and Murphy V. John-
See, post, § 142. son, 23 Pick., 552.
A bill setting out the facts, and praying for the
§141 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BIU,. 128
repetition, and conclude with a prayer for the required process and appropriate
relief." 20 This statement of facts should contain everything necessary to en-
title the complainant to the relief he seeks, and should omit everything that is
immaterial or irrelevant. Nothing should be averred except what is necessary
to be proved, and nothing should be omitted which is essential to sustain the
case. The test of the sufficiency of the averments in a bill is "Would complain- :
ant be entitled to the special relief he prays, if all the averments should be
established by proof 1 And a test of the materiality of a particular averment is
Can the bill be fully sustained as to the special relief sought if the averment is
not proved?
Where, however, there is any doubt whether a particular averment is neces-
sary, the pleader should insert it; 21 and it must always be remembered, in
drawing a bill, that everything which is intended to be proved must be alleged,
and that nothing can be proved which is not alleged. No facts are properly
put in issue by the complainant unless charged in the bill; and, as a conse-
quence, no proof can be offered by the complainant as to any fact, however ma-
terial it may be to his case, unless such fact be stated in the bill, or unless the
defendant sets it up in the answer. The Court cannot notice matter, however
clearly proved, as to which there is no allegation or issue in the pleadings. A
fact, neither alleged in the bill nor stated in the answer, is, therefore, not in
issue, and cannot be considered by the Court, although essential to complain-
ant's success and fully proved. 22 Courts can notice neither allegations of mat-
ters not proven, nor proof of matters not alleged. 23
It is a general rule, that whatever is essential to the rights of the complainant,
and is necessarily within his knowledge, ought to be alleged positively and
with precision. On the other hand, the claims of the defendant may be stated
in general terms. And, if a matter, essential to the determination of the claims
of the complainant, is charged to rest in the knowledge of the defendant, or
must of necessity be within his knowledge, and is consequently the subject of a
part of the discovery sought by the bill, a precise allegation thereof is not re-
quired. 24 If, however, sufficient facts appear on the face of the bill to entitle
the complainant to some relief, relief will.be granted appropriate to the facts,
even though the bill be inartificial, the terms used untechnical, and the relief
prayed not specific. 25
§ 141. —
How Facts Must be Alleged in a Bill. The bill should state the com-
plainant's cause of action with accuracy and clearness, specifying the rights of
the complainant, the injury, or grievance, of which he complains, and the relief
which he asks of the Court. There must be such certainty in the averments of
the facts upon which the bill is founded, that the defendant may be distinctly
informed of the nature of the case which he is called upon to meet. The mate-
rial facts ought to be plainly, yet concisely alleged, and with all the essential
circumstances of time, place manner, and other incidents. If title deeds or other
instruments are referred to, they should not be set out in full but only the sub- ;
stance of such portions as are necessary to a right understanding of the real

matters of the bill. It is not a sufficient allegation of a fact in a bill to say that
one of the defendants alleges, and the complainant believes the statement to be
true for the defendant may allege that which is quite false, and the complain-
;
ant may believe it to be true but the fact should be positively alleged. 20
;
It is sometimes said that a bill in Chancery should be as certain and precise

as a declaration at law, but the proposition is not strictly correct, the same de-
20 Code, § 4314. 23 Turley v. Turley, 1 Pick., 260; Duluth, N. B.,
21 Surplusage does not vitiate; or, as the maxim v. Knoxville F. I. Co., 1 Pick., 87; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
states it, Utile per inutile non vitiatur. 326.
22 But, in such a case, on motion of complainant 24 Sto. Eq. PI., §255; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 321.
and the payment of such costs as the Court may im- 25 Dodd v. Benthal, 4 Heisk., 601.
pose, the bill may be so amended as to aver the es- 20 Sto. Eq. PI.. § 241.
sential matters omitted, or a supplemental bill may be
filed.
129 frame; of an original bill. 142
eisive and categorical certainty not being required in a bill. 27 Nevertheless, a
bill should set forth a distinct and clear cause of action entitling the complain-
ant to the relief he prays. 28 All allegations should be positive, and those made
on information and belief should be so stated. An allegation that "complain-
ant is informed" so and so, or that "complainant believes" so and so, or that
"complainant is informed and believes" so and so, is not sufficient; complain-
ant must go further and allege the facts, directly, saying that complainant is
'
'
informed and believes, and so charges, that" the fact is so and so. 29
But although a general charge is insufficient, yet it does not follow that the
complainant in his bill is bound to set forth all the minute facts. On the con-
trary, the general statement of a precise fact is often sufficient and the circum- ;
stances which go to confirm or establish it, need not be minutely charged; for
they more properly constitute matters of evidence than matters of allegation.
Where a bill, however, charges fraud, accident or mistake, or attacks a stated
or settled account, or seeks the reformation, rescission, or re-execution of a con-
tract, or attacks a judgment or decree, or prays an injunction or a receiver, it
should set forth the circumstances and particular facts on which the relief is
sought, and general charges of error or wrong-doing, or the use of general aver-
ment, is not sufficient, as will more fully appear in the next section. 30
§ 142. Necessity for Fulness and Particularity in Alleging the Facts. —
Every fact essential to the complainant's title to maintain the bill, and obtain
the relief, must be stated in the bill, otherwise the defect will be fatal. For no
facts are properly in issue unless charged in the bill; and of course no proofs
can generally be offered of facts not in the bill nor can relief be granted for
;
matters not charged, although they may be apparent from evidence for the ;
Court pronounces its decrees secundum allegata et probata. The reason of this
is, that the defendant may be apprised by the bill what the charges and allega-
tions are against which he is to prepare his defense. 31 If the rule were other-
wise, the defendant would not only not know what charges he would be re-
quired to meet, but the complainant, by thus failing to inform the defendant,
would be taking advantage of his own wrong. Besides, the Court has no juris-
diction of any matter not contained in the pleadings; and if the Chancellor
should assume to make an adjudication not justified by the pleadings, his decree
would be coram non judice, and void on the face of the proceedings; and this
would be so, even though the facts proved would have abundantly supported
the decree had there been pleadings justifying the proof.
In drawing bills, it must be kept in mind that there is a difference in the de-
grees of particularity required, between (1) bills praying ordinary relief ob-
tainable under the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court, and praying for ordi-
nary process, and (2) bills praying for extraordinary process, or charging
fraud, or assailing presumptions.
1. Where Relief Obtainable at Law is Prayed. In eases of concurrent jviris-
diction the allegations of the bill will resemble those in a declaration in the Cir-
cuit Court and all that is required is a direct averment of the main facts con-
;
stituting the cause of action, without any detail of circumstances or allegations

of particulars. 3ia Such bills need no verification.
2. Where an Injunction or a Receiver is Prayed Por. An injunction and re-
ceiver are extraordinary processes that issue before the suit is tried on its
merits, and often before the defendant is heard and, therefore, the Court re-
;
27 Ibid, notes; Cunningham -o. Wood, 4 Hum., Tenn. Ch., 400; Quinn v. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch., 71'
417; Walker v. Cottrell, 6 Bax., 271. Sto. Eq. PI., § 241-242; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 361, notes!
28 Merriman V. Lacefield, 4 Heisk, 217. 30 Solicitors in framing bills should keep in mind
29 Were the rule otherwise, a denial of the bill that "Equity proceeds upon circumstances,' 5 and that
would be only a denial that complainant was so "in- when equitable relief is sought the circumstances
formed," or so "believed" or "was so informed and should be set forth in the bill.
believed." Neither "information," nor "belief," nor 31 Sto. Eq. PI., §257; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 327; Mer-
both are sufficient grounds for coming into Chancery; riman v. Lacefield, 4 Heisk., 217.
there must be positive averment to put the machin- 3iaSee post, §§ 170; 1073, note 1.
ery of the Court in motion. Foster v. Bradford, 1
§142 FRAME OP AN ORIGINAL Blhh. 130
quires extraordinary particularity and fulness in the averments of the bill.

General allegations of wrong-doing, and formal charges of inequitable conduct,
are wholly insufficient. The particulars and circumstances must be set out, so
the Chancellor may see for himself that the doings complained of are wrong,
and the conduct charged is inequitable, for what may appear wrong or inequit-
able to the complainant, may not so appear to the Chancellor besides the Chan- ;
cellor prefers the facts and circumstances of the case to the opinion or conclu-
sions of the complainant. Counsel in drawing such bills should keep in mind that
such a bill is not only a pleading, but a special affidavit 32 as a pleading, formal ;
averments would be sufficient, no verification would be necessary, only a cost

bond required and only a subpoena to answer would issue. It is on the special
affidavit incorporated in the bill that the extraordinary process issues, if issued
at all. So the bill, in its two-fold nature should be full, precise, definite, direct
and circumstantial in its averments, and give a detailed statement of the main
facts on which the injunction or receiver is prayed; and its allegations should
be on the actual knowledge of the complainant, or if on information and belief,
should be verified by the informant. 33 The bill must aver that it is the first ap-
plication for the particular extraordinary process prayed for. 34
3. Where Fraud is Charged. What is said in the preceding paragraph about
particularity in averment applies fully to bills charging fraud. Fraud is gen-
erally established by proof of circumstances, and these circumstances are gen-
erally known to the complainant; so the Court requires the complainant to set
out these circumstances in his bill not only that the Court may know on what
grounds the charge of fraud is based, but, also, that the defendant may know
the precise facts he will have to meet in framing his answer, and making his
proof. A
general charge of fraud is nugatory, 35 for fraud is not so much a fact
as a conclusion deduced from facts and a bill charging fraud in general terms
;
as the ground of relief and setting forth no particulars showing the fraud, will
be dismissed on demurrer. 36
4. Where a Presumption is Assailed. When a presumption is attacked, the
proof to overcome the presumption must be exceptionally strong. So, a bill
assailing a presumption must be exceptionally strong in its averments, and pre-
cise in its particulars. A
general charge of error in a deed, mortgage, note, or
other written instrument, or in a stated or settled account, or in a judgment or
decree, is wholly nugatory, and a bill based on such a general charge, as a
ground of equitable relief, is demurrable. The bill should follow up the general
charge by setting out in detail the facts and circumstances constituting the
error, 37 and if any fraudulent or inequitable conduct in connection therewith
is charged upon the defendant, the circumstances thereof must be fully speci-
fied, as shown in the preceding paragraph. And, in general, a bill seeking to
undo what has been done, because of error or fraud, must specify the particu-
lars of the error or fraud complained of.
Extraordinary process includes preliminary injunctions, nc exeats, attach-
ments, receivers, publication notices, and appointments of guardians ad litem
for persons alleged to be under disability. In these cases the bill is both a plead-
ing and an affidavit; it is a pleading as to the ordinary process and ordinary
relief prayed for; it is an affidavit as to the extraordinary process prayed;
and, inasmuch as this process is sought ex parte, and before any sort of hearing,
so much of the bill as purports to give the grounds for this extraordinary action
32 See, post, §§838; 841; 1073, note 1; Furnace doff, 7 I-Ieisk., 167; Neil v. Smith, 1 Lea, 373; Eaht
Co. v. Railroad, 5 Cates, 711. r. Mining Co., 5 tea, 18; Reed F. Co. v. Thomas,
33 See, §§160-163; 788-789; 838; 841; Fur-
post, 13 Pick., 478, 483.
nace Co. v. Railroad, 5 Cates, 711. The complainant 3G Borches & Co. v. Arbuckle Bros., 3 Cates, 498.
may get an injunction without conforming to the 37 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 251-252; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 324;
requirements of the 'txet, but if so he will be more Eaht v. Mining Co., 5 Lea, 22; Neil v. Smith, 1 Lea,
lucky than deserving. See, Furnace Co. V. Railroad, 373. Or the facts and circumstances having been
5 Cates, 711; High on Injunc, §§34-35. fully set out, the general charge of fraud, accident,
34 Code, § 4435. or mistake, may then be made.
35 Gernt v. Cusack, 22 Pick., 141; Fort V. Orn-
131 Frame of an original bill. §143
should be full, precise, definite, direct, and particular, in its statements of the
facts, and should be based on actual knowledge, or on reliable information and ;
should, also, explicitly conform to all statutory requirements. All such bills
must be sworn to.
§ 143. Complainants Must Show an Interest in the Subject-matter of the
Suit. — The complainants must show that they have an interest in the matters
sought to be litigated and this interest must be a present, subsisting interest.
;
It is immaterial how small the interest of any of them may be in the subject-
matter of the suit, 38 if the interest be such that its adjudication will enable the
Court more completely to settle all the matters in controversy, so as to leave no
roots out of which future litigation might spring. The object of a suit in Chan-
cery is not merely to show that the defendant has been guilty of illegal or in-
equitable conduct, but to show, also, that the complainant has been injured
thereby. The complainant must, therefore, in his bill, show that he has such
an interest in the subject-matter of the suit as to entitle him to the aid of the
Court in the protection or enforcement of that interest. 39 And if there are more
than one complainant, they must all show themselves in some way interested
in the subject-matter of the suit. It is perfectly immaterial, however, how min-
ute this interest may be, or how distant the possibility of the possession of that
minute interest, if it is a present interest. A
mere possibility, or even proba-
bility, of a future title or interest will not be sufficient to sustain a bill the :
title or interest must be present, actual and existing. 40

§ 144^ Bill Must Show a Ground of Suit. —
Courts are devised for the relief
of persons (1) whose legal rights have been withheld or interfered with, or (2)
who have suffered actionable wrongs, or (3) who are seriously threatened with
irreparable injury. They were not instituted (1) to enable litigious people to
harass their neighbors with trivial suits nor (2) are they proper places for the
;
airing of supposed grievances, nor (3) the ventilation of supposed wrongs, nor
(4) even real misdoing when the complainant has not himself suffered, or is not
menaced with suffering, by reason of such wrongs or misdoing, or is himself in
the wrong. According to our Constitution, Courts are opened to remedy inju-
ries done to one's lands, goods, person or reputation, 41 and Courts' of Equity
sit to administer justice in matters of grave interest to the parties, and not to
gratify their passions or their curiosity, or their spirit of vexatious litigation. 42
No man has a right to set in motion the machinery of the Courts of Justice
unless he has a good cause of action; and this cause he must so set forth in his
bill, that the Court may see it. It is in vain that a complainant has a good
ground for relief, unless he properly sets it forth in his bill, and substantiates
it by proper proof.
It matters not how gross a fraud has been perpetrated, or what relations of
trust and confidence have been violated, or what the disability of wards, lega-
tees, distributees, or other persons, or what iniquitous wrongs have been done
by the defendant, or what violations of right and justice have been committed,
the Court will not sustain a bill setting them forth unless it appear therefrom
that the complainant is entitled to some relief against the wrong-doer who is
made a defendant for the Court will not go through the form of a suit merely
;
to enable the complainant to show forth the wrongs done by the defendant,
and the disabilities and injuries of the complainant, unless it appears, from the
facts stated in the bill, that the complainant will be entitled to some relief
against the defendant by reason of those facts being proved to be true.
The complainant must not only show that he has some interest in the subject-
38 Henderson V. Peck, 3 Hum., 250; Wilson v. to 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 314-317.
Davidson County, 3 Tenn. Ch., 536; Dechard v. Ed- 41 Const. Tenn. Art 1, § 17. The words "lands,
ward, 2 Sneed, 94. goods, person and reputation" include all property,
39 No party is authorized to ask the_ aid of a Court and all rights thereto or derived therefrom. For defi-
of Chancery, actively, without showing an interest nition of property, see ante, § 56.
in the matter litigated; Catron, Ch. J., in Thompson 42 St. Eq. PI., § 500.
v. Hill, 5 Yerg., 419.
§145 FRAME OP AN ORIGINAL BII,!,. 132
matter of the litigation, but that he has such a title to it as against the defend-
ant as gives him the right to sue the latter. Thus, a distributee has an interest
in the personality left by his intestate, yet he cannot sue for its recovery, nor
compel a debtor of his intestate to pay the debt to him, because there is no such
privity between the distributee and the intestate as will authorize the former
to sue a debtor of the latter. The personal representative is the only person
who can bring such suits, he only being the privy of the intestate, and entitled
to sue for his personality, or for the debts due him. 43 So, a person named as
executor has an interest in all the personal property of his testator; but until
he has probated the will, he has no right to sue for such property 44 for, until ;
he properly qualifies as executor, there is no privity between him and his

testator.
§ 145. Bill Must Show a Case Within the Jurisdiction of the Court. Not —
only must the complainant be interested in the subject-matter of the litigation,
and be clothed with such a character as entitles him to bring the suit, and the
defendant be liable to the relief sought against him, or be in some way inter-
ested in the suit, but it must also appear that the case stated in the bill is within
the jurisdiction of the Court. Prior to the Act of 1877, increasing the jurisdic-
tion of the Chancery Court, it was often a question of much nicety and per-
plexity whether the case presented by the bill was one of equitable or legal
cognizance but now it is generally not difficult to determine whether the Chan-
;
cery Court has jurisdiction of a given case. If the debt is of less value than
fifty dollars, 45 or is for an injury to person, property, or character, involving
unliquidated damages, 46 the Court has no jurisdiction; but of all other suits
it has jurisdiction,
47 provided they are brought in the proper county. The local
jurisdiction of the Court will be hereafter fully considered.

§ 146. Bill Must be Brought for the Whole Matter.—A bill must not only be
for a subject within the jurisdiction of the Court, but it must also be brought
for the whole subject. The Court will not permit a bill to be brought for part
of a matter only, so as to expose a defendant to be harassed by repeated litiga-
tions concerning the same thing. It, therefore, requires that every bill shall be
so framed as to afford ground for such a decision upon the whole, matter, at one
and the same time, as may, as far as possible, prevent any future litigation con-
cerning it. It is upon this principle that the Court acts, in requiring in every
case the presence, either as complainants or defendants, of all parties interested
in the object of the suit. And upon the same principle it will not allow a com-
plainant who has two claims upon the same defendant growing out of the same
transaction, to bring separate bills for each particular claim. 48 Courts of
Equity discourage the promotion of unreasonable litigation and, for the pur- ;
pose of preventing a multiplicity of suits, they will not permit a bill to be

brought for a part of a matter only, where the whole is the proper subject of
one suit. Thus, for example, they will not permit a party to bring a bill for a
part of one entire account but will compel him to unite the whole in one suit
;
for, otherwise, he might split it up into various suits, and promote the most
oppressive litigation. 49
When, however, it is laid down as a rule that the Court will not entertain a
suit for a part of a matter, it must be understood as subject to this limitation,
that the whole matter is capable of being immediately disposed of for, if the ;
situation of the matter in dispute is such that no immediate decision upon the
whole matter can be come to, the Court will frequently lend its assistance to the
extent which the actual state of the case, as it exists at the time of the filing of
the bill, will warrant. It is upon this same principle that the Court proceeds, in
43 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 323. matters less than fifty dollars in value, see, ante,.
44 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 318. §26.
45 Code, § 4281. 48 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 330.
46 Acts of 1877, ch. 97. 40 Sto. Eq. PI., § 287.
47 As to cases where the Court has jurisdiction of
133 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. §147
all that class of cases in which it acts as ancillary to the jurisdiction of other
Courts, by permitting suits for the preservation of property pending a litigation
in the common law Courts, or by removing the impediments to a fair litigation
before tribunals of ordinary jurisdiction. In all these cases, it is no ground of
objection to a bill that it embraces only part of the matter, and that the residue
is, or may be, the subject of litigation elsewhere. The preservation of the
property, or the removal of the impediments, is all that a Court of Equity can
effect. The bill, therefore, in seeking that description of relief, seeks the whole
relief which, in such cases, a Court of Equity can give but if a bill, praying;
only this description of relief, should disclose a case in which a Court of Equity
is capable of taking upon itself the whole decision of the question, in such a
case the bill would be defective in not seeking the relief to which the complain-
ant is entitled. 50
§ Bill Must Set up Matters in Avoidance When.
147. Under our former —
method of pleading in Chancery, if the defendant pleaded the statute of limita-
tions, the statute of frauds, payment, accord and satisfaction, an award, a
former judgment or decree, an account stated, a release, a novation or any other
matter in bar, the complainant could, in his replication, set up matters in avoid-
ance of such defense. If the facts in avoidance of such defence are not set forth,
the Code having abolished replications to answers, 51 the complainant has now
no way of avoiding such defense except by his bill. He, therefore, must dis-
close in his bill these matters of defense, and then set forth his facts in avoid-
ance of such defense. If the facts in avoidance of such defense are not set forth
by complainant in his bill, he will not be allowed to prove them, or, if proved,
the Court cannot consider them, because they are not alleged in the bill. 52
Thus, for instance, if a complainant would avoid a plea of the statute of limita-
tions, he must in his bill give the dates and facts which disclose the bar, and
then allege the fact which avoids the bar, such as disability of the complainant,
non-residence of the defendant, fraudulent concealment of the cause of action,
or a new promise within the statute, or such fact in avoidance, though proved,
will not be considered by the Court for the reason already given, and the bill
will be dismissed. 53 Matters thus set up by the complainant in avoidance of
some bar must be proved by him as alleged. 54
§ 148. Bill in Case of a Tender by the Complainant. —
When, on a bill to re-
deem, or on a bill in any other case where a tender is necessary, it is alleged that
a tender was made, the allegations should specify the date and amount of the
tender, and to whom and on what account made, and should aver a will ingness
and readiness on complainant's part to have paid what was tendered at any
time after such tender, down to the filing of the bill; and he should continue
and repeat such tender in his bill and the money, or thing, so tendered, should
;
be filed in Court along with the bill, or a sufficient excuse given for not so
doing. But if the defendant fail to demur to the bill, or to otherwise take
proper exception, because the money, or thing, so tendered, has not been duly
filed, he would be deemed to have waived such filing. 55 On a bill to redeem, a
tender is not necessary when the right of complainant to redeem is absolutely
denied by the defendant. 56
§ 149. Bill Must Not be Multifarious, or Repugnant. In endeavoring to —
avoid the error of making a bill not sufficiently particular to answer the purpose
of complete justice, care must be taken not to run into the opposite defect of
50 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 331. dress, 22 Pick., 109, citing § 336, [now § 331] of this
51 Code, §§4322; 4328; 4432. book.
52 Nothing can be proved that is not alleged. Jen- 54 Gross v. Disney, 11 Pick., 592; Sully v. Chil-
kins v. De War, 4 Cates, 684. See, post, § 455. But dress, 22 Pick., 109;' Jenkins v. De War, 4 Cates,
if complainant fail to allege his matter in avoidance 684. The party that alleges a material fact must
in his bill, he may do so in an amended bill, by leave prove it. See, post, § 444.
of the Court. Barton's Suit in Eq., 129. 55 Rogers v. Tindell, 15 Pick., 356.
53 Jenkins v. De War, 4 Cates, 684; Sully v. Chil- 56 Ibid.
§ 150 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. 134
attempting to embrace in it too many objects. The offence against this rule is
termed multifariousness.
1. Multifariousness is the improperly joining in one bill several matters of a
distinct and independent nature against several defendants. 57 Such a proceed-
ing would be oppressive, because it would tend to load each defendant with an
unnecessary burden of costs, by swelling the case with the statement and proof
of the several claims of the other defendants with which he has no connection.
Besides, the proofs applicable to each would be apt to be confounded with each
other, and great delays would be occasioned by waiting for the proofs of one of
the parties, when the others might be fully ready for hearing. 58
Abill is not to be treated as multifarious, however, because it joins two good
causes of complaint, growing out of the same transaction, where all the defend-
ants are interested in the same claim of right, and where the relief asked for
in relation to each is of the same general character. Neither will a bill be
deemed multifarious where it states a right to an account from A, and B, against
whom it has one remedy which it seeks to enforce, and also claims a lien against
A, for what is due, and seeks that separate remedy against him, for the plaintiff
may well in such a bill entitle himself to each. Indeed the objection of multi-
fariousness, and the circumstances under which it will be allowed to prevail,
or not, is, in many cases, a matter of discretion, and no general rule can be laid
down on the subject. 59
not the number of the parties, nor the intricacy of the claims on the one
It is
side or the other, that renders a bill multifarious it is their disconnection or in-
;
consistency, or the practical inconvenience of considering them together in one

suit. Whenever a series of transactions have a common root or origin, and are
so connected that it is impossible to tell, in advance of the hearing, what bear-
ing one of these transactions may have upon another, or how the respective par-
ties may be charged in reference to each other, embracing them all in one bill
would not make it multifarious. 60 If the interest and liability of the defend-
ants, though separate, flow from the same fountain, or radiate from the same
center, or have a common connecting link, the joinder of such defendants and
matters in the same suit is admissible. 61 The uniting in one bill of several mat-
ters of equity distinct and unconnected, against a sole defendant, is not multi-
fariousness. 62 Bills are not objected to on the ground of multifariousness as
much as formerly, because, if a demurrer for multifariousness is sustained, the
Court may authorize amendments by directing separate bills to be filed, without
new process as to the parties before the Court. 63
2. Repugnancy consists in setting out in the bill two or more causes of action,
or two or more grounds for maintaining the same suit, which are inconsistent
or contradictory, and tend to nullify each other. 64 Alternative grounds of
relief may be set up, and alternative relief prayed, but such grounds or relief
must not be antagonistic or contradictory.
§ 150. Bill Must be Free from Scandal and Impertinence. Care must be —
taken not to overload bills by superfluous allegations, and redundant and un-
necessary statements, or by scandalous and impertinent matter for, if any bill ;
be found such, upon due reference to, and report of, a Master, the complainant
57 Swepson v. Bank, 9 Lea, 713. will be greatly burdened by the consequent volume
58 Sto. Eq. PL, § 271. For the tests of multifari- of proof, and greatly perplexed by the confusion in-
ousness, see Chapter on Demurrers, post, § 284. cident to the complications arising from the incon-
59 Sto. Eq. PI. § 284; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. 334, note; gruous aggregation, he will adjudge the bin to be
Bartee v. Tompkins, 4 Sneed, 636. Chancellors multifarious: if he is willing to wrestle with the
dread a complicated litigation. They yearn to have complex problems presented, he will sustain the bill.
all suits present clear-cut, well-defined issues; and Hence, the question, whether a bill is multifarious
they abhor the confusion and complexity that result or not, often depends on the willingness of the
from the attempt to join disconnected matters in one Chancellor to determine the various matters of con-
suit. This same abhorrence of duplicity exists at the troversy in one suit.
common law. All Courts seek to have as few is- 60 Bartee v Tompkins, 4 Sneed, 636.
sues of fact in a lawsuit as possible. The greater 61 Tohnson V. Brown, 2 Hum., 327.
the number of issues, the greater the difficulty in 62 Code, §4327; Doherty v. Stevenson, 1 Tenn.
reaching satisfactory conclusions, and in doing exact Ch., 518.
justice. If a Chancellor is of opinion that the mat- 63 Code, § 4326.
ters alleged in the bill are so disconnected that he 64 Bynum v. Ewart, 6 Pick., 655.
135 FRAM£ OP AN ORIGINAL BILL. §150
and his counsel 05 will
be liable to pay costs. Impertinence is the introduction
of any matters into a bill, answer, or other pleading or proceeding in a suit,
which are not properly before the Court for decision at any particular stage of
the suit. One of the Ordinances of the Court of Chancery, constituting a funda-
mental rule of the Court, is aimed against this transgression of the good sense,
as well as the good taste, of Equity pleadings. It declares, "That counsel are
to take care that bills, answers, and other pleadings, be not stuffed with repeti-
tions of deeds, writings, or records, in here verba; but that the effect and sub-
stance of so much of them only as is pertinent and material, be set down, and
that in brief terms, without long and needless traverses of points, not traversa-
ble, tautologies, multiplication of words, or other impertinences, occasioning
needless prolixity; to the end that the ancient brevity and succinctness in bills
and other pleadings may be restored and observed. Much less may any counsel
insert therein matter merely criminous or scandalous, under the penalty of good
costs to be laid on such counsel." 66
Scandal consists in the allegation of anything, either in a bill, answer, or any
other pleading, which is unbecoming the dignity of the Court to hear, or is con-
trary to good manners, or which charges some person with a crime not neces-
sary to be shown in the cause to which may be added that any unnecessary alle-
;
gation bearing cruelly upon the moral character of an individual is also scan-
dalous. There are many cases, however, in which, though the words in the rec-
ord are very scandalous, and highly reflect upon the party, yet if they are
material to the matter in dispute, they will not be considered as scandalous for ;
a man may be stated on the record to be guilty of a very notorious fraud, or a

A'ery scandalous action, and yet, perhaps, without having an answer to this very
matter, the party may lose his right. The Court, therefore, always judges
whether, though matter be prima facie scandalous, it is or is not of absolute ne-
cessity to state it and, if it materially tends to the point in question, and is a
;
necessary part of the cause, and material to the case of either party, the Court
never looks upon this to be scandalous. Were it otherwise, it would be laying
down a rule that all charges of fraud are scandalous. 67
However, in cases of mere impertinence, the Court will not, because there are
here and there a few unnecessary words, treat them as impertinent for the rule ;
is designed to prevent oppression, and is not to be so construed as to become

itself oppressive. Nor will the Court in cases of alleged impertinence, order the
matter alleged to be impertinent to be struck out, unless in cases where the im-
pertinence is very fully and clearly made out; for, if it is erroneously struck
out, the error is irremediable but if it is not struck out, the Court may set the
;
matter right in point of costs. 68

It was to prevent these glaring faults of scandal and impertinence, alike mis-
chievous and oppressive, (which might make the records of the Courts the vehi-
cles of slander,) that the Courts of Equity, at a very early period, required all
bills to have the signature of counsel affixed to them; and if no such signature,
appears, or the signature is not genuine, the bill will be dismissed, or ordered to
be taken off the files of the Court. If either scandal or impertinence exist in a
bill, it may be objected to by the defendant in the first stages of the cause, upon
a motion to refer it to the Master, to inquire into the foundation of the objec-
tion. But nothing which is positively relevant to the merits of the cause, how-
ever harsh or gross the charge may be, can be correctly treated as scandalous.
Thus, for example, in bills to set aside deeds, or other instruments, for fraud,
65 The counsel who drew, or signed, the bill, should nent to the cause can be scandalous, and the majus
pay such costs; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 347; Sto. Eq. PL, § or minus of the relevancy is not material Gleaves v.
;
47; Litton v. Armstead, 9 Bax., 514. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 596.

06 Sto. Eq. PI., § 266. As to scandal and imperti- 68 Sto. Eq. PL, § 267; Gleaves V. Morrow, 2 Tenn.
nence in bills, answers and other pleadings, see Ch., 595. The best test of impertinence is, whether
Johnson v.Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch., 244; Jones v. the matter alleged to be impertinent would be proper
Spencer, 2 Tenn. Ch., 776. to be proved as evidence; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 340, note;
07 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 347-348. Nothing that is perti Mrzena v. Brucker, 3 Tenn., Ch., 161.
§151 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. 136
there are often to be found gross charges in relation to the matter of the as-
serted fraud. But these charges are not, by any rule of the Court, to be deemed
scandalous. And indeed, such a proceeding might be dangerous to the cause
itself, and prevent a due investigation of its merits. Hence it is, that nothing
pertinent to the cause is ever deemed scandalous, and the degree of the rele-
vancy is not deemed material. 69
It is obvious that a bill may contain matter which is impertinent, without the
matter being scandalous; but if, in a technical sense, it is scandalous, it must
be impertinent. According to the ordinary practice of the Court, a bill cannot
be referred for impertinence after the defendant has answered, or has submitted
to answer. But it may be referred for scandal at any time and, even, by leave ;
of the Court, upon the application of a stranger to the suit. The reason of the
difference seems to be, that mere impertinence is not in itself prejudicial to any
one; it is but a naked superfluity. But scandal is calculated to do great and
permanent injury to all persons whom it affects, by making the records of the
Court the means of perpetuating libellous and malignant slanders; and the
Court, in aid of the public morals, is bound to interfere to suppress such inde-
cencies, which may stain the reputation and wound the feelings of the parties,
their friends and relatives. 70 A
Court of Chancery is not a register for detrac-
tion. 71
§ 151. —
Prayers for a Discovery, and for Process. Formerly, the interroga-
tory part of a bill was one of its main and most distinguishing features, 72 but
now that all parties are competent witnesses, and the Code allows the complain-
ant to waive the defendant's answer under oath, a discovery is very seldom
sought.
1. Prayer for Discovery. In the part of the bill, usually called the interroga-
tory part, the complainant calls on the defendant to make full, true, direct and
perfect answer, upon his corporal oath, to the best of his knowledge, remem-
brance, information, and belief, to all and singular the matters and charges set
forth in the bill, as fully as though particularly interrogated in reference there-
unto. The bill, also, when seeking a discovery, specially calls on the defendant
to answer certain specific matters, and, sometimes, appends to, or incorporates
in, the bill searching interrogatories to probe the knowledge, exhaust the mem-
ory, and sift the conscience of the defendant, to the uttermost. In this part of
the bill the defendant is also called on to file accounts, statements, deeds, books,
writings, and other documents, to be used as evidence by the complainant.
A defendant, however, cannot be compelled to discover when his oath to his
answer is waived nor can he be compelled to answer an interrogatory which
;
is not based on some antecedent matter stated or charged in the bill nor is he ;
bound to criminate himself, or violate professional confidence, in his answer. 73

Defendants now, however, being competent witnesses in Court, and their oath
to their answers being now generally waived, discoveries are seldom called for
in bills, it being more satisfactory to take the deposition of the defendants, or to
obtain their evidence by cross-examination.
69 Sto. Eq. PI., § 269. pruning hand of the Master must be set to work in
70 Sto. Eq. PL, §270; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 351. this Court, or in the Court below. Below it should
71 Campbell v. Taul, 3 Yerg., 564. In this case, be done, and the authority of the Court exercised to
Chief Justice Catron, in delivering the opinion of suppress such libelous matter, so that it might not go
the Court, said; "If the Courts of Chancery so far down to future ages, wantonly to disgrace the party
forget their duty, or shrink from it, as to permit and his descendants. Furthermore, our records pre-
every irrelevant slander, or truth, if you please, to sent piles of impertinent matter, taking up much of
be proved, and harrow up every misdeed of a man's the time of the Court in the mere reading, and when
life who comes, or is brought into, the Courts, not read, so confused and overwhelming, that generally
permitting the dead to escape, or the wife, the pas- not the least difficulty is to find what is pertinent,
sions of parties seeking gratification will soon make and greatly obscuring it when found." Scandal in
them the sinks of registered infamy, and their rec- oral evidence in a Court of law, like a circle in the
ords a black-book and a nuisance. From such tri- water, spreads into ultimate nothingness; but scandal
bunals, every man, and especially every woman, who in pleadings and depositions are perpetual memorials.
has erred, and few have not, will shrink with horror, Vox emissa volat, litera scripta manet. See, also,
and most justly. Justice herself_ will be driven out Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch., 247.
of them, and none apply for relief but such as are 7= Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 35-38; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 374.
above and beneath detraction. It must not he. The 73 See Chapter on Bills of Discovery, post, § 1116.
137 FRAME OF AN ORIGINAL BIL,L. §152
The other prayers of a bill are for process and relief. In the old form, the
prayer for process came last, but in Tennessee it precedes the prayer for relief. 74
'
2. Prayer for Process. The Code says the bill should conclude with a prayer '
for the required process, and appropriate relief." It is probable that where the
defendants are named as such in the commencement of the bill, and the charac-
'
ter of the process is manifest from the averments of the bill, a prayer for the '
required process would not be indispensable, especially if there be a prayer for

'
'
be made parties by proper process, or even a prayer that

'
relief and that they
'
' '
they "be made parties," or "be required to answer." 75 Nevertheless, no risks

of this sort should ever be incurred, and the bill should always pray for subpoe-
na as to the resident defendants, and publication as to non-resident defend-
ants. 76
If any extraordinary process is sought, such as an injunction, or an attach-
ment, it must be specially prayed for, otherwise it cannot be had 77 and in such ;
case the bill must state that it is the first application for such process. If a re-
ceiver is desired before answer, th,ere should be a specific prayer to that effect
in the bill; however, such a prayer is not indispensable, as a receiver may
be appointed, on motion, at any time during the progress of a cause, on a proper
case made out. 78
§ 152. —
Prayer for Relief. The prayer for relief is generally two-fold, first
for particular relief, and second for general relief. The complainant should
iirst pray specially for that particular relief appropriate to his case, and then
should pray for general relief. But a prayer for some sort of relief, special or
general, seems essential, except in attachment bills, 79 and in bills to obtain evi-
dence. 80 The Code seems to contemplate that "appropriate relief" should be
prayed, 81 from which it might be inferred that a prayer for general relief was
not sufficient: the Code provision, however, is rather commendatory than corn-
mandatory.
Complainant should pray for the precise relief he desires consistent with the
facts alleged in his bill and, as he cannot foresee the result of his suit, he may
;
pray specifically in the alternative, always, however, conforming his prayers to

the case made out by him in the bill. 82 But when his prayer is in the alterna-
tive, its parts must not be antagonistic. 83 Oftentimes a bill has a double as-
pect in such cases an alternative prayer adapted to each aspect "becomes nec-
;
essary. 84 A bill may pray alternately for damages if its primary prayer for
equitable relief be not granted, in cases where damages are allowable, as in
suits for rescission, specific performance and injunction. 85 No part of a bill is
so difficult to draw as the prayer for relief. Ordinarily, the prayer is the nec-
essary legal deduction from the facts alleged, and it requires a comprehensive
intellectual grasp of the whole case to properly formulate the specific reliefs
to which the complainant may be entitled. It should, however, be kept in mind,
that under the prayer for general relief, a complainant cannot obtain a specific
relief inconsistent with that particularly prayed for. 86 But, while praying for
specific relief, the details of the particular relief sought need not be enumerated.
The prayer for general relief should never be omitted, 87 as under it a com-
74 See Code, § 4314. 81 Code, § 4314.
75 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 37-38. See Code, § 4339. No 82 Collins V. Knight, 3 Tenn. Ch., 183.
prayer for process is necessary if the parties in in- 83 Sto. Eq. PL, §42, note.
terest actually appear and make defence. Majors V. 84 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 384-385. Tenn. Ice Co. v.
McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294, 300. No set form of words Paine, 23 Pick., 151, citing § 183 [now § 152] of this
is necessary in a prayer for process. The forms of book.
bills hereafter given will show the appropriate phrase- 85 Hill V. Harriman, 11 Pick., 300.
ology. 86 James v. Kennedy, 10 Heisk., 607. The reason
_
76 Sto. Eq. PI., § 44, 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 390. for this rule is that, if_it were otherwise, it would
77 Sto. Eq. PL, §§41; 43; 1 Dart. Ch. Pr., 388. enable a complainant to take a defendant by surprise.
78 Henshaw v. Wells, 9 Hum., 562; see Chapter ou 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 378; Allum v. Stockbridge, 8 Bax.,
Receivers,**?.??, § 904. 356.
7fl Sto. Eq. PL, §40; Eaton v. Breathett, 8 Hum., 87 It has been a current saying at the Chancery
534. bar, for 150 years, that the prayer for general relief
SO Such as (1) bills to perpetuate testimony, (2) was the next best to the Lord's Prayer. Sto. Eq.
bills to examine witnesses, de bene esse, and (3) bills PI., § 41, note. A prayer for "further and other re-
to obtain a discovery. lief" or for "further relief," is what is meant by a
§152 frame; of an original, bill. 138
plainant is entitled to any relief not specifically prayed for, appropriate to the
pleadings and proof, and not inconsistent with the special prayer. 88 It is said
that if there be no prayer for general relief, and complainant is not entitled to
the particular relief prayed, his suit must fail, unless an amendment of his
prayer is allowed 86 but, where the case made out will justify an amendment, it
;
will generally be allowed, on terms.

But, under a prayer for general relief, a divorce will not be granted 90 a par- ;
tition, or sale for partition, will not be decreed, the bill being for neither 91 nor ;
will land be sold in bar of redemption. 92

prayer for "general relief." A prayer for "general 88 1 pan. Ch. Pr., 377-383, notes; Arnold u. Moy-
relief" would be deemed equivalent to a prayer for ers, 1 Lea, 315.
"further and other relief," and this short form is 89 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 378, note.
often used. 90 Pillow v. Pillow, 5 Yerg., 421.
The omission to pray for specific relief is a matter 91 Ross v. Ramsay, 3 Head, 16.
of form, and defendant may, on leave, amend his 92 Thruston v. Belote, 12 Heisk., 249; Merrill v.
prayer at the hearing. Quinn V. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch., Elam, 4 Bax., 235.
67. Or the specific relief may be prayed orally at
the hearing.
139 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. § 153
ARTICLE III.
FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL.
§ 153. Old Form of an Original Bill. 159. Forms of the Prayers for Relief.
§ 154. Present Form
of an Original Bill. 160. Signing of a Bill.
§ 155. Form of the Address of a Bill. 161. Verification of a Bill.
§ 156. Form of the Commencement of a Bill. 162. Manner of Verifying Bills.
§ 157. Form of the Premises, or Statement of 163. Before Whom Bills Must be Verified.
the Facts. 164. Formal Parts of Bills.
§ 158. Forms of the Prayers for Process.
§ 153. —
Old Form of an Original Bill. What should enter into the substance
of a bill has already been considered, and its frame has. also been generally de-
scribed. 1 The particulars entering into the form of a bill remain to be con-
sidered.
Bills in Chancery were formerly longer and more technical than at present;
and contained nine formal parts 1, The direction or address, indicating the
:
Court in which it was to be filed 2, The introduction, containing the names, de-
;
scription and residence of the complainants, and the character in which they
sued 3, The premises or stating part, which detailed the facts and circumstances
;
of the complainant's case, stating the wrongs complained of, and by whom
done; 4, The confederating part, which alleged a combination between the de-
fendants and others unknown, against the complainants in order to injure and
oppress them; 5, The charging part, which set up the defendants' excuses and
the complainants' answer to them; 6, The jurisdiction clause, being a general
averment that the acts of the defendants were contrary to Equity, and that
complainants have no adequate remedy at law 7, The interrogatory part, which ;
called on the defendants to answer not only the allegations of the bill, but vari-
ous interrogatories, also, according to the best of their knowledge, remem-
brance, information and belief 8, The prayer for relief, ordinarily both special
;
and general and 9, The prayer for process to compel the defendants to appear,
;
and answer the bill, and abide the Court's decree. 2

An examination of one of these old bills will show a vast amount of matter
wholly unnecessary, and a needless prolixity in the statement of what was nec-
essary. Originally, however, bills in Chancery were plain, untechnical state-
ments of the matters complained of, 3 such as an ordinary man of business would
now write to his lawyer. The modern tendency is toward a plain, clear, and
orderly, statement of the facts, omitting everything not material, and avoiding
prolixity, and useless formalities.* The following is an
OLD FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL IN CHANCERY.
[1. The Direction, or Address.]
To the Honorable Seth J. W. Luckey, Chancellor, &c, holding the Chancery Court at Rogers-
ville, for the District composed of the Counties of Hawkins, Hancock, Claiborne, &c.
[2. The Introduction.]
Humbly complaining show unto your Honor your orator, John Doe, and your oratrix,
Jane Doe, both residents of Hawkins County,
[3. The Premises, or Stating Part.]
That Henry Doe, formerly a resident of Hawkins county, died intestate in
their father,
said county on July 15, 1840, and Richard Roe and Robert Roe were duly appointed and
lAnte, S§ 139-152. I 3 Bart. Suit in Eq., 39.

2 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 26-45. ! 4 Code, § 4314.
§153 FORM 03? AN ORIGINAL BILL. 140
qualified as his administrators, and at once entered upon the discharge of their duties as
such. The said Richard Roe resides in Hancock county, and the said Robert Roe in Hawkins
county. [The bill sets out that the estate of Henry Doe, deceased, was more than sufficient
to pay all of his liabilities, that the orator and oratrix are the only distributees, and that three
years have elapsed since the grant of administration, but the respondents have made no set-
tlement with the Clerk of the County Court.]
And your orator and oratrix further show unto your Honor that they have called upon
the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe to make settlement and pay over to them their respec-
tive shares of their said father's personal estate, but so it is, may it please your Honor, the
said Richard Roe and Robert Roe have failed to make any settlement, or to render to your
orator and oratrix any statement or account of their actings and doings as administrators
aforesaid, to the very great damage, injury and loss of your orator and oratrix.
And your orator and oratrix further show and charge that said Richard Roe and Robert
Roe, have, or should have, in their hands as administrators aforesaid, the sum of, at least,
three thousand dollars for distribution to your orator and oratrix as distributees of their said
father's estate ; and your orator and oratrix well hoped that the said Richard Roe and Robert
Roe would have paid the same over to them as in conscience and equity they ought to have
done.
[4. The Confederating Part.]
But now so it is, may it please your Honor, that the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe,
administrators as aforesaid^ combining and confederating together to and with divers other
persons at present unto your orator and oratrix unknown, whose names when discovered
your orator and oratrix pray may be herein inserted, and they made parties respondent hereto,
with proper and apt words to charge them, and contriving how to injure and oppress your
orator and oratrix in the premises, the said confederates sometimes pretend that said Richard
Roe and Robert Roe never were administrators of the father of your orator and oratrix, at
other times they pretend that the father of your orator and oratrix did not die intestate, but
left a will, and at still other times pretend and claim that his personal estate was very small,,
and that all of it has long ago been applied and consumed in paying lawful claims against
said estate; and at the same time said confederates do respectively refuse to set forth and
discover what said personal estate consisted of, or the items and particulars and value thereof,
and how much thereof they have so applied, and to whom and for what paid, and what has
become thereof particularly.
[5. The Charging Part.]
Whereas, your orator and oratrix expressly charge the truth to be that said Henry Doe died
possessed of personal estate of value sufficient to pay all his just debts and funeral expenses,
and leave at least three thousand dollars for distribution to your orator and oratrix as afore-
said, and that said Richard Roe and Robert Roe were duly appointed and qualified as his
administrators and took charge of his personal estate as aforesaid, and that he left no will,
all of which the said confederates at other times confess and admit.
All of which actings and doings, neglects and pretences, and other conduct on the part of
said Richard Roe and Robert Roe and their said confederates, are contrary to equity and
good conscience, and tend to the manifest wrong, injury and oppression of your orator and
oratrix in the premises.
[6. The Jurisdiction Clause.]
In tender consideration whereof, and forasmuch as your orator and oratrix are remediless
in the premises at and by the direct and strict rules of the common la\v, and cannot have
adequate relief save only in a Court of Equity where matters of this and a similar nature
are properly cognizable and relievable.
[7. The Interrogating Part.]
To the end, therefore, that the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, and their said confed-
erates when discovered, may upon their several and respective corporal oaths, full, true,
direct and perfect answers make to the best of their respective knowledge, information and
belief, to all and singular the matters and things hereinbefore stated and charged, as fully
and particularly in every respect as if the same were here again repeated, and they 'thereunto
particularly and distinctly interrogated and that not only to the best of their respective
;
knowledge and remembrance, but also to the best of their several and respective infor-
mation, hearsay and belief, answer and set forth a full, true, fair and accurate account of
each and every item of property, including goods and chattels, money, accounts, notes of
hand, bills single, bills of exchange, mortgages, or other evidences of debt, by them, or either
of them received as administrators as aforesaid; and further that they set forth and discover
on their several and respective oaths as aforesaid, and to the best of their respective know-
ledge, information, remembrance, hearsay and belief, an account, item by item, and date by
date, of each and every payment and disbursement made by them or either of them, and to
whom, and for what, on account of said administratorship.
And your orator and oratrix further show, set forth and charge, that said Richard Roe
and Robert Roe have pending a bill in your Honor's Court against one John Dew to fore-
close a mortgage by said John Dew, executed to the father of your orator and oratrix, for
141 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. §154
one thousand dollars, and that said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, have removed all of their
visible wealth to the State of Kentucky, and are intending speedily to remove thither, and
that should they be permitted to leave the State, especially after collecting said mortgage
debt, their own debt against them by reason of the premises would be greatly endangered, if
not wholly lost.
[8. The Prayer for Relief.]
And that the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe may set forth each, every and all of the
accounts and items whereunto they and each of them have hereinbefore been specially inter-
rogated ;
And that your Honor order an account to be taken and stated, showing what property and
moneys the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, or either of them, received, and should by due
diligence have received, as administrators as aforesaid, and that they be required to pay
your orator and oratrix such balance as your Honor may deem them liable for by reason of
the premises.
And that your orator and oratrix may have such further, or such other relief as the
nature of their case shall require, and as shall be agreeable to equity.
[9. Prayers for Process.]
May please your Honor to grant unto your orator and oratrix the State's writ of ne
it
exeat republica, staying the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, and each of them, from de-
parting into parts beyond this State, and out of the jurisdiction of this Court, without leave
first had from your Honor.
May it, also, please your Honor
to grant unto your orator and oratrix the State's writ
of injunction to be directed to said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, their attorneys, Solicitors
and agents, therein and thereby restraining them, and each and every of them from pro-
ceeding further in said suit against John Dew, and from -collecting said mortgage debt, or
any part thereof, or any other debt due ard owing to said intestate's estate, without leave
first had. And that a receiver be appointed to collect said mortgage debt and all other debts
and property due or belonging to said intestate's estate.
And may it, also, please your Honor to grant unto your orator and oratrix the State's
writ of subpcena to be directed to the said Richard Roe and Robert Roe, therein and thereby
commanding them and each of them on a certain day and under a certain penalty therein to
be inserted, to be and appear before your Honor, in said Court of Chancery, then and there
to answer the premises, and to stand to abide by and perform such order and decree therein,
as to your Honor shall seem meet and proper, and as shall be agreeable to equity and good
conscience.
And as in duty bound your orator and oratrix shall ever pray [for you.]
Walter R. Evans, Solicitor.
[Affidavit, and jurat, as in the next form.]
§ 154. —
Present Form of an Original Bill. But now, by the Code, the confed-
erating part, the charging part, the jurisdiction clause, and other mere formai
matter, are required to be omitted, 5 and it is made the duty of the Court to dis-
countenance prolixity, and unnecessary and false allegations, in all Chancery
pleadings. 6 The result of the statute is, that in our practice, bills are becoming
less and less prolix, and contain less and less unnecessary matter. Neverthe-
less there yet remains in them too much of the old leaven of surplusage and
tautology. The following is the proper form of an original bill, under our
present practice
PORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL.?
[1. The Address.s]
To the Honorable John P. Smith, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Dandridge:
[2. The Commencement, or Caption, or Style.']
John Doe, a resident of Jefferson county, complainant, 1
vs. |
Richard Roe, a resident of Knox county, \

Henry Johnson, a resident of Jefferson county, and '
John Jones, a non-resident of the State, defendants. J
The complainant respectfully shows to the Court:

5 Code, § 4314. 9 Ordinarily, called the Introduction ; but in the
6 Code, § 4316. margin of the Code, termed the Commencement
7 This bill is a mere pleading, and would not Code, § 4313, margin. In our Reports, it is fre
need to be sworn to had it not alleged the non-resi- quently referred to as the Caption; Grubbs v. Colter.
dence and infancy of Jones, and these_ facts might 7 Bax., 432, see syllabus; Robertson, v. Winchester
have been sworn to in a separate affidavit.* 1 Pick., 178; Swan v. Newman, 3 Head, 290; Ma
8 Sometimes, also, called the Direction; but in the jors v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 297; Walker v. Cottrell, 6
Code called the Address. Code, § 4313. Bax., 270; Brown v. Brown, 2 Pick., 314.
§155 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. 142
[3. The Premises, or Statement of the Facts.io]
That he and the defendants are the owners in fee of a lot in the town of Dandridge, in
Jefferson county, situated on Main Street, adjoining the lot of George Williams on the north,
and the lot of Samuel Brown on the south, fronting one hundred feet on Main Street, and run-
ning back between parallel lines two hundred feet to an alley, being lot No. eight in the reg-
istered plan of said town.
II.
Said lot has no encumbrances on it, and no one has any interest therein, except complain-
ant and defendants, who each own a one-fourth undivided part thereof. The deed to com-
plainant and defendants, for said lot, made by John Brown, has never been registered it is in :
possession of defendant Johnson, who refuses In have it registered.
The said lot has a large and valuable mansion-house upon it, and all necessary outbuildings,
making it very desirable property as one lot. It would be manifestly to the advantage of the
parties to have it sold for division, as a partition cannot be made without great injury to all
concerned.
[4. The Prayer for Process."]
rv.
Complainant, therefore prays
1st, That subpoena to answer issue against the said resident defendants, and publication
be made as to John Jones, who is an infant and a non-resident of this State, and that they
be required to answer this bill fully [but not on oath.]
[5. The Prayer for Belief.]
2d, That the defendant, Johnson, be required to file said unregistered deed with his answer,
that it may be used as evidence, and then be registered.
3d, That a guardian ad litem be appointed for the defendant, John Jones, who has no gen-
eral guardian in this State, to defend for him.
4th, That said lot be sold, and that the proceeds be divided between the parties to this
suit, share and share alike, and that complainant may have such further and other relief as
the nature of his case may require. W. R. Turner,
Solicitor. 12
Eugene Holtsinger, Counsel.
[6. The Verification.]
State of Tennessee, )
County of Jefferson. )
John Doe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing bill are true, to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief. John Doe.
[7. The Jurat.]
Sworn to and subscribed
before me, this Dec. 26, 1895.
G. W. Holtsinger, C. & M.
It will thus be seen that an ordinary original bill consists, usually, of five
parts : The address to the Chancellor 2, The commencement, containing the
1, ;
names, character, and county residence, of the complainants and the defend-
ants; 3, The statement of the facts on which the suit is founded; 4, The prayer
for process; and, 5, The prayer for relief. If the bill seeks a discovery, which is
not usual, it might be termed a 6th part of the bill but a discovery is generally ;
included in the prayer for relief. 13 Each of these parts will be more fully con-
sidered.
§ 155. —
Form of the Address of a Bill. Every bill and petition must be ad-
dressed to the Chancellor of the division in which the bill or petition is to be
filed, and should designate him by his name, and give his official character, and
specify the particular Court in which the bill or petition is filed, or to be filed
It would, however, be not improper to omit his name, and address the bill to him
as an officer, giving his official designation, (Chancellor, not Judge,) and the
style of his Court. The following is the statutory form of address: 14
10 This part is, generally, styled the premises, or 12 A bill must always be signed either by the
_
stating part; the Code, however, terms it the state- party himself, or by a Solicitor of the Court. Code,
ment of the facts. Code §4314. §3979; Sto. Eq. PL, §47.
11 According to the English practice, the_ prayer 13 See post, % 159.
for Process came last; but, under our practice, the 14 Code, §§4312-4313. If the address fail to show
prayer for Relief comes last; Code, § 4314. The rel- the particular Court in which the bill is to be filed,
ative order of these prayers, however, is wholly a the Chancellor would not know, when an injunction
matter of form, and, hence, absolutely immaterial. or attachment bill was sent to him by mail for a fiat,
THE ADDRESS OF A BILL.
To the Hon. John P. Smith, Chancellor of the 1st Chancery Division, holding the Chancery
Court at Dandridge.
But an address form would not be improper, especially as it
in the following
may sometimes happen that the exact name of a Chancellor in a distant part of
the State, or the number of his division, may not be known, or there may be a
vacancy in the office.
To the Honorable Chancellor holding 'the Chancery Court at Tiptonville.
The nameof a public officer is, in such a case, immaterial. The bill is not ad-
dressed to the man, but to the officer. The two foregoing forms are simple, and
should be substantially adhered to in drawing both bills and petitions.
§ 156. Form of the Commencement of a Bill. After the address, it would —
seem proper that the names of the parties making the address should first be
given, so that the Chancellor might know who the parties addressing him are,
and in what character they sue. He should, also, know who the parties are
against whom complaint is made, and whether they are sued in their own right,
or otherwise. It is the practice, therefore, to set out the names, character, and
county residence of all the complainants, and of all the defendants, next after
the address to the Chancellor. This is not only an old practice, but it is, also,
the statutory practice 15 and no departure should either be made from it by a
;
pleader, or be allowed by the Court; for it is not only the statutory practice,
but it is the best possible practice, and every departure from it is a confusing
innovation, alike annoying to the Court, to the defendants, and especially to
the Clerk. Oftentimes, when the names and residences of the parties are not
given next after the address, it is really difficult to fish them out of the body of
the bill and the Clerk is sometimes greatly perplexed to know who the parties
;
are, and in what counties they reside. 16 The names, character, and county resi-
dence of the parties should be given thus
COMMENCEMENT, OB CAPTION, OF A BILL.
John Smith, guardian of Henry Jones, a minor, both residents 17 of Knox county; Sarah
Brown, a minor, who sues by her husband, George Brown, both residents of Anderson
county Eliza Jones, a minor, who sues by her next friend, Henry Williams, both resi-
;
dents of Knox county; and Charles Jones and James Jones, residents of Kentucky com-
plainants.
Jonathan Watson, administrator of Samuel Jones, deceased, and Isaac Jones and Thomas
Jones, residents of Knox county, and Richard Jones, a non-resident of the State, de-
fendants.
The complainants respectfully show to the Court :
18
Care should always be taken to show in the commencement of the bill in what
character the parties sue, or are sued and, although this is not absolutely re-
;
quired to be done in this part of the bill, it is, nevertheless, a very convenient
practice. But the name and county of each party should, invariably, be fully
set out in this part of the bill, for the reasons above given.
The following are additional forms of the
in which one of his various Courts the bill was in- the names and residences of the parties," and such
tended to be filed; and, as a consequence, would not is the uniform practice.
know to what particular Clerk and Master to address 18 The commencement, "Humbly complaining,
his fiat. A bill addressed: "To. Hon. John P. Smith, show unto your Honor, your orators and oratrixes,"
Chancellor," is defectively addressed, because it and all similar ones, are foreign to our republican
fails to specify the particular Court in which it is to institutions, and savor of the servility of royal courts,
be filed. Code, § 4312. where "the candied tongue licks absurd pomp, and
15 Code, § 4313; Grubbs v. Colter, 7 Bax., 432. crook the pregnant hinges of the knee, where thrift
10 Occasionally, a bill is so drawn that it would may follow fawning." How much simpler, and more
seem the draftsman himself did not really know suitable to our times and institutions, is the form
who should be made parties, and had purposely left given in our Code: "The complainant respectfully
it and Master to use his best judgment
to the Clerk shows to the Court." In the old English practice,
in the matter. Any extra costs occasioned by the the word "Humbly" was omitted when a peer was
pleader's negligence in this matter should be invaria- the complainant. 2 Smith's Ch. Pr., 553; Lube's Eq.
bly taxed against the complainant. PL, 268. In Tennessee, all men are peers: hence,
17 The Code form (§4313) uses the term, "cit- even by the strict English practice, "humbly" should
1
izen,* but -the section containing the caption. not be used in our State.
(§4313) says: "The address should be followed by
§156 FORM OE AN ORIGINAL BILL. 144
COMMENCEMENTS OP BILLS.
1. Bill by an Infant, Lunatic, or Married Woman, Suing by Next Priend.
Sarah Brown, an infant [or lunatic or married woman,] who sues by John Brown, her next
friend, both residents of Scott county, complainant,
vs.
Charles Brown, the guardian [or husband] of said Sarah Brown, a resident of Overton county,
defendant; and the heirs, distributees, and assignees of William Brown, deceased, whose
names and residences are unknown, and cannot be ascertained on diligent inquiry.
The complainant, Sarah Brown, an infant [or lunatic, or married woman,] who sues by
John Brown, her next friend, respectfully shows to the Court:
2. Billby a Husband and Wife.
Charles Brown and Sarah Brown, his wife, both residents of Overton county, complainants,
vs.
John Brown, general guardian of said Sarah Brown, and Henry Jones and Columbus Jones,
his sureties as such guardian, all residents of Scott county, defendants.
3. '
Bill by a Guardian, Administrator, or Executor.
Charles Brown, general guardian [or administrator or executor] of Sarah Brown [or of
Sarah Brown, deceased,] residents of Overton county, complainant,
vs.
John Brown and Henry Brown, both residents of Clay county, defendants.
4. Bill by a Creditor on Behalf of Himself and all Other Creditors.
John Doe, a resident of Knox county, complainant, who sues on behalf of himself and of all
the other creditors of John Smith, deceased.
vs.
Samuel Smith, administrator of said John Smith, [and all the heirs of said John Smith,
naming them,} defendants.
The complainant, John Doe, who sues in behalf of himself and of all other creditors of
John Smith, deceased, respectfully shows to the Court
5. Bill by a County, City, or Corporation. i»
The County of Roane, complainant,
vs.
The County of Loudon and J. J. Duff, Trustee and resident of Loudon county, defendants.
The Mayor and City Council of Nashville -
vs.
The Mayor and Aldermen of Edgefield.
The East Tennessee Coal Company, a corporation under the laws of Tennessee [or, a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Missouri, and registered in Anderson county under the
laws of Tennessee,] and whose principal office is kept at Coal Creek, in Anderson county,
complainant,
vs.
The Knoxville and Ohio Railroad Company, a corporation whose principal office is kept in
Knox county, defendant.
6. Bill by the State of Tennessee, on relation. 20
The State of Tennessee, which sues by George W. Pickle, her Attorney General [or, by
Thomas A. R. Nelson, her District Attorney, on the relation of John Doe, a resident of
Knox county,] complainant,
vs.
The Mudville Turnpike Company, an alleged corporation whose chief office is kept in Clay
county, and John Doe, a resident of Clay County, defendants.
The State of Tennessee, which sues by George W. Pickle, her Attorney General on the
relation of John Doe, respectfully represents
7. Bill by Partners.
John Smith, James Brown, and Henry Jones, partners in trade under the name of John Smith
& Co., residents of Shelby county, complainant,
John Doe and David Doe, residents of Lake county, doing business under the name of Doe
& Bro., defendants.
10 Citiesand incorporated towns generally sue and lation of some one or more persons. The suit is
are sued by their mayor and aldermen, unless their brought on the relation of a person, when such per-
charters otherwise prescribe. A
town may, however, son is the real complainant, the suit being for his
be sued by the name it is known by. Thus, a suit benefit, as in suits to forfeit a charter, or oust a
may be brought against "The Town of Wartrace usurper, under Code,
§§ 3409-3426. The reason a
Depot." Town of Wartrace V. W. and B. G. Turn- relator required in such cases is that there may
is
pike Co., 2 Cold., 518. See, ante, § 130. be some one before the Court against whom costs
20 The State may sue alone, in her own name; or may be adjudged. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 11; Sto. Eq. PL
may sue jointly with others; or may sue on the re- §49.
8. Bill by a Taxpayer on Behalf of Himself and other Taxpayers. 21
John Doe, a resident of Knox county, complainant, who sues in behalf of himself and all
other taxpayers of said county,

vs.
The County of Knox, and Richard Roe, the county trustee, and a resident of said county,
defendants.
The complainant, who sues in behalf of himself and all other taxpayers of Knox county,
respectfully shows to the Court:
9. Bill by a Legatee on Behalf of Himself and all Other Legatees.
John Doe, a resident of Union county, complainant, who sues in behalf of himself and of all
the other legatees of James Doe, deceased,

vs.
Richard Roe, the executor, Mary Doe, the widow, and Roland Roe, the heir and distributee,
of Roland Roe, senior, deceased, all residents of Union county, defendants.
10. Bill by the State for the Use of a Citizen.22
The State of Tennessee, which sues for the use of John Doe, a resident of Lake county, com-
plainant,
vs.
Richard Roe, guardian of said John Doe, and Roland Roe and Robert Roe, sureties of said
Richard Roe, on his bond as such guardian, all residents of Lake county, defendants.
The complainant, the State of Tennessee, which sues for the use of John Doe, respectfully
represents
Some Solicitors prefer the following form for the caption, or commencement,
and address of a bill, and, as it is substantially the form prescribed by the Code,
there can be no legal objection to it
ANOTHER FORM OF CAPTION AND ADDRESS.
The Complaint of Henry Wilson and John Smith, both residents of Hamilton county,
Bill of
and Charles Johnson, a resident of the State of Georgia, filed in the Chancery Court of
Bradley county,
against
George Jones and Sarah Jones, his wife, residents of Bradley county, and William Smith, a
resident of McMinn county.
To the Hon. S. A. Key, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Cleveland
Complainants respectfully show to the Court
§ 157. Form of the Premises, 23 or Statement of the Facts. This part consti- —
tuting, in truth, the real substance of the bill upon which the Court is called to
act, requires great skill and judgment to frame it aright and if it has not the ;
proper legal certainty, the defect, unless removed, may be fatal. The rules, as
to the proper mode of stating the facts in this part of the bill, have already been
fully considered. It must be remembered, however, that every material fact,
as to which the complainant means to offer evidence, ought to be distinctly
stated; for otherwise he will not be permitted to offer, or require, any evidence
of such fact. A
general charge, or statement, however, of the matter of fact
is ordinarily sufficient; and it is not necessary to charge minutely all the cir-
cumstances which may conduce to prove the general charge 24 for these cir- ;
cumstances are properly matters of evidence, which need not be charged in

order to let them in as proofs. 25 Nothing, however, can be proved that has not
been alleged, and nothing can be decreed that has not been alleged. Neither
proof nor prayers are of any avail in the absence of allegations. Nothing can be
prayed, proved, or decreed, that does not rest on allegations. Allegations are,
at once, (1) the foundation of the Court's jurisdiction of the case, (2) the noti-
fication to the defendant of what is to be litigated, (3) the test of the materiality
and pertinency of the evidence, (4) the limitation of the bounds of the contro-
versy, and (5) the justification of the relief granted.
ginning of the prayer, "The premises considered,
complainant prays."
21 Hunter V. Justices, 7 Cold., 49. 24 Thus, for instance, it is generally sufficient to
22 The party aggrieved by the breach of an official say that complainant owns in fee a certain tract of
bond can sue the obligors directly, and in his own land, without specifying the facts on which his title
name. See, ante, § 119. is based.
23 These are the "premises" referred to at the be- 25 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 27-28.
§ 158 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. 146
The Code requires that the bill should contain a clear and orderly statement
of the facts on which the suit is founded, without prolixity or repetition, with-
out averring any formal combination or confederacy by the defendants, or
others, the insufficiency of the remedy at law, or other mere formal matter. 26
The body of the bill should be divided into paragraphs consecutively num-
bered, each paragraph containing a separate fact and its special circumstances.
Such a division not only generally makes a bill more logical, but greatly facili-
tates reference to its parts, and better enables the defendant to frame his
answer.
§ 158. Forms of Prayers for Process. —
As there is no set form of the prem-
can be no set form of the prayer, for the prayer varies
ises of a bill so there
with the premises, but the following forms will indicate the general character
of the phraseology used in prayers for process
PRAYERS FOR PROCESS.

1. Prayer for Subpoena and Publication. Complainant prays that subpcena to answer
issue as to the resident defendants, and that publication be made as to the non-resident de-
fendants, requiring them to appear, and answer the bill, [but their answer on oath is waived.!
2. Prayer for an Attachment. That an attachment issue [by order of your Honor]
and be levied on all the above described property of the defendant, and all the other property
•of the defendant, or on enough thereof to satisfy complainant's said debt, and costs of this suit.
3. Prayer for an Injunction. That an injunction be ordered by your Honor to issue,

to inhibit and restrain the defendant, his agents and servants, from committing any further
v aste, or destroying any timber, or in any way trespassing upon the tract of land hereinabove
described; [or, from transferring, assigning, encumbering, or removing said property; or,
from doing the particular act or acts complained of, or threatened, specifying such acts
briefly.]
4. Prayer for an Injunction Against a Suit at Law. That the defendant, Richard
Roe, his counsellors, attorneys and agents, be restrained by injunction from proceeding
further in said suit, [or execution;] and also from instituting any new or other suit for a like
purpose in said Court, or in any other Court [or from suing out any other execution or pro-
cess on said judgment,] without leave of your Honor.
5. Prayer for a Receiver. That a receiver be appointed to take possession of the said
goods, chattels, choses in action [or houses, lands, or other property in litigation, or im-
pounded and attached, specifying such property,] and that he be authorized and directed to
soil the said personal property, [or rent and collect the rents of the said houses and lands]
and collect the said choses in action, and that a writ of possession issue to put him in posses-
sion thereof, if necessary.
§ 159. —
Forms of Prayers for Relief. The forms of the prayers for relieii
are as various as the forms of bills, and depend entirely on the material allega-
tions of the bills, but a careful consideration of what has been already said
about prayers for relief, and of the following forms will greatly aid the pleader
in formulating his prayers
PRAYERS FOR RELIEF.
1. Prayer for General Relief. That complainant may have such further and other
'
lelief as he may be entitled to.
2. Prayer for a Guardian ad Litem. That a guardian ad litem be appointed to defend

this suit, for the said Robert Roe, who is an infant without regular guardian.
3. Prayer for an Administrator. That an administrator be appointed to administer the
estate of said Richmond Roe, deceased, in this Court; and that all necessary orders be made,
and accounts taken, for that purpose.
4. Prayer for Discovery. 27 That all the defendants, [or, the defendant, Henry Jones,]
be required on their several and respective oaths to make full, true, direct and perfect an-
swer to all and singular the matters aforesaid, according to the best of their knowledge,
remembrance, information and belief; and that they specially answer, and set forth, whether
— [Here insert the particular interrogatories to be answered. These interrogatories may be_
in the form usually Hied in order to take the deposition of an absent tvitness, omitting, of
course, any caption.]
I 27 For fuller prayers for discovery, see, post, §§

20 Code, § 4314. 1018; 1023; 1121.
147 . FORM OP AN ORIGINAL BIU,. § 159
5. Prayer for the Production of Deeds and Papers. That the defendant, Richard
Roe, be required to file with the Clerk and Master of this Court, the said deed [or other
writing or book,] hereinabove referred to, to the end that complainant, and your Honor, may
have due opportunity to inspect the same.
6. Prayer for an Account. That the defendant, Richard Roe, set forth in his answer,
a true and particular account of all moneys by him, or his agents, or servants, received,
full,
collected, or in any way obtained from the business and transactions referred to, [or, re-
ceived by him as guardian, administrator, partner, agent or trustee;] and all the rents and
profits received, or that might, by due diligence, have been received, by him from the tract
of land, [or house and lot, or business,] hereinabove described; and all the timber, trees;
[notes, accounts, goods, wares and merchandise] or other property, he may have sold, re-
moved, given away, or allowed to be removed, from said premises; and that the Master be or-
dered to take and state an account of all the dealings between complainant and the defendant,
so as to show the full and true amount due complainant, by reason of the premises.
7. Prayers for a Money Recovery, That the complainant may have and recover of
the defendant the said sum of [six hundred] dollars, and interest thereon since the day said
debt matured; [or, recover of the defendant the value of the said work and labor done, and
of the said services rendered by complainant as aforesaid; or recover of the defendant the
amount due on said note, principal and interest; and also the amount due on said account,
and interest thereon;] and all the costs of this cause.
8. Prayers for Damages That the complainant recover of the defendant the damages
.
be has suffered by reason of the failure of the defendant to comply with his said contract;
[or, to make good his said covenants and warranty; or, to perform his said agreement; or,
that complainant recover the damages he has sustained by reason of the said breaches of
contract of the defendant; or, by reason of the quality and quantity of said goods not being
as represented; or, by reason of said deficiencies in quantity, quality, and value;] and, also,
all the costs of the cause.
9. Prayer for Sale of Land. as
Th at said tract of land be sold to satisfy the demand
[or debt] of complainant [or such decree as your Honor may pronounce in complainant's
favor by reason of the premises;] and that said sale be made by the Clerk and Master to the
highest arid best bidder on a credit of not less than six nor more than twenty-four months,
and in bar of all right of redemption, [or, that said sale be made for cash.]
10. Prayer for an Account of Money or Property Had and Received. And
that said defendant [or defendants] set forth in his [or their] answer [or answers] an
account of each and every sum of money or piece of property received by him, [or them, or
either of them] or by any other person or persons, by his [or their] order [or the order of
either of them,] or for his [or their] use, [or for the use of either of them] for, or on account
of, or by reason of, or in. relation to, said agency [partnership or other business or matter]
and when and from whom received; and for what, or on what account, each and every of
said sums of money or pieces of property, were respectively received, and how all and every
of said sums of money, or pieces of property, have been respectively applied or disposed of.
11. Prayer for an Account of Rents and Profits. And that the said defendants set
forth in their answer or answers, a full, true, just and particular account of each and every
sum of money received by them, or either of them, or by any other person or persons, by their
order, or the order of either of them, as rents, profits or issues of said land [or house and lot,
or partnership business, or other business] or any part thereof.
12. Prayer for an Account of Personal Estate. And that the said defendant [or
defendants] discover and set forth in their answer [or answers] a full, true, just and par-
ticular account of- all and singular the personal estate and effects of said testator, [or intes-
tate,] and of every item and part thereof which has come into his [or their] hands, posses-
sion or control, or into the hands, possession or control of any other person or persons, by
his [or their] order or permission, or for his or their use; and that he [or they] give the
nature, quantities and highest values of each of the items so set forth or mentioned, and how
the same have been applied and disposed of, and whether any, and what items have not been
applied and disposed of, and why not; and that the defendant [or defendants] set forth an
account of the debts of said testator [or intestate] and of his funeral expenses, and whether
any and which of such debts and expenses have not been paid, and why.
13. Prayer for the Production of Deeds and Papers. And that the said defendant
[or defendants] set forth in his [or their] answer [or answers] a list or Schedule or descrip-
tion of each and every deed, contract, book, account, letter, paper, or other writing relating,
in whole or in part, to the matters aforesaid, or to any of them, in his, [or their] possession
or control, and that he [or they] deposit the same in the office of the Clerk and Master of
your Honor's Court for inspection and copy; and that he [or they] account for such of the
28 See, post, §§989; 1066; 973; 873; 1039; 1016, for various prayers to sell land.
§ 160 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BILL. , 148
deeds [&c, stating them} referred to in paragraph III [state which paragraph or paragraphs}
of the bill, as are not in his [or their] possession.
§ 160. —
The Signing of a Bill. Every bill, or petition, filed in the Chancery
Court must be signed by the complainant, or petitioner, in person, or by his
Solicitor. A signing on the back of the bill by the Solicitor has been held suffi-
cient.
The great object of this rule is to secure regularity, relevancy, and decency
in the allegations of the bill, and the responsibility and guaranty of counsel
that, upon the instructions given to them, and the case laid before them by their
client, there is good ground for the suit in the manner in which it is framed.
Hence it is that counsel are held responsible for the contents of the bill and if ;
it contains matter which is irrelevant, impertinent, or scandalous, such matter

may be expunged; and the counsel may be ordered to pay costs to the party
aggrieved, and this duty has often been enforced by the Courts of Chancery.
So, where a bill has been filed without authority of the complainant, or of a co-
complainant, the Solicitor will, on due proceedings for that purpose, be ad-
judged to pay accrued costs in consequence of his unauthorized action. 29
It is not essential to the validity of a bill, or petition, that the complainants
should sign it it is sufficient if their names appear in the caption. 30 Neverthe-
;
less, it is much the better practice to require a petition to be signed and sworn
to by the parties themselves, and not by their agents, or Solicitors. 31
§ 161. —
Verification of a Bill. No bill need be sworn to, unless: 1, It prays
for process of injunction, 32 or attachment, or ne exeat; or 2, Unless it seeks the
immediate appointment of a receiver, an administrator or a guardian ad litem;
or 3, Unless it is a bill to sell the property of a person under disability; 33 or 4,
To administer an insolvent estate 34 or 5, To set up lost instruments 35 or 6,
; ;
To have an inquisition of lunacy 36 or 7, To obtain a divorce 37 or 8, For a man-

; ;
damus, 38 or habeas corpus; 39 or 9, A

bill in the name of the State against corpora-
tions and usurpers of office 40 or 10, ;
A
bill of interpleader, 41 or 11, A bill of
review for newly discovered evidence 42 or 12, A
bill to perpetuate testimony,
;
or to take testimony de bene esse; 4s or 13, A

bill or Replevin. 44
It may be stated as a general rule, that, whenever a bill or petition seeks some
immediate order or interposition of the Court, such as an injunction, or an at-
tachment, or a ne exeat, the appointment of a receiver, administrator, guardian
ad litem, or publication as to non-resident or unknown defendants, it must be
sworn to. But the facts necessary for the appointment of a guardian ad litem,
or for process by publication, may be sufficiently made to appear by a separate
affidavit, in which case the bill need not be sworn to, unless its verification is
otherwise required.
Where there is any reasonable doubt whether a bill should be sworn to or not,
it is safer to verify it. But a bill that seeks no process except subpoena, seeks
no order or relief until final decree, seeks no interference with parties or pro-
ceedings in any other forum, and seeks in no way to interfere with the acts,
possession, or property of the defendant pending the suit, need not be sworn to,
as a rule.
Petitions should always be sworn to, when they are filed pending a litigation
commenced by bill. Petitions which are filed in lieu of a bill, such as petitions
2» Sto. § 47, Litton !'. Armstead, 9 Bax.,
Eq. PI., 30 Code, § 3691.
514; 1 Dan. Ch.
Pr., 308, 310, 347. 37 Code, § 2453.
30 Swan r. Newman,
3 Head, 289. 38 Code, § 3567.
.'II Johnson v. Murray, 12 tea, 109. See Stadler V. 30 Code, § 3722.
Hertz, 13 Lea, 315. 40 Code, § 3417. It is probable that an affidavit to
32 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 394, note; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., the bill would only be necessary in case immediate
43-44. extraordinary process is prayed.
33 Code, § 3329. 41 Sto. Eq. PI., § 297.
34 The Code does not expresslyrequire this bill to 42 See, post, § 1247.
be sworn but the extraordinary results of its
to, 43 See, post. §§ 1128; 1134.
being such as publication and injunction, show
filed, 44 Code, § 3376. The verification of bills is fullv
that a verification of the bill is necessary. Code, §§ considered in the Article on Affidavits, post, §§ 788-
2365; 2367; 2370-2372; 2381-2383. 789.
3S! 5(r, Fn T,,r R R7 Tnrlp S3QD1 •
149 FORM OE AN ORIGINAL BIIJ,. §162
for divorce, inquisition of lunacy, mandamus, and habeas corpus, must also be
sworn to but a petition for partition, or for homestead, or for dower, need not
;
be sworn to.
§ 162. Manner of Verifying Bills.— There is sometimes a great looseness,
and sense of irresponsibility, connected with the verification of pleadings. Ver-
ification is not a matter of form, but of substance. It breathes into bills, other-
wise inert, the breath of life and the soul of truth, and gives them immediate
and sometimes far-reaching efficacy. The verification of the bill removes it from
the category of apocryphal documents, and for preliminary purposes impresses
it with the seal of verity.
We have no statute, or authorized rule of practice, specifying the manner and

form of verifying pleadings, but the following form is so generally recognized
that it may be deemed adequate, in ordinary cases 45 :
AFFIDAVITS TO BILLS.
State of Tennessee,
County of Morgan.
John Smith makes oath that the statements by him in the foregoing bill are true to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
John Smith.
Sworn and subscribed
to
before me June 1, 1890.
W. D. Wright, C. & M.
A fuller and better form of affidavit is as follows: 46
State of Tennessee,
County of Morgan.
John Smith makes oath that the statements in his foregoing bill, made as of his own know-
ledge, are true, and those made as on information and belief, he believes to be true.
John Smith.
W. D. Weight, C. & M.
"When a bill is sworn to according to the latter form, and especially when it
shows on its face clearly what statements are made on the complainant's own
knowledge, and what on the information of others, it will have more weight on
the hearing of a preliminary matter, such as a motion to dissolve an injunc-
tion, 47 or to appoint a receiver, than a bill less correctly drawn, and sworn to
on knowledge, information and belief in an indefinite manner.
Sometimes a bill is verified by a Solicitor, or agent. This should never be
done but in case of extreme necessity, especially by a Solicitor. When so veri-
fied, the Solicitor or agent should make oath to his agency and personal know-
ledge of the matters stated in the bill, except those stated to be on the informa-
tion and belief of the complainant, and as to those matters he should make oath
that he believes them to be true. 48 This form is suggested
AFFIDAVIT TO A BILL BY THE SOLICITOR.
State of Tennessee,
County of Morgan.
E. E. Young makes oath that he is the Solicitor of John Smith, the complainant in the
foregoing bill, and that he personally knows that the statements in said bill are true, except
those made as on the information and belief of the complainant, and those he believes to be
true.
E. E. Young.
Sworn and subscribed
to
W. D. Wright, C. & M.
§ 163.- -Before Whom Bills Must be Verified. — Bills required to be under
45 Code, §2453; Caruthers' Lawsuit, §§599; 664. 47 See Chapter on Injunctions, post, §§ 838-843.
For some important matters relating to the verifica- 48 1 Barb. Ch. Fr., 45; see Article on Affidavits,
tion of bills, see Article on Affidavits, post, § 789. post, § 789.
46 This form should always be used in case of bills
for injunctions or receivers.
§164 FORM OF AN ORIGINAL BIIX. 150
oath, may be sworn to, in the State, before any Judge, Clerk of a Court, Justice
of the Peace, or Notary Public, whose attestation shall be deemed evidence of
the fact. 49
They may be sworn to, out of the State, before a Notary Public, or a Commis-
sioner for this State, whose attestation shall be accompanied by his seal of
office; or before a Judge, or Justice of the Peace, of the State, whose official
character shall be attested by the Clerk of the Court in which the Judge pre-
sides, or by the Clerk of the County Court in the case of a Justice of the Peace. 50
§ 164. —
Formal Parts of Bills. To economize space and avoid repetition, the
formal parts of bills in many of the forms in this book are omitted. For the
convenience of the draftsman those parts are here given, and this skeleton bill
will be referred to for guidance.
The Address.si
To the Honorable [giving the name of the Chancellor,] holding the Chancery Court at [stat-
ing the name of the county town where he holds the Court.]
The Commencement, or Caption.52
John Doe, a resident of county [stating the county. Give the names and
county of residence of each of the complainants ; and if any sue by guardians, or next
friends, so state, and give their names, and county of residence. For forms of com-
mencements, see ante, § 156.] .complainant,
Richard Roe and Henry Roe, residents of county, [stating the name of county.
Give the name and county of residence of each of the defendants; and if any of them
are minors, or of unsound mind, without general guardians, so state; if they have guar-
dians, give their names and residences,] defendants.
The complainant respectfully shows to the Court
The Premises, or Statement of Facts. 53
1.
That [this part contains the grounds of complaint, giving the facts on which complainant
bases his right to a decree against the defendant.]
11.
That [this part sets forth any ground for attachment, injunction or other extraordinary
relief complainant may wish.]
in.
The Prayer for Process, &*
Complainant therefore prays
1st, That subpcena to answer issue against the said defendants requiring them, and each
of them, to answer this bill. [// their oath is waived, add:] but their oath to their answer
is waived.
2d, That a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor and non compos defendants. [Sec
§§ 106-108. Omit this, of course, if there be no minor or non compos defendants.]
3d, That an attachment issue against the property of the defendants, [naming the particu-
lar defendants liable. See §§ 869-873.] and especially against the property above mentioned,
[if any be specified in the bill.]
4th, That an injunction issue against the defendants, [naming them] enjoining them from
[doing the acts referred to in the bill; specify them. See §§800-823.]
The Prayer for Special Relief.so
Sth, That [here state the special relief desired, consistent with the bill.]
The Prayer for General Belief. 56

6th, The complainant prays also for such further and other relief as the nature of his case
may require. [// any extraordinary process is prayed, add:] This is the first application for
an attachment [or an injunction] in this case.
Joseph Story, Signature of Counsel. James Kent," 7

Of Counsel. Solicitor.
40 Code, § 4330; Acts of 1866-7, ch. 46; E. W. M. forms themselves, and must be omrtted in drawing
V. J. C. M., 2 Ch. Apps., 463. Notaries, however, must pleadings, decrees, &c.
affix their seals to their certificates or jurats. 53 See, ante, § 157. The premises are sometimes
50 Code, §4331; Cheatham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668. called the body of the bill.
51 See, ante, § 155. 54 See, ante, § 158.
52 For various forms of captions, see, ante, § 156. 55 See, ante, § 159.
—
General Note. The words in italics in the vari-
ous forms in this book are merely words of instruc-
56 See, ante, %% 152;
57 See, ante, § 160.
159.
tion to the draughtsman, and are no part of the

151 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO BILLS. §165
Affidavit to the Bill.sa
State of Tennessee,
County of [Here insert name of county wherein bill is sworn to.]
John Doe, the complainant in the foregoing bill, makes oath, [or affirms] that the state-
ments in his foregoing bill made as of his own knowledge are true, and those made as on
information and belief, he believes to be true.
John Doe.
Jurat to Affidavit.
Sworn to [or affirmed] and subscribed
before me, August 24, 1905.
James C. Scruggs, C. & M.
ARTICLE IV.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE DRAWING OF BILLS.
§ 165. Relations of the Parties to a Suit. § 169. General Form of a Bill Where No Re-
§ 166. The General Rule of Law Applicable lations Exist.
to the Case. § 170. Character of the Allegations in a Bill.
§ 167. Application of the Law of Relations § 171. How Parties Should be Described.
in Drawing a Bill. § 172. How Lands Should be Described.
§ 168. General Form of a Bill Where Rela- § 173. Some Miscellaneous Suggestions.
tions Exist.
§ 165. —
The Relations of the Parties to a Suit. "Whenever two or more per- —
sons have relations to, or with, each other, various legal and equitable rights
and duties arise from the relation 1 and for the protection of these rights, and
j
the enforcement of these duties, Courts are established. These relations are
those of family, neighborhood, society, business, commerce and government
'
and may be divided into: 1, Primary or original relations, being those that
exist between the original parties to the transaction 2, Secondary or derivative ;
relations, being those that exist between an original party and the privy of the
other original party, and 3, Collateral relations, being those that exist between
the privies of the original parties. The principal primary, or original, relations
are those of parent and child, husband and wife, guardian and ward, master
and servant, attorney and client, adviser and advised, vendor and vendee, mort-
gagor and mortgagee, landlord and tenant, trustee and beneficiary, personal
representative and distributee or legatee, principal and agent, bailor and bailee,
partner and partner, tenants in common, principal and surety, debtor and cred-
itor, assignor and assignee, creditor and surety, bargainor and bargainee, and
citizen and State. The principal secondary or derivative relations are those
existing between one of the original parties to the transaction and the vendee,
assignee, executor, administrator, heir, devisee, widow, or other privy, of the
other original party.
The legal and equitable rights and duties, arising from the relations of the
parties, ordinarily become more complicated in proportion to the distance the
parties are removed from the original parties; but, as a rule, a privy's rights
and duties are the same as those of the person in whose shoes he stands, or to
whose rights he succeeds, the principal exception to the rule being in favor of
innocent purchasers for value, without notice.
§ 166. —The General Rule of Law Applicable to the Case.—No one can draw
a logical and concise bill, without first considering the relations of the parties
58 See, ante. §§ 161-163; and, post,
J§ 788-789. seems to have been first made in Lube's Equity
l Hart v. Czapski, 11 Lea, 154. The application
#
Pleadings.
of the doctrine of relations to the fraining of bills
§167 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO BILLS. 152
to the controversy and the general rule of law 2 applicable to the case, and then
alleging the facts necessary to bring the complainant's case within this rule.
This general rule of law is often termed, in our Reports, the theory of the bill. 3 '
'
' '
The clearer this general rule, or theory, appears to the mind of the pleader, the
more logical and concise will be the allegations of his bill. 4 Indeed, the ob-
scurity and confusion and indefiniteness of a bill, almost invariably, result from
the obscurity and indefiniteness of the pleader's conception of the general rule
of law, applicable to the facts of his case. The law of relations enables a pleader
readily to grasp these general rules of law, and thereby make his bills logical
and concise, the two principal characteristics of good pleading.
To every general rule of law there are various exceptions; but these excep-
tions are ordinarily matters to be brought forward by the defendant. In draw-
ing a bill, all matters which are within exceptions to the general rule, and all
matters in avoidance, should generally be left for the defendant to allege ami
prove.
The general rule of law arises: (1) out of the relations of the parties, (2) out
of the rights and duties resulting from those relations, and (3) out of the acts
of the defendant in violation of those rights and duties; and (4) it defines the
manner and measure of redress to which the complainant is entitled. Hence, a
pleader, before beginning to draw a bill, should consider the general rule of law
applicable to his client 's case, and so frame his bill as to make out a case within
the rule, and at the same time not within any of the exceptions to the rule. The
most easy and logical way to do this, is by keeping in mind the relations of the
parties, and the acts of the defendant in violation of the duties arising from
those relations.
§ 167. Application of the Law of Relations in Drawing a Bill. Out of the —
relation of the parties, certain legal or equitable duties arise on one side, and
certain legal or equitable rights on the other. 5 These rights and duties are cor-
related, the duties owing by one party being the rights owned by the other. 6
A violation of the duties violates the correlated right, and a cause of action
arises in favor of the owner of the violated right, and against the owner of the
violated duty. These correlated rights and duties are, or may be, formulated
into general rules of law, the knowledge of which is essential to an adequate
comprehension of the ease. When, therefore, a Solicitor is called on to state
the law applicable to a given case, he should consider, (1) the relations of the
parties, (2) the duties arising from those relations, (3) which of those duties
have been violated by the defendant, (4) what remedy the general rule of law,
applicable to the case, provides for such violation, and (5) in what Court that
remedy can best be enforced.
The general theory of every properly drawn bill, is (1) that the defendant has
done, is doing, or is attempting, or threatening to do, some wrong to, or to with-
hold some right from, the complainant and (2) that the Court in which the bill
;
2 This general rule of law the major premise of

is case in advance of every step taken, and that theory
the legal syllogism; the facts of the case are the consistent with the facts and the law. He should
minor premise, and the special relief prayed for is form this theory before he draws the bill; and con-
the conclusion of the syllogism. No Solicitor can be- form his pleadings to that theory. The proof must
come a good pleader without thoroughly mastering correspond to the theory of his bill; his argument at
the logical principles set forth in this and subsequent the hearing must be in affirmance of this theory as
sections; and, while these principles may, at first, shown by both pleadings and proof; and the relief he
appear metaphysical and abstruse, and their study seeks by decree must be such as the theory requires
uninviting, on closer attention their importance will and allows.
become manifest, and their acquisition will be found 5 Hart v. Czapski, 11 Lea, 154.
a task by no means difficult, or disagreeable. Plead- G Rights are what is due the complainant; duties
ing is the application of logic to legal disputation. are what is owing by the defendant. Every right in
3 Merriman v. Korman, 9 Heisk., 270; Day, Gris- one party has a corresponding duty owing by the
wold & Co., v. Walker, 7 Lea, 714; Taylor v. Lin- other party. When this duty is discharged, the cor-
cumfelter, 1 Lea, 86; Norville v. Coble, Ibid., 467; responding right ceases, the party entitled has his
Wilcox v. Morrison, 9 Lea, 709; White v. Fulghum, own, justice is done and the law is satisfied. Justitia
3 Pick., 283; Walsh v. Crook, 7 Pick, 390; Peterson constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique trt-
V. Turney, 2 Ch. Apps., 519; Comfort v. McTeer, 7 buendi. (Justice is an unvarying and unceasing dis-
Lea, 659. In Bartee V. Tompkins, 4 Sneed, 638, it position to accord to every one what is his due.)
is called the "idea of the bill." Every duty cognizable in the Courts, and every right
4 No case can be properly conducted, either in pre- enforceable in the Courts, arises from some law, or
paring the pleadings, or in taking the proof, or in some contract, express or implied. See, ante, § 58,
making the argument at the hearing, unless the So- note 77.
is filedhas jurisdiction to remedy or prevent that wrong, or to enforce that
right.The wrong-complained of may (1) grow out of some act or omission of the
defendant, in violation of his duties to complainant, arising from some relation
between the parties, or (2) may grow out of some act or omission of the de-
fendant, in violation of some right of complainant, existing independently of
any relations.
§ 168. General Form of Bill Where Relations Exist. Therefore, in drawing —
h bill based on relations, thematter to be considered is, whether the alleged
first
wrong arises from any relation, or not and the second matter to be considered
;
is, what is the general rule of law or Equity applicable to the facts of the case.
Having settled the general rule, and ascertained that the case does not come
within any of the exceptions thereto, you will, in drafting the bill, (1) begin by
showing the relations of the parties, and how they arose or were created,
whether by contract expressed or implied, or by operation of law; (2) then show
how and wherein the duties arising from those relations have been violated by
the defendants, and the extent of the injury resulting to the complainant from
such violation; (3) if there are other parties, secondarily liable to complainant
by reason of the other defendant's primary liability, 7 show how and wherein
(4) if any specific property is sought to be attached, impounded, recovered, or
secured from removal or alienation, so state, specifying the property so as fully
to identify it, and giving, with particularity and precision, the grounds for this
procedure (5) if the defendant is doing, or threatening, any act likely to result
;
in irreparable injury to complainant, or any act contrary to equity and good

conscience, detail such acts, and show how or wherein they will work irrepara-
ble injury, or gross iniquity; (6) if there is any matter connected with, or grow-
ing out of, the foregoing matters, necessary to be brought before the Court to
enable it to make a complete decree and determine the whole controversy, here
bring forward such subordinate matters, and show their connection with the
principal matters in dispute (7) if any preliminary relief is needed, any injunc-
;
tion, attachment, or receiver, so specially pray; (8) then pray for specific and
general relief; (9) aver that this is the first application for the extraordinary
process prayed and then (10) sign the bill, and have your client make proper
;
affidavit to it, if necessary. All of this will, perhaps, be better understood by

reference to the following
GENERAL FORM OF BILL WHERE RELATIONS EXIST.s
[For address and caption, see ante, §§ 1SS; 164.]
The complainant respectfullyshows to the Court:
I.
That, [at a time stated, certain specified facts existed, whereby arose between the complain-
ant and the defendant certain relations, stating the relations.]
II.
That, [as a result of the aforesaid relations, certain specified duties or debts were imposed
on, or incurred or assumed by, the defendant; and certain specified rights accrued to the
complainant, setting forth these duties, or debts, and the rights claimed, with definiteness. |
in.
That, [the defendant has violated his aforesaid duties to complainant, and has withheld
from the complainant his just dues or rights in the premises, showing wherein, with clearness
and particularity.]
That, [as a consequence of the preceding facts, the 'complainant is entitled to relief, and he
therefore .prays (1) for proper process to bring the defendant before the Court, (2) for the
particular relief he deems himself entitled to, and (3) for general relief.]
§ 169. General Form of a Bill Where No Relations Exist.—Bills of this kind

are generally filed to assert rights to, or to secure protection for, specific prop-
erty, real or personal, 9 as in a bill (1) to assert title to, or interest in, land or
7_As surety, endorser, guarantor, purchaser with tended to include every species of property, tangible
notice, voluntary vendee, or other privy. and intangible, capable of ownership, and cognizable
8 The commencement and caption are omitted. See, in the Courts. For definition of property, see, ante.
ante, § 164. §56.
9- The phrase, "property, real, or personal," is in-
§170 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO BILLS. 154
personalty, (2) to protect or preserve land or personalty, (3) to remove clouds
on title, (4) to stay waste, prevent trespasses, and inhibit irreparable injury,
(5) to enjoin or abate nuisances, and the like. These bills also lie in many other
cases where injunctions are needed, as in (1) bills quia timet, (2) bills of peace,
(3) bills to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and indeed in all other cases where
the suit does not spring out of some contract, express or implied, or of some
relation between the parties, but is based on some right of property in the com-
1
plainant, and some actual or threatened violation of that right by the defendant.
The following general form will aid the draftsman of such bills:
GENERAL FORM OE BILL WHERE NO RELATIONS.
[For address and caption, see ante, §§ 155; 164.]
The complainant respectfullyshows to the Court
I.
[Here allege complainant's to the property, or other particular right,

title which he seeks
to assert or protect; describing the property, or right, so as fully to identify it, and if it be
land, give the boundaries and location of the tract.]

II.
[If said title, or rights, are evidenced by any writing or other muniment, so state, giving
its date, and otherwise describing it, and making it an exhibit to the bill.]
ni.
[Show when, wherein, and by which of the defendants, the complainant's rights have been
interfered with, or denied, or his said rights or property injured, or threatened, or his pos-
session or use thereof interfered with, or denied, stating clearly the time, and main facts con-
stituting the wrong complained of, and necessitating the application to the Court for relief.]
IV.
any of the defendants, especially defendants under disability, have rights or interests
[If
similar to those of complainant, and are entitled to similar relief, state, in a general way,
these facts.]
v.
necessary to set up any special equity, or to relate any special atrocities, or gross mis-
[If
conduct, or other iniquitous conduct of the defendants, in order to emphasize the complain-
ant's wrongs, here set out such matters with reasonable certainty of time, place, and circum-
stance and, if there be any grounds for an injunction, attachment, or receiver, here state
;
them fully. 10 ]
VI.
[Here pray for the necessary process to bring the defendants into Court, and if any injunc-
tion, attachment, or receiver is necessary, or guardian ad litem, or administrator, pray therefor
with particularity.]
VII.
[Here specify the particular relief desired, conforming your prayer to the facts alleged,
praying in the alternative when necessary and proper and praying, also, for general relief.]
;
VIII.
[Show that this is the first application for the particular extraordinary process prayed; and,
if not the first, explain, and show why such process should now be granted.]
IX.
[The bill must be signed by counsel, or by the complainant in person; and ifany extraor-
dinary process, or any interlocutory order, not of course, is applied for, the bill must be sworn
to, 11 and a proper jurat attached.]
§ 170. Character of the Allegations in a Bill. —In drawing bills, remember

that the more extraordinary the relief sought, the more specific must be the
allegations. In a bill to collect an ordinary debt, without extraordinary process,
general allegations showing that the defendant is indebted to the complainant
may suffice and, in an ordinary ejectment bill, general allegations of ownership
;
by the complainant, and of wrongful possession by the defendant, may sustain

a suit but general allegations will not be sufficient when the bill seeks (1) to
;
attach property, or (2) to have a receiver appointed, or (3) to obtain an injunc-
10 Keep in mind that a bill for an injunction, at- 11 If publication for non-residents, or a guardian
tachment, or receiver, is both a pleading and an affi- ad litem for minors, or lunatics, is prayed for, the
_
davit, and must possess all the characteristics of a bill must be sworn to, or a separate affidavit of the
special affidavit, as elsewhere fully shown. See, ante, non-residence, or disability, of the defendants filed,
§ 142. before such prayers can be granted.
tion, or (4) to set aside a conveyance, a settlement or a contract, or (5) to re-
form a written instrument, or (6) to sell, reinvest, or expend, the property of
minors, or (7) to set up a resulting or constructive trust, or (8) to have a
specific performance of a contract, or (9) to obtain a divorce, or (10) to obtain
a new trial at law, or (11) a review of a former decree in Equity, or (12) where
in any case fraud is charged, or a trust is set up. In such and all similar cases,
the facts must be set forth with such distinctness, precision and particularity,
that the Court may clearly see the equities complainant is seeking to raise and
have enforced. 12 The Chancellor should not be required to grope his way
through a misty indefiniteness of statement, or be left in a labyrinth of incon-
clusive averments, or be forced to draw deductions from unstable and uncer-
tain premises. The facts on which the alleged equity is founded should be
set forth with such orderly and specific particularity, and with such a well
defined clearness of statement and certainty of averment, that the equity al-
leged will stand forth in the light of the facts with statue-like distinctness to
the eye of the judicial mind, and not be a mere misty mental exhalation floating
indistinctly amid the shadows and darkness of indefinite, inconclusive and
confused general averments and semi-averments, whose meaning and bearing
are inexplicable.
Aparty should not undertake to drag a defendant into a Court of Conscience,
unless he (1) has a good cause of action in fact, and (2) has that cause clearly
and sufficiently set forth in his bill. Neither "information" alone, nor mere
"information and belief," will suffice to sustain a prayer for relief; the com-
plainant must make positive and direct averments, allegations, and charges,
that the facts are so and so, and that the defendant has done so and so, using
information merely as the ground of his charge or averment, and to show
' '
his ' '
that the fact alleged is not based on the direct personal knowledge of the com-
plainant.
§ 171. —
How Parties Should be Described. Parties, both complainant and
defendant, should be described by their proper names, if known, always giving
their first name in full, and never using the initial of their first name, unless
their first given name is unknown, and cannot be readily ascertained. 13 If,
however, a defendant is sued upon a written instrument, he may be sued in the
name and description used in the instrument. 14
If the name of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon dil-
igent inquiry, the bill should so allege, 15 using the statutory form, and setting
forth in the bill clearly the character in which he is sued, and his title or inter-
est in the subject-matter of the litigation. 16
If the name of any party is a common one in the neighborhood, so that the
Sheriff may not know which one of two or more with the same name is intended,
the bill should use some method of designating him, adopting the particular
designation, if any, used by his neighbors. 17 This may be of great importance,
12 Sto. Eq. PI., §§241-251; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 361, or other privy, or representative, of some particular
notes. See, ante, § 142. person named and described in the bill, who, if liv-
13 The law knows but one Christian name; and ing, has an interest in the subject-matter of the lit-
the omission, or incorrect insertion of a middle igation, and who, if dead, has possibly a living
name, or initial, is immaterial. The full Christian spouse and children, or other privies in estate. The
name of a party should always be given in a plead- bill will describe such persons as follows:
ing, or some sufficient excuse alleged for not so do- "The said Susan Jones, who, if living, is entitled
ing. The use of an initial is not sufficient, except in to an undivided one-seventh of said tract of land,
case of suits on written instruments in which initials went to Arizona twenty years ago, and has not been
or contractions of the Christian name are used. heard from for seventeen years. Where she now
Hawes on Parties, § 3. resides, if living; and, if dead, whether she died tes^
14 Code, § 2788. In such a case, however, if he tate or intestate, and whether she left any hus
signs by initials, or signs an unusual name, it would band, children, heirs or devisees, and if so, whert
be well to describe him by his usual name, also; thus, they reside, and what their ages and names, are all
"G. W. Smith, otherwise called George W. Smith unknown to complainants, and cannot be ascertained
[or Wash. Smith]." upon diligent inquiry."
15 Code, § 4352, sub-sec. 4. 17 Thus: "David Beaty, (Tinker);" "John Smith,
16 Code, § 4358. The "character" in which an
_
sometimes called Club-foot John;" "Henry Jones,
unknown defendant is generally sued is that of hus- son of Thomas Jones;" and "James Brown, other
band, child, grand-child, heir, devisee, legatee, vendee wise called Red Jim Brown."
8
S 172 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO BILLS. 156
and may prevent trouble not only in serving the subpoena, but, also, in enforcing
the decree, and in divesting and vesting title.
§ 172. —
How Lands should be Described. Every bill that seeks the sale, par-
tition or recovery, of land, or to clear the title to land, or to redeem land, or to
specifically enforce a contract in reference to land, or that, in any other way,
seeks to effect the title or possession of land, or any interest therein or encum-
brance thereon, should describe the land by location, corners, courses and dis-
tances, 18 or other appropriate description sufficient fully to identify it. ref- A
erence in the bill to exhibits, while sufficient in law, is a loose and dangerous
practice, especially if the exhibit has not been registered. Exhibits are liable
to be lost or mislaid, and are sometimes withdrawn by leave of the Court, in
which case the description may be lost. Unless the land is adequately described
in the bill and in the decree, 19 the purchaser may be greatly embarrassed in as-
serting his title to definite boundaries, and the reputation of the Solicitor, Clerk
and Chancellor, for accuracy and business capacity, may be greatly impaired.
§ 173. —
Some Miscellaneous Suggestions. In drawing a bill where the par-
ties are numerous, always leave in the caption two or three blank lines, for the
insertion of additional complainants and defendants; because, while drawing
the bill, you will often find it necessary to make additional parties, or to make
other changes in the parties, and these blank lines will prove serviceable, and
obviate the necessity of inartificial, and oftentimes illegible, interlineations.
It must be kept in mind that, whenever a bill sets forth facts on the strength
of which (1) process by publication, (2) an injunction, (3) an attachment, (4)
a receiver, (5) the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or (6) any other extra-
ordinary, preliminary, or ex parte process, or order, is prayed or sought, it is
both a pleading and an affidavit, and must, therefore, be verified by the oath of
the complainant, or of some one else acquainted with the facts. 20
If you have no need for the evidence of the defendant, or have not full con-
fidence in his veracity, do not fail to waive his oath to his answer, in drawing
your bill. If, however, there are material facts exclusively in the personal
knowledge of the defendant, or if he have material papers in his possession,
or under his control, necessary to your client's success, you may require an
answer on oath, and may incorporate in your bill searching interrogatories to
be responded to by the defendant in his answer. 21 But remember, that you
cannot force a defendant to discover, if you waive his oath to his answer.
Avoid all scandal, all impertinence, all literary allusions, all poetic displays,
all indelicate statements —
in short, all unnecessary allegations.
After the bill has been drawn, add a half sheet, (2 pages), of blank paper as
a back to the bill; it will be found convenient to write a fiat on, or an order
appointing a receiver, and will give the Clerk room enough to make his endorse-
ments. 22
18 Thus: Said tract of land is situated in the 4th 21 See, post, §§ 1018; 1023; 1121.
Campbell county, adioining the lands
civil district of 22 Some Solicitors are very niggard with their pa-
of Jonathan S. Lindsay, William Allen, J. M. Bibee per. They write below the bottom lines so that the
and others, and begins on a poplar tree m
the Pow- sheets can not be fastened together without covering
ells Valley road, north of jacksboro, a corner of the writing; and they do not leave enough blank
said Lindsay's home farm, running thence south paper for the Chancellor to write a fiat on, or for the
sixty poles to a large persimmon tree, [and so on~\ Clerk to put his endorsements on. Such apparent
to the beginning, containing sixty acres more or less. penuriousness should be avoided. Some Solicitors
19 The bill and exhibits may be lost, or mislaid, have strong jackets for their pleadings, and the prac-
but the minute-book is a permanent record. tice is a very commendable one. Solicitors should
20 But where the bill alleges a fact necessitating a make the mechanical execution of their pleadings a
publication as to a defendant, or the appointment of a matter of pride and solicitude. For some minor de-
guardian ad litem, these facts may be shown by an fects in pleadings, see, post, § 410.
affidavit filed with the bill.
157 EXTRAORDINARY PROCESS. § 174
CHAPTER IX.
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO PROCESS.

Article I. Proceedings Preliminary to Extraordinary Process.
Article II. Piling of the Bill.
Article III. Proceedings in Reference to Costs.
ARTICLE I.
PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO EXTRAORDINARY PROCESS.

174. Proceedings When an Injunction is § 176. Proceedings When a Receiver is
Sought. Sought before Answer.
175. Proceedings When an Attachment of
Property is Sought.
§ 174. Proceedings When an Injunction is Sought. The bill of complaint —

praying an injunction, having been prepared and duly sworn to, as hereafter
fully shown, 1 the next step is to present it to some Chancellor, or to some Judge
of a Circuit, Criminal or Special Court, and apply for a,fiat for an injunction.
The Chancellor, or Judge, after reading the bill, will endorse on it his fiat, or
iiis refusal, and transmit it, in a sealed envelope, to the Clerk and Master of the
Court in which the bill is to be filed. The fiat is ordinarily as follows
FIAT FOE AN INJUNCTION.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at [naming the town where the Court is held
in which the bill is to be Med.]
Issue a writ of injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving bond
therefor in the penalty of [naming the sum. 2 ]
Dec. 4, 1890. S. A. Key, Chancellor.
Complainant must give bond, or take the pauper oath if the fiat so authorize,
before the Clerk and Master can issue the writ of injunction. The forms of
fiats, bonds, and oath, will be found in the Chapter on Injunctions.
§ 175. Proceedings When an Attachment of Property is Sought. 3 If the —

bill seeks to have the defendant 's property attached, it must contain the proper
allegations and be duly sworn to. If the ground of attachment alleged in the
bill is one of the grounds for which an attachment would lie in the Circuit
Court, the Clerk and Master may issue the writ of attachment without a fiat
but if the ground for the attachment is of a different character, the complainant
must apply to a Chancellor, or to a Circuit, Criminal or Special Judge, for a
fiat. This application is made in the same way as when an injunction is sought,
and the practice in granting or refusing a fiat, and in transmitting the bill to
the Clerk and Master, is the same as in the case of injunction bills. Indeed, the
same bill often prays for both an injunction and an attachment.
If the attachment be granted by the Clerk and Master, or by a Chancellor,
or Judge, the bond required by the statute, or the pauper oath in lieu, must be
filed with the Clerk before the writ can issue. The forms of fiats, bonds, and
oaths, for an attachment will be found in the Chapter on Attachments.
1 For the practice in injunction suits, see Chapter 3 See Chapter on Attachment Suits, post, §§ 869-
on Injunctions, past, §§ 800-863. 890. ,
2 If no sum is named, the statute fixes the penalty

at five hundred dollars. Code, § 4440.
§176 EXTRAORDINARY PROCESS. 158
Proceedings When a Receiver is Sought before Answer. 4 It some-
§ 176. —
times happens that the immediate appointment of a receiver is desired by the
complainant. In such a case, his bill, or an accompanying affidavit, must fully
and particularly set out the urgency of the necessity the bill must be sworn to,
;
and must be presented to some Chancellor, or to some Circuit, Criminal or

Special Judge, who, if the case for an instanter appointment be made out, and
good cause shown why notice of the application should not be given, will en-
dorse oh the bill, or on a paper attached thereto, an order appointing a suitable
person receiver as prayed, and specifying the bond he must give, and the duties
he must perform. In such a case, the Chancellor, or Judge, may require the
complainant to give a bond conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duties
of the receiver B in which case this bond must be given before the receiver can
;
act. The Chancellor, or Judge, may award a writ of possession, to put the
receiver in possession of the property specified in the order appointing the
receiver.
On making these orders, the Chancellor, or Judge, will transmit the papers
in a sealed envelope to the Clerk and Master of the Court where the bill is to be
filed. The forms of such orders, and of the bond, will be found in the Chapter
on Receivers.
ARTICLE II.
FILING OF THE BILL.
§ 177. When and Where the Bill May be § 178. Filing of the Bill.
Filed. § 179. When a Pleading is Considered Filed.
§ 177. —
When and Where the Bill may be Filed. Suits are commenced in —
the Chancery Court by bill and bills may be filed in the office of the Clerk and
;
Master of the Chancery Court at any time, 1 whether the Court be in session or
not they may be filed at any hour of the day or night, provided the Clerk and
;
Master, or his deputy, can be found to receive them; 2 and a prosecution bond,
or pauper oath in lieu, is not a condition precedent.
The bill must, of course, be filed in the particular Chancery Court that has
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or of the subject-matter of the suit;
for, if the bill be filed in a Chancery Court that has no jurisdiction, the defend-
ant can defeat the suit by plea in abatement, motion to dismiss, or demurrer.
In determining the proper county in which to file the bill, the following rules
must be considered:
1. Bills to Divest, or Clear the Title to, Land;
2. Bills to Enforce the Specific Execution of Contracts Relating to Realty;

3. Bills to Foreclose a Mortgage, or Deed of Trust, by a sale of personal prop-
erty or realty, must be filed in the county in which the land to be affected by
the suit, or a material part of it, lies or, in case the trust deed or mortgage is
;
4 See Chapter on Receivers, post, §§ 892-917. so great on Sunday, often renders it important to
5 Code, §§ 3948; 4453. have the right to file bills of injunction and attach,
l Code, § 4329. Inasmuch as a suit can be begun ment, and obtain fiats, and process, on that day. See
in the Circuit Court, or before a Justice of the 2 High on Injunc, § 1584.
Peace, on Sunday, (Code, § 2824,) it would seem 2 The Clerk and Master, or his Deputy, may re-
that a bill might be filed in Chancery on that day, on ceive a bill at his own house, or on the street, or
the complainant making affidavit that the defendant anywhere else in his county. In contemplation of
is removing, or about to remove, himself, or prop- law the Courts are always open. Const., Art., 1,
erty, beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. The fact § 17.
that our facilities for travel and transportation are
159 WHERE THE BILL MAY BE FILED. §177
for personalty, the bill must be filed in the county in which such deed or mort-
gage 3 is registered. 4 So,
4. Bills to recover land, whether in the nature of ejectment or detainer suits, 5
and
5. Bills to Sell the Lands of a Decedent to Pay Debts, must be filed in the coun-
ty where the land or a portion of it lies. 6

6. Bills for the Partition of Land, or a sale of land for partition, must be filed
in the county in which the land, or any part of it, lies, or in which the defendant
resides; or, if all the claimants join in the petition, it may be filed in any
county. 7
7. Bills for Dower or Homestead, must be filed in the county where the land,
or a portion of it, lies or in the county where the husband last resided before
;
his death. 8
8. Bills for the Sale of the Property of Persons Under Disability, must be filed in
the county where the property is, or where the person under disability resides. 9
9. Bills by One Non-resident Against Another Non-resident to subject the real or
personal property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a foreign judgment
must be filed in the county where the property is situated. 10
10. Bills to Recover Possession of Personal Property, in the nature of replevin
or detinue suits, must be filed in the county in which the goods and chattels, or
a material part of them, are, or in which either of the defendants may be
found. 11
11. Bills to Enforce Liens of Mechanics, 1 ! 3 Liens on Boats,nb Liens of Employes
-
of railroads, corporations, partnerships, and merchants, 110 liens of contractors

on railroads, lld or other liens on property, must be filed in the county where the
property, or some material part of it, sought to be attached, is situated if realty,
or is found if personalty. 11 *5
12. Bills Against Cities and Counties, whether local or transitory in their na-
ture, must be filed, (1) in case of a city, in the county wherein the city is situ-
ated; and (2) in case of a county, in the Court of the county sued. llf
13. Bills for the Appointment of Administrators must be filed in the county in
which the deceased resided at the time of his death, or in which his estate,
goods and chattels, or effects, were at the time of his death. 12
14. Bills for the Transfer of the Administration of an Insolvent Estate, from the
County Court to the Chancery Court, must be filed in the county wherein the
will was proved, or letters of administration granted, or where the personal
representatives reside, or are served with process. 13
15. Bills Against Joint Makers of Negotiable Paper must be filed in a county
where a joint maker can be served with subpoena to answer. 14
16. If the Complainant and Defendant Both Beside in the Same County, the bill
must be filed in that county, 15 unless the statute requir-es the bill to be filed in
3 The language of the statute is "deed of mort- lla Code, §3543; Acts of 1873, ch. 19.
gage," but "of" is evidently a typographical error, lib Code, § 3550.
lhe statute does not expressly confine the deed, or lie Acts of 1883, ch. 18, sec. 2; Acts of 1897, ch.
mortgage, to personalty, but such is, beyond doubt, 78.
the meaning of the statute.' lid Acts of 1883, ch. 220, sec. 2.
4 Acts of 1877, ch. 107. The Code, §4311, sub- He Acts of 1877, ch. 107; Code, §4311, sub-sec. 5.
sec. 2, reads "may be filed;" the Act of 1877 reads The attachment, in case the subpoena is served, be-
"shall be filed;" and the 2d sec. of the Act repeals comes auxiliary in all of these cases to enforce stat-
all the laws in conflict with it. The statute seems, utory liens.
therefore, to be mandatory; and for that reason is llf Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432. If a decree
given precedence in the list of rules denning the be rendered against a city outside of the county in
local jurisdiction of the Court. See Reid, ex parte. which the city is situated, it is absolutely void for
3 Sneed, 275. want of jurisdiction to make it. Ibid.' Local suits
5 Code, §§2810; 2902, sub-sec. 3; Campbell V. must be brought in the county where the statute re-
Hampton, 11 Lea, 440. quires, and cannot be brought elsewhere. Ibid. Suits
6 Code; §§2267-2270. against counties must be brought in the Courts of
7 Code, §§ 3268-3269; Todd v. Cannon, 8 Hum., the county sued. Ibid.
512. 12 Code, § 2209.
8 Code, §2411; 2810. 13 Code, § 2362 a; Code (M. & V.) § 3207.
9 Code, § 3326; Williams v. Williams, 10 Heisk., 14 Code, §§2823; 2902, sub-sec, 5.
566. 15 Code, §§ 2809; 2902, sub-sec. 4. These sections
10 Code, 4297; Taylor v. Badoux, 8 Pick., 249
§ refer exclusively to transitory actions. § 2808 refers
Bank V. Motherwell, 11 Pick., 172. to transitory actions, and § 2809 refers to "such ac-
11 Code, §2810; 3375. tions," and not to actions generally. See Code, §§
8 177 where; the biu, may be eilEd. 160
some other county. 10 This rule applies to transitory suits, and is subject to
\he preceding rules. 17
17. The Bill may be Filed in any County where the Defendant, or any Material De-
fendant, is Found, unless otherwise prescribed by law. The Chancery Court acts
ordinarily in personam. Unless, therefore, there be some statute expressly re-
quiring the bill to be filed elsewhere, it may be filed in any county in which a
subpoena can be served on the defendants, or on any material defendant. 18 This
is the fundamental rule governing the personal jurisdiction of the Court, and
the exceptions to it are hereinabove stated.
18. The Bill may he Filed in any County in which the Defendant, or a Material^ De-
fendant, Resides, unless otherwise prescribed by law and, if, upon inquiry at his
;
residence, he is not to be found by the officer having the subpoena, he may be

proceeded against by publication or judicial attachment. 20 The exceptions to
this rule are the same as those to the preceding rule.
19. Bills Against Non-residents, or persons whose names or residence are un-
known, may be filed in the county in which the cause of action arose, or the act
on which the suit is predicated was to be performed, or in which the subject
of the suit, or any material part thereof, is. 21
20. Bills to Attach Property may be filed in any county in which the property,
or any material part thereof sought to be attached, is found at the commence-
ment of the suit. 22
21. Bills hy Distributees, or Legatees, to enforce the payment of their distrib-
utive shares, or legacies, may be filed in the county in which the estate was ad-
ministered. 23
22. Bills to Enjoin Proceedings at Law may be filed in the county in which the
suit is pending, or to which execution is issued. 24
23. Bills for Divorce may be filed in the county in which the defendant resides
or is found, or in which the parties resided at the time of their separation but ;
if the defendant is a non-resident, or a convict, then the bill may be filed in the
county where the complainant resides. 25
24. Bills by the State Against Corporations, Usurpers and Trustees, may be filed in
2810; 2902, sub-sec. 3. These sections of the Code, county, the bill could not be filed in Shelby county
(2809; 2902, sub-sec. 4,) are now considered as appli- merely because the defendant happened to be found
cable to the Chancery Court; but, when originally there: in such a case, the bill must be filed in Da-
enacted, they applied exclusively to suits in "the vidson county, unless there be ground of imperative
Courts of Law." Acts of 1849-50, ch. 60 § 2. The local jurisdiction in Shelby (as in case of a bill to
statutes localizing the Chancery jurisdiction, speak recover a tract of land situated in Shelby,); then the
of "districts," and not "counties," Code, §§ 4308 bill must be filed in Shelby county, notwithstanding
4311; 2209; 2267; 2451; 3649; 4236; 3412; 4297. In- both complainant and defendant reside in Davidson.
deed, the statute was inapplicable, when originally If a local suit be brought in the wrong county
passed, to all Chancery districts, including more the Court will have no jurisdiction, even by consent.
than one county; and there were then many such Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432; Mills V. Haley,
districts. Nashville, 1906.
When separate Chancery Courts were first estah 18 Code, §4305; Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Tenn. Ch.,
lished in Tennessee the State was divided into two 647. If the defendant, or a material defendant, can
Chancery Divisions, (ante, §§ '12 and 13,) and the be found even temporarily in a county, the bill may
various counties in each Division were grouped in be filed in such county, provided process can be
Chancery districts, the Court being held in some there served on him, and provided, further, there
one town in each district. As the State increased in is no statute expressly requiring the bill to be filed
population and wealth the number of Chancery Di- elsewhere. Roper v. Roper, 3 Tenn. Ch., 53.
visions was increased and the size of the Chancery 10A material defendant is one who has an inter-
districts decreased, until at last each county became est in the matter in controversy, or a right which U
a Chancery district, so that in Chancery nomencla- to be affected by the decree, or is in possession of
ture, county and "district" became synonymous. In the property, claiming some interest in it. Simonton
codifying the statutes, the substitution of the word v. Porter, 1 Bax., 213. Jackson V. Tiernan, 10
"county" for "Chancery district" was not always Yerg., 175. A
trustee is a material defendant. Helm
made, and some confusion has resulted therefrom, V. Barnes, 1 Lea, 388.
See. Code, §§2209; 2267; 2451; 3412; 3649; 4236; 20 Code, §4311, sub-sec. 1. The object of this
4297; 4308: 4311; and, see, also Armstrong v. State, provision was to give the Court jurisdiction of the
1 Cold., 337; State, ex rel., v. Lindsay, 19 Pick., defendant in the county of his residence, when he
625; 641. cannot, for any reason, be personally served with
16 That is, if all the complainants, and all the process. Parkes u. Parkes, 3 Tenn. Ch., 647. As to
defendants, jive in the same county, then the bill the judicial attachment, see Code, § 3466.
must be filed in tliat county; unless the statute lo- 21 Code, §4311, sub-sec. 4.
calizes the suit by requiring it to be brought in some 22 Code, §4311, sub-sec. 5. Morrow v. Fossick,
specified county, and then it must be brought in the 3 Lea, 129.
county specified. All suits affecting land must be 2S Code, § 2312; Parkes v. Parkes, 3 Tenn. Ch.,
filed in the county where the land is located; such 647.
suits are termed local suits. 24 Code, §4311, sub-sec. 3.
17 To make this more plain, suppose the com- 25 Code, §§ 2451-2451 a.
plainant, and the defendant, both reside in Davidson
161 WHERE THE BILE MAY BE ElLED. §178
the county where the office is usurped or held, or the corporation holds its meet-
ings, or has its principal place of business, or where the trustees reside or are
found. 26
25. Bills for a Mandamus must be filed in the county where the land lies,
when land is the subject of controversy; in all other cases, in the county where
the defendant resides, unless he is a public officer or corporation, and then in
the county in which the office is kept, or the corporation does business. 27
In determining the venue, the complainant should consider
1. Whether the suit in any way affects the title or possession of realty, or
any interest in or lien on realty if so, the bill must be filed in the county where
;
such realty, or a material part of it, lies, 28 unless the statute expressly allows
the bill to be filed in some other county.
2. If realty is in no way affected by the suit, and the action is transitory, 29
then the bill may be filed in any county where the defendant, or a material de-
fendant resides, or may be served with subpoena, unless the statute expressly
requires the bill to be filed in some other county.
3. If there be more than one county in which his bill may be filed, he may
file it in either as may suit his convenience. 30
§ 178. —
Filing of the Bill. After the bill has been duly signed, and, if neces-
sary, verified, it must then be presented to the Clerk of the Court specified in
the address, and asked to be filed. If the bill has not already been endorsed, the
Clerk should, thereupon, endorse it as follows
ENDORSEMENTS ON THE BILL. •
No. 284.31
John Jones, et al., S2

vs.
William Richardson, et al.
Original Bill.
Filed, June 1, 1890.33

Coram Acuff, C. & M.
A. L. Evans,
Solicitor for Complainant.
has already been properly endorsed, the Clerk will merely add to
If the bill
the endorsement the date, and in attachment bills, the hour and minute of the
filing. Bills in Chancery may be filed at any time, in term or in vacation. 34
On the bill being received by the Clerk, the suit is commenced. 35
26 Code, § 3411. A cause is known by its style, as a man is known
27 Code, § 3568. by his name; and any change in the style of a cause
28 All suits relating to land, or injuries to land sure to create confusion, and may cause loss.
or liens or incumbrances on land, are local; and the
is
A
paper or order mis-styled may be stricken from the
reason they are ordinarily required to be brought files on motion; and. though copied into a transcript,
in the county where the land lies is the records af- may be ignored in the Supreme Court. Neither So-
fecting the title are, ordinarily, in such county, and licitors nor Clerks are sufficiently careful about giv-
should remain there. ing every cause its true and due style. So great
29 All suits relating to the person, whether ex con- has been the evil resulting, that Legislative action
tractu or ex delicto not affecting realty, are transi- has been taken, prohibiting the Clerks from chang-
tory. In transitory suits the venue follows the pering the style of any cause, or papers in the same,
son of the defendant.. Debitum et contractus sunt without permission of the Chancellor. M. & V.'s
nullius loci, (Debt and contract are of no place.) Code, § 3664. Besides, a change of style often re-
Actor sequitur forum rei. (The plaintiff must sue sults in the same cause being indexed under two or
in the Court where the defendant lives.) more different styles, in consequence of which it is
30 The utmost caution should be exercised in difficult to find all the entries in a ca(ise; and im-
choosing the venue, as many suits are ultimately lost portant matters are thus left out of a transcript,
in consequence of the bills having been filed in the thereby causing delay, confusion and loss.
wrong county. See Mills V. Haley. Mss.. Nashville, 33 On an attachment bill, the hour and minute, as
1906; Nashville V. Webb, 6 Cates, 432. A local suit well as the day, of the filing should be endorsed.
brought in the wrong county can only result in a When a paper is duly entitled and filed, and the
void decree. Ibid. But a transitory suit brought filing verified by the Clerk's signature, it is said to
in the wrong county may be prosecuted to a valid have on "the wedding garment."
decree unless abated by plea of the defendant. Code, 34 Code, § 4329.
§ 2812. 35 In the Circuit Court a suit is commenced by the
31 This should be the Rule Docket number. issuance of the summons. Code, §2813; and no
32 This abbreviation of the caption of the bill is summons can issue until the costs are secured or
termed the title or style of the cause, and all the pa- paupered, Code, §§ 3187; 3192. But in the Chancery
pers filed in the cause should bear this same title Court a suit is commenced by filing the bill. Code,
§ 179 PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE TO COSTS. 162
§ 179. Considered Filed. A pleading is deemed to be
When a Pleading is —
filed when it is delivered to the proper officer, and by him received to be kept
on file. 36 The Clerk is required to note upon the pleadings the date of the fil-
ing 36a but this is not an absolute prerequisite, 3
;
nor is the date conclusive-
''
upon the parties it may be shown by parol proof that the pleading was filed at
:
some other time. 38 When the date of filing does not appear on the bill, it may be
inferred from the date of the bond and of the issuance of the writ. 39 If the oppo-
site party does not, in due time, take advantage of the fact that a pleading is
not marked filed, he will be deemed to have waived such irregularity, and will
not be allowed to take advantage of it, after having taken some step which rec-
ognizes the pleading as duly filed. 40
In general, a pleading is deemed filed when handed to the Clerk, or to a per-
son in the Clerk's office authorized to receive it, 41 and the failure of the Clerk,
or deputy, to properly mark it filed should in no way prejudice the party
filing it.
42
ARTICLE III.
PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE TO COSTS.
§ 180. Securing the Costs of the Suit. § 182. Taking the Pauper Oath.
§ 181. Form of the Bond for Costs. § 183. Forms of Pauper Oaths.
§ 180. —
Securing the Costs of the Suit, After the bill has been duly signed,
and necessary, verified, it must be presented to the Clerk of the Court speci-
if
fied in the address, with a request that it be filed. This request should be ac-
companied with security 1 for the costs of the suit, or a pauper oath; but the
bond or oath may be filed after the bill has been filed. 2
The security must undertake to pay all costs that may, at any time, be ad-
judged against his principal, in the event it is not paid by said principal; and
no omission, or neglect, to insert this undertaking in the bond will prevent the
security being held liable as stated. 3
All persons who file bills or petitions, requiring a subpoena to answer, must
give this security for costs, or take the pauper's oath, except the State: 4 coun-
ties and municipal corporations are not excepted. 5
§ 4312; or by handing it to the Clerk or anyone in evidence. The defendant's plea, of the statute oE
his office authorized to receive it. Montgomery 7'. limitations, was accordingly overruled. See, also,
Buck, 6 Hum., 416; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 399; Collins v. Rush ». Rush, 13 Pick., 279.
N. B. & M. Insurance Co., 7 Pick., 432; and the Carter v. Wolfe, 1 Heisk., 694.
3,9
cause is pending from such filing, even though pro- 40 Fanning v. Fly, 2 Cold., 486; Mason e. Spur-
cess is not issued promptly, Ibid.; and no cost bond lock, 4 Bax., 560; See Waiver, ante, § 71.
given until long afterwards. Cowan, McClung & 41 Rush v. Rush, 13 Pick., 279.
Co., v. Donaldson, 11 Pick., 322. See Cooper & 42 Montgomery v. Buck, 6 Hum., 416.
Stockell V. Stockard, 16 tea, 143. See, ante, § 132, 1 Code, §§4339; 3187.
where suits at law and suits in Chancery are con- The bond may be taken on the street. Hansard
2
trasted. v. Bank, 5 Hum., 53; and may be given after the
36 Fanning- v. Fly, 2 Cold., 486. See note 35, bill has been filed. Cowan, McClung & Co.. v. Don-
supra. aldson, 11 Pick., 322. See ante, § 179.
30a Chan. Rule, I, §3; Code, §4339. » Code, §§ 3196o-3196c; 4493; Ogg v. Leinart, 1
'37 Fanning V. Fly, 2 Cold., 486. Heisk., 43; Burson v. Mahoney, 6 Bax., 304; Denton
38 Montgomery v. Buck, 6 Hum., 416. In this v. Woods, 11 Lea, 508.
case, the Clerk being absent, the bill was delivered, i Code, § 2806.
in June, to a person occupying the same office as 5 Memphis v. Fisher, 9 Bax., 239. The sureties on
the Clerk, and authorized, by the Clerk, to act for all bonds taken in the Chancery Court should be
him, during his absence. The Clerk, on his return, residents, and have property enough within the State
marked the bill filed in September. The defendants, subject to execution to satisfy the bond. Both the
relying on the statute of limitations, which barred persons and the property of all sureties should be
the suit if the bill was filed in September, the Su- within>he jurisdiction of the Court, to the end that
preme Court, on these facts, held that the bill was the Court may enforce any orders, in reference to
filed in June, and that this could be shown by parol either, necessary in the progress of the cause.
163 PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE; TO COSTS. §181
§ 181. Form of the Bond for Costs. The old form of prosecution bonds is —
not in conformity with the present statutes; but inasmuch as the statute, by
its own operation, writes the proper conditions in all prosecution bonds, any
6
omission, or neglect, to insert these conditions does not impair their validity.
The form of the bond is, therefore, immaterial, if there is enough of it to show
7
that it was intended for a prosecution bond in the particular suit.
To adapt the old forms to the present law, the following would be the
FORM OF A PROSECUTION BOND.
Whereas, John Jones has this day filed a bill, in the Chancery Court at Wartburg, against
William Richardson [and others,] now we, the said John Jones, as principal, and Richard Roe,
as surety, acknowledge ourselves indebted to the said William Richardson [and his co-defend-
ants,] in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars but this obligation to be void if we pay
;
all costs that may be at any time adjudged against said John Jones in said suit.
This June 1, 1890. John Jones,

Richard Roe.
The following form of bond would more nearly comply with the statute, 8 and
is more brief
ANOTHER FORM OF PROSECUTION BOND.
John Jones i
vs. \ In the Chancery Court at Wartburg.

William Richardson, et al. J
We, John Jones and Richard Roe, undertake in the penal sum of two hundred and fifty
dollars, to pay all costs that may at any time be adjudged against the complainant in said
cause, in the event the same are not paid by him.
This June 1, 1890. John Jones,
Richard Roe.
Or, the following obligation, written below the bill, will constitute a suffi-
cient bond, and is often adopted, especially where the Solicitor himself secures
the costs
SHORT FORM OF A PROSECUTION BOND.
We
hereby acknowledge ourselves security for all costs adjudged against the complainant,
in the foregoing cause. June 1, 1890. John Brown,
Richard Roe.
however, best to have the complainant himself sign the cost bond, es-
It is,
pecially when he does not sign the bill in person. Such signing is proof of the
•retainer. Where a suit is by a firm the bond may be signed by a member in the
firm name. 9
If the Clerk and Master has any doubts as to the sufficiency of the sureties
tendered on any bond, he should require them to justify, on oath, in writing. 10
This justification may be written on, or beneath the bond, as follows
AFFIDAVIT OF JUSTIFICATION BY SURETIES.
State of Tennessee, }
County of Knox. J
John Brown and Richard Roe, the sureties on the foregoing bond, being severally sworn,
John Brown says that he owns property subject to execution, worth one thousand dollars,
over and above all exemptions and just debts; and Richard Roe says that he owns property,
subject to execution, worth three thousand dollars, over and above all exemptions and just
debts. John Brown,
[Jurat, as in the form below :]
Richard Roe.
§ 182. Taking the Pauper Oath. —Any

person, with the exceptions stated
below, may file a bill, without giving security for costs, by taking and sub-
scribing the following oath r
11
Code, §§ 3 196o-3 196c. See preceding section.

6 have property in the State subject to execution,
Broyles V. Blair, 7 Yerg., 279. For form of an
7 worth the penalty above their debts.
injunction bond, see Chapter on Injunctions, post: 11 Code, § 3192. The Act of 1879, cli. 94, exclud-
and for attachment bonds, see Chapter on Attach- ing all persons from the benefit of the pauper oath
ments, post. except resident citizens of the State, does not apply
8 Code, § 3196a. to suits in theChancery Court. Hillard V. Stark, 14
9 Brooks & Bro. V. Hartman, 1 Heisk., 39. Lea, 9.
10 State V. Wilson, 3 Pick., 693. Sureties should
§182 PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE TO COSTS. 164
PAUPER OATH.
State of Tennessee, \
County of Jefferson, j
I, John Jones, do solemnly swear that I am a resident of said State, and that owing to
my poverty, I not able to bear the expenses of the suit I am about to commence, in the
am
Chancery Court of Jefferson county, against William Richardson and Henry Johnson, and
that I am justly entitled to the redress sought, 13 to the best of my belief. John Jones.
Sworn to and subscribed,
before me, June 1, 1890.
D. H. Meek, C. & M.
Where there are more than one complainant they must all take the oath, ex-
cept in case of husband and wife and then the oath of the husband, alone, is
;
sufficient for both himself and wife. 14 The oath may be taken before the Clerk
and Master, or before the Clerk of any Court in this State, 15 or before a Justice
of the Peace 16 but not before a notary public of another State. 17 The Clerk
;
and Master is bound to accept the pauper oath, if tendered in lieu of a bond:
he has no discretion in the matter. 18
1. The Pauper Oath Cannot be Taken by the Following Persons:
1. Non-residents of the State. 19 If a resident after commencing his suit on
the pauper oath becomes a non-resident he may be required to secure the sub-
sequent costs. 20
2. Persons suing for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or slan-
derous words. 21
3. Persons suing for an absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony. 22
4. Persons instituting in the Chancery Court suits cognizable in the Courts
of Admiralty of the United States. 23
5. Informers bringing qui tarn suits. 24
6. Persons filing a replevin bill. 26 They may take the pauper oath as to the
costs, but must, notwithstanding, give bond in double the value of the prop-
erty. 26
2. The Pauper Oath Can be Taken by the Following Persons, on Complying with
the Statutory Requirements.
1. Next Friends of Married Women in this State, on the next friend taking and
subscribing to an oath that the married Woman in whose behalf the action is
begun [sic] is not able, and has not sufficient property, to bear the expense
of an action about to be commenced and that such married woman is justly
;
entitled to the relief sought to the best of his belief. 27

2. Next Friends of Infants in this State, on the next friend taking and sub-
scribing to an oath that the infant in whose behalf the action is begun [sic]
is not able, and has not sufficient property to bear the expenses of the action
about to be commenced; and that such infant is justly entitled to the relief
sought, to the best of his [affiant's] belief. 28
12 The pauper oath may be amended. Adamson l\ ing on, or growing out of the building, repair, sup-
Hurt, 3 Shan. Cas., 424. ply, equipment or navigation of, boats operated for
13 This statement is essential, and cannot be omit- commercial purposes on our rivers, and all contracts,
ted. McKienavy v. Pickard, 3 Shan. Cas., 411. express or implied, between the owners or operators
14 Grills v. Hill, 2 Sneed, 711; McPhatridge v. of such boats, or their agents, on one side, and their
Gregg, 4 Cold., 324. employes, passengers, consignors, consignees, mate-
_
15 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Smith, 2 Pick., 45. rial men, and all other persons, on the other side, in
10 Phipps V. Burnett, 12 Pick., 175, overruling reference to employment, wages, material, freight,
Graham v. Caldwell, 8 Baxter, 70. fares, transportation, risks, duties, liabilities and all
17 Fawcett V. Railway Co., 5 Cates, 246. other matters relating to such boats, or their equip-
18 Morris V. Smith, 11 Hum., 134; Snyder «. Sum- ment, manning, freightage, navigation or operation.
mers, 1 Lea, 483. See Bouvier's I,aw Die. "Admiralty." The Act of
19 Act of 1903, ch. 197; Acts of 1901, ch. 126. 1897, ch. 100, is constitutional. Kling v. Packet Co.,
20 Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 1 Cates, 343. 17 Pick., 99. Courts of Admiralty have jurisdiction
21 No such suits can be brought in the Chancery over the waters of all navigable rivers. Ibid.
Court. 24 Johnson v. Hunter, 9 Bax., 684.
22 Acts of 1903, ch. 197. The proviso in this Act 25 Creamer v. Ford, 1 Heisk., 308; Horton V. Vow-
allowing a married woman suing for an absolute di- ell, 4 Heisk., 623; Stone v. Hopkins, 11 Heisk., 192;
vorce to deposit six dollars in cash in lieu of a bond Kincaid v. Bradshaw, 6 Bax. 103.
and security for costs is probably unconstitutional. 20 Horton V. Vowell, 4 Heisk., 623.
See Const. Art. XI., sec. 8. 27 Act of 1903, ch. 581.
23 Acts of 1897, ch. 100; Acts of 1901, ch. 126. 28 Acts of 1889, ch. 105. The language of the
Admiralty suits include all causes of action originat- statute is followed in the text.
165 PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE TO COSTS. §183
3. Guardians of Idiots, Lunatics and Persons of Unsound Mind, appointed by
any Court of this State, on the guardian taking and subscribing an oath that
he has no property of such idiot, lunatic or person of unsound mind out of
which to bear the expenses of the suit he is about to commence, and that he
verily believes that such idiot, lunatic or person of unsound mind is justly
entitled to the redress sought. 29 But he cannot bring a suit for false impris-
onment, malicious prosecution or slanderous words, on the pauper oath. 30
4. Personal Representatives of Estates of Deceased Persons in this State, on
the representative taking and subscribing an oath that he, as such personal
representative, has no property belonging to the estate of the deceased, out of
which to bear the expenses of the suit, and that he verily believes that the
estate, for the benefit of which the action is brought, is justly entitled to the
redress sought. The personal representative incurs no personal liability on
account of such suit unless the Court trying the same should be of opinion and
adjudge that the suit was frivolous or malicious. 31
5. A N
on-Resident who Qualifies as Executor or Administrator, in this State, of
a person dying in this State, and leaving assets here. 32
6. Persons Suing for Divorce from Bed and Board, on taking the ordinary
pauper oath. 33
3. Requirements as to Taking the Pauper Oath When the pauper oath is
taken (1) by next friends of married women or of infants, or (2) by guardians
of idiots, lunatics or persons of unsound mind, or (3) by personal representa-
tives, care should be taken to comply with the respective statutory require-
ments, for a pauper oath that materially varies from the requirements in the
particular case would be a nullity, 34 unless amended by leave of the Court. 35
The pauper oath may be taken, not only in lieu of the .ordinary prosecution
bond, but it may be taken in lieu of an attachment bond, 36 or an injunction
bond. 37 It cannot, however, be taken by the complainant in a replevin bill,
but may be in a detinue bill. 38 A
defendant to an inquisition of lunacy may
appeal on the pauper oath. 39
§ 183. —
Forms of Pauper Oaths. In addition to the form of a pauper oath
in the preceding section, the following forms are given:
PAUPER OATH BY NEXT ERIEND.
County of S
I, John Doe,as next friend of Mary Den, a married woman [or infant] do solemnly swear
that we are both residents of said State, and that said Mary Den is not able, and has not
sufficient property to bear the expense of the suit begun 40 this day [or about to be commenced]
by me as her next friend, in the Chancery Court of said county, against Richard Roe, and
that she is justly entitled to the relief sought to the best of my belief. John Doe.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of , 190.
O. K., C. & M.
PAUPER OATH BY A GUARDIAN OP A NON COMPOS.
County of J
I, John Doe, by appointment of the County Court of said county, guardian of Henry
Doe,
an idiot, [lunatic, or person of unsound mind,] do solemnly swear that we are both residents
of said State, and I have no property of said Henry Doe out of which to bear the expenses of
29 Acts of 1871, ch. 111. Such guardian incurs 34 McKienavy v. Pickard, 3 Shan. Cas., 411.
no personal liability for such suit unless so decided 35 Adamson v. Hurt, 3 Shan. Cas., 424.
by the Court in which the suit is brought or decided. 36 Barber V. Denning, 4 Sneed, 267.
Ibid. 37 Bridges v. Robinson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 352. But to
30 Ibid. entitle a complainant to take the pauper oath in
31 Acts of 1897, ch. 133. An administrator with lieu of an injunction bond, the Chancellor must so
the will annexed should not be permitted to pros- direct. See Chapter on Injunctions, post, § 831
ecute an appeal on the pauper oath when the estate 38 Stone v. Hopkins, 11 Heisk., 190. But see, in-
has assets. Crocker v. Balch, 20 Pick., 6. A non- fra.
resident administrator cannot sue under the pauper 39 Davis V. Norvell, 3 Pick., 36.
oath. Fawcett v. Railway Co., 5 Cates, 246. 40 In the Chancery Court, the suit is begun when
32 Railroad v. Maxwell, 5 Cates, 464; Acts of the bill is filed, and before the pauper oath or pros-
1903, ch. 501. ecution bond is filed. See, ante, §§ 179-180.
33 Acts of 1903, ch. 197.
§183 PROCEEDINGS IN REFERENCE TO COSTS. 166
a suit I am about to commence, [or have commenced] as said guardian, against Richard Roe,
in the Chancery Court of said county, and that I verily believe that said Henry Doe is justly-
entitled to the relief sought. John Doe.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of 190
,
O. K., C. & M.
PAUPEB OATH BY AN ADMINISTRATOR OR EXECUTOR.
County of )
I, John Doe, as administrator of the estate, [or executor of the will] of Henry Doe, do
solemnly swear that I am a resident of said State, and that as said administrator [or executor]
I have no property belonging to the estate of said Henry Doe out of which to bear the
expenses of the suit, which I am about to commence, [or have commenced] in the Chancery
Court of said county against Richard Roe, and that I verily believe that said estate is justly
entitled to the redress sought. John Doe.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this day of , 190....
O. K., C. & M.
167 ORIGINAL PROCESS IN CHANCERY. § 184
CHAPTER X.
ORIGINAL PROCESS IN CHANCERY.
Article I. Original Processes generally Considered.
Article II. Subpoena to Answer.
Article III. Process by Publication.
Article IV. Attachments to Compel an Answer.
ARTICLE I.
ORIGINAL PROCESSES GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 184. Process Defined. § 186. When Original Process May be Is-
§ 185. Original Processes generally Consid- sued, and Executed, on Sunday.
ered.
§ 184. —
Process Denned. Process is the means whereby a Court compels a
defendant to appear before it, or comply with its commands, and is of three
kinds 1, Original 2, Mesne, or Intermediate and 3, Pinal. 1
: ; ;
1. Original Process includes: (1) the subpoena to answer the original bill; (2)
an attachment of the person, or of the property, of the defendant to bring him
into Court; (3) notice by publication to the defendant to answer the original
bill; and (4) an alternative mandamus.
2. Mesne, or Intermediate, Process includes: (1) subpoenas to answer supple-
mental and amended bills, and bills of revivor; (2) subpoenas for witnesses, (3)
injunctions, (4) attachments for violations of injunctions or for other con-
tempts; (5) ancillary attachments of property; (6) writs of scire facias, and
by interlocutory orders.
(7) other writs occasioned
Pinal Process includes: (1) writs of fieri facias, or executions for money,
3.
(2) writs of possession in enforcement of a final decree, (3) attachments against
the person, or property, of a party in enforcement of a final decree 2 (4) man- ;
datory injunctions; (5) writs of distringas, 3 (6) writs of sequestration; 4 (7)

writs of peremptory mandamus ; and (8) writs of restitution.
§ 185. Original Processes generally Considered. —Original processes in the
Chancery Court are the following:
1. Subpoena. This is the ordinary process whereby a defendant is brought
before the Court to answer a bill. It is sometimes called a subpoena to answer 5
in order to distinguish it from a subpoena to testify. This writ is served upon
the person of the defendant by the Sheriff reading it to him.
2. Attachment of Property. Sometimes the defendant cannot well be person-
ally served with process, and yet has property within the jurisdiction of the
Court. In such cases, his property is seized by the Sheriff in obedience to a
writ, and this fact, coupled with a notice to him to appear, is published in some
newspaper, and this is called process by attachment of property and pub-
lication. 6
3. Publication. When the person of the defendant cannot be reached for any
1 Bouv. Law Die, "Process;" Code, §§4348-4349. 4 Code, § 4487.

See White v. The State, 3 Heisk., 338; McGavock v. 5 Code, §§ 4339-4349.
Young, 3 Tenn. Ch., 53}... 6 For proceedings in suits begun by attachment of
2 Code, §§ 4478-4488. property, see Chapter on Suits by Attachment, post,
3 Code, § 3000. §§ 869-890.
§186 ORIGINAL PROCESS IN CHANCERY. 168
reason, and he Has no property that can be attached, he may be brought before
the Court by a notification to appear, published in a newspaper. This sort of
process is called process by publication. 7
4. Attachment of the Person. When a defendant violates some process, order,
or rule, of Court, he is in contempt. In such cases, an order is issued to bring
him before the Court under arrest. This is termed process of contempt, or
attachment of the person. 6 When a defendant, upon whom a subpoena has been
served, fails to answer, the complainant may have his person attached, and
held in custody, until he answers. This writ is not strictly original, but rather
ancillary to the original writ; but, inasmuch as it compels the defendant to
answer the original bill, it is here considered.
No person can be bound or affected by any judicial proceedings, unless
actually, or constructively, notified thereof, previous to such proceeding. 9
Actual notice consists of the service of process upon him in person. Construc-
tive notice may consist of (1) indirect service of process, by leaving a copy at
his usual residence, when he evades service; or (2) of seizing his property,
and by publication of the fact and of the suit in a newspaper; or (3) by publi-
cation of the suit without seizure of his property. Where a statute authorizes
judgment to be taken summarily, on motion without notice, the defendant, who
entered into the obligation on which the judgment is taken, is presumed to
have waived notice, and consented in advance to such judgment, when he
signed the obligation, he being presumed to know that the law allowed judg-
ment in such a case, without notice to him.
5. Alternative Mandamus. This writ will be considered hereafter in connec-
tion with suits for a peremptory mandamus, of which the Chancery Court now
has jurisdiction. 10
§ 186. When Original Process may be Issued, and Executed, on Sunday. —
Civil process, including subpoena to answer, may be issued on any day, and
at any hour of the day; but it cannot be issued on Sunday, unless the party
applying therefor, or his agent, or attorney, make oath, or affirmation, that
the defendant is removing, or about to remove, himself or property beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court in which the bill is filed. This affidavit should be
endorsed on the back of the process and the Clerk and Master should state;
under the affidavit, that the process was obtained on the affidavit. 11 This
affidavit and statement may be as follows
AFFIDAVIT FOB PROCESS ON SUNDAY.

John Doe ]
vs. !
Richard Roe. J
In this cause, John Doe [or Frank Diligent, agent, or attorney, of John Doe,] makes oath
[or affirms'] that ttie defendant, Richard Roe, is removing, or about to remove himself [or
property] beyond the jurisdiction of the Court; and he prays' that a subpoena to answer [or
an attachment, or injunction, or ne exeat, 12 ] may issue and be served instanter. John Doe.
Sworn to and' subscribed
before me, April S, 1891.
N. H. Greer, C. & M. _
This writ was obtained on the preceding oath, and the Sheriff will execute it todav. April
S, 1891. N. H. Greer, C. & M.
Upon receipt of such a writ, it is the duty of the officer to whom it is ad-
and the proceedings are coram non judice, and ab-

7 Publication is original process. McGavock v. solutely void. See maxim, ante, § 60.
Young, 3 Tenn. Ch., 531. 10 See, post, Article on Suits of Mandamus, §§
3 Code, §§ 4360-4361. 1084-1087.
The law delights in giving to every man a day in ii Code, §§ 2824-2825.
Court to make his defense. Peck, J., in Roberts & 12 The Code does not expressly authorize the issu-
Phillips V. Stewart, 1 Yerg., 392. Notice, of some _
ance, and service, of attachments, injunctions, or ne
kind, actual or constructive, is necessary to vitalize exeats, on Sunday; but the term, process, includes
the jurisdiction of the Court over the defendant; them, and they are within both the letter and the
and, if there be no notice, there is no jurisdiction, reason of the law.
169 SUBPCENA TO ANSWER. §is;
13
dressed to execute it on Sunday, and he should use great diligence in so doing.
The Sheriff cannot, however, execute civil process on Sunday in any other case,
unless it shall appear to his satisfaction that the defendant is about to leave
the country, or State. 14
ARTICLE II.
SUBPCENA TO ANSWER.
§ 187. Form of the Subpoena. § 192. Service of Subpoenas.
§ 188. Counterpart Subpoenas. § 193. Service of Subpoenas on Corporations.
§ 189. Requisites of a Subpoena. § 194. Process against Other Defendants.
§ 190. Return Day of Subpoenas. § 195. Alias Process:
§ 191. Issuance of Subpoenas.
§ 187. Form of the Subpoena. subpoena —A implies a penalty, and formerly

there was a pecuniary penalty prescribed in the writ for failure to obey it;
but the present form of the subpoena contains no penalty. Indeed, a subpcena
15 The following is
is now merely a summons. the
STATUTORY FORM OF A SUBPOENA TO ANSWER."
Blount County. j
To the Sheriff of Blount County
SummonRichard Roe and Peter Poe to appear, on or before the 19th day of April next,
before the Chancery Court at Maryville, to answer the bill of John Doe and have you then ;
and there this writ.

This 2nd day of March, 1891. W. C. ChumlBa, C. & M.
This form is very similar to the form of the summons used in the Courts of
law. 17 The form indicates that the writ should bear the date of its issuance.
The practice still exists, however, of testing the subpoena of the first day of the
preceding regular term and this usage is so general and ancient as to have the
;
force of law. 18 The better practice, nevertheless, is the one contemplated by

the statute. Any defect in this particular, however, is cured by the statutory
requirement, and consequent practice, of endorsing on the writ the date of its
issuance. 19
§ 188. —
Counterpart Subpoenas. When there are defendants in another or
other counties from that in which the bill is filed, the complainant may cause
counterpart subpoenas to be issued to any county or counties where any of the
defendants are most likely to be found. 20 But where the suit is brought on
13 Code, §§ 2826; 4093, sub-sec. 7. If there be a rule of Court, making the rule days
14 Code, 2827; Acts of 1885, ch. 53. return days, for original process, then the defendant
15 Heisk. Dig., p. 562, note. In the Code, § 4306, may be commanded "to appear, on or before the first
it is called a summons. Monday in April next, at the office of the Clerk and
16 The following forms are often used: Master of the Chancery Court, in Maryville, to an-
State of Tennessee, 1 swer the bill of John Doe, filed against him, in said
County of Blount, J . Court; and have you then and there this writ."
To the Sheriff of Blount County: ir Code, §2815.
Summon [or, you are hereby commanded to sum- 18 Communis error facit jus.
mon,] Richard Roe, Roland Roe, Robert Roe, and 18 Code, §2819. The Code, §2828, requires that
Peter Poe, to appear, on or before the third Monday all process, issued from any of ^ the Circuit Courts,
of April next, before the Chancery Court at Mary- and returnable thereto, shall be* tested of the term
ville, [or, to appear at the next term of the Chan- next preceding the issuance, but there is no such re-
cery- Court, to be held for said county, at the Court quirement as to subpcenas in Chancery. This method
House, in Maryville, on the third Monday in Aprii of testing Circuit Court writs is that existing at
next, then and there,] to answer the bill of com- common law, and our Chancery Clerks have borrowed
plaint filed against them, and others, by John Doe; their custom from the Circuit Clerks.
and have you then and there this writ. 20 Code, §§ 2821; 4306. But where a suit is local,
As witness my hand, at office in Maryville, the and must be brought in a particular county, a party
third Monday in October, 1890. cannot by a counterpart subpoena be sued in any
W. C. ChumuSa, C. & M. other county. Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432.
Endorsed, "Issued, Mar. 2, 1891."
8 189 SUBPCENA TO ANSWER. 170
negotiable paper, service of a counterpart writ on a joint drawer or maker
will not be sufficient to hold him to answer the bill, unless the original writ has
been executed on a joint drawer or maker. 21
When a counterpart subpoena issues, the Clerk and Master will endorse 22 on
it the following: "This is a counterpart of an original subpoena to answer,
issued in Blount county, for Richard Roe. "W. C. Chumlea, C. & M." And he
will, at the same time, endorse on the original subpoena the following: "A
counterpart of this subpoena to answer issued to Roane county, for Peter Poe.
W. C. Chumlea, C. & M." The only differences between a counterpart and an
original subpcena are: (1) they are addressed to the Sheriffs of different
counties; (2) they contain the names of different defendants, 23 and (3) their
endorsements show that one is the original and the other a counterpart.
§ 189. —
Requisites of a Subpcena. The essentials of a subpcena are as fol-
lows must begin with the name of the State and the county: The Con-
: 1, It
stitution says all writs and other process shall run in the name of the State. 24
2, It must be addressed to the Sheriff of the county wherein it is to be served,
or, if he is incompetent, to the Coroner. 3, It must name the defendants to be
summoned, or otherwise so describe them that the officer may know them. 25
4, It must specify when, and the particular Court, Chancellor, or Clerk, before
whom the defendant must appear. 5, It must state the purpose for which he
must appear, and give the name of the person filing the bill. 6, It must be
dated, or at least must have the date of its issuance endorsed on it. 7, It must
be signed by the Clerk and Master, or his deputy. 26
If these requirements are substantially complied with, the subpoena will be
sufficient, immaterial errors of form or substance being disregarded. 27
§ 190. —
Return Day of Subpoenas. The subpcena must show on its face
when and where the defendant must appear. If the subpoena be to answer an
original bill, it may require the defendant to appear before the Court on or
before the first day of the next regular term, or it may require him to appear
at a rule day, fixed by a rule of the Court 28 but subpoenas to answer supple-
;
mental and amended bills, and bills of revivor, and all other mesne subpoenas,
shall require the defendant to appear at a rule day. 29 When the subpoena is
returnable to a rule day, it may require the defendant to appear at the office
of the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court. The Court is held in the Court
room, and it would be misleading to summon the defendant to appear before
the Court on a rule day, when there is no Court on that day, except such as is
held by the Master in his office. The defendant, however, is expected to know
that the proper place for his appearance is the Master's office. 30
§ 191. —
Issuance of Subpoenas. Upon the bill being filed and the required
security given, the Clerk, after endorsing upon the bill the date of the filing,
and entering the cause on his rule-docket, shall forthwith issue a subpoena to
21 Code, §§2823; 2902, sub-sec. 5. If this law is tp "administer right and justice" in the counties
violated, a plea in abatement will lie to the bill. See wherein they are held. Constitution, Art. I., § 17.
Chapter on Pleas in Abatement. Hence, all Court writs run in the name of the
22 Code, § 2821. State. It is not the Court, nor the Clerk, that issues
23 Both subpoenas may, however, be for the same the writ, in contemplation of law, but the State; the
defendants in part, so as to get service on them in Court and the Clerk being merely the agents of the
either county. Indeed, the phraseology of the stat- State. No one but the State, and those whom she
ute would seem to indicate that counterpart writs has authorized to act and speak in her name, have
might issue simultaneously to as many counties as the authority to command a person to appear any-
there are defendants likely to be found in them. where,' or at any time, or has the rightful power to
Code, § 4306. Of course, a material defendant must call upon any one to give an account of his conduct
be served with the original, unless there be other 25 It would be sufficient to say, "the infant child
grounds of jurisdiction in the county where the bill of John and Jane Doe, under one year old."
is filed. Compare Code, §§2821; 4306; 4343. Pub- 20 Code, §4040, Constitution, Art. VI, -§12. A
lication and attachment as to parties not subpoenaed writ not signed by the Clerk is a nullity, and incapa-
are in the nature of counterpart process. Code, §§ ble of amendment. Wiley v. Bennett, 9 Bax., 581.
4307, 4352. 27 Code, §§4340; 2863-2866.
24 Constitution, Art. VI., 8 12. As in England 28 Code, § 4348.
the King was the "fountain of justice," {ante,^ §§ 2; 20 Code, § 4349.
3;) so, in Tennessee, the people, as organized in the 30 For a fuller statement of the law and practice
corporate form of a State, are the fountain of jus- of return days, see Proceedings in the Master's Of-
tice; and they have deputized, so to speak, the Courts fice, post, §§ 1155-1157; and Ch. Rule XI, § 1200.
171 .SUBPCENA TO ANSWER. §192
answer, and copy of the bill for the defendant, and all other process ordered, 31
such as counterpart subpoenas, writs of attachment, injunction or replevin, is-
suing such writs to the proper counties as shown by the bill. 32
The Clerk issues only one subpoena to each county, embracing therein all the
defendants in such county. The subpoena to the county in which the bill is
filed, shall be accompanied by one copy of the bill, to be delivered to any one
of the defendants named in the subpoena. 33
The counterpart subpoena to any other county, shall be accompanied by a
copy of the bill, to be delivered to some one of the defendants when the sub-
poena is served, and it shall be the duty of the Sheriff to read said copy to each
one of the defendants, at the time he serves the subpoena. 34
The Clerk shall issue, upon demand, to any one of the defendants, his agents
or attorneys, to whom no copy of the bill appears by the Sheriff's return to
have been delivered, a certified copy of the bill, to be charged in the bill of
costs. 35
Attachments, injunctions, and all other process issued to one county, shall
embrace the names of all the defendants required to be served therewith resid-
ing in such county. 36
Upon the proper affidavit being made, as shown in a preceding section, a
subpoena to answer, injunction or attachment, may be issued and executed on
Sunday. 37
§ 192. —
Service of the Subpoena. The Sheriff shall, with all reasonable speed,
obey the command of the subpoena, by serving it on the persons named, and
returning it on or before the day named therefor 3S and in executing the sub-
;
poena he is bound to use a degree of diligence exceeding that which a prudent

man employs in his own affairs. 39
Subpoenas to answer are served by reading them to each defendant specified
therein; and if the defendant evade, or attempt to evade, the service of such
process, the Sheriff shall leave a copy of the subpoena at the usual residence
of the defendant, which will be a sufficient service. 40
The following are forms of returns showing how the Sheriff has executed
the subpoena:
SHERIFF'S RETURNS ON SUBPOENAS.
Came to hand the same day issued [or, April 2, 1891.] Executed in full as commanded
by reading the within writ Richard Roe and Peter Poe, and by leaving a copy of the
to both
bill with Peter Poe, [and a copy of the subpcena with each of defendants, 41 ] this April 3, 1891.
J. M. Armstrong, Sheriff.
Came hand the same day issued. The defendant, Richard Roe, not found in my county.
to
Peter Poe was found, but evaded the service of the writ by hiding in his house. I, therefore,
left a copy of this writ, and a copy of the bill, at his usual residence, with his daughter, Jane
Poe, and return this writ executed as to him. Richard Roe lives in Morgan county.
April 3, 1891. J. M. Armstrong, Sheriff.
Came to hand April 2, 1893. Search made, and the defendant, Roland Roe, not to be found
in my county. 42 June 2, 1893. Thos. C. Holloway, Sheriff.
All of the defendants must be served with process, whether natural persons
31 Code, § 4339. 41 In some of the Chancery Divisions, there is a

32 Code, §§ 4306-4307. Rule of Court requiring the Clerk and Master to is-
33 Code, §§4341-4342. sue a copy of the subpcena to be left with each adult
34 Code, § 4343, as amended by Acts of 1877, ch. defendant: it is a good rule.
45. See, also, Code, § 4306. 42 The Sheriff should go to the defendant's place
35 Code, § 4344, as amended by Acts of 1877, ch. of residence, and make diligent search and inquiry
45. for him. Sending him notice of the writ, or even
36 Code, § 4345. writing to him is no service. The Sheriff is forbid-
3T Ante, § 186. den to return that the defendant "is not to be found
38 Code, § 4347. in my county," unless he shall actually have been at
39 Code, § 4093, sub-sec. 7. his place of abode. Code, § 365. If he ascertains that
40 Code, § 4346. The Sheriff's return should show the defendant is an inhabitant of another county he
how he executed the subpcena, whether by reading it will state the county. Code, § 366. There is a very
to the defendant when so served, or by leaving a material difference between a return that the defend-
copy_ at his usual place of residence when he evades ant is "not found" and a return that the defendant
service. is not to be found." See, post, % 870, sub-sec. 9.
§193 SUBPCENA TO ANSWER. 172
or corporations, male or female, infants 43 or adults, married or single, sick or
well, sane or insane. 44 The Sheriff has absolutely no discretion in executing
process, but must implicitly and fully obey its command. 443,
§ 193. Service of Subpoena on Corporations, and —
Companies. If the bill is
filed in the county in which the corporation sued keeps its chief office, the
subpoena must be served (1) on the president or other head of the corporation;
or, in his absence, (2) on the cashier; or, in his absence, (3) on the treasurer-
or, in his absence, (4) on the secretary; or, in his absence, (5) on any director
of such corporation but, if neither the president, cashier, treasurer, or secre-
;
tary resides within the State, then (6) the subpoena may be served on the chief
agent of the corporation residing in the county where the bill is filed. 45
If a corporation, company, or individual, has an office, or agency, or resident
director, in any county other than that in which the chief officer or principal
resides, service of process may be made on any agent or clerk employed therein,
in all suits brought in such county against said corporation, eompany, or indi-
vidual, growing out of, or connected with, the business of the corporation, com-
pany, or principal. 46
If a county is sued, the subpoena may be served on the County Judge, or
Chairman of the County Court. 47 If an incorporated town is sued, the subpoena
will be served on the Mayor or other head of the corporation. 48
1. Foreign Corporations Doing Business in this State are subject to suit here as
to any transaction had, in whole or in part, within this State or as to any cause ;
of action arising here, but not otherwise, and are served with process in the
same manner as domestic corporations, provided they have an office, agency or
resident director in the county where the suit is brought. 49 But a foreign cor-
poration having no office or agent in this State, can only be brought into Court
by service of subpoena upon some agent or representative, and by notice mailed
to it by the Clerk and Master, and by service of notice and copy of the process
and return thereon by the complainant, or good excuse shown for not making
such service. 50
43 It has been decided that service of process on about any matter, or in any case. Toppins V. Rail-
the general guardian of an infant will bring the in- road, 5 Lea, 600. Process, however, cannot be served
fant itself into Court, and authorize the Court to on a mere traveling agent, or drummer. Railroad
bind it by decree. Britain v. Cowan, 5 Hum., 315; Co. v. Walker, 9 Lea, 475; Lumber Co. v. Lieberman,
Cowan v. Anderson, 7 Cold., 284; Masson v. Swan, 22 Pick., 153. This is a salutary construction, for,
6 Heisk., 450; Scott v. Porter, 2 Lea, 224. These otherwise, merchants might be sued in any county
decisions, however, go to the utmost verge of the where their drummers might be served with process,
law, and it is the universal practice of Solicitors to inasmuch as the statute includes companies, and indi-
have the subpcena served upon all minors, however viduals, as well as corporations. Service on officers
young, and whether they have general guardians or holding over is sufficient. Parker v. Hotel Co., 12
not. The writ should be read to the day-old babe as Pick., 252.
well as to the stalwart adult, for the babe's rights 47 Code, §§ 402-403. Wilson v. Davidson county,
are the same as the man's, and even more jealously 3 Tenn. Ch., 536.
guarded; and the law does not vest the Sheriff with 48 Town of Wartrace v. W. & B. G. Turnpike Co.,
any discretion as to how old an infant must be before 2 Cold., 515.
it shall be servable with process, nor does the law 49 Telephone Co. v. Turner, 4 Pick., 265; Peters v.
allow the Sheriff to decide whether service on a babe Neely, 16 Lea, 275.
will be of any value or not. The law says "summon 50 Foreign corporations doing business in this
the babe;" and the Sheriff is required to obey, and State, but having no local office or agency here, are
he is liable on his bond for all damages arising to subject to suit here as to any transaction had, in
any one by his failure to obey. See, as to the ap- whole, or in part, within this State, or as to any
pointment of guardians ad litem, ante, §§ 106-108. cause of action arising here, but not otherwise. To
44 An idiot, lunatic, or deaf, or dumb person, must bring such a corporation before the Court process
be served equally as though free from these infirmi- may be served upon any agent of such corporation
ties. Rodgers v. Ellison, Meigs, 90. When, however, found within the county, where the suit is brought;
service of subpcena to answer upon a lunatic would and, in the absence of such an agent, process may
be dangerous to his health, upon this fact being made be served upon any person found within the county
clearly to appear to the Court, an order will be where the suit is brought, who represented such cor-
made allowing substituted service UDon tH e physi poration at the time the transaction, out of which tlifc
cian in charge of him. I Dan. Ch. Pr., 177; Speak suit arises, took place; or, if the agency, through
V. Metcalf, 2 Tenn. Ch., 214. The better practice, which the transaction was had, be itself a corpora-
perhaps, would be to deputize the physician to serve tion, then the process may be served upon any agent
the writ. of that corporation, upon whom process miejht be
44a As to service of subpcena in divorce suits, see, served, if it were the defendant. But, no judgment
post, § 1090. can be taken on such service, unless: (1) the Clerk
4-5 Code, §§ 2831-2833. and Master mails by registered letter, to the home
46 Code, §§ 2834-2834b. This statute gives the office of the corporation, a copy of the process; and,
complainant the right to sue a corporation, company, unless (2) the complainant lodges at the home office
or individual, in any county where it, or he, has of the company, with some person found there a t
an office, agency, or resident director; and, the suit written notice, signed by him, or his attorney, stating
need not be confined to matters connected with such that such a suit has been brought, accompanied by a
office, agency, or resident director, but may be copy of the process, and the return of the officer
173 SUBPCENA TO ANSWER. § 194
The Sheriff need not show in his return, that the person served is the presi-
dent, or other head of the corporation, or the cashier, treasurer, secretary, di-
rector, agent or clerk nor need he show the absence of the officers preceding
;
the one actually served. 51

2. Foreign Insurance Corporations and companies, including fire, life and acci-
dent, or casualty, and all. foreign fraternal beneficiary associations, are brought
into Court by service of subpcena upon the State Insurance Commissioner, who
is their attorney for that purpose, service being made on the Commissioner by
the Sheriff of the county where the Commissioner has his office. 52 But foreign
insurance companies doing business in this State through brokers are brought
into Court by service of subpcena upon an attorney designated by the defendant
corporation in the county where the complainant resides but if the defendant ;
corporation fail to designate such attorney within ten days after reception of a
registered letter notifying it of the loss, it may be brought into Court by publi-
cation. 53
§ 194. —
Process against Other Defendants. Service of process upon a non-
resident who has qualified as executor or administrator in this State, in case
the Sheriff cannot find him, may be made on the County Court Clerk of the
county wherein he qualified. The statute makes it the duty of the Clerk to
notify the defendant by mail. 54
Service of process against the owner or owners of a steamboat may be made
on any captain or clerk of the owner or owners, whether captain or clerk of
the boat in question or not. 55
§ 195. —
Alias Process. If a subpoena to answer is returned not executed the
complainant may have an alias or pluries subpcena. If the subpoena is returned
'
Not to be found in my county, "as to any defendant who is a resident of the
'
county, the complainant may have either an alias or a pluries subpoena for such
defendant; or may, at his election, have a judicial attachment against the
estate of such defendant. 56 Or, the complainant may have publication made
to bring the defendant before the Court. 57 Or, the complainant may amend his
bill, if the facts warrant it, and allege any of the statutory grounds for dis-
pensing with personal service of the subpcena, and have notice given the
defendant by publication; or, instead of amending his bill he may file a separate
affidavit stating the necessary facts. 58
Alias subpoenas, taken out at any time after the return of the original, may
be returnable to any Monday of the term, as shown elsewhere. 59
Alias and pluries subpoenas differ in form from original subpoenas only in the
opening words of the command.
thereon; these facts being proved by the affidavit of Sheriff had served the writ upon such officer or agent
the person lodging the same, stating the^ facts, and of the corporation as was necessary to the sufficient
with whom the notice was lodged. If, however, the execution of the process. Nevertheless, it is better in
complainant, or his attorney, make affidavit that he such cases for the return to name the person on
was prevented from serving the notice by circum- whom the subpcena was served. This return has
stances which reasonably excuse such service, which been held_ sufficient, prima facie: "Came to hand
circumstances shall be particularly stated in the affi- same day issued, and executed by summoning James
davit, the Court may allow judgment to be taken A. Whiteside, vice-president of the defendant, and
without affidavit of service of notice, and of the copy acting president, the 20th day of December, 1858,
of the process, if satisfied that the excuse for not
,
and, also, summoned Robert M. Hook, agent of de-
making such service is sufficient. Acts of 1887, ch. fendant, at Chattanooga, the 14th of. February,
226. This Act does not repeal Code, §§ 2831-2834, 1859." N. & C. Railroad Co. v. Eakin, 6 Cold., 582.
which apply equally to domestic and foreign corpora- 52 D'Arcy 1). Mutual Life Ins. Co., 24 Pick., 567;
tions having an office or agency in the county where Acts of 1895,. ch. 160, sec. 9; Acts of 1897, ch. 127,
the suit is brought. The act applies exclusively to sec. 5; Acts of 1901, ch. 113, sec. 6. The complain-
foreign corporations, doing business here, but having ant, in case of a suit against a foreign fraternal ben-
no local office, or resident agent, in the State. Tele- eficiary association, must pay the Insurance Com-
phone Co. v. Turner, 4 Pick., 265. See, I<ife Ins. missioner, at the time process is served on him, three
Co. V. Spratley, 15 Pick., 322. Service on an agent dollars, to be taxed as costs.
of a foreign corporation is sufficient. Ibid. State V. 53 Acts of 1895, ch. 160, sec. 47.
Insurance Co., 22 Pick., 288. 54 Acts of 1903, ch. 501.
51 Town of Wartrace v. Wartrace Turnpike Co., 2 55 Acts of 1881, ch. 66.
Cold., 515. In this case, it was by Hawkins, J., 56 See, fast, §§ 870, sub-sec. 9; 883, where the law
in his opinion, that if a subpcena commands the and practice are fully treated.
Sheriff to summon ''the town of Wartrace," a return 57 See, post, § 196.
"Executed 29th November, 1858," would be good 58 See, post, § 197.
prima facie, the presumption of law being that the 59 See, post, §§ 225-226.
196 PROCESS BY PUBLICATION. 174
ARTICLE III.
PROCESS BY PUBLICATION.
§ 196. When Process by Publication is Al- § 198. Form, Manner, and Time, of Publica-
lowed. tion.
§ 197. Proceedings Preliminary to Publica- § 199. Evidence of Publication.
tion. § 200. Effect of Publication.
§ 196. When Process by Publication is Allowed. As Courts of Equity ordi- —

narily act in personam, they require process to be served on the person of the
defendant, unless otherwise prescribed by law. 1 But, as personal service of
process cannot always be had, the statute dispenses with personal service of
process on the defendant in the Chancery Court, in the following cases
1. When the defendant is a non-resident of the State. 2
2. When upon inquiry at his usual place of abode, he cannot be found so as
to be served with process, and there is just ground to believe he has gone be-
yond the limits of the State.
3. When the Sheriff shall make return upon any leading process that he is
not to be found. 3
4.•
When the name of the defendant is unknown, and cannot be ascertained
upon diligent inquiry. 4
5. When the residence of the defendant is unknown, and cannot be ascer-
tained upon diligent inquiry.
6. When judicial and other attachments will lie, under the provisions of the
Code, against the property of the defendant. 5
§ 197. Proceedings Preliminary to Publication. To dispense with personal —
service of process in any of the cases specified in tbe preceding section, the
facts, on which such dispensation is based, must be stated under oath in the
bill, or by separate affidavit, or appear by the return of the Sheriff upon the
process. 6 And in original attachment suits, to authorize publication, there must
be not only a ground of attachment alleged in the bill, but also a levy upon the
property of the defendant. 7 If the bill alleging a statutory ground of publica-
1 Code, § 4305. poenas to counties where the defendant does not re-
2 Code, § 4352. A person may be a citizen of the side, expressly to have a return of "not to be
State and, at the same time, a non-resident of the found," and then publication, and then a pro con-
State within the meaning of the attachment law, as fesses and final decree. See Scovel v. Abston, 1
when, though his family lives in Tennessee, his busi- Tenn. Ch. 73.
ness keeps him in another State most of his time. 4 Bleidorn v. Pilot Mt. C. & M. Co., 5 Pick., 166.
Cain v. Jennings, 3 Tenn. Ch. 131. A citizen should 5 Code, § 4352. For process by attachment of
be deemed a non-resident enough to warrant a pub- property and publication, see Chapter on Suits by
lication, when he will probably be absent until after Attachment.
the next term of the Court after the filing of the bill. Originally the Court of Chancery acted only in
3 The meaning of this sub-section is, that if the Personam; and it was necessary that process should
bill is filed in the proper county under the law gov- be executed on the person. Grace v. Hunt, Cooke
erning the local jurisdiction of the Court, and a sub- 341. But the facilities for travel are so great, our
poena has properly issued to the county where the people are so migratory, and so many non-residents
defendant in question resides, then, on the Sheriff have business dealings in our State, that justice to
of that county returning that "he is not to be our citizens imperatively required the statutory meth-
found," publication may be made. The law contem- od of bringing parties before our Courts by publica-
plates that the subpoena shall issue to the counLy tion in a newspaper, in the cases where personal ser-
where the defendant resides, because, if his residence vice of process cannot be had. Nevertheless, as nat-
is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent ural justice requires that a person should be heard
inquiry, a publication can be made in the first inbefore he is condemned, the Courts strictly con-
stance. The law does not mean that a subpeena may strue the statutes allowing publication in lieu of
issue to any county, and on being returned "not to personal service. Grewar v. Henderson, 1 Tenn.
be found" that publication may then be made. If it Ch., 76. See. ante, maxim, § 60.
did, gross frauds might be practiced under it, both 6 Code, § 4353.
on the Court and on the defendants, by issuing sub- 7 Code, § 3518; see Chapter on Attachment Suits.
175 PROCESS BY PUBLICATION. §198
tion is not sworn to, a separate affidavit may be filed, in form substantially as
follows
AFFIDAVIT FOR PUBLICATION.
John Doe,
vs. \ No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al.
John Doe, [or, Jacob S. Graves, Solicitor of John Doe,] makes oath that Charles Roe, one
of the defendants in this cause, is a non-resident of the State [or, that the residence of
Charles Roe, one of the defendants in this cause, is unknown, and cannot be ascertained upon
diligent inquiry;] and that the names and residences of the parties sued as the heirs and
other representatives of George Roe, deceased, are unknown, and cannot be ascertained upon
diligent inquiry. He, therefore, prays that publication be made to bring said defendants
before the Court. John Doe.
before me, this April 12, 1891.
The requirements of the Code, in reference to the procedure necessary to
justify a publication, do not limit the power of the Court to order publication
in any of the specified cases, when satisfied that the ground therefor exists
and, on review of such action in the Supreme Court, it will be presumed that
the facts authorizing such order duly appeared, in the absence of rebutting
proof.
If the defendant, when personal service of process is dispensed with, does
not cause his appearance to be entered, the Clerk, as soon as the necessary
affidavit or return is made, shall enter upon the rule docket an order, requiring
the defendant to appear at a certain day therein named, being a rule day, and
defend, or otherwise the bill will be taken for confessed. 8 The Code does not
state where the defendant is to appear, but as he is to appear on a rule day,
and as no Court will ordinarily be then in session, it is manifest that he must
appear at the Master's office.
§ 198. Form, Manner and Time, of the Publication. A copy of the order, —
entered on the rule docket, mentioned in the preceding section, is published
by the Clerk for four consecutive weeks in the newspaper mentioned in the
order, or designated by the general rules of the Court. This order 9 should
contain: (1) the name of the defendant to be notified; (2) the order requiring
him to appear; (3) the style of the Court before which, or before the Clerk of
which, he must appear (4) the time 10 when, and the place where, he must ap-
;
pear; (5) the purpose for which he must appear, specifying the name of the
person filing the bill, or the style of the suit against which he must defend; 11
(6) the fact that the bill will be taken for confessed if he fails to appear and
defend; (7) the date on which the order was made; (8) the name of the Clerk
and Master, or his deputy, making the order, 12 and (9) when the suit is against
an unknown defendant, the order of publication should also describe such
unknown party as near as may be, both by the character in which he is sued,
and by reference to his title or interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. 1 '*
It is not necessary that the foregoing constituents of the order of publication

should be stated in the order of succession given above. A substantial observ-
8 Code, § 4354. the Court does not depend on an original attachment,,

9 This order need not contain all the requirements the order of publication need not contain the re-
of an order of publication in suits begun by an quirements of Code, §§ 3521-3522. Kyle v. Phillips,
original attachment, even in cases where an attach- 6 Bax., 43; Guthrie v. Brown, 10 Heisk., 380.
ment has issued to fix a lien. Kyle v. Phillips, 6 13 Code, § 4358. The following description will
Bax., 43; Guthrie v. Brown, 10 Heisk., 380; Allen v. serve as an illustration: "The unknown heirs of
Gilliland, 6 Lea, 532. See Chapter on Attachment John Day, who once claimed an interest in lot No.
Suits. 40, in the Town of Rockwood, Tenn." Ferriss v.
10 The time must be a rule day. Code, §4354; I,ewis, 2 Tenn. Ch., 291. To authorize such a pub-
Fellows v. Cook, 10 Heisk., 81. lication, the bill, or a separate affidavit, should show
11 A publication for a non-resident must show that the name of the defendant is unknown, and!
who is the substantial complainant. Donaldson V. cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry. Code.
Nealis, 24 Pick., 638. § 4352, sub-sec. 4; Bleidorn v. Pilot Mt. C. & M.
12 Code, §§4354; 4357. When the jurisdiction of Co., 5 Pick., 166.
§ 199 PROCESS BY publication. 176
ance of the requirements will be The following
sufficient. is the usual form of an
ORDER OF PUBLICATION."
To Peter Poe.
John Doe ]
vs.
In the Chancery Court at Clinton, Tenn.
Richard Roe and
I'eter Poe.
In this cause, it appearing from the bill which is sworn to, [or, it appearing by affidavit,
or by the Sheriff's return,] that Peter Poe, one of the defendants, is a non-resident of the
State, 15 he is, therefore, hereby required to appear, on or before the 1st Monday of June 16
next, before the Clerk and Master of said Court, at his office in Clinton, and make defence
to the bill filed against him in said Court, by John Doe, or otherwise the bill will be taken
for confessed.
It is further ordered that this notice be published for four consecutive weeks in the Clinton
Gazette.
This 7th day of May, 17 1890. J. C. Scruggs, C. & M.
The order for publication in lieu of personal service may be made at any time
after the filing of the bill; 18 but, as it is in the nature of process, it should
ordinarily be made as soon as the necessary affidavit or return is made, 19 and
published forthwith. 20 The order must be published for four consecutive
weeks, but the statute does not say how long the last publication must be before
the return day. Inasmuch, however, as it takes all four publications to consti-
tute one service, it would seem that the defendant should have at least five days
after the fourth publication in which to appear and defend, and that unless
five days intervene between the last publication and the return rule day, the
defendant would not be bound to appear and defend, until the rule day next
after the one named in the order. 21
§ 199. —
Evidence of Publication. Ordinarily the fact that publication was
duly made pursuant to the order of the Court, or Clerk and Master, is proved
by the affidavit of the printer, or the actual production in Court of the copies
of the newspaper containing the published notices 22 but any other competent
;
evidence is admissible. 23 If the decree recites that publication was duly made,
that is prima facie sufficient, in the absence of clear proof to the contrary on a
direct attack. 24
§ 200.
—
Effect of Publication. "When publication has been duly made in
pursuance of an order duly made, and the day of appearance has arrived, the
defendant is in Court and is as much liable to interlocutory orders as though
;
actually served with subpoena and the Court may bind him by its orders in
;
relation to taking proof, fixing a day for the hearing, appointing receivers, and
by a pro confesso for want of an answer.
14 Instead of using this heading, or the more com- 16 The defendant may be required to appear at a
mon heading, "Non-resident Notice," in making the rule day. Code, §4354; Fellows V. Cook, 10 Heisk.,
publication, it should be omitted entirely, and the 61.
notice headed thus: To Peter Poe. This heading 17This publication would have been in time, if
will attract the attention of the defendant, pr his actually begun on May 7th. The first publication
acquaintances, while the other two headings will not. would then have been on May 7th; the second, on
The object of the publication is to notify Peter Poe; May 14th; the. third, on May 21st; the fourth, on
and good faith and fair dealing require that the May 28th, and there were five days from May 28th
publication be so headed as most effectually to an- to June 2d, 1890, it being the first Monday of the
swer this purpose. The form of the ordinary no-
_
month. See Lowenstine V. Gillespie, 6 Lea, 641.
tices almost seems to have been originally devised to 18 Code, § 4356.
conceal the name of the person to be notified as ef- 10 Code, §4354.
fectually as possible. See, post, § 877. 20 Code, §§4355; 4339.
15 The order should show, on its face, a statutory 21 Compare Code, §§ 4354, 4344, 4350, 4351, 4369,
ground for publication; and should state that ground sub-sec. 2. Wessells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 66;
as nearly as possible, in the very language of the McGavock v. Young, 3 Tenn. Ch., 529.
statute. The Courts require a strict compliance 22 Code, § 4359.
with the provisions of the law. Ferriss V. Lewis, 2 23 Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Cold., 559.
Tenn. Ch., 291. 24 Allen v. Gilliland, 6 Lea, 521.
177 ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL AN ANSWER. §201
ARTICLE IV.
ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL AN ANSWER.
§ 201. When an Attachment May be Had. § 203. Proceedings upon an Attachment.
§ 202. Form of an Attachment. § 204. Effect of a Contempt.
§ 201. When an Attachment May be Had. When the complainant calls —

upon the defendant to make a discovery under oath as to the matters charged
in the bill, he has a right to such a discovery and the defendant, if served with
;
subpoena, cannot lawfully deprive him of that right, by refusing to answer.

Ordinarily, in such cases, the complainant is content to have his bill taken for
confessed, but occasionally he cannot get full relief without a discovery. In
such a case, he may proceed against the defendant by process of contempt, to
compel an answer. 1
This process of contempt is an attachment for the body of the defendant,
and may be had either upon order of the Chancellor, at the instance of the com-
plainant, 2 or from the Master direct, when the time for answering has expired. 3
Before an attachment can be had, however, it must appear by the return, or
affidavit, of the proper officer, that the subpoena to answer was duly served on
the defendant. 4
If a married woman be in contempt, her husband must, also, be included in
the attachment, unless she has obtained leave to answer alone, or it appears by
affidavit that her husband cannot control her, or is out of the State. 5 But the
husband, if in the State, must obtain leave to answer separately, or he will be
held liable to be attached along with his wife. And so, the wife is not bound
to acquiesce in her husband's answer, and may obtain an order to answer sepa-
rately. 6
§ 202. —
Form of an Attachment. An attachment is in the nature of a capias
or warrant of arrest and requires the Sheriff to take the body of the defendant
;
into his custody, and bring him before the Court. The following is the ordinary
FORM OF AN ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
nneSSee
To the Sheriff of Knox County :
Counffof KnIx
'
}
You are hereby commanded Richard Roe, so as to have him before our Chancery
to attach
Court, at Knoxville, on the 4th Monday of May 7 next, then and there to answer touching a
contempt, which he, as is alleged, has committed against the State, in not answering the bill
of John Doe, 8 and also touching such other matters as shall then and there be laid to his
l Code,4360.
§ Inasmuch as the subpoena issues session of all the defendant's goods and chattels,
in the nameof the State, and the State, through lands and tenements, and hold the same subject to
her commands the defendant to appear,
officers, the.order of the Court, until the defendant appeared
and answer, his wilful refusal so to do is in the and purged his contempt. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 62-74; 1
nature of a rebellious and contemptuous disregard of Dan. Ch. Pr., (original edition,) 572-651. In 1801,
the sovereignty of the State, and the majesty of the our Legislature enacted that "there should be no
Law; and is visited with penalties and pains ade- other process of contempt than attachment, but with-
quate to enforce obedience to the command of the out proclamation." 1 Scott's Rev., 687.
writ, and vindicate the authority of the State. For- 2 Code, § 4361; Ch. Rule, VII, § 2, does not apply
merly, when a defendant failed to answer a bill, and to attachments for failing to answer bills.
was not arrested on the attachment, he was ( 1 3 Chancery Rule, VII, § 5; post. § 1196, sub-sec. 5.
warned to appear by public proclamation, made by 4 Code, § 4361.
the Sheriff; if he failed to appear, he was (2) de- 5 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 54.
clared, "a rebel and a contemner of the law," and a 6 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 499-500.
commission of rebellion was appointed, consisting of 7 The attachment may be made returnable to any
two, three, or four, commissioners, to see that he day of the term, or to any rule day in vacation.
was arrested if these commissioners, with the aid
; Code, § 4362.
ot the Sheriff, and other peace officers, failed to ar- 8 The particular matter of contempt need not be
rest the defendant, then (3) process of sequestration stated in the writ; but it is well to do so, as our
issued, directed to four sequestrators, to take pos- laws do not favor general warrants. Const, of Tenn.,
§203 ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL AN ANSWER. .178
charge, and to perform and abide such order as said Court shall make in this behalf. Herein
fail not, and have you then and there this writ. W. L. Trent, C & M
This 9th day of April, 1890.
There may be alias and pluries writs of attachment, as in case of other writs.
The Clerk and Master should endorse on the writ, the penalty of the bail bond
to be taken by the Sheriff. 9 If the defendant forfeits his bond by failing to
appear, an alias attachment will be issued, upon which no bail bond can be
taken and the penalty of the bond already given may be decreed to be for-
;
feited, and collected by execution. 10
§ 203. —
Proceedings upon an Attachment. The attachment may be returna-
ble to a rule day in vacation, or to some day in term time and upon its service,;
bail may
be taken for the appearance of the defendant at the time fixed there-
in. 11 If the Chancellor, or Master, do not specify the penalty of the bond, the
law fixes it at two hundred and fifty dollars. 12 The following is
THE FOBm OF A BAIL BOND.
The State of Tennessee, 1
County of Knox. J
We, Richard Roe, Henry Roe, and Robert Roe, agree to pay the State of Tennessee two
hundred and fifty dollars, unless the said Richard Roe appears on the 4th Monday of May
next, before the Chancery Court of said county, to answer a charge of contempt, in the
case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, in said Court, and does not depart without leave of the
Court. This May 1, 1890.
Witness, Richard Roe,
J. K. Lones, Henry Roe,
Sheriff. Robert Roe.
If the defendant fails to appear, in compliance with the terms of his bail, a
second attachment issues, upon which no bail can be taken; 13 and the penalty
of the bailbond may be decreed forfeited, and collected by execution. If the
defendant appears in pursuance of his bond, but refuses to answer fully, he
shall be committed to jail, there to remain until he purges himself of the con-
tempt, and complies with the requirements of the law by filing a full and com-
plete answer. 14
After the defendant has been arrested if he fail t& give bond, on his petition,
or on motion of the complainant, a writ of habeas corpus will be ordered by the
Court to issue to the Sheriff ordering him to bring the defendant before the
Court to answer for his said contempt. Such writ may be as follows
WHIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
The State of Tennessee,
County of Knox. f
To the Sheriff of said County:
You are hereby commanded to have the body of Richard Roe, now in your custody, before
our Court of Chancery, at Knoxville, on the 21st day of November, 1895 [or forthwith] to
answer for certain contempts wherewith he is charged, to be dealt with as said Court shall
order. And have you then and there this writ with your return thereon.
This 20th day of November, 1895. H. B. Lindsay, Chancellor.
If the writ is issued in term it will be signed by the Clerk and Master. 15
If the defendant is committed for contempt, the complainant may proceed
with his action as if the bill had been taken for confessed, the allegations being
taken as in all respects true. But in that case, all further proceedings for the
Art. 1, § 7. In the old form of attachment, there to Code, § 4363.

was endorsed on the writ the ground of contempt, 11 Code, § 4362.
thus: "Attachment against Richard Roe, for not an- 12 Code, §§4110-4111.
swering the bill of John Doe." 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 366. 13 The Clerk and Master should endorse on the
9 If there be no order fixing this penalty, the second attachment, that no bail bond will be taken
amount is two hundred and fifty dollars. Code, by the Sheriff.
§4111. The endorsement may be as follows: "In 14 Code, §§ 4363-4364.
this case,the Sheriff will take a bail bond, in the 15 Code, § 3728.
penalty of two hundred and fifty dollars. W. L.
Trent, C. & M."
179 ATTACHMENT TO COMPEL AN ANSWER. §204
contempt shall cease, and the Court, or the Judge thereof, may discharge the
defendant from custody. 16
After an attachment for contempt, no plea or demurrer shall be received un-
less by order of the Court upon motion. 17 The Court, or the Clerk and Master,
may, however, at any time after attachment proceedings have been instituted,
and even after commitment, on good cause shown, grant the defendant further
time in which to file an answer. 18
Where the defendant has been attached for failing to answer the bill, the
following order may be made:
ORDER FOR DEFENDANT TO ANSWER.
John Doe
vs.
Richard Roe.
The defendant, Richard Roe, having been attached, and being now in Court under bond,
lieis ordered to file a sufficient answer to the bill, and pay all the costs of the attachment,
within forty-eight hours, [or such other time as the Court may order,] or the complainant
may apply to the Court for such further order as may be just.
If the defendant continue in contempt, the Court may, on application of the
complainant, make the following further order:
ORDER COMMITTING THE DEFENDANT FOR NOT ANSWERING.
John Doe
vs.
Richard Roe.
The defendant, Richard Roe, having failed to put in ah answer [or, a sufficient answer,]
to the bill as heretofore ordered, upon application of the complainant, it is ordered that the
defendant, Richard Roe, for such his contempt, be committed to the common jail of the
county of Knox, there to remain until he shall have put in a sufficient answer to the bill of
complaint in this cause, unless the Court sooner orders his discharge, and the Clerk and
Master will issue a certified copy of this order to the Sheriff of Knox county, such copy to
operate as a mittimus.
§ 204. —
Effect of a Contempt. It is a general rule, that a party in contempt is
never to be heard, as to any matter connected with the merits of the suit he :
is not allowed to make any motion, except for leave to clear his contempt. 19
His first duty is to show to the Court that he has not wilfully disobeyed its
process, or, if he has, that he sincerely repents. In either case, he must file or
tender a full answer, 20 and offer to pay the costs of the attachment, before he
will be heard.
But while a defendant will not be heard on his own motion, with the excep-
tion stated, he will not be denied the right to be heard in opposition to any
motion by the other side, in reference to the litigation. 21
ie Code, §§ 4366-4367. ceedings by attachment. As to showing cause, see,
17 Code, 4365.
§ ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
18'
Code, § 4368. Good cause must, however, be 10 Gant v. Gant, 10 Hum., 464; 1 Smith's Ch. Pr.
shown before the Clerk and Master would be justi- 62; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 504. He may, however, make
fied in granting the defendant further time in which motions in another cause. He may be in contempt
to file an answer. Such "good cause" must be shown in one cause, and be in good standing in another
by affidavit. In Gant v. Gant, 10 Hum., 464, it was cause. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 505.
held that the Master had no authority to receive an 20 Code, § 4364.
answer from a defendant in contempt; but since 21 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 506; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 281. For
then, he has been given such authority. The effect the practice in contempt cases, generally, see Chapter
of giving further time would be to suspend all pro- on Contempts, post, §§ 918-923.
§205 PRO CONFESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. 180
CHAPTER XL
PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN PROCESS AND APPEARANCE.
Article I. Pro Confesses, and Proceedings Thereon.
Article II. Motions by the Complainant.
ARTICLE I.
PRO CONFESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.

205. When and How a Bill May be Taken § 210. When a Pro Confesso will not Author-
for Confessed. a Final Decree.
ize
206. Effect of a JudgmentPro Confesso. § 211. Effect of a Final Decree Based on a
207. Whena Judgment Pro Confesso May Pro Confesso.
be Set Aside. § 212. When and How a Decree Based on a
208. How a Judgment Pro Confesso May Pro Confesso May be Set Aside.
be Set Aside. § 213. Forms of Petition and Decree to Set
209. When a Final Decree May be Taken Aside a Decree Based on a Pro Con-
on a Pro Confesso. fesso.
§ 205. a Bill may be Taken for Confessed. A defendant is

When and How —
required by the subpoena, or the publication notice, as the case may be, to
answer, or make defence to, the bill and he is given reasonable time so to do.
;
If he fails to do so in the time prescribed by law, 1 and the complainant desires

that he shall answer under oath, and make the discovery called for in the bill,
the defendant, if served with process, may be attached and compelled to answer,
as already shown; 2 but, if no such discovery is sought, the complainant may
have an order taking his bill for confessed, the failure of the defendant to make
any defence being deemed prima facie evidence that he has no defence to make,
but, on the contrary, admits the material allegations of the bill to be true. 3 So,
if the defendant puts in a demurrer, plea, or answer, which have been adjudged
insufficient, and thereafter fails to file a sufficient answer in the time allowed, he
will be deemed to have abandoned all further defence, and to confess the truth
of the bill and the bill may accordingly be taken for confessed by order of the
;
Court. 4 Such an order is generally called a judgment pro confesso. A bill may,
under the Code, be taken for confessed in the following cases :
1. When, being duly served with process, as already stated, the defendant
fails to plead, answer, or demur, by the time fixed by law.
2. When, an order for his appearance having been duly made and published
as prescribed by law, the defendant fails to cause his appearance to be there-
upon entered, and to plead, answer, or demur, or to obtain time to answer.
3. When, process of contempt having been returned executed, or the defend-
ant having been brought into Court upon such process, he refuses to answer the
complainant's bill, or puts in an insufficient answer, so adjudged by the Court.
4. When, a plea or demurrer having been overruled, and the defendant or-
dered to answer the bill, he fails to do so in the time fixed in the order, or, if
no time be so fixed, on the next rule day. 5
1 As to when a defendant must make de- the hill as confessed, and decrees the relief the
fence, see post, §§ 225-227. confession warrants. Qui tacet, cum loqui detet,
2 Ante, §§ 201-204. consentire videtur.
3 Every one presumed to know the law;
is 4 Rose Meek, 19 Pick., 666.
i>.
and the defendant is presumed to know that 6 Ibid. When a demurrer is overruled, and
his failure to make defense is equivalent to no answer filed or time asked to make defense,
an admission, on his part, that the facts set a pro confesso and final decree may be at once
forth in the bill are true. Acting on these entered. Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Donaldson.
presumptions, the Court, accordingly, treats 11 Pick., 322.
181 PRO CONPESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. §206
5. "When, exceptions to an answer having been allowed by the Clerk and
Master, and the defendant or his Solicitor notified thereof, and ordered to
answer, the defendant fails to file a sufficient answer within thirty days, or to
appeal from the order of the Master.
If the process be a subpoena, or a scire facias, the proof of its service must
appear from the return of the officer serving it if publication has been made,
;
the fact may be shown by the affidavit of the printer, the actual production of
the newspaper in Court, or by any other competent evidence. 7 Service of sub- -
poena without copy of the bill will sustain a pro confesso. 8

The following is the form of an order pro confesso where subpoena has been
served on one defendant, and publication has been made as to another:
ORDER PRO CONFESSO.
John Doe, !
vs. \
No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al. J ,
In this cause, on motion of complainant, and it duly appearing to the Court that the defend-
ant, Robert Roe, has been regularly served with subpoena to answer the complainant's bill,
and that the defendant, George Stokes, has been regularly brought before the Court and
made a party to complainant's bill, by publication duly made, and that both said Robert Roe
and George Stokes have failed to appear and make defense to said bill, within the time re-
quired by law it is ordered that, as to them, complainant's bill be taken as confessed, and
;
the .cause set for hearing ex parte.
If a final decree is pronounced at the same time the order pro confesso is
granted, the following addition will be made to the foregoing order:
And thereupon, this cause coming on to be further and finally heard upon the bill, the
judgment pro confesso, heretofore taken and entered against the defendants, Robert Roe and
George Stokes, [and upon the answers of the other defendants and the proof in the cause,]
from all of which it duly appearing to the Court that [and so on, as in case of an ordinary
decree.']
A
failure to take a pro confesso against a proper but not a necessary party,
will be treated in the Supreme Court as an informal dismissal of the bill as to
him and when a defendant is liable to a pro confesso, but the complainant takes
;
a final decree without first taking a pro confesso, no reversible error is com-
mitted. sa
§ 206. —
Effect of a Judgment Pro Confesso. As has been said, the failure
of a defendant to answer is in the nature of a confession that the bill is true, 9
and that he has no defence to make nevertheless this rule should manifestly be
;
so modified as not to apply, 1, to persons under age, or of unsound mind, be-

cause they are unable to take care of themselves 10 2, to executors or adminis-
;
trators, because they often represent minors and others not parties to the suit
[\, to defendants in divorce suits, because public policy forbids divorces by con-
sent of parties and 4, to non-residents and persons whose names and residences
;
are unknown, when their property has not been attached, 11 because they have
6 Code, § 4369. As to sub-section 5, see plement defective averments, nor does it ad-
Code, § 4407. It would seem that the complain- mit the legal conclusions charged: it admits
ant may elect to take the whole bill for con-
fessed, or, only such parts as are covered by
—
facts which are well pleaded no more. 1 Dan.
Ch. Pr., 531-532; Cowan v. Wells, 5 Lea, 682. And
his exceptions. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 523-524; Lea v. when the allegations of the confessed bill are
Vanbibber, 6 Hum., 18; Smith v. St. Louis Ins. not definite as to the sum due, proof must be
Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 605. taken to establish the amount. Sewell v. Tut-
7 Code, § 4359; Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Cold., hill, 4 Cates, 271. When a pro confesso operates
555. as an admission of the allegations of the bill,
8 Avery v. Warren, 12 Heisk., 559. The Chan- no further, or other proof of such allegations
cellor, before allowing; a bill to be taken as are necessary, or proper. Confessio facta in
confessed, should satisfy himself that the de- pidicio omni prooatione major est; or, as another
fault actually exists, and, to that end, should maxim puts it, Habemus optimum testem conflten-
require the proper evidences of such default. tem reum.
sa See Burnett v. Campbell Co., 1 Ch. Apps., 10 Service of subpoena upon a guardian and
18; Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271. not on his wards, will not justify a pro confesso
9 A decree pro confesso is an admission of all against the wards. Rutherford v. Richardson,
the facts and allegations stated in the bill, and 1 Sneed, 612.
has all the force and effect of an answer ad- n The effect of an attachment is to notify
mitting- the complainant's rights as stated in those having the attached property in charge,
the bill. Stone e. Duncan, 1 Head, 103; never- generally the owner's agents, that a suit has
theless, a. pro confesso can neither aid nor sup- been brought; and notice to an agent is notice
§207 PRO CONFESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. 182
bad no actual notice 12 of the and, therefore, cannot be deemed to have
suit,
confessed the truth of the bill. It has accordingly been enacted that, whenever
an order pro confesso is lawfully had, the allegations in the bill are not to be
taken as admitted if the defendant is (1) an infant, or (2) a person of unsound
:
mind, or (3) an executor, or administrator, or (4) a person sued for divorce

or (5) a non-resident whose property has not been attached, or (6) a person
whose name or residence is unknown. In the excepted cases of infants and per-
sons of unsound mind, the defendant shall appear by guardian, or committee,
before the complainant can proceed with his cause. In the other excepted
cases, the complainant may proceed as if the allegations of the bill had been put
in issue by answer not sworn to, with the right to set the cause for hearing
forthwith. 13 On the issue thus made, the complainant may take his proof by
filing interrogatories, or giving notice, as hereafter shown. 14
Apro confessoed defendant is in quasi contempt, and has no right to be heard
as.to any matter arising out of the allegations of the bill he can, ordinarily, be :
heard for one purpose only, and that is on a motion to have the pro confesso,
and proceedings based thereon, set aside. 15 But he can contest any proof taken
after the pro confesso.
§ 207. When a Judgment Pro Confesso may be Set Aside. The failure of —
n defendant to make any defence to the bill is in the nature of a contempt of
Court, as well as an implied confession that the allegations of the bill are true.
For these reasons, the law gives the complainant a right to a judgment pro
confesso, as soon as the defendant's default occurs, and the Court has no right
to deny such a judgment 16 and after the judgment has been taken, neither the
;
Chancellor nor the Master has any right to deprive the complainant of the ben-
efit thereof except within the time, in the manner, and on the grounds, specified
in the law. 17
The law makes the difficulty of setting aside a. pro confesso somewhat pro-
portionate to the negligence of the defendant. 18 Thus, a defendant who has
been served with process, may at any time before final decree, on good cause
shown, obtain from the Chancellor, or Clerk and Master, an order setting aside
the decree pro confesso, upon filing a full and sufficient answer, and the payment
of costs; and a defendant as to whom publication has been made because,
(1) upon inquiry at his usual place of abode, he could not be found so as to be
served with process, and there was just ground to believe that he had gone be-
yond the State; or because (2) the Sheriff made return upon a leading process
that he was not to be found, or (3) because a judicial or original attachment
had been lawfully levied on his property as a leading process, in all such —
cases the defendant shall show merits in order to entitle him to appear and
defend after judgment by default. On the other hand, a non-resident defend-
ant, or one whose name or place of residence is unknown, and who is not served
to the principal. Hence, the law deems the Heisk., 302; Scovel v. Absten, 1 Tenn., Ch., 73.
seizure of a man's property, and a publication A judgment pro confesso against a married wo-
notice, as equivalent to personal service of man admits the allegations of the bill to be
process; and, for this reason, he is bound by true, as charged, except in divorce cases. Hill
an order pro confesso, and subject to a flnal v. Hillman, 6 Lea, 715; Doherty v. Choate, 16
decree thereon without further proof. Lea, 192.
12 If, however, a defendant, as to whom pub- n See Chapter on Depositions, post. Code,
lication has been made without attachment of §§ 3856; 4374.
property, is in any way notified of the penden- 15 He
cannot except to the Master's report,
cy of the suit before a pro confesso has been as to a fact alleged in the bill. Bank r. An-
taken against him, he will be bound by such drews, 3 Shan. Cas., 460. See note 41, infra.
pro confesso, as though originally served with io Anonymous, 1 Tenn. Ch., 2. The Supreme
process. And, so, if after a pro confesso, he has Court will not interfere with the discretion of
notice thereof, and takes no steps in a reason- the Chancellor in setting aside a pro confesso;
able time to have it set aside, he will be equally Buchanan v. McManus, 3 Hum., 449; or, in re-
bound. In all such cases, actual notice is the fusing to do so. Chandler v. Jobe, 5 Lea, 593,
essential thing, and the manner or form of except in extraordinary cases of great and pal-
the notice is non essential. Courts of Equity pable injustice, Ibid.
regard substance, and not ceremony. See Phil- it Post, §§ 208-213; 238; 888-890; Cook v. Dews,
lips v. Hollister, 2 Cold., 269. There is no dif- 2 Tenn. Ch., 496.
ference, in effect, between an order pro confesso 18 The defendant has no right to complain
taken on attachment and publication, and one of these difficulties. Every one is bound to
taken on service of subpoena. Claybrooke v. take care of his own rights, and to vindicate
Wade. 7 Cold., 560. them in due season, and in proper order. Her-
13 Code, §§ 4371-4373; Grubb -u. Browder, 11 man on Estoppel, § 265. See ante, § 71.
183 PRO CONEESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. §208
with process, may appear and defend at any time before final decree, as of
course, 19 he not being deemed guilty of any negligence in failing to answer by
the time fixed by law. And thus, when (1) subpoena was served, to have a
pro-confesso set aside, merits must be shown and costs paid; (2) when a subpoena
was issued but not served, or when no subpoena was issued, but an attachment
was levied, the pro confesso will be set aside on merits being shown and without
costs; and (3) when no subpoena was issued, or no attachment levied, the judg-
ment pro confesso will be set aside, as of course, at any time before final decree,
on an answer being filed, without merits being shown, or costs paid. 20
§ 208. How Judgment Pro Confesso may be Set Aside. As a general
a —
rule, a judgment pro confesso may be set aside at any time before final decree
and even after final decree, provided the term has not ended, or thirty days
elapsed. 21 The rights and liabilities of defendants, in reference to judgments
pro confesso, are widely different, as already shown, and the consideration of
those rights will be simplified by dividing all defendants into three classes
1. All defendants who have been served with process, must show good cause,
file a full and sufficient answer, and pay all the accrued costs of the cause,
before they are entitled to an order setting aside the decree pro confesso. 22
2. Non-resident defendants, or those whose names or places of residence
are unknown, and who are not served with process, may appear and defend
at any time before final decree, as of course, 23 that is, on mere motion and the
tendering, of such an answer as the bill calls for. In such case, no affidavit ac-
counting for- the delay is required, and the merits of the answer are not con-
sidered. When, however, the pro confesso has been followed by a final decree,
against such a defendant, the Court may require both a sufficient excuse for
the delay, and a meritorious answer under oath, before setting aside both the
final decree and the pro confesso, and may also adjudge all the costs accrued in
the cause against the defendant, especially where there has been negligence.
3. All other defendants, as to whom personal service is dispensed with
under the Code, § 4352, must show merits, in order to entitle them to appear
and defend, after judgment by default. 24 By "merits" is meant, (1) a sworn
answer, showing a meritorious defence, and (2) a sufficient excuse for the
delay, shown by affidavit. 25 In such a case, no costs will be imposed. If, how-
ever, there has been a final decree, the Court may impose costs.
The Master may, on a rule day, set aside a pro confesso, and allow an answer
to be filed 26 but he has not the enlarged discretion of the Chancellor in such
:
cases. 27 Before the Master can set aside the pro confesso, and thereby deprive
the complainant of his statutory right to a pro confesso, the defendant" must not
only show good cause for his neglect, but must tender a sufficient answer: 28
this good cause can only be shown by affidavit. An appeal lies to the Chancellor
from the action of the Master in setting aside, or in refusing to set aside, a
judgment pro confesso. 29 Before a pro confesso is set aside, in cases where
19 Code, §§ 4375-4377. A pro confesso may be 2 Pick., 304. An allegation that the defendant
set aside, even after final decree, provided the has a good and valid defense, without setting
decree is still under the control of the Court. it out so that the Court can judge of its mer-
20 The law delights in giving to every man its, is vox et prwterea nihil. It cannot be no-
a day in Court to make his defense. Roberts ticed at all. Montgomery v. Olwell, 1 Tenn.
& Phillips v. Stewart, 1 Yerg., 392. See maxim, Ch., 172. Bashaw v. Temple, 7 Cates, 596.
ante, § 60. 26Code, § 4420, sub-sec. 3.
21 Railroadv. Johnson, 16 Lea, 387. The 2TNevertheless, they generally exercise a
Court has no power over a decree after the much larger discretion, a habit the Chancellors
lapse of thirty days. should sternly discountenance.
22 Code, § 4375; Thorpe v. Dunlap, 4 Heisk., 28 Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496; Totten v.
674. In this case it was held to be error Nance, 3 Tenn. Ch., 264.
not to require the payment of costs on setting 20 Code, § 4416. If, on appeal, by the com-
aside a pro confesso. under section 4375 of the plainant from the action of the Master, in set-
Code. See Bashaw v. Temple, 7 Cates, 596. ting aside a. pro confesso, no sufficient affidavit
23 Code, § 4376. appears to have been made, or, no sufficient
24 Code, § 4377. sworn answer filed, the Chancellor will reverse
25 Cross affidavits, to resist the setting aside the action of the Master, and reinstate the pro
of a pro confesso, are of doubtful and dangerous confesso. Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496. In
tendency, and should not be allowed. Buchan- this case, Judge Cooper held that a "press. of
an v. McManus, 3 Hum., 449; Brown v. Brown, other business." on the na.rt of nnnnaoi toco
§208 PRO CONFESSOS/ AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. 184
merits must be shown, the Chancellor or Master should not only require of the
defendant an affidavit, sufficiently excusing his seeming default, but should,
also, invariably require him to present his proposed answer, in order that a
judgment may be formed as to the merits of the defence to be made, and not
subject the complainant to the annoyance and delay that may result from any
answer, however insufficient, the defendant may think proper to file. 30 The
answer thus presented should always be verified by the oath of the defendant,
even in cases where the bill waives the defendant's oath, such verification not
being for the purpose of substituting a sworn pleading for one not required to
be sworn, but exclusively as an evidence of the good faith of the defendant
in claiming to have a meritorious. defence. It is for the Chancellor, and not
the defendant, to determine whether a defence is meritorious and how can he ;
determine that except the answer be read, and that answer properly verified?
And when such an answer is presented by a corporation, it should, in like
manner, and for like reason, be verified by the oath of the officer, or agent,
of the corporation best acquainted with the truth of the contents. 31
One defendant cannot object to the action of the Chancellor in setting aside
a pro confesso against a co-defendant. 32
The following form will indicate both the form and the substance of an
AFFIDAVIT TO SET ASIDE A PRO CONFESSO.
John Doe, 1
vs. \
No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al. J
The above named defendant, Richard Roe, deposes and says that [here set out fully and
particularly why the answer was not filed in due time, giving the facts on which the defendant
relies to show that he was guilty of no negligence, and that his motion to set aside the
pro confesso is made at the first opportunity possible, under the circumstances.]
Affiant further says that he is advised that he has a meritorious defence to the bill filed
against him in the cause, which defence will fully and at large appear by reference to the
answer he desires leave to file to said bill, which answer is true to affiant's personal knowledge,
and is duly sworn to, and is made a part of this affidavit, and marked A.
Affiant, therefore, prays that the order pro confesso heretofore entered against him in
this cause [and the final decree based thereon] be set aside, and for nought held; and that
he may be allowed to file said answer, and to have due time thereafter to take his proof.
Affiant offers to do equity by paying such costs, and submitting to such orders, as the
Court may deem it equitable to impose. Richard Roe.
[Annex jurat.]
Counter affidavits will not be heard upon a motion to set aside a pro confesso,^
but if the defendant 's affidavit calls in question the conduct of the Master, the
latter may be allowed to make a counter-statement to the Court.
The following is the form of an order setting aside an order pro confesso, upon
an affidavit explaining the default, and the tender of a sworn answer showing a
meritorious defence.
ORDER SETTING ASIDE A PRO CONFESSO.
John Doe,
vs. No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al.
In this cause the defendant, Robert Roe, having by affidavit shown a good excuse for his
failure to answer the bill, and having tendered a sworn answer showing merits, on his
motion, the judgment pro confesso heretofore rendered and entered against him is set aside,
and he is allowed to file said answer, upon the payment of the costs of the cause. Said
not good cause for not filing an answer in due In judicio non creditur nisi juratis. (In mak-
31
time, and that the affidavit must be made by ing a decision, Courts believe nothing unless it
the defendant in person, unless the facts are is sworn to,) or, is a proved writing; or, is a
peculiarly within the knowledge of the person record; or, is otherwise judicially known. See
swearing to the affidavit. See, also, Totten r. post, § 787.
Nance, 3 Tenn. Ch., 264. As to "good cause" 32 Bank v. Bradley, 15 Lea, 279.
see ante, § 62, sub-sec, 8. 33 Buchanan v. McManus, 3 Hum., 449; but
30 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 525; Wilson v. Waters. 7 see Wilson v. Waters, 7 Cold., 323.
Cold., 323; Lewis v. Simonton,8 Hum., 1S5. See
Bashaw v. Temple, 7 Cates, 596.
185 PRO CONFESSOS. AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. §209
answer was, thereupon, filed accordingly. An execution will issue against said Robert Roe
for said costs. 34
Or, the following shorter form may he used:
In this cause, on the defendant Robert Roe's motion, supported by affidavit and a sworn
answer, the judgment pro confesso heretofore taken against him is set aside, on the payment
of the costs of the cause, and said answer allowed to be filed. The answer was, thereupon,
filed accordingly. Execution is awarded for said costs.
Or, if the defendant a non-resident, or one whose name or residence is

is
unknown, and was brought into Court by publication alone, the order may be
as follows:
In this cause, Samuel Stokes, who is a non-resident [or, whose name or residence is un-
known] and who was brought before the Court by publication only, comes, and by Solicitor
[or, in person,] enters his appearance; and, on his motion, the judgment pro confesso hereto-
fore entered against him, was set aside, and he was allowed to file his answer, which answer
was filed accordingly.
§ 209. a Final Decree May be Taken on a Pro Confesso. When a
When —
judgment pro is against a defendant not belonging to one of the fore-
confesso
going excepted classes, 35 so long as it continues in force, it is equivalent to a
solemn admission in open Court that the material allegations of fact contained
in the bill are true and, for this reason, not only is no further proof of such
;
allegations necessary, 38 but such proof would be immaterial, the confession of

record being plenary proof of every fact alleged. 37
If, therefore, the bill alleges enough facts to justify a final decree, taking the
facts for admitted, the complainant may, in a case not excepted, 38 take a final
decree on his pro confesso when the cause is reached on the docket for hearing. 39
No final decree can be taken at a special term, in an excepted case, on a pro
confesso taken at the Master's rules since the regular term: complainant must
wait until the next regular term. A
final decree may, however, be taken at a
special term on a pro confesso taken during, or prior to, the preceding regular
term. 40 If, however, the bill does not aver sufficient facts, taking them as true,
to support a final decree, as when (1) an accounting is sought, or is necessary,
to ascertain the amount due from the defendant, or where (2) the allegations
of the bill are indefinite, or inconclusive, or alternative, in all such cases the
complainant cannot, even after a judgment pro confesso, have a final decree,
unless he establish his demand by satisfactory evidence. 41 If, therefore, a final
decree be based on a confessed bill, which does not aver enough facts to support
such decree, it will be reversible on a bill of review for errors apparent, or on
appeal, or on a writ of error. 42
There are three cases, however, wherein a final decree cannot be had until
the next term after the bill is taken for confessed: 1, When, process of con-
tempt having been returned executed, or the defendant having been brought
34 Interlocutory costs do not include the tax any further, or otherwise, than as to the distinct and
on litigation. definite averments of fact set out in the bill. Ibid.
35 For these excepted classes, see, ante, § 206. Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271.
30 Stone v. Duncan, 1 Head, 103. 42The proportion of reversible decrees, based on
37A pro confesso, however, is an admission only Judgments pro confesso, is very large when com-
of the facts which are well pleaded, and does not pared with decrees resulting from a contested litiga-
aid defective averments of facts, nor admit aver- tion. The demurrers, pleas, answers and other crit-
ments of law, or legal conclusions. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., icisms of the defendant, often. occasion amendments
531, note. to bills that would not, on a pro confesso, have en-
38 The excepted cases are (1) those stated, ante, titled the complainant to any relief whatever.
§ 206; and (2) those stated in Code, §4370. Solicitors are not always proof against the tempta-
39 Blake's Ch. Pr., 162; Rose v. Woodruff, 4 Johns. tion of taking more in their decrees pro confesso
Ch., 547. But see, infra, note 44. than the allegations of their bills would strictly war-
40 Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Cold., 555. In strictness, rant; and Chancellors are not always proof against
it would seem that the final decree on the pro con- the temptation to entrust the decrees in such cases
fesso could not be taken, until the cause was regu- wholly to the complainants' Solicitors. But in
larly reached on the docket for trial. Such a decree Equity, a decree on a pro confesso can rightfully be
is absolutely final after the expiration of the term, only such as would be authorized by the state of the
oi _ after the lapse of thirty days; and cannot be set pleadings, if there had been no default. No decree
aside, except upon some revisory proceeding. John- can rightfully be granted beyond what the allegations
son v. Tomlinson, 13 Lea, 604. of the bill will warrant, and if the bill does not enti-
41 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 525, note. And the defendant tle the complainant to any relief, the fact he has a
will be allowed to controvert any evidence produced pro confesso will not enlarge his rights, or increase
by the complainant in aid of his deficient averments, his remedies. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 526; Lancaster Mills v.
the defendant not being bound by the pro confesso Merchants Co., 5 Pick., 32.
§210 PRO CONEESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. 186
into Court upon such process, he refuses to answer the complainant's bill, or
puts in an insufficient answer, so adjudged by the Court; 2, When, a plea or
demurrer having been overruled, and the defendant ordered to answer the bill,
he fails so to do upon a rule given; 43 and 3, When, exceptions to an answer
having been allowed by the Clerk and Master, and the defendant or his Solicitor
notified thereof, and ordered to answer, the defendant fails to file a sufficient
answer within thirty days, or to appeal from the order of the Master. 44 In
all other cases, where a pro con] csso admits the truth of the bill, a final decree
may be pronounced at the return term of the process.
§ 210. When a Pro Confesso will Not Authorize a Final Decree. While a —
judgment pro confesso, based on service of subpoena, or on attachment of prop-
erty and publication, is such an admission of the truth of the bill as renders
further proof unnecessary, except in those cases where a pro confesso only-
makes an issue 4B nevertheless, if proof be made by a co-defendant, that the
;
allegations confessed are really false, the Court will dismiss the bill as to
both defendants, in all cases where such defendants have a common or joint
interest in the subject-matter of the suit. 40 Thus, (1) where a bill is filed
against two partners, and one answers and disproves the complainant's whole
case, while a judgment pro confesso is taken against the other, the Court will dis-
miss the bill as to both defendants, 47 and (2) where a beneficiary is pro con-
fessocd, and the trustee makes defence; 48 and (3) where a vendee is pro con-
fessoed, and his vendor answers 49 and (4) where one personal representative
;
defends, and the other suffers a judgment by default; 50 in all such cases, the
defence by the defendant who answers avails the defendant who does not
answer, and, if sufficient, overcomes the effect of the judgment pro confesso
against him. This doctrine, however, is not applied to an answer by a de-
fendant who has distinct rights or liabilities, and no joint or common interest
or liability with the party who fails to answer. 51
Nor will a judgment pro confesso authorize a decree in favor of the complain-
ant, unless the bill shows a ground for relief against the defendant. If the
complainant in his bill fails to show such a state of facts as entitles him to a
decree, a pro confesso will avail him nothing, and his bill must be dismissed. 52
This is especially the case where, on a pro confesso, the complainant asks a
decree against a public officer, private agent, or other merely nominal party,
as against whom no right of recovery exists. 53
§ 211. Effect of a Final Decree Based on a Pro Confesso. There is no —
difference between the validity, force, or efficacy, of a final decree based on a
pro confesso so far as third persons are concerned, and the validity, force, or
efficacy, of a final decree based on a bill, answer and proof; and a decree based
43 But see the following note. neously. Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Donaldson, 11
44 Code, §§ 4369-4370. The reason a pro confessoed Pick., 322. This is the rule in the Circuit Court.
defendant is allowed an indulgence in these three in- Code, §2954; but in Chancery, see Code, §4370.
stances, seems to be that in the 1st instance, the 45 See, ante, § 206.
pressure of the Court's hand is still endeavoring to 40 Petty )'. Hannum, 2 Hum., 102; Caldwell C.
compel a discovery from the defendant; and that in McFarland, 11 Lea, 463; Dunscomb v. Wallace, 21
the 2d and 3d instances he has made some show, at Pick., 385.
least, of obeying the mandate in the subpoena. These 47 And where one partner denies the cause of
reasons are hardly sufficient to warrant the indul- action, and it is not proved, a pro confesso against
gence; and it is hoped there are better ones, not an the other partner, will not support a decree against
paient to the author: for. if there be no better ones, him. Butler v. Kinzie, 6 Pick., 31; Allen & Hill,
the statute should be repealed. exrs. V. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
Where, however, in any of these cases, the de- 48 Cherry v. Clements, 10 Hum., 552.
fendant fails to tender a sufficient answer, and tc 40 Hennessee V. Ford, 8 Hum., 499.
fully excuse his conduct by affidavit, the Chancellor 60 Brien v. Patterson, 3 Head, 499: a case at law.
should rigidly refuse to set aside the pro confesso. 51 Phillips v. Hollister, 2 Cold., 269; Simpson t'.
Equity favors the diligent, and not those who slum- Moore, 5 Lea, 3'76.
ber on their rights. 52 McGavock v. Elliott, 3 Yerg., 373; Ross v. Ram-
Since the above was written the Supreme Court sey, 3 Head, 15; Chandler v. Jobe, 5 Lea, 591; Chad-
has decided that when a demurrer is overruled at well v. McCall, 1 Tenn. Ch., 640; Sewell v. Tuthill
the return term a pro confesso and final decree can & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271; Lancaster Mills 0. Mer-
then be entered, if the defendant fails to answer chants' Co., 5 Pick, 32; Winham e. Crutcher, 3
next day or to obtain further time. Rose V. Meek, 9 Tenn., Ch. 666.
Pick., 666; and if the suit is on a note o' )ther evi 53 McGavock V. Elliot, 3 Yerg., 373; Buckner I).
dence of debt both decrees may be entered simulta- Abrahams, 3 Tenn. Ch., 346.
187 PRO CONFESSOSj AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. §212
on a pro confesso, if executed before it is set aside under any of the foregoing
provisions, will be a protection to all persons acting upon its validity, and
will confer a good title to all property sold under it. 54
It is no objection to the execution of a decree rendered against a defendant,
that it was founded on a bill taken for confessed, without personal service but ;
the Court may, and generally ought to, require the complainant to give suffi-
cient security, in such sum as the Court deems proper, to abide by and perform
such order, touching the restitution of property, or repayment of money, as
the Court may make, upon the defendant subsequently setting aside the decree,
and successfully resisting the complainant's suit. 55
And as between the complainant and the defendant, the final decree against
the latter, based on the judgment pro confesso, is as valid as though pronounced
upon answer and proof, until set aside, or reversed, in the manner prescribed
by law; 50 and even when the defendant is brought before the Court by publi-
cation alone, a personal judgment for the debt sued on may be rendered against
him, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as though he had been brought
before the Court by service of subpoena. 57
§ 212. When and How a Decree based on a Pro Confesso may be Set Aside.
A final decreebased on a judgment pro confesso, against a defendant served
with subpoena, may be set aside during the term at which it was rendered, pro-
vided not more than thirty days have elapsed since its rendition. After the
expiration of the term, or of said limit of thirty days, the decree cannot be
set aside, except upon proper proceedings instituted for that purpose, as in case
of decrees based on bill, answer and proof. 58 These proceedings in suits
brought by original or judicial attachment or property, will be found fully con-
sidered under the head of Attachment. 59 In all other than attachment cases,
a decree without personal service of process against a defendant who does not
appear to defend, is not absolute until three years from the decree, unless a
copy of the decree is served upon the defendant, in which case it becomes abso-
lute if the defendant fails to come forward and make defence within six months
after service. 60
The death of the defendant proceeded against without personal service,
whether the death occur before or after the filing of the bill, does not render
the proceedings void, but his heirs or representatives, as the case may be, have
the right, within three years from the rendition of the final decree, to make
themselves parties by petition, verified by affidavit, showing merits, and con-
testing the complainant's bill. 01 •
The original defendant, his heir, representative, or assignee claiming under

him by virtue of any act done before the commencement of the suit, may, within
six months after service of a copy of the decree, or within three years after
the decree when not served with such copy, be admitted to answer the bill,
upon petition showing merits, and giving security for the payments of costs;
and witnesses on both sides may be examined, and such other proceedings may
be had thereon, as if the cause were then newly begun. 82
54 Code, § 4383. 01 Code, § 4380.

55 Code, §4382; Scovel V. Absten, 1 Term. Ch., 02 Code, §§ 4379-4381. These sections do not refer
73; Sexton V. Alberti, 10 Lea, 457. This bond should to decrees based upon pro confessos in attachment
be invariably exacted when the complainant takes the cases. Code, § 4378. The petition should be filed in
pauper's oath. the Chancery Court in which the decree was ren-
50 Johnson V. Tomlinson, 13 Lea, 604. dered, even where the cause had been finally deter-
57 Taylor v. Rountree, 16 Lea, 725. But see, post, mined in the Supreme Court on appeal. Brown V.
§ 887, note. Brown, 2 Pick., 277. The opinion in this case by
58 Johnson V. Tomlinson, 13 Lea, 604; Pryor V, Special Judge M. M. Neil, of the Trenton bar, is a
Coleman, 2 Shan. Cas., 257. very exhaustive and able one, on the questions of
59 See Chapter on Suits by Attachment, post; practice arising on the foregoing sections of the
Code, §§4378: 3529-3534. Code. See Metcalf v. Landers, 3 Bax., 35, for the
60 Code, § 4379. The three years, within which practice in setting aside final decrees. The petition
the application to set aside the decree must be made, may be filed in vacation. Bledsoe V. Wright, 2 Bax.,
begin to run from the date of the decree in the 471.
Supreme Court, in case the suit is carried to that
Court by appeal. Brown v. Brown, 2 Pick., 277.
§213 PRO CONEESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. 188
If the petitionshow merits on its face, and is not fatally contradicted by the
record, it is sufficient, and need not be accompanied by an answer. 63 The '
proper way to test the sufficiency of the petition is by a motion to dismiss, and
in deciding on the motion, the Court will look alone to the petition and to the
record, and no answer to the petition will be allowed. If the motion to dismiss
is overruled, the decree complained of will be set aside, and the defendant
allowed to make all defences of law and fact to the bill, as if the bill had just
been filed and process served. 64
§ 213. Forms of Petition and Decree to Set Aside a Decree Based on a Pro
—
Confesso. The following forms of a petition and a decree will illustrate what
has been said in the preceding section
PETITION TO SET ASIDE A DECREE BASED ON A PRO CONFESSO.ss
John Doe,
vs. \
No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al.
To the Honorable Andrew Allison, Chancellor

Your petitioner, the above named defendant, Richard Roe, respectfully shows to the Court.
I.
That on the day of [giving date,] the above named John Doe filed his bill in
said cause against petitioner in this Court, alleging among other things that petitioner was
a non-resident, and praying publication against petitioner. A
judgment pro confesso was at
the May term, 1890, of this Court, pronounced against petitioner, based on an alleged pub-
lication as to petitioner and a supposed default by him; and at the same term a final decree
was made in the cause based on the said bill, the deposition of the complainant, and said
judgment pro confesso, by which decree the said complainant was given a recovery of four
hundred dollars, and all the costs of the cause, against petitioner, and execution awarded.
Said execution was on [giving date] levied on the following tract of land, the property of
petitioner: [Here describe it according to the levy; and, also, by a fuller description, if
necessary.] Said land was sold, under said execution, to the complainant, for the sum of
four hundred and twenty dollars and the Sheriff made him a deed therefor accordingly,
;
which deed has been registered, and the complainant is now holding and claiming said land
by virtue of said deed, and the previous proceedings in said cause. For a fuller account of
all the said proceedings, reference is made to the record in said cause now in this Court.
ii.
Your petitioner positively and solemnly avers and declares that, when said bill was filed,
and allthe proceedings thereunder had, as herein above stated, he was a non-resident of the
State of Tennessee, and a resident of the State of Indiana, that he had no knowledge, what-
ever, of said proceedings, or of any of them, but was absolutely and wholly ignorant of the
filing of the bill, and of all of the orders, decrees, and other proceedings in said cause, until
the third day of the present month, [January, 1891,] when he came to this county on other
business, and, greatly to his astonishment, learned of said suit, and of the sale of his said
tract of land thereunder.
in.
Your petitioner positively and solemnly avers that the cause of action set forth by said
complainant in his said bill is, and was at the filing of said bill, wholly false, and without any
foundation whatever in fact, or in law. Your petitioner did not owe said complainant. any
sum on any account whatever at the filing of said bill, or at the time of said decree; and did
not owe him the account exhibited to said bill, or any part thereof. [Set forth specific denials
of the cause of action alleged in the bill, and give any and all explanations, acquittances, re-
leases, receipts, &c, the petitioner may have, making his defences as full, clear and strong
as possible, according to the facts. Go into details and remember that this petition is in the
;
nature of an affidavit, and should be positive and specific, and adequate to the end in view.]
IV.
Your petitioner herewith exhibits his answer 66 to said bill, duly verified by his oath, and
he makes said answer a part of this petition, and says that said answer is true on his own
personal knowledge, and he prays that notice 67 of the filing of this petition be served on
said complainant, returnable instanter ; and that, on the hearing of this petition, said final
decree, and said judgment pro confesso, and said Sheriff's deed, be set aside, and for nought
63 Metcalf v. Landers, 3 Bax., 35. There is no is.". See, post, §§ 888-890, for similar proceedings in
need for an answer, until the Court has determined attachment suits.
that the defendant has the right to answer. But a 66 It is to tender an answer, but no
good practice
sworn answer disclosing merits will strengthen the answer is required until the right to answer has
defendant's application, and may turn the scale in his been determined. Metcalf V. Landers, 3 Bax., 3a;
favor. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 367. Brown v. Brown, 2 Pick., 277.
04 Brown v. Brown, 2 Pick., 277. The effect of 67 Notice may be served on the complainant before
allowing the petition to be filed unconditionally is the petition is presented, stating the day when it
to annul the decrees in the cause, and to restore will be presented, and the motion made to set aside
the, defendant to the status of a defendant whose the decree.
time to answer has not expired. Ibid.
189 PRO CONEESSOS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. §213
held; and that he be allowed to file said answer, and to take all proper proof. He, also,
prays for a writ of restitution to restore to him the said tract of land 68 or else, that a re- ;
ceiver be appointed to take it in charge until final decree in the cause. Petitioner, also, prays
for such other and general relief as he may be entitled to. Richard Roe.
[Affidavit and jurat as in § 162, ante.] 89
DECREE SETTING ASIDE A DECREE AGAINST A NON-RESIDENT.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 618.

On this 17th day of January, 1891, came the defendant, Richard Roe, and presented his
petition, praying therein that the order pro confesso and the final decree and other proceed-
ings in this cause be set aside, and that he be allowed to answer the bill, tendering with his
said petition an answer, duly sworn to. And notice of the presentation and filing of said
petition having been heretofore given the complainant, and he being present by his Solicitor,
and the said petition and answer, and the original record in the cause, having been read,
and argument of counsel heard, the Court is of opinion that the petitioner is entitled to have
both the order taking the bill for confessed, and the final decree in this cause, set aside, va-
cated, and for naught held.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court, that said order pro confesso and said
final decree be both set aside and vacated, and the defendant is allowed to file the answer
exhibited to his said petition, which answer is filed accordingly, and said petition also. And
it being admitted in open Court by the complainant, through his Solicitor, that the complain-
ant is by his tenant in possession of the tract of land sold in this cause, it is ordered by the
Court, on motion of the defendant, that a writ of restitution issue to restore to the defendant
the possession of said tract 70 but the tenant in possession will not be ousted until the end
;
of the present year, provided he will attorn to the defendant. 71

The cause is remanded to the rules for proof generally, and the defendant is granted leave
to cross-examine the complainant, whose deposition has heretofore been taken.
After the decree has been set aside, and the answer filed, witnesses on both
sides may be examined, and such other procedings may be had and taken in the
cause as if the issue had been duly made up by filing the answer at the appear-
ance term. The effect of the order, allowing the answer to be filed, is 'to anni-
hilate the interval between publication and the presentation of the- petition to
set aside the decree and to give the defendant every right he would have had,
;
if his answer had been filed at the appearance term, and if the term at which
it is was the appearance term. 72
filed
When a non-resident defendant is permitted to make defence after final
decree, he must do so by an answer, and not by a demurrer. 73
GS If the property has been sold to a stranger, the Pr. 367. But any facts specially in the knowledge of
defendant, on having the decree set aside, will not. the Solicitor may be sworn to by him.
be entitled to recover back the property. Sexton v. 70 Sexton v. Alberti, 10 Lea, 452.
Alberti, 10 Lea, 458. 71 The tenant may be regarded as a person acting
69 The petition should be sworn to by all the pe- on the validity of the decree. Code, § 4383.
titioners. An affidavit to the petition by their Solic- 72 Code, § 4381 ; Brown v. Brown, 2 Pick., 277.
itors is not sufficient. Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn Ch., 73 Ledgerwood V. Miller, 2 Shan. Cas., 66.
496; Totten v. Nance, 3 Tenn. Ch., 264; 1 Barb. Cli.
§ 214 MOTIONS BY COMPLAINANT. 190
ARTICLE II.
MOTIONS BY COMPLAINANT.
§ 214. Motions and Affidavits generally Con- § 218. Motions for Alias, or Mesne Process.
sidered. § 219. Motions for Attachments for not An-
§ 215. Motions for Leave to Amend the Bill. swering.
§ 216. Motions in Reference to Defendants § 220. Motions by Complainants in Person.
Under Disability. § 221. Suits by Motion in Chancery.
§ 217. Motions for Orders Pro Confesso.
§ 214. Motions and Affidavits generally Considered. —A
motion is an oral
application to the Court in term time, or to the Chancellor or Master in vaca-
tion, for some order in relation to the suit in which the application is made. An
affidavit is a statement of facts reduced to. writing, and sworn to before some
person authorized to administer the oath. Affidavits are ordinarily made in
support of motions, in order to bring before the Court some fact not otherwise
appearing.
The subject of motions and affidavits will be hereafter fully considered in
Articles devoted thereto but the principal motions and affidavits made in
;
Court, or before the Chancellor, or Master, after service of process, and before
the defendant has filed any pleading, will be considered here.
§ 215. —
Motion for Leave to Amend the Bill. Although the complainant may
amend his bill before defence made without application to the Court, neverthe-
Court be in session when the necessity for an amendment appears, it is
less, if
proper to move the Court for leave to amend. Such a motion may be in the
following form
MOTION AND ORDER TO AMEND THE BILL.
John Doe,
vs. \
No. 618.
In this cause, the complainant moved the Court for leave to so amend his bill as to allege
that John Brown claims to own an interest in the tract of land sought to be sold for partition
in this cause, but that the extent of such interest, if any, is unknown and so as to make said
;
John Brown a defendant, and require him to discover the nature and extent of his interest,
if any, and how evidenced, which motion was by the Court allowed, and said amend-
ment was made accordingly on the face of the bill. A
subpcena, and a copy of the bill as
amended, will issue, and be served on said John Brown.
When a motion to amend the bill is made after answer filed, it must ordinarily
be supported by affidavit, showing (1) why the amendment was not made
before, (2) specifying the substance of the proposed amendment, and (3) aver-
ring that the matter of the proposed amendment is true.
The subject of amending bills and of supplemental bills will be hereafter
fully treated in a separate Chapter.
§ 216. Motions in Reference to Defendants under Disability. — If his bill is
filed against a defendant who is a minor, or a person of unsound mind, without

a general guardian, it is the duty of the complainant, at the appearance term,
or on or after the appearance rule day, to have a guardian ad litem appointed
for such minor, or non compos. The Chancellor, or Master, may, on motion, make
the appointment in vacation or, if the Court be in session, the appointment
;
191 MOTIONS BY COMPLAINANT. §217
may be made by the Court. The motion and order, if made in Court, 1
may be
as follows
'
ORDER APPOINTING A GUARDIAN AD LITEM.
John Doe,
vs. r No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al.
In this cause, the complainant moved the Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for Charles
Jones, one of the defendants, and it appearing to the Court that said Charles Jones is a
minor [or, person of unsound mind,] duly in Court by service of process, [or, by publication,]
and that he has no general guardian, the Court appointed John W. Green, Esq., a Solicitor
of the Court, guardian ad litem of said Charles Jones, to defend this suit for him and the ;
said John W. Green in open Court accepted said appointment, [and filed his answer as such
guardian.]
A guardian ad litem cannot be regularly appointed until the day the person
under disability is required to appear; and the appointment cannot be made
at all, unless such person has been actually brought before the Court, by service
of subpoena, or by publication. In contemplation of law, the infant, or lunatic,
must be in Court in obedience to its process, before the Court has such jurisdic-
tion of his person as to authorize it to appoint a guardian ad litem for him. 2
§ 217. Motions for Orders Pro Confesso. On any rule day after the time —
allowed for making defence has expired, the complainant may move the Court,
or Master, for an order to take the bill as confessed. In vacation, the defendant
has all of the appearance rule day in which to file his defence, and so a pro
confesso cannot be entered against him until the next rule day. If the first day
of the term, or any Monday of the term, is appearance day, the defendant must
make his defence on appearance day, or on the first two days thereafter or on, or ;
after, the fourth day, he will be liable to a pro confesso. If the motion is made
in Court, it may be as follows
ORDER PRO CONFESSO.
John Doe, 1
vs. \
No. 618.
In this cause the complainant moved the Court for a judgment pro confesso against the
defendant Daniel Roe and it appearing to the Court that said Daniel Roe is duly in Court,
;
by service of subpeena [or, by publication,] requiring*him to appear and defend on the first
Monday in February, 1891, and that he has failed to make any defence to complainant's bill
as required by the rules of this Court, it is ordered by the Court,, that said bill be taken as
confessed, as to said Daniel Roe, and the cause set for hearing ex parte, as to him.
The taking of pro confessos has, heretofore, been fully considered, and the
reader is referred to the Article on that subject. 3
§ 218. Motion for Alias, or Mesne, Process.—If the Sheriff has failed to find
a defendant,- or the publication is defective, the complainant should move the
Court at the appearance term for alias process, to bring the defendant into
Court; or, in a proper case, he may have a judicial attachment against the
defendant 's property, and an order for publication. If the Court will continue
sufficiently long, such alias, or mesne, process may be made returnable to any
Monday of the term. 4 The order for alias process may be as follows
ORDER EOR ALIAS PROCESS.
John Doe, I
vs. \
No. 618.
In this cause, on motion of the complainant, alias subpeena to answer is awarded against
the defendant, George Smith, returnable to the 4th Monday of the present term, being the
.24th day of the present month.
The form of the motion, and order, when made
1 the day set for his appearance must have come;
_
in the Master's office, is substantially the same as until then, he is not in Court, in contemplation ot
when made in Court. law. See, ante, §106; post, §227.
2 Not that the person under disability must be ac- 3 Ante, §§ 205-213.
tually and bodily in Court, but that_ the subpeena i Ch. Rule, XI. §4; post, §1200, sub-sec. 4.
must have been served, or the publication made, and
§219 MOTIONS BY COMPLAINANT. 192
All alias process runs like original process, except that it commands the
officer, "as he has heretofore been commanded," to do so and so. The following
is the form of
AN ALIAS SUBPOENA.
Blount County. j
To the Sheriff of said County
You are hereby commanded, as you have heretofore been, to summon Peter Poe to appear
[&c, as in § 187, ante.]
If a defendant has died, or married, since served with process, such fact may
be proved in open Court, and a scire facias ordered by the Court, on motion,
against the husband of the married defendant, or the heirs or personal repre-
sentatives of the deceased defendant. 5 The following is the form of an
ORDER FOR A SCIRE FACIAS.
John Doe, j
vs. \
No. 618
In this cause, the death of James Jones was suggested and proved in open Court. And it
being suggested that Henry Jones is his administrator, [or, that William Jones and George
Jones are his heirs at law,] it is ordered by the Court, on motion of the complainant, that a
scire facias issue to notify said Henry Jones [or, said William Jones and George Jones,] to
appear on [some Monday of the term, or at some rule day, specifying the day,] and show
cause, if any he has [or, they have,] why this suit should not be revived against him, [or
them.]
Motions for Attachments for not Answering. If the defendant fails

§ 219.
—
to answer a bill seeking a discovery, within the time required by law, the com-
plainant may either take an order pro confesso against him, or may move the
Court, or Master, for an attachment against the body of the defendant to com-
pel him to answer. 6 In such a case, the motion may be in the following form:
MOTION FOR AN ATTACHMENT.
John Doe, |
vs. y No. 618.

In this cause, the complainant moved the Court for an attachment against the defendant,
George Smith, to compel him to answer the bill and it appearing to the Court, that the sub-
;
poena to answer the bill was duly served on the defendant, George Smith, on the 10th day of
February, 1891, that he has failed to answer, or make other defence to said bill within the
time required by law, and that said bill calls for a discovery from said defendant under oath,
it is ordered by the Court that an attachment issue against said George Smith for not an-
swering said bill, said attachment to be returnable to Thursday of the present week. The
Sheriff may take a bail-bond in the penalty of five hundred dollars.
§ 220.Motions by Complainants in Person. There are some motions best —

made by a complainant in person, or made by a Solicitor in his presence. Where
a person's name is used as sole complainant, or as co-complainant, without au-
thority, he must take steps to repudiate the suit as soon as he has notice of its
existence. If the suit be pending, he should present an affidavit that the bill
was filed without authority, and move the Court to order the bill taken from
the files or dismissed as to him, and that the Solicitor filing the same be taxed
with all the costs of the cause. Upon such motion the Court will hear the evi-
dence, the burden of proof being on the Solicitor to show authority. 7
Where the suit has ended before the complainant learns of its existence, and
he has suffered any loss by such suit, he should file an original bill in the nature
of both a bill to impeach a decree for fraud and a bill of review, setting forth
the facts, and making the Solicitor and all of the parties to the original suit
5 For the practice in reviving suits, see Chapter 7 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 308-310; Courtney v. Dyer, 2
on Abatement and Revivor, post. Shan. Cas., 360; post, % 1174.
6 The proceedings in such a case have already been
fully detailed; see, ante, §§ 201-204.
193 MOTIONS BY COMPLAINANT. § 221
"
defendants, and praying to be relieved from all liability under the decree com-
plained of, and, if necessary, for an injunction against its enforcement as to him.
*
So, where a complainant complains of, or repudiates, any act of his Solicitor.
he should do so in person or, at least, should be present in Court at the time
;
his complaint made.

is
§ 221. —
Suits by Motion in Chancery. Suits may be commenced in the Chan-
cery Court by motion, 9 and decrees rendered summarily, without pleadings,.and
generally without notice, against certain officers and attorneys, and against
those indebted to certain sureties, stayors and endorsers. 10 The proceedings
in such suits are wholly foreign to the pleadings and practice in Equity, and
are purely statutory. They are seldom resorted to in the Chancery Court, and,
as they are treated of in books on practice in the Circuit Courts, and would un-
necessarily enlarge this volume, already cumbersome, they will not be further
considered.
sPost, §§233, note 3; 1174. I 10 Code, §§3583-3635.
8 Code, § 4312. I
j}
222 APPEARANCE BY THE DEFENDANT. 194
PART III.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE
APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT TO
THE CLOSE OF THE PLEADINGS.
CHAPTER XII.
APPEARANCE AND DEFENCE.
Article I. Appearance by the Defendant.
Article; II. Defences generally Considered.
Article III. Preliminary Motions by the Defendant.
ARTICLE I.
APPEARANCE BY THE DEFENDANT.
§ 222. What is an Appearance. § 226. When a Defendant Brought into Court
by Publication is Bound to Appear.
§ 223. What Constitutes an Appearance,
§ 224. Effect of an Appearance.
§ 227. When and How Defendants under
Disability Appear.
§ 225. When a Defendant Served with Sub-
§ 228. Where a Defendant, or Other Person
poena is Bound to Appear.
Summoned, is Bound to Appear.
§ 222. What is an —
Appearance. The subpoena and the notice by publication
require the defendant to appear, on or before a day named, before the Chancery
Court, to answer the complainant 's bill. What is meant by appearing is not
coming bodily into the Court House, when and where the Court is in session,
but making some motion, or doing some act of record, in a cause, or filing with
the Clerk and Master some written defence to complainant's suit. 1 This mo-
tion, act of record, or written defence the defendant ordinarily makes through
his Solicitor, 2 but he may make it in person. 3 Unless a defence is made, in
the manner and time required by the practice of the Court, a judgment pro
confesso will be entered against the defendant.
An appearance is, then, any act whereby a defendant recognizes the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, in the particular cause wherein he is a defendant. This ap-
pearance, or recognition of the Court's jurisdiction, may be: (1) a limited, or
special, appearance or (2) an unlimited, or general, appearance.
; limited, or A
special, appearance is ordinarily made for the express purpose of disputing the
jurisdiction of the Court; 4 and the appearance must affirmatively, or neces-
sarily, appear to be for such limited, or special purpose, as, for instance, to
plead in abatement, 5 or it will be deemed to be an unlimited, or general appear-
ance. A general appearance is one that is not expressly, or necessarily, limited
to the particular matter, motion, or pleading constituting the appearance. All
appearances are deemed to be general, or unlimited, unless expressly declared
to be special and limited, or unless its spcial or limited character is necessarily
implied from the nature of the motion, or pleading, constituting the particular
appearance in question.
A defendant may appear voluntarily as soon as the bill is filed, and without
"waiting for the subpoena to be served on him. 6 This is sometimes called appear-
ing gratis, and is generally resorted to, when a defendant wishes to make
1 In the eye of the law, a defendant is only seen 3 Code, § 3979.
to be present by what appears upon the records of 4 Sometimes called a conditional appearance. 1
the Court. Strauss V. Weil, 5 Cold., 124. And so Dan. Ch. Pr., 512; 536.
the Code requires the defendant not only to appear, Friedlander V. pollock, 5 Cold., 490; Sherry «.
5
but, also, to defend. Code, § 4360. Divine, 11 Heisk, 725; Boon v. Rahl, 1 Heisk., 12.
2 See, post, % 1174. u Strauss it. Weil, 5 Cold., 124.
195 APPEARANCE BY THE DEFENDANT. §223
some immediate application to the Court in the cause, 7 or to resist some appli-
cationby the complainant. 8 A defendant, who so appears, has every right he
would have had if subpoena had been served on him, returnable on the day he
voluntarily appeared. 9 Thus, an appearance to have pro confesso set aside is not
such an appearance as will debar a defendant from pleading in abatement to
the bill. 10
§ 223. What —
Constitutes Appearance. In practice, the service of a subpoena
on the defendant is equivalent to his appearance at the time and place specified
in the writ 11 and it is only when there has been no personal service of subpoena,
j
that an actual appearance by the defendant becomes important. defendant A

may be brought before the Court by attachment of his property and publication
in a newspaper or, in some cases, by publication without any attachment but
; ;
such devices are only substitutes for actual notice, and are allowed only because
otherwise there would often be a failure of justice. 12 In all such cases, Courts
proceed with uneasiness and misgivings, they realizing that it is the manifest
right of every one who is sued to have a reasonable notice of the suit, and a
fair opportunity to make defence. For this reason, Courts yearn for some
evidence that a defendant brought before the Court by publication has actual
knowledge of the litigation, and they seize, with some eagerness, upon any act
of the defendant recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court over him, in the
particular case.
Hence, the filing of any pleading, 13 the making or resisting of any motion, 14
the filing of exceptions to a Master 's report, the taking of depositions to be read
in the cause, the making of any agreement With the complainant, or his Solic-
itor, relative to any proceeding in the cause, 15 or any other act in the cause,
between the filing of the bill and the rendition of the final decree, whereby
the pendency of the suit is recognized expressly, or by necessary implication,
will, if there be record evidence of the fact, constitute a general and unlimited
appearance, 16 unless limited by express declaration, or necessary implication,
in which case the appearance will be limited.
In all cases of voluntary appearances, where no pleading is filed or motion
made by the defendant, in order to avoid disputes or misconstruction, it is
proper to have some entry of record in reference to the defendant's appearance.
Such entry, however, is not indispensable, for the Courts will not permit a
party, who appears to have had actual knowledge of the pendency of a suit
against him, to complain because he was not formally notified. 17 Courts of
Equity regard substance, not ceremony, and actual notice is the substantial
thing, and not the ceremony of notification.
§ 224. —
Effect of an Appearance. As the object of process, whether by sub-
poena, or by attachment of property and publication, or by publication alone,
is to notify the defendant of the pendency of a suit against him in a particular
Court, it follows that the actual appearance of the defendant cures any defect,
7 1 Dani Ch. Pr., 539; Jones V. Fulghmn, 3 Tenn. 16 Strauss v. Weil, 5 Cold., 124. Judge Cooper
Ch., 193. says that, doubtless, with us an entry of the Solicit-
8 As when he desires to have an injunction modi- or's name, either by himself, or by the Clerk at his
fied, or dissolved; or, wishes to resist the appoint instance, on the rule or trial docket, would be a
ment of a receiver. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 539, note. sufficient entry of the appearance of the parties he
9Squibb v. McFarland, 11 Heisk.. 567. claimed to represent. Pugsley v. Freedman's Co., 2
10 -Lumber Co. V. Lieberman, 22 Pick., 153. Ttnn. Ch., 138. r Livingston V. Gibbons, 4 Johns.
11 The Code says that service of the subpoena on Ch., ON. Y.), 95.
the defendant shall bind' him to appear. Code, §§ it But, on appeal to the Supreme Court, his ap-
4350-4351. pearance would be shown in the record only by
12 The purpose of all original process is to bind the return on the writ, or by some order pro con-
the defendant to appear. See, ante, 60, fesso, or by some pleading, or other paper, filed by
13 Pugsley' v. Freedman's Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 138. him in the cause, or by some entry on the minutes,
But where a-demurrer is filed by "the defendants," showing the fact of his appearance. For this reason,
it will not be presumed to be the pleading of a de- it is all-important to have some record evidence of
fendant not served with process. Dougherty V. a defendant's appearance; otherwise, the jurisdiction
Shown, 1 Heisk., 302. of the Court over the person of the defendant would
14 McBee v. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558. appear to be wanting.
15 Proudfit v. Picket, 7 Cold., 563; Pugsley V.
Freedman's Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 138.
§225 APPEARANCE BY THE DEPENDANT. 196
omission, or imperfection, in the process, or in its execution. 17 1 Indeed, if the *
defendant actually appears, it matters not whether any process in fact ever
issued at all.
And when a defendant does any act, indicating unmistakably that he recog-
nizes himself as a party to the particular suit, he is conclusively deemed to have
knowledge of the contents of the pleadings, and of the whole record in the
cause, including all that has been done in it and he conclusively waives any ir-
;
regularity or informality in the process whereby he was notified of the suit and ;
indeed waives the process itself.

Appearance in an attachment suit gives the Court jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant but not of the property sought to be attached the latter de- :
pends on the validity of the attachment proceedings. 18

A regular guardian can waive process for his ward, and so can a husband for
his wife, when they are living together, and her separate estate is not involved
in the litigation. A
partner can, while the partnership exists, enter the appear-
ance of his firm but not after its dissolution. Infants and lunatics can neither
;
enter an appearance, nor waive process and all proceedings against them not
;
based on proper process, properly executed, are void. There can be no guardian
ad litem appointed for them, until after such service of process, and until the
return day thereof; and, therefore, a guardian ad litem cannot enter their ap-
pearance, or waive process for them. 19
But where the Court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, an appearance
by the defendant does not give the Court the right to proceed and pronounce
a decree. 20 If, however, the objection to the jurisdiction is merely local or per-
sonal, such objection is waived by "appearance, and defence to the merits, except
in suits relating to land.
§ 225. When
a Defendant Served with Subpoena is Bound to Appear. —
defendant is to appear at the time and place 21 specified in the subpoena,
bound
or publication notice. This time is not uniform throughout the State, because
by statute, original process may, by rule of Court applicable to the Court where
made, be returnable to the rule days, and all others except final process may be
so returnable. 22 In pursuance of this statute, in many of the counties, there
is a Chancery rule providing that all process, except final process, shall
be made returnable to the rule days. Where there is no such rule of Court,
all original procss is returnable to the first day of the regular term, and service
of the original subpoena on the defendant five days before the return day,
binds him to appear within the first three days of the term, if the Court hold so
long, otherwise on the first day of the term. 23 But, if the subpcena be served
upon the defendant, within five days before the first day of the term, he is not
bound to appear before the first day of the second term after the- service, 24
unless the term last longer than one week and the subpcena is made returnable
to some subsequent day of the term, in which case he must make his defence
within the first three days of such return day, or be liable to a pro confcsso; and
if the subpcena is made returnable to a subsequent day, as stated, but executed
17a 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 78. the Court is about to adjourn, pro confesso may be
18 Stewart v. Smith, 3 Shan. Cas., 686. taken in any case in which defense has not been
19 Taylor v. Walker, 1 Heisk., 734. made. Acts of 1905, ch. 472.
20 Agee v. Dement, 1 Hum., 332; Ferris v. Fort, The original act (Code, § 4350) was intended for
2 Tenn. Ch., 150. Courts held for two or three days in certain small
21 The place will, usually, be the office of the counties, the Chancellor holding Court in one county
Clerk and Master, if he desires to file a pleading; or, f om Monday to Wednesday, and in the next county
l
if he desires to make his actual appearance by mo- from Thursday to Saturday. Under this section as
tion, the place for him to make such an appearance amended, a pro confesso can be taken on the second
will be before the Master, in his office, or in the morning of the term; but, if the Court should con-
open Court, while the Chancellor is sitting. tinue until Thursday, it would be proper to retake
22 Code, § 4348. the pro confesso; unless the defendant had. in the
23 Service of the original subpcena on the defend- meantime, made a defense, which he might lawfully
ant five days before the return day shall bind him do, and have the pro confesso, entered on the second
to appear within the first three days of the term, dnv of the term, set aside on motion, as, of course,
if the Court hold so long; otherwise on the first without affidavit and without costs.
day of the term; Provided, however, if the term of 24 Code, §§4351; 2830; Wessells v. Wessells, I
Court be for more than three days, and the business Tenn. Ch., 60.
of the Court has been finished within three days, and
197 APPEARANCE BY THE DEFENDANT. §226
within the five days before the return day, then the Monday succeeding such
return day becomes the return day, and the defendant is allowed the three
succeeding days thereafter to make defense. 25
Under these rules, if the subpoena is served on the defendant on the Wednes-
day next before the return day, such service would be in time to require the
defendant to appear on such day, or on the Tuesday or the Wednesday next
following and if he failed so to appear, a judgment pro confesso could be en-
;
tered against him, in open Court, on Thursday morning. 26 The defendant in

such case has all the first three 27 days in which to appear, and make his de-
fence, or to obtain further time for that purpose. 28
But if the Court hold less than three days, the defendant is bound to appear
and make his defense on the first day of the term, and if the business of the
Court has been finished within three days and the Court is about to adjourn
on the second or third day of the term, a pro confesso may be taken against him
if he has made no defense. In such a case the order may be in the following
form, omitting the title of the cause
ORDER PRO CONFESSO ON 2ND DAY OF TERM.
In this cause, on motion of complainant's Solicitor, and it duly appearing to the Court
that the defendant, Richard Roe, is duly in Court by service of subpoena, [or, by publication,]
and that he has failed to appear and make defense to complainant's bill within the time re-
quired by law, and the Court being about to adjourn, it is ordered that complainant's bill be
taken as confessed by him, the said Richard Roe, and the cause set for hearing ex parte.
[And in a proper case, a final decree may be taken and entered at the same time. See ante
§ 20S.]
When the subpoena is returnable to a rule day, by a rule of the Court, the
defendant ha'sall of the return rule day in which to file his pleading 29 and, as ;
no pro confesso can be entered against him until the next succeeding rule day, he
has all the intermediate time in which to file his pleading. It must be remem-
bered, however, that each day of the term, as well as the first Monday of every
month in vacation, is a rule day, and, a rule day for all rule day business and ;
if a term of Court comes between the return rule day and the first Monday of
the next month, a judgment pro confesso may, for want of a defence, be entered
on any day of such term.
The return days of all mesne process in the Chancery Court, such as subpoenas
to answer supplemental, and amended bills, and bills of revivor, shall be the
rule days of the Court 30 and, in such cases, the defendant must file his written
;
defence with the Clerk and Master before the rule day next after the return
rule day, or a pro confesso may be entered against him on such next rule day.
But, if a term of Court shouM begin before such next rule day, the pro confesso
may be entered on any day of the term, inasmuch as every day of a term is a
rule day. 31
But, alias or mesne process taken out at any time may be returnable to any
Monday of the term, and if executed five days before the return day the defend-
ant has the first three days of the term, if the Court hold so long, otherwise the
first day of the term to make defense, or obtain time therefor; and after said
three days, or one day, as the case may be, the cause stands to be proceeded
in for all purposes. If such alias or mesne process be executed within the five
days before the return day the succeeding Monday becomes the return day, and
the cause stands to be proceeded in at that term. 32
§ 226. When a Defendant brought into Court by Publication is Bound to
—
Appear. When the defendant is brought into Court by attachment of property
28 For the practice where the defendant is re-
25 Ch. Rule XI, §§ 1-3.
20 Dickinson v. Lee, 2 Cold., 615. quired to appear at a rule day, and when pro con-
27 The allowance of three days, (called days of frssos may be taken at rules, see Proceedings in the
grace,) in which to perform a duty that should have Master's Office, post, § 1157.
been done on the first day, is a very ancient custom, 29 Wessells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 60, 67.
and grew out of the fact that "our sturdy ancestors 30 Code, § 4349.
held it beneath the condition of freemen to appear, 31 Code, § 4421.
or to do any other act, at the precise time ap- 32 Cr. Rule XI, §§ 4-5; § 1200, post.
pointed." 3 Blackstone's Com., 278, citing Tacitus,
to show it was German law, before the Christian era.
S227 APPEARANCE BY THE DEFENDANT. 198
and publication, the last publication must be at least one
the time week before
fixed in the published order for the defendant's appearance. 33 If, therefore
the time so fixed be the first day of the term, and there be less than one week
between the last publication and the first day of the term, it would seem that
the defendant is not bound to appear until the first three days of the second
term of the Court after such publication, 34 but, if the appearance day is a rule
day, then the defendant need not appear until the rule day coming at least one
week after the last publication and he has all of such rule day in which to
;
make his defence.

"When the defendant is brought before the Court by publication, without any
attachment of property, the fourth publication is equivalent to the service of
the subpoena on the day of such fourth publication; and if five or more days
elapse between the day of such last publication and the rule day specified in
the published order for the defendant's appearance, then such rule day is his
day for appearance, 35 but if less than five days elapse, then the next succeeding
rule day is his appearance day. In all such cases, the defendant has all of the
appearance day in which to make his defence, and no pro confesso can be entered
against him until the rule day next succeeding the appearance day.
If, in any case, the defendant has a demurrer, plea, or answer, properly filed,
no pro confesso can be entered against him, even though he may have been in
default when such pleading was filed. And, if in any case, a term of Court
comes while a defendant is in default, a pro confesso can be entered against him
on any day of such term, unless he filed a proper pleading before the motion
for such a judgment was made.
§ 227. When and How Defendants under Disability Appear. As already —
shown, minors and persons of unsound mind must be brought into Court in the
same way as defendants not under any disability; but as minors, idiots and
lunatics cannot bind themselves by any contract, and, as a consequence, cannot
retain counsel, and as they are incapable of making their own defence, the
law of the Court requires that they should appear by regular guardian, when
they have such and, if they have none, it becomes the duty of the Court, or of
;
the Master, if the Court be not in session, to appoint a guardian for them, for
the purpose of the particular litigation. This guardian is called a guardian
ad litem. 86
Neither the Chancellor nor the Master can rightfully appoint a guardian
ad litem unless: (1) the infant, idiot or lunatic is made a defendant to the bill;
and (2) is duly in Court by service of subpoena, or publication fully made. The
Court must have actually acquired jurisdiction of the person of the infant, idiot
or lunatic before a guardian ad litem can be appointed, and this jurisdiction can
be acquired only by proper service of proper process; 37 and not then, until
the return day of such process ss for, until the return day, the process is, in
;
contemplation of law, in the Sheriff's hands, and the Court cannot know
whether it has been duly served or not; and besides, the party served is not
required to appear until the return day of the process. 39 Hence, any appoint-
ment before the return day would be premature. 40 An infant without a general
guardian does not become a defendant to a bill unless (1) the bill names him
33 Code, § 3523. of the highest honor, to zealously and jealously

34 Code, §§4351; 3524-3526. guard all the interests of his ward. As to the rights,
35 Wessells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 60. This case powers, and duties, of guardians ad litem, see, ante,
holds that the four publications are equivalent to §§ 106-108.
seivice of process on the day of the fourth and last 37 Frazer V. Pankey, 1 Swan, 75; Taylor v.
publication, and that this last publication must be Walker, 1 Heisk., 738.
five days or more before the day the defendant is 3S See, ante, § 227.
bound to appear. McGavock v. Young, 3 Tenn. Ch., 30 The infant, or nan compos, may have a regular
529. guardian appointed for him, before the return day,
30 The Master should be very careful to appoint as and thus obviate the necessity for a guardian ad
guardian ad litem a Solicitor of good repute, and litem.
v-holly disinterested, unless interested on behalf of 40 Code, §4369, sub-sees. 1 and 2; §4372. See,
the ward; and this guardian should deem it a point ante, % 227, note.
199 DEFENCES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. §228
as such, (2) process has been executed as to him, and (3) an answer filed for
him by a guardian ad litem duly appointed. 41
If a married female defendant is a minor, or of unsound mind, she must ap-
pear by a regular guardian, if she has one and if none, a guardian ad litem
;
must be appointed for her. In such a case, however, her husband is generally
eppointed her guardian, when she is a co-defendant, unless they are living
apart, or her interests are antagonistic to his. If a married female defendant
is of age, and of sound mind, she, ordinarily, appears with and by her husband,
who must see to it that her answer is put in jointly with his. If, however,
their interests or feelings are antagonistic, she may, if she -or he choose, appear
and answer separately. 42
§ 228. Where a Defendant, or Other Person Summoned, is Bound to Appear.
"When a defendant, witness, or other person, is subpoenaed, or in any way noti-
fied by service of process, or by publication, or by an order of record, "to
appear before the Court," the place for him so to appear is in the office of the
Clerk and Master of the Court, who is authorized by law and the practice of
the Court to represent the Court, pro hac vice; and who will, on due inquiry, in-
form the person so appearing what is required of him, so that he may order his
movements advisedly. 43 A person does not, ordinarily, appear before the Chan-
cery Court in propria persona, unless he does so (1) to manage his own case, 44
or assist his Solicitor therein, or (2) is under arrest, or on trial, or (3) is a
witness examined in open Court, or (4) is present in reference to the execution
of some bond or other instrument, or the solvency of the sureties of some party.
A party appears before the Court, as a rule, in the person of his Solicitor,
and whatever paper he wishes to present or file, and whatever motion or argu-
ment he wishes to make, and whatever protest or request he desires to submit,
and whatever other action he feels called on to take, in reference to any matter
before the Court, is, usually, done by or through his Solicitor, either in the
office of the Clerk and Master, or in open Court, as the exigency may requir?
or convenience suggest.
ARTICLE II.
DEFENCES GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 229. Proceedings Preliminary to Making § 231. Various Modes of Defence.
Defence. § 232. Order in which Defences Must be
§ 230. Defences generally Considered. Made.
§ 229. Proceedings Preliminary to Making Defence.—When a defendant is

notified by service of subpoena, or by publication, that a bill has been filed
against him, his first duty is to employ a Solicitor of the Court, in which the
bill is filed, to represent him, unless he intends to defend in person. He must
be careful to make defence within the time required by law, or a judgment pro
confesso will be entered against him. If he has not been served with a copy of
the bill, he is entitled to a copy on demand; 1 he is, also, entitled to see the orig-
inal bill, and the exhibts thereto, if any; but he has no right to take them out
of the office of the Clerk and Master.
The employment of a Solicitor by the defendant is ordinarily verbal; but,
41 Miller V. Taylor, 2 Shan. Cas., 462; Lewis & 42 See, ante, §§ 88; 99.
Lenoir v. Outlaw, 1 Tenn. (Overt.,) 141. The old 43 See, post, §§ 1156-1159.
Equity practice required the Sheriff to bring the 44 Code, | 3979.
infant into Court. Ibid. 1 Code, § 4344.
§230 DEFENCES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 200
where the defendant does not sign, or swear to, his answer, the better practice
is for the Solicitor to obtain from the defendant a written authority to appear
for him in the cause. However employed, the Solicitor has all the rights his
client would have and may have a copy of the bill, and an inspection of the
;
original bill, and the exhibits but he has no right to take any of them out of
;
the without the express permission of the Court, or the Clerk and Master.
office,
Having read the bill, or obtained a copy, the defendant, or his Solicitor,
will, with all diligence, possess himself of. the real facts in the case and, es-
;
pecially, of the matters relied on as a defence.

1. If there be any ground for disputing the jurisdiction of the Court, a plea
in abatement must be filed before any other defence is made, or offered to be
made, or even before any motion is made in the case.
2. If, on inspecting the bill, it shows a manifest want of Equity on its face
or, if any prerequisite of' the writ be wanting, he may enter a motion to dismiss
the bill, provided the defendant is subpoenaed to appear on the first day of *he
term. If, however, he is subpoenaed to appear at a rule day out of term, this
motion is not available, as it cannot be made except in open Court.
3. If the bill be demurrable, the demurrer must be drawn and filed, taking
care not to apply it to the whole bill, unless so intended.
4. If none of these defences can be made, but the bill is liable to be defeated
by a plea in bar, such a plea is the next defence in order.
5. If such a plea is not available, or if available is not advisable, then the
defendant must answer the bill, or disclaim; and if an answer will be insuffi-
cient to enable him to make complete defence, or to obtain all the rights he is
entitled to arising out of the controversy, or the subject-matter thereof, he may,
6. Pile his answer as a cross-bill or, if it is necessary to bring new parties
;
before the Court, he must file a separate cross-bill.

7. If the bill is made up of several distinct matters, and a demurrer will lie
to a part of it, a plea in bar to another part, and an answer can be made to
the remainder, the defendant may join all of these defences; and may, in addi-
tion, file a cross-bill if he needs any affirmative relief growing out of the
subject-matter of the litigation.
The fact that all of the foregoing matters are involved in every defence, and
that the various defences must be made in the order stated, and that the
making of any of the defences is a waiver of all the defences that precede it,
show how important it is for a defendant to be diligent in employing a compe-
tent Solicitor; and how diligent and cautious the Solicitor must be after his
employment.
If there be any paper referred to in the bill as an exhibit and not filed, the de-
fendant may have an order, by the Master, entered on the rule docket, requir-
ing such exhibit to be filed, and extending the time for answering until a rea-
sonable period after the defendant is notified of the filing.
§ 230. —
Defences generally Considered. The bill and the subpoena require
the defendant to answer the bill. If, however, there are sufficient reasons,
either inside or outside of the bill, why he should not answer it, he may avail
himself of these reasons. These reasons, if outside of the bill, are brought for-
ward by plea, or by a motion to dismiss, which is, in such a case, in the nature
of a plea. If the reasons, however, are inside of the bill, or, in other words,
apparent on its face, they are brought forward by demurrer, or by a motion to
dismiss, which is, in such case, in the nature of a demurrer. 2 If the defence
thus made is sustained by the Court, the bill is dismissed, unless the defect in
the bill can be cured by amendment, in which case it may be amended on proper
application. Some of the defences thus set up do not reach the merits of the
controversy, and though they may cause the bill to be dismissed, such dismissal
2 Code, §§ 4384-4388.
201 DEFENCES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. § 231
will not prevent another bill being filed on the same grounds. But others of
these defences do go to the merits, and, if sustained, not only cause the dis-
missal of the bill, but also forever terminate the matters in controversy.
The defences which merely dismiss the suit, without touching the merits, are
called dilatory defences, because they only delay a decision on the merits the ;
defences, which result in the decision of the controversy on its merits, are called
peremptory, or permanent defences, because they result in a permanent determina-
tion of the controversy. 3
1. Dilatory Defences are those which insist: (1) that there are such irregu-
larities in bringing the suit, or in selecting the venue, or in issuing, or executing
the process, that the defendant has the right to have the suit abated and (2) ;
that the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the matters set forth in the bill.
2.. Peremptory Defences are those which insist: first, that the complainant
never had any right to institute the suit; or second, that if any such right ever
existed, it is extinguished or ended. The defence that no right to sue ever
existed includes the following: (1) that the complainant's rights are not su-
perior to those of the defendant; (2) that the defendant has no interest in the
controversy; and (3) that there is no privity between the complainant and the
defendant, or any other right in complainant to maintain the suit against the
defendant. The defence that if the complainant ever had any right to sue the
defendant such right is extinguished, or ended, is based on the ground; (1)
that the right to sue has been extinguished by the act of the parties themselves
or (2) that it has been ended by operation of some law. 4
§ 231. Various Modes of Defence. —The mode and order in which these
matters of defence may be made are 5 :
1. By Disclaimer,' a species of answer whereby the defendant disclaims all

interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and prays to be dismissed.
2. By Plea in Abatement, a pleading which (1) relies on some single fact out-
side of the bill itself, and also outside of the merits of the controversy, to abate
the suit; or (2) denies some jurisdictional allegation.
3. By Motion to Dismiss, which is an informal and summary method of end-
ing the litigation, and is based on the fact (1) that the bill is unknown to the
forms of the Court; or (2) that there is no Equity on the face of the bill;
or (3) that the Court has no jurisdiction of the defendant or the subject-matter
or (4) that some one or more of the prerequisites of the writ are wanting or ;
(5) that there is a mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties; or (6) that the bill is
multifarious; or (7) that there is some other statutory ground of dismissal. 6
4. By Demurrer, a pleading which insists that, as a matter of law, the state-
ments in the bill do not entitle the complainant to the relief prayed by him
against the demurrant.
5. By Plea in Bar, a pleading which raises an issue on some single matter
of fact touching the merits, which issue if decided in the defendant's favor
will end the suit or, at least, end so much of the bill as the plea covers.
;
6. By Answer, a pleading which either denies the material allegations in the

bill, or admits them, and sets up new matters which avoid them.
7. By Cross Bill, a pleading which brings such additional matters, or parties,
or both, before the Court as are necessary for the defendant's full protection
and defence, or for a full adjudication of all the matters in controversy.
8. By a Joinder of any two or more of the foregoing defences, when the bill
contains distinct matters subject to distinct defences.
§ 232. Order in Which Defences Must be Made. It is important for the —
pleader to keep in mind the order in which the various kinds of defences must
be relied on, inasmuch as a mistake, in this matter, may preclude him from
availing himself of the only successful ground of defence open to him. The
3 Sto. Eq. PI., § 434. |
5 Code, § 4384.
4 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 434-435. I
6 Code, § 4386.
§233
S PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. 202
order of defence is strictly logical, beginning with the most technical, and
least meritorious, kind of defence, and proceeding, by regular stages, to the
least technical and most meritorious. The order of defence is prescribed by
and is in strict accord with the true logic of pleading. It is as follows
statute, 7
Pleas in Abatement,
1. including, under this term, all pleas which seek
to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the defendant, or
over the subject-matter of the suit.
a. Motions to Dismiss, including all the various grounds whereon the defend-
ant seeks to have the bill summarily dismissed, without filing any written plead-
ing.
Demurrers, whether to the whole bill, or only to a part thereof.
3.
Pleas in Bar, comprising all pleas which do not dispute the jurisdiction of
4.
the Court.
5. Answers, which also, include Disclaimers, 8 whether the disclaimer covers
the whole, or only part, of the subject-matter of the litigation.
6. Cross Bills, whether joined to the answer, or filed as a separate pleading.
The adoption of any one of the foregoing defences is a waiver of the right to
set up any defence that precedes it 9 but, where strong reasons can be shown,
;
especially where the defendant is a person under disability, the Court will
allow the answer to be withdrawn, and a demurrer filed or a demurrer to be ;
withdrawn, and a plea in abatement filed. 10 Each of these defences will be fully
considered in subsequent sections.
AETICLE III.
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT.

§ 233. Motion for Complainant's
Solicitor to § 237. Motions for Further Time to Make
Show
his Authority. Defence.
§ 234. Motions in Reference to Security for $ 238. Motions to Set Aside Orders Pro Con-
Costs. fesso.
§ 235. Motions in Reference to the Filing § 239. Motions for Rules on Complainant to
of Exhibits. Take Steps.
§ 236. Motions by Husband, or Wife, to
Answer Separately.
§ 233. Motion for Complainant's Solicitor to Show his Authority. If the —

defendant has any good reason to believe that complainant's Solicitor has no
authority to institute the suit, 1 he may move the Court to make a rule on the
Solicitor, to produce his authority. 2 This motion must be based on an affidavit,
because the Court presumes the Solicitor has due authority. 3 The affidavit may
be as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OP WAUT OP AUTHORITY.
John Doe, j
vs. \
No. 618.
In this cause, the defendant, Richard Roe, makes oath that he has good reason to believe,
of the
Code, § 4384.
7 granted on the payment of all the costs
Disclaimers are not included in the Code list of
8 cause, accruing subsequent to the filing of the an*
modes of defense otherwise than as included in swer, unless the defendant was misled by the con-
answers. duct of the complainant, as in Merchant V. Preston,
Seifred v. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., 20; Cooke 1 Lea, 280.
V. Richards, 11 Heisk., 711. But see, post, §§ 260- 1 See, ante,§ 220; and, post, § 1174.
261. 2 Lynn Glidwell, 8 Yerg., 1; Cage v. Foster, J
V.
10 Cooke Richards, 11 Heisk., 711; Merchant V.
v. Yerg., Wright v. McLemore, 10 Yerg., 235;
261;
Pieston, 1 Lea, 280; Chestnut v. Frazier, 6 Bax., Gillespie, ex Parte, 3 Yerg., 325; Jones v. Stockton,
217; Lowe v. Morris, 4 Sneed, 69. These cases show 6 Lea, 133. „,.„.
that even after answer filed, the Court may, in ^ 3 Rogers V. Park, 4 Hum., 480; Jones v. William-
proper case, allow the answer to be withdrawn and 3. son, 5 Cold., 379.
demurrer to the jurisdiction of the Court to be filed. The first step to be taken by a party who proposes
In such cases, however, the leave should only be
203 PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. §234
and does believe, [or, has been reliably informed and believes,] and charges, that Henry Jones,
who signed the bill of complainant as Solicitor, and who brought this suit and is now prose-
cuting it, did not then have, and does not now. have, authority so to do and that he is acting ;
as complainant's Solicitor in this cause, without any lawful warrant or authority so to act.
Wherefore, affiant prays the Court to require said Henry Jones to produce and exhibit his
authority to act as complainant's Solicitor in this cause.
[With proper jurat.] Richard Roe.
On such affidavit being presented, and said motion entered, the Court will
enter a rule on the Solicitor to produce his authority. The following is a form
of a
MOTION AND RULE ON A SOLICITOR TO PRODUCE AUTHORITY.
John Doe, j
vs. \
No. 618.
In this cause, the defendant moved the Court to make a rule on Henry Jones, Esq., a Solic-
itor of this Court, to show his authority, if any he have, for bringing and prosecuting this
suit; and the affidavit of the defendant having been read in support of said motion, on con-
sideration thereof, it is ordered by the Court that said motion be allowed, and the said Henry
Jones, Esq., is ruled to produce his authority for prosecuting this suit within five days [or
such other time as the Court may allow, taking into consideration the distance to the place
where the complainant lives, or may be found,'] or the suit will be dismissed at his personal
cost.
After the lapse of a term after the filing of the bill, the rule will not be
made, unless the delay is satisfactorily accounted for. 4 The authority need
not be in writing, and, if in writing, need not be a formal power of attorney,
and need not be formally probated. Satisfactory evidence of authority is all
that is required. 5 If the authority of the principal Solicitor is undisputed, his
assistant's authority cannot be questioned. 6 husband can employ counsel A
8
for his wife, 7 and one of several joint contractors may employ counsel for all.
§ 234. Motions in Reference to Security for Costs. If the complainant has —
failed to give a bond for the costs, or to take and file the pauper oath in lieu, or
the bond, or the oath, on file is fatally defective in substance, a motion will lie
to dismiss the suit on that account; and the Court will sustain the motion,
unless the deficiency is supplied before the motion is finally ruled on. 9 The
Court will allow the complainant a reasonable time, within which to file the
to institute a suit in Chancery, is to authorize a So- tute the suit; and it will not be sufficient to assert,
licitor practicing in the Court to commence and con generally, in opposition to the complainant's affidavit,
duct it on It is not necessary that such
his behalf. that authority had been given. Counsel must have
authority should be in writing, although it would, special authority to file a bill. General authority to
perhaps, be better that Solicitors, before they com act as counsel is not sufficient to authorize the bring-
mence suits, should be in possession of some written ing of a suit.
authority for that purpose; but, in either case, in If the name of a person is made use of in a bill as
order to warrant a Solicitor in filing a bill, the au- co-complainant with others, without his consent, such
thority, be it in writing or by parol,, ought to be spe- person may move that his name may be struck out,
cial; and it has been held that a general authority and that the Solicitor who filed the bill may be
to act as Solicitor for a party will not be sufficient to ordered to pay the costs; such a motion, however,
warrant his commencing a suit on his behalf, al- should be made at the earliest possible opportunity
though, under a general authority, a Solicitor may after the fact Has come to the complainant's know-
defend a suit for his client. ledge; and if there has been acquiescence or laches
The rule which requires a Solicitor to be specially on the part of the complainant making the applica-
authorized to commence a suit on behalf of his client, tion, it will not be granted.
applies as well to cases where the party is to sue as The usual course, however, in such a case, is for
a co-complainant, as to cases where he is to sue the defendant to move that the bill may be taken
alone; and even to cases where his name is merely off the file, and that the costs may be paid by the
made use of pro forma. complainant. Upon such a motion, if any doubt
If a Solicitor files a bill in the name of his client, arises as to whether the bill has been signed by
without having a proper authority from him for so counsel or not, the Court will refer it to the Master
doing, the course for the client to pursue, if he tc inquire into the fact; and if he certifies that it
wishes to get rid of the suit, is to move that the bill was not signed by counsel, the bill will be ordered to
may be dismissed with costs, to be paid not by the be taken off the file and suppressed, and the com-
complainant, but bv the Solicitor filing the bill: If plainant directed to pay the costs. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
a bill be exhibited in the name of a married woman 3C6-312.
against her husband, it may, upon affidavit that she 4 Wilson v. Turk, 10 Yerg., 247.
knew nothing of it, or had not consented to it, be 5 Rogers v. Park, 4 Hum., 480.
dismissed. A motion to dismiss a bill, as having 6 Chambers v. The State, 3 Hum., 237.
been filed without the privity or consent of the com- 7 Kindell v. Titus, 9 Heisk., 743.
plainant, must be accompanied by an affidavit of the 8 Wright v. Mclvemore, 10 Yerg., 235.
complainant himself, that the bill had been filed with- «A motion to dismiss for want of a cost bond is
out any authority from him; and to avoid the effect waived by filing a demurrer based in part on the
o f such an application, the Solicitor against whom want of the bond. Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Don-
it is made must show distinctly, upon affidavit, that aldson, 11 Pick., 322.
he had a special authority from the party to insti-
§235 PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. 204
bond, or take the pauper oath such time, however, not to extend beyond
;
the term. If the bond, or oath, is tendered at any time during the term, it will
be received, and any order dismissing the suit will be set aside, and the suit re-
instated. 10
If the bond has been given, and the sureties to such bond are wholly insuffi-
cient, the defendant may make affidavit of such insufficiency and, on such affi- ;
davit, make a motion for a rule on the complainant to give sufficient bond, or
justify his sureties. Such affidavit and motion may be as follows
AFFIDAVIT OF INSUFFICIENCY OF SURETIES,
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 618.

In this cause, the defendant, Richard Roe, makes oath that John Smith and George Brown,
the sureties on the complainant's prosecution bond, are wholly insufficient,
[Jurat.] Richard Roe.
MOTION FOR BETTER COST BOND.
John Doe,
vs. \ No. 618.
In this cause, on motion of the defendants and for sufficient cause shown, it is ordered by
the Court that the complainant give a sufficient cost bond, or justify the sureties on his present
bond, on or before the last day of the present term, [or, on or before the second day of the
next term, or, on or before some other fixed day,] or his suit will be dismissed.
If the suit is brought on the pauper 's oath the suit may be dismissed on that
ground, or the complainant required to secure the costs, if it be shown by dis-
interested persons that the allegation of poverty is probably untrue, or the
cause of action frivolous or malicious. 11 The motion is usually made to require
the complainant to secure the costs, such motion being based on an affidavit
that he is able so to do and the Court hears the evidence orally and decides
;
summarily. 12
§ 235. Motions in Reference to the Filing of Exhibits. It is the duty of the —
complainant to file all papers and documents referred to in his bill 13 and if he ;
fails so to do, the defendant may obtain from the Master, or the Court, an
order requiring such papers and documents to be filed, and extending the time
for answering until such order has been complied with.
ORDER TO FILE EXHIBITS.
John Doe,
vs. \ No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al.
In this cause, on motion of the defendants, it is ordered by jthe Court that the complainant
filethe exhibits to his bill within two days, [or within some other specified tinted and the
defendants are given until ten days after the filing of said exhibits in which to file their
answer.
If the complainant should fail to comply with this order, the defendants may
have a rule on him to file the exhibits by a given day, and, on failure so to do,
may have the suit dismissed. 14
§ 236. Motions by Husband or Wife to Answer Separately. It is a general —
rule that, in a suit against husband and wife, the husband must file the joint an-
swer of himself and wife, or the bill may be taken as confessed by both. If,
therefore, either party wishes to answer separately, an order must first be
obtained allowing it. The cases in which such an order will be made have
Sharp v. Miller, 3 Sneed, 42; Irvins v. Mathis,

10 Barber v. Denning, 4 Sneed, 267, 269. So, dis-
11 Hum., 603; Bettis v. Mansfield, 11 Hum., 604. ?aupering should be cautiously done. Brumley v.
11 Code, § 3194. Tayworth, 3 Yerg., 423. The English law is more
12 See Moyers v. Moyers, 11 Heisk., 495; Heath- liberal to pauper litigants than ours. See Dan. Ch.
erly v. Hill, 8 Bax., 170. The object of the law Pr., 37-44; 111.
allowing paupers to sue on oath of poverty is to place 13 Ch. Rule, I, §2; post, §1190.
the weak on a level with the strong in the Courts. 14 Code, §§ 4389-4390.
205 PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. § 237
already been fully stated. 15 If the facts on which the motion is based do not
appear in the record, they must be made to appear by affidavit.
ORDER ALLOWING A HUSBAND OK, WIFE TO ANSWER SEPARATELY.
John Doe, j
vs. \
No. 618. t
In this cause, on motion of the defendant, Richard Roe, [Rachel Roe] supported by his
[her] affidavit, he [she] is allowed to answer separately from his wife [her husband.]
Such an order may be made without affidavit when not contested by the other
spouse.
§ 237. Motions for Further Time to Make Defence. If, for any good cause —
shown, the defendant is unable to answer the bill within the time required, he
may obtain from the Court, Chancellor, or Master, 16 further time within which
to file an answer. Such good cause should ordinarily be shown by affidavit.
It is far more easy to get an extension of time within which to answer, than
to have an order pro confesso set aside. If the Master grants an extension, he
should enter it on his rule docket. The extension, if granted by the Court, will
be entered on the minutes; and, if granted at Chambers, will be endorsed by
the Chancellor on the written application, and transmitted to the Master.
ORDER EXTENDING THE TIME FOR ANSWERING.
John Doe, !
vs. \
No. 618.
For good cause shown by affidavit, the defendants are allowed the further time of ten days,
[or, until the day of , next] in which to file their answer.
§ 238. Motions to Set Aside Orders Pro Confesso. If the bill has been —
taken as confessed by the defendant, his first and most urgent duty and task
are to have the order pro confesso set aside. When and how this must be done
has already been fully stated 17 but the defendant cannot be too strongly im-
;
pressed with the following facts:

1. The application should be made at the earliest possible moment, and any
delay must be duly explained by affidavit.
2. The failure to file an answer, or to make other defence, must be satisfac-
torily accounted for by affidavit.
3. An answer must accompany the application to set aside the order pro
confesso; and this answer must not only show a meritorious defence, but must,
also, be sworn to, even though the bill waive the defendant's oath, or though
the answer be by a corporation. 18
§ 239. Motions for Rules on Complainant to Take Steps. If a complainant —
fail to take any step necessary to the progress of the cause, the defendant may
have a rule made by the Master, or the Court, requiring such step to be taken,
or the cause dismissed. The grounds for such a rule are ordinarily 1, failure :
to bring all the defendants before the Court; 2, failure to revive a suit where
some necessary party has died 3, failure to amend a bill when leave has been
;
obtained, and the amendment is essential; 4, failure to revive when a single

woman who a party marries; 5, failure to comply with an order to file the
is
exhibits to his bill; 6, failure to file a proper cost bond, or a proper pauper
oath, in lieu; and (7) failure to supply lost papers.
ORDINARY RULE TO TAKE STEPS.
Tohn Doe, I
vs. \ No. 618.

In this cause, on motion of the defendant, Richard Roe, the complainant is required to
15 Ante, §§ 88;99; and, see, Answers, post, §§ 236; a pleading, but as an affidavit, evidencing the good
383 faith of the applicant, and the meritorious character
16 Code, § 4368. of the defense. No Court will set aside a pro con-
17 Ante, §§205-213; post, 888-890. fesso, in order to let the defendant file an answer
18 In such a case, the answer is sworn to, not as disclosing no defense. But see, ante, § 207.
§239 PRELIMINARY MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. 206
take,and prosecute with due diligence, all steps necessary to bring all the defendants before
the Court [or, all steps necessary to revive this cause against the proper representatives of
Robert Roe, deceased.]
PEREMPTORY RULE TO TAKE STEPS.
John Doe,
vs. No. 618.
Richard Roe, et al. .
In this cause, on motion of the defendant, Richard Roe, it is ordered by the Court that
unless the complainant immediately take, and prosecute with due diligence, all steps necessary
to bring all the defendants before the Court within ninety days, this suit will be dismissed
at the next term.
207 PLEAS IK ABATEMENT. §240
CHAPTER XIII.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT.
Article I. Pleas in Abatement Generally Considered.
Article II. Pleas in Abatement to the Process.
Article III. Pleas in Abatement to the Bill.
Article IV. Frame and Form of Pleas in Abatement.
Article V. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Suits.
Article VI. Proceedings upon a Plea in Abatement.
AETICLE I.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

? 240. Pleas in Abatement Defined. § 242. Rationale of the Practice in Pleas in
§ 241. Pleas in Abatement and in Bar Dis- Abatement. *
tinguished According to Tennessee § 243. Pleas in Abatement. How Divided in

Practice. Our Practice.
§ 240. Pleas in Abatement Denned. —A

plea in abatement, in our practice,
either (1) alleges some matter, not otherwise appearing in the record, which,
if true, will abate the suit; or (2) denies some matter, appearing in the record,
which, if false, will abate the suit if the plea is successful, the Court is ousted
;
of jurisdiction to proceed any further in the suit; and is, therefore, bound to
dismiss the bill. 1 If a fact, which if not alleged would be a ground for a plea
in abatement, be alleged in the bill it will be a ground of demurrer. 2
There are only two pleadings by which the jurisdiction of the Court can be
disputed: 1, pleas in abatement, and 2, demurrers. A
plea in abatement dis-
putes the jurisdiction (1) by denying some jurisdictional allegation in the
record, or (2) by alleging some fact not in the record. demurrer disputesA
the jurisdiction by taking advantage of some one or more material allegations
set out in the bill. But, inasmuch as a demurrer politely admits the bill to be
true, pro hac vice, and disputes the jurisdiction by argument only, while a plea
in abatement peremptorily disputes the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit
on the merits, the Court requires a plea in abatement to be filed before a
demurrer.
§ 241. Pleas in Abatement and in Bar, Distinguished According to Ten-
—
nessee Practice. All pleas in our Chancery Courts are divided by our statutes
into 1st, Pleas in Abatement and 2d, Pleas in Bar. 3 All pleas that dispute
: ;
the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case, and seek to have the bill dismissed
without any investigation of the merits of the controversy, are pleas in abate-
ment. 4 All other pleas are pleas in bar. The defences that can be set up in a
plea in bar may, also, be set up in an answer, and are generally so set up, but
matters proper for a plea in abatement cannot be set up in an answer. 5
1 The word "abatement," in the English Chancery gzess has been obstructed by the death, marriage, or
Court practice, means "suspension" or "obstruction;'" bankruptcy, of a party, it then has, in Tennessee, the
whereas, in a law court, it means "destruction."
' English- meaning, and is equivalent to "suspension."
The failure to note this distinction, has produced no Bouvier's Law Die, "Abatement;" Sto. Eq. PI., §
little confusion in the text-books and reports. In 354.
Tennessee Chancery practice, the word abatement 2 Parker v. Porter, 4 Yerg., 81; Code, §4386; .1
has, generally, the same meaning as in the law Dan. Ch. Pr., 605.
courts; and a plea in abatement does not seek to 3 Code, § 4384.
suspend, or obstruct, the suit, but to destroy it; to i Code, §§ 4309, 4318.
terminate it, for the time being. When the term 5 Code, §4318. The classification, of pleas, in our
"abatement" is used in reference to suits, whose pro- Chancery practice, is quite unlike that found in Story,,
§242 PEEAS IN ABATEMENT. 208
§ 242. Rationale of the Practice in Pleas in Abatement. Good reason sug- —
gests that if a defendant desires to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court he
should do this before he makes any defense against the merits of the case stated
in the bill; for (1) it would be a great waste of time and of money to contest
a ease on the merits, by putting in an answer, and taking the depositions of wit-
nesses, and other proof, and going through the forms of a hearing, if the
party did not intend to submit to the decision of the Court when made; and
(2) it would be mere trifling with the Court and the opposite party, if not an
act of bad faith, to make such a contest, when the defendant reserved the
right to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court in case the decision, or the prob-
abilities, were against him.
The uniform rule of all Courts has, therefore, required a defendant who in-
tended to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court, to do so at the outset, and be-
fore he made any defense to the charges against him on the merits of the con-
troversy for, if he could show that the Court had no right to try him on the
;
case made by the complainant, then good reason and good faith required him to
show it in the very beginning, in limine as the books say, and thus save time,
trouble and expense, and preserve good faith to the Court.
§ 243. Pleas in Abatement, How Divided in Our Practice. Pleas in abate- —
ment, in our practice, may be divided into (1) Pleas in Abatement to the Pro-
cess, and (2) Pleas in Abatement to the Bill.
1. Pleas in Abatement to the Process attack the process by showing (1) that
it wrongfully issued, or (2) was wrongfully executed.
2. Pleas in Abatement to the Bill attack the bill by showing (1) that the
Court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or (2) no jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the suit, or (3) that the bill is prematurely filed, or (4)
that the complainants are not partners as they allege, 8 or (5) that by reason
of some other matter the bill should be abated.
ARTICLE II.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT TO THE PROCESS.

244. Pleas in Abatement to the Process § 245. Pleas in Abatement to the Subpoena.
generally Considered. § 246. Pleas in Abatement to the Attachment.
§ 244. Pleas in Abatement to the Process Generally Considered. —Pleas in

abatement to the process are unknown to general Equity pleading, all such
pleas being to the bill 7 but our Chancery system of pleas is largely statutory,
;
and our pleas in abatement in the Chancery Court are analogous to such pleas
in the Circuit Court.
Daniel, Barbour, and other writers, who give the Code, § 3779a; Acts of 185°-'60, ch. 104. See
English Chancery practice. The division given in the form of plea, post, § 254. This under our practice
text is the only one consistent with the logic of our would not be a plea in abatement if our Legislature
statutes, and the only one that will rescue our Chan- had not so named it. Legitime imperanti parere ns-
cery practice, in reference to pleas, from its present cesse est.
disheartening confusion. 7 Under general Equity pleading, pleas in abate-
It is fundamental maxim in pleading, that a
a ment are: 1, to the jurisdiction; 2, to the person of
matter in abatement cannot be incorporated in an an- the complainant, or defendant; and 3, to the bill.
swer, but that a matter in bar may. Our Code al- 1. Pleas to the jurisdiction assert that some pther
lows all matters to be incorporated in an answer, ex- Court, ordinarily some other Court with equitable
cept objections to the jurisdiction. Hence, it follows, jurisdiction, has jurisdiction of the matter in ques-
as an inevitable deduction of logic, that all objections tion.
to the jurisdiction are matters in abatement, and that 2. Pleas to the person of the complainant or de-
all other defenses are in bar, and may be made in the fendant are described below. See § 252.
answer. See Nailer v. Young, 7 I,ea, 738. The line 3. Pleas to the bill are (1) for want of proper
of division, between pleas in abatement and pleas in parties, or misjoinder of parties, (2) for multiplicity
bar, in the Circuit Court, is different; and this fact of suits and (3) for multifariousness. See Sto. Eq-
has tended to increase the confusion as to the classi- Fl., §§ 705-735.
fication of pleas in the Chancery Court.
209 PLEAS IN ABATEMENT. §245
Pleas in abatement to the process may, in order to avoid confusion, be di-
vided into: 1, Pleas in abatement to the subpoena; and 2, Pleas in abatement
to the attachment and will be considered separately.
;
§ 245. —
Pleas in Abatement to the Subpoena. 8 Pleas in abatement to the
subpoena are those that seek to terminate, or abate, the suit by reason of some
fatal irregularity in the issuance or service of the subpoena. 9 They include
the following:
1. That the process, whereby the defendant was brought before the Court,
was issued or served on Sunday, in a case wherein such issuance or service is
not authorized by law. 10
2. That the process was served on the defendant while attending his duty at
a muster of militia, or at an election, or as a witness, 11 or juror.
3. That the defendant is a joint drawer of negotiable paper with others, and
the original writ was not served upon any one of the joint drawers. 12
PLEA TO THE SUBPOENA."
James Martin,
vs, In the Chancery Court at Smithville.
Richard Ramsey.
The defendant, Richard Ramsey, for plea in abatement to the suit brought against him in
this cause, says, That the subpoena to answer in the cause was executed on him by the Sheriff
of De Kalb county while he, the defendant was in attendance at the Circuit Court of said
De Kalb county, sitting at Smithville, the defendant being then and there in attendance as
aforesaid, under summons as a witness in a suit pending in said Circuit Court between John
Martin, plaintiff, and R. R. Stephens, defendant; and this the defendant is ready to verify.
Therefore, he prays the judgment of the Court, whether he shall be compelled to make any
othejr answer to the bill; and prays to be dismissed. Richard Ramsey.
County of DeKalb. j
Richard Ramsey makes oath that the above plea is true in substance and in fact.
Richard Ramsey.
Sworn to and subscribed before me, \
Sept. 10, 1846. Charles Smith, C. & M. j
§ 246. Pleas in Abatement to the Attachment. The object of an original —

attachment of property is to compel the appearance of the defendant, and if
the attachment is fatally defective, either (1) for want of a legal ground, or
(2) for want of the prerequisites, or (3) because not levied on the defendant's
property, the defendant may plead such facts in abatement to the writ; for
when a complainant undertakes to obtain a decree against a man without serv-
ing a direct notice upon him, he should be required to take every preliminary
step prescribed by the law as a substitute for such direct notice. 14 The follow-
ing are the grounds of a plea in abatement to the attachment
4. That the grounds, on which the original attachment writ issued, were
false, or did not exist. 15
5. That the attachment was issued without affidavit and bond. 16
6. That the property, on which the attachment was levied, did not belong to
the defendant. 17
8 See note 80 to § 264, post. Martin v. Ramsey, 7 Hum., 260; Baker v. Compton,
9 Code, § 2902. 2 Head, 471.
10 Would publication for a_ non-resident, made in 14 No reason occurs why a plea in abatement
a newspaper published exclusively on Sunday, be a would not lie for want of a legal publication notice,
ground of abatement? for it takes both the levy of the attachment and the
11 Martin v. Ramsey, 7 Hum., 260. In this case, notice by publication to constitute full service of
the plea, that the defendant was subpoenaed to an- process by attachment. Code, § 3524; Riley v. Nich-
swer the bill while attending the Circuit Court as a ols, 1 Heisk., 19; Bains v. Perry, 1 Lea, 37.
witness, was allowed, and the bill dismissed. This 15 Foster v. Hall, 4 Hum., 346; Isaacs v. Edwards,
decision, in so far as it holds that such a plea, if 7 Hum., 465; Norris v. Ellis, 6 Hum., 467; Kendrick
tiue, operates to dismiss the bill is questionable on v. Davis, 3 Cold., 527; Klepper v. Powell, 6 Heisk..
grounds of good practice, good reason and common 503.
justice. See, post, 264, note 80. ie Code, § 3476.
12 Code, §§2803; 2902. 17 Harris v. Taylor, 3 Sneed, 536; Robb V. Parker.
13 This form has been adjudicated to be good. 4 Heisk., 70.
§247 PLEAS IN ABATEMENT TO THE BII.lv. 210
ARTICLE III.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT TO THE BILL.
§ 2S0. Pleas in Abatement to the Local Juris-
§ 247. Pleas in Abatement to the Bill gen- diction of the Court over the Subject-
erally Considered. Matter.
§ 248. Pleas in Abatement Because of Pre- § 251. Pleas in Abatement to the Local Ju-
maturity of the Suit. risdiction of the Court over the Per-
§ 249. Pleas in Abatement to the general Ju- son of the Defendant.
risdiction of the Court over the Sub- § 252. Pleas in Abatement to the Person un-
ject-Matter. der the old Practice.
§ 247. Pleasi in Abatement to the Bill Generally Considered. The object of —

these pleas is to defeat the jurisdiction of the Court 1, by denying some juris-
:
dictional allegation of the bill or 2, by alleging some matter not stated in the
;
bill, which, if true, will defeat the jurisdiction. The principal pleas in abate-
ment to the bill, under our system of Chancery pleading, are the following
§ 248. Pleas in Abatement, Because of the Prematurity of the Suit. If a —
suit is brought before the cause of action is matured, the defendant may plead
such prematurity in bar of the action, or may set up the defence in his answer, 18
but if the suit is brought before the defendant is liable to suit, by reason of
some statute exempting him from suit, for a season, he may plead that fact in
abatement of the suit. Thus, if an executor or administrator is sued within
six months after his qualification, unless the suit be by a surety of the deceased,
the defendant is required by the statute to plead the prematurity of the suit
in abatement. 19
PLEA IN ABATEMENT BECAUSE OE PREMATURITY OF SUIT.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court at Loudon.
John Smith, Admr., &c.
The defendant, John Smith, Administrator of Richard Smith, deceased, for plea in abate-
ment to the bill in this cause, says, That he was appointed and qualified as such administrator,
by the County Court of Loudon county, on the first Monday in January, 1891, and within
six months before this suit was brought. Wherefore, he prays that this suit may be abated
and dismissed. John Smith, Admr., &c.
[To be sworn to, as shown in § 254, post.]
§ 249. Pleas in Abatement to the General Jurisdiction of the Court over
—
the Subject Matter. The jurisdiction of the Chancery Court over money de-
mands, where the suit is not in aid of a judgment creditor, is limited to debts
or demands of not less value than fifty dollars. 20 If, therefore, it appears on
the face of the bill that the debt or demand is of less value than fifty dollars,
the defendant may have the bill dismissed, on motion or demurrer, unless the
suit is in aid of a judgment creditor, or to recover land, or specific personal
property. If the debt or demand be alleged to exceed fifty dollars, when it is
in fact of less value than fifty dollars, the defendant may plead that fact in
abatement of the bill. 21
18 Bell v. Bullion, 2 Yerg., 479; Robinson V. lie when the value of the debt or demand is really
Grubb, 8 Bax., 19; Pigue v. Young, 1 Pick., 263, less than fifty dollars, although alleged in the bill
Manufacturing Co. v. Weatherly, 17 Pick., 318, cit- to be over fifty dollars. Spurlock v. Fulks, 1 Swan,
ing the above section of this book, then § 268. 289; Wagstaff v. Braden, 1 Bax., 304. See also,
19 Code, §§2274-2275; Treece v. Treece, 5 Lea, Smets v. Williams, 4 Paige, (N. Y.), 364; 1 Dan.
223. It is probable that this defense may be set up Ch. Pr., 558, note. It was held in Birmingham «J.
in an answer, also, as it does not dispute the juris- Tapscott, 4 Heisk., 382, that this defense could not
diction of the Court. be made in an answer. Such seems, also", to have
20 See § 26, ante. been the holding in Wagstaff v. Braden, 1 Bax., 304.
21 It is a fundamental maxim in pleading, that The plea must, therefore, be a plea to the jurisdic-
any matter, which, if alleged, would make the bill de- tion, and is, consequently, in our practice, a plea in
murrable, may, if not alleged, be set up by plea. abatement.
Our Supreme Court has intimated that a plea would
211 pleas in abatement to the bile. §250
The defendant may, also,, plead in abatement any other fact that will show
the subject-matter of the suit to be without the general jurisdiction of the
Court.
PLEA IN ABATEMENT TO THE GENERAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
The defendant, John Smith, for plea in abatement to the bill, says, That the amount lie
owes the complainant, in this cause, is less than fifty dollars and, therefore, beneath the dig-
;
nity of this Court; and he prays the judgment of the Court, whether he shall answer further.
[To be properly sworn to. See post, § 254.] John Smith.
§ 250. Pleas in Abatement to the Local Jurisdiction of the Court over the
—
Subject-Matter. There are various provisions of the statutes requiring that
suits, relating to certain specified matters, shall be brought in certain specified
counties and if a bill, dealing with these specified matters, is filed in a county
;
other than that specified in the statute, the defendants, even though personally
served with process, may file a plea in abatement to the local jurisdiction of
the Court over the subject-matter of the suit.
The various requirements of the statutes, as to the local jurisdiction of the
Court over the subject-matter of the suit, have already been fully stated, 22
and need not be repeated. In a general way, these statutes may be summarized
as follows
1. All bills to recover, or to divest, or clear, the title to land, or to foreclose
mortgages or trust deeds relating to land, or to specifically execute contracts
relating to land, or to sell the lands of decedents to pay debts, must be filed
in the county where the land, or material part of it, is situated.
2. All bills to foreclose mortgages, or trust deeds, on personalty, must be filed
in the county where such mortgage is registered.
3. All bills to sell the lands of persons under disability, or to partition, or
sell for partition, lands held in common, must be filed in the county where the
land, or some part of it, lies, or where the defendant resides.
4. All bills to transfer the administration of an insolvent estate from the
County Court, must be filed in the county wherein the will was proved, or let-
ters of administration were granted, or where the personal representatives
reside or are served with process.
5. All bills for the appointment of administrators, must be filed in the county
where the deceased resided at the time of his death, or where his estate, goods
and chattels, or effects, were at the time of his death.
6. All bills against cities and counties must be filed (1) in case of cities, in
the county containing the city, and (2) in case of counties, in the county sued.
If suits in reference to any of these matters are not brought in the county
required by the statute,' the defendant may plead that fact in abatement of the
suit.
The following is the form of a plea in abatement to the local jurisdiction of
the Court over the subject-matter
PLEA IN ABATEMENT TO THE LOCAL JURISDICTION OP THE SUBJECT-
MATTER
John Doe, j
vs. \ In the Chancery Court at Knoxville.

John Smith. J
The defendant, John Smith, for plea in abatement to the bill, says, That the tract of land
sought to be recovered in this cause, [.or, the title to which is sought to be divested or cleared
up in this cause, or, the contract as to which is sought to be specifically executed in this
cause,] lies in the county of Anderson, and no part of it lies in the county of Knox. Where-
fore, this defendant says, that this Court ought not to take further jurisdiction of this cause.
[To be sworn to, as shown in § 254, post.] John Smith.
22 See, ante, §177. If a suit be local, and impera- this requirement be evaded or nullified by means of
tively required by statute to be brought in a par- a counterpart subpoena. Ibid. See, ante § 177, notes
!
ticular county, itcan be brought in no other county, 17; 30. But a transitory suit brought m the wrong
and if brought in another county the whole proceed- county, may be successfully prosecuted unless abated
ing is void, whether the jurisdiction be objected to by plea of the defendant. Code, § 2812.
or not. Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432. Nor can
§251 PEEAS IN ABATEMENT TO THE BILE. 1
212
§ 251. Pleas in Abatement to the Local Jurisdiction of the Court over the
—
Person of the Defendant. While the Court of Chancery acts ordinarily in per-
sonam, and, therefore, suits may generally be instituted in any county where the
defendant, or any material defendant, may be found; 23 nevertheless, there
are some important statutory exceptions to this rule and, if any one of these
;
exceptions is violated, the defendants may show the fact by plea in abatement,
and thus defeat the suit. The exceptions have been already set forth with
particularity, in considering the local jurisdiction of the Court, 24 and need not
be repeated here, in detail.
The following are the principal grounds for pleas in abatement to the local
jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the defendant
1. That the complainant and the defendant resided, at the time the suit was
brought, in the same county, and the bill is filed in another county, 23 and the .
Court, where the suit is brought, has no local jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the suit.
2. That neither the defendant pleading in abatement, nor any other material
defendant, was served with process in the county wherein the suit was
brought; 26 nor do they reside 27 in such county; and the jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of the suit is not in such county.
The county in which a bill must be filed has already been fully shown. 28
The following will serve as a guide in drawing pleas, under this section
PLEA IN ABATEMENT TO THE LOCAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANTS
John Doe, I
vs. j- In the Chancery Court at Knoxville.

John Smith. J
The defendant, John Smith, for plea in abatement to the bill, says This suit is brought to
:
recover an alleged debt, and the complainant and the defendant both resided in Anderson
county when the bill was filed, and the defendant was not then and is not now, residing in
Knox county.
Wherefore, he prays the judgment of the Court whether he shall answer further.
[To be sworn to, as shown in § 254, post.] John Smith.
§ 252. Pleas in Abatement to the Person under the Old Practice. Under —
the old Equity practice pleas to the person were in abatement. These pleas in
eluded,
1. Pleas to the Person of the Complainant, that he is an infant, idiot or luna-
tic, or a bankrupt, or that she is a married woman, or that the complainant is
not the person he claims to be, or does not sustain the character in which he
sues; and,
2. Pleas to the Person of the Defendant, that he does not possess the char-
acter in which he is sued, as for instance that the defendant is not an unmar-
ried woman, or is not an executor, administrator, guardian or heir, or that he
is a bankrupt. 30
Under the Tennessee practice all of these defences can be set up in the an-
swer, as they do not dispute the jurisdiction of the Court, and are, therefore,
not matters for a plea in abatement. But the Legislature having enacted that,
whenever two or more persons sue as partners upon an account, bill of exchange,
bond or note, it shall not be necessary for them to prove their partnership,
31
unless the defendant files a plea in abatement denying the partnership on oath,
of course such a plea by this ipse dixit becomes a plea in abatement, and due
23 Code, § 4305. This section applies to actions all the proceedings are void. Nashville V. Webb, 6
of a transitory nature, and not to actions referred Cates, 432. But if a transitory suit be brought in
to in the preceding section. the wrong county it may be prosecuted to a termina-
24 See, ante, § 177. tion unless abated by plea of the defendant. Code.
25 Code, § 2902, sub-sec. 4; 2809; 2812. § 2812. See, ante, § 177, notes, 28-30.
28 Code, §4305. See Rogers v. O'Mary, 11 Pick., 29 For another form, see § 254, post.
514. 30 See Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 722-732.
27 Code, §4311, sub-sec. 1. 31 Acts of 1859-1860, ch. 104. If this defense is
28 See, ante, § 177. If a local suit be brought in made in an answer it must be sworn to, or so much
the wrong county the Court has no jurisdiction, and of the answer sworn to as denies the partnership.
213 FRAME AND FORM OF PLEAS IN ABATEMENT. § 253
courtesy to a co-ordinate department of the State requires that it shall wear
that cognomen. 32 The following is a form of
PLEA DENYING COMPLAINANTS ABE PARTNERS.
John Doe and Henry Doe, partners 1
vnder the name of Doe & Bro., I
vs. [ In Chancery at Huntsville.

Richard Roe. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea in abatement to the bill, says that the complainants
are not partners as by them alleged in their bill. Richard Roe.
[To be sworn to. See post, § 254.]
ARTICLE IV.
FRAME AND FORM OF PLEAS IN ABATEMENT.
§ 2S3. Requisites of a Plea in Abatement, I § 254. Frame and Form of Pleas in Abate-
under General Equity Practice. ment.
§ 253. Requisites of a Plea in Abatement under General Equity Practice.

A plea in abatement must possess all of the requisites of a plea in bar, stated in
subsequent sections; 33 except,
1. The ground of a plea in abatement must be sufficient to merely dismiss the
suit, and not to bar it.
2. A plea in abatement must not touch upon any matters affecting the merits
of the controversy. 3 *
The requisites of an affirmative plea in abatement, under the general Equity
practice, are 1, it must be based on matter outside of the bill 2, such matter
: ;
must reduce the decision of the cause to a single point, on which issue can be
taken; 3, this point must be one that, if decided for the defendant, will
dismiss the bill, and not bar it; 4, the plea must be direct and positive, and not
argumentative, or inferential; 5, it must be verified by the direct and posi-
tive oath of the defendant, unless it is proved by a Court record, and then
35 and
it is verified by the record; (6) it must be filed and determined, before
any other mode of defence is resorted to. A negative plea in abatement merely
denies the jurisdictional allegations of the bill. If, after a plea in abatement has
been filed, and while it is pending, any other defence is made, such as a demur-
rer, motion to dismiss, plea in bar, or answer, the plea in abatement will be
deemed to be waived, and will be treated as abandoned, under the general prac-
tice, but not in this State.
Pleas in abatement are not favored by the Courts, because they do not go to
the merits of the case and no latitude in practice is extended to them. They
;
must always be filed in the right time, in the right form, and with the right
verification; 36 they are strictly construed and strictly dealt with, and intend-
ments in their favor are not allowed to supply defects. 37 A party, who relies
on a technicality to defeat an equity, must not present an untechnical techni-
32 Ita lex scripta est. Moses, 3 Bax., 467. In the latter case, the verifica-
33 Post, §§ 335-340. tion on "knowledge, information, and belief," was
34 If, however, the plea intended to be in abate- held insufficient, but an amended verification that the
ment, was really in bar, the Court would not dismiss plea was "true in substance and in fact," was sus-
it on that account, if it presented a sufficient ground tained_ by the Supreme Court. See Digests, under
of defense on the merits. The Court will properly Pleas in Abatement, for many cases as to verification.
name any pleading, that has enough substance in it 36 Grove v. Campbell, 9 Yerg., 7. The Chancery
to merit consideration, and will give it full force and Court, however, will not regard the form, if the
effect regardless of its name. See, ante, § 43. substance of the plea is good.
35 Code, § 2901; Grove v. Campbell, 9 Yerg., 7. 3T Friedlander V. Pollock, 5 Cold., 490.
This is the leading case. See, also, Wrompelmeir v.
§254 FRAME AND FORM OF PLEAS IN ABATEMENT. 214
cality, for a Court of Justice will not aid or favor him in his efforts to defeat
justice. Nevertheless, the Court will give him the full benefit of the law, and
will not violate its own rule of regarding substance rather than form. If, there-
fore, a plea in abatement is good in substance, the Court will not overrule it
merely because it is bad in form, 38 but will allow the form to be amended. 39
§ 254. Frame and Form of Pleas in Abatement. An affirmative plea in —
abatement must contain a succinct statement of the facts 40 relied on to abate
the suit and the forms given in the Code, 41 being models of brevity and cer-
;
tainty, can be safely followed in Chancery pleading. 42 A negative plea in abate-

ment merely denies the jurisdictional allegations of the bill. The forms of the
commencement and conclusion of pleas in abatement and in bar are substan-
tially the same. 43
AFFIRMATIVE PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
John Doe, |
vs. Y In Chancery at Sevierville.

Richard Roe. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea in abatement to the bill in said cause, says, That he
and the complainant both resided in the same county, to-wit, in the county of Blount, when
the bill in this case was filed, and
that the said bill is filed in the county of Sevier. Where-
fore, he prays to be dismissed with his costs. Richard Roe.
State of Tennessee, {
County of Sevier. 5
Richard Roe makes oath that his foregoing plea is true in substance and in fact.
Richard Roe.
Sworn to and subscribed before me,
July 1, 1890. A. T. Marshall, C. & M.
A negativeplea in abatement merely denies the allegation, or allegations, in
the bill on which- the jurisdiction of the Court over the person, or property of
the defendant depends, as will be seen by the following form, and by other
forms in this book
NEGATIVE PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
John Doe, j
vs. > In Chancery at Sevierville.

Richard Roe. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea in abatement to the bill in said cause, says, That
the tract of land sought to be recovered by the bill does not lie, nor does any part of it lie,
in the county of Sevier. Richard Roe.
[To be signed and sworn to as above.]
Thestatute provides that no plea in abatement shall be received in any Court,

unless its truth is verified by the oath of the party, or otherwise, 44 and if the
proper verification is wanting, the plea may be struck out of the files, on
motion. 45
38 Friedlander V. Pollock, 5 Cold., 495. such plea should be judged by the rules of reason,
39 The statutes allowing amendments, apply to and in the liberal spirit of our statutory system of
pleas in abatement with as much force as to anv pleading; Stewart v. Magness, 2 Cold., 312; not by
other pleading. Code, §§ 2863-2871. See Wrompel- the harsh rules of an arbitrary system, now obsolete.
meir v. Moses, 3 Bax., 467. See Battelle v. Youngstown R. M. Co., 16 Lea, 358;
No reason occurs why a plea in abatement should 365. A
plea that is good in form at law, ought cer-
be disfavored by Courts. Surely, a Court does not tainly to be good in form in Equity.
want to exercise an unlawful jurisdiction, and all a 43 What is said in this book about the forms of
plea in abatement undertakes to do is to show the pleas in bar is fully applicable to pleas in abatement,
Court that it has no lawful jurisdiction in the case; Post. SS 335-340.
and this showing a defendant has the right to make, 44 Code, § 2901. It must be verified by oath, if
and when made the Court should impartially con- pioof outside of a record is necessary to sustain it;
sider it. The plea is no impeachment of the integrity but when the plea is verified by a record, no oath is
of the Chancellor, but the mere assertion of a legal necessary. Crove l\ Campbell, 9 Yerg., 7.
right, one that it is the duty of a Solicitor to assert 45 Friedlander v. Pollock,. 5 Cold., 490. The oath
when the facts justify. The Act of 1897, ch. 121, must he positive, and not on information and belief.
gives this plea a standing in Court equal to any Seifreid v. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch„ 17; Wrotn-
other defense. pelmeir v. Moses, 3 Bax., 467. The plea may be
40 Code, § 2906. verified by one of two partners, or by their Solicitor,
41 Code, § 2940. if his affidavit shows that he is acquainted with the
42 Code, § 2894. The fact whether a plea is in facts set out in the plea. Cheatham V. Pearce, 5
bar or abatement, is ascertained by the subject- Pick., 668. As to verification of pleadings, see,
matter. Code, §2908; and not by its form, nor by post. §§ 788-789. A
verification that the plea is
the form of its conclusion. Friedlander v. Pollock, "true" is good, without adding "in substance and in
5 Cold., 495. If a party has a right to file a plea, fact." Armstrong V. State, 17 Pick., 389.
J15 PLEAS IN ABATEMENT IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. §255
ARTICLE V.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT IN ATTACHMENT SUITS.
§ 255. When a Plea in Abatement Should be § 258. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment
Supported by an Answer. Suits not Overruled by Defences on
§ 256. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment the Merits.
Suits generally Considered. § 259. Forms of Pleas in Abatement in At-
§ 257. Objects of Pleas in Abatement in At- tachment Suits.
tachment Suits.
§ 255.When a Plea in Abatement Should be Supported by an Answer.

When an attachment bill charges a fraudulent transfer of property, both as a
ground of equitable relief and as a ground for an attachment of property, and
alleges particulars of the fraud charged, a plea in abatement denying the al-
leged fraudulent transfer should be supported by answer denying the specifi-
cations of fraudulent conduct, when the defendant is called on to answer unto
them on oath because complainant is entitled to the discovery he seeks in aid
;
of his charge of fraud. 46 The bill in such a case combines (1) a pleading
alleging indebtedness, (2) an affidavit of fraudulent transfer and (3) a call
upon the defendant for a discovery.
But when an attachment bill charges a single fraudulent disposition of prop-
erty, both as a ground of attachment and as a ground of equitable relief, with-
out averring any matters of evidence in support of the charge of fraud, and the
defendant by plea in abatement denies the fraudulent transfer, no answer in
support of such plea is necessary 1st, because there is no discovery to be made
:
in the answer; and 2d, because all the answer could do would be to deny the
fraudulent transfer, and that had already been done by the plea in abatement.
Hence, an answer under these circumstances would overrule the plea, under
the old practice 47 but not under the present practice. 48
;
A plea in abatement need not be supported by an answer when the defend-

ant's oath to his answer is waived, for that is a waiver of any discovery. 49
§ 256. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Suits Generally Considered. Pro- —
ceedings in Court by attachment of property are purely statutory. Attach-
ments are of two kinds, original and ancillary; but, while both are obtained
and executed in the same way, and both alike impound the defendant's estate,
their objects are different. The primary object of the original writ is to aid
in compelling the defendant to appear in Court and defend the suit wherein the
writ issued; and the secondary object is impound enough of his property to
secure the debt sued for; while the only object of the ancillary writ is the seiz-
ure of the defendant's property as security for the complainant's demand, the
defendant being brought into Court by service of subpoena.
All attachment suits, therefore, have a two-fold object, (1) a decree for the
debt of demand claimed, and (2) the seizure, at the beginning of the suit,
of enough of the defendant's property to satisfy the decree when obtained. 50
Bank, 1 Bax., 200; Pique V.
46 Seifred V. People's See Article on Pleas supported by an answer, post,
Young, 1 Pick., 263.An answer in support of a §§ 341-349, where forms are given, which are good
plea is no part of the defense. The defense is con- for pleas in abatement.
tained in the plea; the answer is the discovery the 47 Cheatham V. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 668.
complainant has called for. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 129; 1 48 Acts of 1897, ch. 121; see, post, §§ 260-261.
Dan. Ch. Pr., 624. The answer in such a case, must 49 Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 668.
expressly show that it is in support of the plea. If 50 An original attachment suit has a third object:
the oath to the answer is waived, the plea need not to compel the appearance of defendant by the seizure
be supported by an answer. Cheatham V. Pearce, 5 of his property.
Pick., 668.
§257 PLEAS IN ABATEMENT IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. 216
So, an attachment bill has a twofold nature: it is (1) a pleading setting forth
a cause of action, and (2) an affidavit of some statutory ground or grounds for
the preliminary seizure of the defendant's property to satisfy the anticipated
recovery.
As a result of this twofold attack upon him the defendant has a twofold de-
fence he has a defence to make to the bill as a pleading, and another defence
:
to the bill as an affidavit. His defence to the bill as a pleading is made by de-
murrer, plea in bar, or answer and his defence to the bill as an affidavit is made
;
by a plea in abatement or, in some cases, by a motion to dismiss.

;
§ 257. Objects of Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Suits. The objects —

of the bill in all attachment suits are (1) to obtaining a decree for the demand
:
sued on, and (2) to impound enough property to satisfy it; and in case of an
original attachment suit, (3) to compel the appearance of the defendant.
The object of a plea in abatement to the attachment whether original or
ancillary, is to abate the writ, and discharge the levy made under it, thereby
restoring the possession and title of the property to the defendant. And, in
case of an original attachment, the abatement of the writ also abates the suit,
for the suit being bottomed on the writ falls with the writ. 51
And when the attachment is abated, and the levy thereunder discharged,
any transfer of, or lien on, the attached property obstructed by the levy be-
comes operative as though such levy had never been made.
§ 258. Pleas in Abatement Not Overruled by Defences on the Merits. Pleas —
in abatement in attachment suits differ so materially from such pleas in ordi-
nary Equity pleading that considerable discrimination is necessary to avoid
confusion and error. In ordinary Equity pleading the defendant is brought
before the Court by subpoena, served upon his person; but in an original
attachment suit he is brought before the Court by a seizure of his prop-
erty, and notice of that fact, and of the suit, given him by publication. So,
in an attachment suit the defendant may have two very different defenses,
one to the merits of the suit, and another to the merits of the attachment;
and may wish to set them both up by pleading in abatement to the at-
tachment, and by demurring, pleading in bar, or answering, to the bill. But
inasmuch as under the general rules of Equity pleading, a demurrer, plea, or
answer, overrules a plea in abatement to the bill, it was once thought that they
would, also, overrule a plea in abatement to the writ of attachment, whether
such writ was original or ancillary, 52 not considering the great difference be-
tween pleas in abatement to the bill in ordinary Equity pleading and pleas in
abatement to the attachment under our Code pleading.
It is, however, now settled, after much controversy and contrariety of de-
cisions, that a defendant may, at the same time, plead in abatement to the
attachment, whether original or ancillary, and demur, plead in bar, or answer
to the bill, and that there is no inconsistency in the two simultaneous de-
fenses 53 and the Legislature has recently confirmed this adjudication by enact-
;
ing that a defendant can plead in abatement, and plead or answer to the merits
at the same time, and that his plea in bar or answer is no waiver of his plea in
abatement. 54
In case of either an original or an ancillary attachment, the defense to the
attachment may fail, and the defence to the bill may succeed, or vice versa. The _
defendant is often benefitted by defeating the attachment even when he fails to

defeat the bill on the merits, because, when the attachment is defeated, the lien
51 Sublato fundamento cadit opus. (When the 53 Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735. When a defend-
foundation is removed what is built upon it tumbles ant in an original attachment both pleads in abate-
down.) ment and answers, the attachment thereby becomes
52 An original attachment becomes ancillary when- ancillary. Templeton v. Mason, 23 Pick., 625.
ever a subpoena is served on the defendant. Temple- 54 Acts of 1877, Ch. 121.
ton v. Mason, 23 Pick., 625; or whenever the de-
fendant enters his appearance.
217 PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. §259
is discharged ab initio, and any intervening sale or lien becomes operative and
valid.
§ 259. Forms Abatement in Attachment Suits. There is no

of Pleas in —
drawing pleas in abatement in attachment suits. The
technical difficulty in
attachment writ is grounded on the causes of attachment alleged in the bill,
and the plea in abatement merely denies each and all of the causes alleged.
PLEA IN ABATEMENT IN ATTACHMENT SlUITS.ss
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery at Trenton.
Richard Roe.
The defendant for plea in abatement to the writ of attachment in this cause, says, That
he did not reside out of the State at the time the bill in this cause was filed, and has not
since resided out of the State; and says, that he had not removed himself or property, or
any part thereof, out of the State when the bill in this cause was filed, nor has he since re-
moved himself or property, or any part thereof, out of the State; and says that he had not
fraudulently disposed of, nor was he about to fraudulently dispose of, his property or any
part thereof, when the bill in this cause was filed, as said bill alleges. Wherefore, he prays
that the attachment be abated, [7/ it is an original attachment, add:] and the bill dismissed.
[To be sworn to as in § 254.] Richard Roe.
PLEA IN ABATEMENT TO ORIGINAL AND ANCILLARY ATTACHMENTS.^
Mary Rahl,
vs. In Chancery at Knoxville.
William Boon.
The defendant, William Boon, for the plea in abatement to the original and ancillary writs_
of attachment in this cause says, That he had not fraudulently disposed of his property, or of
any part thereof, nor was he about fraudulently to dispose of his property or any part thereof,
at the time of the issuance of such writs or either of them, or at any other time before or
since that time, as in and by the bill of complaint is most falsely and erroneously alleged.
[To be sworn to as in § 254.] William Boon.
ARTICLE VI.
PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT."
§ 262. Setting a Plea Down
for Argument.
260. When a Plea in Abatement Must be § 263. Taking Issue upon a Plea.
Filed under General Equity Practice. § 264. Effect of the Decision of a Plea in
261. When a Plea in Abatement May be Abatement.
Filed and Heard under the Tennes- § 265. Effect of the Trial of a Plea in Abate-
see Practice. ment in Attachment Suits.
§ 260. When a Plea in Abatement must be Filed under General Equity

—
Practice. Inasmuch as a plea in abatement undertakes to dispute the right
of the Court, to take any step in the suit, the Court requires the plea to be filed
before any step is taken. If a defendant intends to dispute the jurisdiction
of the Court, on any ground, common reason requires that he should do so, at
the threshold of the litigation and the practice of the Court accordingly is, that
;
he must file his plea in abatement before making any other sort of defence what-
soever. 58 And not only must he file his plea in abatement, before either moving
to dismiss, or demurring, or pleading in bar, or answering, but he must have his
plea finally disposed of, before making any other sort of defence for if, after ;
55 This plea is on the hypothesis of the several substantially the same as proceedings upon a plea
causes of attachment having been alleged in the bill. in bar; and, to save repetition, reference is made to
56 This plea was held good in Boon v. Rahl, J the Article on that subject in the Chapter on Pleas
Heisk., 12. in Bar, post.
57 The proceedings upon a plea in abatement are 58 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk., 711.
§261 PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. 218
filing a plea in abatement, he moves to dismiss, or demurs, or pleads in bar, or

answers, such a step is deemed an abandonment of his plea in abatement, and
lie will not be allowed to return to it. The Court will not, ordinarily, allow a
plea in abatement to be filed, after a pro confesso has been set aside. 59
The party who contests the right of the Court to take jurisdiction, because
of some fatal irregularity in the issuance or service of process, or because of
the locality of his residence, or of the subject-matter, must do no act that recog-
nizes or acquiesces in that jurisdiction. He must dispute the jurisdiction, (1)
in the right way, (2) at the right time, and (3) in the right form. (1) The
right way is, by a plea in abatement. (2) The right time is, at the appearance
term, and before any other defence is made, or any leave is asked or obtained
in reference to any other defence. (3) The right form is a plea containing the
requisite substance, and a sufficient verification.
But under the Act of 1897, a plea in abatement and a plea in bar, or an
answer, may be filed at the same time and the filing of a plea in bar or an
;
answer will not overrule a plea in abatement.

§ 261. When a Plea in Abatement May be Filed and Heard Under the Ten-
—
nessee Practice. Down to the passage of the Act of 1897, 60 there was great con-
tention at the bar, and no little difference of opinion on the bench, 61 (1) as to
when a plea in abatement might be filed, (2) as to the effect of filing a plea in
bar or an answer on a plea in abatement, and (3), as to the effect of a decision
against a plea in abatement upon an issue of fact; and these contentions be-
tween Solicitors and differing opinions among Chancellors were greatly in-
creased and aggravated by the impossible endeavors to reconcile pleas in
abatement in attachment cases with pleas in abatement in ordinary Equity
pleading, complicated as the former pleas were by pleas in abatement to the
subpoena, a plea utterly unknown to Equity pleading, and injected into our
Chancery pleading by the ill-considered act of the Courts making the statutes
in reference to grounds for pleas in abatement in the Circuit Courts applicable
to the Chancery Courts.
The Act of 1877 changes all this, and not only makes a plea in abatement
equal in favor with a plea in bar or an answer, but in some respects makes it
the most favored, thereby reversing all former rules of pleading, for the Act
not only allows a plea in abatement to be filed along with an answer, thitherto
the most favored of all pleadings by a defendant, but provides that if at the
trial the plea in abatement is found true the Court is bound to sustain it and
dismiss the bill, even though the answer fail to set up a good defence, or, setting
up a good defence, is proved to be false and the bill proved to be true the ;
result being that a plea in abatement, if found to be true, overrules the

answer. 62
By the Act of 1897, the defendant may plead over to the merits of the bill
after judgment against his plea in abatement rendered either upon motion to
strike out, or upon argument as to its sufficiency, or upon demurrer, or upon
an issue of fact, as to its merits. 63 In other words, no act of the defendant in
unsuccessfully filing or relying upon a plea in abatement, and no adverse ac-
tion of the Court in reference ,to the sufficiency or truthfulness of such plea,
will debar him from making any defence to the merits he could have made
if no plea in abatement had ever been filed by him.
But the statute goes further, and authorizes the defendant to plead in abate-
ment, and, at the same time, to plead in bar to the merits or to answer to
so See Lumber Co. V. Lieberman, 22 Pick., 153. under the Act of 1897 would the defendant be en-
00 Acts of 1897, ch. 121. titled to have the bill dismissed if his plea in abate-
Gl See, notably, Eattelle & Co. V. Youngstown R. ment should be found true on trial ?
M. Co., 16 Lea, 355; and Simpson V. Railway Co., 5 63 Thach v. Accident Association, 6 Cates, 271:
Pick., 304. Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271; Railroad
02 Query: suppose the answer confesses the debt, v. McCollum, 21 Pick., 623.
219 PROCEEDINGS, UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. §262
merits; and, in such plea in bar or answer, to rely on any defenses he might
have made had no plea in abatement been interposed. 64
The act of the defendant in filing a plea in bar, or an answer, after pleading
in abatement, is not to be deemed a waiver of his plea in abatement, but both
defenses shall stand, and the issues of fact raised by both shall be heard at
the same time, 05 and if the plea in abatement is found to be true, the suit will
be abated and the bill dismissed, even though complainant may be entitled to a
decree on the merits 66 but if, at the hearing, the plea in abatement is found
;
to be false, the Court will then adjudicate the case upon the merits in favor of
the complainant or defendant as Equity may require. 67
"Where a defendant unsuccessfully relies upon a plea in abatement, the issue
of fact being found against him, and he fails to plead over, or apply for leave
to plea over, a pro confesso can be entered against him, and then a final decrea
on the pro confesso. 68
In case of either an original or an ancillary attachment, the defendant, with-
out the aid of the statute, may plead in abatement to it, and at the same time
answer the bill on the merits. 69
§ 262. Setting a Plea Down for Argument. The first question for the com- —
plainant to consider when a plea is filed, whether it be a plea in abatement or
in bar, is its sufficiency. If he deem the plea insufficient, either in form or sub-
stance, he must set it down with the Clerk to.be argued.
70 He may do this by
an entry upon the minutes of the Court, if in session or upon the rule docket, ;
or by filing with the Clerk a paper containing the substance of such entry, if
Court be not in session. The following is a
form: of setting down a plea fob argument.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
The complainant says the defendant's plea in abatement is insufficient.
1st. Because not properly verified. 71
it is
2d. Because, if true, it presents no ground for abating the suit.

Wherefore he sets said plea down for argument.
Edward T. Sanford, Solicitor.
The plea must be set for argument at the first term after it is filed 72 and, if ;
on argument, it is judged to be sufficient, the complainant must take issue upon

it, instanter if, however, the plea is overruled, the defendant must answer the
;
bill by the next rule day, 73 which will be the next day if the term continues
he may, however, obtain further time 74 from the Court, on application.
§ 263. —
Taking Issue upon a Plea. Issue is taken upon a plea, 75 whether it
be a plea in abatement or in bar, by filing the statutory replication thereto, as
follows
64 Acts of 1897, ch. 121. §2; Sewell v. Tuthill & for, the case was remanded for proof on that point.
Pattison, 4 Cates, 271. 69 Bank li. Foster, 6 Pick., 735.
65 But by consent the hearing of the issues raised 70 Code, § 4393.
by the answer may be continued until the plea in 71 If not properly verified, the plea may be stricken
abatement is disposed of. from the files, on motion. Seifreid V. People's Bank,
06 It would seem that
if the Act of 1897 is given 1 Bax., '200.
full defendant might by plea in abatement
effect a 72 Code, § 4394.
deny the jurisdiction and at the same time by an- 73 Code, § 4395.
swer admit the debt, and if successful on _his_ plea 74 This further time should not extend beyond the
the complainant's bill' would have to be dismissed. adjournment of the term. If a defendant delays a
But the Court might allow the complainant to take suit, by an insufficient dilatory pleading, he should
any money tendered by the defendant. Railroad V. not reap the reward of a delay, which is often all he
McCollum, 21 Pick., 623. expects; he should be required to answer next day,
67 Ibid. or if given more time, he should be given it only on
68 Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, 271. In payment of the costs of the cause. This ruling is
was rendered without any pro
this case a final decree within the spirit of Code, § 2938, authorizing the
confesso; the Supreme Court held this was not a _
costs of the cause to be adjudged, for filing a frivo-
reversible error, but as the allegations of the bill lous demurrer.
did not make clear the amount of the claim sued 75 Code, § 4393; Cheatham V. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.
§ 264 PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. 220
EXPLICATION OF A PLEA.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
The complainant joins issue on the plea filed in this cause. 78
Edward. T. Sanford, Solicitor.
This replication may be written immediately under the plea, on the same
paper but whether so written, or put in on a separate sheet of paper, it should
;
be duly filed by the Clerk.

A negative plea makes an issue without a replication, 77 and the practice is
to treat an affirmative plea as at issue without a replication after complainant
lias had twenty days' notice of its filing, and has taken no action thereon. 78
If the complainant has ground for a special replication, he may file the same,
in addition to his general replication, on obtaining leave of the Court. 79 A
replication to a plea should be filed, or the plea set down for argument as to
its sufficiency, before the lapse of twenty days after the filing of the plea.
§ 264. —
Effect of the Decision of a Plea in Abatement. If a plea in abate- —
ment good, both in form and substance, the complainant must dismiss his bill,
is
or take issue upon the plea, and have the issue tried upon the evidence. If,
on the trial of this issue of fact, the plea be found true, the Court will order
the bill to be dismissed. 80 Such dismissal, however, cannot be pleaded in bar
of a second suit on the same cause of action. If the plea in abatement is over-
ruled upon argument, 81 the order of the Court is, that the defendant pay the
statutory costs 82 and answer the bill. 83 The following is the form of an
ORDER RULING ON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
John Doe, ]
yj. j- No. 314.
Richard Roe. J
The plea in abatement filed by the defendant, having been set down by the complainant
to be argued, and having been read, and argument as to its sufficiency having been heard,
the Court is of the opinion that the plea is sufficient. It is, therefore, ordered by the Court
that the complainant reply to said plea within ten days [If the plea be found insufficient omit ,
ail after the word "opinion," and add, in lieu:] that the plea is insufficient in law. It is, there-
fore, ordered by the Court that said plea be overruled and disallowed, and that the defendant
answer the bill within two days, 84 and that he pay the statutory costs, for which an execution
Will issue.
If the defendant wished to rely on his plea in abatement to the jurisdiction,

in the Supreme Court, under the old practice he had to decline to answer
the bill and make no further defense, for any further defense was deemed an
76 Code, § 2390. This is the form used in the to suits at law, using the term, "actions;" Code, §
Circuit Court, but it is equally good in the Chan- 2102; while the pleas in abatement under the head
cery Court. of Chancery practice are pleas to the local and
77 Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735. peisonal jurisdiction of the Court; Code, §§4309;
78 See Seifreid v. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., 20; 4384-4385; and not pleas to the process. Parker v.
1 Bax., 200; Wilson v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 31. Porter, 4 Yerg., 81. Pleas in abatement to the pro-
79 Code, §§ 2931-2932. cess are unknown in Equity pleading, and the prac-
so This rule is not to be understood as applying tice of abating suits in Equity, by plea in abatement
to pleas to ancillary^ attachments; but it applies to to the process, is an anomaly; but it may be law.
pleas to all other writs. Baker v. Compton, 2 Head, 471. But, see Grove l\
It is easily seen, how, on principle, the sustaining Campbell, 9 Yerg., 7; Wilson v. Scruggs, 7 Lea, 639:
of a plea in abatement will result in the dismissal of Battelle v. Youngstown R. M. Co., 16 Lea, 364;
a suit at law; because a suit at law is commenced by Rogers v. O'Mary, 11 Pick., 514.
summons, Code, § 2813; and if the summons becomes SI Whittaker v. Whittaker, 10 Lea, 97; Parmlee
null for any reason, the suit grounded on it must v. Railroad, 13 Lea, 602; Code, §4395.
become null also; for, sublato fundamento cadit opus. 82 Code, § 3203. This section may not be obliga-
But a suit in Chancery is begun by the filing of the tory on the Chancellor; but it is a good guide, and
bill, Code, § 4312, and not by the issuance of the ought to be followed, except when its operation
subpoena; and it is hard to see how abating the sub- would be inequitable.
poena will abate the bill, in those cases where the S3 Code, § 4395 ; Whittaker V. Whittaker, 10 Lea,
plea is founded on an illegal issuance or service of 98; Simpson v. Railway Co., 5 Pick., 308.
process, to say nothing of the injustice of punishing 84 The next rule day, or such further time as the
the complainant for a wrong done by a Clerk, or Court may prescribe, is allowed the defendant in
Sheriff, himself an officer of the law. Nevertheless, which to answer the bill. Code, §4395. If Court
it has been adjudged that such is the effect. Martin be in session the next day, that day would be the
V. Ramsey, 7 Hum., 260. The Code, treating of next rule day.
pleas in abatement to the process, evidently refeis
221 PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. §264
abandonment of his plea 85 but under the present practice he has the right to
;
defend on the merits after his plea has been found untrue on the facts. 86
"Where, however, the issue tendered by a plea in abatement, is tried on its
merits, upon an issue of fact, if the plea be found false, the complainant, prior
to the Act of 1897, was entitled to an order taking his bill for confessed, and a
final decree thereon ;
ST but now the defendant has the right to plead over to
the merits, or answer. 88 The entry on the minutes of the Court, in case of a
trial on an issue of fact, may be as follows
DECREE ON THE HEARING OP A PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 314.

Richard Roe. J
This cause came on to be heard, this 18th day of April, 1891, before the Chancellor [or,
before the jury heretofore demanded in the cause, to-wit William Brown and naming them
:
all —who were duly sworn well and truly to try and determine the issue made] on the plea
in abatement, and the proof having been read [or, heard, if tried by a jury and argument of
counsel heard, the Chancellor [or jury] finds the issue in favor of the defendant.
It is, therefore, decreed by the Court that the bill be dismissed, and that complainant and
Frank Friend, his prosecution surety, pay all the costs of the cause, for which let execution
issue.
[If the issue be found in favor of the complainant, insert after the words, "in favor of," in
the above form, the following :] the complainant. And the defendant not applying for leave
to plead over or answer, 89 it is, therefore, decreed by the Court that the bill of complaint be
taken for confessed. And, thereupon, this cause coming on to be further and finally heard
upon the bill, the order pro confesso, and the whole record, upon consideration thereof, the
Court orders and decrees [then give the decree complainant is entitled to, on a pro confesso.]
If the defendant has pleaded in abatement and answered at the same time,
as he has the right to do under the Act of 1897, and the cause is heard at the
same time upon the issues made by the bill and piea, and by the bill and answer,
then this decree will be modified, as follows
[If the issueon the plea be found in favor of the complainant, insert after the words "in
favor of" in the paragraph of this decree the following:] the complainant.
first
And thereupon, this cause coming on to be further [and finally, if it be a final decree,]
heard upon the bill and the answer of the defendant thereto, and the evidence, and whole
record in the cause, and argument of counsel, the Court is of opinion that complainant is
entitled to the relief by him specially prayed in his bill.
It is, therefore, decreed by the Court that complainant have and recover of the defendant
the sum of seven thousand, six hundred and fifty-four dollars and thirty-two cents ($7,654.32)
and all the costs of the cause, for which an execution will issue.
[If any property has been attached, omit all of the decree after the words "costs in the
cause," and recite' that property has been attached, and order its sale as shown in § 887, post,
if complainant has a lien upon any property, let the decree so recite and declare the lien, and
then order the property to be sold as shown in § 567, post.]
The Act of 1897 provides that a plea in abatement and an answer may be
filed at the same time, and when so filed shall be heard at the same time, in
which case the decree may be as follows
85 Wilson v. Scruggs, 7 Lea, 635; Union County This last case expressly overrules Battelle V. Youngs-
V. Knox County, 6 Pick., 541. town R. M. Co., 16 Lea, 355.
S6 Acts Of 1897, ch. 121, § 1. While the defend- 88 Acts of 1897, ch. 121. The phraseology of this
ant has the right to defend on the merits after his statute would indicate that its framer had suits at
plea in abatement has been overruled, he is _ not law exclusively in mind.
obliged to take advantage of the right. See Waiver, so The defendant can waive the benefit of the Act
ante, § 71. See also, Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, of 1897; and, if he fail to plead over or answer at
4 Cates 271 once, or to apply for leave so to do, when his plea
87 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 125.
' The Code, § 4393, says in abatement is overruled on an issue df fact, he
that if a plea be found false, the complainant shall will be deemed to have waived such benefit, and a
have the same advantages as if it had been so found pre confesso and final decree can at once be pro-
t
by verdict at common law; and at law, this advan- nounced against him, as was the practice prior to
tage is equivalent to a judgment by default. Bacon the Act of 1897. Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4
v Parker, 2 Tenn., (Overt.) 55; Wilson v. Scruggs, Cates, 271. See Waiver, ante, § 71.
7 Lea, 635; Simpson v. Railway Co., 5 Pick., 304.
§ 265 PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN ABATEMENT. 222
DECREE ON BILL, PLEA IN ABATEMENT, ANSWER AND PROOF.
John Doe, et al., ")
vs. > In Chancery Court at Dandridge.

Richard Roe. J
This cause coming on this day to be heard upon the bill, the plea in abatement and the
answer, and the proof having been read as to all the issues and argument of counsel heard-
the Court finds the issue on the plea in abatement in favor of the defendant. It is, there-
fore, decreed that the bill be dismissed, and that complainant and Frank Friend, his prose-
cution surety, pay all the costs of the cause, for which an execution is awarded.
If the issue on the plea in abatement is found against the defendant, then
omit all in the above decree after the words "in favor of" and insert, in lieu,
the following:
the complainant. And the Court being of opinion that the complainant is entitled to the
relief by him prayed, it is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that [For forms of
decrees, see post, §§ 566-568.]
§ 265. Effect of the Trial of a Plea in Abatement in Attachment Suits. If —

the plea in abatement is to an original attachment and the defendant is not
before the Court by service of subpoena, or by voluntary appearance outside of
his pleadings, and the issue on the plea be found in his favor, the bill will be
dismissed, as shown in the preceding decree but if the defendant is before the
;
Court, and has answered as well as pleaded in abatement, if his plea be found
in his favor, and the issues on bill and answer be found in favor of the complain-
ant, then the attachment will be discharged, a decree rendered in complainant's
favor on the bill and answer, and an execution awarded for the amount of the
'
decree. In such case, in the preceding decree omit all after the words, in favor '
'
of the defendant, an insert, in lieu, the following
'
It is, therefore, decreed that the writ of attachment be quashed and the levy thereunder
released and discharged, and the costs incident to the attachment will be paid by the com-
plainant.
The Court, also, finds the issues raised by the bill and answer in favor of the complainant;
and it is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that [For forms of decrees, see post,
§§ 566-568.]
If the issues on the plea in abatement to the original attachment be found

in favor of the complainant, and the issues on the bill and answer be, also, found
in favor of the complainant, then omit all after the words "in favor of" in the
foregoing decree, and insert, in lieu, the following
the complainant.
It is, .therefore, decreed by the Court that the plea in abatement be overruled and disal-
lowed.
And the Court, being of opinion that the complainant is entitled to the relief by him prayed,
it is,therefore, ordered and decreed that [Here insert decree as prayed, and order the prop-
ertly attached to be sold. For forms, see post, § 887.]
Court on the hearing should decide against both the plea in abatement
If the
and the then the bill will, of course, be dismissed, and the costs of the suit
bill,
apportioned accordingly, adjudging the costs incident to the plea against the
defendant, and the balance of the costs against the complainant, unless Equity
otherwise require.
223 MOTIONS TO DISMISS BIU,S. §266
CHAPTER XIV.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILLS.
§ 270. Motionto Dismiss for Want of Juris-
266. The Office ofa Motion to Dismiss. diction of the Defendant.
267. The Grounds of Motions to Dismiss. § 271. Motion to Dismiss for Want of a Pre-
268. Motion -to Dismiss for Want of Equity requisite of the Writ.
on the Face of the Bill. § 272. Motion to Dismiss on Other Grounds.
269. Motion to Dismiss Because the Form § 273. When a Motion to Dismiss Must be
of the Bill is Unknown. Made.
§ 266. Office of a Motion to Dismiss. —

If there appear in the record, some
fatal irregularity in the bringing or prosecution of the suit, or, if some fatal
defect be manifest on the face of the bill, the Code provides that the bill may
be dismissed on motion of the defendant, because of such irregularity, or de-
fect. The object of the motion is to summarily end the suit; and, as a conse-
quence, the ground of the motion must be both manifest and conclusive. If, by
amendment, the irregularity can be remedied, or, if the defect or omission can
be supplied, the duty of the Court to allow it to be done 1 for Courts are
it is -,
instituted to enable complainants to have a hearing on the merits. If, how-

ever, it is manifest from the positive averments of the bill, or from other mat-
ters affirmatively appearing, that the defect is fatal, and cannot be remedied,
the bill will be dismissed. The statute provides this summary method by mo-
tion because, in such a case, the complainant having no standing in the Court,
the sooner the suit is ended the smaller the costs he will be obliged to pay.
§ 267. Grounds of Motions to Dismiss. —A
bill may be dismissed on motion
of the defendant
1. For want of equity on its face.
2. Because unknown to the forms of the Court.
3. If it appear on the face of the bill, that the Court has no jurisdiction of
the person of the defendant.
4. For want of any of the prerequisites to the issuance of the Writ.
5. For mis- joinder or non- joinder of parties, where the fact appears on the
face of the bill.
6. For multifariousness.
7. For such other grounds as may be specially declared sufficient by the
Code. 2 Some of these other grounds are: (1) champerty; 3 (2) the omission of
the allegation, in an insolvent estate bill, that the estate amounts to one
thousand dollars in value; 4 and (3) a failure to speed a cause according to a
rule. 5 All of these grounds will be more fully considered in the following sec-
tions. The 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th causes of dismissal, are in the nature of demur-
rers ore tenus, and may be raised by demurrer; 6 but the demurrers for such
causes must be special enough, not to fall under the ban against general de-
murrers. A
bill cannot be summarily dismissed on motion, except for the causes
above enumerated. 7
1 Code, §§ 4387; 2863-2869. By the Code, § 4388, the 1st, Sth and 6th causes
2 Code, § 4386. of dismissal, may also be raised by demurrer, and by
3 Code, § 1783. §§ 4309, 4319, it is enacted that the jurisdiction of
4 Code, §2365; see, as to amounts, Code, §2362; the Court may, also, be resisted by demurrer.
and Steel v. Maness, IS Lea, 143. T Ford v. Bartlett, 3 Bax., 22.
5 Code, § 4390.
§268 MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILIvS. 224
§ 268. Motion to Dismiss for Want of Equity on the Pace of the Bill.
"Whenever (1) the supposed rule of law or Equity, on which the bill is founded
manifestly does not exist; or (2) if existing, whenever the facts alleged mani-
festly fail to bring the case within such rule; or (3) if within the rule, when-
ever the facts alleged clearly show that the case falls within some manifest
exception to the rule in each of these three cases, there is a want of equity on
;
the face of the bill, and a motion to dismiss the bill for that cause will be sus-
tained.
The Court will not, however, sustain the motion, unless the cause thereof be
not only good, but manifestly good by which is meant, that the Court will not,
;
on such a summary motion, search the bill for fatal defects, nor weigh in deli-
cate balances any nice points of law urged against the bill. Such matters must
be brought forward by demurrer. If there be any ground for reasonable de-
bate, as to whether there is a want of Equity, the motion to dismiss will be over-
ruled. Indeed, it may be said generally, that the want of Equity, to justify a
motion to dismiss on that ground, must be so manifest and so complete, that the
Chancellor would not be reversed, if he should dismiss the bill on his own
motion. 8
If there be any Equity, at all, on the face of the bill, even if it be defectively
stated, the motion to dismiss cannot prevail 9 and, on such a motion, every rea-
;
sonable presumption is to be made in favor of, rather than against, the bill. 10
§ 269. Motion to Dismiss, Because the Form of the Bill is Unknown. While —
the Chancery Court looks to substance and not to form, yet form is necessary to
substance. If the essential formalities of a bill were not adhered to, it would
widen into such a loose indefiniteness of style and statement, and into such an
utter abandonment of method and meaning, that it would be impossible often-
times to define its substance amid the chaotic conglomeration of its multiform
informalities. Pleadings must have some form 11 and no party has a right to
j
substitute his own form of a bill, for the form sanctioned by the Court. In
Chancery, no form is required not necessary to a clear, orderly, and respectful
presentation of complainant 's grounds of suit and common politeness and good
;
manners both require that this necessary and simple form be substantially ad-
hered to. The dignity of the Court, and the due, decent, orderly and accurate
administration of justice, require that the ordinary form of a bill should not
be substantially departed from.
A bill will, therefore, be dismissed if it be unknown to the forms of the
Court. 12 If a bill (1) should be addressed not to the Chancellor but to the
Clerk, or should have no address; or (2) if it should contain no prayer; or (3)
if it should be in rhyme or (4) if it should fail to name the parties defendant
;
or (5) if it should be in a foreign language, or so badly written as to be illegi-

ble or (6) if it should be unintelligible; or (7) if it failed to give the names
;
and residences of the parties in any and all such cases, the bill would probably
;
be deemed unknown to the forms of the Court, and would be dismissed on

motion.
8 Quinn ». Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch., 70; Henderson v. uncertainty and perplexity in the administration ot
Mathews, 1Lea, 34; Earles v. Earles, 3 Head, 367; justice. Every irregularity of this sort is fraught
Mayse v. Biggs, 3 Head, 36; Thompson v. Paul, 8 with inconvenience, and generally tends to delays
Hum., 117; Merriman v. Norman, 9 fleisk., 269; and doubts. And it has been well remarked, that
Knight v. Atkinson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 384; Anderson V. infinite mischief has been produced by the facility of
Mullenix, 5 Lea, 287. Courts of Justice in overlooking errors in form. It
8 Anderson v. Mullenix, 5 Lea, 287; Randall V. encourages carelessness; and places ignorance too
Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 137; Colville v. Colville, 9 much on a footing with knowledge. To which it may
Hum., 524; Thompson v. Paul, 8 Hum., 114; Hen- be added, that it often exposes the parties them-
derson v. Mathews, 1 Lea, 34. selves to no small hardships, by embarrassing them
10 Kerr «. Kerr, 3 Lea, 227; Anderson V. Mulle- at every step in the progress of the cause; and in-
nix, 5 Lea, 287. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. volving the merits of the cause in superfluous details
This maxim applies to bills when questioned by a and inartificial allegations, at once loose, obscure,
motion to dismiss, or by a demurrer. See §§ 63; 317, and misleading. Sto. Eq. PI., § 454.
note 4. The disregard of form is a glory in a Court, but
11 Forma dat esse. The want of form constitutes a shame in a litigant. Form is the scabbard of the
a just objection to the proceedings in every Court of sword of justice that keeps it bright and keen.
Justice; for to reject all form would be destructive 12 Code, § 4386.
to the law as a science, and would introduce great
225 MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILLS. §270
But, a bill contains allegations sufficient, if true, to entitle the complainant
if
to some the fact that the bill is inartificially drawn, or is misnamed by
relief,
the draftsman, will not justify a motion to dismiss. In such a case, the Court
judges the bill, not by its name, or want of technical precision in its frame and
averments, but by its substance, 13 and the matters of Equity it sets forth.
While the proper name of the bill will not atone for defects of substance, yet
proper substance will atone for a defect in the name. The name of a bill is
mere matter of form, and is absolutely immaterial and, whatever be its name, ;
the Court will look at its allegations and prayers, and judge the bill thereby,
and not by the particular name it may happen to bear. The rights of the
parties will be determined exclusively by the matters of Equity alleged, and not
by the appellation given the bill by the complainant's solicitor. 14 This is
especially true of bills not strictly original, some of which have highly technical
names, and others have various objects and offices. All such bills are judged by
their averments, and prayers for relief, and not by their names. 15
What is meant by the maxim, that Equity regards the substance and not the
forms of things, is that if there be sufficient substance in the pleading, the
Court will not disregard that substance merely because of the want of some
technical formality. 16
§ 270. Motion to Dismiss, for Want of Jurisdiction of the Defendant. It —
has already been shown that the Court will not entertain a bill, when it has no
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, provided objection is properly
made on that ground. This want of jurisdiction, when not apparent on the face
of the bill, must be made to appear by plea in abatement but, when apparent, ;
a motion to dismiss, 17 or a demurrer, 18 will lie to the bill. The local jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant is a matter oftentimes of great importance to
him; and when that jurisdiction is wanting, when the bill is not filed in the
proper county, the defendant may object to the jurisdiction over him. This ob-
jection frequently appears on the face of the bill, because the Code requires the
county residence of the parties to be stated in the bill 19 and when the objection;
does so appear, the defendant may move that the bill as to him be dismissed.
§ 271. Motion to Dismiss, for Want of a Prerequisite to the Writ.—Before
a subpoena can issue, or publication be made, the complainant must give the
13 If the coin be gold a wrong name will not the Mississippi: they keep the course of justice in
make it brass. The name is a mere tag. Nomina its proper channel.
mutabilia, res autem immobiles. (Names are mutable 17 Code, § 4386.
but things are immutable.) No baptismal name is 18 Code, §§ 4309; 4319.
required for a bill, and no plea of misnomer will lie 19 It would seem from Code, § 4309, that a
motion
to it. Majors V. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 295. to dismiss would, also, lie when it appears from the
14 Among the many authorities supporting the tex*. face of the bill, that the Court has no local jurisdic-
see: Dodd v. Benthal, 4 Heisk., 601; Majors v. Mc- tion of the subject-matter. Chancellor Cooper held,
Neilly, 7 Heisk., 294; Cheek v. Anderson, 2 Lea, in Shaw v. Patterson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 171, that for
a
194; Northman V. Liverpool Ins. Co., 1 Tenn. Ch., want of general jurisdiction of the subject-matter a
312; Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 599. See maxim, bill could be dismissed on motion, under
Code, §
Equity looks to the intent rather than to the form, 4386, inasmuch as a general want of jurisdiction' or
ante, § 43. the subject-matter is, ordinarily, all that is meant
The Moloch of Formality erected by the Law, and by
want of equity on the face of the bill; and he cites
on whose iron altars justice has been so often sacri- in support of his holding, Code, §4309;
ficed, has never profaned the Temples of Equity.
Greene v
Starnes, 1 Heisk., 582; and .Bennett v. Wilkins,
5
Technicalities should not be used as swords to per- ^-° Id -. ?40. It must be considered, however, that
petrate wrong, but as shields to protect the right. §4309 is in an article dealing exclusively with the
Butler V. Kenzie, 6 Pick., 34. There is no magic in lersonal and Local Jurisdiction of the Courts as
forms or names in a Court of' Equity. Northman /'. shown by its contents and its title. In Thompson &
Insurance Co., 1 Tenn. Ch., 312. See §§ 43; 431, note Meger s Code, section 4309 is said to have been
4; 681; 719; 64, sub-sec. 4; 139, note 19. Nihil facit drawn from the Act of 1801, ch. 6, §16, modified-
error nominis cum de corpore constat. (An error of and the original section in that act reads as follows-
name amounts to nothing when there is certainty as After answer filed, and no plea in abatement to the
to the thing itself.) Prxsentia corporis tollit error- local jurisdiction of the Court, no exception
em nominis. (The presence of the body does away for want
of jurisdiction shall ever afterwards be made," mean-
with the mistake in the name.) The bill being in ing, of course, no exception for want of
local juris-
the hands of th£ Chancellor, its praenomen is wholly diction. In considering a section of the Code r&
immaterial, he will judge it from its allegations. The gard must be had to the original statute, and to
Code does not require a bill to have any Christian the title of the Article and Chapter of the Code
name. Code, §§4312; 4314. and
the connection in which it is found. It seems rea-
1
15 Arnold v. Myers, 1 Lea, 308; Northman v. Liv- sonably plain, from various sections of the
erpool Ins. Co., 1 Tenn. Ch., 312; 318; Maddox v. Code
th?t the general jurisdiction of the Court
Apperson, 14 Lea, 599; Murphy v. Johnson, 23 Pick., over the
subiect-matter in any civil case where the
552. complain-
ant is entitled to any relief, legal, or equitable,
16 Forms are to the Courts what the levees are can
to only be resisted by demurrer. Post §§289- 295-
§ 272 MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILLS. 226
required cost bond, or file the required pauper oath in lieu thereof. Such bond
or oath is a prerequisite to the writ, and for the want of such a prerequisite
the bill will be dismissed on motion. 20
So, in an original attachment suit, a sworn bill containing a good ground for
an attachment, and an attachment bond, or a pauper oath in lieu thereof, are
prerequisites to the issuance of the writ of attachment, and for the want of
either of such prerequisites, a motion to dismiss the bill will lie. 21
The motion to dismiss may, also, be made in a case of a fatal defect in any of
said prerequisites. The defects in the form of attachment bonds and affidavits
may, however, be amended; and where no attachment bond, at all, has been
given, or one fatally defective, a sufficient bond may be given, even after a mo-
tion to dismiss for want of a sufficient bond. 22
A bill filed on Sunday, without the prerequisite affidavit, may be dismissed
on motion. 23
§ 272. Motion to Dismiss, on Other Grounds. —A bill may, also, be dis-
missed : (1) for mis-joinder or non-joinder of parties, where the fact appears on
the face of the bill; (2) for multifariousness; 24 (3) for want of the allegation,
in a bill to administer an insolvent estate, that the value of the estate equals
one thousand dollars; 25 (4) for want of a prosecution bond, when the com-
plainant's oath of poverty is shown to be untrue, or his cause of action frivo-
lous or malicious, or is one that cannot be paupered; 26 (5) for failure of com-
plainant to comply with a rule to speed the cause; 27 (6) for failure of a non-
resident complainant to answer interrogatories, by a given day, on a peremp-
tory order so to do; 28 (7) for champerty or maintenance; 29 (8) for uncleanness
of complainant's hands; and (9) for want of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the suit. 30 The last six grounds of dismissal may be relied on at any
time before final decree, 31 the other three grounds must be taken advantage of
in due season, or they will be waived.
A
bill in Chancery cannot be ordinarily dismissed, on motion of the defend-
ant, except for the causes enumerated in the statutes. 32 This does not, however,
prevent a bill being dismissed by the complainant himself, either orally, in
open Court, or in writing during vacation. 33
§ 273. When a Motion to Dismiss must be Made. The different modes of —
defence have been heretofore stated, and the order in which they must be relied
33a
on. It is too late to make a motion to dismiss because of some defect appa-
rent on the face of the bill after demurrer, or plea in bar, or answer has been
filed. The adoption of any one of these defences, is a waiver of the right to
make a motion to dismiss. 34 The only mode of defence, that precedes a motion
to dismiss, is a plea in abatement, a defence which seeks to end the suit by
reason of some objection outside of the merits of the controversy, and outside
whereas, its local jurisdiction may be resisted by 22 Code, § 3477; Alexander «. Lisby, 2 Swan, 107;
plea in abatement, demurrer, or motion to dismiss. Brooks V. flartman, 1 Heisk., 36. But only defects
Code, §4309; post, §292. This construction har- in the form of the attachment affidavit are amenda-
monizes all the sections of the Code on the subject, ble. Lillard V. Carter, 7 Heisk., 604.
and harmonizes the vast majority of the decisions 23A lawfully filed bill is one of the prerequisites
of our Supreme Court in reference to demurrers to of a writ.
the jurisdiction. One distinguishing feature of our 24 Code, § 4386. See, also, §§ 4325-4327 Johnson
practice is, that when a party objects to any matter V. Brown, 2 Hum., 327.
in Court, he must specially designate the ground of 25 Code, § 2365.
his objection, and put his finger on it, by way of 20 Code, § 3194.
identification. It has been held that a demurrer for 27 Code, § 4390. The rule, however, must precede
want of equity, admits the jurisdiction. Chesney V. the dismissal. Kain v. Ross, 1 Lea, 76.
Rodgers, 1 Heisk., 241; post, § 292; and so it cannot 28 Code, § 4464.
well be seen how a motion to dismiss for want of 29 Code, § 1783.
equity can deny the jurisdiction, unless the matter 30 The bill may be dismissed at any time when it
be absolutely beyond either legal or equitable cogni- appears that the Court has no jurisdiction of the
zance. subject-matter. Travers V. Abbey, 20 Pick., 665.
20 Code, § 4386. But defects in prosecution bonds, See, post, §§ 290; 525.
and in pauper oaths, may be supplied by amendment, 31 Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Hum., 379; Dowell V.
or by new bonds, or oaths. Morris v. Smith, 1 Dowell, 3 Head, 502; Markham v. Townsend, 2
Hum., 133; Andrews V. Page, 2 Heisk., 641; Wilson Tenn. Ch., 713.
v. Corry, 1 Lea, 391; Snyder v. Summers, 1 Lea, 32 Ford v. Bartlett, 3 Bax., 22.
481; Adamson V. Hurt, 3 Shan. Cas., 424. See, 33 Code, § 3199. But see, post, §§ 523-524.
ante, § 182, note. 33a Ante, §§ 231; 232.
21 Bank v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Hum.. 311. 34 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk.. 711.
227 MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILIyS. §274
of the body of the bill. All of the grounds of a motion to dismiss, except the one
for want of Equity, also seek to end the suit without contesting the merits. It
is a rule of Courts, that, after a defendant has taken issue with the complainant
on any of the merits of the controversy, he will not be allowed to set up any
defence that is based on some matter outside of the merits. motion to dismiss, A
therefore, must be made before demurrer, plea in bar, or answer, or it will not
be' entertained, except in the cases hereinbefore referred to. 85
§ 274. How a Motion to Dismiss May be Defeated, or Avoided. There are —

two ways to meet motions to dismiss 1st, to show that the motion is not sus-
:
tainable on the face of the record and, if sustainable, 2d, to avoid the motion
;
by supplying the defect. If no leave to supply the defect be necessary it should

be supplied, if possible, before the motion to dismiss is argued but if leave be ;
necessary such leave should be applied for before or during the argument of the
motion to dismiss.
The complainant may amend his bill, or supply the prerequisites of the writ,
after a motion to dismiss has been made and even after such a motion has been
;
sustained. 38 In the latter case, however, the amendment must be made, or the
prerequisite of the writ supplied, during the term at which the motion to dis-
miss was sustained or at least, leave to amend, or to supply, must be obtained
;
during such term, or within thirty days after the entry of dismissal, if the term
is longer than thirty days.
MOTION TO DISMISS BILL ALLOWED, AND DISMISSAL SET ASIDE.

John Doe, |
vs. [No. 618.

Bichard Roe, et al. J
In this cause the defendants moved the Court to dismiss the bill for want of a prosecution
bond or pauper oath in lieu, and, it appearing that no bond or oath has been filed, said motion
is allowed, and the bill dismissed, at complainant's cost, and an execution will issue accord-
ingly.
Thereupon, complainant tendered and filed a prosecution bond, and moved the Court to
set aside and vacate the order dismissing his bill, which motion is allowed, and said order
of dismissal is vacated and annulled, and the cause reinstated on the docket to be proceeded
in."
35 See, ante, § 272. amended. Sharp V. Miller, 3 Sneed, 42; Irvins V.
36 Code, §§ 4387; 4335. The Courts are as lib- Mathis, 11 Hum., 603.
eral, in allowing the prerequisites of the writ to be 37A prosecution bond may be filed after the mo-
amended or supplied, as in allowing the bill to be tion is made. See, ante, § 179.
§275 DEMURRERS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 228
Article
229 DEMURRERS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. §277
truth of the bill, for the purpose of testing its sufficiency in law, by a pleading
called a demurrer. 3
A demurrer, therefore, is a pleading which raises questions of law only, and
only such questions as arise on the face of the bill, taking the bill as true and ;
the questions ordinarily raised on the face of the bill by a demurrer, are, that
supposing the facts to be as alleged in the bill, (1) the general rule of law or
of Equity, presupposed by the bill, does not in fact actually exist, or at least not
to the extent and with the effect supposed; (2) but, if so, that the facts set forth
in the bill are not such as the rule contemplates and provides a remedy for (3) ;
but, if so, that the bill shows other facts which draw the case within some ex-
ception to the rule of law or Equity supposed; (4) but, if not so, the Court in
which the bill is filed, is without jurisdiction to enforce the rule (5) but if not ;
so, that the complainant is not entitled to bring the suit; (6) but, if so, that the
defendant is not liable to the particular relief prayed. 4
And these various grounds of demurrer may be further summarized as
follows:
1. Complainant mistakes the general rule of law or, ;
2. He mistakes the force of the facts; or,

3. He mistakes the exceptions to the general rule of law or, ;
4. He mistakes the forum or, ;
5. He mistakes his rights under the law and facts or, ;
6. He mistakes the defendant's liability.
§ 277. —
Grounds of a Demurrer Analyzed. Taking into consideration the
rules heretofore given, as to the various relations between the parties, and the
duties arising from those relations, and considering demurrers in connection
with those rules, 5 a demurrer to. a bill should present one or more of the follow-
ing objections:
1. The supposed law of the relation does not, in fact, exist or, at least, does ;
not exist for the purpose, or to the extent, assiimed by the bill. 6
2. The facts alleged in the bill do not show the relation contemplated by the
supposed law. 7
3. The facts alleged do not show any violation of the supposed law. 8
4. The relief prayed is not of the character or extent allowed by the sup-
posed law. 9
5. The complainant shows in his bill some fact that puts his case within an
exception to the supposed law. 10
6. The defendant is not liable to the specific relief prayed. 11
7. The Court addressed has no jurisdiction to enforce the supposed law in
favor of the complainant and against the defendant, on the facts alleged, and
to the extent prayed. 12
All of these seven grounds may be condensed into one The complainant :
3 The word demurrer comes, so Lord Coke has 6 As when a bill is filed to enforce a verbal con-
said, from the Latin word, demorari, to abide; and, tract made by a married woman, to give a lien on
therefore, he who demurs in law, is said to abide in land to secure money borrowed to pay for the land.
law; moratur, or demoratur in lege, and will go no Durant V. Davis, 10 Heisk., 522.
further, until the Court has decided whether the 7 As when a bill for divorce from bed and board,
other party has shown sufficient matter, in point of and for alimony, is filed by a woman who shows in
law, to maintain his suit. Sto. Eq. PL, § 441. her bill that at the time she married the defendant
4A bill must not only show, that the complainant
,
she had a living husband.
is entitled to, or interested in, the subject-matter of 8 As when a creditor files a bill to collect a debt
the litigation, and is clothed with such a character shown not to be due. Carter V. Turner, 2 Head, 52.
as entitles him to maintain the suit, and that the o As when a judgment creditor, upon a nulla bond
defendant is also liable to the relief sought against return, files a bill to reach money in the debtor's
him, or is, in some manner, interested in the dis- pocket, and to have him compelled, by attachment, to
pute, and that there is such a privity between him pay the judgment out of such money. Webb V.
and the complainant as gives the complainant a title Jones, 13 Lea, 200.
to sue him, but it must, also, pray the Court to 10 As when the bill shows that the suit is barred,
grant the proper relief suited to the case, as made or that there has been a former recovery, or any
by the bill; and if, for any reason, founded on the other defense in avoidance.
substance of the case, as stated in the bill, the com- 11 As when a vendee seeks to have a specific per-
plainant is not entitled to the relief he prays, either formance of a sale of realty, admitted to be in parol.
in the whole, or in part, the defendant may demur. 1 As when a divorce bill shows on its face that
1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 325-326. the complainant is a non-resident.
5 Ante, §§ 165-167.
§ 278 DEMURRERS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 230
makes out in his bill no such case as entitles him to the relief he prays against
the defendant, in the Court addressed. This, however, would be in the nature
of a general demurrer, and for that reason not allowable. The specific reason
or reasons, why the complainant is not entitled to the relief prayed must be
clearly stated. The demurrant must, so to speak, put his finger on the defect
in the bill, and show precisely wherein it is a defect. General and indefinite
demurrers will not avail.
§ 278. Demurrers of Right, and by Allowance. The foregoing are really —
all the substantial grounds of demurrer the defendants have the real right to
rely on; but there are some others which the Court allows the defendants to
set up, in the interests of good pleading and of a proper administration of
justice, 13 such as 1, That the bill seeks to litigate only a part of a controversy;
:
2, That the complainant should be repelled, because his hands are unclean; 3,
That' all the persons necessary to a complete determination of the whole con-
troversy, are not made parties; 4, That the complainant is guilty of laches; 5,
That the bill is multifarious, it improperly confounding distinct grounds of suit;
6, That the bill contains repugnant causes of action; and 7, That there is an-
other suit pending, for the same matter between the same parties. These
grounds of demurrer being in the interest of good pleading, or of the proper
administration of justice, and being for that reason allowed by the Court, are
mere criticisms on the structure of the bill, or the conduct of the complainant
and, therefore, on sustaining such demurrers, the Court, on proper application,
will, with two exceptions, grant complainant leave to amend his bill, or to
otherwise obviate the objections raised by the demurrer, as he may be advised;
whereas, when a demurrer, which is filed as a matter of right, is sustained,
there is, generally, no ground for amendment, and the bill is dismissed. The
two exceptions above mentioned are when the complainant has been guilty of
iniquity, or of laches. Demurrers are allowed in these cases, not as a matter of
right to the defendant, but because the Court, being a Court of Conscience,
founded to- redress unconscientious acts, will not assist a person whose own un-
conscientious conduct has aided in causing the wrong of which he complains,
or whose laches has rendered it impossible for the Court to do him justice with-
out great risk of doing the defendant injustice. No one has the right to call
the powers of a Court of Equity into operation, unless his hands are clean and
his feet are swift.
The reason demurrers of right usually end the suit when they are sustained,
is that they either oust the Court of its jurisdiction, or show the want of sub-
stance in complainant's claim for redress. Demurrers by allowance, on the
other hand, do not question either the jurisdiction of the Court, or the substance
of a complainant's case. Demurrers of right show that, under the law, the
defendant cannot be held liable in that suit, and in that Court. Demurrers by
allowance submit to the Court the question, not whether the defendant is liable,
but whether the Court ought, under the circumstances, to allow the complain-
ant to proceed with his suit. Demurrers by allowance question the propriety of
the suit, demurrers of right question its validity. 14
§ 279. —
Demurrers to the Discovery. If the bill seeks a discovery, to that
extent it is in the nature of an examination of the defendant, as a witness, in
support of the complainant's case. Hence, it inevitably follows that the de-
fendant cannot be compelled to discover any matter he could not be called on
to state as a witness nor is the complainant entitled to any discovery not nec-
;
essary to aid him in making out his own case. A bill for relief and discovery
is both a pleading, and a series of interrogatories for the defendant to answer
as a witness and an answer to such a bill is both a pleading and a deposition.
;
13 Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 290; Sto. Eq. PL, I

in bar; and demurrers by allowance, demurrers in
§ 135a. abatement; but the terms used in the text are be-
14 Demurrers of right may be termed demurrers I
lieved to be more expressive.
231 DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE. §280
Treating it is a deposition, it may be stated, as a general rule, that whenever
the evidence called for by the bill, could be resisted, if called for when the
defendant was on the witness stand, it can be resisted on the same ground by
demurrer to the bill.
Where a bill seeks both relief and discovery, the discovery being incidental
to the relief, if the complainant is not entitled to the relief a demurrer will
15
lie to the whole bill.
§ 280. Demurrers not Applicable to Pleas, or to Answers. Demurrers are —

inapplicable to pleas, 16 or to answers. If a plea be bad in substance, the course
is not to demur to it, but to set it down for argument and if then found bad, ;
it is at once overruled. If an answer is insufficient, in its responses to the
charges and statements in the bill, the objections are to be taken to it by excep-
tions filed. If it be in substance bad as a defence, and no further proofs are
required by the complainant, the case can be set down for a hearing xipon the
bill and answer. 17
ARTICLE II.
DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE.
§ 281. Demurrers by Allowance generally 8 28S. Demurrers Because of Repugnancy.
Considered. Demurrers Because of the Pendency
§ 282. Demurrers Because the Bill is Not for of Another Suit.
the Whole Matter. 287. Demurrers Because the Complainant's
§ 283. Demurrers Because of Want of Proper Hands are not Clean.
Parties. § 288. Demurrers Because of Laches.
§ 284. Demurrers Because the Bill is Multi-
farious.
§ 281. Demurrers by Allowance Generally Considered. As already shown, 1 —

there are some grounds of demurrer which Courts allow, not because the de-
murrant has rights that the bill seeks to violate, nor because the complainant
has no right to relief against the demurrant, but because the science of good
pleading, or the proper administration of justice, is promoted by such demur-
rers. These grounds of demurrer are 1, Because the bill is not for the whole
:
matter 2, Because there is a want of proper parties 3, Because the bill is mul-
; ;
tifarious; 4, Because the complainant's hands are not clean; 5, Because of the
laches of the complainant; and 6, Because of the pendency of another suit,
between the same parties, about the same matter.
It is manifest that none of the foregoing grounds of demurrer are based on
any right of the defendant and that their allowance is wholly a matter within
;
the discretion of the Court. In each of the six foregoing cases, the defendant
may be in the wrong, and liable to the relief prayed but in the first three of ;
the for.egoing cases the Court refuses to proceed further, when a demurrer is
interposed, unless and until the complainant conforms his bill to the require-
ments of good pleading; and in the last three of the foregoing six cases the
Court will ordinarily, on demurrer, stay its hand because the complainant has
estopped himself from asking the aid of a Court of Conscience.
15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 547 n. Heisk., 503. For the same reason, a motion to strike
16 A demurrer will lie to a defective plea in a out a plea will be treated as equivalent to setting it
Court of law, Code, §2928; Caruth. Law Suit, 21b. down for argument as insufficient. Brevard v. Sum-
In Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., 38, a plea supported by an mar, 2 Heisk., 97.
answer was demurred to. Such a practice is irreguc Setting a cause down for hearing on bill and an-
lar, but as Courts of Chancery look to substance, swer is in the nature of a demurrer to the answer.
and not to forms, such a demurrer will be treated as 17 Sto. Eq. PL, § 456; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 542, note.
equivalent to a motion setting the plea down for ar- l Ante, § 278.
gument as to its sufficiency. Klepper v., Powell, 6
§ 282 DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE. 232
§ 282. Demurrers Because the Bill is Not for the Whole Matter. —A bill
may be good as far as it goes, but may not go to the
it full extent that complete
justice may require; that is, it may seek to litigate
a part of a matter only,
leaving the balance open for further litigation. Of course, in such a case, the
defendant would have no right to require the complainant to so shape his bill
as to sue for the whole matter but as Courts of Equity delight to do complete
;
justice, and not by halves, and as they seek to prevent a multiplicity of suits,
they allow a defendant, who has been sued as to a part only of given matter,
to insist by demurrer that he shall be sued as to all, or as to none. And, in
general, whenever it appears by the bill, that the object of the suit does not
embrace all the relief, which the complainant is entitled to under the facts
stated, the Court will allow a demurrer on that ground. 2 But, if a complainant
should split his cause of action, and sue on one part of it, a recovery on that
part will bar a suit on the balance. 3 This ground of demurrer, however, seldom
appears on the face of a bill, except in case of bills filed for an accounting and ;
even in such a case, the defendant will seldom undertake, by demurrer, to force
the complainant to enlarge his claim.
§ 283. Demurrers Because of Want of Proper Parties. Who are the proper —
parties to a suit has been fully considered elsewhere. 4 Whenever the want of
proper parties appears on the face of the bill, it constitutes a good ground of
demurrer but if no demurrer be filed, or motion to dismiss made, an objection
;
at the hearing will avail nothing. 5

Whenever a demurrer is put in for want of necessary parties, it must show
who are the proper parties from the facts stated in the bill not indeed by name, ;
for that might be impossible, but in such a manner as to point out to the com-
plainant the objection to his bill, and to enable him to amend by making proper
parties. 6
On sustaining a demurrer for want of proper parties, the Court will always
give leave to make the new parties, either by an amendment, 7 or by a supple-
mental bill, when substantial justice between the actual parties to the suit
requires it. And even if the bill should be dismissed for this defect, the dis-
missal will be without prejudice to another bill. 8
The general rule, requiring all persons in interest to be made parties, is not
so much a right of the parties before the Court, as a rule prescribed by Courts
of Equity themselves in order to prevent future litigation. 9 Hence, the Court
will allow-the necessary parties to be brought before the Court at any stage of
the suit, even at the hearing. 10
DEMUEKEB FOB, WANT
OF PARTIES.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see post, § 310.]
Because the bill shows that Roland Roe has an interest in the land sought to be sold, [or,
has the legal title to the land sought to be sold, or, is interested in the account prayed to be
stated,] and he is not made a party to the bill for ; which reason, no complete decree can be
made in the cause.
§ 284. Demurrers Because the Bill is Multifarious. The subject of multi- —
fariousness has already been fully discussed. 11 The cases upon the subject of
multifariousness are extremely various; and the Courts, in deciding them, seem
to have considered what was convenient in particular circumstances, rather
than to have attempted to lay down any absolute rule. Demurrers for multi-
fariousness may be divided into two kinds. 1, Frequently, the objection raised
to a bill, though termed multifarious, is, in fact, properly speaking, a mis-
joinder of causes of suit, the cases or claims asserted in the bill being of so dif-
ferent a character, that the Court will not permit them to be litigated in one
•l1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 558. 8 Sto. Eq. PI. § 541.
3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 330, note. 9 Sto. Eq. PL, § 135 a.
iAnte, §§80-131. 10 Code, §§4335-4337; Gray r. Hays, 7 Hum., 588'
* Code, §§ 4325; 4337. Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 289.
fi Sto. Eq. PI., § 543. 11 See, ante, § 149.
7 Gray V. Hays, 7 Hum., 588.
233 DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE. §284
suit. It may be, that the complainants and the defendants are parties to all
oi the transactions which form the subject of the suit; but, nevertheless, those
transactions may be so dissimilar, that the Court will not allow them to be
joined together in one suit; but will require distinct suits. 2, But what is more
familiarly understood by multifariousness, as applied to a bill, is, where a party
is made a defendant upon a record, with a large portion of which, and of the
case made by which, he has no connection whatsoever. In such a case, a demur-
rer is allowed because uniting distinct matters in one record will put the parties
12
to great and useless expense.
But the objection of multifariousness must still be confined to suits, where
the case of a particular defendant is entirely distinct and separate, in its
subject-matter, from that of the other defendants. If the case against one
defendant is so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits,
the fact that some other defendant may be a necessary party, to some portion
only of the case stated, will not make the bill multifarious. It is nof in-
dispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters con-
tained in the suit it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some
;
matters in the and they are connected with others. 13

suit,
Mere multiplicity of matters charged in the bill will not make it multifarious,
if these matters have any such connection as renders their joint determination
necessary or proper to the adjustment of all the equities arising from that con-
nection, or from the complications of the case. Where the matters spring from
a common root, or result from one transaction, or have any other connecting
ligaments, they are not multifarious, however numerous.
The result of the principles to be extracted from the cases on the subject
of multifariousness seems to be, that where there is a common liability, and a
common interest, a common liability in the defendants, and a common interest
in the complainants, different claims to property, at least if the subjects are
such as may without inconvenience be joined, may be united in one and the
same suit without making it multifarious. 14
And so, by the Code, the uniting in one bill of several matters of Equity,
distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, is not multifariousness. 15
The reason why the objection for multifariousness must be taken by the de-
fendant by demurrer, and not at the hearing, is that this objection proceeds on
the ground that the union of distinct matters creates unnecessary trouble and
expense to the party who has no concern with some of the transactions, by put-
ting him to the trouble and expense of litigating questions with which he has
nothing to do and if the defendant answers and takes his proof, the expense is
;
in a great measure incurred, and it will be too late for him to complain, if he
suffers the cause to proceed to a hearing. 16 And now, by statute, it is provided
that the objection of multifariousness must be made by motion to dismiss, or
by demurrer. 17
1. Essentials of Multifariousness. To make a bill demurrable for multifa-
riousness, it must contain all of the following characteristics
1. It must join two or more causes of action against two or more defendants.
12 Sto. Eq. PL, §530; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 334-346. 15 Code, § 4327.
Another reason for not allowing separate and dis- 10 Sto. Eq. PI., §271, note.
tinct causes of suit, against separate defendants, to 17 The sections of the Code, upon the subject of
be litigated in one suit is, that the burden of adju- multifariousness, are as follows:
dication is, thereby, greatly increased. Chancellors 4325. Multifariousness, misjoinder, or non-joinder
dread unnecessary complications, and often allow de- of parties, is no sufficient cause for the dismission
murrers for multifariousness, not so much to benefit of a bill in Equity, unless objection is made by mo-
the demurrant as to relieve themselves from the in- tion to dismiss, or demurrer.
creased burdens resulting from the entanglements of 4326. If a demurrer for multifariousness is sus-
a heterogeneous litigation. They realize the great tained, the Court may authorize amendments, by di-
difficulty of doing complete justice when the record recting separate bills to be filed without new process
is very large, the parties very numerous, and the as to the parties before the Court, and by the addi-
matters in controversy many and complicated. It is, tion of new parties, or otherwise, as may be deemed
also, impossible, in such cases, to equitably appor- necessary for the attainment of justice.
tion the costs. 4327. The uniting in one bill of several matters of
13 Sto. Eq. PI., §271, u. Equity, distinct and unconnected, against one de-
14 Sto. Eq. PL, § 533. fendant, is not multifariousness.
§ 285 DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE. 234
2.These two or more causes of action must hav« no connection or common
origin, but must be separate and independent.
3. The evidence pertinent to one or more of the causes must be wholly
im-
pertinent as to the other, or others.
4. One or more of these separate and independent causes of action must
be
capable of being fully determined, without any necessity of bringing in the
other cause or causes, in order to adjust any of the legal or equitable rights of
the parties.
5. The decree proper, as to one or more of these separate and independent
causes of action, must be exclusively against one or more of the defendants, and
the decree proper as to the other cause or causes, must be exclusively against
the other defendant, or defendants.
6. The relief proper against one or more of the defendants, on one or more of
these separate and independent causes of action, must be distinct from the
reli'ef proper against the other defendant or defendants, on the other cause or
causes of action.
7. The satisfaction of the proper decree by any one of the defendants, to the
extent of his alleged liability, on any one or more of said distinct causes of
action, must not be a satisfaction of the proper decree against the other defend-
ants, on the other cause or causes of action.
8. Upon the consideration of the entire bill, the multifariousness must be
apparent, and the misjoinder of distinct causes of action manifest. 18
2. Forms of Demurrers for Multifariousness. The following are forms of
demurrers for multifariousness, omitting the caption
DEMURRERS FOR MULTIFARIOUSNESS.
[For title, commencement and conclusion, see post, § 310.]
Because appears by said bill that it is brought against this defendant and various other
it
defendants for distinct matters and causes of suit, with several of which this defendant is
not alleged, or shown to be, in any manner interested or concerned, and that the bill is
multifarious.
Because said bill is multifarious, in that it is filed against this defendant mainly to have
a certain tract of land sold for partition but it, also, seeks to recover alleged debts in no
;'
way connected with said land from the other defendants, and seeks to hold this defendant
liable for an alleged balance due complainant as a former partner and this defendant is
;
not in any manner interested in or connected with the debts sought to be collected from his
co-defendants, nor is said partnership in any way connected with said land.
Because the bill is multifarious, in that it seeks to recover from him a debt alleged to
be based on certain mercantile transactions with which it is not charged the other defend-
ants are concerned and seeks to recover rents and damages for waste from the other de-
;
fendants, and it is not charged that this defendant is in any way liable for either said rents
or said damages.
§ 285. Demurrers Because of Repugnancy. —Where the bill sets out two or
more distinct causes of action against the same defendant which are repugnant,
or contradictory, or inconsistent, a demurrer will lie on that ground. Thus
where the bill sets forth a cause of suit based on the validity of a writing, and
another cause based on facts that invalidated the writing, and the reliefs
prayed were inconsistent, a demurrer for repugnancy will lie. 19 The difference
between repugnancy and multifariousness seems to be that the former sets up
discordant grounds of suit against one or more defendants, while multifarious
bills setup distinct grounds of suit against several defendants. The Code
rule, 20
allowing several distinct causes of action against one defendant, does nos
contemplate repugnant causes of action.
§ 286. Demurrers Because of the Pendency of Another Suit. If the bill —
show that another suit is pending between the same parties, about the same
18 The
correctness of these tests will be found and rules of pleading of the present day, [1854] to
fully supported by the adjudications on the subject defeat by demurrer a clear equity, for multifarious-
of multifariousness, as well as by the text books: ness or misjoinder as to parties.' And see Code,
ante, § 149. See also, Berdanatti v. Sexton, 2 Tenn. §§ 4325-4327.
Ch., 704. In Dechard v. Edwards, 2 Sneed, 99, our 19 Bynum v. Ewart, 6 Pick., 655; see, ante, § 149.
Supreme Court, through Judge Caruthers, say: "It 20 Code, § 4327.
would be inconsistent with the liberalized practice
235 DEMURRERS BY ALLOWANCE. § 287
matter, in a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, a demurrer will lie. 21 Thus,
where the County or Circuit Court has rightful jurisdiction, concurrent with
the Chancery Court, over a particular matter, a demurrer will lie on that ground
to a bill in Chancery seeking to assume the jurisdiction of such matter then
pending in either the Circuit or County Court, and to enjoin further proceed-
ings in such matter in the latter Court. 22
§ 287. Demurrers Because the Complainant's Hands are not Clean. He who —
has done iniquity shall not have equity. Courts of Conscience require of their
suitors, that they shall not have willingly participated in any unconscientious
or illegal transaction, which they are asking the Court to- enforce, to set aside,
or to correct. As a rule, whenever it appears on the face of the bill that the
complainant's hands are stained with any iniquity, or illegality, connected with
the subject-matter of the suit, a demurrer will be allowed, for, according to the
maxim, in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.
But if the complainant was not in equal fault, or if public policy requires it,
the Court may allow him relief, even where he has, to some extent, participated
in the wrong he seeks to have righted.
The demurrer because the complainant's hands are not clean may be as
follows
DEMURRERS BECAUSE COMPLAINANT'S HANDS ARE NOT CLEAN.
Because the bill shows that the complainant conveyed the land, he now seeks to recover,
to this defendant for the purpose of hindering and delaying his creditors and that he wil- ;
lingly, knowingly, and actively participated in the fraud of which he complains.

Because the bill shows that the note sued on was given [or, that the contract sought to be
enforced was based] on an iniquitous consideration [or, on an immoral, or illegal considera-
tion,] to the enforcement of which this Court will not lend its aid.
§ 288. Demurrers Because of Laches of Complainant. Equity assists those —

who are vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights. Nothing can call the
Court into activity but diligence and good faith. If, therefore, the bill discloses
gross laches on the part of the complainant, especially in bills for injunction,
or specific performance, or in cases where prompt disaffirmance was necessary,
or where acquiescence is grossly reprehensible, the Court will allow a demurrer
because of such laches. 23
21 Dan. Ch. Pr. 561. 23 Sto. Eq. 503, note. See,
| PI.. § ante, %% 49;
22 Parkes v. Gilbert, 1 Bax., 97; Rhea v. Meredith, 69-70.
6 Lea, 608.
§289 DEMURRERS OE RIGHT. 236
ARTICLE III.
DEMURRERS OF RIGHT.
§ 289. Demurrers Because of Want of Equity S 295. Demurrers Because the Subject-Matter
in the Bill. of the Suit is Unfit for, or Foreign
§ 290. Demurrers Because of Want of Juris- to, a Court of Equity.
diction in the Court. S 296. Demurrers Because the Bill Seeks to
f 291. Demurrers Because the Value of the Enforce a Penalty, or Forfeiture.
Subject-Matter is Beneath the Dig- § 297. Demurrers Because the Facts do not
nity of the Court. Bring the Case within a General
§ 292. Demurrers Because the Bill has been Rule.
Filed in the Wrong County. § 298. Demurrers Because the Case Falls
§ 293. Demurrers Because the Suit is for In- Within some Exception to the Gen-
juries Involving Unliquidated Dam- eral Rule.
ages. § 299. Demurrers Because the Complainant is
% 294. Demurrers Because the Complainant not Entitled to Bring the Suit.
has a Plain, Adequate, and Complete § 300. Demurrers Because the Defendant is
Remedy at Law. not Liable.
§ 289. Demurrers Because of Want of Equity in the Bill. Following, then, —

the logical subdivision of the grounds of demurrer heretofore stated, 1 the first
cause of demurrer to be considered is, that, taking the facts as stated in the bill
to be true, there is no rule of law or of Equity whereunder the complainant is
entitled to the relief he seeks, or to any relief. While this is a good ground of
demurrer 2 when specifically applied to the facts stated, yet, if put in the old
'
form, There is no equity in the bill, " or in any similar general form, it will be
'
deemed too general for a special demurrer. 3 The result is, whenever there is a
manifest want of Equity in the bill, or in other words, whenever the general
rule of law or Equity presupposed by the bill does not in fact actually exist,
or, at least, does not exist to the extent and with the effect supposed, the defend-
ant usually takes advantage thereof by a motion to dismiss, 4 which is a sort
of statutory parol demurrer.
There are violations of moral duties which Courts do not undertake to re-
dress, because not attended with pecuniary loss, or not involving a breach of
legal obligation. 5 There are, also, equities so mixed up with iniquities that a
Court of Conscience will not soil its hands by trying to separate the one from
the other. 6 There are cases of strict legal right, accompanied with such cir-
cumstances of oppression and injustice, that a Court of Equity will not lend its
aid in enforcement of such an unconscientious advantage. 7 There are pecuniary
injuries done which cannot be redressed because of some other rule of law or
Equity more important to be observed, growing ordinarily out of dealings with
persons under disability, 8 or resulting from a failure to comply with some stat-
utory requirement. 9 There are cases where pecuniary compensation by way of
damages is manifestly the appropriate remedy, and a specific performance im-
practicable, if not impossible. 10 There are matters which estop a complainant
from setting up what would otherwise have been legal or equitable rights,
and thereby defeat his suit.
1 Ante, §§ 276-277. of Equity to enforce a contract made with his ward,
2 Code, §§ 4386; 4388. the day after he attained his majority, wherein the
3 Ante, § 277; post, % 305. defendant agreed to convey him land, for a grossly
4 Code, § 4386. inadequate consideration.
5 Such as the disinheritance of a deserving child, 8 Such as loans of money to, or executory con
or the breach of a contract based on no considera- tracts with, infants, unmarried women, and lunatics.
tion. il Such as the statute of frauds; and the registra-
As where money was given to be used for some tion laws.
illegal, or immoral, purpose, and the complainant 10 Such as suits to compel the defendant to "wry
seeks to recover it back, because the defendant mis- the complainant, or to paint a picture, write a book,
used it. and the like.
1 As where a former guardian comes into a Court
237 DEMURRERS OP RIGHT. §290
In such cases, and, also, in all criminal cases, and cases of a criminal na-
all
ture, a Court of Equity refuses to take jurisdiction, because there is in them a
manifest want of Equity; and bills in such cases may either be dismissed on
motion for want of Equity, or a special demurrer will lie to the bill.
The following form will indicate how a demurrer, for want of equity on the
face of the bill, must be drawn in order not to be a general demurrer
SPECIAL DEMURRERS FOR "WANT OF EQUITY.
Because the complainant is not entitled to the relief he prays, nor to any relief, his bill
showing that the contract sued on was voluntary and without consideration [or, was not re-
duced to writing.]
Because the complainant is not entitled to the relief he prays, nor to any relief, his bill
showing that he had constructive notice by registration of this defendant's title {or, had
actual notice of this defendant's equities] when he made the purchase he is now seeking to
enforce.
Because the complainant is not entitled to the relief he prays, nor to any relief, the
matters contained in his bill not being such as create any obligation on the part of this de-
fendant, enforceable in the Chancery Court, by reason of the .infancy [or coverture] of this
defendant.
§ 290. Demurrers Because of Want of Jurisdiction in the Court Over the

—
Subject-Matter. Jurisdiction is .the rightful authority and power of a Court, to
determine a controversy, and grant the appropriate relief. Hence, it is the
first and fundamental rule that, whatever the object of the bill, it must state a
case within the jurisdiction of the Court addressed. If it fails in this respect,
the error is fatal in every stage of the cause, and can never be cured, either by
waiver or consent. Consent may cure a want of local jurisdiction, and will give
jurisdiction of the person, but not of the subject-matter. 11 If the Court has no
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, all of its proceedings are void, and its decrees
in the case are nullities, 12 except it be a decree dismissing the bill and adjudg-
ing the costs thereof against the complainant.
If, therefore, the bill shows that the Court has no jurisdiction of the subject-
matter, the defendant should demur to it on that ground. For instance, if the
bill should call on the Court to try a criminal case, or an issue of devisavit vcl
non, or an appeal from another Court, or an action for injuries to person, prop-
erty or character, involving unliquidated damages, or a proceeding by certiorari,
or a contest over the election of a Sheriff, in any such case a demurrer will lie.
But the matters over which the Court has, and has not jurisdiction, having
heretofore been considered, will not be here repeated. 13
But, in order to sustain a demurrer to the whole bill, for want of jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, it must appear that no substantial and essential part of
the complaint is within the jurisdiction of the Court. Where any matter set
up in a bill is within the jurisdiction, the bill will be sustained as against a de-
murrer to the whole bill, even though there be matters in the bill clearly with-
out the jurisdiction. 14 A demurrant, in such cases, must confine his demurrer
to so much of the bill as is objectionable, or his demurrer will be overruled
because too broad; 15 and the demurrer must specially state that the objection
16
is for the want of jurisdiction.
There may, also, be a want of local jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or of
the person, but this sort of want of jurisdiction will be considered later. 17
11 The rule, that if the defendant answers without the subject-matter the bill may be dismissed, mero
objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court, he cannot motu, at any time. See, post, § 525. Even consent
thereafter object to the -jurisdiction, must be taken cannot confer jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
with the qualifications, (1) that the Court has juris- See Nashville v. Webb, 6 Cates, 432.
diction of the subject-matter; (2) that it is compe- 12 Sto. Eq. PI., § 10.
tent for the Court to grant the relief sought; and 13 Ante, §§ 16-30.
(3) that the case is fit to be investigated in a Court 14 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 549, note; Bittick v. Wilkins.
of Equity. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 550, note; Stockley r. 7 Heisk., 312; and cases cited, post, § 306.
Rowley; 2 Head, 493; Starnes V. Newsom, 1 Tenn. 15 Post, § 306.
Ch., 245; Baker V. Mitchell, 21 Pick., 610; Travers 16 Post, § 306.
V. Abbey, 20 Pick., 665. See Hooper V. Rhea, 3 17. Post, §§292; 305.
Shan. Cas., 145. If the. Court has no jurisdiction of
§ 291 DEMURRERS OF RIGHT. 238
Demurrers for want of jurisdiction should specify the fact that they question
the jurisdiction of the Court. The following forms will indicate the manner
in which such demurrers should be drawn
DEMUBKERS FOR WANT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.

[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see post, §310.]
Because the bill shows that

this is a suit to recover unliquidated damages for an injury
to
the property [person or character] of the defendant, and this Court has no jurisdiction there-
of, the complainant having a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at Law.
Because the bill seeks to enjoin the collection of taxes due the State [or, to try an issue of
devisavit vel non, or, to determine the validity of a patent, or, to enjoin the breach Of a copy-
right, or, to wind up a National Bank,] and this Court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief.
Demurrers Because the Value of the Subject-Matter is Beneath the
§ 291.
Dignity of the Court. —
The true ground of this objection is, that the entertain-
ment of suits of small value has a tendency, not only to promote expensive and
mischievous litigation, but, also, to consume the time of the Court in unimport-
ant and frivolous controversies, to the manifest injury of other suitors, and to
the subversion of the public policy of the land. Courts of Equity sit to admin-
ister justice in matters of grave interest to parties, and not to gratify their
passions, or their curiosity, or their spirit of vexatious litigation. 18 Our Code
accordingly declares that the Court has no jurisdiction of any debt, or demand,
of less value than fifty dollars, 19 except in certain cases heretofore stated. 20
DEMURRERS BECAUSE THE DEMAND IS FOR LESS THAN FIFTY DOLLARS.
[For commencement, and conclusion, see post, § 310.]
title,
Because the debt [or demand, or subject-matter] sued for is of less value than fifty dollars,
.as appears by the statements of the bill, and therefore beneath the dignity of the Court, and
not within its jurisdiction. [The averments after the word "dollars" are not essential, but
customary.].
§ 292. Demurrers Because the Bill has been Filed in the Wrong County.
This ground of demurrer is based on the fact that some other Court of Chancery
is invested with the proper jurisdiction. 21 The statutes specify in what coun-
ties certain Chancery suits shall be brought, thereby defining and limiting the
local jurisdiction of each Court over the subject-matter of various suits; and
if a suit, the jurisdiction over which has been localized by statute, should be
brought in a county other than that required by the statutes, the jurisdiction
of the Court in such county may be resisted by demurrer.
The statutes, also, in same cases, make the local jurisdiction of the defendant
depend on the residence of the parties, and require suits to be brought in the
•counties of such residence if this requirement is violated, and the bill so shows,
:
itwill be demurrable.
But the local jurisdiction, either as to the subject-matter, 22 or as to the per-
son, may be waived by failing to object to it by motion to dismiss, or by demur-
rer, when it appears on the face of the bill, or by plea in abatement when it
does not so appear. 23 The filing of an answer, without having previously ob-
jected to the jurisdiction, is a waiver of all objections thereto. 24
The local jurisdiction of the Court has been elsewhere fully considered, and
its repetition here is unnecessary 25 but it may be stated that a demurrer for
;
want of local jurisdiction of the subject-matter is a waiver of the local jurisdic-

18 Sto. Eq. PI., § 500. local privilege given him by the law, he cannot after-
19 Code, § 4281. wards claim it; and the Court thus acquires full ju-
20 Ante, § 26. risdiction over the subject-matter. But neither this
21 Sto. Eq,. PI., § 486. note nor the text must be -construed as applying to
22 There is a wide difference between a want of local suits affecting land. See Nashville v. Webb, 6
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and a want of Cates, 432; and, ante §177, note llf.
t
As to the
local jurisdiction of the subject-matter. In the for- effect of the want of jurisdiction of the subject mat-
mer case, the Court can do nothing even by consent; ter, see, ante, §§ 289-290; and post. § 525.
in the latter case, it can do everything by consent, 23 Code, §§4309; 4319; 4386; 4318; I<owery !>.
or even by failure to object. It is not the subject- Naff, 4 Cold., 370; Bennet v. Wilkins, 5 Cold.. 240.
matter that defeats the jurisdiction in the latter case, 24 Code, § 4321.
but merely the locality of the subject-matter; and if 25 See, ante, § 177.
the defendant does not insist, at the outset, on the
239 DEMURRERS OF RIGHT. § 293
tion of the person, and vice versa; and that a demurrer on any ground, except a
want of jurisdiction, admits the jurisdiction. 28
The rule, that if the objection to the jurisdiction is not taken before answer,
it cannot be taken at all, has long been in force in the Chancery Courts of
England and the United States 27 and as early as 1801, our Legislature enacted,
;
that after answer filed, and no plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of the
Court, no exception for want of jurisdiction should ever afterwards be made. 28
The following*are illustrations of demurrers for want of jurisdiction of the
person of the defendant, or of the subject-matter of the suit:
DEMURRERS FOB, WANT OF LOCAL JURISDICTION OF THE DEFENDANT.
Because Court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, he and the com-
this
plainant both residing in the county of Blount when the bill was filed, and there being no
ground of jurisdiction in the county of Knox shown in the bill.
DEMURRER FOR WANT OF LOCAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER.
title,
Because this Court has no jurisdiction of the land sought to be recovered [sold, partitioned,
or otherwise dealt with,] said land being shown by the bill to be wholly in the county of
Scott, and the bill showing no grounds of jurisdiction in the county of Morgan.
§ 293. Demurrers Because the Suit is for Injuries, Involving Unliquidated

—
Damages. If the bill show on its face that its object is to recover unliquidated
damages for an injury to person, property, or character, a demurrer will lie
for want of jurisdiction on that ground. If, however, the damages have either
been liquidated, that is, agreed on, in advance of the suit, by the parties, they
may be recovered by bill in Chancery; and so may damages that, though un-
liquidated, are not for injuries to person, property, or character, such as dam-
ages for breach of contract or for fraudulent conduct. 29 The following is the
form of a demurrer in such a case
DEMURRER BECAUSE THE SUIT IS FOR DAMAGES FOR INJURIES.
title,
Because the billis recover unliquidated damages for injuries to the person [or
filed to
property, or character,] of the complainant, and the complainant has a plain, adequate and com-
plete remedy at law; and the Chancery Court has no jurisdiction of the case made by the bill.
§ 294. Demurrers Because the Complainant has a Plain, Adequate, and Com-
plete, Remedy —
at Law. In general, Courts of Equity will not take jurisdiction
where the powers of the common law Courts are sufficient for the purposes
of justice, unless such jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly conferred by stat-
ute. It may, therefore, be stated, generally, that, where the complainant can have
as effectual and complete a remedy in a Court of law as in a Court of Equity
and that remedy is direct, certain, and adequate, a demurrer to the jurisdiction
of the Chancery Court will hold, unless that Court has obtained concurrent
jurisdiction with the Courts of law, by statute. But where there is a clear right,
and no plain, adequate, and complete, remedy therefor at law adapted to the
particular exigency, there Courts of Equity will assume jurisdiction, by virtue
of their inherent powers. 30
But the fact that a Court of law has jurisdiction of the case stated in the
bill, is no longer a ground of demurrer, in Tennessee because it may be a ;
case of concurrent jurisdiction. The demurrer must be because the Chancery

Court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter.
Prior to the Act of 1877, increasing the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court,
the most common ground of demurrer in that Court was that the complainant
'
'
26 Post, § 305. involving unliquidated damages, was conferred upon

27 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 555; Sto. Eq. PI., §437, note. the Chancery Court concurrently with the Circuit
28 Acts of 1801, ch. 6; 1 Scott's Rev., 688; Code, Court; and a demurrer, for want of jurisdiction of
§5 4309; 4321. the cause of action, was denied by the same Act, ex-
29 By the Act of 1877, ch. 97, jurisdiction of all cepting in cases of unliquidated damages for injuries
the civil causes of action triable in the Circuit Court, to person, property, or character. See, ante, §§ 21; 29.
except for injuries to person, property or character, 30 Sto. Eq- PL, §473; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 551.
§294 DEMURRERS OF RIGHT. 240
had a plain, adequate, and complete, remedy at law;" but since that Act, this
ground of demurrer has almost ceased to exist, 31 except in so far as it may be
applicable to bills filed to probate wills, to enjoin suits or executions at law or
otherwise relieve against proceedings, suits, judgments, or executions, at law.
Where the jurisdiction of the Chancery and Circuit Courts is concurrent, the
Court that first takes jurisdiction thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction in
that particular case; and if the bill should show that the Circuit Court had
acquired jurisdiction, in such a case a demurrer would lie, o*l that ground. 32
The questions of jurisdiction that now arise, are not so much questions of
jurisdiction between the Courts of Equity and the Courts of law, as questions
of ]ocal jurisdiction between the various Courts of Chancery, themselves.
But while it is ordinarily true that, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction in the
( circuit and Chancery Courts, a demurrer will lie to the bill, if it shows
on its
face that the same cause of action between the same parties is pending, or has
been tried, in the Circuit Court, nevertheless, if the bill show some good reason
why the Chancery Court should assume the jurisdiction, a demurrer will not
hold. Thus, if a party can make out his case more effectually in the Chancery
Court, or can obtain some substantial relief beyond what he could obtain at
law, he may come into Equity and enjoin the action at law; this is especially
true in cases where, by accident, mistake, or fraud, a party is at a disadvantage
in a Court of law, whether he be complainant or defendant in such Court. 33
The following forms of demurrer will indicate how the fact, that the com-
plainant has an adequate remedy at law, may be taken advantage of
DEMTJRREBS BECAUSE OF REOVEEDY AT LAW.
Because the complainant has a plain, adequate, and complete, remedy at law, by appeal to
the Circuit [or, Supreme] Court; [or, by certiorari; or, by a writ of error coram nobis; or,
by a writ or error; or, by a writ of error and supersedeas in the Supreme Court.]
Because the bill shows that all the matters of controversy, in this suit, are now being liti-
gated between the parties to this suit, in the Circuit Court of Anderson county and said ;
Circuit Court, having first obtained jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit and the
parties, and being able to administer a plain, adequate, and complete, remedy, should be al-
lowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction of the matters in controversy.
31 This Act has included within the domains of 4- Where damages for the breach of a contract
the Chancery Courts all of the debatable grounds would be inadequate, especially in cases of contract
over which the Courts of law and Equity battled for for the sale, or purchase, of land, and in other cases
six hundred years. See, ante, §§ 21; 29. where justice requires that the contract should be
32 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §179; Lindsley v. James, 3 specifically performed. A
Court of law cannot de-
Cold., 483; Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 143; Dixon cree, or enforce, a specific performance; it can
V Railroad, 7 Cates, 362. award damages only, in such a case.
33 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 885. See Digests under In- 5. Where the complainant has a beneficial interest
junction; see, also, post, § 814. %n property, the legal title to which is vested in a trus-
A complainant has not a plain and adequate rem- tee, who is violating, or jeopardizing, the trust. A
edy at law in the following cases: Court of law does not recognize such interests, but
1. Where the injury threatened, or being com- regards the trustee as the real, and only owner, it
mitted, would be irreparable and damages would not
, having respect for no one but the holder of the legal
put the complainant in statu quo; and especially title.
where the defendant is insolvent. A Court of law 6. Where an accounting between the parties is
can only award damages; it can grant no injunction, necessary, and the items are too numerous, and the
nor otherwise stay the hand of the defendant; and matters too complicated, for a jury, acting largely,
he may, therefore, persevere in his wrong-doing, or wholly, on oral evidence. A
Court of law cannot,
even after suit at law has been brought against him. bv means of a jury, and on oral testimony, take and
2. Where the complainant needs the reformation state, a long and intricate account with reasonable
of a tvritten instrument, either (1) to assert his real accuracy.
rights, or (2) to protect himself from loss, or (3) 7. Where the complainant has a vendor's, or other
tc resist an uniust and inequitable claim by the de- lien on property, the sale of which is necessary to
fendant. A Court of law cannot reform a writing, enable him to get his money. A Court of law cannot
and will not hear proof that tendsto vary, or con- enforce a vendor's lien, or any other lien, except as
tradict, a written instrument. Written instruments given jurisdiction by statute. A Court of law can,
include notes of hand, deeds, mortgages, and other as a rule, award a general execution, only.
written evidences of contract. 8. Where the complainant's rights, or interests,
3. Where a zvritten instrument has been obtained are equitable, and not legal; as in cases of trusts,
by fraud, accident, or mistake, and the defendant mortgages, deeds of trust, equities in land based on
has it in his power, by a sale of the instrument, or agreements to convey, marshaling securities, and
property conveyed b- the instrument, to an innocent cases where the relation of trust and confidence ex-
purchaser, to injure the complainant. A Court of isted between the parties, and cases where the com-
law cannot compel the defendant to surrender such plainant is entitled to a set-off and the defendant is
an instrument; or. if it be a deed, cannot reinvest a non-resident, or insolvent.
the complainant with title to the property.
241 DEMURRERS OF RIGHT. §295
§ 295. Demurrers Because the Subject-Matter of the Suit is Unfit for, or For-
eign to, —
a Court of Equity. This ground of demurrer is very similar to the one
first mentioned, the want of Equity in the bill, and what is said of that ground
applies to this. This ground covers: 1, All criminal cases and cases in the
nature of criminal cases 2, All cases of which the Circuit and County Courts
;
have exclusive jurisdiction 3, All cases wherein a co-ordinate department of the

;
State Government is sought to be coerced, or restrained, in those matters exclu-

sively within its jurisdiction 4, All cases wherein the Courts, or the Officers, of
;
the United States Government, are sought to be reached, or affected as such

and 5, All cases of which the United States Courts have exclusive jurisdiction,
such as questions affecting patents and copyrights, and questions arising out of
the Acts of Congress, or treaties with foreign nations.
§ 296. Demurrers Because the Bill Seeks to Enforce a Penalty, or a Forfeit-
ure. —Another ground of demurrer isj that it appears on the face of the bill,
that its object is to enforce a penalty, or a forfeiture. It is a universal rule in
Courts of Equity, not to lend their aid to enforce any penalty, or forfeiture
but to leave the party to his remedy at law. But if the complainant seeking
relief, is solely entitled to take advantage of the penalty, or forfeiture, and he
expressly waives any right to the penalty, or forfeiture, the bill is maintain-
able. 34
§ 297.Demurrers Because the Facts do not Bring the Case Within a General
Rule. —It may
be that the rule of Equity is as supposed by the bill, and that the
Court has jurisdiction of the defendant, and yet the state of facts set out in
the bill may be insufficient to bring the case within that rule and, as a conse- ;
quence, the complainant may have no right to the benefit of the rule. 35 Thus,
the complainant may fail to show any actionable interest in the subject-matter
of the suit, or may fail to show that the supposed relation exists, or that any
of its duties have been violated by the defendant. In all such cases, if the facts
set forth in the bill plainly show the infirmity of the complainant's case, a de-
murrer will lie, such demurrers being, generally, that, on the facts set out in
the bill, the complainant is not entitled to the relief he prays, nor to any relief,
as against the demurrant.
§ 298. Demurrers Because the Case Falls Within some Exception to the Gen-
eral Rule. —
Whenever the general rule, entitling a complainant to bring a suit
in Chancery, on a given state of facts, has one or more exceptions, (as, perhaps
they all have,) if the facts set forth in the bill bring the case there made within
one or more of these exceptions, a demurrer will lie for that reason. Some of
the most common exceptions, on which demurrers may be grounded, are the
following
1. Prematurity of the Suit. Although the general rule is that a debtor must
pay the creditor what he owes him, yet the latter cannot sue until the debt falls
due. And a suit cannot be brought against an executor or administrator within
six months after his qualification.
DEMURRER BECAUSE OE PREMATURITY OF SUIT.
title,
Because the bill shows on its face, that the note [contract, claim, obligation, or, debt,]
sued on was not due at the time the bill was filed, and that no cause of action had then
accrued to the complainant.
2. The Statutes of Limitation. If a creditor delays bringing suit until it is
barred by the statutes of limitations, and this fact is clearly shown in the bill,
a demurrer may be interposed, 3 ® unless other circumstances are shown in the
bill avoiding the bar.
34 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 387; 563; Sto. Eq. PL, §521. the complainant could enforce a penalty, or a for-
What is the effect of the statute, giving the Chan- feiture, in the Circuit Court, his rights would be the
eery Court jurisdiction of suits at law, in case of same in Chancery. •
a bill filed to enforce a penalty, or forfeiture, is yet 35 See, post, §411, note 2.
to be determined. It would seem, however, that if 36 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 484;503.
§ 299 DEMURRERS OF RIGHT. 242
DEMURRER BECAUSE THE SUIT IS BARBED BY THE STATUTE.
title, commencement, and conclusion, see post, § 310.]
[For
Because the shows on its face, that the cause of action accrued more than six [or
bill
three, or seven, or ten] years before the bill in this case was filed. [Or,]
Because the bill shows on its face that the cause of action sued on did not accrue within
three [six, seven or ten] years next before the bill in this case was filed.
3. The Statute of Frauds. The bill may state what would otherwise be a con-
tract within some general rule, but if the statute requires such contract to be
in writing, and the bill shows that it is in parol, a demurrer will hold to the
bill. 37
DEMURRER BECAUSE THE CONTRACT IS NOT IN WRITING.

commencement, and conclusion, see post, § 310.]
[For title,
Because the bill shows on its face, that the contract sued on was not reduced to writing,
as required by the statute for the prevention of frauds and perjuries, but that said contract
rests in parol.
4. Other Demurrable Exceptions. If any other exception to the general rule

authorizing suit in the particular ease, appear clearly on the face of the bill,
it will be a good cause of demurrer. It may be stated, generally, that any mat-
ter which would be proper for a plea in bar, if it did not appear in the bill, will
be a good ground of demurrer if it does appear in the bill. These grounds are,
in addition to those already stated: (1) payment, or other adjustment; (2) for-
mer judgment or decree; (3) an award; (4) a release; (5) a stated, or settled,
account; and (6) innocent purchaser for value.
The following forms will serve as a guide in drawing demurrers under this
sub-section
DEMURRER BECAUSE OF MATTERS IN AVOIDANCE.
Because the bill shows on its face, that the matters in controversy have been adjusted, and
no facts are set out invalidating said adjustment.
Because it appears from the face of the bill, that the debt sued for has been paid [or, has
been reduced to a judgment, or, has been settled by an award, or, has been released.]
Because it appears by the face of the bill, that this defendant is an innocent purchaser, for
a valuable consideration, without any notice of the equities alleged.
§ 299. Demurrers Because the Complainant is not Entitled to Bring the Suit.
The general rule supposed may be correct, the proper forum for the enforce-
ment of the rule may have been chosen, the case made may be within the general
rule, and not within any exception thereto, and yet the bill may show on its
face that the complainant is not the proper party to bring the suit. The mat-
ters which disable the complainant from prosecuting the suit, are ordinarily the
following
1. is Under a Personal Disability.
The Complainant If an infant, or a mar-
ried woman,
or an idiot, or a lunatic, exhibiting a bill, appear upon the face of
it to be thus incapable of instituting a suit alone, and no next friend, or guard-
ian, or committee, is named in the bill, the defendant may demur. But if the in-
capacity does not appear upon the face of the bill, the defendant must take ad-
vantage of it by plea. This objection extends to the whole bill, for, as the
defendant might at the hearing be entitled to costs, he would be materially in-
jured, by being compelled to answer a bill exhibited by persons, whose property
is not at their own disposal, and who are, therefore, incapable of paying the
costs. 38
DEMURRER BECAUSE COMPLAINANT IS AN INFANT.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see, ante, 310.]
Because the bill shows on its face that complainant is under the age of twenty-one years,
and yet he sues without anyone being named as his guardian, or next friend.
3TTreece v. Treece, 5 I>a; 223. I piosecute a suit to final decree if proper objection
38 Stc*. Eq. PI., § 493. A lunatic may, however, | is not made at the proper time. Ante, § 82.
243 DEMURRERS OP RIGHT. §299
DEMURRER BECAUSE COMPLAINANT IS A MARRIED WOMAN.
[For-title, commencement, and conclusion, see, ante, 310.]
Because complainant's bill shows she is a married woman, and yet she sues without her
husband, or a next friend, and her bill alleges no such facts as justify her in so suing.
2. The Complainant is not Entitled to the Character in which he Sues. The
defect of the title of the complainant to the character in which he sues, is the
proper subject of a demurrer, where the objection positively appears upon the
face of the bill. Thus, for example, if it should appear upon the face of the bill,
that the complainant sued as administrator, in virtue of the grant of administra-
tion in a foreign country, the objection might be taken by demurrer; for it is
clear that the complainant has no right, under that administration, to sue in our
courts.
So, if a voluntary association of persons, not incorporated, should affect, by
their bill, to sue in the style and character of a corporate body, the bill would be
demurrable on that very account, if the objection appeared upon the face of it
for it is the exclusive prerogative of the government to create corporations, and
invest them with the powers of suing, as such, by their corporate name. 39
3. The Complainant Shows no Interest in the Subject-Matter. If the com-
plainant sets forth in his bill facts, that show he has no interest in the subject-
matter of the suit, or no interest in some material part thereof, a demurrer will
lie ; in the latter case, 40 however, the demurrer must be expressly limited to
that part of the bill liable thereto. The complainant must not only show an
interest in the subject-matter, but a right to institute a suit concerning it,
against the defendant. In order to enable a complainant to sue upon a contract,
there must ordinarily be some privity between him and the defendant, whereby
he has the right to make a demand of him. A
defendant may be in the wrong in
a given matter, and yet the complainant may not be the proper person to bring
suit upon such wrong. Thus, the debtor of a decedent ought to pay the debt,
but a legatee or distributee cannot sue him. But there are many cases where no
privity is needed to enable a complainant to maintan a bill, as (1) in case of in-
junctions to prevent trespasses, nuisances and the like; (2) in cases of fraud,
actual and constructive; (3) in cases of contribution, 41 and (4) in cases of mar-
shalling of securities.
What sort of interest will sustain a suit has been heretofore fully discussed. 42
4. The Complainant has Failed to Take a Necessary Preliminary Step. Where
some preliminary step must be taken to perfect a right of action, as where a
notice must be given, or a tender made, and the bill fails to allege that such step
has been taken, a demurrer will lie for that reason and so where a tender is ;
alleged but the money tendered is not filed with the bill. 43
5. Some of the Complainants have no Right to Sue. If any one Or more of
several complainants have no common interest in the suit, or have separate and
diverse interests therein, this is such a mis-joinder as constitutes a good ground
of demurrer, and such a demurrer goes to the whole bill. 44 But the Court
would allow the improper complainants, with the consent of the other com-
plainants, to dismiss the bill as to themselves, and this may be done even after
a demurrer for such mis-joinder has been sustained, and the bill dismissed, if the
application be made within thirty days, or before the term ends. The objection
that there is a mis-joinder of complainants, cannot be taken advantage of at the
hearing, but the Court will then decree according to the respective rights of
the complainants and if any of them then appear to have no interest in the
;
suit, or in the recovery, the bill will be dismissed as to them. 45 The Court on
39 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 496-497. The defect of the title 43 Rogers v. Tindell, 15 Pick., 356. See, ante.
of the complainant seldom appears on the face of § 148.
the bill, and must, therefore, be, ordinarily, raised 44 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
302; 557; notes; Sto. Eq. PI
by plea, or answer. §§279; 283, 509. See, ante, §§ 109-112.
46 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 302; Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 283; 544,
40 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 314-316; Sto. Eq. PL, § S13.
note; or, the Court may, at the hearing, decree
41 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 513-514, notes. against a complainant, and the defendants, in favor
42 Ante, §§ 143-144. of the other complainants. Ibid. Code, § 2972.
§ 300 RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS. 244
proper application, allow co-complainants to be made, defendants
will, also,
when their interests, or the rights of the other complainants, so require. 46 But
1
the demurrer to the bill, in such cases, must be narrowed to the particular relief
objected to, otherwise it will be overruled because too broad.
Where there is a mis-joinder of parties, if the mis-joinder is of parties as com-
plainants, all the defendants may demur: for such a mis-joinder is a proper
ground of objection by all. If the mis-joinder is of parties as defendants, those
only can demur who are improperly joined. 47
§ 300. Demurrers Because the Defendant is not Liable. The defendant may —
not be liable at all, or he may not be liable to the extent prayed, or he may not
be liable to the complainant. He may have no interest in the subject-matter
of the suit, and may in no way be liable to any decree, and may not be entitled
to the benefit of any decree. In any such case, he is not a proper party, and
a demurrer will lie on that ground, if it plainly appear in the bill.
On the other hand, the defendant may be liable to the complainant in some
way, and yet not liable in the particular way, or to the particular extent, the
bill prays. Almost all demurrers to the substance of the bill are, in effect, de-
murrers to the relief prayed; 48 but the ground of demurrer here referred to,
is not because the complainant is not entitled to relief, but because he is not
entitled to the special relief he prays for, or at least not entitled to some of it,
as against the demurrant.
Whenever, therefore, the bill prays for some particular relief against a de-
fendant, which the facts stated do not warrant, a demurrer will lie to the bill
to that extent; but such demurrer must be so drawn as to be confined to that
part of the bill seeking the unwarranted relief, otherwise, the demurrer will be
overruled because too broad. 49
It may be stated, in general, that if, for any reason, founded on the substance
of the case, as stated in the bill, the complainant is not entitled to the relief
which he prays, the defendant may demur. It is obvious, that if the case stated
is such, that, admitting the whole bill to be true, the Court ought not to give the
complainant the relief, or assistance, which he prays for, in whole, or in part,
the defect, thus appearing upon the face of the bill, is not only a sufficient, but
an appropriate ground of demurrer. And, where the objection is thus on the
face of the bill, it should be taken by a demurrer, and ought not to be taken by
a plea. 50
ARTICLE IV.
RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS.
§ 301. Demurrers Defined, and Explained. § 306. A Demurrer must not be Too Broad.
§ 302. When a Demurrer will Lie. § 307. A Demurrer must not Speak.
§ 303. The Office of a Demurrer. § 308. Rules when a Demurrer is Joined with
§ 304. What a Demurrer Admits. Another Pleading.
§ 305. All Demurrers must be Special.
§301. Demurrers Denned, and Explained. Whenever any ground of de- —

fence is apparent upon the face of the bill itself, either from the matter con-
tained in it, or from some defect in the case made by it, the proper mode of
defence is by demurrer.
A
demurrer is a pleading by a defendant which, while admitting the matters
of fact stated in the bill to be true, shows (1) that, as they are therein set forth,
46 Sto. Eq. PL, § 544, note. The bill may be I 48 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 557; Sto. Eq. PL, § 526.
amended, at the hearing. Code, § 4337. ! 49 See, post, § 306.
47 Sto. Eq. PL, § 544. I
60 Sto. Eq. PL, § 52«; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 557.
245 RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS. §302
they are insufficient for the complainant to proceed upon, or to oblige the de-
fendant to answer or (2) that, for some reason apparent on the face of the bill,
;
or because of the omission of some matter, which ought to be contained therein,

or for want of some circumstance which ought to be attendant thereon, the
defendant ought not to be compelled to answer. It, therefore, demands the
judgment of the Court, whether the defendant shall be compelled to answer
the complainant's bill, or that particular part of it to which the demurrer
specially applies. 1
A general demurrer is one that assigns no particular or specific ground of
objection to the bill, except the usual formulary, "that there is no Equity in
the bill." A
special demurrer is one that points out the particular defects in
the substance of the bill. In our practice, a general demurrer is not allowed,
however deficient in Equity the bill may be. The Code requires every demurrer
to state the objections relied on and the Courts hold that these objections must
;
be stated with certainty and directness. 2

§ 302. —
When a Demurrer will Lie. A demurrer will lie whenever it is clear
that, taking the charges in the bill to be true, the bill would be dismissed at
the hearing. A demurrer will not be sustained, however, unless it is an abso-
lute, certain, and clear proposition that the bill would be dismissed; for, if it
is a case of circumstances, in which a minute variation between them as stated
by the bill, and those established by the evidence, may either incline the Court
to modify the relief prayed, or to grant no relief at all, the Court, although it
sees that the granting the modified relief at the hearing will be attended with
considerable difficulty, will not support a demurrer; for, if there is any possi-
bility that the complainant will be entitled to any relief, at the hearing, a de-
murrer to the whole bill will not lie. 3
If a bill contains two or more supposed equities, or causes of action, or joins
as defendants several parties, if one of these supposed equities or causes of
action is manifestly not maintainable, as against one of the defendants, a de-
murrer may be filed to so much of the bill as sets forth such insufficient matter,
or the defendant, not answerable, may demur to the relief prayed against him.
Hence, the general rule that a demurrer will lie to the whole bill, when com-
plainant does not show himself entitled to any relief or it will lie to a part of
;
a bill, when complainant is not entitled to the relief he prays as to that part.
A demurrer to the whole bill should be based on some short, dry, point of
law, destructive of the relief sought, 4 and it must be plain that, for the reason
stated in the demurrer, the bill must be dismissed at the hearing, for want of
merits. 5 If there be doubt whether the grounds of the demurrer are sufficient
to destroy the bill, or that part of the bill which it specifically covers, such
doubt will enure to the benefit of the bill, and the demurrer will be overruled,
The causes of demurrer must be upon some matter in the bill, or upon the
omission of some matter which ought to be therein, or attendant thereon and ;
not upon any foreign matter alleged by the defendant. 6 No matter outside of
the bill can be considered on the hearing of a demurrer, except the law and
such matters as the Court may take notice of judicially and no demurrer will ;
lie to the form of the bill. 7
§ 303. The Office of a Demurrer. —A

demurrer is a pleading which, in sub-
stance, insists that, admitting the bill to be true, the complainant is not entitled
to the relief he seeks against the demurrant, and that, therefore, the bill should
be dismissed as to him. The logic of a demurrer is that, as the complainant
cannot by proof make out a case stronger than the allegations of his bill, if
1 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 543-544. Daniel's definition has 5 Brien v. Buttorff, 2 Tenn. Ch., 523; 1 Dan. Ch.
been somewhat changed: he says a demurrer is "in Pr., 543, note. A demurrer should unsheathe some
substance, an allegation by a defendant," etc. Sto. keen point of law, incisive enough to reach the
Eq. PI., §446. heart of the bill, and thus destroy it.
2 Sto. Eq. PL, §455; Code, §2934. 6 Sto. Eq. PL, § 447.
3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 543-544. 7 Code, §§ 2865, 2934.
4 Payne V. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 154.
$304 RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS. 246
those allegations, when admitted to be true, will not warrant any decree
against the demurrant, then proof of those allegations will avail nothing, and
hence the bill should be dismissed without any further costs, or proceedings
by either party.
The object of a demurrer, therefore, is to save costs, and bring the litigation
to a speedy close. If no one of these ends is obtained, there is little use in a
demurrer. s For, in general, if a demurrer would hold to a bill on its merits
the Court, although the defendant answers, will not grant relief upon hearing
•
the cause. There have been, however, cases in which the Court has given
relief upon the hearing, although a demurrer to the relief would probably have
been allowed. But such cases are rare, 9 and the relief granted in such eases is,
generally, based in part upon the answer.
In regard to the appropriate use of a demurrer, it may be stated as a general
rule, that, whenever the ground of objection or defence is clearly apparent on
the face of the bill itself, either from matter contained in it, or from some defect
in its frame, the proper mode of setting up the objection, or defence, is by
demurrer, and not by way of plea. Hence, if the case of the complainant, as
stated in his bill, will not entitle him to a decree, the proper course is for the
defendant to insist upon it by way of demurrer, although it may be equally fatal
at the hearing. When the bill is manifestly fatally defective in substance, it is
advisable to demur, because it saves unnecessary expense to all parties. 10 When
the objection is to a defect in matter of form, the objection must be taken by
motion, demurrer for matter of form having been abolished by statute. 11
Demurrers are, also, often used to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court, as
already fully shown. 12
§ 304. —
What a Demurrer Admits. As a demurrer proceeds upon the ground
that, admitting the facts stated in the bill to be true, the complainant is not
entitled to the relief he seeks it is held that, at least for the purpose of argu-
;
ment, all the matters of fact which are stated in the bill are admitted by the
demurrer, and cannot be disputed in arguing the question whether the demurrer
be good or not and such admission extends to the whole manner and form in
;
which the bill states the facts. Upon this ground, where a bill misstated a deed
by alleging it to contain a proviso, the Court, upon the argument of a demurrer
to the bill, refused to allow the defendant's counsel to refer to the deed itself
for the purpose of showing the incorrectness of the manner in which it was set
out, although the bill contained a reference "for greater certainty as to its
contents, etc.," to the deed as being in the custody of the defendants. 13
But, although a demurrer confesses the truth of the facts alleged in the bill,
svich confession is strictly confined to the facts. The demurrer does not admit
any matters of law suggested in the bill, or inferred from the facts stated; nor
does it admit the arguments, deductions, inferences, or conclusions, set forth
in the bill. Nor does a demurrer admit allegations contrary to facts, judicially
known to the Court. Upon the argument of a demurrer, the bill alone must
be looked to for the facts of the case, except such facts as the Court may judi-
cially know. If a bill materially misstates a deed in the defendant's possession,
and refers to it for greater certainty as to its contents, the Court will not allow
the defendant to read the deed on the argument of the demurrer for the purpose
of contradicting the bill. 14
But where a bill, not original, refers to a record in the original cause, and
in effect makes such record, or any part thereof, a part of itself, then such a
8 Payne v. Berry, 3 Term. Ch., 157. A very large terial part thereof. Brien V. ButtorfF, 2 Tenn Ch..
proportion of the demurrers filed are too near the 527; Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 157.
line of frivolousness to justify a Court in an endea- Sto. Eq. PI., § 447.
vor to determine on which side they are. Now, that 10 Sto. Eq. PI., §453. See, post, 8 590.
all the benefits of a demurrer to the merits may be 11 Code, §§2934; 2865; Waggoner l). Whit-', U
had by relying thereon in the answef, (except when Heisk., 741.
the jurisdiction of the Court is to be contested,) a 12 Ante, § 290.
separate demurrer should never be filed, unless it is IS 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 544.
certain to be destructive of the bill, or of some ma- 14 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 544-546.
247 RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS. §305
record, or part, may be looked to on the argument of a demurrer to such a bill.
A demurrer necessarily admits the truth of the facts stated in the bill, so far
as they are relevant, and are well pleaded but it does not admit the conclusions
;
of law drawn therefrom, although they are also alleged in the bill. Thus, if a
demurrer extends to any particular discovery, the matter sought to be discov-
ered, and to which the demurrer extends, is taken to be as stated in the bill.
And if the defendant demurs to the relief only, the whole case made by the bill
as the ground of the relief prayed for, is considered as true. demurrer, there- A
fore, was formerly always preceded by a protestation against the truth of the
matters contained in the bill, a practice borrowed from the civil law, and
probably intended to avoid any conclusion in another suit; for in the present
suit it is wholly without effect. 15 But this protestation is not only wholly un-
necessary, but is obnoxious to good pleading, and should be wholly omitted.
It is one of those prolix and unnecessary allegations the Chancellor is author-
ized to order stricken out. 10
§ 305. —
All Demurrers must be Special. Formerly, a demurrer to a bill might
be general; but now, the Code requires all demurrers to state the objections
relied on; 17 and a general demurrer is a nullity. 18 The very objection to be
relied on by way of demurrer must be stated in the demurrer, and stated spe-
cifically, and not inferentially, or by way of intendment. Thus, if the defendant
intends to demur because the Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter in controversy, he must allege this want of jurisdiction as
his ground of demurrer. It will not avail him, in such a case, to demur gen-
erally, because complainant's bill contains no ground of Equity entitling him
to any relief; 19 for such a demurrer admits the jurisdiction, even in case where
there is a clear want of jurisdiction. 20 So, where the demurrer is based on the
ground that the Court has no local jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit,
this practically concedes that the Court has jurisdiction of the person of the
demurrant, even in a case where that jurisdiction could have been resisted by
a demurrer on that particular ground. 21 The demurrant cannot allege one
cause of demurrer in his pleading, and another in his argument. As he makes
his bed so must he lie in it.
A demurrer must not only always specify the several causes on which it is
founded, but if the demurrer does not go to the whole bill, it must, also, clearly
specify the particular parts of the bill which it is designed to cover for, if the ;
particular parts are not distinguished, the Court will be compelled to look over
the whole bill, in order to pick them out, which task the Court will not under-
take. And this designation of the particular parts of a bill which the demurrer,
or the particular cause of demurrer, is intended to cover, 22 must be done, not
by way of exception, as by demurring to all, except certain parts of the bill
but by a positive definition of the parts, to which the defendant seeks to avoid
making any answer. 23
If a demurrer is too general, that is, if it covers, or is applied to, the whole
bill, when it is good to a part only or, if it is a demurrer to a part of a bill only,
;
but yet is not good to the full extent which it covers, but is so to a part only, it
will be overruled for it is a general rule, that a demurrer cannot be good as
;
to a part of what it covers, and bad as to the rest and therefore it must stand
;
or fall altogether. But a demurrer may assign several causes of demurrer and ;
15 Sto. Eq. PL, § 452. "That there is no equity in the bill," is a general
lft Code, § 4316. demurrer, and cannot be noticed as a demurrer, for
17 Code, §2934; Hobbs V. Memphis R. R., 12 that reason. Chesney V. Rodgers, 1 Heisk., 239; Mc-
Heisk., 526. Caleb v. Crichfield, 5 Heisk., 290. But it may be
18 Kirkman V. Snodgrass, 3 Head, 370. treated as a motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Smith
19 Kirkman v. Snodgrass, 3 Head, 370; Chesney v. Thomp. Cases, 233; Code, §4386.
Rodgers, 1 Heisk^ 239. 21 Whittaker v. Whittaker, 10 tea, 93.
20 Chesney v. Rodgers, 1 Heisk., 239. "That the 22 Buckner v. Abraham, 3 Tenn. Ch., 346; Sto. Eci.
complainant is not entitled to the discovery prayed PI., §457; Code, §2934.
by his .bill against this defendant," is not a special 23 See next section.
demurrer. Finley V. McCormick, 6 Heisk., 392.
§ 306 RULES GOVERNING DEMURRERS. 248
it good to the whole extent of the demurrer, and another is bad, the
one cause is
demurrer will be sustained. 24 Separate causes of demurrer, each bad as such
cannot be connected so as to make a good lumping demurrer to the whole bill. 25
The rule may be laid down generally, that no ground of demurrer will be
noticed by the Court, unless it is not only specifically stated, but also specifically
applied to the bill, showing whether it is to the whole bill or a part of it, and if
to a part, what part. No matter what grounds of demurrer to the bill may, as
a matter of fact, exist, the demurrant will not be allowed to insist on any except
those designated in his demurrer, even when those in his demurrer are insuffi-
cient.
§ 306. A Demurrer must not be —
Too Broad. A demurrer may be too broad
by which meant, it would have been good if it had been confined to a specific
is
part of the bill, but being a demurrer to the whole bill, and not to the specific
part to which it might have been confined, it disputes the whole bill, and, there
being some Equity in the bill, the demurrer must, for that reason, be overruled. 26
When a demurrer to the whole bill is sustained, the whole bill is destroyed, and
the Court will not dismiss the whole bill merely because a part of it is demurra-
ble. If, therefore, the defendant seeks to cover only part of the bill by his
demurrer, he must, in the commencement of his demurrer, specify with particu-
larity that part as the part to which he demurs, and, at the conclusion, pray to
be hence dismissed as to such part. The reports contain many instances of de-
murrers overruled because too broad, which would have been sustained if con-
fined to that part of the bill really demurrable. 27 But, if the bill contains no
cause of action whatever, it may be dismissed, although the causes of demurrer
assigned may not cover the real defects. 28
A demurrer intended for only a part of a bill, must not only be specific, and
designate that part of the bill which is intended to be covered by it, but the
designation must be so clearly made that the Court will be in no doubt as to
the part intended, and will have no difficulty in directly ascertaining that part.
The part specially demurred to must be designated in such clear and precise
terms that not only the Court will have no trouble in ascertaining the part
covered by the demurrer, but in case the demurrer is sustained, the Master may
have no trouble, on exceptions to the answer for insufficiency, in ascertaining
how much, and what part, of the bill remains in Court to be answered unto. 29
A defendant may, however, put in separate and distinct grounds, or causes,
of demurrer to separate and distinct parts of a bill; for the same grounds of
demurrer frequently will not apply to different parts of a bill. And if separate
grounds of demurrer are put in to different and distinct parts of a bill, one
ground of demurrer may be overruled upon argument, and another be al-
lowed. 30
Where there are several defendants, if they all join in one demurrer to a
bill, the demurrer may be good, and be allowed, as to one of the defendants,
and be bad, and disallowed, as to the other defendants for the defence may be;
good as to one person, and be wholly inapplicable to another. And there is a

clear, although a nice, distinction between a demurrer which is too broad in
regard to all the defendants, and one which is too broad, or inapplicable, to
some of the defendants. 31
Where a demurrer has been overruled, the Code says no other demurrer shall
be received, but the defendant shall answer the allegations of the bill. 32 This,
24 Saunders V. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 575; Sto. Eq. 3 Head, 359; Saunders v. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 567;
PI., § 443. Mann V. Bamberger, 4 Heisk., 486; Bittick v. Wil-
25 Bryan V. Buttorf, 2 Tenn. Ch., 523. . kins, 7Heisk;, 312; Riddle v. Motley, 1 Lea, 468;
26 Riddle v. Motley, 1 Lea, 468; Russell V. Bank, Phoenix Ins. Co. V. Day, 4 tea, 247.
20 Pick., 614; Tyner v. Fenner. 4 Lea, 472. 28 I,ane v. Farmer, 11 Lea, 568; Parks v. N., C.
27 Some of these cases are the following, in all of & St. L. R. R. Co., 13 Lea, 1. See, past, § 525.
which the rule is recognized, that, a demurrer, bad 29 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 457-458, note; Buckner V. Abra-
because too broad, is bad altogether, and will be hams, 3 Tenn. Ch., 349.
disallowed: Allen v. Lanier, 4 Hay., 290; Colville V. 30 Sto. Eq. PL, § 444.
Colville, 9 Hum., 524; Fay v. Jones, 1 Head, 443; 31 Sto. Eq. PI., § 445.
Hunter v. Justices, 7 Cold., 49; Crowder V. Denny, 32 Code, § 4395.
249 FORM OP DEMURRERS. §307
however, is probably not imperative, for, if a demurrer should be overruled
because too broad, when, if it had been narrowed it would have been sustained
as to a part of the bill, the Court would be justified in allowing the demurrer
to be amended, if by so doing the litigation would be greatly narrowed, and
the costs greatly lessened. 33
§ 307. —
A Demurrer must not Speak. From what has been said as to the
nature and office of a demurrer, it is clear that it can lie only for objections ap-
parent upon the face of the bill itself, either from the matter inserted, or
omitted, or from defects in the frame thereof. A demurrer cannot, therefore,
state what does not appear upon the face of the bill, otherwise it would be what
has been emphatically called a speaking demurrer, that is, a demurrer wherein
a new fact is introduced in order to support it.
34 Thus, for example, where a
bill was filed to specifically enforce a contract for the sale of land, without
stating whether it was in writing or not, a demurrer to the effect that the
complainant was not entitled to the relief sought because the contract was
not in writing, was a speaking demurrer, the bill not stating that the contract
was not in writing and the presumption being, on demurrer, that it was in
writing. 35
§ 308. Rules when a Demurrer is Joined with another Pleading. As has —
been already stated, a demurrer may be to a part only of a bill. In such a case,
the remainder of the bill must either be pleaded to, or be answered. Every
defence must be a complete bar to any recovery, whether that bar be one of law,
presented by demurrer, or one of fact, presented by plea in bar, or by answer,
or whether the bar consist of some two or more of these defences. All this will
be fully shown hereafter, when treating of the Joinder of Defences. 36
ARTICLE V.
FRAME AND FORM OF DEMURRERS, AND WHEN TO BE FILED.
§ 309. Frame of a Demurrer. § 311. Demurrers Coupled with Answers.
§ 310. Form of Demurrers. § 312. When a Demurrer Must be Filed.
§ 309. Frame
of a Demurrer. —A
demurrer is a pleading to test the suffi-
ciency of a If all the material facts alleged in a bill be true, yet if the
bill.
bill shows on its face (1) that the Court has no jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, or (2) no local jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the
suit, or (3) no general jurisdiction of the cause of action, or (4) that
the complainant is entitled to no relief, or (5) that the defendant is in no
way liable to the complainant, and not a proper party to the suit, the Court will
not require the defendant to answer such bill, if he will show the fatal in-
firmity of the bill, as to him, by a demurrer specifying the infirmity. The
office of a demurrer is, therefore, to challenge the right of the complainant
to proceed on his bill as it stands, even admitting every fact in it to be true and ;
the demurrant points out the fatal infirmity of the bill, and demands the judg-
33 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 600: Sto. Eq. Pi., § 443, note. jurisdiction is stretched to the uttermost, then the
In the U. S. Equity Courts, the modern English Court would be justified in allowing a demurrer to
rule has been adopted, as follows: "No demurrer, or be so narrowed, by proper amendment. It is not safe
plea, shall be held bad, and overruled, upon argu- for our Chancery Courts to follow the rules of the
ment, only because such demurrer, or plea, shall not U. S. Equity Courts, on questions of jurisdiction:
cover so much of the bill as it might, by law, have the jurisdiction of our Chancery Courts is general,
extended to." U. S. Equity Rule, 36; Cooke, 404; whereas the jurisdiction of the U. S. Equity Courts
Sto. Eq. PI., § 443, note. But no such amendment is special, and this distinction totally changes the
should be allowed in order either to defeat the ju- rules on the question of jurisdiction.
risdiction of the Court, or to defeat, limit, or, in 34 Sto. Eq. PL, § 448.
any way, diminish, an apparently just demand. If 35 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 365; 561; 655; Macey v. Chil-
an amendment, narrowing a demurrer, will result in dress, 2 Tenn. Ch., 442; Trust Co. V. Weaver, 18
narrowing the bill down to such matters only as can Pick., 66.
possibly be entertained by the Court, even when its 36 See, post, §§ 402-405.
§ 310 form of demurrers. 250
ment of the Court whether the bill is sufficient to
justify the Court in compelling
him to answer it, and whether, for the reasons set forth in the demurrer, the
bill should not be dismissed without further proceedings thereon.
A demurrer formerly commenced with a solemn protestation, that the de-
fendants did not confess any of the matters in the bill contained; but this
ancient and useless formula is now generally omitted by the best pleaders, it
being not only absolutely unnecessary, but, also, mere surplusage, and liable to
be stricken out, under the statute, by the Chancellor on his own motion, at
the cost of the demurrant. 1
After the protestation, came the general or special causes of demurrer and ;
these in turn were followed by a verbose prayer for the judgment of the
Court as to whether the demurrant should answer further, and for dismissal.
The old form of a demurrer will be seen in a foot-note to the next section.
Now, all this stiff pomposity of verbiage, which was akin to the silk gowns,
and the ponderous wigs, of the lawyers and the Judges of the same period,
has given way to the simpler forms now in use. The following form of demur-
rer is in conformity with the spirit of our present practice
FORM OF A DEMURRER.
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery at Kingston.
Richard Roe, et al.
The defendant, Peter Poe, demurs to the bill in this cause,

Because he is not a proper party, having no interest in the subject-matter of the suit,
1st.
and not being in any way liable to the complainant.
2nd. Because complainant is not entitled to any relief against him, and does not specially
pray any.
Wherefore, this defendant prays the judgment of the Court whether he must answer further,
and prays to be dismissed. James SEvrER, Solicitor.
In order to prevent delays by putting in frivolous demurrers, it is required
by the practice of the Court, that the demurrer should be signed by counsel, or
by the defendant. But it is not required to be put in on oath, as it asserts no
fact, and relies merely upon matter apparent upon the face of the bill. 2
§ 310.
'
—
Form of Demurrers. Formerly demurrers began with a " protesta-
'
long and formal, and ended with a wherefore, equally long and formal
'
'
tion, ' '
but now all such formalities are forbidden by the Code, 3 and in drawing a de-
murrer, the protestation clause, and most of the wherefore clause, should be
omitted as useless verbiage. The following is a proper
FORM OF A DEMURRER.
[The Title, or Style of the Cause.]
John Doe, ]
vs.
f-
No. 983. — In the Chancery Court, at Clinton.
Richard Roe. J
[The Commencement.]
The defendant demurs him in this cause on the following grounds
to the bill filed against
[The Grounds, or Causes of Demurrer.]
1st. The bill shows on its face, that the cause of action therein set forth accrued more than
three [or six, or ten,] years before the filing of the bill, and is barred by the statute of limita-
tions of three [or six, or ten,] years.
2d. The contract sued on is shown by the bill to be usurious, and the Court will not lend
its aid to enforce an illegal contract.
[The Conclusion.]
And
the defendant prays the judgment of the Court, whether he shall be compelled to
answer further, and prays to be dismissed. James A. FowlER. Solicitor.
1Code, §4316. and alleged, do demur to the said bill; and, for
2 Sto.Eq. PI., §461; Code, §3979. cause of demurrer, show that the said complainant
3Code, § 4316. The protestation and concluding has not, by his said bill, made such a case as entitles
clauses are seen in the following old form of a him, in a Court of Equity, to any discovery from
general demurrer: these defendants, respectively, or any of them; or
These defendants, by protestation, not confessing
•
any relief against them, as to the matters contained
all, or any, of the matters, and things, in the said in the said bill, or any of such matters; and that
complainant's bill contained, to be true, in such any discovery which can be made by these defend-
manner, and form, as the same are therein set forth, ants, or any of them, touching the matters com-
251 FORM OE DEMURRERS. §311
A demurrer must be signed by the defendant in person, or by his Solicitor
4
but as it asserts no fact, it need not be sworn to.
§ 311. —
Demurrers Coupled with Answers. A defendant is not bound to file
a separate demurrer, except for want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter of
the suit, or of the person of the demurrant. "With these exceptions, he may
rely on any ground of demurrer by setting it up in his answer.
6 When he relies
upon a demurrer in his answer, the form and location of the demurrer is imma-
terial it may be either prefixed to the answer, or suffixed to it, or incorporated
:
in its body. 6
DEMURRER COUPLED WITH AN ANSWER.
John Doe, j
vs.
\
Demurrer and Answer to the Bill.
The defendant, Richard Roe, demurs to so much of the bill in said cause, as [Here specify
briefly the particular part of the bill by the demurrer, as in § 316;] and for cause of
aimed at
demurrer shows: [Here set out the causes or grounds of demurrer.} And for answer to the
residue of said bill, the defendant says: [Here set forth the answer to so much of the bill
as is not demurred to. If the part of the bill demurred to is, also, answered to, the answer
will ove,rv.le the demurrer?}
A DEMURRER IN AN ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs. \ —
No. 716. In Chancery, at Sevierville. /
The demurrer and answer of the defendant, Richard Roe, to the bill filed against him and
others in the above entitled cause.
This defendant, Richard Roe, demurs to the bill filed in this cause, [or demurs to so much
of the bill filed in this cause, as {here setting it out as in § 316;)] and for cause of demurrer
shows
1st.' [Here set out the causes tersely, and number them in order.]
And this defendant, not waiving his said demurrer, but relying thereon, for answer to
said bill, says [Here set forth the answer to each and every allegation of the bill, in the
:
same manner as though no demurrer had been prefixed to the answer.]

This subject will be further considered in treating of the Joinder of De-
fences 8 but it may be said, generally, that great caution must be exercised in
;
joining two or more defences.

§ 312. —
When a Demurrer Must be Filed. If a defendant desires to demur
to the whole bill, he must do so before answering the bill for an answer to the ;
bill will overrule a demurrer to the whole bill. If, however, he wishes to demur
to a part only of the bill, he can do so, and then answer the balance of the
bill, at the same time, taking care to indicate clearly the part of the bill de-
murred to, and the part answered. 9
A demurrer to the bill cannot be filed after a plea in bar or an answer has
been filed; 10 nor can a demurrer be interposed when time is given to answer
the bill, a demurrer not being regarded as an answer in the sense contemplated
in the order giving the time. 11
If the demurrer is the first pleading the defendant intends to file, he must
deliver it to the Clerk in the time specified in the subpoena to answer, as already
shown, 12 or a pro confesso will be entered against him; and if he intends to
plained of in the .said bill, or any of them, cannot vent the delays incident to the filing of separate de-
be of any avail to the said complainant for any_ of murrers; and to enable a defendant to answer, with-
the purposes for which a discovery is sought against out losing his right to demur, also. Hardin V. Egin r
these defendants by the said bill; nor entitle the 2 Tenn. Ch., 39.
complainant to any relief in this Court, touching Ibid.
any of the matters therein complained of. Where- 1 A
demurrer coupled with an answer is quite dif-
fore, and for divers other good causes of demurrer, ferent from a demurrer incorporated in an answer.
appearing in the said bill, these defendants do demur In the latter case, the answer may cover the part
thereto, and they pray the judgment of this honora- of the bill aimed at by the demurrer, without over
ble Court, whether they shall be compelled to make ruling the demurrer. Code, §4319; Hardin V. Egin,
any further, and other, answer to the said bill, and 2 Tenn. Ch., 39.
they humbly pray to be dismissed from hence with 8 See, post, §§ 402-405.
their reasonable costs in this behalf sustained." Van 9 See, ante, § 310.
Heyth. E<J. Drafts., 419; Sto. Eq. PL, §483, note. 10 Êxcept when the defendant is specially allowed
Such a demurrer would, now, be too general to be to withdraw his answer for that purpose. See, ante,
noticed. Ante, § 305. § 232, note.
4 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 590. n Chy. Rule I, § 7; post, § 1190.
5 Code, § 4319. The object of the statute, allowing 12 Ante, §§205; 225-227.
a demurrer to be relied on in the answer, is to pre-
§313 ACTION OP THE COURT ON DEMURRERS. 252
answer after unfavorable action of the Court on his demurrer, he should be
present when his demurrer is overruled, so as to file his answer if he have one
ready, or to get time to answer, or he will be liable to a pro confesso.
ARTICLE VI.
ACTION OF THE COURT ON DEMURRERS.
§ 313. How Demurrers are Disposed Of. § 315. Effect of Sustaining, and of Overrul-
$ 314. When Demurrers are Disposed Of. ing Demurrers.
§ 316. Amending Demurrers.
§ 313. —
How Demurrers are Disposed Of. A demurrer is a challenge by the
defendant to the complainant to test the right of the latter to require an answer
to his bill; and the complainant can take no step forward so long as the de-
murrer remains undisposed of. If he thinks the demurrer good, but
avoidable by an amendment to his bill, he can avoid it by amending
his bill; 1 if, however, he thinks the demurrer fatal to his case, the
only course open to him is to allow the Court to determine the sufficiency of
the demurrer, or to dismiss his bill on his own motion. If, on the other hand,
he thinks the demurrer bad, for any reason, he may demand the action of the
Court upon it, either when the case is reached on the docket, or at any earlier
time allowed by the rules of the Court. 2
At the hearing of a demurrer the usual course of procedure is as follows:
(1) the complainant reads his bill; (2) the demurrant reads his demurrer, and
opens the argument in support of it; (3) the Solicitor of the complainant then
replies to the argument of the demurrant and (4) the demurrant concludes the
;
argument. 3 In hearing a demurrer, the argument is strictly confined to the

case presented by the bill, which is, for the purpose of the argument, not only
conclusively deemed to be absolutely true, but is, also, given a construction
favorable to its maintenance. 4
The Court may sustain one or more of the grounds of demurrer assigned, or
may sustain all, or may overrule all.
§ 314. When Demurrers —

are Disposed Of. Inasmuch as a demurrer, if good,
will destroy the whole, or at least, a part of the bill, it is manifestly useless to
proceed further with the suit, until the sufficiency of the demurrer has been
tested. For this reason, the statute requires that a demurrer shall be set for
argument at the first term after it is filed. 5
But, as in case of a plea in abatement, the demurrant must not take any step
in the cause until his demurrer has been disposed of, or he will be conclusively
deemed to have abandoned his demurrer. The object of a demurrer is to ascer-
tain whether the Court will require the defendant to make any further answer
to the bill, and if the demurrant voluntarily makes further answer, either by
filing a plea or an answer, such action is a voluntary abandonment of his de-
murrer. 9
If the defendant has incorporated a demurrer in his answer as provided by
1 Code, § 4333. i 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 596; post, % 317. If exhibits arc
2 Some Chancellors allow demurrers to be called made a part of the bill, they may be considered at
up, and argued, on motion days, after motions of the hearing of a demurrer. Pope v. Harrison, 16
course, have been all heard. Such a practice greatly Lea, 82. On the hearing of a demurrer to a bill
expedites the preparation of a cause for hearing, of review, the pleadings and decree sought to be
especially in counties where the term lasts several reviewed may be considered. See, post, § 1251.
weeks. Code, § 4394.
3 The leading counsel for the demurrant usually 8 Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., 39.
replies to the complainant's Solicitor. 1 Dan. Ch.
Pr„ 596.
253 ACTION OP THE COURT ON DEMURRERS. § 315
the Code, 7 he must, also, comply with the further requirement of setting down
the matters of demurrer for argument at the next term of the Court, 8 or it
may be treated as abandoned. 9 And even where leave has been given to rely
on a demurrer in the answer, the advantage of it will be lost, and the demurrer
waived, unless it is disposed of before the cause is heard on the merits. 10
§ 315. Effect of Sustaining, and of Overruling, a Demurrer. If the com- —
plainant conceives that there is not sufficient cause apparent in his bill to sup-
port a demurrer put in to it, or that the demurrer is too extensive, or is other-
wise improper, he may take the judgment of the Court upon it but if he con- ;
ceives the demurrer to be good, and that, by amending his bill, he can remove
the ground of the demurrer, he may do so before the demurrer is argued. But
after a demurrer to the whole of a bill has been argued and allowed, the bill
is out of Court, and therefore cannot be regularly amended. To avoid this con-
sequence, the Court has, sometimes, instead of deciding upon the demurrer,
given the complainant liberty to amend his bill, on his paying the costs incurred
by the defendant. And this is always done in the case of a demurrer for want
of parties. "Where a demurrer leaves any part of a bill untouched, the whole
of the bill may be amended, notwithstanding the allowance of the demurrer
for the suit in that case continues in Court, the want of which circumstance
seems to be the reason of the contrary practice, where a demurrer to the whole
of a bill has been allowed. 11
But, in practice, the Court delivers its opinion upon the demurrer, before
entering up judgment, thus giving the party an opportunity to move for leave
to amend, before final judgment upon the demurrer or, what is more common,;
the counsel interpose orally, at the bar, a suggestion to the Court, that if the
opinion of the Court should be against them, upon any point, relievable by
amendment, they will ask leave for that purpose. 12
Even after a demurrer to the whole bill has been allowed, however, the Court
will allow the bill to be amended, if it can be done at that term, so as to be
proof against the demurrer, and otherwise sustainable 13 but the amendment ;
should be made known to the Court, before ]~ave to make it is allowed, so that
the Court, and not the complainant, may judge of its merit.
If the demurrer is based on, what is termed in this book, grounds of allow-
ance, 14 such as (1) that the bill is not for the whole matter, or (2) that there is
a want of proper parties, or (3) that the bill is multifarious, the Court will
always readily allow the bill to be amended so as to correct the defect, on proper
application, either before or after the demurrer is sustained.
After a demurrer to the whole bill has been overruled, a second demurrer to
the same effect cannot be filed; 15 and the defendant must plead in bar to the
bill, or answer it. 16 The Court may, however, allow a demurrer, to be
amended; 17 or the Court may, in a doubtful case, overrule a demurrer with
leave to the demurrant to rely upon it, in his answer and at the hearing but ;
if, in such a ease, the defendant goes to a hearing, without previously insisting
on the demurrer in his answer, he is deemed to have waived his demurrer. 18 If,
however, a demurrer is overruled without leave to rely on it, such a -ruling is
final, and the Chancellor is bound by it, and cannot redetermine the question,
and sustain the demurrer, at the hearing. 19
7 Code, §! 4318-4319. 13 Code, §§2936; 4333-4335; 4387; Crowder v
s Code, § 4320. Turney, 3 Cold., 551.
9 Caruthers v. Caruthers, 2 Lea, 77, citing Hardin li Ante, §§ 278; 281-288.
v. Egin, 2 Tenn. Ch., 39, which says that a demurrer 16 Code, % 4395; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 600; Sto. Ea PI
contained in an answer, should be set ^for hearing § 460.
as speedily as possible, by the party relying upon it; 16 Code, § 4384.
otherwise, he may be charged with costs, and may be IT But, see, ante, § 306, note 33.
held to have waived its benefits. See, also, on this 18 Rogers v. Betterton & Co., 9 Pick., 630.
point, Kyle v. Riley, 11 Heisk., 230; and Stephens v. 19 Boyd V. Sims, 3 Pick., 771. The practice of
Martin, 1 Pick., 278. overruling demurrers, with leave to rely upon them,
10 Boyd v. Sims, 3 Pick., 774. in the answer, and at the hearing, is questionable!
li Sto. Eq. PL, § 459. If, at the hearing, the demurrer is sustained, all the
12 Sto. Eq. PI., § 459 o. trouble and expense of preparing the case for hear-
§316 ACTION 01? THE COURT ON DEMURRERS. 254
A decree which sustains a ground of demurrer that goes to the entire bill
but overrules other grounds of demurrer, is a final decree, and an appeal lies
from it. 20 The overruling of a demurrer in general terms, when the bill presents
distinct grounds for relief, does not adjudicate that all the grounds are main-
tainable, but only that there is sufficient Equity in the bill to require an an-
swer. 21
When a demurrer is overruled, the defendant must answer the bill by the
next rule day, or by the time prescribed by the Court, or the bill may be taken
for confessed, and final decree pronounced. 22 And if the bill is brought on a
note of hand, a judgment or decree, bond, stated or sworn account, or other
prima facie evidence of debt, and is demurred to, and the demurrer overruled,
and the defendant fails then and there to plead in bar, or answer, or obtain
time to make defence, the complainant is entitled to a pro confesso and a final
decree thereon, instanter. 23
ORDER PRO CONFESSO OJT OVERRULING A DEMURRER,
AND FINAL DECREE.
Cowan, McClung & Co., j
vs. No. 813.— Final Decree. 2 *

f
John Donaldson. J
'
The demurrer of the defendant to the bill having been overruled, and the defendant having
failed to answer the bill in the time allowed by law, on motion of complainant's Solicitor, the
bill is ordered to be taken for confessed and set for hearing ex parte.
And thereupon this cause coming on to be further and finally heard upon the whole record,
and especially on the bill and the said judgment pro confesso, it is ordered, adjudged and
decreed by the Court, that, [Here set out the decree in accordance with the special prayers
of the bill. See post, §§ 566-568.]
DECREE SUSTAINING A DEMURRER, AND DISMISSING THE BILL.
John Doe, 1
vs. V No. 716.

The demurrer of the defendants coming on this day to be argued, the Court is of opinion
that the demurrer is good and sufficient, and it is therefore allowed and the Court, there-
;
upon, orders and decrees that the bill be dismissed, and that complainant and Henry Doe,
his prosecution surety, pay the costs of the cause, for which an execution will issue.
§ 316. —
Amending Demurrers. A demurrer may be amended like any other
pleading; 25 but, inasmuch as a demurrer is, itself, a fault-finder, the Courts
show it but little favor when its own fault is confessed, and leave to amend is
prayed only in order to enable it to find more fault. "Where, however, a part of
the bill is clearly demurrable, but the demurrer, while really aimed at such part,
in fact covers the whole bill, the Court will sometimes allow the demurrer to be
narrowed and confined to so much of the bill as is really demurrable. As
already shown, 26 many demurrers, which would have been good, if confined to
part of the bill, are held bad because they are not so confined. It is manifest,
that a demurrer will not lie to the whole bill, merely because a part of the bill
is demurrable. Where a part only of the bill is demurrable, the demurrer
should be strictly confined to such part. The strictness of the practice on this
subject, however, is not consistent with the liberality of our practice in other
and similar respects, and the Chancellor would be abundantly justified in allow-
ing a demurrer, which is too broad, to be so narrowed in its terms as to apply
exclusively to the demurrable part of the bill, especially when such a course
ing, on the issues of fact, go for naught. A

demur- demurrer been finally determined when first heard.
rer should be finally determined, when first heard; 20 Simmons V. Taylor, 2 Pick., 729.
because, when subjected to a redetermination, it in- 21 Clark v. Pence, 3 Cates, 20.
troduces into the suit an element of uncertainty, 22 Rose v. Meek, 9 Pick., 666.
that tends to prevent a full development of the facts; 23 Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Donaldson, 11 Pick.,
the defendant hoping, and the complainant fearing, 322.
that the demurrer may be sustained, at the next hear- 24 See Cowan, McClung & Co. v. Donaldson, 11
ing, and, the evidence taken, be, thereby, rendered Pick., 322.
absolutely valueless. As a consequence of this state 26 Code, §§2863; 2867.
of uncertainty, neither side, in preparing proofs, 26 Ante, § 306.
puts forth the effort it would have made, had the
255, ACTION OF THE COURT ON DEMURRERS. § 316
would greatly narrow the litigation, and consequently lessen the costs of the
suit. 27
To illustrate what is meant by a demurrer being too broad, and being nar-
rowed, suppose a bill to be filed by John Doe, an administrator, to sell some of
the decedent's town lots, to pay the decedent's debts; and, also, to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance of other lots to Richard Roe, one of his heirs, all of
the heirs being defendants to the bill and suppose Richard Roe should file this
;
demurrer
FORM OF A DEMURRER TOO BROAD.
John Doe, 1
vs. > Demurrer.

The defendant, Richard Roe, demurs to the bill filed against him, and others, in this
tause, on the following grounds
1st. The estate of the complainant's intestate, not being alleged to be insolvent, the com-
plainant, as his administrator, has no right to file a bill to set aside his intestate's conveyance
to this respondent, on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors.
Wherefore, this defendant prays the judgment of the Court, whether he shall be compelled
to answer further, and prays to be hence dismissed.
John Jennings, Solicitor.
On argument, this demurrer would be held to be too broad, and would be

overruled, notwithstanding the manifest fact that the demurrer would have
been good had it been confined to that part of the bill which sought to set aside
the conveyance to Richard Roe. The demurrer, in the commencement, shows
that Richard Roe "demurs to the bill," that is, to the whole bill; and, in its
conclusion, it "prays the judgment of the Court whether the defendant shall be
compelled to answer further, and prays that he be hence dismissed." While,
therefore, it is plain that the demurrer is good to a part of the bill, it is equally
plain that it is not good to the whole of the bill, and that, as a consequence,
Richard Roe must "answer further," and cannot be "dismissed," because the
bill is good as to him, in so far as it seeks to sell some of the town lots to pay
debts.
Now, if the Court should allow this demurrer to be narrowed, its commence-
ment and conclusion would be amended so as to read as follows
FORM OF A DEMURRER TO FART OF A BILL.
John Doe, 1
vs.
\
Demurrer to the Bill.
The defendant, Richard Roe, demurs to so much of the bill as seeks to set aside the con-
veyance made by complainant's intestate to this defendant, and for cause of demurrer shows
[Here set out the same ground of demurrer.]
Wherefore, this defendant prays the judgment of the Court whether he shall be compelled
to answer further as to so much of the bill as seeks to set aside said conveyance; and he
prays to be hence dismissed as to such part of said bill.
John Jennings, Solicitor.
The following are further forms of rulings illustrating probable phases of
the case
RULING OF COURT ON A DEMURRER TOO BROAD.
John Doe, |
vs. No. 683.

\
The demurrer of the defendant, Richard Roe, to the bill coming on this day to be heard,
the Court is of opinion that the demurrer is bad and insufficient, because too broad, and over-
rules the same, and requires the demurrant to answer the bill on tomorrow.
Thereupon the demurrant having narrowed his demurrer, by leave of the Court, so as to
confine it to so much of the bill as seeks to set aside the conveyance made to him by the
decedent, and argument having been heard thereon, the Court is of opinion that the demurrer,
27 The Supreme Court, itself, did this, in the case I PI., § 443, note 4. Courts of Equity should always
.of Riddle V. Motley, 1 Lea, 468. See, also, Sto. Eq. I be liberal, when liberality promotes justice.
§317 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING DEMURRERS. 256
as amended, is good and sufficient and it is, therefore, allowed. Thereupon, it is ordered and
;
decreed that the bill be dismissed, in so far as it seeks to set aside said conveyance. The
demurrant is allowed one day in which to answer the remainder of the bill.
But, supposing on the filing of said amended demurrer the complainant
should ask and obtain leave to so amend his bill as to avoid the point of the said
demurrer, then the ruling of the Court would be as follows
ORDER OP COURT OVERRULING A DEMURRER.
John Doe,
vs. No. 683.
\
Richard Roe, et al.
The amended demurrer of Richard Roe to the bill in this cause coming on for argument,
on motion of the complainant he is allowed to amend his bill by inserting at the end of the
2d paragraph the words, "the insolvency of the estate of the decedent has been duly suggested
to the County Court of said County," and said amendment having been made on the face of
the bill, thereupon the Court overruled the demurrer, and required the demurrant to answer
Hie bill, and three days are allowed him for that purpose.
ARTICLE VII.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING DEMURRERS.
318. The Practical Value of Demurrers
§ 317. The Disposition of the Court towards Considered.
Demurrers. 319. How to Frame a Demurrer.
The Disposition of the Court towards Demurrers. The Courts do
§ 317. —
not favor demurrers; and this for several reasons: (1) they are often unneces-
sarily filed (2) they are frequently hypercritical (3) they are many times filed
; ;
for delay (4) they sometimes evince a disposition to stifle an investigation of

;
the merits of the controversy; and (5) as a result, they very seldom have any
merit; and are, consequently, generally overruled. 1
The legislation of our State, 2 and that of England, has long been hostile to
frivolous demurrers; and the object of our statute, in allowing a defendant to
rely on a demurrer in his answer, was to save the delay occasioned by separate
demurrers, 3 and in that way mitigate some of the evils resulting from demur-
rers without adequate grounds.
The Courts make every reasonable presumption in favor of the bill when
assailed by a demurrer 4 and if, upon a critical examination of the facts stated
;
in the bill, there is a possibility that the suit may be sustained, though upon a
different ground from that assumed, a demurrer to the whole bill will be over-
ruled, 5 the policy of the Courts being, to give every complainant an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the merits of his case, when any Equity whatever appears
in his bill, although defectively stated. 6 For this reason, demurrers are now less
frequently filed than formerly. 7
§ 318.
—
The Practical Value of Demurrers Considered. Demurrers are often —
of more practical value to the complainant than to the defendant and the only ;
substantial ground of complaint against demurrers, is the delay occasioned by

1 See, Barton's Suit in Equity, 113; Sto. Eq. PI., Ambiguum placitum interpretari debet contra pro-
§ 454, note. See statutes, and Court rules, in vari- ferentem. Our Courts apply the maxim, Benigne fa-
ous States, against demurrers. Code, §§2865; 2934; cienda sunt interpretations, ut res magis vateat
2938; 4319; 4397; Tenn. Ch. Rule I, §7; Equity qyam pereat; and such is the spirit of our religion,
Rules of U. S. Courts, §§31; 34; Cooke, 403. Constitution and laws. Const., Art. 1, § 17; Code, 5
2 Code, §§2865; 2934-2938. 2S84. See, ante, § 63.
3 Hardin «. Egin, 2 Tenn. Ch., 39. 6 Trafford V. Wilkinson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 449.
4 Thompson v. Paul, 8 Hum., 114; Lincoln V. Pur- 8 Anderson «. Mullenix, 5 Lea, 287.
cell, 2 Head, 143; Kerr v. Kerr, 3 Lea, 222. The 7 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 542.
English rule is the reverse, following the maxim.
257 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING DEMURRERS. §319
demurrers that are frivolous, hypercritical and impertinent. Demurrers, gener-
ally, are but little more than a notification to the complainant to amend his bill
in certain particulars, to strengthen it where weak, and to unload it of unneces-
sary matters, or parties and the Solicitor of the demurrant thus becomes a
;
mere volunteer training-master to assist in putting the complainant's bill into

such a shape that it will triumphantly reach the goal of its ambition. 8 Indeed,
the demurrant, either in his demurrer, or in his argument thereon, often points
out to the erring complainant the true road to success a road the latter is —
generally not slow to take advantage of, by amending his bill, thus using the
demurrant's own weapon to destroy him in the final battle. 9
As a rule, a defendant should never demur, unless the point of his demurrer
will almost certainly either, (1) cause the bill to be dismissed for want of juris-
diction of the person or the subject-matter; or (2) will penetrate to the very
heart of the bill, and thus totally destroy it; or (3) will be fatal to some sub-
stantia] part of the bill, 10 in which latter case, he should be very careful to con-
fine his demurrer to that part of the bill intended to be aimed at. Such a de-
murrer is a vindication of the right of a demurrer to a place in the science of
pleading, for it ends the litigation with the least possible delay, and the least
possible costs and thus benefits alike the complainant, the demurrant, and the
;
Court.
§ 319. How to Frame a Demurrer. —A
demurrer is, in substance, some con-
clusive reason why
the defendant should not be required to answer the bill.
This reason should be expressed in the most concise and cogent manner possible.
Some demurrers are as long as an argument some state, restate, and reiterate
;
the restatement of the same objection and others are a mere collection of criti-
;
cisms. As a rule, the longer the demurrer, the weaker it is and the more num- ;
erous the causes of demurrer, the less its effect. Sometimes it is well to restate
a ground of demurrer in an alternative form but long demurrers should never
;
be filed. The ground of almost any demurrer may be expressed in five or six
lines and if three or four grounds are not sufficient to destroy the bill, it would
;
be better to answer the bill at once, for it is safe to predict that a longer de-
murer will be ineffectual.
A
demurrable bill generally exposes a vulnerable part to plain view, and a
demurrer is some keen point of law, driven into the bill through this weak and
exposed part. A. demurrer operates like a stiletto, and not like a bombardment.
The brevity of an axiom, or a proverb, should characterize its form; and its
8 The following observations of Wigram are quoted of them all. If circumstances exist, as in the case
in a note to section 859, of Story's Eq. PI. : "A de- put by Lord Redesdale, by which the plaintiff's right
fendant, who demurs, indeed, may have the benefit to relief may be qualified, the defendant, by pleading,
of every objection, which is apparent from the face may lose the benefit of those qualifying circum-
of the bill, and a decision in favor of a demurrer, stances, which an answer would save. And, if the
if submitted to by the plaintiff, will put a more ground of defence be single, the defendant will
speedy termination to a suit, than a defense by an- obtain no advantage by a plea, which an answer
swer. But this possible advantage is purchased at will not equally afford him, but will subject himself
the price of a premature discussion of the case, of to the disadvantage of a premature discussion of
which, if the demurrer should be unsuccessful, upon his case, which has already been adverted to. Neg-
argument, or the plaintiff be permitted to amend ative pleas were (although reluctantly) admitted in
his bill, or if he should file a new bill, he will not Equity pleadings; because, without such a mode of
fail to take advantage. The injurious consequences meeting a case, the defendant was without the
of such discussions have, almost universally, induced means of protecting himself against discovery."
counsel of the greatest experience to advise against Wigram on Discovery, §§ 153-161. Inasmuch as a
the practice of demurring, except where it was of discovery is seldom sought now, the effect of the
paramount importance to the defendant, to avoid foregoing quotation is: Never to demur, or plead,
some of the discovery sought by the bill. The nec- when the same defence may be made by answer.
essity for demurring could never have existed, if a 9 Not seldom does the demurrant's Solicitor feel,
defendant could, by answer, be protected against the at the hearing, that his defeat was the result of his
discovery, which the demurrer would cover. A
plea, own demurrer.
which raises a question of law only, is in the same
predicament as a demurrer. A plea, however, which " So the struck eagle, stretched upon the plain,
raises a question of fact, is open to observations of No more through rolling clouds to soar again,
a graver character, which would necessarily super- Viewed his own feather on the fatal dart
sede its use, if a defendant might, by answer, pro- And wing'd the shaft that quivered in his heart."
tect himself against discovery, save that, which may
be necessary to try the plea itself. If the defendant 10' What is meant here by " some substantial part
has several grounds of defense, he will, by plea, lose of the bill," is,some part, which, when destroyed,
the benefit of all, except that which his plea may will either lessen the costs,
(1) or, (2) lessen the
raise; whereas, by answer, he may have the benefit recovery against the demurrant.
§ 319 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING DEMURRERS. 25§
substance should not only be good law, but law that will pierce the heart of the
bill to its very core.
If the bill includes more matters than one, a demurrer may be applied to one
of these parts, in which case great care should be taken to expressly confine the
demurrer to the particular part of the bill intended to be covered by the
demurrer. A bill cannot be destroyed by striking at one if its limbs. The books
—
are full of cases of demurrers overruled because too broad, demurrers which
would have been allowed, if they had been narrowed and confined to the par-
ticular matter assailed. When you demur to a part of a bill only, say so, and
specify the part and answer the remainder of the bill. Remember these rules
;
1. Never demur to the whole bill, unless the point of your demurrer will
destroy the whole bill.
2. Never demur to the whole bill, when the point of your demurrer is fatal
to a part only of the bill.
3. When your ground of demurrer is destructive of a part only of the bill,
confine your demurrer to such part only, and answer the remainder of the bill.
4. Condense each ground of your demurrer into a single short and cogent
sentence, or proposition.
5. Assign no cause of demurrer unless (1) it is applicable to the facts con-
tained in the bill, and (2) will certainly show that those facts do not entitle the
complainant to the relief thereon sought against the demurrant.
6. Content yourself with two or three grounds of demurrer, no ground cov-
ering more than five or six lines in writing.
7. Never demur when your demurrer will benefit your adversary more than
your client.
Always demur when the bill shows a want of
8. jurisdiction; the failure to
demur in such a case may be fatal to your client.
259 PLEAS IN BAR. §320
CHAPTER XVI.
PLEAS IN BAR.
Article I. Pleas in Bar Generally Considered.
Article II. Kinds of Pleas in Bar. .
Article III. Frame and Form of Pleas in Bar.

Article IV. Pleas Supported by an Answer:
Article V. Proceedings upon a Plea in Bar.
ARTICLE I.
PLEAS IN BAR GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

320. Pleas in Bar Defined. § 322. The Various Kinds of Pleas in Bar.
321. Pleas in Bar Distinguished from Pleas § 323. The Rationale of Pleas in Bar.
in Abatement. § 324. Pleas in Bar no Longer Necessary.
§ 320.
—
Pleas in Bar 1 Defined. "When any matter fatal to the bill, or to any
substantive part of it, appears on the face of the bill itself, it may be taken
advantage of by a demurrer, and, sometimes, by a motion to dismiss but, when ;
a matter fatal to the bill, or to any substantive part of it, exists in fact, but
is not apparent on the face of the bill, it must be brought before the Court by
an affirmative plea, or by an answer. So, if some single allegation of the bill
be false, and if the proof of its falsity will defeat the bill, or defeat a material
part of the bill, such allegation may be denied by a negative plea. Hence, it
may be generally stated that the office of a plea is either (1) to bring forward
some single matter of fact, omitted from the bill, which, if true, will destroy
the bill, or (2) to deny some single matter of fact alleged in the bill, which, if
false, will deprive the bill of its Equity, and cause its dismissal. The former
is called an affirmative plea, the latter a negative plea. It will thus be seen, that
a plea is a special answer showing, or relying on, a single matter of fact as
ground for dismissing the bill. But while the defence proper for a plea is one
that presents a single point or matter of fact,, which will cause the dismissal
of the bill, or that part of it to which the plea applies, nevertheless it is not nec-
essary that the defence should consist of a single fact the defence may consist :
of a variety of circumstances, if they are all material, and all tend to one point. -
The office of a plea in bar is to narrow the issue, lessen the costs, and speed the
decision of the controversy.' For this reason, the Court does not ordinarily
allow more than one plea in bar to be filed for, if more than one plea be filed,
;
the costs and delays would be nearly or quite as great, as though the defendant
had answered.
An affirmative plea brings forward a matter of fact omitted from the bill,
and which if alleged would have rendered the bill demurrable while a negative ;
plea denies a matter of fact which, if it had been omitted from the bill, would
l Pleas in bar are seldom used in Tennessee 2 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 603; Sto. Eq. PI., § 649. The
Chancery practice, as all matters that can be set up matter ofwhich the plea presents, may be
fact,
by such pleas can now be set up in an answer. made up of constituent facts.
several Thus, the
Code, § 4318. Such pleas, however, are largely plea of innocent purchaser brings forward the sev-
considered in this book, 1st, because they are allow- eral facts constituting that defence: (1) Seizure in
able and sometimes used; and 2d, because they fee, by the defendant's vendor; (2) a conveyance,
show the defences that can be made by an answer, in fee, to the defendant; (3) the payment of the
and illustrate the particularity required in an purchase-price, and (4) the absence of notice of
answer when certain special defences are set up. complainant's alleged equities.
As to the practical value of pleas in bar, see, ante,
§ 318, note 8; and, post, %% 324; 359.
§321 PLEAS IN BAR. 260
have made the bill demurrable. A defendant cannot, by an affirmative plea
insist upon a matter which is apparent upon the face of the bill, and may
be'
made the subject of a demurrer. 3
Pleas in bar admit: (1) that the Court has jurisdiction; and (2) that the bill
on its face entitles the complainant to relief; and seek (3) to defeat his title
to that relief, by either denying some material fact alleged in the bill, or by
bringing forward some new material fact which avoids the case made out by
the bill. Hence, pleas in bar, when sustained, terminate the particular suit.
Pleas in bar are not so much used as formerly to set up defences in bar, for
the reason that, under the Code, the defendant may now incorporate all matters
of defence, on the merits, in his answer, and is not required to plead specially
in any case, except in abatement. 4 The meaning of the statute is that all
matters, on which a plea in bar may be grounded, may be set up in an answer
and as discoveries and sworn answers are seldom called for now, an answer is
ordinarily a mere plea, or series of pleas, in the garb of an answer. Under our
practice, the substance of pleas is retained to the utmost, even when incor-
porated in an answer, and no one can draw an answer, with accuracy and pre-
cision, unless he well understands the essentials of pleas in bar. 5
§ 321. Pleas in Bar Distinguished from Pleas in Abatement. The division —

of pleas in the English practice is into: (1) pleas to the jurisdiction; (2) pleas
to the person of the complainant or defendant; (3) pleas to the bill; and (4)
pleas in bar. In our practice, all pleas are divided into (1) pleas in abatement,
and (2) pleas in bar. All pleas in abatement dispute the jurisdiction of the
Court over the person, or the subject-matter. Pleas in bar include all defences,
proper for a plea, that do not dispute the jurisdiction of the Court. 8 The
matter of a plea in bar can always be set up in an answer whereas the matter ;
of a plea in abatement can never be set up in an inswer, but must always be

pleaded specially, and pleaded before any other defence is made, or offered to
be made. Pleas in abatement deny that the Court has any right to take any
step at all in the suit, except to dismiss it. Pleas in bar concede the right of
the Court to proceed in the cause, but deny that the complainant is entitled to
the relief prayed, or at least to some substantive part of the relief prayed. In
our practice pleas in bar range in effect all the way from a simple dismissal of
the bill, as in case of a plea of a former suit pending, to a total bar of the sub-
ject-matter of the bill, as in case of plea of former judgment.
§ 322. —
The Various Kinds of Pleas in Bar. Pleas in bar are, ordinarily, di-
vided into (1) the pure, or affirmative, (2) the negative, or impure, and (3)
:
the anomalous.
1. Affirmative Pleas in Bar are those which merely state matter not apparent
upon the bill, and rely upon the effect of such matter in bar of the complainant's
claim. Such a plea usually proceeds upon the ground that, admitting the case
stated by the bill to be true, the matter suggested by the plea affords a sufficient
reason why the complainant should not have the relief he prays, or the dis-
covery which he seeks and when such a plea is put in, the Court, in order to
;
save expense to the parties, or to protect the defendant from a discovery which
he ought not to be compelled to make, instantly decides upon the validity of the
defence, taking the plea and the bill, so far as it is not contradicted by the plea,
to be true. 7
3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 604. under the head of pleas, as under the head of
4 Code, 88 4318; 4309: 4385; Lowery v. Naff, 4 answers. An answer is a mere series of pleas; and
Cold., 370; Bennett V. Wilkins, 5 Cold., 240; Ken the averments necessary in a plea are equally neces-
drick v. Davis, 3 Cold., 524. sary in an answer. Hence, the space devoted to
5 Defences in bar are the same, whether set up pleas is, by no means, misused; but essential to a
in a plea, or in an answer; and, although the ordi- thorough understanding of the science of defensive
nary practice now is to set up these defences in an pleading.
answer, rather than by plea; nevertheless, the de- 6 See Pleas in Abatement, ante, 5 241.
fences are the same, and can be as well considered • 7 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 604.
The grounds of affirmative pleas in bar are almost as numerous as are the
affirmative defences that may be set up in an answer; but the following are
the principal grounds: (1) prematurity of the suit; (2) another suit pending;
(3) a former judgment; (4) an award; (5) payment; (6) a release; (7) a
stated account; (8) the statute of limitations; (9) the statute of frauds and
perjuries; and (10) innocent purchaser.
2. Negative Pleas in Bar are those which, instead of admitting the facts
stated in the bill, and destroying their effect by setting up some new fact or
chain of facts, undertake to destroy the complainant 'a right to relief, by deny-
ing some matter of fact stated in the bill on which his right depends. Thus,
where a bill is filed to redeem, or to foreclose a mortgage, or to settle a partner-
ship, a negative plea averring that there is no mortgage, or that there is no
partnership, will be good. 8 So this plea will lie to negative the character in
which the complainant sues, or the defendant is sued, as where the complainant
sues, or the defendant is sued, as heir, executor, administrator, guardian, or as
a corporation, or partner.
A
negative plea must, ordinarily, be supported by an answer, when the bill
sets up matters which, if not denied by the answer, would, if true, defeat the
plea. 9
Negative pleas in bar ordinarily deny (1) that the complainant possesses
the character in which he sues, or (2) that the defendant possesses the character
in which he is sued, or (3) that the complainant has the title he claims, or (4)
that the defendant executed the instrument sued on, or (5) that complainants
are partners, or (6) that the debt or demand sued on is of the value of fifty
dollars.
Anomalous Pleas in Bar 10 are those which, strictly speaking, neither affirm
3.
new matter nor negative the complainant's title as alleged in the bill, but which
reassert some fact stated in the bill, and which the bill seeks to impeach, and
deny all the circumstances which the complainant relies upon as the ground
upon which he seeks to impeach the fact so set up. Thus, where a bill is brought
to impeach a decree, on the ground of fraud used in obtaining it, the decree
may be pleaded in bar of the suit, with averments negativing the charges of
fraud. 11 Anomalous pleas must be supported by an answer, when the bill seeks
a discovery, or alleges facts or circumstances in avoidance of the admitted bar. 12
§ 323. —
The Rationale of Pleas in Bar. The logic of an affirmative plea in
bar is this the complainant having omitted from the bill an essential matter of
:
fact, which, if it had not been omitted, would have rendered the bill demurra-
ble, the defendant may, by bringing this omitted essential matter of fact before
the Court, destroy the apparent case contained in the bill, and in this way ter-
minate the litigation, quickly and cheaply. Thus, a bill may show on its face
a good cause of action, setting up many details, and praying for relief. If,
however, the bill suppresses the fact that there has been a payment or a release,
or a former adjudication, or that the suit is barred by the statutes of limitation,
or that any other statutory, or equitable, defence exists, in any such case the
defendant may set up this suppressed fact by a plea in bar, and, thereby, end
the suit.
s 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 604-605; Sto. Eq. PL, § 660. separately considered in this Chapter. The charac-
9 Seifred v. People's Bank, 1 Bax., 200. teristics of each of the three classes are distinctive;
10 Negative pleas are sometimes termed anomalous and any attempt to treat them under one head, or
pleas; but, in this volume, they are separately even under two heads, is sure to result in confusion,
classed. if not in error. Beames, Story, and Daniel, find
u 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 605 ; 607. themselves obliged, constantly, to use qualifying
12 Whithorne v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., phrases, and make exceptions, in treating of pleas;
147. Anomalous pleas are, sometimes, termed im- because, much that is true of one sort of plea, is*
pure, and, sometimes, incongruous, pleas; they are, not true of the other two sorts. See Beames' PL
also, occasionally, termed negative pleas; but their in Eq., 6; 7; 9-18; 36; 124-125; Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 651;
character is so different from that of an ordinary 660$ 667-671. This confusion is almost entirely
negative plea, that they are treated, in this work, obviated by separating pleas into three classes, as
as a separate class. It is believed that many of the has been done in the text. Daniel recognizes these
difficulties in dealing with pleas, arise from inter- three classes. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 604-607.
mixing the three classes of pleas, which have been
A negative plea in bar denies some essential allegation contained in the bill
some averment on which the case rests and the logic of the plea is that, inas-
; :
much as the complainant's alleged rights all depend on a false allegation of a

single essential matter of fact, it is unnecessary for the defendant to answer all
the various charges and averments in the bill, when the suit can be ended by a
plea denying the allegation of this one essential matter of fact. A negative plea
in bar is the opposite of an affirmative plea; an affirmative plea in bar seeks
to bring into the case an essential matter of fact which the bill has left out,
while a negative plea seeks to strike out of the case an essential matter of fact
which the bill has brought in. In other words, an affirmative plea seeks to end
the suit by injecting into it a fatal fact, and a negative plea seeks to end the
suit by extracting from it a vital fact.
It is plain, that both affirmative and negative pleas in bar are really nothing
more than short, pointed answers, intended to confine the litigation to a single
issue, that, if decided in favor of the defendant, would end the suit; and, it
is for this reason, the Courts often disallow a plea in bar as a plea, but allow
it to stand as an answer, with liberty to the complainant to except to it for
insufficiency, as an answer.
§ 324. Pleas in Bar no Longer Necessary. —Under the old practice, the de-
fendant was required to answer most searching interrogatories in reference to
his business affairs and could be forced to divulge the most important secrets
;
relative to the matters in controversy. To avoid the unpleasant necessity of

these disclosures, the lawyers of those days resorted to pleas in bar whenever
they could be made available. The result was a very artificial system of plead-
ing, quite foreign to the simplicity of the original Chancery practice. But now
that a discovery is seldom sought by a bill, and parties are competent witnesses,
the old necessity for pleas in bar has, to a great extent, ceased to exist; and
they are, therefore, seldom used. Under our practice, a defendant is not re-
quired to specially plead any matter in bar, but may incorporate all matters
of defence to the merits in his answer. 13 Unless, therefore, the defendant de-
sires to plead some matter in abatement, he will, ordinarily, set forth his de-
fences in an answer, and thus avoid the perils and perplexities incident to pleas
in bar. 14 Nevertheless, when either a negative or affirmative plea in bar will
greatly narrow the controversy, and thereby lessen costs, and shorten the
litigation, such a plea would be good practice. As illustrations of cases where
pleas in bar may be advantageously interposed, may be mentioned the follow-
ing affirmative pleas: (1) accord and satisfaction, (2) payment, (3) account
stated or settled, (4) award, (5) former judgment, (6) failure of consideration,
(7) infancy, (8) coverture, (9) duress, (10) statute of limitations, (11) stat-
ute of frauds; and the following negative pleas: (1) denial of the character
in which the complainant sues, or the defendant is sued (2) denial of the rela- ;
tion alleged, and (3) non est factum.

13 Code, § 4318. plicable to pleas in bar. They illustrate the logic of
14 While pleas in bar are no longer necessary, legal defence; and the uniform ruling of our Courts
and are, in fact, seldom resorted to, nevertheless is, that, when matter proper for a plea is incor-
their logic remains, and he who wishes to be a good porated in an answer, all the certainty required in a
pleader must master that logic. All the defences plea is necessary in the answer. Connell V. Furga-
that can be made by plea in bar can, also, be made son, 5 Cold., 405; Rhea V. Allison, 3 Head, 179;
by answer; but the defences are the same, and the Stephens v. Porter, 11 Heisk., 348. See Arnold )!.
essential averments are the same; and no pleader Kyle, 8 Bax., 322. As to the practical value of
can intelligently draw an answer who does not pleas, see ante, § 318, note 8.
thoroughly understand the rules and principles ap-
263 KINDS OF PLEAS IN BAR. §325
ARTICLE II.
KINDS OF PLEAS IN BAR.

8 325. Pleas to the Bill. § 330. Plea of the Statute of Frauds.
§ 326. Pleas to the Person. § 331. Plea of a Statute of Limitations.
§ 327. Plea of Title in the Defendant. § 332. Plea of Innocent Purchaser.
§ 328. Plea or Former Suit Pending. § 333. Pleas of Stated, and of Settled, Ac-
§ 329. Plea of Former Judgment, or res ad- counts.
judicata. S 334. Other Pleas in Bar.
§ 325. —
Pleas in Bar to the Bill. Courts of Equity delight to do complete
justice, and not by halves. This maxim means that the Court delights to do
complete justice in one and the same suit, and not to do half justice in one suit,
and risk the chance of doing the other half, in another suit about the same
general cause of action. For this reason, Courts of Equity require (1) that
all the persons necessary to enable the Court to do complete justice in one suit
shall be made parties, either complainant or defendant and (2) that one cause ;
of action shall not be split into several.

These matters may be set up by plea but such pleas, like demurrers by al-
;
lowance, are not based on any ground of right in the defendant, and are allowed
by the Court only in the interest of good pleading, and in aid of the proper
administration of justice. The grounds of these two pleas may be more fully
stated as follows:
1. That the Bill is for Only a Part of the Subject-Matter of the controversy,
that the complainant is splitting up his cause of action, and is, thereby, giving
occasion for a multiplicity of suits. 1
2. That there is a Mis- Joinder of Parties Complainant, or a non-joinder of
parties complainant or defendant. 2 If the complainants have no joint right of
action against the defendant, he may plead that fact. So, if there is such a
deficiency of parties, whether complainants or defendants, that the Court will
be unable to do complete justice, this fact may be pleaded, the plea showing
the persons proper to be made parties, either by name or description, to the end
that the complainant may know how to amend his bill, 3 and bring the deficient
parties before the Court, either by making them co-complainants, or by making
them defendants, or both.
Pleas for want of proper parties are, however, seldom filed, as they very
seldom profit the defendant. Under our Code, a non-joinder of parties is no
sufficient cause for the dismissal of a bill in Equity, unless objection is made by
motion to dismiss, or demurrer. 4 On such a plea being sustained by proof, the
cause will be ordered to stand over, with leave to the complainant to amend,
but if the amendment is not made on a rule given, the bill may then be dis-
missed. 5
§ 326. —
Pleas to the Person. These pleas, in effect, maintain that whatever
may be the merits of the case on the facts, either (1) the complainant is not the
person to call upon the Court to investigate them, or (2) if the complainant
1 Sto.Eq. PL, §§287; 746. by adding the necessary parties, as is done even
2 Code, §§4325; 4337; 4386; 4388. where a demurrer for want of parties is allowed.
note; 238.
3 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 745, Gray v. Hays, 7 Hum., 588; Sto. Eq. PI., § 745.
4 Code, § 4325. This section is not in conflict 5 It is difficult to classify pleas to the bill: their
with §4337; for, while the latter section recognizes matter and effect are in abatement, but as they do
a plea for want of proper parties, yet it does not not object to the jurisdiction of the Court, they
authorize a hill to be dismissed because of such a may be set up in an answer, and must, therefore, in
plea. The order on sustaining such a plea, would our practice, be classed among pleas in bar. See
be to let the bill stand over, with leave to amend Code. 55 4337: 4386: 4388.
§326 KINDS OF PLEAS IN BAR. 264
is the person, that the defendant is not the person he is alleged to be. These
pleas question, ordinarily, either the character in which the complainant sues,
or in which the defendant is sued, and include the following:
1. That the complainant is an infant, or married woman, or a person of un-
• sound mind, and sues in his or her own name, without next friend, or guardian. 6
2. That the defendant is not a single woman, nor an adult, nor a person of
sound mind.
3. That the complainant suing, or the defendant is being sued, as adminis-
is
trator or executor, when he does not
possess that character in this State, having
been appointed by some other State.
4. That the complainant does not sustain the character in which he sues;
that he is not a corporation, or an administrator, or executor, or guardian, or
trustee, or partner, or heir, or husband, or wife, or widow, or devisee, or legatee,
or distributee, or tenant in common. 7
5. That the defendant does not possess the character in which he is sued;
that, he is not a corporation, or an executor, or administrator, or guardian, or
trustee, or heir, or husband, or tenant, or partner, or the official he is represented
to be. 8
6. That the complainant or defendant is a bankrupt. If a complainant, who
has made an assignment in bankruptcy, sues for a debt included in his assign-
ment,, the defendant can plead that fact in bar to the bill, or may allege it in
his answer. On the other hand, if a defendant has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy, and is sued upon a debt from which he has been discharged, he can
plead such discharge in bar to the bill, or may set it up in his answer. The
certified discharge is evidence of the jurisdiction of the Court granting the dis-
charge, and of the regularity of the proceedings, and of the discharge itself. A
discharge in bankruptcy does not, however, proprio vigore, nullify all antecedent
debts, but must be pleaded, and if the defendant fails to plead his own dis-
charge, or the assignment in bankruptcy by the complainant, he is deemed to
have waived such defense, and must suffer judgment accordingly. But a dis-
charge when pleaded and proved is conclusive and cannot be avoided. 9
These pleas, under the old practice, were generally classed as pleas in abate-
ment, 10 but in our practice they are pleas in bar, because they do not question
the jurisdiction of the Court, and may, therefore, be relied on in an answer.
The last three classes are, also, pleas in bar by the strict logic of pleading,
because, if true, they do not abate the suit, but bar the complainant's right or'
recovery against the defendant, and forever terminate the controversy. These
pleas are the same in effect as those that deny the title of the complainant to
institute the suit, or deny the interest of the defendant in the subject-matter
of the suit. 11
PLEA THAT COMPLAINANT IS A MARRIED WOMAN.
commencement, and conclusion, see, post, § 340.]
[For title,
The defendants, for plea to the bill filed against them in this cause, say,
That the complainant, Sarah Doe, before and at the time of the filing of her said bill, was,
and now is, a married woman, the wife of John Doe, who is still living and fully capable of
suing, if necessary, in her behalf.
o Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 725; 727; ante, §§ 82-83. proceedings have taken away from the bankrupt
7 Sto. Eq. PI., § 727. complainant his rights, or from the bankrupt de-
8 Sto. Eq. PL, § 732. fendant his liability. Whatever destroys the com-
Sto. Eq. PL, §§519, 722, 726; Morris v. Creed, plainant's suit, and disables him forever from re-
11 Heisk., 165; Hudson V. Bingham, 12 Heisk., 59: covering, may be pleaded in bar. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
L,oveland's Pro. in Bankr., § 298. 638. If a party who sues as heir is not an heir,
io Sto. Eq. PL, §§708; 722. does not a plea denying his heirship as completely
11 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 728; 734. In all the cases in bar the suit as would a plea admitting his heirship,
the last four classes stated in the text, the plea, if but denying his ancestor's title? The want of
found true, forever terminates the controversy, by character cannot be cured as to that suit; and, it _
showing, either (1) that the complainant has no complainant subsequently becomes an heir, admin-
right to the relief he seeks, because he has no title istrator, guardian, or other character, and then
to the character in. which he sues; or, (2) that the sues, as such, it is as much a new and different
defandant is not liable to the complainant, because suit as that of a complainant, who, after being de:
he has not the character, and consequent liability, feated, for want of a title to a particular farm,
the complainant alleges; or, (3) that the bankruptcy should bring a second suit, after acquiring that title.
265 KINDS OP PLEAS IN BAR. §327
PLEA THAT DEFENDANT IS A MARRIED WOMAN.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see, post, §340.].
The defendant, Mary Roe, for plea to the bill, says

That when the bill in this cause was filed she was and now is married to one Richard Roe,
who was then and still is her husband, and living in Knox county, Tennessee.
PLEA THAT COMPLAINANT IS AN INPANT.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see, post, § 340.]
That the said complainant at the time of filing his said bill was, and now is, an infant under
the age of twenty-one years, and he sues by neither a guardian nor a next friend.
PLEA OF BANKRUPTCY OF THE DEFENDANT.
That, on the day of 190-., in the District Court of the United States for the
,
......District of Tennessee, he was adjudged a bankrupt, and was duly discharged from
the debt or demand set forth in complainant's bill, as will more fully appear from said dis-
charge which is herewith filed, marked A, and made a part of this plea.
§ 327. —
Plea of Title in the Defendant. If the defendant's title be superior
to the complainant 's, he may plead it in bar. Such a plea will, generally speak-
ing, be founded either (1) on an adverse possession sufficiently long to bar the
suit, or (2) on a will, or (3) on a conveyance. 12 To a bill brought by an heir
at in posession, the latter may plead his title under the
law against a devisee
will, averring that the will was duly executed and proven. To a bill by an
heir against the defendant in possession of land claimed by the former, the
defendant may plead a conveyance executed to him by the ancestor. 13 To a
bill brought by the holder of the last deed in the regular chain of conveyances
from the grantee against a person in possession, the latter may plead, (1) that
he has had twenty years' notorious and continuous adverse possession of the
land; or (2) that the land has been granted, and that he has had seven years'
notorious and continuous adverse possession thereof, under a color of title or ;
(3) that he has had seven years' continuous adverse possession thereof. The
last plea is a plea of the statute of limitations, as it merely bars the suit, while
the first two pleas are pleas of title, the possession being merely the evidence
of title, and standing in the place of a deed, and having the same force and
effect. The matter of the first and second of the above named pleas may be
relied on without being specially pleaded.
§ 328. —
Plea of Former Suit Pending. In Courts of concurrent Equity juris-
diction, the one that first acquires jurisdiction thereby obtains exclusive juris-
diction. 14 If, therefore, there be a suit pending, in another Court of concurrent
Equity jurisdiction, between the same parties, concerning the same subject-
matter, and for the same object, the defendant to the second suit may plead the
pendency of the former suit as a defence 15 to the second suit. But the pen-
either, of the former suits, cannot be pleaded in

12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 672. bar of the third suit.
13 Sto. Eq. PI., § 812. Nevertheless, the plea of former suit depending
14 Moore V. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 143. questions not so much the jurisdiction of the Court
is The exact character and class of the plea of as the manifest unjustness of permitting the de-
former suit depending seem involved in some doubt; fendant to be twice sued, at the same time, for the
and, in our Courts, the plea has oscillated between same matter; and, to this extent, it goes to the
pleas in abatement and pleas in bar. It is said, in merits. For this_ reason, in our practice, this de-
Green V. Neal, that it is not strictly a plea in abate- fence may be relied on in the answer; and, hence,
ment, but is in the nature of a plea in bar. 2 under the Code, must be treated as in the nature of
Heisk., 219. In Macy v. Childress, it is said to be a plea in bar, as to the time, and manner, of setting
in the nature of a plea in abatement. 2 Tenn. Ch., it up; but as in the nature of a plea in abatement,
25. And in Morley V. Power, 5 Lea, 697; and, in when its effect is to be considered. Connell v. Fer-
Connell V. Ferguson, it is said to be strictly, neither guson, 5 Cold., 401; and cases above cited. Parmlee
a plea in abatement, nor in bar, but a plea to the V. Railroad, 13 Lea, 600. It is said in Turley v.
bill. 5 Cold., 405. In Tennessee, all pleas are Turley, 1 Pick., 261, that all pleas may be relied
either pleas in abatement, or pleas in bar. Code, upon in an answer, which do not go to the juris-
§ 4384. This is, manifestly, not a plea in bar, log- diction of the Court; and this is the true, and only,
ically considered; for, if successful, it does not bar criterion in our State. And in Railroad v. Brigman,
the suit, but only abates it; and if, after the plea 11 Pick., 625, citing the above section of this book,
is allowed, the former suit is dismissed by the com- (then, § 333,) it is held that a plea of former suit
plainant, he can bring a third suit in the Court, pending is a plea in abatement in our Circuit Courts,
allowing the plea, against the same parties, and for but a plea in bar in our Chancery Courts. See, ante
the same purpose; and the dismissal of both, or §§241; 243; 321.
§328 KINDS OF PLBAS IN BAR. 266
dency of two suits 10 for the same subject-matter, and the same purpose, in two
different Chancery Courts in this State, will not prevent both Courts from
pro-
ceeding to a hearing where each suit is instituted by a different person. 17 The
pendency of a suit in another State, or in a United States Court sitting in this
State, cannot be pleaded in abatement, or in bar, to a suit in our own State
between the same parties upon the same matter. 18
The plea should set forth, with certainty, (1) the commencement of the
former suit, its general nature, and character, and objects and the relief prayed,
giving the substance of the former bill or declaration (2) that the second suit ;
is for the same subject-matter as the first, and between the same parties, or
their privies; (3) that the proceedings in the former suit were taken for the
same purpose; (4) that there have been proceedings in the suit, such as an
appearance, or process requiring an appearance, and (5) that the former suit
is still pending. 19
not necessary that the former suit should be between precisely the same
It is
parties as the latter suit it may be between their privies. 20 Nor is it necessary
:
that the entire subject-matter of the latter suit be included in the former suit,
for if the latter suit is for a part of the subject-matter of the former suit, the
plea will lie. 21 Thus, if after a bill is filed to recover property, and a second
bill is filed to recover a part of the same property, either by the original com-
plainant or a purchaser from him, the pendency of the former suit may be
pleaded.
Where there is a plea of the pendency of a former suit, the course is to
obtain a reference of the plea to the Master to ascertain and report, whether
both suits are substantially the same and the course, which the Court has
;
taken, where the second bill has appeared to embrace the whole subject in
dispute, more completely than the first, has been, to dismiss the first bill with
costs, and to direct the defendant in the second cause to answer, upon being
paid the costs of a plea allowed which puts the case on the second bill in the
;
same situation as it would have been in if the first bill had been dismissed
before filing the second. 22
ie Searight V. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 186; Macy v. was for the creditor's benefit, and he could have
Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch., 25; Cunningham v. Camp- become a party to it by petition, or even by motion.
bell, 3 Tenn. Ch., 491. It is stated, in works on 21 Searight v. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 186. For
Equity Pleading, that this plea will not lie when the tests when the plea will lie, see test of the suffi-
pending suit is in a Court of law; Sto. Eq. PI., ciency of a plea of former judgment, post, § 329.
§ 742. The test of the identity of the matters of the two
Story says, that where the defendant is being suits, is whether the judgment in the first could_ be
sued also at law, he is not without a remedy for the pleaded to the second in bar as a former adjudica-
double vexation; for a Court of Equity will, upon tion. Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 144.
the coming in of the defendant's answer, put the 22 Sto. Eq. PI., § 738. Story evidently refers to
complainant to his election, whether he will proceed cases where both suits are in the same Court.
in the suit at law, or in Equity; and, if he elects Exactly how the truth of a plea of former suit de
the latter, then, an injunction will issue to stay pending is to be ascertained, is not definitely set-
further proceedings at law; if he elects the former, tled. In Green v. Neal, 2 Heisk., 217, the plea was
then, the bill will be dismissed. But, if the com- referred to the Clerk and Master for a report as to
plainant should fail fin his suit at law, this dismissal whether the two suits were the same; and the ques-
of his bill will not be a bar to his bringing a second tion was determined on exceptions to his report;
bill. Sto. Eq. PI., § 742; Cocke V. Dotson, 1 Tenn., but, in this case, both suits were in the same Court
(Overt.), 169. Franklin V. Hersch, 3 Tenn. Ch.. See Searight V. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 191. In Allen
469; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 126. v. Allen, after reviewing the authorities, it was held,
17 Moore V. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 141. As instances bv Chancellor Cooper, that this plea must be dealt
of suits of this character, may be mentioned, suits with like all other pleas; set down for argument, if
to wind up a partnership, suits to partition land deemed bad; issue taken on it, if deemed good, but
lying in different counties, or to sell them for par- false. 3 Tenn. Ch., 145; and, see Montgomery ».
tition. Olwell, 1 Tenn. Ch., 184; Searight v. Payne, 1
Lockwood v. Nye, 2 Swan, 515; Cunningham
18 Tenn. Ch., 190; and Macy v. Childress, 2 Tenn.
li. Campbell, 3 Tenn. Ch., 491. Ch., 23.
Brien v. Marsh, 1 Tenn. Ch., 628; Sto. Eq.
18 The correct practice, under our statute, is the
PL, § 737. one indicated by Chancellor Cooper. Our statute
20 But it must be brought by the same complain- prescribes one uniform course, on all pleas, whether
ant, or by some person in the same right; for, if the in abatement, or in bar. Code, § 4393. Why refer
two are filed by different persons, though for
bills the plea to the Master, when it raises such nice
the same purpose, the Court will not stop either questions of law and fact as will inevitably result in
before decree. Moore l). Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 141; exceptions to any report the Master may make?
but, see, Green v. Neal, 2 Heisk., 217, where it was Why not have it decided by the Court, in the first
held that a bill filed by a distributee against an ad- instance? The English Masters were trained law-
ministrator for a devastavit, was good ground for a yers ours are, generally, not. The English practice,
;
plea of former suit to a bill afterwards brought by also, contemplates that both suits are in the same
a creditor against the same administrator for the Court, England having but one Chancery Court;
same devastavit, on the ground that the first suit whereas,, as a matter of fact, in our State, the
267 KINDS OF PLEAS IN BAR. §329
Wherea decree is made upon a bill brought by a creditor, on behalf of him-
self all other creditors of the same person, and another creditor comes in
and of
before the Master to take the benefit of the decree, and proves his debt, and
then files a bill on behalf of himself and the other creditors, the defendants
may plead the pendency of the former suit; for a person coming in under a
decree, is a quasi party. The proper way for a creditor in such a situation to
proceed, if the complainant in the original suit is dilatory, is by application to
the Court for liberty to conduct the cause. 23
The matter of this plea may be incorporated in an answer, without the nec-
essity of pleading it specially; but, when so incorporated, there must be the
same certainty of averments that is required in a plea; 24 but as the plea of
former suit depending need not be sworn to, 25 so an answer setting up the
same defence need not be sworn to, when the oath to the answer is waived.
The plea may be good as to part of the two suits, and bad as to the residue,
in which case it will be allowed to stand as a defence in so far as it is good. 26
The following form will illustrate the frame and essentials of a plea of former
suit pending:
FLEA OF FORMER SUIT PENDING.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Kingston.
Richard Roe, et al.
The defendants, for plea to the bill filed against them in the above entitled cause, say, That
heretofore, and before the complainant filed his present bill in this Court, to-wit on the :
Sth day of March, 1891, he filed another bill of complaint in this Court, [or, in the Chancery
Court of Loudon county] against these defendants for the same matters, and to the same
effect, and for the like relief, as he, the complainant, does, by his present bill, demand and
set forth, that is to say, the complainant in his said former bill, alleges that [Here give the
substance of the former bill and its prayers.] to which said first bill these defendants did put
in their joint and several answers, denying [Give the defences set up in the answer;] and
other proceedings were thereupon had; and the said former bill is still pending in this
Court, [or, in said Chancery Court,] and the matters thereof undetermined; and, therefore,
the said defendants do plead the said former bill, answer, and proceedings in bar of the
present bill, and demand the judgment of this Court, whether they shall be required to make
any other, or further answer thereto; and pray to be hence dismissed with their costs.
[Annex affidavit and jurat as in § 340, post.
S. C. Brown, Solicitor.
§ 329.Plea of Former Judgment, or, Res Adjudicata. If the same con- —

troversy has been already adjudicated on its merits between the same parties,
former suit is, generally, in some other Court. the Court at the hearing on the facts, the complain-
When we have a plain statute, it would seem to be ant is entitled to the same advantages as if it had
as binding on our Courts as the practice of the
t
been found false in fact by verdict at common
Court of another nation, especially when the latter law, that is, he is entitled to a final decree as on a
is not adapted to the state of facts here prevailing. judgment pro confesso. Code, §4393; Bacon v.
See Green 'c. Neal, 2 Heisk., 217. As to the neces- Parker, 2 Tenn., (Overt.), 55; Wilson V. Scruggs,
sary evidence to sustain the plea, see Searight V. 7 Lea, 635; Simpson v. Railway Co., 5 Pick., 304.
Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 186; Macey V. Childress, 2 23 Sto. Eq. PI., § 740.
Tenn. Ch., 24. Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 142; 24 Connell v. Furgason, 5 Cold., 405 ; • Macey v.
Cunningham v. Campbell, 3 Tenn. Ch., 488. The Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch., 25; Morley v. Power, 5
proper proof in support of the plea is a certified Lea, 697.
copy of the record of the former suit. Parmelee v. 25 Green v. Neal, 2 Heisk., 219. All the authori-
Railroad, 13 Lea, 600. See, also, Williams v. Cap- ties agree that when the former suit is in the same
linger, 6 Hum., 257. Court, the plea of such suit need not be sworn to;
If the plea be found false, it has been decided but there is a difference of opinion on the subject
that the defendant has the right to answer over, when the former suit is in another Court. Some
and contest the case upon the merits. Cunningham authorities hold that in the latter case the plea must
v. Campbell, 3 Tenn. Ch., 488; See Battelle v. be sworn to. Mitf. Eq. PL, 247, note; the great
Youngstown Cq., 16 Lea, 355. But why make an weight of authority, however, is to the effect that a
exception in favor of this plea when the statute plea of a former suit pending in another Court
makes no such exception? In Searight v. Payne, 1 need not be sworn to. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 118; 1
Tenn. Ch., 186, Chancellor Cooper seemed to be of Dan. Ch. Pr., 686-687; Sto. Eq. PL, § 742, note;
opinion that the practice in reference to this plea Beames, Pleas in Eq., 150. The reason given for
was unsettled. The Code, § 4393, prescribes one not requiring a plea of former suit pending to be
uniform practice in case of all pleas; and when we sworn to, is that the Court takes cognizance of its
follow our own statutes the road is plain and own records. This reason is good only when the
straight, but when we disregard our own statutes former suit is in the same Court. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
for the sake of conformity to the English practice, 688. On principle, it would seem that where the
then arise uncertainty and confusion. If our stat- former suit is in another Court, the plea should be
ute is observed, then, when a plea of former suit on oath.
pending is filed, if deemed insufficient, it must be 26 Searight v. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 186. See
set down for argument; if deemed -or held sufficient, former notes to this section.
.. i: *„ it.
*.: u- ct...i. ic (~..~A f~i
4. i —
or their privies, in a Court of competent jurisdiction, the judgment or decree
of such Court may be pleaded in bar to the second suit. 27 Such plea must
'however, show that the issue and the subject-matter in the two suits were the
same, and that the former suit was between substantially the same parties as
the present suit 28 and so much of the former bill and answer must be set forth
;
as is necessary to show that the same point was there in issue. 29

Although a final judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction, whether in
this, or in any other State, will operate as a bar to a claim for the same matter
in a Court of Equity, yet if, from any circumstance, such as fraud, mistake, acci-
dent, or surprise, it is against conscience that the defendant should avail himself
of such a bar, a Court of Equity will interfere to set it aside. Where, however,
a bill for that purpose is filed, the defendant may plead the judgment in bar,
negativing by averments, and denying by an answer in support of his plea,
the equitable circumstances alleged in the bill upon which the judgment is
sought to be impeached. 30
John Doe, I
vs. i
In Chancery at Rutledge.
Richard Roe, and J-
Roland Roe.
PLEA OF RES ADJTTDICATA, OR FORMER JUDGMENT OR DECREE.
The defendants, for plea to the bill filed against them in this cause, say, That hereto-
fore, and before the complainant filed his said bill in this Court, to-wit on July 25, 1882. :
he, the complainant, filed another bill in this Court [or in the Chancery Court at Knoxville,]
against the defendant for the same matter and demand and to the same effect, and for like
relief, as he, the complainant does, by his present bill, demand and set forth that is to say, ;
the complainant in his said former bill alleged (1) that the defendant, Richard Roe, was
justly indebted to him in the sum of one thousand dollars, evidenced by a note of hand, dated
January 1, 1880, and due one day after the date thereof; and alleged (2) that this defendant,
Richard Roe, intending and contriving not to pay said debt, did, on August 6, 1881, convey
to this defendant, Roland Roe, the following tract of land in the 10th civil district of Knox
county. [Here describe it exactly as it is described in complainant's former bill,] and al- ;
leged (3) that this conveyance was made and contrived of fraud, covin, collusion and guile,
to the intent and purpose to delay, hinder and defraud the creditors of said Richard Roe
of their just and lawful debts, and especially to delay, hinder and defraud complainant of his
said debt and alleged (4) that this defendant, Roland Roe, took said conveyance from his
;
co-defendant, the defendant Richard Roe, well knowing the fraudulent purpose and char-
acter thereof, and with intent to aid his co-defendant, the defendant, Richard Roe, to hinder,
delay and defraud his creditors, especially the complainant, of their just debts; and that said
conveyance was collusively made, and that there was a secret agreement between the de-
fendants whereunder the defendant, Roland Roe, was to hold said land in secret trust for
the benefit of his co-defendant, Richard Roe; and alleged (5) that while said conveyance
recites that it was' made for the consideration of one thousand dollars in hand paid, the
recital is false, and that no cash was paid at all, and that if any was pretended to be paid it
was a mere device in furtherance of the covin, collusion and fraud whereby the defendants
were contriving to hinder and delay the complainant and (6) prayed for process against
;
defendants, and for a decree against the defendant, Richard Roe, for the amount due com-
plainant %s hereinbefore shown, and for principal and interest, and for costs of the suit, and
to have said conveyance decreed to be fraudulent and void as against complainant, and said
tract of land sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of complainant's debt; and (7)
prayed further that all other creditors of the defendant, Richard Roe, might be allowed to
come in and prove their debts, that the bill be sustained as a general creditors' bill, that said
property be attached, that the defendant, Roland Roe, be enjoined from selling, encumbering,
or in any way disposing of said property, or any part thereof, and for general relief; all of
which will fully and at large appear by reference to the record of said suit herewith filed,
marked A, and made an exhibit to this plea, and a part hereof. 30a
27 Harris v. Water & Light Co., 6 Cates< 323. parties and for the same property, will not bar a
Or it may be set up in an answer. But the defence new suit based upon a subsequently acquired title.
must be specially and expressly set up and relied on McKissick «. McKissick, 6 Hum., 75.
in one pleading or the other, otherwise it cannot be 29 Sto. Eq. PL, I 791. ,
of any avail at the hearing, though appearing in the 80 Dan. Ch. Pr., 664. Or, he may make his
evidenre; and enough of the former bill and answer entire defence by answer, the answer containing
must be set out to show clearly that the issues in the matter both of the plea and the supporting
the former suit and in the pending suit are identical; answer. . ,
or the record in the former suit may be filed as an 30a It is best to file the record of the former judg-
exhibit to theanswer. Turley V. Turley, 1 Pick., ment as an exhibit. Jourolmon v. Massengale, i
251; Jourolman V. Massengale, 2 Pick., 81. Pick., 81, 88.
28 But a former judgment, between the same
'§
269 KINDS OF PLÂS IN BAR. 329
These, defendants were served with process under said former bill, and rriade answer in
substance as follows: (1) defendant, Richard. Roe, denied the justness of said note, and
averred that it was obtained from him by fraud and duress under the form of a compromise
into which he was forced, and that the only consideration was money lost in gambling with
the complainant; (2) both of these defendants answered fully to the charges of fraud, covin,
collusion and guile, and denied each and all of them absolutely, and denied that there was
any trust or secret agreement whereunder this defendant, Roland Roe, was, or is, to hold
said land for the benefit of his co-defendant, Richard Roe; and (3) bpth of these defendants
averred that said conveyance was made in pursuance of a title-bond executed two years before
said alleged note of hand, and that the consideration expressed in said conveyance was duly
and wholly paid, eight hundred dollars of it before said alleged note was executed, and the
remaining two hundred dollars on the day said conveyance was executed.
These defendants further say that on the issues thus made, proof was taken and the suit
came on for final hearing, and was heard in and by this Court, [or, by the said Chancery
Court at Knoxville,] and this [or said] Court decreed that said note for one thousand dol-
lars, then and now sued on, was based on a gambling consideration, and was fraudulent and
void, and dismissed said former bill of complainant, and taxed him with all the costs of said
former bill and suit, and the complainant prayed no appeal from said decree.
Therefore, these defendants plead said former suit, proceedings and adjudication in bar of
the present bill, and aver and say that said adjudication is and remains in full force and
effect; and they pray the judgment of the Court whether they shall be required to answer
further, and pray to be hence dismissed with their costs.
[Annex affidavit as in § 340, post] G. Mc. Henderson, Solicitor.
The question whether the former suit and the present one are for the same
cause of action, the parties being substantially the same, is answered in the
affirmative if the subject-matter of the present suit is either identical with, or
included in, the subject-matter of the former suit, or the same question might
have been raised. 31 To ascertain whether the subject-matter of the present
is included in the former suit, these two tests may be applied 1st, Could the:
subject-matter of the present suit have been properly included in the adjudica-
tion of the former suit, the pleadings being considered? 32 and 2d, Would the
evidence pertinent in the present suit have been admissible in the former suit ?
If these two questions, and they are alternative forms of the same test, are an-
swered affirmatively, then it conclusively follows that the two causes of action
are the same, and the former adjudication is ground for a plea in bar of the
present suit.
It is not required that the results of the two suits should be the same, any
more than it is required that the results of two trials of the same suit at law
should be the same. When a new trial of the same suit is had at law, the
second verdict often differs from the first; and so the evidence in the second
trial often differs from that in the first. These considerations show, that
the decisive test whether the two suits are for the same cause of action, does
not depend on whether the evidence in the second suit was actually introduced
in the first, nor on whether the judgment in the first suit actually included the
subject-matter of the second suit. The real questions are 1st, Could the evi- :
dence in the present suit have been legally introduced in the former suit?
2d, Could the former judgment have legally included the subject-matter of the
present suit ?
If, therefore, the capacity and scope of the former suit were sufficient to have
legitimately included the subject matter of the present suit in its adjudication,
then, in the sense of the rule, the two suits are for the same cause of action,
whether the former adjudication, as a matter of fact, embraces the precise
subject-matter of the present suit, or not. 33 The estoppel of a judgment or
decree extends to all matters material to the decision which the parties might
have brought forward. 34
And of course, the tests that apply to a plea of former judgment, apply with
equal force to a plea of the pendency of a suit not yet determined. 35
31 Sto. Eq. PL, § 791, note. Nolan v. Cameron, 9 Lea, 234; Boyd v. Robinson,
32 Lindsley v. Thompson, 1 Tenn. Ch., 274. 9 Pick., 1.
33 Lindsley « Thompson, 1 Tenn. Ch., 274; 34 Sale v. Eichberg, 21 Pick., 333.
Knight v. Atkinson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 388; Nicholson «. 35 Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 144; ante, § 328.
p=t*»,c n n e. w,,m 3Q4 Parkpg ». Clift. 9 Lea. 524:
To
constitute a good plea of former judgment, it must be shown by giving
the substance of the former bill and answer, (1) that the same issue was
joined in the former suit, as is tendered in the bill (2) that the subject-matter
;
of the suit was the same, and (3) that the proceedings in the former suit were
for the same object and purpose, 38 and if the former suit was decided in favor
of the defendant, the plea must show, (4) that the former judgment was ren-
dered on the merits, 37 and (5) that the former judgment was final. 38 If the
facts set out in the plea or answer make out the defence, it is not necessary to
use any merely technical phraseology, or to aver in so many words, that the
defendant relies on the defence of res adjudicata. 89
§ 330. —
Plea of the Statute of Frauds. Whenever any agreement required
by the statute to be in writing exists really in parol, only, the statute may be
pleaded to any bill filed to enforce such agreement; and so may the statute
be pleaded to a bill setting up an essential verbal variation of a written con-
tract within the statute. 41 This plea is applicable to suits brought for the
specific execution of contracts for the sale or lease of lands, when such con-
tracts have not been reduced to writing, but that fact does not appear on the
face of the bill. If the fact that the contract was in parol appear on the face
of the bill, the proper method of taking advantage of the fact is by demurrer. 42
The plea must contain express averments, denying that the contract specified
in the bill was reduced to writing and signed by the defendant, or by any
person by him thereunto lawfully authorized and must rely on the statute in
;
bar of the bill. 43

If this defence is set up in an answer, it must be made specifically. verbal A
contract for the sale of land is not void, but voidable only; and, if it is ad-
mitted in the answer, such written admission will be a compliance with the
statute, and will authorize the Court to enforce the contract, unless the defend-
ant in his answer expressly relies on and pleads the statute, in bar of the relief
prayed. 44
The following is the form of a
PLEA OP THE STATUTE OP PBATJDS.
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea to the bill filed against him in the above entitled
cause, says, That neither he, nor any person by him, thereunto lawfully authorized, did ever
sign any contract or agreement in writing, or any memorandum or note thereof, for the sale
[lease or mortgage,] to the complainant of the tract of land [or, lot] mentioned and de-
scribed in the said bill. And the defendant pleads and relies on these matters, and the
statute for the prevention of frauds and perjuries, in bar of complainant's suit; and prays
to be dismissed.
§ 331. —
Plea of a Statute of Limitation. 40 If the bill show on its face that
the recovery sought is barred by a statute of limitation, 47 a demurrer will lie;
30 Sto. Eq. PI., 780, a. or collaterally assailed. Kilcrease l: Blythe, 6

87 Bankhead v. AHoway, 1 Term. Ch., 207; Hunt Hum., 378. Nemo debet bis vexari.
v. Means, 2 Sneed, 548; Harris v. Water & Light 41 Sto. Eq. PI., 761.
Co., 6 Cates, 328. Vl 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 655, note; Treece v. Treece,
38 Sto. Eq. PI., 8 791. 5 Lea, 223.
80 Arnold v. Kyle, 8 Bax., 322; Code, §§2884; 43 Code, 8 1758; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 656; Sto. Bl
2906. But the record of the suit at law must be PI., 8 763; Brakefield v. Anderson, 4 Pick., 206.
produced in support of this defence. Williams v. 44 Sneed v. Bradley, 4 Sneed, 301, Brakefield r.
Caplinger, 6 Hum., 257. See, also, Parmelee v. Anderson, 3 Pick., 206; Barnes Bros. v. Coal Co.,
Railroad, 13 Lea, 600. And enough of the former 17 Pick., 354; City v. Manufacturing Co., 9 Pick.,
bill and answer must be set forth to show that the 276. A part performance of a parol contract as to
same point was then in issue. Sto. Eq. PL, §791; land will not take it out of the statute. Patton v.
Jourolmon v. Massengill, 2 Pick., 81. The estoppel McClure, Mart. & Yerg., 333; Goodloe «. Goodloe,
of a judgment, or decree, extends to all matters Nashville, 1906.
which the parties might have had decided, as well 48 Our statute of frauds is based on the Act of
as to those actually decided. Lindsley V. Thompson, 1715, ch. 38, which, in turn, is based on the statute
1 Tenn. Ch., 272; and the fact that the former of 29 Charles II., ch. 3: anno, 1676.
judgment or decree was irregular, or even erron- 40 Our statutes of limitations are based on the
eous, in no way invalidates its force and effect. Act of 1715, ch. 27, which in turn is based on the
Ibid; Nicholson v. Patterson, 6 Hunt., 394. Unless Act of 21 James I., ch. 16, passed in 1623.
the judgment or decree be absolutely void, it is 4T Laws are made for the diligent and not for
proof against collateral attack. Mere errors that the negligent. Ante, 8 49. Statutes of limitation
might have reversed the_ decree on appeal, or writ force persons having debts or demands to be in
of error, do not impair its validity when indirectly
271 KINDS OP PLEAS IN BAR. §331
but if the bill suppress the fact of the bar, such fact must be set up by plea, the
plea ordinarily averring, either that the cause of action did not accrue within
the period specified in the particular statute of limitation relied on or, in suits ;
to recover specific property, that the defendant had been in continuous adverse
possession for the time requisite to bar the recovery sought.
The bill, may, however, show that the cause of action arose more than the
statutory limit of years before suit was brought, and may avoid the bar by
alleging a fraudulent concealment of, the cause of action by the defendant; 48
or a new promise by him, or a statutory disability, or the non-residence of the
defendant. 49 In such a case, a pure plea would not lie and the defendant must ;'
file an impure, or anomalous, plea, setting .up tj}g limitation relied on, and
denying the new promise, or the disability, or the non-residence, or denying the
fraud, or denying that the fraud, if any, was first discovered within the limita-
tion. The plea should, also, be accompanied with an answer in its support, con-
taining a like denial of the promise, or other matter charged, and all the cir-
cumstances thereof. 50
A
statute of limitation which bars the remedy only must be pleaded, or
specially set up in the answer, or it cannot be relied on at the hearing 51 but a ;
statute which cuts off the right need not be pleaded, or relied on in the answer,
but may be relied on at the hearing, as a bar to the complainant's title.
Statutes of limitation which bar the right are those which give title to personal
property, 52 or to land, 53 if not sued for within the period of limitation. 54 Heirs,
or other persons who inherit land, may plead the statute of limitations to pro-
tect their land in an administration suit, if the administrator fail to do so. 55
The plea must be verified, or it may be disregarded; 56 but the verification ,
may be waived by filing a replication to the plea, or by taking proof on it. 57

PLEA OF A STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
John Doe, |
vs. \ In the Chancery Court, at Madisonville.

The defendant, Robert Roe, for plea to the bill filed against him and others, in the above
entitled cause, says, That the complainant's cause of action, if any he has, accrued more than
•dustrious and vigilant. The interests of society 02 Code, § 2773; McCombs v. Guild, 9 Lea, 87.
require that there should be some end to the right 53 Code, §§2763; 2767; 2281; 2786; Caldwell v.
'to litigate. The law allows all claimants -a reason- McFarland, 11 Lea, 463.
able time in which to bring suit; and if they fail 54 Bomar v. Haglar, 7 Lea, 89. In this case, the
to do so within the time allowed, and, as a conse- reason of the text is clearly shown by Judge
quence, suffer loss, they must impute that loss to Cooper.
their own negligence or misplaced confidence, and Courts of Chancery are equally as much bound
not to the law, which was made for the general to respect the statutes of limitations as are Courts of
good, and cannot be warped to suit the exigencies law. Hickman v. Gaither, 2 Yerg., 207. And in
of individuals. Statutes of limitations are made for all cases where the Courts of law and Equity have
:the good of society, and for the peace and quiet of concurrent jurisdiction, these statutes apply with
mankind, so that they may know when to be at as much vigor in one Court as in the other. Peebles
rest, and when the troubles of threatened litigation v. Green, 6 Lea, 474. But, a Court of Chancery,
may cease. Smith v. Hickman, Cook, 332. Nature,
,
having no such forms of actions as the statutes of
"herself, appoints a season for everything, and if limitations specify, it must, of necessity, loolc to
anything is not done in the season appointed, the the evidence; and if, upon that evidence, a suit at
wheels of time are not reversed for the benefit of law would be barred, it will be barred in Equity.
any one. The doors of the Courts open at the Phipps v. Richmond, 1 Hum., 21. In applying the
summons of those only who are diligent. The stat- statutes of limitations, Courts of Equity have made
ute of limitations, not only in this State, but gen- but one exception beyond those contained in the
erally, is now looked upon with favor, as a statute statute, and that is in cases where the- cause of
-of repose. Cocke V. Hoffman, 5 Lea, 112; Coleson action has been concealed by the fraud of the de-
v. Blanton, 3 Hayw, 152. Time is depicted carrying fendant. Nicholson v. Lauderdale, 3 Hum., 200;
a scythe and an hour-glass. While, with his scythe, Vance v. Motley, 8 Pick., 310; and where a bene-
"he cuts down the evidence which might protect a ficiary sues an express trustee, Hughes v. Brown, 4
party against unjust demands, he, at the same time, Pick., 578.
with his hour-glass, metes out the period when un- The statutes of limitations now cover nearly the
just demands can be no longer sued on. Smith's whole field of Equity, and the exceptions recognized
Eq. Jur., 20. See, ante, § 70. in the Chancery Court are very few. By the act
48 See note, 54, infra. of 1885, ch. 9, vendors' liens on realty retained in
40 Sully v. Childress, 22 Pick., 109, citing the the face of the deed, mortgages, deeds of trust, and
above section of this book, then § 336. assignments of realty to secure debts, are barred in
60 Graham V. Nelson, 5 Hum., 610; Sto. Eq. PL, ten years after the maturity of the debt.
§ 754; Bank v. Bank, 1 Ch. Apps., 474, citing the 56 Miller v. Taylor, 2 Shan. Cas., 464; Acts of
above section of this book, then § 336. 1905, ch. 73.
01 Carter V. Wolfe, 1 Heisk., 701; German Bank 56 Graham V. Nelson, 5 Hum., 609.
§332 KINDS OF PI/EAS IN BAR, 272
six [or, ten] years before said bill was filed, [and if a new promise is alleged, aeW— and
that
he did not promise to pay the debt sued on within six years next before the filing of the bill,]
[Annex affidavit and jurat as in §254.] McCroskey & Peace,: Sol's.
In drawing pleas of the statutes of limitations, it is a safe practice to follow
the language of the statute itself as closely as possible, as by so doing the
statute is pleaded in its own words.
The plea of the statute of limitations in case of suits brought to recover lands
must conform to the statute relied on. The following form will aid the pleader
PLEA OF SEVEN YEARS' ADVERSE POSSESSION.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 618. > In Chancery, at Wartburg.

The defendants, for plea to the bill filed against them in this cause, say, That they, and
each of them, have had by themselves [or, by themselves and those through whom they
claim, or, by those through whom they claim,] continuous adverse possession of the tract of
land sued for by complainant, for more than seven years before the bill in this case was filed.
[Annex an affidavit and jurat, as in § 254, ante.] William A. Henderson, Solicitor.
—
Plea of Innocent Purchaser. From what has been above stated, 58 it
§ 332.
is obvious that where a conveyance is insisted upon by plea, as an adverse
title, it must bear date at a period anterior to the commencement of the com-
plainant's title as shown by the bill: there are cases, however, in which a con-
veyance may be insisted upon, though posterior in point of date, to the com-
plainant's title. In such cases, however, it is necessary to the validity of the
plea, that the conveyance should have been for a valuable consideration, and
that, at the time it was perfected, the defendant, or the person to whom it was
made, should not have had notice of the complainant's right. A plea of this
sort is called a plea of purchase, for a valuable consideration, without notice
and it is founded upon the principle that where the defendant has an equal
claim to the protection of a Court of Equity to defend his possession, as the
complainant has to the assistance of the Court to assert his right, the Court will
not interpose on either side. 59
Such a plea must contain the following essentials
1. it Must Aver a Conveyance. It must show that the defendant holds the
land in dispute under a deed of purchase, giving its date, and name of vendor. 60
An agreement to convey, or a title bond, is not sufficient. 61
2. Seizin, Actual or Pretended, in the Vendor. It must aver that the vendor
was seized, or pretended to be seized, in fee, at the time he executed the con-
veyance. 62 If the conveyance pleaded be of an estate in possession, the plea
must aver that the vendor was in possession, at the time of the execution of
the conveyance. And, if it be of a particular estate, and not in possession, it
must set out how the vendor became entitled to the reversion. But, although
a bill be brought by an heir, the plea need not, on that account, aver the pur-
chase to be from the complainant's ancestor. 63
3. Payment of the Consideration Money. The plea must, also, distinctly
aver that the consideration money, mentioned in the deed, was bona fide and
truly paid, independently of the recital of the purchase deed for, if the money ;
be not paid, the plea will be overruled, 04 as the purchaser is entitled to relief
05
against the payment of it. The particular consideration must also be stated.
There can be no objection to the amount of the consideration; for, if it be
valuable, the plea will not be invalidated by mere inadequacy. The question is,
58 See ante f 327. See, also, ante, § 75, where 02 Craig v. Leiper, 2 Ycrg., 193. This is a lead-
the equities of an innocent purchaser are considered. ing case. See, also, Saylors v. Saviors, 3 Heisk.,
no i ,_/an. Ch. Pr., 674; Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 805-808. 529; White v. N. & N. R. R. Co., 7 Heist., 550.
See Innocent Purchaser, ante, 8 75. The plea of 03 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 677; Sto. Eq. PL, 8 805.
innocent purchaser is no defence to an ejectment 04 Livingston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 66. ,
hill. 1 Pom. Ec[. Jur., §8 743; 765. The plea of «-, High v. ISatte, 10 Yerg., 337; Ellis v. Temple,
innocent purchaser is called the " Gibraltar of 4 Cold., 321. Whether the particular consideration
defences." paid should be alleged seems to be doubted. 1 Dan.
00 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 676. Ch. Pr., 677.
01 Smitheal ». Gray, 1 Hum., 496; Pillow V. Shan-
non, 3 Ycrg., 508.
not whether the consideration is adequate, but whether it is valuable. For, if it
be such a consideration as will not be deemed fraudulent within the statute,
or is not merely nominal, it ought not to be impeached in Equity. " But the
11
consideration must have been advanced at the time the title is taken; for a
conveyance, in consideration of a pre-existing debt, will not protect the pur-
chaser. 07
4. Denial of Notice of Complainant's Claim. The plea must, also, deny notice
of the complainant's title, or claim, previous to the execution of the deed
and payment of the purchase money; for till then, the transaction is not com-
plete and therefore, if the purchaser have notice previous to that time, he will
;
be bound by it. The notice so denied must be notice of the existence of the
complainant's title, and not merely notice of the existence of a person who
could claim under that title. 08 But a denial of notice, at the time of making
the purchase and paying the purchase money, is good.
The notice must be positively and not evasively denied, and must be denied
whether it be, or be not, charged by the bill. 09 If particular instances of notice,
or circumstances of fraud are charged, the facts from which they are inferred
must be denied as specially and particularly as charged. But the defendant
need only by his plea deny notice generally, unless where facts are specially
charged in the bill as evidence of notice.
If there are circumstances charged to show that the defendant had notice,
the plea must be supported by an answer denying notice, and denying the
particular facts alleged in the bill to show notice. But the denial of notice in
the answer, does not exempt the defendant from the necessity of denying notice
in his plea. 70
If, however, a defendant omit to deny notice either in his plea, or in his
answer, and the complainant fails to object in the proper time and manner,
he will be deemed to have waived the question of notice and, even if notice ;
be proved, it will avail him nothing at the hearing. 71

A
person affected by notice has the benefit of the want of notice to interme-
diate parties, and may shelter himself under a purchaser without notice. But
notice to an agent is notice to the principal. 72
The defence of innocent purchaser cannot be made at the hearing, unless
set up by plea, or answer; 73 and when set up in an answer must contain the
same essential averments, and be otherwise as full and explicit, as though set
up in a plea. 74 Indeed, in such a case, an answer is both a plea and an answer
in support of it.
00 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 677. The allegations of the plea, or of the answer, so
07 Cook n. Cook, 3 Head, 719; Anderson v. Tay- far as it relates to this defence, must include all
" "3
lor, 1 Tenn. Ch., 44 J. Finnegan v, Finnegan, those particulars which are necessary to constitute
Tenn. Ch., 515. a bona fide purchase. It should specify the consid-
08 Pinson v. Ivey, 1 Yerg., 296; Sto. Eq. PI., eration, which must appear from the averment to be
§806. " valuable," within the meaning of the rules upon
oo Aiken v. Smith, 1 Sneed, 312; Sto. Eq. PI., that subject, and should show that it has actually
§662; Pillow i'. Shannon, 3 Yerg, 509. been paid and not merely secured. It should also
70 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., § 678. Story says that it is deny notice_ in the fullest and clearest manner, and
not the office of a plea to deny particular facts of this denial is necessary whether notice is charged in
notice, even if such particular facts are charged. the complaint or not. The denial must correspond
Sto. Eq. pi., § 806; and such would seem the better with the settled rules upon the subject of notice, so
practice. It is the office of the answer supporting as to bring the case within the operation of those
the plea to deny the particular facts; and, it is rules. The defendant must allege that the grantor
believed that a general denial of notice in a plea from whom he immediately took his title, was
will be sufficient, even when the bill charges par- seized, or appeared to be seized, or pretended to be
ticular facts and circumstances to show notice. But seized, of a legal estate at the time of the convey-
in the latter case, the plea must be supported by an ance, and also that such grantor was in possession,
answer denying such particular facts and circum- if the conveyance purported to be of a present es-
stances. tate in possession. Consequently, the defendant
7t 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 679; 695; Harris v. Smith, 14 must allege that by the conveyance in question he
Pick., 286; Stainback V. Junk, 14 Pick., 306, both either actually obtained a legal freehold estate, or
citing above section of this book, then, § 337. else obtained what purported and appeared to be'
72 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 675; Sto. Eq. PL, § 808. such an estate, and what he at the time purchased
78 It cannot be made by demurrer. Dunham v. as, and supposed and believed to be, such a free-
Harvey, o Cates, 620. —
hold lefjal estate that he acquired a legal seizin
74 Rhea «. Allison, 3 Head, 177. Pomeroy gives from his immediate grantor. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
the necessary allegations of a plea, or answer, set- § 785. See Dunham v. Harvey, 3 Cates, 620.
ting' up the defence of innocent purchaser, as fol-
lows:
§ 333 PLEAS IN BAR. 274
The following is a short but sufficient form of a plea of innocent purchaser
PLEA OP INNOCENT PUBCHASEPv.
John Doe,
vs. [ No. 793. > In Chancery, at Knoxville.
Richard Roe, et at. J
This defendant, Romeo Roe, for plea to the bill filed against him and others, in this cause,
says
That on the 8th day of May, 1890, his co-defendant, Richard Roe, was seized, or pretended
to be seized, in fee, of the lot described in the bill, and was in actual possession thereof, and
this defendant on said day purchased from said Richard Roe said lot, for the consideration
of one thousand dollars, which was then and there truly and actually paid to said
Richard Roe, and this defendant then and there took from said Richard Roe, in
pursuance of said purchase, a deed conveying to this defendant said lot in fee, with
full covenants of seizin, right to convey, and general warranty of title, which deed was on
said day duly acknowledged, probated, and registered. And this defendant avers that, at and
before the taking of said deed, and the payment of said money, he had no notice whatever
of the title and claim the complainant sets up to said lot in his bill, and had no reason to
believe or suspect that he had any such title or claim, or any claim or title whatsoever, but
he verily believed that said Richard Roe then had the legal and equitable right to sell and
convey said lot; and that in all he did in making said purchase and in paying said considera-
tion money, this defendant acted in good faith, without any notice whatever of complainant's
alleged rights, and without any intention in any way to injure or defraud the complainant.
And so this defendant insists and pleads that he is a bona fide purchaser of said lot, for a
good and valuable consideration, and without notice of the title and claim set up by the com-
plainant to said lot; and he, therefore, prays to be dismissed.
[Annex affidavit and jurat, as in § 340, post.) W. P. Washburn, Solicitor.
If the bill charges circumstances showing notice, or charges fraud, the plea
must be supported by an answer denying the circumstances, or the fraud. 75
This answer may follow the plea, thus
ANSWER SUPPORTING A PLEA.™
And this defendant, not waiving his said plea, but relying thereon, and for better support-
ing the same, for answer to said bill, says [then proceed with u denial of the particular
:
facts or circumstances alleged in the bill as evidence of notice; or with a denial of the fraud
alleged; and conclude the answer in the usual ivay.]
§ 333. Pleas of Stated, and of Settled Accounts. When a bill is filed for —
the purpose of compelling the defendant to account, if there has already been
a stated account, or if there has been a settled account, he may set up this
defence by plea in bar.
An account is stated when the matters of charge and discharge on both sides
have been examined, a balance struck, and such balance admitted to be correct.
When such balance is paid, the account is called a settled account. 77
To sustain a plea of stated account, the account must be shown to be (1) in
.writing, (2) that a balance was struck, (3) what that balance was, (4) that
the balance was agreed on as correct, and, (5) that the settlement resulting
in such balance was final. 78 It is not necessary to aver or prove that the ac-
count was settled upon a minute investigation of items, a general agreement
or composition being sufficient; nor will the fact that errors were excepted
be a sufficient ground for opening an account, unless specific errors are pointed
out in the bill. 79 It is not essential to the validity of a stated account as a bar,
that it should be signed by the parties; it will be sufficient if it has been deliv-
ered and acquiesced in for a considerable length of time. The plea must, how-
ever, aver that the stated account is just and true, to the best of the defendant's
knowledge and belief. 80 Where fraud is charged, and the defendant pleads the
account in bar, he must in his supporting answer deny the allegations charging
fraud. 81
Settlements with the County Court, made by executors, administrators, and
guardians, when the beneficiaries are infants, are only prima facie correct, and
T7, See, post, §§ 345-349. 7ii 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 666; Sto. Eq. PL, 8 800.
~or full so 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 666.
77 Sto. Eq. PI., § 798. See, past, § 952. 81 Sto. Eq. PL, § 802; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 667.
78 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 665; Sto. Eq. PI. § "98.
275 PLEAS IN BAR. § 334
may be opened without surcharging and falsifying them; they will, however,
be prima facie evidence in the taking of the general account. 82 But where the
beneficiaries are of age, and have notice of the settlement, and the right of
contest and appeal, such settlements have all the force and effect of a stated
account. 83
A stated account will not be opened, unless the complainant charges and
clearly proves either fraud on the defendant, or specific error caused by mis-
take. Where, however, the relation of attorney and client, principal and agent,
guardian and ward, or trustee and beneficiary, exists, the Court will open a
stated account on much less proof than when there is no such confidential rela-
tion and will do so in such cases even where only general errors are pointed
;
out, if fraud or undue influence be shown. 84

But where there is no fraud, and where errors or mistakes only are shown to
exist in the account, the account will not be opened, but the complainant will be
permitted merely to surcharge and falsify it. This is an important distinction,
because, where an account is opened, the whole of it may be unraveled, and
the parties will not be bound by deductions agreed upon between them, on
taking the former account. The onus proband i is always on the party having
the liberty to surcharge and falsify; for the Court takes it as a stated account.
If the party can show omission for which there ought to be credit, it will be
added, (which is a surcharge), or of any wrong charge is inserted, it will be
deducted, (which is a falsification). This, however, must be done by proof
on his side. Although a party seeking to open a settled account, must specify
the errors he insists upon, yet it is not necessary that he should, at the hearing,
prove all the errors specified in his bill. If he proves some of them, he entitles
himself to a decree giving him liberty to surcharge and falsify. Where parties
are at liberty to surcharge and falsify, they are not confined to mere errors
of fact, but may take advantage of errors of law and where one party is al-
;
lowed to surcharge and falsify, the other is allowed the same privilege. 85
PLEA OF STATED, OR SETTLED ACCOUNT.
John Doe, 1
vs. In Chancery, at Knoxville.
J-
Richard Roe, ct al. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea to so much of the bill as seeks an account, says that
on or about the 10th day of April, 1893, [giving the date of the settlement,} the complainant
and defendant made and stated a full and final account in writing of all the matters and
things referred to in the bill, which account was true and just to the best of his knowledge
and belief, and resulted in a balance of $200, [stale the amount,] due the defendant, [or, the
complainant.] [If the account was settled then add,] And that the complainant approved said
account and paid [or received] the said balance due from [or to] him on said account, on
or about the 15th day of April, 1893 [giving the date of the payment. If the defendant re-
ceived the balance and gave a receipt thereon, then add,] And thereupon the complainant
gave the defendant a receipt for the same as follows: [here copy it in full]. [If vouchers
were delivered up or destroyed, then add:] thereupon defendant surrendered [or. with com-
plainant's consent, destroyed] all his vouchers relating to said settlement. [If the bill charges
fraud in avoidance of the account, add:] and the defendant denies each and every allegation
80
of fraud contained in the bill.
Therefore the defendant pleads said stated [or settled] account in bar of the complainant's
bill, and prays to be hence dismissed.
[Annex affidavit of the truth of the plea. Sec post, § 340.] A. B., Solicitor.
If fraud is charged in the bill as a ground for opening the account, then not
only must the plea deny the fraud, but it must be accompanied by an answer
denying the fraud. 87
§ 334. —
Other Pleas in Bar. There are various other pleas in bar, among
which the following are the most usual
l. Plea of an Award. Whenever the matters set up in a bill as the ground
'
82 Turney v. Williams, 7 Yerg., 213; Elrod v. Lan- 85 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668. For practice in suits for
caster, 2 Head, 571; Code, §§2305; 3786. an accounting, see, post, §§953-958.
S3 Turney v. Williams, 7 Yerg., 212; See, also, so Sto. Eq. PI., §802.
Matlock V. Rice, 6 Heisk., 39. 87 For a form of a supporting answer, see, post,
84 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 667; Sto. Eq. PL, 800. § 348.
§ 334 PL3AS IN BAR. 276
of relief, have been included in an award, such award may be pleaded to
the
bill. 88 If the bill be filed to set aside an award, the award may be pleaded
in bar to the bill, in which case the fraud, or misconduct alleged in the
bill
must be denied by way of averment in the plea, and the plea must be supported
by an answer denying all the charges which assail the award. An agreement to
refer the matters in dispute to arbitrators cannot, however, be pleaded. 89
2. Plea of a Release, Payment, or Accord and Satisfaction. If the complain-
ant has released his claim, or if he has been paid, or if there has been an accord
and satisfaction, these matters may be pleaded in bar of a bill seeking a rcovery
on the same claim, or cause of action. In such a case, the consideration upon
which the release was made, or the amount paid, or the terms of the accord
and satisfaction, should be specified in the plea and if the bill seeks to avoid
;
the release, payment, or satisfaction, because of fraud, duress, accident, or mis-

take, these grounds must all be generally denied by the plea, and must be
specially denied by an answer in support of the plea. 90
3. Plea of Prematurity of the Suit. If the bill should be filed before some
necessary preliminary act has been done, or before the debt sued on was due, or
before the right to make demand had vested, or before an executor had pro-
bated the will, in any such case the defendant may plead the prematurity on
the suit in bar of the bill. 91
4. Plea of Non est Factum. This plea is interposed when the suit is based
on some obligation purporting and alleged to be executed by the defendant, and
he wishes to deny that he executed it.
PLEA OP NON EST FACTUM, to'i

title,
That the note, [bond, or other instrument sued on in the bill,] upon which the complain-
ant's bill is founded, was not executed by him, or by any one authorized to bind him in the
premises.
The plea must be verified. See ante, § 254.
5.Plea that Complainant is Connected with a Trust. When the complainant,

or any other person or corporation interested in the prosecution of the suit,
is connected with, or the cause of action grows out of, some business with a
trust, that fact may be pleaded in bar of the suit. 93
PLEA THAT COMPLAINANT IS CONNECTED WITH A TRUST.
title,
The defendant for plea to the bill filed against him in this cause, says that the complainant
[or William Brown, one of the complainants,] is a member of, or connected with, and the
cause of action grows out of business, or a transaction with, a trust [pool, contract, arrange-
ment, or combination] made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free competition
in [Here insert some one or more of the things declared illegal by the Act of 1891, ch. 218,
sec. 1, such as] the manufacture and sale of tobacco in this State.
6. Plea of Tender. When, before the bill was filed, the defendant tendered
to the complainant all the complainant was entitled to, such tender can be
pleaded in bar to the bill.
PLEA OF TENDER OF MONEY.
The defendant for plea says that after complainant's- cause of action accrued, and before
the bill in this case was filed, he tendered to complainant the sum of dollars [stating
the amount], which was the full amount due complainant on the note, [contract, account, or
other cause of action,] sued on by him in his said bill, but the complainant refused to receive
the same. The defendant has always been, and still is, ready and willing to pay said sum to
the complainant, and he now brings it into Court along with this, his plea, and deposits it
with the Clerk and Master, and tenders it to the complainant.
7. Plea of an Estoppel. A.11 matters relied on as an estoppel must be speci-
88 Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., 38. I

91 See, ante, § 248.
80 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 803-804. \
02 Furnish v. Burge, 17 Pick., 538.
so Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 796-797. I
03 Acts of 1891, ch. 218, § 5.
ficallypleaded, whether deeds, judgments, decrees, records, agreements, con-
duct or words.
8. Other Pleas in Bar Every matter of defence, outside of the denial of the
charges in the bill, must be specially set up, such as, besides pleas already
stated, (1) non-performance of condition precedent, (2) set-off, (3) recoup-
ment, (4) novation, (5) alteration of contract, (6) rescission of contract, (5)
fraud, (6) failure of consideration, (7) consideration, illegal or immoral, (8)
infancy or coverture of defendant when contract was made, or obligation
incurred, (9) duress and (10) drunkenness.
A plea or set-off must be so definite and specific that an issue of fact may be
made thereon. 94
ARTICLE III.
FRAME AND FORM OF PLEAS IN BAR.
335. General Requisites of a Plea in Bar. § 338. Requisites of an Anomalous Plea.
336. Requisites of an Affirmative Plea. § 339. Frame of a Plea in Bar.
337. Requisites of a Negative Plea. § 340. Forms of Pleas in Bar.
—
General Requisites of a Plea in Bar. The true end of a plea in bar
§ 335.
is,to save to the parties+the expense and delay of an examination of the wit-
nesses on all the matters set up in the bill. This being so, it is manifest that if
the plea should make such an issue as would result in all the expense and delay
consequent upon an answer, no benefit would accrue from filing a plea rather
than an answer. 1 Hence the rule that a plea must be either an allegation, or a
denial, of some, controlling fact, or of some matters, which, taken collectively,
make out some general fact, which is a complete defence. 2
A
plea must reduce the questions of fact in issue to a single point and this ;
point, if decided in favor of the defendant, must end the bill, or at least so
much of the bill as is pleaded unto. But while a plea must reduce the issues of
fact to a single point, it may nevertheless set up a variety of circumstances, if
these circumstances all tend to a single point, and, when all taken together,
constitute but one general fact. 3
As the office of a plea is to save expense and delay, by narrowing the issues
of fact down to a single point, the Court, ordinarily, disallows double pleas
for, if more than one issue of fact is to be made, the defendant may as well
answer at once. 4 Nevertheless, two pleas are sometimes allowed when they
present issues in a narrow compass thus, a plea that a complainant is not an
;
heir, as asserted in his bill, and a plea of the statute of limitations, have been
allowed to be pleaded together. 5 Two or more pleas in Chancery can only be
filed, however, by leave of the Court; 6 and such leave will only be granteii
when, thereby, the issues are greatly narrowed, and the costs much lessened,
94 State, ex rel, v. Alexander, 7 Cates, 156. lessen the expense, to determine the suit upon a
1 Benson v. Jones, 1 Tenn. Ch., 498. sjngle point. Whereas, if more than one plea should
2 Sto. Eq. PI., § 652. be allowed, then, there may be as many pleas as
3Sto. Eq. PL, §§652; 654. there are matters to be put in issue; and, thus, pleas
4 Benson V. Jones, 1 Tenn. Ch., 498. would tend to lengthen the litigation, and increase
5 Sto. Eq. PL, § 657. The reason why a defend- the expense. As an answer is only a connected se-
ant is not, generally, allowed to plead more than one ries of pleas, if more than one plea is necessary, the
plea in Equity, while he can plead several at law, is,
_
defendant should almost invariably be required to
that the defendant at law has no opportunity of filing answer. Benson v. Jones, 1 Tenn. Ch., 498; Sto.
an answer to all the various matters set up in the Eq. PL, § 657, note; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 608.
declaration. The reason a plea is allowed in Equity, e Benson v. Jpnes^ 1 Tenn. Ch., 498 ; 1 Dan. Ch.
§336 PIÂS IN BAR. 278
vhen compared with a defence by answer. When two or more pleas are filed
they must not be inconsistent.
It has been already stated that a demurrer cannot be good in part, and
bad
in part; although one cause of demurrer assigned may be good, and the others
not. But the same principle does not apply to a plea; for a plea may be bad
in part, and not in the whole. Thus, for example, if a plea covers too much
the Court will allow it to stand as a defence to the part it properly covers *
and will require the part not covered to be answered unto.
A plea, like a demurrer, may be either to the whole bill, or to a part only of
the bill. If it does not go to the whole bill, it should definitely and exactly
express to what part it does extend. "Whenever an affirmative plea is to tho
whole of the bill, but does not extend to, or cover the whole, the plea is bad s ;
but in such a case the Court may allow it to stand for an answer, with leave
to the complainant to except to its sufficiency.
§ 336. —
Requisites of an Affirmative Plea. An affirmative plea, in addition
to the characteristics and requisites stated in the preceding section, must also
possess the following
1. It must be founded on some new matter, that is, on matter not apparent
on the face of the bill; or, as the technical phrase is, it must be founded on
some matter dehors the bill. 9
2. It must not only reduce the case to a single point, but it must be such a
point as is issuable and also, such as, if decided in favor of the plea, will result
;
in the dismissal, or bar of the bill. 10

3. It must be direct and positive, and not state matters by way of argument,
or inference. Where, however, the defendant is executor, administrator, or
heir, and the facts are not in his personal knowledge, he may swear to the plea,
according to his best knowledge and belief. 11
4. It must clearly and distinctly aver all the facts necessary to render the
plea a complete defence to so much of the case made by the bill as the plea is
intended to cover, so that the complainant may, if he chooses, take issue upon
it. Averments are also necessary to exclude intendments, which would other-
wise be made against the pleader. 12
§ 337. —
Requisites of a Negative Plea. The office of a negative plea is not
to bring forward some new matter to displace the Equity of the bill, but to deny
some single material fact alleged in the bill, and thus end the suit. To illus-
trate if the bill be by a party claiming to be an heir, personal representative,
:
partner, or tenant in common, it is manifest that if he does not possess this

character he cannot maintain his suit, and the office of a negative plea is to
put in issue this character in which the complainant sues, by emphatically and
briefly denying that he possesses such character, thus reducing the contest to
a single narrow issue. 13 And so, the defendant may, by a negative plea, deny
the character of heir, administrator, guardian, partner, or husband, attributed
to him by the bill, if the result of the suit hinges on his possessing that char-
acter.
A negative plea is not, however, by any means, confined to a denial of the
character in which a complainant sues, or the defendant is sued, but such a
plea is proper whenever any alleged fact, essential to the relief sought, is false,
and can be so negatived as to present a single narrow issue of fact, decisive oi
the suit. A
negative plea may not only be filed to put in issue some single fact
on which the complainant's right to relief depends, but may, also, be used to
deny any single fact on which the bill rests the alleged liability of the de-
fendant.
7 Sto. Eq. PL, § 692. io Sto. Eq. PI., § 661.
8 Sto. Eq. PI., § 693. n Sto. Eq. PL, § 662; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 684.
T-n«"i „ Tones,
<i
1 Term., Ch., 498; Sto. Eq. PL, 12 Sto. Eq. PL, § 665. ,„ c ,.
§647; 651; 660. 13 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 604; Sto. Eq- PL, §§ 6 60 ! 668 '
279 PIÂS IN BAR. §338
A negative plea is often required to be supported by an answer, especially
when the Equity of the bill is based on charges of fraud, or of notice.
§ 338. —
Requisite of an Anomajpus Plea. An anomalous plea, as already
shown, one which reasserts some matters stated in the bill, and which the
is
bill seeks to impeach, and denies the alleged matters of impeachment. Thus,
where a bill is filed to impeach a decree on the ground of fraud used in obtain-
ing it, the defendant may plead the decree in bar of the suit, aiding his plea
by averments negativing the charges of fraud alleged in the bill. Of the same
nature are pleas, setting up the award itself, to a bill filed for the purpose of
impeaching it on the ground of partiality or fraud in the arbitrators; and
pleas setting up stated accounts and releases where bills have been filed for
the purpose of setting them aside. 14 Such pleas simply rely on the decree,
award, account, or release, and deny the matters of avoidance alleged in the
bill; in other words, an anomalous plea relies on that which the bill seeks to
avoid, and seeks to avoid that on which the bill relies.
Anomalous pleas must be supported by an answer, denying all the facts and
circumstances charged as matters of fraud in the bill. 15
§ 339. —
Frame of a Plea. Formerly pleas, like demurrers, were prefaced by
a protestation against any admission of the facts stated in the bill; but this
always unnecessary precaution is now obsolete and the defendant now, after
;
giving the style of the cause and of the Court, proceeds at once to state the
extent to which his plea goes as whether it is to the whole bill, or to part only
;
of the bill; and in the latter case, to what part it is intended to apply: then
follows the substance of the plea, or matter relied upon, as an objection to the
jurisdiction of the Court, 16 or to the person of the complainant, or of the
defendant, or in the bar of the suit, together with such averments as are
requisite and necessary to eupport it. The conclusion of the plea is a prayei
ior the judgment of the Court, whether the defendant ought to be compelled
to make any further answer to the bill, or to the part of it to which the plea
is offered; 17 or the plea may conclude with a simple prayer to be dismissed
generally, or to be dismissed as to so much of the bill as the plea covers.
Pleas in bar setting up any defence, not a matter of record, must be sworn
to; 18 but pleas of any matter of record in the Court itself, need not be upon
oath. 19 Pleas must also be signed by counsel. 20 The verification of a plea in
behalf of a firm, by one member of the firm, is sufficient. plea may be veri- A
fied by the Solicitor, if he show in his affidavit that he is acquainted with the
facts set out' in the plea. 21 A
plea may be sworn to before any person author-
ized to swear a defendant to his answer. 22
§ 340. Forms of Pleas in Bar. —Pleas, like all other pleadings in Chancery,
were formerly long and complicated; but the Code sweeps away all prolixity,
and discountenances all unnecessary and false allegations in pleadings; 23 and
pleas in Chancery should now conform to the terse models set forth in the
Code, for Courts of Law. 24 The following is a proper
14 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 605-606. a Court other than that wherein the plea is filed.
15 Sto. Eq. PI., §651; 670; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 614- The waiving of an answer under oath does npt
620. waive the defendant's oath to his plea. 1 Dan. Ch.
16 What is said in this section as to the frame of Pr., 686, note.
pleas applies both to pleas in abatement; and pleas in 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 685. Or, pleas may be signed
bar. by the defendant in person. Code, § 3979.
17 Sto. Eq. PI., § 694. 21 Cheatham V. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.
18 Graham V. Nelson, 5 Hum., 605. 22 Aplea is a special answer. See Cheatham v.
is 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 686; Sto. Eq. PL, § 696. It is Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.
the safer practice to verify all pleas that require tr 23 Code, §4316; ante, § 339.
FORM OF AN AFFIRMATIVE PLEA IN BAB.
[The Title, or Style of the Cause.]
John Doe, T
vs. V In Chancery Court at Jacksborp.

Richard Roc. J
[ Commencement. ]
The defendant for plea to the bill in this cause says
[The Matter of the Flea.]

That the debt specified in the bill as the ground of suit was fully paid and satisfied by him
before the bill was filed.
[The Conclusion.]
He, therefore, prays to be hence dismissed with his costs. W. R. Peters, Solicitor.
[The Verification.]
State of Tennessee, 1
County of Campbell, f
The defendant, Richard Roe, makes oath 25 that his foregoing plea is true.
[The Jurat.] Richard Roe.
before me, June 1, 1890.
John J. Graham, C. M.
FORM OF A NEGATIVE PLEA IN BAR.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Jacksboro.
Richard Roe, Adm'r, &c. _
The defendant, Richard Roe, who is sued in said cause as administrator of Robert Roe,
deceased, for plea to the bill, says, that he is not, and never has been, administrator of the
estate of said Robert Roe, deceased, as said bill alleges. Wherefore, he prays to be dismissed
with his costs. Richard Roe.
[Affidavit and jurat, as above]
There is no difference in form between a plea in bar and a plea in abatement,
and the fact whether a plea is in bar, or in abatement, is ascertained by the
subject-matter, 20 and not by the form.
If a plea in bar is to only a part of the bill, it must so show on its face and ;
must be expressly limited to such part, or it will be disallowed on argument,

because insufficient to bar the whole bill.
If the bill should seek to enforce other equities besides, for instance, a parol
sale of land, the plea of the statute of frauds should be limited as follows:
FORM OF A PLEA TO PART OF A BILL. 27
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe, cl al.
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea to so much of the bill as seeks to enforce an alleged
contract for the sale of land therein described, says:
That neither he, nor any other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, ever signed
any contract or agreement, or any memorandum or note thereof, in writing, for the sale of
said land, or of any part thereof, or of any interest therein, to the complainant.
Wherefore, he prays to be hence dismissed as to so much of said bill as seeks to enforce
said contract of sale. C. Sawyers, Solicitor.
J.
But where a part of a bill is pleaded to, the remainder of the bill must be
answered; and in answering, care must be observed to limit the answer to so
20 J'leas that require to be sustained by evidence, prays, &c] says: [Stating the ground of tlic
not of record, must be Bworn to. Ante, § 339. flea.] .
in Code, 8 2908. And the old form of the conclusion of a plea is

27 The old form of the title and commencement of as follows:
picas as follows:
is Therefore this defendant doth plead said matter to
The plea of Richard Roe to the complaint filet s:iid bill, and prays the judgment of the Court
against him in the Chancery Court at Jacksboro, by whether he should be compelled to make any further
John Doe. answer to the said bill [or, to so much of said bill as
This defendant, by protestation, not confessing any is hereinbefore pleaded to:] and prays to be hence
of the matters in said bill to be true, for pica to dismissed with liis reasonable costs.
said bill \or, for pica to so much of said bill as Jas. R. Cocks, Solicitor.
2*
much of the bill as has not been pleaded to for, if the whole bill be answered,
;
the answer will overrule the plea. Where the plea covers only a part of the
bill, the answer to the remainder of the bill may follow the plea,
on the same
page of the paper, as follows
And the said defendant, not waiving his said plea, but insisting thereon, for answer to the
remainder of said bill, says: [Here set out the answer to so much of the bill as is not cov-
ered by the plea.]
ARTICLE IV.
PLEAS SUPPORTED BY AN ANSWER.
341. When a Plea Must be Supported by an § 346. When a Supporting Answer is not
Answer. Required.
342. Why a Plea Must be Supported by an § 347. The Frame of a Plea, and of the Sup-
Answer. porting Answer.
343. Origin of this Class of Pleas. § 348. Form of a Plea, and of the Sup-
344. Character of Such a Plea. porting Answer.
345. Character of the Supporting Answer. § 349. The Present Practice.
When a Plea Must be Supported by an Answer. The cases, in which

§ 341. —
it isnecessary that a plea should be supported by an answer, may be conven-
iently divided into: 1, Those where the defendant denies some allegation in
the bill necessary to the relief the complainant prays; 1 2, Those where the
complainant admits the existence of a legal bar, but alleges some equitable
circumstances to avoid the effect of the bar; 2 and 3, Those where the com-
plainant does not admit the existence of any legal bar, but charges some cir-
cumstances, which may be true, and to which there may be a valid ground of
plea, and also charges other circumstances which are inconsistent with the
substantial validity of the plea. 1, In the first case, the defendant must answer
when the bill charges facts or circumstances which would tend to disprove, or
otherwise invalidate, the plea, responding in his answer to all matters not
expressly met and denied by his plea. 2, In the second case, the defendant
may insist, by way of plea, upon the legal bar, denying the circumstances,
which would avoid it and he must accompany the plea with an answer, mak-
;
ing a discovery as to all the circumstances charged in the bill, in support of

his plea. 3, In the third case, the defendant must distinguish those facts,
which if true, would not invalidate or disprove his plea and plead to the relief ;
and discovery sbught with regard to them. And he must then accompany the
plea with an answer to those facts, and to those only, which if true, would dis-
prove, or invalidate his plea, and to all the matters which are specially alleged
as evidence of those facts. 3
Even a plea in abatement denying the ground of an attachment may be
properly supported by an answer denying the various charges of misconduct
tending to support the fraudulent transfer alleged as the ground for an attach-
ment. 4
28 The answer will be deemed an answer to the them, (2) to_ avoid the effect of a judgment at law,
whole bill, whether so intended or not, and although (3) to set aside a release, or (4) an award, or (5) lo
the whole bill be not in fact answered, unless the open a stated account. I Dan, Ch. Pr., 616.
answer show affirmatively on its face that it is an a 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 616; Sto. Eq. PI., § 674.
answer to a part only of the bill. J Seifred r. People's Bank, 1 Bax., 200; Pigue v.
1 Benson »'. Tones, 1 Tenn. Ch., 498. Seifred »'. Young, 1 Pick., 263. The pleas in abatement in
People's Bank, 1 Bax., 200; Pigue V. Young, 1 Pick., these cases were strictly negative pleas, and the
263. supporting answers were clearly within the rule ap-
2 The most common cases of this class are bills
_f £ I
( 1 plicable to such cases.
Where the bill charges fraud or notice, or other equitable matter in avoid-
ance of the bar pleaded, the plea must be supported by an answer denying the
fraud, notice, and other facts and circumstances alleged by the bill in avoid-
ance. 5
§ 342. Why a Plea Must be Supported by an Answer. All negative and —
anomalous pleas in bar of a suit must be supported by an answer, when a dis-
covery is prayed in the bill. 6 It has heretofore been fully shown that a bill u
both a pleading and an interrogation, and that an answer under oath is both s,
pleading and a deposition. 7 As a pleading, the bill may be met by a negative

or anomalous plea, denying some essential fact contained in it, but such pleas
are no answer to the matters of interrogation, and the interrogation may be
intended to obtain the very evidence necessary to maintain the bill, and defeat
the plea. 8 An affirmative plea does not deny any matter contained in the bill;
indeed, for all the purposes of the plea,
it admits all of the matters of fact
charged in the bill. An
affirmative plea, therefore, in effect, admits the bill,
but seeks to displace its Equity, by bringing forward a single additional matter
of fact. Inasmuch, then, as an affirmative plea admits the truth of the bill, the
complainant cannot find fault with the defendant for not answering his inter-
rogation. 9 Nor can the complainant object to a plea because not supported by
an answer, when he in his bill has waived an answer on oath. 10
Anomalous and negative pleas, however, deny some essential fact or facts
alleged by the complainant, and at the same time admit nothing, but leave the
complainant's interrogation wholly unanswered, thus depriving him of the
very evidence his bill was, in part, filed to obtain in furtherance of his case. 11
And, besides, if such a plea is not supported by an answer negativing those
charges and allegations of the bill which tend to sustain the matter denied by
the plea, such charges and allegations become evidence for complainant on
argument of the sufficiency of the plea. 12
§ 343. —
Origin of This Class of Pleas. The origin of this class of pleas may
be easily traced to a change in the frame and character of bills and pleadings,
from those which existed under the old practice of the Court. Bills were for-
merly of a very simple character, not taking any notice of the real or supposed
defence which would be set up by the defendant. The defence came out upon
a plea; the replication stated the matter in avoidance of the plea; then the
rejoinder denied the matter in the replication; and the parties were then at
issue. When, for example, according to the old practice, a complainant by his
bill stated a case for relief, if there had been a former decree on the merits,
which he sought to set aside on account of fraud in obtaining the decree, the
bill did not, in any manner whatsoever, allude to the decree. It was left to
the defendant to plead the decree, as a defence barring the complainant's
right. And the complainant then, by his replication, would reply that the
decree t had been obtained by fraud: by which the complainant would admit
that the decree was a bar, if not capable of impeachment on the ground of
fraud. The defendant would, by his rejoinder, avoid or deny the charge of
fraud, and sustain the decree and the issue would be simply on the charge of
;
fraud. 13
But, when a change of the frame of pleadings took place, and special replica-
tions, rejoinders, and surrejoinders, fell into disuse, and the bill, instead of
relying solely on the matter constituting the complainant's original case, pro-
ceeded to anticipate the defence, and charged facts to avoid that defence (thus
5Graham v. Nelson, 5 Hum., 60S. n 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 615.

8 See, post, § 345. 10Cheatham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.
7 Ante, § 142; Sto. Eq. PL. § 672. llPigue V. Young, 1 Pick., 263; Cheatham v.
s Seifred v. People's Bank, 1 Bax., 200; 1 Dan. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.

Ch. Pr., 614; Sto. Eq. PI., §672; Cheatham V. 12 Seifred v. People's Bank, 1 Bax., 200.
Pearce, S Pick., 668. 13 Sto. Eq. PL, § 676.
283 PIvEAS IN BAR. §344
performing the double functions of a bill, and of a replication under the old
practice), and required a discovery as to the matters charged, a change in the
mode of making his defence became indispensable for the protection of the
defendant; and he was compelled to put in a plea, which was, in part, both a
plea and a rejoinder. That is, he was obliged to plead the bar, and to negative
the charges and circumstances which sought to avoid it. And, as a discovery
was sought in relation to these very matters charged in avoidance, he was also
compelled to accompany his plea with an answer, fully discovering and re-
sponding to these matters. The material issue thus made between the parties
was not the bar set up in defence but it was the facts and charges set up in
;
the bill to avoid it. Nor was the plea, under such circumstances, liable to the
imputation of duplicity for it contained, in the whole, but one single defence.
;
And the answer was necessary in support of the plea because the complainant ;
was entitled to the discovery of the facts and charges, stated in his bill in
avoidance of the bar, and which might be indispensable to prove his case at
the hearing. 14 And while such an answer is technically called an answer in
support of the plea, nevertheless it is, in effect, often an answer in support of
the bill.
§ 344. —
Character of Such a Plea. The plea, as well as the answer, must
contain averments negativing the facts and circumstances set up in the bill in
avoidance of the bar admitted by the bill. For otherwise, the plea will not
amount to a complete defence to the bill, since the denial of those facts and
circumstances is in truth the only point in the controversy. If those facts and
circumstances do not exist, the bar or defence is admitted by the complainant
to be perfect. If they do exist, the defendant must equally admit that the bar
or defence is fatally defective. 15 In drawing the plea, it is important to keep
in mind the distinction between so much of the bill as is a pleading, and the
part that is a mere interrogation. The office of the plea is to effectually meet
so much of the bill as is a pleading, and no more. It should not cover any part
of the bill that is in effect a mere interrogation calling for a discovery. plea A
is not rendered double by the insertion of several averments 16 that are neces-
sary to exclude conclusions arising from allegations in the bill to anticipate
and defeat the bar set up in the plea.
Hence it is, that, in every case where an answer is required to accompany a
plea, the plea should not cover the whole bill. It should cover so much of the
bill only as is a pleading; and not cover any part of the bill which relates to
the discovery of the particular facts; for, as to these, the complainant has a
right to require an answer. If the plea covers such a discovery, it will be bad
because the defendant is bound to make that discovery. 17
It must be remembered that the answer in support of "the plea is no part oc
the defence. The defence is the matter set up in the plea, and the answer is
merely the evidence the complainant has ealled for to sustain his case, 18
although when that evidence makes for the defendant, the effect of the answer
is to aid the latter, and not the complainant.
§ 345. Character of the Supporting Answer. In drawing the answer in —

support of the plea, the fact that a bill is both a pleading and an interrogation
must be kept in mind. The object of the answer is two fold: 1st, To respond
to the matter charged in support of the case made by the bill, and to this extent
it is a sort of deposition; and 2d, To negative those averments and charges in
the bill, which, if not denied by the answer, would, by intendment, show the
plea to be insufficient. 19
14Pigue v. Young, 1 Pick., 263; Sto. Eq. PI., § 17 Benson V. Jones, 1 Tenn., Ch., 498; Sto. Eq.
678; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 606. PI., § 686.
15 Sto. Eq. PL, § 680. is 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 624; Cheatham v. Pearce, 5
If! 1 nan C\\ Pr f.(\7 Tino-at-dus «_ Tt-initv Pick fifiS
The answer in support of a plea must be full and clear, or it will not support
the plea for the Court will take all of the bill not covered by the plea, or the
;
answer, to be true. 20 If there is any charge in the bill, which is an equitable

circumstance in favor of the complainant's case against the matter pleaded,
such as fraud, or notice of title, that charge must be denied by way of answer,'
as well as by averment in the plea. In such a case, the answer must be full
and clear, or it will not be effectual to support the plea; for the Court will
intend the matters so charged against the pleader, unless they are fully and
clearly denied. But if they are in substance fully and clearly denied, it may
be sufficient to support the plea, although all the circumstances charged in the
bill may not be precisely answered. Even though the Court, upon argument
of the plea, may hold these charges sufficiently denied by the answer to exclude
intendments against the pleader yet, if the complainant thinks the answer to
;
them is evasive, he may except to the sufficiency of the answer in those points. 21
"Where an answer is filed in support of a plea, care must be observed not to
extend the answer so as to cover that part of the bill already covered by the
plea; for, in such a case, the answer would overrule the plea. The same rule
prevails where no answer is required to support the plea in such a case, no :
discovery being called for, the bill is a mere pleading, and is, therefore, wholly
covered by the plea. Consequently, in such a case, any answer would over-
rule the plea. 22
The best test of the sufficiency of an answer in support of a plea is, to con-
sider as true every allegation in the bill not sufficiently denied by the answer,
and then to consider whether, if these allegations be true, the plea is a suffi-
cient bar to the complainant's claim for relief. 23
§ 346. When a Supporting Answer is Not Required. If it appears from —
the bill, that no discovery is sought by the complainant, in aid of the facts and
circumstances he alleges in avoidance of the bar he admits, the defendant need
not put in any answer at all. 24
In order to require, or even to justify, an answer, there must be some specific
Pacts charged in the bill, to which such an answer is a proper response. A bill
may be specific in two respects. It may allege a particular fact, and charge
that the evidence thereof is in the possession of the defendant; or it may be
specific in charging a general fact such as the fact upon which the title of the
;
complainant is founded, and charge particular circumstances to prove that

general fact, and require discovery thereof from the defendant. It is neces-
sary, in order to the allowance of an answer in support of a plea, that the bill
should contain some charge of one kind or of the other. Therefore, where the
bill does not charge any specific fact, inconsistent with the plea, negativing,
and avoiding, as it were, that plea by anticipation, it is not necessary to put in
an answer in support of the plea for nothing is charged, which is specific in
;
any point of view, to defeat the plea, and an accompanying answer is unneces-
sary and indeed is improper, since it would overrule the plea. 25
;
In general, an answer is not required to support a plea, unless the complain-

ant charges fraud, notice, or some other equitable ground of avoiding the bar
admitted by his bill. And when such an answer is required, it ordinarily arises
from one of two considerations 1, It is in the nature of proof called for by
:
the bill, to enable the complainant to obviate the bar he is seeking to avoid in ;
which case the defendant must fully answer all the charges of fraud, notice,
or other equitable circumstances alleged. In such a case the answer is for the
20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 624. the defendant to his answer is waived, no answer \n
21 Sto. Eq. PI., § 684. support of the plea is necessary, unless there be al-
22 Sto. Eq. PI., § 668. legations which are not denied by the plea; ana
23 Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige, (N. Y.), which, if not denied by an answer, would render the
178. This is a leading case. plea insufficient. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 614, note; Heartt
24 Sto. Eq. PI., § 682; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 616; Cheat- v. Corning, 3 Paige, CN. Y.), 566.
ham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668. It would seem, both 25 Sto. Eq. PL, § 681.
from reason and authority, that when the oath of
complainant's benefit. 2, It is in the nature of a support to the plea, and is
intended by its denial of the details, specifications, and circumstances of fraud,
notice, or other equitable matters, to exclude those intendments which, with-
out such a denial, would be made against the defendant; for, upon argument
of a plea, every fact stated in the bill and not denied by the answer in support
of the plea, is taken to be true. In cases of this sort, the answer is for the
defendant's benefit, and is, in reality, in support of the plea; whereas, in the
former case the answer is required by the complainant as a means of proof to
overthrow the defence set up by the plea and is, in reality, in support of the
;
bill. 26
§ 347. Frame of a Plea, and of the Supporting Answer. The office of the —
plea to put in issue the matters alleged in avoidance by the bill, ordinarily
is
fraud or notice and the office of the answer in support of the plea is to respond
;
to all the charges whereby the avoidance is sought to be sustained. Thus, in a

bill seeking to set aside a decree, because of fraud in its procurement, and
specifying the circumstances of the alleged fraud, the plea will set up the
decree in bar of the bill, by proper general averments denying the allegations
of fraud; and the answer will meet fully and deny all the circumstances of
fraud alleged in the bill, and will respond to all other matters of interrogation
in the bill.
In all cases where a plea is accompanied by an answer, it must be put in upon
oath, unless the defendant be a corporation, and then its seal must be affixed. 27
"When an answer accompanies a plea in order to support it, it is prefaced with
an averment that the defendant does not thereby waive his plea, but wholly
relies thereon. So, where the plea is not to the whole of the bill, but only to n
the answer is commenced with the same protestation against a waiver of
X'art,
the plea, and with a declaration that it is intended to be only in answer to the
part of the bill, not covered by the plea. 28
As the averments negativing the charges of fraud are used merely to put
the fact of fraud, as alleged by the bill, in issue in the plea, they may be ex-
pressed in the most general terms, provided they are sufficient to put the
charges of fraud, contained in the bill, fully in issue. And as the complainant
is entitled to have the answer of the defendant, upon oath, to any matter in
dispute between them, in aid of proof of the case made by the bill, the defend-
ant must answer .to the facts of fraud, alleged in the bill, so fully, as to leave
no doubt in the mind of the Court, that, upon that answer, if not controverted
by evidence on the part of complainant, the fact of fraud could not be estab-
lished. If the answer should not be full in all material points, the Court may
presume that the fact of fraud may be capable of proof in the point not fully
answered; and may, therefore, not deem the answer sufficient to support the
plea as conclusive; and, therefore, may overrule the plea absolutely, or only
as an immediate bar, saving the benefit of it to the hearing of the cause. But,
although the answer may be deemed sufficient to support the plea upon argu-
ment, the complainant may except to the answer, if he conceives it not to be so
full to all the charges, as to be free from exception; or, by amending his bill,
he may require an answer to any matter, which may not have been so exten-
sively stated, or interrogated to, as the case warranted; or to which he may
apprehend, that the answer, although in full terms, may have been in effect
evasive. 29
If, however, the complainant excepts to the answer, that is an admission
that the plea is sufficient. The better practice for the complainant is to set
20 While the answer, in such is called an
cases, answer in support of the plea, but an answer in
answer in support of the plea, it such, in reality,
is support of the bill.
only when it effectually overcomes the special mat- 27 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668. •
ters charged in the bill; if the answer confirms those 28 Sto. Eq. PI., § 695.
the plea down
for argument, and thus have its sufficiency determined, before
excepting to the answer for insufficiency. 30
§ 348. Form of a Plea, and of the Supporting Answer. The form of an —
answer in support of a plea is simple and untechnical. The plea is in the usual
form of a plea in bar, and the supporting answer follows the plea, on the same
paper. All this will more clearly appear by the following general form of a
plea and a supporting answer, showing their characteristics, and how joined.
GENERAL FORM OF A PLEA AND A SUPPORTING ANSWER.
John Doe )
vs. > No. 618. InChancery, at Knoxville.

Richard Roe, et al. )
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea to the bill filed against him in this cause, says:
That [Here set out the matter pleaded, such matter being ordinarily a release, former judg-
ment, award, account stated or settled, innocent purchaser, or other matter in avoidance of
the bill.}
Therefore, this defendant pleads the said release [former judgment, award, account stated,
account settled, innocent purchaser, or other matter pleaded in avoidance,} in bar of the
complainant's bill [or, in bar of so much of the complainant's bill as is hereinbefore partic-
ularly mentioned,] and prays the judgment of the Court hereon.
And this defendant, not waiving his said plea, but relying thereon, and in support thereof,
tor answer to the residue of said bill, says, that the release, [former judgment, award, account
stated or account settled,] was not obtained by any artifice or fraud whatsoever; and he denies
the fraud and artifices charged, and denies the undue influence alleged, and says that all
and singular the allegations of fraud set forth in the bill are untrue. [Deny the particular
circumstances of fraud charged. If notice is alleged in the bill as the ground of its equity,
—
say The defendant had not at the time he purchased said lot, [or at the time he took his deed
iherefor, or at the time he paid the purchase-money for said lot,] any notice whatever of com-
plainant's alleged claim to said lot, and the defendant says that the first notice that he ever
had of said claim was when he read complainant's said bill, and that until he read said bill
he never had any notice of complainant's claim, or any suspicion thereof, or any reason or
ground of suspicion.]
Therefore, the defendant prays to be hence dismissed.
W. P. Washburn, Solicitor.
[Annex an affidavit of the truth of the answer and plea.]
§ 349. —
The Present Practice. The old practice of filing a negative plea,
and supporting it with an answer, is still in force, although seldom resorted
to. 31 The present practice is to incorporate all matters of defence to the
merits, in the answer. 32 It is now good pleading to incorporate in the answer
all the averments that would constitute a good negative or anomalous plea,
.tmd in the same answer to respond to all matters of interrogation. In short,
the plea and supporting answer of the old practice can now be both incor-
porated in one and the same answer, the present answer in such eases being,
in effect, a plea supported by an answer. 33 And our Courts discourage the
34
practice of answering in support of a plea, where an answer can be avoided.
30 Sto. Eq. PL, § 689. practice, can perform the two-fold office of a plea
31 The author has set forth this practice, in this and an answer; and a defence by that mode is less
Article, more to make his book complete, than as evi- perplexing, less technical, and more apt to be sus-
dence of his appreciation of the present value of this tained, than the old method by plea and supporting
form of pleading and defence. The principles in- answer.
volved are, however, valuable to all who seek to mas- 32 Code, § 4318.
ter the science of pleading. Pleas in bar should now 33 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 617, note.
never be resorted to when they require an answer 34 Pigue V. Young, 1 Pick., 263.
in their support, as an answer, under our present
ARTICLE V.
PROCEEDINGS UPON A PLEA IN BAR.*
§ 3S0. How
a Plea is Put at Issue. § 353. When a Plea May be Ordered to Stand
§ 351. The Truth of Pleas, How
Ascertained. for an Answer.
§ 352. Overruling and Allowing Pleas. § 354. Amendment of Pleas.
§ 350. How
a Plea is Put at Issue. —If the complainant conceives any plea
to be naught, either for the matter or manner of it, he may set it down with
the Clerk to be argued 2 or, if he thinks the plea good, but not true, he may
;
take issue upon it, and proceed to trial. 3 Upon the argument of a plea, every
fact stated in the bill, and not denied by the averments of the plea, or by the
answer in support of the plea, must be taken as true; and; on the other hand,
the matter contained in the plea must be considered as true, upon such argu-
ment. 4
If, therefore, the complainant conceives a plea to be defective in point of
form, or of substance, he may take the judgment of the Court upon its suffi-
ciency, as stated above. Upon argument of a plea in bar, it may either be al-
lowed or disallowed, or the benefit of it may be saved to the hearing; or it may
be ordered to stand for an answer. If allowed on argument, the plea is deter-
mined to be a full bar to so much of the bill as it covers, if the matter pleaded,
with the averments necessary to support it, are true. If, therefore, a plea is
held sufficient upon argument, or if the complainant without argument thinks
it, although good in form and substance, not true in point of fact, he may take
issue upon it, and proceed to disprove the facts upon which it is endeavored to
be supported. 5
But, upon argument, the Court may not be content either to overrule the
plea or to allow it, being of opinion, that, while the plea, if strictly true, may
be a defence, nevertheless the complainant may introduce matters in evidence
under his bill which would avoid the plea. In such a case, the Court, in order
to' give both sides a full opportunity to present their case, will, without over-
ruling the plea, direct that the defendant may have the benefit of it at the
hearing. Upon such an order the complainant may prove matters that will
either disprove or avoid the plea. 6
If the complainant takes issue on the plea, and the plea be found true, it
will be a good defence to so much of the bill as it covers, for the plea may
1 The proceedings upon a plea in bar and upon a would seem that a plea must be set down for argu-
plea in abatement are the same, except that a plea ment, (which is equivalent to excepting to its suffi-
in abatement can never be ordered to stand for ciency,) or issue taken upon it, within twenty days
an answer. And what is said in this article about after notice of its being filed; and if the complainant
(1) putting pleas at issue.; (2) ascertaining the truth fail to set the plea down for argument, or to take
of pleas; (3) overruling and allowing pleas; and (4) issue upon it, within said time, the defendant may
amending pleas, applies to pleas in abatement as well have his plea taken for confessed, or may treat the
as to pleas in bar. cause as at issue, without a replication, in which lat-
2 It is irregular practice to demur to a plea, but ter case the cause would stand for trial at the term
should such a demurrer be filed, the Court would next following. See, Code, §§4400, 4401; 4322;
treat it as a mode of setting the plea for hearing as 4328; 4432; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 121; Allen V. Allen, 3
to its sufficiency. Klepper v. Powell, 6 Heisk., 506. Tenn. Ch., 145; Seifred V. People's Bank, 2 Tenn.
In Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., 38, a plea was demurred Ch., 17; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 696, note. Taking proof
to, and no objection raised to the practice. See Dan. on the plea would be equivalent to taking issue upon
Ch. Pr., 692, note. A demurrer lies to a plea in the it. Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735.
Circuit Court. Harris V. Taylor, 3 Sneed, 536. 4 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 694; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 120-121.
3 Code, 4393; post, % 351. Our Statutes and Rules 5 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 695; Sto. Eq. PI., §697. The
of Practice are silent as to when and how issue must burden of proof upon an affirmative plea is on the
be taken on a plea; but inasmuch as a plea is a spe- defendant, but in case of a negative plea the burden
cial answer, and an answer must be excepted to is generally on the complainant.
within twpntv rlnvs after nntire nf its heinc filed, it 6 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.. 699: Stn. "FYi PI S fiQS
apply to only a part of the bill, or, if it applies to the whole bill, may be true
only as to a part, in which latter case it will bar such part. 7 Unlike a demur-
rer, a plea may be good in part and bad in part, and such a plea will be sus-
tained to the extent of its goodness. 8
If the complainant deems a plea insufficient, either for the manner or the
matter of it, he may set it down with the clerk to be argued, or he may set it
down for argument by an entry on the minutes, if the Court be in session.
The following is a
PORM OP SETTING A PLEA DOWN POR ARGUMENT.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe, et <
The complainant says the plea of the defendant, Richard Roe, is not sufficient:
1st. Because it is not properly verified. 9
2d. Because, if true, it presents no matter sufficient to bar the suit.
3d. Because it does not cover the whole bill and does not profess to be to a part only
; of
the bill.
Wherefore, he sets said plea down for argument. Leon Jourolmon, Solicitor.
If the complainant considers the plea good in form and in substance, but
false in fact, he must take issue upon it, if an affirmative plea, 10 and proceed
\o trial. 11 Issue is taken, ordinarily, by filing a replication 12 within twenty
days.
REPLICATION TO A PLEA.
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery, at Knoxville.
Richard Roe, et i
The complainant joins issue on the plea filed in this cause by the defendant, Richard Roe.
A. S. ProssEr, Solicitor.
The Truth of Pleas, How Ascertained. If the plea, upon argument,
§ 351. —
is held to be good or, if the complainant admits it to be so by replying to it,
;
the truth of the plea is the only subject of question remaining, so far as the
plea extends and nothing but the matters contained in the plea, as to so much
;
of the bill as the plea covers, is in issue between the parties. If, therefore,
issue is thus taken upon the plea, the defendant must prove the facts it sug-
gests. 13 If he fails in this proof, so that at the hearing of the cause, the plea
is held to be no bar, and the plea extends to the discovery sought by the bill,
the complainant is not to lose the benefit of that discovery but the Court will ;
order the defendant to be examined on interrogatories, to supply the defect.

But, if the defendant proves the truth of the matter pleaded, the suit, so far
as the plea extends, is barred, even though the plea is not good., either in point
of form or of substance. Therefore, when a defendant pleaded a purchase for
a valuable consideration, and omitted to deny notice of the complainant's title,
and the complainant replied, it was determined that the plea, although irreg-
ular, had been admitted, by the replication, to be good; and that the fact of
notice not being in issue, the defendant proving what he had pleaded, was
entitled to have the bill dismissed. 14
Pleas of a former decree, or of another suit depending in the same Court,
are generally referred to the Master to inquire into the fact and if the Master ;
7 Moore v. Holt, 3 Tenn. Ch., 143. 12 Code, § 2930. The contrast between the form
8 Searight v. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 189; 1 Dan. Ch. of this replication and the old form, well illustrates
Pr., 610; Sto. Eq. PI., §692; Parmelee v. Railroad, the superiority of our present forms of pleading over
13 Lea, 600. the old forms. The form of the replication above
9 If the plea is one requiring verification, and is given is the one used in the Circuit Court, but it is
not properly verified, it may be stricken from the equally available in the Chancery Court.
files on motion. 13 The burden of proof is on the defendant when
10 A negative plea makes an issue without a repli- he pleads an affirmative plea, but the burden is on
cation. A replication is, however, allowable, but not the complainant when the defendant files a negative
necessary. Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735, modifying plea. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 697-698.
Cheatham v. Pearce, S Pick., 668. 14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 697; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 695.
11 Code, § 4393, Cheatham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668.
289 PLEAS IN EAR. §352
reports the fact true, the bill, on confirmation of the report, will be dismissed.
But the complainant may except to the Master's report, and bring on the mat-
16
ter to be argued before the Court.
The complainant may go into evidence to disprove the plea, and if he has in
his bill alleged any matter which, if true, may have the effect of avoiding the
plea, such as notice or fraud, he may introduce any proof he may have in sup-
port of his allegation. And where the plea introduces matter of a negative
nature, such as denial of notice or fraud, if the existence of the notice or fraud
is not admitted by the answer in support of the plea, it will be necessary
for
the complainant to produce evidence in support of the affirmative of the prop
osition. After the complainant has replied to a plea, the validity of the plea
can never be questioned, but only its truth in fact, nothing but the matters
;
contained in the plea, as to so much of the bill as the plea covers, is in issue
between the parties. If, therefore, issue is thus taken upon the plea, the
defendant must prove the facts which it suggests. But, if the defendant provea
the truth of the matter pleaded, the suit, so far as the plea extends, is barred,
16
even though the plea is not good, either in point of form or substance.
A plea in bar presupposes that, if a certain essential fact, omitted from the
bill, could be made to appear or, if a certain essential fact contained in the
;
bill could be made to disappear, then the bill would be demurrable. On this
presupposition, the plea avers that the omitted essential fact exists, or that
the alleged essential fact does not exist. If complainant disputes the legal ac-
curacy of the presupposition, he will set the plea down for argument as to its
sufficiency, thus making an issue of law 17 if he admits the presupposition, but
;
disputes the truth of the plea, he will take issue upon it, and. thus raise a ques-
tion of fact. 18
§ 352. —
Overruling and Allowing Pleas. If, upon argument, the Court is of
opinion that the plea is insufficient as a defence, it is overruled, and the defend-
ant required to answer the bill. 19
If, however, the plea is allowed, it is thereby determined to be a full bar to
so much of the bill as it covers, if the matter pleaded be true in which case ;
the complainant must dismiss so much of the bill as is covered by the plea, or
take issue upon the plea. 20
Sometimes, upon the argument of a plea, the Court considers that, although
the plea appears to set up a good defence, yet there may be facts in avoidance.
In such a case, the Court may direct that the benefit of the plea be saved to
the defendant at the hearing, in which case the plea must be replied to by the
complainant 21 or the Court may allow the defendant to rely upon the matter
;
of the plea in his answer, which is the better practice. 22

If the complainant files a replication to the plea, and the plea is, at the
hearing, found to be true in fact, it will be a complete bar to so much of the
bill as the plea covers, even though the plea is not good, either in form or in
substance. 23
§ 353. When a Plea May be Ordered to Stand for an Answer. — If, upon
15 Sto. Eq. PI., § 700; but see, ante, § 328, note 22. either as a demurrer, Witt v. Ellis, 2 Cold., 40; or
16 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 697-698. as a mode of setting the plea for argument on its
17 In strict Chancery practice, a demurrer is not sufficiency. Klepper v. Powell, 6 Heisk., 506, ante,
the proper method of testing the sufficiency of a § 350.
plea but, inasmuch as a demurrer is used for that
;
_
18 Code, § 4393.
purpose in the Courts of law, and is withal a plain, 10 Code, § 4395. No second plea is allowed upon
intelligible and definite method of testing a plea's the overruling of a plea upon argument. Ibid.
sufficiency, no reason exists, outside of ancient 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 696.
usage, why a demurrer should not lie to an insuffi- 21 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 699; Brien V. Marsh, 1 Tenn.
cient plea in Equity as well as at law. Setting down Ch., 625. If there be two pleas, both or either may
a plea for argument is in the' nature of a general de- be allowed to stand for an answer. Ibid.
murrer, while demurrers, being now special, point out 22 Whittaker v. Whittaker, 10 Lea, 98. The latter
the particular objections to the plea relied on, and practice is more consonont with our statute. Code,
thus more fully conform to the spirit of our present § 4318. Of course, the matter of a plea to the juris-
system of pleading. And our Courts have practically diction cannot be relied on in an answer. Ibid.
argument, the Court considers that the matter offered by way of plea may be
a defence, or part of a defence, but that it has been informally pleaded, or
is
not properly supported by the answer, so that the truth is doubtful, it will, in
such case, instead of overruling the plea, direct it to stand for an answer. 24
If a plea is ordered to stand for an answer, it is allowed to be a sufficient
answer to so much of the bill as it covers unless, by the order, liberty is given
;
to the complainant to except to it for insufficiency; and where a defendant

pleaded to the whole bill, and, on arguing the plea, it was ordered to stand for
an answer, without saying, one way or the other, whether the complainant
might except, the complainant was not allowed to except, because, by the
terms " for an answer " in the order, a sufficient answer is meant, an insuffi-
cient answer being no answer. It is to be observed, that, if a plea be to a part
only of the bill, and is accompanied by an answer to the rest, an order that it
may stand for an answer, without giving the complainant liberty to except,
will not preclude the complainant from excepting to the answer to that part
of the bill which is not covered by the plea. The order for the plea to stand
for an answer, is, however, frequently accompanied with a direction that the
complainant shall be at liberty to except but the liberty is sometimes qualified
;
so as to protect the defendant from any particular discovery, which he ought

not to be called upon to make. When a plea has been ordered to stand for an
answer, with liberty to except, the complainant must proceed to deliver his
exceptions within twenty days, otherwise the answer will be deemed sufficient.
The proceedings upon the exceptions are the same as those upon exceptions to
answers in general. 25
If a plea is accompanied by an answer, and is ordered to stand for an answer,
without liberty to except, the complainant may yet except to the answer, as
insufficient to the parts of the bill not covered by the plea. If a plea, accom-
panied by an answer is allowed, upon argument as sufficient, the answer may
be read at the hearing of the cause to counterprove the plea. 26
§ 354. —
Amendment of Pleas. Pleas may be amended where there has been
an evident slip or mistake, and the material ground of defence seems to the
Court to be good. Tet the Court always expects to be told precisely what the
amendment is to be, and how the slip happened, before it will allow the amend-
ment to be made. The defendant will, also, be tied down to a short time in
which to amend. 27
The motion to amend must be supported by an affidavit, and be accompanied
by the draft of the amendment proposed, that the Court may judge of its
materiality. 28A defect in the form of a plea, or in the form of its verification,
may be amended without affidavit, the plea being resworn to after amend-
ment. 29 After a plea has been argued and overruled, no second plea will be
allowed. 30
24 Brien o. Marsh, 1 Tenn. Ch., 625. 28 Dan. Ch. Pr., 704.
25 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 700-701; Sto. Eq. PL, § 699. 29 Trabue v. Higden, 4 Cold., 620; Seifred v. Peo-
26 Sto. Eq. PI., § 699. pie's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., 19.
2T Sto. Eq. PL, § 701. 30 Code, § 4395.
291 ANSWERS TO BILLS. §355
CHAPTER XVII.
ANSWERS AND DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS.
Article I. The Answer as a Pleading.
Article II. The Answer as a Deposition.
Article III. Matters Common to All Answers.
Article IV. The Frame and Form of an Answer.
Article V. Practical Suggestions as to Answers.
Article VI. Disclaimers to Bills.
ARTICLE I.
THE ANSWER AS A PLEADING.
§ 355. General Nature on an Answer. § 358. Answer Superior to a Plea as a Mode
§ 356. Answer as a Mode of Defence. of Defence.
§ 357. What Defences May be Made by an § 360. What is a Sufficient Answer When
Answer. the Defendant's Oath is Waived.
§ 358. All the Defences Relied on Must be
Stated.
§ 355. —
General Nature of an Answer. If a defendant 1 is unable to over-
throw the bill by a plea in abatement, or a motion to dismiss, or by a demurrer,
or a plea in bar, he must answer the bill. An answer may have a four-fold
nature 1, It may set forth the defendant 's defences to the charges contained
:
in the bill, and to this extent it is a mere pleading 2, It may contain the de- ;
fendant's responses to the discoveries sought by the bill, in which case it is

also a sort of deposition 2 3, It may set up matters as to which the defendant
;
is entitled to some affirmative relief either against the complainant or against

a co-defendant, and to this extent resembles a cross-bill; and 4, It may enter
into a detail of all the matters that can be set up in answer to the equities of
the bill, in order to sustain a motion to dissolve an injunction, or to defeat a
motion for a receiver, in which case the answer partakes of the nature of a
counter affidavit. 3 All of these different phases of an answer will be duly
considered in their proper places but, for the present, an answer will be con-
;
sidered in its character as a pleading, and as a deposition.

The general nature of the answer which a complainant has a right to require
from each defendant upon the record, is sufficiently shown by the old form of
'
prayer in a bill requiring an answer on oath that the defendant may, upon his
: '
corporal oath, according to the best and utmost of his knowledge, recollection,
information and belief, full, true, direct and perfect answer make to all and
singular the several matters and things hereinbefore contained, and that as fully
1 The party filing an answer as a pleading is Story, Daniel, Barbour, Pomeroy and other eminent
termed a defendant, because he defends; but when authors. See, ante, § 133, note 7.
he, also, answers the question propounded by the 2 When an answer is demanded on oath, it is both
bill, or makes the discovery called for, he is termed a pleading and a deposition. See, Smith V. St. Louis
a respondent, because he responds. t
The term re- Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 601; Sto. Eq. PI., §850;
spondent is the more formal and ancient, but in this Gardner v. Gardner, 4 Heisk., 310; 3 Greenl. Ev., 8
book, the term defendant is preferred, (1) because 284.
it is now almost universally used in our statutes and 3 The failure to note these various phases an an-
Supreme Court Reports; and (2) because an answer swer may assume, has caused some apparent, and
is generally a mere unsworn pleading, setting up de-. some real, conflicts in the rulings of Courts in refer-
fences, and a response under oath is seldom called ence to answers. See, Sto. Eq. PI., § 850; 1 Dan.
§356 ANSWERS TO BILLS. 292
and particularly as if the same were here again repeated, and he thereunto sev-
erally and distinctly interrogated. 4 '
'
§ 356. Mode of Defence. In its character as a pleading, 5 an

Answer as a —
answer may up
the defences of fact the defendant can present on the
set all
merits of the controversy. These defences may consist: (1) in a denial of anv
one or more of the material allegations of the bill or (2) in a confession of the ;
apparent case made out by the bill, and the presentation of new matters that
avoid some one or more of the material averments of the bill; or (3) an
answer may deny some allegations, confess others, and confess and avoid the
rest or (4) it may admit the material allegations of the bill, and set up some
;
defence thereto that might have been pleaded in bar, such as the statute of
limitations, the statute of frauds, innocent purchaser, former adjudication, and
the like.
An answer generally controverts the facts stated in the bill, or some of them
and states other facts to show the rights of the defendant in the subject of the
suit, or the absence of any right on the part of the complainant. But some-
times it admits the truth of the case made by the bill, and, either with or with-
out stating additional facts, submits the questions, arising upon the case thus
made, to the judgment of the Court. If an answer admits the facts stated in
the bill, or such as are material to the complainant's case, and states no new
facts, or such only as the complainant is willing to admit, no proof is neces-
sary the answer, in such a case, is considered as true and the Court will
: ;
decide the cause upon its admissions. But, if the answer does not admit all
the facts in the bill, material to the complainant 's case, or states any fact which
the complainant is not disposed to admit, the truth of the answer, or any part
of it, may be controverted by the complainant, and the truth of the allegations
of the bill established by proper evidence.
A
defendant should, in his answer, confine himself to the facts pertinent to
the ease, and should refrain from stating arguments, inferences, or conclusions
of law. The object of a pleading is to notify the adverse party of the facts
intended to be proved, and not to inform either him or the Court what infer
ences of law should be drawn from the facts. 7 If, however, a defendant under-
takes, in his answer, to make out a particular defence, which he deduces from
tbe facts he sets out, he will not be allowed, at the hearing, to use these same
facts for the purpose of establishing a different defence 8 for such a course ;
would not only operate as a surprise to the complainant, but would, also,
enable a defendant to mislead his adversary.
What Defences May be Made by Answer. The defendant in his
§ 357. —
answer not confined to any one defence, but may avail himself of any and
is
all matters of law or fact, which will constitute either a partial or a complete
defence to the charges contained in the bill. He may, in his answer: (1) deny
any or all of the complainant's material allegations; or, (2) may confess and
avoid any or all of them; or, (3) may set up any matter of law or fact that
would constitute a plea in bar to the relief prayed or, (4) may adopt any two ;
or more of these various methods of defence.

A defendant may, in his answer, set up as many defences as may be deduced
from the same state of facts. Thus, he may rely both on the statute of limita-
tions, and on the laches of the complainant, as the evidence to support each is
substantially the same. He may, also, rely upon various defences in the alter-
native thus he may deny that he ever executed the writing charged, and may
;
4 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1884. gation that the defendant has a good and valid de-
r. Sto. Eq. PL, § 850. fence, without specifying the defence so that the
6 Sto. Eq. PL, i 849. Court can judge of its merits, is vox et praterea ni-
7 An answer should content itself with giving the hil, and cannot be noticed at all. Montgomery v.
facts. The Chancellor, generally, knows the law as Orwell, 1 Tenn. Ch., 172.
well as counsel; and when the facts are set forth, he 8 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 713.
will determine their force and legal effect. An alle-
293 ANSWERS TO BILLS. §358
aver that, if executed by him, its execution was obtained by duress or fraud,
and that there was a failure of consideration; and, as a further defence to it,
may plead the statute of limitations. A defendant cannot, however, set up
two defences which are absolutely inconsistent and contradictory. 8
The defendant is not required to file any other pleading than an answer
unless he intends to set up matters in abatement, or to object to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. 10 He may set up, in his answer, any matter that would be a
ground of demurrer, or the subject-matter of a plea in bar. And, in general,
he may incorporate all matters of defence in his answer, and is not required
to plead specially, or to demur, in any case, except to the jurisdiction of the
Court. 11 The result is, a plea in bar is seldom necessary, and seldom used.
§ 358. All the Defences Relied on Must be Stated. The defendant in —
answering must be careful to set forth, clearly, any and all special defences
he intends to rely on, 12 whether such special defences be matters of law, or
matters of fact. If he intends to rely on (1) the want of proper parties, 13 (2)
on the statute of frauds, (3) the statute of limitations, (4) the defence ot
innocent purchaser, (5) non-partnership with a co-defendant, 14 (6) failure, or
ijlegality, of consideration, (7) usury, (8) payment, (9) satisfaction, (101
release, (11) former adjudication, (12) non-performance of condition precedent,
(13) alteration of instrument sued, on, (14) tender, (15) higher security taken,
(16) merger, (17) an account stated, (18) title paramount, (19) an award, (20)
a compromise, (21) infancy, (22) coverture, (23) drunkenness, (24) mental
unsoundness, (25) fraud, (26) duress,' (27) estoppel, (28) non est factum, (29)
non-partnership of complainants, (30) set-off, (31) recoupment, 15 or the like,
he must set up these defences in a clear and unambiguous manner, to the end
that the complainant may be apprised thereof; for he cannot avail himself of
any matter in defence which is not stated in his answer, even though it should
appear in the evidence. 18
It would be a gross fraud upon the complainant to allow a defendant to set
up one defence in his answer, and to make out and rely upon an entirely differ-
ent defence in his proof. If such a practice were tolerated, instead of a plead-
ing subserving the purpose of notifying the adversary of what the pleader in-
tended to prove, it would be a mere ruse to enable him to mislead and deceive
his adversary as to his real cause of action, or real defence. And where a de-
fendant has made out a case by proof, different from the one set up in his an-
swer, he should not be allowed to amend his answer so as to conform to the
proof, without being onerated with the costs of all the proof taken in the cause.
The proofs must be conformed to the pleadings, and it is a reversal of both
logic and law to allow a party to conform his pleadings to his proofs.
In stating a defendant's case, however, it is only necessary to use such a
degree of certainty as will inform the complainant of the nature of the defence
to be made and the same degree of definiteness need not be observed in setting
;
out these defences as is required of the complainant in specifying the grounds

on which he relies for relief. 17 Nevertheless, is a fundamental rule of pleading,
applicable alike to bills, pleas, and answers, that nothing can be proved or dis-
9 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 713. Allegans contraria non est 10 Furman V. North, 4 Bax., 296; Turley v. Tur-
audiendus. (He who alleges matters that are conley, 1 Pick., 261; Read v. Street Ry. Co., 2 Cates,
tradictory will not be heard.) 316; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 712. And when the matter
10 And he may even object to the general juris- of a plea is set up in an answer, the averments must
diction of the Court over the subject-matter contain all the certainty of a plea, not in its tech-
Travers v. Abbey, 20 Pick., 665. See, ante, § 290. nical niceties, but in its material statements. " Cer-
11 Code, §§4318-4319; French v. Rainey, 2 Term tainty of allegation constitutes the beauty of Equity
Ch., 652; Travers v. Abbey, 20 Pick., 665. Pre pleading." Turley, Judge, in High v. Batte, 10
maturity of suit may be pleaded in an answer. Yerg., 338.
Pigue v. Young, 1 Pick., 263.
"
,
17 The defence that the claim is stale may, how-
12 Rogers V. Green, 9 Heisk., 679; Coward ever, be insisted on without being set up in the
Culver, 12 Heisk., 544; Williams v. Bartlett, 4 Lea, answer. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 714, note 5. The reason
620. of this is that staleness is not so much a defence as
13 Code, §§ 4318-4319, 4337. it is a rule, regulating the discretion of the Chan-
14 Alley v. Myers, 2 Tenn. Ch., 206. cellor.
§359 ANSWERS TO BILLS. 294
proved which has not been alleged. 18
As to the particularity required in set-
ting forth defences reference made
to the preceding Chapter on Pleas in Bar.
is
Whatever may be pleaded in bar may be set up in an answer, and when so set
up the same degree of definiteness, particularity and directness should be
observed.
§ 359. Answer Superior to a Plea as a Mode of Defence. Where the same —
defence can be made by an answer that could be made by plea, it is gen-
erally better to make it by answer, because: (1) an answer is less technical,
and more easily framed; (2) an answer can set up all the facts and circum-
stances that tend to aid, or strengthen, the defence; 19 (3) an answer enables
a defendant to present his defences in all their fullness and particularity, and
shows a disposition to boldly and frankly meet all the alleged equities set up
in the bill; whereas, (4) a plea rather indicates a disposition to avoid a contest
on the merits, and sometimes implies that the defendant has no defence except
some hard rule of law, or some technical bar; and (5) as a result, a plea is
often regarded with disfavor by the Court, 20 when the same defence set up in
an answer, and especially when explained and supported by equitable circum-
stances, will be regarded with, at least, an impartial disposition. Chancellors
have a yearning to penetrate to the heart of the merits of a controversy, and
sometimes feel that a plea is like a door, that shuts them out of the chamber
where the real truth is to be found.
As shown elsewhere, pleas were formerly resorted to in order to avoid being
compelled to make a discovery, which was often irksome and embarrassing, as
well as damaging, for when a defendant answers under oath he is required to
answer fully. By means of a plea, the defendant relieved himself from the
disagreeable task of answering as to all the many matters he was required to
discover. But now, in Tennessee, bills praying a discovery under oath are
seldom filed, and all defences, except matters in abatement and objections tu
the jurisdiction, may be incorporated in the answer, including both matters of
'aw and matters of fact. 21 Hence, pleas are seldom necessary, and less seldom
resorted to and the tendency is here, as throughout the Union, to present all
;
defences by means of an answer and this is especially true where an unsworn

;
answer is permitted. As a bill is the simplest and most natural, and yet the most
effective method of presenting a complainant's cause of action to a Court, so
an answer is the simplest and most natural, and yet the most effective method
of presenting the defendant's side of a legal controversy.
§ 360. What is a Sufficient Answer when a Defendant's Oath is Waived
An answer having been originally intended to be a sworn discovery of facts in
the defendant's knowledge, necessary to enable complainant to make out his
ease, it was natural for the defendant to evade full and direct answers to the
charges and interrogatories contained in the bill and we accordingly find the ;
books of Chancery Practice full of cases where answers have been excepted to
because evasive, and because not containing full and direct responses to the bill.
But when an unsworn answer is called for, it is manifest that no discovery is
sought or expected, and that complainant contemplates nothing more from the
defendant than a pleading making an issue. 22 For this reason, it has been uni-
formly held that an unsworn answer cannot be excepted to, for insufficiency, 2 *
If, therefore, an unsworn answer cannot be excepted to for insufficiency, the
result would seem inevitable that an answer containing nothing but a general
denial of "each and all of the allegations of the bill, and every part thereof,"
18 See, Furman t'. North, 4 Bax., 296. 23 Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 599:
19 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 714; Sto. Eq. PI., § 851. in this case the matter is fully considered, and nu-
20 Sto. Eq. PL, § 454, note; ante, § 318, note. merous authorities are cited. See, also, Sheppard v.
21 Code, §§ 4318-4319. Akers, 1 Tenn. Ch., 326, and cases there cited.
22 Code, §4317; Overton r Holinshade, 5 Heisk.,
683-
295 ANSWERS TO BIU,S. §360
would be a sufficient unsworn answer, as it makes an issue, and puts the com-
24
plainant to the proof of all the material allegations in his bill.
What is meant by the statement that an unsworn answer cannot be excepted
to for insufficiency, is: that it cannot be excepted to for not meeting every
charge, averment and interrogatory contained in the bill, if it, as a whole, con-
tains sufficient to make an issue. This answer may be a general one, as stated
above but if the defendant makes an issue as to some of the material allega-
;
tions of the bill, but utterly ignores others, and nowhere in his answer generally
traverses "all the materia] allegations not otherwise answered," such an answer
would be liable to exception for insufficiency, because the defendant must
answer sufficiently to make an issue on the whole bill. 25
The provisions of our statutes for enforcing an answer, 26 and for securing a
sufficient answer by means of exceptions, were intended for sworn answers
where discoveries were sought, in whole or in part and such provisions were ;
not intended to apply to unsworn answers, containing nothing scandalous or

impertinent. 27
Nevertheless, whatever may be the strict law when tested, it is unquestiona-
bly the better practice for an unsworn answer to respond to each of the ma-
terial allegations, in their order, and conclude with a general denial of each and
every allegation not already answered unto. Besides, where a defendant, by
denying well known facts, thereby causes the cost of proving them, it would be
a proper exercise of discretion to onerate him with a part of the costs, even
when successful. For all parties owe it to the Court, and owe it to the cause of
justice and of good pleading, to circumscribe the issues as much as possiblo,
and to make the costs of the litigation as light as possible.
In all cases where the statute requires a plea to be sworn to, an answer incor-
porating such a plea must be sworn to, even when the oath of the defendant to
his answer is waived by the complainant. In such a case, the answer is a mere
pleading, but nevertheless a pleading required by the statute to be under oath. 23
24 This is the conclusion fairly deducible from the records of the Court from being encumbered
the cases cited in Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 2 with impertinent matter, or made the vehicles of
Tenn. Ch., 599, and in bueppard v. Akers, 1 Tenn. private malice. They are rigidly enforced for the
Ch., 326. By the Code, § 4322, " no replication is attainment of these ends. * * * If, however,
required or allowed," even when the answer, by
_
no real benefit is to be obtained by calling them into
confession and avoidance, presents an issue wholly play, a resort to them is a useless consumption of
different from the one tendered by the bill. In time, and sets ponderous machinery in motion to no
such a case, an issue on the new matter in the purpose." Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 593.
answer is made by operation of the statute, much " This ponderous machinery " was not devised for
the same as an issue on the matters in the bill is unsworn answers; and hence, where no discovery is
made by a pro confesso against an infant. As an sought, and where the answer contains nothing im-
answer without oath ordinarily denies everything in pertinent or scandalous, such answer cannot be ex-
the bill, it would much speed the cause to allow the cepted to for insufficiency, if it contains enough to
complainant to waive an answer entirely, except put all of the complainant's material allegations in
when ne wishes a discovery on oath, or when the issue, and this it may do by a general denial of
defendant wishes to set up matters in avoidance; " each and every allegation in the bill contained,"
and in case of such waiver to have an issue made as well as by a specific denial of each specific allega-
by operation of law on all averments of fact con- tion, seriatim.
tained in the bill. Be this as it may, the logic of 28 Code, §§2909; 3777; 3779 a. The defendant
the foregoing authorities demonstrates that any un- may confine his affidavit to so much of the bill as
sworn answer, that makes an issue of fact on all the denies the partnership, or the execution of the in-
material averments of the bill, is a sufficient answer. strument sued on. The waiver of the defendant's
See, also, Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 154. In oath to his answer means that the complainant does
Story's Equity Pleading, § 875, c, it is said with, not want the answer as a deposition it does not
;
great positiveness :
" There can be no question, mean that the defendant is to be allowed to plead
upon principle, it would seem, that the answer of non-partnership or non est factum without swearing
the defendant not upon oath, although responsive to to the plea. This he must do even in the Circuit
the bill, is to be treated merely in the nature of a Court. The plea denying the alleged partnership, is
plea of denial, by way of special traverse, and it misnamed a plea in abatement by the statute. Code,
would be of the same effect, precisely, if it were § 2908. It is no more a plea in abatement than is
a mere general issue." the plea of non est factum, or the plea of not guilty.
25 Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 154. The defence of non-partnership may be set up in an
26 Code, §§ 4360-4368. answer. It would be disrespectful to the Legisla-
27 "The rules which regulate exceptions to Chan- ture to suppose that they meant anything more than
cery pleadings," says Chancellor Cooper, " were that such a defence must be sworn to. See, Eaton
intended to secure full discovery, and to prevent v. Dickinson, 3 Sneed, 405.
§361 THE ANSWER AS A DEPOSITION. 296
ARTICLE II.
THE ANSWER AS A DEPOSITION.
§ 361. Answer as a Mode of Proof. § 365. Thoroughness of the Required Dis-
§ 362. What Must be Answered, and How. covery.
§ 363. Particularity and Precision Required § 366. How Charges Must be Denied.
in an Answer as a Deposition. § 367. Difference between an Answer Sworn
§ 364. What Matters Must be Discovered, to, and an Answer not Sworn to.
and How.
§ 361. —
Answer as a Mode of Proof. Formerly, the principal purpose of an
answer was the discovery of facts within the defendant's own knowledge, either
because the complainant had no other means of proof, or to save the expense
of obtaining other proof. The defendant was not formerly a competent witness
in any Court, and his evidence could only be had by making him a party to a
bill in Equity, and compelling him to answer. 1 Parties being now competent
witnesses, however, the necessity of a discovery from a defendant now seldom
arises; and, as a consequence, the oath of the defendant is generally waived.
Nevertheless, cases arise when an answer on oath is required, and in such cases
the defendant must respond particularly and precisely to each and every mate-
rial allegation and charge contained in the bill; making the discovery called
for, if in his knowledge or power; denying such allegations as are personally
known to be untrue admitting such as are personally known to be true ex-
; ;
pressing belief or disbelief as to those not personally known to be true or un-

true, but as to which the defendant has information averring want of informa- ;
tion or of belief as to those parts of the bill of which he has no knowledge, in-
formation or belief and bringing forward such matters of avoidance, or in bar,
;
as he can present to defeat the whole, or any part, of the relief sought by the
complainant.
§ 362. What Must be Answered, and How. The defendant— required to
is
answer to each and all of the matters of fact contained in the not only
bill,
according to his positive knowledge of the facts stated, and to his best remem-
brance of them, but also according to the best information he may have re-
ceived, and the best belief he may have in reference thereto. It is not necessary,
however, that the defendant should say, in so many words, that he has no know-
ledge, information, or belief, in relation to the matters charged. Any other
expression which amounts to the same thing will be sufficient. 2
It is not necessary for a bill to contain specific interrogatories, in order to
obtain a specific answer from the defendant. 3 The general interrogatory or
request in the bill, "that the defendant may answer make to all and singular
the premises, fully and particularly, as though specially interrogated," is suffi-
cient to entitle the complainant to a full disclosure of the whole subject-matter
of the bill, equally as if he had specially interrogated the defendant to every
fact stated in the bill, with all the material circumstances. 4 Nevertheless,
1 Gardner V. Gardner, 4 Heisk., 310. In conse- force, and must be observed whenever an answer
quence of the general habit of waiving the defend- under oath is called for.
ant's oath to his answer, there is a tendency in 2 Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch„ 597. In this
Tennessee, even when the oath is not waived, to case, Chancellor Cooper says that the object of a
regard the answer primarily, and almost exclusively, discovery is not merely to purge the conscience of
as a pleading, whose office is to present the intended the defendant, but to lighten the burden of proof.
defences rather than to furnish evidence in support On this point see. Chapter on Bills of Discovery.
of the complainant's case. Nevertheless, the rules 3 Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 597.
of practice on the subject of a discovery are in full 4 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 715, note 4; Sto. Eq. PI- § 38.
297 THE ANSWER AS A DEPOSITION. § 363
special interrogatories are often added in order to prevent evasion, and to thor-
oughly sift the conscience of the defendant. 5
§ 363. Particularity and Precision Required in an Answer as a Deposition.
In its character as a deposition, an answer must contain a full and perfect re-
sponse to each and all of the material allegations in the bill. It must confess,
avoid, deny, or traverse, all the material parts of the bill. It must state facts
and not arguments. It is not sufficient that it contains a general denial of the
matters charged but there must be an answer to the sifting inquiries upon the
;
general subject. It should, also, be certain in its allegations, as far as practica-

ble. To so much of the bill as it is necessary and material for the defendant
to answer, he must speak directly and without evasion and he must not merely
;
answer the several charges literally; but he must confess or traverse the sub-
stance of each charge. 6
And, wherever there are particular and precise charges, they must be an-
swered particularly and precisely, and not in a general manner, although the
general answer may amount to a full denial of the charges. Thus, where a bill
required a general account, and at the same time called upon the defendant to
set forth whether he had received particular sums of money, specified in the
bill with many circumstances respecting the times when, and of whom, and on
what accounts, such sums had been received, it was determined that setting
forth a general account by way of schedule to the answer, and referring to it as
containing a full account of all sums of money received by the defendant, was
not sufficient. And the complainant, having excepted to the answer on this
ground, the exception was allowed, the Court being of opinion that the defend-
ant was bound to answer specifically to the specific charges in the bill; and
that it was not sufficient for him to say, generally, that he had in the schedule
set forth an account of all sums received by him. 7
In that part of an answer that is a pleading, the defendant must state his
case distinctly, and specify his defences but he is not required to disclose the
;
proofs on which his defences rest. On the other hand, that part of the answer
which is a deposition must give a direct and full answer to every question
asked, and to every allegation and charge made; for, as to this part of his
answer, the defendant is a witness giving in his evidence, and Sworn to tell the
truth, and the whole truth. 8
§ 364. What Matters Must be Discovered, and How.— Where defendants
have power the means of acquiring the information, necessary to enable
in their
them to give the discovery called for, they are bound to make use of such
means, 9 whatever pains or trouble it may cost them; therefore, where defend-
ants filling the character of trustees are called upon to set out an account, they
cannot. frame their answer so as merely to give a sufficient ground for an
account in the Master's office they are bound to give the best account they can
;
by their answer. But a defendant ought not to be required to obtain informa-

tion so as to meet the complainant's wishes, and thereby become his agent to
procure testimony. 10 Where executors, or other trustees, are called upon to
set out accounts, they must set them forth although, for the purpose of ren-
;
dering their schedules less burdensome, they may, instead of going too much
into particulars, refer to the original accounts in their possession; and when
it is said that a defendant may refer to an account in his possession, it must
not
be understood as authorizing him to refer, by his answer, to accounts made out
by himself for the purposes of the case, but only to accounts previously in ex-
istence. 11 But 'where a defendant is required to set forth a general account, he
may set forth the account, or the statement of the sums received, by means of
schedules annexed to his answer, and made part thereof. 12
6 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 35; 38. 9 Gleaves r. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch.. 597
e Sto. Eq. PI., § 852. 10 Morris v. Parker, 3 Johns., Ch., (N. Y.) 301
7 Sto. Eq. PI., § 852. U 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 724.
8 Gres. En. F.v.. 19 10 1 T\nn ni, T>_ 7T7
§ 365 THE ANSWER AS A DEPOSITION. 298
In many eases where the defendant is asked, as to his knowledge or informa-
tion of facts, it is not sufficient for him to say that he has no knowledge or infor-
mation of those facts, if the facts are such as have passed between his agent and
the complainant, and he is interrogated thereto for under such circumstances
;
he is bound to make inquiries of his agent before he makes his answer. Such
a case is not governed by the same considerations as one where the facts are
equally open and accessible to both parties, and the means of information are
the same; for the principal has means of knowing from his agent what the
facts are and he has no right in his answer to say that he does not know what
;
his agent has done. It is plain that if he answered that he had been informed
by his agent that the facts were so, and he believed the information, the answer
would be good evidence, and might be material. So if a party is interrogated
as to his knowledge, remembrance, information and belief, and the answer
alleges that the defendant has no knowledge or information that a fact is not
true, that is not sufficient, for he ought to state whether he believes it to be
true. 13
§ 365.Thoroughness of the Required Discovery. It is a fundamental rule —
of Equity pleading that, when an answer on oath is called for, and the defend-
ant answers, he must answer fully, and leave no charge or allegation in the bill
without an adequate response; and he must answer "as to his knozvledge, remem-
brance, information and belief. And, in general, if a fact is charged, which is in
1
'
the defendant's own knowledge, as if done by himself, he must answer positive-

ly and not to his remembrance or belief only, if it is stated to have happened
within seven years before. It seems, however, that where a special cause is
shown, so positive an answer may be dispensed with. As to facts which have
not happened within his own knowledge, the defendant must answer as to his
information and belief, and not as to his information merely, without stating
any belief either one way or the other. It is not, however, necessary to make
use of the precise words "as to his information and belief;" the defendant may
make use of any expressions that are tantamount to them thus, to say that the ;
defendant "cannot answer the facts inquired after, as to his belief or otherwise."
is generally considered a sufficient denial; for though the word, "information"
is not used, the expression, "belief or otherwise," is held to include it. And so
where an answer was in this form "And this defendant further answering
saith, it may be true for anything he knows to the contrary, that," &c, and after
going through the several statements, it concluded thus "but this defendant —
is an utter stranger to all and every such matters, and cannot form any belief con-
cerning them;" the defendant in stating himself to be an utter stranger to all
and every the matters in question, did answer as to his information, and did, in
effect, deny that he had any information concerning them. A defendant cannot,
by merely saying "that a matter may be true for anything he knows to the con-
trary," avoid stating what his recollection, information, or belief, with refer-
ence to it is, or saying that he has no recollection or information, or that he
cannot form any belief at all concerning it, either in these words or in equiva-
lent expressions. 14
If the defendant answers that he has not any knowledge or information of a
fact charged in the bill, he is not bound to declare his belief one way or the
other. It is not sufficient to answer that the specific facts charged
'
'
may be '
true, but the defendant has no knowledge of them, and leaves the complainant
to prove them." Nor is it sufficient to say that "the defendant has not any
knowledge of the foregoing facts but from the statement thereof in the bill."
A denial by the defendant, "according to his recollection and belief," is not
sufficient, when the fact is directly charged to be within his knowledge but ;
when a defendant states that he is "utterly and entirely ignorant," as to a

13 Sto. Eq. PL. § 855. u. | 14 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 723.
299 THE ANSWER AS A DEPOSITION. 366
§
fact, it is sufficient. 15 It is not necessary that a defendant should say in so
many words, that he has no knowledge, information, or belief in relation to the
matters charged any other expression which amounts to the same thing will
;
he sufficient. 16
In general, if a fact is charged which is in the defendant's own knowledge,
as if it is done by himself, he must answer positively, and not to his remem-
brance or»belief, at least if it is stated to have happened within seven years
before. But as to the facts which have not happened within his own knowledge,
he must answer as to his information and belief, and not his information merely,
without stating any belief either one way or the other. As to recent facts,
however, within his own knowledge, he must answer positively, and not on
belief, although not so as to the result of a conversation. 17
§ 366. How
Charges must be Denied.—If the defendant deny a fact he must
traverse it and not by way of negative pregnant; thus, if a fact be
directly,
laid to be done with divers circumstances, the defendant may not traverse it
literally as laid down in the bill, but he must traverse the point of substance
as, if a man be charged to have done a thing upon such a day, or in such a
place, he must. not deny that he did it in manner and form as charged, for that
implies that, in some sort, he did it. So, if he be charged with the receipt of
one hundred dollars, he must deny that he has received one hundred
.
dollars, or any part thereof; and if he has received any part, he must
set forth what part. 18 So, an answer to a bill of discovery for documents
in the defendant's possession, merely alleging the defendant's belief that the
documents do not contain evidence, or tend to show the complainant's title, is
not sufficient, but the answer must distinctly negative the allegations in the
bill. However, no positive rule can fully provide for all the various difficulties
in cases of this sort; and each case must, therefore, be decided upon its own
circumstances. 19 The purpose of all the rules on this subject is that, when an
answer on oath is called for, the defendant shall be compelled to make a full,
direct, clear, and frank response to all charges, averments and allegations in
the bill and shall not be permitted to be silent, evasive, indefinite, or ambigu-
;
ous in his answers to those charges and allegations. It is the duty of the defend-
ant to make full, true, direct, and perfect answers to all and singular the mat-
ters stated and charged in the bill and such answers must not only exhaust
;
his knowledge and remembrance, but, also, his information, hearsay and belief;
and this duty the Courts will firmly enforce.
§ 367. Difference between an Answer Sworn to and an Answer not Sworn
to. —The difference between an answer sworn to by the defendant on the com-
plainant's demand, and an answer not sworn to because of the complainant's
express waiver of such oath, is the difference between a paper which is both
a pleading and a deposition, and a paper which is merely an adverse pleading.
The Code says, that where an answer from a defendant under oath is waived by
the complainant in his bill, the answer is entitled to no more weight as evidence
than the bill. 20 The result is, an answer, the oath to which is waived, is a mere
pleading, whose exclusive function is to make an issue of fact, 21 or a mixed
issue of law and fact 22 whereas an answer, the oath of the defendant to which
;
has not been waived, is not only a pleading containing all of the defendant's
23 in so far as it is
defences to the merits of the bill, but is also a deposition,
responsive to the averments and the charges contained in the bill, and as such,
has all the force and effect of any other deposition in the cause. If, however,
15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 723, note 4. 18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 726.
16 Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 597. 19 Sto. Eq. PL, § 855.
IT Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 854-8S5. When a defendant 20 Code, §4317.
21 DiJnlap v. Haynes, 4 Heisk., 479.
answers that he has no knowledge of the fact
charged, but believes it to be true, this is deemed an
22 Code, §§4318-4319.
23 Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 601.
admission of its truth, for, what the defendant be-
lieves in such a case, the Court will believe. Sto.
§368
$ MATTERS COMMON TO ALL ANSWERS. 300
the one required to be sworn to, it also partakes of the nature of a depo-
bill is
sition forenough to balance any contrary averments or statements in a sworn
answer. 24 The failure to keep this distinction in mind has resulted in much
confusion in specifying the requirements of answers. 28
ARTICLE III.
MATTERS COMMON TO ALL ANSWERS.
§ 372. Scandal and Impertinence not Allow-
368. The Answer Must Make an Issue. able.
369. Answer where there are Several De- S 373. Prayer for Counter Relief.
fendants. § 374. When an Answer Must be Sworn to,
370. What Documents a Defendant Must even When the Oath is Waived.
Produce, and When. § 375. Essentials of an Answer.
§ 371 What Matters Need Not be Answered. § 376. When an Answer Must be Filed.
The Answer Must Make an Issue.. An answer that makes no issue

§ 368. —
is may be stricken from the files on motion, 1 and an order pro
no answer, and
confesso taken. Every answer, whether on oath or not, should distinctly and
fully meet every material averment and charge contained in the bill; and
should do so specifically, and not by way of general sweeping denials. A
general admission of all the allegations and charges set forth in the bill, is,
however, sufficient.
to admit or deny a charge or allegation is not deemed an
While the failure
admission of its truth, nevertheless, such failure would be deemed a circum-
stance against the defendant in weighing the evidence for and against such
charge or allegation. 2
§ 369. Answer Where There are Several Defendants. Where there are —
several defendants, no one of them is required to answer matters that relate
exclusively to his co-defendant. Co-defendants can answer separately or
jointly, but when their defence is joint they should answer jointly. One de-
fendant can, also, adopt the answer of a co-defendant in whole or in part, using
appropriate language to make it his own as fully as though he had himself
made each and every response therein adopted. 3
Where a defendant answers, and meets fully the equities set up in the bill
against a co-defendant who has been pro confessoed for want of an answer,
such answer, if sustained by the proof, will also protect the latter from a decree
on the pro confesso, when there is privity of interest between them, such as
partner and partner, 4 trustee and beneficiary, 5 vendor and vendee, 6 and the
24 McLard
t>. Linnville, 10 Hum., 163; Bogart v. to be admitted." 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 837, note.
#
In our
McClung, 11 Heisk., 112-113; Williamson v. Wil- courts of law, all allegations in the declaration, not
liamson, 11 Lea, 365. See Chapter on Evidence, denied in the plea, are taken as true. Code, § 2910.
post, § 460. See, also, Code, § 2929. It has often been held that
25 An
answer required to be under oath, when not an answer may be "too faint in its denials to call for
properly sworn to, stands as an unsworn answer and proof on the part of the complainant." Rhea v. Alli-
only makes an issue. Chester p. Canfield, 2 Shan. son, 3 Head, 179; Cox r. Waggoner, 5 Sneed, 544.
_
Cas 309 If an answer "too faint in its denials" is equivalent

Overton, 4 Hayw., 291. The defend-
1 Phillips V. to an admission, it would seem that an answer that
ant must answer sufficiently to make an issue. Payne does not deny at all could not have any more force,
V. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 154. to say the least. Nevertheless, the weight of author-
2 In England, under the present practice, every ity is that a failure to admit, or deny, any material
allegation in a bill not denied, nor expressed to be allegation in a bill, is not an admission, and that the
not admitted by the answer, is deemed to be ad- complainant must prove the truth of the allegation
mitted, except in case of answers by married not replied to. Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co.,
women, infants, and lunatics. Snell's Pr. Eq., 669. 2 Tenn. Ch., 599. In this case, the point is thor-
In NewJersey and Kentucky, a material fact averred oughly considered, and all of our cases cited.
in the and not denied in the answer, is taken as
bill, 3 See, post, §§378; 382.
admitted. In New Hampshire, the Chancery Rules 4 Petty V. Hannum, 2 Hum., 102.
provide that "all facts well alleged in the bill, and 5 Cherry v. Clements, 10 Hum., 552.
not denied, or explained in the answer, will be held 6 Hennessee V. Ford, 8 Hum., 499.
301 MATTERS COMMON TO ALL ANSWERS. §370
like. But where the rights of the pro confessoed defendant are distinct rights,
7
and he has no joint or common interest with the defendant who answers, this
rule does not apply. 8
§ 370. What Documentsa Defendant Must Produce, and When. In so far —
as an answer a deposition, it is the duty of the defendant to disclose his
is
possession of any and all books, papers, writings, and other documents, called
for by the bill, if in his possession, custody, or control. If he is charged with
having in his possession, custody or power, books, papers, or writings, a state-
ment in his answer that there are certain books, papers, or writings, in some
other county or State, the particulars of which he is unable to set forth, with-
out any answer as to the fact, whether they are in the defendant's possession,
custody, or power, will be insufficient; for, if the defendant admits the books,
papers, or writings to be in his possession, custody, or power, the complainant
may make a motion upon the defendant to produce them and the Court will, ;
upon such motion, order them to be brought in within a reasonable time. And
so, where a defendant stated, in his answer, that he had not certain books,
papers, and writings in his possession, custody, or power, because they were
coming over to this country, it was held that they were in his power, and that
the defendant ought to have so stated in his answer. It may be observed
here, that where books, papers, or writings, are in the custody or hands of the
defendant's Solicitor, they are considered to be in the defendant's own cus-
tody or power, and should be stated to be so in his answer. So, generally, all
the books, papers, and documents which the defendant has a right to inspect,
provided he can enforce that right, are deemed to be in his power. 9
If a defendant is called upon to set out a deed, or other instrument, in the
words and figures thereof, he should do so, or give some reason for not com-
plying with the requisition he may, however, avoid this by admitting that he
;
has the deed, or other instrument, in his possession, and offering to give the
complainant a copy of it. It may here be observed that it is, always, a proper
precaution, where a defendant sets out a deed, or other instrument, in his
answer, whether in here verba, or by way of recital, to crave leave to refer to
it, as, by so doing, the defendant makes it a part of his answer, and relieves
himself from any charge in case it should be erroneously set out. 10

The defendant will be required to produce documents and papers (1) ad-
mitted, in his answer, to be in his possession, or under his control; or, (2) re-
ferred to in his answer, and not admitted to be in his possession, or under his
control, but shown to be; or, (3) when referred to in his answer for greater
certainty. But the complainant is not entitled, as a matter of right, to the
discovery and production of any documents, or papers, called for by the bill,
except those which appertain to his own case, or the title made by his bill.
Documents and papers, which wholly and solely respect the defendant's title,
or defence, he is not compellable, by his answer, to discover, or to produce
but if he voluntarily refers to them, for greater certainty, he may be com-
pelled to produce them. 11
§ 371. What Matters Need Not be Answered. A defendant need not an- —
swer any matter that is scandalous or immaterial nor need he answer any in- ;
terrogatory not based on some material matter of fact charged in the stating
part of the bill. If an answer to an interrogatory, either in the affirmative or
negative, would not be pertinent to the matters put in issue by the bill, such
7 In Brian V. Peterman, 5 Head, 499, a denial of up against himself, and the other defendant, who
the justice of an account, by one of two executors, does not answer, no decree can be rendered against
was held sufficient for both, they being jointly the defendant failing to answer." See, also, Butler
charged, citing Petty v. Hannum, 2 Hum., 102. See, v. Kinzie, 6 Pick., 31, in which case, Caldwell,
J.,
also, Smith v. Cunningham, 2 Tenn. Ch., 565, where cites all the cases on this question, in our reports.
the authorities are cited. In McDaniel v. Goodall, 2 8 Phillips t'. Hollister, 2 Cold., 269.
Cold., 395. it is declared to be "a well settled prin- 9 Sto. Eq. PI., §852; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 725.
ciple of this [the Supreme] Court, that if a joint de- io 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 725-726.
f,.,.Jn,.f i,-.B,i'a,-a file Kill
-i ,1
1 mmniri>c tliM TTVniiltr cpf
1 11 Stn Pn PI SR SCQ-QCO
$372 MATTERS COMMON TO AU, ANSWERS. 302
interrogatory need not be answered. 12 It may be stated as a rule, that any
matter charged in a bill, that is clearly immaterial, may be absolutely ignored
by the defendant in his answer. One test of materiality is to ascertain whether
if the defendant should answer in the affirmative, the admission would be
oi
any use to the complainant in the cause, either to assist his Equity, or to ad-
vance his claim to relief. If it is, it must be answered, for it is material if not ;
it is immaterial, and need not be answered. 13
In considering what is material to be answered unto, it must be remembered

that a discovery may be material to the complainant's general case, if made by
some one of the defendants, which would be wholly irrelevant if made by an-
other in such cases, the defendant, from whom the discovery would be imma-
;
terial, is not obliged to make it. A

defendant is, in fact, only obliged to answer
so much of the complainant's bill as is necessary to enable the complainant to
obtain a complete decree against him individually. Defendants in Equity are
frequently formal parties, and are introduced for the purpose of bringing be-
fore the Court all persons who have an interest in the subject in dispute: and
although, in practice, it is very common for each party to answer every
part of the bill, it is often unnecessary. Thus, a trustee, or encumbrancer,
or heir at law, need answer only so much of the bill as applies to him. The
propriety of this distinction is obvious, when the nature of a bill in Equity is
considered, namely, that although it is a suit combining several parties for the
purpose of obtaining an object, in which they are all in some manner interested,
yet the suit is distinct as against each defendant. Each defendant, therefore,
is liable only so far as the bill prays relief against him and his defence may, ;
therefore, be applicable to that part of the case only, 14 and he need not answer
any part of the bill except what applies to, or concerns, himself. 15
The Court will not, in general, allow the circumstance of a complainant's hav-
ing a claim upon a defendant, to be used for the purpose of enabling such com-
plainant to investigate all the private affairs of such defendant. Nor will the
Court compel the defendant to make a discovery, where the interests, which the
complainant may have in it, is very remote in its bearings on the real point in
issue, and would be an oppressive inquisition. 16
But it must always be remembered that a defendant cannot be compelled to
discover any facts which (1) may tend to criminate him; or (2) subject him to
a forfeiture, or to something in the nature of a forfeiture or (3) which are im- ;
material to the relief sought against him or (4) which may be matters of pro-
;
fessional confidence; 17 or (5) which relate to his own title in eases where there
is no privity between him and the complainant. 18 In these cases, the defendant
is not compelled to protect himself from a discovery, by plea or demurrer, but
raay in his answer decline to disclose such facts, upon stating the grounds upon
which he bases his actions such grounds, if matters of fact, to contain the sub-
;
stance of a plea. 19 The Court must be satisfied from the circumstances of the
case that his grounds are sufficient. 20 In such cases, the question whether the
defendant is, or is not, obliged to make the discovery, will be determined by
the Court, in case the complainant excepts to the answer for insufficiency. 21
§ 372. Scandal and Impertinence not Allowable. An — answer, like any other
pleading, must be free from any scandalous, improper, irrelevant, or imperti-
nent matter.
l. As to Scandal. If an answer goes out of the case stated in the bill, and
drags in anything scandalous, it will be expunged, by order of the Court. 22
12 French v. Rainey, 2 Term. Ch., 640. Sto. Eq. 17 French 1). Rainey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 647.
PI., § 36;Dan. Ch. Pr., 717.
1 18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 717; 721; Sto. Eq. PL, §846.
13 Sto. Eq. PI., § 853. 19 French v. Rainey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 652-653.
14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 853c. 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 716.
15 Ibid, § 848. 21 Sto. Eq. PL, § 846.
io Sto. Eq. PI., § 853 b. 22 Gleaves I). Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 592.
.303 MATTERS COMMON TO AIX ANSWERS. §373
But, as in a bill, so in an answer, nothing relevant can be deemed scandalous. 23
But the substance of the matter may be relevant, and yet the mode of expression
may constitute scandal. 24 What is scandal has heretofore been considered. 23
2. As to Impertinence. Strictly speaking, every statement in pleading be-
yond the naked facts relied on is impertinence 26 and if an answer goes out of
;
The case, made by the bill, to bring in some matter not material to the defence,
it' will be deemed impertinent; and, upon proper application, will be ex-
punged. 27 Long recitals, unnecessary digressions, setting forth documents at
length, and prolix details, constitute impertinence. 28 An answer should contain
a clear and orderly statement of the facts on which the defence is founded,
without prolixity or repetition. 21 Nothing material is impertinent. 30
'
The best rule, for determining whether an}*- given matter be impertinent, is
to consider whether it would be proper to put it in issue, or to establish it by
evidence 31 for, it is plain that if any matter need not be either admitted, de-
;
nied, or proved, it can have no relevancy to the merits of the controversy, and
must be absolutely impertinent and unnecessary; and its introduction should,
in some proper way, be rebuked by the Court.
In the Code, it is made the duty of the Court to discountenance prolixity and
unnecessary and false allegations, in all Chancery pleadings and for this pur- ;
pose the Court may, on its own motion, or upon application of the opposite
party, refer the pleadings to the Master to be revised, or order particular parts
to be stricken out, and charge the party in fault with the unnecessary costs. 32
Under this section of the Code, all scandalous, impertinent, and irrelevant
matter would be deemed unnecessary matter; but how a Court, or a Master,
«an ascertain what allegations in a pleading are false, by a mere examination of
the pleading itself, is not apparent. At the hearing, however, the Court can
impose costs on a party whose "false allegations" have caused "unnecessary
'
costs.
All scandalous and impertinent matter will be expunged, on exception being
taken thereto; 33 or the Court may, on its own motion, refer the pleadings to
the Master to be revised, or order particular parts to be stricken out. 34
§ 373. Prayer for Counter Relief.—The Code, in specifying the contents of
an answer, says, it should contain a "prayer of dismissal, or counter relief."
This would seem to indicate an intent to allow an answer to set up matterg
proper for a set off, or cross action, such as are allowed in the Circuit Court, 33
but the practice is to- require the answer to be filed as a cross-bill, when such
matters are set up, and counter-relief sought thereon. 36 Nevertheless, when
there are counter equities in the defendant's favor, which may be granted on
the maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity, it is proper for such a
defendant to set these out fully in his answer, and pray for such counter-
relief. 37 The answer, when filed as a cross-bill, will be considered hereafter. 38
§ 374. When an Answer Must be Sworn to, even When the Oath is Waived.
There are two classes of cases wherein the answer must be sworn to, even when
the complainant has waived an answer under oath (1) where the statute re- :
quires the defence to be on oath; and (2) where the defendant uses his answer
both as a pleading and as an affidavit.
23 Nothing relevant is scandalous, and the mafus 35 Code, §§ 2918-2924.
or minus of the relevancy is not material. Blake's 36 Mrzena V. Brucker, 3 Tenn. Ch., 161; and
Ch. Pr., 264; Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn., Ch., 596. cases above cited.
24 Sto. Eq. PI., .§ 862. 37 It would seem, from a consideration of Code,
25 Ante, § 150. sections 4315, 4324, 2970-2974, 2918-2924, that it was
26 Gleaves V. Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 594. the intention of the revisers of the Code to allow a
27 Mrzena v. Brucker, 3 Tenn. Ch., 161. cross-claim to be set up in an answer, without filing
28 Sto. Eq. PL, § 863. the answer as a cross-bill. Such, however, is not the
29 Code, §4315. practice. The defendant must in such cases, file
30 Sto. Eq. PI., § 863. his answer as a cross bill in order to enable die
31 Mrzena v. Brucker, 3 Tenn. Ch., 161; 1 Dan. complainant to present his defences, and if neces-
Ch. Pr., 728, note 4. sary, to deny, on oath, any cross-claims purporting
32 Code, § 4316. to be signed by the complainant, or his agent. See
33 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 862-863. infra, note 43.
34 PnHc S 4316 SR Qoo hn*+ RK^HC. 1 in Tit. 1 t\ti£
$374 MATTERS COMMON TO AIX ANSWERS. 304
1. Where the Statute Requires It. Under the Code,
pleas which (1) denv all
the execution, or assignment, by the defendant, his agent, attorney, or partner
of any instrument in writing the foundation of the suit, whether produced or
alleged to be lost or destroyed and (2) all pleas since the last continuance, must
;
be sworn to. 3B So, when any of these defences are set up in answer, the answer
must be sworn to.
"Where the plea is required to be sworn to, if the defendant cannot admit or
deny the fact for want of sufficient knowledge, he may state his want of know-
ledge, and thereupon make the denial necessary to present the defence. 40
Every written contract, instrument, or signature, purporting to be executed
by the party sought to be charged, his partner, agent, or attorney in fact, and
constituting the foundation of an action, is conclusive evidence against such
party, unless the execution thereof is denied under oath. 41 If the party be
dead, the personal representative may make the denial under oath, according
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. 42
The execution or assignment of instruments offered in evidence by the de-
fendant, when allowed by law, is equally conclusive as when introduced by the
complainant, unless denied under oath. 43
When two or more persons sue as partners upon an account, bill of exchange,
bond or note, unless the partnership is denied by a plea, or answer on oath, the
partnership need not be proved. 44
A sworn account from another county, or State, is conclusive evidence against
the party sought to be charged, unless he shall on oath deny the account, 45 or
prove that it has been paid. 46
So, if the instrument sued on, although, originally executed by the defendant,
has been materially altered since its execution without authority from the de-
fendant, he must in his answer, or by a special plea of non est factum, so aver;
and such answer or plea must be sworn to 47 even though the bill call for an
;
unsworn answer.
And if an endorser is sued on his endorsement, he must deny, on oath, the
execution of the endorsement, and as a result, his plea or answer denying the
endorsement must be sworn to. 48
The answer denying the execution or assignment of such instruments, must
be as definite and comprehensive as a plea. But, in such cases, the defendant
is not bound to swear to the truth of any other matter or defence contained in
his answer, when his oath to his answer is waived, and .may limit his oath to
such parts of the answer as contains the required denial or he may annex to ;
his answer as a part thereof a sworn denial.
SPECIAL AFFIDAVIT TO AN ANSWER.

State of Tennessee, ]
County of Knox. J
Richard Roe makes oath that so much of his foregoing answer as denies that complainants
are partners [or, as denies the execution, or assignment, or endorsement, of the note, account,
or other instrument, sued on.] is true.
[Sworn to and subscribed, &c, see ante, § 340.] Richard RoE.
2. Where the Defendant has Use for it as Pleading and an Affidavit. Sometimes
of the paper sued on, or, as denies the partnership

30 Code, §§2909; 3777. of the complainants.
40 Code, §2911. 45 Code, § 3780. M. & V.'s Code, § 4529, mis-
41 Code, 3777; Snap v. Thomas, 5 Lea, 503; Doug- digests the law on this point. The section omits an
lass v. Cross, 6 Cold., 416. account proved before a justice of another State. M.
42 Code, § 3778. & V.'s section should begin, "An account on which
43 Code, § 3779. Before a defendant could offer action is brought, coming from any other county, or
such an instrument in evidence, it would seem that State, with," etc. T. S. Code, §§ 3780-3780 a; Acts
the complainant .should have some chance to deny it of 1879, ch. 40; Hist. Lawsuit, (Martin's ed.,) 270,
under oath, by a proper pleading. This indicates the note. Foster & Webb v. Scott County, 23 Pick., 693.
necessity of filing the answer as a cross-bill, when 46 Briggs V. Montgomery, 3 Heisk., 678.
counter-claims are set up by the defendant. 47 Claybrooks v. Wade, 7 Cold., 560; Bloom v.
44 Code, § 3779 a. In all the foregoing cases, the Cate, 7 Lea, 471 Cor. Lawsuit, § 126.
;
affidavit to the answer may be restricted to so much 48 Code, §§2909; 3777; Knott V. Planter's Bank,
of the answer as denies the execution, or assignment. 2 Hum., 493.
305 ANSWERS TO BII^S. §375
the defendant needs to use his answer as an affidavit, in order to meet a sworn
Fill in some interlocutory matter, such as on an application to set aside a judg-
ment pro confesso, or on a motion to dissolve an injunction, or to secure or
49
resist the appointment of a receiver, or for some other purpose. In all such
50
cases, the answer must be sworn to, in order to be of any avail.
§ 375. —
Essentials of an Answer. An unsworn answer must contain the fol-
lowing essentials:
1. It must be properly entitled.
2. It must respond to all the material allegations of the bill sufficiently to ad-
mit them, or to put them in issue.
3. It must set up, distinctly, each and every special defence to be relied on
at the hearing. 51
4. It must be free from scandal and impertinence.
5. It must be properly signed.
6. It must be filed in the cause.
A sworn answer, in addition to the foregoing essentials, must contain the fol-
lowing :
1. It must make full and true discovery of every matter charged in the body
of the bill, or contained in the interrogatories, as to which the defendant has
either personal knowledge or remembrance, or information from others, or
belief and if, as to any such matter, the defendant has neither knowledge, re-
;
membrance, information, nor belief, he must so distinctly state.

2. must be properly sworn to.
It
Ifany of these essentials, except the third, is wanting in an answer, it will
be subject to exceptions, as hereafter shown.
§ 376. —
When an Answer Must be Filed. Unless a plea in abatement, de-
murrer, or plea in bar, has been duly filed on or before the third day of the ap-
pearance term, if the Court holds three days, and if not, on the first day of the
appearance term, an answer must then be filed, or the defendant will be in
default, and liable to an order taking the bill for confessed, and to a final de-
cree thereon. 52 But, on good cause shown, 53 the defendant may obtain further
time within which to file his answer: in which case the answer must be filed
within the time given, or he will be liable to a pro confesso. 5 *
40 It must always be sworn to in support of a out it, but a defendant would not be allowed to
motion to set aside an order pro confesso, when the prove any matter in avoidance, unless it was spec-
defendant is required to show merits. No Court ially pleaded. It is, therefore, essential to the de-
should set aside a pro confesso in order to let in an fendant's defence that such special matter be set up
unsworn answer. But after such an answer is filed, in his answer.
if the bill has waived the defendant's oath, the affi- 52 See, ante, §§ 225-227.
davit to the answer is functus officio. 63 See, post, § 62, sub-sec. 8, as to what is meant
50 See, post, §§ 387; 842. by "good cause shown."
51 This is really not an essential in the ordinary 54 See, ante, §§225-227; where the time when an
meaning of the term. An answer will be good with- answer must be filed is fully considered.
§377 Li. FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 306
AETICLE IV.
THE FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 1
§ 377. Commencement of an Answer. § 383. Answer of an Infant.
§ 378. Body of an Answer. § 384. Answer of Other Persons under Dis-
§ 379. When, How, by Whom, and Before ability.
Whom, an Answer Must be Signed § 385. Forms of Titles and Commencements
and Sworn To. of Answers.
§ 380. Form of an Answer. § 386. Forms used in Framing Answers, and
§ 381. Old Form of an Answer. Setting up Defenses.
§ 382. An Answer by Adoption.
§ 377. —
Commencement of an Answer. In the first place, an answer must
be entitled in the cause so as to agree with the style of the cause in which it is
to be filed. A defendant may correct any mistake in his own name made by
the bill, 2 but cannot correct or alter the names of other parties, 3 or change the
style of the cause. 4 There are several forms of titles of answers, all of which
will be hereafter considered.
An answer must clearly show (1) of which of the defendants it is the
answer and (2) the names of the complainants in the cause in which it is filed
;
as an answer. Two or more persons may join in the same answer, and where
their interests are the same, and they appear by the same Solicitor, they ought
to do so, unless some good reason exists for their answering separately. It
may be stated as a general rule, that the defendants should answer jointly,
unless their titles are different. An answer, purporting to be the joint answer
of five defendants, cannot be sworn to as the answer of three only, but it ought
to be amended by striking out the names of the other two. An answer mis-
naming the complainant, is considered as no answer and the defendant, there- ;
fore, is not bound by it. If there is a mistake in a name, the answer may be
taken off the file, corrected, and resworn. But where there is a misnomer of
the complainant in the cause, and a proper answer is afterward put in, the
first answer will be ordered to be taken off the file, by the description of a
paper writing, purporting to be an answer. 6
After giving the title of the cause, it is common, in drawing an answer, to
make a reservation of the benefit of all exceptions to the bill because of its
errors, uncertainties, and imperfections; but such a reservation is not only
utterly worthless, but downright surplusage, and mere impertinence and may ;
be stricken out on motion of the complainant, or by the Court on its own

motion. 6 But if the defendant desires to rely on a demurrer in his answer, it
is ordinarily set out before the answer of the bill is undertaken.
§ 378. Body of the Answer—Next after the demurrer, if any, comes the
substance of the answer, according to the defendant's knowledge, remem-
brance, information and belief, in which the matter of the bill, with the inter-
rogatories founded thereon, are answered one after the other, together with
such additional matter as the defendant thinks necessary to bring forward in
his defence, either for the purpose of qualifying, or of adding to, the case
made by the bill, or of stating a new case on his own behalf. 7
1 All answers must be in English, even the answer 3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 731.
of a foreigner. Dan. Ch. Pr., 855. 4 Code, (M. & V.), § 3664; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 732.
2 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 731. This correction may be 5 Sto. Eq. PI., § 869; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 732.
made thus: "The answer of David Doe, in the bill, 6 Code, §§4315-4316.
by mistake, called Daniel Doe, to bill of complaint," 7 Sto. Eq. PI., § 870.
etc.
307 FRAME AND FORM OF AN" ANSWER. §379
The answer should contain a clear and orderly statement of the facts on which
it isfounded, without prolixity or repetition; 8 and should hot refer to files of
another Court as containing a statement of the defendant's case. 9
After the responses to the various charges and interrogatories, and after
setting up any matters in avoidance, and any pleas or other special defences
to be relied on, the answer Usually contains a general traverse or denial of any
and all other matters hot already otherwise specifically answered; 10 and con-
cludes with a prayer of dismissal or counter-relief, according to the nature of
the case. 11
Where there are several defendants, one of them may sufficiently answer by
adopting a sufficient answer, put in by a co-defendant but it will not be a ;
sufficient adoption to say that the facts in the co-defendant's answer are
" substantially correct as far as this defendant is concerned." "Where two
defendants answer jointly, and one of them speaks positively for himself, the
other may, where not charged with anything on his personal knowledge, say
he has read the answer and believes it to be true. 12
An answer, like a bill, should be divided into paragraphs, numbered con-
secutively, each paragraph containing, as nearly as possible, a separate and
distinct response, statement, or allegation. This practice has been found not
only conducive to brevity and certainty in pleading, but greatly facilitates
reference to the contents. 13
§ 379. When, How, by Whom, and Before Whom, an Answer Must be
,
—
Signed and Sworn to. The signing and verification of an answer are matters
of no little importance they are the acts which vitalize it and entitle it to a
:
place among the records of the Court, and to be filed in the cause whereof it
is entitled.
By Whom an Answer Must be Signed. An answer must be signed by the
1.
defendant in person, 1 4 or by his Solicitor, 15 and that Solicitor- must belong to

,
the bar of the Court in which the answer is filed. The reason a Solicitor is
required to sign the answer, when a party does not sign in person, is to ensure
that it is in proper form, and contains no scandalous or impertinent matter
and to enable the Court to know to whom to look, in case of gross irregularities
in the body of the answer.
2.By Whom an Answer Must he Sworn to. An answer must also be sworn to
by each and all of the defendants joining in the same, except those whose oath
is waived by the bill. The defendants may jointly, or separately, or jointly
and severally,- answer, but in either case each defendant whose oath is not
waived, must swear to his answer, or it will be no answer as to him. 18 A joint
answer of husband and wife must be sworn to by both, unless the complainant
consents to receive it on the oath of the husband only. The guardian of a
minor, or of a non compos, and a guardian ad litem, swear to the answers they
put in for their wards, they swearing only to their belief in the truth of the
defence made. When a married woman is also an infant, she must answer by
guardian ad litem. 17
But the signature of a party, or of his counsel, or of both, or the oath of a
8 Code, § 4315. answer, when not sworn to by him. Johnson v. Mur-

9 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 731. ray, 12 Lea, 109; Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496-
io Sto. Eq. PI., § 870. Carter v. Montgomery, Ibid., 219. Objection to an
11 Code, § 4315. answer, because not signed by the defendant, must
12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 730. be made within twenty days after the filing of the
13 This practice exists now in England, 1 Dan. Ch. answer, or, rather, after notice of such filing.' Jones
Pr., 731; and in several of. the States; and is being uCarper, 2 Tenn. Ch., 626; Stadler v. -Hertz, 13
generally adopted in Tennessee. Lea, 315. The signature of the solicitor to an un-
14 Code, § 3979. sworn answer is ordinarily sufficient. '
Stadler V.
15 Sto. Eq. PI., §876; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 733; 1 Hertz, 13 Lea, 317.
Barb. Ch. Pr., 141. The answer must be signed by 16 Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496; 1 Dan.
Ch.
the defendant in person, or by his Solicitor, though Pr. 734; Sto. Eq. Jur., §874. . . •
the oath be waived. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 734. The bet- 17 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 753-754, notes.
ter practice is to require the defendant to sign his
§380 FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 308
defendant, will be deemed to have been waived,
not objected or excepted to
if
within the time allowed for filing exceptions to the answer. 18
The answer of a corporation is put in without oathj and under the corporate
seal, if it have one if none, then, under a scroll attested by its president or
;
other proper officer. But if a corporation desires its answer to perform any
of the functions of an affidavit, or as a ground for dissolving an injunction,
19
it must be sworn to by some officer acquainted with the facts.
If the bill does not waive an answer on oath, the defendant must make
affidavit to the truth of his answer, unless the defendant is a corporation, in
which case its corporate seal is attached as its most solemn affirmation of the
truth of its answer. 20 The proper verification of the answer is always a mat-
ter of great importance, and often the rights of the defendant depend on the
force and effect of the affidavit to his answer. 21 Where a defendant is neither
an infant nor a lunatic, he must swear to his answer, in his own proper person.
A married female defendant must swear to her answer when the bill so re-
quires. Guardians ad litem sign and swear to their own answers. 22 Neither
an infant nor a lunatic is required to sign or swear to his answer, unless the
infant is over fourteen years of age, and the object of the suit is to sell his
property for reinvestment, or for his education and support, in which case he
must answer, and swear to his answer, in person. 23
If the answer (1) sets up and relies on the plea of non est factum, or if (2) it
denies, the execution of any written instrument purporting to be signed by the
defendant, and constituting the foundation of the suit, or if, (3) it denies the
partnership of the complainants in certain cases, such an answer must be
sworn to, even when the bill waives the defendant's oath to his answer. 24
3. Before Whom an Answer May be Sworn to. Answers may be sworn to (1)
before any Judge, Justice of the Peace, Court Clerk, or Notary Public, in this
State; and (2) in another State, before any Judge, or Justice of the Peace,
accompanied by a certificate of his official capacity by the Clerk of his Court;
and (3) before a Commissioner of this State appointed by the Governor, or
by a Notary Public, whose attestations shall be under their seals of office and ;
(4) in any foreign government, before any officer authorized to take probates
of deeds, and authenticated in like manner. 25
§ 380. Form of an Answer. — It will be seen, from the foregoing analysis,
18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 733; 736, notes. See, Waiver, ant, and puts in an answer in that character, as well
ante, §71. as in that of guardian, he need only affix his signa-
19 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 735, note; Sto. Eq. PL, §874; ture to the answer once.
Smith v. St. Louis M. L- Ins. Co., 2"Tenn., Ch. 599. Sometimes, the Court has, under special circum-
20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 735. A corporation, being an stances, directed the Clerk to receive an answer,
artificial person, has neither soul nor conscience, though it has not been signed by the defendant; as,
and is incapable of committing perjury; hence, it where a defendant went abroad, forgetting, or not
cannot make an oath. having had time, to put in his answer; or, where a
The answer of a corporation may be verified as defendant had gone, or was resident, abroad, and
follows: had given a general power of attorney to defend
And the defendant, having now answered fully, suits. Ibid.
has caused its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed 23 Code, § 3325.
by its Secretary [or President] in attestation of the 24 Code, § 3777. The defendant may limit his
truth of this its answer to said bill. affidavit to so much of his answer as denies the exe-
Frank Faithful, cution of the writing sued on. When two, or more,
Secretary, [or President.] persons sue, as partners, upon an account, bill of
21 See Article on Affidavits; and, see sections in exchange, bond, or note, it will not be necessary for
Chapters on Injunctions and Evidence, post. Mr. them to prove their partnership, unless the defend-
Daniell says: "The form of the oath, or affirmation, ant files a plea denying the partnership, on oath.
administered to a defendant, on putting in his an- The statute calls this plea a plea in abatement, but
swer, is as follows: 'You swear (or solemnly affirm), it is no more a plea in abatement than is the plea of
that what is contained in this your answer (or plea non est factum. Code, § 2098. All that the statute
and answer), as far as concerns your own act and means is that the plea must be on oath. It would be
deed, is true to your own knowledge; and that what disrespectful to the Legislature to suppose otherwise.
relates to the act and deed of any other person, or See Eaton v. Dickinson, 3 Sneed, 405; Barnes v.
persons, you believe to be true.' " 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., Thompson, 2 Swan, 315. The statute prescribes
ch. 15, §2, p. 270; Sto. Eq. PL, §872, note. such pleas for "suits at law;" but inasmuch as
22 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 734. An answer must, also, be Courts of Chancery have jurisdiction of the pauses
signed by the defendant, or defendants, putting it of action specified in the statute, the more prudent
in, unless an order has been obtained to take it practice would be to verify such plea in Chancery,
without signature; where an answer is put in by in the same manner that pleas of non est factum are
guardian, or guardian ad litem, the signature of verified.
such guardian, or guardian ad litem, is alone re- 25 Code, § 4398.
quired; and where such guardian is, also, a defend-
309 FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. §380
that there is very little formality in an answer. If it is properly entitled, and
is responsiye to the bill, and is duly signed and verified, when verification is
necessary, it will be a sufficient answer. The following is a

FORM OF AN ANSWER. 26
The Title, or Style of the Cause.
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery, at Jacksboro.
Richard Roe, et al.
Commencement.
The defendant, Richard Roe, for separate answer to the bill filed against him and others
in said cause, says
The Substance, or Body.
1.
That he admits that he purchased from complainant the tract of land described in the
bill, at the time and for the price alleged in the 1st paragraph of the bill; but he denies that
there was to be any lien retained. On the contrary, this defendant says that it was expressly
agreed that there should be no lieu, and the deed received by this defendant acknowledges on
its face that the purchase-money was fully paid at the delivery of said deed, such acknowledg-
ment being in strict accord with the agreement of the parties.
11.
This respondent denies the allegations contained in the 2d paragraph of the bill, in so far
as they charge that the certificate of deposit, given complainant by this defendant, was in-
tended as collateral security for the said purchase-money; and this defendant positively
avers the fact to be, that said certificate of deposit was assigned to complainant without re-
course, and was received by complainant as equivalent to cash money, and as an absolute
and unconditional payment for said land.
HI.
This defendant has no personal knowledge, and no information, relative to the matters
alleged in the 3d paragraph of the bill, and cannot therefore admit them, or any of them and ;
he has no belief as to their truth, and demands that they be strictly proven, if deemed
material.
In answer to the allegations contained in the 4th paragraph of the bill, this defendant
denies that he ever promised or agreed, to convey to complainant the house and lot described
in said paragraph, and says he never made any such, or any, promise or agreement to make
said conveyance; and he says that, if any such agreement was made by his co-defendant, Peter
Poe, the latter was not by him thereunto lawfully authorized, and this defendant says that
there is not, and never was, any agreement in writing to sell or convey said house and lot,
or either of them, or any interest in them, signed by him, or by any one by him thereunto
lawfully authorized, and as to this paragraph of the bill, and the prayer for specific perform-
ance predicated thereon, he relies on and pleads the statute for the prevention of frauds and
perjuries.
v.
The General Traverse.

All allegations contained in said bill not already specifically denied are here and now
generally denied, and denied as fully as though separately and specifically denied.
The Conclusion.
And now having fully answered, thisdefendant prays to be hence dismissed with his costs.
Robert Pritchard, Solicitor. Richard Roe.
The Affidavit, or Verification.
County of Hamilton. J
Richard Roe makes oath that he has read [or, heard read] his foregoing answer, and
knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to
the matters therein stated to be on his information and belief, and those matters he believes
to be true. 27 Richard Roe.
before me, this July 3, 1890.
J. B. Ragon, C. & M..
20 The Code provides no form for an answer, but common sense provisons. The title, or style of the
declares that the answer should contain a clear and cause, and the^ commencement are conformed, as
orderly statement of the facts on which the defense nearly as practicable to the caption or commence-
is founded, without prolixity or repetition, and [con- ment of the Code form of a bill, which is deemed in
clude] with a prayer of dismissal, or counter relief, conformance to the best prevailing practice in our
according to the nature of the case. Code, § 4315. State, and is substantially the same as the revised
And it is made the duty of the Court to discounten- practice in England. Hicks' Ch. Pr., § 103.
ance nrolixitv. Code. 8 4316. In drawincr the ahnvp 27 Thfe it +h* uenal fnm. n f «« n JKJ n .»'4. 1 T\
§381 PRAMS AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 310
§ 381. —
Old Form of an Answer. The old form of an answer was almost as
cumbersome and tautological as the old form of a bill, and contained almost
as many unnecessary words. Indeed, in both pleadings the sense was often
suffocated by the pleonasms in the clauses, and the. inversions in the sentences. 28
The following form illustrates what were the usual commencements and con-
clusions of answers, before our Code
OLD FORM OF ANSWER.
The and several answers of John Smith and Henry Jones, two of the defendants,
joint
to the bill of complaint, filed against them and others' in the Chancery Court at Nashville, by
Charles Brown, an infant, by William Brown, his father and next friend, complainant.
These defendants, now and at all times hereafter saving and reserving to themselves all,
and all manner of, benefit and advantage of exceptions that can or may be taken to the man-
ifold errors, uncertainties, imperfections and insufficiencies in the said complainant's said
bill contained, for answer thereunto, or unto so much and such parts thereof as these de-
fendants are advised is material or necessary for them to make answer unto answer and —
say, they admit, [stating what they specially admit,] and these defendants deny [stating what
they specially deny, and concluding as follows:]
And these defendants deny all, and all manner of, unlawful combination and confederacy
wherewith they are, in the said bill, charged, without that, that any other matter, cause, or
thing, in the complainant's said bill of complaint contained, material or necessary for these
defendants to make answer unto, and not herein or hereby well and sufficiently answered
unto, confessed or avoided, traversed, or denied, is true, to the knowledge or belief of these
defendants. All of which matters and things these defendants are ready and willing to aver,
maintain and prove, as this honorable Court shall direct; and humbly pray to be hence dis-
missed with their reasonable costs, and charges in this behalf most wrongfully sustained.
A. Jackson, Solicitor. John Smith,
[Annex affidavit by both of the defendants. See ante, § 380.] Henry Jones.
It will be noted that the whole ground covered by the above answer is cov-
ered by the first five and last three lines of the answer set out in the preceding
section.
§ 382. —
An Answer by Adoption. Where there are several defendants hav-
ing similar interests and defences, and one of them has answered, this answer
may be adopted in whole or in part by the others, or by any one or more of
them. If the answer is adopted in whole by any one or more of such defend-
ants he, or they, may, with the consent of the defendant who has answered,
write under such answer words to the following effect
John Doe, 1
vs. [ In Chancery, at Jacksboro.
' The defendants, Robert Jones and Henry Smith, say they have read, [or, heard read.j
the foregoing answer of their co-defendant, Richard Roe, and that the contents thereof are
true of their own knowledge, except as to the. matters therein stated to be on information
and belief, and these matters they believe on information to be true.
And these defendants adopt the foregoing answer of Richard Roe as their own.
Robert Jones,
Henry Smith.
This must be sworn to by the defendants who sign it, unless the bill waives
their oath.
If a defendant wishes to adopt an answer in part, but has no personal
knowledge of certain matters answered unto on personal knowledge, he can
do so by specifying these matters, and answering as to them on information
and belief or otherwise, as shown in the following form
ANSWER BY ADOPTION.
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery, at Jacksboro.
Richard Roe, et al.
The defendant, Roland Roe, for answer to the bill in this cause says that he has read
of affidavit is often used for both bills and answers: [Sworn to, as above.] ,
State of Tennessee, 7 More care should be given to the forms of affida-
County of Hamilton, j vits and jurats then is sometimes done. See Article
Richard Roe makes oath- \_or, affirms,] that the on Affidavits, post, .§§ 788-789.
statements in his foregoing answer, made as his own 28 See forms in Van Hayth. Eq. Dr., passim^
knowledge, are true; and those made as on informa-
tion and belief, he believes to be true.
Richard Roe.
311 frame; and form of an answer. §383
[or, heard read] the answer of his co-defendant, Richard Roe, and that the said answer is
true as of his own knowledge, except as to the parts thereof contained in paragraphs 4 and S,
in reference to certain alleged trespasses [specifying with particularity the parts excepted,]
and as to these matters he has no personal knowledge but on information believes the answer
as to them to be true.
And this defendant adopts the said answer of Richard Roe as his own.
Roland Roe.
This answer must be sworn to, unless the bill waives this defendant's oath.
If the oath of the defendant is waived, he can write under the answer he
desires to adopt, the following: " I adopt the foregoing answer, and make
it my own," and sign it, and have the Clerk and Master refile it as his answer.
§ 383. Answer of an Infant. —

An infant answers by his general guardian,
if he have one, he answers by a special guardian appointed by the
if not,
Court, pro hac vice, called a guardian ad litem, as heretofore fully shown. 29
The guardian ad litem ordinarily files a mere general answer for his ward,
placing his rights and interests under the protection. of the Court, 30 but, if on
investigation, he deems it advisable to put in a special answer for his ward, it
is his duty to do so. 31
If an infant who has answered by guardian ad litem attains his majority
while the cause is pending, he has the right to put in a new answer, upon satis-
tying the Court that his interests will be promoted thereby. His application
to put in a new answer should be supported by affidavit snowing merits, and
should be made without delay. 32
The following is the usual form 33 of a
GENERAL ANSWER OF AN INFANT BY GUARDIAN AD LITEM.
John Doe. ]
vs. ! In Chancery, at Jacksboro.
Richard Roe, ah Jet
The defendant, Robert Roe, an infant, for separate answer to the bill filed against him in
said cause, answering by J. E. Cassady, his guardian ad litem, says, That he is an infant
about ten years old, and knows nothing about the matters in said bill alleged, and, therefore,
neither admits nor denies them, but submits his rights and interests in said matters to the
protection of the Court. Robert Roe,
[Annex affidavit, as in § 380.] By J. E. Cassady, Guardian ad litem.
The answer must be sworn to by the Guardian ad litem; indeed, the answer
is considered to be his, and not the infant's; and the infant is not bound by it;
and it cannot be excepted to for insufficiency. 333 -
§ 384. Answers of Other Persons Under Disability. An idiot answers by —

bis regular guardian, or by a guardian ad litem specially appointed by the
Court to make proper defence for him. If a defendant is reduced to a state of
second childhood by age and infirmity, the course is for him to answer by a
guardian ii_ the same manner as an infant. The answer of a lunatic is, also,
to be made by his regular guardian, or by the person appointed as his guardiau
ad litem by the Court to defend the suit. And a complainant cannot except,
for insufficiency, to the answer of a defendant of unsound mind, against whom
» commission of lunacy has issued, he answering by his guardian ad litem but ;
if he answers by a regular guardian his answer may be excepted to. 34

A married woman generally answers jointly with her husband, but some-
times she answers separately by leave of the Court in which case she answers ;
by her next friend. "Where a marriage has really taken place only to defraud
creditors, a married woman may be made to answer as if she were "single. And
it has been held, that where a husband and wife have answered jointly, and
the bill is afterwards amended, and then the husband goes abroad, the wife
remaining in this country, and being the material defendant, there must be an
29 See, ante, §§ 106-108, in relation to guardians 32 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 149-150.
ad litem. 33 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 412; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 163.
30 Mills v. Dennis, 3 Johns. Ch., 368. 33a 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 148-149.
si 1 Barb. Ch. Pr.. 148. 34 Stn. Kn Ttir 8 R71 1 "R^k fl, r>- 1 11
§ 385 FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 31!
order upon her to answer separately, or it will not be any contempt of tb

Court in her if she refuse to answer. 35
A married woman may, by leave of the Court, answer separately from he
husband (1) when their interests are antagonistic; (2) when he is mentall;
incompetent to answer; (3) when she disapproves of the defence he intends to
make: (4) when they are living separate; and (5) in any other case when i
seems proper to the Court that she should be allowed to answer separately. 36
§ 385. Forms of Titles and Commencements of Answers. While, as ha —
often before been remarked, the Chancery Court looks to substance rathe'
than to form, and while there is no prescribed form of an answer, neverthelesi
there must be enough form to enable the Court and its officers to identify th<
writing as an answer, and there must be enough title and commencement t(
clearly show what particular bill it answers. The following are some of th<
most common forms of titles and commencements used in our State
TITLES AND COMMENCEMENTS OP ANSWERS.
1. For Husband and Wife.37
The joint answer of Richard Roe and Rachel Roe, his wife, defendants to the bill of com-
plaint of against them [and others,] in the Chancery Court at Nashville.
John Doe, filed
These defendants reserving to themselves all right of exception to said bill, for answei
thereto say. [Or the following form can be used in lieu :]
John Doe, "]
vs. y In Chancery, at Nashville.

These defendants, as husband and wife, jointly answering the bill in said cause, say [Or :
when the wife answers separately, the commencement will be :]

The defendant, Rachel Roe, answering the bill in said cause separately from her husband
the said Richard Roe, by leave [or order] of the Court, says
2. Tor Two or More Defendants who are Sui Juris, and Join in Answering.
Thejoint and several answers of Roland Roe and Romeo Roe, defendants, to the bill o1
complaint filed against them [and others,] in the Chancery Court at Memphis by John Doe
and Henry Doe.
These defendants reserving to themselves all right of exception to said bill, say: [Or the
following form can be used in lieu:]
John Doe, 1
vs. y In Chancery, at Memphis.

Rich Roe, et al. J
The defendants, Roland Roe and Romeo Roe, jointly and severally answering the bill ir,
said cause, say:
3. For Separate Answer by a Defendant who is Misnamed in the Bill.
The separate answer of Richard Roe in the bill called Rich Roe, defendant, to the bill
of complaint filed against him and others in the Chancery Court at Chattanooga by John Doe.
This defendant reserving all right and benefit of exception to said bill, for answer theretc
says: [Or the following form may be used in lieu:]
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery, at Memphis.
Rich Roe, et al.
.
The defendant, Richard Roe, in the
.
bill in said cause, called Rich Roe, separately answer-
ing said bill, says
4. For Separate Answer by a Corporation.
John Doe, j
vs. Y In Chancery, at Maryville.

Montvale Springs Company. J
The defendant, the Montvale Springs Company [or, the County of Blount, or the City of
Knoxville, or the Knoxville & Augusta Railroad Company,] for separate
answer to the bill
bled against it in said cause, says
§ 386. Forms Used

in Framing Answers, and in Setting up Defences-
There are certain formulas used in framing answers, which, while not essential
35 Sto. Uq. PL, § 873; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 753-754. sane, will, generally, be allowed to answer sepa
86 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 178-183; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 150- rately, whenever she applies for leave to do so.
153; Code, §§ 2486; 2805. The English rule is much 37 Husband and wife generally answer jointly,
relaxed in this State; and a wife, if an adult, and bee, ante, §§236; 383.
313 FRAME AND FORM OF AN ANSWER. 386
§
are evidences of good pleading, and the young Solicitor would do well to
adopt
them wherever applicable. The following are those oftenest needed
1. Where a Defendant Admits a Statement. This defendant, further answering, says

he has been informed and believes it to be true, that [or, This defendant admits that, (speci-
fying the substance of the allegation in the bill intended to be admitted.)]
2. Where the Defendant is Ignorant as to the Allegation. This defendant, further
answering, says that he knows nothing whatever as to the truth of the allegation in the bill
tnat, [here stating the allegation briefly;] and this defendant has no information or belief
in reference thereto, he being an utter stranger to all these matters, and to each of them.
3. Where the Defendant Denies an Allegation in the Bill. This defendant, further
answering, denies that, [or, says it is not true that,] this defendant [or, the complainant,] did
[specifying the substance of the charge denied.]
4. Where the Defendant Denies an Allegation and Calls for its Proof. This de-
fendant denies that [here giving the substance of the allegation denied;] and if such fact is
material, this defendant requires that it be duly proved, [or, that the deed, or other writing,
be produced and duly proved, or, that said decree, judgment, award, or contract, be produced
at or before the hearing of the cause, and proved in the manner required by law.]
5. Where a Defendant Believes a Statement to be True. And this defendant,
further answering, says that he believes it to be true that, [stating the allegation in the bill
referred to;] but the defendant does not know the same of his own knowledge.
6. Where an Account of Moneys Received, or Paid, is Kequlred And this defend-.
ant, further answering, says he has, in a schedule to this answer, marked A, which he makes
a part hereof, set forth, according to the best and utmost of his knowledge, remembrance,
information and belief, a full, true, and particular account of all and every sum and sums of
money by him received for or on account of [the matter in controversy, stating it.]
7. Where a Defendant Admits a Statement as to a Written Instrument. And this
defendant further says that he has been informed and believes it to be true that the allegation
in complainant's bill as to the existence of a certain deed [will, contract, bond, mortgage, or
other writing, specifying the instrument referred to,] is true, but this defendant has no know-
ledge of the contents thereof, and for greater certainty as to its contents refers to the said
deed [or other instrument] when the same shall be produced and duly proved, and such pro-
duction and proof this defendant requires.
8. General Denial of Allegations not Already Admitted or Denied. All and every
charge and allegation in complainant's bill not hereinbefore answered, admitted, avoided,
or denied, is here and now denied, and the complainant required to fully prove the same,
according to the rules of law and of this Court.
9. Where the Defendant Pleads the Statutes of Limitations in his Answer.
This defendant avers and pleads that the cause of action set forth in the bill, if any there
be, accrued more than six [or ten] years before said bill was filed and he relies on and
;
pleads the statute of limitations of six [or ten] years in bar of the complainant's bill and
alleged cause of action. [Or, To so much of the bill as seeks to hold this defendant liable
on (or, seeks to recover, or, seeks a decree for, the account, note, debt, bond, mortgage, or
lien,) he pleads and relies on the statute of limitations of six (or ten) years in bar thereof,
the cause of action alleged having accrued more than six (or ten) years before the bill was
38
filed, as he avers and pleads.]
10. Where the Defendant Pleads the Statute of Frauds in his Answer. This de-
fendant avers and says that the agreement for the sale of the land described in the bill [or
other agreement sought to be enforced] alleged to have been made by this defendant, and
sought to be enforced by the bill, was not reduced to writing, nor was any memorandum
or note thereof ever signed by him, or bv any one by him thereunto lawfully authorized, and
he pleads this fact, and the statute for the prevention of frauds and perjuries, in bar of any
relief on said alleged agreement.
11. Where the Defendant Pleads in His Answer that he is an Innocent Purchaser.
This defendant avers and says that on May 8, 1890, his co-defendant, Roland Roe, was
seized, or pretended to be seized in fee [and so on, using the remainder of the words con-
tained in the plea of innocent purchaser in § 332.]
12. Where the Defendant in His Answer Pleads a Former Judgment or Decree.
These defendants, for further answer, say that heretofore, and before the filing of said bill,
to-wit, on July 25, 1882, the complainant filed another bill in this
Court [or, in the Chan-
cery Court at ] against these defendants [and so on, using the remainder of the words
contained in the plea of former judgment, in § 329.]
of limitations the answer should specifically and directly

38 If the bill sets " facts to avoid the statute
up I
|
deny all the alleged facts. See, ante, % 147.
§387 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO ANSWERS. 314
ARTICLE V.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO ANSWERS.
387. As
to Answers when to be Used as § 390. As
to Pleading the Statutes of Frauds,
Affidavits. Innocent Purchaser, and Former
388. As to Setting up Matters in Avoid- Judgment.
ance. § 391. How to Frame an Answer.
389. As to Pleading the Statutes of Limita- § 392. As to Answering Fully.
tions.
§ 387. As to Answers When to be Used as Affidavits. Attention has already —

been called to the fact that an answer often serves the double purpose of a
pleading and an affidavit, 1 especially when (1) it is to be used to resist the
granting of an injunction prayed for, but not yet allowed; (2) when it is to be
used as the basis of a motion to dissolve an injunction already granted; and
(3) when it is to be used to resist the appointment of a receiver; or (4' to
have the order of appointment modified. In all such cases, the answer must
possess all the definiteness, particularity, precision, and directness, necessary
in an affidavit and its value and force will be in direct proportion to its clear-
;
ness, fullness, and appositeness, and in proportion to the number of its material
statements based on the personal knowledge of the defendant himself. There-
importance (1) that the answer should show on its face
fore, it is often of vital
what statements are based on the personal knowledge of the defendant, and
what on information and belief; and (2) that the affidavit to the answer should
be that the facts stated as on. the defendant's own knowledge are true, an<?
those based on information he believes to be true. 2
§ 388. —
As to Setting up Matters in Avoidance. In drawing an answer, the
most important matter for you to consider is; what is your client's real
defence ;
—
on what facts does he rely to defeat the bill. Of course, all the
material allegations of the bill must be responded to, and if your client's
defence is purely negative, that is, consists entirely in denying the material
facts charged, then an answer negativing the charges in the bill will be ade-
quate to the emergency. But if your client's defence consists in new matters,
matters not stated in the bill, or, if stated, incorrectly stated, then you must
set forth these matters in your answer, fully and clearly, according to the facts
your client will be able to prove. These new matters are commonly called
matters in avoidance, and you will not be allowed to prove them, or to read
your proof in reference to>them, at the hearing, unless you have in your answer
set them up as a defence. It is no uncommon thing for defendants to suffer,
because of their failure to set up, in their answer, the facts in avoidance con-
stituting their defence.
The most common matters in avoidance are: (1) fraud, vitiating the con-
tract; (2) failure of consideration; (3) payment; (4) a release; (5) an award;
(6) a former judgment; (7) a subsequent agreement; (8) a recission; (9)
statute of limitations; (10) statute of frauds; (11) innocent purchaser; (12)
1 See, ante, §§ 361-366; also, post, § 392. Young Solicitors are, sometimes, perplexed by the
2 Ananswer on information, and belief, has but fact that the oath of their clients to their answers is
little may be true, and
force, for the reason that it waived. This means that the answer is not wanted
yet allbe based on mere hearsay. An answer, so by complainant as a deposition but it, by no means,
;
sworn cannot withstand a bill whose averments

to, prevents the defendant from swearing to it, and us-
of fact are based on personal knowledge, and are ing it as an affidavit, for his own purposes. The
directly and positively sworn to as true on complain- oath to such an answer is available at all times, ex-
ant's own knowledge. See Chapters on Injunctions cept at the hearing.
and Evidence, post.
515 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO ANSWERS. §389
usury; (13) tender; (14) infancy; and (15) set-off. In all cases, where matters
in avoidance exist, the complainant may, and ordinarily will, aver the original
agreement, or other cause of liability, in such a way that he will be entitled to
a decree against your client at the hearing, on the pleadings and proof, if, in
drawing the answer, you content yourself with merely denying the allegations
of the bill. 3 In all such cases, you should be particular to set up your affirm-
ative defences, specifically, fully, and clearly, conforming your allegations to
the facts your client will be able to prove. 4
You must, however, be careful not to get caught between the horns of n
dilemma, by setting up matter in avoidance which will entitle the complainant
to a decree against your client, on the facts set out in avoidance. Thus, if you
allege a contract, or a state of facts disclosing a liability, different from that
charged in the bill, the complainant may abandon the grounds for relief
alleged in his bill, and take a decree against your client on the facts contained
in the answeB. 5
§ 389. As to Pleading the Statutes of Limitations. If the effect of the —
lapse of time is to vest title in your client, you need not plead the statute of
limitations. Thus, if your client, sued in ejectment, has had seven years open,
continuous, adverse possession of the land in dispute, before suit brought,
holding under a grant, deed, devise, or other writing purporting to be a con-
veyance in fee, and the land is granted land, he becomes thereby vested with
title thereto, and need not plead the statute of limitations. So, adverse pos-
session of three years gives title to personal property, and you need not plead
the statute in such a case. Nevertheless, all prudent pleaders set up and rely
on the statutes of limitations, in every case where it can be pleaded.
Remember, the statute cannot be relied on as a defence, except in the two
foregoing cases, unless specially set up in a plea, or in the answer. This de-
fence is one a defendant is not obliged to rely on, and the law does not allow
it, unless it is relied on and, where a defendant fails to rely on it, he is deemed
;
to decline the benefits of the statute. 6

As a result, he will not ordinarily be allowed to amend his answer, so as to
set up the statute of limitations, without the payment of the costs of all proof
then on file, and frequently will be taxed with all the costs then accrued; and,
if the motion to so amend is not made until the trial term, it may be refused
altogether. 7
The defence of the statute of limitations is generally made in the answer,
along with all the other defences to the bill, but whether made in the answer,
or in a plea, it must be specifically made. It is a fundamental rule in Chancery
pleading to allege every fact on which the pleader relies, to make every charge
he expects to prove, to set up every defence he hopes to establish, and to bring
forward every matter likely to help his case.
§ 390. As to Pleading the Statute of Frauds, Innocent Purchaser, and
.
—
Former Judgment. The fact that these, and all other defences in bar, may be
set up in an answer, has caused young pleaders to think that, when relied on
in an answer, the same measure of definiteness and particularity is not neces-
sary as when relied on by plea. This is an error, that has often resulted in
disaster to the defendant. It may be stated, generally, that every defence
proper for the subject-matter of a plea in bar, should, when pleaded in the
3 The fact that an unsworn answer is usually ance. You should never file an answer without first
called for, often causes Solicitors to draw and file a ascertaining your client's real defence.
mere negative answer, in the nature of a general * See Turley v. Turley, L Pick., 251.
denial of the cause of action, without ever investigat- 5 See cases cited in the Chapter on Decrees. Post,
ing the facts. The result is, defendants, not unfre- §§ 406, note— ; 555, note 1; 558.
quently, find themselves, at the hearing, either 6 Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto.
obliged tp submit to a decree, because their proof in Broom's Leg. Max., 670; Johnson v. Cooper, 2
avoidance is ruled out; or, are obliged to pay all the Yerg., 533. See Waiver, ante, § 71.
costs of the cause, in order to get leave to amend 7 Wilson v. Wilson, 2 Lea, 17.
4.1..:. „.,,.,„<,.. ,.„ «. +„ ...+ .... .J..;- ,i-f.~...> :« „*rr.iA-
§ 391 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO ANSWERS. 316
answer, be set forth with the same precision and accuracy as when set up in
a
plea in bar. 8
1. The Statute of Frauds cannot be relied on at the hearing unless specially
pleaded, or set up as a defence in the answer. It will not avail to call atten-
tion, in the answer, to the fact that the agreement sued on is not in writing;
nor will it profit to deny that it is in writing, or to allege that it is
not in
writing. The fact that it is not in writing must not only be distinctly averred
but the Court must also be plainly notified that such fact is set up, and relied!
on as a defence and bar to the relief prayed. 9
2. The Defence of Innocent Purchaser is often insufficiently made in answers.
Pleading " in short " has sometimes, though with painful reluctance, been
condoned by the Courts of law, but never by the Courts of Chancery and to ;
say in an answer, in a general way, that the defendant was an innocent pur-
chaser and relies on that fact as a defence, avails nothing, and is a mere delus-
ion. The indispensable elements of this plea have been already fully enum-
erated and treated of, and every prudent pleader will consult his books before
framing this defence in his answer. 10
3. The Defence of a Former Judgment, or Decree, requires to be drawn with
great care in order to be available. 11 Instead of great care, however, it often
happens that the defence is set up so indefinitely and carelessly that it is
wholly ignored at the hearing; and the result is loss to the client, and morti-
fication, not to say disgrace, to the Solicitor.
§ 391. —
How to Frame an Answer. In drawing an answer, you should keen
in mind the doctrine of relations, and of the general rule of law, already stated.
1. Where Relations Exist." If the bill is based upon relations, you must
either (1) deny the relation alleged, or the facts alleged as showing the rela-
tion; or (2) you must show that no such duties or rights as alleged resulted
from those relations; or (3) you must, by way of avoidance, set up some new
facts, such as payment, release, adjustment, former judgment, award, statute
of limitations, or the like.
Where No Relations Exist.". If no relations are alleged, you must either
2.
(1) deny the complainant's title; or (2) you must deny the injury he alleges
your client has done; or (3) you must, by way of avoidance, set up some of
the new facts above stated in case of relations.
3. As to Setting In an answer, you can unite as many defences
up Defences.
as exist. Tou may deny
the relation and the violation of the relation, and
may set up matters in avoidance at the same time. So, you may deny com-
plainant's title and the injury he alleges, and at the same time set up any
matters in avoidance. Great care must be observed in such cases, however, to
prevent your answer from presenting inconsistent or antagonistic defences.
Thus, while denying the title or relation, and the injury alleged, you may say
DENIAL AND AVOIDANCE, HOW COMBINED.
Further answering, the defendant says that, while not now nor then admitting complainant's
title [or, the relation alleged,] and not admitting the wrongs he complains of, nevertheless,
for the sake of buying peace and to save himself the trouble and expense of defending a suit,
the defendant did on [such a day, giving the date,] pay the complainant the sum of fifty dol-
lars, [or other amount,] in full satisfaction of said supposed injuries; and the defendant pleads
said payment and satisfaction in rar of the recovery sought by the bill.
In the same way, a release, former judgment, award, or the statute of limi-
tations, may be set up in bar of any recovery, even when the answer denies
the original liability.
Always keep in mind that you cannot rely on, at the hearing, any special
8 See, ante, § 324, note 14. I 11 bee, ante, § 329.

9 See, ante, §§ 330; 390. 12 See, post, § 415, for a summary of all possible
10 See, ante, §§332; 390. I
defences on the merits.
317 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO ANSWERS. §392
defense, it matters not how good a defence it is, nor how clearly it is proved,
unless it has been distinctly set up in the answer. 13
4. As to the Phraseology of an Answer. Ordinarily, in drawing an answer it
is best to begin with the beginning of the bill, and answer its charges and
averments, one by one, in the order in which they appear in the bill. If the
bill is divided into paragraphs, as it should be, divide your answer into corre-
sponding" paragraphs, if practicable, admitting or denying the allegations ot
the bill, paragraph by paragraph.
Avoid all literary displays, all attempts at wit, all repartee, retorts, or un-
kind allusions or insinuations, either towards the complainant, or his Solicitor,
and all scandal. Courts are not arenas for the display of rhetoric, poetoy, wit,
sarcasm, or invective, much less of billingsgate or scandal.
In detailing facts, omit all profane and indecent expressions, and all mani-
festations of indignation or passion. Clothe hard facts in soft words. By the
courtesy of your language, show that you are a gentleman, and that you, also,
have respect for your profession and for the Court. 14
If the answer is called for on oath, remember it becomes both a pleading and
a deposition, and let the defendant's responses to the charges be full, clear,
and direct, and let it be sworn to in due form, as heretofore shown.
If the answer is not on oath, have your client sign it if it is on oath, his sig-
;
nature to the affidavit will be sufficient evidence that it is his answer.

§ 392. —
As to Answering Fully. It is a general rule of Equity pleading
that, if a defendant answers at all, he must answer fully, if an answer on oath
is called for; but that, if his oath is waived, his answer cannot be objected to
for insufficiency, provided it makes an issue. Under the operation of this
exception to the general rule, many pleaders make their answers a mere string
of empty formalities and general denials. This practice had its origin in the
fact, that many unsworn answers are drawn in the absence of the defendant,
and consequently in ignorance of the facts. Nothing, but the most imperious
necessity, should ever induce a Solicitor to draw an answer in the absence of
his client.
An unsworn answer should, not as a rule of pleading, but as a rule of great
practical value, be as full as a sworn answer, if the defendant has any defence,
or even excuse, to present to the Court. The bill often opens up the details
of the controversy, and pictures in dark colors the wrongs alleged, making
the narrative hot with flashes of invective and denunciation against violations
of trust and confidence, or pathetic with the sufferings of injured innocence,
or the wails of victimized suppliants —
all done to arouse indignation against
the defendant, and sympathy for the complainant.
To such a hot storm of allegation and denunciation, mere cold and format
denials of the material allegations of the bill are totally insufficient. Such an
answer is often regarded as but little better than an admission, that the
defendant has no merits on his side, and that his only hope of success depends
on denials, and the failure of proof. To meet such a bill, the defendant, even
when his oath is waived, should go into the details of the controversy from
his own point of view, and should show, as far as possible, that the complain-
ant has drawn on his imagination for his facts and should, in a dispassionate
;
and calm manner, meet all the allegations, and show the holldwness of com-
plainant's charges. Do not undertake to meet heat with heat, or denunciation
with denunciation; but, on the contrary, reprove such displays in a Court, and
adopt a style of coolness and a tone of moderation, as a sign of confidence in
13 See, ante, § 358. that the adverse party used indecent or profane lan-
14 Chancellors frequently debate in their hearts, guage, without specifying the language used. The
while pleadings are being read, whether to order language used is mere evidence, and not a proper
scandalous and impertinent matter to be stricken out, allegation. No pleading should contain such matters
or to reprove counsel therefor, or to pass the matter of evidence.
in silence. It is amply sufficient in a bill, to charge
§ 393 DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS. 318
the justness of your defence, and of your willingness to have all the' facts
pre-
sented to the Court.
Therefore, as a rule, answer fully, whether, your client's oath is demanded
or waived. Such an answer can do no harm, and will often do much good.
A bill is a sort of opening argument on behalf of the complainant; and
that
argument will seldom be met by a mere formal general denial: Let your
answer present your side of the controversy, as fully as the facts and' the rules
of pleading will permit.
If your client has a meritorious defense have him swear to his answer, even
when his oath is waived. Such an answer has more force. The Court is im-
pressed by the fact that it is not a mere pleading by counsel.
ARTICLE VI.
DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS.
393. Disclaimers Defined. § 396. Effect of Disclaimer.
394. When Defendant not Allowed to Dis- § 397. Frame of Disclaimer.
claim. § 398. Form of Disclaimer.
395. When Disclaimer Allowable.
§ 393. —
Disclaimers Denned. If the defendant has no defence, and does
not desire to make any, he need not answer the bill, or make any other defence
thereto, unless a discovery is sought from him, in which case he must answer
for, if he does not do so voluntarily, he can be compelled by attachment. If he
claims nothing, and the bill on its face shows that he has no interest in the
subject-matter of the suit, and that no relief is prayed against him, he may
demur, unless the bill alleges that he has, or claims, an interest, in which case
he must disclaim, or answer. If he claims no interest in the subject-matter of
the suit, and he has not been claiming any, and has not been exercising any
acts of possession or ownership thereover, he may disclaim. A disclaimer is a
sort of answer, which renounces all claim to the subject of the complainant's
demand, and makes no defence other than a denial of any and all charges that
the defendant is claiming an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, or is in
possession of it, or exercising acts of ownership over it, when such charges
are made.
A disclaimer is distinct, in substance, from an answer, although sometimes
confounded with it. But it can seldom be put in without an answer; for, if
the defendant has been made a party by mistake, having had an interest, which
he may have parted with, the complainant may require an answer sufficient to
ascertain whether that is the fact, or not and if, in truth, it is so, an answer
;
seems necessary to enable the complainant to make the assignee a party, instead
of the defendant disclaiming. And although a mere witness may avoid answer-
ing by a disclaimer, yet an agent, charged by a bill with personal fraud, can-
not, by disclaiming any interest, avoid answering fully. 1
§ 394. When Defendant Not Allowed to Disclaim. A defendant cannot, —
by a disclaimer, deprive the complainant of the right of requiring a full
answer from him unless it is evident that the defendant ought not, after such
;
disclaimer, to be retained as a party to the suit. For a complainant may have

a right to an answer and a discovery notwithstanding a disclaimer and, in ;
such a case, the defendant cannot shelter himself from answering, by alleging
1 Sto. Eq. PI., § 838.
319 DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS. § 395
that lie has no interest in the subject-matter of the suit. 2 Although he has no
interest in others may have an interest in it against him. He may be deeply
it,
accountable and the very statement, that he is .deeply accountable, is, in one
;
sense, an allegation that he has an interest in the suit. A

man cannot disclaim
his liability. Under such circumstances, it may be necessary to revive a suit
against the personal representatives of a deceased defendant, who had himself
disclaimed. 3 Nor can a disclaimer by one defendant prejudice the complain-
ant's right as against the others. 4
A party cannot get rid of his liability to answer a suit by a mere disclaimer,
if his answer may properly, under all the circumstances, be required.
5
Thus,
for example, if his disclaimer does not show that he is under no liability in
respect to the matters of the bill,, it will be bad. So, if the bill alleges some
other facts, as, that the defendant has mixed himself up with the whole trans-
action, and has by his personal conduct made it necessary that the bill should
be filed, a mere disclaimer will not entitle him to be dismissed from further
answering the suit; for, under such circumstances, justice might not be done
to the other party. Generally speaking, therefore, a mere disclaimer is scarcely
to be deemed sufficient, or proper, except where the bill simply alleges that
the defendant claims an interest in the property in dispute, without more, for
under such circumstances, if the defendant, claims no interest, that is a suffi-
cient answer to the allegation. 6 It would seem, on principle and authority,
that a disclaimer cannot be made by a person, incapable from disability, of
conveying the property or right disclaimed. 7
Unless the defendant has been claiming, or been in possession of, the subject-
matter, or exercising acts of ownership over it, the disclaimer generally ends
the suit at complainant's cost. But if the disclaimer is false, the complainant
may prove its falsity, and thus not only entitle himself to a decree, but subject
the defendant, in the discretion of the Court, to the costs of the suit.
§ 395. When Disclaimer is Allowable. —A disclaimer is ordinarily filed by
a defendant, when he
falsely charged with claiming an interest in certaiu
is
property, assets, or rights, specified in the bill. A
party who claims an interest
in land may be sued, even though not in possession, or not exercising any acts
of ownership 8 and if the allegation that he claims an interest is false, in whole
;
or in part, he must disclaim as to so much of the land as he does not claim, be

it all or only a part. So, if the bill seeks to recover more land than the de-
fendant is in possession of, or is exercising acts of ownership over, he must
disclaim as to so much of the land as he does not claim, or is not in possession
of, or is not exercising acts of ownership over; and as to the part he does
claim, he must plead or answer. Any. plea, or answer, which denies that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding the land sued for, or is unlawfully claim-
ing an interest in, or unlawfully exercising acts of ownership over, the land
sued for, admits that the defendant is in possession of the premises sued for,
unless he states distinctly in his answer the extent of his possession. 9 Hence,
it is of great importance to the defendant, to show distinctly, in his answer, by
metes and bounds, or other definite description, the extent of his possession or
claim, and to enter a full and absolute disclaimer as to the balance of the land
sued for otherwise, although he may defeat a recovery as to that part of the
;
land which, outside of his answer, he really claims, he will be liable to the
costs of the cause for contesting the complainant's right to all the land sued
for. But a defendant cannot dispute the complainant's entire claim, and, at
the same time, in the same answer, disclaim as to part for, in such a case, his
;
answer would overrule his disclaimer. 10

2 Wallace v. County Court, 3 Shan. Cas., 556. sCode, § 3231.
s Sto. Eq. PI., § 840. 9Code, § 3240.
i 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 707. 10 Lea v. Slatterly, 7 Bax., 235; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
5 Wallace v. County Court, 3 Shan. Cas., 556. 709; Sto. Eq. PI., I 839. The two defences are ab-
6 Sto. Eq. PI., § 838, a. solutely inconsistent.- AUegans contrarianon est ait-
7 Bouv. L. Die, "Disclaimer." diendus.
§396 DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS. 320
A defendant cannot, after bill filed, transfer his interest in the subject-
matter of the suit, and then disclaim. 11
§ 396. —
Effect of Disclaimer. If the defendant disclaims, and it appears
that the bill was exhibited for vexation only, the Court will dismiss the bill
with costs against the complainant. But if the complainant had probable
cause or reason to exhibit his bill against such defendant, he may, if he pleases
pray a decree against such defendant, and all claiming under him, since the
bill was exhibited; and it is commonly granted. 12 The course to be pursued
by the complainant, after a sufficient disclaimer to the whole bill has been
filed, is either to dismiss the bill as to the party disclaiming, or to amend;
unless the disclaimer is false, and this he may prove. 13
If a defendant puts in a disclaimer, and afterwards discovers that he had an
interest, which he was not apprized of at the time when he disclaimed, the
Court will, upon the ground of ignorance, or mistake, permit him to make his
claim. But the Court will, in such a case, require the defendant to show a
strong ground by affidavit, to get rid of the disclaimer upon the record. 14 If
the defendant takes no steps to get rid of the effect of the disclaimer, he will
be forever barred, because it is matter of record. 15 Where a defendant claims
rights against a co-defendant, but not against the complainant, he should
reserve such rights in his disclaimer, or they will not be considered in deter-
mining the suit. 16
When an answer amounts to a disclaimer, any matter in it, not responsive to
the bill, is mere surplusage. Thus, where the stock of a shareholder in a cor-
poration was attached, and such a corporation being a co-defendant, answered
that it had no interest in the stock, but that a third party not sued had, the
allegation as to such third party was held to be mere surplusage. 17
If the disclaiming defendant has occasioned the suit by his own misconduct,
as by setting up a false claim, the complainant may so show, and on this being
done the costs will be adjudged against such defendant. 18
§ 397. Frame of Disclaimer. —Though a disclaimer is, in substance, distinct
from an answer, yet it is, in point of form, an answer, and is preceded and
concluded by the same. formal words, and it is put in and filed, in the same
way. It contains simply an assertion that defendant disclaims all right and
title to the matter in demand but, in order to entitle the defendant to be dis-
;
missed with costs, the disclaimer should state that the defendant does not,
and never did, claim any, and that he now disclaims all, right and title in the
subject-matter of the suit. The forms given in the books of practice are all of
an answer and disclaimer, joined in one pleading.
If a defendant puts in a disclaimer when he ought to answer, or accompanies
his disclaimer by an answer which is considered insufficient, the defendant may
except to it, in the same manner as to an answer. And if a disclaimer and an-
swer are inconsistent, the matter will be taken most strongly against the de-
fendant on the disclaimer. 19
A defendant may disclaim as to one or more matters in the bill, and answer
as to the others. So, he may demur to one part of the bill, plead to another
part, answer to a third, and disclaim to a fourth; but each of these defences
must clearly refer to a separate and distinct part of the bill, and no defense
11 Wallace v. County Court, 3 Shan. Cas., 542. in 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 707.
See, ante, §§66; 115-116. 17 Saltmarsh v. Hockett, 1 Lea, 215.
12 Sto. Eq. PI., § 842. 18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 709. Whenever a suit is
13 1 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 709. caused by the falsity of a defendant's claim, and his
14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 841. defence to such suit rests upon such falsity, he will
15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 709. Inasmuch as the plead- be taxed with the costs, even though successful, a&
ings are seldom enrolled; and mav therefore, be- where he falsely claimed to be heir, administrator,
come lost, or mislaid, it would be good practice, or executor. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1405; Adams' Eq.,.
when a complainant dismisses his bill because of _ a 389. And see Pigue n. Young, 1 Pick., 263.
sufficient disclaimer, to recite in the decree of dis- 19 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 708-710.
missal, the fact, and substance, of the disclaimer;
and thus perpetuate the fact.
321 DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS. §398
must lap on any part of the bill covered by another for reasons defence, 20
already given.
Under our Code, a disclaimer will be deemed a species of answer 21 and must, ;
like an answer, be sworn to by the defendant, when his oath is not waived, and
must be signed by the defendant in person, or by his Solicitor. 22
§ 398. —
Form of Disclaimer. The essential thing in all pleadings in Chan-
cery is substance; and so a disclaimer is sufficient, if, (1) it contains the neces-
sary substance, and (2) is properly entitled and filed in the cause, and (3) is
duly signed when the defendant's oath is waived, or is duly signed and sworn
to, when the oath is not waived. The following is a
FORM OF DISCLAIMER.^
John Doe, 1
vs. V —
No. 423. In the Chancery Court, at Kingston, Tenn,
This defendant, Roland Roe, for answer 24 and disclaimer to the bill filed against him and
others in this cause, separately answering, says
I.
That he disclaims any and all and to the tract of land

right, title, interest, or claim in
described in the bill, [or to the legacy or property or other subject-matter of the suit.]
n.
[If the facts will then add:] This defendant further says that he does not now
warrant it,
claim said land, [or other property,] or any interest whatever therein, and never did claim
any interest whatever, and never had any possession of said land, and never exercised any
acts of ownership over it.
He, therefore, prays that this disclaimer may be taken as a full and sufficient answer to
said bill, and that he may be hence dismissed with his costs.
George L. Burke, Solicitor. Roland RoE. 25
20 Sto. Eq. Pi., § 839. PI., §843;3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 2113. The complainant
21 Code, § 4384. is an answer, as well as a disclaimer; al-
entitled to
22 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 708. though, the disclaimer be satisfactory to him, he
if
23 For another form of a disclaimer, see, post, § may waive a further answer. Sto. Eq. PL, § 840.
1049. 25_As a disclaimer is a muniment of title, it should
24A disclaimer is a species of answer; and the be signed by the defendant in person.
forms all commence as shown in the text. Sto. Eq.
§ 399 cross bills. 322
CHAPTER XVIII.
CEOSS BILLS.
S 399. Cross Bills Generally Considered. I § 401. Proceedings upon a Cross Bill
§ 400. When a Cross Bill should be Filed. |
§ 399. —
Cross Bills Generally Considered. It frequently happens that the
original bill is so framed as to cramp a defendant in making his defence; or
that full justice cannot be done all the parties, and especially a defendant, with-
out bringing other and cognate matters before the Court; or without a dis-
covery from the complainant or that it is necessary to bring a new party before
;
the Court in order to fully adjust the rights and equities of the original par-
ties or that the defendant has affirmative rights growing out of, or incident to.
;
the subject-matter of the controversy, which he wishes to have adjudicated

and enforced in the same litigation or that the defendant is entitled to a set off,
;
a receiver, an injunction, or some other affirmative relief connected with the

litigation. In any such cases, the defendant may file a cross bill, in order more
fully to make his defence, or in order to obtain the affirmative relief to which
be deems himself entitled.
In our practice, the efficacy of cross bills has been enlarged, and the variety
and extent of the reliefs granted greatly increased so that, by means of both ;
original and cross bills, the Court is enabled to fully dispose of the entire
subject-matter of every litigation and to do complete justice to all the parties,
;
complainant and defendant; and enforce the rights and duties of all, so as to
leave no roots out of which new suits may arise. 1
§ 400. When a Cross Bill should be Filed. The proper time for filing a —
cross bill, when such a bill is deemed necessary, is at the time of putting in the
answer to the original bill; for the cross bill is, ordinarily, for the purpose
of making a more complete defence than can be made by an answer. If a
cross bill is not then filed, the delay must be satisfactorily accounted for, or
the proceedings on the original suit will not be stayed. 2
Under our Code, the answer may be filed as a cross bill, if the relief thereby
sought is against the complainant but, if it is necessary to bring new parties
;
before the Court, a separate cross bill must be filed. Ordinarily, all of the equi-
ties and legal rights the defendant desires to bring before the Court, and have
adjudicated, may be set up as well in an answer, filed as a cross bill, as in a
separate cross bill 3 and, as a consequence, separate cross bills are now seldom
;
filed,except when necessary to make a new party, or when filed subsequently

to the filing of the answer to the original bill. Sometimes, the necessity for a
cross bill does not appear until after the filing of the answer; and sometimes
the facts, necessitating a cross bill, do not arise until after the filing of the
answer in such cases, a separate cross bill must be filed and, if prompt and
: ;
proper application is made, leave to file it will be readily granted.

§ 401. —
Proceedings upon a Cross Bill. When the defendant resorts to a
cross bill, he is required to answer the original bill before he can require the
Dan. Ch. Pr., 1548, note; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 129.

1 For a fuller consideration of the practice and 2 2
pleadings in reference to Cross Bills, see, post, §§ No leave of the Court is necessary to file a cross bill.
3 For forms of answers filed as cross-bills, see,

725-738.
post, §§ 405; 733-735; 1096.
323 cross bills. § 401
original complainant to answer the cross bill. 4 A
cross bill may be dismissed on
motion, demurred to, pleaded to, or answered and these various defences must
;
be made, at the same time, and in the same way, as in case of defences to origi-
nal bills. The testimony taken in the original cause may be read in the cross
cause, and vice versa, as a rule the two causes are generally treated as one
:
cause and generally heard and determined at the same time, and in the same
;
decree. At the hearing, the cross bill may be dismissed, and relief granted on
the original bill; or, the original bill may be dismissed, and relief granted on
the cross bill or, relief may be granted on both bills or, both bills may be dis-
; ;
missed.
The subject of cross bills will be fully treated in a subsequent Chapter, spec-
ially devoted to them. 5 They are briefly alluded to in this part of the book,
because, in order of time, they belong here. Their treatment, however, requires
too much space to make it convenient to consider them, in detail, here.
i Code, § 4408. |
5 See, post, §§ 725-738.
§402 JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES. 324
CHAPTER XIX.
JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES TO A BILL.
402. Joinder of Two
or More Kinds of De- § 404. How a Plea and an Answer Must be
fence. / Joined.
403. Howa Demurrer and an Answer Must § 405. Form of an Answer filed as a Cross
be Joined. Bill.
§ 402. Joinder of Two or More Kinds of Defence. As already shown in —

treating of demurrers and pleas in bar, a defendant is not obliged to confine
himself to any one mode of defence; but, if the bill furnish occasion, he may
demur to one part of it, plead in bar to another, answer to a third, and disclaim
as to the balance; and all of these defences may be joined, and relied on, at
the same time. It must, however, be kept in mind, that there cannot be two
kinds of defence made to the same part of the bill, at the same time, by separate
pleadings; thus, the same part of a bill cannot be demurred to and pleaded to,
or answered, at the same time in separate pleadings nor can the same part be ;
pleaded to and answered, at the same time, in separate pleadings; for a de-
murrer is overruled by a plea or an answer, and a plea is overruled by an
answer. Where two or more kinds of defence are, therefore, made at the same
time, by separate pleadings, they must clearly relate to separate and distinct
parts of the bill. 1
To illustrate how these various defences may be joined in resisting the same
bill: Suppose one complainant should file a bill against one defendant, alleging:
(1) that the defendant had agreed, in writing, for a valuable consideration, to
convey to him a certain farm; (2) that the defendant at the same time agreed,
for a valuable consideration, to sell and convey to him another certain farm
adjoining the former; (3) that notwithstanding complainant had fully paid
for the former tract, and had duly tendered the-stipulated price for the latter
tract, the defendant refused to convey either tract (4) that on complainant ;
remonstrating with the defendant for repudiating said agreements, the defend-
ant assaulted and severely beat him, doing him great injury and damage and ;
(^5) that the defendant is now claiming a part of complainant's home farm
adjoining said latter tract, and is threatening to cut some of the timber trees
thereon and suppose complainant in his said bill should pray (1) for a specific
; :
performance of the two contracts of sale (2) for damages resulting from the
;
battery charged; and (3) for a decree settling complainant's title to his home
farm. There being only one defendant, the bill could not be attacked for multi-
fariousness, 2 but the defendant might (1) demur for want of jurisdiction as to
the claim for damages; (2) might plead the statute of frauds as to the agree-
ment to sell the second tract mentioned, and show that the agreement was not;
in writing; (3) might answer as to the agreement in writing to convey the
first named tract, and show that the agreement to convey contains a material
mistake, hurtful to defendant, and designedly caused by the complainant and ;
(4) might disclaim as to complainant's home farm; and (5) might file his
answer as a cross bill, or file a separate cross bill, to show the particulars of
1 Ante, 3 232; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 787; 1 Barb. Ch. 2 Code, § 4327.
Pr., 173; Saunders v. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 575; Sto.
Eq. PI., §§439; 442.
325 JOINDER OP DIFFERENT DEFENCES. §403
the mistake in the written agreements to convey, and pray to have it corrected,
and the writing reformed.
Our practice favors the incorporation of a demurrer in an answer, and the
incorporation of a plea in an answer, 3 the object being to enable the parties to
take their proof pending the demurrer, or plea, and thus hasten the final deter-
mination of the cause. 4 The statute allowing a defendant to rely on a demurrer
or plea in his answer, allows a defendant to answer to so much of the bill as
he demurs or pleads to; and in such a case the rule that an answer overrules a
demurrer or plea when both apply to the same part of the bill, does not prevail. 5
If, however, the demurrer or plea be merely prefixet to the answer, and not
contained in it, or made a- part of it, but is intended to be a separate and dis-
tinct pleading, an answer covering the part of the bill demurred or pleaded to,
would overrule the demurrer, or plea. If, however, the defendant seeks to
object to the jurisdiction of the Court, he must file a separate demurrer, or a
separate plea, as all answers admit the jurisdiction. 6
§ 403. How a Demurrer and an Answer Must be Joined. As an answer —
overrules a demurrer to so much of the bill as is answered, it is of great im-
portance, when a demurrer does not go to the whole bill, to have it clearly ex-
press the particular parts of the bill which it is designed to cover for, if the ;
particular parts are not distinguished, the Court will be compelled to look over
the whole bill, in order to discover them. And this designation of the particu-
lar part demurred to must be done, not by way of exception, as by demurring
to all, except certain parts of the bill, but by a positive designation of the par-
ticular parts intended to be demurred to. 7
Thus, for example, where a defendant puts in an answer and demurrer, the
demurrer extending to the whole of the bill, "except only as to such part, and
so much thereof, as requires this defendant to set forth, whether, &c, &c, the
'
'
demurrer was overruled, because it imposed upon the Court the duty of com-
paring the demurrer and the answer with the whole bill. So, where a defend-
ant put in an answer to so much of the bill as he was advised he was bound to
answer, making an answer to certain charges in the bill, and then put in a de-
murrer "to all and every the other allegations, and charges, and matters, and
things in the complainant's bill contained," the demurrer was overruled; for
it imposed on the Court the necessity of finding out what was demurred to, by
examining every part of the bill. So, where a demurrer was put in to all the
relief and to all the discovery prayed by the bill, "except so far as the bill
seeks a discovery touching the several title deeds, &c, in the bill mentioned, &c,
&c," and as to the residue of the bill, not demurred to, proceeded to answer
the facts specified and excepted, the demurrer was held bad, and overruled for
the like reason. 8
In framing a demurrer to one part of the bill, and answering to another part,
care must be taken, not only not to include in the part demurred to any part
of the bill which is covered by the answer but also, not to include in the an-
;
swer any matter to which the demurrer, although not in form, yet in substance,
properly applies for, in such a case, the demurrer is overruled by the answer. 9
;
The following is the form of

DEiMTJItBEB, JOINED WITH AN ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs. No. 618.— In the Chancery Court, afSevierville.
Richard Roe, et al.
The demurrer of the defendant, Richard Roe, to part of the bill filed against him and
others in said cause, and his answer to the remainder of said bill.
3 Code, §§4318-4319. Eq
St °' P1
457 Dill ° n "" Dav!s 3 Tenn Ch
i Harding v. Egan, 2 Term. Ch., 39. 38fi
'" § ' ' --
5 In Saunders v. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 576, this dis- 8 Buckner v. Abrahams, 3 Tenn. Ch., 346: Sto
tinction seems to have been overlooked. Eq. PI., §458; Payne v. Berry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 1S4.
6 Code, §4321; Rankin v. Craft, 1 Heisk., 711;
but see, ante, § 261. „ 9 St °-,„E(i- P1 - § 46S Saunders V. Gregory, 3
.
xieisk., 575.
:
§ 404 JOINDER OP DIFFERENT DEFENCES. 326
i.
This defendant, for demurrer to so much of said. bill as seeks to obtain a recovery of
damages against. him for the assault and battery alleged in the bill, says that this Court has
no jurisdiction of such cause pf action, but that the jurisdiction thereof is in the Circuit
i
Court; and he prays to be hence dismissed as to so much of sa'M bill as seeks said recovery.
'
n -
And as to the remainder of said bill, the defendant, hot waiving his said demurrer, for
answer to said remainder, says; [Then proceed with the answer to the residue of the bill,
being careful, however, to say nothing whatever relative to the assault and battery; and
conclude as in case of an ordinary answer.']
The matter of demurrer may, however, under the Code, be incorporated in
the answer; and, in such a case, the answer may_cover matter so relied on
without overruling the grounds of demurrer thus set up, unless such grounds
dispute the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject-matter or the person. 10
If the defendant desires to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court by a demurrer,
he must file a separate demurrer for that purpose, for all answers admit the
jurisdiction. 11
The following would be the form of a
DEMURRER INCORPORATED IN AN ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs. \
]
—
No. 716. In the Chancery Court, at Jacksboro.
The demurrer and answer of the defendant, Roland Roe, to the bill filed against him and
This defendant demurs to the bill, because it shows on its face that complainant's cause
of suit accrued more than six years before his bill was filed, and is, therefore, barred by the
statute of limitation of six years; and the defendant relies on this ground of demurrer as a
defence to the bill.
And for bill, this defendant, not waiving his foregoing derrturrer, says that
answer to the
he paid the debt, for the recovery of which complainant sues, before the filing of the bill.
This defendant, therefore, prays to be dismissed. Roland Roe.
J. E. Johnston, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, if the bill requires an answer on oath.]
§ 404. How a Plea and Answer must be Joined. What is said in the pre- —
ceding section, about the care and caution to be observed in joining a demurrer
and answer, applies with full force to the joining of a plea and answer. The
part pleaded to must be designated with such particularity of description, that
there can be no uncertainty as to what part of the bill is covered by the plea
and in answering to the remainder of the bill, care must be taken to say nothing
whatever about the particular part of the bill covered by the plea. 12 How this
may be done is shown by the following form of a
PLEA JOINED WITH AN ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs.
]
\ No. 618. —In the Chancery Court, at Sevierville.

The plea of the defendant, Richard Roe, to part of the bill filed against him and others
in said cause, and his answer to the remainder of the bill.
I.
This defendant, for plea to so much of said bill as seeks a specific performance of the
alleged agreement by this defendant to sell and convey to the complainant the second tract
of land mentioned in the bill, and therein designated as the " Ridge Farm," says,
That neither this defendant, nor any person by him thereunto^ lawfully authorized, did
ever sign any contract or agreement in writing, or any memorandum or note, in writing, of
any contract or agreement, for the sale to complainant of' the said " Ridge Farm," or of any
1
part thereof. And as to so much of said bill as seeks the specific enforcement of the alleged
contract for the sale of said " Ridge Farm," this defendant pleads the foregoing matter, and
relies on the statute for the prevention of frauds and perjuries.
ii.
And, as to the remainder of the said bill, this defendant, not waiving his said plea, for
answer to said remainder, says: [Then proceed with the answer to the residue of the bill,
10 Code, §4319; Harding 0. Egan, 2 Tenn. Ch., |

11 Code, §4321'; Rankin -v. Craft, 1 Heisk., 711;
39. but see, ante, § 261.
I 12 Sto. Eq. PI., § 688.
327 JOINDER OP DIFFERENT DEFENCES. §405
carefully avoiding any mention of, or allusion to, any of the allegations in the bill in reference
to the " Ridge Farm;" and conclude as in case of ordinary answer.]
A
defendant may, however, under the Code, incorporate the matter of any
plea in bar in his answer and he is not required to file a separate plea in any
;
case, except when he seeks to dispute the jurisdiction of the Court.

13 plea A
to the jurisdiction of the Court must be separately filed, and any answer will
overrule it. 14 The following is the form of a
PLEA INCORPORATED IN AH ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs. No. 716. —In Chancery, at Rutledge.
Richard Roe, et al.
The plea16 and answer of the defendant, Robert Roe, to the bill filed against him and
This defendant, for plea to the said bill, says that the note [bond, or other instrument,)
sued on by the complainant, and constituting the foundation of his suit, was not executed
by him, or by any one authorized to bind him in the premises.
And not waiving his said plea, but relying thereon, this defendant further answering said
bill, says [Here he may set up any other matters of defence, suiph as infancy, duress, insan-
:
ity, drunkenness, statute of limitations, or other matter.]

And now, having fully answered, he prays to be dismissed.
G. Mc. Henderson, Solicitor. Robert Roe.
The plea set up in the foregoing answer must be sworn to, even though the
oath to the answer be waived. 16
§ 405. Form of an Answer Filed as a Cross Bill. 17 An answer, when in- —
tended to be filed as a cross bill, must combine the form and substance of an
answer with the substance and prayers of a cross bill. In so far as it is to be
an answer, it must conform to all the requirements of an ordinary answer and ;
when the bill has been fully answered, then the draftsmen will set up any
equities, connected with the subject-matter of the litigation, which he may
desire to have enforced, unless, as generally happens, these equities have al-
ready been sufficiently shown in answering the bill,. The answer as a cross bill
will then conclude with a prayer for process, and for the special relief sought,
and for general relief. The following is the form of an answer filed as a cross
bill, the original bill having been filed by a wife against her husband and the
trustee and beneficiary in a trust deed, to enjoin the sale of the land by the
trustee, and assert her rights to a homestead therein: 18
ANSWER AND CROSS BILL TO ENFORCE DEED OF TRUST.

Ann E. Enochs, by her next friend, John Doe, 1
Jn
at D yersburg.
^ Chancery Court>
John W. Wilson, P. E. Wilson, and James W. Enochs./
The and several answer and cross
joint bill of John W. Wilson and P. E. Wilson, to the
bill filedagainst them and James W. Enochs, in the above entitled cause.
These respondents, for answer to said bill, say
They admit that the complainant, Ann E. Enochs, is the wife of their co-defendant,
James W. Enochs; and that the complainant's husband is in possession of the tract of land
containing one hundred acres described in her bill and ; that the defendant, John W. Wilson,
is about to sell said tract, in pursuance of authority given him by her husband by a deed of
trust, in which she did not join; but these defendants find nothing else in the bill that they
can admit, and each and all of the allegations of the bill, not hereinabove admitted, are each
and all denied.
The facts connected with the attempt of the defendant, John W. Wilson, to sell said
tract, are as follows James W. Enochs, on January 5, 1876, conveyed the tract of 100 acres
:
described in the bill to the defendant, John W. Wilson, in trust, to secure a note of the said
13 Code, §4318. . , 17 See, post, §§ 732-733.

14 Code, §4321; Kendrick v. Davis, 3 Cold., 524; 18 This form is based on Enochs v. Wilson, 11
but see, ante, 261. . tea, 228, in which case- the .original bill was'dis-
15 Or the words plea and' may be entirely omit- missed, and the prayer of the cross-bill granted
ted, and the commencement of an answer used. See, also, Chestnutt v. Frazier. 6 Bax '217
16 Code, §§ 2909; 3777; ante, §§ 374; 380, note 24.
§ 405 JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES. 328
James W. Enochs, executed on that day to the defendant, P. E. Wilson, for the sum of
fifteen hundred and eighty-five dollars, bearing interest from date, at the rate of ten per
cent, per annum, and due two years after the date thereof: said trustee, John W. Wilson,
upon default in the payment of said note, was authorized in and by said trust deed to sell
said tract for cash, and apply enough of the proceeds to pay said note, principal and interest.
in.
Said note having matured, and none of it having been paid, or offered to be paid, the
defendant, P. E. Wilson, requested said trustee, the defendant John W. Wilson, to advertise
and sell said tract in the manner specified in and by said trust deed; and he, the said trustee,
had advertised the same accordingly; and was about to sell when he was restrained by the
injunction of your Honor's said Court, in this cause.
IV.
These defendants, further answering, say, that it is true that the complainant did not
join her husband in the execution of said trust deed; but she fails to state to your Honor,
what these defendants aver to be the fact, that, at the time said trust deed was executed, her
said husband owned a tract of land containing one hundred and forty-six acres, adjoining
said one hundred-acre tract and that, at said date, she and her husband and children resided
;
on said one hundred and forty-six-acre tract, as their homestead. These defendants aver
that said homestead tract was well worth three thousand dollars at the time said trust deed
was made and these defendants were at the time, and now are, advised that it was not
;
necessary for the complainant to join her husband in the execution of said trust deed.
v.
These defendants further answering, say, that since the execution of said trust deed the
complainant's husband has sold and conveyed said homestead tract, selling ten acres of it to
one M. O. King, on February 23, 1876; seventy acres on March 20, 1876, to one Segroves for
the benefit of certain creditors and on March 23, 1877, he sold the residue of said home-
;
stead tract to one H. Fuller, his wife's father, for a pretended consideration of two thousand
dollars; but he, the defendant Enochs, and the complainant and their family, continue to
reside on said residue as before.
VI.
Further answering, these defendants say, that the complainant joined her husband in said
deed to Segroves, and that the seventy-acre tract conveyed to him, Segroves, was at the date
of the conveyance well worth fifteen hundred dollars. Complainant also signed the deed to
said Fuller, and her privy examination was duly taken to its execution but for some reason
;
her husband did not sign the deed, although the deed purports to be made by him.
VII.
And now, having fully answered, these defendants are advised that, on proper application
by cross-bill, your Honor will declare and enforce their rights in the premises; and they,
therefore, file this their answer as a
CROSS BILL
and assuming to that extent, the character of cross-complainants, on the foregoing statement
of facts, which they say is true, pray
1st. That all proper process issue, and be served on said Ann E. Enochs, and her said
husband, James W. Enochs, who are made defendants to this cross-bill, requiring them to
answer this cross-bill, but not on oath.
2d. That the amount due the cross-complainant, P. E. Wilson, on said note, which is here-
with filed as an exhibit to this cross-bill, marked " Exhibit A," be ascertained and that he
;
have a decree against the cross-defendant, James W. Enochs, for the amount due thereon.
3d. That said deed of trust, which is herewith filed as an exhibit to this cross-bill, and
marked " Exihibt B," be specifically enforced by decree of your Honor and the tract oi
;
land therein described, to-wit: said one hundred-acre tract, be sold as therein stipulated
for cash, and in bar of all equity of redemption, or homestead rights, in satisfaction of the
amount decreed to be due on said note, and of the costs of this cross-bill.
4th. And that the cross-complainants have all such other and further relief as they may
be entitled to. John W. Wilson,
Latta & Marshall, Solicitors. P. E. Wilson.
If the oath to the answer is waived, no affidavit need be annexed to the an-
swer filed as a cross-bill, unless some extraordinary process is prayed in such :
case, the affidavit may, if so desired, be so framed as to cover only the facts
on which the prayer for extraordinary process is based.
AFFIDAVIT TO ANSWEB FILED AS A CROSS BILL.
County of Dyer. )
John Wilson and P. E. Wilson, above named; make oath and say that the statements in
329 JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES. § 405
their foregoing answer and cross-bill, made as on their own knowledge are true, and those
made as on information and belief, they believe to be true.
Sworn to and subscribed "I John W. Wilson,
before me, March 4, 1878. P. E. Wilson.
\
John Somers, Chancellor. J
ANSWER AND CROSS BILL FOR SUBROGATION."
"1
John Doe, et al.,
vs. \ Tn Chancery at Nashville.
Rachel Roe. J
The answer and cross-bill of Rachel Roe to the bill filed against her in said cause.
The defendant for answer to said bill says
i.
That she admits the death of James Doe, and it may be that he was the father of com-
plainants, John Doe and George Doe, but how this is she has no knowledge, and calls on
complainants to prove their kinship.
ii.
Further answering, she admits said James Doe at one time owned the house and lot
described in the bill, but she denies that he was the owner or possessor thereof at his death.
That your Honor may understand the nature of defendant's ownership and possession of said
house and lot, further answering, she says, that she and James Doe were living together in
said house, but occupying different rooms and beds; and she positively denies that they were
cohabiting when he died, or had been cohabiting for several years next before his death.
While so living in the same house, and about six years ago, he borrowed four hundred
dollars from the Ideal Building and Loan Association, and gave it a mortgage on said house
and lot to secure the loan. Soon afterward and after paying about one hundred dollars on
said mortgage he fell sick and was never able to do any more work, and she supported him
with the labor of her hands until he died, and then she paid the expenses of his last sickness
and funeral. After said James Doe became unable to work, said house and lot were adver-
tised for sale under said mortgage, and was about to be sold, when he took his deed for
said house and lot out of his trunk, and handed it to defendant, in presence of witnesses,
and said to her " Here is my deed for this house. I cannot pay the balance of the mortgage,
and I turn it all over to you, and you can do the best you can. If you lift the mortgage the
property is yours. Here's the deed." Thereupon the defendant took the deed and has kept
it ever since, claiming said house and lot as her own property. Defendant thereupon made
a contract with said Building and Loan Association to pay them ten dollars a month on
said mortgage, and at this rate, except when she paid more, she finally paid the entire
balance on said mortgage, aggregating three hundred and seven dollars, for all of which
she has the receipts given by said Association, and has said mortgage endorsed to her by
said Association.
hi.
Further answering, defendant denies that said James Doe was ever of weak mind, but
she admits that he was weak in body and so weak as to be unable to work the last five
years of his life. She denies that she ever exercised any influence over him to obtain said
deed. On the other hand, he begged her to take it, and do all she could to keep the property
from being sold under the mortgage, a thing she was slow to do, for fear that after paying
a great deal she might not be able to pay all, and thereby lose what she had paid. "She
emphatically denies all fraud and imposition in obtaining said deed and mortgage, or either
of them, or any sale to her by said James Doe of said property, except as herein stated.
IV.
Further answering, defendant denies that she is insolvent. She owes nobody anything,
has her taxes all paid and seventy-three dollars loaned out on good security, and is still
able to work, and does work, and is earning over ten dollars a month besides her expenses,
and can give security for the rents of said house and lot pending this litigation, if your
Honor so requires.
V.
Further answering, the defendant files with this answer said deed and mortgage, marked
A and B,respectively.
And now having fully answered said bill she prays that it may be dismissed. But being
advised that, on the facts of this case, if she cannot hold said house and lot, she has an
equitable lien thereon to reimburse her for what she paid on said mortgage, and for said
medical and funeral expenses, which latter amounted to fifty-five dollars, therefore, she files
this answer as a
CROSS BILL.
and the premises considered prays
1st. That the complainants, John Doe and George Doe, be required by subpoena to answer
this cross bill, but not on oath.
19 This is the answer to bill in § 1050, post, I The Supreme Court granted the subrogation prayed
which is based on Vaughn v. Vaughn, 16 Pick., 282. I in the cross bill.
§405 JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES. 33Q
2d. That the title to said house and lot be declared in her, and vested in her.
3d. But if not entitled thereto that she be subrogated to the rights of said Building and
Loan Association under said mortgage, and that said mortgage be foreclosed, and said lot
sold for cash and in bar of redemption, the mortgage so stipulating, and out of the proceeds
she be paid the amount paid by her on said mortgage, and interest on her payments. She
also prays for a decree for the said medical and funeral expenses, and for such further and
other relief as she may be entitled to. Rachel Roe.
John Ruhm, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, as defendant's oath to her answer was not waived. See, ante, f § 380; 789.]
To perfect the answer as a cross bill, a prosecution bond must be given, or
pauper oath filed in lieu, and a subpoena to answer the cross bill must issue and
be served on the complainants.
331 RATIONALE OF PLEADINGS. §406
CHAPTER XX.
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PLEADINGS.
Article I. Rationale of Pleadings.
Article II. Different Defences Distinguished.
ARTICLE I.
RATIONALE OF PLEADINGS.
§ 406. Object of Pleadings. § 409. Summary of the Principal Rules of
i 407. Logic of Pleadings. Pleading.
§ 408. General Rule, and Doctrine of Rela- § 410. Some Minor Defects in Pleadings.
tions, Applied to Pleadings.
§ 406. —
Object of Pleadings. The object of a pleading is to give the oppo-
site party and the Court notice of what matters of fact and law the pleader
intends to submit to the decision of the Court. As to these matters, and none
others, proof must be made, if they are disputed; and on these, and none
others, a decree must be based if proof is made as to other matters, such proof
;
is impertinent; and if a decree is based on other matters, to that extent it is

coram non judice and void. 1
While it is true, that no affirmative proof can be made by a party except as to
matter by him alleged in his pleadings, nevertheless, it is not required that a
pleader should go into the details of the facts by him set up nor is it necessary ;
for him to specify what particular facts he relies on, nor the proofs by which he
expects to establish them. The rules of Chancery pleading have been relaxed
since depositions have come to be taken in the presence of both parties, who
can thus learn and have a full' opportunity to meet the particular evidence set
up in support or denial of the matters contained in the pleadings. But when,
under the old practice, depositions were taken in secret, and their contents not
known to the parties until the proofs were all closed, and publication passed, it
was of very great importance that each party should have specific notice what
his adversary expected to prove, otherwise surprises would have been inevita-
ble, and either injustice done, or a remandment to the rules for rebutting proof
made necessary. Nevertheless, it is, and must forever remain, a fundamental
rule of pleading, that nothing is in issue except what has been alleged; and
neither can proof be made, nor decrees be pronounced, as to matters not con-
tained in the pleadings. 13,
§ 407. —
Logic of Pleadings. Every bill is of the nature of a syllogism, the
major premise of which, consisting of the supposed general rule of law appli-
cable to the case, is ordinarily not expressed, but taken for granted. The state-
ment of facts contained in the bill constitutes the minor premise of the syl-
logism, and the special prayer is the conclusion of the syllogism:
Take an ordinary syllogism All Europeans belong to the white race John
: :
Samboyer is a European. Therefore, he belongs to the white race. In ordinary

conversation, the major premise is taken for granted; and we say John Sam-
l One fundamental matter Courts and pleaders between defendants, whose answers create an
exists
should ever keep in mind is, -that adjudications must between them a decree can be based on such
issue
be based on issues; and that issues cannot 'arise, an But, without an issue, there can be no
issue.
except between antagonistic parties whose pleadings proof, and no decree except by consent.
create the issues; -and' who-'have,,. .thus, a' chance, to
1
1
'* J^ The maximum, Qebile fundamentuni fallit opus,

introduce evidence, arid to examine and cross- applies in such cases; for, if the pleadings be in-
in tliAO ifeciifc Tf antaanniem
§ 408 RATIONALE OP PLEADINGS. 332
boyer belongs to the white race, because he is a European. So, a bill ordinarily
omits the major premise, (which is the supposed general rule of law applicable
to the case,) and states only the minor premise, (or particular facts,) and the
conclusion, (or special prayer).
To analyze a bill filed by an administrator to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance made by his intestate (1) the major premise, or supposed general rule of
:
law, which is not stated in the bill, but taken for granted, is that- on applica-
:
tion of an administrator by bill, the Chancery Court will set aside a fraudulent
conveyance made by his intestate (2) the minor premise, or statement of facts,
;
is that the intestate of the complainant made the fraudulent conveyance al-
leged; and (3) the prayer, or conclusion, is that the conveyance be set aside.
1. A
plea in abatement to this bill would say, in substance, that admitting
the to be true, nevertheless the Court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief
bill
prayed, because neither is the land situated, nor was any material defendant
served with process, in the county wherein the suit is brought. 2. A
demurrer
would say, in substance, admitting the facts alleged in the bill to be true, never-
theless the complainant is entitled to no relief, because the general rule of law
is not what he supposes it to be, such relief being granted only when the estate
is insolvent, and no suggestion of insolvency is alleged. 3. A negative plea in
bar would deny that the complainant was administrator, or would deny that
the conveyance was fraudulent. 4. An affirmative plea in bar would say,
in substance, that admitting the facts alleged, and that on them the com-
plainant is entitled to the relief prayed, that nevertheless, there is another
fact not mentioned in the bill which destroys the right to relief, to-wit: that
the defendant has been in adverse possession of said land under said deed
for more than seven years before said, suit was brought. 5. An answer need
not admit anything, and it may deny complainant's right to relief, (1) on the
ground that the complainant was not administrator; (2) on the ground that
there was no fraud in the conveyance, as alleged; (3) on the ground that the
estate was not insolvent; and (4) on the ground of seven years' adverse pos-
session. 6. A disclaimer would deny that the defendant was in possession
of the land, or claiming any interest in it, or exercising any acts of ownership
over it, and would disclaim any interest in, or title to, said land under said
deed, or otherwise and would deny ever having had, or claimed, any title or in-
;
terest therein.
And thus, 1, the plea in abatement disputes the right of the Court to deter-
mine the controversy 2, the demurrer directly disputes the conclusion of the
;
syllogism, and indirectly disputes the unexpressed major premise 3, the neg-
;
ative plea in bar denies a material allegation in the bill, and thus negatives the
minor premise 4, the affirmative plea in bar sets up a new fact, which, if true,
;
would constitute an exception to the general rule, or major premise; 5, the

answer sets up (1) three facts, any one of which, if proved, negatives the minor
premise, and (2) one fact which, if true, constitutes an exception to the major
premise, or general rule and 6, the disclaimer denies a material allegation in
;
the bill, and, also, sets up a new fact, the joint effect whereof is to negative the
minor premise.
be seen that every properly constructed bill is a syllogism, whose
It will, thus,
major premise, the supposed general rule of law, is suppressed; and when this
conception of a bill is thoroughly grasped, the Solicitor of the complainant will
find it of great practical value in formulating his bill, and in expressing it in
an orderly and logical manner and, on the other hand, the Solicitor of the de-
;
fendant will the more readily understand what defences to set up, and when
and how.
§ 408. General Rule, and the Doctrine of Relations, Applied to Pleadings.
In drawing a bill where there are relations, the first matter to be considered is,
what are the relations of the parties, and what the legal duties resulting from
333 RATIONALE OF PLEADINGS. § 408
those relations, in connection with -the facts and circumstances of the case.
Having settled these preliminaries, the next matter is to ascertain whether
there is any general rule of law or Equity applicable to the facts of the case,
and to the relations of the parties, entitling the complainant to relief. The gen-
eral rule being determined (corresponding to the major premise in a syllogism,)
such facts and circumstances of the case, and no more or other, should be
alleged as will show that the case is within the general rule of law or Equity
on which the suit is to be based. (These facts and circumstances are the
minor premise of the syllogism.) The case being thus shown to be within
the general rule, the relief prayed follows as an inevitable conclusion, both in
iogic and in law. Every general rule has its exceptions these exceptions should :
not ordinarily be mentioned in the bill; for, if they are, it becomes necessary
to negative them in order to make out a case, and in that event the complainant
assumes unnecessary burdens. 2 It devolves on the defendant, as will be here-
after shown, to aver and prove that the case comes within one of these excep-
tions to the general rule.
To illustrate the foregoing, take the case of a promissory note held by the
payee. The relation of the parties is that of debtor and creditor and the facts ;
are that the debtor has executed a promissory note to the creditor as evidence
of his indebtedness. The general rule of law applicable to the facts of the case,
is that the maker of a promissory note is bound to pay it after maturity to the
payee, if he is the holder. But to this rule there are several exceptions, among
them the following: (1) the maker is not bound. to pay, if, when the note was
executed and delivered, he was a minor; or (2) was of unsound mind; or (3)
was drunk; or (4) was under duress; or (5) was fraudulently imposed on;
nor is he bound if (6) the consideration wholly failed; or (7) if the note is
based on an illegal consideration, or (8) is barred by the statute of limitations.
Complainant, in drawing a bill to collect the note, should content himself with
alleging that the defendant executed the note to him, stating date and amount,
and that it is over due. 3 These allegations bring the case within the general
rule. It is not even absolutely necessary to allege that it is complainant's
property, or that it is unpaid, the law presuming these facts, the note having
been executed to the complainant, and he having the note in his possession.
Much less is it necessary to allege that the note was given for a valuable and
lawful consideration, or that the defendant was an adult, of sound mind, sober,
free to act, and not imposed on by any artifice. These are all matters for the
defendant to set up.
If, however, the note should be barred by the statute of limitations, and it
becomes necessary to disclose this fact in the bill, in such case, it is essential
to go further, and set up the facts which avoid the bar of the statute, such as
non-residence of the defendant, or a promise to pay the note made within six
years.
Of course, if the bill seeks a discovery from the defendant, it may and should
go into a detail of the facts and circumstances as to which the discovery is
sought, and on which the interrogatories, if any, are based.
If there should be no relations between the parties, the first question to be
considered by the draftsman of the bill is the rights of the complainant, these
rights being ordinarily rights to the title, use, control, or benefit, of particular
property; the second question is wherein the defendant is interfering with
those rights and the third question is the general rule of law or Equity appli-
;
cable to the facts of the case, and entitling the complainant to relief on those
facts. Here, again, this general rule is the major premise of the syllogism, the
facts, bringing the case within the general rule, constitute the minor premise
z But if the demand is barred by the statute of tends to avoid the bar, as heretofore stated.
I
See f
limitations the complainant must so show if he in- I ante, § 147. '
,
I 3 But if the note is barred, see. /mf» 8 147

§409 RATIONALE. OE PLEADINGS. 334
of the syllogism, and the special relief prayed is the conclusion of the, syllo-
gism. 4
§ 409. Summary of the Principal Rules of Equity Pleading.—The following
summary of rules governing all pleadings, except demurrers, may be of benefit
to the inexperienced pleader. 5
1. All pleadings must state the essential facts it is not necessary, however
:
as a rule, to state the evidence by which those facts may be proved.

2. It is not necessary to allege any matter of either law or fact, of which the
Court will take judicial notice.
3. It is not necessary to state matters which would more properly come from
the adverse party.
4. It is not necessary to allege circumstances that are necessarily implied
from what is alleged.
5. It is not necessary to allege what the law will presume.
6. Where the items of an account sued on are numerous, it is sufficient to
state their character, and the amount, without specifying them in the pleading.
In such a case, however, they should be contained in an exhibit.
7. Less particularity in statement is required when the facts are shown to
be better known to the opposite party than to the party pleading. One of the
very objects of the bill may be to ascertain these facts.
8. Pleadings must not be argumentative they mUst be confined to allegations
:
of facts.
9. Pleadings should not contain mere recitals of what the pleader has been
informed, or what he believes but should specify what he alleges the facts to
;
be these facts, however, he may allege on information and belief.

:
10. All scandal, impertinence and surplusage must be avoided. The follow-
ing matters are surplusage: (1) matters judicially known to the Court; (2)
conclusions of law; (3) matters of evidence; (4) matters of information or
belief, on which no positive allegation of fact is based; (5) all arguments and
inferences; and (6) all displays of rhetoric, poetry, wit, sarcasm, or invective.
11. All pleadings should contain the truth, even when not under oath. No
party should allege any affirmative matter that is not pertinent, and a fact
capable of being proved. Not that he must be able to prove all that he alleges,
but that his allegations must be facts believed by him to be provable.
12. All pleadings must be consistent an inconsistent bill is demurrable for
:
repugnancy; an inconsistent answer may be treated as no answer, and an in-

consistent amendment will not be allowed. 53 -
13. Bills that pray injunctions or receivers, or charge fraud, or seek to undo
what has been formally done, should be positive and precise, and give particu-
lars and circumstances; in such bills general allegations only are insufficient.
14. Answers to such bills should unequivocally deny- all material allegations
that are false, and explain away all that are true, giving particulars and cir-
cumstances. 7
15. All pleadings should conform to approved precedents, both in form and
phraseology.
§ 410. —
Some Minor Defects in Pleadings. There are some minor defects in
pleadings too insignificant to be reached by a demurrer, and generally of too
little importance to be the subject of a motion, but nevertheless of a character
that greatly impairs the merit of the particular pleading. Some of the defects
are the following:
4 No Solicitor, unless he be a genius, will ever 6 These rules are taken partly from Stephen on
succeed as a draftsman of bills, if he fails to thor- Pleading; and, while intended for Courts of law,
oughly grasp the doctrine of relations, and the are equally applicable to pleadings in Chancery.
value of comprehending the general rule, applicable 5a See, ante', §149; 285; 672; 64, sub-sec 2;
to the case. This failure is the cause of so many Hardwick v. American Can Co., 7 Cates, 393.
bills being confused, prolix, tautological, obscure, 6 See, ante, §§ 142; 838-843.
and chaotic, the equities whereof are enveloped in 7 See, ante, § 361-367; post, 842.
mists, submerged in surplusage, and nebulous to the
eye of justice. See, ante, §§ 165-168.
335 RATIONALE OF PLEADINGS, §410
1. The Failure to Specify the Date of an alleged transaction. It is not uncom-
mon to see expressions of this sort in bills and answers: (1) "on the day of
188—;" (2) "some time in the year 187—," and (3) "on the day of
2. The Failure to Specify Quantity and Value. Such allegations as the follow-
ing are utterly inadmissible, and display gross negligence, carelessness, and in-
difference to, if not ignorance of, the fundamental rules of pleading: (1) "con-
taining acres, more or less," (2) "of the value of dollars," (3)
"amounting to at least——;" (4) "to the number of ;" and (5) "in the
-district, adjoining the land of-
3. The Failure to Specify the Given Names of Persons. An initial letter is too
indefinite. J. Smith may stand for Joel, James, Jesse, Jacob, Joseph, Julius,
Jeptha, Jared, or Jasper, as well as John, Smith. The first names of parties are
often described by their initials this often results in confusion and delay, and
:
sometimes in loss. Where a party signs a paper sued on by initials, it is well to

describe him both by his full given name and by the name subscribed to the
paper, thus T. J. Smith, otherwise called Thomas J. Smith.
:
4. Erasions, Interlineations, and Other Changes on the Face of Pleadings. Plead-

ings are sometimes so full of erasures and interlineations that it is almost im-
possible to decipher them, and to certainly determine whether various im-
portant matters are intended to be changed or not and if to be changed, it is
;
difficult to tell exactly what the changes are. No pleading should have any
interlineations, except such as are authorized by the Court; nor should any
considerable erasures, or other changes, be made on the face of any pleading.
The pleadings should be certain and definite, and these qualities are incompat-
ible with erasures, interlineations, or other changes, in the original text.
It is a fundamental rule of pleading, applicable to all of the foregoing mat-
ters, that whatever is alleged in a pleading must be alleged with certainty, to
the end that the adversary may know exactly what is alleged, so that he may
be able to deny or admit, or to confess and avoid, the particular matter.
5. All Pleadings should be Properly Entitled. Every suit has a name, and by
that name it is known and distinguished from all other suits. The statute for-
bids the Clerk to change the style of a cause 8 and the Chancellor should see
;
to it that Solicitors, also, conform to this statute. No pleading should be

allowed to go into a file unless its style entitles it to be so filed.
6. All Pleadings should be in the Second and Third Persons. It is no uncom-
mon thing in some counties to find bills and answers partly in the first person
and partly in the third person. This is execrable, whether viewed from a
grammatical or a legal standpoint. The party pleading, in addressing the
Chancellor, may use the second person, but he should refer to himself as com-
plainant or defendant,- and not as "I." 9
7. All Pleadings Should be Free from Scandal, Impertinence, and Surplusage.
A Chancery pleading is not the place for a display of wit, humor, sentiment,
poetry, rhetoric, or pathos. Nor is it the place to indulge in sarcasm, irony,
invective, insinuation, abuse, or any other scandalous or impertinent matter. 1 1 '
Such improprieties are not only exceedingly reprehensible in themselves, but

they also incite similar reprehensible retaliations from the adverse side. These
scandalous and impertinent displays are sure to excite the indignation of the
Chancellor, and the ridicule or disgust of the bar. Solicitors, in drawing
pleading's, should repress too great an enthusiasm for their client's supposed
rights, and too great indignation at the defendant's supposed misconduct; and
8 M. &V.'s Code, § 3664. for further answer, says that the charge that I acted
1
9 In England, under the new practice, all answers fraudulently is false." Such a shifting, from the
are in the first person, the defendant saying: "I third, to the first person, is discreditable to the
,
admit," "I deny," "I believe," "I do, say, aver, pleader, and shows that he is as unskilled in plead-
charge," etc. 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 2111, note. But an ing, as in parsing.
answer is reprehensible that says: "The defendant, 10 See, ante, §§ 150; 372; and, post, §§421; 1190.
§411 DIFFERENT DEFENCES DISTINGUISHED. 335
thereby escape the mortification of being rebuked by the Court, or ridiculed
by the bar, for excess of zeal, or deficiency of discretion.
8. All Exhibits should be Lettered and Piled. It is not uncommon for bills and
answers to refer to, and profess to exhibit, a document not even in the party's
possession, sometimes referring to it as on such a page of such a book in the
Register's office, or as in the records of another Court. This is wholly inad-
missible. All papers and documents referred to in pleadings must be filed
with the pleadings, 11 and so lettered, or numbered, or described, as to be iden-
tified. No book belonging to any public office, and no original record of an-
other Court, or office, can be made an exhibit to a pleading. If such a record
is needed as. an exhibit a certified copy must be exhibited; but an original
record of the same Court may be referred without being exhibited, and the
opposite party notified in the pleading that it will be read at the hearing. A
document may be referred to thus: " as in said deed, [contract, will, letter,
decree, book, record, or other written or printed thing, naming it,] will more fully
appear, and which [or, a certified copy of which,] is herewith filed, marked A, arid
made a part of this bill [or answer."] Papers referred to in a bill or answer,
and not numbered, lettered, or otherwise identified, will not be considered in
the Supreme Court, even when actually copied into the transcript. 12
ARTICLE II.
DIFFERENT DEFENCES DISTINGUISHED.

§ 411. Various Kinds of Pleadings Con- § 414. General Analysis of Defences on the
trasted. Merits.
§ 412. Differences between a Demiirrer and § 415. Summary of the Defences on the
a Plea in Bar. Merits.
§ 413. Differences between an Answer and
a Plea.
§ 411. Various Kinds of Pleadings Contrasted. If the bill shows a state —

of facts within a general rule 1 of law or Equity, the defendant must either
deny one or more of the complainant's essential allegations of fact; or, admit-
ting the facts in the bill, he must show such additional facts as will bring the
case within at least one of the exceptions to the general rule. To take the
illustration above used, the essential allegations in the bill are, 1st, That the
defendant executed to complainant the note sued on 2d, That the complainant ;
holds it; and 3d, That it is overdue. If either of these three allegations is
denied, a valid defence is set up. If, however, these allegations are true, the
defendant must admit them, and make out a defence by showing additional
facts, bringing the case within one or more of the exceptions to the general
rule. In other words, he must admit the facts alleged in the bill, but avoid
them by showing that, when he executed and delivered the note sued on, he
was a minor, or deranged, or drunk, or under duress, or defrauded, or that the
consideration was illegal, or has totally failed, or that the note is barred by
the statute of limitations, or some other matter in avoidance.
If the bill shows on its face that it does not come within any general rule of
law or Equity, entitling the complainant to relief, the defendant may demur to
the bill. So he may demur, if the facts stated in the bill bring the whole case
within some exception to the general rule, and no facts are alleged obviating
the exception.
li Ch. Rule I., sec. 2; post, § 1190. I 1 See, ante, §§ 166; 275-277, notes; and see note 2,
12 Simmons V. Taylor, 22 Pick., 729. I infra.
337 DIFFERENT DEFENCES DISTINGUISHED. §412
The purpose and office of a demurrer, then, is to show that the case made
by the bill, either does not come within any general rule of law or equity en-
titling the complainant to relief, or else comes within some exception to the
rule. And the, purpose and office of a plea in bar is, by alleging some single
ract suppressed in the bill, or by suppressing some single fact alleged in the
bill, to show either that the complainant's case is not within the
general rule,
or else that it is, also, within some exception td that rule. The office of an
answer is to deny enough of the facts alleged in the bill to destroy the case
made or to admit the bill, and set up such new facts as will take the case out
;
2
of the general rule, or put it into some exception to that rule.
§ 412. Differences Between a Demurrer and a Plea in Bar. The office of a —
demurrer is, to raise a question of law on the facts as the bill gives them and ;
a demurrer maintains that, on those facts, the complainant is not entitled tp

some, or to any, of the relief he prays. The office of a plea in bar is, not to deny
the Equity of the bill, but (1) either to deny some matter of fact in the bill,
which, if false, destroys that Equity, or (2) to bring forward some new matter
of fact, which, if true, obviates that Equity. A demurrer takes the facts as the
complainant states them, but disputes the conclusions of law or Equity he
seeks to draw from those facts. In short, a demurrer deals exclusively with
questions of law, whereas a plea deals exclusively with questions of fact. A
demurrer admits the facts of the bill, but disputes its law; whereas, a plea in
bar admits the law of the bill, but disputes its facts.
An affirmative plea in bar does not dispute any fact alleged in the bill, or
any alleged deduction from the facts stated; but seeks to bring before the
Court a new fact, which, if true, destroys the complainant's right to belief. A
negative plea in bar denies some substantial averment of fact in the bill, but
never challenges any of the deductions of law or Equity the complainant seeks
to draw from the facts he alleges. A demurrer to the relief, however, neither
seeks to bring forward new matters, nor to deny any fact alleged in the bill,
but merely disputes the deductions sought to be drawn from the matters of
tact stated, the demurrer, for the purpose of testing the validity of the bill,
admitting all the facts alleged.
2 The following diagram is given as illustrative of small circles represent eight exceptions to this gen-
the foregoing discussion: eral rule, the maker not being so bound if, when
the note was executed, he was (1) a minor; or (2)
deranged; or (3) drunk; or (4) under duress; or
(5) was fraudulently imposed on; or (6) there was
a want of a legal consideration; or (7) the consid-
eration has wholly failed; or (8) the note is barred
by the statute of limitations.
1. The office of a Bill, as a pleading, is to present
a case within the general rule, entitling the com-
plainant to relief.
2. The office of a Demurrer is to show (1) that
there is no such general rule of law or Equity, as
the bill presupposes; (2) that, if there is, the case
made out by the bill does not come within such rule;
or (3) that, if within the rule, the facts alleged in
the bill show that the case falls within one, or more,
of the exceptions to the rule.
3. The office of an Affirmative Plea in Bar is to
allege some new fact that will bring the case within
one of the exceptions to the general rule.
4. The office of a Negative Plea in Bar is to deny
EXPLANATIONS. some material fact alleged by the bill, and thus
The large represents the general rule of
circle show that the case is not within the general rule, as
law or Equity; see, ante, § 166; and the small when (1) the plea of non est factum is put in; or
circles represent the exceptions to the general rule. (2) a plea that the complainant is not the payee, or
It will be noted that the small circles are not really not the holder, and not entitled to collect the note.
within the circumference of the large circle, but are 5. The office of an Answer, as a pleading, is (1)
formed by loops in its circumference, thus limiting to deny some allegation of the bill necessary to
the area of the large circle, as exceptions limit the bring the case within the general rule; or (2) to
comprehensiveness of the general rule. make some additional allegation, that will take the
Using the case already supposed, the general rule, case out of the general lule, or force it into some
represented by the large circle, is: The maker of a exception to the rule. And, thus, an answer may
promissory note is -bound to pay it to the payee, perform the offices of both an affirmative, and a
§ 413 DIFFERENT DEFENCES DISTINGUISHED. 33&
The office of a plea in bar is to bring forward some matter of fact, which if
it had been alleged, or to deny some matter of fact, which; if it had not
been
alleged, would have made the bill subject to demurrer. Hence, any fact which
if it had been alleged, would have made the bill demurrable, is good matter for
an affirmative plea and any fact which, if it had not been alleged, would have
;
made the bill demurrable, is the proper subject of a negative plea.

It results from these premises, that pleas in bar and demurrers are in thy
nature of correlatives; and that whatever fact, if alleged or omitted by the
bill, would be a ground of demurrer, will, if not alleged or omitted, be a ground
of plea. 3
The following are the principal differences between a demurrer and an
affirmative plea (1) a demurrer applies to matters expressed; an affirmative
:
plea applies to matter suppressed; (2) a demurrer applies to the case as

brought before the Court by the bill an affirmative plea applies to the case as
;
modified by a new matter of fact which it has brought before the Court; (3) a
demurrer demands the judgment of the Court on the case as the bill states it
&n affirmative plea demands the judgment of the Court on the case as modifier!
by the new fact brought forward by the defendant in his plea.
And the following are the principal differences between a demurrer and a
negative plea (1) a demurrer admits all the facts alleged in the bill, a negative
:
plea positively denies, at least, one material fact; (2) a demurrer seeks to havft
the case decided on the facts contained in the bill, a negative plea seeks to have
it decided after some material fact has been, in effect, stricken out of the bill.
A demurrer never raises any questions except those of law, a plea never
laises any questions except those of fact. All pleas, however, admit every
allegation in the bill not by them expressly denied.
§ 413. —
Differences Between an Answer and a Plea. The office of an answer,
as a pleading, is to contest the claim for relief set up in the bill and this con- ;
test is made either, (1) by denying the truth of the case made by the bill, or
(2) by bringing forward new matter which avoids that case.
4
plea in bar A
has identically the same office an affirmative
; plea bringing forward some new
matter of fact in avoidance of the case made by the bill, and a negative plea
denying the truth of some material allegation of the bill. The only substantial
differences between an answer and a plea in bar are (1) an answer is often :
both a pleading and a deposition, whereas a plea is always a pleading and

never a deposition; (2) an answer may both deny and avoid a case made by
the bill, whereas a plea in bar always does either one or the other, but never
both; (3) an answer may deny or avoid every material allegation contained in
the bill, whereas a plea can ordinarily deny or avoid only one material allega-
5
tion. Hence it is that a plea in bar is sometimes called a special answer; and
an answer, as a pleading, is, in effect, merely a series of pleas of one or more
kinds.
It will thus be seen that an answer includes all possible pleas in bar, and
covers all the bill and, as the greater includes the less, and the whole contains
;
all its parts, it follows, both as a matter of pleading and of logic, that an answer
supersedes and overrules a plea in bar to the same matter.
A plea in abatement does not question the merits of the controversy, but
seeks to abate the suit for some reason outside of the merits. Both a plea in
bar and an answer, in effect, admit that there is no ground of abatement, or
else none the defendant cares to rely on; and each seeks to contest the bill on
its merits. The result is that if, after filing a plea in abatement, the defendant
3 Thus, if, in a bill for specific performance, the whereas, if this allegation be made, it is a ground
sale of the land is alleged to be in parol, that is a of a negative plea.
ground of demurrer; whereas, if this fact be omit- 4 In this book, all pleas are divided into (DjPJ* 8
ted, it is a ground of an affirmative plea. So, if, in ill abatement, and (2) pleas in bar. Ante, IS 241 !
a bill by an administrator to land fraudulently

sell 243; 321.
conveyed by his intestate, the estate is not alleged 3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 603; Sto. Eq. PL, § 6+9-
to be insolvent, that is a ground of demurrer;
either pleads in bar or answers, he in effect abandons his plea in abatement;
and, hence, the universal rule that a plea in abatement is overruled by a plea in
bar, and either or both pleas are overruled by an answer. This important qual-
ification must, however, be kept in mind an answer overrules a plea in bar
:
only, when the former covers the ground occupied by the latter, for as here-
tofore and hereafter shown> a defendant may plead to part of the bill, and
answer to the residue.
Ademurrer contests the bill exclusively on the issues of law arising from
the facts contained in the bill itself; a plea contests the bill on some single
issue of fact which, if found in favor of the plea, will end the suit and an ;
answer contests the bill either by denying the facts it alleges or by avoiding
them, or by both. It will thus be seen that every matter which is ground for a
plea in bar may be set up in an answer; but inasmuch as an answer contests
the bill exclusively on the merits, no ground of abatement which disputes the
jurisdiction of the Court can be set up in an answer nor can a plea in abate-
;
ment be joined with any other kind of defence. The Courts favor defences
on the merits, and when a defendant has once made defence to the merits, he
will be deemed to have waived and abandoned all objections to the jurisdiction
by him made, and not determined. 6
§ 414. General Analysis of Defences on the Merits. —A
bill in Chancery is
generally filed to assert rights, growing out of relations, or to assert rights
.,
which are independent of relations. In the former case, it ordinarily alleges

(1) the relation between the parties; (2) the duties of the defendant, and the
rights of the complainant arising from the relation; (3) the violation of those
rights and duties by the defendant, and (4) prays for consequent relief.
In order, therefore, to meet these allegations on the facts, the defendant
must (1) deny the alleged relation of the parties, or (2) must in some way
invalidate that relation, if it ever existed, or (3) must deny that any of said
rights and duties were violated as charged; or (4) must show affirmatively
that, since such violation, there has intervened some act of the parties, 7 or some
rule of law, 8 that avoids his liability and bars the suit.
The denial of the relation can often be made by a negative plea the matters ;
in avoidance are frequently proper for an affirmative plea, and any and all of
the defences are proper to be set up in an answer.
If the bill is filed to assert rights which are independent of relations, it
ordinarily alleges (1) the title, interest, or right sought to be enforced or pro-
tected, or the wrong sought to be prevented; (2) the manner in which the
defendant is interfering with complainant's rights or property, or is commit-
ting or threatening the wrong complained of; and (3) prays for the conse-
quential relief.
To meet these allegations on the facts, the defendant must (1) deny the
alleged title, interest or right of the complainant; or (2) must deny the com-
mission of the wrongs alleged; or (3) must set up, affirmatively, some bar or
equal Equity.
The first defence may often be made by a negative plea, and the last by an
affirmative plea all three defences may be made by answer.
;
§ 415. Summary
of the Various Defences on the Merits.— In order that the
various defences that can be made on the merits, in a Chancery suit, may more
6 A
The rationale of this ruling is this: defence battle-axe intended to strike down the enemy by a
to the merits necessarily implies a willingness for single blow on his uncovered head. An answer is a
the Court to determine the validity of such defence; shield intended to protect against the assaults of
and, as the Court cannot make the determination one's opponent; while an answer and cross bill com-
unless it has jurisdiction, the necessary implication bined are a shield for defence and a sword for
is, that the defendant concedes the jurisdiction, assault.
when he submits such a defence to the decision of 7 Such as payment, a releases-accord and satisfac-
the Court. tion, novation of the debt, assignment of the debt,
A demurrer is a sword of slender blade and keen an award, or a judgment.
point, intended to reach the heart of the adversary 8 Such as the statute of limitations, laches, and
§415 DIFFERENT DEFENCES DISTINGUISHED. 340
9
specifically appear, the following table has been prepared, giving (1) the
defences where the bill alleges no relations, and (2) the defences where rela-
tions are alleged.
TABLE OF DEFENCES ON THE MERITS.

A. WHERE NO RELATION IS ALLEGED IN THE BILL,
the defences are
I. Non-existence of Bights Claimed,
because of .
1. Want of privity between the parties or ;
2. Complainant having no title, interest or right or ;
3. Title in the defendant or ;
4. Title in a third person.

II. Non-existence of the Injuries Alleged,
because of
1. The acts complained of not having been done or ;
2. The acts complained of having been committed by a stranger or ;
3. The acts complained of having been authorized by some law, or license.

III. Matters in Avoidance, 10
because of
1. Defendant being an innocent purchaser or ;
2. Accord and satisfaction; or

3. Award; or
4. Former judgment or ;
5. Statutes of limitations or ;
6. Laches; or
7. Estoppel.
B. WHERE A RELATON IS ALLEGED IN THE BILL,
the defences are
I. Non-existence of the Alleged Relation,
because
1. No such contract or relation as charged existed or ;
2. The complainant does not possess the character he claims or ;
3. The defendant does not possess the character alleged or ;
4. Non est factum, (the deed, note, or other instrument sued, not having
been executed by the defendant.)
II. Invalidation of the Alleged Relation.! 1
because
1. Parties not competent to contract, by reason of
(a) Mental unsoundness or ;
(b) Infancy; or
(c) Coverture; or
(d) Drunkenness; or
(e) Duress.
2. Insufficiency of consideration, by reason of
(a) Total failure of consideration; or
(b) Gross inadequacy of consideration; or
(c) Illegality of consideration.
3. Contract obtained by fraud, by means of
(a) Misrepresentation; or
(b) Concealment; or
This table has been mainly compiled from Lube's 10 Matters in avoidance must be specially set up,
Equity Pleadings and Chitty's Pleadings. A careful and relied on, by plea or answer; and the burden of
study of it will enable the student to grasp, thor- proving them is on the defendant.
oughly, all possible defences, on the merits, to all 11 Where the defence seeks to invalidate the al-
possible bills; and he will find it of great value in leged relation it must be specially set up, and proved,
preparing his defences. by the defendant, as in other cases of avoidance.
(c) Undue use of confidential relations.
4. Act to be doneillegal or impossible.
5. Form of contract insufficient, either
(a) At common law, or
(b) By statute. 12
IH. Non-existence of the Alleged Violations of Complainant's Bights,
because
1. The suitwas prematurely brought or ;
2. The acts complained of were not done or ;
i. The acts complained of, if done, were authorized by some law, or license
IV. Hatters in Avoidance,"
consisting of
1. Acts of both parties, to-wit
(a) Alteration, or recission, of the contract; or
(b) Account stated; or
(c) Payment, or accord and satisfaction; or
(d) Release of the debt sued for or ;
(e) Award for the same cause of action; or

(f) Novation, (a new note or contract executed in lieu.)
2. Acts, of the complainant alone,
consisting of
(a) Former recovery for the same cause of action; or
(b) Non-performance of condition precedent or ;
(c) Pendency of another suit for same cause or ;
(d) Assignment of the debt to a third person or ;
(e) Laches; or
(f) Estoppel.
3. Acts of the defendant alone,
consisting of
(a) Performance of the contract or duty; or
(b) Tender of the money, property, or services due or ;
(c) Set-off.
(d) Recoupment.
4. Acts of the law,
consisting of
(a) Judgment for defendant in bar of the claim or demand now sued
on; or
(b) Statute of limitations.
(c) Bankruptcy.
12 Such as the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries. | as a defence. In all such cases, the burden of proof
13 These matters in avoidance must all be spe- rests on the defendant.
cifically set forth in a plea,or answer, and relied on I
§416 HOW PLEADINGS ARE TESTED. 342
CHAPTER XXI.
HOW PLEADINGS ARE TESTED.
Article I. Testing the Sufficiency of Pleadings.
Article II. Exceptions to Answers.
Article III. Suggestions as to Testing Pleadings.
ARTICLE I.
TESTING THE SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS.

§ 416. Testing of Pleadings. S 418. Testing the Sufficiency of Bills.
§ 417. Object and Results of Testing Plead- § 419. Testing Pleas and Demurrers.
ings.
§ 416. —
Testing of Pleadings. There is some method of testing the suffici-
ency of every pleading. The very pleadings that are used as tests are them-
selves the subjects of tests. All of these tests have reference to the fitness of
the particular pleading, for the office it seeks to perform and if such pleading ;
is unfit for such office, the sooner this fact is ascertained the better for all the
parties concerned. Pleading is a practical logic applied to matters of forensic
controversy, and the severest scrutiny of reason is visited upon every bill,
demurrer, plea, and answer, filed in the progress of a cause and, on a challenge ;
of insufficiency, the Court must hear argument, and determine whether the
pleading challenged is equal to the duty it is commissioned to discharge. The
sufficiency of a bill is tested by a motion to dismiss, or by a demurrer the suf- ;
ficiency of demurrers and pleas is tested by setting them down for argument,
which is in the nature of a demurrer ore tenus and the sufficiency of an answer
;
is tested by written exceptions filed to it, these exceptions being in turn tested
by argument, in order to ascertain whether they are well taken, or should be
disallowed. 1
As soon, therefore, as a pleading is filed, it is the duty of the opposite party
to apply the proper test of its sufficiency and if he fail to apply such test, then
;
its sufficiency is conceded. Hence, when a bill is filed, the defendant must test
its sufficiency by a motion to dismiss, or by demurrer when a demurrer or plea
;
is filed, the complainant must test it by having it set down for argument and ;
when an answer is filed, the complainant must test its sufficiency by filing
exceptions.
§ 417. Object and Results of Testing Pleadings. The general object of —
testing a pleading is to ascertain whether it, if true, will accomplish the purpose
for which it was filed. Thus, a bill is filed to obtain the relief prayed, and the
objects of a demurrer and motion to dismiss are, to test whether the allegations
of the bill, if true, entitle the complainant to the relief he seeks. So, a plea is
filed in order to defeat the bill, and the object of argument on the sufficiency
of a plea is to test whether the plea, if true, will defeat the suit. Neither a bill
1 Demurrers have been filed to answers, and pleas such and, a demurrer, or exception, to a plea may
;
have been both demurred to, and excepted to, in be treated as a method of setting the plea for argu-
order to test their sufficiency. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 542: ment, as to its sufficiency. Ante, § 350. The suf-
692; 758, notes. The sufficiency of answers, and ficiency of a demurrer, itself, is tested by setting it
pleas, cannot, of course, be tested that way; but, if down for argument, which is as much a test of the
a demurrer to an answer contain the essentials of sufficiency of the demurrer, as the demurrer is a
an exception to an answer, it may be treated as test of the, sufficiency of the bill.
343 HOW PLEADINGS ARE TESTED. §418
nor a plea becomes any stronger because proved to be true and if they are in- ;
sufficient, when admitted to be true, it necessarily results that it is useless to go

to the trouble and expense of proving them to be true. The Court, therefore,
refuses to allow any proof to be taken upon a bill, or a plea, which is insuf-
ficient, provided the proper tests are applied to such pleadings, and applied
in due season.
often happens, however, that these tests disclose the fact that the pleading
It
under scrutiny, while defective, is nevertheless, capable of being made suf-
ficient by amendment. In such a case, on proper application in due season, the
Court will, ordinarily, allow a proper amendment to be made for it is the duty ;
of Courts to give a complainant a reasonable opportunity, to properly present

his side of the controversy and likewise to give the defendant an equal oppor-
;
tunity, to set up his defences.

The results of testing pleadings, are, therefore, generally, either (1) an
amendment of the pleading tested; or (2) its total overthrow and disallowance
or (3) its vindication as sufficient, and the disallowance of the test.
§ 418. Testing the Sufficiency of Bills. As already stated, the sufficiency —
of a bill is tested either by a motion to dismiss, or by a demurrer. If, when
either or both of these tests are applied, the complainant sees that bis bill
needs amendment, he may avoid the effect of the test by making the necessary
emendment. Or, he may, either before or after such tests, discover that his
bill is defective, and insufficient to give him the relief he seeks in which case ;
he may amend, by leave of the Court, when such leave is necessary. Indeed, as
will be seen, 2 the Court will allow a bill to be amended even after allowing a
motion to dismiss, or, after sustaining a demurrer, provided the amendment
avoids the objection allowed, and is made in due season. Motions to dismiss
and demurrers have already been fully considered.
§ 419. Testing Pleas and Demurrers. all pleas, whether —The sufficiency of
in abatement or them down for argument, as already
in bar, is tested by setting
fully shown elsewhere. "When a plea is filed, the bill may be amended so as to
avoid the point of the plea, and the plea may be amended so as to strike more
unerringly the vulnerable part of the bill. And thus, argument, like a two-
edged sword, may prove the bill deficient, or may prove the plea deficient. How
pleas are tested, and the practice relative thereto, has already been fully
stated. 3
to dismiss and demurrers are means of testing the sufficiency
While motions
of a they are themselves tested upon argument4 as to their own sufficiency,
bill,
and are often overruled because not well taken. And, as tests, they may be
amended so as to make the tests more efficacious. But, as tests are critical in
their nature, they should be free from criticism themselves; and, for this
•reason, Courts are slow in allowing motions to dismiss and demurrers to be
amended.
2 See Chapter on Amended and Supplemental and supreme test of the sufficiency of every plead-
Bills, post; and see Index for various sections on ing; and, authority, statute, and. reason are the
Amendments. three arbiters, to determine the sufficiency of the
3 See, ante, § 350. argument. Ratio et auctoritas duo clarissima mundi
4 It will be seen, upon a critical survey of the lumina. (Reason and authority, the two brightest
foregoing tests, that, after all, argument is the final lights of the world.)
§420 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. 344
AETICLE II.
EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS.
§ 420. Testing the Sufficiency of Answers. § 423. Frame and Form of Exceptions to An-
§ 421. When Exceptions to an Answer will swers.
Lie.
§ 422. When Exceptions to an Answer will § 424. How Exceptions are Disposed Of.
not Lie.
§ 420. —
Testing the Sufficiency of Answers. It must be remembered, that
an answer under oath is both a pleading and a deposition. As a pleading, it is
not subject to any test as to its sufficiency except at a hearing on bill and
answer, the test then being as to whether it is sufficient to bar complainant's
right to relief. As a deposition, however, an answer can be excepted to, on the
ground of the insufficiency of its responses to the charges and interrogatories
contained in the bill. The exceptions challenge the sufficiency of the answer
as a deposition, pointing out with particularity wherein the answer fails to
respond to the discovery called for in the bill. These exceptions are, in their
turn, tested by argument, and are often disallowed as not well taken.
§ 421. When Exceptions to an Answer Will Lie. As already fully shown, —
a sworn answer must admit or deny every material allegation in the bill and ;
must set forth fully and frankly the details of particular matters called for by
the bill; and must, at the same time, be free from all scandalous and imper-
tinent matter. If the complainant, upon an examination of the answer, finds
that (1) it does not admit or deny all the material allegations of the bill, or
i,2) does not set forth fully and frankly the particular matters called for, 1 or
(3) contains matters that are scandalous or impertinent, he may test its suf-
ficiency by filing written exceptions to it, pointing out such parts of the bill
as are insufficiently answered, or such matters in the answer as are scandalous
or impertinent. 2 The Court may, also, on its own motion, except to an answer
because of its prolixity, and its unnecessary and false allegations, and may
order the Master to strike out particular parts of it, or to revise it. 3
When a partial demurrer, or a partial plea, has been overruled, and has left
so much of the bill unanswered as was covered by the demurrer or the plea,
the complainant must except to the answer, if he wishes a fuller answer;
because, an answer being on file, the defendant is not bound to answer further,
unless exceptions are taken. So, when a plea is ordered to stand for an answer,
with liberty to except, the complainant may file exceptions to such answer,
so as to obtain a response to so much of the bill as is not covered by the plea.
1 Howsoever evasive and unresponsive an answer swers were, formerly, both depositions and plead-
may be, it stand as a sufficient answer, unless
will ings; now, they are, generally, pleadings only. See,
the complainant, by due exceptions, compel a more ante, § 361. The best rule to ascertain whether the
direct,' and more responsive answer. Philips v. Over- matter in question is impertinent is to see whether.
ton, 4 Hay., 292; Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. the subject of the allegation could be put in issue,
Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 603. or given in evidence between the parties. 1 Barb.
2 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 758-760, notes. Formerly, all Ch. Pr., 202. As to what matters are impertinent,
answers were under oath, and one of the main and what scandalous, see, ante, 8 150.
objects of the bill was to extort testimony from the 3 Code, § 4316. It has been well said, that "The
defendant, in support of the complainant's case. Court itself was concerned to keep its records cleaitj
Then, answers were frequently evasive, insufficient, and without dirt, or scandal, appearing thereon.
irrelevant, irresponsive, impertinent, and scandalous, Lord Eldon said, with reference to the subject ot
and exceptions were constantly resorted to, in order scandal in proceedings, that he did not think that
to enforce fuller, and more direct answers, and to
t
_
any application, by any person, was necessary ; andt
purge the answer of its irrelevant, irresponsive, im- that the Court ought to take care that allegations,
pertinent, and scandalous matter. But, now that bearing cruelly upon the moral character of indi-
sworn answers are seldom called for, exceptions to viduals, and not relevant to the subject, should not
answers have become correspondingly seldom. An- be put upon the record. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 351.
345 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. §422
In such a case, a plea is only a partial answer. But if a plea is ordered to stand
for an answer without express liberty to except, no exceptions can be taken. 4
Exceptions to an answer must be filed by the complainant's Solicitor, within
twenty days after he receives notice of the filing of the answer, or the right to
5
iile them will be waived.
§ 422. When Exceptions to an Answer Will Not Lie. Exceptions for insuf- —
ficiency of discovery will not lie to an answer, the oath to which the complain-
ant has waived, because such an answer is not evidence, but only a pleading f
neither will exceptions for insufficiency of discovery lie to the answer of an
infant, nor to the answer of a corporation, nor to the answer of an Attorney-
General, nor to the answer of a guardian ad litem? but they will lie to the
answer of a general guardian. 8 Exceptions will not lie to an answer because
9
it does not state fully and explicitly matters that are purely in avoidance.
The complainant cannot except to an answer to an amended bill, on the

ground that such answer does not respond to matters contained in the original
bill; because, by not excepting to the answer to the original bill, he admitted
the sufficiency of such answer. For a like reason, if, after filing exceptions,
the complainant amends the averments of his bill, he will be considered as
having waived his exceptions. 10
Where there is a plea, or a demurrer, to a part of the bill, and an answer to
the residue, if the complainant except to such answer before the argument of
the plea or demurrer, the effect of such exception is to admit the validity of
the plea or demurrer. 11
§ 423. Frame and Form of Exceptions to Answers. Exceptions to an —
answer must point out particularly in what respects the answer is insufficient,
or what matter is scandalous or impertinent. A general exception will be
deemed no exception. The complainant must put his finger on each material
allegation in the bill not answered, or not sufficiently answered. Exceptions
founded on verbal criticisms, slight defects, and immaterial matters, will be
invariably disallowed, and treated as vexatious. 12 Each ground of exception
should be separately and specifically stated, and the various exceptions con-
secutively numbered. They must be properly entitled, and signed by the com-
plainant, or his Solicitor. Verbal exceptions to an answer will not be con-
sidered.
If there be separate answers by different defendants, separate exceptions
must be filed to each answer. 13
The frame of exceptions to answers will be better seen by reference to the
following forms
EXCEPTIONS TO AN ANSWER FOB SCANDAL, AND IMPERTINENCE."
John Doe,
vs. No. 618. — In Chancery, at Knoxville.
Richard Roe, et al.
The complainant; John J3oe, excepts to the answer of the defendant, Roland Roe, because
of its scandal.
words in paragraph 3 [or, on page 2] of said answer, beginning with the
1st. For that the
word, " Complainant," and ending with the words, " well knew these facts," are scandalous.
2d. For that the whole of paragraph 4 [or, page 3] of said answer is scandalous.
4 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 761. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 599; 1 Dan.
5 As soon as an answer is filed, the Master must Ch. Pr., 760, note.
notify the complainant's Solicitor thereof, by_ letter, 8 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 177. In consequence of the
or otherwise; and such Solicitor, if he desires to ruling that an unsworn answer can not be excepted
except to the answer, must file his exceptions within to for insufficiency of discovery, exceptions are now
twenty days after receipt of such notice. Code, seldom filed.See, ante, § 361.
§4400; Ch. Rule, I., § 5; Jones v. Carper, 2 Tenn. 9 Lanum Steel, 10 Hum., 284.
V.
Ch., 626; Stadler ». Hertz, 13 Lea, 317. See, 10 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 762.
Waiver, ante, § 71. li 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 178, 183.
6 Sheppard V. Akers, 1 Tenn. Ch., 326; 1 Barb. 12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 763-764.
Ch. Pr., 143. But an unsworn answer may be ex- 13 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 764.
cepted for scandal and impertinence. Ibid. 14 The foregoing form may be used in case of
1 Sheppard v. Akers, 1 Tenn. Ch., 326; Smith v. exceptions when taken by a defendant for scandal
in the bill.
§424 EXCEPTIONS TO ANSWERS. 346
3d. For that the words
paragraph 5 [or, on page 4] of the answer, beginning with tht
in,
words, "And complainant prompted," and ending with the words, "were well known it
the community," art impertinent.
Wherefore, the complainant prays that said scandalous' and impertinent matter be expunged
from the answer. •
Lewis Tillman, Jr:, Solicitor.

EXCEPTIONS TO AN ANSWER FOB INSUFFICIENCY.
John Doe, 1 ,
.•'•
_, vs. V No., 618. — In Chancery, at Knoxville.
The complainant, John, Doe, excepts to the answer of the defendant, Richard Roe, because
of its insufficiency.
For that the defendant has not answered to the best of his knowledge, remembrance,,
1st.
information and belief whether [such an allegation or charge in paragraph 3 of the bill is
true, specify the allegation, or charge.]
2d. For that the defendant has not answered whether he did or not [setting forth ,i
charge], as in paragraph 3 of the bill it is alleged he did.
3d. For that the said defendant has not in his said answer set forth and discovered how,
when, and to whom he paid the money by him received from the complainant, as alleged in
paragraph 4 of the bill.
4th. For that the said defendant has not fully answered as to the matters and charges set
forth inparagraph 5 of the bill.
Sth. For that the said defendant has not fully answered and discovered when, how, and
to whom he transferred the funds that went into his hands as alleged in paragraph 6 of
the bill.
For that the said defendant has not to the best of his knowledge, remembrance,
6th.
information and belief, answered and set forth a full, just and true inventory of the goods
and chattels, notes and accounts, and other effects that came into his hands, or under his
control, or should by due diligence have come into his hands, belonging to said estate
[or to said partnership, or to complainant,] and how, when and to whom, and for how
much, the same or any part and what part thereof has been sold or disposed of, and what
part has not been disposed of, and what is become thereof, as he was called on and required
to do in the bill.
Wherefore, the complainant prays that the said respondent may be compelled to put in
a full and complete answer to complainant's bill. T. S. Webb, Solicitor.
RULING OF THE MASTER ON EXCEPTIONS, AND APPEAL.
[The ruling of the Master is ordinarily written immediately beneath the exceptions, if
there be sufficient room.]
The 1st, 2d and 6th exceptions allowed, the others disallowed.
July 24, 1891. W. L. Trent, C. & M.
From the ruling of the Master on the 3d, 4th and Sth exceptions, complainant appeals
to the Chancellor. T. S. Webb, Solicitor.
July 24, 1891.
From the ruling of the Master on the 1st; 2d and 6th exceptions, the defendant appeals.
July 25, 1891. Leon Jourolmon, Solicitor.
§ 424. How
Exceptions are Disposed of. The complainant must set his —
exceptions down
for hearing before the Master, within ten days after they have
been filed, 15 or upon failure to do so, the answer will be deemed sufficient,
fjpon the exceptions being thus set down for hearing, the Master shall act upon
them immediately; and, if allowed, he shall notify the defendant's Solicitor
to file a sufficient answer within thirty days. From the action of the Master
allowing the exceptions, the defendant may, within the thirty days, appeal to
the Chancellor. 10 If the defendant, in obedience to the Master's order, file an
answer deemed sufficient by the latter, 17 he shall, by letter or otherwise, notify
the complainant's Solicitor of the same, and he may appeal to the Chancellor
within ten days after the notice. These various appeals must be acted on by
the Chancellor at his earliest convenience; and he may hear them in vacation,
and may make such order in the matter of the appeal as may be proper. 18
15 For good reasons, shown by affidavit, the Chan- Wood v. McFerrin, 2 Bax., 493; Smith i>. St. Louis
cellor may allow further time to file exceptions. M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 604.
Marsh v. Crawford, 1 Swan, 116. 17 The Master should, in such a case, refuse to
io Ch. Rule, I., §§ 4-5. The Chancellor can not receive and file an answer by him deemed insuffi-
pass on exceptions, except on appeal. The Master cient. Exceptions to an answer to exceptions are
must first act upon them. ,If exceptions are filed in wholly inadmissible, under our practice.
open Court, they may be stricken' from the files. is Code, 88 4402-4404; Ch. Rule, I,' 8§4-5; 8 1190,
post.
347 SUGGESTIONS AS TO PLEADINGS. §425
If the defendant, upon exceptions sustained to the sufficiency" of his answer,
neglects and refuses to put in a sufficient answer, or shall put in another insuf-
ficient answer, the complainant may take his bill for confessed as to the part-
to which his exceptions relate, and proceed with the cause as in other cases ly ;
or he may, at his election, have the defendant attached, in which latter case
the same procedure may be had as though no answer, at all, had been filed. 20
The filing of exceptions to an answer does not delay the taking of depositions,
or otherwise preparing the cause for hearing. 21
If the Master allow the exceptions, or any of them, he will so find, putting
his findings in writing, at the foot of the exceptions; and he will date and sign
his rulings and, at once, give the proper notice of his action. The party de-
;
siring to appeal from the rulings of the Master, will write his appeal immedi-
ately below the ruling appealed from, and will date and sign it. 22
There is some difference in practice between exceptions for insufficiency and
exceptions for scandal and impertinence the latter exceptions may be filed
:
and acted on at any time, by leave of the Court indeed, the Court may, on its ;
own motion, or upon application of the opposite party, refer the answer to the
Master to be revised, or order scandalous and impertinent matter to be stricken
out of the answer. 23
ACTION OP THE COiUItT ON EXCEPTIONS TO AN ANSWER.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 618. — In Chancery, at Knoxville.
The exceptions taken by the complainant to the answer of the defendant, Richard Roe.
because of its insufficiency, coming on to be heard on appeals from the rulings of the Master,
and the same having been argued by counsel, it is ordered that the 1st, 2d and 6th excep-
tions be allowed and the 3rd, 4th and 5th exceptions be disallowed; and it is ordered that
the defendant, Richard Roe, file a sufficient answer within thirty days, or the complainant
may take his bill for confessed as to the parts to which his said exceptions relate, and
proceed with the cause as in other cases. 24
ARTICLE III.
SUGGESTIONS AS TO TESTING PLEAS.

§ 425. Suggestions to the Solicitor of the S 426. Suggestions to the Solicitor of the De-
Complainant. fendant.
§ 425. Suggestions to the Solicitor of the Complainant.---It will be found

important for you to keep in mind the following matters in reference to the
testing of pleadings
1. Suggestions as to Demurrers. Do, not specially dread a demurrer: as a
rule, demurrers are the complainant's friends: if the bill is utterly unmain-
tainable, a demurrer will end it, at the least cost if, on the other hand, it is at ;
all maintainable, the demurrer will ordinarily point out to you some deficiency
10 Code, § 4407. The complainant, in such a case, 23 Code, § 4316. The Chancery Rules require ex-
in Judge Cooper's opinion, may take the whole .bill ceptions for insufficiency to. be filed in twenty days,
for confessed, if he so chooses. Smith v. St. Louis but do not limit the time within which exceptions
M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn; Ch., 60S. See, also, Marsh for scandal and impertinence may be filed. Ch.
v. Crawford, 1 Swan, 116, which holds that an Rule 1, sees. 4 and 5; see, post, § 1190.
answer, well excepted to, and adjudged imperfect, 24 Code,
§ 4407; 4369, sub-sec 5. What is meant
1
is no answer. Lanum V. Steel, 10 Hum., 280. by complainant "proceeding with the cause as in
20 Marsh v. Crawford, 1 Swan, 116; 1 Dan. Ch. other cases" is not clear: it probably means proceed-
Pr., 775. For the procedure, by attachment, sec, ing with the cause as in other cases where bills are
ante, § 203. taken for confessed, that is, if the part confessed
21 Ch. Rule, I, § 5; Code, § 4406. entitles complainant to a final decree he may take it,
22 The practice, in acting on exceptions, and in otherwise he must make the necessary proof. See,
appealing therefrom, is the same as on exceptions ante, §§205-213.
to depositions. See, post, § 501.
426 SUGGESTIONS AS TO PLEADINGS. 348
in the bill which you can readily correct, and which might have greatly
injured
you at the hearing, had not the demurrer pointed it out to you in season. If
the demurrer shows some deficiency, at once amend your bill, and have copy
and notice thereof duly served on the defendant. If, however, you wish to
obtain the benefit of argument, and of the Court's opinion, you will set the
demurrer down with the Clerk to be argued. Remember, nevertheless, that
you may amend before argument of the demurrer without leave of the Court
and at slight cost while, after argument, you must obtain leave of the Court'
;
and submit to such terms as the Court may impose 1 and the Court may refuse
j
to allow you to amend, or may tax your client with all the costs of the cause. 2
2. Suggestions as to Pleas. As soon as you are notified 3 of the filing of a
plea, you should consider it; and if you deem it sufficient you should
file a replication; if you deem it insufficient you should set it down with
the Clerk, in writing, to be argued. 4 If you fail to do this within twenty
days, the defendant may proceed to take proof on it; or, if the local rule
permit, may take his plea for confessed, for want of a replication. And remem-
ber, that a deficient plea, one you might have had adjudged insufficient, may
defeat your suit, if you are forced to a hearing on an issue of fact as to its
truth. 5
3. Suggestions as to Answers. Whenever an answer is filed, it is the duty of
the Clerk and Master to forthwith notify you. 6 On receiving such notice, you
should within twenty days carefully peruse the answer, in order to see: (1)
whether its' disclosures are such as to necessitate an amendment of your bill;
(2) whether you desire to except to it for insufficiency; and (3) whether its
admissions are sufficient to justify you in setting the cause down for hearing
on bill and answer.
If an amendment to your bill is necessary, you should take the requisite
steps with all diligence if you desire to except to the answer for insufficiency,
:
you must file your exceptions within twenty days after receipt of notice of the
filing of the answer if you wish to set the cause for hearing on bill and answer,
;
you must do so within twenty days after notice of the filing of the answer or, ;
in case of exceptions and a new answer, then within twenty days after notice
of the filing of a sufficient answer. 7
If you fail to except to an answer for insufficiency, within the twenty days,
you thereby admit the answer to be sufficient; and the statute operates as a
replication to the answer, and thus makes an issue of fact. If you have called
for a discovery from the defendant on oath, you are not likely to obtain a full
discovery without the coercion of exceptions to his answer for insufficiency.
Hence, the vital importance of filing such exceptions within the twenty days.
Remember that, if you file exceptions to an answer for insufficiency, you
must set them down for hearing before the Master within ten days after the>
are filed; or, upon your failure to do so, the exceptions will be deemed to be
abandoned, and the answer will be deemed sufficient. 8
§ 426. Suggestions to the Solicitor of the Defendant. Inasmuch as you —
represent the defendant, the same measure of diligence and vigilance is not
ordinarily required of you and your client as are required of the complainant.
The following matters, however, demand prompt and intelligent attention
l. Suggestions as to the Bill. As soon as you are retained, procure a copy of
the bill, so that you may be able to apply the tests of its sufficiency in due
season. Remember, that after a pro confesso has been entered against your
client, it is too late to move to dismiss, and too late to demur. If, on inspecting
1 Code, §§ 4333-4334. 4 See, form of setting down, ante, § 350.

2 Crowder v. Turney, 3 Cold., 551; Code, §2938. 5 See, ante, § 351.
See, Amended Bills. 6 Code, §§4400; 4422.
3 It is the duty of the Clerk and Master to notify TCode, §§4322; 4400-4403; Ch. Rule, I, 5 5,
you of the filing of a plea, as well as of an answer, post; | 1190, sub-sec. 5.
a plea being a special answer. 8 Ch. Rule, I, § 5; post, § 1190, sub-sec. 5.
349 SUGGESTIONS AS TO PLEADINGS. § 426
the bill, you can have it dismissed on motion, enter your motion, specifying the
particular ground, or grounds, on which it is based. If you can destroy the
bill, or have any substantial part of it dismissed, by demurring, file your demur-
rer, being careful (1) to make it special, and (2) if it be to a part only of the
bill, to confine it, by appropriate language, to such part. If the result of a
demurrer will be merely to compel the complainant to amend his bill, consider
whether such a demurrer will not profit him more than you.
2. Suggestions as to the Answer. If you receive notice that exceptions to
your answer have been sustained by the Clerk and Master, at once consider
whether you will file a further answer, or will appeal from the ruling of the
Master. Remember, that if you fail to appeal, within thirty days after notice
to file a sufficient answer, it will be too late to appeal; and, that if a sufficient
answer is not filed in time, your client is liable to a pro confesso, or to an attach-
ment, as the complainant may elect.
§427 AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. 350
CHAPTER XXII.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS.
Article I. Amendments Generally Considered.
Article II. Amended and Supplemental Bills.
Article III. Amended Demurrers and Pleas.
Article IV. Amended and Supplemental Answers.
ARTICLE I.
AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
§ 427. What Matters May be Amended. 8 429. How to Prevent Amendments becom-
§ 428. General Rules as to Amendments. ing Obstacles to Justice.
§ 427. —
What Matters May be Amended. Perfection is the exception, and
imperfection the "rule, in all human proceedings; 1 and the right to amend
what was defectively done without bad faith, is deemed sacred, provided such
right is sought to be exercised in good faith, in good season, in due form, and
before any contrary right has intervened. Imperfections and errors occur
often in judicial proceedings, and both the Courts and the Legislature have
endeavored to make rules whereby such imperfections and errors would wor't
as little hardship as possible. It has been enacted that no summons, writ,
pleading, process, return, or other proceeding in any civil action in any Court,
shall be abated or quashed for any defect, omission, or imperfection 2 and that ;
no civil suit shall be dismissed for want of necessary partie's, or on account of

the form of the action, or for want of the proper averments in the pleadings;
but the Courts shall have power to change the form of action, strike out or
insert in the writ and pleadings the names of either plaintiffs or defendants,
so as to have the proper parties before the Court, and to allow all proper aver-
ments to be supplied. 3
These statutory provisions are full of beneficence, and all-comprehensive;
and in construing them, the Courts hold that any and every paper filed, or
proceeding instituted, in a Court of Justice is amendable, and cannot be brought
to nought for any defect, omission, or imperfection, provided the defect or
omission be supplied, or the imperfection be corrected, in the right way and at
the right time.
Any and every paper filed in any proceeding in the Chancery Court is amend-
able, unless it be so defective as to be a nullity. If it has a root of substance,
its trunk may be pruned, or new shoots may be added but if it has no sub-
;
stance or virtue at all, then there is nothing to amend. 4 Amendments must be

made to an existing substance, either by changing its form, or by adding omis-
sions, or by correcting defects or imperfections. This rule applies to process
of all sorts, to bonds and pleading's of all kinds, to motions, petitions, reports
by the Master, proceedings in the Master's office, and to a limited extent, even
to the orders and decrees of the Court. The law intends that suits shall be
tried upon their merits, without being entangled in ceremonies, or strangled
\>y formalities, 5 and the object of the statutes quoted was to place common
1 Nihil simul inventum est et perfectum. (Noth- 3 Code, § 2869. The subject of amendments is
ing is made and perfected at the same time.) If specially treated of under the head of the various
thou, Lord, wilt be extreme to mark what is done pleadings subject to be amended.
amiss, O Lord, who may abide it? Psalm, 130. i Maples v. Tunis, 11 Hum., 111.
2 Code, § 2863. 5 Hunter v. Sevier, 7 Yerg., 136.
351 AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. §428
sense upon her native seat, from which she had been driven by technicalities. 11
Forms were invented to aid, and not to impede, the administration of justice.
§ 428. —
General Rules as to Amendments. Courts should be liberal in allow-
ing all amendments to pleadings, necessary to enable a party to have his side
of the controversy fully presented on its merits; 7 but the Court is under no
obligation to favor a party who is interposing obstacles to a hearing on the
merits. This liberality in allowing amendments should be balanced by an
equivalent severity in the imposition of costs on the parties seeking to amend
The following are the general rules On the subject of amendments
1. The Proposed Amendment Must be Pertinent and Germane to the Controversy,
and must be of such a character that it will either enable the applicant the
better to present his case, or will enable the Court the better to understand the
controversy, and to do complete justice between the parties. No amendment
that is impertinent, or multifarious, or that brings in foreign matters, or that
is inconsistent with, or antagonistic to, the claims or prayers of the original
bill, or that is proper matter for another suit, should be allowed on any terms. 8
2. The Application to Amend Should be Made at the First Opportunity after the
applicant has learned Of the necessity of the amendment, or of the existence
of the facts on which his application is based. 9 party who allows his adver- A
sary to take steps, or costs to be unnecessarily incurred, after he has knowldge
of a defect, and an opportunity to amend, should be held estopped to make
the amendment. Good faith requires diligence in such cases. Courts are slow
to help the slow.
3. The Application to Amend should be Made Before the Court Acts on the par-
ticular pleading sought to be amended. A
party should not be allowed to
experiment with his pleading, by' waiting to see what the Court may think of
it, after his attention has been called to its defects. party who voluntarily A
assumes should be bound by the result, and should not be heard to com-
risks,
plain, or to ask another trial of chance. 10
4. The Application should Not Only be at the Right Time, as stated in the two
foregoing rules, but it should be made in the right way, and in accordance
with the practice and rules of the Court. If affidavits of diligence and good
faith are required by the rules or practice, they should be duly presented, in
support of the application. Statements "as on affidavit," are almost in the
nature of a contempt of Court on the part of a suitor or Solicitor who is already
in default, because he is seeking to correct one error by making another. 11 If
ever a Solicitor should diligently, fully, and cheerfully, comply with the re-
quirements of every rule, however stringent, it is when, being in default, he is
confessing it, and asking leave of the Court to make the necessary amendment.
If the rules of the Court require that the proposed amendment should be re-
duced to writing, and sworn to before presented, this, also, should be done.
And more all the requirements of the rules should not only be complied with,
:
but this compliance should be frank and prompt, not sullen and slow.
5. And the Application to Amend should be Accompanied by an Offer to Pay Such
costs, or to comply with such other terms and requirements the Court may
impose, as the price or condition of allowing the amendment to be made. 12
ii Henderson V. King, 4 Hay., 97. As, in some 9 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 403; 415, note 5; Rodgers v. Rod-
religions, images, invented to aid in the worship of gers, 1 Paige, (N. Y.), 424; Marr V. Wilson, 2 Lea,
God, became, in_ process of time, themselves the 229.
objects of worship, and thus supplanted God him- 10 Bills are sometimes allowed to be amended,
'
self; so, in some Courts, the forms invented to aid after a demurrer has been sustained; but, in such
in the administration of justice, have come to be cases, the complainant should be visted with costs.
regarded of more importance than justice itself. Code, § 4334.
See, ante, § 43. Ill Dan. Ch. Pr., 402; 403; 415; 424; 425; 704,
7 Patton V. Dixon, 21 Pick., 97, citing the above notes. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 1 Paige, (N. Y.), 424.
section of this book, then § 427. As to "showing cause," see, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
8 1 Dan Ch. Pr. ( 402; 426, notes; Bosley v. Phil- 12 The Court may, in a proper case, charge the
ips, 3 Tenn. Ch., 649; Masson v. Anderson, 3 Bax., party amending with all the costs of the cause. Mt.
290; Rogers v. Simpson, 10 Heisk., 655; Scott v. Olivet Co. v. Budeke, 2 Tenn. Ch., 480.
T„,-lo.. O T Dn A70
§429 AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. 352
When all the foregoing requirements are complied with, the applicant
is
ordinarily entitled, as a matter of right, to make the amendment desired and ;
if his application is denied, he is in the best possible condition to have

the
ruling of the Chancellor reversed in the Supreme Court. But when he fails to
comply with the foregoing rules, then the granting of the amendment becomes
a matter of discretion, and the Supreme Court will not, ordinarily, undertake
to revise that discretion.
6. But Where the Pleading is in. Behalf of an Infant, or Person of Unsound Mind
the Court will not require the same measure of diligence, in the matter of
amendments, as when the party applying is under no disability. Courts con-
sider infants and persons of unsound mind as under their general guardianship,
and will not permit them to suffer either by error of omission, or by error of
commission, in the pleadings of their next friends, or guardians. The Court
will even act affirmatively in their behalf, when necessary, on its own motion
and will order ah improper admission or submission in a pleading, filed in
behalf of an infant, to be stricken out, or an affirmative amendment to be
made, when necessary to the infant's rights. 13
7. But When an Amendment to a Bill or Answer is Manifestly in Furtherance of
justice, and necessary to prevent an irreparable injury, or to prevent the
adverse side from obtaining the benefit of an unconscientious advantage, the
Court will, as a general rule, allow any such amendment at any stage of the
suit, 14 taking care, however, to punish any negligence or delay, by the im-
position of penal costs.
§ 429. How Prevent Amendments Becoming Obstacles to Justice. It is
to —
manifest that Courts were to allow amendments of any kind, at any stage of
if
the litigation, without restriction, impediment, or penalty, it would not only
be destructive of good practice and correct pleading, but great delays and
difficulties in judicial procedure would be the result. License is as dangerous
as tyranny, and want of forms is as detrimental to the administration of justice
as is the excess of technicalities.
If amendments are allowed without affidavits showing diligence, good faith,
find a good excuse, and without the imposition of penal costs, the practice of
the Court will soon degenerate into a comedy of errors the rules of pleading ;
will be utterly ignored confusion and uncertainty will reign where order and
;
certainty should be supreme and Justice will be obliged to grope her way, in
;
her own temple, through dark labyrinths, without a guide.

If no penal costs are imposed, Solicitors will cease to object to defects in the
pleadings or proceedings of their adversaries, inasmuch as their objections
will avail them nothing but, on the other hand, will be a downright benefit to
;
the party in default, by enabling him to perfect his case. "The glorious uncer-
tainty of the law" will become then a reality, and not a jest. The practice
prevalent in our County Courts will become the course of procedure in all thj
Courts; and our Supreme Court will find itself so overwhelmed by irregulari-
and deficiencies that it will be unable to administer justice on appeal.
T.ies
The remedy for these evils consists in stern rules, sternly enforced, requiring:
1. That every motion to amend shall be made in due season and shall, in case ;
of delay, be supported by an affidavit showing merits, diligence, and good

faith. 2. The affidavit should specify the proposed amendment, and should
give a sufficient excuse for any apparent delay. 3. If a pleading is to fat
amended, the truth of the amendment should be sworn to. 4. The amendment,
is Sto. Eq. I'l., 8 892; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 72. be obtained by a complainant recovering on a claim,
14 As illustrations of an irreparable injury, and which, the proof shows, had been paid, released, or
an unconscientious advantage: (1) An irreparable otherwise discharged, because the fact of payment,
injury to a complainant would arise, should he be or release, had not been set up in the answer. See,
not allowed to so amend as to include in his suit Purman v. North, 4 Bax., 296; Sto. Eg. PL, 8 9<«i
some proven item that he would be barred from re- McEwen V. Troost, 1 Sneed, 186; McVey v. Ely. 5
covering in another suit; and, (2) on the other hand, I.ea, 438.
the benefit of an unconscientious advantage would
353 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. §430
if itcauses any delay, or additional proof, should be granted only on the pay-
15
ment of a portion, or all, of the costs of the cause.
Solicitors dislike to write affidavits, and clients dislike to pay costs. The
Chancellor will be importuned to hear statements "as on affidavit," and to
•
forego the imposition of costs; but affidavits and costs constitute the penalty
parties must suffer for their negligence, and the price parties must pay for
leave to amend and the Chancellor who enforces the rule rigorously will soon
;
find that applications to amend will seldom be made, that the practice in his
Court will greatly improve, that diligence will characterize the members of
bis bar, and that general satisfaction and general commendation will be the
result.
Patched-up pleadings are alike discreditable to the Chancellor and to the
Solicitor responsible therefor —
discreditable to the Chancellor for tolerating
such looseness of pleading, and discreditable to the Solicitor because of his
ignorance, or negligence.
ARTICLE II.
§ 430. When Bills May be Amended. § 431. Supplemental Bills.
§ 430. When Bills May be Amended. —

The consideration of Amended and Sup-
plemental Bills requires so much space that a separate Chapter will be hereinaf-
ter devoted to them. 1 It may be stated generally, however, that a large liberty
of amendment is allowed the complainant. Courts are made for complainants,
and the law gives them all reasonable opportunities to so amend and perfect
their bills as to be able to bring before the Coiirt, in proper form, the particular
matters they desire to submit to its adjudication. If the amendment is made
before a plea or answer is filed, or before a demurrer is argued, it may be done
as a matter of course, without any leave of the Chancellor, or Master, as here-
after more fully shown. In all other cases, the bill can be amended only by
jeave of the Chancellor, given in open Court. 2 Such leave, however, will read-
ily be given when (1) the importance of the amendment is made to appear,
and (2) diligence and good faith are shown by affidavit in support of the
application. The bill may even be amended at the hearing, when (1) merits
manifestly appear in the record, and (2) no laches, or bad faith, taints the
conduct of the complainant, and (3) when such an amendment will not operate
harshly, or unjustly, upon the defendant, or take him by surprise, or cut him
off from a valid defence he might have made.
If new facts arise, or new parties acquire interests, after the original bill
has been filed, a supplemental bill is the proper pleading to bring such new
matters, or parties, before the Court and application to file such a bill should
;
he made as soon as the facts come to the complainant's knowledge; and it is

good practice to accompany the application with an affidavit, explaining any
seeming delay; and with a copy of the proposed supplemental bill duly verified,
as will more fully be shown in the Chapter on Amended and Supplementai
Bills, to which reference is made for a fuller consideration of the subject.
15 Thereno hardship in these rules.

is shouldWhy ments, without terms, tends to corrupt the practice,
your suffer because of the negligence, or
client degrade the science of pleading, and to put negli-
lgnorance, of his adversary, especially if that ad- gencc on a par with diligence, and ignorance on a
versary be the complainant? And, on the other
t
par with skill. See Waiver, ante, §71; and
hand, why should you not suffer the just penalty of Show Cause, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
your own want of diligence and skill? He who l See, post, §§ 666-697.
seeks Eauitv. must, do Eauitv. To allow amend- 2 Code. 68 4332-4334.
§ 431 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. 354
§ 431. Supplemental Bills. —Any change may be made in the matter of an
original bill, or in the parties thereto, before an answer has been put in;
and
such changes may be made, of course, and without application to the Court. 3
These changes are made as amendments to the original bill, and the bill when
so changed is called an amended bill. But when it becomes necessary to change
the matter, or parties, of a bill, after an answer has been put in, this change is
made by a supplemental bill, or, as it is often termed, an amended and supple-
mental bill. 4 In strictness, however, a supplemental bill is more comprehensive
than an amended bill, and may include matter which has come into existence
since the original bill was filed whereas, an amended bill speaks as of the date
;
of the filing of the original bill, and cannot, therefore, properly include matters
which have come into being since the original bill was filed. 5
The subject of supplemental bills will be hereafter fully treated in a separate
Article; but it may be stated here that the office of a supplemental bill is to
hring before the Court: 1, Matters pertinent to the original suit which have
occurred since the bringing of the suit 2, Matters which existed when the suit
;
was brought, but which cannot now he added to the original bill, because it
has been answered, and the issues are made up 3, Matters necessary to obtain ;
an additional discovery, the necessity often arising because of the disclosures

in the answer; 4, To bring new parties before the Court; and 5, To remedy
defects in the prayer of the original bill. 6
ARTICLE III.
AMENDED DEMURRERS AND PLEAS.
§ When Demurrers 'May be Amended.
432. § 433. When Pleas May be Amended.
I
§ 432. When Demurrers May be Amended. As already stated, any plead- —

ing may be amended and while demurrers are not regarded with favor by the
;
Courts, nevertheless, on application before argument, the Court will readily

allow a demurrer to be amended. If the bill is without Equity, the Court may,
and perhaps should, allow the demurrer to be so amended as to reach the vul-
nerable part of the bill. So, if the demurrer is to the whole bill when only a
part of the bill is demurrable, the Court may, on proper application, allow the
demurrer to be so amended as to apply exclusively to that part of the bill liable
to demurrer. 1
The amendment of demurrers has already been fully considered, 2 and need
not therefore be further elaborated here.
§ 433. When Pleas May be Amended. In cases where a plea discloses a —
substantial ground of defence to the bill, but the plea has not been so
framed as to sufficiently make the defence, the Court will, on proper applica-
tion, allow the plea to be amended. If the plea is too defective to be amended,
and there is an apparent ground of defence disclosed by the plea, the Court
will allow the defendant to plead de novo. 9'
3.
Amendments to pleas in abatement
are more slowly allowed than to pleas in bar, for a party who disputes the
jurisdiction of the Court should not ask any favors of a tribunal whose author-
ity he disputes.
a
This subject will be found further considered under the head of Pleas.*
•i Code, §§ 4332-4333. See, also, Chapter on 6 Lube's Eq. PL, 187-188, and notes. The Court
Amended and Supplemental Bills, post, §§ 666-697. will, however, ordinarily allow the prayer to be
4 The name of the bill is immaterial : the Court amended, on motion.
will have regard to its substance, and not to its 1 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 584. bee, Fitzgerald V. Cum-
name. Dodd v. Benthal, 4 Heisk., 601; Majors v. mings, 1 Lea, 222; Riddle V. Motley, 1 Lea, 468; 1
McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294; Cheek v. Anderson, 2 Lea, Barb. Ch. Pr., 111.
194; Northman v. Liverpool Ins. Co., 1 Tenn. Ch. 2 Ante, §§ 306, note 33; 316.
312; Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 599; Murphy v. 3a 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 127; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 703-704.
Johnson, 23 Pick., 552. 4a Ante, % 354.
5 See Chapter on Am. and Sup. Bills, post, §§ 666-
697.
355 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. §434
ARTICLE IV.
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS.
§ 434. Amended Answers generally Consid- § 436. How an Answer is Amended.
ered. § 437. When a Supplemental Answer Must
§ 435. What Amendments May be Made to be Filed.
Answers.
§ 434. Amended Answers Generally Considered. In amending answers —

there is some difference between answers required to be sworn to and answers
not so required. An answer sworn to is in the nature of a deposition as well
as a pleading, while an unsworn answer is a pure pleading. Courts are very
slow to allow a sworn answer to be amended and it is only under very special ;
circumstances that a defendant will be allowed to make any material alteration

in it, after it has once been filed. 1 If, however, the Court is satisfied that the
error, mistake, or omission, was the result of accident or inadvertence, that the
proposed amendment is meritorious, that there is no bad faith in the matter,
and that the application has been promptly made after the discovery of the
error or omission, the amendment will ordinarily be allowed, on such costs as
are equitable. The Court must, ordinarily, be satisfied of these facts, by the
affidavit of the party making the application.
If the Court allows an unsworn answer to be withdrawn because prepared
by counsel in the absence of the defendant, and a new answer to be filed in lieu,
the original answer cannot be read as evidence against the defendant at the
hearing. 2
There is no limit to the time within which an application to amend an answer,
or file a supplemental answer, must be made 3 but the longer the lapse of time
;
since the answer was filed, the more slow the Court is in granting the applica-
tion, and the greater the costs the defendant will be required to pay. But
where the complainant cannot be placed in the same situation he would have
been in had the new matter been set up in due season, the Court will not permit
an amendment to be made, or a supplemental answer to be filed. 4 Nevertheless,
where a refusal to allow an amendment will work irreparable injury to the
defendant, and give the complainant an unconscientious advantage, the Court
will, at any stage of the suit, allow any amendment to an answer that is in
absolute furtherance of justice, 5 always punishing the defendant for any neg-
ligence, or delay, by a proportionate imposition of costs.
The Court will always allow time in which to take proof upon any new issue
of facts raised by an amended or supplemental answer, for otherwise such an
amendment would be nugatory. 6
§ 435. What Amendments May be Made to Answers. There is no limit to —
the character of the amendments that may be made to an answer, except that
11 Barb. Ch. Pr., 164; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 778; The bill, in this case, was filed and answered in
Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. Ch., 343. In this cause, the 1865; the release was executed in 1867, was proved
When, and how, answers maybe amended,
question: in the cause in 1870, or 1871; and, in 1874, the
and what amendments are not admissible, is fully Supreme Court granted leave to amend. Manifest
considered. See, also, Wilson v. Wilson, 2 Lea, 17; justice required this amendment. In McVey v. Ely,
Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 896-903. 5 Lea, 438, the amended answer was allowed to be
2 Hurst v. Jones, 10 Lea, 8. filed two years after the filing of the original an-
3 Furman V. North, 4 Bax., 296. swer, in order to give the defendant an opportunity
i 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 782. Flora v. Rogers, 4 Hay., to set up a defence, discovered since he filed his
202. original answer. The defence, in this case, was the
In Furman v. North, 4 Bax., 296, the Supreme
5 fraudulent alteration of the note sued on; and the
Court remanded the cause, with leave to the de- refusal to allow the amendment would have been a
fendant to amend his answer, if desired, so as to violation of justice.
put in issue a release of the debt sued for, such re- 6 Stull v. Goode, 10 Heisk., 58.
§436 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. 356
after one defence has been set up and proof taken thereon, the Court will not
allow another and inconsistent defence to be set up by way of amendment, or
by a supplemental answer. 7
Amendments may be allowed to correct (1) a mistake or error in a matter
of fact, or in the statement of a fact, or (2) a mistake in the admission of assets
or (3) to set up new matters of defence tât have come to the defendant's
knowledge since his answer was filed. Mistakes by counsel in drawing the
answer, or in advising his client that it was not necessary to set up an omitted
defence, may be corrected by prompt affidavit of the facts. 8 But no amend-
ment will be allowed in order to plead the statute of limitations, or the statute
of frauds, 9 unless, perhaps, where the application to amend is made with great
promptness nor will an amendment be allowed to set up any unconscientious
;
defence. Where, however, such defences are defectively set forth, an amend-
ment will be allowed to give the defendant the benefit of the defence he in-
tended to set up. 10
The Court is very, reluctant to allow amendments after the proof has been
taken 1X nor will it allow an amendment based on the ground that the defend-
;
ant answered under a mistake of law. 12 Amendments that contradict the state-
ments in the first answer, or that change the ground of the defence, are inad
missible. The defendant must clearly show that it is due to justice to pernr't
the defence already made to be altered in the manner proposed. 13
§ 436. How an Answer is Amended. If the amendment desired is in a small —
matter, not going to the merits, the Court will allow it to be made on motion
but if the defendant desires to amend his answer in a material point, he must
present his own affidavit verifying the proposed amendment, explaining how
the error, mistake, or omission happened, and excusing any apparent delay. 1 '
An application to file a supplemental answer must be supported in the same

way. 15
Applications to amend answers are, usually, made in open Court. In matters
of urgency and moment, however, the application may be made to the Chan-
cellor in vacation, on due notice to the complainant.
Unsworn answers are allowed to be amended with somewhat more liberality
than where the defendant is required to answer on oath nevertheless, the same ;
rules apply. An unsworn answer is as much the solemn averment of record of

the defendant as if sworn to. 18
§ 437. When
a Supplemental Answer Must be Filed. If the proposed —
amendment one that materially changes the nature of the defence set up, or
is
necessitates any erasures, or serious interlineations, or brings forward new
matter, or makes explanations, the defendant will be required to file a supple-
mental answer, and will not be allowed to make any erasures, or considerable
interlineations, in his original answer.
The supplemental answer should be drawn and duly verified before being
presented to the Court, and the application for leave to file should be supported
by the affidavit of the defendant, and, if necessary, of his agent, or Solicitor,
showing a sufficient reason why the facts contained in the supplemental answer
were not introduced into the original answer, accounting for any apparent
7 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 167; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 778-782; McCarthy v. Catholic Knights, 18 Pick., 345; Peter-
Hardwick v. American Can Co., 7 Cates, 393. See, son v. Turney, 2 Ch. Apps.. 519.
ante, § 409. 12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 779; Stull v. Goode, 10 Heisk.,
8 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 164-165; Hurst o. Jones, 10 66.
Lea, 8. 13 Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. Ch., 343; Wilson v.
9 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 781; Cook V. Evans, 9 Yerg., Wilson, 2 Lea, 17.
288; Stull v. Goode, 10 Heisk., 58; Cook v. Bee, 2 14 Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. Ch., 343. The affidavit
Tenn. Ch., 344; Wilson V. Wilson, 2 Lea, 17. of the Solicitor is not sufficient, unless the facts arc
10 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 164. exclusively within his knowledge. Wilson V. Wil-
11 An amendment to an answer should be made son, 2 Lea, 17.
before the taking of proof when the matter of 15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 781.
amendment is within the defendant's knowledge. 16 Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. Ch., 343; Wilson v.
Wilson, 2 Lea, 17.
357 AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. § 437
delay, and averring that justice requires that he should be permitted to alter
the defence already made. 17
"While by the strict rules of pleading, a defence arising after the cause is at
issue, such as a payment, or release, or award, must be set up by a cross bill in
the nature of a plea since the last continuance, nevertheless, under our liberal
practice, a supplemental answer might be filed by leave of the Court, setting
ap such a defence, 18 and any other defence that has arisen since the original/
answer was filed.
An amended or supplemental answer may be in the following form
AMENDED OB. SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWEB.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Nashville.
The amended [or, supplemental] answer of Richard Roe to the bill filed against him and
others in this cause.
This defendant, in addition to [or, in explanation of, or, in correction of,] the answer
heretofore filed by him in this cause, leave of the Court having first been obtained, says
that» [Here set out the additions, explanations, or corrections, stated or referred to in the
order of the Court allowing the amended or supplemental answer to be Med; and conclude
as in an ordinary answer.
An amended or supplemental answer should be signed and sworn to but ; if
leave to has been previously obtained, and the oath of the defendant
file it is
waived by the bill, it need not be sworn to.
17 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 781-782. I 18 Furman v. North, 4 Bax., 276: Sto. Eq. PI.,
I §§ 902-903.
§438 HEARING A CAUSE ON BILL AND ANSWER. 358
PART IV.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE
CLOSE OF THE PLEADINGS TO THE CON-
CLUSION OF THE HEARING.
CHAPTER XXIII.
HEARING A CAUSE ON BILL AND ANSWER.
438. Motion to Set a Cause for Hearing § 440. Form of Decree When a Cause is
on Bill and Answer. Heard on Bill and Answer.
439. Hearing a Cause on Bill and Answer.
§ 438. Motion to Set a Cause for Hearing on Bill and Answer. If, on read- —
ing the answer, the complainant is willing to admit the truth of the answer, he
may, by motion, specially set the cause for hearing on bill and answer. 1 This
motion may be made before the Master by the complainant, and entered on the
rule docket; or it may be made in open Court. It must, however, be made
within twenty days after complainant 's Solicitor has notice of the filing of the
answer or, in case of exceptions and a new answer, within twenty days of his
;
notice of the filing of a sufficient answer, 2 unless the Court allows the motion
to be made after said time, which allowance the Court will readily make, 3 on
due application, especially if no proof has been filed. The motion may be in
the following form:
MOTION TO SET A CAIUSE ON BILL AND ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
This cause is by the complainant this day specially set for hearing on bill and answer.
§ 439. Hearing a Cause on and Answer. When a cause has been set
Bill —
down for hearing by the complainant, on bill and answer, the answer is ad-
mitted by the complainant to be true and therefore, no proof is needed, 4 unless
;
it becomes necessary to prove some of the exhibits to the bill which have not
been fully admitted, or to produce some record of the Court, to which the
answer refers. 5
1 Code, §§ 4322; 4430. Setting a cause for hear- 51 Dan. Ch. Pr., 829; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 308; 318.
ing on bill and answer is in the nature of an oral A cause stands for trial at the first term after k is
demurrer to the answer. at issue, even though no proof be filed by either
2 The reason of this is, that the lapse of twenty party. Code, §§4328; 4401; 4432. And the setting
days is equivalent to the filing of a replication; of a cause for hearing, by the complainant, ex-
Code, §§ 4322; 4328; and, under the former practice, pressly on bill and answer, within the twenty days
a cause could not be set for hearing, on bill and allowed for that purpose, must not be confounded
answer, after replication; because a replication de- with the regular hearing of a cause, on the call of
nied the truth of the answer; whereas, on setting a the docket, after the lapse of twenty days from the
cause for hearing, on bill and answer, complainant filing of a sufficient answer. In the latter case, the
admits the truth of the answer. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., cause is not set for hearing, by the complainant, on
318; 249-252. The Court, however, will permit a bill and answer; but it is set for hearing, by the
cause to be specially set for hearing, on bill and Clerk and Master, in obedience to law. Code,
answer, after issue made up. § 4431, and sections above cited; and, when so set
3 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 834. for hearing, by the Clerk and Master, instead of the
4 Bowers v. McGavock, 6 Cates, 438. As to when, answer being admitted to be true, it is deemed
and how, causes are set for hearing, on bill and denied, by the complainant. Code, §§ 4432; 4328.
answer, see, ante, § 438.
359 HEARING A CAUSE ON BILL AND ANSWER. §440
On the hearing of a cause on bill and answer, every matter set up in the
answer, whether responsive to the bill or purely in avoidance, must be taken as
true. This rule includes even those matters which the defendant avers that he
believes and hopes to be able to prove. 6 And matters which the defendant
neither admits or denies will be deemed denied, when a cause is thus heard on
bill and answer. 7 Exhibits to the. answer are, also, taken as true and duly
proved. 8
But the rule that the answer is to be considered true in all points, does not
mean that the legal deductions insisted on in the answer are to be considered
as true, but only such matters of fact as are stated in the answer. 9
If the complainant sets the cause down for hearing on bill and answer, and
the Court should be of opinion that there is not sufficient matter confessed by
the answer, to entitle the complainant to any of the relief prayed, the bill will
be dismissed with costs. But, as a rule, where a cause has thus been heard, and
the complainant fails to make out his case for want of sufficient admissions in
the answer, the suit will either (1) be dismissed without prejudice or, (2) the ;
complainant will be given leave to withdraw his application to have the cause
heard on bill and answer, and the cause will be remanded to the rules for proof
in either case, however, the complainant will be taxed with all the costs of the
cause. 10
§ 440. Form of a Decree When Cause is Heard on Bill and Answer. The —
following form will show the commencement of a decree when a cause is heard
on bill and answer.
DECREE ON BILL AND ANSWER.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
This cause, having been heretofore specially set for hearing by the complainant on the bill
of complaint, and the answer of the defendant thereto, came on to be heard, this June 4,
1891, before Hon. John P. Smith, Chancellor, upon the bill and answer, as aforesaid, and
argument having been heard, on consideration thereof, the Chancellor is of opinion that the
answer fully meets and overcomes all the equities and causes of suit alleged in the bill.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court, that the bill be dismissed; and that the
complainant and David Doe, his surety for the costs, pay all the costs of the cause, for
which execution will issue. [If the Chancellor should be of opinion that the complainant is
entitled to relief, then say after the words, "on consideration thereof," the Chancellor is of
opinion that the complainant is entitled to the relief by him prayed. It is, therefore, ordered,
adjudged and decreed, by the Court, that [following the prayer of the bill] See, post,
§§ 566-568.}
6 The reason of the rule is that, by setting the of twenty days after answer filed, operates as a
cause for hearing on bill and answer, the complain- statutory replication; and, if a suit is set down for
ant has debarred the defendant from the opportunity hearing, by the complainant, on bill and answer,
of proving what he hopes to prove. Brinkerhoof v. before the lapse of the twenty days, the effect of
Brown, 7 Johns. Ch., 223. This rule prevails such act is to admit the truth of the answer. It,
whether the oath to the answer is waived or not. therefore, behooves the complainant to diligently
Ibid., note. scrutinize the answer, before setting the cause down
7 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 318; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 982; for hearing, on bill and answer; and to examine
Rodgers v. Rodgers, 6 Heisk., 489; Railroad V. carefully into the exhibits filed to the answer, and
Murrell, 11 Heisk., 717. Under the old practice, if the records referred to in it; and to the force of all
the defendant intended to dispute the truth of the matters set up in avoidance; and to the effect of all
answer, he filed a replication; if he did not file a denials, and of all matters the defendant says he
replication, the truth of the answer was admitted, believes to be true, and hopes to prove.
and the cause was set for hearing, on the bill and 8 Milligan v. Humbard, 11 Heisk., 139.
answer. Lowry v. McGee, 5 Yerg., 238; 1 Barb. 9 Rodgers v. Rodgers, 6 Heisk., 495.
Ch. Pr., 249. Under our present practice, the lapse io 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 318; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 982.
§441 Evidence in chancery. 360
CHAPTER XXIV.
EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY.
Article I. Evidence Generally Considered.
Article II. When Proof is, and is not, Necessary.
Article III. Pleadings When Evidence.
Article IV. When Proof Must be Filed.
Article V. Practical Suggestions Concerning Proof.
ARTICLE I.
EVIDENCE GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
§ 441. General Rules of Evidence. 447. Amount of Evidence Necessary to
§ 442. When Parol Evidence is Admissible Vary, or Annul, Writings or Rec-
to Vary, or Annul, Writings or ords.
Records. § 448. Fraud Proved by Circumstances.
5 443. Burden of Proof. § 449. When Fraud Will be Presumed.
§ 444. Presumptions Generally Considered. § 450. Inspection in Aid of Proof.
§ 445. Amount of Evidence Necessary. § 451. What Facts the Chancellor Cannot
§ 446. The Probative Force of Court Rec- Consider.
ords.
§ 441. —
General Rules of Evidence. Evidence is the means whereby the
mind is induced to believe, or disbelieve, an allegation of fact; and legal
evidence includes all oral statements by parties, or witnesses, and all writings,
or other documents, proper to be heard by a Judge in determining an issue of
fact. The office of evidence is to prove or disprove what is alleged; and to
contradict or weaken, or corroborate or strengthen, other evidence already
made. Proof is sufficient evidence to satisfy the mind that an allegation of fact
is probably true. 1 The production of evidence is governed by four general rules
1. The Evidence Must Correspond With the Allegations in the pleadings, and
be confined to the points put in issue by the pleadings. 2 This rule includes facts
and circumstances relating to the matters in issue, and facts that tend to
strengthen, or weaken, the evidence introduced. 3
2. The Substance, Only, of the Issue Need he Proved. As a rule, allegations of
time, place, quantity, quality, and value need not be proved strictly as alleged,
unless the jurisdiction of the Court, or the right of action, depends upon such
matters, or they are otherwise essential. 4
3. The Burden of Proving a Proposition in Issue Lies Upon the Party Who Sub-
stantially Asserts the Affirmative 5 The best tests for ascertaining on whom the
burden of proof lies, are to consider who would lose, if (1) no evidence were
introduced by either side or, (2) if the allegation to be proved were stricken
;
1Proof and evidence are often used as synony- must be established by evidence, unless they are
mous terms, but they differ in meaning. Proof is admitted by the opposite party, either in his plead-
the end, and evidence is the means. Proof estab- ing, or in separate writing.
a The complainant,
lishes the truth; evidence only tends towards it. however, is required to prove so much, only, of his
Bump, Fraud. Conv., 578. Proof convinces, makes bill as is necessary to entitle him to a decree. A
certain, demonstrates, creates full belief; evidence party must not only prove the substance of the case
influences, indicates, makes probable, creates partial alleged by him, but he must prove, substantially, the
belief. same case as that stated in his pleading; he cannot
2 Kelley v. Fletcher, 10 Pick., 1. prove a different case, even though it be a good
3 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 51-55; Johnson V. Luckadoo, one; for that would be a surprise to the other party
12 Heisk., 273. which the Court would not permit. Each party s
4 1 Ev., §§ 56-62.
Greenl. The substance of the proof must be confined (1) to proving what he
case, made by the pleadings, must be proved; that affirmatively alleges, and (2) to disproving what he
is, all the facts alleged in his pleading, which are denies. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 857-860.
necessary to the case of the party alleging them, 5 See, post, § 443.
361 EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY. §442
out of the record; the burden of proof rests upon the party who, in such a
case, would lose. 6
4. The Best Evidence of Which the Case, in its Nature, is Susceptible, Must
Always be Produced. 7 This rule ordinarily excludes hearsay, and parol evi-
dence of the contents of writings, records and other documents and requires ;
that the originals, or certified or examined copies of records be produced and ;
that writings he duly called for, or their loss duly shown, before allowing parol
evidence of their contents. 8
The rules of evidence as to the competency of witnesses, and the methods of
obtaining testimony, are the same in Courts of Chancery as in the other Courts
of this State, except so far as changed by statute. 9 In all causes in Chancery,
except divorce cases, and when a trial by jury is had, the testimony of witnesses
is required to be taken in writing, without compelling their personal attend-
ance. 10 In divorce cases, and in trials by jury, either party may examine the
witnesses in open Court, or take their testimony by depositions, as in other
cases. 11 Exhibits to bills, or answers, may be proved by affidavit filed with the
exhibits in the Clerk 's office, at any time before the hearing, or by witnesses at
the hearing. 12
§ 442. When Parol Evidence is Admissible in Chancery to Vary, or Annul,
—
Writingsi or Records. As a rule, parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissi-
ble to contradict, or vary, the terms of a valid written instrument. 19 This rule
was one of the most sacred known to the common law Courts, and was based
upon the principle that the contracts of parties, deliberately written and signed,
could safely be evidenced and perpetuated only by the writings themselves;
and to permit the enlargement, diminution, or change, of their terms to be
made by the frail and treacherous recollections of witnesses, would be to make
the writings themselves useless, and the rights intended to be secured by them
uncertain and doubtful, and would, also, furnish a strong temptation and in-
centive to perjury and fraud. 20
Inasmuch, however, as under the protection of this rule, the fraudulent
sometimes gain inequitable advantages and, in the formation of written con-
;
tracts, however solemn, the necessitous sometimes yield to oppression, and the
ignorant and rash sometimes blunder into mistakes, the rigor of the rule has
been, in many cases, relaxed by Courts of Equity, in order that fraud may be
thwarted, mistakes corrected, accidents relieved against, trusts set up and en-
forced, and usury exposed and eliminated. 21 Most of the cases in which Courts
of Equity admit parol evidence to vary, reform, contradict, enlarge, diminish,
or annul, written instruments, may be classified as follows
1. Cases of Fraud, Accident, or Mistake. When, by some accident or mistake,
the writing doe's not truly and adequately express the real intent of the con-
tracting parties 22 or, when by fraud, some undue and inequitable advantage
;
has been taken by the defendant, either in framing the contract, or in obtaining
the consent of the complainant thereto, or otherwise, on a bill being filed for the
express purpose of correcting, or annuling, such a written contract, parol evi-
dence will b,e heard to show the accident, mistake, or fraud complained of. 23
e 1 Greenl. Ev., § 74; Best Pr. Ev., § 269. 19 1 Greenl. Ev., 275 Ellis Hamilton,
§ ; v. 4
7 Melius est petere fontes quam sectari rivuloi. Sneed, 514; Bridges v. Robinson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 723.
(It is better to seek the fountains, than* to follow 20 Richardson v. Thompson, 1 Hum., 154. '
the rivulets.) 21 Ibid; 3 Greenl. Ev., §§360-365; 2 Sto. En.

8 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 82-96. Jur., §1531; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§216; 226. As
9 Code, §4455; Hardin v. Stanly, 3 Yerg., 381. to the amount of proof required to overcome the
The maxim, JEquitas sequitur legem, applies in ques- presumption in favor of the correctness of writings,
tions of evidence. Gres. Eq. Ev., 3. But only in see §§445; 447, post.
part. See, ante, § 53; and post, § 442. 22 As to what constitutes accident, and mistake;
10 A Court of Chancery, as a rule, sees and deter- and what accidents and mistakes, will be relieved
mines; while a court of law, ordinarily, hears and against, see, Index.
determines. 23 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §1531; Greenl. Ev., § 296a;
11 Code, §§ 4456; 4467; 4470. 3 Ibid, 360; 363; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 859; Wood ».
12 Code, § 4458. The Chancery Rule of 1858, Goodrich, 9 Yerg., 266; Perry v. Pearson, 1 Hum.,
(Rule, XVI), requiring notice to the adverse party, 431; 1 Meigs' Dig., §§471; 526; 543. For cases
one day before the hearing, was not carried into the when instruments will be reformed or rescinded, see
§442 EVIDENCE- IN CHANCERY. 362
2. Cases to Set Up, or Enforce Trusts. When, by parol, some trust is en-
grafted upon a will, deed, or other written instrument, a Court of Equity will
on a bill filed for that purpose, hear parol proof to set up, and establish, such
trust. 24 On a bill filed to have a resulting or implied trust declared and en-
forced, the complainant may prove, by parol, that he, or the alleged beneficiary
paid or furnished the consideration, even when the deed shows otherwise. The
complainant may, also, show, by parol, that the defendant made the purchase,
or took the title, as his agent, or for his benefit in whole, or in part. The de-
clarations and admissions of the holder of the legal title may be proved, even
after his death, to set up a trust in favor of another in the property so held.
And so the defendant may prove, by parol, that the money, or other considera-
tion, paid or advanced, was intended to be a gift; and that no trust was in-
tended. 25
3. Cases to Have Deeds Declared Mortgages. Upon a bill being filed to have
a deed, absolute on its face, declared to be a mere mortgage, or security for a
debt, a Court of Chancery will allow the complainant to show the truth of his
allegations by parol testimony. So, a complainant may, upon a bill being filed
for that purpose, show by parol evidence, that when a deed absolute on its face
was executed, there was coupled with it, by parol, the right of re-purchase, or
the right to repay the purchase-money and have a re-conveyance. 20
4. Cases for a Specific Performance. Upon a bill to enforce a specific per-
formance of a written contract, the defendant may show, by parol evidence,
that, because of fraud, surprise or mistake, the written contract sought to be
enforced does not express or contain the real agreement between the parties or, ;
else, that the agreement was entered into through mistake, or was obtained by
fraud. 27
5. Other Cases Where Parol Evidence is Admissible. There are other cases
wherein parol evidence will be heard by the Chancery Court to vary, reform, or
annul writings, the most important of which are the following 1, In cases of :
settled accounts, when the bill alleges specific errors, mischarges, or omissions
and seeks to surcharge and falsify the account, because of fraud, or mistake, in
relation to said errors. 28 2, In cases of decrees and judgments, when the bill
alleges that the decree or judgment complained of was obtained by fraud,
accident or mistake, the facts constituting the alleged fraud, accident or
mistake, may be proved by parol, even when they contradict, or vary, the
record itself. 29 3, In cases of bills filed for a recission of a written contract,
because the complainant was drunk, insane, under duress, unduly influenced, or
an imbecile, or that some fraud or imposition was practiced upon the complain-
ant, the facts alleged as a ground of rescission may be proved by parol, even
though the writing is thereby contradicted. 30 4, In cases of latent ambiguity
in a will, or other writing, parol proof is admissible to show the meaning of the
testator, or other party to the writing. 31 5, Parol evidence is admissible to
show (1) that a written contract has been totally discharged; or, (2) that a
new and distinct agreement upon a new consideration has been made, either as
a substitute for the old, or as an addition to it; or, (3) that the time or place
of performance has been changed; or, (4) that damages for the breach of a
24 For cases of trust, see, Index; 1 Meigs' Dig., 27 Pom. Eq. Jur., §860; 3 Greenl. Ev., §361;
§ 553; 1 Perry on Trusts, §§ 76-77. 1 Meigs' Dig., § 548.
25 For the law in reference to parol proof, to set 28 1 Meigs' Dig., § 459.
up trusts, see, 3 Greenl. Ev., § 365 2 Pom. En-
; 29 Walker V. Cottrell, 8 Bax., 77; Maddox t>.
Jur., §§ 1040-1041; 1 Meigs' Dig., 553; 1 Perry on Apperson, 14 Lea, 604.

Trusts, §§ 134-140; 143-150. 30 1 Meigs' Dig., § 543.
26 3 Greenl. Ev., § 364; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1195- 311 Greenl. Ev., §§287-295; 297; 2 Meigs' Dig.,
1196; Lewis V. Bayhss, 6 Pick., 280; 1 Meigs' Dig., § 1430; 2 King's Dig., §2577; Weatherhead V. Sew-
§ 527. Parol proof may, also, be heard to show that ell,9 Hum., 271; Mumford 1'. M. & C. R. R. Co., 2
a title bond, or other executory agreement, was Lea, 393. In this case, it is shown that all contracts
really a mere mortgage. Jones V. Jones, 1 Head, should be construed in the light of the circumstances
105; James v. Fields, 5 Heisk., 394. The proof, in connected with their execution, these circumstances
all such cases, must be clear, and leave no reason- to be shown by parol. See, also, on this point, 2
able doubt. Lewis v. Bayliss, 6 Pick., 280. But Meigs' Dig., § 1430, page 1478; Insurance Co. l>.
see, post, §§445; 447. Mathews, 8 Lea, 509.
363 Evidence in chancery. §443
contract have been waived, or remitted; or, (5) that the contract was founded
upon an insufficient, or an unlawful consideration, or was without considera-
tion. 32 So, it may be shown by parol, that only a part of the contract was, in
fact, reduced to writing, or intended to be reduced to writing, and that there
was a part of the contract intentionally left in parol or, that there was an addi-
;
tional and suppletory agreement in parol. 33 6, Receipts may be varied, or con-

tradicted, by oral testimony, in so far as they are receipts, both at law and in
Equity. 34 7, The recitals in a Sheriff's deed as to notice having been
given, and as to the order of sale having been in his hands, 35 and the recitals in
any deed, as to the consideration, or the payment of consideration, may be dis-
proved by parol evidence. 36
§ 443. —
The Burden of Proof. The duty of proving, or disproving, the facts
in dispute on an issue between the parties to a suit, is termed the burden of
proof. This burden rests on that party against whom, on the state of the plead-
ings, the issue would be decided if no proof in regard to it was introduced.
Inasmuch as the complainant would generally lose the suit if no evidence was
introduced, the burden of proof generally rests on him but, sometimes, it rests
;
on the defendant; for there are cases in which the defendant would lose the
suit if no evidence was introduced, as where he admits the material allegations
of the bill but sets up new matter in avoidance. Where the material allega-
tions of the bill are denied by the answer, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant; but where the plea, or answer, expressly or constructively con-
fesses the material allegations of the bill, and sets up new matters in avoidance
of the bill, the burden of proof rests upon the party who maintains the affirma-
tive of the issue, 37 or, as it might be more definitely expressed, it rests upon
that party whose material affirmative allegations are not expressly, or im-
pliedly, admitted by his adversary. 38 So, when a complainant alleges facts in
his bill to avoid some bar, such as the statute of limitations, payment, an
award, a release, a former judgment or decree, the burden of proving such
facts rest on him. In general, when ever a prima facie right is disclosed by the
pleadings, the burden of proof rests upon the party disputing that right and ;
whenever, at any stage of the proof, one party would be entitled to a decree,
the burden of proof devolves upon the other party until he becomes entitled
to a decree, and in this way the burden of proof may shift several times before
the proofs are finally closed. 39 The Court will always treat a deed, or other
instrument, as being the thing which it purports to be, until the contrary is
shown. Wherever there is a presumption that a fact exists, he who makes an
allegation to the contrary must prove it. In cases where the presumption of
Jaw is in favor of one party, the other party must overcome it, even if it be
necessary to prove a negative, as where the child of a married woman is alleged
to be illegitimate. 40
§ 444. Presumptions Generally Considered. —A
presumption is (1) a con-
ciusion of law, or (2) an inference of fact 41 drawn from experience and obser-
vation, or deduced from proven facts, that a certain fact not proven exists.
32 1 Greenl. Ev., §§302-304; 284; 2 King's Dig., dicit sive actor sive reus, necesse est ut probat. (In
§ 2741. general, whoever asserts a fact, whether he be com-
33 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 302-304; Bissenger v. Guite- plainant or defendant, is bound to prove it.)
man, 6 Heisk., 277; 2 Meigs' Dig., § 1430; 2 King's 38 These allegations, while generally affirmative,
Dig., § 2744. are sometimes negative; as where a complainant
34 1 Greenl. Ev., § 305; 2 Meigs' Dig., § 1439; 2 grounds his right of action upon a negative allega-
King's Dig., § 2777. tion, and where the establishment of this negative
35 2 Meigs' Dig., §1174; Randolph v. Metcalf, 6 is an essential element of his case. 1 Greenl. Ev.,
Cold., 410; Loyd v. Anglin, 7 Yerg., 428; Code, §78.
§§ 3039-3042; 2 King's Dig., § 2861. 39 In strictness, the burden of proof does nol
36 2 Meigs' Dig., § 1179; 2 King's Dig., § 2778. shift in such a case, but it is the weight of the evi-
37 The leading^ maxims are: Ei incumbit probatio dence that shifts. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 74, note.
qui dicit non qui negat. (The burden of proof rests 40 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 851.
upon him who asserts a fact, not upon him who de- 41 Facts - from which inferences are drawn are
nies.) This is the great rule. Best Pr. Ev., § 269. termed "evidentiary" facts; the facts inferred are
AMrmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio. (The termed "ultimate" or "principal" facts. McKelvey
burden of proof rests upon him who affirms, not on Ev., 8.
upon him who denies.) In genere, quicunque aliquid
§445 Evidence in chancery. 364
Presumptions are of two kinds presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
:
1. Presumptions of law are rules which, in certain cases, either forbid, or

dis-
pense with, any proof as to the truth, or falsity, of the fact presumed. 2. Pre-
sumptions of fact are inferences of the existence of some fact not otherwise
proved, deduced from the existence of other facts which have been proved:
these inferences being such as the common sense and common experience of
mankind show to be the facts usually occurring in such cases. 42
Presumptions are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
will yield to no proof, however strong; but disputable presumptions may be
overcome by proof. As illustrations of conclusive presumptions of law may be
mentioned 1, that every one knows the criminal law 2, that every sane
: ;
man contemplates the probable consequences of his own acts; and 3, that
every one has knowledge of a deed duly registered.
Disputable presumptions of law are prima facie proof of the fact, and throw
the burden of proof on the party disputing them. 43 As illustrations of disput-
able presumptions of law, the following may be mentioned: 1, that everyone
is innocent of the fraud charged upon him 2, that the possessor is the owner
;
3. that the acts of persons having apparent authority are rightful; 4, that a
state of facts once known to exist continues a reasonable time 5, that ail ;
children are legitimate 6, that all persons are sane 7, that everyone over
; ;
seven years of age is competent to testify 8, that everyone who has not been
;
heard from for seven years, after due inquiry by those best informed, is dead;
and 9, that a man and woman cohabiting as husband and wife are lawfully
married.
The following presumptions are, also, disputable, and may be rebutted by
parol evidence in Chancery: 1, that the recitals in Sheriff's deeds are correct;
2, that a receipt is correct; 3, that a resulting trust arises in favor of the
person paying the consideration when the deed is taken in the name of a
stranger; 4, that such a trust does not arise when the deed is taken in the
name of a wife, child, or dependent; 5, that a deed absolute on its face is not
a mortgage; 6, that an account stated or settled is correct; 7, that every.
writing fairly expresses the intention of the parties thereto; and 8, that the
judgments and decrees of Courts having jurisdiction of the subject-matter are
correct.
Time is a witness in Chancery that what has long been acquiesced in must
originally have been founded on some right this presumption is wholly inde-
:
pendent of the statutes of limitation. 44 Presumptions, also, arise from acqui-

escence 45
§ 445. Amount of Evidence Necessary. Civil causes are determined in —

accordance with the preponderance of the proofs. The party upon whom the
burden of proof rests must introduce sufficient evidence to satisfy the mind of
an impartial Judge that the fact he alleges is probably true. 46 Courts proceed
upon the preponderance of probabilities; and a mere preponderance of evi-
dence, however slight, must necessarily turn the scale. 47 If a party is chargei
with a great moral wrong, he may introduce evidence of his good character,
and invoke the legal presumption of innocence. 48
There are, in almost every suit, certain presumptions of law which are in the
42 Greenl. Ev., § 14: Best on Presump., 4-20; 1 Bowman, 5 Pick., 132. Hughes' Instructions to
Phillips Ev., 599; 2 Whart. Ev., § 1237. Presumptio Juries, § 382. Preponderance of testimony is not
ex eo quod plerumque fit. (A presumption arises of measured by a mere numerical preponderance of
that which generally happens.) witnesses, but by the" weight, credit, and_ value of
43 Stabit presumptio donee probetur in contrari- the aggregated testimony on the respective sides.
um. (The presumption will stand good until the Coles v. Wrecker, 2 Shan. Cas., 341. Ponderantur
contrary is proved.) testes non numerantur. (Witnesses are weighed not
44 See, ante, § 70. counted.) Dignioribus est credendum. (The most
45 See, ante, § 68. worthy are to be believed.) The preponderance is
46 Hamilton v. Zimmerman,
5 Sneed, 44. ascertained by considering the weighty credit and
47 Hills v. Goodyear, Lea, 233; Harding o.
4 value of the evidence on each side. Hills V. Good-
Waters, 6 Lea. 329; Chapman
V. McAdams, 1 Lea, year, 4 Lea, 233.
500; Gage v. Railway Co., 4 Pick., 724;, McBee V. 48 McBee V. Bowman, 5 Pick., 132.
365 EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY.. §446
nature of evidence, and must be overcome by evidence, before there can be
even an equiponderance of evidence. These presumptions have created, what
is sometimes termed, exceptions to the general rule that a mere preponderance
of evidence is sufficient in civil cases. When, however, it is considered that
these presumptions stand for evidence, it will be seen that they constitute no
exception to the rule. 49 Presumptions vary in cogency from the slight to the
indisputable, or conclusive; but inasmuch as conclusive, or indisputable, pre-
sumptions necessarily shut out all proof, and make evidence absolutely inad-
missible, it follows that only disputable presumptions of law can be met an.
overcome by evidence. In the absence of any other evidence, these presump-
tions are plenary proof of the fact presumed; and will sustain a decree as
effectually as though the fact presumed had been proven by parol, or written,
evidence. It follows, therefore, that when a disputable presumption of law
exists in a lawsuit, it throws the burden of proof on the party who disputes the
presumption. This burden varies in degree from the very weak to the very
strong; presumptions, like witnesses, or other proofs, differing in cogency,
some being easily overcome, and others being almost conclusive.
"When, therefore, we read in the books that, in various cases, such as suits to
reform writings, to set up a resulting trust, to have a deed declared a mort-
gage, and the like, a mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice, nothing
more is meant than that a mere preponderance of evidence on the side of the
complainant will not overcome the defendant's evidence, reinforced, as tho
latter is, by a presumption of law in favor of the writing assailed. 50 If, how-
ever, the complainant 's evidence outweighs both the presumption and the other
evidence in favor of the defendant, then the complainant has made out his
case, even though the preponderance in his favor be very slight; and this is
true, whatever the character of the suit, and howsoever strong the presumption
to be overcome. 51 In ascertaining the preponderance of evidence, in any case
where a presumption exists, such presumption will equal in weight so nnich of
the adverse evidence as is necessary to neutralize the presumption.
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule, without exception, that
treating presumptions as evidence, the complainant will be entitled to a decree
when he makes out his case by a preponderance of evidence, however slight. 52
In this connection, it must not be forgotten that there are presumptions in the
complainant's favor, as well as presumptions against him; and when a pre-
sumption arises in favor of the complainant, it throws the burden of the proof
on the defendant, as to the fact presumed. 53
§ 446. The Probative Force of Court Records.—A Court record is some-
4!) Disputable presumptions of law are witnesses; 52 Bennett v. Mass. M. L. Ins. Co., 23 Pick.,
and, like other witnesses, vary in probative force, 371,
citing the above section, then § 447.
from very weak to very strong. All disputable pre- 53 Supposing that 100 chances (the whole
sumptions are based on the probabilities of the hap- num-
ber) equals certainty, then any number of chances
pening of the thing presumed. If the probabilities less than 50 equals possibility, and any number
are weak, the presumption is proportionately weak;
more than 50 equals probability. The nearer the
if they are strong, the presumption is proportionately
number of chances that an allegation is true ap-
strong. But these probabilities have no reference to proaches 50, the nearer the possibility of its truth
the particular fact presumed: they have reference to
approaches probability; and the nearer" the number
the happening of such fact, as a rule, that is, gen-
of chances, over 50, approaches 100, the nearer the
erally, or in a majority of cases; and, because it
probability of its truth approaches certainty. Thus,
happens that way generally, or in a majority of
cases, we infer, in the absence of contrary proof,
the possible gradually takes on the color and sub-
that it has happened_ that way in the particular case stance of the probable as the number of chances of
in question ;
—
and this general inference is termed a
presumption, and is sufficient proof of the fact pre-
the allegation being true increases; and when that
number reaches 51 out of the 100, then the possible
is merged into the probable; and as the
sumed, when there is no sufficient actual evidence to number of
the contrary. Presumptio ex eo quod pterumque fit. chances that the allegation is true increases from 51
t
(A presumption arises from that which happens very to 100, so the probable takes on the color and sub-
often. stance of the certain; and when the number of
50 The presumption in favor of the correctness of chances reaches 100, then the probable is merged
a writing may be greatly weakened by interlinea- into the certain. So, in a suit in Court, whenever
tions, erasures, bad penmanship, gross illiteracy, or the complainant shows by proof that there are over
other defects upon its face not fully explained, and, 50 chances out of the 100 that his contention is true,
also, by circumstances of secrecy, haste, collusion or then his contention is probable, and he is entitled to
imposition attending its execution. have it considered proved, and entitled to a decree
51 Stone v. Manning, 19 Pick., 232, citing the accordingly. When over 50 out of the 100 chances
above section of this book, then § 447. thus favor any proposition then there arises a pre-
sumption or inference that the proposition is true.
§447 EVIDENCE IN CHANCERY. 366
times offered in evidence to show what one or the other of the parties stated
in his pleading, or in some affidavit or deposition in the cause, and is then used
mainly for purposes of contradiction or of estoppel. But the probative force
of a Court record is, ordinarily, contained in the judgment or decree. A judg-
ment or decree imports absolutely verity, 13 and is conclusive on the parties,
and on all claiming under them; and when offered in evidence cannot be as-
sailed or discredited by proof outside of the record containing it; but, if at-
tacked at all, must be attacked because of some infirmity appearing in the rec-
ord itself, or by another decree declaring it to be void. 14
As to their efficacy and probative force, judgments and decrees are of three
sorts
1. Valid Judgments and Decrees, being those based on jurisdiction of both the
subject-matter and the person, and justified by the pleadings and proofs, or the
consent of the parties they are proof against direct attacks by appeals or writ
:
of error, or by bill in Chancery, and, of course, also, against collateral attacks. iS

2. Voidable Judgments and Decrees, being those which are valid on their face,
and, therefore, proof against collateral attack, but are reversible on direct at-
tack by appeal or writ of error, or by bill in Chancery. 16
3. Void Judgments and Decrees, being those that appear on the face of the
record itself to have been rendered without jurisdiction of the parties or the
subject-matter, or without being justified by the pleadings, or the consent of
parties. Void judgments have no efficacy or probative force, and yield to col-
lateral attack. 17
In a valid decree the Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-
matter, and the decree is justified 18 by the pleadings, or by the consent of the
parties, such consent appearing in the record. In a voidable decree, the record
falsely shows jurisdiction of parties and subject-matter, or such consent, if the
decree is at variance with the pleadings, no fatal infirmity being disclosed in
the record itself and this is why it is invulnerable to collateral attack. Where-
:
as, a record containing a void decree discloses its fatal infirmity on its face,
shows a want of jurisdiction of parties or subject-matter, or a decree at vari-
ance with the pleadings and not consented to by the parties in interest.
§ 447. Amount of Evidence Necessary to Vary, or Annul, Writings or Rec-
—
ords. In all civil suits, in the absence of a statute prescribing the quantum 54 of
proof, a preponderance of probabilities prevails, however slight such prepon-
derance may be. 55 It is sometimes said that to vary, reform, or rescind, a set-
tled or stated account, or a written instrument, or a judgment or decree of a
Court, on the ground of fraud, accident, or mistake, or to have a deed declared
a mortgage, or to set up a trust, by parol evidence, such evidence must be of
the clearest and most convincing nature 56 but, if the writing, or decree, itself,
;
be considered a witness, and is given the degree of probative force to which it
13 Judicium semper pro veritate accipitur. ( pleadings when not at all justified by the proof:
judgment is always taken to be the truth.) Russell Such a decree, while correctible in the Supreme
V. Houston, 7 Cates, 536. Court, is absolutely impregnable to attack when
14 It can be shown by a supplement to the record offered in evidence. On a collateral attack no evi-
that the decree has been reversed in the Supreme dence can be looked at, whether it is in the record
Court. A final decree in an ejectment suit in Chan- or out of it. -The decree is judged of by the plead-
cery and the entries on the rule docket are admis- ings, process and its own contents; and, unless these
sible in evidence, when it is shown that the papers show that the decree is void, it is valid in every
in the case are lost. Russell v. Houston, 7 Cates, Court when offered in evidence. Kindell V. Titus,
536.' See, post, §§564-565; and especially §619, 9 Heisk., 727; Campbell V. Bryant, 2 Shan. Cas.,
note 3. The decree alone should beconclusive, un- 146; Freeman on Judgts., §§ 120; 124.
less the partyobjecting to it produces competent
54 If a statute prescribes the quantum of proof,
evidence to nullify or impair it. The presumption
the Court cannot find the fact on less evidence than
is in favor of the decree, and a presumption needs
that prescribed. Simmons Leonard, 7 Pick., 194.
V.
no corroboration until impeached by competent evi-
dence, bee, ante, § 445.
Thus deeds and and agreements with-
wills of realty
15 See, post, §§ 564-565; 814, note 43. in the statute of frauds, must be proved as pre-
16 Such judgments and decrees are sometimes scribed by the statute.
miscalled "void"; but they are as efficacious as valid 55 Hills v. Goodyear, 4 Lea, 233.
—
judgments and decrees, indeed, are valid until re-
versed by direct attack. See, post, § 814, note 43.
58 Wray v. Cutter, 12 Heisk., 28; Hall V. Fowlkes,
9 Heisk., 753; Haynes V. Swan, 6 Heisk., 560;
17 Ibid. Holder v. Nunnelly, 2 Cold., 288; McCammon v.
18 A decree may be abundantly justified by the Pettitt, 2 Sneed, 242; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §862.
isentitled under all the circumstances, then the general rule of preponderance
oi'probabilities will prevail. 57 When relations of trust and confidence exist
between the parties to a written instrument, and in cases where the parties do
not deal upon an equality, less proof is needed to overcome the writing, or
decree. 58
In a suit to set up a resulting trust, if the money is proved to have been paid
by A, and the legal title is taken in the name of a stranger, the Court will pre-
sume a resulting trust in favor of A
but if the title be taken to a wife, child,
;
or other person for whom A

is morally bound to provide, the Court will pre-
sume that it was a provision, advancement, or gift: either of these presump-
tions will, however, yield to satisfactory contrary proof. 59
§ 448. —
Fraud Proved by Circumstances. Fraud is seldom established by
direct and positive proof, and such proof is not necessary. Generally, the first
effort of a man, who intends to commit a fraud, is to throw a veil over the
transaction, to conceal it from discovery, to baffle all attempts at detection,
and to shield it against attack. No man willingly furnishes the proof of his
own turpitude. Fraud is, for this reason, rarely perpetrated openly and in
broad daylight. It is committed in secret, and is usually hedged about by
every guard that can be devised to prevent its discovery and exposure. Its
path is crooked and circuitous, its footprints are carefully covered up, the signs
of its operations are diligently removed, or attempted to be removed, and the
mask of honesty and good faith is put over the face of the real transaction.
For these reasons, fraud is usually proved by circumstantial evidence. 00
In consequence of the abhorrence with which fraud is regarded by Courts
of Conscience, in consequence of the heinousness of the offence, and, in conse-
quence of the artifices, devices and coverings used to conceal it, and to baffle
detection, a wide range of evidence is allowed in proving its existence; and
Courts of Equity do not restrict themselves by the same rigid rules that Courts
of law do, in the investigation of fraud, and in the evidence and proofs required
to establish it. 61
Fraud assumes many shapes, disguises and subterfuges, and is generally so
secretly hatched that it can only be detected by a consideration of facts and
circumstances, which are frequently trivial, remote and disconnected, and
which cannot be interpreted without bringing them together, and contemplat-
ing them all in one view. In order to do this it is necessary to pick one fact or
circumstance here, another there, and a third yonder, until the collection is
complete. Each detached piece of evidence is not, therefore, to be rejected
when offered, because apparently trivial. A
wide latitude of evidence is
allowed; and if a fact or circumstance relates directly, or indirectly, to the
transaction, it is admissible, however weak or slight it may be, its relevance
depending, not upon its weight or force, but upon its bearing or tendency. 62
57 See the reasoning of Judge Cooper, in Hills V. itsslime, by which it may be traced." This charge
Goodyear, 4 Lea, 233. was sustained by the Supreme Court, and has often
58 bnell v. FJam, 2 Heisk., 88. been quoted approvingly. Harris v. Smith, 2 Cold.,
59 Dudley V. Dodsworth, 10 Hum., 12; Pillow v. 308. Fraud is usually hatched in secret, in arbore
Thomas, 1 Bax., 120; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1037-1041; cava et opaca. Bump, Fraud. Conv., 31.
2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 1201-1205; 1 Perry on Trusts, 61 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 190; Bump, Fraud. Conv., 579;
§§ 133-150. Wait on Fraud. Conv., § 281.
60 Bump, on Fraud. Conv., 600; Wait on Fraud 62 Bump, Fraud. Conv., 579; 1 Wharton on Ev.,
Conv., §§ 6, 17, 13, 224; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 188. See § 33, note. The proof of fraud, usually, consists of
Article on Fraudulent Conveyances, post, §§ 1009- many items of evidence, which, standing detached
1017. Smith v. Harrison, 2 Heisk., 243. In charg- and alone, would be immaterial but which, in con-
;
ing the jury, in the case of Floyd v. Goodwin, 8 nection with others, tend to illustrate, and shed light
Yerg., 490, the Circuit Judge said: "In most in- upon, the character of the transaction, and show
stances, the evidence of fraud must be gathered the position of the parties, and their motives, con-
more from the circumstances attending the transac- duct, and relation to each other. Qua singula non
tion, than upon tangible proof; such things are not prosunt, juncta juvant. Circumstances may stamp
generally told or done openly. Lord Coke says, It upon a transaction the indelible marks of fraud, and
is hatched in secret; and another great man has are quite as reliable as positive evidence. Bump,
gone further, and says, It is hatched in the hollow Fraud. Conv., 601. The evidences of fraud are of-
of a tree. It, therefore, has to be ferreted out by ten so intangible and indistinct yet so convincing
carefully following its marks and signs; for fraud that Chancellors are said sometimes to smell it
will, in most instances, though never so artfully and rather than see it.
secretlv contrived, like the snail in its Dassaire. leave
§449 Evidence; in chancery. 368
Issues of fact in civil cases are determined by a preponderance of testimony
and the rule applies as well to cases in which fraud is imputed as to any other
and if the evidence is of sufficient force to produce a preponderance of assent
in favor of the allegation of fraud, that is all that the law requires, and the
fraud will be deemed proved, although there be some doubt of its existence. 63
The Court of Chancery is the arch enemy of fraud and to that Court those ;
who are the victims of bad faith generally apply for redress, not only because
the Chancery Court can grant more perfect relief, but, also, because it wiJl .
often grant that relief upon weaker presumptive evidence than will a Court of
law. 64 Where the Court can pronounce a decree that will place each of the
parties in substantially as good a condition as they were in respectively at the
time the alleged fraud was committed, it will act upon less evidence than would
ordinarily be required to support a verdict. 65
§ 449. When Fraud —
Will be Presumed. It is often said, that fraud will not
66
be presumed : nothing more is meant than that fraud will not be pre-
by this
sumed merely because it is alleged. 67 When, however, certain states of facts
are once shown to exist, a presumption of fraud will arise sufficiently strong
to throw on the defendant the burden of proving that there was nothing fraud-
< lent, or inequitable, in the transaction sought to be impeached. 68 Among these
i
states of facts, the following are the most common

1. "Where Confidence Has Been Violated. When an advantageous conveyance.
contract, or gift, is obtained from another by a person standing to him in a
relation of trust and confidence, as in case of advantageous conveyances, con-
tracts, and gifts, obtained by guardians from wards, attorneys from clients,
trustees from beneficiaries, agents from principals, parents from their children,
physicians from patients, priests from parishioners, the trusted from the trust-
ing, in any and all such cases, on the relationship and advantage being proved,
fraud will be presumed. 69
2. Where a Trustee Deals With Himself. When a person acting in a fiduciary
capacity, directly or indirectly deals with himself for his private and personal
benefit, as when a trustee, administrator, guardian, agent, or sheriff, sells
property to himself, or makes a personal profit out of a transaction by him in
his fiduciary capacity, in any and all such cases, fraud will be presumed. 70
3. Where the Consideration is Shockingly Inadequate. Where the consideration
paid, or promised, is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, espec-
63 Bump, Fraud. Conv., 605. 66 Presumption and inference are sometimes con-
Smith v. Harrison, 2 Heisk., 243; 3 Greenl. Ev.,
64 founded. Fraud can always be inferred from facts
§254; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 190. and circumstances proved; indeed, it is seldom di-
65 The reason a Court of Equity will presume rectly proved, and is nearly always inferred. What
fraud, when a Court of law will not, is this: When is meant by "badges of fraud," is, certain signs by
a Court of law finds fraud, it is incapable of restor- means of which fraud is inferred. See, post, § 1010.
ing the parties to their original condition, and of 67 Wait on Fraud. Conv., § 7.
giving to each his own: it simply destroys the con- 68 See, post, § 1011.
tract, and often leaves the defendant poorer, and 69 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 955-963; Birdsong v. Bird-
the plaintiff richer, than they were at the making of song, 2 Head, 297; Bayliss v. Williams, 6 Cold.,
of the contract; and, thus, a judgment at law will, 440; Martin v. Martin, 9 Heisk., 644.
sometimes, put the plaintiff in a better position, and Where fiduciary or confidential relations exist
the defendant in a worse position, than strict justice between the complainant and the defendant, and the
will justify. On the other hand, a Court of Equity, bill alleges that the latter took advantage of that re-
while doing full justice to the complainant, requires lation to obtain an unfair bargain, on proof of the
him to do full justice to the defendant; and when relation, the burden of proof is, at once, shifted to
.
a contract is rescinded, on the ground of fraud, by the shoulders of the defendant; and he must satisfy
a Court of Chancery, on complaint of the person the Court that he acted in good faith. The great
defrauded, the defendant is restored to all of his principle, by which Courts of Equity are governed,
original rights; and, if he has paid the complainant in such cases, is: That he who obtains an advan-
any money, or has otherwise benefitted the com- tageous bargain, from a person placing confidence
plainant, the Court will make him whole. In short, in him, is bound to show that no undue advantage
the Chancery Court can, and will, so adjust the was taken of that confidence ; and the burden of
rights of the parties, that a recission of the contract, proof is devolved on him to establish, affirmatively,
on the ground of fraud, will give each of the parties the perfect fairness, adequacy, and Equity of his
his exact dues; and, for this reason, the Court will claims. This rule applies to parents, guardians,
often find fraud, on comparatively slight evidence, trustees, pastors, attorneys, physicians, and all others
well knowing that such a finding can do the de- standing in confidential relations with those with
fendant no great harm; whereas, a failure to find whom they bargain. 3 Greenl. Ev., § 253. See,
fraud, would ruin the complainant. But, where ante, § 46.
parties cannot be placed in statu quo, the evidence 70 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §958; Collins v. Smith, 1
of fraud should be as clear in a Court of Equity as Head, 256.

in a Court of law.
iallywhen accompanied by other inequitable circumstances, such as (1) con-
cealments, misrepresentations, undue advantage or oppression on the part of
the person obtaining the benefit, or (2) ignorance, weakness of mind, sickness,
old age, incapacity or pecuniary necessity, on the part of the other party, in
such cases, fraud is presumed. 71
4. of Weak Mind is Imposed On. Where a very advantageous
Where a Person
bargain, or a very valuable gift, is obtained from a person of great mental
weakness, especially when accompanied with other inequitable circumstances
72
similar to those in the preceding paragraph, fraud is presumed.
5. Where Gifts by Debtors Injure Their Creditors. Where the debtor makes a
voluntary conveyance of his estate, or of any part thereof, without leaving
enough in his hands to satisfy his creditors, fraud is presumed. 73 Equity re-
quires a man to be just before it allows him to be generous.
6. Where Property is Held in Trust for an Insolvent Debtor. Where a debtor,
against whom an execution has been returned unsatisfied, has property, or
money, held in trust for him, fraud is presumed, except where the considera-
tion proceeded from a third person, and the trust is evidenced by will duly
recorded, or deed duly registered. 74
7. Where Misrepresentations Have Misled. When the misrepresentations made
by the defendant were of such a character as would naturally induce any ordi-
nary person to act upon them, and the complainant did act upon them to his
detriment, then the defendant will be presumed to have made the misrepresen-
tation to induce the complainant so to act. 75
§ 450. —
Inspection in Aid of Proof. Although Courts of Chancery determine
every matter by written or printed evidence, nevertheless, when the subject-
matter of the evidence can be readily produced in Court, and is of a character
to elucidate the evidence, the Chancellor will order the production of such sub-
jects before him, for his better satisfaction as to the truth. 76 Thus, he will (1)
order an infant to be produced in Court for satisfactory proof of its existence,
age, and discretion; or, (2) will order an original document, or book, to be
produced, in order to ascertain its genuineness, and integrity, or its age, or
meaning, or precise state, and character; or, (3) will require models, machines,
and patented articles to be brought into Court, especially when a comparison
becomes important; and, (4) where the subject is immovable; 77 or, (5) where
the inspection of the inside of a house, or of a room, or of a lot or tract of land,
is necessary to enable the party out of possession to make proper proof, the
Court will order the party in possession to permit an inspection by witnesses. 78
§ 451. What Matters the Chancellor Cannot Consider. Solicitors are some- —
times not clear as to what matters a Chancellor can or cannot consider, in de-
termining the facts of a case and the following general rules are given on this
;
subject
1. Evidence as to Matters Not Alleged in the Pleadings cannot be considered by
the Chancellor, 79 no matter how good a cause of action they indicate, or how
strong a defence they present. The Chancellor can no more make a decree on
proof not justified by the pleadings than on pleadings not justified by the
proof. 80
71 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 927-928; Wright V. Wilson, 75 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 880.
2 Yerg., 296; Hardeman v. Barge, 10 Yerg., 204; 76 Sometimes, on motion, the Chancellor will order
Birdsong V. Birdsong, 2 Head, 291 Merriman v.
; an original document to be sent up to the Supreme
Lacefield, 4 Heisk., 219; Meath v. Porter, 9 Heisk., Court on appeal. See Ross v. Scott & Russell, 15
227.
72 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §947; Gass ». Mason, 4 77 3 Greenl. Ev., §§ 328-329; Gresl. Eq. Ev.,
Sneed, 506; Craddock v. Cabiness. 1 Swan, 474; 449-455.
Walker v, McCoy, 3 Head, 106; Parrott v. Parrott, 78 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1663.
1 Heisk., 687: King, «. Cohoon, 6 Yerg., 75; Tally 79 Kelley «. Fletcher, 10 Pick., 1.
». Smith, 1 Cold., 291; Knox v. Haralson, 2 Tenn. A
80 decree must stand on two feet, one foot
Ch., 236. supported by the pleadings, the other foot by the
73 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 972. proof. A decree on proof alone is coram non judice
74 Code, §4283; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §1042; 1 and void. See, post, % 555, note 4.
Meigs' Dig., p. 676.
§452 WHEN PROOF IS NECESSARY. 370
2. His Own Knowledge of the Pacts cannot be considered by the Chancellor,
any more than a juror can take into consideration his own personal knowledge
of facts pertinent to the case. Every suit must be determined on the facts
found in the record of the cause. The Chancellor's private knowledge of facts
is the knowledge of the man, and not the knowledge of the officer. 81 Were the
rule otherwise, the Chancellor might decide the case on a state of facts that
would not appear in the transcript on appeal, and would, therefore, be un-
known to the Supreme Court.
3. His Own Knowledge
of the Character of a Witness cannot be regarded by
him. If the party most concerned is content to allow a man of bad reputation
to testify, without proving his reputation, it is not for the Chancellor to im-
peach the witness by his own private knowledge of his character. On the other
hand, the Chancellor cannot prefer the testimony of a witness, because of his
personal knowledge of his integrity. The tests of a witness' credibility must
be found in his deposition, or elsewhere in the record.
4. That One of the Parties is Poor, or is a Woman, or is TJnf ortunate, is a matter
that the Chancellor cannot consider. As a man, he may and must commiserate
the poor and the unfortunate but if, as a Judge, he took such matters into con-
;
sideration, he would not only sink the Judge into the man, but would be guilty
of deciding the cause according to favor and affection. Such conduct would
not only be grossly partial, but would savor of corruption and oppression. A
Judge is sworn to determine causes by his head, and by a cool head at that, and
not by the sympathies of his heart. 82
5. What Does Not Appear in the Record Does Not Exist, so far as the Court is
Concemed,83 except as to matters that are judicially known and this funda- ;
mental rule has no exceptions, and it includes the three rules already given.
Nor should the Chancellor allow a Solicitor in his argument to allude to mat-
ters not in the record such allusions necessarily imply that the Solicitor either
;
does not know his own duty or thinks that the Chancellor does not know his,
;
and can be swayed by undue influences.
ARTICLE II.
WHEN PROOF IS, AND IS NOT, NECESSARY.
§ 452. What Need Not be Proved. § 455. What Facts are in Issue.
§ 453. When Evidence by the Complainant § 456. What is in Issue Upon a Plea.
is Not Necessary. § 457. What is in Issue Upon an Answer.
§ 454. When Evidence by the Defendant is
Not Necessary.
§ 452. —
What Need Not be Proved. Often a great deal of unnecessary evi-
dence injected into the record of a litigation. To aid the inexperienced
is
Solicitor in determining what need not be proved, the following summary of
rules is given
1. Whatever is Not Put in Issue by the Pleadings Need Not be Proved. Evidence
as to matters not in issue is immaterial, irrelevant, impertinent, and illegal:
the Court will reject such evidence on objection being made to it; and will dis-
81 Non refert quid notum sit judici, si notwm non cording to the sympathies of his heart or the in-
sitin forma judicii. See, ante, § 62, sub-sec, 1. clinations of his feelings. If his heart prompt him
82 The Judge is sworn "to administer justice to aid the unfortunate, let him do so by contributing
without respect of persons, and impartially to dis- from his own pocketbook, and not by forcing a liti-
charge all the duties incumbent on him, as a Judge, gant to contribute.
to the best of his skill and ability." Code, § 309. 83 Idem est non esse et non apparere. A Judge
Hence, a Judge cannot have "respect of persons," should be near-sighted as to the facts, and see noth-
whether they be male or female, rich or poor, ing outside of the record; but should be far-sighted
friends or foes; and he must decide controversies as to the law, and see all the law applicable to the
"to the best of his skill and ability," and not ac- case. See, ante, § 62, sub-sec, 1.
371 WHEN PROOF IS NECESSARY. §453
regard it, as mere worthless rubbish, if not objected to. The sole object of 1
evidence is to prove what the pleadings show to be in dispute, and thus enable
the Court to determine the controversy. No decree can be based on evidence
as to matters not alleged in the pleadings. 2
2. What is Judicially Known to the Court Need Not he Proved.3 This judicial
knowledge includes our form of government, National and State f the Constitu-
tion and public laws of the United States, and of our own State
4 the general
;
officers of these two governments the main facts in the public history of the
;
two governments; the main geographical facts of the United States, and of
this State the subdivisions of the State, its counties, towns, rivers, and general
;
geography the officials of the county where the Court is sitting the religion
; ;
and general customs of the people their language and the meaning of words
;
the rules of grammar and arithmetic and a great multitude of other matters,
;
which every well-informed citizen of the State is presumed to know. 5

3. Whatever is Admitted in the Pleadings, Expressly or by Necessary Implication,
Need Not be Proved. If a defendant confesses and avoids, the complainant need
not prove his cause of action; he must confine his efforts to resisting the de-
fence set up. "What a plea does not deny it admits, by necessary implication
and the complainant need concern himself only as to the issue raised by the
plea.
4. Whatever is Admitted by Written Agreement of the Parties Need Not be
Proved. Such admissions are absolutely conclusive, and partake of the nature
of solemn admissions of record. Neither will the Court hear evidence to ex-
plain, or vary, such an agreement.
When Evidence by the Complainant is Not Necessary. No evidence
§ 453. —
isnecessary to sustain the bill
1. Where the bill has been taken for confessed against an adult defendant,
not non compos, who has been served with subpoena, or who has voluntarily
entered his appearance, or who has been brought into Court by attachment of
his property and publication. 6
2. Where the answer confesses the Equity of the bill, and sets up new matter
in avoidance of that Equity. But after the matter in defence is proved, the
complainant must rebut it.
3. Where the foundation of the suit is a written contract, note, or other in-
strument, and the execution thereof is not denied under oath. 7
§ 454. When
Evidence by the Defendant is Not Necessary. The defendant —
is make any proof
not required to
1. Where no relief is prayed against him; as where he is made a party be-
cause an officer of the law having process, or is made a defendant as officer of
a corporation whose sworn answer is called for, or is made a party as a mere
agent, or otherwise, no decree being sought against him.
2. Where he disclaims, and no attempt is made to show that he has been set-
ting up any claim to the property involved in the suit, or exercising any acts
of ownership over it.
3. Where he has denied the material allegations of the bill, and none of them
have been sustained by proof.
4. Where, though some relief, may be prayed against him, he does not seek
1 Non potest probari quod probatum non reUvat.. (What is known [judicially] to the Court needs not
(That cannot be proved, which, when proved, is the aid of witnesses.)
irrelevant.) 4 But the laws of another State must be proved,
2 Shaw v. Patterson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 171; Henderson as any other fact, or they will be presumed to be
V. Bigham,' 12 Heisk., 58; Rogers v, Breen, 9 Heisk., the same as the laws of our own State. Bagwell v
679; Bedford v. Williams, 5 Cold., 207. But in the McTighe, 1 Pick., 618; Templeton v. Brown, 2 Pick.,
Chancery Court, it is not necessary in order to put a S3. Prossumitur Judex habere omnia jura in scrinio
matter in issue that it shall be alleged by one party pectoris sui. (A Judge is presumed to have all the
and denied by the other, for a matter in avoidance laws in the book-case of his breast.)
alleged in the answer is in issue, as is a matter 5 1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 4-6a.
alleged iri the bill and neither denied nor admitted 6 Ante, § 206.
in the answer. 7 Code, § 3777.
3 Quod constat Curia opere testium non indiset.
455 WHEN PROOF IS NECESSARY. 372
to dispute the complainant 's right thereto, and is willing he may have the relief
he prays.
5. When he has, by his answer, admitted the material allegations of the bill,
or the bill has been taken for confessed by him. In the latter case, however, if
the bill pray an account, the defendant may, and should, introduce his evidence
before the Master at the taking of the account. 8
§ 455. —
What Facts are in Issue. The object of pleadings is, (1) to notify
the opposite party what matters will be offered in evidence; and (2) to inform
the Court what matters are submitted to its adjudication. It is, therefore, (l'j
a fundamental rule of pleading that no facts are in issue, unless they are al-
leged in the pleadings; and (2) it is a fundamental rule of evidence that no
proof is admissible, unless it relates to the facts alleged in the pleadings. 9 The
Court cannot notice matter, however clearly proved, unless it be alleged in the
pleadings 10 and omissions in the allegations of the bill cannot be supplied b y
;
evidence. 11
It may be laid down as an indisputable proposition, that whatever facts are
necessary to entitle a complainant to a decree, or to enable the defendant to
sustain the defence in avoidance by him set up, must be proved, unless they
are admitted by the other party. 12 In strictness, any fact alleged by one side
and admitted by the other, in their respective pleadings, is not in issue, and
need not be proved, whether the admission be express, or constructive. 13 Any
matter alleged in the bill, and neither admitted nor denied in the answer, must
be proved. 14
§ 456. What is in Issue upon a Plea. —A
plea in bar admits every material
allegation of the bill not covered by the plea. This is necessarily so from the
fact that the complainant is entitled to an answer to every allegation and
charge contained in the bill and so much of the bill as the defendant does not
;
dispute by his plea, is deemed admitted, for all the purposes of the issue made
by the plea. 15 On the argument of a plea in bar, every fact stated in the bill,
and not denied by the averments in the plea, and by the supporting answer, if
any, must be taken as true 16 and so, when a replication is filed to a plea, the
;
complainant need not prove the truth of such of his allegations as are not de-
nied by the plea. The only facts in issue, and on which proof need be taken,
are those put in issue by the plea. Thus, if the statute of frauds is pleaded to
a bill for a specific performance, the agreement not being alleged in the bill to
be in writing, nothing is in issue except the existence of a written agreement,
the balance of the bill being admitted. So, if such a bill allege the agreement
to be in writing, and a negative plea is filed denying that allegation, the only
matter in issue is whether the agreement is, in fact, in writing, all the other
racts alleged in the bill being admitted. Hence, the rule may be laid down
that on the trial of a plea in bar, nothing is in issue but the truth of the plea
if the plea be affirmative, the burden of proof is on the defendant if the plea ;
be negative, the burden of proof is on the complainant. 17
8 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 525, note. 14 Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch.,
9 Gres. Eq. Ev., 229. Mr. Gresley says that all 603. and cases there cited; Bank V. Jefferson, 8
evidence is impertinent when it relates to (1) mat- Pick., 537; Nichols V. Cecil, 22 Pick., 455. In some
ters not in issue; (2) matters admitted in the plead- of the States, all facts well alleged in the bill, and
ings; (3) matters that are immaterial, and (4) mat- not denied, or explained, in the answer, are deemed
ters that are needlessly prolix. Ibid, 229-246. admitted. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 837, note 4. This is the
10 Sheratz v. Nicodemus, 7 Yerg., 9; Bedford v. rule in our Circuit Courts. Code, § 2910; and it is
Williams, 5 Cold., 207; Austin V. Ramsey, 3 Tenn. the true rule. The holding of our Supreme Court
Ch., 121; Johnson v. Luckadoo, 12 Heisk., 273; to the contrary is unfortunate, when the oath of
Turley v. Turley, 1 Pick., 260; Merriman
v. Lace- the defendant is waived; because (1) it, without
field,4 Heisk., 209. reason, makes the law of pleading in Chancery dif-
11 V. Patterson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 174; Wood-
Shaw ferent from that in the Circuit Court; (2) it violates
ward v. Walton, 7 Heisk., 50. The failure of the bill a fundamental rule of pleading; and (3) it encour-
to set up matters in avoidance of a defence cannot ages imperfect and evasive answers. An unsworn
be cured by proof: the proper practice is to amend answer is a mere pleading, and the rule of pleading
the bill and allege the matters in avoidance. See, in the Code, § 2910, should be applied to it.
ante, § 147. 15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 837. See, Code, § 2910.
121 Dan. Ch. Pr., 836. in 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 694.
18 Gres. Eq- Ev., 236. 17 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 837.
373 WHEN PROOF IS NECESSARY. §457
So, on a plea in abatement if the plea brings forward new matter, nothing
:
is in issue but the truth of the new matter ; in which case the burden of proof
is on the defendant if the plea in abatement deny some allegation of fact in
:
the bill, the truth of that allegation is the only matter in issue and, on that ;
issue, the burden of proof rests on the complainant. And, in general, it may be
stated that the rules applicable to the frame^ form and proof, of pleas in bar,
affirmative and negative, apply to the frame, form and proof of pleas in abate-
ment, affirmative and negative.
The admission of the truth of so much of the bill as is not denied by the plea,
or by the plea and supporting answer, when such answer is filed, is called a
constructive admission. 18
§ 457. What is in Issue —
upon an Answer. When a bill has been answered,
every material fact, alleged in the bill and not admitted by the answer, is in
issue. At law, every fact alleged in the declaration, and not denied in the
plea istaken as true 19 but in Chancery, every allegation of fact in the bill not
;
admitted or denied in the answer, must be proved, the failure to admit or deny
being equivalent to a denial. 20
It is a fundamental rule in Chancery, as in the courts of law, that no evi-
dence will be admitted in reference to any matter not noticed in either the
bill, or the answer. 21 For this reason, if a complainant proves a case outside
.of the pleadings, such proof will not entitle him to any decree and if, on the ;
other hand, the defendant proves a defence, outside of the issues raised by the
pleadings, such a defence will not profit him, 22 except the defence be that of
champerty.
If the defence consists in a denial of the material allegations of the bill, then
the truth of those allegations is the main issue, and the burden of proof is on
the complainant if the defence consists of matters in avoidance, then the truth
;
of those matters is the main issue, and the burden of proof is on the defendant. 23
It must be kept in mind, however, that evidence of particular facts may be
given under an allegation of the general fact; thus, where the character of an
individual, or his general behavior, or the state of his mind, is charged gener-
ally, evidence of particular facts and acts, bearing directly on the charge, may
be proved. 24 The rule that no evidence will be admitted in support of facts not
mentioned in the pleadings, does not require that the evidence containing those
facts should be mentioned, nor does it require that the materials, of which those
facts consist, should be detailed in the pleadings. 25 And if the facts and cir-
cumstances which constitute a ground of relief be stated, these may be proved,
although the ground of relief be not designated in technical language. 26
18 Ibid. ford, 3 Hay., 271. In such cases, the Court will,
19 Code, § 2910. sometimes, allow the pleadings to be amended, so as
20 Hill V, Walker, 6 Cold., 429; Hardeman v. . to let in the proof. See Article on Amendments.
Burge, 10 Yerg., 202; Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 23 But, if the complainant sets up matters" in
2 Tenn. Ch., 602; Bank v. Jefferson, 8 Pick., 537, avoidance of an anticipated defence, and such de-
citing the above section; Nichols V. Cecil, 22 Pick., fense is made, then, as to such matters, the burden
455; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 837, note. See, ante, §452, of proof is on the complainant. Jenkins V. DeWar,
note 2. 4 Gates, 684; Gross v. Disney, 11 Pick., 592; Sully
21 This subject will be found fully considered in v. Childress, 22 Pick., 109. See, ante, % 147.
the Chapters on Bills and Answers; and the reason 24 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 853.
of the rule there given, requiring parties to allege 25 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 855.
in their pleadings every matter they expect to prove. 26 Weatherhead v. Boyers, 7 Yerg., 545; Bartee v.
Ante, §§ 140-142; 358. The very object of pleading Tompkins, 4 Sneed, 624; Cunningham v. Wood, 4
is to inform the Court of what the charges and the Hum., 417; Cox v. Waggoner, 5 Sneed, 543. In-
defences are; and to notify the opposite side what deed, it is always safe pleading to set out the facts
facts he must meet. on which the pleader relies, whether the pleading
22 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 853. Sappington v. Ruther- be a bill, a plea, or an answer.'
§458 PLEADINGS WHEN EVIDENCE. 374
AKTICLB III.
PLEADINGS WHEN EVIDENCE.

458. Admissions in the Bill. § 461. Answer When Not Evidence for the
459. Admissions in the Answer. Defendant.
460. Answer When Evidence for the De- § 462. When the Bill is Evidence in Behalf
fendant. of the Complainant.
§ 458. —
Admissions in the Bill. The facts, positively and directly alleged in
the are in the nature of admissions by the complainant and the defendant
bill, ;
may use them as such at the hearing. Whether such allegations are true, or
not, is immaterial, they being put forth as true are of the nature of judicial
admissions, for the purposes of that particular trial. If, however, an amended
bill has been filed correcting, or changing, any of the facts alleged in the origi-
nal bill, the original bill cannot be read against the complainant, in so far. as it
has been changed, or corrected, by the amended bill. 1 Where damaging admis-
sions are inadvertently made in a bill, especially in a bill not required to be
sworn to, the Court will, on proper application, allow the bill to be so amended
as to omit, or avoid, or explain, the injurious admission.
§ 459. —
Admissions in the Answer. All admissions in an answer, whether the
answer is under oath or not, are conclusive against the defendant and may be ;
read against him as evidence at the hearing, 2 whether the facts admitted are on
his own personal knowledge, or merely on information and belief. What a de-
fendant states in his answer, on information only, will not be deemed an admis-
sion; but if he answers that he "believes," or is "informed and believes," that
the fact is so, this will be deemed a sufficient admission of the fact, in the ab-
sence of qualifying or contrary clauses for, the general rule is, that what the
;
defendant believes the Court will believe. 3

The answer of one defendant cannot be read against a co-defendant, unless
such co-defendant claims through him whose answer is proposed to be read, or
is a partner, or jointly interested in the transaction in question, or they are
otherwise identified in interest or, unless the answer is adopted, in whole or in
;
part, by the defendant against whom it is read. 4

§ 460. The Answer when Evidence for the Defendant. When the complain- —
ant makes the defendant a witness, by calling for his answer on oath, such
answer is not only evidence in favor of the complainant in so far as it admits
the allegations of the bill, but it is, also, evidence in favor of the defendant, in
so far as it directly and positively denies such allegations, or is otherwise re-
sponsive to the bill. The general rule is, that such an answer is evidence in so
far as it is directly responsive 5 to the allegations and charges made in the bill;
and if it directly and positively denies the material allegations and charges of
the complainant, his bill must be dismissed unless he can overcome the answer,
;
Greenl. Ev., § 275 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 838.

1 3 ; propounds an interrogatory, or makes a
If the bill
Dan. Ch. Pr., 837, note; 846, note; Wilson V.
2 1 charge, and calls on the defendant to answer it, if
Waters, 24 Pick., 398. the answer give the precise information called for,
3 3 Greenl. Ev., § 282; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 840. in whole, or in part, or directly and positively ad-
4 3 Greenl. Ev., §283; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 841; mits or denies the charge, it is responsive. If the
_
Turner v. Collier, 4 Heisk., 95. But see Sawyers answer is, in effect, "yes, but;" or "no,_ but," it is
v. Sawyers, 22 Pick., 597, which holds that the an- responsive in so far as it admits, or denies, but not
swer of one defendant cannot be read against a co- responsive as to the "buts," excuses, explanations,
defendant claiming under him when he had trans- and avoidances, these not having been called for.
ferred the property or interest before he filed his The complainant must take what he called for, but
answer. cannot be compelled to take what he did not call
5 The test of the responsiveness of an answer is; for. The defendant must make out his part of the
Was the response one directly called for by the bill. suit for himself.
If so, it is responsive; if not so, it is not responsive.
575 PLEADINGS WHEN EVIDENCE. §461
(1)by the testimony of two witnesses to the substantial facts, or (2) by one wit-
ness and corroborating circumstances, or (3) by circumstances of greater
weight than the evidence of one witness; or (4) by documentary evidence of
greater weight than one witness. 6 These corroborating circumstances may be
found in the answer itself, or in the evidence in the cause, the corroboration
requisite being only so much as may be necessary to produce a clear preponder-
ance of proof in favor of the complainant. 7
When issues are submitted to a jury, a sworn answer .may be read as evidence
on behalf of the defendant in which case it will be given the same weight it
;
would be entitled to if the issues of fact were submitted to the decision of the
Chancellor. 8
The Weight of a Sworn Answer, as Evidence, is ascertained by the same rules as
are applicable to a deposition, as evidence and if it contain elements that im-
;
pair, or destroy, its effect as credible testimony, it may be overcome by one wit-
ness. The rule, that a sworn answer is equal to one credible witness, does not
prevail
1. Where the answer makes new averments, or brings forward matters in
avoidance, or discharge. 9
2. Where the answer is unreasonable, or contradictory in itself, or sets forth
circumstances corroborative of the bill. 10
3. Where the answer is not direct, positive and unequivocal in its denials, or
explanations. 11
4. Where the answer is on information and belief.
12
5. Where the answer itself shows, or it is apparent from the defendant's sit-
uation, or condition, that, though the answer is positive, he swears to matters
of which he could not have personal knowledge. 13
But the weight of the answer as evidence for the defendant is not to be les-
sened because he is an interested party; 14 nor can the complainant assail the
character of the defendant in order to weaken the effect of his answer. 15
§ 461. The Answer when Not Evidence for the Defendant. The rule that —
an answer is evidence for the defendant has several exceptions, besides those re-
ferred to in the preceding section, the most important of which are the fol-
lowing :
1. Whenthe Oath of the Defendant is Waived by the complainant in his bill,

the answer is entitled to no more weight than the bill as evidence. In such a
case, the answer merely makes an issue. 16
2. Answer of a Corporation merely creates an issue, even when sworn to by
one of its officers. 17
3. Answer in a Divorce Suit, though sworn to, merely creates an issue, 18 both
by operation of the statute, and because of the fact that the bill, also, is re-
quired to be under oath.
4. Whenever the Law Requires a Bill to be Sworn to, as in case of an injunction
6 3 Greenl. Ev., §§289; 354; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 10 Brown Brown, 10 Yerg., 84; Raines v. Tones,
v.
844-848, notes; Overton v. Bigelow, 3 Yerg., 517; 4 Hum., 490; Smith v. Kincaid, 10 Hum., 73.
Bogard V. McClung, 11 Heisk., 113; Baker V. Bar- li Rhea v. Allison, 3 Head, 179.
field, 4 Hum., 514; Smith v. Kincaid, 10 Hum., 73. 12 An answer on information and belief simply
7 Raines v. Jones, 4 Hum., 490. The answer of makes an issue, and may be overcome by a single
the defendant may be overcome by one witness, and witness. McKissick v. Martin, 12 Heisk., 313;
any circumstances which may turn the balance. The Wilkes v. May, 3 Head, 175. See Article on Affi-
corroboration may_ be very slight, for the defendant davits, post, § 788.
is an interested witness. Gres. Eq. Ev., 4-5. 13 Boyd v. Reed, 6 Heisk., 631. On the general
8 Pearce v. Suggs. 1 Pick., 724. question, when one witness will overturn a sworn
9 Alexander v. Wallace, 10 Yerg., 105; Davis V. answer, see Sto. Eq. PL, § 849a, note; 1 Dan. Ch.
Clayton, 5 Hum., 446. In such cases, the burden of Pr., 845-846, notes; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 289.
proof rests on the defendant: but if the matters in 14 3 Greenl. Ev., § 284.
avoidance are a direct and proper response to the 15 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 845, note; Murray v. Johnson,
charges or interrogatories in the bill, then the an- 1 Head, 354.
swer is evidence of those matters. Beech v. Haynes, ie Code, §4317; Lindsley v. James, 3 Cold., 487;
1 Tenn. Ch., 570; Gass V. Simpson, 4 Cold., 288; Dunlap v. Haynes, 4 Heisk., 479; Overton v. Holin-
Walter V. McNabb, 1 Heisk., 703. This rule does shade, 5 Heisk., 683.
not apply where the answer admits the contract 17 Van Wyck v. Norvell, 2 Hum., 192; Smith v.
sued on, but insists it contained other material pro- St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 600.'
vicinnc Ttf^linla hi fV,.i*l OO P;„t- ASt ,..'4-,*..,* +!,«
§462 PEEADINGS WHEN EVIDENCE. 376
bill, then a sworn answer thereto merely creates an issue, and one credible
witness will be sufficient to overturn the denials in the answer. 19
5. Answer of an Infant, or of a Person of Unsound Mind, though called for oil
oath and sworn to, cannot be read as evidence against them. The answers of
infants, and persons of unsound mind, are generally framed and sworn to by
their regular guardians, or their guardians ad litem; and the Court will not hold
them bound by any admissions such guardians may make, and will often order
damaging admissions to be stricken out of their answers. As a rule, the answer
of an infant, or non compos, merely makes an issue of fact on every material alle-
gation of the bill affecting such defendant. 20 The answer of a married woman,
however, may be read against her, if she is not an infant, or of unsound mind. 21
6. When the Answer Sets up Matter in Avoidance it is not evidence for the de-
fendant, as to such matter, because he is not a witness, except in so far as he is
required to answer. "When, therefore, he sets forth in his answer matters in
avoidance, or other matters not referred to in the bill, to that extent his answer
is not responsive, and not, therefore, a deposition, but a mere pleading. 22 Hence,
matters in avoidance set up in an answer must be proved by the defendant and, ;
if he fail to prove them, the complainant will be entitled to a decree. 23

7. When an Answer Required to be on Oath is not properly sworn to it only
makes an issue. 24
8. When a Complainant Answers the Petition of an intervening creditor, his
answer merely makes an issue. 25
§ 462. When the Bill is Evidence in Behalf of the Complainant. Ordinarily, —

a bill is a mere pleading, but, when it is required by statute, or the practice of
the Court, to be sworn to, it partakes of the nature of an affidavit, and has a
probative character. Thus a sworn bill, with proper allegations, will justify a
writ of injunction, attachment, ne exeat or replevin, or the appointment of a
receiver, or administrator, or guardian ad litem, or a publication to bring the
defendant before the Court, the bill in such ease being regarded both as a
pleading and an affidavit.
Ordinarily, a bill when fully met by a sworn answer must be overcome by
two witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstances, 26 for the
sworn answer has the force of a deposition. But if the bill is one required to
he sworn to, and is sworn to, it also, has the force of a deposition, and thus
neutralizes the probative force of the answer: 27 it is witness against witness.
"While this is generally true, nevertheless if the sworn bill be weak and indefi-
nite, or general, in its allegations, or its allegations be sworn to on information
and belief, and especially if sworn to by some one not appearing to know the
facts, its probative force is greatly impaired. 28 And so with the answer. 29 If,
on the other hand, a sworn bill be full, clear and emphatic, and the sworn an-
19 The reason of this rule would seem to include word "resumed," near the close of the opinion,
bills for attachments, ne exeats, and the appoint- should be "received" Carrick v. Prater, 10 Hum.,
ment of receivers, as well as in case of bills for 270.
injunctions. Nevertheless, it has not been so ex- 20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 169; 177; 178; 841.
pressly adjudged. The decisions all refer to injunc- 21 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 185.
tion bills. The reason of this rule is, that where 22 3 Greenl. Ev., 290; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 845, note.
both bill and answer are sworn to, the oath of the 23 3 Greenl. Ev., 290; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 844-846,
complainant neutralizes the oath of the defendant. notes; Napier v. Elam, 6 Yerg., 108; Beech «.
Searcy v. Pannell, Cooke, 110; McLard -v. Linn- Haynes, 1 Tenn. Ch., 569; Davis v. Clayton, 5
ville, 10 Hum., 163; Boyd v. Reed, 6 Heisk., 631; Hum., 446.
Trabue V. Turner, 10 Heisk., 447; Montgomery v. 24 Chester v. Canfield, 25 Shan. Cas., 309. But
Rich., 3 Tenn. Ch., 664. It seems, however, that if see 5 Paige, (N. Y.) 654, construing a similar
a bill required to be under oath, is not based upon statute.
the personal knowledge of the complainant, bxlt 25 Irvine V. Dean, 9 Pick., 346.
merely upon information and belief, and the answer 26 Ante, § 460.
is direct and positive, and on the personal knowledge 2T Searcy v. Pannell, Cooke, 110; McKissick ».
of the defendant, one witness only will not over- Martin, 12 Heisk., 311; Carrick V. Prater, 10 Hum.,
come such an answer. Spurlock V. Fulkes, 1 Swan, 270; Montgomery V. Rich., 3 Tenn., Chy., 664; Mc-
289. The report of this case contains several mis- Lard v. Linnville, 10 Hum., 163. See, also, § 460,
prints. The sentence referred to (pp. 290-291) note 19.
should read: "True, the bill was sworn to, but 28Topp v. White, 12 Heisk., 201; McKissick v.
* * * not upon the personal knowledge of the com- Martin, 12 Heisk., 311; Wilkins v. May, 3 Head,
plainant," etc. See syllabus of the case. The com- 173. See, also, §§ 142; 838; 851-852.
plainant was defendant in the Circuit Court. The 29 Ante, § 460.
377 WHEN PROOF MUST BE FILED. §463
swer weak, indefinte or general, the probative force of such an answer is so
weak that very slight corroboration of the bill will justify a decree. 30 Or, if a
sworn answer be full, clear and responsive, and the sworn bill weak, indefinite,
and general, one witness in behalf of the bill will not justify a decree, unless
he is corroborated. 31 The relative probative force of bills and answers is not
only often decisive at the hearing on the merits, but often decisive, also, in
determining motions to grant or dissolve injunctions, and to appoint receivers.
ARTICLE IV.
WHEN PROOF MUST BE FILED.
§ 463. Steps Preliminary to the Taking of 467. When Documents Will be Ordered to
Proof. be Produced.
§ 464. When a Cause is at Issue. 468. When and How Exhibits Must be
§ 465. The Time Allowed for Taking Proof. Proved.
§ 466. When Documentary Evidence Must be
Filed.
§ 463. Steps Preliminary to the Taking of Proof. As soon as the issue of —

fact is made, each party should narrowly scrutinize the pleadings in order to
ascertain (1) exactly what matters are in issue, and (2) on whom the burden
of proof rests, and (3) in what event, and how, such burden may be cast upon
the other side. The parties must consider not only what must be proved by
each of them, respectively, but, also, how the proof is to be made.
The complainant should consider whether he can risk setting the cause for
hearing, on bill and answer or whether he had better except to the answer, for
;
insufficiency: if he have a pro confesso he should consider whether such pro

confesso is a confession of the bill, or only makes an issue of fact.
The defendant should remember that if his defence is in avoidance, the bur-
den of proof rests upon him, and not upon the complainant. All parties should
be diligent in getting in their evidence, and keep in mind that the cause stands
for hearing at the first term after answer filed.
§ 464. When a Cause is at Issue. —A cause is at issue for the taking of proof
whenever a plea or answer has been filed to the bill by all of the defendants,
or a pro confesso has been entered against those not pleading or answering, and
a replication has been filed to the plea in case a plea is filed, or twenty days have
elapsed since answer filed. The issue usually consists of an allegation of a fact
or facts by one party and a denial of such allegation or allegations by the other
party. The allegation of facts is usually made by the complainant, and the
denial by the defendant but this is not always so the allegation upon which
; ;
the issue is made is sometimes made by the defendant, and the denial is some-
times made by the law. 1 Thus, 1, The defendant may, in his answer, confess the
material allegations in the bill, and set up new affirmative matters in avoid-
ance, in which case the law makes an issue by interposing a denial of these new
matters, and requiring the defendant to establish them by proof; 2, The defend-
ant may, and often does, answer without denying all the material facts alleged
in the bill, in which case, unless the complainant except to the answer for in-
sufficiency, the law interposes a denial, and requires the complainant to prove
30 Rhea v. Allison, 3 Head, 179; Cox v. Wag- the issue is regarded as made in the same way as if
goner, 5 Sneed, 544. a replication had been filed, unless the cause is set
31 Carrick v. Prater, 10 Hum., 270. for hearing expressly on bill and answer. The
l Formerly, a replication to the answer was neces- statute, proprio vigore, operates as a replication filed
sary to put a cause at issue in the Chancery Court, at the end of the time_ allowed for putting in excep-
§ 464 WHEN PROOF MUST BE FILED. 37g
what is neither admitted, nor denied,- in the answer; 3, Where a plea is filed
and the complainant, without filing a replication, takes proof as to its truthful-
ness, or acquiesces in the taking of proof by the defendant as to the truth of his
plea, in such a case, the Court will consider the plea as having been denied
and as being at issue, and will allow a replication to be filed as of a date prior
to the taking of the proof, or will consider such a replication as filed 2 and 4 ;
In those cases, where a pro confesso is not deemed a confession, the law makes
it equivalent to a denial of all the allegations of the bill. 3
It will thus be seen that an issue, for the purpose of taking proof, is ordinarily
made either (1) by the filing of a replication to a plea; or, (2) by an answer-
or, (3) by an order pro confesso for want of a plea, or answer. The filing of ex-
ceptions to an answer for insufficiency does not prevent the taking of proof and ;
for all purposes of taking proof, or otherwise preparing for a hearing, a cause
becomes at issue as soon as an answer is filed, whether the answer be excepted
to or not. 4
The complainant's Solicitor is allowed twenty days, after notice of the filing
of the answer, to put in exceptions to the answer for insufficiency or to set the ;
cause for hearing on bill and answer. If he fail to except, or to set the cause
ior hearing on bill and answer, within that time, the cause becomes at issue. 5
If the complainant put in exceptions to the answer, various steps are taken in
consequence that result in the answer being adjudged sufficient or insufficient
if adjudged sufficient, the cause becomes at issue upon such adjudication being
made; if, however, the answer be adjudged insufficient, the cause does not
become at issue until a sufficient answer has been filed. 6 Hence, the rule may be
stated to be, that a cause is at issue, after answer filed, for the purposes of a
hearing (1) at the end of twenty days after complainant's Solicitor receives
1
notice of the filing of the answer, unless within that time he excepts to the
answer and (2) if he excepts, then the cause is at issue for the purposes of a
;
hearing whenever the exceptions are finally disallowed; or (3) if the exceptions
are allowed, then the cause is at issue, and stands for trial whenever a sufficient
answer is filed. 7
A
pro confesso makes an issue as against all defendants who are (1) infants,
(2) persons of unsound mind, (3) executors, (4) administrators, (5) defendants
to divorce bills, (6) defendants to bills without attachment of property who
are non-residents, and (7) defendants whose names and residences are un-
known the issue in all such cases being the same as though the allegations of
;
the bill had' been denied by an answer not sworn to. 8

A
cause is, also, at issue for the purposes of taking proof, and also of a
hearing, at the return term of the process on which a pro confesso is taken
against a defendant for failure to make defences, when duly brought into Court
(1) by service of subpoena, or (2) by publication, or (3) by attachment and
publication. In all other cases where a pro confesso is taken, the cause stands
for hearing at the next term after the bill is taken for confessed. 9
If time is granted a defendant to plead, or answer, "so as not to delay," such
a grant has the same effect as though a plea or answer was then filed and the ;
cause is then at issue for all the purposes of taking and filing proof.
When a cause is set down by the complainant for hearing on bill and answer,
it is not deemed at issue for the purpose of taking proof; but the complainant,
by such act, is deemed to admit everything alleged in the answer, and to acqui-
esce in the truth of the defendant's denials, thus rendering the taking of proof
wholly unnecessary. 10
1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 834; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 252.
2 5 Code, §§ 4322; 4328; 4401; 4430; 4432.
Code, §§4371; 4373.
3 6 The procedure on exceptions to answers has
i Code, §4406; Ch. Rule, I, §6, post, §1190. heretofore been stated. Ante, §§ 420-424.
Code, § 4457, dates the right of the defendant to 7 Code, §§4328; 4401; 4403; 4432.
take proof from the filing of a sufficient answer; 8 Code, §§4371; 4373.
but this section is impliedly repealed by the Chan- 9 Code, §§4369-4370; 3524-3528.
cery Rules. See the 1st section of the Act of 1871, 10 See, ante, § 439.
ch. 97, post, § 1189.
§ 465. The Time Allowed for Taking Proof.—All proof in chief must be
taken within four months, and all rebutting proof within six months, after the
cause becomes at issue. 11 If an order is made giving the defendant time to
plead or answer, "so as not to delay/' the time for taking proof will begin to
run from the date of the order. The Chancellor, or Master, may, however, ex-
tend the time for taking proof by either party, upon sufficient cause shown by
affidavit, and upon terms.
12 Proof in chief, in the meaning of the Chancery
rule, is proof that tends to establish the affirmative allegations of the plead-
ings 13 and rebutting proof is proof that tends to refute these allegations, or
;
that assails the evidence, or witnesses, of the other party. Proof of matters in
avoidance is proof in chief. Rebutting proof may be taken at any time within
the six months after the time for taking proof begins to run but proof in chief, ;
whether by the complainant or the defendant, must be taken within the four
months. 14
§ 466. When Documentary Evidence Must be Filed. —The Chancery Rule
requiring each party to take his proof in chief within four months, and his re-
15
butting proof within two months, does not apply to documentary evidence,
but is confined to depositions. This is shown by the following considerations
1. The expression "take proof," in the Rule, is applicable exclusively to taking
depositions, and not to filing documentary evidence. Documentary evidence is
not " taken. " 2. The Code and the Chancery Rules both provide for exceptions
16 but do not provide for
to depositions, because not filed in reasonable time;
exceptions to documentary evidence, on any such ground. 3. Exhibits to bills
and answers may be provided by witnesses at the hearing. 17 Such exhibits are
always documentary. 4. Documentary evidence consists ordinarily of notes,
bonds, deeds, wills, records, books, and other writings, and these are often (1)
of too much value to suffer the risks and hazards of a Court file and (2) they ;
are generally well known to the opposite side, and (3) they are often muniments
of title, or choses in action, and are consequently private property, and not
proper matters to be filed in Court after the manner of depositions, and for
these reasons may be retained by the party by special order of the Chancellor,
or Master. 18 5. The Chancery rules of 1830, and of 1858, allowed deeds, trans-
n Ch. Rule, II, §4, says: "After a cause is set of Tennessee should keep abreast of the times; and,
for hearing, the same shall be open to both parties in these days of railroads, telephones and telegraphs,
for proof, without leave of the Court." A cause is Court business should not be conducted on a slow-
"set for hearing" as soon as it is at issue. Code, coach schedule. See Wood v. Frazier, 2 Pick., 508.
§ 4431. As to when a cause is at issue, see, ante, 12 Ch. Rule, II, §4; ante, §62, sub-sec. 8. The
§464. affidavit should be special; and should not only show
As to when documentary evidence must be filed, a good excuse for not taking the proof within the
see the next section. limit allowed, but should, also, give the names of
The statute does not give the parties six months the witnesses sought to be examined, and speci fy
in which to take proof, but makes six months the the facts each is expected to prove. The order ex-
maximum limit, and allows the case to be tried at tending the time should designate the witnesses al-
any time after it is at issue. Rather v. Williams, 10 lowed to be examined, and should onerate the party
Pick., 543, citing the above section, then § 463. applying with the costs of all the proof thereafter
Harris v. Bogle, 7 Cates, 701. See, post, §1191. taken, both by him and the opposite party. This
On a continuance each party has only the remainder rule as to costs should never be relaxed, except in
of the four and two months in which to take his cases where the failure to take the proof in time was
proof, unless his time be extended by the Court, the caused by some act of the opposite party, or by
Chancellor or the Master, as elsewhere shown, or by some accident or mistake of the applicant, unmixed
consent of the other party. with negligence on his part.
The object of Chancery Rule, II, § 4, post, § 1191, The fact that the evidence of the other party was
was to ensure a trial at the second term after the ,
filed at the last moment allowed for so doing is no
bringing of the suit; and to give a right of trial at ground for enlarging the time for taking evidence
the first term, if the answer has been filed in time in chief, if it is confined to matters distinctly put in
to take the requisite proof, especially if such proof issue by the pleadings. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 890.
is documentary, or in a narrow compass. The stat- 18 Proof in .chief is proof necessary to produce a
utory time for taking proof is ample, and the Chan- result contrary to what would be the decree if no
cellor should vigorously enforce the limit prescribed. proof at all were introduced.
The 69th rule of the United States Equity Courts 14 When a bill or answer is allowed to be amended
provides that three months, and no more, shall be so as to raise a new issue of fact, additional time
allowed for the taking of testimony, after the cause may be allowed to take proof on such issue. Stull
is at issue; unless the Court, or a Judge thereof, v. Goode, 10 Heisk., 58.
shall, upon special cause, shown by either party, em 15 Documentary evidence, in practice, is deemed
large the time; and no testimony, taken after such to comprise all written evidence. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
period shall be allowed to be read in evidence at the 1820, note. See, post, § 468.
hearing. In England, the evidence in chief, on 16 Code, § 3868; Ch. Rule, II, § 5; § 1191, post.
both sides, must be closed within eight weeks after 17 Code, § 4458.
§467 WHEN PROOF MUST BE FILED. 380
scripts of records, or other written documents, to be filed at any time before the
cause was heard. 19 6. Under the general rules of Chancery practice, documen-
tary evidence may be filed, and the execution of writings proved, at the hearing,
and after the taking of evidence has been closed. 20
When, however, documents and papers are exhibited to pleadings, or depo-
sitions, they must be Master's office at the time the pleading or de-
filed in the
position, is filed, unless, by special order of the Chancellor, or Master, it is other-
wise ordered. In case of such an order, the party offering the documents may
retain them until the hearing, unless required by the Chancellor, or Master, to
file them sooner. 21
§ 467. When Documents will be Ordered to be Produced. The Chancery —
Court has inherent authority to order a party to produce documents 22 in his
possession, or control, provided (1) he admits that the documents are in his
possession, or control; and (2) it satisfactorily appears that their production is
necessary, to enable the party demanding their production to make out his
case. 23 This order is usually made on the defendant, in which case it is based
on an admission in his answer, or in his deposition; but it may, also, be made
on the complainant, if he admits in a pleading, or in a deposition, that he has in
his custody, or control, a document necessary to the defendant's case. If the
complainant, however, has documents whose production is valuable to the
defendant, the latter may file a cross bill, and pray a discovery; 24 or he may
file interrogatories under the statute. 25 The Court, however, in its general dis-
position to aid in discovering all facts material to the controversy, 26 will, on
motion of either party, compel the other party to produce any document admit-
ted, or proved, to be in his possession, and material to the party seeking its
production.
The Court will not, however, compel the production of a document when
such production would violate professional confidence, or would tend to subject
the party having it to a criminal charge, or to a penalty, or forfeiture. In such
cases, however, the party objecting to an order of production, on any of these
grounds, must distinctly swear that he believes the document to be privileged,
or that its production would tend to criminate him, or expose him to a penalty,
or to a forfeiture. 27
An order for the production of documents is enforced by attachment for con-
tempt, which will issue on proof of service of the order to produce, and of
failure to produce as required by such order. 28 Or, when necessary, the Court
may appoint sequestrators, and order them to seize the documents required to
be produced. 29
The document must be produced in the Clerk's office, and filed with him; 30
and if any part of the document is privileged from production, the Chancellor
will, upon proper affidavit of the fact, allow the party ordered to produce, to
seal up such privileged part. 31
Documents not in the possession of a party to the suit may be obtained, or
their production enforced, by a subpcena duces tecum. If this subpoena is not
obeyed, the person upon whom it is served may be attached and punished for
contempt, on proof that the document is in his possession. 32
ie Cooke, 448; 456. 24 3 Greenl. Ev., § 302; Lewis V. Brooks, 6 Yerg.,

20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 881-883. See Wood V. Neeley, 184.
7 Bax., 590. 25 Post, §§483-485.
21 Ibid. Where either party has, in his pleading, 26 An inspection of an original document is often
notified the other that he will, at the hearing, read necessary when its authenticity or validity is in ques-
certain deeds, contracts, decrees, or other docu- tion. See Walker v. Walker, 6 Cold., 573.
mentary evidence, referred to in his pleading, but 27 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1833-1835; 3 Greenl. Ev., §300.
not exhibited, such evidence need not be filed until 28 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1839.
the hearing. If the opposite party desires such doc- • 20 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1056.
umentary evidence filed earlier, he must obtain an SO 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1836.
order to that effect from the Chancellor, or Master. si This affidavit is conclusive. 2 Dan. Ch. fr.,
22 The word "documents" comprises all written, 1824.
or printed, evidence. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1820, note. 32 3 Greenl. Ev., § 305.
23 Clift V. Clift, 3 Pick., 21:
ORDER TO PRODUCE A DOCUMENT.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
In this cause, on motion of the complainant, supported by the averments of his bill [or by
affidavit,or by the deposition of E. F., filed in the cause, or by admissions in the answer,]
it is ordered by the Court that complainant in person, or by his Solicitor, have the right to
inspect, and take a copy of the document referred to in the bill [or in said affidavit, or
deposition] as the will of G. H. [or, the letter, deed, contract, or other written or printed
document, describing it,] in the office of the Clerk and Master of this Court on the 1st day
of April, 190S, and for ten days thereafter and, if the complainant so desire the Clerk and
;
Master will certify in writing thereon that such copy is correct. [In case it is desired to
inspect a book or other large document, either printed or written, and make a copy of only
a part thereof, the order should give leave to make a copy of so much thereof as complainant
may desire, giving the defendant the right to Ale the whole book, or other document, should
he so desire.] And the defendant is ordered to deliver said will, [or other paper, naming it.]
to the Clerk and Master on or before said date for such inspection and copy.
§ 468. When and How Exhibits Must be Proved. Exhibits comprise all —
writings, printings, and other things, 33 (1) exhibited, or annexed, to a bill, an-
swer, petition, affidavit, report, deposition or other paper, filed in a cause, or
(2) proved in a cause when not exhibited, or annexed, to any pleading or other
paper.
1. Exhibits to Pleadings May be Proved (1) by affidavits, filed with the ex-
hibits in the Clerk's office at any time before the hearing; or (2) by witnesses,
at the hearing. 34
Ordinarily, no exhibit can be proved at the hearing by witnesses, if it requires
more evidence than the mere proof of its execution, or of hand-writing, to sub-
stantiate it. If the authenticity of the exhibit is questioned, and a cross-exam-
ination becomes necessary, it cannot be proved viva voce at the hearing. The
examinations of the witnesses is restricted, at the hearing, ordinarily to three
or four very simple points, such as (1) the custody and identity of an ancient
document produced by its custodian, (2) the accuracy of an office copy by the
proper officer, (3) the execution of a deed, or other writing, by the attesting
witness, and (4) the hand-writing of a letter, receipt, note, or other writing.
The Court may ask the witness questions suggested by adverse counsel, and a
limited cross-examination may be allowed. 35 If, however, the Court should see
that the adverse party is surprised by the introduction of viva voce evidence,
r.nd that a cross-examination would not be sufficient to enable the adverse party
to test the authenticity, or genuineness, of an exhibit, the hearing of the cause
should be suspended, and proof allowed to be taken as to the authenticity, or
genuineness, of such exhibit.
2. Exhibits to Depositions Should be Proved by the witnesses to whose deposi-
tion they are exhibited. The depositions of subscribing witnesses to deeds, or
other writings, should be taken with such instruments annexed thereto. 36
The following form is given as an illustration of how such exhibits are
proved
AFFIDAVIT TO PROVE AN EXHIBIT.
John Doe,
vs. No. 30. —In the Chancery Court, at Brownsville, Tenn.
Richard Roe.
John Jones, being duly sworn, says
i.
[Whenthe exhibit is proved by an attesting witness.] That he was present on [or about]
the day the deed [or other writing] now here shown him, marked "A," and made an exhibit
hereto, was executed by the parties thereto ; and that he saw Richard Roe [give the name or
33 Exhibits include not only deeds, wills, choses to which it is appended, or of which it is an exhibit.
in action, accounts, written contracts of all sorts, Gres. Eq. Ev., 98, note; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 881-888,
letters, plats, drawings, plans, models, specifications, notes.
maps, books, pamphlets, records, transcripts, and all 34 Code, § 4458.
other written_ or printed matter; but include, also, 35 Gres. Eq. Ev., 188; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 882-883,
samples of things, and even things themselves, when Consequa V. Fanning, 2 John. Ch., (N. Y.), 481.
convenient, for inspection, or as illustrative, or ex- 36 Code, § 4459.
§469 SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROOF. 382
names of the signers of the exhibit] sign, [or, heard him acknowledge,] said deed [or other
ivriting,] and that the affiant signed his name thereto as a witness, at the request of
said
Richard Roe.
ii.
[When the exhibit is not proved by an attesting witness.] That he is well acquainted with
the handwriting of Richard Roe [the signer of the exhibit,] and that the deed now here
shown him [describe it] marked "A," and made an exhibit hereto, was signed by said Richard
Roe, and that his name thereto is in the proper handwriting of said Roe.
Affiant, also, says that he is well acquainted with the handwriting of George Roe, and that
the name of said George Roe subscribed to said deed, [or other exhibit,] as an attesting
witness, is in the proper handwriting of the said George Roe.
And further this affiant saith not.
[Add jurat.] John Jones.
The Master should attach the exhibit to the affidavit, and mark it filed, giving
the date, and sign his name to the endorsement so that the exhibit may be fully
identified.
When a writing, not exhibited to any pleading, or to other paper in a cause,
is to he proved, at the hearing by a witness, reasonable notice thereof should be
given the other party. But the Chancellor has the discretion to allow an ex-
proved viva voce at the hearing. 37
hibit to be
ARTICLE V.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROOF.
469. When to Begin Taking Proof. § 472. When and What Agreements to Make
in Reference to Proof.
470. What Must be Proved. 473. Danger of Negligence and Excess of
§
471. As to Documentary Evidence. Confidence, in Preparing Proofs.
§ 469. When to Begin Taking Proof. —

If you have any witness whose testi-
mony is vital, you should take his deposition at the earliest moment possible. If
the witness is aged, or infirm, or going out of the county, or State, or is the only
witness to a material fact, you may take his deposition at any time after filing
your bill, 1 without waiting for an answer, or plea. In no event allow any delay
in taking your proof, especially if the burden of proof rests upon you. 2 Many
good causes are lost by negligence in preparing a cause for trial and, on the ;
other hand, many doubtful causes are won by diligence and skill in taking
testimony.
Keep in mind, that all proof in chief must be taken within four months after
issue joined, and all rebutting proof within two months thereafter.
§ 470. What Must be Proved. —A
great deal of unnecessary proof is taken
in almost every contested suit. 3 This is generally the result of parties and
Solicitors not really knowing exactly what proof is requisite. The first question
you are called on to determine after the plea has been replied to, or the answer
filed, is:
1. What are the Matters Really in Issue. To ascertain this, it is necessary to
examine the bill, and see what the essential affirmative allegations are, and
which of them have not been admitted by the answer. Nothing admitted
by the answer is in issue but every material affirmative allegation in the bill
;
not admitted by the answer, and every material affirmative allegation, by way
37 Barrow V. Rhinelander, 1 Johns. Ch., 550; quired to wait for the amendment to be made, or
Consequa V. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch., 481. the answer to be filed, before beginning to take
1 Code, §§ 3836; 3838; 4462. See, post, § 474. proof.
2 If your adversary has obtained time to amend 3 In preparing for a suit conform your pleading
or answer, so as not to delay, this will not prevent to your proof, but in preparing for the trial conform
you proceeding to take your proof: you are not re- your proof to your pleading.
383 SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROOF. § 471
of avoidance, in the answer, is in issue, and must be proved by the party making
the allegations.
The question next in importance to be determined in preparing to take proof,
2. On Which Side Rests the Burden of Proof. Ordinarily, the burden of proof
restson the complainant but, whenever the defendant admits the material alle-
;
gations of the bill, and sets up new matters by way of avoidance, the burden of
proving these new matters rests upon him. 4 The general rule is, that which-
ever party makes a material affirmative allegation, on him rests the burden of
proving it, unless it is admitted by the opposite party. The defendant must
prove: (1) payment; (2) a release; (3) failure, or illegality, of consideration;
(4) fraud, when set up to defeat the deed, or contract, alleged in the bill; (5)
a former judgment (6) a new contract set up in lieu of the one sued on or (7)
;
;
any other affirmative matter by him set up to defeat the cause of action alleged
by the complainant.
Defendants often lose when they have really good defences, because they are
not aware that the burden of proof is on them.
3. Some Important Rules of Evidence. The following rules of evidence should
be kept in mind in the preparation of proof:
1. The best evidence possible must be produced.
2. The evidence must be pertinent to the pleadings.
3. Nothing is evidence at the hearing that is not on file in the cause.
4. Presumptions prevail until rebutted by other proof.
5. Facts known to the Chancellor as an individual are not evidence.
6. He who asserts a material fact in his pleading must prove it, unless ad-
mitted.
7. He who confesses a material fact, and avoids it, must prove the matter in
avoidance.
8. A preponderance of proof prevails.
§ 471. As to —
If you file a copy of any record, or of
Documentary Evidence.
a registered deed, or other registered, or recorded, instrument, see to it that
it is (1) properly copied, (2) properly certified, and (3) properly endorsed and
marked filed in the cause. Note the names and dates in such copies to see that
they are correct.
Remember, you cannot file a copy of a registered deed, or of any other instru-
ment, that should be in your client's possession, unless you have proved that the
original has been unintentionally lost, destroyed or mislaid, and cannot be
found on diligent seach. Nor can you introduce parol evidence of the contents
of a writing in the possession of the other side, unless you show that you have
served reasonable notice on the possessor to produce the original. This notice
should be given before the parol proof is taken; but if given in a reasonable
time before the parol proof is read in evidence, that would be sufficient. 5 This
notice may be in the following form
NOTICE TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS AT THE TAKING OF PROOE.
John Doe, 1
vs. r I n Chancery, at Loudon.
Richard Roe. J
To the said Richard Roe
You are hereby notified to produce before the Master, at his office, on the [day fixed for
taking the depositions] the following books of account, [letters, deeds, and papers, describing
them particularly so as to identify them, e ] or I will prove their contents by secondary
evidence. John Doe,
By J. E. Cassady, Solicitor.
This notice may be added to the notice of the taking of the depositions.
4 As to the burden of proof, see, ante, §§441; 8 The notice must describe the writing or instru-
443; 445. ment demanded, so as to identify it. 1 (Jreenl. Ev..
5 Notice should be sufficiently long to enable the § 562; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 878.
party to produce the papers called for. 1 Greenl.
Ev., §562.
§472 SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROOF. 384
§ 472. When and What Agreements to Make in Reference to Proof.—It fre-
quently happens that there are important facts which are indisputably true
such as decrees of Courts, registered deeds and other- matters of record, dates
of well known events, names of heirs or distributees, contents of a book or of
a corporation's minutes, and the like. In all such cases, it is almost reprehensi-
ble for a Solicitor to refuse to agree that the fact is as he knows it to be, or as
he can, without much trouble, ascertain it to be. Often a deed, or a Court
record, or a book of accounts, or other document, is needed only to show a sim-
ple fact, or date in such a case, it is a great saving of costs to have an agree-
:
ment, in writing, as to the particular fact, or facts, contained in such document,

and needed in evidence.
Agreements as to proof should be made as soon as the need for them appears;
and, if possible, should be made before any of the acerbities incident to a litiga-
tion arise. Admissions and agreements should always be in writing, and duly
signed and they should be- clear and distinct, and duly entitled, and filed in the
;
cause. 7 If not in writing, they should be incorporated in the decree, if the

decree to any extent, based on them. 8
is,
The practice of making such agreements is one greatly to be commended and, ;
in construing them, the Courts will give them the force and effect contemplated
by the parties at the time they were executed. 9
For the purpose of thean admission made by counsel is conclusive and
suit, ;
full authority to make admissions

is presumed. Chancellors eagerly lay hold of
such admissions as the basis of their decrees and they are deemed better evi-
;
dence of the facts than the finding of a jury. 10 Such admissions once made,
and acted on, cannot be retracted: if made without authority, the party's
remedy is against his counsel, unless his consent was obtained by fraud. 11
The following matters are proper to be included in written agreements be-
tween counsel, if the facts will abundantly justify such a course:
1. That a decree, to such and such an effect, was pronounced by such and
such a Court, on such and such a day, between such and such parties.
2. That deeds, or grants, exist between such and such parties, for such and
—
such a tract of land, dated so and so, especially when such deeds are registered.
3. That both parties derive title from a common source, and the date of each
party's title.
That the land in dispute is granted land, and was granted prior to such
4.
and such a day: these facts are ordinarily important only when a party is
seeking to make out his case by means of adverse possession under a color of
title. 12
5. That such and such a book, such as a merchant's book, a corporation book,
a family Bible, a diary, or memorandum book, contains such and such a state-
ment, or entry, or date, or other fact. In such a case, it would be well to copy
the statement, entry, or fact desired, in full, showing its date, the number of the
page, and the connection in which it is found.
6. That such and such a witness will swear so and so, and that the agreement
shall have all the force and effect of a deposition by such witness, but no
greater or other force and effect.
7 3 § 292; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 849.

Greenl. Ev., such proof, in vain, requested his adversary to admit
8 The Court should byrule, require all such agree- it,the Court woul'd be justified in taxing the refusing
ments to be in writing. party with a proportionate part of the costs, even
It is to be regretted, that many Solicitors stand though such party was successful in the suit.
in such awe of their clients that they are unwilling 10 Gres. Eq. Ev., 456-458. See, also, Gates «.
to make any agreement, whatever, in reference to Brinkley, 4 Lea, 710.
the evidence; and, as a consequence, the adverse
_
11 Jones v. Williamson, 5 Cold., 371; 2 Whart.
side is frequently forced to obtain copies of deeds, Ev., § 1184.
and records, and to take depositions, in order to 12 The time has come for our Courts to presume
prove facts well known to all the parties, thereby that all land in litigation has been granted, such
greatly and unnecessarily increasing the costs; and, presumption to be rebuttable. Apresumption of
to that extent, bringing the Courts into disrepute fact arises when a great majority of the probabilities,
because of the expenses of litigation. On it being are uniformly in favor of the fact presumed.
made to appear at the hearing, that the side filing
385 PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING PROOF. § 473
AGREEMENT AS TO FACTS.
John Doe, ]
vs. In Chancery, at Knoxvrlle.
Richard Roe.
In this case we agree
as to the following facts
1st. That [Here set out what the complainant agrees to.]
2d. That [Here set out what the defendant agrees to.]
3d. That [Here set out any other facts agreed to.]
We agree that this agreement may be filed and read as evidence in said cause.
This day of , 19
John Doe, by Eugene Webb, Solicitor.
Richard Roe, by Charles H. Smith, Solicitor.
§ 473. Danger of Negligence, and Excess of Confidence, in Preparing Proofs.
Some Solicitors, because of negligence, indifference, or excess of confidence,
often tempt fate, by (1) failing to make their pleadings sufficiently full or suffi-
ciently definite; (2) by failing to prove with sufficient certainty certain links in
their chain of evidence; and (3) by relying too much on presumptions of law
which are disputable, or do not certainly exist in the ease. Very often, a
doubtful suit may be made certain by (1) the addition of a single allegation in
a pleading, or (2) by the answer to a single question in a deposition, or (3) by
the filing of a single paper as evidence in the cause, or (4) by the giving of no-
tice to the adverse side that a certain document will be read at the hearing, or
(5) by due notice that parol proof of the contents of a written instrument will
be offered on the trial of the cause.
Many suits for a long time hang trembling in the balance, ready to yield to a
very slight increase in the weight of the evidence on either side. In such cases,
diligence reaps golden harvests, and negligence is overwhelmed with avalanches
of disaster. A
pound of preponderance turns the scales of justice as effectually
as a ton. The failure to make the necessary proof often arises from the fact
that the matters are so notoriously true, that the party who should prove them
hopes that the adverse side will admit them, or that the Chancellor may take
a sort of quasi-judicial cognizance of them, or that they may not be disputed at
the hearing.
The following are cases illustrative of the foregoing general statements
1. Where a son claiming as heir failed to prove that he was a son.
2. Where heirs failed to prove the death of their father.
3. Where a legatee failed to prove that he was the nephew, Thomas, referred
to in the will.
4. Where a party offered in evidence a copy of his deed, without accounting
for the absence of the original.
5. Where a party failed to notify the adverse side to produce a particular
^
writing, or he would prove its contents by parol.
6. Where a person performing a marriage ceremony, was not shown to be a
minister, or a magistrate.
7. Where a party failed to file the deed under which he was claiming.
8. Where a party failed to notify the adverse side that he would read
a
record of the same Court on the hearing.
9. Where a party erroneously supposed that the burden of proof was on his
adversary.
10. Where an unregistered deed filed in evidence was not proved by wit-
nesses.
11. Wherea party claiming under a will failed to file the will.
It is true, inmany of such cases, the Courts will, ordinarily, allow the cause
to stand over until the defect of proof can be remedied but, as a rule, they im-
;
pose on the delinquent party one-half, or more, of the costs of the cause, as a
penalty for his negligence, and as a warning to all others.
§474 DEPOSITIONS IN CHANCERY. 386
CHAPTER XXV.
DEPOSITIONS IN CHANCERY.
Article I. Depositions Generally Considered.
Article II. Notice to Take Depositions.
Article III. Depositions Taken on Interrogatories.
Article IV. Formalities of a Deposition.
Article V. Powers and Duties of Commissioners, and Rights
and Duties of "Witnesses.
Article VI. Exceptions to Depositions.
Article VII. Amendment of Depositions.
Article VIII. Practical Suggestions About Depositions.
ARTICLE I.
DEPOSITIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 474. When Depositions May be Taken. § 478. How Commissioners are Appointed to
§ 475. Depositions of Parties to the Suit. Take Depositions.
§ 476. How
Depositions are Taken. § 479. Value of Depositions Compared With
§ 477. Before What Officers Depositions May Oral Testimony.
be Taken.
§ 474. —
When Depositions May be Taken. In the Circuit Court, the evi-
dence of witnesses may be taken by deposition, 1 in certain specified cases but ;
the statute requires that in all causes in Chancery, excepting divorce causes,
and cases tried by jury, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken in writing,
without compelling their personal attendance. In divorce causes, and on the
trial of issues by a jury, either party may examine the witnesses in open Court,
or take their proof by depositions. 2
1. Taking Proof Before Suit Brought. The depositions of notaries, and other
important witnesses, may be taken and perpetuated before any suit, in the
manner specified in the statutes. 3
Taking Proof Before Answer Filed. "When witnesses are aged, or infirm, or
2.
are going out of the Chancery Division, or do not reside in such Division, the
Court, or Clerk and Master, upon affidavit of the facts, may, at any time after
the bill is filed, either before or after a cause is at issue, authorize the depo-
sitions of such witnesses to be taken de bene esse, on such notice as may be
thought just; and depositions thus taken may be read as if taken regularly,
unless retaken by order of the Court, upon application of the opposite party. 4
The Court will not, however, except for strong reasons, suppress the depositions
thus taken but will, ordinarily, on mere motion, give the opposite party leave
;
to cross-examine the witnesses upon giving proper notice to the party who took
their depositions.
1 Code, § 3836. vice or publication, as provided in section 1802, as if
2 Code, §§4456; 4467; 4470. These sections suit were pending. Code, § 3889.
would not prevent the Court from ordering, on mo- The deposition of a Notary may be taken, whether
tion of any party, a witness to be subpoenaed to a suit be pending or not, on ten days' notice to the
attend Court in order that his deposition might be opposite party, if resident in the State, and forty
taken instanter, sufficient grounds appearing to sus- days' notice if out of it; to be read as evidence be-
tain such motion. Nor would they prevent the Court tween the same parties in any suit then or after-
from ordering an attachment for a recalcitrant wit- wards depending, should the Notary die or remove
ness. Code, §§ 4106; 4455; Ch. Rule, VII, §§ 6-7. out of the State before the trial. Code, § 1802.
3 The statute as to Notaries is as follows: The As to the perpetuation of the testimony of other
evidence of a Notary Public, in any matter officially witnesses, see Code, §§ 3876-3888; and post, §§ 1125-
done by him, may be taken and perpetuated, without 1132, where the practice is fully set forth.
petition, upon notice to the other side by actual ser- 4 Code, § 4462.
387 DEPOSITIONS IN CHANCERY. §475
If the witness is the only one to a material fact, his deposition may, also, be
taken at any time after the suit is commenced, upon giving the usual notice. 5
3. Taking Proof After Answer Filed. The complainant may take testimony at
any time after answer filed, or after a decree pro confesso; and the defendant
may take testimony at any time after filing a sufficient answer. 6 The pendency
of an appeal from the ruling of the Master on exceptions to an answer will not,
however, prevent either party from proceeding to take his proof. 7
4. Taking Proof on a Plea. The statute does not expressly state when a plea
is to be put at issue; but as a plea is a special answer, it would seem from
analogy that a plea should be put at issue by filing a replication within twenty
days after notice of its being filed. 8 Of course, whenever the complainant
actually files a replication, that puts the plea at issue. 9 Proof may be taken on
a plea at any time after issue taken. Indeed, if both parties take proof on i
plea before any replication is filed, the Court will allow a replication nunc pro
tunc, or will treat the case as though a replication had actually been duly filed.
§ 475. —
Depositions of Parties to the Suit. In all Chancery causes, and pro-
ceedings in the nature of Chancery causes, the depositions of parties may be
taken upon notice simply as in the case of other witnesses the fact that a per- :
son is a party, or interested in the suit, or the wife or husband of a party, is no

disqualification. 10
If a party to a suit, whose testimony is desired, resides beyond the limits of
the State, the person wishing his evidence may file interrogatories with the
Clerk and Master, which shall be answered before such party can be allowed
to proceed to hearing. 11
Should such person delay to answer in a reasonable time, to be judged of by
the Court, or Clerk, a peremptory order may be made by the Court, or Clerk,
requiring the interrogatories to be answered by a given day, and on failure, if
the delinquent is the complainant, the bill may be dismissed, notice of which
shall be given by the Clerk and Master to the party, or his Solicitor; or the
answer may be taken off the file, and the bill taken for confessed, if the de-
fendant be in default. 12
§ 476. —
How Depositions are Taken. Depositions may be taken (1) by con-
sent, (2) on notice, or (3) upon interrogatories. A party's consent is conclu-
sively presumed if he cross-examines the witness. When there is no consent,
notice of the time and place of taking the deposition must be given; and, if
the deposition is to be taken on interrogatories, notice of their being filed must
be given.
No permission need be obtained in order to take a deposition, unless: (1)
the witness has already been examined as to the same facts, by the same party
or (2) the cause is not at issue; or (3) the time for taking proof has expired.
Each party may begin the taking of proof as soon as his right accrues, as here-
tofore shown; and may continue taking until his time has expired.
The details of the time, place, manner, and form, of taking depositions, the
5 Code, §§ 3836; 3838. While these two sections 6 Code, § 4457. The complainant is allowed
were probably primarily intended for suits in the twenty days after notice that the answer has been
courts of law, they, no doubt, were intended by the filedto except to such answer; and, if he fail to
codifiers of the Code to apply to suits in Chancery except within said time, the cause shall be at issue.
also, as the chapter is general, and includes all civil Code, §§4400-4401; post, §1190; Ch. Rule, I, §5.
actions. Code, § 3836. See, also, § 3869. Indeed, Hence, in strict law, the defendant cannot begin
the universal practice in Chancery is to take depo- taking his proof until the time for excepting to his
sitions, and to test the correctness of their taking, answer has expired.
according to the provisions of the Code contained in T Code, §4406; Ch. Rule, I, §6; post, §1190,
the Chapter concerning Depositions; and this is sub-sec, 6.
authorized by the Code § 4455, which reads as fol-
Fi
8 Code, §§ 4322; 4328; 4432. See, ante, § 350.
lows: The rules of evidence as to the competency 9 Code, § 4393.
of witnesses; and the methods of obtaining testi- 10 Code, § 3890; Act of 1879, ch. 200.
mony, are the same mCourts of Chancery as in the 11 Code, § 4463.
other Courts of this State, except so far as they 12 Code, § 4464; see, also, §§ 4389-4392.
may be altered by the express provisions of this
Code. As to taking proof de bene esse, see, post,
§477 DEPOSITIONS IN CHANCERY. 388
various steps preliminary to their filing, and the time and manner of excepting
to them, will all be found in the subsequent sections.
§ 477.Before what Officers Depositions may be Taken. Depositions in —

Chancery taken before the Clerk and Master, but depositions may
are, usually,
also be taken by any Judge, Justice of the Peace, Mayor or chief magistrate
of a town or city, the Clerk of any Court, a Notary Public, or any other person
properly appointed, or commissioned by the Court or Clerk, not being inter-
ested, of counsel, or related to either of the parties within the sixth degree,
computing by the civil law. 13
Commissioners of the State of Tennessee, appointed by our Governor in the
different States, may, also, take depositions. 14
§ 478. How
Commissioners are Appointed to Take Depositions. Any per- —
son, qualified as above stated, may be commissioned to take depositions either
in or out of the State, upon application of either party, and without any affida-
vit laying grounds. 15 This commission is issued by the Clerk and Master, or
bis Deputy, and it has long been the practice to issue commissions in blank, 16
to be filled by the party applying therefor, his attorney or agent, on obtaining
a suitable person to act at the place where the deposition is to be taken. The
following is the form of
A COMMISSION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS.
TO MELVIN NORTON.
Confiding in your prudence and fidelity, you are hereby given full power and authority to
summon before you John Clark, and his examination on oath, or affirmation, to take in writ-
ing, on behalf of John Doe, [upon the interrogatories hereto annexed, 17 ] in a cause pending
in our Chancery Court at Maynardville, wherein John Doe is complainant, and Richard Roe
and Peter Poe are defendants, said deposition when taken to be signed by said witness, and
certified, sealed, addressed, and transmitted, by you to the Clerk of our said Court, in the
manner and form prescribed by our laws.
Witness, Coram Acuff, Clerk and Master of our said Court at office in Maynardville, this
July 1, 1891. Coram Acuff, Clerk and Master.
§ 479. Value of Depositions Compared with Oral Testimony. While often —
the oral examination of witnesses in open Court, before a jury, will enable an
expert Solicitor to more effectually expose and crush a false witness; or to
extort the truth from a hostile or unwilling witness or to involve him in gross
;
self-contradiction, or manifest inconsistencies and while the appearance of

;
the witness, and his demeanor in testifying, and his general conduct on the wit-
ness-stand, 18 are great aids in judging of his intelligence, sincerity, impartiality,
and reliability, there are nevertheless many weighty considerations in favor of
taking proof in writing. These are
13 Code, §§3865; 1802a-1802i>; Acts of 1885, ch. McCandless v. Polk, 10 Hum., 617; Oliver Bank, t>.
11. The statement in the caption, or certificate, of a 11 Hum., 74.

deposition, that the person taking the deposition is a The method of taking depositions by means of a
Justice of the Peace or other officer authorized to commissioner, on interrogatories annexed, or ques-
take depositions, or signing the certificate officially tions appended, is very useful in sections where a
as such officer, is sufficient evidence of that fact. suitable officer cannot be had. In some States they
Hoover v. Rawlings, 1 Sneed, 287; Wilson v. Smith, have Examiners to take depositions, but as they are
5 Yerg., 379; Carter v. Ewing, 1 Tenn. Ch., 212; not authorized to take depositions for our Courts,
Read v. Patterson, 11 I,ea, 433. they can be appointed Commissioners, and thus be
14 The notaries should affix their seals, and if they authorized to act.
live in another State should certify the date and 17 The portion in brackets will be inserted only
expiration of their commissions. Code, § 1802, b; in case the deposition is to be taken upon_ interroga-
Acts of 1885, ch. 11, § 2. The official character of tories. If the deposition is to be taken in another
the Commissioners when not stated may be proved State, the Solicitor should forward, along with the
aliunde. Cooke, 431, note. commission, full directions how to take the depo-
15 Code, §§3865; 4456. In Courts of law the sition, and enclose a caption, certificate, and an ad-
taking of depositions is not a matter of course as in dressed and endorsed envelope; or the deposition
Chancery; and, hence, a party applying for a com- will almost certainly be defectively taken and trans-
mission to take depositions in a law Court must mitted.
make it appear, by oath or otherwise, that the case 18 When we read a deposition we see the witness,
is one where, under the Statute, he has the right to as itwere, "through a glass, darkly"; but, when he
take depositions. Code, §§ 3844-3845. is examined in open Court, we see him "face to
1G This blank, however, should be filled either be- face."
fore, or at the time of, the taking of the deposition.
389 NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS. §480
1. "Where testimony is in writing there can be no dispute as to what a witness
has testified. 19
"Witnesses are often more precise, and more clear, when giving in their de-
2.
positions, than when testifying orally.
3. Witnesses are more apt to tell the truth, when they know that their words
are being taken down, and therefore cannot be denied, or retracted, than when
testifying orally in open Court.
4. When the evidence in a cause is all in writing, there is no danger of a
party being surprised at the trial, (1) by his witnesses failing to appear; or
(2) becoming sick; or (3) failing to testify as expected; or (4) testifying to
what was not expected.
5. the evidence is in writing, a party knows when he is ready for trial,
Where
and the risks incident to oral evidence are all avoided. No new evidence can be
sprung, no witness can be tampered with, no evidence can be lost.
6. A
party who is in the right, is, as a rule, much more certain to be able to
win his case when the proof is in writing, than when witnesses are required to
attend and testify orally. It is difficult for a party to have all of his witnesses
in attendance at one time. Some will be sick some absent on business, or pleas-
;
ure some forget the day some have sick families some leave the State some
; ; ; ;
get tampered with; some become hostile, or unwilling; and some, for various
other reasons, fail to attend, or, attending, do not testify as expected. But by
ordinary diligence, the depositions of all such witnesses can be readily taken
from time to time, and all disappointment avoided.
7. And lastly, the expenses of a litigation are much less when depositions are
taken, than when witnesses give their personal attendance in open Court. It
is safe to say, that the costs in an ordinary Chancery suit are less than one-
half of the costs in an ordinary suit in the Circuit Court.
And, as either party may demand a trial by jury in the Chancery Court, and
enforce the attendance of witnesses for oral examination in open Court, when-
ever such a course is promotive of justice, it will be seen that a Court of Chan-
cery offers each party every means to enable him to overcome the machinations
of his adversary, the enmity or dishonesty of witnesses, the dangers of per-
jury, and the risks of accident and mistake, and to get the real facts before the
Court. 20
ARTICLE II.
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS.
§ 480. Length of Notice. I § 482. Service of Notice.
§ 481. Form and Requisites of Notice. |
§ 480. —
Length of the Notice. The notice to take depositions shall be served
on the opposite party at least five days beforehand, when the depositions are to
be taken in the county in which the suit is pending. When the depositions are
to be taken out of the county, the notice shall be as follows for fifty miles or :
under, five days from fifty to one hundred miles, ten days over one hundred
; ;
and not exceeding two hundred and fifty miles, fifteen days if over two hun- ;
dred and fifty and not exceeding five hundred, twenty days if over five hun- ;
dred, thirty days. When the deposition is to be taken in any State or Territory
19 Vox emissa volat, Htera scripta manet. (A witness through and through, and writes him down
word when spoken flies away, a letter when written as reliable, doubtful, or worthless. The witness
remains.) who thinks he can impose false evidence on the
20 Both witnesses and parties should remember Court, either overvalues his own ability in that par-
that the Chancellor is a man of large acquaintance ticular, or undervalues the ability of the Court to
with the ways of the world; and that he is not a distinguish the true from the false; and will find
mere machine to be stuffed with absurd, unreason- his testimony cast into the rubbish box where frauds,
§481 notice; to take depositions. 390
of the United States west of the Rocky Mountains, such time as the Court, or
Clerk, may order, not exceeding forty days in foreign countries, such time as
;
the Court, or Clerk, may order. 21 The Court, or the Clerk and Master, may,
upon good cause shown, either restrict or enlarge the periods of notice above set
forth 22 and, in all cases in which more than one person is complainant or de-
;
fendant, the Court, or Clerk, may determine whether notice shall be given to
each person, and, if not, to whom notice shall be given a memorandum of the ;
order being kept among the papers. 23

ORDER DISPENSING WITH NOTICE AS TO CERTAIN PARTIES.
John Doe, et al., 1
vs. [ In Chancery, at Loudon.

In this case it is ordered that notice to take depositions need not be served on Sarah
Doe, a complainant, or on Julia Roe and Charles Roe, defendants. May 20, 1891
N. H. Greer, C. & M.
The fact that this order was made should be rioted on the rule docket, and
the order itself kept among the papers of the cause.
§ 481. Form and —
Requisites of Notice. The statute allows either party liti-
gant to take the depositions of witnesses, upon giving the opposite party legal
notice of the time and place, or by filing interrogatories. 24 The only object of
this notice is to give the opposite party due opportunity to be present and
cross-examine the witnesses whose depositions are to be taken. The notice
should therefore state: (1) the style of the cause; (2) the Court where pend-
ing, (3) the names of the witnesses, 25 (4) where to be examined, 26 (5) in what
house, room, or office, (6) on what day, (7) beginning at what hour, (8) in
whose behalf, (9) for what purpose, (10) should be duly signed by the party,
or his Solicitor, (11) should be addressed to the opposite party, and (12) should
be served on him in due time. 27 These requisites need not appear in the notice
in any particular order. If the substance is in the notice, the form is imma-
terial. The following is a good form :
NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS.

John Doe,
vs. \ In the Chancery Court, at Nashville, Tenn.
Richard Roe, et al.
Richard Roe, the defendant, is hereby notified that I will, on the 2d day of June next, at
the house of George Jones, in the city of Nashville, No. 76 Summer Street, take the deposi-
tions of Ann Jones and Julia Jones, to be used as evidence on my behalf in said cause, be-
ginning said depositions at 10 a. m. on said day, and continuing the taking from day to day,
if necessary, until completed. 28 May 20, 1891. John Doe.
To Richard Roe. By Jack Baker, Solicitor.
The notice need not be dated, nor need it be formally addressed to the oppo-
site party it is sufficient if its form shows that it is intended as a notice to him
;
nevertheless, it is well to date it, and formally address it.

If a party, in person or by agent, participate in the taking of a deposition
that is a waiver of notice.
21 Code, §§ 3851; 3853. taking of the deposition continues through one-half

22 Code, § 4460; see, also, § 3846. The "good of the business hours of the given day; but a depo-
cause," should be shown by affidavit; arrd the length sition begun and ended at an unusual hour, or ended
of notice should be readily shortened in cases of in a short time and at once closed, and the witness
emergency when, by railroad or steamboat, the place dismissed, in consequence whereof the adverse party,
for taking the depositions can be easily reached in a though present before noon, had no opportunity to
shorter time than the Code prescribes. Railroads cross-examine, should be suppressed on these facts
and steamboats were unknown in 1817, when the appearing in the certificate of the Commissioner, or
length of notice was fixed by our statute. As to by the affidavit of the party injured, or his Solicitor.
"good cause," see, ante, § 62, sub-sec, 8. Smith v. Cocke, 1 Tenn. (Overt.,) 296.
23 Code, § 3850. 28 Unless the notice provides for continuing the
24 Code, § 3847. taking of depositions from day to day, the taking
25 Robertson v. Campbell, 1 Tenn. (Overt.,) 172. must begin on the day specified, and the Commis-
26 A party cannot be required to attend at two sioner has no power to adjourn the taking to the
different places on the same day. But he must elect next day. But, see Read v. Patterson, 11 Lea, 434.
which place he will attend, and attend accordingly, If the taking is actually begun on the day named in
or he will not be in an attitude to except to either the notice, the Commissioner may finish the taking on
deposition. Blair V. The Bank, 11 Hum., 84. the next day. Brandon V. Mullenix, 11 Heisk., 446.
27 The mention of the hour is not essential, if the Read «. Patterson, 11 Lea, 434.
391 DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON INTERROGATORIES. § 482
Notice of the filing of interrogatories must be given, when the deposition is
to be taken on interrogatories. The following is a form

NOTICE OF THE FILING OF INTERROGATORIES.
John Doe, ]
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Kingston, Tenn.
\
Richard Roe, et al. J . ,, Tr .
Mr. John Doe : have this day filed, in the office of the Clerk and Master, at Kingston,
I
interrogatories to be propounded to John Jones, a witness in my behalf in the above named
case. June 13, 1891. Richard RoE,
By F. D. Owings, Solicitor.
§ 482. Service of Notice.— The Code provides that the Sheriff, coroner, or
constable, of any county in this State, into whose hands a notice to take deposi-
tions has been put, shall deliver a copy of such notice to the proper person in
due time, and return the original notice with the time of delivery marked there-
on, to the Court, or Justice, before whom the suit is pending
29 but a private
;
person may serve a copy of the notice, in which case he must make affidavit of
the fact and time of service, and exhibit the original notice to his affidavit.
Counsel frequently accept service for their clients. 30
Service is effected by delivering a true copy of the notice to the person to
whom it is addressed, if he be a resident of the State but if he be a non-resident,
;
the notice may be served upon his agent, or Solicitor. 31

In all cases in which more than one person is complainant or defendant, the
Court, or Clerk, may determine whether notice shall be given to each person,
and, if not, to whom notice shall be given a memorandum of the order being
;
kept among the papers. 32
ARTICLE III.
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON INTERROGATORIES.

§ 483. When Depositions May be Taken on 1 § 484. Notice of Filing of Interrogatories.
Interrogatories. I
§ 485. Form of Interrogatories.
§ 483. When
Depositions May be Taken on Interrogatories. It sometimes —
happens that too inconvenient, or too expensive, to take the deposition of
it is
a distant witness upon notice or it may be difficult to ascertain where a distant
;
witness will be at any given time. The Code accordingly provides that when
the witnesses reside out of the State, or over one hundred and fifty miles from
the place of trial, either party may take their depositions by filing interrogator-
ies with the Clerk, giving the opposite party notice thereof, who shall have ten
days thereafter to file cross interrogatories, to which rebutting interrogatories
may then be put; at any time after which the deposition may be taken upon a
certified copy of the interrogatories, to be issued by the Clerk. 1
If the opposite party is a non-resident, or if a judgment by a default, or pro
confesso, has been taken for want of appearance, and defence, the depositions
may be taken by filing with the Clerk a copy of the interrogatories, with a
memorandum of the time and place of taking the depositions, for twenty days
before taking the same. 2
29 Code, § 3854. m writing, exhibited by the party, complainant or
30 The verbal waiver of service should never be defendant, to be propounded to the witnesses in the
asked or given, for it is apt to result in difference cause. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 887.
of recollection, and consequent disagreement. The 2 Code, § 3856. If the opposite party is a non-
acceptance, or waiver, should always be in writing. resident, ten days' notice is sufficient. Code, § 4374.
31 Code, § 3854 a; Ch. Rule, II, § 3, post, § 1191. The conflict between these two sections (3856 and
If the party to be served has left the State, on busi- 4374,) may be reconciled by confining section 3856 to
ness or pleasure, service on his agent, or Solicitor, courts of law; and applying section 4374 exclusively
would probably be sufficient. to suits in Chancery. Section 4374 was originally
32 Code, § 3850. Such order may be entered by enacted expressly for the Chancery Court, and ap-
the Master on his rule docket. Code, § 4417. pears in the Code under the head of Chancery Prac-
1 Code, § 3855. Formerly, the general mode of ex- tice. And see Code, § 4455.
§484 DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON INTERROGATORIES. 392
And, in eases where a pro confesso has been taken against a defendant, and
the testimony is required on behalf of the complainant, and the defendant does
not reside within the State, the complainant may take depositions by interroga-
tories filed ten days beforehand, or by the usual notice of the time and place
of taking, entered on the rule docket. 3
"When interrogatories are filed with the Clerk, he shall give notice thereof
to the counsel of the opposite party, and such notice shall be sufficient if such
opposite party be a non-resident. 4
"When a deposition has once been taken on interrogatories, their efficacy is
exhausted; and another deposition cannot be taken on them, unless they are
re-filed, and new notice given. 5
§ 484. —
Notice of Filing of Interrogatories. The party desiring to take depo-
sitions on interrogatories must prepare his interrogatories in due form, num-
bering them numerically, giving them a proper caption and signing them, and
file them with the Clerk. He must, then, give due notice of such filing. In giv-
ing this notice he must consider, 1st, the residence of the witnesses 2d, the res- ;
idence of the opposite party, and 3d, the state of the pleadings.
1. If the witnesses reside out of the State, or over 150 miles from the place of
trial, ten days' notice is sufficient. 6
2. If the witnesses live in the State, but the opposite party is a pro-confessoed
non-resident, ten days' notice is sufficient. 7
3. If the witnesses live in the State, but the opposite party is a non-resident
who has made defence, or is a resident who has been pro-confessoed, twenty
days' notice must be given. 8
When witnesses reside out of the State, or over one hundred and fifty miles
from the place of trial, they should be asked in one of the interrogatories
where and in what State they reside, and how far distant from the place of
trial. When the witness gives the name of the place where he resides, but does
not give the distance, the Court will take judicial notice of the geography of
the country, and thereby determine the distance.
The following is a form of
NOTICE OF FILING INTERROGATORIES.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Nashville, Tenn.
Richard Roe, et al.
Richard Roe, defendant, is hereby notified that I have this day filed with the Clerk and
Master, at Nashville, interrogatories to be propounded to John Jones, a witness in said cause
in my behalf, who resides in Arkansas [or in Bristol, Tenn.]
May 20, 1891. John Doe,
To Richard Roe. By Jack Baker, his Solicitor.
If the opposite party is a non-resident, notice to his counsel is sufficient. 9
§ 485. Form
of Interrogatories. —The form of the interrogatories may be
substantially as follows:
INTERROGATORIES.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Nashville, Tenn.
Richard Roe, et al.
Interrogatories to be propounded to John Jones, who resides in Arkansas, [or in Bristol, 10
Tenn.,] a witness for the complainant in said cause.
Interrogatories 11 by the complainant:
1st. State your name, age, and occupation.
2d. State where you reside, and whether or not the place is over one hundred and fifty
miles from the Court House in Nashville, Tenn.
3 Code, § 4374. When the notice is entered on the 7 Code, § 4374.

rule docket it must be for the same length of time 8 Code, § 3856.
as; when personally served. 9 Code, §§3854 a; 3856 a.
4 Code, § '3856 a. This should be a ten days' no- 10 Or, at some other place over 150 miles from the
tice, and is intended to enable the counsel to cross Court House in Nashville.
the interrogatories. 11 Objections to the form of interrogatories must
5 Foster v. Smith, 2 Cold., 474. be taken before they are crossed. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 921.
Code, § 3855.
393 DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON INTERROGATORIES. § 485
3d. State whether you know any of the parties to this suit. If so, which of them ?
4th. [Proceed to interrogate the witness fully and particularly as to the matters to be
proven by him, being careful to avoid scandalous, irrelevant, and leading questions; and it
may be well to close with a general interrogatory^ like this:] 11
-
20th. If you know any other fact, or facts, which may be of any benefit to any of the
parties to this suit, or that may be material to the matters you have testified about, or to the
matters in question in this suit, please now state such fact, or facts, fully and particularly. 13
Jack BakBr, Sol. for Complt.
If the opposite party desires to cross the original interrogatories, he may
do so within the time allowed, following substantially the foregoing form; or
he may attach his cross interrogatories to the original, and head them, "Cross
'
Interrogatories, without more. After they have been crossed, the party filing
'
the original may, at any time before taking the deposition, file rebutting
interrogatories for the purpose of re-examining the witness.
SOME GENERAL INTERROGATORIES FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WIT-
NESSES WHO ARE TO BE EXAMINED ON INTERROGATORIES.
Interrogatory 1. Have you talked with any one in reference to your evidence in this case.'
Int. 2. If so, give the names of the persons you talked with.
Int. 3. Did you on your memory alone in your answers? or, have you talked with
rely
others? If so, with whom
have you talked?
Int. 4. Have you used any writings, letters, papers, books, or other memoranda, to re-
fresh your recollection of facts or dates, in answering any of the questions in this case?
Int. 5. If so, specify the writings, books, papers, or other memoranda you have used.
Int. 6. Please file with your deposition the writings, letters, books, papers, or other mem-
orandum you have used.
Int. 7. Give the names of all persons who have at any time been present while you have
been giving this deposition.
Int. 8. What interest have you in this suit?
Int. 9. If you have any business relation or connection with any of the parties to the
suit, state what it is, and with which party.
Int. 10. If you are of any kin to any of the parties to this suit state to whom and the
relation.
Int. 11. Were you sworn
as a witness before your examination was begun.
Int. 12. If you have been requested not
to say anything about any matter connected with
your deposition, or with this lawsuit, state what that matter was, and state it fully, and
state who made the request.
Int. 13. If you have any letter, telegram, paper, book, or memorandum that in any way
relates to this lawsuit, or to this deposition, state what it is, and file it.
Int. 14. If you know any fact, or have heard any of the defendants, [or complainants]
say anything, that will be of benefit to the complainant [or defendant] please give such
fact or statement as fully as though specially questioned about it.
12
L Dan -
9 h ,? r;> 924
-
„' interrogatory in all cases. Rules of U. S. Eq.
13 There should be a rule of Court requiring this
I
| Courts, §71; Cooke, 412.

§486 FORMALITIES OF A DEPOSITION. 394
ARTICLE IV.
FORMALITIES OF A DEPOSITION.
486. Caption of Deposition. § 490. Enveloping and Transmitting Deposi-
487. Body of Deposition. tion.
488. Certificate to Deposition.
489. Depositions When
and How Taken in § 491. Receiving and Filing a Deposition.
Shorthand, or in Typewriting.
§ 486. —
Caption of a Deposition. The form of a deposition is prescribed by
the statute, and this form must be closely adhered to. The caption must be
substantially as follows 14 :
GENERAL FORM OF THE CAPTION.

A B,
vs. In the Chancery Court, county, Tennessee.
C D. .
Depositions of and witnesses for complainant, [or defendant,] in the above
case, taken upon notice, [or interrogatories] on the day of 189 [giving the date
,
specified in the notice,] at [the place specified in the notice,] in the presence of the complain-
— ,
ant and defendant, [show the fact.]

The said witness, aged , being duly sworn, 15 deposed as follows : [Then follow
the questions and answers.]
Or, to conform the foregoing general caption to the notices given in a preced-
ing section, and thus make a special form
SPECIAL FORM OF A CAPTION.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee.
Richard Roe, et al.
Depositions of Ann Jones and Julia Jones, witnesses for the complainant in the above
cause, taken upon notice on the 2d day of June, 1891, at the house of George Jones, in the
city of Nashville, No. 76 Summer Street, in the presence of the complainant and the defend-
ant, Richard Roe, and their Solicitors. 16
The said witness, Ann Jones, aged 16 years, 17 being duly sworn, deposed as follows
Q. 1, by the complainant. [Then follow the questions and answers.]
§ 487. —
Body of Deposition. The caption having been written out, the wit-
ness duly sworn, his or her name and age written down, the party or his Solic-
itor will then proceed to write 18 his questions as follows:
QUESTIONS BY EUGENE WEBB, SOLICITOR OF COMPLAINANT,
[OR DEFENDANT.]
Q. 1. If you are acquainted with any of the parties to this suit, state which and how long ;
you have known them.

Ans. I know all the parties, and have known them for a year, or more.
Q. 2. If you are in any way related to any of the parties to this suit, state which, and how.
Ans. I am not related to any of them, to my knowledge.
Q. 3. If you have any agreement, letters, or other writing, relating to the matters in dis-
pute signed by the defendant, Richard Roe, please produce the same. State what you know
about their execution, and make them exhibits to your deposition.
Ans. I have an agreement signed by Richard Roe, and left by him with me to be kept,
by consent of John Doe. I saw Richard Roe sign the paper, and I witnessed it at his request.
This agreement I herewith file, and mark it Exhibit A to this my deposition.
14 Code, § 3848. camvH know a witness' age otherwise than by the

15 The witness should be sworn before his exam- proof.
ination is begun. Code, § 38S9. 18 It is not essential to the admissibility of a de-
36 Show which of the parties was present, and position that the questions should be reduced to
which had Solicitors present, if any, giving_ their writing: they may be oral. Code, § 3859, is direc-
names. It is often important to know what Solicitors tory. Read V. Patterson, 11 Lea, 430. In England,
were present. Sometimes the questions and answers under the new practice, depositions are taken down
are iriire intelligible when it is known what Solicitor "not' ordinarily by question and answer, but in the
examincl the witness. form of a narrative.'' 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 904. Indeed,
17 The age should always be stated. The weight in England, affidavits are now largely used instead of
to be given the testimony of a witness often depends depositions. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 887-904.
to some extent upon his age; and the Chancellor
395 FORMALITIES OF A DEPOSITION. §488
It is important to see to it that all papers proved by a witness should be
made exhibits to his deposition, and should be lettered, or numbered, and at-
tached to the deposition. If this cannot, for any reason, be done, then the ex-
hibit should have the style of the cause written upon it, and, also, the fact that
it is an exhibit to the deposition, and should be marked filed by the Clerk when
he opens the deposition. The Commissioner would do well to write his name,
and official designation, on the exhibit when he signs the deposition.
ENDORSEMENT ON AN EXHIBIT.
John Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al.
Exhibit A, to the Deposition of John Jones.
Samuel Bright, J. P.
The complainant will proceed with all his questions, writing them down in
order as soon as each preceding question has been fully answered, being care-
ful to ask no leading, scandalous or irrelevant question. He may conclude with
19 if the opposite party
a general question like the last one in the interrogatories ;
is not present. If he is present, any general question may be omitted. After

the complainant has asked his last question, he will turn the witness over to the
opposite party to cross-examine as follows
CROSS-QUESTIONS BY WILLIAM B. FORD, SOLICITOR OF DEFENDANT,
[OR COMPLAINANT.]
Q. 1. In what way are you interested in this suit?
Ans. I have no interest in it whatever.
Q. 2. [The defendants will proceed with all their questions, and having ended their cross-
examination, the complainant will again take the witness for re-examination.']
RE-EXAMINATION BY COMPLAINANT.
Q. 1. Please explain more fully how you happened to be at the place spoken of in answer
to cross-question 5.
Ans. I was there on a visit to my aunt; had gone there a week before.
Q. 2. [The complainant will ask all questions he desires, proper on a re-examination, and
when the last one has been answered, the Commissioner will add:]
And further this deponent saith not. Her
Witness to mark: Ann Jones. 20 X
Samuel Bright, J. P. mark
DEPOSITIONS TAKEN ON INTERROGATORIES.
[// the deposition is to be taken on interrogatories, after the proper caption has been writ-
ten, the witness will be sworn, and will then answer each direct interrogatory, as follows:]
1st To the 1st interrogatory, the witness says
My name is John Jones, I am
70 years old, and a merchant.
2d. To the 2d interrogatory, the witness says:
I reside at Eureka Springs, Arkansas, which place is over one hundred and fifty miles
from the Court House at Nashville, Tenn.
[And so continue, until all the direct interrogatories have been fully answered; then let
him answer the cross-interrogatories, if any, as follows:]
1st. To this the 1st cross-interrogatory, the witness says : [After the cross-interrogatories
have all been answered, the Commissioner will add:]
And further this deponent saith not. John Jones. 21
§ 488. Certificate to Deposition. —After
the depositions have been duly
all
taken and signed by the witnesses, the Commissioner will add the following
certificate 22 :
CERTIFICATE TO A DEPOSITION.
The foregoing depositions were taken before me, as stated in the caption, and reduced to
writing by me, [or, by the witnesses.] And I certify that I am not interested in the cause,
nor of kin or counsel to either of the parties, and that I sealed them up and delivered them
to John Doe, [or, put them in the express office at Nashville, Tenn., or, in the post-office,]
without being out of my possession, or altered after they were taken. Given under my
hand, the 2d day of June, 1891. Samuel Bright, J. P. for Davidson Co.
19 Ante, § 485. does not require the signature. See, Code, 58 3848-'
20 In many of the States, it is no objection to a 3859; 3860; 3863.
deposition that the witness omitted to subscribe his 21 The witness will write his own answers, and
name to it. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 917, note. Our Code sign his own name, if he well can.
•>•> On/In R 1QAQ
§ 489 FORMALITIES OP A deposition. 396
The last clause may be written across the back of the envelope on the sealed
side, instead of inserting it in the certificate, 23 in which case, there may be
omitted from the foregoing certificate all the words between "parties" and
"given under."
The Commissioner will then annex a
BILiL OP COSTS.24
Commissioner: Samuel Bright, taking 2 depositions $2.00
Witnesses:25
Julia Jones, one day's attendance $1.00
25 miles of travel, 4 cts@ 1.00 2.00
Ann Jones, one day's attendance from another county 1.50

30 miles of travel, @
5 cts 1.50
2 ferriages, @
10 cts 20 3.20
If the deposition is taken by the Clerk and Master of the Court wherein the
suit is pending, the certificate is ordinarily omitted, and often the caption is
quite informal. Indeed, in such cases, and in many others where both parties
are present, the certificate is often waived. "Where, however, only one party is
present, and the deposition is not taken by the Clerk and Master, such party
should see to it that the caption, certificate, sealing, and transmitting are all
done in exact compliance with all the requirements of the law.
§ 489. Depositions When and How Taken in Shorthand, or in Typewriting.
Persons authorized to take depositions may take them in shorthand, and subse-
quently reduce the same to manuscript or typewriting, or may take them di-
rectly on a typewriting machine provided, that in case the deposition be taken
;
in shorthand, the person taking it can truthfully certify, and does certify sub-
stantially, as follows
CERTIFICATE WHEN DEPOSITION IS TAKEN IN SHORTHAND.
I certify that being a stenographer, I took the foregoing deposition in the
exact language of the witness, and reduced it to typewriting [or manuscript] that it was ;
then read over by the witness in my presence [or was read over by me to the witness], and
was approved and signed by him and I also certify that I am not, in any capacity, in the
;
regular employ of the party in whose behalf this deposition is taken, nor in the regular employ
of his attorney; and I certify that I am not interested in the case, nor of kin or counsel to
either of the parties, and that I sealed up said deposition and delivered it to
[or, delivered it to the express office, or, put it in the postoffice] without its being out of my
possession, or altered after it was taken.
No
deposition taken under this section shall be signed by the witness until
it have been reduced to manuscript or typewriting. 26 Depositions may
shall
be taken by stenographers in the regular employ of the litigant taking the de-
position, or his attorney, where the opposite party consents. 27
§ 490. Enveloping and Transmitting a Deposition. The deposition, when —
complete, shall, together with the commission, and interrogatories, if any, and
all documents which may have been deposed to, and all exhibits, be duly envel-
oped and sealed, with the Commissioner's name written across the seal, and
directed to the Clerk of the Court where the cause is pending, with the title of
the cause endorsed on the envelope it may be sent by mail, express, or private
:
conveyance. 28
The Commissioner will be careful to put everything in the envelope that
belongs to the deposition, 29 including the interrogatories, if any, the notice and
23 Code, § 3849. 27 Ibid, § 2.

24 Ch. Rule, II, § 1; post, § 1191. 28 Code, §§ 3860; 3861 a.
25 Witnesses living in the county where examined 29 If proof of the notice to take depositions is
get one dollar a day, and four cents a mile; but wit- made before the Commissioner by affidavit, or the
nesses living out of the county get one dollar and a notice is returned to him by the officer, let such affi-
half a day and five cents a mile. Code, § 2830 a- davit or notice be, also, enclosed with the deposition.
2830 b. Ch. Rule, II. § 2; post, § 1191.
20 Acts of 1899, ch. 276, § 1.
397 FORMALITIES OF A DEPOSITION. §491
proof of service, if any, and all exhibits and, ; having sealed the envelope, or
moistened the mucilage on its flap and securely closed it, and written his name
across where the flap is joined to the body of the envelope, will address the
envelope to the Clerk and Master of the Court, and endorse on the left end of
the envelope the title of the cause, thus
ENDORSEMENTS ON THE ENVELOPE.
POSTAGE
STAMP
°
Q s
«
THE CLERK AND MASTER,
NASHVILLE,
2
TENN.
The Commissioner may, also, write across the back of the envelope the cer-
tificate mentioned in the preceding section, as follows
s
<
Ihereby certify that I sealed up the within depositions, and delivered

them John Doe, [or, put them in the post-office, or, in the Southern Ex-
to
press office,] without being out of my possession, or altered, after taken, June
2, 1891.
The Commissioner may, however, deliver the deposition to the Clerk and
Master in person, in which case he need not envelope it at all. But he must take
the messenger's oath before the Master on delivering the deposition, unless his
30
certificate shows that he delivered it to the Master.
§ 491. —
Receiving and Filing a Deposition. When the depositions are re-
ceived by the Clerk, he shall certify upon them whether they were received by
mail, express, or private conveyance. If sent by private conveyance he shall
require the person delivering them to make affidavit that he received the depo-
sitions from the Commissioner, and that they have not been out of his posses-
31 The Clerk is required to
sion, or opened by him while in his possession.
endorse upon the deposition the day it is filed, and to make an entry upon the
docket giving the style of the cause, the names of the witnesses, and the date
of filing. 32 Depositions may be opened by the Clerk at any time after they are
30 Hutson v. Hutson, 9 Lea, 354. the deposition itself, and not on the envelope, The
31 Code, § 3861 Acts of 1870, 2d Sess., ch. 16.
; envelope may get lost.
32 Code, § 3867. This endorsement must be on
S492 DUTIES OP COMMISSIONERS AND WITNESSES. 398
filed, atthe request of either of the parties, or his attorney and copies may be ;
furnished the parties on demand. The Clerk shall note on the deposition the
fact that it was opened by him. 33
ARTICLE V.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMISSIONERS, AND RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF
WITNESSES.
492. General Powers of Commissioner. 495. When an Interpreter is Needed.
493. General Duties of Commissioner. 496. Exceptions Taken Before Commis-
494. Rights and Duties of Witnesses.
§ 492. —
General Powers of Commissioner. Every officer authorized by law
to take depositions is, for that occasion, termed a Commissioner, whether a com-
mission is issued to him by the Clerk and Master or not; and such officer is,
while engaged in the discharge of his duties, vested with all the powers of a
Court to preserve order, prevent interruption, and control the conduct of the
parties in the examination of the witness. 1 He may accordingly fine any person
guilty of wilful disobedience, or resistance, to any lawful command he may
make during the examination, such fine not to exceed ten dollars. 2
The Commissioner, or person authorized to take depositions, has power to
issue subpoenas for witnesses, which may be served by the Sheriff, or any con-
stable and the certificate of the Commissioner, or person authorized, that the
;
witness failed to appear, together with the return of the officer, is proof of the
facts. 3 Any witness who fails to appear in such cases, according to the terms
of the subpoena; or who fails to answer the questions which may be lawfully
put to him, is subject to the penalties provided for enforcing the attendance of
witnesses to give testimony in Court, and compelling them to testify. 4 The
penalty for non-attendance may be enforced by the tribunal having cognizance
of the suit, upon scire facias as in other cases. 5
If any witness refuse to give testimony when legally bound, he shall be com-
mitted to the common jail, by the Commissioner before whom he is bound to
testify, there to remain without bail or main-prize, until he is willing to testify
as the law directs. 6
If a witness fail to appear when summoned before a Commissioner, the sub-
poena is returned to the Chancery Court, with the endorsement of such failure
made thereon, by the Commissioner and scire facias issues as in other cases. 7
;
If a deposition is begun on the day fixed in the notice, and it is impracticable

to finish it on that day, it may be finished on the next but the Commissioner ;
cannot postpone the beginning of the deposition. 8

A
subpoena for witnesses may be substantially in the following form 9 :
33 Code, § 3870. Under the old practice, no depo- Clerk and Master in such cases, is greater. See,
sition was allowed to be opened, nor was the Com- post, § 1196.
missioner allowed to divulge its contents, until all the 3 Code, § 3862.
proof in the cause had been taken, and the cause set i Code, § 3863.
for hearing. The seals of the depositions were then 5 Code, § 3864. All other penalties for contempts
broken, and the contents of the depositions were before the Commissioner would probably be enforced
made known to the parties. This was called "passing in the same way, the Commissioner certifying the
publication." Cooke, 431; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 945. Gres.
Eq. Ev., 71. Under our practice, the opening of a Code, § 3823.
6
deposition by the Clerk is equivalent to publication Code, § 3825. This section requires the subpoena
7
in the English practice; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 945, note to be returned to the Circuit Court of the county;
7; and the expiration of the time for taking proof but in view of the Act of 1877, increasing the juris-
is, with us, equivalent to passing publication, in diction of the Chancery Court, and Code, 3864, the
England. Chancerjr Court probably has jurisdiction when the
lCode, §3858. Commissioner is acting as one of its officers.
2 Code, §§4106-4107; 4112. The authority of the 8 Read v. Patterson, 11 Lea, 430.
9 Code, § 3814.
399 DUTIES OE COMMISSIONERS AND WITNESSES. § 493
SUBPOENA FOB WITNESSES.
The State of Tennessee.
To the Sheriff, or any ConstaDle, of Knox County
Summon Jane Brown and George Smith to appear before me, at the house of John Wilson,
in the 10th civil district of said county, on June 25th, 1891, at 10 a. m., [naming the place and
time specified in the notice,] to give testimony in behalf of the complainant in a suit pending
in the Chancery Court, at Knoxville, between Richard Roe, complainant, and John Doe and
others, defendants. Notify said George Smith, that he is required to bring with him a written
contract deposited with him by the defendant, John Doe, on or about May, 1890, [or other
paper needed, and in the witness' possession, describing it so as to identify it.]
Witness my hand, May 30, 1891.
I. C. Grant, J. P. and Commissioner.
§ 493. —
General Duties of Commissioner. The Commissioner, having first
sworn the witness according to law, should require the questions to be reduced
to writing before being put, and then read to the witness; and should take
down the answers in writing, or cause the same to be done by the witness him-
self,as near as may be in the witness' own words. 10
the duty of the Commissioner: (1) to preserve order; (2) to see that the
It is
witness is fairly dealt with (3) to require a witness to answer all proper ques-
;
tions (4) to examine each witness separate and apart from all the others named
;
in the notice, when either party makes oath before him that he verily believes
justice so requires; (5) to prevent a witness being taken aside privately by
either party during his examination; (6) to read over to the witness, or allow
the witness to read over, his deposition, if so requested, before it is signed,
and to correct it, or allow the witness to correct it, where erroneous; 11 (7) to
annex to the deposition a bill of costs, showing what each witness is entitled to
for attendance, mileage and ferriages, and what his own costs are, and (8) to
properly certify, envelope, endorse and transmit the deposition when taken,
without allowing it to be out of his possession, or in any way altered, after
it has been taken. Commissioners should make and enforce all rules and orders
necessary to prevent a witness from being tampered with, or. instructed, or in-
timidated, while being examined, or while attending to be examined. 12
§ 494. —
Eights and Duties of Witnesses. First of all a witness is entitled to
courteous treatment not only while being examined, but while in attendance,
and is entitled to protection from insult, menace, disturbance, or interruption. 13
He has the right to make any changes in his deposition before he has signed it,
but cannot make changes by erasures or interlineations, 14 if objection be made
but must make his changes or explanations in writing at the foot of his deposi-
tion.
A witness may use notes to refresh his recollection as to dates, names and
amounts, but he cannot be allowed to copy a writing into his deposition, nor to.
use a deposition previously prepared. 15 If he has a writing he wishes to use he
may exhibit it to his deposition, if either party desires it.
A witness may properly refuse to answer a question which may criminate
him, or tend to criminate him, or expose him to a penalty or to a forfeiture, or
which would involve a breach of professional confidence. 16
It is the duty of a witness to answer every question fully without reservation,
to the best of his knowledge, telling not only the truth, but the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth. A witness should not be allowed to spar with
counsel but should be required to confine himself to his duties as a witness, 17
;
and not be allowed to comport himself as an entertainer, or as a judge of the

10 Code, § 3859. This section is directory as to quired to reduce their objections to writing, and no
the manner of putting the questions; they may be arguments should be allowed.
put verbally. Reed v. Patterson 11 Lea, 432. 13 Blake's Ch. Pr.,' 133.
11 Blake's Ch. Pr., 133; Barb. Ch. Pr., 282. 14 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 282.
12 Objections are sometimes made to questions and 10 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 282; Blake's Ch. Pr., 133.
answers expressly to help the witness, or to show 16 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 942-945. But if such questions
him how to answer, or how not to answer, or else to are answered without objection by the witness, they
intimidate him, or otherwise unduly influence him. cannot be objected to at the hearing by a party.
A Commissioner who tolerates such conduct is either 17 He is under pay as a witness, and should con-
grossly ignorant of his duty, or lamentably deficient duct himself accordingly.
,•„ „„„-,„,, t„ ,i„ i,.-o A„t„ P,^.. „!,„,, 1,1 ha —-
§ 495 DUTIES OP COMMISSIONERS AND WITNESSES. 400
character of the questions, or as having large liberties or discretion as to
when or what he should answer, and how fully he should answer.
§ 495. —
When an Interpreter is Needed. If a witness whom it is proposed to
examine does not understand and speak English, an interpreter must be used.
The interpreter should be sworn, 1st, that he understands the tongue of the
proposed witness, and 2d, that he will interpret truly. The oath may be ad-
ministered by the Commissioner, in the following form. "You do solemnly
swear that you understand the tongue of the witness, [naming him], and that
you will truly and faithfully interpret to him the oath to be administered to
him, and the questions to be put to him, out of the English language into the
[German, or other language of the witness, stating it;] and that you will truly
and faithfully interpret his answers thereto out of the [German or other language
18
of the witness, stating it;] into the English language."
The deposition of a person who is deaf and dumb may, in like manner, be
taken by the aid of a person skilled in the sign language, unless the witness
can read and write, in which case he can, of course, read the questions and
write his answers, being first sworn in writing.
Leave to use an interpreter may be obtained from the Chancellor in Court,
or at Chambers, on notice to the adverse party. 19
§ 496. Exceptions Taken Before the Commissioner. If the form of a ques- —
tion is objectionable, it must be excepted to in writing before it is answered; 20
if the substance of the question is objectionable, it may be excepted to in writ-
ing before the Commissioner, or may be excepted to orally before the Court
when read at the hearing. The reason of the distinction is: if the form of a
ciuestion could be first excepted to in Court, it would enable the excepting party
to reserve his objection until it was too late for the other party to remedy, or
obviate, the defect; whereas, if the objection is raised before the question is
answered, the form of the question can be changed, or a new question asked;
and if the party questioning fails or refuses to change the form of his question
on objection being duly made, he voluntarily assumes the risk of his question,
and the answer thereto, being ruled out at the hearing. The ordinary objection
to the form of a question is, that it is leading.
So, if an answer is objectionable because not responsive to the question, it
must be excepted to on that ground in writing, before the Commissioner; be-
cause, if then excepted to, the questioner may ask a question expressly to get
the benefit of the irresponsive matter, and thus make it competent evidence.
All of the reasons and rules, applicable to objections to the form of a question,
equally apply to objections to the form of an answer.
What is meant above by exceptions to the substance of a question are excep-
tions because the question is (1) impertinent, irrelevant, or immaterial, or (2)
calls for hearsay, or (3) for parol proof of a writing, or (4) for privileged com-
munications, or (5) for matter that would tend to criminate the witness, or (6)
seeks to change a written agreement, or a will, by oral evidence, or (7) other-
wise violates some rule as to the admissibility of evidence.
The Commissioner should never undertake to rule out a question, unless it
is so manifestly ridiculous, or scandalous, as to be a matter of contempt. The
opposite party should be allowed to write his objection to a question or answer,
upon the face of the deposition but he must not call upon the Commissioner to
;
rule on his objection. 21

181 Barb. Ch. Pr., 285; Dan. Ch. Pr., 855. Court, and the party invoking such action on the
19 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1062; post, §775. part of the Commissioner should be onerated with
20 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 921, note; 2 Scott's Rev., 866, all the costs occasioned thereby.
note. Commissioners should, however, suppress all wrang-
21 If Commissioners were given the right to pass ling between parties, or their Solicitors, or agents,
on the admissibility of evidence, it would result in at the taking of depositions; especially wrangling
giving them the right to decide the lawsuit itself; for over the admissibility of evidence, or the legality of
the Chancellor would be restricted to such evidence questions or answers. What parties wish to say by
as the Commissioners saw fit to allow. It is a gross way of objection, let them reduce it to writing on the
usurpation of authority for a Commissioner to ex- face of the deposition, or on a separate paper to be
clude any evidence from the consideration of the attached to the deposition.
401 EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS. §497
ARTICLE VI.
EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS.
§ 497. Exceptions to Depositions Generally 8 500. How Exceptions are Taken and Ruled
Considered. on.
§ 498. Various Grounds of Exception. § 501. When and How Exceptions Must be
S 499. When Exceptions Must be Taken. Disposed of.
§ 497. Exceptions to Depositions Generally Considered. Exceptions to —

evidence are of three kinds: 1, Exceptions taken to the competency of the
witness 2, Exceptions taken to the competency of the evidence and 3, Excep-
; ;
tions taken to the admissibility of the deposition because not taken according
to law. The last kind of exceptions do not question the competency of the
witness, or the competency of the evidence, but merely questions the manner
1
in which such evidence has been obtained, and brought before the Court.
In order (1) to give the opposite party an opportunity to be present and
cross-examine the witness whose deposition is taken, and (2) to have the testi-
mony fairly taken down, and (3) to secure it from alteration after it is taken,
the law provides certain preliminaries, requirements, and safeguards, the viola-
tion or non-observance of any one of which will vitiate the deposition, if it is
excepted to on that ground. As such exceptions, however, do not go to the
substance of the deposition, but to its form, and are in the nature of matters
in abatement, the law requires that they be made and disposed of before the
trial is commenced, or they will be considered as waived. On the other hand,
exceptions to the competency of the witness, or of his evidence, may be taken
at the trial when the deposition' is offered, or the evidence is sought to be read.
The object of exceptions to a deposition is to suppress it, or rule it out of the
case; and, if the exceptions are sustained, the deposition is suppressed, and
cannot be read at the hearing. The suppression of a deposition will not prevent
the party taking it from, at once, retaking it, unless his time for taking such
proof has expired.
§ 498. —
Various Grounds of Exception. The grounds of exception to the
admissibility of a deposition have reference mainly to the form, manner, and
time, in which it was taken, and transmitted, and to the various formalities
prescribed to secure a fair deposition, and preserve it from alteration.
The following are the principal grounds of exception to the admissibility of
depositions
1. Exceptions for Want of Notice. The statute requires that notice of the time
and place of taking depositions, shall be served upon the opposite party; and
a deposition may be excepted to for want of such notice. The requisites of
this notice have been given in a previous section. 2 The opposite party may
waive notice or may attend, or have an agent in attendance, without notice, in
any of which cases he is estopped from excepting for want of notice. 3 A notice
that is not sufficiently long is, in effect, no notice, and may be disregarded by
the party on whom it is served. Notice cannot be given to take depositions at
two different places on the same day 4 nor can the Commissioner postpone the
;
commencement of the taking. 5

1 An exception to a deposition is one thing; an 4'Blair v. The Bank, 11 Hum., 84. But the party
exception to the evidence contained in the deposi- notified must attend at one place or the other; or he
tion is an entirely different thing. The deposition cannot be heard to object. Ibid.
5' Where
may be subject to exception, while the evidence, con- the notice is to take the deposition on a
tained in the deposition, is absolutely unexceptiona- certain day, -the Commissioner cannot postpone it to
ble; and so, the deposition may be utterly free from another day; but if the notice be to take on a certain
exception, while the evidence it contains is wholly day, and the deposition is then commenced, and it
inadmissible. becomes impracticable to finish it on that day, it may
2 Ante, § 481. be finished on the next day. Read v. Patterson, II
o t> ir i .. t e tj — ice
§498 EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS. 402
2. Exceptions Because Not Taken at a Proper Time. deposition may be ex- A
cepted to if taken before suit was brought, if the statutory prerequisites were
not complied with. 8 So may a deposition be excepted to if taken after suit was
brought, but before issue joined, when such taking was not authorized by the
statute, or by the Court, or by the Clerk and Master or, if authorized, was not ;
taken in the manner authorized. 7 If a deposition is taken after the time for
taking proof has expired, or during the trial term, it may be excepted to on
that ground, unless taken on a proper order, or by consent of the opposite
party. 7a So, if proof in chief is taken after the time for taking proof in chief
has expired, but while proof in rebuttal may be taken, the deposition may be
excepted to in so far as it contains proof not in rebuttal. 8
3. Exceptions Because Irregularly Taken. A
deposition may be excepted to
(.1) when taken by a person not authorized to take depositions, or who is inter-
ested, or of kin, or counsel, to one of the parties; or, (2) when it does not ap-
pear that the witness was sworn; or, (3) when a witness makes answers pre-
pared for him by another, or adopts another's evidence or, (4) when a witness ;
copies a form of deposition previously by him prepared, or merely re-swears

to a former deposition; 9 or, (5) when a witness fails, or refuses to answer
proper interrogatories; or, (6) when a deposition was not reduced to writing
by the witness, or the Commissioner; 10 or, (7) when a deposition is not signed,
or sworn to, by the witness; or, (8) when the deposition is illegible; or, (9)
when the deposition has been altered since it was taken; or, (10) when the wit-
ness was re-examined to the same facts by the same party without an order; 1 '-
or, (11) when the witness refused to answer proper questions; 12 or, (12) when
the party excepting was hot allowed to ask a proper question, or proper ques-
tions were ruled out by the Commissioner; or, (13) when the questions are lead-
ing, to an excessive degree; 13 or, (14) when the witness was allowed to retire
during his examination, and to have private conferences with the party exam-
ining him, or with his counsel or, (15) when the witness was deeply intoxicate<l
;
during his examination; or, (16) when his testimony is scandalous; or, (17)
when he refused to be cross-examined, or the exceptant had no opportunity to
cross-examine him; 14 or, (18) when any other irregularity occurred during thu
taking of the deposition, or since, whereby the excepting party has been injured
without his fault. 15
4. Exceptions Because of Informalities in the Deposition. The statute prescribes
the forms of the caption and of the certificate of a deposition, and if these forms
are substantially departed from, an exception will lie for that reason. Such
informalities consist of: (1) omission or misstatement of the style of the cause,
or of the Court where pending (2) failure to show that the witness was sworn;
;
(3) or other defect in the caption; (4) failure to show who reduced the dep-
6 Ante, § 474. 13 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 922.
7 Ante, § 474. But a party who cross-examines a 14 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.; 930.
witness cannot except to the deposition on the 15 Some
of the foregoing grounds of exception arc
ground that the cause was not at issue when it was of such a character that their sufficiency must be
taken. Harton v. Lyons, 13 Pick., 180. largely a matter of discretion; Underhill v. Van
7a Stadler v. Hertz, 13 Lea, 315. Cortland, 2 Johns. Ch., 339, and note; 1 Dan. Ch.,
8 In case of such exceptions, the Chancellor, on ap- Pr., 951; depending on the aggravation of the par-
peal, will allow the deposition to stand de bene esse, ticular irregularity. The irregularities may be shown
and will reserve his decision on the exceptions until by affidavit; Smith v. Cocke, 1 Tenn. (Overt.), 296;
the hearing. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 951, note; otherwise, it or by the evidence of the Commissioner, or pf the
might be necessary to hear the pleadings and proof witness himself, or of other witnesses. In Oliver v.
all read before he could determine the correctness, of The Bank, 11 Hum., 74, the defect in the deposition
the exceptions. not appearing on its face, it was proved by a witness,
9 Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea, 331; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 907, and the deposition ruled out. It was said in Wilson
note; 929. v. Smith, 5 Yerg., 407, that when a Commissioner
10A deposition cannot be reduced to writing by a sustains the necessary official character to act as
third person even when he is so directed by the Com- such "the Court will give credence to all he certi-
missioner. E. T., V. & G. Railroad Co. V. Arnold, 5 fies." Can then a Commissioner certify to matter,
Pick., 107. The parties may, however, consent that transpiring at the taking of the deposition, which
a third person may write the answers of the witness. would make it subject to exception? See Carter ft
11 Ch. Rule, II, § 6. In such a case, on appeal, Ewing, 1 Tenn. Ch., 212; 3 Greenl. Ev., §346.
the Chancellor will, unless the point be very clear, Where the questions in a deposition are grossly lead-
permit the deposition to stand de bene esse, and re- ing, the Court may disregard the evidence at the
serve the decision of the appeal until the hearing. 1 hearing, without any motion being made to suppress
Dan. Ch. Pr., 951, note. it, or any exceptions being taken to it 1 Dan. Cn.
12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 951, note. Pr., 922.
403 EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS. 499
osition to writing (5) or showing that it was reduced to writing by an unau-
;
thorized person; (6) failure to show that the Commissioner was not interested,
or not of kin, or of counsel; or, (7) failure to show that it was sealed up, and
properly transmitted, without being altered or out of his possession; or (8;
failure of the Commissioner .to sign it or (9) other defect in the certificate.
;
5. Exceptions Because of Irregularities After the Taking. A

deposition may be
excepted to for irregularities occurring after it was taken, such as, (1) the
Commissioner may not properly envelope, or seal it (2) he may not properly
;
endorse the title of the cause on the envelope; (3) he may not write his name
across the seal of the envelope; (4) he may not show what he did with the
deposition after it was taken; (5) the person to whom it was delivered may
not have made the affidavit required by the statute; (6) the Clerk and Master
may not have endorsed on the deposition the source whence received, and that
it was opened by him.
§ 499. —
When Exceptions Must be Taken. The Code requires that all ex-
ceptions to depositions for want of notice, because not filed in reasonable time,
or for other causes going to the admissibility thereof, except objections to the
competency of the witness, or of his evidence, shall be made and disposed of
before the commencement -of the hearing, or trial, otherwise they will be con-
sidered as waived. 16 Hence, all exceptions to a deposition, not based on the in-
competency of the witness, or of his evidence, must be taken before the trial is
commenced. It is not too late to take an exception after a cause has been reached
on a call of the docket. The hearing, or- trial, of a cause does not commence
until some affirmative step has been taken, such as beginning to select the jury,
or to read the declaration, or the bill, or to make a verbal statement of the case
preliminary to reading the declaration, bill, or petition. The mere announce-
ment of a readiness to try would not be the commencement of the hearing, or
trial; but any affirmative step taken thereafter, such as swearing the jury, or
reading the bill, or the like, would constitute such a commencement. Neverthe-
less, it would perhaps be too late for a party to file exceptions after announcing
his readiness to try, on the case being called but he would probably be allowed
;
after such announcement, and before the commencement of the trial, to appeal
from the action of the Clerk sustaining exceptions to his depositions, or to de-
mand the action of the Court on appeals from the Clerk's ruling, in cases where
he had had no notice of such exceptions, or ruling. 17
§ 500. How Exceptions are Taken, and Ruled On. Exceptions to deposi- —
tions must be in writing, and must specifically point out the precise ground of
exception to the deposition, after the manner of a special demurrer, or of ex-
ceptions to a Master's report. A
general exception to a deposition should
always be overruled.
EXCEPTIONS TO A DEPOSITION.
The defendants except John Doe:
to the foregoing deposition of
1st. Because the defendants had no notice of the time and place of taking the same. 18
2d. Because the deposition was taken after the complainant's time for taking proof had
expired.
3d. Because the deposition was taken by a person not authorized by law to take depo-
sitions.
4th. Because the certificate does not show what was done with the deposition after it was
taken.
Sth. Because there is nothing on the deposition, or annexed thereto, showing whence, how
or from whom, the Clerk and Master, received the deposition, or that the messenger made
the required affidavit. 18 July 2, 1891. James C. Ford, Solicitor.
16 Code, §3868: Campbell o. Baird, 11 Pick., 345. insufficiency is of time, place,

name, style of cause,
17 There should be a rule of Court requiring the or other matter of substance.
Clerk to notify the opposite party of the filing of 19 Ordinarily, only one or two grounds of excep-
exceptions, or the taking of appeals. Code, § 4422. tion will appear; more are given in the text merely
$501 EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS. 404
The Clerk and Master will at once consider the exceptions, and forthwith
write under them his rulings, 20 as follows
RULING OF THE CLERK ON EXCEPTIONS.
The foregoing exceptions are allowed [or, sustained.]
July 2, 1891. , John J. Graham, C. & M
The foregoing exceptions are disallowed, [or, overruled.]
July 2, 1891. John J. Graham, C. & M
[Or,]
The 1st and 3d of the foregoing exceptions are sustained;
and the others are overruled
•
July 2, 1891. John J. Graham, C. & M.
§ 501. When and How Exceptions Must be Disposed of. All exceptions —
to depositions, for want of notice, or for failure to comply with any statutory
requirement, or formality, or on any other ground, not going to the competency
of the witness, must be made in writing before the Clerk, 21 and be disposed of
before the commencement of the hearing, or trial, or they will be considered as
waived. 22 The ruling of the Clerk on the exceptions disposes of them, if such
ruling is submitted to by the party ruled against. If, however, either or both
of the parties are dissatisfied with the decision of the Clerk, an appeal may be
taken therefrom to the Chancellor. 23 The entry of the appeal should be imme-
diately under the entry of the Clerk 's ruling, in form substantially as follows
APPEAL FROM THE CLERK'S RULING.
Complainant appeals to the Chancellor from the foregoing decision.
July 2, 1891. James H. LewallEn, Solicitor.
Appeal taken July 2, 1891. 2 *
John J. Graham, C. & M.
This appeal should be brought by the exceptant to the attention of the Chan-
cellor, at the earliest moment possible. If the appeal is acted on in vacation,
the Chancellor will endorse his action on the paper containing the exceptions,
or on a paper annexed thereto, as follows
CHANCELLOR'S RULING ON THE APPEAL.
The foregoing appeal heard; and the exceptions overruled, [or, sustained.]
July 3, 1891. John P. Smith, Chancellor.
If Court is in session, the action of the Chancellor
be entered on the may
minutes, instead of endorsed on the paper containing the exceptions.
If the Clerk overrules the exceptions to a deposition, the exceptant must
take and prosecute an appeal from the ruling of the Clerk, or he will be deemed
to have waived his exceptions. If the Clerk sustains the exceptions, the party
taking the deposition must appeal, or he will not be allowed to read the dep-
osition at the trial. 25 An appeal vacates the ruling of the Clerk, and leaves the
deposition as though the exceptions had never been acted on by the Clerk. If,
therefore, the Clerk sustains an exception, and an appeal is taken, the appeal
vacates his ruling and, unless the exceptant calls upon the Chancellor to act
;
upon his exceptions, before the trial begins, they will be considered as waived.
The. exceptant must see to it that his exceptions are finally disposed of, before
the commencement of the hearing, or trial. Therefore, when the Master sus-
tains his exceptions, and the Master's ruling is appealed from, inasmuch as such
appeal vacates the Master's action and leaves the exceptions undisposed of,
the duty devolves on the exceptant, and not on the appellant, to have the ex-
20 He must act on the exceptions as soon as they sibilityof the deposition, the exceptions must be
are filed. Code, § 3869. made after the trial has begun, and when the excep-
21 Travis v. Laurance, 2 Shan. Cas., 109; Railroad tionable evidence is offered, or at least before the
,-. Harris, 17 Pick., 527. evidence is closed. The State l'. N. Bank, 16 Lea,
22 Code, §3868. Ch. Rule, II, §5; post, §1191. 116.
If the regularity or admissibility of the deposition, 23 Code, §3869. Ch. Rule, II, §5; post, §1191,
regardless of the evidence it contains, is to be ex- sub-sec. 5.
cepted to, the exceptions must be filed, and finally 24 It is prudent,and perhaps necessary, to have
acted on, before the trial begins. Travis V. Laurance, the Clerk note the fact and date of the appeal, and
2 Shan. Cas., 109; Railroad v. Harris, 17 Pick., 527. attest it with his signature.
If the evidence contained in the deposition is to be 25 Hawkins t>. McNamara, 1 Heisk., 352.
excepted to, regardless of the regularity or admis-
405 AMENDMENT OF DEPOSITIONS. §502
ceptions acted on by the Chancellor; and, if he fails to do so before the trial
begins, his exceptions will be considered as waived, and the deposition may be
read. 26 In short, a deposition may always be read, unless there is standing
against it, when the trial begins, an exception sustained without appeal; and
it is too late after the trial begins either to take exceptions, or to appeal from
the Master's ruling, or to call for the action of the Chancellor on an appeal
already taken. 27
ARTICLE VII.
AMENDMENT OF DEPOSITIONS.
§ 502. Amending Depositions Generally Con-
sidered. § S04. How Amendments to a Deposition are
§ 503. What Amendments to Depositions Made.
May be Made.
§ 502. Amending Depositions Generally Considered.

Under the old prac- —
tice, when
the contents of a deposition were kept secret from every one except
the Commissioner himself, when it was considered a grave matter to allow the
testimony to be known until all the proof in the cause had been taken, and
when this secrecy was deemed essential to prevent perjury, amendments to
either the form, or the substance, of the deposition, were allowed with very
great hesitancy, and only for extraordinary reasons. But now that depositions
are openly taken in the presence of both parties, and especially as the Commis-
sioners have often but little experience in taking depositions, it would seem
that there should be the same opportunity to amend depositions as is allowed
in other proceedings in Court, 1 to the end that justice may be attained, and
causes be tried on their merits without being entangled in the nice formalities
of the law. 2 And it is accordingly, a common practice now to allow depositions
to be amended when there is an informality or imperfection in the taking or
transmitting of it, or when there is some error, omission, or mistake, in the
evidence contained in it.
§ 503. What Amendments to Depositions —
May be Made. Any defect, omis-
sion, or imperfection, resulting from accident or mistake, either in the form of
the deposition, or in the transmission of it, or in the substance of it, may be
amended, when the fact of the defect, omission, or imperfection, and of the
accident or mistake causing it, is clearly made to appear in the manner stated
in the next section.
1. Amendments to the Substance of a Deposition. When a witness has made a
mistake in his testimony, or has omitted to answer some part of the interroga-
tories, or the Commissioner has omitted to take down, or has erroneously taken
26 Code, §§3868-3869; Carter v. McBroom, i
to.. A general objection to such a deposition will be
Pick., 378; Campbell v. Baird, 11 Pick., 345. construed as referring merely to the competency, or
27 If your exceptions are overruled by the Clerk, relevancy, or legal effect, of the testimony contained
you must take and prosecute an appeal before the therein, and not as embracing any matter of form,
trial begins, or your exceptions will go for nought. or question of regularity, or authority, in the taking
If your exceptions are sustained by the Clerk, and of such deposition. Garvin v. Luttrell, 10 Hum.,
the other party appeals, you must have the Chan- 16; Miller v. State, 12 Lea, 223.
cellor act on your exceptions before the trial begins, 1 Code, § 2863 Bewley v. Ottinger, 1 Heisk., 354.
;
or they will be considered

as waived. Carter V. 2 Hunter
v. Sevier, 7 Yerg., 136.
McBroom, 1 Pick., If exceptions to your dep-
378. .
Many errors in pleadings, depositions and decrees,
ositions are sustained by the Clerk, you must ap- some ludicrous, others perplexing, and still others
peal, or your depositions go for nought. Brandon downright injurious, result from typewriters and
v. Mullenix, 11 Heisk., 446; Hawkins v. McNamara, stenographers either misunderstanding the words
1 Heisk., 352. If you have grounds of exception to dictated, or misreading their stenographic notes.
your adversary's deposition, you must take them Even our statutes contain many such errors: thus
and have them finally acted on before the trial be- by the Act of 1885, ch. 93, Milliken and Vertrees
gins, or you will be deemed to have waived them.' were "authorized, directed and empowered to revise,
Suson v. Ellis, 11 Heisk., 80; Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea, digest and qualify [codify intended] all the general
319. A
deposition may be read, if not specially ex- statutes in force in this State;" and the Act of 1887.
cepted to before the trial begins, even when it is ch. 156, refer to their work as "Milliken & Vertrees'
accompanied by neither caption, certificate, notice, complication [meaning compilation] of the laws of
commission, or authority of any kind for taking the Tennessee." Courts should be very liberal in allow-
same; and when nothing appears but the style of ing such and similar errors to be corrected, even at
§504 AMENDMENT OF DEPOSITIONS. 406
down, some part of his answer; and in other like cases, where the defect of
evidence has resulted from accident or inadvertence, leave to supply the defect
and correct the error by a re-examination of the witness will be granted by the
Court. In such cases, however, the re-examination will be restricted to the
supply of the defect, or the correction of the error, without retaking any other
parts of the testimony, unless the entire original deposition has been sup-
pressed. 3
2. Amendments to the Form of a Deposition. Any defect, omission, error, or
imperfection, in the form of the caption, or of the certificate, or in the signing
of the deposition, or of the certificate, or in the endorsements on the envelope,
or in the affidavit of the messenger, or in the endorsement of the Clerk, may be
amended when such defect, omission, error, or imperfection is evidently the
result of accident, or mistake, or inadvertence.
§ 504. How Amendments to a Deposition are Made. Amendments may be —
desired either in, or to, the evidence contained in the deposition, or in the for-
malities incident to its taking.
1. Amendments in, or to, the Evidence. A
witness has the right to read, or
have read to him, the whole of his deposition, before he can be required to sign
it. He may make any correction in his testimony, by an explanatory addition
thereto, at any time before he departs from the presence of the Commissioner,
though the deposition be signed and closed, but he can make no change or addi-
tion after he departs, except by leave of the Court for that purpose, 4 which
leave the Court will sometimes grant, on proper application therefor.
The ordinary method of showing to the Court the fact and circumstances of
the mistake, is by the affidavit of the witness but the mistake may, also, appear
;
from the certificate of the Commissioner, or upon the face of the deposition
itself, or otherwise. Knowledge of the mistake is the important fact, and the
Court, when once it has knowledge of the fact, will act upon that knowledge,
regardless of the manner in which it may have been obtained. 5
Sometimes, in cases of clear mistake, involving only a verbal alteration, the
Court, instead of ordering a re-examination of the witness, will permit the dep-
osition to be amended on its face in open Court. This has been done by the
alteration of a date stated by the witness by mistake, or by the correction of
a mistake by the examiner; especially where the witness was old, and very
deaf, the mistake being first clearly shown and proved, to the entire satisfaction
of the Court. 6 So, the Court would allow a witness to sign his deposition in
open Court, when he had inadvertently neglected to do so, at the taking.
2. Amendments in, or to, the Form of the Deposition. If there has been any
error or mistake by the Commissioner, in any matter of form in the caption,
or certificate, of the deposition, or in the signing of the certificate, or in the
endorsements on the envelope, the Commissioner, on motion for that purpose
by any party interested, may, in open Court, under the direction and super-
vision of the Court, correct such error or mistake, making the amendment
under his official oath. 7 Such amendments, however, must state the facts as
they really existed at the time the deposition was taken; and are made nunc
pro tunc.
In like manner, if the Clerk and Master has neglected or failed to make the
proper endorsements on the deposition after receiving or opening it, he, on
motidn, may be allowed in open Court to correct any error, or supply any de-
fect, in such endorsements.
So, any failure on the part of the messenger to make the necessary affidavit,
3 3 Greenl. Ev., § 346. require their affidavits, or even their depositions, so
4 3 Greenl. Ev., § 324; Gres. Eq. Ev., 69; 1 Dan. that cross-questions may be asked. See, 1 Dan. Ch.
Ch. Pr., 929. Pr., 953.
5 3 Greenl. Ev., 346. But proof of the fact of a 6 Greenl. Ev„ § 347.
mistake should be clear. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 930, note. 7 Bewley v. Ottinger, 1 Heisk., 354; Eller V. Rich-
The Chancellor may, unless the case is very clear, ardson, 5 Pick., 575; Carter v. Ewing, 1 Tenn. Ch.,
examine both the witness and the Commissioner, or 212.
407 SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DEPOSITIONS. § 505
when the deposition is sent by private conveyance, may be corrected at any

time, by the messenger in person making the necessary affidavit; and it is
probable that this be done without the leave of the Court. 8
may ,
Amendments form of a deposition may be made, even after the dep-

to the
osition has been ruled out by the Clerk on exceptions based on the very defi-
ciency sought to be corrected by the amendments. In such case, the proper
practice is, not to appeal from the Clerk's ruling, but to obviate that ruling by
applying to the Court for leave to make the amendment, and then making it
accordingly. 9
Amendments must, however, be made before the beginning of the hearing,
or trial, if the deposition stands ruled out, or suppressed, on exceptions.
ARTICLE VIII.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DEPOSITIONS.

505. Rules for Questioning Witnesses. § 510. Rebutting Evidence.
506. How to Examine a Witness. § 511. As to Exceptions to Depositions.
507. How to Examine Your Own Witness. § 512. Exceptions to Evidence, When, Where
508. How to Cross-Examine a Witness. and How Taken.
509. Frame and Forms of Questions for § 513. How to Read Depositions at the Hear-
Depositions. ing.
§ 505. —
Rules for Questioning Witnesses. Oftentimes, many unnecessary
questions are propounded to witnesses, thereby unduly prolonging the exam-
ination, and needlessly swelling the record. This vexatious prolixity of aimless
interrogation ordinarily arises from a failure to comprehend the real matters
in issue. No question should ever be asked without a definite object, and that
object should be either (1) to prove, or disprove, a matter in issue; or (2) to
corroborate, or contradict, evidence already taken, or a witness already exam-
ined; or (3) to lay grounds for such corroboration or contradiction; or (4) to
test the accuracy, veracity, or credibility, of a witness; or (5) to shake his
credit by injuring his character, or general reputation; or (6) to give him an
opportunity to explain. 1 Hence, it is indispensable to a lawyer-like examina-
tion that the questioner shall have well in mind (1) the issues contained in the
pleading, (2) the evidence already taken in the cause, and (3) what can be
proved or disproved by the witness.
1. Complainant's Questions should, ordinarily, seek to draw out of the witness
what he knows: (1) in reference to the truth of the affirmative matters of fact
alleged in the bill (2) in reference to the falsity of the affirmative matters of
;
fact set up in the answer by way of avoidance (3) in reference to the charac-
;
ter, or hostile testimony, of the defendant's witnesses; (4) in reference to any

facts, or circumstances, tending to sustain the allegations of his bill, or to cor-
roborate the evidence, or witnesses, he has already introduced; and (5) in ref-
erence to any facts, or circumstances, tending to rebut the evidence, or dis-
credit the witnesses, of the defendant.
2. Defendant's Questions should, ordinarily, seek to show what the witness
knows: (1) in reference to the falsity of the claims set up in the complainant's
bill; (2) in reference to the truth of any affirmative allegations set up by him-
self, by way of avoidance; (3) in reference to the character, or hostile testi-
8 The Clerk and Master may administer the oath to the Court to have the defects and omissions in
to the messenger at any time before the hearing be- the depositions corrected according to the facts.
gins. Ibid.
9 Bewley v. Ottinger, 1 Heisk., 354. In such a l All evidence should be pertinent, material, pro-
case, an appeal from the Clerk's ruling would be in bative, explanatory, rebutting, corroborative, or cu-
vain, as his decision would be correct, and would mulative.
§506 SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DEPOSITIONS. 408
mony, of the complainant's witnesses; (4) in reference to any facts, or circum-
stances, tending to refute the evidence, or witnesses, of the complainant; and
(5) in reference to any facts, or circumstances, tending to sustain his matters
in avoidance, or to corroborate the evidence, or witnesses, he has already intro-
duced.
Solicitors should avoid putting leading questions to their own witnesses:
such a practice is not only grossly illegal, but is a direct injustice to the other
side. And if the witness is easily led, and led too far, the opposite side will be
apt to expose his ignorance, or his dishonesty. If, however, a witness is hostile
to the party calling him, or is unwilling to testify, the Court will allow leading
questions to be asked. 2
§ 506. —
How to Examine a Witness. As a rule, begin your direct examina-
tion of a witness by asking him his name, age, business, place of residence, how
near he lives to the parties, or the property in dispute, his relationship to any
of the parties, and how long he has known them, and what interest he has in
the subject-matter in controversy, if any. These questions are generally of
value in weighing the evidence of the witness and they, also, have the effect
;
of putting the witness at ease. As the Chancellor cannot see and hear the
witness give in his evidence, the facts called forth by the above questions are
often the only means he has of testing the comparative credibility of disagree-
ing witnesses.
Insist upon your adversary's witnesses being put under the rule, and exam-
ined separate and apart from each other, if you have any reason to suspect any
concocted evidence, or false swearing. Witnesses on the same side often con-
form their testimony to that of those who have already testified. 3 Oftentimes,
your only chance to destroy false evidence is by having the witnesses exam-
ined out of each other's hearing, and thereby involving them in conflict as to
particulars and circumstances. 4
Before you examine a witness, ascertain what he knows material to the con-
troversy this will render it unnecessary to ply him with a multiplicity of fish-
:
ing questions, or to run a drag-net of general interrogations through his mem-

ory, in order to discover what he knows.
Never attempt to mislead an honest witness, or to entrap him. Deal fairly
with those disposed to deal fairly with you. Be gentle with the young and
timid courteous to those disposed to tell the truth firm and dignified with the
; ;
flippant and impertinent forbearing towards the ignorant and stupid shrewd
; ;
with the shrewd, and crafty with the crafty.

While a witness is being examined by the other side, keep a memorandum of
points suggested by or during the examination, so that you will not forget to
interrogate the witness in reference to them, when your turn comes to examine
him. You should pay the closest attention to the examination when conducted
by the other side, so that you may be able to object to the form, or substance,
of any question propounded; and to see that anything favorable to your side
in the answer of the witness is not omitted to be written down and to prevent ;
the entryof any thing unfavorable to your side, not said by the witness. Make
all of your objections to the form, or substance, of questions, in writing, anil
neither argue them yourself before the Commissioner, nor allow the other side
to argue them. The Chancellor, and not the Commissioner, is the proper officer
to hear the arguments and pass upon the objections.
2 The Court may, at the hearing, disregard the cery, all witnesses were examined in secret, no one
evidence drawn from a witness by questions grossly being present but the witness and the examiner,
leading. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 922. even Solicitors being excluded.
3 Weak witnesses are sometimes intentionally given 4 Witnesses often testify falsely because of de-
a chance to hear other witnesses testify in advance fective memories, intending to swear the truth.
of their examination, so that their recollection may When such witnesses are examined out of each
be refreshed, and their confidence strengthened. By other's hearing, the deficiencies in their memories
such means, a weak, or timid, or partial witness may will become apparent from their conflicts; whereas,
be converted into a false witness, and learn to echo if they hear each other testify, they are apt to en-
what he has heard others swear. Formerly, in Chan- deavor to make their testimony harmonize.
§ 507. How to Examine Your Own Witnesses. —It requires fully as much art
and thought examine witnesses, as it does to draw a pleading, or
to properly
make a brief. In examining your own witnesses, you must keep in mind what
proof you need to make, and what you can make by the particular witnesses
you are examining.
1. Objects of the Direct Eixainination are (1) to prove the material affirmative
allegations in your pleading; (2) to disprove the material affirmative allega-
tions in your adversary's pleading; (3) to destroy, or weaken, the evidence
filed by the opposite party; and (4) to corroborate or sustain your own wit-
nesses. Hence, in examining one's own witnesses, it is all important to know
(1) what you need to prove generally, (2) what has already been proved in the
case, and (3) what you can prove by the particular witness you are examining.
To know the first two you must know the contents of the pleadings, and the
proof on file to know the last, you, or your client, should have conferred with
;
the witness before he was summoned. Solicitors who examine a witness with-
out this three-fold knowledge, are like men groping for something in the dark,
and they run like risks.
If your witness is young, timid, or diffident, ask him where he lives, how far
be lives from the place in controversy, whether he knows the parties, or some
similar questions, in order to put him at ease. If he is old, experienced in
business, or self-possessed, observe a respectful courtesy in your demeanor, and
proceed at once to the material facts you wish to prove. If he is flippant, or
conceited, or disposed to be humorous or impertinent, be grave and dignified in
your manner, and somewhat ceremonious, so as to impress the witness with the
importance and solemnity of the examination.
2. Objects of the Re-examination are (1) to obtain from the witness an ex-
planation of matters which are either not fully stated on the cross-examination,
or which are apparently in conflict with his evidence on the direct examination
and (2) to prove by the witness some new fact, the proof of which is made
necessary by the evidence elicited on the cross-examination. If the witness
las been confused, or entangled, by the cross-examination, he may be given an
opportunity to restate his evidence, and to disentangle himself.
Do not allow yourself to become annoyed because your witness has been
worsted by the cross-examination; preserve your temper and equanimity, and
open your re-examination by a reassuring tone and comforting manner, and so
shape your questions as to enable the witness to readily recover his self-pos-
session, and to correct, or explain, his inconsistencies, if any. By means of a
skilful re-examination, a battered witness may often be repaired, and be en-
abled to leave the stand with his credit fully restored.
§ 508. —
How to Cross-Examine a Witness. Never cross-examine a witness
without a definite and pertinent object. Aimless, hap-hazard and random ques-
tions are not only of no benefit to the questioner, but they often result in draw-
ing out answers that are a downright damage to him. Cross-examinations
have, ordinarily, four objects: 1, To destroy, or weaken, the force of the evi-
dence the witness has already given 2, To draw forth some evidence in favor
;
of the cross-examiner 3, To destroy, or weaken, the credibility of the witness

;
and 4, To lay ground for contradicting him. Unless the witness is friendly, or
wholly impartial, beware of trying to prove by him any fact material to your
case, for an adverse answer from him may counterbalance your own proof on
that point.
Witnesses to be cross-examined are, ordinarily, either (1) prejudiced against
your side, or (2) friendly to your side, or (3) indifferent to both sides.
1. Witnesses Prejudiced Against Your Sdde should be cross-examined with
great caution. If you can get along with your case without proving anything
by them, never ask them any questions, except as to matters that may tend to
§ 508 SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DEPOSITIONS. 410
kinship to the party calling them, their interest or feeling in the case, their
unacquaintance with the facts, and any other matter that will impair the effect
of their testimony. If, however, the witness knows the facts on which your
success depends, and you cannot prove those facts by any other witness, but
are obliged to tear the truth from the witness' throat, or wring it out of his
heart, begin by asking him leading questions, as to the most remote circum-
stances of the case, circumstances so unconnected with each other that he can-
not see the drift of your questions. Then, interrogate him as to circumstances
nearer to the transaction, and draw nearer and nearer, until you reach the very
time and place of the main fact. Do not, however, call on him to answer as to
the truth of the main fact, until a contrary answer will be grossly inconsistent
with the circumstances he has already sworn to, and will involve him in irre-
parable contradiction, and then demand of him whether, considering all he has
testified to, the main fact is not as you claim it to be. Coerce a concession out
of him, or demand an explanation of his glaring inconsistencies.
When an adverse witness, on cross-examination has answered several con-
secutive questions, by saying that he- did not remember, inject a question cov-
ering a matter he has already sworn that he does remember and, if he is dis-
;
honest, the chances are he will answer such question by saying that he does not
remember, and will thus expose his wilful dishonesty, or gross unfairness.
"When an adverse witness answers all of your questions in the negative, so
change the form of your questions that a negative answer will make in your
favor. Thus, if you wish to prove so and so, ask the witness if the contrary of
so and so is not the fact. If, for instance, you wish to prove that A was not
sober, ask such adverse witness if A was not perfectly sober on the occasion in
question. An adverse witness will, on cross-examination, under the influence
of seductive leading questions, and courteous demeanor, often admit some smaJi
circumstance, not deeming it worth an evasion. Truth, however, is so linked
to truth, that a very small admission often necessitates another in confirmation,
sr explanation. In this way, admission after admisrion may be obtained, until
the witness is hopelessly enmeshed in a web of contradictions of his own spin-
ning. In order to get a witness to make an admission of remote circumstances,
begin your cross-examination, as though you believed all he said, and had full
confidence in his honesty, but wanted some small particulars which the other
side had not called for.
2. "Witnesses Friendly to Your Side, when introduced by the other side, are,
as a rule, of more value to you than when introduced by yourself, because, (1)
you can ask them leading questions, and (2) they cannot ordinarily be im-
peached, or contradicted, by the party introducing them. Tou should endeavor
to prove by them every pertinent and material fact in their knowledge and you
;
may, as a rule, question them freely and unreservedly, for a witness friendly
to you is apt to be somewhat hostile to the other side, because made a witness
by them against his inclination.
3. Witnesses Who are Indifferent are dangerous, oftentimes, and must bo
cross-examined with care, lest they give you a damaging answer. If their in-
difference arises from general sullenness, be careful not to offend them, but be
as courteous and suave as possible. If their indifference is the result of impar-
tiality, then question them freely, but no further than the truth will warrant,
If the heart of an indifferent witnesses can be won, he may prove a valuable
acquisition but if he is inclined to resent your advances, let him go cave
; :
canem!
4. Witnesses When Intoxicated, Insubordinate, or Tampered With. If any irreg-
ularity occurs while taking a deposition, or depositions, prove it by a witness,
or by the Commissioner. Among such irregularities may be mentioned (l.i
That a witness was intoxicated, or insubordinate, or quarrelsome; or (2) was
tampered with by the opposite party, or his attorney. If a witness was in any
way tampered with by the opposite side during his examination, or in any way
approached, or stuffed, prove it by him while his deposition is being taken.
If important to show who is present at the taking of proof, show it by some
witness, or by the Commissioner. You may question the witness as follows on
the above matters
QUESTIONS TO SHOW TAMPERING.
Have you not talked with X
5 since the last question?
Did you not have a talk with X

after I asked the preceding question, and before you an-
swered it?
Have you not refreshed your recollection as to facts, figures, or dates, since your deposi-
tion began? or since you were summoned as a witness?
Please state in what way you so refreshed your recollection.
Please file the paper you so used in refreshing your recollection, and mark it exhibit A to
your deposition.
Is not X present at the taking of your deposition, and is he not assisting in asking ques-
tions ?
Has he not asked you some questions ? If so, what ones ?
Did X show you any papers when he talked with you about this case? What papers
were they? Give their contents.
§ 509. —
Frame and Forms of Questions for Depositions. It is a great saving
of time and annoyance for proper questions to be propounded to a witness,
whether his examination is on notice or on interrogatories; and is especially
important in the latter case, as the opportunities of remedying any defect in
question or answer is much less when the deposition is taken on interrogatories.
To aid counsel in framing his questions, in the latter case, some common forms
are here given. Counsel would do well, however, to divide many of these ques-
tions, 1st, because the witness may be confused by too many or too complicated,
questions being propounded at once 2d, because Commissioners do not always
;
take the trouble to have the witness answer all of the questions, main and sub-
ordinate, included in one interrogatory.
QUESTIONS FOR DEPOSITIONS.
1.Preliminary Questions.
Q. State your age and occupation and post-office address. Do you know what this suit
is about, and are you in any way interested in it? If so, state how.
2. To Prove Knowledge of Parties or Other Persons.
Q. Do you know the parties to this suit [or O. P.] or any of them? and if any, which
ones? And how long have you known them? [or, O. P.] If related to any of them, to whom
and in what degree?
3. To Prove a Paper-Writing.
Q. Look at the paper-writing here shown you, marked A, [or some other letter}, and
state whether you are acquainted with the hand-writing of [naming person,] and whether
the name [giving name] subscribed to said paper-writing is in his hand-writing. State whether
or not the body of said paper writing, or any part of it, and if any what part is in his hand-
writing ?
4. To Prove an Oral Agreement.
Q.State whether you were present some time in the year 19...., when a conversation took
place between complainant and defendant about [naming the subject]. If so, state that con-
versation fully, and what if anything was said about [naming the particular matter.] State
the agreement of said parties fully as to such matter.
5. To Prove a Written Agreement.
Q. [Repeat the interrogatory above as an introduction]. State whether the said agreement
or any agreement was then and there, or afterwards, reduced to writing and signed by said
parties, or either of them and which one. Look at the paper-writing here shown you, marked
[state how marked,] and say whether or not it is the writing so signed. [If this zvitness is a
witness to said agreement, then add :] Did you witness the signature of either or both parties
to said paper-writing, and if either, which one. Did you, or not, subscribe your name to said
writing as a witness? And is, or not, your name subscribed to said writing your own hand-
writing?
6. To Prove Hand- Writing.
Q. Look at the paper writing now produced, marked A, purporting to be a promissory
note for dollars from B. C. [now deceased] to the complainant, dated the day of
, 19...., and
whether or not you ever saw said B. C. write, or are you by any
state
other means acquainted with his hand-writing? If so, state whether the body of said note
is in his hand-writing? or whether his name subscribed thereto is in his own hand-writing?
7. To Prove Books of Account. '
Q. If you were ever in the employment of A. B., so state, and state in what capacity.
Look at the book, here and now produced, and state whose book it is, and for what purpose
it was used, and if it had a name or designation state it.
8. To Prove a Statement or Admission.

Q. State whether or not you are acquainted with A. B.? If so, and you heard him say
anything about [state briefly what,] give all he said on the subject. And if you know how
he happened to make these statements, tell the circumstances.
9. To Prove an Account Stated.
Q. Did you ever, and make out an account in writing of the dealings and
if so when,
transactions between the complainant and defendant? If so, state how you happened to do
so, and whether the complainant and defendant furnished you with any books, papers or
memoranda to aid you, and if so what books, papers or memoranda? Specify them.
Look at the writing here shown you, marked A
[or some other letter,] and state whether
or not it is the account so drawn out by you, or a true copy thereof? State whether the
paper-writing here shown and marked A
contains a just and true account of all dealings and
transactions between the complainant and defendant during the time appearing on its face,
or are there errors, omissions or false charges therein, and if any point them out.
State whether you delivered, or mailed, a copy of said account so drawn out by you to the
defendant, and if so which and when and if you know whether the defendant received the
;
same, so state.
10. To Prove a Deed, Note, Contract, or Other Writing.
Q. Look at the paper-writing here and now shown you, marked A, [or some other letter,]
and state whether it was signed, or acknowledged by any person or persons in your presence
as his, [her] or their act and deed. If so, state what person or persons, and whether he
[or she] or they signed his, [her] or their names to, or acknowledged, said paper-writing.
Jf either party signed by mark, state which party, and state who wrote the name of such
party to said paper-writing.
[If this witness witnessed the paper-writing then add:]
Q. Are you, or not, a subscribing witness to the signing and delivering of said paper-
writing? In whose hand-writing is your name subscribed to said paper?
11. To Prove a Payment.
Q. Were you present when the deed [mortgage, note, bill of sale, or other contract,
stating- it] was executed and delivered? If so, did you see the consideration money paid?
If so, how much was paid and by whom and to whom? If the real consideration is not stated
in said deed, tell what it was.
12. To Prove Acknowledgments of an Instrument.
Q. If you are acquainted with A. B., state whether or not and when you have heard him
speak of a certain deed [note of hand, mortgage, deed of gift, bill of sale, or other written
instrument,] alleged to have been (given by him to C. D., and whether or not he made any and
what admissions or declarations in reference thereto. State all he said upon the subject.
13. To Prove a Tender of Money, or Other Thing.
Q. If you were present when A. B. is alleged to have made a certain tender to C. D., so
state; and state all that then took place, and whether A. B. had the money [or other thing]
present and if so, how much money did he have, and whether he offered it to C. D., and
;
whether C. D. accepted it. Give the date and place of this tender.
14. To Prove a Death.
Q. State whether or not you knew A. B.? If so, is he living or dead? If dead, how do
you know that fact, from being present at his death, or at his funeral, or by public repute?
or otherwise?
15. To Prove Service of a Notice, or Other Writing.
Q. State whether or not, on or about the day of 19...., [stating the date,] ,
or at any other time, and when, you delivered to C. D. a paper-writing, purporting to be a

notice [or, a copy of a notice] [state what it purported to be,] from A. B.?
;
If so, was or
not it signed by said A. B.? Did you or not keep a copy [or the original?] Look at the
paper-writing now shown you, marked A, and state whether or not it is a true copy [or the
original] of the writing by you so delivered ?
16. To Prove an Examined and Compared Copy of a Record.
Q. Look at the paper-writing here shown you, marked A, and state whether or not it is
a true copy of any and what record of any and what Court [or office?] State whether or not
you have carefully examined and compared said paper writing, here produced, with the
original, and with whom, 6 if anyone?
6 That is, who aided you, if any one, in making I original while the other compares the copy,
the comparison ? Usually, one person reads the I
413 SUGGESTIONS ABOUT DEPOSITIONS. §510
17. To Lay Grounds to Contradict a Witness.
X. Q. Did you not have a conversation with A. B. at [staling the place] on or
about the day of :19...., [stating the time,] about [state briefly what;] and
,
did you not then and there tell him that [stating what he is supposed to have said?] If you
did not so state to him, tell what you did say to him at that time.
18. To Impeach a Witness on His Reputation.
Q. Are you acquainted with the general reputation of A. B. among his neighbors?
Answer yes, or no, to this question. State what that reputation is good, bad or what?
State whether from that reputation you would believe A. B. on his oath?
—
19. Concluding Question.
Q. If you know of any other matter or thing relating to this suit that may throw light
on it, or be of benefit to either the complainant or the defendant, please state it as fully as
though specially and particularly questioned about it.
§ 5.10. Rebutting Evidence. —
Never fail to do all the rebutting you can.
Many good cases are lost, or greatly crippled, by failure to rebut. If your
client has been proved to have done a damaging act, or made a damaging state-
ment, or admission, be sure to put him on the stand to rebut the injurious evi-
dence, if it be false, or if it be capable of a satisfactory explanation. Solicitors
frequently fail to re-take their client's depositions to rebut admissions, or acts,
proved on them by the other side. Courts pay great attention to admissions by
a party, when such admissions are clearly proved, and are not denied.
If the character or evidence of any of your witnesses is assailed, sustain them
vigorously by rebutting evidence and if they can aid you in this rebuttal, re-
;
examine them. Corroborate your material witnesses as much as possible. A

ease is often lost for want of corroboration easily obtainable. The skill and
diligence of a Solicitor are exhibited to the best advantage in marshaling his
proofs so as to corroborate his own witnesses, and to rebut the proofs of the
adversary.
§ 511. —
As to Exceptions to Depositions. Remember, that all exceptions to
depositions, (1) because not taken in time; or (2) for want of notice; or (3)
for any defect in caption, or certificate, or in transmission or (4) for other ;
causes going to the admissibility of the deposition, must be made and disposed
of, before the commencement of the hearing, or trial. Be careful, then, to get
in all of your exceptions, and have them finally disposed of, before the cause is
reached on a call of the docket and, if any of your own depositions are ex-
;
cepted to, take all steps necessary to get rid of the exceptions: appeal, if the
Clerk's rulings are wrong or apply to the Court for leave to have the informal-
;
ity corrected, if it be correctible. Remember, that an appeal from the Clerk's

ruling on exceptions annuls his rulings therefore, if your adversary has ap-7
:
pealed from the action of the Clerk sustaining your exceptions to his deposi-
tions,you must have his appeal acted upon by the Chancellor before the hear-
ing commenced, or your exceptions will go for naught.
is
§ 512. Exceptions to Evidence, 7 When, Where, and How Taken. The fol- —
lowing are the principal rules governing the time and place for taking excep-
tions to evidence
1. Competency of a Witness may be made before he is ex-
Objections to the
amined, or as soon as his incompetency appears during the examination; but
they must be made when his deposition is offered to be read at the hearing.
The grounds of these objections will be stated hereafter. 8
2. Objections to the Form of the Question must be made when the question is
asked, and before the answer is given, whether the question is asked while the
witness' deposition is being taken, or while he is being examined orally. Ob-
jections to the form of a question in a deposition must be in writing before the
Commissioner, and must be repeated when the question is read in his deposi-
tion at the hearing; or the objection will be considered as waived. The opposite
1 Be sure to keep in mind the great difference be- I 8 See, post, § 535, sub-sec, 1.
tvveen exceptions to a deposition and exceptions to |
party will not be allowed to wait for an answer to an objectionable question
and object if be does not like the answer. His silence is a consent that the
question may be answered this same rule applies to objections to the substance
:
of a question. 9
3. Objections to the Substance of the Question may be made in writing before
the Commissioner when it is asked, and before the witness answers it, and this
is good practice but it must be made when the question is read in his deposi-
;
tion at the hearing, or it will be deemed to be waived. 10

4. Objections to Answers Because Not Besponsivemust be made before the Com-
missioner before another question is asked, and cannot be first made at the
hearing. If the answer is illegal or irrelevant it may be objected to when made
before the Commissioner, but must be objected to at the hearing. 11
5. Objections to Both Question and Answer because the evidence called for and
given is irrelevant, incompetent or illegal, may be made before the Commis-
sioner, but must be made before the Court when the question is read. 12
6. Objections to Evidence Heard by the Master on a Reference. When evidence is
taken by, or offered before, the Master, on a reference to state an account, or
make a report, incompetent evidence must be objected to before he closes the
proof, or it cannot be objected to at the hearing of exceptions to the report.
If the rule were otherwise, the evidence before the Chancellor might be different
from that before the Master; besides, if the evidence had been objected to
before the Master, the party offering it would have had the opportunity of
curing or supplying the deficiency, if any.
§ 513. How —
to Read Depositions at the Hearing. In reading depositions
at the hearing, omit all formal parts, such as the style of the cause, the caption,
the certificate, the number of questions, and the like. State the name of the
witness and his age, and then read the first question and the answer thereto
without any preferatory remarks. It is, ordinarily, unnecessary to say "ques-
tion" before reading the question, or to say "answer" before reading the
answer; the distinction between question and answer can, ordinarily, be indi-
cated by the inflection of the voice.
A deposition taken by one party and not read by him may be read by the
other party, 13 if the evidence is competent. In such a case, the fact that the
deposition was taken by the other party may be stated before the reading of
it is begun.
9 See, post, §§ 496; 535. I 12 See, post, § 535.
10 Ibid. 13 Saunders v. Railroad, 15 Pick., 130.
11 Ibid. I
415 MOTIONS BEFORE THE CASE IS CALLED. §514
CHAPTER XXVI.
MOTIONS PREVIOUS TO THE HEARING.
Article I. Motions Before the Case is Called.
Article II. Motion for a Continuance.
Article III. Motions to Dismiss the Bill.
Article IV. Suggestions How to Prevent Delays, Arising
from Amendments and Continuances.
ARTICLE I.
MOTIONS BEFORE THE CASE IS CALLED.
514. Motions by the Complainant. § 517. Motions by a Quasi Party.
515. Motions by the Defendant. § 518. Motions by a Stranger to the Suit.
516. Motions Common to Both Parties.
§ 514. —
Motions by the Complainant. Motions have already been defined, 1
and will hereafter be fully considered in a separate Chapter. 2 The principal
motions made by the complainant, between the perfection of his pleadings and
the hearing of the cause, are the following
1. Motions to Prepare His Case for the Hearing. These are (1) motions to take :
a non-resident defendant's answer off the files, and to take the bill for con-
fessed, because the defendant has failed to answer interrogatories in obedience
to a peremptory order; (2) motions for a scire facias, and for a revivor of the
cause (3) motions for leave to file an amended bill to set up matters in being,
;
but not known, when the original bill was filed and (4) motions for leave to
;
file a supplemental bill to set up matters that have come into being since the
original bill was filed.
2. Motions to Protect, or Enforce, his Bights, Pending the Litigation. These mo-
tions are: (1) motions for an injunction, or a restraining order; (2) motions
for a receiver (3) motions for an attachment for contempt against the defend-
;
ant, or against a witness; (4) motions by a wife for alimony; (5) motions to
require money, choses in action, or other personalty, in possession of the de-
fendant, to be deposited with the Master; (6) motions to impound, or loan out
money; and (7) motions for an order on the defendant to produce and file
deeds, contracts, or other documents, in his possession, which the complainant
has the right to inspect.
§ 515. —
Motions by the Defendant. The principal motions made by a de-
fendant, after the issue has been made up, are the following: (1) for a rule on
the complainant to take some step necessary to keep the suit in progress; (2;
motions to dismiss the bill of a non-resident complainant because he has failed to
answer interrogatories in obedience to a peremptory order; (3) motions to abate
the suit for failure to revive on the death of the complainant; (4) motions for
leave to file a crossbill to set up matters of defence that have arisen since the
answer was filed;- (5) motions to dissolve an injunction, or discharge an attach-
ment and (6) motions for leave to withdraw the answer, and file a plea or a
;
demurrer.
1 Ante, § 214. I consequence, motions will be dealt with very briefly
2 The Chapter on Motions deals in_ detail with the |
in this Chapter._See, ante, §§214-219; 256-262; 266-
§516 MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. 416
§ 516. Motions Common to Both Parties. The following motions may be —
made either by the complainant or the defendant: (1) motions to require the
adverse party to produce documents in his possession; (2) motions to shorten
or lengthen, the notice for taking depositions; (3) motions to extend the time'
for taking proof; (4) motions for leave to re-examine a witness, or retake a
deposition; (5) motions in reference to exceptions to depositions; (6) motions
for a trial by jury; (7) motions to consolidate two or more causes; (8) motions
to revive on the part of the mover; and (9) motions for a continuance.
§ 517. —
Motions by a Quasi Party. Receivers, guardians, and trustees, ap-
pointed by the Court, sureties on notes taken by the Master, purchasers at a
Master's sale, and the officers of the Court, may move the Court in reference to
any matter wherein they are interested or concerned, connected with a suit.
(1) Receivers may apply for instructions; (2) guardians may apply for an
allowance for their wards; (3) purchasers may ask to be relieved from their
purchase (4) the Master or Sheriff may apply for instructions as to his duty
;
in any particular matter before the Court; and (5) persons who come in under
a decree, to file and prove claims, may make motions in reference to their
claims.
§ 518. —
Motions by a Stranger to the Suit. A person, who is neither a party
nor a quasi party to a suit, is termed a stranger. Such a person cannot, ordi-
narily, make any motion in the cause. The Court will, however, hear him, on
petition, in the following cases: (1) on petition for leave to become a party to
set up claim to property involved in the litigation; (2) on petition for leave to
file a claim, or to come in under a bill, order, or decree, which allows creditors
or claimants to become parties; (3) on petition for leave to reclaim property
in the custody of the Court, or its officers; (4) on petition for leave to sue a
receiver in order to establish a money demand against him, or to prove title
to property in his possession; and (5) on petition in reference to a bid for prop-
erty which the Master or receiver refused to receive, or to report.
ARTICLE II.
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE.
519. Motion for a Continuance. § 521. Terms Imposed on Continuances.
520. Form of an Affidavit for a Contii § 522. Effect of a Continuance.
uance.
§ 519. —
Motion for a Continuance. When a case is reached on the docket
and called for trial, either party not ready for trial may move the Court to con-
tinue the cause, supporting his motion by affidavit or affidavits, unless the op-
posite side agree to the continuance. 3 The affidavit must be both special and
very strong, when the time for taking proof in chief has expired. An affidavit
for a continuance should be made by the party in person; unless (1) he
is prosecuting the suit by an agent, and then by the agent; or (2) unless he is
\mable to attend Court for any sufficient reason, in which ease the affidavit
may be made by his Solicitor, or any other person who has personal knowledge
of the facts.
The affidavit for a continuance should show, with particularity:
;i If your client wishes a continuance on any present such affidavit. If a continuance is refused,
ground at all debatable present such ground to the and you lose the suit, your client will be less dissat-
Court; and, if an affidavit in its support is advisable, isfied.
417 MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. § 520
1. The names and residences of the witnesses, whose depositions are desired
to be taken and read at the hearing.
2. A detailed statement of the particular facts expected to be proved by each
of these witnesses, such facts to be material to the issues involved, and favor-
able to the party asking a continuance.
3. The efforts put forth by the applicant to take the depositions of said wit-
nesses. Such efforts should ordinarily be due attempts to take their depositions,
or a sufficient reason given for not making the attempts. The efforts put forth
must be such legal process as the law provides.
4. If the testimony was discovered too late to take their depositions, show
that there was due diligence used in searching for evidence, and why these
witnesses were not previously interviewed.
5. Show that the desired witnesses are within the jurisdiction of the Court,
and amenable to process and that their depositions can and will be taken with-
;
in such reasonable time as the Court may allow.

6. If the desired witnesses live out of the State, show what grounds the
affiant has for believing that their depositions can be taken in a reasonable time.
7. Show that the evidence of the desired witnesses could not have been sup-
plied by any other known proof; and that there was no other witness or wit-
nesses known to affiant by whom he could prove the same facts.
8. If affiant has been misled, or hampered, by the other party or if his wit- ;
nesses have in any way been interfered or tampered with by the other party,
state the facts in detail, and show how he was thereby prevented from being
ready for trial.
9. Aver that this application for a continuance is made not for delay, but in
order that the affiant may have a reasonable opportunity to make his defence,
and that justice may be done.
10. The affidavit should be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant
and, if on information and belief, the name of the informant should be given,
and his affidavit should be presented in corroboration.
§ 520. Form of an Affidavit for a Continuance. The following — is a form
of an affidavit for a continuance, based on the foregoing rules
AFFIDAVIT FOR A CONTINUANCE.*
John Doe, I
vs. > In the Chancery Court, at Knoxville.

In this cause, the complainant [or, defendant,] moves the Court to grant him a contin-
uance, with leave to take further proof; and in support of his motion makes oath that he
cannot go safely to trial at the present term [or, that he cannot safely have this cause heard
at the present term,] for want of the depositions of George Jones, Henry Williams, John
Smith, and Charles Fen.
i.
By George Jones, who

lives in Claiborne county, he has good reason to believe, and does
believe, that he can prove that [Here set out in detail what you expect to prove by him, giving
the particulars. General statements will be insufficient.] Affiant would have taken said
Jones' deposition, but he did not learn the foregoing facts, or any of them, until six days
ago, which was too late to have his testimony taken. Said Jones lives in Claiborne county,
and affiant had no reason to suppose that he knew said facts, and [Here show why affiant did
not interview Jones before, and why he did not suppose that Jones knew amy material facts.]
il.
By said Henry Williams, who lives in this county, affiant has good reason to believe, and
does expect and believe, that he will be able to prove that [Here set forth particularly what
you expect to prove by him, stating the precise facts, and avoid general and sweeping aver-
ments of fact.] Affiant would have taken said Williams' deposition in due season, had it not
been that said Williams was so sick that his physician forbade his examination. [Or, give
such other reason for not taking his deposition as will show that you have not been negligent.]
IJThis affidavit may, by paying^ proper âttention |

guide, either by a complainant or by a defendant.
§521 MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. 418
in.
By said John Smith and Charles Fen, who live in Union county, affiant expects, on good
grounds, to be able to prove that [Here give the particular facts you expect to be able to
prove by each witness. Statements that you expect to prove by a witness that you own the
property in dispute, or that the defendant owes {or, does not owe,) the debt sued for, or that
the defendant had {or, had no,) notice, or that the defendant did {or, did not do,) the wrongs
charged in the bill, or that the defendant was {or, was not,) guilty of the fraud or other
—
inequitable conduct alleged, all such statements are too general: they are conclusions of law
or inferences of fact rather than facts.] Affiant would have had the depositions of these two
witnesses taken in time to read at the present term, if [Here show your excuse for not taking
their depositions, stating particularly what efforts you made, if any, to take them, and why
you were unsuccessful. If no efforts were made, state fully and clearly why not. If the
adverse party has tampered with the witnesses, or has misled you, or in any way impeded or
hampered you, show all the facts and circumstances connected with the conduct of which
you complain.']
IV.
Affiant cannot safely go to trial at this term without the testimony of the foregoing wit-
nesses; and he could not and cannot prove said facts so fully by any other witnesses. Their
evidence will, as he has good reason to believe, and as he is advised by his Solicitor, fully
prove [or, disprove,] the material allegations of the bill, and will show that the relief prayed
should [or, should not,] be granted in whole or in part; whereas, without the testimony of
said witnesses, the real truth of the controversy will not appear to the Court, and great
and irreparable injury will, in consequence, be suffered by affiant.
Affiant will be able to take the depositions of said witness within such reasonable time as
the Court may allow. This application for a continuance is not made for delay, but that
affiant may have a fair chance to take said depositions, and thereby to prove his case, [or,
make his defence,] and to have the real facts of the controversy before the Court, that
justice may be done him in this suit. And if, on consideration of the whole record, the
Court shall be of opinion that there has been any lack of due diligence on affiant's part, he
offers to submit to such terms as to the Court may appear equitable. John Doe.
before me, this May 26, 1891.
W. L, Trent, C. & M.
§ 521. Terms Imposed on Continuances. —
When a cause on the docket is
called for trial, either party be not then ready for trial, he may apply to have
if
the cause continued. 5 If he has had as much as six months in which to take
his proof, no motion for a continuance should be entertained, unless supported
by an affidavit showing that he has very strong evidence not yet taken, or filed,
and a very strong excuse for not having taken or filed it, in due season. If the
Chancellor, in such a case, should continue the cause, it should ordinarily be
only upon the payment of one-half of the unadjudged costs of the cause and ;
if it be the second continuance by such party, then only upon the payment of all
the unadjudged costs of the cause. 6 If the applicant for a continuance has had
a reasonable opportunity to get ready for trial, even though he has had less
than six months in which to take his proof, the Chancellor should not heed his
5 Courts are made for complainants; defendants loudly and complainingly insist on a speedy hearing,
neither need nor desire Courts. The Constitution of prompted really by the secret fear that criminating
Tennessee says all Courts shall be open; and every proof may be discovered. The proper maxim is: In
man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, preparatories ad judicium favetur actori. (In matters
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due preparatory to trial the complainant should be fa-
course of law, and right and justice administered vored.)
without sale, denial or delay. Const., Art. 1, § 17. The old stage-coach methods of practice heretofore
justice delayed is justice denied. The old maxim pursued in Tennessee are not adapted to these days
of the Civil Law, that defendants are more to be of railroads, telegraphs and telephones. The Courts
favored than complainants, (Favorabiliores ret potius should keep up with the times. Chief Justice Tur-
ney said " Until communities have the assurance
quam adores habentur,) announced a just rule for :
the ancient Roman forum, where an insolvent debtor that they may command a ready red-ess of (rricv-
could be condemned to be sold into slavery, or even ances and protection of rights, they will lack energy
killed, by his creditor, if no purchaser could be and thrift and respect for law. * * * Tt is ex-
found. The maxim was, also, a just one in England — —
pected rightfully expected of the Courts '.hat they
and America in former days, when an insolvent will do their whole duty in declaring and enforcing
debtor could be imprisoned, and all of his property such rules as will secure speedy trials, and just
sold. But now there are not only no penalties at- judgments, in all causes coming before them." Wood
tached to insolvency, but there are large exemptions, v. Frazier, 2 Pick., 508.
both real and personal. The reason of the maxim, 6 Nothing spurs parties to diligence so effectually
therefore, no longer existing, the maxim itself should as the certainty that negligence will be visited with
no longer be observed in our Courts. Cessante ra- costs. No continuance should be granted except on
tione legis cessat ipsa lex. The Court should really affidavit showing good cause, and not then ex™!"
favor the party on whom the burden of proof rests, on terms. Hart V. Scruggs, 1 Tenn. Ch., 1., The
so as to give him a reasonable opportunity to prove rule requiring a party to pay costs, as the price of
Parties who are conscious of their guilt a continuance, is based on the maxim that Me
his case.
often put on the mask of injured innocence, and who seeks Equity must do Equity." The Court
419 MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. §522
application, unless it be supported by an affidavit showing diligence, and a
good excuse for not having the desired evidence on file. 7
If the parties have had less than two months in which to take proof, the cause
will ordinarily be continued on mere motion of either party, and without terms.
But where as much as four months time for taking proof has elapsed, the cause
'
should not be remanded for taking proof for a longer period than four months. 3
Complainants in injunction and attachment suits should be required to put
forth extraordinary diligence in preparing for trial and severer tests should be ;
applied, and harder terms imposed on complainants in such cases than in ordi-
nary suits, if the injunction or attachment operates harshly on the defendant.
§ 522. —
Effect of a Continuance. A party applies for a continuance because
be is not ready to further proceed in the cause at that term, and when a con-
tinuance is ordered the cause is no longer before the Cotirt for the balance of
that term, and no further step can be taken in it at that term, 9 unless (1) by
consent of all parties in interest, or unless (2) the order of continuance is set
aside on due notice to all parties interested. 10
RULING ON A MOTION FOB, A CONTINUANCE.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe, et al.
This cause having this day been reached on the docket, the complainant, [or defendants,]
moved for a continuance, and read the affidavits of himself and John Laggard in support of
his, [or their,] application, on consideration whereof the Court continued the cause, and
remanded the cause to the rules for two months, for the further taking of proof in chief,
and for one month for proof in rebuttal, he to pay all the costs of the cause hereafter ac-
cruing. [Or, if the application is denied, omit all after the word "Court," and insert:] over-
ruled the motion, and ordered the hearing to proceed; and thereupon the cause coming on
to be further and finally heard this May 20, 1905, before Hon. Hal. H. Haynes, Chancellor,
upon the original [and amended] bill [&c. See, post, § 568.]
should have no favorites as between persons not ly as necessary 'to the ends of justice.' may be He
under disability, except in so far as it favors those compelled to admit a deposition, or document, in evi-
who are diligent; and the Chancellor has no right dence which ought to be, but cannot be admitted by
to grant a favor to one party at the expense of an- the strict rules of law. He
may be compelled to pay
other. Favors should be paid for in costs; other- such part of the costs as the Court may, under the
wise the party in default is rewarded and the party circumstances, think just, although by strict rules of
who has done his duty is punished. law the costs are to abide the event of the suit. The
A continuance always works an injury to one of Court, however, will take care that the terms ex-
the parties; and another maxim of Equity says that acted are not such as will defeat the ends of justice."
"where a loss must fall on one of two parties, it A party applying for a continuance is at the
should fall on him whose act or default occasioned mercy of the Court. Cheatham V. Pearce & Ryan, 5
the loss," for otherwise, he would derive an advan- Pick., 668.
tage from his own wrong. A Chancellor should 7 A
party applying for a continuance is at the
never deprive one party of the just rewards of his mercy of the Court which can impose terms as to the
diligence, in order to relieve the other party of the time, place and manner of taking proof. Cheatham
just penalty of his negligence; for that would be to v. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 668. If the applicant
punish him who had done his duty, and to reward does not accept the terms he can withdraw his appli-
him who had failed to do his duty. cation.
Judge Abraham Caruthers, in his History of a 8 If a longer period is allowed, the parties will
Lawsuit, (g 341,) says; " 'The Court, in granting often delay taking their proof until the week before
continuances, may impose terms upon the party at Court; and then one side or the other will want a
whose instance the cause has been continued, by second continuance to rebut the proof thus recently
making him pay costs, or otherwise, as may best taken; whereas, if only four months are allowed the
further the progress of the cause, and the ends of Chancellor, or Master, may, in vacation, allow an-
justice.' (Code, % 2942.) The Courts always had other month, when necessary, in which to take the
this power. _
The theory of the law is, that contin- rebutting evidence; and in this way the cause will
uances are in the sound discretion of the Court. It become ready to be heard.
is the strict legal right of the parties to have the For various suggestions how to prevent the delay
cause tried at the time appointed by law; and if one arising from amendments and continuances, see post
'
asks delay, he asks what deprives the other of a strict §§ 526-529.
legal right; and the Court may exact of him, as the 9 Hurst v. Selvidge, Thomp. Cas., 17; Crouch V.
condition upon which it will grant his request, that Mullenix, 1 Heisk., 481.
he shall yield to his adversary something which he is 10 Acontinuance obtained by fraud or imposition
not in strict law entitled to, but which may be equal- may be set aside on notice to the party obtaining it.
§523 MOTION TO DISMISS BILL. 420
ARTICLE III.
MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE BILL.
§ 523. When Complainant Can or Cannot
Dismiss His Bill. § 525. When the Court May, on its Own
§ 524. Motion by Complainant to Dismiss Motion, Dismiss a Bill.
His Bill.
When Complainant Can or Cannot Dismiss his Bill. The complain-

§ 523. —
ant ordinarily, the master of the suit, 1 and, as a rule, can dismiss it at any
is,
time, before a decree, at his pleasure. 2 But there are a few important -excep-
tions to this rule, based on reason and good faith, and growing out of the fact
that the Chancery Court, when justice requires it, will give a defendant all the
rights of a complainant, and impose on the complainant all the liabilities of a
defendant. This arises from the fact that the Court regards where a party
stands on a vs. line as of less importance than where he stands on the line of
justice and right, as shown by the pleadings and proof in the case.
The following are the principal exceptions to the rule which gives the com-
plainant the right to dismiss the suit
1. Where, on a bill for an accounting, there has been an interlocutory decree
ordering an account. 2
2. Where a decree has been pronounced, adjudicating the principles involved
in favor of the defendant. 3
3. Where the bill has been filed in behalf of others having concurrent rights,
and one of these others offers a bond to cover all the costs of the cause and
asks to be made a complainant. 4
4. Where the bill has been filed as a general creditors' bill, and, on an account
being taken the complainant is found to be a debtor and not a creditor, but
various creditors have been duly made parties under the bill and proved their
claims. 5
5. Where, in any ease on the pleadings, a decree may be rendered in favor
of the defendant, and steps have been taken to prepare the case for hearing
since the answer was filed.
6. The dismissal of an original bill by the complainant will not be allowed
to carry with it a cross-bill, or answer filed as a cross-bill, setting up groimds
for affirmative relief, on which proof has been taken. 7
7. Where a husband and wife are co-complainants, and she a necessary com-
plainant, the husband cannot dismiss the suit, without her consent given in open
Court, or in the manner prescribed by the statute. 8
1 Dominus Eq. Jur.,
litis; 1 548, note 3
Sto. j unjustly disappoint the reasonable expectations of
2 Code, § 3199;Ch. Pr., 793; Fisher V.
1 Dan. the defendant, or defendants, and require the mat-
Stovall, 1 Pick., 316. He may
dismiss his bill in ters in controversy to be litigated anew, with new
writing in vacation. Code § 3199. At common law expenditures of time, labor, and money.
a plaintiff has the right to dismiss his suit whenever 7 Partee V. Goldberg, 17 Pick., 664. But com-
he may choose, except where the defendant pleads plainant's right to dismiss his bill is not defeated
a set-off, as to which the defendant is a plaintiff, a because defendant's answer has been filed as a cross
plea of set-off being a sort of cross action. Riley & bill, when no cost bond is given for a cross bill, and
White V. Carter, 3 Hum., 230; Galbraith v. E. T. V. no appearance or answer thereto. Moore v. Tillman,
& G. R. R. Co., 11 Heisk., 173. 22 Pick., 361.
3 Fisher V. Stovall, 1 Pick., 316. 8 No action in the name of husband and_ wife,
4 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 794. commenced by the issuing of process, or pending in
. 5 See Fall v. B. & L. Asso., 21 Pick., 26. any Court, for slander of the wife, or for any other
6 In such and similar cases the defendant has a cause of action in which it is necessary to sue in
vested right to a hearing on the merits. When a the name of husband and wife, when the action
complainant has instituted a suit that may benefit survives to the wife,, shall be dismissed by the hus-
the defendant, or defendants, and especially a suit band, without the consent of the wife, given in open
in part for their benefit, and after the defendant, or Court in term time; or in vacation, without the writ-
defendants, have come into Court, at his instance, ten order of the wife, witnessed by two witnesses
and filed an answer, or answers, setting up equities with both of whom the Clerk of the Court is per-
and asking for relief, it would be reprehensible trif- sonally acquainted. And though such order be pre-
ling with the Court, and a gross exhibition of bad sented to the Clerk, yet the suit shall not be dis-
faith towards the defendant or defendants, for the missed until ordered by the Court in term time.
complainant to try to dismiss the suit, and thus Code, §§ 2487-2488.
wilfully waste the time and labor of the Court, and
421 MOTION TO DISMISS BILL. § 524
The fact that the statute gives the complainant's Solicitor a lien on his right
of action from the filing of the bill does not deprive the complainant of the
right and power to dismiss his bill, whenever he chooses so to do. 9 bill filed A
by a District Attorney, on the relation of another person to impeach the title of
the defendant to a public office, may be dismissed by the District Attorney not-
withstanding the protest of the relator. 10
§ 524. Motion by Complainant to Dismiss His Bill. Subject to the excep- —
tions in the preceding section, the complainant may, at any time before a
decree, dismiss his bill on motion in open Court, or by writing filed with the
Clerk in vacation. If there be several complainants, any one of them may
dismiss his bill as to himself, when such dismissal will not injure his co-com-
plainants. The complainant may dismiss his bill as to all of the defendants,
or as to any one or more of them.
The following is a form of an
ORDER DISMISSING A BILL.
John Doe, 1
vs. V No. 618.

In this cause, came the complainant this day by his Solicitor, and moved that he be
allowed to dismiss his bill [as to the defendant, Richard Roe,] which motion was allowed,
and the bill [as to said Richard Roe] was dismissed accordingly. It is therefore
ordered by the Court, that the bill in this cause stand dismissed [as to said Richard
Roe,] and that the defendants recover of the complainant, and David Doe, his prosecution
surety, all the costs of the cause [accrued in consequence of said Richard Roe having been
made a party,] for which an execution is awarded.
If the dismissal is as to Richard Roe, only, the words in brackets will be in-
serted in the order; if the bill is dismissed as to all of the defendants, the
words in brackets will, of course, be omitted.
If the complainant is not ready for trial, and is refused a continuance, he
should dismiss his bill, and thereby avoid the bar that would result from his
bill being dismissed at the hearing, by the Chancellor.
The dismissal of bills at the hearing will be fully considered hereafter. 11
But the Court may, at any time within thirty days, if the Court hold so long,
for good cause shown and on due notice to the defendant, or his Solicitor, re-
scind the order of dismissal, and restore the cause to the docket.
§ 525. When the Court May, on its Own Motion, Dismiss a Bill. The Court —
may, on its own motion, dismiss any bill that presents a case the subject-matter
of which is wholly without the jurisdiction of the Court, or manifestly unfit for
its consideration. If a bill has no equity on its face if, on the facts alleged,
;
the complainant is clearly entitled to no relief whatsoever, the Chancellor is

not obliged to wait until the bill has been demurred to, or pleaded unto, or an-
swered, or the cause brought regularly to a hearing; but he may, summarily,
and on his motion, dismiss the bill for if, on his own statements, the complain-
;
ant has manifestly no case whatever, and the dismissal of the bill at some
stage of the cause is clearly inevitable, he has no right to complain if the Chan-
cellor dismisses the suit before further costs have accrued. 12 If the suit is being
prosecuted under the pauper oath, and the burden of the costs for that reason
is likely to fall on the officers of the Court, and the witnesses, there is all the
greater reason why the Chancellor should, on his own motion, dismiss a frivo-
lous bill. 13 The Chancellor should not, however, dismiss a bill on his own
motion, merely because it is inartificially drawn, if there be any Equity in it;
nor because its cause of suit is defectively stated. If the bill is probably capa-
ble of being so amended as to develope a cause of action, the complainant should
not be debarred from that right by the summary act of the Court, on its own
motion. The true rule is probably this If the affirmative facts stated in the
:
9 Tomplrins v. Railroad, 2 Cates, 157. 11 See Chapter on Decrees, post, §§ 569-S70.

U
I
inKta+ii ov Vffl « Aor*»P 91 Pick 5HR' State l>V I 15 Tfrnnn. fl PVJ*.,-o™ T3,«U 101
§526 SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT DELAYS. 422
bill show clearly and conclusively that no whatever can be grounded on
relief
these facts, the Chancellor may dismiss the bill on his own motion but though ;
the allegations of the bill are too defective to entitle the complainant to any
relief, yet if those defects are capable of being supplied without contradicting
any of the positive averments of the bill, in such a case the Chancellor has no
right to dismiss the bill on his own motion before he can have that right, the
:
facts affirmatively alleged must manifestly oust the complainant of any right
lo any relief whatsoever. 14
The Chancellor may, on his own motion, dismiss a bill because, on its face,
it claims usury, or seeks to enforce a contract that is illegal, immoral or against
public policy, or is filed to obtain a collusive or pro forma decree, 15 or to punish
the defendant for a crime or misdemeanor, or because of champerty, 16 or the
gross uneleanness of the hands of the complainant, as shown by his own bill.
A Court of Equity will not lend its aid to enforce an illegal, or grossly inequit-
able, contract at the instance of a party who was an active participator in the
iniquity, his own bill disclosing the turpitude. 17
ARTICLE IV.
SUGGESTIONS HOW TO PREVENT DELAYS ARISING FROM

AMENDMENTS AND CONTINUANCES.
§ 526. Applications to Amend, or Continue § 528. Exceptions to the Foregoing Rules as
How Considered. to Costs.
S 529. Continuances by Consent, How Dealt
§ 527. Rules to Prevent Delay. With.
§ 526. Applications to Amend, or Continue, How Considered. The Consti- —

tution says that "justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." 1
Chancellors are sworn to support, that is, to obey and enforce, this Constitution.
To sell justice would be a crime, to deny justice would be an outrage akin to
crime, and to delay justice is an intolerable wrong, for delay is equivalent to
a denial while the delay continues the virtue of justice often evaporates dur-
:
ing the delay. Denial and delay are man and wife, and injustice and injury
are their children. 2 Nearly all the delays in a suit grow out of amendments
and continuances.
1. If Defendant asks to Amend, or Continue, the Chancellor should consider
(1) that a delay of justice is a pro tanto denial; (2) that it is ordinarily to the
interest of a defendant to have delay and (3) that it is often part of a defend-
;
ant's tactics to seek delay, and to invent excuses for delay; and (4) that a
defendant's affidavit that his "application for leave to amend or continue is
made not for delay, but that justice may be done," means often, at most, jus-
tice from his point of view and that generally his idea of justice is, merely to
;
yet a chance to prevent the complainant from obtaining the decree he is fairly
and rightfully entitled to at the hands of the Court.
14 See, ante, §§ 268; 290. itor who prepares the pleadings and takes the proof,
15 Ward V. Alsup, 16 Pick., 738. and the very Judge himself, whose duty it is to see
16 Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Hum., 379; Dowell v. that all others do their duty, and that there is no
Dowell, 3 Head, 502. procrastination,are all infected with the same epi-
IT Ante, § 42, Isler V. Brunson, 6 Hum., 277, and demic, until Court files become hoary with age, the
cases cited in the syllabus of this case. equities set up in them become stale and unprofitable,
1 Const, of Tenn., Art. I, § 17. the Court itself falls into odium, and its proceedings
2 Procrastination is an epidemic that infects all are mentioned only to be the target for the feeble
who minister in the Courts. The Sheriff who serves shafts of idle wit, or the flaming thunder-bolts of
the writs, the parties and witnesses who are sum- public indignation.
moned, the Clerk who gets up the reports, the Solic-
423 SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT DECAYS. 527
If Complainant asks to Amend, or Continue, the Chancellor should consider
2.
(1) that the complainant has brought the suit, and forced the defendant to
appear, and defend; (2) that all delays by the complainant increases the costs
of the cause, and the fees of adverse counsel, and thereby works injustice to
the defendant; and (3) that a complainant, who fails to diligently prepare his
case for trial, converts the machinery of the Court into an engine of oppression
and transforms the spirit of justice into a Moloch of torture. 3
When a party is ready for trial, due time for preparation having elapsed,
the Court should not rob him of the advantages of his diligence. Such a prac-
tice paralyzes diligence, demoralizes both parties, and degrades a Court of
Justice to the low level 'of a dispensary of favors, and gives just occasion for
the suspicion that either partiality and favoritism prevail, or that the Chancel-
lor is deficient in the great virtues essential to his high office. 4
§ 527. —
Rules to Prevent Delay. How to prevent delay becomes, therefore,
a problem every conscientious Chancellor should studiously endeavor to solve.
Down to the present, no solution has been found so simple, and yet so effectual,
as the vigorous enforcement of the following rules
1. That every motion to continue, made after the lapse of five months after
issue, and every motion to amend made after the lapse of one month after an-
swer, shall be supported by affidavit, showing clear merits, and fully excusing
delay.
2. That the allowance of such motion to continue shall be conditioned on the
payment of the costs of all proof thereafter filed and if eight months shall have
;
elapsed since issue, then the applicant for a continuance shall pay all the unad-
judged costs of the cause.
3. That, if any amendment, made as above stated, necessitates a continuance,
the party amending shall pay the costs of all proof thereafter filed; and if a
term has intervened since the answer was filed, the party amending shall pay
all the unadjudged costs of the cause, if his amendment necessitates a continu-
ance.
No man has a right to cast his burdens upon his adversary, and compel him
to bear them. We
are commanded to love our enemies, but not to tax them to
pay for our own losses. When, therefore, a party is prevented by sickness,
death, accident, or mistake, from being ready for trial, it is grossly unreasonable
for him to askihe Court to compel his adversary to bear, without compensation,
the burdens resulting from a continuance, or an amendment. He who seeks
Equity should do Equity and he who seeks a continuance, or leave to amend,
;
should do Equity, by paying costs proportionate to the benefits received by him,

or to the burden imposed on his adversary.
The fact that the party seeking a continuance or an amendment, has been
prevented from getting ready by reason of sickness, death, accident, or mistake,
may be a just ground for allowing his motion but it is no just ground for heap-
;
ing burdens upon the other side. Continuances and amendments, when granted,
should be paid for in costs. He who seeks a favor should do a favor. When
one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, he must bear it whose act, or
neglect, caused the loss. The party continuing or amending causes an increase
3 The "law's delay" is one of the wails of the time^ is not delayed^ because the farmerwas negligent,
world; has filled all the ages of history.
it Com- or sick, or otherwise burdened. Under the laws of
plainants inaugurated this wail, and have kept_ it Nature, each case is tried when reached, and there
alive through all the thousands of years of its exist- are no continuances; and yet no one blames the laws
ence. Hence, complainants should always put forth of Nature. The very reason that parties are neg-
extraordinary diligence, and not be themselves guilty ligent in preparing for trial is, because they believe
of that delay for which they have anathematized the they will be able to get a continuance. When they
Courts, and invoked the wrath of heaven upon their realize that no continuances will be granted, except
Judges. for the most extraordinary causes, then they will
4 The law of man cannot be more just than the prepare for the sessions of the Court as they will pre-
law of God. Both laws are made to do the greatest pare for the seasons of nature; and continuances will
good to the greatest number. Under the law of God become exceedingly rare. And then will come to
the dilatory suffer; then why should they not suffer pass that prophecy of our Constitution: "The Courts
under the law of man? The four seasons come shall be open, and right and justice administered,
and go: and he who is not readv for each season without sale, denial, or delav."
§ 528 SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT DELAYS. 424
of costsand expenses, and should bear the burden thereof. If there has been
ample time to prepare for trial, the party continuing or amending should be
taxed with all the costs of the cause in any event, he should, in such ease, be
:
taxed with the costs of proof thereafter filed.

all
Parties dislike to pay costs before final decree and Solicitors are fully aware ;
of this dislike. The effect of this dislike and knowledge is to greatly stimulate
diligence, both on the part of Solicitors Parties who know and their clients.
that they will have to pay for favors will be slow to ask them, and quick to
avoid the necessity of asking. The result is, great promptness in preparing for
trial.
The application of the two foregoing maxims, (He who seeks Equity must do
Equity, and, He who causes the loss should bear the loss,) regulates the discre-
tion of the Court on the subject of continuances and amendments, by fixed
equitable principles, readily understood, and easily applied. The party asking
the favor gets it, and, therefore, cannot say he was denied the chance to present
his case or proof fairly and fully before the Court and the party resisting the ;
application to continue or amend, cannot say that he was made liable for the
costs occasioned by the favor granted to his adversary —
and thus justice is
done to all, and injustice to none.
§ 528. Exceptions to the Foregoing Rules as to Costs. —When, however, the
suit is againstan executor, administrator, guardian, partner, agent, trustee, or
other person occupying a fiduciary relation toward the complainant, and the
till charges a breach of trust, it would be prudent for the Court, when the
complainant is granted a continuance, or leave to amend, to reserve the adjudi-
cation of costs until the hearing; and if, at the hearing, the defendant should
be found in the wrong, the costs incident to the favor granted should not ordi-
narily be adjudged against the complainant. The reason of this exception is,
that no one should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. It is the
duty of a fiduciary to fully disclose to the beneficiary every matter connected
with the trust; and if, by reason of his failure or refusal so to do, a suit is
brought, and a continuance or an amendment becomes necessary, such default-
ing trustee should not be allowed to profit by his own default. 5
Where, also, a continuance is necessitated by the fraud, or contrivance, of
the opposite party, as a rule no costs should be adjudged against the party ap-
plying for such continuance otherwise, the party guilty of the fraud would
;
derive an advantage from his own wrong. It would be a fraud for a party to
make an agreement, out of Court, with his adversary looking to a compromise,
and then repudiate the agreement too late for his adversary to prepare for trial.
The Court must not allow its rules to be used as snares by the artful to entrap
the unwary.- This would be to allow Justice to be wounded in her own temple,
and with her own weapons.
Where the application for a continuance is based on accident or mistake, un-
mixed with fault or negligence on the part of the applicant, or is based on some
misconduct of some officer of the law, without fault on the part of the applicant,
the terms imposed as the price of a continuance might be reduced, or remitted
entirely.
Continuances by Consent, 6 How Dealt With. After the lapse of six
§ 529. —
months no continuance should be allowed on consent of parties,
after issue,
unless, (1) the agreement provides for the payment of at least one-half of the
unadjudged costs of the cause or (2) unless at least one-half of the unadjudged
;
costs is divided between the parties by order of the Court. There should be a
rule of Court to this effect. Continuances by consent, without the payment of
costs, should not be allowed
5 Loveman v. Taylor, 1 Pick., 1. I called session of the Legislature, and the Act is
6 Chancery Rule VIII, § 1, was repealed at a | probably unconstitutional. See, post, § 1197.
425 SUGGESTIONS TO PREVENT DELAYS. § 529
1. Because if parties intend to litigate, they should be required to litigate,
and they do not so intend, the suit should be terminated. They should not
if
be allowed to confederate to defeat the rules of the Court in reference to con-
tinuances such agreements are often mere evasions of the rules, and akin to a
:
contempt of Court. >
2. The officers of the Court, and the witnesses, are entitled to their fees
; and
the parties should not be allowed to deprive them of their just dues, by agree-
ments to continue the suit.
3. The Chancellor owes it to the public to keep his dockets clean, and not to
allow his Court to become a Rip Van Winkle cave for the slumber of lawsuits.
4. Unless costs are taxed in case of continuances by consent, the efficacy of
all rules imposing costs in case of continuances will be greatly impaired; for
Solicitors, ready in one case and not ready in another, will equalize their re-
spective advantages and disadvantages by consenting to the continuance of
both cases.
§530 HEARING BY THE CHANCELLOR. 426
CHAPTER
XXVII.
THE HEARING, OR TRIAL OF THE CAUSE.
Article I. The Hearing by the Chancellor.
Article II. Incidents of the Hearing.
Article III. Trial by Jury.
ARTICLE I.
THE HEARING BY THE CHANCELLOR.
§ 530. The Rationale of Courts and Their' § 536. Hearing on a Matter Appealed From
Jurisdiction. the' County Court.
§ 531. When a Cause is Ready for a Hear-
§ 537. The Argument of Counsel.
ing.
§ 532. The Ordinary Routine
of the Court. § 538. How Exceptions to Evidence, and the
§ 533. When a Cause Stands for Trial. Chancellor's Rulings Thereon, are
§ 534. How
Causes are Heard. Made a Part of the Record for
§ 535. Objections to Evidence at the Hear- Purposes of Review.
ing.
§ 530. The Rationale of Courts, and of their Jurisdiction. The State having —
prohibited parties from settling their disputes by fraud or force is, therefore,
under obligations to devise a better method of settling them. She has, accord-
ingly, provided Courts and their ways and means of enabling a complainant to
assert his just rights, and of giving a defendant a fair opportunity of disputing
an unjust claim; and has empowered her judicial officers to decide the issues
raised by the parties on their pleadings and proofs, and to right all wrongs, and
to give to each party what is his due, and to require from each party what is
clue from him to the other.
Parties, having thus an opportunity to have their rights redressed, or to resist
unjust demands, if they fail to take due advantage thereof, either by faults in
their pleading, or deficiencies in their proof, or by negligence in preparation
for trial, forfeit all right to complain of the decree pronounced against them,
when such decree is based on the case as the Court found it, and the day for its
determination had arrived in a due and' orderly course of procedure, such case
being made by themselves, and each with full and equal liberty to present every-
thing he desired, or considered of value to his contention.
Hence it is that all disinterested men respect the vast majority of Court decis-
ions, and consider Courts the best means of settling the contentions that arise
among men.
§ 531. When is Ready for a Hearing.
a Cause —
Hearings take place when-
ever any matter ready to be disposed of by the Chancellor, and the Court is in
is
session. Matters are often apparently ready for such disposition, when some
one or more of the parties are not ready, so that it is important to know when a
matter is ready for the action of the Chancellor.
1. A Demurrer is Ready to be Heard as soon as it is filed, if Court is in ses-
sion and, if not in session, as soon as Court meets and continues ready to be
;
;
heard until the Chancellor takes it up and disposes of it and this he may do ;
when the cause is regularly reached on the call of the docket, or when motions
are in order and one of the parties calls it up for the action of the Court or ;
at Chambers, on due notice.

427 HEARING BY THE CHANCELLOR. §532
2. A PleaBeady to be Heard, as to its sufficiency, as soon as filed, and con-
is
tinues so ready for twenty days, and if not then heard or set for argument, its
sufficiency is deemed to be admitted. After replication filed, a plea is ready to
be heard on the issue of fact at the first term of the Court after its filing, and
continues ready thereafter, when reached on a regular call of the docket, until
heard or may be heard at Chambers, on due notice.
;
3. A Cause is Heady for Hearing on Bill and Answer, after being specially SO
set, whenever regularly reached on the call of the docket. In such a case no
proof is heard, except the exhibits to the pleadings, if any or may be heard at ;
Chambers, by consent of parties.

4. A Cause is Ready for a Final Hearing at the first term of the Court after
the bill has been answered, and continues ready for a hearing at every term of
the Court thereafter, if not then heard. 1 If any of the defendants have not
answered, and a pro confesso has not been entered against them, it should be
taken when the cause is reached on the docket for hearing, for strictly a cause
is not ready for a final hearing until all of the defendants have answered or
been pro confessoed. A cause may, also, be heard at Chambers by consent of
parties.
5. A Cause is Beady for Hearing on the Master's Eeport .whenever regularly
reached on the call of the docket. If the report has been excepted to such ex-
ceptions may be heard and disposed of whenever motions may be heard. 2 If
not excepted to the report may be confirmed, on motion, at any time after the
second day of the term, when motions are in order.
6. A Cause is K-eady for Motions to be Entered and Heard at such times as the
rules of the Court wherein the cause is pending permit. 3
§ 532. The Ordinary Routine of the Court. —When the hour for the meeting
of the Court arrives, the Chancellor takes the bench, and rapping for attention,
directs the Sheriff to that the Court is open. 4 The Sheriff,
make proclamation
thereupon, cries out: "Oyez! oyez! oyez! 5 The Chancery Court for Knox County
is now open for the dispatch of business.'" The Clerk and Master then delivers
to the Chancellor the Court docket, unless the same is already on his desk. If
it is the first day of the term, the Clerk and Master will also deliver to the
Chancellor his Financial Report 6 of money on hand, and his Report of Supreme
Court Reports 7 on hand and will acquaint the Chancellor with any defect in
;
any of his bonds by reason of the death, insolvency, or removal, of any of the
sureties. 8
If there be minutes to be read, the Clerk will then deliver to the Chancellor,
or to some Solicitor, the orders and decrees that have been entered on the
minutes, and will either read the minutes himself, or have some other competent
person read them, while the Chancellor, or Solicitor, having the orders and
decrees, compares them with the minutes as the latter are being read. 9
The minutes of the first day of the term should be preceded by a caption, 93, in
substance, as follows
1 Code, § 4432; see, post, § 533. 5 These words are French, and mean: "Hear yel
2 Ch. Rule IV, § 15; § 1193, sub-sec. 15. hear ye! hear ye!" French was, at one time, the
3 Each Court has its own rules for hearing mo- language of the Courts of England.
tions, demurrers, exceptions to pleas, appeals from 6 See, post, § 1161.
the Master, and other preliminary matters. 7 See, post, § 1162.
4 The Constitution says that all Courts shall be 8 Code, § 335 a.
open. Tenn. Const., Art. 1, § 17. This means: 1, 9 This_ comparison of the original orders and de-
That the Courts are always open for the filing of crees with the minutes is indispensable to the ac-
pleadings, and even for the filing of petitions when curacy of the latter, especially in the matter of
necessary to save the bar of the statute of limita- names, dates, amounts, metes and bounds of lands,
tions. Bledsoe v. Wright, 2 Bax., 471. 2, That the shares in case of partition, and other matters not in-
business of the Court should be transacted, and the ferable from the context.
minutes read and signed, in the Court House, and 9a This, technically, is also the caption of every
in public view; or, at least, in a place where the order and decree made during the term; and when
people may attend at pleasure. Code, § 4101; Bass V. an order or decree is certified for any purpose it
State, 6 Bax., 583. But by consent, divorce suits should be preceded by the captions of the term, and
§533 HEARING BY THE CHANCELLOR. 428
CAPTION OP THE MINUTES OP THE TEEM.nb
State of Tennessee
Be it remembered that, at a regular [or, special,] term of the Chancery Court, for Knox
county, begun and held at the Court House in Knoxville, on the first Monday in January,
1885, present and presiding Hon. William B. Staley, Chancellor of the Second Chancery
Division, the following proceedings were had
The proceedings of the Court will follow this caption in the order of time, as
nearly as practicable. The caption of the minutes of subsequent days of the
term may be in this form
CAPTION OP THE DAY'S MINUTES.
TUESDAY, JANUARY 5TH, 1885.
Court met pursuant to adjournment, present and presiding Chancellor William B. Staley.
The minutes of yesterday [or, of last Wednesday,] were read and signed, and the following
further proceedings had
Then follow the proceedings in order of time as near as possible.
After the minutes of the day have been read, and corrected, the adjourning
order is written, unless it has already been written, and the Chancellor attests
the accuracy of the minutes by signing them officially, just below the entry of
adjournment. Such entry and signature, are, ordinarily, as follows
ENTRY OP ADJOURNMENT.
The Court, thereupon, adjourned until tomorrow morning at 8 o'clock, 1 "
[or, until the
next term.] W. B. Staley, Chancellor.
After the minutes have been signed by the Chancellor, he usually announces
his conclusions as to the matters and causes that were submitted to him for his
determination on the previous day. The Clerk is then directed to call the roll
of Solicitors in order that they may make motions, read their drafts of decrees
prepared for entry on the minutes, and bring before the Court such other mat-
ters as they may desire to have the Court pass on. The hearing of motions has
been elsewhere considered, 11 and will not be repeated here but if there be any ;
exceptions to depositions to be acted on, or any appeals from the ruling of the
Clerk on such exceptions, or any notices of the introduction of documentary
evidence to be given, or any other matter that must be done before the hearing
of a cause is begun, this is a good opportunity to attend to such matters.
After all motions have been disposed of, the docket is called; and, as each
case is called, it is continued, or set for a given day, or heard.
§ 533. —
When a Cause Stands for Trial. A cause stands for trial at the first
term after it becomes at issue. Where there are no exceptions filed to an an-
swer, a cause is at issue at the end of twenty days after the complainant's Solic-
itor has notice of the filing of the answer, and such notice will be presumed, in
absence of any question raised, to have been received on the day the answer was
filed. It may, therefore, be stated as a general rule, that a cause is at issue at
the end of twenty days after the filing of the answer, in' case no exceptions to
the answer are put in. 12
The Code, in at least three sections, declares that a cause shall stand for trial
13 Construing these sections along with
at. the first term after answer filed.
those allowing twenty days within which to except to an answer, the conclusion
is reached (1) that a cause stands for trial at the first term coming twenty or
more days after the complainant's Solicitor has notice 14 of the filing of the
answer, if no exceptions to the answer are put in within that time; and (2)
9b See note 9a, on preceding page. to except? Most certainly. The statute then must
10 For other captions of the minutes, see, post, mean that the cause is at issue at the end of twenty
§ 1138. days after notice to complainant's Solicitor, when no
11 Ante, §§ 514-521. And see Chapter on Motions, exceptions are filed within that period. Ante, §§
post, §§ 739-769. 420-424. , IT
12 Code, §§4328;4401, says that, if no exceptions 13 Code, §§ 4328; 4401; 4432; ante, % 439. In Har-
to the answer are filed, the cause shall stand for ris v. Bogle, 7 Cates, 701, it is said that where the
terms of Court -are long, issue will be made, proof
trial at the first term after answer filed; but how
can it be known that no exceptions win be filed, taken, and the cause stand for trial, all within the
without waiting for the twenty days to expire? Sup- period of a single term. . ,
pose a term should begin within twenty days after 14 Notice will be presumed to have been received
answer filed, would not the complainant, neverthe- by the Solicitor on the day the answer is filed unless
less, have the whole of the twenty days within which the contrary appears.
that if exceptions are put in, a cause stands for trial at the first term after they
are disallowed, or (3) if allowed, at the first term after the filing of a sufficient
answer.
But, although a cause thus stands for trial at the first term after it is at issue,
it does not by any means follow that it will be tried at that term. Nevertheless,
it is the duty of the Clerk and Master to set the cause for hearing, and transfer
it to the trial docket

1B and when called will be subject to be tried, or continued,
;
as to the Chancellor may appear proper. 16

§ 534. —
How Causes are Heard. The cause having been called on the docket,
and both parties having announced their readiness for trial, or the motion for
a continuance having been overruled, the Chancellor directs that the case be
taken up. 17 The complainant's Solicitor, thereupon, makes a brief statement of
the nature of his bill. The defendant's Solicitor then states his defence, or
reads the material part of his answer. 18 If there be any defendants in default,
as to whom no judgment pro confesso has been entered, the complainant may
uow have a pro confesso entered against them. The evidence is then read in the
following order 1st,, the evidence in support of the bill is read by the com-
:
plainant's Solicitor; 2d, the evidence of the defendant is read by his Solicitor;
and 3d, if the complainant has any rebutting evidence it is read last. 19
The evidence having been all read, the junior counsel for the complainant
opens the argument; he is followed by the junior and senior counsel for the
defendant in turn and then the senior counsel for the complainant is heard in
;
reply. 20
On the conclusion of the argument, the Chancellor announces his decision, if
he has reached one if not, he reserves his decision until a future day, and the
;
papers and briefs of counsel and authorities relied on, are sent to his Chambers
or he may hold the case under advisement for thirty days after the adjournment
of the Court. 21
§ 535. Objections to Evidence at the Hearing.— Objections to a deposition
as a whole because
(1) of want of due notice of the taking; or (2) because of
some defect in the caption, or certificate or (3) because not taken, or written,
;
by a person duly authorized or (4) because not properly transmitted to the

;
Clerk or (5) because taken after the taker's time for taking proof had expired;
;
or (6) because retaken to the same matters without an order or (7) for any ;
other cause going to the admissibility of the deposition, and not to the com-
petency of the witness, or his evidence, must be made and disposed of before
the commencement of the hearing, or trial, otherwise they will be considered
as waived. 22 No such objection can be raised when the deposition is read, or
offered to be read, at the hearing.
The following objections to the evidence must, however, be made when the
evidence is offered at the hearing
15 Code, § 4431. 19 In reading the evidence, begin, ordinarily, with

16 Rather v. Williams, 10 Pick., S43, citing § 463, your client's own deposition if he gives a full his-
(now § 465,) of this book. tory of the case; if not, read first that deposition
17ln Chancery, causes are not always heard in which covers most of the facts of the case.
public. When there are valid objections to a public 20 The right to open and- close the argument does
hearing, the cause may be heard privately in the not, however, always belong to the complainant. It
Chancellor's room in the Court House, when both belongs to the defendant when the entire burden of
parties consent thereto. This has been the uniform proof rests upon the latter. The right to open and
practice of the Court in case of family disputes, and close the argument belongs to the party who (1)
other matters of a delicate nature, unfit for publi- pleads affirmative matter in abatement; or (2) who
cation. A private hearing may be given even against moves to dismiss; or (3) who demurs; or (4) who
the consent of one of the parties. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., pleads affirmative matter in bar; or (5) who excepts
984; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 319. In Tennessee, the Chan- to an answer, deposition, or Master's report; or (6)
cellor would not grant a private hearing except by who objects to a witness, or to his evidence; or (7)
consent of parties. And not then in a case of public who maintains the affirmative of any given question;
importance. In divorce suits, a private hearing is or (8) who has the entire burden of proof to bear'
often allowed on application of either party, the See, Best, Pr. Ev., § 637.
other not objecting. 21 See, post, § 544.
18 In reading pleadings and depositions, omit all 22 Ch. Rule, II, §5; post, 1191, sub-sec.
§ 5; see
formal parts, such as captions, certificates, and affidn- ante, § 501.
vits, also the boundaries of lands, fiats, and dates
of filing, unless special reasons exist for calling the
§ 536 HEARING BY THE CHANCELLOR. 430
1.Objections to the Competency of the Witness, because (1) he is an infant
idiot, or lunatic,without sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligations
of an oath, and give correct answers to questions put or (2) because the wit- ;
ness was intoxicated while testifying; or (3) because the witness is deaf and
dumb, or unable to speak, or write, in the English language, and the interpreter
was not sworn; or (4) because the witness is infamous by the judgment of a
Court, and disqualified, to testify; or (5) because the witness is a husband, or
wife, of the party objecting, or of the opposite party, and the evidence is as to
a matter that occurred between them, by virtue, or in consquence, of the mari-
tal relation; or (6) because the witness is an executor, administrator, or guar-
dian, and his evidence is as to transactions with, or statements by, the testator,
intestate, or ward or (7) because the witness is a party, and his evidence is as
;
to a transaction or conversation with, or a statement by, the opposite party,

who is of unsound mind. 23
2. Objections to the Competency of the Evidence, because (1) not relevant to
the issues involved, or, immaterial; or (2) because not the best evidence, being
hearsay, or a copy, or parol evidence of the contents of a writing; or (3) be-
cause a privileged communication; or (4) because a transcript not duly certi-
fied; or (5) because a deed not registered; or (6) because only a part of a
record, or writing. 24
3. Objections to the Form of the Evidence, because (1) the questions of the
adverse party to his own witness were leading; (2) because the answer of
the witness was not responsive to the objector's question. 25
4. Objections to Evidence Must be Specific, or the Court is not required to no-
tice them. General exceptions to a deposition, witness, paper, question or an-
swer need not be noticed by the Chancellor, and will not be noticed in the Su-
preme Court. If a party thinks he has ground of exception to any evidence or
witness he must specify it, and not require the Court to guess it. general A
exception is no exception. 26
§ 536. Hearing on a Matter Appealed from the County Court.—The Code
provides that any person interested in the estate may except to the account
taken and stated by the County Court Clerk with an administrator or execu-
tor; and that when such an account has been finally settled by the County
Court, either party may appeal from the judgment of the Court to the Chancery
or Circuit Court and the appeal shall be brought before the Chancellor or Cir-
;
cuit Judge at his first session in such county or district, and it shall be sufficient
to take up on said appeal only so much of the record as will suffice to present
26a
the matter complained of in the decision below.
The matters in dispute, in such a case, would ordinarily be heard upon the
exceptions taken to the account in the Court below. But, if the case is of such
a nature that justice cannot well be done on the County Court record, the Chan-
cellor would, probably, have the power to refer the matters in dispute to the
Master, under proper instructions; or he might remand the case with proper
instructions to the County Court. 26b
§ 537. —
The Argument of Counsel. The one purpose of argument is to aid
the Court (1) in reaching a correct conclusion from the evidence as to the truth
of the facts alleged in the pleadings and (2) to aid the Court in applying the
;
right law to the facts as found. Counsel for the complainant, therefore, should
endeavor to show (1) how the evidence sustains his bill, and (2) how it dis-
proves the defences set up and counsel for the defendant should endeavor to
;
show how the evidence contradicts the bill and supports the answer. Counsel
23 M. & V.'s Code, §§4563-4565. time the leading question is put, or the irresponsive
24 Objections to the admissibility of evidence, made answer is made. See, ante, § 496.
before the Commissioner, must be renewed and ruled 26 Powers v. McKenzie, 6 Pick., 167.
on in Court when the deposition is read, or they 26a Code, §§ 2302-2304.
will be deemed to be waived. Sahlien v. Bank, 6 2Cb Such power would be within the spirit of
Pick., 221. Code, §§ 3152 and 3170. On such a reference addi-
25 But in such case, the objections will go for tional evidence might be heard and the account re-
naught, unless they are made in writing at the very cast.
on both sides should point out the inconsistencies and incredibility of the evi-
dence, or any part thereof, and why and wherein a witness is or is not to be.
credited.
If there be any disputed questions of law involved in the cause, counsel on
each side should file a written brief of the authorities by them relied on, and
should send the books to the Chancellor's room. 27
In arguing any matter before the Chancellor, it should always be kept in
mind that nothing so commends both counsel and his cause as a smooth, clear,
lmimpassioned, and candid, presentation of the law and facts of the case,
wholly unmixed with ungenerous or unkind allusions to opposite counsel, or
to his arguments; and that nothing so harms both counsel and cause, in the
estimation of the Chancellor, as manifest misquotations of law or evidence,
unjust criticism of parties 28 or witnesses, unwarranted deductions from the
evidence, unfair statements of the arguments of the other side, or unnecessary
exhibitions of temper.
§ 538. How Exceptions to Evidence, and the Chancellor's Rulings Thereon,
are Made a Part of the Record for Purposes of Review. Formerly, where ex- —
ceptions to evidence were sustained by the Chancellor, or any matter of evi-
dence was excluded by him, at the hearing, a bill of exceptions was necessary
to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the evidence so ruled out; but now,
where exceptions to evidence are either sustained or overruled, it is not neces-
sary upon an appeal of the case, to embody the rulings of the Chancellor, the
exception and the excluded evidence, in a bill of exceptions, if the rulings of
the Chancellor, the exceptions and the excluded evidence are set out in the
body of the deposition and properly authenticated by the Chancellor. 29
So, where any document, deposition or exhibit to a deposition, or any other
paper, is excluded, in part or as a whole, it is no longer necessary on appeal to
embody the same, the exceptions thereto and the rulings of the Chancellor, in
a separate bill of exceptions, where the action of the Court on the parts, or the
whole documents, depositions, exhibits 30 thereto, or other papers, is duly noted
thereon by the Chancellor, such action by the Chancellor constituting the same
a part of the record, in lieu of a bill of exceptions. 31
The statute declares that these rules shall not apply where the testimony
is oral, 32 by which is meant that where witnesses are examined orally in open
Court, at the hearing, as on a trial by jury, the exceptions to the testimony of
the witnesses so examined, and the rulings of the Chancellor thereon must be
perpetuated by a bill of exceptions as was the practice before the statute.
ACTION OF CHANCELLOR ON EXCEPTIONS TO EVIDENCE IN DEPOSITIONS.
[This action to be written on the face of the deposition.]
Above question [or answer] objected to by defendant, [or complainant,] because [here
set out the ground of objection.']
Objection sustained, [or overruled,] and answer excluded [or admitted.]
April 3, 1906. A. B., Chancellor.
27 In arguing a cause, lawyers should keep in to say that justice and reason seldom suffer from
mind that a Justice of the Peace needs less argument thorough argumentation; whereas, injustice always
than a juror, that a Circuit Judge needs less than dreads investigation, and abhors discussion. The
a Justice of the Peace, that a Chancellor needs less value of thorough argumentation, as an aid in at-
than a Circuit Judge, and that a Supreme Judge taining justice, is illustrated in our own State by
needs less than a Chancellor. Nevertheless, they are the following cases: Nicholson v. Patterson, 6 Hum.,
all benefited by sound argument, and especially by 394; Sevier v. The Justices, Peck, 362; Fogg V.
the production of pertinent law. The best Judges, Williams, 2 Head, 474; and Senter 1). Bowman, 5
as a rule, desire to hear argument. In early times, Heisk., 15. See Lindsley v. Thompson, 1 Tenn. Ch.,
the same cases were often argued again and again. 272, 275. See, post, § 1319, note 20.
The case of .Stowell V. Zouche, in Plowden, was ar- 28 The motives of litigants are immaterial, and
gued four times; Manby & Richards v. Scott, in cannot be inquired into, and should not be com-
Ivevinz, was argued four times; and there is a case mented on. Maeey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch., 442;
in Wille's Reports which was argued five times, and State, ex rel. v. Williams, 2 Cates, 590.
at five different terms. These re-arguments were 28 Act of 1905, ch. 49. sec. I. A prudent Solicitor
often before all the Judges of England, and by the will, however, often prefer to set all these matters
ablest lawyers. 1 Kent's Com., 487. The case of up in a bill of exceptions.
Moss v. Averill, 10 New York, 449, was argued 30 The statute omits the word "exhibits," but this
three times; Holt V. Ward, 2 Strange, 938, was ar- is evidently a typographical error.
gued four times; and Tooke v. Hollingsworth, 5 31 Act of 1905, ch. 49, sec. 2.
.. C 1 OL T?_
s INCIDENTS OF THE HEARING. 432
ACTION OF CHANCELLOR ON EXCEPTIONS TO DEPOSITIONS.
[This action to be written at the foot of the deposition.]
Foregoing deposition read, notwithstanding
tion s 33
A
April
-
, ,
3,
^
1906.
[or, ruled out because of]
A -
foregoing excep-
B -> Chancellor.
ACTION OF CHANCELLOR ON EXCEPTIONS TO A DOCUMENT.

[This action to be endorsed on the document itself. si ]
This deed [or other document] objected to by complainant, [or defendant,] because [spec-
ifying the ground of objection.] Objection overruled, [or sustained,] and deed read [or
excluded ] A. B., Chancellor.
April 3, 1906.
ARTICLE II.
INCIDENTS OF THE HEARING.
§ 539. Amendment of Pleadings When Al- § 543. Announcement of the Decree.
lowed at the Hearing.
§ 540. What Defects in the Proof May be § 544. Taking a Case Under Advisement.
Remedied at the Hearing. § 545. Drawing of Orders and Decrees.
§ 541. Remanding a Cause for Further Proof.
§ 542. No Objection to Relief at the Hearing, § 546. Leaving the Record Unadjourned.
When.
§ 539. Amendment of Pleadings when Allowed at the Hearing. Whenever, —

at the hearing, it appears impossible to the Court to do complete justice, or to
determine the whole controversy, without an amendment of the bill or cross-
bill, making new new
prayers, or new parties, the Court may,
allegations, or
on its own motion, or on motion of a party, allow the cause to stand over, with
leave to make the necessary amendments, or new parties, or both. 1 In all such
eases, however, the party in default should be taxed with all, or a large part,
of the costs of the cause. 2 If, after such amendments, either party desire to
take further proof on the issues raised by the amendments, the cause should
be remanded to the rules for that purpose, but not for proof generally.
ORDER FOR A CAUSE TO STAND OVER TO MAKE NEW PARTIES.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
This cause coming on to be heard this day, and the record having been read [or the
pleadings having been read,] and argument of counsel [in part] heard; and it appearing to
the Court that Robert Roe, and his wife, Rachel Roe, are necessary parties defendant to this
cause, on motion of the complainant, it is ordered that the cause do stand over, to the end
that the complainant may so amend his bill as to make said Robert Roe and Rachel Roe
parties defendant thereto. The complainant and David Doe, his prosecution surety, will pay
all the costs accruing in the cause between now and the final decree, said costs to be here-
after taxed.
§ 540. What Defects in the Proof may be Remedied at the Hearing. From —
the earliest times, Courts of Equity have relieved against mere errors of Com-
missioners, witnesses and Solicitors and when there has been an accidental de-
;
fect in evidence, have, before the hearing, at the hearing, and at the re-hearing
of a cause, allowed the defect to be supplied. 3 Thus, leave has been given at
33 That is, the exceptions to the deposition for 1 Sto. Eq. PI., § 333, note. When it is manifest
want of notice or proper formalities. See, ante, §§ that justice cannot be done without amending the
497-501. These exceptions must of course, have been pleadings so as to make the necessary allegations or
ruled on by the Master and, on appeal, acted on by parties, the Chancellor should allow the cause to
the Chancellor. stand over for that purpose. The Supreme Court
34 If no room on a document or deposition to en- often remands causes on its own motion for such-
dorse the exception, and action of the Chancellor, purposes. See, post, § 1318.
the endorsement may be made on a paper attached to 2 See, ante, §§ 526-528.
the document or deposition, and exhibited thereto 3 Gres. Eq. Ev., 196.
by letters or figures of identification.
433 INCIDENTS OF THE) HEARING. §541
the hearing: (1) to prove the execution of a deed on file; (2) to stamp an in-
strument (3) to prove the loss of a deed so as to let in a copy (4) to prove the
; ;
death of a witness to an instrument; (5) to prove that the defendant is a mar-

ried woman (6) to prove the death of a party (7) to prove that the defendant
; ;
is out oi the jurisdiction of the Court; and (8) in any case of defects or omis-
sions of proof, whether brought to light and become material in consequence of
something which arises unexpectedly in the course of the hearing, or caused
by accident or inadvertence. 4 And the Court will be specially lenient in such
cases, when minors or persons of unsound mind would otherwise be injured.
If necessary, the Court will remand the cause, or postpone the hearing, with
liberty to supply the requisite proof. And so, if the Court see in any such case
that the opposite party is liable to be prejudiced by its action, the cause will be
remanded to enable him to rebut.
ORDER FOE, A CAUSE TO STAND OVER TO SUPPLY PROOF.
John Doe,
vs.
This cause coming on this day to be heard upon the pleadings and proofs, and the record
having been read, and the argument in part heard, and it appearing to the Court that the
complainant has inadvertently omitted to prove the execution of the title-bond by Henry
Brown to the defendant, Richard Roe, [or has inadvertently omitted to prove some other
manifest link in his chain of evidence,} it is ordered, on motion of the complainant, that
this cause do stand over with leave to him to prove the execution of said bond; but for this
leave he will pay one-fourth of all the accrued costs of the cause, for which an execution
may issue.
§ 541. —
Remanding a Cause for Further Proof. While the Chancellor is usu-
ally content to determine the cause upon such proofs as the parties may choose
to read, he is under no compulsion to do so, as is a Judge of a Court of law.
The Chancellor may not only postpone his decision, but, if he deems the evi-
dence unsatisfactory, or defective, or if he is unable to solve the questions in is-
sue upon the proofs read at the hearing, he may require further evidence. 5 This
right of the Chancellor is inherent in his office and does not depend on any con-
sent of the parties. Thus, after or during the hearing, the Chancellor may re-
mand the cause for further evidence on particular points, or may remand it for 1
further proof generally, or may refer it to the Master to report as to certain

facts about which there are defects or failures in evidence, or he may order a
trial by jury. 8
Where in any case, the Court can see that a party has a clear right so that
injustice will be done by dismissing his bill, but his suit fails from some over-
sight or neglect not culpable, it is the duty of the Court to remand the cause for
further proof, that justice may be done.
The Supreme Court will remand a cause, on its own motion, to the end that
further proof may be taken, when it appears probable that a decision upon the
evidence then in the record will work injustice, 7 and, for a greater reason, the
Chancery Court will remand under the same circumstances.
And so, if it should clearly appear that a defendant has a good defence in
whole, or in part, which by some oversight not culpable he has failed to prove,
the Court, applying the foregoing rules impartially, would, on his application,
remand the cause with leave to make the proof. 8
§ 542. No Objections to Relief at the Hearing, When. No objections be- —
cause of the non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties, complainant or defendant, or
i 1 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 858, note. It is the experience of the author, that it is impol-
5 3Greenl. Ev., §330-337; Gres. Eq. Ev., 489. itic to remand a cause for further proof on a point
« Ibid ; Moses r. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea, 415. as to which the evidence is conflicting; for the rea-
T See, post, § 1318. son that there is a strong temptation to introduce
8 But remandments, whether for the benefit of one false testimony when the parties realize that the
party or the other, should be only on the payment case will turn on the decision of a disputed point.
of all, or a large part, of the costs of the cause. Causes should be remanded, not for more proof on
See, ante, % 527. Hearst r. Proffitt, 7 Cates, 560; a ^disputed question, but for proof on some question
§543 INCIDENTS OF THE HEARING. 434
because of multifariousness, can be made at the hearing, but the Court in such
case will decree upon the merits. 9 If the defendant, at the hearing, object for
want of parties, not having previously taken the objection by plea, answer, or
demurrer, the Court may render a decree saving the rights of the parties not
before it, or grant leave to amend on terms not extending beyond the payment
of costs. 10 The jurisdiction of the Court cannot be objected to at the hearing,
if the defendant has answered 11 unless, indeed, the case be one wholly unfit to
j
be determined in a Court of Equity. 12

—
Announcement of Decree. The evidence in the cause having been
§ 543.
read, and the Solicitors of the parties having concluded their argument, the
papers in the cause and the briefs of counsel, all properly assorted and ar-
ranged for convenient reference, are sent to the Chancellor's chambers for his
further consideration. If any authorities have been relied on specially by
counsel they, also, should be sent along with the papers in the cause.
The Chancellor, thereupon, proceeds to further consider the case, looking
first to the pleadings to be sure of the issues involved, then to such pertinent
evidence as his notes of the hearing indicate to be important, and lastly to the
briefs of counsel and the authorities cited. 13
After reaching a conclusion, the Chancellor prepares a memorandum of his
findings of law and fact, if the case is of importance and complicated and, if ;
the case is of special importance or complication, he may write out his opinion
in whole or in part. If the case is one of frequent occurrence he will, ordinar-
ily, announce his conclusions orally. 14
The Chancellor is not required to give his reasons for his decisions, and in
many cases it is wisest not to do so. 15
§ 544. —
Taking a Case Under Advisement. If the Chancellor desires time to
investigate a case after the hearing, or if he desires to consult authorities not ac-
cessible, or if unprepared for any other reason, to announce his decision, he may
hold the case under advisement, or he may call on the parties for additional
briefs, or for further argument on particular matters. If he wishes to hold the
case under advisement he should so state on the minutes of the Court 16 but in ;
such case he must forward his decree to the Clerk and Master of the Court in
thirty days, unless by consent of counsel, further time is allowed him. 17
ENTRY IN CAUSE TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe, et at. ,
This cause came on this July 24, 1905, for final hearing on the pleadings and proofs in
the cause and argument of counsel, and the Chancellor desiring time for further considera-
tion takes the case under advisement, [and by consent of counsel he is allowed sixty days
in which to file his decree.]
9 Code, §§ 4338; 4325. These objections must be argument is closed; the winning side is apt to
made by motion to dismiss, or by demurrer; and if be too jubilant, and the losing side too resentful.
the mis-joinder, or non-joinder, of parties does not 15 The decision is the thing he is required to give
appear on the face of bill, the objection may be by the law. A sound decision based on no announced
made by plea. Code, §§ 4325;4386-4388. reasons is infinitely better than an unsound decision (
10 Code, § 4337. based on many reasons. Reasoning sometimes en-

11 Code, §§4309; 4321; 4385. This has long been tangles the conscience and befogs the intellect. See
the law. Acts of 1801, ch. 6; LeRoy r. Piatt, 4 McGuire V. Gallagher, 11 Pick., 349.
Paige, (N. Y.), 77. 18 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, sec. 2. In the old forms,
12 The true meaning of this rule is, that after the only entry in such a case was this: "Curia ad-
answer filed, no exception can be taken (1) to the visare vult." [The Court wishes to deliberate]. The
local jurisdiction of the Court over the person, or power to take a case under advisement is one that
over the subject-matter, and (2) that no objection exists independently of the statute, the only effect
can be taken to the general jurisdiction because of a of the statute being to limit the time the case may
perfect remedy at law. It does not mean that be- be so held, and to provide for the entry of the de-
cause an answer has been filed the Court is bound cree in vacation.
to pronounce a decree in a case unfit for Equity. 17 This part of the Act is merely directory, and
See, ante, § 177, notes 17 and 30; and § 290. a decree withheld beyond the statutory time, or be-
13 See, post, § 1141, sub-sec. 10. yond the extension, would be valid and proof against
14 The Chancellor usually announces his decision any exception on that account.
on the day following the conclusion of the hearing, When a case is thus taken under advisement the
or on a day later, because he requires some time to record of the Court should be left unadjourned, and
consider the matters in issue, and besides, counsel the minutes unclosed, so that the decree and any
are in a condition more dispassionately^ to hear his prayer for, and grant of, an appeal may be entered
views. As a rule, it is unwise to decide any case thereon. See, post, § 546.
that has been vigorously contested, as soon as the
435 TRIAL BY JURY. §545
§ 545. —
Drawing of Orders and Decrees. The Solicitor of the party in whose
favor the decision is made, is expected by the Court to draw the order, or de-
cree. Orders are often entered, after being read to and approved by the Chan-
cellor, without being previously submitted to the opposite counsel; but the
latter should always be given the opportunity to inspect and criticize the draft
of the decree, before it is read to the Chancellor. 18 If the opposite counsel
object to the decree, he should forthwith bring the matter of his objection be-
fore the Chancellor, in order that the decree may be settled at once.
In drawing decrees, care should be taken to have them follow the pleadings,
and the specific prayer for relief, unless relief has been granted under the gen-
eral prayer.
The Chancellor should never allow an order or decree to be entered on the
minutes until after it has been expressly approved by him. This practice in-
flexibly adhered to will enable the Clerk to keep his minutes free from inter-
lineations, erasures, and other alterations.
§ 546. Leaving the Record Unadjourned. The Chancellor may leave the —
record of the term unadjourned until Court in course in which case the min- ;
utes being open, orders and decrees made in vacation may be entered therein
as in term time. 19 All entries made in the open minutes after the close of the
term, should be compared with the originals by the Chancellor and approved
by him, as soon after the entry is made as convenient, but in no event later than
the next regular term of the Court. 20 All orders and decrees entered on the
open minutes are as effective as those made and entered in term time. 21 While
not necessary it may be well for the Chancellor to make an entry on the minutes
showing the minutes are intentionally left open, thus
ENTRY SHOWTNOr THE MINUTES LEFT OPEN.
Thebusiness of the term ready for hearing being disposed of, but that decrees in cases
held under advisement, and decrees and orders made at Chambers, may be the more conven-
iently entered of record, the record is left unadjourned and the minutes left open until the
next regular term. Hal H. HaynES, Chancellor.
ARTICLE III.
TRIAL BY JURY.
§ 547. When a Trial by Jury May be Had. § 552. Effect of a Verdict.
§ 548. When a Trial by Jury is Appropriate. § 553. Some Suggestions in Reference to De-
§ 549. Frame of Issues of Fact. manding a Jury.
§ 550. Form of the Issues, and of the Ver- 554. Term to be Extended When Trial
dict. Not Concluded.
§ 551. How the Trial is Conducted.
§ 547. When a Trial by Jury May be Had.— Ordinarily in the Chancery

Court, the Chancellor determines all issues whether of law, or of fact; 1 but
'either party to a suit is, upon application therefor in due season, entitled to a
jury to try and determine any material issue of fact all issues of fact in any :
case shall, however, be submitted to one jury. 2
18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1009; Crow v. Blythe, 3 Hay., Chancery has always been insignificant. Cooper v.
236; Whitney v. Belden, 4 Paige, (N. Y.), 140. Stockard, 16 Lea, 145.
19 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, sec. 2. See, post, §§ 771- It sometimes supposed that either party to a
is
775. Chancery suit has a Constitutional right to a trial by
20 Ibid. If the entries differ from the originals
_
jury. This supposition is based on a misapprehen-
they must be made to conform to them. Ibid, sec. 9. sion. The Constitutional provision that "the right of
21 Ibid- trial by jury shall remain inviolate," (Art. I, § 6,)
lCode, §3 2953; 2955. refers to trials at common law; Neely v. State, 4
§548 TRIAL BY JURY. 436
The demand for a jury may be made in the pleadings, or at the bar after the
cause is at issue. If the demand is made in the pleadings, the cause will stand
lor trial at the first term before a jury summoned instanter. 3 Either party may
demand a jury at any time before the hearing is actually begun. 4 The Court
may, however, make a rule requiring the demand for a jury to be made, in open
Court, on some previous day of the trial term, in order to have time to obtain a
jury, and to give the opposite side notice of the demand. 5
The demand for a jury may be made in the bill, answer or plea, by inserting
therein, ordinarily at its conclusion and just before the signature of the Solic-
itor, the following: "And the complainant, [or defendant, as the case may be,]
demands a jury to try all the issues of fact in this cause." The demand, if made
below a pleading, must be dated and signed; and should be marked "filed" by
the Clerk. If the demand is made after the pleading is filed, it must be made in
open Court, or at Chambers, and entered on the minutes, thus
DEMAND FOR A JURY.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
The complainant [or defendant,] demands a jury to try all the issues of fact in this cause.
§ 548. When
a Jury Trial is Appropriate. The following are the principal —
cases wherein a trial by jury is appropriate 1, Where the evidence is so contra-
:
dictory, or so nearly balanced, that an open and rigid cross-examination of the

witnesses before a jury is necessary for the ascertainment of the truth; 2,
Where the genuineness of a deed, will, note of hand, bill of sale, or other written
instrument is in issue 3, Where questions of sanity, duress, fraud, usury, and
;
failure of consideration, are involved 4, Where the defence of adverse posses-

;
sion is interposed in an ejectment suit; 5, Where the question in issue is the

dividing line between two tracts or lots of land 6, Where unliquidated damages ;
are to be assessed 7, Where a deed, or bill of sale, is alleged to have bee.n given
;
as a mere mortgage 8, Where the fact of marriage, or the legitimacy of chil-

;
dren, is in issue 6 and 9, Where, in a divorce suit, matters of fact are charged
;
in the bill and denied in the answer. 7

But in all the foregoing cases, the main reason for a trial by jury is the con-
tradictory character of the evidence, or the importance of an open and rigid
cross-examination of the witnesses in the presence of the Court and jury. 8
The Chancellor may, on his own motion, submit any disputed question of fact
to a jury, in order to have their verdict thereon for his own information and :
this he will ordinarily do when the evidence is so conflicting that it is difficult

to ascertain the truth. 9
§ 549. Frame of Issues of Fact. —
The issues of fact, to be determined by the
jury, are made up by the parties under the direction of the Court; and they
State, 9 Hum., 53; Goddard v. State, 2 Yerg., 99; Tuesday of the trial term. Cheatham v. Pearce, 5
Jackson v. Nimmo, 3 Lea, 613; 3 A. & E. Ency. of Pick., 668. If a jury trial be not demanded at the
Law, 719. Indeed, even in those cases in Chancery firsttrial term it may be demanded
at any subse-
wherein a jury is demanded, the suit, strictly speak- quent trial term.Harris l\ Bogle, 7 Cates, 701. A
ing, is not tried by the jury, inasmuch as they merely waiver of a jury at one term does not preclude a
answer certain questions of fact submitted to them. party from demanding a jury at a succeeding term.
Cooper V. Stockard, 16 Lea, 144. It would seem, Worthington v. Railroad, 6 Cates, 182. But applying
however, that where the jurisdiction of the Chan- for and obtaining a reference to the Master is a
cery Court has been extended by statute so as to_
waiver of a demand for a jury. Harris r. Bogle, 7
include actions formerly cognizable exclusively at Cates, 701.
common law, the Constitutional right of trial by jury The statutes prescribing when and how juries shall
would remain, at least when demanded by the de- be demanded, (Acts of 1875, ch. 4, and Acts of
fendant. Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold, 385. 1889, ch. 220,) do not apply to the Chancery Court.
3 Code, § 4466. If not demanded in the pleadings Cooper V. Stockard, 16 Lea, 140; Cheatham v. Pearce,
it cannot be demanded until the other party has had 5 Pick., 668.
time to take proof. Harris v. Bogle, 7 Cates, 701. " 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1073, note.
Chancery Rule 2, § 4, as to the time for taking proof, 7 Code, § 2458.
does not apply when a jury is demanded in the 8 Townsend f. Graves, 3 Paige Ch., (N. Y.), 453;
pleadings. Ibid. Hammond v. Fuller, 1 Paige Ch., 197, Desty's notes;
4 Allen v. Saulpaw, 6 Lea, 477. Vanderheyden V. Reid, Hqpk. Ch., (N. Y.), 408.
5 Stadler V. Hertz, 13 Lea, 315. In this cause Munson v. Reed, Clarke's Ch., (N. Y.), 580; Allen
the Supreme Court sustained a rule which required r. Saulpaw, 6 Lea, 482.
the demand for a jury to be made on or before 9 State ». Allen, 2 Tenn. Ch., 46.
should set forth, briefly and clearly, the true questions of fact to be tried. 10
The Chancellor has the power and it is his duty to so shape the issues submitted
by the parties as to present the material and determinative questions of fact
made by the pleadings, briefly and clearly. 11 These issues must, of course, be
responsive to the pleadings/ 2 and must be so comprehensive of the questions of
fact put in issue by the pleadings that, when determined by the jury, the Court
will be able, upon the findings of the jury, and the balance of the record, to
pronounce a full and complete final decree on all the material matters involved
in the controversy. 13 The issues should be responsive to the pleadings, and
should raise no questions of fact not raised by the pleadings. 14
The party applying for a jury trial must submit material issues and if he ;
iails so to do the verdict will be immaterial, and the Court may, thereupon,
determine the case as though no jury trial had taken place, if the record is in a
condition to justify that course. 15 But where the issues are material, on the
verdict being set aside, whether by the Chancery or the Supreme Court, neither
Court can determine the facts and decide the cause thereon, but the cause must
be re-tried by a jury. 18
§ 550. Form of Issues, and of the Verdict. The issues may be in the form —
of pleadings at law; 17 but the better practice, perhaps, is to resolve the issues
made by the pleadings into the form of questions, 13 to be answered, "yes" or
"no," or by dates, amounts, quantities, or boundaries, as the case may be.
Thus, on an ejectment bill, to which is interposed the defence of adverse pos-
session, and the statute of limitations, the following issues might be submitted
to the jury :
ISSUE'S OF FACT.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 213.

Richard Roe. J
The following issues of fact are made up by the parties, under the direction of the Court,
to be submitted to the jury
i.
Aside from any of the defences set up by the defendant's answer, does the complainant
own in fee the tract of land he sues for in his bill?
II.
Or if he owns a portion only of said tract, state what portion, giving the metes and bounds.
10 Code\ § 4468. Lea, 144. In this case, Chief Justice Deaderick, in

11 Burton v. Farmers* Association, 20 Pick., 414. speaking of the questions to be tried by a jury in
12 James v. Brooks, 6 Heisk., 150; Ragsdale v. Chancery, said, "In practice, these questions are lit-
Gossett, 2 Lea, 729. erally questions propounded to the jury, which, in
13 Connor u. Frierson, 14 Pick., 183. their verdict, they are required to answer affirma-
14 Burton v. Farmers' Association, 20 Pick., 414. tively, or negatively."
15 Gass v. Mason, 4 Sneed, 509; Ragsdale v. Gos- Since the system of special pleading has been
sett, 2 Lea, 729; First N. Bank v. Oldham, 6 Lea, practically abandoned, and the general issue of law
729; Mills v. Faris, 12 Heisk., 452; Nelson V. Clay- and fact substituted for it, juries in the Circuit Court
brooke, 4 Lea, 687. have become, in effect, a bench of twelve Chancellors,
If the issue tendered by a party be immaterial, who decide the case on ill-defined, and often ill-
the Chancellor may refuse to submit it, and proceed conceived notions of law and general Equity, these
with the hearing without a jury, and make a decree notions of the individual^ jurors often differing as
as though no jury had been demanded. Dan. Ch. Pr., much as their faces, clothing, and habits of thought.
1079, note. If, however, he does submit an imma- The Circuit Judge can advise these twelve Chancel-
terial issue, it is his duty to disregard the finding of lors, in a general way, as to what the law is; and,
the jury thereon, and if all the proof be in writing, if they find contrary to his judgment, all he can do
he should at once find the facts for himself, and is to refer the case to another bench of twelve Chan-
pronounce a decree thereon. Gass v. Mason, 4 cellors, to be tried anew in the same general way,
Sneed, 509; Ragsdale v. Gossett, 2 Lea, 730. rule A and on the same general and incongruous notions;
of Court requiring issues to be filed on or before and if their verdict accords with the former verdict,
a specified^ time, and that each should embrace only the power of the Judge is, ordinarily, at an end; and
one question of fact, is proper and reasonable. the second verdict must, ordinarily, stand, however
Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 668. strongly the Judge may dissent, and however grossly
16 First N. Bank v. Oldham, 6 Lea, 718. the law may have been violated and justice out-
17 James v. Brooks, 6 Heisk., 150. In Lancaster raged.
v. Ward, 1 Tenn., (Overt.), 430, the issues were as But, in the Chancery Court, if the issues are
follows: properly prepared, they accomplish in part the pur-
_.
"First, Whether the bill single for $860, exhibited pose of special pleading, by restricting the findings
in the complainant's bill, was procured from John of the jury to pure questions of fact. The verdict
Lancaster, the deceased, by the defendant Ward, by in issues in Chancery is in the nature of a special
fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence, as verdict. The jury does not, ordinarily, pass on any
stated in complainant's bill. question of law, and the Chancellor should see that
"Second, Whether the defendant Ward paid to the issues are so framed as to restrict them to pure
the deceased any consideration for the said bill sin- Questions of fact, thus confining the jury to their
™la. „.,J i£ t x :j i.j 1 :-J »» .cj _r
§551 TRIAL, BY JURY. 438
Had the defendant been in actual and adverse possession of any part of the tract sued for,
openly, notoriously, and continuously, for a period of seven or more years next before the
bill was filed?
IV.
If the defendant had had such possession, state what color of title he held under, if any.
v.
If the defendant's possession was not held under any color of title, state the metes and
bounds of his possession held for seven or more years next before the bill was filed.
In Ragsdale & Mabry v. Gossett, 19 Judge Cooper held that the issues should
have been as follows
ISSUES OF FACT.
George H. Ragsdale, et a
vs.
V. F. Gossett, et al.
In this cause, the following issues of fact are tendered by the complainants to be sub-
mitted to the jury:
i.
Was the money borrowed from Mcintosh and Johnson the separate estate of the wife?
H.
If so, was any part of it used in the purchase of the chattels in controversy, for her sep-
arate use?
in.
Was the sale of these chattels, and the purchase as made, intended as a fraudulent device
to protect the husband's property from his creditors ?
In Hunter v. Wallace, 20 the issues submitted to the jury were in the form of
questions, and in substance as follows
ISSUES OF FACT.
1st. Had Finley notice of the sale to the plaintiff at the time he paid the purchase-money,
or procured his conveyance?
2d. What was the value of the improvements made by the plaintiff?
3d. Did Knox empower Wallace, either by letter or verbally, to make the contract with
the plaintiff?
If the issues are in the form of questions propounded to the jury, (which is
the better practice,) their verdict is an affirmative or negative answer. The
jury do not, as a rule, return a verdict in favor of the complainant for the
money or thing sued for, or in favor of the defendant generally, but they say
such and such allegations, or propositions .of fact, are true, or false. The jury
do not try the suit, but try such questions only as are submitted to them. The
Chancellor tries and decides the suit, aided by the finding of the jury. 21
§ 551. —
How the Trial is Conducted. A jury trial in the Chancery Court is
conducted in the same manner as in the Circuit Court :-- the parties summon
their witnesses and enforce their attendance, 23 and the witnesses are sworn,
put under the rule and examined, as in a Court of law. 24 Jurors are designated
by the Court, and summoned by the Sheriff, and are tried, empanelled and
sworn, as in the Circuit Court. 25 The Chancellor passes on all questions of evi-
dence, and on the competency of witnesses, and after the proof is all in on both
sides, the cause is argued to the jury by the respective counsel, and the jury
is then charged by the Chancellor. The charge of the Chancellor may be re-
quired by either party to be reduced to writing before delivered. The jury
should be directed to reduce their findings to writing but this is not essentia). ;
The verdict of the jury may be set aside on any ground that would vitiate it if
in the Circuit Court, and the Chancellor has the same power to grant new trials
as is possessed by Courts of law. Indeed, the whole proceedings, from the time
the demand for a jury is made until their verdict is approved, or set aside, by
19 2 Lea, 737. party that viva voce testimony will be introduced.

20 Term., (Overt.,) 239. Johnson v. Warden, 1 Shan. Cas., 670.
21 Cooper v. Stockard, 16 Lea, 144. 25 The Court shall designate good and lawful men
22 Code, § 4466. to serve as jurors, and direct the Sheriff to summon
23 Code, § 4470. them instanter. Code, §§ 3996; 3993. Jurors in the
24 When a trial by jury is demanded in the Chan- Chancery Court must have the same qualifications,
cery Court it is not necessary to notify the adverse are subject to the same rules, and receive the same
pay, as regular jurors in the Circuit Court.
the Chancellor are, in all respects, the same as in jury trials in the Circuit
Court, 26 and so is the manner of making out a bill of exceptions, and praying
and prosecuting an appeal to the Supreme Court.
DEMAND FOB, A JURY, ISSUES, VERDICT, AND FINAL DECREE.
John Doe, )
vs. \ No. 683.

Richard Roe. J
In this cause, the defendant demanded a jury to try the issues of fact involved in the
pleadings, which demand was granted; and the following issues of fact were thereupon made
up by the parties, under the direction of the Court, to be submitted to the jury:
1. Was the note sued on executed by the defendant?
2. If not, how much does the defendant owe the complainant on the account exhibited
to the bill, if anything ?
3. If the defendant is indebted on said account, should interest be added? If so, from
what date?
And thereupon came the following jury, all good and lawful men, [naming them,] who
were duly sworn well and truly to try said issues, and a true verdict to render thereon,
according to the law and the evidence; and the evidence [or, argument] jiot being concluded,
the jury was respited until tomorrow, [or, and the evidence, and argument, and the charge
to the Court, having been heard, the said jurors, upon their oaths aforesaid, say:
To the first question they answer, "Yes."
To all the other questions they answer, "No."
Whereupon, the defendant moved the Court to set the said findings of the jury aside, and
yrant him a new trial on said issues, which motion on due consideration thereof, was by the
Court overruled.
And, thereupon, the cause coming on to be further and finally heard this day, upon the
pleadings and the said findings of the jury, on consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged,
and decreed by the Court that [Here insert the adjudications of the Court and the award of
Anal process. See, post, §§ 567-568.]
§ 552. —
Effect of a Verdict. When a Chancellor orders a jury on his own
motion, his object is to get the opinion of the jury on a difficult question of
fact, so that he may thereby be aided in reaching a conclusion satisfactory to
his judgment; or, as the books express it, the object of the verdict is to inform
and satisfy the conscience of the Chancellor. In all such cases, the verdict is
merely adyisory, and if it does not satisfy the conscience of the Chancellor, he
may disregard it, and find the facts for himself. 27 He will, however, give the
verdict due consideration, and will not set it aside unless clearly erroneous.
But when either party demands a jury, their verdict is conclusive upon the
Chancellor, unless he grants a new trial, or unless the issiie tendered be imma-
terial. The object of the statute, in allowing a party to demand a jury in the
Chancery Court, is to give him all the benefits and rights resulting from such
a trial in a Court of law. 28
The jury having determined the issues submitted to them, the Chancellor, if
he allows the verdict to stand, considers the facts found by the jury to be true,
and determines the rights of the parties as he deems just and right in view of
the facts found. In other words, the jury report their opinion upon the ques-
tions submitted to them, and the Chancellor tries and determines the suit be-
tween the parties upon the facts reported by the jury, and the other facts be-
fore him, and the law governing the case. 29 If, by agreement of parties, the
Chancellor hears the case on oral testimony, his decision has all the force and
effect of the verdict of a jury. 30
§ 553. Some Suggestions in Reference to Demanding a Jury. If, in any —

case afteryou have taken your proof, you feel that the real facts are with you,
but that (1) by false swearing, or (2) by the refusal of obstinate witnesses to
answer fully, or (3) by the collusion of witnesses, or (4) by the evasion of
26 Code, §§ 4466-4470. The practice in jury trials 28 James v. Brooks, 6 Heisk., 150; Morris v. Swa-
is fully and admirably set forth in Caruther's Law- ney, 7 Heisk., 591: Code, §4469. The verdict will
suit. A bill of exceptions is prepared, signed and not be disturbed by the Supreme Court if there be
filed, and a record thereof made on the minutes, in any evidence to support it. Scruggs v. Heiskell, 11
the same manner as in the Circuit Court. For a Pick., 455; McElyn v. Hill, 21 Pick., 319.
form of a bill of exceptions, see, post, § 1214. 29 Cooper v. Stockard„ 16 Lea, 144.
OT n T\ /-M- Tl_ 1 ATT 1 ATO. IIOI. r* .. 'MT f—
oa «.... a. A+ ii T>:_1. im
§554 TRIAL BY JURY. 440
unwilling or hostile witnesses, you have been unable to get out the facts fully
enough to risk a trial before the Chancellor on your depositions, then consider
whether it would not be well to demand a jury, and have the witnesses sub-
poenaed and examined in open Court. A
vigorous oral examination of a wit-
ness, in open Court before a jury, will often elicit truth impossible of extraction
by means of a deposition. This is especially true of the direct examination of
your own witnesses, when they are hostile; and of the cross-examination of
jour adversary's witnessess, when they are unwilling to tell the whole truth.
A Solicitor, however, should never demand a jury merely because his client
believes (1) that there is a local prejudice in his favor, or (2) that the other
party is a corporation laboring under local prejudice, or (3) that a jury will
allow more damages than will the Chancellor, or (4) that there is a chance to
defeat justice, or to do injustice, by means of local or other prejudice, or by
any artifice. Any Solicitor who aids or abets his client in demanding a jury
for any such purposes, lowers himself in the estimation of the Court, prostitutes
the machinery of justice, and degrades at once the profession to which he be-
longs, and the Court in which he practices. "Law is neither a trade nor a
solemn jugglery," but the science of justice; and a Court of Conscience is not
the forum for any unconscientious practices.
§ 554. Term to be Extended When Trial Not Concluded. Whenever a case —
is pending and on trial by the Court, or a jury, and undetermined at the time
when the term at which it is pending expires, on account of [lapse of] time,
and on account of the arrival of the succeeding term, the term shall be ex-
tended and continued into such succeeding term for all the purposes of trying,
disposing of, and returning verdict and rendering judgment in, such case so
pending and on trial, the same as if such new term had not arrived. And the
jury trying such case shall not be discharged because of the expiration of the
term. 31
31 Acts of 1899, ch. 40. Under this Act the Court I ing appeals. R. R. and Telephone Cos. i;. Simmons,
may continue and extend a term for the purpose 23 Pick., 392.
of disposing of motions for a new trial ana grant- I
441 NATURE AND EXTENT OF RELIEF GRANTED. §555
PART V.
PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY FROM THE

CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING TO THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECREE.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
DECREES ON THE MERITS.
Article 1. Nature and Extent of the Relief Granted.
Article II. Decrees Generally Considered.
Article III. Kinds of Decrees.
Article IV. Practical Suggestions as to Decrees.
ARTICLE I.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE RELIEF GRANTED.
555. Grounds of a Decree. 561. When Relief Against a Defendant is
556. Extent of the Relief Granted. Defeated by a Co-defendant.
557. Relief Under the General Prayer.
558. When Relief May be Based on the 562. When Persons Not Parties May Take
Answer. Benefits Under a Decree.
559. What Relief a Defendant May Have. 563. When Interest Will be Allowed in a
560. Relief When Granted Between Co- Decree.
fendants.
§ 555. —
Grounds of a Decree. The bill and decree in a cause are syllogistic
in their nature, the law constituting the major premise of the syllogism, and
hence seldom expressed, the bill constituting the minor premise, and the decree
constituting the conclusion of the syllogism. For this reason, which is as sound
in law as in logic, the decree must be a legitimate deduction from the bill 1 and
the law, or it will be erroneous on its face. 2 And if the facts alleged in the bill
are denied in the answer, and not proved, any decree based on such a bill will
be erroneous in fact. 3 It follows from these premises, that a proper decree
must be based either on the bill and the 'admissions in the answer, or on the
bill and the proofs in the cause sustaining it, and that a decree not so based is
necessarily erroneous. A decree must be founded on, and sustained by, both
the material allegations and the pertinent proofs in the cause it cannot be ;
based on allegations without pertinent proofs, nor on proofs without corre-
l Occasionally decrees are based on the admissions deemed as based on allegations admitted. See, post,
contained in. the answer. The complainant might § 558.
amend his bill, and charge the facts thus admitted, 2 Such an erroneous decree may be reversed on
in which case, the Court would decree on the admis- appeal, or by writ of error, or by a bill of review
sion; but as Courts of Equity look at the substance for error apparent; and, if wholly outside of the
and -not at ceremony, they deal with such an answer pleadings, is void. See, post, §§ 565; 814, note 43.
as though the facts admitted had been charged in 3 Such a decree may be reversed on appeal, or by
an amended hill, and thi»n n^mitt^rl Kv thp Apirnri-
§556 NATURE AND EXTENT OP RELIEF GRANTED. 442
sponding allegations, but must conform to the material allegations in the plead-
ings, as well as to the pertinent proofs in the cause. 4
A
Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction of any matter not submitted to it
in a pleading for adjudication; nor can the defendant be called on to respond
to anything not alleged against him. Neither can a Court consider any evi-
dence which does not directly, or indirectly, tend to prove, or disprove, the
averments contained in the pleadings. A decree can neither be based on allega-
tions without corresponding proof, nor on proof without corresponding allega-
tions 5 but all decrees must be the concurring result of allegations justified by
;
proof, and proof justified by allegations. 8 A decree based on pleadings, with-

out proof, will be reversed on appeal or writ of error, but will be good against
collateral attack while a decree based on proof, without pleadings, will not
;
only be reversed on appeal or writ of error, but will, also, yield to a collateral
attack for such a decree is coram non judice, and absolutely void. 7 The juris-
;
diction of the Court is circumscribed by the pleadings, and the pleadings are
circumscribed by the law. 8
§ 556. —
Extent of Relief Granted. It is a fundamental rule of Courts of
Equity to make as complete a decision, upon all the points embraced in a cause,
as the nature of the case will admit so as to preclude, not only all further liti-
;
gation between the same parties, and the possibility of the same parties being,
at any future period, disturbed or harrassed by other parties claiming the same
matter, but also to preclude any danger of injustice to persons who are not
before the Court. 9 Acting upon this fundamental rule, Courts of Equity not
only require the pleadings to so present all the matters in controversy, that
they may be properly and fully adjudicated, 10 but they, also, require all per-
sons having any interest in the subject-matter of the controversy to be made
parties, to the end that they may either have their rights ascertained, or their
duties declared, or their claims adjudged, or their titles bound. 11 And the
extent of the relief the Court will grant is, therefore, commensurate with all
the rights, all the duties, all the claims, and all the titles, of all the parties to
the suit in and to the subject-matter of the controversy, so far as those rights,
duties, claims and titles appear in the pleadings and in the pertinent proof.
The pleadings must conform to the law, the proof must conform to the plead-
ings, and the decree must conform to them all: it must be within the law and
the pleadings, and be sustained by the proof. If a decree is outside the plead-
ings, it is void if inside the pleadings but outside the proof, it is voidable on
;
appeal or writ of error, but is otherwise valid.

Relief Under the General Prayer. As a rule, no relief can be granted
§ 557. —
if none is prayed for; 12 and no relief will be granted inconsistent with that
prayed for. The decree ordinarily follows the special relief sought by the bill,
if the pleadings and proof will warrant it. 13
If the complainant is not entitled to the specific relief he prays, he may,
under the general prayer, have such other relief as, on the pleadings and proof,
1 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1003, note. A decree must be tions of the parties, and cannot go outside of them
based upon both the pleadings and the proof, and even to do substantial justice. The parties make the
must be logically responsive thereto. The complain- issues in their pleadings. Teague v. Teague, 2 Ch.
ant cannot recover on a case different from that al- Apps., 376. Judicis est judicare secundum allegata
leged in his bill. Neither allegations without proof, et probata. (It is the duty of a Judge to make his
nor proof without allegations, nor proof and allega- judgment in accordance with the allegations and the
tions which do not substantially correspond, will en- proofs).
title the complainant to relief. The proof must fol- 7 Unless made by consent of parties. See, post,
low the bill, and the decree must follow both. 1 {565.
Dan. Ch. Pr.; 361; 861; 4 Bax., 296; 4 Heisk., 209; 8 See note 4, supra.
609: 3 Bax., 302; 9 Lea, 63; 9 Heisk., 679; 746; 3 9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 990; see, ante, §§36; 38.
Tenn. Ch., 118; 4 Hum., 417; 12 Heisk., 700; 2 10 See, ante, § 146.
Tenn. Ch., 174; 4 Sneed, 625; 1 Pick., 87. A decree 11 See, ante, §§ 90-95.
wholly outside of the issues raised by the pleadings is 12 But where a bill is filed under a statute pre-
coram non judice, and void even when collaterally scribing the relief, it may be granted without a
attacked. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 853, Mayo v. Harding. 3 prayer, as in attachment cases where the attached
Tenn. Ch., 237. See, also, Kine v. Rowan, 10 Heisk., property mav be sold without a sale being prayed for.
677; Wilcox v. Blackwell, 15 Pick., 352. Eaton v. Breathett, 8 Hum., 536; Code, §3536;
5 Gernt v. Cusack. 22 Pick., 141 Bradshaw ; r. Van Ouin v. Leake, 1 Tenn. Ch., 73.
Valkenberg, 13 Pick., 316. 13 Pillow v. Pillow, 5 Yerg., 420.
6 And the Court is absolutely bound by the allega-
443 NATURE AND EXTENT OF RELIEF GRANTED. 558
fairly entitled to, 14
provided it is not of a character to take the defendant
he is
by surprise. 16 The relief under the general prayer must be such as follows,
ordinarily and logically, from the pleadings and the proof. If the bill prays
for general relief only, the complainant can orally pray, at the hearing, for the
specific relief he is entitled to, on the case made out by the pleadings and
proof. 18
§ 558. When
Relief May —
be Based on the Answer. Where the answer de-
nies the precise case alleged in the bill, and sets up a different case, if the com-
plainant fail to prove the case he alleges, and he be entitled to any relief on the
ease set up in the answer, the Court will grant him such relief. 17 It would be
more regular in such cases, however, for the complainant to amend his bill and
charge the case made in the answer but, as Courts of Chancery disregard form,
;
a decree will be rendered as though such an amendment had been made. 18 But
when relief is based upon an answer, the whole answer must be taken together,
the matters of discharge as well as the matters of charge and when so consid- ;
ered, must show that the complainant is entitled to relief, or none will be
granted on the answer alone. 19 In case the answer sets up a discharge, also,
if the complainant wishes to avail himself of the matters of charge and disprove
the matters of discharge, he must amend his bill, and allege the former and
deny the latter. 20
§ 559. WhatRelief a Defendant May Have. —

While, as a rule, a defendant
to a suit is not entitled to any affirmative relief, unless he obtains it by means
of a cross-bill, or an answer filed as a cross-bill, (and even then he obtains it as
a complainant, and not as a defendant,) nevertheless, there are important ex-
ceptions to this rule; and when a defendant's equities are the same as the com-
plainant's, the Court will grant the former the same relief as is granted the
latter, if the bill so prays. 21
And, as he who seeks Equity must, also, do Equity, the Court will give the
defendant any relief he may be entitled to in good conscience, as against the
complainant, as to any matter connected with the subject-matter of the litiga-
tion. 22 Thus, a defendant will (1) be allowed a set-off, or (2) will be allowed
the value of his improvements made in good faith and without notice when
complainant recovers the land, or (3) will be allowed the principal of his debt
1
when complainant has an usurious or inequitable instrument cancelled, or (4 )
will be allowed the liens by him removed when a partition is sought. 23 On a

bill for an account, a decree may be rendered in favor of the defendant for the
balance found due him, and a cross-bill is not necessary to entitle the defendant
to such a decree. 24 So, on a bill to enjoin a mortgage sale, and for an account
to ascertain the true balance of the mortgage debt, a decree may be rendered
in the defendant's favor for such balance, and the mortgaged land sold, with-
out a cross-bill. 25
§ 560. Relief When Granted Between Co-defendants. As a general rule, —
the Court will not make a decree between co-defendants, but will content itself
by granting the complainant the relief he may be entitled to, or by dismissing
his bill. To this rule there are, however, frequent and important exceptions
and it is a settled doctrine of adjudication that whenever, in a Court of Equity,
li Peterson V. Turney, 2 Ch. Apps., 519; Tennes- 22 Under this maxim, an equitable right may be
see Ice Co. o. Paine, 23 Pick., 151; Dollman v. secured, or an equitable relief awarded, to the de-
Collier, 8 Pick., 660. fendant, which he could not have obtained in a suit
15 Allum v. Stockbridge, 8 Bax., 356. brought by him for that purpose. 1 Pom. Eq. Tur.,
16 Dodd v. Benthall, 4 Heisk., 609. §§ 385-387; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 64 e ; ante, § 39.
IT 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 361; Rose v. Mynatt, 7 Yerg., 23 See, ante, § 39; and post, § 560.
30; Maury V. Lewis, 10 Yerg.. 118; Bailey v. Bailey, 24 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 992, note; Fisher v. Stovall, 1
8 Hum., 230; Shannon V. Erwin, 11 Heisk., 340; Pick., 316; Croft V. Johnson, 8 Bax., 390; Allen V.
Cox v. Waggoner, 5 Sneed, 543. Allen, 11 Heisk., 387.
18 Or the amendment may be made at the hearing, 25 Polk V. Mitchell. 1 Pick., 364. But a cross-bill
1 Dan. Ch. Pr.. 861. See, ante, % 555, note 1. is necessary if the defendant wishes to enforce his
19 Neal n. Eobinson, 8 Hum., 435; Mulloy r. mortgage on a bill filed for an accounting. Griffith
Young, 10 Hum., 298. V. Security Association, 16 Pick., 410. See, Lewis v
20 Tamcsnn i! SbplW 9. "Rirm 1QR fllaas. R Pirk 147
§561 NATURE AND EXTENT OF RELIEF GRANTED. 444
a case is made out between defendants, by evidence
arising from the pleadings
and proofs between the complainants and the defendants, the Court is not only
'
entitled to make a decree between the defendants, but is bound to do
so. 2 9
The tendency of the Court is in favor of the more frequent exercise of this
jurisdiction and to make decrees between co-defendants in all cases, as to
;
all
matters contained in the pleadings that if left undetermined would leave roots
of future controversy; the object of the Court being to prevent a multiplicity
of suits, and to bring litigation to an end. 27 And to effectually do this, the
Court will so decree as (1) to settle all equities between the parties arising out
of the pleadings, regardless of their attitudes as complainants or defendants,
and (2) to make a final disposition of the entire subject-matter of the liti-
gation. 28
The cases in which a decree may be made in favor of one defendant against
another are
1. Where the decree, made in favor of the complainant against one or more
of the defendants, operates to create a right, or equity, in favor of one de-
fendant against another which can be adjusted or protected in the same suit;
such right, or equity, however, must arise out of the decree itself, and not from
a state of facts outside of the decree. 29
2. Where
the complainant and one or more defendants have rights of the
same and growing out of the same facts, against the other defendant or
natiire,
defendants, so that the same decree may declare and enforce the rights of the
complainant and of the defendant, or defendants, whose interests are the same
as his. 30
3. Where the relief to which the complainant is entitled cannot be granted
without first determining the rights and equities existing between the defend-
ants, and growing out of facts charged in the bill. 31
§ When Relief Against a Defendant is Defeated by a Go-defendant.

561.
A Court of Chancery seeks to do Equity to and between all the parties to a
suit as far as possible under the pleadings and proofs, regardless of their atti-
tude as complainants or defendants and allows no forms of pleading and no
;
technicalities of practice to stay its hand in doing such complete justice to each
party as good reason and good conscience require; and, when necessary for
26 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1371, note; Henshaw v. Ward, co-complainants. Thus on a bill (1) to redeem land,
9 Hum., 568; Allen V. Baugus, 1 Swan, 404; Ingram or (2) to partition land, or (3) to sell land for par-
v. Smith, 1 Head, 428: LaGrange v. M. & C. R. R. tition, or (4) to set up title to specific real or per-
Co., 7 Cold., 420; Davis v. Reaves, 7 Lea. 585. See, sonal property, or (5) to recover a trust fund, or (6)
also, Code, § 2974; and Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 392-394. to compel an executor, administrator, guardian or
27 Barb. Ch. Pr., 339; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1371; Code, other trustee to account, or (7) to sell land to pay
§ 2974. Bont judicis est lites dirimere ne lis ex lite debts, or (8) to wind up an insolvent estate, part-
oriatur, et interest reipublica ut sint -fines litium. nership or corporation, or (9) to have a general ac-
28 Allen v. Baugus, 1 Swan, 406; Birdsong v. Bird- counting, the Court will render a complete decree,
song, 2 Head, 302; LaGrange v. Rainey; 7 Cold., and so mould it as to make a final and full disposi-
457. Such relief, however, must be confined to the t tion of the entire, subject-matter, and of the rights
matters arising out of, or connected with, the ques-* of all the parties having an interest therein, regard-
tions raised by the pleadings, or the determinations less of their attitudes as complainants or defendants.
contained in the decree, and cannot be grounded on In such cases, a defendant, whose right or interests
the proof alone. If the proof show the defendant to are concurrent with those of the complainant, will#
be entitled to relief against a co-defendant, or against be given the same sort of recovery, and his rights
the complainant as to matters not set up in the and interests will be protected and enforced in the
pleadings, the defendant seeking such relief must same manner as though he were a co-complainant,
resort to a cross-bill, or to an original bill, according and especially if he be an infant, or person of un-
to the nature of the case. See McKee v. Dail, 1 Ch. sound mind.
Apps., 689, which cites the above section, (then § 31 Henshaw v. Wells, 9 Hum.. 568. Blinded Jus-
544.) tice,with sword in one hand and scalesin the other,
29 L. & M. R. R. Co. -o. Rainey, 7 Cold., 457; condemning all in one scale and rewarding all in the
Keeling v. Heard, 3 Head. 592. other scale, is the divinity of the Courts of law.
30 Ingram
v. Smith. 1 Head, 411; Gentry v. Gen- The divinity of the Courts of Chancery, on the other
try, Sneed, 87; Allen v. Baugus, 1 Swan, 404:
1 hand, is open-eyed Equity, having neither sword nor
Davis r>. Reaves. 7 Lea, 585. These cases show that scales, wearing the breast-plates of good reason and
where the complainant and one or more of the de- good conscience, using both hands to remove all
fendants have an interest in the same property, real forms, cloaks, veils, technicalities and subterfuges,
or personal, against the other defendants, the Court that conceal or distort the real facts and circum-
will determine and enforce the rights of all the par- stances of the case before her, separating the pure
ties to such property, regardless of their altitude as grains of truth from the straw and chaff of fraud and
complainants or defendants; and will so decree as artifice, and -apportioning to each party, whether
though the bill had been filed on behalf of the de- complainant or defendant, what in good reason and
fendants having conrurrent rights with the com- good conscience is his just due.
plainant, or as though such defendants were really
445 nature; and extent of RELIEF granted. §562
this purpose, the Court will require pleadings to be amended, new parties to
be made, and additional proof to be filed.
Under the operation of its rule of doing complete and not half justice, 32
when, from defences made by one party the non-liability of a non-defending
party appears, the Court will not adjudge the latter to be liable, not even when
33 Thus, where there is privity
a pro confesso has been entered against him.
between defendants, a good defence by one of the privies will protect a co-
defendant who is a co-heir, co-legatee, co-partner, co-principal, co-surety, tenant
in common, co-trustee, co-director, co-guardian, co-executor, co-administrator,
beneficiary or trustee, principal or agent, or vendor or vendee, from the conse-
quences of a pro confesso.
When, on the pleadings alone, or on both pleadings and proof, it appears
that the complainant is not entitled to any recovery, what justice is there in
giving him a decree against an innocent man because as a defendant he has
failed to make any defense? The Chancery Court declines to enforce for-
feitures and relieves against penalties, and while it may punish such a de-
fendant by taxing him with some of the costs it will not hold that he has for-
feited all rights and incurred all penalties by failing to answer the bill when
it appears of record in the cause that he is not liable, for that would be to
crucify an innocent man on a technicality, 34 and aid a guilty man to perpetrate

an iniquity by means of the forms of procedure.
Therefore, it has been adjudicated, (1,) that a defence by an heir or legatee
will enure to the benefit of the excutors of the estate 35 (2,) that a defence by;
one partner will enure to the benefit of another partner; 36 (3,) that a defence
by a trustee will protect the beneficiary; 37 (4,) that a defence by his vendor
will save a vendee from a pro confesso against him; 38 and (5,) where one per-
sonal representative successfully defends he thereby relieves the representatives
from the effects of a judgment by default in a Court of law 39 so that the gen- ;
eral rule stated in the second paragraph of this section may be considered a
part of our jurisprudence. 40 But, on the contrary, where there is no privity,
no joint liability, or no common interest between two defendants, the answer
and defence of one will not enure to the benefit of the other who has been pro
confessoed, and will not protect him from the liability alleged in the bill. 41
§ 562. When Persons Not Parties May Take Benefits Under a Decree. It —
often happens that persons who are not parties are entitled to take benefits
under a decree this happens when they are interested in the subject-matter of
:
the suit, but have not been made parties because (1) too numerous, or (2)
because their interests or names were not known; or (3) because the bill is
filed for their benefit in part. The most ordinary cases of a right to come in
under a decree are the following: 1, Where a decree directs a fund belonging
to an estate, or to a trust, to be paid out to those entitled, in which case, lega-
tees, distributees, and creditors may come in at any time before final distribu-
tion of the funds. 2, Where a female party marries pending the suit, and no
notice thereof is taken by the Court, the husband may come in under the decree
in the right of his wife; 3, Where the persons entitled are numerous, and the
bill is filed for the benefit of all concerned 4, Where the decree in a partition,
:
or similar case, adjudges that certain unknown heirs have an interest, these
heirs may set up that interest under the decree 5, Where a person has acquired
;
by purchase, descent or otherwise, the interest of a partv in the decree and 6, ;
Where, in any case, a person not a party has an interest in the fund to be dis-
tributed, and the scope of the decree includes him and his interest. 42
32 See. ante. § 38. 38 Hennessee v. Ford, 8 Hum., 499.
33 McDaniel v. Goodall, 2 Cold., 395. 39 Brien v. Patterson, 3 Head, 499.
34 A pro confesso is only a technical confession of 40 See, ante, §§210; 369, for other illustrations of
liability. the operations of this rule.
35 Allen & Hill, exrs. v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359. 41 Phillips v. Hollister, 2 Cold., 269.
36 Cheatham v. Pearce & Ryan, 5 Pick., 668. Even 42 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 335-336; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1209.
after a. pro confesso. Butlere. Kenzie, 6 Pick., 31. 1214.
§563 NATURE AND EXTENT OF RELIEF GRANTED. 446
In all such cases, the proper procedure to obtain the benefit of a decree is by
a sworn petition, setting forth clearly the facts on which the claim is based,
and praying to be made a party to the cause, and to be allowed to come in and
prove the petitioner's claim under the decree. Such petition, however, cannot
be used to attack the decree, nor to set up rights, claims, or interests in conflict
therewith this can be done by a bill only.
;
If such a decree is merely interlocutory, the rights and privileges of such

third persons are greater, and they may have their rights expressly protected
in the final decree, and may contest the claims of other claimants.
§ 563. When Interest Will be Allowed in a Decree. Interest is the com- —
pensation which may be demanded by the lender from the borrower, or the
creditor from the debtor, for the use of money, the rate not to exceed six per
centum any excess over that rate is usury. 43 Interest was not allowed at com-
:
mon law, 44 but the Legislature and the Courts have made many instances where
interest is legal. Thus, all bills single, bonds, notes, bills of exchange, and
liquidated and settled accounts, signed by the debtor, bear interest from the
time they become due, unless otherwise specified in the writing; 45 and all
judgments and decrees draw interest from their date. 40 In all other cases,
Chancellors and juries are given an equitable power to allow interest in the
form of damages, if they think it just. 47 The general rule is to allow interest
in all cases where the amount of the debt is certain, and not disputed on reason-
able grounds. The Clerk and Master will allow interest in stating an account
when so directed in the order of reference. 48 Interest may be allowed on the
separate items of a debt from the periods at which they respectively fell due. 4 ''
And where damages are allowed for a breach of contract to deliver specifie
articles on a given day at a certain price, interest may be allowed on such
damages from the breach of the contract to the date of the decree. 50 Interest
is allowable on a debt admitted, and agreed to be paid,
51 and on an account
rendered and not disputed in a reasonable time.

Interest is not ordinarily allowable on unliquidated demands, unless there
is some precise time fixed for payment, or an account has been rendered or a
demand made, or some custom or usage warrant it; 52 but where the debt is for
property sold or services rendered or money loaned to the defendant, or a just
debt paid for him, and the transaction reasonable, and no equities or meritor-
ious defences, interest is ordinarily allowable.
Interest is an incident of a debt after its maturity, because it is either given
by positive law, or, in the absence of countervailing Equity, by the equitable
verdict of the jury, or by the Court acting in place of the jury; but where the
debt to be paid, or the duty to be performed, is uncertain, no interest ought to
be allowed. "When the Court has discretionary power to allow interest it may
make the allowance from the maturity of the debt, or from date of demand
made on defendant for payment, or from date of acknowledgment of debt by
the defendant, or from the day the suit was commenced to collect it, which is
deemed a demand.
In the Code form of declaration on the common counts, it is alleged that "the
several sums of money, with interest thereon, are now due;" 53 which seems to
imply that in suits for money due by account, open or stated, or due for money
loaned, or for goods, wares and merchandise, or for specifie articles of personal
43 Code, §§ 1943-1944. is silent on the subject. Shepard v. Akers, 2 Tenn.

44 Cherry v. Mann, Cooke, 268 Caruthers v. An-
; Ch„ 627.
drews, 2 Cold., 381 Overton V. Bolton, 9 Heisk.,
; 46 Thompson v. French. 10 Yerg., 458.
766. In this respect the Law of Moses was followed, so Noe v. Hodges, 5 Hum., 103.
where interest is termed usury. Lev. 25:36-37. 51 Mills v. Mills, 3 Head, 709.
45 Code, § 1945. 52 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1258, note 4.
48 Code, § 1948. 53 Code, § 2939, Form, No. 8. These forms allow
interest in no other suits except those on written
<
47 Cole v. Sands, 1 Tenn., (Overt.,) 106: Williams

v. Inman, 5 Cold., 269; Haralson v. McGavock, 10 evidences of debt signed by the defendant, thus
Lea, 726; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Collier. 7 Pick., 525. placing money due on a common count on the same
48 Shepard V. Akers, 2 Tenn. Ch., 627; or, in a footing as money due on a note of hand, or other
proper case, he may charge interest when the decree evidence of debt signed by the defendant.
447 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. §564
property, or for money paid for the defendant at his request, or for work and
labor done for the defendant, interest- is to be allowed on the recovery from the
day it became due. Hence, it is safe to say, that in all such cases interest should
be allowed from the day the complainant had the right to the money he sues
for.
The rule for casting interest, when partial payments have been made, is to
apply the payment, in the first place, to the discharge of the interest then due.
If the payment exceeds the interest, the surplus goes towards discharging the
principal, and the subsequent interest is to be computed on the balance of the
principal remaining due. If the payment be less than the interest, the surplus
of interest must not be taken to augment the principal, but interest continues
on the former principal until the periad when the payments, taken together,
exceed the interest due, and then the surplus is to be applied to discharging
the principal and interest is to be computed on the balance as aforesaid. 54
;
ARTICLE II.
DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED,

564. Nature, Office, and Effect, of a Decree. 571. The Drawing, and Entering, of Orders
565. Essentials of a Valid Decree. and Decrees.
566. Frame of a Decree.
567. Formal Parts of a Decree.
§ 572. When a Decree May be Changed.
568. Forms of Decrees. § 573. When and How Decrees May be
569. Dismissing Bills at the Hearing. Amended.
570. When a Bill Will be Dismissed With- § 574. 'ihe Revivor of Decrees.
out Prejudice.
§ 564. Nature, Office, and Effect of a Decree. 1 —A

decree is the determina-
tion of the rights of the parties as to the matters in controversy before the
Court, duly pronounced by the Chancellor, and entered on the minutes of the
Court. 2 As the office of pleadings is to present to the Court the issues of law
and fact the parties desire to have adjudicated, and as the office of proof is to
sustain by facts the respective contentions of the parties, so the office of a de-
cree is to close the controversy and adjudge the conclusions of law and fact
reached by the Court as to the respective rights, duties, and liabilities of the
parties. As a rule, decrees determine the rights of all the parties to the suit
according to Equity and good conscience, and are pronounced only after hear-
ing and understanding all the points in issue 3 but a decree is none the less a
;
decree, and none the less valid, although pronounced without such a hearing
and understanding, and in violation of Equity and good conscience. 4 The force
and effect of a decree, when unappealed from and unreversed, is not impaired
by the fact that the decree is unjust, and might have been reversed on appeal,
or by writ of error. So long as the parties aggrieved acquiesce in it, so long is
54 This is the rule laid down by Chancellor Kent, ducted from the aggregate of principal and accrued
in Jackson i). Connecticut, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 17, and interest, and the balance becomes a new principal
approved by our Supreme Court. Tones v. Ward, 10 upon which subsequent interest will be computed.
Yerg., 160; Scanlan v. Houston, 5 Yerg,, 310; Union 1 Decretum est sententia lata super legem. (A
Bank v. Williams, 3 Cold., 582 Thompson v. Chil-
; decree is a decision based on law.)
dress, 1 Tenn. Ch. 369; Smith v. Thomas, 8 Bax., 2 A decree is defined by our statutes to be "a de-
417; Curd ». Davis, 1 Heisk., 576. termination of the rights of the parties in a suit in
The rule may, perhaps, be more briefly stated thus; Equity." Code, § 2970. A decree properly so called,
1. Where the payment equals or exceeds the accrued is ordinairly made upon a hearing of the cause, and
interest such payment is deducted from the aggre- is a determination of the principles or issues in-
gate of principal and accrued interest, and the bal- volved. Orders made upon motions or petitions, are
ance becomes a new principal upon which subsequent not decrees, though in the nature of decrees; they
interest will be computed. 2. Where the payment is are usually termed decretal orders. 1 Barb. Ch.
less than the accrued interest such payment is not Pr., 336.
computed until it and subsequent payments equal or 3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 986.
§565 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED, 448
it and binding, nor can it be incidentally or collaterally assailed. Until
valid
reversed by an appellate Court, or impeached by an original bill for fraud, or
set aside upon a bill of review, a decree, however erroneous, is absolutely con-
clusive upon the parties to the suit and their privies, provided the Court had
jurisdiction of the subject-matter. 5 In Tennessee, a decree in Equity is for all
purposes as high in dignity, and as conclusive in effect, as a judgment at law,
and as effectually terminates the litigation in which it is pronounced.
A
decree is operative and binding upon all the parties to the suit, whether
they be natural or artificial persons, and whether under disability or not."
Persons under disability have a longer period in which to sue out a writ of
error, or to file a bill of review, or a bill to impeach a decree for fraud, but none
the less is the original decree conclusive upon them until set aside, modified or
annulled, by a proper procedure. Infants have no longer a day in Court, after
attaining majority, to show cause why they should not be bound by a decree. 7
A
decree is not binding, however upon a person not made a party, nor upon
a party not brought before the Court, 8 unless such a person was a member of a
class whose interests and rights were duly and expressly presented for adjudi-
cation. 9
§ 565. —
Essentials of a Valid Decree. The Chancery Court is a Superior
Court of general Equity jurisdiction, 10 and all of its decrees are presumed to
be valid, and this presumption is conclusive against collateral attack, 11 unless
it affirmatively appear, on the face of the record itself 12 :
1. That the Court Tiad no general jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the

litigation 13 or
:
2. itself is wholly outside of the pleadings, 14 and no binding

That the decree
consent thereto is shown in the record 13 or ;
3. That the Court had no jurisdiction of the party complaining, in person or

by representation of interest in which case it is void only as to such party, or
:
his privies. 16
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 986, note. And, if all the per- licce res judicata non rescinds (It is to the interest
sons in being who have an interest in the subject- of-- the State that adjudications be not nullified).
matter of the suit are made parties, the decree will Russell v. Houston, 7 Cates, 536^ See, 4 Yerg., 166;
bind those subsequently born who have an interest. 7 Heisk., 246; 12 Heisk., 629; 4 Sneed, 379; 5 Hum.,
Parker v. Peters, 2 Shan. Cas., 636; Ridley v. Halli- 319; 6 Hum., 445; 1 Head, 555; 2 Bax., 484; 6 Bax.,
day, 22 Pick., 607. 274; 8 Bax., 80; 152; 467; 1 Lea, 466; 9 Lea, 710;
6 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., '334; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 986. The 16 Lea, 82: 1 Pick., 171; and many other cases
decree is binding on those who claim under the par- cited in the Digests. See, post, § 1302; 649; ante,
ties to the suit. Russell v. Houston, 7 Cates, 536. §§ 446.
7 Winchester tf. Winchester, 1 Head,_ 460. 12 Reinhardt v. Nealis, 17 Pick., 169.
Infants were formerly allowed a day in Court, to 13 Jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot be
show why they should not be compelled to make a given by consent, except where that jurisdiction de-
deed; but now our Courts divest the title propria pends on the venue. If the Court has no jurisdic-
vigors out of the infant, and no deed by him is nection of the subject-matter, and no right to determine
essary, and hence no day in Court is necessary. it, or pronounce a decree therein, all its orders and
Wilson v. Schaefer, 23 Pick., 300. decrees are nullities, arid may be so treated, on a
8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 986, note; Davis v. Reaves, 7
collaterial attack; and the fact that the defendantap-
Lea, 588. peared and made no objection to the jurisdiction,
9 See note 5, supra.
or consented to the decree, -will not validate the pro--
10 See, ante, §§ 16-19; 23. /
11 Pope v. Harrison, 16 Lea, 82; Reinhardt v.
ceedings. Agee v. Dement, 1 Hum., 331; White V.
Buchanan, 6 Cold., 32; Noel V. Scoby, 2 Heisk., 28;
Nealis, 17 Pick., 169.
Ferris v. Fort, 2 Tenn. Ch., 150; Board V. Bodkin
A Court of general jurisdiction is presumed to _
Bros., 24 Pick., 700; Baker v. Mitchell, 21 Pick.,
have acted correctly, and the burden of showing 610. See, ante, § 177, notes 17 and 30; and § 290.
the contrary rests upon him who alleges it. Every
intendment is in favor of its decrees. Irregularities
14 A decree wholly foreign to the pleadings would
be coram non judice, and absolutely void. 1 Dan. Ch.
in the proceedings, or erroneous deductions from the
Pr., 853; Dillard v. Harris, 2 Tenn. Ch., 193; Mayo
evidence, will not affect their validity, if the Court
v. Harding, 3 Tenn. Ch., 237; Easley v. Tarkington,
had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the
person. If such jurisdiction be shown by the record, 5 Bax., 592. Penniman V. Smith, 5 Lea, 130; Thomp-
all irregularities go for naught; if such jurisdiction
son u. Keck, 23 Pick., 451; Gilreath v. Gilliland, 11
Pick., 383; Teague V. Teague, 2 Ch. Apps., 376. The
be not shown the proceedings are void, however reg-
ular in all other respects. Proceedings in suits may appearance of the defendant, and that the decree is
justified by the pleadings, will be presumed, however,
be very irregular and easily reversible in the Supreme
Court, on appeal, or writ of error, and yet invulner- after a considerable lapse of time, and when the
able to collateral attack. Courts hesitate long, and record is imperfect. Pope V. Harrison, 16 Lea, 82.
insist upon a clear case, before pronouncing a de- And consent of parties will validate such a decree.
cree void. If the Court had jurisdiction of the sub- See next note. Wilson v. Schaefer, 23 Pick., 300;
ject and of the party, that is enough to make the Johnson v. Osment, 24 Pick., 32; Bigley V. Watson,
decree proof against collateral attack, even in cases 14 Pick., 353.
where the decree would have been easily reversed on 15 Reinhardt v. Nealis, 17 Pick., 169. A, ,
decree
an appeal, or on a writ of error. Epperson v. Robert- wholly outside the pleadings is validated by the con-
;
son, 7 Pick.. 407; Campbell v. Bryant. 2 Shan. Cas., sent of the parties appearing in the decree. Ibid.
146; Kindell r. Titus, 9 Heisk., 727. Interest reipub- 16 If a person is not duly made a party to a suit
A decree is absolutely void if it appear on the face of. the record itself either
(1,) that the Court had no general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, or (2,)
that the decree is wholly outside of the pleadings, and no consent thereto ap-
pears and a decree is void as to any person shown by the record itself not to
;
have been before the Court in person, or by representation. All decrees, not
thus appearing on their face to be void, are valid and binding, until either
;1,) reversed in the Supreme Court, or in the Court of Chancery Appeals, on
appeal or writ of error, or (2,) are reversed on a bill of review, or (3,) are set
aside on a bill filed to impeach it.
All decrees not thus appearing on their face to be void are absolutely proof
against collateral attack, and no parol proof is admissible on such an attack to
show any defect in the proceedings, or in the decree. 17
§ 566. Frame of a Decree. —Decrees commonly consist of five parts: 1st,
The style of the cause in which it is pronounced; 2d, The commencement, which
usually gives the date of the decree, and the name of the Chancellor by whom
it is pronounced 3d, The recitals, which state the facts on which the decree is
;
based 4th, The declaratory part, which sets forth the rights of the parties, and
;
5th, The ordering, or mandatory part, which specifies what shall be done, when,
how, where, by whom, and to or for whom. 18 The first and fifth parts only are
absolutely essential, as the fourth part may be largely incorporated into the
fifth. These five parts will be considered more fully.
1. The Title, Style of the Cause. The decree should show, in its style, or else-
where on its face, the names of all the parties to the cause, both complainant
and defendant and, also, the character or capacity in which any of the parties
;
sues or is sued, when in other right than in his own, 19 as when he sues or is
sued as executor, administrator, next friend, guardian, trustee, assignee, and
the like. The better practice is to incorporate all of their names in the body of
the decree, especially the names of the defendants, when more than one. 20
2. The Commencement of a Decree. It is often important, and nearly always
convenient, to know the date of the decree, and the name of the Chancellor
pronouncing it. The date is sometimes essential, especially when a decree is
entered nunc pro tunc, as the parties' rights sometimes depend on the date when
a decree is pronounced. The following form of commencement, though brief,
is adequate This cause was heard on this May 20, 1890, before Chancellor John
:
'
'
P. Smith, upon" —
Unless there be some special reason for having the decree
.
bear the date when actually pronounced, it will be so dated as to conform to

the date of the minutes in which it is entered; and if it bear a prior date, it
should show on its face that it is entered nunc pro tunc. 21
3. The Recitals in a Decree. Formerly, an abstract of the pleadings and proof
followed the introductory part of a decree, and constituted the premises of the
declaratory part but now the recitals are confined to a plain and succinct state-
;
by service' of subpoena, publication, or appearance, questioned: these are matters to be inquired into
or is not duly in. Court by representation of interest, only by the Supreme Court on appeal, or writ of
or by a privy, he is not bound by any decree in error. See Freem. on Judgments, §§ 120; 124.
such suit. But if the Court has, jurisdiction of the 18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1001-1004.
person of the parties, all persons claiming under )9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1002.
them are bound by the decree, if it is otherwise 20 This is a matter of no little importance. Inas-
valid. A decree against a person not before the much as the pleadings are no longer enrolled, and
Court, is a nullity as to .him and all claiming under frequently get lost or mislaid, and as the rule dockets
him; but such a decree is nbne the less valid and are not always kept in due form, there may be noth-
binding as to other parties actually brought before ing on record to show who the parties to a cause
the Court. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 986, note. As to repre- are, and in what character they sue or are sued,
sentation of interest, see Parker v. Peters, 2 Shan.
Cas„, 636; Ridley v. Halliday, 22 Pick., 607. .A de-
unless the decree should so show on its face.
careful Solicitor will not, in order to save a "min-
A
cree on a bill filed in the wrong county in a local ute's time, jeopard his client's interests by failing to
suit is void, even when the jurisdiction is not ob- insert all the names of the parties in the style, or
jected to. Nashville v. Webb, 6 Gates, 432; Mills ». body, of a final decree. A decree which does not
Haley, MSS., Nashville, 1906. give, in its style or elsewhere on its face, the names
17 See, ante, § 446. A decree is collaterally at- and character of all the parties to the suit, is fre-
tacked, when objected to as evidence in another cause. quently absolutely unintelligible, and if the pleading's
Pope v. .Harrison, 16 Lea, 90. Oh such an attack are lost, may be valueless without further litigation
the justness of the decree, and whether it is free 21 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 337; 2 Dan Ch. Pr., 1002, note!
frnm prrnr or enctninpil hv thp pvirlenre. rannnt he
§ 566 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 450
rnent of the facts without any abstract of the and may be dispensed
pleadings, 22
with altogether, unless the Court otherwise direct. 23 Every final decree, how-
ever, should at least show that the cause was heard upon the bill, the answers of
those answering, the order pro confesso as to those pro confessoed the exhibits, if ;
any, the other orders and reports, if any, and the proof, including any agree-
ments. 24 It is of material importance that the decree should show what evi-
dence was objected to at the hearing, and the ruling of the Court thereon; 25
and if any verbal agreements made at the bar' are considered by the Court,
these should be recited in the decree. Whenever a decree is made by consent,
it should be so stated on its face.
4. The Declaratory Part of a Decree. After reciting that the cause was heard
upon the pleadings, specifying them when necessary, the orders pro confesso,
if any, and the other orders, if any the reports of the Master, if any the ex-
; ;
hibits, if any, and the proof, including any verbal agreements made in open
Court, the decree should declare what, after considering all these, and the argu-
ments of counsel, the Court is of opinion the facts, 26 and the rights and duties
of the respective parties, are. This part of the decree is a sort of premise 27 of
the ordering, or mandatory, part of the decree, and makes the meaning of the
latter clearer, and its equity more manifest. 28 The declaratory part of a decree
should, as a rule, follow the premises, or essential allegations of the bill.
5. The Ordering, or Mandatory Part, of a Decree. This part and the title, or
style of the cause, are the only absolutely essential parts of a decree. The man-
dates of a Court are its ultimate conclusions and final resolutions, all else in the
decree, except the style of the cause, being merely preambles and inducements.
The mandatory part of a decree is its vital and virile part, and contains the
specific orders and directions of the Court, and points out with clearness and
emphasis what shall be done, when, how, where, by whom, and to or for whom.
The ordering part of the decree must conform to the pleadings, and be respons-
ive to them, leaving no matter undetermined, and no roots for further litigation
it should be precise and definite, free from vagueness, and capable of being
executed with certainty. 26
The mandatory part of a decree is as follows
"It is; therefore, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court that" [the (1) defendant
pay the complainant the amount of money due, or (2) that the complainant recover the (3)
land, or (4) sum of money, or (5) other right he sues for, or (6) that he is entitled to the
Hen, or right, or interest, he claims, or (7) that the contract be reformed, or rescinded, or.
specifically performed, or (8) that the defendant be perpetually enjoined from doing any
of the acts complained of, or (9) that he be required to do the particular thing sought by
the bill, or (10) that the cloud be removed, or (11) the title be divested and vested, or (12)
that the complainant have such other relief as he-prays for, and may be entitled to, and (13)
that the costs be paid by such and such parties, and (14) that the proper final process issue.]
There is a marked difference between a technical decree in Chancery and a
judgment at law. A judgment gives the plaintiff a recovery without any other
22 Since the discontinuance of the practice of en- sequence of the different parts of a decree, will have
rolling the pleadings, it has become of more import- no difficulty in drawing a lucid and concise decree,
ance to recite in a decree the substantial facts on such a decree being one of the highest evidences of
which the decree is based, because in this way the genuine legal skill and ability. As he is a timid
facts are perpetuated of record, in case the pleadings Chancellor who gives no reasons for his decrees, so
and proof should be lost or mislaid. he is a timid or unskilled Solicitor who omits the de-
23 Code, §§4476-4477; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 338. claratory part in drawing a decree.
24 This recital is valuable as a perpetuation of the 28 The declaratory part of a decree is in the na-
facts, for reasons stated in the preceding notes to this ture of a preamble to a resolution, giving the reasons
section. and considerations moving the Chancellor to the
25 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1003. mandatory conclusions he reaches.
26 Decrees need not recite the facts on which they 20 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1004-1006. A
decree should (1)
are based, but only the conclusions to which the specify the precise amount of money to be paid; (2)
Court has come. The Code, however, does not pro- the precise tract of land to be sold, identifying it;
hibit a plain and succinct statement of the facts (3) the precise persons by whom and to whom
in a decree; Code, §§ 4476-4477; and such a state- money should be paid; (4) the precise acts to be
ment is often important, and may be properly made done, by whom, when, where, and for whom, and
in the declaratory part of a decree. (5) should leave nothing to be determined by any
27 The recitals of a decree are the premises of the other person, or to be ascertained by calculation, ex-
declaratory part of a decree, the declaratory part is cept when a reference to the Master is expressly
the premise of the mandatory part, and the man- made. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1004, notes. The mandatory
datory part is the premise of the final process, in- part of a decree, should, as a rule, conform to the
cluding orders of sale, which are a sort of final pro- special prayers of the bill.
cess. The draftsman, who remembers this logical
451 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
1
§567
reason than that the jury has found in his favor, 29a
whereas a technical decree
in Chancery gives a summary of the pleadings and the findings of facts by the
Chancellor and then commands the defendant to do the particular act, pay the
money decreed to be due from him, execute the instrument required, specifically
perform the contract named, deliver the real or personal property, or the deeds,
papers or other instruments described, or enjoins and prohibits the defendant
from doing the acts complained of.
In case of a money recovery, enforceable by execution, many Solicitors, in
drawing decrees, pursue the forms of judgments at law in a similar case, and
there is no good objection to this practice, and it has been often followed in this
Treatise.
If the decree leaves any matter undisposed of, there should be added to it a
special or general reservation of such matters, the general reservation order
other matters are reserved. 30 If the decree is entered nunc pro tunc, it
' '
being, '
'
should so state. If further application to the Court for some order in the case
be probable the decree should conclude as follows : "And either party is to be at
liberty to apply to the Court as occasion may require." 81
§ 567. —
Formal Parts of Decrees. To illustrate the preceding section, the
formal parts of decrees are here set out. These parts will be often referred to
in the forms of decrees given in this Treatise, they being omitted in many forms
in order to economize space and avoid unnecessary repetition.
THE FORMAL PARTS OF A DECREE.
The Title, Style of the Cause.32
A B and C D, 1
vs. } No. 1313

E F, GH and I J. J
The Commencement.
This cause came on to be heard this August 25, 1890, before Chancellor John P. Smith [or,
Judge William R. Hicks, sitting by interchange with Chancellor John P. Smith,] upon
The Recitals.
the bill [or, the original the answers of the defendants, E F and I J, the
and amended bills],
latter by K and the judgment pro confesso
L, his general guardian [or, guardian ad litem,]
heretofore taken and entered against the defendant G
H, 83 [as to both the original and
amended bills,] and upon the written agreement exhibited to the [original] bill, and the
other proof in the cause, and argument of counsel.
The Declaratory Part. 34
from of which it appears to the Court that [Here insert such of the essential allegations
all
of the bill as are sustained by the proof, or admitted by the answers.]
The Ordering, or Mandatory Part.
It istherefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court
1. That [Here insert what the Court has decreed, following, as a rule, the specific prayers
vf the bill, unless the Court's decree is different.]
29a Ajudgment at law is as follows, omitting the vation of liberty to apply does not alter the final
verdict of the jury: "It is therefore considered by nature of the decree. Such a decree can be appealed
the Court that the plaintiff recover of the defendant from as a matter of right, and may be pleaded in
five hundred dollars [or, the premises specified in the bar to another suit, for the same matter. This liberty
declaration,] and the costs of the suit, for which an to apply is taken advantage of by motion or petition,
execution [and writ of possession] will issue." but in either case all parties concerned should have
30 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1366-1375. In Shepard v. notice, and an opportunity to be heard.- 1 Barb. Ch.
Akers, 2 Tenn. Ch., 627, interest was allowed in a Pr., 333; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 996. See, post, § 579, on
subsequent decree, without any reservation in the Supplemental Decrees.
former decree. The former decree was, however, for 32 Give the correct style of the cause, ordinarily
an account between, the parties. the style endorsed on back of the bill. See, ante,
31 State, ex re!., v. Williams, 2 Cates, 597. This §178.' Technically, every decree has a caption iden-
reservation of liberty to apply is a prudent precau-
'
tical with that of the first day's minutes; but the
tion: 1st, When the decree is of such a character practice is to consider the caption of the first day's
that, upon the death of a party, other parties may minutes as the caption of every order and decree
have rights under the decree requiring action by the made during the term. See, ante, § 532.
Court; 2d, When parties by representation not in 33 Give the names of all the defendants, and show
esse when the decree was pronounced may be born, which ones answered and which were pro confessoed.
and some action of the Court may be necessary for 34 This part of the decree is important, but not
the protection of their rights; 3d, When parties are essential; and may be omitted. Code, § 4476. In
required by the decree to do some specific act, and such case the following form is often used after the
further orders may become necessary for the enforce- recital: On consideration whereof it is ordered, ad-,
ment of the decree; 4th, When, .in, any other case, judged and decreed by the Court:
2. That [Here order the sale of any property sought to be sold described in the bill, or
levied on by attachment.]
3. That [Here make the injunction, if any, perpetual, if desired and proper.]
4. That the costs of the cause be paid by the defendants E F and G H, and I J, for
which an execution will issue. [Or, adjudge the costs otherwise, if the Court so determines.]
5. That all other matters are reserved, [if any are reserved!] This decree was made on
the 20th instant, and is entered now for then. [Insert this, if a fact, and especially if necessary
to obtain priority of lien or of satisfaction.]
§ 568. —
Forms of Decrees. The frame of decrees as set forth in the preced-
ing section will be more fully illustrated by the following forms
GENEIRAL FORM OF A DECREE.
The Title, or Style, of the Cause.
A B, 1
vs. \ No. 618.

C D, et al. J
The Commencement.
This cause was heard on this 24th day of June, 1891, before Chancellor M N, [or, before
Hon. K
L, Judge of the Sth Circuit, sitting by interchange with Chancellor M N.]
The Recitals.
Upon the original and amended bills, the answers of the defendant, C D, and of the minor
defendant, E D, by O
P, his guardian ad litem, to both of said bills, the judgment pro confesso
heretofore entered against the defendant, D
D, as to both of said bills, the exhibits to the
original and amended bills, the stipulation between the complainant and the defendant, C D,
and the other proof in the cause, [showing in detail the various bills, answers, exhibits, and
stipulations Med, and pro confessos taken. Or the recital may be general, thus: upon the
pleadings and proof in the cause, and the pro confesso against the defendant, D.] D
The Declaratory Part.
From all which it appears to the Court that [giving the general facts alleged in the bill,
and sustained by the proof.]

The Mandatory Part.
ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court that the complainant have and
It is, therefore,
recover of the defendants, C D and E F, the sum of one thousand dollars, and all the costs
of the cause; [or, the property described in the bill; or, that complainant's rights are so and
so; or, that the defendants be required to do so and so; or, that they be perpetually enjoined
from doing so and so; —
following, as a rule, in this part of the decree, the prayer in the bill
for specific relief.] The costs of the cause will be paid by the defendant, C D, for which an
execution will issue against him; [or, the costs of the cause will be paid out of the fund in
the cause, or out of the proceeds of said sale or, will be paid one-half by the complainant and
;
the other half by the defendant, or as otherwise decreed.] A

writ of possession will issue to
put A
B in possession of said tract of land. [If a report is ordered, specify the matters to be
reported, then add:] said report will be made to the present [or, next,] term of the Court,
until which time all other matters are reserved.
FORM OF AN INTERLOCUTORY DECREE.

John Smith and Henry Smith, \
David Smith, Mary Smith,

No '
226 '
\
Daniel Smith and George Jones. J
The Commencement.
This cause was heard this May 20, 1890, before Hon. John P. Smith, Chancellor, [or, before
The Recitals.
the original and amended bills, and the answers of David Smith and Mary Smith in person,
and of Daniel Smith, a minor, by G. Mc. Henderson, his guardian ad litem, and the pro con-
fesso heretofore taken and entered against the defendant George Jones, the two deeds ex-
hibited to the bill, and the other proof in the cause, from all which

it appears that the complainants John Smith and Henry Smith, and the defendants David
Smith, Mary Smith, and Daniel Smith, as children and heirs at law of William Smith, de-
ceased, are tenants in common, and equal owners, share and share alike, of the tract of land
('escribed in the bill, situated in the 4th civil district of Grainger county, and bounded as
follows Beginning on a large poplar, [giving description by metes and bounds.] And it
:
453 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 569
further appearing that Susan Jones, born Smith, formerly the wife of the defendant, George
Jones, died in the lifetime of her father, the said William Smith, leaving no children.
The Ordering, or Mandatory, Part.
therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court:
It is
1. That said John Smith, Henry Smith, David Smith, Mary Smith, and Daniel Smith are
iach entitled, as equal tenants in common, to an undivided one-fifth of said tract of land, and
as such are entitled to have said tract partitioned, or sold.
2. That George Jones has no title or interest in said land, or in any part thereof, either
in his own right, or in the right of his deceased wife.
3. That the Master hear proof and report to the present term, if practicable, and if not,
to the next term
(1) Whether said tract of land is so situated that advantageous partition thereof can be
made; or
(2) Whether it would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that the tract should
be sold instead of partitioned.
4. The adjudication of costs, and counsel fees, and all other matters, are reserved.
5. This decree was made on May 10, 1890, and is entered now for then.
The mandatory part of every decree should be divided into paragraphs, and
each paragraph consecutively numbered. These numbers may be placed at the
beginning of the paragraphs, as shown above, or they may be put in the center
of a separate line above the paragraphs.
The form of a final decree is substantially the same as that of an interlocutory
decree, except no matter is reserved, and there is no reference to the Master as
to any matter.
FORM OP A FINAL DECREE.
John Jones, 1
vs. S- No .953.
Henry Thomas and George Stokes. J
The Commencement.
This cause came on to be heard this August 25, 1890, before Chancellor John P. Smith, [or,
The Recitals.
the original and amended bills, the answers of the defendant Henry Thomas to both bills, and
the judgment pro confesso heretofore entered against the defendant George Stokes as to
both bills, and the written agreement exhibited to the amended bill, and the other proof in the
cause, 36 from all of which
itappears 36 that the defendants, Henry Thomas and George Stokes, did, on December 12,
1888, execute said written agreement, giving the complainant a lien on the saw-mill, engine,
boiler and fixtures described in the bill, and situated on the farm of William Cook, in the
2d civil district of Grainger county, to secure the payment of six hundred dollars, on or before
April 25, 1890; and that the defendant George Stokes, did in and by said agreement guarantee
to pay complainant any balance due on said written agreement in case the proceeds of said
property do not satisfy the same and it further appearing that there is now due on said
;
agreement principal and interest the sum of six hundred and forty-eight dollars and that all ;
of said property has been attached to secure the payment of the same;
The Ordering, or Mandatory, Part.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court 37 :
1. That complainant have and recover of the defendants,, Henry Thomas and George
Stokes, said sum of six hundred and forty-eight dollars, and all the costs of this cause.
2. That if said sum and costs are not paid within sixty days, the Sheriff [or Master]
will, after giving legal notice, sell said saw-mill, engine, boiler and fixtures for cash in hand,
to the highest and best bidder; and an order of sale will issue accordingly. If the proceeds
of said sale be insufficient to satisfy this decree,
3. An execution will issue against both defendants for the balance remaining unpaid.
4. The costs of the cause will be paid in the first instance out of the proceeds of said sale.
§ 569. —
Dismissing Bills at the Hearing:. If, at the hearing, it appear that
the complainant is not entitled to any relief, either under his special prayers,
or under his general prayer, his bill will be dismissed if, however, he is entitled ;
35 When the various pleadings and important 36 The declaratory part should follow, as a rule,
proofs are recited, there is less danger of confusion the essential allegations of the bill,
arising, especially on appeal, from papers getting 37 The ordering part of a decree should, as a rule,
to relief as to some matters, or as to some of the parties, he will be granted ap-
propriate relief as to such matters, or as to such parties ; and as to all other
matters and all other parties, the bill will be dismissed. If the complainant is
entitled to relief on the case set up in the answer, he will be granted such relief,
even though entitled to none on his own bill. 38 These matters have been fully
treated in the previous sections of this Chapter. 39 The following is the
form of a
DECREE DISMISSING A BILL.
D. C. & J. W. Hubbard,
vs. \ No. 842.
J. W. Fravell, et al. J
This cause coming on to be heard, this June 25, 1882, before Chancellor W. G. Croley,
upon the bill, the answers of the defendants, and the proof, from consideration of all which
it appears to the Court that the equities [or, causes of action,] alleged in the bill are fully
met and denied by the answers, and are not sustained by the proof. It is, therefore, ordered,
adjudged, and decreed by the Court, that the bill be dismissed, and that the complainants, and
John Smith, their prosecution surety, pay all the costs of the cause, for which let an execution
issue. 40
§ 570. When a Bill Will be Dismissed Without Prejudice.—When a bill is

dismissed (1) because of some slip or mistake in the pleadings or proof, or (2)
because of failure to give some required bond, or (3) for want of any of the
prerequisites of the writ, or (4) for want of necessary parties, or (5) for any
other reason not involving the merits of the controversy, it should generally be
dismissed without prejudice to complainant's rights to file another bill. And
even when there is an adjudication upon the merits, and it appears probable
from the pleadings, or proof, that in a new suit better adapted to the equities
sought to be set up, relief may be had or that, in a subsequent suit, evidence
;
not now attainable may be produced, the Court will, on application, incline to
dismiss the bill without prejudice, if the complainant is guilty of no negligence
or bad faith. 41
Where, however, the defendant has taken his proof on the merits, and the
complainant has either taken no proof, or is unwilling to have the cause heard
on the proof on file, he should not be allowed to dismiss his bill without preju-
dice and thus be given full leave to again relitigate the same matters with the
;
same parties. In such case the complainant may, subject to the rules heretofore
laid down in this Chapter, dismiss his bill, but such dismissal must be subject
to all the consequences incident to a dismissal with prejudice. 42
§ 571. The Drawing and Entering of Orders, and Decrees. After the Chan- —
cellor has delivered his opinion, the duty of drawing the consequent order or
decree generally devolves on the Solicitors of the winning party. The Chan-
cellor frequently furnishes the draftsman with a memorandum of the chief
points of his .ad judication. In drawing the decree, the draftsman should, not
only in the declaratory part, carefully and conscientiously follow the Chan-
cellor 's opinion, but should, in the mandatory part, earnestly endeavor to have
his draft fully and fairly express the Chancellor's conclusions.
If the Chancellor has inadvertently failed to adjudicate any question raised
by the pleadings, either the draftsman, or the opposite party, may call his
attention to it, after notice thereof to the other side, and have it determined, to
the end that it may be incorporated into the draft of the decree.
After the decree has been fully drawn, it should be submitted to the Solicitor
of the other party for his inspection and criticism if he raises no objection to ;
38 See, ante, §§406, note; 555; 558. remand the cause for further proof, as the exigency
39 See, ante, §§ 555-563. may require. In such case, however, the complain-
40 This decree is based on Hubbard v. Fravell, 1 ants should be taxed with all the costs of the cause;
Lea, 315. for, otherwise, the complainant will obtain an ad-
41 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 994; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 331. No vantage from his own want of diligence. The inter-
suit should ever be dismissed because of any slip, locutory taxation of costs is the best spur to dili-
mistake, or omission, that can be remedied, corrected gence, and the best preventive of delay.
or supplied in the Court where the bill is pending. 42 See Parkes V. Clift, 9 Lea, 524; and cases
The better practice is to allow the complainant to there cited; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1523.
amend his bill, or to file a supplemental bill, or to
it, or if his objections are acquiesced in, or removed, the draft is then read to
the Chancellor in open Court, or at Chambers, and if approved by him, is de-

livered to the Clerk for entry upon the minutes. 43 If the respective Solicitors
cannot agree upon the draft of the decree, they must submit their differences
to the Chancellor in open Court, or at Chambers, and he will determine them,
and settle the decree. 44
The decree must be written upon not less than half a sheet of paper, and in
ink. 45
Until a decree has been settled and entered on the minutes, it is considered as
only inchoate, and neither party can have any benefit from the decision. 46 A
(i.ecree, however, is considered as entered from the time it is left with the Clerk
for that purpose, although, from a press of business, it may not be actually
copied into the minute-book for some days afterward. If the Chancellor should
die, or resign, before a decree has been entered on the minutes, such a decree
would be a nullity, and the cause would remain on the docket for trial, as
though it had not been heard. 47
§ 572. When a Decree May be Changed. —A
decree is inchoate, and has no
force whatever, until it has been entered on the minutes 48 and even after it has ;
been entered on the minutes, and the minutes signed, it is completely within
the power of the Chancellor until the end of the term, unless the term continues
longer than thirty days after the entry of the decree, and then until the end of
thirty days. 49 During this period, the Chancellor may modify, amend, add to,
subtract from, or make any other change in, the decree he may deem proper,
and may even absolutely vacate it, and restore the cause to the docket or he ;
may vacate the decree and have one entered in favor of the other party. 80
These changes, or reversals, of the decree may be on the Chancellor's own
motion, or on reargument or reconsideration, or on a formal rehearing on a
petition filed for that purpose. 61
ORDER VACATING A DECREE.
John Doe, 1
vs. } Order vacating decree.

On motion of the defendants, supported by the affidavit of George Slow, their Solicitor, [or,
for satisfactory reasons appearing to the Court, or, by consent of parties,] the decree pro-
nounced in this cause on the day of 19.... [gwing the date,] in favor of the complain-
,
ant [or the defendants,] is hereby recalled, vacated and annulled, and the cause is reinstated
on the trial docket, to be further proceeded in as though said decree had never been made.
The most usual matters in which decrees are amended before adjournment,
are the following (1). where there are miscalculations of amounts, or of inter-
:
est; (2) where the costs have not been adjudged, or have been misjudged; (3)
where there are errors, or omissions, in reference to the Master's report; (4)
where there are errors, or omissions, in the recitals of the decree (5) where ;
43 The law does not recognize any order or decree 47 Fraker v. Brazleton, 12 Lea, 278.
made by the Chancellor, until it has been entered 48 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 341.
upon the minutes of the Court. The minutes are 49 Acts of 1885, ch. 65 ; Railroad v. Johnson, 16
not invalidated by the failure of the Chancellor to Lea, 387.
sign them, because of death, sickness, or other rea- 50 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1018-1028. During the period
son. Moore v. State, 3 Heisk., 493; Jackson v. stated in the text, the record of the Court, even
Jackson, 3 Shan. Cas., 18; Pickett v. State, MS
S., though entered on the minutes, is said to be "in
Knoxville, 1906. the breast of the Judge," and is absolutely under his
44 The Chancellor may require the Solicitor object- control. State v. Disney, 5 Sneed, 598; Hall v.
ing to the draft to make a draft of his own, or he Bewley, 11 Hum., 105; Davis V. Jones, 3 Head, 604;
may himself correct the decree, or draw the decree Timmons v. Garrison, 4 Hum., 148; Abbott v. Fagg,
de novo, 1 Heisk., 749; State v. Dalton, 1 Cates, 544.
45 Ch. Rule, III, §1; post, §1192. A sheet of 51 It may be (1). that the decree was pronounced
legal cap contains four pages, and a half sheet con- without argument; or (2) under a misapprehension,
tains two pages. Many careless or penurious Solic- by the Chancellor, of some admission or statement
itors write decrees on a part of a half sheet. This by counsel; or (3) that some allegation, or pleading,
should not be allowed; it results in interlining, in or proof, was overlooked or misunderstood; or (4)
crowding the margins, and in much illegibility for that the Chancellor was, in some way, misled; or
want of due space. Decrees written with a lead pen- (5) that for any other reason, injustice has been in-
cil should be deemed nullities, and the Master should advertently done. . While Chancellors should be
be directed to return .them. A
Solicitor who does far removed from instability of judgment; neverthe-
not deem the decree worthy of his care should dis- less, no sentiment of pride should stay fheir action,
miss hie hill ncf-i, n'rpc that .),..
§573 DECREES GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 456
there are errors, or omissions, in the metes and bounds of a tract of land men-
tioned in the decree (6) where there are blanks in the decree, to be filled by
;
dates, names, amounts, or otherwise; (7) where the prayer for an appeal was
not entered, or was misentered; and (8) where the decree was ordered to be
entered nunc pro tunc, and it does not contain the order.
But after the' lapse of the thirty days after its entry, or after the close of the
term, the Chancellor's power to make any revision of a decree settling rights
is forever ended, 52 except on a bill of review, or on a bill to impeach the decree
for fraud, no matter how manifest and gross the error, nor how certain he may
be of its existence. 53 The decrees of Fate are not more beyond his power of
change. His right thereafter to rectify a decree, as shown in the next section,
is rather clerical in its nature than judicial, such rectification not requiring any
exercise of discretion, and not embracing any redetermination of any matter. 54
An order or decree made by consent cannot be modified or varied, in an es-
sential part, without the assent of all the consenting parties. 55 The Court may,
liowever, upon the application of either party, give such further directions as
shall become necessary for the purpose of carrying such order or decree into
effect, according to its spirit and intent. 56
An
interlocutory order or decree that settles a principle, adjudges a right, or
determines an issue, especially if made upon a hearing of the cause, is, after the
lapse of thirty days, or after the adjournment of the term, as much beyond the
power of the Court to change it as is a final decree 57 but an interlocutory order
;
or decree settling no rights, but merely ordering an injunction, or making a ref-

erence to the Master, or appointing a receiver, or giving directions to a re-
ceiver, or to the Master, or ordering a sale of property, or providing for the
safe-keeping or other disposition of property in the custody of the Court, or
ruling on motions in reference to proof, or other matters preparatory to a trial,
may be set aside, overruled, or disregarded, at a subsequent term, provided such
action does not take any party by surprise, or deprive any party of a vested
right. 58
§ 573. When and How Decrees May be Amended. —As already stated, de-
crees are entirely within the power of the Chancellor for thirty days, or during
the term if it continue less than thirty days; and he may, during this period,
make any changes in them he may deem necessary to the furtherance of justice.
After the expiration of said period, however, a decree cannot be in any way
changed, except in the manner and to the extent provided by the statute. The
52 And he has no more authority than any third some conflict between them and the text books, in
person to make alterations and additions. Kennedy regard to the power of a Court to change an in-
t>. Kennedy, 13 Lea, 25. The instant he affixes his terlocutory decree at a subsequent term. The gen-
signature to the entry adjourning his Court to the eral rule is, that a decretal or interlocutory order
next term that instant his power to make any may, on final hearing, be altered, modified, or va-
changes in the record is forever gone. cated. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1371, note. Our Supreme
53 Allen V. Barksdale, 1 Head, 240. Meek v. Court, however, has frequently held exactly the re-
Mathis, 1 Heisk., 536. Berdanatti V. Sexton, 2 Tenn. verse. Johnson v. Hannah, 2 Lea, 10; Meek V.
Ch., 702. The only remedies in case of such errors Mathis, 1 Heisk., 536. There are, also, decision in
are: (1) an appeal, taken within the Chancellor's accordance with the general rule. Morris V. Rich-
power to grant it; (2) a writ of error coram nobis; ardson, 11 Hum., 389. See, also, Franklin V. Frank-
(3) a bill of review; (4) a writ or error; and (5) lin, 2 Swan, 525; Shaw v. Patterson, 2 Tenn. Ch.,
a bill to impeach the decree for fraud; the last four 174; Bank v. Bilbrey, 3 Bax., 10. This confusion
are filed after the lapse of said limit. When a de- has grown out of the fact that, by various gradations,
cree is made it speaks for itself, and cannot be en- interlocutory decrees approach final decrees, until the
larged, restricted, or modified by parol proof. Bank line of distinction becomes imperceptible. 2 Dan. Ch.
v. Memphis, 23 Pick., 66. Pr., 986, note. Our cases may all be reconciled
54 Post, § 573. And see Elliot v. Cochran, 1 Cold., with themselves and with the text books by observing
389; State v. Bank, 12 Pick., 591. the distinction made in the text between the two _
55 In Anderson V. Thompson, 7 Lea, 259, a ma- kinds of interlocutory decrees; the kind that adjudi-
jority of the Supreme Court held that a final judg- cates no question raised by the pleadings and set-
ment of the Circuit Court could not be set aside at tles no rights, being subject to alteration or vacation
a subsequent term, and the pleadings amended by at a subsequent term, or at the final hearing; and all
consent; but the dissenting opinions of Judges Free- other interlocutory orders and decrees being final in
man and Turney greatly weaken the force of the their nature and not subject to be changed at a #
decision. Consensus focit legem atque tollit errorem. subsequent term, thus conforming to the maxim of
56 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 351; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1030, Bacon: Sententia interlocutoria revocari potest, defi-
note. nitive! non potest. But after all, if the Chancellor s
57Grimstead v. Huggins, 13 Lea, 728; Allen I). by the Su-

final decree be right it will be affirmed
Shanks, 6 Pick., 359; Vaccaro v. Cicalla, 5 Pick., preme Court, regardless of his errors in overruling
163. interlocutory decrees. Bank V. Bilbrey, 3 Bax., 11;
58 There is some confusion in our Reports, and Allen v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
Chancellor may, at any time within twelve months after final decree, and while
the cause is still in his Court, amend any clerical error, mistake in the calcula-
tion of interest, or other mistake or omission in the decree, where there is suffi-
cient matter apparent on the record, the papers in the cause, or entries by the
presiding Chancellor, to amend by. 59 Every mistake, apparent on the face of
the record, may be corrected by the Court at any time after final judgment, at
the discretion of the Court. 60
The party seeking to have a decree amended, after the cause has been finally
disposed of, must give the opposite party ten days' notice of his intention to
move the Court for a correction of the supposed mistake; 61 and, on the day
specified in such notice, the motion should be entered on the minutes of the
Court. If, at the hearing of the motion, the mistake complained of is apparent
on the face of the record, the correction will be made as a matter of course; 62
if, however, the mistake is not apparent on the record, the party making the
motion must be able to show the mistake by the papers in the cause, or by the
entries of the Chancellor on his docket. The proof of the mistake must appear
of record, or by some matter in the nature of a record, and parol evidence is
absolutely inadmissible, no matter how strong, or how clear; and even when
the evidence conforms to the requirements of the statute, it should be so con-
clusive as to leave no reasonable doubt, 63 (1) that the mistake or omission
alleged in the notice actually exists, and (2) as to what correction should in
fact be made.
§ 574. —
The Revivor of Decrees. A decree continues in full force from the
day made, until it is satisfied, or is barred by the statute of limitations or
it is ;
until it is modified, vacated, reversed, or annulled, on proper proceedings for

that purpose and an execution, or other proper process, may issue on it at any
;
time, as long as it is in force. 64 If the complainant die, it must be revived in

the name of the person entitled to its benefits. If the defendant die, it must be
revived against his successor in liability. If there are more defendants than
one, and any of them die, leaving the co-defendant or co-defendants surviving,
this will not debar the complainant from enforcing his decree by execution, or
otherwise, against the survivor or survivors, 65 to the extent of their liability;
or, he may, in such case, revive by scire facias, or by a bill of revivor, against
those standing in the decedent 's shoes. 66
Decrees are revived by and against the same parties by and against whom
the suit would have been revived had the decedent died before the decree was
pronounced; and what has elsewhere been said about the revival of suits in
case of death, applies in all respects to the revival of decrees in case of death;
the rules as to the proper parties to revive or revive against being the same in
both cases.
On a proceeding to revive a decree, whether by a bill of revivor, or by a scire
facias, the defendant may plead and prove any fact that has transpired since
the rendition of the decree that would bar the decree, or make it inequitable to
revive it he may plead the bar of the statute of limitations, a release, a pay-
:
ment, or any other matter that is a discharge, or satisfaction, of the decree. 67

59 Code, § 2877. What is here meant by the cause decree amended [corrected, or rectified,] August 25,
being still in Court, is that it has not been removed 1890. See Minute Book O, page 246. A B, Chan-
to the Supreme Court of the State by appeal, or writ cellor." 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 352; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1031.
of error, or to a U. S. Court in pursuance of some 63 The record is of such dignity and verity that
Federal statute. Dictating decrees to typewriters and nothing but the clearest statutory proof should be
stenographers causes many errors. See § 502. allowed to prevail against it — proof cogent enough
60 Code, % 2878. See 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 349-352; 2 to remove all doubt of the truth of the amendment
Dan. Ch. Pr., 1013; 1029-1032. sought to be made.
61 Code, § 2879. 64 Code, § 2987. Execution issued after the
62 It would seem that the proper way to make lapse of ten vears will be quashed. Cannon V. La-
this amendment, or correction, would be, (1) to man, 7 Lea, 513.
enter the proper order or decree on the minutes of 65 Code, § 2988. For proceedings to revive, see
the term at which the motion for the amendment or Chapter on Abatement and Revivor.
correction is made, and (2) to note on the margin 66 Bank v. Marr, 13 Lea, 108.
of the decree amended or corrected, the fact and date 67 A decree cannot be revived by scire facias
of the ampnHmpfit nr rnrrpMinn. the Chancellor to after the lanse of ten vears. Rnirers ii- TTnllinore-
§575 KINDS OF DECREES. 458
ARTICLE III.
KINDS OF DECREES.
§ 575. Interlocutory Decrees.
§ 578. Nunc pro Tunc Decrees.
§ 576. Final Decrees.
§ 577. Consent Decrees. § 579. Supplemental Decrees.
§ 575. —
Interlocutory Decrees. An interlocutory decree is' one which ex-
pressly, or by necessary implication, reserves some particular matter or matters
for further consideration, or reserves the further consideration of the cause
generally until a future hearing. 1 All decrees which precede the final decree
are interlocutory; a final decree being one which terminates the litigation, and
from which an appeal will lie as a matter of right. 2 Any order or decree pre-
paratory to a final decision of the cause is interlocutory. 3
All decrees overruling motions to dismiss the bill, and overruling demurrers
and pleas all decrees referring matters to the Master for his action and report
;
all decrees remanding causes to the rules for further proof; all decrees deter-
mining exceptions to depositions and to reports all decrees determining appli-
;
cations to amend, or file additional pleadings all decrees ordering sales of land,
;
or other property; all decrees allowing or disallowing motions of all kinds

whatsoever all decrees on preliminary matters, or matters preparatory for a
;
hearing on the main issues and all other decrees that expressly reserve matters
;
for future consideration, are interlocutory decrees. 4

§ 576. Final Decrees. —A
final decree is one that (1) decides and disposes
of the whole merits of the cause and (2) reserves on its face no further ques-
;
tions, or directions, for the future judgment of the Court. 5 final decree, as A
the term necessarily implies, puts an end to the litigation, leaving none of the
issues open for further consideration, or action; and this it may do, (1) by dis-
missing the bill, or (2) by granting the relief prayed, in whole or in part, and,
13) in either case, adjudging the costs, and awarding final process. decree A
may be final without being complete. A complete final decree determines every
question properly raised by the pleadings, and leaves no roots of the subject-
matter of the litigation, out of which other controversies can arise it finally :
and forever closes and bars the doors against any reopening of the matters in
dispute, and concludes and ends the controversy. A decree which, though not
complete, is final in its nature, reserves nothing for the further action of the
Court, adjudges costs, and awards final process, is nevertheless a final decree.
When only a part of the relief prayed is granted, or only a part of the issues
are determined, and the decree, though final, is silent as to the residue, the effect
is the same as though the bill had been expressly dismissed as to the residue of
the relief sought, and as though the issues undecided had been expressly ad-
judged against the party maintaining the affirmative thereof. But a decree is
not final which leaves matters undisposed of as to one or more of the de-
fendants. 6 i
1 2 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 986, note. Whether a decree is changed, or set aside. Gilb. For. Rom., 183; 2 Dan.
final, or interlocutory, is to be determined by its Ch. Pr., 1019.
subject-matter and substantial purport. Code, § 2971. 5 Pond V. Trigg, 5 Heisk., 539; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
2 See, post, § 576. The reader of this book must 993, note. A
decree is final even when (1) it fails
always keep in mind the fact that the purpose of to adjudge the costs; Brown v. Wright, 1 Ch. Apps.,
the author is to give the practice in Tennessee, and 160; or (2) fails to award an execution in a case of
not the general practice elsewhere. money recovery. Hyder V. Butler, 19 Pick., 289.
3 Delap v. Hunter, 1 Sneed, 101 1 Barb. Ch. Pr.,
; The law adjudges the costs in the former case
326. against the losing party, and in the latter case awards
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 986. In strictness, all final dean execution. Ibid.
crees are interlocutory until the term ends, or e Lang v. Ingalls Zinc Co., 15 Pick., 476; Bank v.
thirty days elapse; for until then they may be Matson, 11 Pick., 632.
459 KINDS OF DECREES. § 577
In our practice, a decree which determines the principles involved in the con-
troversy, and (1) orders an account, or (2) a sale, or (3) a partition, is not a
final decree 7 and cannot, therefore, be appealed from without leave of the
;
Court and cannot be reviewed at all on a writ of error. 8

;
A decree dismissing a bill upon its merits is final and conclusive until re-
versed, and may be pleaded in bar to a second bill for the same relief on the
same subject-matter, between the same parties, unless the decree of dismissal
shows on its face that the dismissal is without prejudice to complainant's right
to file another bill. 9
A decree may be final as to one party, and not final as to the other thus, a :
decree determining the controversy as to one of the defendants, whose interests

are not connected with the others, and adjudging the costs as to him, is a final
decree 10 and from such a decree, the Chancellor may, in his discretion, allow
;
an appeal. 11
A final decree may, however, be changed, or overruled and vacated, by the
Chancellor, even after it has been entered and the minutes of the day signed,
provided such change, or vacation, is made within thirty days from the decree,
if the term holds so long, otherwise, before the adjournment of the term. After
the lapse of said period of thirty days, or after the adjournment of the term,
the decree becomes and passes beyond the control of the Court, 12
strictly final,
and can only be changed, or overruled, (1) by the Chancellor, upon a bill of
review, or a bill to impeach the decree for fraud, or (2) by the Supreme Court,
on appeal or writ of error. Decrees in our Chancery Courts are not enrolled in
the English sense, but with us a decree is deemed to be enrolled as soon as the
Chancellor's right to change it has terminated.
§ 577. Consent Decrees. —A
decree is frequently made by consent of parties.
In such a case, the Court does not inquire into the merits or equities of the
decree*, nor whether it is sustained by the pleadings. 13 The only questions for'
the Court to determine are (1) Are the parties capable of binding themselves
:
by consent; and (2) whether they have consented, or do now consent, to the
proposed decree. These two facts appearing, the Court orders the decree to be
entered, provided that it shows upon its face that it is a consent decree. If it
does not so show upon its face, it is not a consent decree, even though in fact it
was consented to; but it is a decree of the Court in invitum, and subject to all
the remedies for its correction allowable in case of contested decrees.
A decree by consent is in the nature of a solemn contract and is, in effect, an ;
admission by the parties that the decree is a just determination of their rights
upon the real facts of the case, had such been proved. As a result, such a decree
is so binding as to be absolutely conclusive upon the consenting parties, and it
can neither be amended, or in any way varied, without a like consent, nor can
it be reheard, appealed from, or reviewed upon a writ of error. 14 The one only
way in which it can be attacked, or impeached, is by an original bill alleging
fraud in securing the consent. 15
Where, however, a decree is based upon a writing authorizing a particular
decree to be made, or otherwise adjusting the controversy, if the decree is not
justified by such writing, to that extent it is erroneous, and may, therefore, bfl
reheard, appealed from, or otherwise reviewed, as in case of a contested decree
or the Court may, on motion, amend or rectify the decree. 16
7 Code, § 3157. This statute changed the former Osment, 24 Pick., 32; Bigley v. Watson, 14 Pick.,
rule of the Court as to what constitutes a final de- 353.
cree; and the decisions of our Courts prior to the 14 Williams v. Neil, 4 Heisk., 279; Jones v. Wil-
Code are apt to mislead. Abbott V. Fagg, 1 Heisk., liamson, 5 Cold., 371 Boyce v. Stanton, 15 Lea, 346.
;
742. 15 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 373; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 974; 1460,
s Gibson V. Widener, 1Pick., 16; Barton v. Tur- notes. In case of consent decrees the following max-
ley, 11 Lea, 600; Terrell V. Ingersoll, .10 Lea, 77. ims apply (1) Conventio vincit legem; (2) Volenti
:
t
9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 994. As to when a bill will be non Ht injuria; (3) Consensus tollit errorem. Mus-
dismissed without prejudice, see, ante, § 570. grove v. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch., 580. The statute pro-
10 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 331. vides for an appeal only when a party is "dissatisfied
11 Code, §3157. with a decree;" and a party cannot be dissatisfied
12 Acts of 18R5. ch. fi5r Railroad v. Tohnson. 16 With a dprrPP tlint Tip mneonlc t*\ it <...." *..«.'» r*„J-
§578 KINDS OF DECREES. 460
The Court will not, ordinarily, make a decree by consent where infants are
concerned, without referring it to the Master to inquire whether it be for. their
benefit; yet, if such a decree is made, the infants will be bound by it. 17 The
consent of counsel to a decree is to be given upon their own conception of their
authority and if their client is injured by such consent, his remedy is against
;
bis counsel, unless his counsel's consent was procured by fraud. 18

A decree for an absolute or limited divorce cannot be entered by consent but ;
a decree for alimony may be.

A mere pro forma decree should not be allowed to be entered, and if entered
will be dismissed in the Supreme Court, regardless of its merits. 19
§ 578. Nunc Pro Tunc Decrees.—Ordinarily, there is nothing to be gained

by having a decree dated on the very day the cause was heard, or the Chan-
cellor 's opinion delivered and for this reason, decrees usually bear even date
;
with the minutes of the Court in which they are entered. But parties have the
right to have the decree entered as of the date of the hearing, and when the de-
lay of the Chancellor in deciding the cause after the hearing, or the delay of
counsel, or the Clerk, in drawing or entering the decree after the decision, works
an injury to any party, and especially to the winning party, the Court will, on
application by the party interested, order the decree to bear even date with the
hearing, or with the decision, as the party in interest may elect. Such a decree
is said to be entered nunc pro tunc. 20
Decrees nunc pro tunc are often entered in the following cases: 1, Where
either party died after the hearing, and before the decree is entered; 21 2,
"Where, after decision made, and before decree entered, the defendant made a
conveyance of his realty 3, Where a report, or a sale, has been made by a Mas-
;
ter or a Special Commissioner, or a partition has been made by Commissioners,

and the decree ordering the same has not been entered in such a case, an entry:
nunc pro tunc will relate back to the time the decree was made, and will make
1
valid the intermediate proceedings authorized by the decree and 4, Where, in ;
any case, the act of the Chancellor after the hearing, or the conduct of opposite
counsel, or the neglect of the Clerk, has resulted in delaying the entry of a
decree, and the delay may injuriously affect any of the parties, it is the duty of
the Court, on application of such party, to have such decree entered as of its
proper date 22 and it is no ground for refusing such application, that the rights
;
of third parties will be injuriously affected thereby. 23 The usual formula in

case of nunc pro tunc decrees is: "This decree was made on the (naming the day
the cause was heard), and is entered now for then, by order of the Court."
A nunc pro tunc order or decree ought not to be entered except upon the clear-
est, evidence, such as (1) the distinct recollection of the presiding Chancellor;
or, (2) some memorandum by him, or by the Clerk and Master; or, (3) the
agreement of counsel. 24 To justify a nunc pro tunc order or entry, at a subse-
quent term, there must be some matter in the nature of a record to base it upon,
such as (1) a decree actually drawn at the time, but, by mistake, not entered;
or, (2) an entry on the Chancellor's docket; or (3) a memorandum, or opinion
in writing, by the Chancellor. 25
Courts can make their records speak the truth as to things done and should ;
do so by entries nunc pro tunc, even after an appeal has been prayed and
granted. 26 But after the jurisdiction of the Court over the cause is lost, no
17 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 373; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 975; Mus- 22 Freem. on Judgts., §§56-58; Davis v. Jones,
grove v. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch., 576; Milly v. Harrison, 3 Head. 603. Actus Curia neminem gravabit.
7 Cold., 199, The Court should look closely into 23 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1017, note.
such decrees, and see that they do not prejudice the 24 Shea v. Mabry, 1 Lea, 319; Carter v. McBroom,
infant. Ibid. 1 Pick., 377. See Kearney v. Jackson, 1 Yerg., 295.
18 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 374; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 575. 26 McGavock r. Puryear, 6 Cold., 34; Farns V.
19 Ward v. Alsup, 16 Pick., 738. Kilpatrick, 1 Hum., 379; Newland v. Gaines, 1
20 Freem. on Judgts., §§ 56-58; Sto. F,. PI., 5 363, Heisk., 720; M. & O. R. R. v. Dowd, 9 Heisk.. 179.
note. 26 Davis v. Jones, 3 Head, 603 ; Pond v. Trigg, 5
21 McLean v. State, 8 Heisk., 288; Mayfield v. Heisk., 536; Newland v. Gaines, 1 Heisk., 720.
Stephenson, 6 Bax., 403.
461 SUGGESTIONS AS TO DECREES. §579
nunc pro time order can be made, 37
without a petition, and notice to parties
adversely interested. Such a petition may be filed by a third party interested-
in the decree. 28
§ 579. —
Supplemental Decrees. It frequently happens that, after all the
issues raised by the pleadings have been determined, or after a final decree on
the merits of the controversy, either dismissing the bill or granting relief, some
further order or decree is necessary in order to completely adjust all the mat-
ters incidental to the litigation. Thus, 1, The defendant may be entitled to a
teference and decree on the question of damages, when an attachment or in-
junction bill is dismissed or 2, It may be necessary to take judgment on pur-
;
chase-money notes, executed to the Master or Special Commissioner, or to re-

sell the land in enforcement of the lien for purchase-money; or 3, It may be
necessary to make orders and decrees relative to settlements with receivers,
and to take judgment on their bonds or 4, It may be necessary to make orders
;
in reference to calling in loaned money, or in reference to loaning out money

or 5, Questions may arise as to the proper distribution of funds in the hands of
the Master or 6, An order of sale may be necessary in consequence of a levy on
;
land too late to make a sale 29 or 7, It may be necessary to revive a decree or 8,

;
;
To set aside the satisfaction of a decree; 30 or, 9, To substitute a surety, or a

purchaser, to the rights of a complainant under a decree 31 or 10, It may be ;
necessary to attach a party for violation of a perpetual injunction; or 11, To

make some other order in enforcement or execution of a final decree, or in ad-
justment of the consequential rights or duties of parties, or officers of the Court,
thereunder. Inasmuch as the foregoing orders and decrees are supplemental in
their nature and office, they are denominated supplemental orders and de-
crees. 32
ARTICLE IV.
PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO DECREES.

580. Suggestions as to the Substance of § 581. Suggestions as to the Writing and
Decrees. Entry of Decrees.
§ 580. Suggestions as to the Substance of Decrees. In the first place, be —

sure that your decree is supported by the pleadings, and that it is both a logical
and a legal deduction from the pleadings. In drawing your de'eree, keep in
mind the following particulars
1. If there are defendants under disability of infancy or mental unsoundness,
recite in your decree the fact that the cause was heard on the pleadings, includ-
ing their answers by regular guardian, or guardian ad litem.
2. If any defendant has been pro confessoed at rules, recite that fact in the
decree.
3. If any oral agreements were made at the hearing, incorporate them in the
decree; otherwise, you will lose their benefit if the case should go to the Su-
preme Court.
4. If you excepted to any evidence at the hearing, show those exceptions in
the decree, or in writing, authenticated by the Chancellor, or in a bill of excep-
tions, or you will lose the benefit of them in the Supreme Court. 1
27 Staggs v. State, 3 Hum., 372; Hill v. Bowers, 4 29 Pond v. Trieg, 5 Heisk., 532.
Heisk., 272. 30 Code, § 2990, amended by the Acts of 1875, ch.
28 Rush v. Rush, 13 Pick., 279. In this case a 3.
nunc pro tunc divorce decree was entered at a sub- 31 Code, §§ 2994-2996.
sequent term on petition of a stranger injured by 32 See, ante, § 566, note 31, on "leave to apply."
the non-entry of the decree, the party divorced hav- 1 See, ante, § 538.
ing died. Thp TnHtrp's rlnptpr rnntainpd thpsp words;
§ 581 SUGGESTIONS AS TO DECREES. 462
5. If you excepted
to any ruling, or order, of the Court made at the hearing,
incorporate that fact in the decree, and file a bill of exceptions, if necessary, to'
show all the facts.
6. If your client has obtained a money recovery, state the amount thereof in
words and do not, in your haste, express the amount in figures only. Figures
;
are too easily changed, and too liable to be misunderstood. You may use both
words and figures.
7. If the decree directs a sale of land, or removes a cloud, or transfers the
possession or title of land, or adjudicates the title, describe the land by metes
and bounds in the decree. This will then be a permanent record of title,
whereas the file may get lost.
8. If the decree affects the title to land, or affects other important matters,
give the names of all the defendants in the body of the decree. The pleadings
may get' lost.
9. Always see that proper final process is awarded. If your client is adjudged
the possession of any property, do not fail to have a writ of possession awarded.
If you are entitled to a perpetual injunction, have it so decreed. See that your
decree awards an execution for the costs.
10. If the decree is not satisfactory, pray an appeal, even in cases where an
appeal will not lie as a matter of right. Such a prayer, when disallowed, may
improve your standing when the case finally gets into the Supreme Court: it
will be evidence that you did not willingly submit to the decree.
11. If you are allowed an appeal, and are unable to get your bill of excep-
tions, if any, made out, signed and filed, be sure to get an extension of time,
and then be sure to file it within such extension.
12. Do not fail to dispose of any fund in Court, or in the hands of a Eeceiver
or to make an injunction, if any, perpetual, in a proper case; or to order at-
tached property to be sold as such, if any.
13. If the decree be final and in your favor have the costs adjudged, final
process awarded, and a lien declared in your favor on the recovery.
§ 581. —
Suggestions as to the Writing and Entry of Decrees. In drawing
decrees, the following matters are worthy of consideration
1. Write your decrees in ink, on legal cap paper, never using less than half
a sheet (two full pages-) of paper.
2. Divide your decree into paragraphs, as elsewhere shown, and number your
paragraphs. If the decree directs a reference to the Master, paragraph and
number the matters referred.
3. Take pains and due deliberation in drawing your decree avoid interlinea-
;
tions, erasures and other alterations. Consult and follow the forms given in the
books; and do not rely on your own skill until you have become an expert
draftsman.
4. Present your decrees in open Court, in due season, first showing them to
adverse counsel, if practicable.
5. Never allow the minutes of a term to be closed without being sure that
your orders and decrees have all been duly entered.
463 DECREES AS TO COSTS, §582
CHAPTER XXIX.
DECREES AS TO COSTS.
Article I. Cos.ts Generally Considered.
Article II. The Adjudication of Costs.
ARTICLE I.
COSTS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
582. What are Costs. S 584. Statutory Requirements as to Costs.
583. General Rules as to the Taxation of
Costs. § 585. Taxation, and Retaxation, of Costs.
§ 582. What are Costs. —

Costs are the expenses incident to a suit and con- ;
sist and postage 1 allowed by the statute to the officers of the

(1) of the fees
Court for various specified acts and services connected with a procedure in
Court; (2) of the fees, mileage and ferriage allowed witnesses in the cause;
(3) of necessary fees paid by the successful party, for copies of deeds, bonds,
wills, or other records, filed as part of the testimony; 2 (4) of the expenses
necessarily incurred, and allowed by the Court, in the progress of a cause, such
as expenses for protecting or preserving property, for making surveys and
plats, and for advertising property; (5) of the expenses incident to a receiver-
ship, or to a sequestration and (6) of counsel and guardian ad litem fees.
;
§ 583. —
General Rules as to Taxation of Costs. Costs in Chancery, except as
hereinafter shown, are taxed against such party, or parties, as the Court, in its
discretion, may deem equitably liable therefor, in view of all the circumstances
of the suit. 3 The discretion exercised by the Court in adjudging costs is not an
arbitrary, capricious, blind discretion, but an equitable discretion, resulting
from a consideration of the entire case, and all its circumstances, and the situa-
tion and conduct of the parties, in connection with the principles and practice
in reference to the taxation of costs that have been acted on in analogous
cases. 4
The discretion of the Court in adjudging costs is subject to review in the
Supreme Court 5 but will not be reversed except in case of clear abuse. 6
;
As a rule, costs follow the result of the suit; 7 but this is because, as a rule,
it is equitable that they should. This rule is seldom departed from, except when
itwould be inequitable to follow it. Parties, though unsuccessful, are some-
times exonerated from costs, because of their good conduct, or some Equity;
and on the other hand, successful parties are sometimes taxed with costs, be-
cause of their bad conduct. 8 A complainant may be entitled to the relief he
prays, and yet be guilty of some conduct connected with the suit, or the
1 Code, § 3207. per legem quid sit justum. (Discretion is to discern

2 Code, § 3206. by aid of the law what is just.)
3 Code, §4493; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1376. And the 5 Snapp e. Purcell, 13 Lea, 693.
prosecution surety may be held liable, even though 6 State V. Lewis, 10 Lea, 168; Grosvenor v. Bethel,
his principal is successful. Allison v. Stephens, 2 9 Pick., 577; Tyler «. Walker, 17 Pick., 306.
Head, 251; Ogg «. Leinart, 1 Heisk., 40. 7 Raht v. Mining Co., 5 Lea, 79. Ubi damna dan-
i Clark v. Clark, 4 Hay., 36. Perkins v. McGav- tur victus victori in expensis condemnari debet. Civil
ock, 3 Hay., 255. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 322. Discretion Law. And if a final decree fail to adjudge the costs
here does not mean an arbitrary discretion, but a the law adjudges them against the losing party.
sound and reasonable discretion, secundum arbitrittm Brown v. Wright, 1 Ch. Apps., 160.
boni judicis. 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 693. Whoever hath 8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1397; Hunter ». Gardenhire, 13
power to act at discretion is_bound_by the_ rule of Lea, 658; Durant v. Davis, 10 Heisk., 524.
§584 DECREES AS TO COSTS. 464
subject-matter, that offends the conscience of the Court; and so, a defendant
may lose a suit, and yet commend himself to the favor of a conscientious Chan-
cellor in such cases, the Court will adjudge the costs so as to meet the require-
;
ments of Equity, and conform to the practice of the Court in such matters. 9
§ 584. —
Statutory Requirements as to Costs. The following are statutory
exceptions to the rule that the taxation of costs is discretionary with the Court
1. When a complainant amends his bill after copy issued, he must pay all the
costs occasioned thereby.
2. When
a defendant's answer is excepted to for insufficiency, and he files a
sufficientanswer within a month on a rule so requiring, he will not be liable to
costs but if he fail so to do, no further answer shall be received except upon
;
costs.
3. The unsuccessful party must pay the other three dollars when a plea, or
demurrer, or an exception to an answer, is overruled or allowed. 10
4. The complainant must pay the costs when his bill is dismissed for want of
prosecution. 11
5. The applicant in a suit to have dower assigned must pay the costs. 12
6.The complainant, who fails to set aside a conveyance alleged to be fraud-
ulent, must pay all the costs except those incident to the taking of judgment
on his claim, if he obtain such judgment. 13
7. A female in whose favor a divorce decree is made cannot be taxed with
the costs. 14
8. The Chancery Courts will follow the law of the Circuit Courts in the tax-
ation of costs in analogous cases. Thus, (1) in case of the abatement of a suit
by the death of the complainant, the defendant will be considered the siiccessful
party 15 and (2) when a defendant fails on a pleading to the merits previously
;
tiled, but succeeds on a pleading in the nature of a plea since the last contin-
uance, he will, ordinarily, be taxed with the costs which accrued previous to
the filing of his last pleading, whether such pleading be a supplemental answer,
or a cross bill. 16
§ 585. —
Taxation, and Retaxation, of Costs. The Clerk and Master makes
out the bill of costs, after they have been adjudged by the Court. The defend-
ants against whom judgment has been recovered, are entitled, as between them-
selves, to a taxation of the costs of witnesses whose testimony was obtained at
the instance of one of the defendants, and inured exclusively to his benefit. 17
Costs omitted in taxing the bill of costs may be retaxed, at any time, upon
application to the Court but if the judgment for costs has been paid, the party
;
against whom the retaxation is asked, shall have five days' notice of the appli-
cation. If the taxation of costs be. excessive, by charging the costs of witnesses
who were not examined, or by charging costs to an improper party, or taxing
costs contrary to law, or, the taxation is otherwise erroneous, the party ag-
grieved may move the Court for a retaxation, setting forth the particulars in
which the Clerk has erred. 18
Not more than two witnesses called to prove the same fact shall be taxed in
any bill of costs against the losing party, except in case of witnesses called to
attack or sustain the character of a witness or party. If more than the num-
ber of witnesses allowed are examined in proof of any particular fact, a motion
9 See next Article for a fuller treatment of this application, will retax them. State, ex rel., v. Alex-
subject, §§ 587-593. ander, 7 Cates, 156.
10 Code, §§4492; 4405; 4397. 18 Code, § 3211-3212. A motion to retax costs is
11 Code, § 4494. in the nature of a bill to surcharge and falsify, and
12 Code, § 2418. should put its finger on every error of commission,
'
13 Code, § 4292. and specify every omission.

14 Code, § 2477. If the fact that costs have been mistaxed
15 Code, § 3201. against a party comes to his knowledge after the
16 Code, § 3208. Court has adjourned he majr have the execution
17 Code, § 3210. The decree is for costs, gener- stayed as to the errors complained of, on presenting
ally, their taxation in detail being left to the Clerk. a petition to the Chancellor at Chambers, and have
If the Clerk mistax the costs, the Court, on proper an adjudication thereon at the next term.
465 ADJUDICATION OF COSTS. §586
should be made at the term at which the cause is tried, and the Court will
instruct the Clerk as to the taxation of costs: such motion can not be made
afterwards, without good cause shown. 19
The losing party may move the Court at the trial term, to direct the Clerk as
to how disputed costs should be taxed or how costs should be taxed as between
;
parties, when several of them are made variously liable for the costs.
ARTICLE II.
THE ADJUDICATION OF COSTS.

586. The Adjudication of Costs Generally § 590. When the Costs Will be Apportioned.
Considered.
§ 591. When Administrators, Guardians, and
587. When a Successful Complainant May
Other Trustees, Will be Taxed
be Taxed With Costs.
With Costs.
588. When a Successful Defendant Will
be Taxed With Costs. § 592. Costs on Interlocutory Proceedings.
589. When Each Party Must Pay His Own § 593. When Costs Will be Paid Out of the
Costs. Fund.
§ 586. The Adjudication of Costs Generally Considered. By both the civil —

and the common law the unsuccessful party was taxed with the costs of the
litigation 1 and by our Code, the successful party in a civil suit at law is entitled
-,
to full costs unless otherwise directed by law 2 but in the Chancery Court, both
;
by usage 3 and by statute, 4 costs are adjudged according to the discretion of

the Court, as hereinafter shown. Nevertheless, even in Chancery, as a rule the
unsuccessful party pays the costs 5 and, if a decree otherwise final fails to ad-
;
judge the costs, the law adjudges them against the losing party, 6 and awards
an execution therefor if there be a money recovery. 7
§ 587. When a Successful Complainant May be Taxed With Costs. It is not —
enough that a complainant obtains a decree he must, also, be without fault, if
:
he would escape costs. And so a complainant may be successful and without

fault, and yet the defendant may, also, be wholly without fault, in which case
it would be manifestly inequitable to burden the latter with all the costs of a
suit instituted for the complainant's benefit.
The following are cases where the complainant, though successful, may be
charged with the costs, if the defendant be free from wrong 1, In a suit by :
complainant to quiet his title, defendants claiming nothing 8 2, Where the de- ;
fendant is a mere stake-holder; 3, Where the complainant seeks to redeem after

mortgage forfeited 4, Where a full tender was made before suit 5, Where the
; ;
defendant is administrator or executor without assets, and the complainant

knew that fact; 9 6, Where the defendants are heirs, claiming nothing, and
especially if they are minors 8 7, Where an infant on attaining majority sues to
;
have his deed set aside, the defendant being guilty of no fraud 10 8, Where a ;
married woman takes advantage of her coverture and recovers, the defendant
having done nothing inequitable 11 9, Where a vendor compels a specific per-
-,
formance, but had not shown a good title' before suit; 12 10, Where a widow
seeks an assignment of dower; 13 11, Where complainant was greatly in fault,
but the strict law was in his favor 12, Where complainant has obtained a bar-
;
19 Code, §§ 3213-3214. 8 Armstrong u. Douglass, 5 Pick., 230: Patton

v
1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1376; 1381.
2 Dixon, 21 Pick., 97.
2 Code, §3197. 9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1381-1400.
3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1376. io Barker v. Wilson, 4 Heisk., 271
4 Code, § 4493. 11 Durant V. Davis, 10 Heisk., 524
5 Raht V. Mining Co., 5 Lea, 79. 12 Adams Ea.. 389.
§588 ADJUDICATION OF COSTS. 466
gain oppressive to the defendant 13, "Where the complainant recovers, but
;
claimed greatly too much; 14 14, Where the defendant offered a reasonable set-
tlement before suit; 15 and 15, Where a complainant has been guilty of laches,™
or his mistake caused the suit 17 16, Where he filed an original bill when he
;
could have obtained the same relief by cross bill in a pending suit 18 17, Where ;
he brought an unnecessary, foreclosure suit; 19 18, Where his own mis-

conduct necessitated the suit; 20 and 19, Where his recovery is less than fifty
dollars. 21
In almost all cases where the complainant obtains relief and the defendant is
insolvent, the Court will require the complainant to pay the costs due the
officers of the Court, and his own witnesses, in the first instance; and give
him a judgment over against the defendant for such costs.
§ 588. When
a Successful Defendant Will be Taxed With Costs.— A defend-
ant not unfrequently is guilty of such unconscientious conduct in connection
with the litigation, that, though successful, it would be inequitable to burden
the complainant with the costs.
The following are cases where the defendant, though successful, should be
charged with the costs 1, Where as administrator, executor, guardian, or
:
trustee, he failed to file proper inventories, or make the settlements required by

law, in consequence whereof suit was brought for an account 22 2, Where the ;
suit was caused by the defendant falsely claiming to be heir, executor, partner,
or the like; 23 3, Where, in a divorce case, his conduct was very improper; 2 * 4,
Where a suit for specific performance was dismissed, because the defendant
had no title 25 5, Where his vacillating conduct caused, or prolonged, the liti-
;
gation, he obtaining benefits once informally renounced; 26 6, Where his negli-

gence, or mistake of law, caused the litigation 27 7, Where he succeeds on the
;
pJea of bankruptcy; 28 or 8, on the defence of former adjudication set up in his

answer, but without merits 29 or 9, Where his defence was technical, and with-
;
out merits 40 10, Where he introduced an unnecessary amount of testimony 31

; ;
11, Where he succeeded on a cross bill, but his negligence caused the litiga-
tion; 32 or 12, Where, as agent, his misconduct caused the suit. 33
§ 589. When Each Party Must Pay His Own Costs. There are cases where —
the Court will make each party pay his own costs, most of them being cases
where both parties are equally at fault, or equally without fault, or where the
defendant succeeds, but without merits. In the following cases each party
should pay his own costs: 1, Where the suit is adjusted out of Court, the
defendant obtaining set-offs or reductions, and the costs not being disposed
of 34 2, Where complainant failed because of his misunderstanding of the con-
;
tract, but without fault on his part; 35 3, Where, in a doubtful case, the com-
plainant, though successful, refused a fair offer of adjustment 4, Where both ;
parties are at fault 36 or 5, are equally innocent 37 6, Where the suit is cause!
; ;
by the misconduct of a third person, both parties being without fault; 38 7,

Where the defendant succeeds, but without merits of his own; 39 8, Where, in
consequence of the peculiar hardship of the case, the unsuccessful party should
14 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1398-1399. 27 Fraker v. Brazleton, 12 Lea, 281; Wray v. Wil-
16 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1394-1396; Coal Creek, M. & liams, 2 Yerg., 302.
M. Co. v. Moses, 15 Lea 311; Perkins v. McGavock, 28 Payne v. Beech, 2 Tenn. Ch., 711.
3 Hay., 257. 29 Arnold v. Kyle, 8 Bax., 319.
18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1398; Bracken B. Martin, 3 30 McKoin V. Cooley, 3 Hum., 561.
Yerg., 55. 31 Lassater v. Garrett, 4 Bax., 375.
17 Helm V. Wright, 2 Hum., 72. 32 Crank V. Flowers, 4 Heisk., 638.
18 Parker V. Britt., 4 Heisk., 243. 33 Ray v. Haag, 1 Ch. Apps., 249.
19 Clark v. Jones, 9 Pick., 639. 34 Eastburn V. Kirk, 2 John. Ch., 317; 1 Dan. Ch.
20 Huffman v. Huffman, 1 Lea, 497. Pr., 795; 2 Ibid., 1382.
21 Smets v. Williams, 4 Paige, (N. Y.) 364. 35 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1398.
22 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1416-1417. 30 Knuckolls v. Lea, 10 Hum., 577.
23 Adams Eq., 389; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1405; Pigue v. 37 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1400-1402; Hicks v. Porter, 6
Young, 1 Pick., 263. Pick., 1.
24 Shell v. Shell, 2 Sneed, 729. 38 Penaleton V. Eaton, 3 John. Ch., 69,
25 Adams Eq., 389. 89 Peck v. Peck, 9 Yerg., 305; Nicoll v. Trustees,
26 Gentry v. Gentry, 1 Sneed, 87. 1 Tohn. Ch., 166; Finley v. Gant, 8 Bax., 115.
40
be relieved from part of the costs 9, Where the defendant succeeds on the
;
ground that the complainant participated in the inequitable conduct he com-

plains of; 41 10, Where proof is very conflicting, but no satisfactory prepon-
derance in favor of the complainant 42 and 11, Where a cause is remanded by
;
43
the Supreme Court for proof of complainant's corporate character.
§ 590. When the Costs Will be Apportioned. There are cases —
where it
would be hardly equitable to onerate either party with all the costs, and yet
where it would not be equitable to onerate one of the parties with all of his own
costs. In such cases the Court apportions the costs. The following are cases
where costs are ordinarily apportioned: 1, Where there are several issues, or
claims, and the complainant fails on some, and succeeds on others; 44 2, Where
the complainant fails to maintain some alleged equities 3, Where the suit was ;
brought for an account and sustained; 45 4, Where the complainant fails to

prove an alleged fraudulent conveyance, but establishes his debt; 46 5, Where
the defendant answered when he might have ended the suit by demurrer, or
plea, and thereby saved costs and delay 47 6, Where the complainant fails, but
;
was deceived by the defendant's conduct; 48 7, Where the complainant obtains

a decree, but made unfounded charges of fraud 49 8, Where the bill is dismissed
;
49a
because both parties are guilty of iniquity 9, Where the complainant suc-
;
ceeds, but was negligent of matters affecting the interests of the defendant, who
was an imfocent sufferer in the transaction 50 10, Where a complainant succeeds
;
but could have obtained the same relief by cross bill in another cause; 51 11,
Where none of the parties have merits 52 and 12, Where they are apportioned
;
among the parties in proportion to their respective interests. 53

§ 591. When Administrators, Executors, Guardians and Other Trustees, and
Officers, —
Will be Taxed With Costs. It is manifestly inequitable that an inno-
cent person should suffer because of the negligence, fraud or other misconduct
of another, especially if the latter is charged with the duty of caring for the
interests of the former. For this reason, Courts charge executors, adminis-
trators, guardians and other trustees, personally with the costs of improper
proceedings instituted by them, and of proper proceedings instituted against
them. 54 The following will serve as illustrations of this general rule 1, Where ;
an administrator's bill to sell land to pay debts is dismissed, because not sus-
tained by proper proofs 55 2, Where an administrator failed to plead the statute
;
of limitations, although on the hearing no assets were found in his hands 56 3, ;
Where a trustee is seeking to enforce an improper compromise 57 4, Where ;
administrators, executors, guardians or trustees are held personally liable for

tailing to discharge a duty 5, Where an administrator sued to recover land, the
;
title to which was in his intestate's heirs; 58 and 6, a Judge acting coram non
judice may be taxed with the costs of a successful mandamus suit against him. 5i*
§ 592. —
Costs on Interlocutory Proceedings. The Chancellor frequently ad-
judges costs in an interlocutory order granting leave to amend pleadings, or
setting aside a pro confesso, or extending the time for taking proof, or overruling
a plea or demurrer, or granting a continuance, or allowing the rehearing of a
40 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1404. 49a Carrick V. Armstrong, 2 Cold., 268. In this
41 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1397. case, the bill was dismissed, and each party taxed
42 Humphreys v. McCloud, 3 Head, 235. with half the costs.
45 Bank v. Jefferson, 8 Pick., 537. 50 Irwin V. Burnett, 6 Hum., 344.
44 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1407; Adams Eq., 389; Raht r. 51 Parker V. Britt, 4 Heisk., 249.
Mining Co., 2 Lea, 80. 52 Peck v. Peck, 9 Yerg., 301.
46 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1407-1408. 53 Traughber V. Smelser, 24 Pick., 347.
46 Code, § 4292. In such a case, complainant must 54 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1416-1419; Wade v. Fisher, 10
pay all the costs down to the decree adjudging that Heisk., 490.
the conveyance is not fraudulent. This provision of 55 Wade v. Fisher, 10 Heisk., 490; Porterfield v.
the statute often operates in favor of dishonest debt- Taliaferro, 9 Lea, 242.
ors, and should be repealed. See Bump on Fraud. 56 Apperson V. Harris, 7 Lea, 323 ; Wray v. Wil-
Con., 572-573. liams, 2 Yerg., 302.
47 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1394; Reed v. Noe, 9 Yerg., 57 De Graffenreid v. Green, 1 Cold., 110.
283; Code, §4320. 58 Cotham V. Britt, 10 Heisk., 469.
§593 ADJUDICATION OF COSTS. 468
cause, or granting a new trial by jury. In all such cases, the controlling con-
siderations should be 1, Has the applicant manifested good faith and due dili-
:
gence ? and 2, Will the allowance of the application result in an increase of the
costs, or in any way operate to the disadvantage of the opposite party? 60
The following general rules will serve as a guide in taxing costs on interlocu-
tory proceedings
1. A Pro Confesso should be Set Aside only upon the payment of the costs of
the cause, except in cases heretofore specified. 603,
2. An Amendment to a Pleading that causes a continuance should not be al-
lowed, except upon the payment of the same costs as would be imposed on a
continuance.
3. An Extension of the Time for Taking Proof should not be allowed, except
upon the payment of the costs of all depositions, or other proofs, thereafter
taken or filed by either party.
4. A
Continuance should not be granted, after the expiration of the statutory
lime for taking proof, except on payment of all the unadjudged costs of the
cause.
5. A Behearing, or a New Trial should not be granted in order to let in new
evidence, except on payment of all the adjudged costs of the cause.
6. Affidavits Showing Good Cause 60b for granting the application should be im-
peratively required in each of the foregoing cases, and oral statements, as on
affidavit, should not be heard, even by consent.
7. Mo Costs should be Taxed in any of the foregoing cases when the applica-
tion is the result of the act of an officer of the Court, or of the fraud of the oppo-
site side, or of accident or mistake, unmixed with negligence on the part of the
applicant, his Solicitor or agent.
8. On Overruling a Demurrer, or Plea, deemed frivolous, the defendant
should be taxed with all the costs of the cause, if such demurrer or plea was
filed more than two months before the first day of the term. 61
§ 593. When Costs will be Paid Out of the Fund.—The Chancery Court is
frequently called on to administer a fund, or an estate; or to aid executors,
administrators, guardians or other trustees, in the administration of their
trusts or to wind up estates, corporations and partnerships that are insolvent.
;
In such cases, where no party has been guilty of inequitable conduct, or has
caused unnecessary costs, the Court ordinarily orders the costs 'to be paid out
of the fund being administered. The following are cases of this character 1, :
Where an estate, or fund, is being administered by the Court but the costs of :
unnecessary proceedings will be paid by the party causing them. 62 2, Where

executors, administrators, guardians, receivers, trustees, and agents, fairly
account and pay over, and act in good faith, and the suit is not caused by their
misconduct; 63 3, Where an executor properly seeks the aid of the Court, in
construing, executing or sustaining a will 64 4, Where the suit is necessary to
;
the execution of a trust 65 5, Where the suit is brought by one or more creditors
;
for the benefit of all 6, Where the suit is to administer a charity, if the parties
;
60 The rulesimpose interlocutory costs are

that 61 Code, §§ 2938; 3203. Code, § 2934, is con-
generally based on the principle of compensation^ The strued as applicable to the Chancery Courts; Kirk-
law has no favorites as between equals, except in so man v. Snodgrass, 3 Head, 370; then why not §
far as it favors those who are diligent; and a Court 2938, in the same Article? The three dollars ad-
has no right to grant a favor to one party at the judged against the unsuccessful party on the argu-
expense of another party. Favors should be paid ment of demurrers and pleas, Code, §§4397; 4405;
for in costs; otherwise the party in default is re- 4492, are in the nature of a forfeit, or penalty, and
warded, and the party who has done his duty is are not costs in the ordinary sense. There is no
punished. As he who seeks Equity must do Equity, necessary conflict between the various sections of
so he who seeks a favor of the Court should accom- the Code on this subject; and Equity should follow
_
pany his application with an offer to pay such costs the law in uprooting frivolous pleadings filed for
as the Court may impose. No rule so greatly en- mere delay.
courages diligence and prevents negligence, as the 62 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1377; 1411.
uniform taxation of costs against parties seeking 63 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1411-1418.
favors. 64 Bennett v. Bradford, 1 Cold., 472 ; Rogers v.
The subject of the taxation of costs in cases of Ross, 4 John. Ch., 608; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1427; Frank-
amendments and continuances has been already fully lin v. Armfield, 1 Cold., 638.
-onsidered. Ante, §§429; 526-529. 65 Adams Eq., 389, De Graffenreid t). Green, 1
60a See, ante, § 207. Cold., 110.
sob See, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
liavebeen guilty of no inequitable conduct; 7, Where a mortgagee, or benefi-
ciary under a trust deed, with powers of sale, seeks the aid of the Court to
enforce his security; 66 8, Where,
in cases of constructive fraud, a fund comes
mto Court; 67 and 9, Where
real estate is partitioned, or sold for partition, in
which case counsel fees may, also, be taxed as part of the costs. 68
ee Adams Eq., 389. The Court will almost invari- 67 Bump on Fraud. Con., 572.
ably order the costs' paid out of the fund arising 68 Acts of 1887, ch., 183.
from Court sales where they could not, probably,
otherwise be made.
§.594 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. 470
CHAPTER XXX.
REFERENCES TO THE MASTER, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Akticle I. When References are Necessary, or Proper.
Article II. Proceedings upon a Reference.
Article III. The Master's Report.
Article IV Proceedings upon a Master's Report.
ARTICLE I.
WHEN REFERENCES ARE NECESSARY, OR PROPER.
594. Object of a Reference to the Master. § 598. When References to the Master are
595. What Matters May be Referred to the Proper.
Master. § 599. How and When References are Made.
596. Matters Not Proper to be Referred to
the Master.
§ 600. Frame of a Reference.
597. When References to the Master are § 601. Form of a Reference.
Necessary. § 602. Reference on Further Directions.
§ 594. Object of a Reference to the Master —

There are often (1) inquiries
to be made during the pendency of a suit, or (2) accounts to be taken, or (3)
calculations to be made, or (4) settlements to be investigated, or (5) particulars
Lo be ascertained, or (6) special ministerial acts to be performed, or (7) other
matters to be attended to, which require the skill of a bookkeeper, accountant,
or a man of business, rather than the judgment of a Chancellor; and if the
Chancellor was obliged to attend to all of these matters of inquiry and detail,
the sessions of the Court would be greatly prolonged, and the number of Chan-
cellors would have to be greatly increased. To remedy this difficulty, and
enable the Chancellor to devote his time to the finding and adjudication of the
more important matters in litigation, and to the determination of the principles
governing the controversy, Equity Courts have an officer, called a Master in
Chancery, specially fitted to aid the Chancellor, by taking off his shoulders the
burden of many details, the making of many inquiries, and the ascertainment
of many facts. The character, powers, and duties of this officer are shown .
elsewhere. 1
The findings of the Master are analagous to a special verdict in a Court of
law, and it may be stated generally, that what a jury is to the Circuit Court,
the Master is to the Chancery Court, with these advantages in favor of the
Chancery practice (1) the Master's reports are far more definite, precise, and
:
thorough than the verdicts of a jury; (2) the Master's reports, as a rule, are
more correct and otherwise more satisfactory than verdicts; (3) the Master's
2
errors are more manifest, and more easily corrected than the errors of a jury ;
and (4) there are matters of account, of details of calculation, of tabulation,

and of classification, with which juries are wholly unfitted to deal. 3
Hence, it may be stated that the objects of a reference to the Master are: 1,
To relieve the Chancellor of the details and minor matters involved in a litiga-
1 See Chapter on the Clerk and Master, post, §§ 8 How could a jury by means of oral explanations
1153-1172. pass on the many items of cross accounts contained
2 The Master's report gives items and details spec- memoranda, and running through
in various books or
ifically, whereas the verdict of a jury is in gross, and many years?
it cannot often be known whether any particular
item was allowed or not.
471 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. §595
tion, to the end that the Chancellor may have more time to devote to the con-
sideration of the larger matters 4 and 2, To present the details, or minor mat-
;
ters in such a form as to enable the parties to scrutinize them, and point out all
supposed errors.
§ 595. What Matters may be Referred to the Master. —The matters referred
to the Master are almost as numerous as the matters subject to the jurisdiction
of the Chancery Court; and include the following: 1, Whether it is to the
interest of the owners to sell a tract of land for partition; 2, Whether it is to
the manifest interest of minors, or married women, to sell their property; 3,
Whether it is necessary to sell a decedent's lands to pay his debts; 4, Whether
the title to land sold, or about to be sold, or .purchased, is good 5, Whether ;
there are any tax liens, mortgages, trust deeds, life estates, or other liens on
land sold, or about to be purchased, by order of the Court; 6, What are the
rssets and liabilities of a decedent, a partnership, corporation, or other person,
whose assets are in the custody of the Court; 7, What are the relative rights
and priorities of various creditors, or claimants, of the same fund 8, What is ;
the state of the account between a guardian, personal representative, receiver

or other trustee, and the beneficiaries; or between persons having mutual deal-
ings 9, The validity and amount of any particular liability 10, The compensa-
; ;
tion of guardians, personal representatives, receivers, trustees, guardians ad

litem,- Solicitors, and others; 11, The proper allowance for the maintenance of
a married woman, infant or person of unsound mind, or for the education of an

infant 12, The investment of money belonging to persons under disability, or
;
belonging to persons who fail to draw the same out of Court; 13, The ascer-
tainment of heirs, or legatees, or distributees, whose estates are in Court and ;
their residences, when their names and abodes are unknown; 14, The assess-
ment of damages in any case where properly allowable 15, The ascertainment ;
of the value of any property, real or personal, or of any betterment or perma-

nent improvement and 16, whether in any pleading, petition or deposition,
;
there is any, and what, scandalous, impertinent or unnecessary matter. Indeed,

it may be stated that, in general, there is no question of unknown or disputed
fact which may not be referred to the Master, to the end that the Chancellor
and the parties may have the benefit of his investigations and findings. 5
Where a question arises incidentally (1) as to the title to property about to
be purchased, or sold, under the orders of the Court, or (2) as to who owns
certain property involved in the litigation, or (3) as to what interests the par-
ties, or others not parties, have in such property, or (4) as to what encumb-
rances rest upon property about to be purchased or sold under the orders of
The Court, in any and all such cases it is proper to refer such matters to the
Master; 6 but where the suit is brought expressly to recover property on the
strength of complainant's title, the Court must then determine the title; and
the truth of complainant's allegations of ownership in such a case is not a
proper matter to be referred to the Master. 7
§ 596. Matters not Proper to be Referred to the Master. The line of divis- —
ion, between matters proper to be referred to the Master, and matters not
proper to be referred, is not well defined; but it may be stated, generally, that
the main issues of the controversy, 8 and the principles on which these issues are
to be adjudicated, must be determined by the Chancellor, 9 while collateral, sub-
ordinate, and incidental issues, and the ascertainment of facts ancillary to the
determination of the main issues, or to the execution of the decree, may be
referred to the Master. It is pot proper to refer a question of law, or the deter-
4 See note 12, infra. Master to determine a question of title can be made
5 1 Smith's Ch. Pr., 9-11. in no case. It does not so decide. The decision is
<i 2 Dan. Ch. Barb. Ch. Pr.. 519;
Pr., 1215; 1283; 1 entirely in accord with the general doctrine laid
Code, § 3310. Moredock V, Williams, 1 Tenn., down in the text. See Buchanan v. Alwell, 8 Hum.,
(Over.,) 325; Buchanan v. Alwell, 8 Hum., 516. 516, Judge McKinney writing both opinions.
7 Woodson v. Smith. 1 Head. 277. This case is 8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.. 1168. note.
§597 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. 472
urination of a question of law, to the Master, but a mixed question of law and
fact may be referred. 10 References in old cases as to old matters, and as to
what has been done in the ease, or what its present condition is, ought not to
be granted: this is the work of counsel. 11
§ 597. When References to the Master are Necessary. References to the —
Master are necessary in the following cases 1, When in any case it is necessary
:
to take and state an account between the parties, covering numerous items;
2, When the assets of a decedent, a partnership, a corporation, or other person,
are being administered in Court, and it becomes necessary to ascertain the kind,
items and amount of such assets, and the names, priorities and equities, of the
creditors, and the amount due each; 3, When it becomes necessary to show a
deficiency of personal assets, in order to justify the sale of a decedent's lands
to pay his debts 4, When an insolvent estate is being wound up in Chancery,
;
and it becomes necessary to ascertain the character and amount of the

assets, and the names, priorities and equities, of the various creditors and
claimants, and the amounts due each 5, When it becomes necessary to ascertain
;
whether any, and what, tax liens, mortgages, trust deeds, life estates, and other
encumbrances, exist on land sold, about to be sold, or about to be purchased
by the Court 6, When the duty devolves on the Court of investing money be-
;
longing to persons under disability, and it becomes necessary to find a bar-

gainor, or a borrower; 7, When it becomes necessary to make inquiry for. heirs,
distributees, legatees, or persons entitled to a fund in Court.
References are necessary in the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th of the foregoing cases
1, Because they necessitate long, minute and tedious arithmetical calculations
2, Because the duties connected with them are clerical rather than judicial 3, ;
Because the accounts are often so long and so complicated that errors and
omissions are almost unavoidable 4, Because all parties in interest should have
;
an opportunity to scan the account when taken, to the end that they may
point out any and all errors, or omissions, therein and 5, Because by bringing
;
the case on for hearing on the Master's report, and the exceptions thereto, ail
clerical matters are eliminated, or greatly reduced, and the controversy is nar-
rowed down to the real points in issue, and to those matters only in the case
that require judicial determination. 12
References are necessary in the 5th, 6th, and 7th of the foregoing cases: 1,
Because the duties imposed in such cases on the Master are incompatible with
the office of Judge 2, Because the duty of a Chancellor is not to hunt for facts
;
outside of the record, but to declare the rights of the parties on the record as
presented by them; and 3, Because the duties imposed by the reference require
so much time that they could not well be attended to while Court is in session.
§ 588. When References to the Master are Proper.—There are matters as to
which references to the Master are proper to be made, but are not imperative
matters which the Chancellor may refer to the Master for a report, or which he
may determine without a reference. In these cases, the Chancellor exercises his
discretion, and directs a reference, or adjudicates without a reference, as the
exigency may require. In exercising his discretion in such matters, the Chan-
cellor will consider: 1, Whether the Master's duties on a reference will be
appropriate to his office 2, Whether more proof will be required, or is desired
;
3, Whether a report by the Master will narrow, simplify, or more clearly define,
10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1203; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 516. that the argument of counsel would only "darken by
11 Eubank v. Wright, 2 Tenn. Ch., 538. its elucidations, and puzzle by its explanations;"
12 White v. Cox, 4 Hay., 214. Besides, while a his decree, when rendered, would be but little, if
Chancellor might be willing himself to perform the any, better than a Master's report; and, on appeal
drudgery of taking and stating an account after a to the Supreme Court, the assignment of errors
hearing, he has no right to onerate the Judges of would be merely exceptions to the Chancellor's re-
the Supreme Court with such drudgery as would port. The Supreme Court should not tolerate such
necessarily result from the practice of deciding such a practice. But in Gray u. State it was held that the
suits without a reference and a report. A Chan- trial Judge in the Circuit Court might state an ac-
cellor who would undertake to decide a complicated count without referring it to the Clerk. 11 Pick.,
account, without a reference and a report, would find 317.
himself overwhelmed by such a confusion of details
473 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. §599
the matters in controversy and 4, Whether a report will enable either or both
;
parties to present their cases more satisfactorily to the Court. If these ques-
tions are answered in the affirmative, the Chancellor will generally order a ref-
erence; if, however, the probabilities are that the Master's report will settle
nothing, but that on exceptions thereto the whole controversy will come on for
redetermination before the Court, in such a case a reference will not be made.
The inclination of the Chancellor is to order a reference when either party
desires it, unless the desire is based on a disposition to delay the final deter-
mination of the suit. 13
Subject to these general rules, references are proper when the question is 1, :
whether a tract of land should be sold for partition or, 2, whether it is mani- ;
festly to the interest of minors, or married women, tb sell their property for
reinvestment, or for their maintenance or education or, 3, whether a particular;
claim is valid, and its amount; or, 4, what is a reasonable compensation for a
guardian, personal representative, receiver, trustee, guardian ad litem, Solic-
itor, 14 or any other person entitled to compensation; or, 5, what is a proper
allowance for the maintenance of a married woman, infant, or person of un-
sound mind, or for the education of an infant or, 6, what amount of damages
;
is properly allowable in a given case or, 7, what is the reasonable value of

;
any property, real or personal, or of any betterments or permanent improve-

ments or, 8, what is the present cash value of a homestead, dower, or other life
;
estate or, 9, whether a party has a title to property in controversy 15 or, 10,
;
;
whether any pleading, petition, or deposition contains any, and what, scandal-
ous, impertinent, or unnecessary matter.
§ 599. How and When References —
are Made. As a reference is a step in the
progress of a suit, it is generally made on motion of the complainant some- :
times, however, it is made on motion of the defendant and sometimes the Chan- ;
cellor makes a reference on his own motion, for his own guidance or informa-
tion. A
reference is usually made after a preliminary hearing on the main
questions in controversy, and after a decree settling those questions the refer- ;
ence in such cases being mainly in furtherance of the decree, and being based
on the adjudication made, and the principles declared. 16 Sometimes, however,
the pleadings themselves show that a report will be necessary and when, in ;
such a case, a reference can be made, plainly, pointing out to the Master what
he must report on, and by what rules he must be guided, a reference will be
ordered without waiting for any hearing on the proof, leaving the parties to
introduce their proof before the Master, and to contest any matter in dispute
by exceptions to the Master's report.
Other references are made on petition of third parties, or are made as inci-
dental to the main litigation, or as elucidatory of some side issue, or as neces-
sary to a complete decree, or as a means of avoiding further litigation connected
with the subject-matter of the suit.
A reference may be had at any time between the filing of an answer and the
final disposition of the cause, even after a decree and the return of an execution
satisfied, or after a sale made and confirmed. In short, a reference will be
ordered whenever necessary to enable the Court to do justice in any matter
connected with the litigation, or connected with the enforcement of the decree,
13 The devices of counsel to secure desired delays 15 A reference is frequently made to the Master
are multitudinous; the forms in which these delays to inquire into the title of a party to property in
are sought are Protean; the reasons by which their question in a cause. References of this nature are
applications for delay are supported are plausible principally made in suits for the specific performance
and seductive; and their protestations that they de- of contracts for the sale, or purchase, of real estate;
sire the speediest possible trial consistent with justice but such references are not confined to such cases.
are vehement and perplexing. A purchaser may have a reference before the sale is
14 The Chancellor should always determine the confirmed to him; or even after confirmation and
compensation of a guardian ad litem and Solicitor, before he pays the purchase-money. 2 Dan. .Ch. Pr..
where all the services by them were rendered in the 1215-1220.
given case, and are evidenced by the record, or 10 The order of reference must be founded on the
judicially known to the Court. A reference to the pleadings and proofs, and cannot be more extensive
§ 600 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. 474
or the distribution of the proceeds of a decree. A reference, however, should
never be made as to matters of account, unless the Court is able, either from
the admissions of the answer, or from the proof, to so specify the principles and
rules on which the account is to be taken as to limit the range of inquiry, and
reduce the matters to be reported on, to those points essential to the determina-
tion of the litigation. General and indefinite references for an account, without
determining any principles, or giving any special directions for the guidance
of the Master, should never be made, as they generally result in unnecessary
proof, and an inconclusive and unprofitable report, productive only of costs,
confusion, disappointment and delay. 17
In decreeing an account, the Court should settle and specify the principles
on which the account is to be taken and, when practicable, should define the
;
powers and duties of the Master, and indicate, in a general way, what he is
required to do in each particular matter referred to him. 18 The object of such
rulings and directions is to narrow the range of inquiry, to point out to the
Master the paths for him to pursue in his investigations, and thereby prevent
the unnecessary accumulation of costs. The Court should, also, rule on dis-
puted matters of evidence, and specify what books of account, or other evi-
dences of account, what settlements, and what other proofs, the Master may-
consider, and what weight he should give them, and what rights of surcharge
and falsification, or what other liberties the various parties may exercise. If
the Chancellor, at the hearing, has reached a definite conclusion as to any large
items of the account, he should so find, and direct the Master to take such items
as prima facie, or absolutely correct, or to totally reject them, as the case may
be. 19 If there be agreements to be construed, or instruments to be passed on,
the decree of reference should settle the construction and effect of such agree-
ments, and determine the validity and meaning of such instruments, so that
the Master may be neither entangled nor embarrassed by such questions. 20
References, however, may be made by consent, without any preliminary deter-
mination of principles. 21
§ 600. —
The Frame of a Reference. If the order of reference is to elucidate
some matter in controversy, it must necessarily conform to the issues raised
by the pleadings if the reference is not for the purpose of aiding in the
;
determination of the matters in controversy, it must, nevertheless, relate to

some matter pertinent to the pleadings, or to the decrees, or to the subject-
matter, or to the funds or property in the custody of the Court.
The order of reference should clearly indicate the matter to be reported on,
and if any rules or directions are necessary for the giiidance of the Master,
they should be specified. The order should not only contain all the specific
directions necessary to enable the Master to understand what he is expected to
do, but should lay down with particularity the principles on which he is to
act, to the end that the inquiry may be made as narrow as possible, and all
impertinent and unnecessary matters may be excluded. 22 If any book of
account, or settlement between the parties is deemed prima facie correct by the
Court, the order of reference should so state, and leave be given the attacking
party to surcharge and falsify such book of account, or settlement; 23 but if
such settlement is wholly set aside, and an account de novo ordered, the decree
should so state.
17 Carey v. Williams, 1 Lea, 51; Patton v. Cone, 1 21 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 857, note; 2 Ibid, 992; Wes-
Lea, 14; Terrell v. Ingersoll, 10 Lea, 77. sells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 58; Trimble V. Dodd,
18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1221, note; Cobb o. Jameson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 500. Where the adult parties consent
1 Tenn. Ch., 604; Jones v. Douglass, 1 Tenn. Ch., to an account before a hearing, the Chancellor may,
357. in a proper case, consent for the parties under dis-
19The decree of reference should specify what ability. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 857. But in such cases,
accounts and settlements, if any, should be taken as the reference should be expressly without prejudice
prima facie correct. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1232, note. to any_ question in the case affecting those under
20 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1233, notes. In short, the de- disability.
cree of reference should, as far as possible, blaze 22 Cobb v. Jameson, 1 Tenn. Ch.. 604; 2 Dan. Ch.
out the Master's road, and mile-mark it, and put up Pr., 1221, note.
finger-boards at the forks, and indicate the paths to 28 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1232, note.
be avoided and the short cuts that may be taken
with safety.
475 REFERENCES TO THE MASTER. § 601
In ease of a reference for an account, or for a reference as to more matters
than one, the order should be divided into parts, each part contained in a sepa-
rate paragraph, and covering a subdivision of the account, or a single matter
and each paragraph should be given in its proper logical order, or legal se-
quence, and be consecutively numbered. The paragraphing and consecutive
numbering of an order of reference is necessary to an orderly and intelligible
report. 24
The order of reference may specify when a report shall be made, and when
fled, and may state what notices of the taking of the account shall be given,
and on whom served. 25 The order should, also, state whether any and what
evidence on file may be considered in taking the account, and whether any and
what new evidence may be filed by the parties, and may state what evidence
shall not be considered. The Court may, also, make all necessary orders as to
the production of documents, books, vouchers, or other evidence in possession of
the parties.
Each party should be required, before the taking of proof on a reference
begins, to file with the Master a statement of all his items of charge against
the other party, and no item not contained in such statement should be con-
. sidered. 26
Many forms of references will be given in subsequent pages of this treatise
which can readily be found by the Index.
§ 601. Form of a Reference. —The following general form is given, to aid in
drawing a reference. Before drawing the reference it would be well to consider
the preceding section
ORDER OF REFERENCE.
John Doe, ]
vs. \ No. 619
Richard Roe, et. al. J
This cause came on to be heard this December 1st, 1906, before Chancellor Hugh G. Kyle,
upon the bill, the answers of all the defendants thereto, the cross-bill of the defendant Sarah
Roe and the answer thereto, and the proof in the cause, [including the agreement signed by
all the parties, except Sarah Roe, which is filed and marked A;] and argument of counsel
having been heard, the Chancellor is of opinion that this is a proper case for a reference to
the Master. [Or, in a proper case, the decree may declare the rights and liabilities of the
parties, and lay down the rules and principles to govern the Master in stating the account, or
Staking the report. See, post, § 1040.]
The Master is, therefore, directed to hear proof, including that on file, and report to the
next term of the Court
1st, What [&c, setting out the matters to be reported on, putting each head in a separate
paragraph, and numbering the paragraphs consecutively. See, post, §§975; 1040.]
if possible,
2d, Whether [&c, See Index, for various orders of reference.}
The Master will [&c, Here set out any special rules for the guidance of the Master as
to evidence, or the force and effect of documents, settlements previous reports, or agreements
,
between the parties, or as to requiring the parties to file their respective chargers or discharges.
See, post, § 958.]
All other matters are reserved until the incoming of the Master's report.
§ 602. —
Reference on Further Directions. On the incoming of the Master's
report the Chancellor may confirm it, in whole or in part, or he may recommit
it in whole or in part, or he may recommit it with further directions. It is not
necessary in the original order of reference to reserve the right to give further
directions. 27 The Chancellor is not bound by any directions contained in an
order of reference. References are made to obtain facts, and the Chancellor
may make such changes in his references, and such additions thereto, as he may
deem proper to obtain the facts necessary for a complete adjudication of all the
matters in controversy.
24 The deficiencies, disorders and general confus- wonderful how much order and lucidity a skillful
ion sometimes found in Master's reports, are as and diligent Master will deduce from a chaos of
much the fault of the Solicitor who drew the order unmethodical orders and heterogeneous evidence.
of reference as of the Master who made the report. 25 Ch. Rule, IV, § 1; post, § 1193.
Confused, illogical, and chaotic references, neither 26 Of course, such statements would be amendable
paraexaDhed nor numbered, often result in similar
'
likeany other pleading. See, post. § 958.
§ 603 PROCEEDINGS UPON A REFERENCE. 476
REFERENCE ON FURTHER DIRECTIONS.
John Den, ]
vs. \ No. 723
Richard Fen, J
[Follow the decree on exceptions to a report, in § 616, post, down to the words, "all other
matters," and add:
The Master is further directed to report whether any trees were cut and removed from
said land by the defendant, and if so, when cut and the value thereof; and he may hear addi-
tional proof on this point.
ARTICLE II.
PROCEEDINGS UPON A REFERENCE.

S 603. When and Where a Reference is to § 606. Opening the Account.
be Executed. § 607. Examination of the Witnesses.
§ 604. Notice of the Time and Place of Tak- § 608. The Production of Documents.
ing an Account. § 609. Character of the Evidence.
§ 605. Meeting of the Parties, and Adjourn- § 610. Filing Claims Before the Master Un-
ments. der a Decree.
§ 603. When and Where a Reference is to be Executed. The Court may fix —
xlie time when an account shall be taken and the report be made but when th3 ;
time is not so fixed, the Master fixes the time and place. If the reference is not
.l'or an account, but for a report as to some other matter, the Court usually
leaves it to the Master to determine when he will make his report. But in aJl
eases where any of the parties is required or expected to furnish proof to be
used in making the report, a time should be fixed by the Master for making
bis report, and the parties interested duly notified thereof, to the end that they
may have their witnesses present, or their proof on file in due season. When
the decree does not fix the time in which the report shall be made, the Code
requires the Master to proceed with the least practicable delay to comply with
the terms of the reference x and any neglect of duty in this respect is punish-
;
able by a fine of fifty dollars, and the Master is also guilty of a misdemeanor,
and subject to removal from office. 2
The ordinary place for taking an account is the office of the Master; but he
would be authorized to take it at another place, if more convenient to the
parties, or if any other good reason justified such action. 3
§ 604. Notice of the Time and Place of Taking an Account. The time and —
place for taking the account having been fixed, either by the Court, or the
Master, the next step to be taken is to give the notice thereof. This notice is
given not only to the parties interested in the account, and to be affected by it,
but, also, to their respective Solicitors, if both the party and Solicitors reside
in the county if both do not reside in the county, then notice shall be given to
;
the one that does reside in the county, whether he be the party, or his Solicitor,
in all cases in which a party is a non-resident, the notice must be served on his
Solicitor. If the parties are numerous, the notice must be served upon such of
them as the decree, or Master, may designate. The notice shall be executed five
days before the day assigned for taking the account, and the notice should, on
Code, § 4474.
1 the P art of llis <* ief officer. The Code says the
Code' §§4472-4473; Ch. Rule, VII, §9, post,
2 Chancellor "shall punish such neglect," not may
§ 1196 sub-sec, 9. These severe penalties indicate punish. Masters should begin taking proof for their
that Masters have, in the past, been very remiss in reports within thirty days after the order is made,
complying with orders of reference. Such remiss- and should have the last one of their reports on hie
at least five days before the next term. Ui. Kule,
ness greatly retards the final determination of a suit,
and tends to bring the Court into disrepute. The IV, §8, post, 8H93.
„,,„,
Chancellor, who requires diligence on the part of 3 Ch. Rule, IV, §2; post, § 1193.
all litigants, should countenance no negligence on
477 PROCEEDINGS UPON A REFERENCE. § 605
warn the person notified that
its face, if he fail to attend, the account will be
proceeded with ex parte*
The rule that all parties interested in the result of an account are entitled to
attend before the Master at the taking, applies not only to those who are par-
ties, but also to those who are quasi parties,
5
such as (1) creditors who seek
cither to prove a claim of their own, or to disprove the claim of another (2) ;
claimants of any fund or property involved in the litigation, or in the custody

of the Court and (3) purchasers of property sold by order of the Court, when
;
their rights therein or thereto are in question.

The following will serve as a form of
NOTICE OF THE TAKING OF AN ACCOUNT.
John Doe, ]
vs. [ In Chancery, at Dandridge.
Take notice, that, on the 2d of June next, at 10 a. m., at my office in Dandridge, I will
begin the taking of the account ordered in said cause at the last [or, present,] term, when
and where you will attend with your proof, or the account will be proceeded with ex parted
IYou will produce at said time and place the following books, or, papers: {describing them,)
to be used as evidence in the taking of said account.]
May 10, 1891. Dan H. Meek, C. & M.
To Mr. Richard Roe.
§ 605. Meeting of the Parties, and Adjournments. If, on the day desig- —
nated in the notice, the parties, or any of them, attend, the Master will proceed
with the taking of the account, unless, upon affidavit of either party showing
sufficient cause, he adjourn the matter from day to day, or to another day prior
to the time he is required to file his report, at which time, unless he again ad-
journ the same, he will proceed to take the account, and make the report. If
there is no adjournment, the Master will proceed forthwith to examine the
witnesses and other proof introduced and when he has concluded his examina-
;
tion, the account shall be closed, notwithstanding a party may fail to attend. 7
§ 606. —
Opening the Account. If either fail to attend, the account shall be
closed, and no other evidence shall be introduced or heard, 8 unless the party
offering it shall, within ten days by special affidavit, 9 show that he has material
evidence, which was not before the Master at the time fixed for taking the
account, and which he could not by proper diligence have produced at the time
set for taking the account in which case the Master may open the account for
;
the reception of further evidence by both parties upon the same notice pre-
scribed for the original account. 10 The Court, also, may at any time before
confirmation, open the account for additional evidence. 11
§ 607. —
Examination of the Witnesses. When the hour arrives for the tak-
ing of the account, the Master will begin the examination of the witnesses of
4Ch. Rule, IV, §§ 2-5, § 1193. The notice should heard, except upon special affidavit showing sufficient
be served by leaving a copy with the person to be cause.
notified, and returning the original, with a return 9 The special affidavit, like a special affidavit for a
thereon, to the Master. If the parties are numerous, continuance, should (1) give the names of the wit-
the Master should, by an entry on his rule docket, nesses, or the character of the documents; should
designate those to be notified. If the report states (2) specify what the witnesses or documents will
that due notice was given of the time and place of prove, and should (3) show that there was no want
taking the account, that is sufficient evidence of the of due diligence on affiant's part, and no negligence
fact, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. in not producing this evidence before the Master at
2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1171, note. the proper time, and (4) that he can and will have
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1174; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 477. this evidence before the Master if the account is
6 Ch. Rule, IV, § 3. If the order of reference opened. If the evidence specified in the affidavit is
requires any party to produce books, deeds, writings, material, and proper diligence be shown, the Master
or other documents, the notice to him should so may, in his discretion, open the account for addi-
state. tional evidence. Ch. Rule, IV, § 9; § 1193.
7 Ch.Rule, IV, §§ 4-9; § 1193. 10 Ch. Rule, IV, §9; Stull V. Goode, 10 Heisk.,
8 of this part of Chancery Rule, IV,
The meaning 58. When the account is opened^ it should be
§ 9, though somewhat obscure, evidently is: (1) that opened not only for the introduction of the evidence
if neither party attends, the Master will close the
specified in the affidavit, but for such rebutting evi-
account, using such proof as may then be in the dence as the other party may bring forward. The
record; (2) if only one party attends, the Master Master should not open the account generally, as a
rule, but should open it only for the particular evi-
will not wait for the other party, but after taking
the proof of the attending party, will close the ac- dence referred to in the affidavit, and for evidence
count, without waiting for the other, party; and, (3) in rebuttal thereof.
11 Ch. Rule, IV, § 9, post, § 1193; Stull v. Goode,
that when an account has once been closed, whether
§608 PROCEEDINGS UPON A REFERENCE. 478
the party on whom burden of the proof; and, after they have been all
rests the
examined, he will hear the evidence offered by the other party; after which he
will allow rebutting proof. The Master may, however, by consent of parties, or
for good cause, vary this order for the examination of witnesses. In the exam-
ination of a witness, all due formalities should be observed, 12 as in case of tak-
ing depositions.
A witness whose deposition was taken in chief before the hearing, as to any
matter, cannot upon a reference be examined as, to the same matter, by either
the Master or the party whose witness he is, without an order of the Court,
or of the Master, upon affidavit showing cause therefor; but he may be exam-
ined touching any other matter. A witness who was not examined before the
hearing, but who was first examined by the Master at the taking of the account,
may be re-examined by the Master at his discretion. 13 So, also, a witness who
lias been examined on behalf of one party, may be examined by the other party
without an order. 14
A witness who fails to appear before the Master when duly summoned may
be attached and a witness who appears and refuses to answer legal interroga-
;
tories shall be committed by the Master to the county jail until he consents to
give his testimony. 15 The Master has, also, all the powers of a commissioner in
taking depositions. 16
§ 608. —
The Production of Documents. The order of reference frequently
requires some or all of the parties to produce before the Master, all deeds, books,
papers and writings, in their custody or under their control, relating to the
matters of reference, to the end that they may be used in the taking of the ac-
count, or in making the report ordered. In such cases, the Master will notify
the parties to produce such documents, at the same time he notifies them of the
time and place of taking the account. 17 If the order of reference does not
lequire the production of documents by the parties, or if other persons have
books, documents, or other writings under their control, the production of such
books, documents, or other writings, may be enforced by a subpoena duces
tecum. 1 * Documents, when introduced, may be inspected by any party inter-
ested in the reference.
§ 609. —
Character of the Evidence. In taking an account, the order of ref-
orence shows what matters the Master is called on to consider and the plead- ;
ings cannot be looked to except as an explanation of the true meaning of the

order of reference. No evidence should be heard by the Master, unless it will
legitimately aid him in reaching a conclusion on the matters covered by the
reference. On the taking of an account, neither party should be allowed to
introduce proof as to matters not referred to the Master, even when such mat-
ters are put in issue by the pleading because the Master is not trying the cause,
;
19
or preparing it for trial, on the issues raised by the pleadings, but exclusively
20
on the issues raised by the order of reference. If one party is allowed to
travel outside of the order of reference, the other party will want to follow
him, and the result will be that the costs will be greatly increased, the time
12 The Master will find it necessary, to the prompt of a witness are, (1) the danger of perjury by the
and orderly conduct of accounts, to insist on the witness when he knows where the cause pinches, and
enforcement of the regular rules of procedure in how his testimony bore upon it; and (2) the anxiety
taking proof, requiring each party to introduce his of the Court, or Master, to prevent improper tam-
#
proof in the same order as on a trial before the pering with the witness to induce him to retract, or
Chancellor, and requiring each witness to be exam- contradict, or explain away, what he swore in his
ined in the same manner. former examination. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1192.
13 Ch. Rule, IV, §§ 10-11; § 1193, post. The Mas- 15 Ch. Rule, VII, §§ 6-7. See, post, § 1196.
ter must keep in mind that his duty is to reach the 16 See, ante, §§ 492-496.
inner truth of the controversy, and where a witness 17 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1176.
is intelligent, truthful, and familiar with the facts, 18 Code, § 3814. A failure to produce documents,
these characteristics should be considered when his when required by the Court, or by a subpeena duces
re-examination is requested. On the other hand, an tecum, is a contempt, and punishable as such. 2
unreliable witness should never be re-examined, Dan. Ch. Pr., 1179. For a form of a subpeena duces
where other evidence as to the same matter is acces- tecum, see, ante, § 492.
sible. Light does not come from smoke, and pure 19 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1187; 1269, notes.
water cannot flow from an impure fountain. 20 Maury v. Lewis, 10 Yerg., 115; Markham t>.
14 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1191. The reasons which re- Townsend, 2 Tenn. Ch., 718.
quire a special order to authorize the re-examination
479 PROCEEDINGS UPON A REFERENCE. §610
for taking proof greatly prolonged, and the Master greatly perplexed, and per-
haps overwhelmed, by a mass of immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent testi-
mony. The rules of evidence in taking the account are, in no particular, differ-
ent from the rules of evidence in preparing the case for hearing before the
Chancellor., "When incompetent evidence is offered it must be then and there
objected to, or at least objected to before the evidence is closed by the opposite
party, or the objector will be deemed to have waived any objections. Such ob-
jections should be in writing and brought to the attention of the Master, and
the party offering the evidence.
1. What Evidence may be Considered. The parties have the liberty, in any
reference to the Master, to make use of all the pleadings, depositions and docu-
mentary evidence, on fiie in the cause when the order of reference was made. 2
'
The Master must consider, also, all depositions and documentary evidence
taken and filed by any of the parties before he begins to make up his report.
And when the reference is for an account, the parties may, in addition to all
the foregoing evidence, introduce witnesses to be examined by the Master in
person, or by his deputy.
2. Agreements by the Parties. Before the Master begins the examination of
the witnesses, he should call on the parties to know what matters referred to
him are wholly or in part agreed on, what are admitted, and what denied. 22
In this way, the range of investigation may often be greatly narrowed, and
the matters really controverted specifically defined, thus greatly lessening both
the labor and the expense of taking the proof, and making the report. All
such agreements should be reduced to writing, signed and filed.? 3
§ 610. Filing Claims Before the Master, Under a Decree. —Whenever there
fire funds in Court to be administered or distributed, and the Master,
assets or
by order of the Court, is directed to report the parties having interest therein,
or claims thereto, as creditors, legatees, distributees, beneficiaries or otherwise,
any such person, even when not a party to the suit, is authorized, under such
an order, to set up his claim to such assets or funds.
To do this in proper form, he must present his petition, either in open Court,
or before the Master, praying to be allowed to come in under the decree, and
file and prove his claim. 24 This petition should detail the particulars of the
claim, and the circumstances under which it arises and should be accompanied
;
by any written evidence of the claim or claims specified. 25 The petition should
be sworn to as an evidence of the good faith of the petitioner. 26 On the filing
of such a petition, the petitioner is entitled to all the rights of any other party,
so far as is necessary to prove or defend his. claim or debt, and is entitled to
the production of all documents in the possession or power of any of the parties
to the suit relating to his claim and, conversely, the other parties are entitled
;
to the like production of documents in his power or possession. 27

Where publication is made requiring persons to present and prove their
debts or claims within a certain time, or be forever barred, such a publication
will not preclude a person from proving his debt or claim at any time while the
fund is in Court. Such person must, however,, present a sworn petition showing
merits, and explaining satisfactorily his delay. 28
Ordinarily, a creditor or claimant, when a competent witness, may prove his
claim by his own deposition, when it is not contested. It must be remembered,
212 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1188. 26 Miller v. Taylor, 2 Shan. Cas., 462. See, post,
22 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,"1222, note. See, post, § 9S8. § 1003.
23 Counsel should always endeavor to lessen the •26 The sworn petition will not, however, be an
costs and labor of taking the accounts, by agreeing evidence of the justness of the claim; the claim must
to_ such matters as cannot be contested. Ashoit be otherwise proved. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1209.
stipulation as to deeds, contents of records, books, or 2T 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1209, note. If the Master dis-
other documents will often save great costs; as will allows his claim, he may except. Ibid, 1212.
agreements in reference to dates, names of heirs, and 28 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1204-1205. Such a creditor
ages of parties. will, ordinarily, be required to pay any costs occas-
24 The answer of the complainant under oath to ioned by the filing of his petition. Ibid.
§611 THE MASTER'S REPORT. 480
however, that the party representing the estate against which the claim is made,
has a right to the benefit of any defence which he could have made to the claim'
had a bill been filed against him by the claimant to establish such claim; he
may plead the statute of limitations, failure of consideration, set-off, payment
or any other defence. So may one creditor or claimant contest the validity
of the claim of any other creditor or claimant. 29
ARTICLE III.
THE MASTER'S REPORT.
§ 611. The Master's Report, and What it
§ 613. Form of a Master's Report.
Should Contain.
§ 612. Frame of a Master's Report. § 614. When a Report Must be Filed.
§ 611. The Master's Report, and What it Should Contain.— report is ordi- A
narily either (1) a formal statement by the Master showing how. the facts or
matters referred to him are or (2) a formal statement of how he has discharged
;
some duty imposed upon him by the Court. 1 It is, therefore, essential to a com-
plete report that the Master shall fully and definitely respond to every matter
referred to him, to the end that his report may supply the Court with all the
facts called for, or inquired about and in all respects show that the Master
;
has fully and properly discharged every duty imposed on him by the order of
reference.
A perfect report must not only contain everything called for, and show that
every duty imposed has been performed, but it must also contain no recital of
facts not called for, and no statement of acts not required to be done. In
making his report, the Master must confine himself to the matters referred to
him: those matters circumscribe his authority and limit his jurisdiction. All
other matters contained in his report are mere surplusage and impertinence;
and the Court will pay no attention to them, unless to order them to be
stricken out. 2
The report must not only respond to all the requirements of the order of
reference, but it must be positive, definite, and correct; not inferential, hypo-
thetical, or in the alternative as to any matter. The Chancellor wants the
Master's findings as to the facts,. and his positive and affirmative conclusions
as to matters of judgment, or opinion. A
report, giving alternative states of
facts, or alternative conclusions, is no report at all, and will be set aside on
motion. The facts called for must be set forth in the report with such precision
and particularity, and the duty imposed by the reference must be performed
with such fullness and completeness, that the Court will have no difficulty in
basing on the report an adjudication as to all and every matter specified in the
order of reference.
The Court will not allow anything in an account under the name of general
expenses: the party must specify the particulars. 3 Sums in gross will not be
allowed in any case for the party charged therewith has the right to know the
;
items; and lumping charges are generally not only excessive, but are some-
times cloaks for frauds. 4 A
report, for these reasons, should contain no lump-
ing charges, and no lumping credits, but should specify every item of charge
or credit.
29 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1211, note. Ch. Pr., 1295, note. Of course, his regular deputy
1 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1294. Inasmuch as the taking may make and sign a report,
of an account involves the exercise of judgment and 2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1296-1297.
discretion, the Master can not delegate this duty to s 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1232.
another, nor can he adopt an account stated by an- 4 Dolosus versatur in generalibus.
other, either in the same or in another suit. 2 Dan.
481 THE MASTER'S REPORT. §612
§ 612. —
Frame of a Master's Report. The frame of a report is as important
as its contents for a report may contain everything called for by the order of
;
reference, and yet its statements may be so unmethodical, and its arrangement
so unsystematical, and its construction so irregular and chaotic, that no decree
can be predicated upon it without rearranging and restating its contents. As
every order of reference should not only specify, in a separate paragraph, each
particular matter to be reported on, but should also give each item of the ref-
erence in its proper logical order, or legal sequence, and consecutively num-
bered; so a report should, not only respond fully and directly to each of the
particular matters of reference, but should also respond to them in the order
in which they appear in the reference, and should never have under one head
what properly belongs to another head of reference.
The report should not contain any more of the decree or order of reference
than is necessary to show what matters have been referred; nor should the
evidence be either recited, or summarized. Preambles, explanations, and argu-
ments, are wholly out of place in a report, as are also all other matters that
imnecessarily tend to swell its size. What the Chancellor calls for are facts,
—
conclusions and acts, in a word, results, and not the processes by which the
results were reached. 6 The report should not be hypothetical, or in the alter-
native, unless so required and the facts found should be stated with such posi-
;
tiveness and particularity that an issue as to their correctness may be readily

raised by an exception thereto. The report of the Master is in the nature of
a special verdict and his findings should not only be clearly and fully respon-
;
sive to the order of reference, but each finding must be clear, direct, emphatic
and brief. And where sums and amounts are reported on, he should give
each item allowed, and not the gross sum or amount, for otherwise neither
party could intelligently except, not knowing what items had been allowed and
what disallowed. 6
The report must be written in ink, 7 and properly paged and should ; refer, by
page, to the particular pages of the record upon which each item is based. 8 A
reference to a deposition, or to a transcript, is too indefinite, as they may eon-
tain many pages. The number of the question and answer in a deposition may
be referred to, as well as the page.
§ 613. —
Form of a Master's Report. The form of a Master's report can be
readily understood from the foregoing sections, and from the following form. 9
MASTER'S REPORT.
John Doe, j
vs. \ No. 619.— Master's Report to Nov. Term, 1890.

The undersigned respectfully reports that, in obedience to a decree in this cause, pro-
nounced at the last term, directing the Master to hear proof and report
1. What amount was originally due from the defendant, Richard Roe, to the complainant,
for the construction of the dwelling-house referred to in the bill, after deducting payments
made to complainant, before the assignment by complainant to the defendant, Stokes.
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1298-1300, notes; Evans V. except thereto. Every item allowed or disallowed by
Evans, 2 Cold., 143. While the report of the Master the Master, should be set out either in the report,
should not, on the one hand, copy the proof on or in a schedule thereto; and the Master should un-
which it is based, it should not, upon the other hand, der each item give the precise place in the record
be a mere skeleton, presenting nothing but an array where he obtained the proof in reference thereto,
of figures. Each item should be numbered, and giving the document and page, and if a deposition,
when these items rest upon accounts, receipts, or the name of the witness, the page and number of
other vouchers, they should be numbered correspond- the answer. A general reference to a document,
ingly; and where they are supported by depositions, pleading or deposition, is but little better than no
the pages of the depositions should be referred to. reference at all. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1301, notes.
The Master should state the grounds of his action 7 The ink should be black, and the paper should be
in a concise and intelligible manner, referring to the legal cap. Fancy inks and fancy paper are abomina-
pages of the depositions and of documentary evi- tions in Court proceedings; and a sure sign of some
dence, on which he relies. Green v. Lanier, 5 Heisk., infirmity on the part of the officer or Solicitor vol-
662; Stull v. Goode, 10 Heisk., 58. untarily using them.
e The Master's report should not contain any 8 Ch. Rule, IV, §§6-7; post, 1193.
lumping charge or credit, composed of several items, 9 For other forms of Reports, see, post, §§916;
unless accompanied by a schedule of such items; be- 994; 976. The above form is intended to conform to
cause, where a lumping charge or credit is made, the requirements given by Judge Nelson, in Greene
neither party can with any certainty or definiteness, v. Lanier, 5 Heisk., 671.
§ 613 the master's report. 482
2. How much
of the debt due from the complainant to the defendant, Charles Stokes, did
the defendant, Richard Roe, pay, and under what contract; and what payments defendant,
Richard Roe, made to said Stokes thereunder.
3. Was said dwelling-house constructed according to contract; and if not, what deduction
should reasonably be made from the contract price.
4. What amount does the defendant, Richard Roe, owe complainant for building the out-
houses and fences on the lot containing said dwelling-house, after deducting all payments
made, and all other credits.
5. What balance is due from the defendant, Richard Roe, and what part of said balance
belongs to complainant, and what part to the defendant, Charles Stokes.
i.
As to the 1sthead to be reported on, I report that the defendant, Richard Roe, originally
owed the complainant the full contract price for the building of said dwelling house, to-
\t it : • $2,100,00
{Written contract, p. 3.)
Less the following payments :
(1) Paid January 2, 1890, $400.00

{Exhibit No. I, to the dep. of Richard Roe; and dep. of John
Doe, p. 41.)
(2) Paid January 18, 1890 600.00 1,000.00
{Exhibit No. 2, to dep. of Richard Roe; and dep. of John Doe,
P- 42-)
Balance originally due the complainant for the building of said house.... $1,100.00
I find that the payment of $300.00 set up in the answer was not in fact made, for the reason
that the check by which it was sought to be made, was never cashed, and could not have been,
because the defendant, Roe, had no money in the bank subject to such check. {See dep. of
the Cashier, John Jones, pp. 1-2; and dep. of John Doe, p. 8; and the said check, exhibit 3,
to John Doe's dep.)
11.
As to the 2d head to be reported on, I report that the complainant owed defendant, Charles
Stokes, $2,300.00; and that he, on January 20, 1890, gave said Stokes an order in writing on
the defendant, Richard Roe, for all the balance due complainant for constructing said house.
{See dep. of John Doe, p. 8; and dep. of Richard Roe, p. 5.) This order was accepted by the
defendant, Roe, and on it he has made the following payments
•
Paid Charles Stokes, Jan. 21, 1890, $400.00

{Dep. of Stokes, p. 3; dep. of Roe, p. 6.)
Paid Charles Stokes, Feb. 25, 1890, 300.00
{Dep. of Stokes, p. 4; dep. of Roe, p. 7.)
Total amount paid by the defendant, Roe, to Stokes, on said order $700.00
III.
Asto the 3d head of reference, I report that while thehouse was not constructed strictly
agreed to accept it, and did accept
according to the original contract, yet the defendant, Roe,
it, as though it had been so constructed; and that such acceptance
was based on a sufficient
consideration, consisting of additional work done and materials furnished by complainant,
and of delays caused by Richard Roe, himself.
.{Deps. of John Doe, p. 12; and James Johnson, p. 4.)
IV.
As to the 4th head of reference, I report that the defendant, Roe, owes complainant for
building the said out-houses and a fence a balance of $218.00
As follows
Total cost of materials and labor, $480.00
{Dep. of John Doe, p. 18; and exhibit 5 to his dep.)
Paid Charles Stokes on said order, 262.00
{Deps. Stokes, p. 3, and Roe, p. 12.)
The defendant, Roe, claims a deduction of $20.00 because the fence is not straight. This
claim I disallow 1st, because it was straight when built and accepted, {Dep. of Doe, p. 18;)
:
and 2d, the crooks in it were caused by defendant, Roe's, clothes' lines being tied to the fence
in wet weather {Dep. of Sarah Cook, pp. 2-3.)
Defendant Stokes agrees that the said balance of $218.00 belongs to complainant, and that
complainant owes him nothing after he gets the sum of $286.13, as shown under head v.
(Dep. of Stokes, p. 6.)
v.
As to the Sth head of reference, I report that the defendant, Richard Roe, owes
1. On the dwelling house, principal, ^92 92-
Interest, from Jany. 1, 1890, 47.00

{Dep. of John Doe, p. 14.)
$34700
This balance of $347.00, I find to belong as follows
483 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER S REPORT. §614
To defendant,- Charles Stokes, . .
.' $286.13
(See deps. of Charles Stokes, p. 8, and John Doe, p. 14.)
To complainant, -John Doe, ,
60.87
(See same deps. and pages as next above.)
$347.00
By agreement between defendant, Stokes, and complainant, the said balance was to be
used to pay whatever sum complainant yet owed him, Stokes, and they agree that said sum
is $286.13, and the remainder of said $347.00 is the property of complainant. (Dep. of Charles
Stokes, p. 3.)
2. Balance owing by defendant, Richard Roe, on the out-houses and fence . . $218.00
(Dep. of Stokes, p. 6.)
Total Balance due from defendant, Richard Roe, $565.00
Of which there is due defendant, Stokes, $286.13
And due complainant, Doe, 278.87 565.00
All of which is respectfully submitted, this Oct. 13, 1890.

W. L. Trent, C. & M.
§ 614. When —
a Report must be Filed. If the order or decree prescribes a
lime when a report shall be filed, the report must be filed within such time, or a
satisfactory excuse given in writing to the Chancellor, by the same time, in lieu
of such report; 10 and a failure so to do makes the Master liable to severe pen-
alties. 11 If the time for filing the report is not prescribed by the order of ref-
erence, the report must be filed five days before the first day of the term suc-
ceeding the order of reference. 12 The object of having the report filed before
the first day of the term is to enable the Solicitors of the parties to examine it,
and file such exceptions to it as they may desire these exceptions must be filed :
on or before the second day of the term, or sooner if the cause is sooner reached
on the docket; 13 and hence the necessity of having the Master's report on file
at as early a day as possible. 14 If the Master fails to file his report within the
time required, he must file, in lieu, a valid excuse in writing, duly verified by
his oath. 15 The Master must note upon the hearing docket, and also upon the
Chancellor's docket, opposite the cause, the fact that his report has been filed. 16
ARTICLE IV.
PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER'S REPORT.
615. Exceptions to a Master's Report. § 618. When and How to Correct Errors
616. Form of Exceptions to a Master's Re- Not Reached by Exceptions.
port, and Decree Thereon. § 619. Effect of a Master's Report.
617. When
and How
Exceptions are Dis- § 620. Effect of Confirmation of a Master'
posed of. Report.
§ 615. Exceptions to a Master's Report. After a report has been filed, the —
fact should be noted at once on the dockets of the bar and the Chancellor,
opposite the cause, 1 so that the parties interested may have notice of the filing,
and thus be enabled to examine the report. If any party is dissatisfied with a
report on the. ground that he has material evidence not "before the Master, and
which he could not by proper diligence have produced, he may, within ten days
Code, § 4471.
10 Such laggardness so interferes with the administra-
Ante, § 603.
11 tion of justice that it should be stimulated into stat-
12
Ch. Rule, IV, § 8; post, § 1193. utory activity by the rigid application of the statu-
Ch. Rule, IV, § 12; post, § 1193.
13 tory penalties. Masters must understand that it is
l*
Notwithstanding the imperative language of the .not only a gross neglect of duty, but, also, a con-
statute, and its peremptory repetitions; notwith- tempt of Court, and a violation of law, to fail to file
standing the severe penalties imposed, cumulative in a complete report, or a sworn excuse, within the
their character; and notwithstanding the exhorta- time required. Code, §§ 4471-4474; Ch. Rule. VII
tions of the Chancellor and of counsel, there are §9.
some Masters who will persist in so delaying to
'
15 Code, § 4472; Ch. Rule, VII, § 9; post, S 1196

comply with an order of reference, that the term 18 Ch. Rule TV SB- A/irf S110?
§615 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER'S REPORT. 484
after closing the account, file a special affidavit showing these facts, and move
the Master to open the account. 2 If, however, a party has no additional evi-
dence, or if ten days have elapsed, he must except to the report if dissatisfied
with it.
Exceptions to a Master's report are proper only in those cases which he has
come to a wrong conclusion upon the matters referred to him. Where he pro-
ceeds irregularly, 3 or neglects to report upon all the matters referred to him,
or failed to give notice, or heard improper proof, improperly refused to re-
open the account, or to grant a continuance, or otherwise denied a party his -
just rights, the proper course for the aggrieved party is to apply to the Court
to set aside the report, and refer it back to the Master, with proper directions, 4
supporting his application by affidavit of the facts, when they do not otherwise
sufficiently appear. Exceptions are in the nature of special demurrers to the
_
report, and must be based upon the report, and not on matters outside of the
report; 5 and must clearly and distinctly specify the matter, or item, excepted
to, 6 and why excepted to. The exceptions must be numbered, and refer to the
page or pages of the report "which show the item or matter excepted to; and,
also, refer to the page or pages of the depositions, or other parts of the record,
by which the Master's report is sought to be impeached. 7
Exceptions should not be prolix, or argumentative, but should state concisely
the fault imputed to the report; 8 and should show what the report should have
been, on the matter excepted to. And when a party excepts to a report which
contains a number of items, he must specify the particular items of which he
complains. He cannot by a general exception impose upon the Court the burden
of examining every item in the report in order to ascertain the error. 9
A general exception to a Master's report will not be noticed; neither will a
specific exception unless proper reference is made to the page or pages of
the deposition, or other evidence, by which the exception is sought to be sus-
tained; for the exceptant cannot, either by general exceptions, or by general
references to the proof, impose on the Court the burden of hunting for errors,
or for proof to sustain exceptions. 10 The report is presumed to be correct,
and the party who disputes that correctness, must clearly and specifically desig-
nate the precise errors he complains of, and the precise proof in the record
showing such errors: in short, he must put his finger both on the error and
the proof of the error. 11
A party cannot, by means of exceptions to a report, reopen any matter adju-
dieated prior to the report. The Master, in making his report, is bound by the
decree ordering the report, and by the former decrees, if any and so are the ;
parties. A
party cannot, therefore, have the benefit of a rehearing, or of a
bill of review, or of an appeal, or of a writ of error, or of an original bill, by
12 The former proceedings are conclusive as to
filing exceptions to a report.
the matters of reference. Exceptions to a report must be confined to the report
iiself, and to the evidence on which it is based. If the Master has obeyed the
order of reference, and his report is sustained by the facts in the record, excep-
tions are of no avail. 13 The office of exceptions is to show that the Master has
not followed the order of reference, or has not made proper deductions from
the evidence in the case.
2 Ch. Rule, IV, § 9. Creditors, claimants, and T Ch. Rule, IV, § 13; post, 1193; Green v. Lanier,
other quasi parties, may have an account opened, or 5 ITeisk., 670.
may file exceptions, in the same manner, and_ on the 82 Dan. Ch IV., 1309. note.
same terms, as parties to the record: but if their 9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1315, note. See, also, White r.
claims are disallowed, and not referred to in the re- Cox, 4 Hay., 213.
port, they should first obtain leave of the Court to 10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1315, note. A
reference to a
file exceptions. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1311. deposition is too indefinite. The reference must
3 The fact that the Master employed a party as an give the page of the deposition, or the number of the
amanuensis in making his report is no ground of question and answer.
exception, no improper conduct being shown. Long- 11 The Court will not notice any exceptions to a
rcire v. Fain, 5 Pick., 393. Masters' report, except those that point to the par-
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1309, note. See, post, § 618. ticular item or matter excepted to. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
5 Musgrovev. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch., 576. 1815, note.
o Ridley v. Ridley, 1 Cold., 323; Goddard ". Cox, 12 Maury v. Lewis, 10 Yerg., 119.
1 Lea. 112; Musgrove l'. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch.. 576. 13 Musgrove V. Lusk, 2 Tenn. Ch., 576.
485 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER'S REPORT. § 616
Any who is a party, or a quasi party, to the suit, may take exceptions
person
to a report. Creditors and claimants, whose debts and claims have been al-
lowed, or disallowed, may except either as to matters connected with their
own claims, or as to allowances made to other creditors or claimants. If there
be nothing in the report, or in the proof, that will support an exception by a
creditor or claimant whose claim has been unjustly disallowed, he should file
an affidavit, or present a sworn petition, showing the facts, and have the report
recommitted as to his claim, with proper directions. 14
No one can except unless he has been aggrieved; he cannot except because
another party, even an infant, has been aggrieved. 15
§ 616. Form of Exceptions to a Master's Report, and Decree Thereon. In —
drawing exceptions to a Master 's report, no technical set form is indispensable
the essential matter is that the exceptions should clearly and distinctly state
the matter or item excepted to, and also refer to the page or pages of the evi-
dence sustaining the exception and impeaching the report. 16 The following is
the usual form of
EXCEPTIONS TO A MASTER'S REPORT.
John Doe, ]
vs. V No. 619

Exceptions of the defendant, Richard Roe, to the report of the Master filed in this cause
on Oct. 13, 1890
1st. The Master has, under the 1st head of his report, (page 4,) charged this defendant
with $2,100.00, as the contract price of the dwelling-house, whereas the weight of the proof
is that complainant subsequently agreed to do all the work, and furnish all the materials, for
$2,000.00. (Deps. of Richard Roe, p. 8; Sarah Roe, p. 6; and Wm. George, p. j.)
2d. The Master under the 3d head of his report, (page 6,) reports that this defendant
agreed to accept the house as though it had been constructed according to contract, and fails
to allow any deduction for defective work and materials, and for work not done whereas he ;
should have reported the following deductions

(1) Defective chimneys, $40.00
{Dep. of Wm. George, p. $, q. 13.)
(2) Defective stair-case, . . - 18.00 • •
{Dep. of J as. Neal, p. 3, q. 7.)

(3) Defective doors 14.00
(Dep. las. Neal, p. 4, q. 9.)
(4) Defective plastering, 25.00
(Dep. of Richard Roe, p. 9; and Jas. Neal, p. 5, q. 12.)
3d. The Master fails to allow under the 4th head, (p. 8,) any deduction for defects in
the fence, whereas he should have allowed $20.00, the cost of straightening it. (Deps. of John
Dike, p. 3; and Richard Roe, p. 12, q. 18.)
4th. The Master reports under the 5th head of his report, (p. 10,) a total balance due from
this defendant of $565.00; whereas said balance is only $348.00, being $217.00 less than the
report. [This amount of $217.00 is composed of the additional credits claimed in the preceding
exceptions.)
Wherefore, this defendant excepts to said report, and appeals therefrom to the Court.
Henry H. Ingersoll, Solicitor.
The following is the form of a decree disposing of the foregoing exceptions
to the Master's report, showing the various rulings of the Court on the various
exceptions
DECREE ON EXCEPTIONS TO A REPORT.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 619

This cause coming on fthis day to be heard before Hon. T. S. Logan, Judge, sitting by inter-
change, upon the whole record in the cause, but especially upon the Report of the Master,
filed Oct. 13, 1890, and the exceptions of the defendant, Richard Roe, to said report and ar- ;
gument of counsel having been heard, and the premises understood by the Court, the Court
overrules and disallows the first of said exceptions, and sustains and allows the third of said
exceptions and as to the second and fourth exceptions, the report is recommitted, and
;
both
14 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1311. mand for a report on correct principles. Hardwick
"arawick
lB
„_ _ t
Musgrove v. L
usk 2 , Tenn. Ch., 576. .When a | V. Can. Co.,
.5 Gates, 657.
§ 617 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTERS REPORT. 486
parties are allowed ten days to file additional proof as to the matters referred to in said second
exception. At the end of said ten days the Master will make and file his report in reference
to said matters, and will show the balance due from the exceptant, Richard Roe.
All other matters are reserved until the incoming of said report.
The foregoing forms illustrate most of the features usually found in excep-
tions to reports, and in decrees ruling on such exceptions; but the following
form will serve as a further illustration of such exceptions and decrees
EXCEPTIONS TO A REPORT.
John Den, ]
vs. \ No. 723.
Richard Fen. J
Exceptions taken by the said defendant to the report of the Master made in this cause
to the present term of the Court
1st Exception. For that the Master has in and by his said report, (Item I, page 2,) stated
that the said complainant paid said defendant, on the 5th of December, 1887, $5,000, and
charges this defendant with the same, and interest thereon, whereas the proof does not show
that such payment was, in fact, ever made.
2nd Exception. For that the Master has in his said report, (Item V, page 10,) stated that
the value of the rents and profits of the tract of land in controversy in this suit, while occu-
pied by the complainant, at only $50.00 a year, whereas the proof shows them to have been of
the yearly value of $100.00. {See dep. of Frank Fen, page 12, q. 21.)
3rd Exception. For that the Master has in his said report, (Item VII, page 12,) stated that
the value of the permanent improvements erected by the complainant on said tract of land at
$1,000, whereas, according to the weight of the evidence, they are not worth more than $600.00.
(See dep. of Geo. Bird, pp. p to 12; and dep. of Thos. Cate, p. 8, q. 10.)
4th Exception. For that the Master should, in his said report, have allowed the defendant
$200.00, the amount of the check referred to in the answer. The report wholly ignores said
check. (See dep. of Richard Fen; and the affidavits of John Carr and James Crow, herewith
Hied, and marked respectively exhibit A, and exhibit B, to these exceptions.)
In all of which particulars, the defendant excepts to said report, and appeals therefrom
to the judgment of the Court. T. S. Webb, Solicitor.
DECREE ON EXCEPTIONS TO A REPORT.

John Den, 1
vs. \ No. 723.

Richard Fen. J
On this 10th day of June, 1891, before the Hon. B. M. Estes, Chancellor, came on for argu-
ment, the exceptions taken by the defendant to the report of the Master, made in this cause
to the present term of the Court; and the Court having heard read the report, the proof
referred to therein, and the exceptions, and being of the opinion that the first exception
taken as aforesaid, being for that the Master, in and by his said report, has stated that the
complainant paid said defendant, on the 5th day of December, 1887, the sum of five thousand
dollars, and charges the defendant with the same, and interest thereon, is well taken, the same
is sustained. And the Court being of opinion that the second exception taken as aforesaid,
being for that the Master in and by said report, stated the value of the permanent improve-
ments erected by the complainant on the tract of land in controversy, in his suit at one thousand
dollars, the Court orders that eight hundred dollars, and no more, be allowed for said im-
provements, that appearing to the Court to be their reasonable value, and said third exception
is, to that extent, sustained and allowed. The matters contained in the defendant's fourth
exception, relative to the bank check, referred to in the answer, and in the defendant's affida-
vits in support of his said fourth exception, not being sufficiently clear to the Court, the report
is recommitted as to said matters, and the Master will report thereon at the end of ten days
herefrom, hearing the proof on file, and any additional proof filed by the parties, or either of
them. All other matters are reserved until the incoming of this report.
§ 617. When and How Exceptions are Disposed Of. All exceptions to a —
Master 's report must be on or before the second day of the term to which
filed
the report is made returnable, unless the cause is sooner reached on the docket,
in which event. the exceptions must be filed at the calling of the cause; in
either case, the exceptions shall be immediately set down for argument, and
shall be heard and disposed of like a motion, provided they are disposed of by
the Court before or when the cause is reached for trial. 17
On the argument of exceptions, the exceptant has the right to open and con-
clude. 18 The better practice is to hear argument on both sides as to one excep-
17 Ch. Rule, IV, §§ 12; 15; post, § 1193. Excep- I made in the Supreme Court. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1302,
tions not taken in the Chancery Court cannot be note.
I
18 Upon the hearing of exceptions, the exceptant
487 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER'S REPORT. § 618
tion before taking up the next exception. Before argument the proof should
be read, or, at least, so much of it as refers to the matters contained in the
exceptions or the Chancellor can allow counsel for the exceptant to read dur-
;
ing his argument such parts of the evidence as sustain his exceptions, and can
allow opposite counsel, during his argument, to read so much of the evidence
as sustains the report, confining the exceptant's counsel, however, to the pages
of evidence specified in his exceptions.
Upon the argument of exceptions, the Court may sustain some and overrule
others, or may sustain in part and overrule in part. Upon sustaining one or
more exceptions, the Court may either recommit the report of the Master
with directions to review it as to the exceptions sustained; or the Chancellor
raay himself correct the error specified in the exception, without recommitting
the report, and thereupon confirm the report as by him corrected, or modified. 19
The Chancellor will not, however, during the argument of exceptions, consider
any general exceptions, or any matter in a report not excepted to. 20 Matters
not excepted to are deemed correct.
Exceptions cannot be taken to a Master's report after it has been confirmed:
confirmation makes it a part of the decree. If, therefore, a party desires to
except to a report that has been confirmed, he must first have the decree of
confirmation set aside. If the party show grounds of exception, and, also, show
that he was prevented from excepting by fraud, surprise, or mistake, the Court,
if it has not lost control of the decree of confirmation, will set it aside, and
allow the report to be excepted to. In general, however, the Court is very cau-
tious in admitting applications to review a Master's report after it has been
confirmed and it is only in cases of fraud, surprise, or mistake, that it will be
;
permitted. 21
FINAL DECREE ON A REPORT.
John Den,
vs. —
No. 723. Final Decree.
Richard Fen.
This cause coming on to be further and finally heard, this July 20, 1891, before Hon. B. NT.
Estes, Chancellor, upon the whole record in the cause, and especially on the report of the
Master, filed June 20, 1891, and the exception of defendant thereto, and upon argument of
counsel, on consideration of all which, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that said excep-
tion be overruled and disallowed, and said report confirmed; and that the defendant is justly
indebted to the complainant by reason of the premises, in the sum of thirteen hundred dollars.
(7/ the complainant has no lien on any property to secure his debt, the decree zvill then
proceed as follows:] for all of which and the costs of the cause, which are adjudged against
the defendant, an execution will issue. [If the debt is a lien on real estate, conclude the
decree after the words "thirteen hundred dollars" as follows:]
And it further appearing that complainant is entitled to have said sum declared a lien on
the tract [or lot] of land described in the bill, it is so ordered, adjudged and decreed.
And if said sum of thirteen hundred dollars and all the costs of the cause are not paid
into the office of the Clerk and Master of the Court in satisfaction of this decree within
sixty days, the Clerk and Master will, in the manner required by law, sell said tract [or lot]
of land to the highest and best bidder, on a credit of six, twelve, eighteen and twenty-four
months [&c. See balance of decree in § 626, post.]
§ 618. When and How to Correct Errors not Reached by Exceptions. Ex-
ceptions will not reach any error not apparent in the report, or in the accom-
panying proofs. If, therefore, the Master (1) takes an account without notice,
or (2) rules out material and admissible evidence, so that it does not appear in
the record, or (3) if the Master refuses to examine a material and competent wit-
ness, or (4) if the Master admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence,
or
must confine himself to the exceptions, and will not It is sometimes advisable to take up and dispose
be allowed to raise other objections to the report, nor of an important exception before taking up the next
to go behind the decree. The exceptions and the first hearing the part of the report excepted to,
argument must be founded on the facts stated in then
the exception to such part, and lastly argument for
the report, or in the accompanying proofs; and evi- and against the exception, each side in his argu-
dence which was not before the Master cannot be ment referring to the evidence he relies on
read. If a party has new evidence, he should not 19 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1318-1319, notes.
except, but move the Court to open the account and 20 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1315, note.
recommit the report. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1317, notes;
r* —1J 1 ... r*-_.
->l Ibid, 1314, note; 1321.
§619 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTERS REPORT. 488
improperly refuses to open the account on application made to him, or
(5) if
the Master commits any other error in taking an account which cannot be ade-
quately presented to the Court by exceptions to the report, the party injured
may bring the matter before the Chancellor at Chambers, or in open Court, and
obtain any order necessary to correct the error, and give the injured party the
relief he is entitled to, supporting his motion by affidavit if the facts* do no*,
otherwise appear. In such cases, if the report has not been filed, the Chancello-
may, at Chambers, 22 or in Court direct the Master to receive the rejected evi-
dence, or reject the received evidence, or hear the rejected witness, or open the
account and if the report has been filed, it may be recommitted, with proper
;
instructions to the Master. In cases of this sort, exceptions will not enable the
party injured to obtain the relief he is entitled to. 23
If the Master was prejudiced against a party, or had expressed an opinion,
or was nearly related to one of the parties, or was interested in the litigation,
on such fact being made known to the Chancellor, either in vacation, or in term
time, he may appoint a commissioner to take the account, 24 the application for
fcuch appointment being made in due season, and the applicant not having
waived the Master's incompetency.
The party injured by any act of the Master specified in this section should
bring the matter before the Chancellor at the first opportunity. Acts ol acqui-
escence, after knowledge, will be deemed a waiver of any error, or disability, of
the Master.
If a party, or quasi party, desires to introduce new evidence, he must file a
special affidavit, detailing such evidence, showing clearly its materiality, and
cogency, explaining satisfactorily why it was not introduced before the Master,
and why application to open the account was not made to the Master on such ;
an affidavit the Court may recommit the report to the Master, on such terms
and with such directions as will effectuate the ends of justice. 25
§ 619. A
Effect of a Master's Report.— Master's report is in the nature of a
special verdict, and exceptions to it are in the nature of a motion for a new
trial and the Court will not overrule it unless the evidence clearly preponder-
;
ates against it. The burden is on the party excepting, to establish the mistake,
or misconduct, or disability, alleged. Where a matter of fact, depending on
conflicting testimony, and the credibility of witnesses, has been referred to the
Master, his decision will not be interfered with, unless it is a plain case of error,
or mistake, especially when the witnesses were examined before him. 26 The
result is, the Court will not allow an exception to the Master's report, unless
the exception is clearly sustained by the weight of the evidence, or otherwise
affirmatively appears to be well taken.
The effect of confirming a report is the same as though the facts contained
in the report had been ascertained by the Court, upon argument and due con-
sideration of the record in the cause. Indeed, if a report is confirmed without
exceptions filed, the facts found by the Master will, on appeal to the Supreme
Court, be conclusive whereas, if the Chancellor had upon argument found the
;
same facts, his finding would be inconclusive, and subject to modification, or

reversal, on appeal or writ of error.
§ 620. Effect of Confirmation of a Master's Report. Master's report —A
when unexcepted to is confessed to be true and correct, in so far as said report
is responsive to the order of reference and a decree confirming it is conclusive
;
upon all parties, including minors properly represented, after the term is
passed. 27 Neither can such a report when so confirmed be set aside in the
Supreme Court, even when the report is erroneous on the proof 28 but may be ;
22 Code, §§4410; 4416. judge of their credibility than is the Chancellor. See
23 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1309; 1317-1319, notes. Brown v. Dailey, 1 Pick., 218; and Turley V. Turley,
24 Code, § 4414. 1 Pick., 251.
•jr. Ch. Rule, IV, § 9. 27 Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359;
28 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1298; 1321, notes. When the Grimstead r. Huggins, 13 Lea, 728.
Master sees and hears the witnesses, he is a better 28 Ibid.
489 PROCEEDINGS UPON A MASTER'S REPORT. §620
set aside on an original bill surcharging and falsifying the report and decree
for fraud. 29
When a Master's report is confirmed by the Chancellor on exceptions as to
facts,such concurrence has the force and effect of a verdict of a jury and judg-
ment thereon, and is conclusive on the Supreme Court. 30 But a concurrent find-
ing of law, 31 or of a mixed question of law and fact, or of fact based on mere
opinions or estimates, 32 is not conclusive but subject to review and redetermina-
tion in the Supreme Court, and this is so even when the Court of Chancery
Appeals also concurs on a question of law. 33
29 Vaccaro v. Cicalla, 5 Pick., 63, 76. as estimates as to fees of Solicitors, or compensa-
30 Hicks v. Porter, 6 Pick., 1 ; Fitzsimmons v. tion of guardians, administrators and other trustees.
Johnson, 6 Pick., 416; Dollman v. Collier, 8 Pick., 33 Hascall v. Hafford, 23 Pick., 355. A mixed
660. See, post, § 1302. question of law and fact should not be referred to
31 Railroad v. Knoxville, 14 Pick., 1. the Master. Ibid.
32 Pearson v. Gillenwaters, 15 Pick., 446. Such
ij 621 DECREES OF SALE. 490
CHAPTER XXXI.
DBCEBES OF SALE, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Sales Generally Considered.
Article II. Report of Sale, and Proceedings Thereon.
Article III. The Opening of Biddings.
Article IV. Purchasers' Duties, Rights, and Liabilities.
Article V. Payment of Money Under a Decree to Parties
Entitled.
ARTICLE I.
SALES GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
§ 621. When a Sale Will be Decreed. 625. When Private Sales Will be Made by
§ 622. What Should Appear of Record When the Court.
Land Sold for Debt.
is 626. Form of a Decree of Sale.
§ 623. Sale of Land in Bar of Redemption. 627. Duties of the Master in Reference to
§ 624. Duties of the Court in Making Sales. Sales.
§ 621. —
When a Sale will be Decreed. The Chancery Court will, by decree,
order the Clerk and Master, or a special commissioner, or a receiver appointed
for that purpose, to sell property, real or personal, in the following cases
1. Where the property is described in the bill; and its sale is prayed for, and
is necessary, to enforce some lien or trust, created by the contract of the parties,
or by operation of law, or by the decree of the Court.
2. Where the bill is filed to sell ^he property therein described (1) for par- :
tition among tenants in common (2) for reinvestment in case of persons under
;
disability; (3) for the maintenance or education of persons under disability;

(4) to pay the debts of a decedent; (5) to wind up an insolvent or dissolved
corporation; or (6) to pay the debts of a fraudulent vendor.
3. Where property described in the bill has been attached, or otherwise im-
pounded, during the progress of the cause.
4. Where, in any other case, the sale of the property described in the bill is
necessary, or proper, for the due enforcement of the rights of any of the parties
to the suit.
5. Where property has been levied on by attachment or execution, and for
some reason has not been sold by the officer levying the writ.
§ 622. What Should Appear of Record when Land is Sold for Debt. Before —
land can be properly sold for debt the following facts should appear of record,
or in the decree for sale:
1. The owner of the land must be before the Court.
2. A debt necessitating such sale must be established by sufficient proof.
1
3. The precise amount of this debt must be ascertained and stated in the
decree. 2
The land to be sold must be described in the decree, or by reference to the
4.
bill,or to the attachment or execution levy, or to some other part of the record,
so as to identify it 3 and such land must not be different from that sought to be
;
reached by the bill, if any be so sought. 4

1 Miller v. Taylor, 2 Shan. Cas., 461. are sold the acreage should be known, and sales in
2 Pryor v. Coleman, 2 Shan. Cas., 257; Lewis 1). gross not allowed. Horn v. Denton, 2 Sneed, 125.
Baker, 1 Head., 388; Codwise V. Taylor, 4 Sneed, 4 A decree is coram non judice and void that sells
351; Denny v. Steakley, 2 Heisk., 156. a different tract from that described in the bill.
3 And when the lands of parties under disability Bank v. Carpenter, 13 Pick., 437.
491 DECREES OF SALE. §623
5. The homestead and dower should be carved out when either or both en-
cumber the land.
6. The right of redemption should be preserved, unless good reasons exist
for a sale in bar of redemption.
5
7. Opportunity should be given to the debtor to pay the debt before the sale.
6
8. The sale should be duly advertised.
9. If there be more tracts than one, each tract should be sold separately,
unless, for sufficient reasons appearing in the record, the Court should order
two or more adjoining tracts to be consolidated and sold as one. 7
§ 623. Sale of Land in Bar of Redemption. Man naturally loves the land —
he owns, and in all ages among all civilized nations, the law has regarded a
man's home as sacred, and has declared that when sold it should be subject to
redemption.
1. When the Right to Redeem Exists, and When it May be Barred. Ordinarily, —
under our law, real estate sold for debt under any judicial procedure is sold
subject to redemption at any time within two years after such sale. 8 But where,
upon a foreclosure of a mortgage, or deed of trust, or in any case the specific
land to be sold is mentioned in the decree, the Court, upon application of the
complainant, may order:
1. That the property be sold on a credit of not less than six months, nor more
than two years.
2. That when the sale is made and reported, and confirmed, no right of re-
demption or repurchase shall exist in the debtor or his creditors, but that the
purchaser's title shall be absolute. 9
Under these provisions of the Code three things must be done to maKe -i
decree destroy the right of redemption 1st, the complainant must pray in his
:
bill that the land specified in the bill be sold on a credit, and in bar of the
equity of redemption 2d, this specified land must be mentioned in the decree
;
of sale; and 3d, the decree must order that the sale be on a credit, specifying
1he time, which must be not less than six months, nor more than two years, and
that when made no right of redemption shall exist. 10 The statute evidently
contemplated that no part of the purchase price should, on such a sale, be re-
quired to be paid in cash, but the Supreme Court has decided that if, on facts
appearing in the record, when the decree is made, a cash payment will not inter-
fere with the obtaining of a full and fair price, the Court may require a portion
of the purchase money to be paid in cash. 11 But, if such justifying facts do not
so appear in the record, a sale requiring any portion of the purchase money to
be paid in cash will vitiate the sale and, on appeal or writ of error, the Supreme
;
Court will set the sale aside and order a resale, and allow the right of redemp-
tion from the day of such resale. 12 It is not imperative on the Chancellor to
order a sale on credit, barring the equity of redemption, merely because the
5 Lewis v. Baker, 1 Head, 388; Codwise v. Taylor, The parties are all sui juris, and consent to sale for
4 Sneed, 351. cash, in whole or in part.
6 See, post, § 627. As a rule, the prepayment of any cash lessens the
T Pryor v. Coleman, 2 Shan. Cas., 257; Cooke v. price bid for the land somewhat in proportion to the
Walters, 2 Lea, 1 16. percentage of cash required; that is to say, if ten
8 Code, § 2124. per cent, cash is required, the land will, ordinarily,
9 Code, § 4489. bring ten per cent, less, and this percentage holds
10 McBee V. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558; Thruston V. good until about the limit of 25 per cent. And of
Belote, 12 Heisk.; 250; Glass v. Porter, 7 Bax., 114; what benefit is it to any one, except the Clerks, to
Turner v. Argo, 5 Pick., 443. have ten per cent, of the purchase money paid in
11 Hodges V. Copely, 11 Heisk., 335; McBee V. cash?
McBee, 1 Heisk., 558. The Master may be required Neither should a tract of land be sold first in lots,
to report whether a cash payment will prevent the and then as a whole, adopting the sale bringing the
land being sold for a full and fair price. larger sum in the aggregate. In such a case, shrewd
No cash should ever be required, unless: 1, The and scheming bidders will combine, and not bid when
sale is made in the enforcement of a contract ex- the lots are sold separately, but wait until the prop-
pressly providing for a sale for cash, and then it is erty is sold as a whole, .and then bid a nominal ad-
the duty of the Court to sell for cash. Knox 1>. vance, and, on confirmation of the sale, partition the
McCain, 13 Lea, 197; or 2, Some cash is impera- property between them. To defeat such a device, let
tively required to discharge taxes, or other pressing the property be sold as a whole first, and then sell 't
encumbrances; or 3, The interests of the owners of in lots: this method outs Door and honest men nn
§ 624 DECREES of sale. 492
complainant asks for such relief in his bill. It is a matter of sound legal discre-
tion to be exercised in view of the facts of the case. 13
2. When the Right to Redeem Does Not Exist. In construing the various sec-
tions of the Code relative to the equity of redemption, 14 it is apparent that it
is_ intended to exist in cases only where the land is sold for debt of the owner
of the land, and it therefore does not exist in the following cases
1. Where land is resold by the Court for the purchase money due from the
purchaser at the original Court sale, he failing to pay the full amount of his
bid. In such a case, the resale may be made for cash, without the equity of
redemption. 15
2. Where land is sold in an administration cause for the payment of the
debts of the decedent. 16
3.Where land is sold for partition of proceeds among tenants in common. 17
4.Where the lands of married women, infants, 18 idiots, lunatics, or persons
of unsound mind 19 are sold for support, education, reinvestment or division.
When land is sold in any bf the foregoing cases it is not necessary for the
decree to bar the equity of redemption.
§ 624. —
Duties of the Court in Making Sales. It is an exercise of great power
on the part of a Court to sell a man's property, and especially his land, against
his will and, in making a judicial sale, the Court should diligently see 1, That
; :
the proper parties are before the Court to give a good title to the purchaser
2. That the pleadings and proofs justify the sale; 20 3, That there is a proper
decree of sale 21 4, That the sale is made by the Master in strict compliance with
;
the decree 5, That the best price possible is obtained for the property sold, and
;
6, That the report of sale by the Master, and the confirmation thereof, are in
regular form. The Court acts as a sort of judicial agent for the parties in
making a sale. 22
In making sales of property, real or personal, the Court has two great duties
to discharge a duty to the owner of the property, and a duty to the buyer of
;
the property. The duty to the owner of the property is discharged when the
highest possible price has been obtained for it 23 and the duty to the purchaser
;
is discharged by giving him a good title to what he buys, or, at least, such a
title as he has the right in reason to expect. 24 It savors of judicial tyranny
and oppression, and is certainly judicial injustice, either to sacrifice the owner,
by selling his property for a grossly inadequate price, or to sacrifice the buyer,
by taking his money and giving him no title or other consideration in return.
§ 625. When Private Sales will be Made by the Court. While sales by —
the Master are generally made publicly, and on due advertisement of the time,
place and terms, 25 nevertheless, inasmuch as a Court of Chancery is bound by
no forms, but looks to the substance of things, and strives to best promote the
interests of all concerned, cases often arise when the Chancellor deems it expe-
dient for the welfare of the parties to order the Master to sell at private sale
or the Chancellor may accept an offer made directly to the Court, or may
ratify a sale already made, and that, too, even when persons under disability
have an interest in the land. The question for the consideration of the Court
in case of persons under disability is not how the land has been sold, but the ne-
13 Hoyal v. Bryson, 6 Heisk., 142. See, post, of the parties are under disability the number of
§ 1141; sub-sec, 6. acres in the tract should be ascertained before sale
14 Code. §§ 2124; 4489. is made. Horn v. Denton, 2 Sneed, 12S ; and reason-
15 Mosby V. Hunt, 9 Heisk., 676; Holman u. able time, say sixty days, given the defendant to
Green, 4 Bax., 135. pay the debt before sale. Lewis V. Baker, 1 Head,
16 Love v. Williams, 2 Lea, 227. 388; Codwise v. Taylor, 4 Sneed, 351. See preceding
17 Code, § 3300. section.
18 Code, §§ 3323-3336. 22 Glenn v. Glenn, 7 Heisk., 367.
19 Code, §§ 3716-3719. 23 Childress V. Hurt, 2 Swan, 487; Glenn v. Glenn,
20 There are three things the law is anxious about; 7 Heisk.,- 367; Owen v. Owen, 5 Hum., 352; Lucas
1, That judgments should be effectual; 2, That sales v. Moore, 2 Lea, 7; Atkins v. Murfree, 1 Tenn. Ch„
should be valid; and 3, That decisions should be 56; Click V. Burris, 6 Heisk., 544.
uniform. These golden words are by Judge Hay- 24 See, Porter v. Cocke, Peck, 49; Jones V. Doug-
wood, in Porter n. Cocke, Peck, 49. lass, 1 Tenn. Ch., 357.
21 The exact amount of the debt should be fixed 25 Code, §§ 2145a-2149; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1292.
in the decree. Lewis v. Baker, 1 Head., 388; if any
cessity or inexpediency of the sale, and the propriety of ratifying it, considering
the price offered in short, the question is, will the welfare of the person under
;
disability be promoted by the sale ? In all such cases, the Court acts as guardian
for those not able to act for themselves and endeavors to do for them what ;
they themselves would almost certainly do, if able freely and intelligently to
act for themselves. Irregularities in a sale of an infant's land will be disre-
garded, where such sale is manifestly advantageous to the infant. 26 Thus, the
Court will ratify a sale made by a next friend of infants during the progress
of a suit instituted by him to sell their land, the Court being satisfied that such
27 the advisability of the sale
sale was an advantageous one for the infants,
having been first duly referred to the Master for investigation and report. 2 s
§ 626. —
Form of a Decree of Sale. A decree of sale should (1) be preceded
by some adjudication warranting a sale (2) it should specifically describe the
;
land ordered to be sold, and not refer to pleadings, deeds or other papers, for
the description; (3) it should expressly declare by whom the sale shall be
made and (4) it should specify when, where, and on what terms, the sale shall
;
be made. The following form will serve as a guide in drawing a decree of sale,
omitting the antecedent adjudication
FORM OF A DECREE OF SALE.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court that [unless this decree is satisfied
within sixty days from this day,] said tract of land be sold by the Clerk and Master of' this
Court, [or, by Jonathan S. Lindsay, as special commissioner of this Court,] to the highest
and best bidder, on a credit of six and twelve months, taking from the purchaser notes for
the purchase-money drawing interest from the date of sale, with one or more solvent sureties
thereto, and retaining a lien on the land as further security for the purchase-money. Said
sale will be made in front of the Court House door in Knoxville [or, on the premises,] and
on the notice prescribed by law. [// the tract of land has not been already described in the
decree, then add:] Said tract of land is described as follows: [Here insert the description
given in the title papers, or in the surveyor's report^] [If the sale is in bar of redemption,
then say:] And on the special application of the complainant, both in his bill and at the bar,
that said land be sold on a credit and in bar of all right of redemption, said sale will be
made on the credit aforesaid, and when made and confirmed by the Court, no right of re-
demption or repurchase shall exist in the defendants, or in any of their creditors, but the
title of the purchaser shall be absolute. 29
The Master [or, special commissioner,] will report his action in the premises to the next
regular term of the Court, until which time all other matters are reserved.
§ 627.Duties of the Master in Reference to Sales. The Master is required —
in making
sales to exercise the utmost diligence, impartiality and good faith.
It is a gross breach of his duty for him to do any act that will either directly
or indirectly favor a purchaser to the detriment of the parties entitled to the
proceeds but he should earnestly endeavor to realize the highest possible price
;
for the property he has been commissioned to sell. His principal duties in ref-
erence to sales are the following
1. He Must Duly Adveit'se. the Property. If the decree of sale specifies any
particular method of advertising the property, this method should be strictly
26 Elliot V. Blair, 5 Cold., 185; Swan r. Newman, bar of redemption, the Court should use every means
3 Head, 289. to realize the highest price. This cannot always be
27 Kirkman et at., ex parte, 3 Head, 518. In this done by a public sale, and it is often deemed more
case, the Court said in substance, that it was the advantageous to the parties to sell by private con-
Court that made the sale and not the next friend; tract. In such cases, the Court may, in its discretion,
that the next friend was only the medium through order the sale to be so made. Or, if a would-be
which the offer to purchase was made known to the purchaser has already been obtained who offers
Court; that the offer, being a very advantageous what is considered a high price, and the parties in
one, the Chancery Court could, and did, in the inter- interest desire the property to be sold to him, the
est of the infants, properly accept it; and that the Court may authorize such a sale: if persons under
purchaser acquired a good title. This case lays down disability are interested, the Court will not, however,
the true doctrine for all cases of Chancery sales: the accept such a bid without a reference to the Master
Court makes the sale; the Master merely reports, for to mMiire and report whether any better bid can be
the information of the Court and the parties, the obtai/ed, or whether it is to the manifest interest of
best bid he can get for the property ordered to be all wirt'e.3 to accept the bid offered: if the Master
sold; and on such report it is for the Court to say reports in favor of the bid, the Court will, ordinarily,
whether such bid will be accepted and the sale made. accept it.
In the language of Judge Caruthers, in the above 29 When the bill prays for a sale on a credit and
case, "It is the sanction of the Court that makes
' in bar of redemption, the complainant is, ordinarily,
the sale." Wood v. Morgan, 4 Hum., 371. See entitled to have it so sold. Smith V. Taylor, 11 Lea,
Hurt V. Long. 6 Pick., 445. 738; Gibbs v. Patten, 2 Lea, 180; Hoyal v. Bryson,
28 Inasmuch as Chancery sales are, generally, in 6 Heisk., 139.
§627 DECREES OF SALE. 494
followed. The Master has no discretion to vary or disregard such method, but
must implicitly obey the directions contained in the decree. In his advertise-
ment he should give the names of the. complainant and defendant, or parties
interested, should briefly describe the land, and mention the time, place, and
terms of sale. 30
If the decree does not give any special directions in reference to the method
of advertising and selling the property, it must be advertised and sold in the
manner prescribed by the statute. 31 If the Master fail to sell according to the
decree, or to the statute, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable in damages
but the sale will not necessarily be either void or voidable. 32 If the decree
specify when the property shall be sold, the Master must strictly comply with
such direction; if there be no such direction, the land should be advertised in
time to sell it within three months after the decree of sale. 33
The advertisement for the sale may be in the following form
CHANCERY SALE OF LAND.
In obedience to a decree of the Chancery Court at Knoxville, made in the case of John
Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al., I will, on Saturday, June 27, 1891, at noon, in front of the Court
House door in Knoxville, [or, on the premises,] sell to the highest and best bidder, the tract
of land, [or, town lot,] in said decree described, being the farm on which Richard Roe now
resides, in the 10th civil district of Knox county, containing 100 acres, more or less. 34
Said sale will be [for cash in hand, or,] on a credit of six and twelve months, [following
the terms specified in the decree,] and in bar of the equity of redemption. Notes, drawing
interest from the day of sale, with good personal security, will be required of the purchaser;
and a lien will be retained on the property sold, as further security.
June1891.
1, W. L. Trent, C. & M.
2. He
should Announce the Terms of the Sale. Before he begins to cry the
property, the Master should distinctly and fully announce the terms of the
sale; and state what amount, or per cent., of cash will be required, if any; on
what time the sale is to be made, if on a credit, and when each installment of
the purchase-money is to be paid; what security is required to the purchase-
money notes, and when interest will begin to run on such notes.
3. He should Describe the Property to be Sold. If the land is described in the
decree by metes and bounds, this description should be given on the day of
the sale or, if the decree refers to some other paper for a description, such
;
paper must be followed in describing the land. The Master may, also, state,
at the time and place of sale, in a general way, the character of the property
to be sold; but he must carefully avoid making any statements, either in his
advertisement or in his verbal proclamation, which will unduly enhance the
value of the property, or mislead the purchaser. A
Court of Equity will not
allow any deception whatever to be practiced upon bidders. 35
4. He should Require the Purchaser to Comply with the Terms of Sale. When the
property has been knocked down to the highest bidder, the Master should
at once require him to comply with the terms of the sale, by paying the re-
quisite amount of cash, if any cash is required, and by giving notes, with
30 Code, § 2149. A description by metes and ested to obtain an advanced bidder, and thus prevent
bounds is not only wholly unnecessary, but is down- the property being sacrificed. The Master who
ught oppressive when the costs of publication are makes such a delay is not only violating his duty,
thereby much increased. Chancellors should scan but, as a rule, is, also, injuring the parties interested
the costs of publications made by the Master, and in having the land bring its full price. Code,
see that no unnecessary costs are incurred. § 4474.
31 See Code, §§2145 2155; Act of 1859-1860, ch. 34 The land should not be described in the adver-
60. tisement by metes and bounds, unless the decree ex-
32 Code, §§ 2152-2153. pressly so orders. A brief general description, suf-
83 Asale is in the nature of an execution, and ficient to identify the tract, or lot, is sufficient.
the advertisement should be begun within the time Code, § 2149. Many advertisements of land sales
prescribed by law for the issuance of executions. are entirely too long. Some have too much head,
Code, § 3005, as amended by Act of 1869, ch. 47; others too much body, and still others too much end-
and Act of 1871, ch. 62. See, also, Act of 1885, ing; and, as a consequence, the printer's fees are
ch. 65. illegally and inequitably increased. Clerks should
Some Masters delay their sales until the month run their offices in the interest of litigants, and not
before the term following the decree of sale. This in the interest of newspapers; and Chancellors
should never be done, unless the party entitled to the should tax them with all unnecessary advertising
proceeds of the sale so orders, in writing. If a sale costs.
is promptly made, it better enables the parties inter- 85 Veeder v. Fond, 3 Paige, (N. Y.), 94.
approved security, 36 for the deferred payments, such notes to draw interest
from date of sale.
If the purchaser of property sold at the Master's sale fails to make payment,
or comply with the terms of the sale, the Master may again expose the property
to sale, on the same day or, he may re-advertise it and re-sell it, according to
;
the directions contained in the decree. 37 If the Master is satisfied with the
good faith and ability of the highest bidder, he may allow him a reasonable
opportunity to comply with the terms of his bid. 38 If, however, the Master
has reason to doubt the good faith or ability of the bidder, he may demand an
immediate compliance with the terms of the sale. 39 The following is a
FORM OF A NOTE FOR PURCHASE -MONEY.
$500.00 Knoxville, Tenn.
Six months after date, we, or either of us, promise to pay S. P. Evans, Clerk and Master
c»f the Chancery Court at Knoxville, Tennessee, or his successor in office, the sum of five
hundred dollars, with interest from date hereof. This note is given for, and is a lien on, the
property purchased by the undersigned William Jones at a sale made by said Clerk and
Master, under a decree pronounced by said Court, at the May term, 1881, in the case of John
Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al. t No. 618, on the Rule Docket of said Court.
Witness our hands this 20th day of June, 1881.
William Jones, ,
George Jones, (surety,)

Henry Jones, (surety.)
5. He should Make Due Report of the Sale to the Court. As soon as the prop-
erty has been sold, the Master must make out and submit to the Court a re-
port, 40 showing the property sold, the person to whom sold, when sold, the
amount of the sale, the principal and interest collected on the sale, if any;
the number and amount of the notes,, if any, and the names of the sureties
thereon, and any other matter connected with the sale proper to be stated. This
report should describe the land by metes and bounds, or other accurate descrip-
tion, unless such a description is contained in the decree of sale. 41 The report
should be filed before the first day of the term.
6. His Duty when the Purchaser Pails to Comply with the Terms of Sale. Courts
of Chancery will not tolerate any trifling with its process, or with officers acting
under its orders; and when the Master is selling property under a decree,
whoever bids is conclusively presumed to bid in good faith, and the Court will,
by attachment, compel a bidder to comply with his bid. If, therefore, a solvent
3G If the Master negligently takes insufficient se- report of sale; and, as a consequence, they are sel-
curity, he will be held liable, and will, also, forfeit dom, if ever reported, unless specially called for by
all fees and commissions due him in the cause. Dean a separate order of the Court, which will be made,
v. Hale, 7 Lea, 613. of course, on motion.
37 Ch. Rule, XIV, § 1; post, 1203. 41 There has, in the past, been too much negli-
38 This reasonable opportunity might be a day, or gence in describing lands sold, or ordered to be sold.
a week; but it should not be so extended as not to In some cases, no description outside of a general
leave time for the Master to re-advertise the prop- and indefinite reference is contained either in the
erty. As to the powers of the Court over a bidder pleadings, decree of sale, or Master's report of sale;
failing to comply with his bid, see, post, § 642. and in some cases, the Master has been ordered to
39 Irby v. Irby, 11 Lea, 165. In this case, the make a deed to the purchaser, on the latter furnish-
Master required Hubbard, the highest bidder, to ing metes and bounds for such deed! Such practice
comply with the terms of sale in one hour. Hubbard should not be tolerated. 1, It results in property
announced that he would not be able to comply with bringing a less price because of the uncertainty of
the terms of the sale until the following Monday: description; 2, It sometimes requires subsequent liti-
and thereupon, the Master at once resold the prop- gation to settle the boundaries; and 3, False boundar-
erty, with the understanding that, if Hubbard com- ies are sometimes given to the Master to be included
plied with the terms of the sale according to his in his deed to the purchaser. The Court should
promise, the sale would be confirmed to him. The never sell lands except by metes and bounds, and
Master then resold the property to other parties for should always require the description to be contained
a much less sum, and reported the facts to the Court. in the decree of sale, or in the report of sale. The
Hubbard failing to comply with the terms of the Master then knows what he is selling, the purchaser
sale, the Court confirmed the sale to the next highest knows what he is buying, and if the files in the
bidder. On appeal* the Supreme Court held that cause are ever lost, the minutes of the Court will
the Master's action was entirely correct, and affirmed perpetuate the description. In aid of our land titles,
the Chancellor's decree. This case is an illustration the Courts should set a good example of carefulness
of the fact that the highest bid is not always the and accuracy. In Sims v. Cross, 10 Yerg., 460, it
best bid. The best bid is the highest bid that is in was decided that a decree was not void for uncer-
compliance with the terms of the sale. tainty in the description of the land sold, inasmuch
40 Code, § 4045. This section states that the Mas- as the Master's report of the sale referred to a mort-
ter shall, also, report the aggregate fund on hand, gage deed, which was on file, for a description.
the disbursements made, to whom andwhen, specify- Nevertheless, the better and safer practice, is to in-
ing the fees allowed to the Master and other officers corporate the description in the decree, or in the
of the Court. These matters cannot be included in a report of sale.
§628 REPORT OP SALE. 496
bidder refuses to comply with the terms of his bid, and there is not sufficient
time to resell on the same day, or to re-advertise and resell before the day the
report of the sale must be filed or, if the Master think it improbable that so
;
good a bid can be had on a resale, in either event he may report to the Court
the fact that the land was sold to such a bidder, and that he failed, or refused,
to comply with the terms of sale. In such a case, the Court will deal with such
bidder as in case of contempt. Even if the Master makes a resale in such a case,
be should nevertheless report the fact of the failure, or refusal, of such bidder
.-it the first sale to comply with the terms of his. bid, and upon such report,
upon motion and petition, the Court would attach such bidder, and hold him
responsible for the extra costs occasioned by his conduct, and may, also, impose
a fine and imprisonment for his contempt. 42 If the highest bidder fail to make
payment, or comply with the terms of the sale, the Master may again expose the
property to sale on the same day, or may re-advertise and resell according to
the decree, as though the first sale had never taken place. 43
AETICLE II.
REPORT OF SALE, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
§ 628. The Master's Report of Sale. § 631. When a Party May Have a Sale Set
Aside.
§ 629. Confirmation of Sale, and Divestiture
§ 632. When a Purchaser May Have a Sale
of Title.
Set Aside.
§ 630. Form of a Decree Confirming a Sale. § 633. Procedure in Setting Aside Sales.
§ 628. —
The Master's Report of Sale. The property having been knocked
down to the highest bidder, complying with the terms of sale, and he having
duly executed and delivered his notes, or paid the money, or otherwise complied
with the terms of sale, the Master will then make out his report of the sale,
showing therein in what manner he has complied with the decree of sale, to
whom he sold the property, when, and on what terms. In general, it is not
necessary for the Master to show in his report all the details of advertising and
giving notice, but a general statement that he did advertise, or did give the
notice, required by law or the decree, is sufficient. The report may be in the
third person, or in the first person but a report in the first person carries with
;
it a larger measure of personal responsibility. The following is a

FORM OF A MASTER'S REPORT OF SALE.
John Doe,
vs. No. 618.— Master's Report of Sale.
Richard Roe, et al.
I respectfully report that, in obedience to a decree in this cause made at the last term,
commanding me to sell the property therein mentioned, I advertised [and gave the notice]
as required by the decree, and, on the 20th day of June, 1881, in front of the Court House
door in Knoxville, [or, on the premises,] sold said property, at public sale, in bar of the
equity of redemption, to William Jones, he being the highest and best bidder, at the price
of one thousand dollars, for which he gave his two promissory notes, each for the sum of
five hundred dollars, dated June 20th, 1881, [the day of sale,] due respectively, six and twelve
months after date, and bearing interest from date, with George Jones and Henry Jones, as
his sureties thereon. Said property so sold is that certain tract or lot of land in the 7th civil
district of Knox county, Tenn., adjoining the lands of George Jones, Henry Jones and others,
bounded as follows Beginning on a black oak, Henry Jones' corner, [and giving the de-
:
scription in full by metes and bounds to beginning;] containing one hundred acres, more or
less.
42 In such a case, a petition should be filed speci- should notify the first purchaser that the resale
fying the contempt, and due proceedings had there- would be at his cost and risk, and he should, also,
on. See Chapter on Contempts, post, S 921. make report of these facts to the Court.
43 Ch. Rule, XIV, § 1 § 1203, post.
;
The Master
497 master's report oe sale. §629
Said notes show on their face that they were given for, and are a lien on, said land, and
are hereto exhibited.
And in obedience to said decree, and on due notice, I, also, sold, on the same day, the
following personal property to the highest and best bidders
1 Red cow to John Jones, for $ 25.00
1 Threshing machine to Henry Brown, for 93.00
1 Stock of goods, (See Exhibit A.)* 327.00
$445.00
personal property for cash, except the threshing machine, which I sold
I sold all of said
on a credit of six months, taking a note therefor with surety and retaining a lien on the
machine. Said money and note are in my possession, subject to the order of the Court.
Respectfully submitted, this June 20, 1881. S. P. Evans, C. & M.
EXHIBIT "A" TO REPORT.

Isold the stock of goods as follows:
1 box of soap to John Brown, for $1.00
1 plow to Henry Jones, for ., 6.00
1 bolt of domestic to Kate Clark, for ... 3.00
[And so on to the end.]
June 20, 1881. S. P. Evans, C. & M.
§ 629.Confirmation of Sale, and Divestiture of Title. When the Master —

makes a sale of personalty, and reports the sale for the action of the Court,
showing that the purchaser has complied with the terms of the sale, upon con-
firmation of such sale hy the Court, the sale becomes complete, and the title
to the personalty so sold becomes vested in him, without any formal decree
divesting and vesting title, subject, however, to any lien that may be retained
to secure the purchase-money, or for any other purpose. 2 In sales of realty,
however, the mere confirmation of the report of sale does not of itself divest
and vest the legal title it only completes the sale. The legal title must be
:
passed by decree, or by deed in pursuance of a decree, for that purpose. 3

When land is sold on a credit, the better practice, where the solvency of the
purchaser and his sureties is doubtful, is merely to confirm the sale, thus
reserving the legal title until the entire consideration money has been paid. 4
The more usual practice, however, is to confirm the sale in all cases, and divest
and vest title by the decree of confirmation, reserving in the decree an express
lien on the land to secure the payment of the unpaid purchase-money, and
directing the Master to make the purchaser a deed, or give him a certified
copy of the decree, upon the purchase-money being all paid.
Under certain circumstances, hereinafter shown, the Chancellor may confirm
a sale of land at Chambers. 43,
§ 630. Form —
of a Decree Confirming a Sale. It is a prudent precaution to
specify in the body
of a decree of confirmation the names of all the parties who
have any title to, or interest in, the land, as the papers in the cause may some
day get lost, or mislaid, and the title thereby become clouded. The following is
the form of such a decree, omitting the caption
DECREE CONFIRMING A SALE.
This cause came on to be heard this day before Hon. William B. Staley, upon the whole
record in the cause, including the decree of sale and the Master's report made in obedience
thereto, which report is as follows
[Here copy the report, in full. 6 ]
1 When the items are numerous they should be biddings reopened, and an advanced bid received.
put in a schedule, and not entered in the body of the This sale was made under an agreement, the terms
report. of which do not appear. To prevent confusion, the
2 Graves v. Keaton, 3 Cold., 13; Young v. Thomp- decree ordering the Master to sell personalty should
son, 2 Cold., 596. These were cases wherein slaves specify on its face whether the sale would require
had been sold under statutory authority. Where the confirmation by the Court^ or not.
Master is ordered to sell goods, wares, and merchan- 3 Webster V. Hill, 3 Sneed, 333; Bryant V. Mc-
dise, or other personalty, as a receiver, unless the Callum, 4 Heisk., 517; Wayne v. Fouts, 24 Pick.,
decree otherwise direct, his sale would be final with- 145.
out any confirmation by the Court. In Moore v. i Webster v. Hill, 3 Sneed, 333; Bryant v. Mc-
Watson, 4 Cold., 64, where a steamboat and her ap- Callum, 4 Heisk., 517.
pendages were sold by the Master, the biddings were 4a See, post, § 772.
opened, and the sale confirmed to the original pur- 5 The statute requires this report to "be embodied
chasers, at an advanced bid; and after this, but at in a decree to be entered on the minutes of the
the same term, this second sale was set aside, the Court." Code, § 4047.
§631 MASTER S REPORT OE SALE. 498
And said report, being unexcepted to, is by the Court, on motion of the complainant [or
defendant, or purchaser,] in all things confirmed.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged, and decreed, by the Court that all the right, title
and
interest, of the defendants Richard Roe, Roland Roe, Robert Roe and Romeo Roe, and of
all the other parties to this suit, 6 in and to said tract of land, [in both law and Equity,] be
divested out of them and each of them, and be vested in the said purchaser, William Jones,
as an indefeasible inheritance in fee simple forever [or, for and during the natural life of
the defendants, or as the case may be;] [subject to the lien aforesaid for the unpaid purchase-
money.] And when said purchase-money shall have been fully paid, the Clerk and Master
will make, acknowledge for registration, and deliver to said William Jones, a deed conveying
said tract of land to him, as aforesaid, or will give him a duly certified copy of this decree,
as a muniment of title, at his election, he paying the legal fees therefor. On application of
the purchaser a writ of possession will be issued to put him into the possession of said tract
of land.
[Then ordinarily follow some directions relating to the distribution of the proceeds, or
some other matters.']
§ 631. When a Party May Have a Sale Set Aside. —A party may have a sale
set aside whenever the property has not sold for a fair price, and there has
been (1) some failure of the Master to advertise the land properly or (2) to
.-
;
sell at the right time, or at the right place or (3) the Master has been guilty
;
of some other misconduct, or irregularity, injurious to the sale or (4) the pur- ;
chaser has been guilty of some misconduct tending to diminish the price, or
discourage bidding; or (5) others have been guilty of combinations, or other
acts injuriously affecting the sale; or (6) the weather was so exceedingly in-
clement, or the waters so high, or in some other way bidders were prevented,
or deterred, from attending the sale or (7) for some other reason, not the
;
fault of the party complaining, a fair sale was not had. Mere inadequacy of
price, however, without more, will not justify a Court in setting aside a sale,
unless an advance bid be tendered. The only test a Court can have of the
value of property sold at a forced sale, is the price it will bring on due notice,
at a public sale fairly conducted. 7
If the property has sold for so good a price that a resale would probably
avail nothing, the Court may disregard all irregularities in the sale, especially
where persons under disability are concerned. 8 The fullness of the price in
such cases, however, should be made affirmatively to appear, by reference to
the Master, or otherwise.
§ 632. When a Purchaser May Have the Sale Set Aside. A purchaser may —
have the sale set aside at any time before the title is vested in him and the
term passed, if (1) the parties have no title to the property, or (2) if their title
is seriously clouded, 9 or (3) if the property is not such in quality, size, 10 situa-
tion, character or value, as it was described to be, or (4) if from some want of
necessary parties, or other fatal defect in the proceedings, or in the jurisdiction
of the Court, the sale would be void, 11 or (5) if, for any other reason the pur-
chaser would not get such a title, or property of such quality, situation, dimen-
sions or value, as he had a right to expect, or as was authoritatively represented
at, or before, the sale, 12 or (6) if, after the sale and before confirmation, the
property should be destroyed or otherwise be materially injured, or greatly im-
paired in value. 13
But a purchaser will not be relieved unless he apply in due season, and is
6 It is a prudent precaution to include all the par- as to quantity, and the boundaries are correctly
ties, when some are specified. given, the purchaser takes the risk as to quantity,
Atkisson v. Murf ree, 3 Tenn. Ch., 728 Irby v.
7 ; unless there be fraud, or so great a deficiency as to
Irby, 11 Lea, 165. Tantum bona valent quantum create the presumption of fraud. Moses v. Wallace,
vendi possunt. 7 Lea, 413. As a correlative of this rule, if a pur-
8 Bryant v. McCallum, 4 Heisk., 511; Swan v. chaser by the acre, by mistake obtains a substantial
Newman, 3 Head, 289. But a void sale will not be surplus, over what he supposes he is buying, and
confirmed, if the sale be attacked. Andrews v. An- the other party supposes he is selling, such purchaser
drews, 7 Heisk., 234. will be compelled to pay for, or return, such surplus.
9 Read v. Fite, 8 Hum., 328; Deaderick u. Smith, State v. Kellar, 11 Lea, 399.
6 Hum., 138. 11 Crabtree v. Niblett, 11 Hum., 488; Kindell v.
10 If the sale is by the acre, the purchaser is en- Titus, 9 Heisk., 737.
titled to an abatement for the deficiency. Myers v. 12 Pearson v. Johnson, 2 Sneed,> 580.
Lindsay, 5 Lea, 331. But where the land is sold in IS Eakin v. Herbert, 4 Cold., 119; Childress v.
.
gross, not by the acre, and without any stipulation Hurt, 2 Swan, 487; Graves v. Keaton, 3 Cold., 8.
499 master's report OF SALE. §633
unaffected by negligence or other inequitable conduct. If he buys, or allows
the sale to be confirmed to him, with knowledge of the facts set out in his peti-
tion for relief, he will not be released. 14
There is one prevailing rule running through all our Reports, and that is,
that the Court will not set aside, for irregularities merely, the sale of an infant's
15 provided the purchaser will
estate, where it is advantageous to the infant,
get a good title. 10
The rights and liabilities of purchasers will be considered in subsequent
sections. 17
§ 633. —
Procedure in Setting Aside Sales. When the Master reports that
he has sold the land in pursuance of the decree, or has advertised the sale as
required by law, or by the decree, the Court will presume that his report is true
and the truth of the report cannot be put in issue by an exception to the effect
that the Master did not advertise as required, 18 or did not do any other thing
as reported, unless there be some evidence in the report itself, or exhibited
thereto, or elsewhere on file in the cause, contradicting the report. 19 Inasmuch
as such contradicting evidence seldom appears of record, an exception to a
report of sale will seldom lie and, as a consequence, a report of sale must usu-
;
ally be assailed by a sworn petition setting out in detail the grounds on which
the sale is attacked. 20 On such a petition being filed, the Court may order proof
to be taken summarily, or may refer the matter to the Master, or if the Master's
conduct is called in question, may appoint a special commissioner to report on
the truth of the petition.
When a purchaser seeks an abatement of the purchase-money, or to have an
encumbrance removed, or to be relieved from his purchase entirely, or to have
his rights under his purchase enforced, he should proceed by petition, if the
cause is still in Court. 21 Being already a quasi party to the suit, and entitled
to be heard in any matter growing out of his purchase, an original bill is not
only unnecessary, but improper, if the cause be pending.
A purchaser may file his petition to be relieved from a sale, in whole or in
part, at any time before a conveyance is executed, 22 but after the sale has been
confirmed, and the term of the Court at which confirmation was had is
passed, a sale can only be set aside for fraud, accident, mistake, or other suffi-
cient ground. 23
A petition attacking a Chancery sale must be positive in its averments. In-
formation alone is insufficient to set the machinery of the Court in motion. A
party who assails a judicial proceeding must ascertain the real facts before
filing his petition, and must be able to allege those facts with definiteness and
positiveness. 24
14 Spence v. Armour, 9 Heisk., 167. purchaser to come

in for relief by petition in the
15 Elliott v. Blair, 5 Cold., 185. original cause,after the confirmation of the sale.
lfl Swan v. Newman, 3 Head, 289; Rucker v. Foster v. Bradford,1 Tenn. Ch., 402. The true
Moore, 1 Heisk., 726; Andrews v. Andrews, 7 rule would seem to be this: If the cause is still in
Heisk., 234. Court, the purchaser, being a quasi party, has the
IT See, post, §§ 640-643. right to relief by petition, even though such petition
18 Childress v. Harrison, 1 Bax., 410. be not filed until after confirmation; but if the cause
19 An exception to a Master's report must be be out of Court, the purchaser must obtain relief by
based on matter appearing in the record. Ante. original bill. Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch., 402;
§ 618. Spence v. Armour, 9 Heisk., 167. If a petition con-
20 Childress v. Harrison, 1 Bax., 414. tained sufficient merits, prayed for process, and
21 Read v. Fite, 8 Hum., 330; Blackmore v. Bar- brought all necessary parties before the Court, it
ker, 2 Swan, 342; Leake v. Cannon, 2 Hum., 169; would no doubt be entertained, as in the nature of
Majors v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294. an original bill. It would seem from Spence v.
22 Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch., 400; Deader- Armour, 9 Heisk., 167, that a cause is out of Court,
ick v. Smith, 6 Hum., 138; Read v. Fite, 8 Hum., as to the purchaser, after the sale has been con-
328. firmed, and the term of the Court, at which the con-
23 Spence v. Armour, 9 Heisk., 167. There is firmation is had, has passed.
some conflict in our Reports as to the right of a 24 Foster v. Bradford, I Tenn. Ch., 400.
§634 OPENING OF BIDDINGS. 500
ARTICLE III.
OPENING OF BIDDINGS.
634. When Biddings Will be Opened. § 637. Forms Incident to the Opening" of
When Biddings.
635. the Master May Open the Bid-
dings.
§ 638. Proceedings When Biddings are
Opened.
636. How Biddings are Opened by the § 639. When and How Biddings Will be Re-
Court. opened.
§ 634. When Biddings will be Opened.—Inasmuch as a sale 1 of land by the

Master is conditioned upon its confirmation by the Court, and inasmuch as the
chief aim of the Court is to obtain as great a price for the property as possible,
it is the regular practice of the Court to "open the biddings;" that is, to allow
a person to offer a larger price than the estate was originally sold for by the
Master, and upon such offer being made, and the terms of the original sale com-
plied with, to direct a re-sale of the property. 2 Biddings will be opened at
any time before a confirmation of the Master's report of sale, upon proper appli-
cation being made, and a tender of an advance of at least ten per cent. 3 The
Court will exercise more liberality in opening biddings when persons under
disability are interested in the property sold, than when all the parties are
adults and sui juris* But, inasmuch as the sale is made for the benefit of the
parties to the suit, and is under their control, the Court will not, when they are
all sui juris and content with a sale, open the biddings at the instance of a third
party who has no interest in the land, or in its proceeds, but merely wants to
purchase the property. 5 Where, however, there are parties under disability
1 Although usually termed a sale, the proceedings merciless creditor, or of combinations among bidders,
before the Master are really not a sale, or at the that the cry of the people against such outrage, in-
very uttermost only a conditional sale. In Wood v. justice and oppression would penetrate to the halls
Morgan, 4 Hum., 371, Judge Green says, "There is of legislation. It is safe to say, that the practice of
no sale until the offer made to the Master is sanc- opening biddings has these most beneficial results:
tioned by the Court and confirmed. * * * How 1st, it enables the owner of the land to secure the
can that be a sale which is not obligatory upon the highest possible bidder; 2d, it prevents, or greatly
parties? It is a bid, an offer by the purchaser, and thwarts, combinations among bidders; 3d, it enables
if the Court is satisfied with it, it is obligatory upon the Court more effectually to remedy irregularities
the parties making it, and, being confirmed by the at the Master's sale; 4th, it greatly increases the
Court, vests in the purchaser a right to the prop- lower of the Court to do justice both to the bidder
erty." So, Kirkman, ex parte, 3 Head, 518; Arm- and the owner, and 5th, in a great many cases, pre-
strong v. McClure, 4 Heisk., 80. See, ante, §§ 629- vents property from being sold at grossly inadequate
633. prices. If biddings were not opened, and redemp-
2 The implied contract of sale by the Master is, tion not allowed, Courts would often become mere
that the saleis to be confirmed unless, (1) the Court deslroyers of the estates of debtors. On this general
has good reason to be dissatisfied with it; or (2) the subject, see Atkisson v. Murfree, 1 Tenn. Ch., 51.
purchaser has good reason to be dissatisfied with it; Besides, a bidder has no right to complain: 1st, be-
and the purchaser has no more right to complain of cause the opening of the biddings is a part of the
the Court for accepting a higher bid, than has the implied contract under which he bids; 2d, he runs
Court the right to complain of the purchaser for no risk until the sale is confirmed, and if the prop-
wanting to be relieved of his purchase, when he erty is destroyed it is not his loss; and 3d, he has
fails to get a title, or has other sufficient ground. until confirmation to investigate the title he will get,
And as to the policy of opening biddings, the author and to ascertain whether the property is what it was
has long been profoundly convinced of its justice represented to be. Atkisson v. Murfree, 1 Tenn.
and wisdom. Nearly all of the complaints are made Ch., 53.
by Masters and purchasers: the Masters complain 3 Click v. Burriss, 4 Heisk., 539; Atkisson v. Mur-
because of the increased trouble of a second sale free, 1 Tenn. Ch., 51; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1286. Where,
without a corresponding increase of compensation, however, the amount of the bid is large, say over
and the purchasers complain because of their disap- $10,000, the Court may open the biddings in order
pointment in not getting the property at their bid, to obtain an advance as low as five per cent. 2 Dan.
after complying with the terms of the sale. It is, Ch. Pr., 1287. And when the amount of the bid is
also urged that the fact that the biddings are liable small, say under $10, the Court may refuse to open
to be opened often deters bidding at a Master's sale. the biddings even on an offer of ten per cent.
There is truth in all these objections, but the ques- 4 Glenn v. Glenn, 7 Heisk., 367.
tion is not whether the practice is free from objec- 5 Bright v. Bright, 12 Lea, 630; Mayo V. Harding,
tions, or whether it does not occasionally work un- 3 Tenn. Ch., 237; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1288. The Court
justly or injuriously, but whether it is not, in the will, however, allow a creditor to file a petition to
main, preferable to the practice of making Master's have biddings opened, even when all the parties^ to
sales absolute. If the latter practice prevailed, it the suit are content with the sale, the creditor having
would soon result in a statute making all Chancery a judgment against the owner of the land sold, and
sales subject to redemption, because such sales would execution on his judgment having been returned
so often be mere ruthless sacrifices of property, and nulla bona. Childress v. Hurt, 2 Swan, 488.
would so often make the debtor the victim of a
501 OPENING OF BIDDINGS. § 635
interested in the proceeds of the land, the Court will allow a stranger to peti-
tion for an order opening the biddings, when the interest of such parties will
be promoted thereby. It is not necessary for a party to make an advanced
bid any one has the right
; to do so, 6 and any person interested in the proceeds
of the sale, although not a party, may file a petition to have the biddings
opened. 7
The proper time for opening biddings is before the Master's report of sale
has been confirmed absolutely after that, increase of price alone, however
:
large, is not sufficient to induce the Court to grant the application, although
it is a strong auxiliary argument when there are other grounds. After confir-
mation and the close of the term, the purchaser is to be regarded as the owner
of the estate according to his purchase, and his title will not be disturbed by
opening the biddings, except in case of fraud, accident, mistake, or the exist-
ence of a relation of trust 8 and then only on an original bill, setting forth the
;
equities relied on, and making the proper parties and the proper prayers, so
that issues of law and fact may be regularly made and determined. 9
'
On applications to open biddings, the Court should so rule as to secure the
highest possible price for the land it sells, provided that such ruling does not
(1) unduly delay the progress of the suit, (2) does not encourage or reward
negligence, on the part of those interested in bidding, or procuring bidders,
and (3) does not tend to generally discourage bidding at the time and place
of the original sale by the Master. 10 The policy of the law is to make the
original sale by the Master a finality, and not an experiment and the reserva- ;
tion of the right to set aside such a sale, and to open the biddings, is a mere
safeguard and a precaution against circumstances and irregularities tending
to lessen or prevent due competition and an offer to advance the reported bid
;
ten per cent, is deemed by the Court presumptive evidence of some such circum-
stance or irregularity.
§ 635. When the Master May Open the Biddings. Where an advance bid —
of as much ,as ten per cent, of the original bid is made in vacation, the Clerk
and Master, without any order or decree authorizing him, may accept such
advance bid, and reopen the biddings on such sale, and receive additional bids,
and hold the biddings open for other advance bids to some day by him desig-
nated. He must give the purchaser at the original sale and the parties or their
Solicitors of record, notice of his reopening of the biddings, and report his
action to the Court for confirmation. But this action and authority of the
Clerk and Master in no way abridge the right and jurisdiction of the Chancellor
to reopen the biddings on such terms as he may deem right. loa The proceedings
in the Master's office under this section should conform substantially to those
set out in the following section.
§ 636. How
Biddings are Opened by the Court. —The procedure in Court
in opening biddings is as follows 1, A
written offer must be made to advance
:
the bid reported by the Master at least ten per cent., and to comply with all
the terms of the sale. 2, If the sale is for cash, wholly or partly, the proposed
bidder must deposit with the Master the whole amount of cash required by his
bid, including the additional per cent. 3, If the sale is on time, in whole, or
in part, and secured notes are required, he must execute the notes and secure
them in strict compliance with the terms of the decree of sale, 11 dating the
6 Wilson v. Shields, 3 Bax., 65. 10 Morton v. Sloan, 11 Hum., 278. Applications

7 Childress v. Hurt, 2 Swan, 488. to open biddings should be favorably considered, and
8 Houston v. Aycock, 5 Sneed, 406 ; Spence e. every due effort made to realize the best price.
Armour, 9 Heisk., 169. But if an application to Ivucas v. Moore, 2 Lea, 7.
open the biddings before confirmation was prevented 10a Act of 1899, ch. 37.
by surprise, accident or mistake, or by the fraud of 11 Glenn v. Glenn, 7 Heisk., 367. If secured notes
the purchaser, the Court will set aside the confirma- be not given, the Court might lose a good purchaser
tion, and allow the application, if regular in all other while trying to get a better one, and thus, by grasp-
•respects.
9 McMinn v. Phipps, 3 Sneed, 196; Spence v. Ar-
ing at a probability, lose a reality. Mound City M
L. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 3 Tenn. Ch., 230; Childress
mour, 9 Heisk., 167. v. Harrison, 1 Bax., 415.
§637 OPENING OF BIDDINGS. 502
notes back to the day of the Master's sale. 12 4, The Master's certification of
the sufficiency of the security tendered must be written under the notes; or
the sureties may sign the written offer to advance the bid, and join in the offer
to comply with the terms of sale, and the Master may certify their sufficiency
beneath their signatures. 5, A
petition must then be presented to the Court,
by some person interested 13 in the proceeds of the sale, reciting the foregoing
facts, and exhibiting the foregoing papers, and praying the Court to open the
biddings, and keep them open until some set day and hour. 6, Reasonable
notice of the time, when such petition will be presented, and the motion to open
the biddings made, must be given to the purchaser at the Master's sale. 14 7, On
all the preceding steps being duly taken, 15 the Court will make an order open-
ing the biddings, and directing them to stand open until a day and hour named,
when they will be closed, 16 and directing the Master to start the bidding with
the advanced bid specified in the petition.
If, however, the purchaser at the original sale consent, and all of the parties
consent, the biddings may be opened without the filing of any petition, or the
execution of any notes, the order showing on its face such consent. The Court,
should, however, when any of the parties are under disability, be careful not to
open biddings, by consent of the purchaser, until the proposed advance bidder
has secured his bid by adequate security in a binding form, otherwise a good
sale may be lost through the insolvency of the advance bidder.
When no objection is made; and none appears to the Court, the Court may
allow the biddings to be opened, informally, without any petition, motion, or or-
der, all parties in interest, including the purchaser, consenting and the Master, ;
in such case, may surrender to the original purchaser his notes, or money, and
substitute for his name, in his original report of sale, the name of the new pur-
chaser, acting throughout as though such new purchaser had been the purchaser
at the original sale. When proper caution is exercised, and all parties consent,
no objection can be seen to this practice it facilitates the dispatch of business,
;
saves costs, and works injury to no one.

§637. Forms Incident to the Opening of Biddings. The following forms —
may be of benefit to the young Solicitor, and to the Master, when urgency pre-
vents due deliberation in drawing the required paper:
PETITION TO OPEN BIDDINGS.
John Doe,
vs. In Chancery at Knoxville, Tenn.
Richard Roe, et al.
To the Hon. William B. Staley, Chancellor:
Your petitioner, Richard Roe, respectfully shows to your Honor that John Gibbs, a re-
sponsible man, offers, in writing, to give eleven hundred dollars for the tract of land sold
by the Master to William Jones for one thousand dollars, under the interlocutory decree
rendered in this cause at the May term, 1881. Said Gibbs tenders sufficient sureties, and.
offers to fully comply with the terms of sale set out in said decree. His said offer, marked
Exhibit A, is herewith filed, and prayed to be taken as a part of this petition. The said Wil-
liam Jones has notice of the said offer, and of this petition.
Your petitioner prays that said sale to said William Jones be set aside, and that the bid-
bings for said .property be opened. George Andrews, Solicitor.
County of Knox. f
12 The reason of this is, that in contemplation of be difficult, or cause injurious delay. Nevertheless,
law, the sale is a mere continuation of the Master's the Court should always require actual notice to be
sale, and relates to it. Besides, the rights of cred- given the purchaser, not only to enable him the more
itors, or other parties entitled to the proceeds of the effectually to protect his rights, but also to enable
sale would be injuriously affected if the notes were him to bid for the property at the opened sale.
dated on the day of re-sale. Atkisson v. Murfree, 1 15 Applications to open biddings, made in good
Tenn. Ch., 57. faith, should be favorably received and liberally
13 Where any party is under disability, the Court acted upon, the object of the Court always being to
will allow a stranger, or the proposed bidder himself, realize the best possible price for the property. An
to present the petition, regarding him as a quasi applicant should not be repelled merely because his
next friend. application is not in due form, but the Court should
14 As the purchaser is a quasi party as to all mat- give such directions as will enable him to conform
ters connected with his bid, he is not so entitled to to its practice, and secure the right. Lucas V. Moore,
actual notice that it would be error to open biddings 2 Lea, 7.
without such notice, if the service of notice would 16 Atkisson v. Murfree, 1 Tenn. Ch., 57.
503 OPENING OF BIDDINGS. § 637
Richard Roe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing petition are true.
Richard Roe.
Sworn to and subscribed before
me, this July 6, 1881.
W. A. Galbraith, D. C. & M. j
This petition must be filed by a person having an interest in the land, or in

the proceeds thereof. If the parties to the suit are satisfied with the sale, and
those interested in its proceeds are content, a mere stranger has no right to
have the biddings opened, merely because he, or some one else desires to own
17
the property. Any one, however, may make an offer to raise the biddings.
EXHIBIT "A" TO THE PETITION OF BICHABD BOE.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Knoxville.
Richard Roe, et al.
To the Chancellor
The undersigned, John Gibbs, hereby offers to give eleven hundred dollars for the tract of
land sold in this cause, on June 20, 1881, to William Jones, for one thousand dollars; and,
also, offers to fully comply with all the terms of sale specified in the decree of sale and he ;
tenders the sureties named below that he will fully perform this offer, if accepted by the
Court.
July 6, 1881. John Gibbs.
If the above offer of John Gibbs is accepted, we hereby bind ourselves to sign the purchase-
money notes as his sureties and we hereby guarantee that he will fully comply with his
;
foregoing offer, if it is accepted by the Court.

July 6, 1881. Frank Brown,
Robert Roe.
I hereby certify that the above named Frank Brown and Robert Roe are good and suffi-
cient sureties for the performance of said offer.
July 6, 1881. S. P. Evans, C. & M.
If good sureties were not required, the Court might release a bidder whose
bid was well secured, and accept a bidder in lieu who would be unable to
comply with the terms of the sale, and thus lose the substance in grasping
after a shadow.
The decree opening the biddings may be in the following form
DECBEE OPENING BIDDINGS.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 618.

Richard Roe, et al. \
The defendant, Richard Roe, this day presented his petition, and the exhibit thereto, pray-
ing that the sale of land reported by the Master to have been, made to William Jones for
one thousand dollars be set aside, and that the biddings on said land be opened
And it duly appearing from said petition, and exhibit, that John Gibbs has filed a written
offer to bid eleven hundred dollars for said tract of land, and that he has tendered good and
sufficient security for his said bid; and it also duly appearing that said William Jones has
been duly notified that said petition would this day be presented to the Court for action
thereon
On consideration of the premises, it is ordered by the Court, that the said sale to William
Jones be set aside, and that the biddings on said tract of land be opened, and kept open
by the Master at his office until noon, on July 26, 1891, until which time he will receive bids
for said tract of land on the terms prescribed in the decree of sale, beginning with the said
bid of John Gibbs, exhibited to said petition. The Master will close the biddings at the
hour herein specified unless there be more than one person then bidding, in which case he
will cry the sale until the highest, last and best bid shall be obtained. He will report the
person making such bid as the purchaser, on his complying with the terms of sale said report :
will be made to the present [or next] term of this Court.
must be kept steadily in view, that the opening of the biddings is a mere
It
continuation of the former sale, 18
and that, as a consequence, the notes executed,
snd the rights of the bidder, bear date even with the date of the original sale,
and relate thereto, even when it will result in a note being overdue when
executed.
17 See, ante, §§ 634-636. I for any reason, entirely set aside. On a re-sale, the
18 A re-sale takes place when the original sale is, |
proceedings are de novo.
§ 638 OPENING OF BIDDINGS. 504
§ 638. Proceedings when Biddings are Opened. When the biddings are —
opened, the purchaser is entirely discharged from his purchase and if he has ;
paid a deposit, or any part of the purchase-money, into Court, he will be

entitled to have it paid back to him. If he is the purchaser of more lots than
one, and the biddings are ordered to be opened as to some of these lots, the
purchaser will be allowed to have the biddings opened, and to be discharged
from his purchase, as to all the lots which he has purchased, it being considered
but reasonable, that if he became the purchaser of a subsequent lot, in con-
sequence of his having been declared the best bidder upon the prior lot, he
should, if he is deprived of the purchase of the first lot, have the option of
retaining or surrendering the subsequent lot. The purchaser, in order to
entitle himself to such an indulgence, should appear upon the motion to open
the biddings, and produce an affidavit that he had bid for the subsequent lots
in consequence of his having been declared the best bidder for the first lot. 19
On the biddings being opened, the Master will receive bids as required by
the opening order, and will continue to receive them until the hour fixed for
closing them. It is a safe and convenient practice to require each bidder to
put his bid in writing, thus
John Doe, i
vs. [• Opened Biddings.

The undersigned bid the amounts opposite our respective names for the property ordered
to be sold in this cause
NAMES OP BIDDERS. AMOUNT OF BIDS. 20
Jonathan Williams $650.00
George Anderson 675.00
Jonathan Williams ~.~ 700.00
At the time and place specified for the closing of the biddings in the order
opening the biddings, the Master will close the biddings by accepting and re-
porting the highest bidder complying with the terms of sale. If, at the hour
of closing the sale, there be more than one bidder, the Master should cry the
property until the highest bid has been obtained. When the sale has been
made, the purchaser will, thereupon, pay the amount of his bid, or execute
notes therefor, with the required security, or otherwise in all things comply
with the requirements of the decree of sale. The Master will then report the
sale.
THE MASTER'S REPORT OF SALE ON OPENED BIDDINGS.
John Doe, ].
Zi. > Master's Report of Sale on Opened Biddings.

'
I respectfully report that, in obedience to an order made in this cause opening the bid-
dings upon the property sold herein, on June 20, 1881, to William Jones, I kept said biddings
open until July 26, 1881, at noon, when I sold said property, in bar of the equity of redemp-
tion, to John Gibbs, he being the highest and best bidder, at the price of twelve hundred dol-
lars, for which he gave his two promissory notes, each for the sum of six hundred dollars,
dated June 20, 1881, [the date of the original sale,] due respectively six and twelve months
after date, bearing interest from date, with Frank Brown and Richard Roe as his sureties
thereon. Said property so sold, is that certain tract [or, lot,] of land in the 7th civil district
of Knox county, Tenn., [describing it as in the original report.]
Said notes show on their face that they were given for, and are a lien on, said land, and
are hereto exhibited.
Respectfully submitted, July 26, 1881. S. P. Evans, C. & M.
§ 639. When and How Biddings will be Re-opened. After the biddings —
have once been opened and closed, and the sale 'confirmed, it is no easy matter
to have the biddings re-opened. 21 Nevertheless, during the term, the record
19 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1288. ilar insignificant amounts, when the bids are already
20 When the bids exceed $100.00, no bid less than in the hundreds, and sometimes in the thousands of
$1.00 should be received; when the bids exceed dollars. Such insignificant bids fall under the
$500.00, no bid less than $5.00 should be received; maxim de minimis non curat lex, and should not be
when the bids exceed $1,000.00, no bid less than tolerated either by the Master, or the Court.
$10.00 should be received. Much time is frittered 21 Click V. Burris, 6 Heisk., 545.
away by taking bids of 5, 10, and 20 cents, and sim-
S05 purchasers' rights and liabilities. §640
isunder the control of the Court, if good cause be shown for a re-opening
and
of the biddings, the Court will do especially where parties under disability
so,-
would otherwise suffer. 22 The Court will not, however, re-open biddings
merely because ten per cent, more is offered. After confirmation, there must
be equitable circumstances, as well as an advanced bid, to justify the Court
in re-opening the biddings. 23 If the report 6f the second sale has not been
confirmed, the biddings will be re-opened on slighter grounds than after con-
firmation. 24 The Court will also relax the rules when the interests of persons
under disability will be promoted by re-opening biddings. 25 After the bid-
dings have once been re-opened, and a public re-sale had, the Court may, upon
another offer of an advanced bid of ten per cent., confirm the sale to the re-
ported bidder, with his consent, at the new advance. 26
The course of procedure to re-open biddings is the same as on a proceeding
to open biddings, except that more particularity and a stricter compliance
with the rules of practice in such cases should be required.
ARTICLE IV.
PURCHASERS' DUTIES, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES.

§ 640. The Duties of a Purchaser. § 642. The Liabilities of a Purchaser.
§ 641. The Rights of a Purchaser. § 643. Judgment on Purchase-Money Notes.
§ 640. —
The Duties of a Purchaser. While Chancery sales are conclusive
upon the parties to the suit, and, as a result, almost universally confer a
all
good title upon the purchaser, nevertheless there is no warranty of title, 1
except in sales for partition and it is consequently incumbent on a purchaser
;
to ascertain (1) that the Court has jurisdiction under the pleadings to make
the sale, (2) that the parties to the suit have a good title to the property, and
(3) that all of the persons having, an interest in the property, legal or equita-
ble, are duly in Court. If these three requisites exist, the purchaser will ac-
quire a good title, even though there be error in the decree, 2 or though the
decree be reversed on a writ of error. 3
Apurchaser is just as much bound, in law and in morals, to investigate the
title of property about to be sold by a Court, and the regularity and validity
of the proceedings under which it is to be sold, as he is bound, in case an agent
offers property for sale, to inquire into the title of his principal, and the regu-
larity, validity and extent of his authority to bind his principal. 4
§ 641. —
The Rights of a Purchaser. The purchaser at a Chancery sale
becomes a party by virtue of the Master's report of sale, and may make any
22 Mayo v. Harding, 3 Tenn. Ch., 237. In Moore the subject-matter, (2) into the jurisdiction of the
v. Watson, 3 Cold., 64, the sale of a steamboat and Court over the parties, and (3) into the title of the
appendages was set aside a second time, and the parties to the land. Whoever buys land, at a private
biddings re-opened. sale from a private person, is bound to see to it that
23 Bradford V. Hamilton, 3 Tenn. Ch., 344. In the title is good; and this investigation he makes, or
this case, the Court refused to re-open the biddings has made, at his own expense. Why then should not
at the instance of the owner, who was present at the a purchaser at a Chancery sale investigate the title
resale, upon a mere offer of an advance of ten per to the land he has bought, before the sale is con-
cent. Tiie case was affirmed by the Supreme Court. firmed to him? or at least before he pays the pur-
24 Vaughn V. Smith, 3 Tenn. Ch., 368. chase-money? Hence, it is a settled rule in Chan-
25 Ante, § 636. cery, that a person purchasing under a decree of the
26 Irby V. Irby, 11 tea, 165. Court, must not only see that the parties to the suit
l When land is sold at a forced sale, the maxim have a good title to the land sold, but that the sale
caveat emptor applies: and the Court has no power is made according to the decree. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
to guarantee a good title to the purchaser. Irby V. 1275; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 529. But the purchaser is
Irby, 11 Lea, 165; and cases there cited. not charged with the burden of investigating the
#
'
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1276, note. merits of the controversy; if the Court has jurisdic-
3 If, however, a decree confirming a sale be ap- tion to sell, and the parties to the sale have title, the
pealed from and reversed, such reversal will nullify purchaser need inquire no further. McGavock V.
the sale, and entitle the purchaser to the purchase- Bell, 3 Cold., 512. If the defendant, as whose prop-
money by him paid. erty the land was sold, had no title, the purchaser
4 There is no hardship in requiring a purchaser to will get no title. Thompson v. Speck, 2 Ch. Apps.,
inquire (1) into the jurisdiction of the Court over 759.
§642 PURCHASERS RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES. 506
motion, or any petition, necessary to protect his rights, or relieve himself
file
from liabilities grdwing out of the sale."
The purchaser is entitled to have all tax liens, mortgage liens, trust-deed
liens, vendors' liens, life estates, or other encumbrances on the property, re-
moved, or else discharged out of the purchase-money paid by him into Court, 6
and he has the right to have a reference to the Master to ascertain whether a
good and clear title can be made to him and if it appears that such title can-
;
not be made, he will not be compelled to complete the purchase. 7

The purchaser is entitled to rents only from the confirmation of the sale by
the Court 8 and he is not entitled to the possession of the property purchased
;
until confirmation. If he take possession before confirmation, and the sale be

set aside, he will be deemed a trespasser, and held liable for mesne profits. 9
He is not liable for any loss or injury by fire, or otherwise, which may happen
to the property before the sale to him is confirmed. 10
If a purchaser desires to substitute another person in his stead, the Court
will, on motion, make an order to that effect, or may allow the Master to
make the change in his report. 11 No such substitution should, however, be
made where the substitute has paid anything for the privilege, and the Court
may, and ordinarily should, require an affidavit that there was no under bar-
gain, and no consideration paid by the new purchaser, to stand in the other's
shoes. 12 If any such consideration appears, the Court may either require the
new purchaser to take the property at the additional price, or may order a
re-sale. 13
A purchaser may, on petition, be relieved from his purchase before confirma-
tion, ifhe shows that he will not get a good title, or that there is a material
deficiency in quantity, or that material misrepresentations were made in the
advertisement, or at the sale, as to the value or character of the property, or
that, for any other reason, it would be inequitable to compel him to complete
the purchase by payment of the amount of his bid. 14 He will not, however,
be relieved after confirmation, because of an encumbrance of which he had
knowledge at the time of his bid, and which he then supposed the estate would
be able to pay. 15 But when he has been prevented from applying for relief,
before confirmation, by misrepresentation, surprise, accident, mistake, or the
fraud of persons interested in the sale, he will be discharged from his pur-
16 provided the purchase-money
chase, even after the sale has been confirmed ;
has not been paid and disbursed. 17

A purchaser has the right to appeal from any judgment rendered against
him, and has also the right to a writ of error. 18
§ 642. —
The Liabilities of a Purchaser. A sale of real estate by the Master
is, whether so stated or not, conditional upon its confirmation and, until such ;
confirmation, may be set aside, either because of fraud, accident or mistake,

or some irregularity in the proceedings, or because a higher bid has been ob-
tained. Hence, no sale becomes absolute until confirmation and the adjourn-
ment of the Court, or the lapse of thirty days after confirmation in case the
5 Blackmore V. Barker, 2 Swan, 340; Majors f. when his purchase notes draw interest from the day
McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294. of sale. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1277, notes. But as he
6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1278; Childress V. Vance, 1 purchases under the terms of the sale, he has no
Bax., 406. right to complain.
, „,
7 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1283. As a rule ,the Chancery n 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1278, note.
in Childress v. Hurt, 2 Swan, 487.
Court in no case undertakes to sell more than the
11 Newland v. Gaines, 1 Heisk., 722; Fitzpatnck
title of the parties to the suit; and after confirma-
tion the rule of caveat emptor applies; Housley v. 1. Thomas, 16 Lea, 216.
Lindsay, 10 Heisk., 651; Staunton V. Harris, 9 12 Blake's Ch. Pr., 276; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 536.
13 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1285.
Heisk., 579; Foster v. Bradford, 1 Tenn. Ch., 400;
except in case of sales for partition, Deaderick i\ 14 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1284; Childress V. Hurt. 2
Smith, 6 Hum., 147. Swan, 487; Pearson v. Johnson, 2 Sneed, 580; Eakin
8 Armstrong V. McClure, 4 Heisk., 80. And if v. Herbert, 4 Cold., 119. As to when a purchaser
the suit is appealed to the Supreme Court, the pur- may have a sale set aside, see, ante, § 632.
chaser gets rents only from the final confirmation of 16 Mountcastle v. Moore, 11 Heisk.j 481.
Pearson v. Gillen waters, 15 18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1288-1292.
the sale by that Court.
receiver pending 17 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1277, notes.
Pick., 446; and is not entitled to a
Ibid. It would be more equitable to 18 Eagan v. Phister, 5 Sneed, 298; Majors «. Mc-
the appeal.
give the purchaser the rents from the day of sale, Neilly, 7 Heisk., 294.
507 PURCHASERS RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES. §643
term A bidder bids with this understanding, express or implied,
lasts longer. 19
and has no just right to complain, if, for sufficient reason, the sale to him by
the Master is set aside by the Court.
"When a person bids at a Chancery sale, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the Court as to all matters connected with such bid and if his ;
bid is accepted by the Master before it is withdrawn, and is reported and con-
firmed, the Court may by attachment compel the purchaser to complete his
purchase, by paying the purchase-money; 20 or may order a re-sale of the
property and issue an execution against him and his sureties, if any, for any
loss caused by the re-sale 21 in such case, however, the order of re-sale should
:
only be made after notice to him that the re-sale will be at his risk. 22 A per-
son who makes an advance bid may, also, be held liable in the same way, and
to the same extent. 23
If the purchaser fail to make payment or comply with the terms of sale,
the Master may again expose the property to sale on the same day, or on a
subsequent day, and after giving due notice of the time and place according
to the directions contained in the decree 24 or the Master may report the facts
;
to the Court, which last would be .the proper course, if the purchaser is a
solvent person, and his bid higher than could probably be obtained on a' re-sale.
Where two or more persons purchase one lot, they must purchase and pay
as tenants in common, and will not be allowed to pay their proportions sepa-
rately, because of the confusion which might ensue. 25
§ 643. Judgment on Purchase Money Notes. Where a purchaser at a —

Chancery sale fails to pay all the purchase-money, the Court may, on motion,
and without notice to the purchaser or his sureties, order the land to be resold
for cash, and in bar of the equity of redemption and if any balance remains
;
due after the confirmation of such sale, the Court may award an execution
against the purchaser and his sureties for such balance. 26
The following is the form of a judgment on a purchase-money note, omitting
the caption:
JUDGMENT ON A PURCHASE-MONEY NOTE.
In this cause, on this 6th day of July, 1891, before the Hon. S. A. Rodgers, sitting by inter-
change with the Chancellor, came A. T. Marshall, the Clerk and Master of this Court, and
produced, in open Court, the following note
[Here set it out in full.]
And moved the Court for judgment thereon, in his name for the use of those entitled to
the proceeds thereof, and for the enforcement of the lien specified on the face of said note,
and in the decrees in this cause.
And it appearing to the Court from an inspection of said note [and the credits thereon,]
that the sum of eight hundred and sixty-four dollars and twenty cents, principal and interest,
is due on said note, it is ordered and decreed by the Court that said A. T. Marshall, as
Clerk and Master of this Court, for the use of those entitled, recover of said Richard Roe
and his surety, Robert Roe, said sum of eight hundred and sixty-four dollars and twenty
cents, and the costs of this motion.
And it further appearing from an inspection of said note and of the record in this cause,
that said note was given for the purchase-money of a tract of land sold in this cause, and
that a lien was retained on said land to secure the payment of said note and said purchase-
money, said land being described as follows A
tract of one hundred and sixty acres, more
:
or less, lying in the 8th civil district of Sevier county, on the East Fork of Pigeon River,
in The confirmation only completes the contract to pay the purchase-money. Payment cannot be re-
of sale, and does not pass the legal title: this must sisted on the ground of irregularity in the sale, after
be done by a decree divesting and vesting title, or the sale has been confirmed by the Court, and the
by the Master's deed, made by* order of the Court. time for the parties to appeal has expired. 2 Dan.
Webster v. Hill, 3 Sneed, 339; Code, §§4103-4105; Ch. Pr., 1281-1284.
4485. 23 Allen v. East, 4 Bax., 308.
20 Blackmore v. Barker, 2 Swan, 340; Deaderick 24 Ch. Rule, XIV; § 1203, post.
v. Smith, 6 Hum., 138; Mosby v. Hunt, 9 Heisk., 25 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1278.
675; Van Bibber v. Sawyer, 10 Hum., 82. 26 Munson V. Payne, 9 Heisk., 672; Mosby 1).
21 Allen v. East, 4 Heisk., 308. Hunt, 9 Heisk., 675. An execution is frequently
«22 Sharp v. Hess, 1 Tenn. Leg. Rep., 23. It is a ordered to issue before the confirmation of the sale,
contempt of Court for a bidder to trifle with the but such a practice is irregular, and may prove op-
Master, or for any other person to interfere with a pressive in case the bid on the land is raised high
Master's sale, in any way. A bidder will not, how- enough to satisfy the decree. In such a case, a
ever, be attached for contempt until the sale has surety may be greatly injured by the unnecessary
been confirmed to him, and he has failed, or refused, sale of his property under the execution.
§644 PAYMENT OF MONEY UNDER A DECREE. S08
.bounded as follows [Giving the description in the decree ordering or confirming the original
:
sale.] It is, therefore, ordered,, adjudged, and decreed that said land be subjected to the
satisfaction of this decree; and, that unless this decree is satisfied within three months from
this date, the Master, after advertising according to law, will proceed to sell said tract of
land at public sale, at the Court House door in Sevierville, to the highest bidder, for cash
in hand. He will report his action in the premises to the next term of the Court, until which
time all other matters are reserved.
It is further decreed that in the event that the proceeds arising from the sale of said tract
of land, after confirmation, of said sale, shall prove insufficient to satisfy this decree, execu-
tion may issue, after such confirmation, for such balance as may remain unsatisfied.
AKTICLB V.
PAYMENT OF MONEY UNDER A DECREE. TO PARTIES ENTITLED.
644. Payment by the Clerk and Master of 645. Payment of the Proceeds of Property
Money and Property in His Hand?. '
Sold in Administering Assets.
§ 644. Payment by the Clerk and Master of Money and Property in his
—
Hands. All the money and other property in the hands of the Clerk and
Master received by virtue of his office are Court funds, except his own fees
and commissions and he holds them in trust, under his bond and oath of office,
;
for those thereunto entitled and it is his duty to have such money and other
;
property always on hand ready to be paid over or delivered to the party enti-
tled, his agent or attorney, or to his Solicitor, upon application, according to
1
the directions and decrees of the Court. 2 When the Clerk and Master has
doubts about the propriety of paying over money in any given case, and the
parties or their Solicitors disagree in reference thereto, he should bring the
matter to the attention of the Court.
Money in the hands of the Clerk of a Court is in custodia legis, and subject
to the orders and decrees of the Court and cannot be lawfully paid to any one
;
except by order of the. Court. 3 It can be reached by attachment or garnish-

ment only by suit against the party entitled to it. 4
In subsequent sections of this Book will be given full directions to the Clerk
and Master in reference to the payment of money in his hands belonging to
raarried women, 5 infants, 6 and lunatics. 7
§ 645. Payment of the Proceeds of Property Sold in Administering Assets.
When the Chancery Court takes jurisdiction to sell property, and especially
land, for the purpose of dividing the proceeds among creditors, it stamps upon
such proceeds the nature of a trust and, as a consequence, takes especial care
;
that they reach the hands of the beneficiaries. Accordingly the Court makes
full and specific directions to the Clerk and Master in reference to paying out
such proceeds, and sees to it that they go directly from the hand of the Court
to the hand of the beneficiary, his agent, attorney or Solicitor. The Court will
1 Code, § 4043. Ency. of Law, 1116-1128. See Drane V. McGavock,

2 Code, § 4475. 7 Hum., 132; Bank v. Dibbrell, 3 Sneed, 38«;
3 Craig v. Governor, 3 Cold., 247; Yowell and Mayor t>. Potomac Co., 2 Bax., 302.
Wife, ex parte, 7 Heisk., 563; Somerville V. Somer- 5 Post, § 1167.
ville, 5 Heisk., 166; Massey V. Gleaves, 1 Tenn. Ch., 6 Post, § 1168.
7 Post, § 1168.
i Railroad v. Todd, 11 Heisk., 556; 8 Am. & Eng.
509 PAYMENT OE MONEY UNDER A DECREE. § 645
not turn over the proceeds of the sale of land to pay the debts of a decedent,
to the administrator in the case to be by him disbursed to the creditors, 8 for
the administrator's bond does not cover such proceeds; 9 and, besides, the cred-
itors are either parties or quasi parties to the suit. 10
The cases in which property is sold in the interest of creditors in order to
pro rate the proceeds are, among others
1. Sales of lands of insolvent decedents.
2. Sales of land under a deed of trust for the benefit of creditors.
3. Sales of lands under a bill to wind up a corporation that has made an
assignment.
4. Sales of land under a bill in behalf of creditors to set aside fraudulent
conveyances.
5. Sales of land on a general creditors' bill.
8 Moses v. Moses, 1 Shan. Cas., 414. I 10 Post, §§ 792-794; 1003.

9 Gambill V. Campbell, 12 Heisk., 739. |
§646 HOW nECREES ARE ENFORCED. 510
CHAPTER XXXII.
HOW DECREES ARE ENFORCED.
Article I. Pinal Process Generally Considered.
Article II. Transfer of Title by Decree, or Deed.
Article III. Pinal Process Against the Person.
Article IV. Pinal Process Against Property.
Article V. Sequestrations to Enforce Decrees.
Article VI. Proceedings in Enforcement of Decrees on Remandment.
ARTICLE I.
FINAL PROCESS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
§ 646. Powers of the Chancery Court in En- S 647. Kinds of Final Process.
forcing its Decrees. $ 648. Essentials of Final Process.
§ 646. Powers of the Chancery Court in Enforcing its Decrees. Courts of —

Chancery have, inherently, all power necessary effectually to enforce their
orders and decrees; and can exercise such power against either the person or
property of the party in default. 1 Formerly a decree in the Chancery Court,
unless it was for land, operated only in personam; and the only mode of en-
forcing it was by what is termed process of contempt against the party dis-
obeying it, by keeping him in prison until he fully complied with all the re-
quirements of the decree. And when a disobedient party, either could not be
arrested on process of contempt, or having been arrested remained in prison
without obeying the decree, the party entitled to the benefit of the decree
might have a writ of sequestration to seize the defendant's personal property,
and the rents and profits of his real estate, and apply the proceeds to the sat-
isfaction of the decree. 2 These processes, though still authorized by law, 3
are now seldom resorted to, the Legislature having authorized the Chancery
Courts to divest and vest title to property; and to issue all writs for the col-
lection of money, or to obtain possession of real or personal property, in use
in the common law Courts. 4
The Chancery Court has thus, in its armory, every process and writ known
either to Law or Equity, to enable it to enforce its decrees; 5 and, while the
common law writs and the statutory powers of divesting title, are generally
used instead of the process of attachment and writs of sequestration, neverthe-
less, the latter are sometimes indispensable to enable the Court effectually to
enforce its decrees, and to do full justice in the cause. It is a general rule
that Courts of Chancery have the power to issue any process that may be nec-
essary to carry their decrees into effectual execution. 6
12 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1042; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 440; show that, even in those States where there are no
Code, §§ 4478-4488. separate Chancery Courts, the authority of the
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1032. Courts vested with Equity jurisdiction to issue all
3 Code, §§ 4478-4481; 4487; 3104. the writs and processes necessary to effectuate that
_
4 Code, §§ 4484-4486; 4488; 2997-3000. jurisdiction, is constantly and vigorously maintained,

In the war of legal altercation, the bill is the and unhesitatingly exercised whenever the exigency
proclamation of war, the answer is the defiance of requires. Indeed, it may be stated in brief, that the
the adversary, the witnesses are the soldiers, the Chancery Courts of Tennessee are clothed with full
authorities are the artillery, the hearing is the battle, power to employ any and all process necessary to
the decree is the victory, and the results of the final completely carry out any order or decree they may
process are the spoils or war. lawfully make; and the extraordinary rarity of un-
5 Code, § 4488. usual process is an evidence, not of the want of
Executio est finis et fructus legis. (Execution is authority on the part of the Court, but of the effect-
the end and fruit of the law.) 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., iveness of the usual processes, and of the honorable
§874. obedience of the people to the mandates of their
6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1042-1070; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 440; own laws, as administered by their own Courts.
Code, §§4478-1488; 2997. An examination of the Ante, § 32. See Russell V. Stinson, 3 Hay., 12.
Reports of the various States of the Union will
511 HOW DECREES ARE ENFORCED. §647
§ 647. —
Kinds of Final Process. The Chancery Court is equipped with every
variety of writ, necessary to enforce its decrees, or to enable it to do justice.
It can use its own peculiar processes against the person or property of the
party in default, or can use the processes employed in the common law Courts,
or may use the processes and powers conferred upon it by the Legislature.
The usual methods of enforcing decrees in Chancery, generally speaking, are
(1) by process against the person of the party in default (2) by process against ;
the property of such person, (3) by writs of possession, and (4) by writs of
restitution.
I. The Ordinary Chancery processes to enforce decrees are the following
1. Injunctions to Perform Decrees, accompanied by a copy of the decree. This
is commonly called a writ of execution of a decree. 2
2. Attachments for Contempt, against the person of the party in default, under
which he may be arrested and committed to jail, there to remain until he per-
forms the decree. 3
3. Writs of Distringas, against the property of corporations, 4 to compel them
to perform a decree, or to enforce a money recovery, or to transfer the posses-
sion of personal property.
4. Writs of Sequestration, against the estate of a delinquent to compel obedi-
ence to a decree. 5
5. Writs of Assistance, to put the party entitled into possession of the prop-
erty decreed to him. 6 This writ is substantially the same as a writ of posses-
sion, and is now generally called by that name.
II. The common law final processes used by our Chancery Courts 7 are
1. Executions, or, as they are more correctly called, writs of fieri facias,
being the ordinary writs for the enforcement of decrees for money.
2. Writs of Possession, which are used to put a party into possession of prop-
•
erty decreed to him.
3. Writs of Restitution, whose office is to restore a party to the possession of
property of which he had been dispossessed by the Court, or its officer.
' '
All of the foregoing writs are, technically speaking, executions, execution ' '
being the general name of any and every process or writ whereby the judg-
ments and decrees of Courts are enforced. 8
III. The statutory processes and powers conferred upon the Court to enable
it to enforce its decrees are the following:
1. Divestiture of Title to property out of one or more parties, and vesting it
in those entitled, by decree. 9
2. Appointment of Commissioners to Make Sales, and to execute conveyances,
releases and acquittances, binding upon the parties in interest. 10
3. Decrees Becoming Effective without a conveyance, release or acquittance,
when the party required to execute the same fails so to do. 11
2 Barton's Suit in Equity, 161. to the judgment of the Court.) See "Execution" in
3 Code, §8 4478-4481. Bouv. Law Die; Blake's Ch. Pr., 163-164; 469-475;
4 Code, § 3000. A distringas is used at common 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 440-445; 2 Ibid, 475-480; Code,
law, also ; but it is, ^nevertheless, accounted a Chan- title of Chapter, 13, preceding § 2997.
cery writ. Blackstone enumerates the different kinds of exe-
5 Code, § 4487. A
sequestration can be effectively cutions issued on judgments in civil cases, as fol-
used against a non-resident or absconding defendant, lows: 1, writ of possession; 2, writ of abatement
who has property in the State, and who is required (of a nuisance) ; 3, writ of restitution (in. replevin,
to convey land situated in another State, or to exe- when the defendant wins the suit) 4, writ of dis-
;
cute a release or acquittance of a judgment, or a tringas (in detinue, when the plaintiff wins the suit),
lien or mortgage of record in another State. 1 Barb. and in case of money recoveries; 5, capias ad satis-
Ch. Pr., 444. If the land to be conveyed, or the faciendum, (ca. sa., to arrest and detain the defend-
mortgage, lien, or judgment to be discharged, are ant until he paid the debt) 6, fieri facias, (fi. fa.,
;
in this State, the Court can, by virtue of its own to seize and sell the defendant's goods and chattels)
decree, transfer the title, or discharge the obligation, 7, levari facias, (to sell the rents and profits of the
and perpetually enjoin its enforcements; but as the defendant's lands and tenements) j 8, elegit, (to sell
decree of the Court cannot operate extra-territor- his lands) ; and 9, extendi facias (extent, under
ially, sequestration is the only available alternative, which the body, goods and chattels, lands and tene-
unless the person of the defendant can be seized on ments, of the defendant were all seized at once to
process of attachment for contempt. See Chapter satisfy the judgment.) 3 Blacks. Com., 412-421.
on Attachment for Contempt; post, 58 845-848; 918- 9 Code, § 4484.
923 io Code, § 4485.
e'l Barb. Ch. Pr., 441; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1062. ^11 Code, §4486. A
decree directing the Clerk and
§648 HOW PECREES ARE ENFORCED. 512
§ 648. Essentials of Final Process.—If no appeal is taken from ,a final de-
cree, the next, and ordinarily the last, step in the progress of a suit, is the
enforcement of the decree. And as the decree itself awards final process, and
is authority for its issuance, it is a fundamental rule that this final process
must conform to the decree in all essentials. The essentials of. final processes
are as follows
1. The process issued, in enforcement of a decree, must be the kind of pro-
cess awarded by the decree itself, or by the law. 12
2. The process must run in the name of the State of Tennessee it must be ;
addressed to the proper executive officer it must show what is to be done, by

;
whom, and when; it must be tested, and be signed by the Clerk and Master,
or his deputy.
3. The process must sufficiently identify the suit in which, and the Court
from which, it is issued, by giving the names of the parties or the style of the
cause, and the style of the Court pronouncing the decree. 13
4. The process must pursue the decree, 14 not only in its nature, but as to
the amount of money to be paid or made, and as to description of property to
be put in possession of the party recovering it, and as to other acts to be done.
12 The law awards an execution on a decree for a cution is not warranted by the decree, it may be
money recovery. Hyder v. Butler, 19 Pick., 289; superseded and quashed.
and no reason occurs why it does not award a writ 2. The next circle represents the evidence, circum-
of possession when land is recovered. Code, scribing both the decree and the execution. If a
§§2997-2998; 3003. See, post, §655.
decree is not justified by the evidence, it may be
13 Trotter v. Nelson, 1 Swan, 7.
reversed by appeal, or writ of error, and may be
14 The execution, to be absolutely valid, must not
reversed even after execution has issued by a writ
only be within the decree, but the decree must be t
of error, and on a supersedeas the execution may be

within the evidence, the evidence must be within
stayed and annulled.
the pleadings, and the pleadings must be within the
procedure and jurisprudence of the Chancery Court. 3. The circle next to the outmost represents the
This may be illustrated by a diagram, thus: pleadings, circumscribing the evidence, the decree
and the execution. If the evidence is not pertinent
to the pleadings, or does not substantiate the plead-
ing, on appeal or writ of error the decree will be
reversed, and if an execution has issued it will be
superseded and annulled.
4. The outside circle represents the procedure^ and
jurisprudence of the Chancery Court circumscribing
the pleadings, evidence, decree and execution; and
if the pleadings or evidence do not justify the decree
on appeal or writ of error the decree will be re-
versed, and if an execution has issued it will be
superseded and annulled.
But a decree so erroneous as to be reversible on
appeal or writ of error is, unless so reversed, valid
enough to support an execution and justify all that
may be done under it. A decree, however, that is
absolutely void on its face, will not support an ex-
ecution; and whoever undertakes to enforce such an
execution is a trespasser, and his levy, sale or other
act of execution is void in law. As to void and
voidable decrees, see, ante, §§ 446; 565; md
post,
1. The inmost circle represents the decree circum- § 814, note 43.
scribing the execution, or final process. If the exe-
513 TRANSFER OF TITLE BY DECREE, OR DEED. 649
ARTICLE II.
TRANSFER OF TITLE BY DECREE, OR DEED.

§ 649. Vesting Title, and Executing Instru- the Master, or Commissioner.
§ 650. Deed by
ments, by Decree.
§ 649. Vesting Title, and Executing Instruments, by Decree. Originally, —

the Chancery Court compelled parties to execute conveyances, by process of
contempt and of sequestration 1 but now, by statute, the Court may, by decree,
j
divest the title to property, real or personal, out of any of the parties and vest
it in others and such a decree has all the force and effect of a conveyance by
;
such parties executed in due form of law. The Court may, also, appoint a Com-
missioner to execute all necessary conveyances, releases, and acquittances,
either in his name, or in the name of a party, as the Court may think
proper and the instrument so executed will be as valid as if executed by the
;
party. Or the Court may direct a party to execute a conveyance, release, or

acquittance; and if he fail or refuse so to do, in the time specified in the
decree, or in a reasonable time, if no time is thus specified, the decree operates
in all respects as if the conveyance, release, or acquittance was in fact made
by such party as directed. 2
Under these provisions of the statute, the Court generally divests and vests
titles to property by decree, or directs the Clerk and Master, as commissioner,
to make the proper party a deed conveying the property to him. 3 The decree
is often in the alternative. The following is a form of a
DECREE VESTING TITLE, AND ORDERING A DEED.
And said report of sale, being unexcepted to, is in all things confirmed. It is therefore,
ordered and decreed by the Court, that all the right, title, and interest of all parties to this
stiit*[or, of C D and E F] in and to said tract of land [or other property] be and the same
are hereby divested out of them, and each of them, and vested in said G H, [the purchaser,
complainant, or other person;} as an indefeasible inheritance in fee simple, forever; and
the Clerk and Master of this Court, as commissioner, will in his own najme, [or, in the name
of the parties,] execute and deliver to said G H
a deed conveying to him, the said G H, all
the right, title, and interest, of all the parties to this suit, [or, of C. D. and E F,] in and to
said tract of land, 5 [or other property;] or will give him a certified copy of this decree for
registration, if said 6. H. prefer the same. The costs of said deed, or certified decree, will be
paid by said G H; and on his application a writ of possession will issue to put him in pos-
session of said tract of land.
1 Claiborne u, Crockett, Meigs, 607; 2 Dan. Ch. practice was to recite in decrees enough to show the
Pr., 1032. jurisdiction of the Court, and the rightfulness of
2 Code, §§4484-4486; 4103-4104. the conclusion reached. Now, however, the Code
3 The Code, §§ 4485; 4105, declares that the decree declares that decrees need not recite the facts upon
of the Court divesting and vesting title, or the deed which they are based, but only the conclusions to
of the Clerk, shall have the same force and effect, which the Court has come. Code, § 4476.
and will be as valid, as if executed by the party in Since the publication of the original edition of
person. These are all-comprehensive words; and in this work containing the foregoing note, the Supreme
Lowry V. McDurmott, 5 Yerg., 225, interlocutory Court in Russell v. Houston, 7 Cates, 536, has de-
and final decrees, ordering and confirming a sale of cided that a final decree in an ejectment suit in
land, were allowed to be read as evidence, without Chancery and the entries on the rule docket are ad-
producing the bill or answer upon which they were missible in evidence without producing the balance
made; and on the strength of such decrees the plain- of the record when the file of papers containing the
tiff recovered in ejectment, the defendant objecting pleadings cannot be found. See, note 14 to § 446,
to the decree on the ground that the bill and answer ante.
were not produced. But in Whitmore v. Johnson, 4 The decreeshould, in case of a sale, ordinarily
10 Hum., 610, it was held that the decree is not bind all of the parties to the suit, by divesting the
admissible, without a supporting record, unless it title out of all of them, and vesting it in the pur-
embody aH the facts necessary to show the right of chaser. Russell *'. Stinson, 3 Hay., 13. In other
the complainant to relief, and the jurisdiction of the cases, the title will be divested out of the defendants,
Court to grant the relief. This holding emasculates or some of them, and vested in the complainant, or
the statute, and withers its efficacy, and should be in the complainant and some of the defendants, ac-
confined to the special case decided, the Court evi- cording to the nature of the decree.
dently being influenced by the fact that the decree 5 The description of the tract, or other property,
in that case was by a Circuit Court, in a case over should fully appear either in the decree ordering, or
which the jurisdiction of that Court was "new, spec- the decree confirming, the sale. See, ante, §§ 172;
ial, and limited." When the decision was made, the 627, note; 580.
8
S 650 TRANSFER OF TlTL,E BY DECREE, OR DEED. 514
A
decree directing the Clerk and Master to make a deed to the purchaser
operates propria vigore as a deed from its date. 6 The decree, or deed of the
Clerk, as the case may be, has the same force and effect as a conveyance by the
party, and must be registered. 7
Where the sale is made at the voluntary instance of the parties, the decree,
or deed of the Clerk, implies a covenant of seizin and warranty of title by the
parties whose interest is sold, their heirs and representatives, unless otherwise
provided in the face of the decree. 8
§ 650. Deed by the Master, or Commissioner. It is a common practice to —
authorize the Master, or. special commissioner, to make a deed to the purchaser
of land, sold by him under the decree of the Court. The following is a form
of a
MASTER'S, OR COMMISSIONER'S, DEED.
This deed 9 by William L. Trent, Clerk and Master [or Commissioner] to G H, [the pur-
chaser,] both of Knox county, Tennessee, witnesseth
That, whereas, a bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Knoxville, Tennessee, on January
5, 1889, by A B against C D and E F, [giving the names of all the parties out of zvhom title
is to be divested,] to recover a debt due him from said defendants, [or, to enforce a vendor's
lien, or, as the case may be.]
And, whereas, a decree was duly rendered in said cause by said Court, at its November
term, 1889, commanding me, [or, my predecessor] to sell the following tract [or, lot] of land
[or other property,] situated in the 10th civil district of Knox county, adjoining the lands
of I J and K
L: Beginning on a large poplar K
L's corner [describing the land, or other
property conveyed, according to the decree ordering or confirming the sale.] And whereas,
said tract [or, lot] of land [or other property,] Was by me [or, said other person,] sold ac-
cordingly, and said G H
became the purchaser, and said sale was duly confirmed by the
Court, at its May term, 1890, [and all the right, title, and interest of all the parties to the
suit {or, of all the defendants, or, of E F, or, as the case may be,) divested out of them and
vested in said G H, {if such was the decree.)]
And, whereas, I was by said decree authorized and directed to execute and deliver a deed,
conveying to said G H
all the right, title, and interest, of all the parties to this suit, [or, of
all the defendants, or, of E F, or, as the case may be',] in and to said tract [or, lot,] of land
[or other property.]
Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises, and of the sum of one thousand dollars
[specifying the amount of the purchaser's bid and not including any interest he may havi
paid,] to me paid by the said G H, I, William L,. Trent, Clerk and Master [or Commissioner]
of said Court, by virtue of the power and authority conferred upon me by said decree, do,
by this deed, grant, convey, and confirm, unto said G H, his heirs and assigns forever, all
the right, title, and interest, of all the parties to said suit, [or, of all of said defendants, or,
of E F, or, as the case may be,] in and to the said tract [or, lot,] of land, [or other property^
and every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances, as an indefeasible inheritance in
fee simple, forever, [or, for and during the natural life of said E F, or, as the case may be.]
As witness my hand, and the Seal of said Court, this August 28, 1890.
Witnesses William L. Trent,

O P,
Clerk and Master [or Commissioner.]
Q, R.
County of Knox. j
Personally appeared before me, John W. Conner, Clerk of the County Court of said county,
William L. Trent, Clerk and Master [or Commissioner] as aforesaid, with whom and whose
6 Behrn
v. White, 24 Pick., 392. ville, Tennessee, a decree was made on the 17th day
7Code, § 4104. of June, 1890, in the cause of AB vs. C D
and
8 Code, § 4105. E F, authorizing and commanding me, William L-
As a decree divesting and vesting title need not Trent, Clerk and Master of said Court, to make to
recite the facts on which it is based, it_ may well be
_ G H, a deed for a certain tract of land sold to him
contended that a Master's, or Commissioner's, deed, by said Court, in said cause, as the property of said
need not recite such facts. The above deed was C D and E F, upon the purchase-money therefor
drawn in conformity to the case of Whitmore v. being paid; and whereas, said purchase-money, to-
Johnson, 10 Hum., 610, referred to in a preceding wit, the sum of one thousand dollars, has been fully
note to this section. It is believed, however, that paid.
the following shorter form would be valid: Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises,
and of said sum of one thousand dollars to me paid,
SHORT FORM OF A MASTER'S DEED. I, William L> Trent [&c, as in the longer form
Know ali. Men by These Presents, above given, describing the land by location, metes
That, whereas, in the Chancery Court at Knox- and bounds.]
S15 FINAL PROCESS AGAINST THE PERSON. §651
official position I am personally acquainted, and acknowledged the execution of the foregoing
[or, within,] deed, on the day it bears date, and for the purposes therein expressed.
As witness my hand, and the seal 10 of my Court, this August 28, 1890.
L. s. John W. Conner, Clerk.

}
A
probate in the ordinary statutory form would be sufficient, but the above
additions have, perhaps, some value.
ARTICLE III.
FINAL PROCESS AGAINST THE PERSON.

§ 651. Injunctions to Perform Decrees. § 652. Attachments to Enforce Decrees.
§ 651. —
Injunctions to Perform Decrees. Before issuing any attachment
or sequestration, the Court may award a mandatory injunction 1 requiring a
party to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, spe-
cified in the decree and in the writ. 2 The" following is the form of 3
AN INJUNCTION TO PERFORM A DECREE.
To the Sheriff of Hamilton county:
Whereas, on the 10th day of July, 1890, a decree was made in our Chancery Court at
Chattanooga, in the case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, therein pending, commanding the said
Richard Roe to sign, acknowledge, and deliver to the said John Doe, a deed 4 conveying
to said Doe, in fee with covenants of warranty and seizin, lot No. 6 in the town of Decatur,
Alabama, on the north-east corner of River and Second Streets and also commanding ;
him to execute and deliver to said Doe a release and acquittance of the lien retained by
him on the lot by him sold to said Roe, in said town of Decatur, being lot No. 7, adjoining
said lot No. 6 on the north, as by said decree doth more fully appear, a copy of which is
herein enclosed to be delivered by you to said Richard Roe.
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to serve said copy of said decree 3 upon said Richard
Roe, and make known to him that he is strictly enjoined and commanded to do, perform and
fulfill and do all and every the matters and things in said decree specified and contained, in
so far as the same relates to him, according to the true meaning and import of said decree,
and in ten days from the service of said copy; and that he hereof fail not at his peril. Herein
fail not, and make return of this writ, and how you have executed the same, on the 1st
Monday of August next, at my office.
Witness, J. B. Ragon, Clerk and Master of our said Court, at office in Chattanooga, this
July10, 1890. J. B. Ragon, C. & M.
The Sheriff should show in his return that he read the writ to the defendant,
and handed him the copy of the decree and the date of such service.
;
not necessary, however, that a writ of injunction should issue with

It is
the decree, 6 the service of a copy of the decree alone is sufficient to bind the
defendant; and if he fails or refuses to comply with the terms of the decree,
in ten days after the service of a copy thereof, an attachment may issue by
order of the Court upon the officer's return or affidavit of service of such copy. 7
If the defendant in execution keeps out of the way, or absconds, so that a
10 The seal of the Chancery Court is not needed make a conveyance, the deed may be subject to the
to the deed, nor is the seal of the County Court approval of the Clerk and Master of the Court.
needed to the probate, but they add to the solemnity Kennedy V. Woodfolk,
Hay., 195 200.
3 ;
Ind dignity of both deed and probate. Code, §§ 4479-4480.

5
1 See Chapter on Injunctions, post, § 824. 6 As
a matter of practice, the writ is seldom
2 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 441; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1043; issued, service of a copy of the decree being abso-
Smith's' Ch. Pr., 429. lutely sufficient. Nevertheless, it may be nothing
3 Barton's Suit in Eq., 161. Formerly such writs but fair to a defendant, who has no Solicitor to
were addressed to the defendant himself, hut now advise him, to issue the writ to the end that he may
5 652 PINAL PROCESS AGAINST THp PERSON. 516
copy of the decree cannot be served upon him, or if he evades receiving the
decree, affidavit of the fact, and that a copy of the decree was tendered him,
or left at his last place of abode, will authorize the issuance of an attachment
without actual service of the copy of the decree. 8 If it appear to the Court
by affidavit that service of a copy of the decree cannot be had, or is likely to
be evaded, the Court may award a writ of sequestration in the first instance."
§ 652. Attachments to Enforce Decrees.—Courts of Equity ordinarily act
upon the person of the defendant, and enforce their decrees by process of at-
tachment against his person, 10 when necessary but such is the obedience of par-
;
ties to the Court's mandates, and such the efficiency of the common law and stat-
utory processes for enforcing the orders and decrees of our Chancrey Court, that
it is seldom necessary for the Court to bring into requisition its own peculiar
process, to compel the payment of a sum decreed, or the surrender or transfer
of property, or the execution of conveyances, releases and acquittances. These
common law and statutory processes are, however, a mere lengthening and
strengthening of the arm of the Court. 11 Its own peculiar powers and process
for enforcing its rules, orders and decrees, still exist, and their efficacy is, in
no way, impaired because held in reserve for extraordinary exigencies and the ;
Court may, in the first instance, if deemed expedient, compel a party to per-
form its decree by process against his person, or by a writ of sequestration
against his estate. 12 But such is the regard of the Court for the liberty of the
•citizen and his rights of property, that it withholds these processes for cases
where they are imperatively required to prevent a failure of justice. Thus,
where land lies in Tennessee, the Court may, under the statute, 13 divest and
vest the title by decree, or may appoint a Commissioner to make the deed, or
direct the Master to make it, but if the land is situated in another State, these
common law and statutory methods are absolutely ineffectual: in such a case
the Court will, when the defendant resides within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Court, 14 and has been served with subpoena, compel him to execute a
conveyance within a specified time, and on his failure so to do will commit him
to jail, there to remain until he makes the deed. 15
The Court will not only compel a defendant to execute a deed in such a case,
hut, where any property to be conveyed, or a judgment to be satisfied, or a
mortgage, trust deed, or other lien to be discharged, or a debt or obligation
to be acquitted, is in another State, or of such a character, or so situated, that
a decree divesting title or directing a conveyance, release, or acquittance
would be ineffectual, or not fully operative proprio vigore; the Court is bound
to require the party to make the necessary conveyance, release, or acquittance,
and to enforce this requirement by process of attachment, and by sequestration,
if necessary.
The Court will, by attachment, compel a defendant to perform any specified
act, when other process would be ineffectual. Thus, the Court will, by attach-
ment, enforce the payment of a trust fund into Court, 16 or the surrender of a
deed or other document, or choses in action, or other personal property, espe-
cially property stamped with a trust, or having some extrinsic value not to be
compensated in damages, or will enforce the payment of the widow's year's
8 Code, §4480. i>. W. & A. Railroad, 8 Bax., 54; Johnson v. Kim-

9 Code, § 4487. bro, 3 Head, 557. In cases of fraud, trust and
10 See, ante, § 32. contract, the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court is
11 Code, §§2997-3000; 3104; 4484-4488. sustainable if the Court has jurisdiction of the per-
12 Code, §§4305; 4478-4481; 4487-4488. son of the defendant, although the land to be af-
13 Code, §§ 4484-4486. fected by the decree lies beyond the State. King v.
14 Wicks v. Caruthers, 13 Lea, 353. Pillow, 6 Pick., 287; Paper Co. v. Shyer, 24 Pick.,
15 Miller V. Birdsong, 7 Bax., 531; 2 Dan. Ch. 444.
Pr., 1032, note; 1627; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§743-744; in Seidenbach v. Denklespeil, 11 Lea, 297. In
3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1318; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 44; Code, this case, the surety of a receiver was required by
§4481. Nevertheless, a Court of Equity will not an order in personam to pay into Court a sum of
m*ke a decree that must be enforced in personam. money belonging to the receivership, and deposited
when full and complete relief cannot be enforced with him by the receiver, to indemnify him against
except by the exercise of authority over property loss as surety on the receiver's bond.
which lies in another State. W. U. Telegraph Co.
517 final process against the person. §652
support by the administrator, 17 or the deposit of funds in the State treasury
in a suit State. 18
by the
The decree should, in all such cases, not only require the defendant to do
the specific act, but should fix the precise time within which it must be done 19 ;
and the Chancellor has power, on motion, as well in vacation as in term time,
to make further orders, and to issue such writs and processes as may be nec-
essary to carry into effect such decree or order, reasonable notice of such
motion being given the adverse party, or his counsel. 20
An attachment issues by order of the Chancellor, upon the officer's return,
or affidavit, of the service of a copy of the decree ten days beforehand, and
that the party has failed or refused to comply with the terms thereof. If the
defendant in execution keeps out of the way, or absconds, so that a copy of
the decree cannot be served upon him, or if he evades receiving the decree,
affidavit of the fact, and that a copy of the decree was tendered him, or left
at his last place of abode, will authorize the issuance of an attachment, without
actual service of the copy. 21 If the Court see proper in the first instance, or, if
i:pon issuance of the attachment, the delinquent cannot be found, a writ of
sequestration may issue against the estate of such delinquent to compel obedi-
ence to the decree. 22
All attachments for the non-performance of a decree are in the nature of
an execution, on service of which no bail shall be taken, but the party shall
be committed to jail, there to remain until he performs the decree 23 or until, ;
upon a habeas corpus, he has purged his contempt, and been discharged by
the Chancellor upon such conditions in respect to his compliance with the
decree as the Chancellor may think proper. 24 He cannot be discharged, how-
ever, until he has cleared his contempt, 25 and the adverse party, his agent, or
attorney, is entitled to reasonable notice of the hearing upon the writ of
habeas corpus, if in the State, and may interrogate the party in contempt upon
his oath, and controvert the truth of his statements by other proof. 26
The following is the form of an
ORDER FOR AN ATTACHMENT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE OF A DECREE.
John Doe, ]
vs. > Order for an Attachment.
Richard Roe. J
In this case it duly appearing that the defendant, Richard Roe, has not performed the
decree against him as he was enjoined and commanded to do, and is in contempt, on motion
of complainant, an attachment is awarded against him, and it is ordered that he be committed
to the common jail of Knox county, there to remain until he shall fully comply with and per-
form said decree.
On such an order being made an attachment will issue, instanter, upon which
the defendant will be arrested and committed to jail. The attachment may be
as follows
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
Knox County. \
To the Sheriff of Knox county:
You are hereby commanded to attach the body of Richard Roe, and him safely and closelv
keep inyour custody in the common jail of Knox county, there to remain until he shall have
fully complied with and performed the decree rendered against him in and by our Chancery
IT Rocco V. Cicalla, 12 Heisk., 508. 22 Code. § 4487; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1047.
is Acts of 1873, ch. 78.
Under the
former English practice, a writ of sequestration
19 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1043. The time may be lim- might issue while the disobedient defendant was in
ited thus: "On or before the day of ;" jail, but our Code seems to imply that process
or, "Within days after service of a copy of against the person, and process against his property,
this decree." Ibid. If no time be fixed, the Code will not both be allowed at the same time. Code,
gives the party ten days after service of a copy of § 4478, gives alternative process against the person
the decree. Code, § 4479. or against his property; and section 4487, also,
20 Code, §§4411-4412. gives alternative and not double process.
21 Code, §§ 4479-4480. When the defendant can- 23 Code, §4481; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1046-1048.
not be found the Chancellor mav. on an ex barte 24 Code. 8 4482.
§653 PINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY. 518
Court at Knoxville, in favor of John Doe, or until our said Court of Chancery shall make
an order to the contrary.
And you will make return to the next term of our said Chancery court, at Knoxville, on
the 4th Monday of November next, how you have executed this writ, by proper endorsement
thereon.
This May 30, 189S. W. L. Trent, C. & M.
On the service of this writ no bond will be taken.
For the proceedings and practice in case of attachments of the person, see
the Article on Attachment to Compel an Answer, 27 and the Chapter on Con-
tempts. 28
ARTICLE IV.
FINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY.
§ 653. Executions, or Fieri Facias, to En- § 656. Writs of Distringas.
force Decrees
§ 654. Orders of Sale. § 657. Writs of Restitution, When Issued,
§ 655. Writs of Possession, or Assistance. and How Obtained.
§ 653. Executions, or Fieri Facias, to Enforce Decrees. When a decree is —

pronounced the law awards an appropriate writ for its enforcement, and this
writ, whatever its form and effect, is termed an execution, 1 When the decree
awards a money recovery, the appropriate writ is a fieri facias, now generally
called an execution, because it is the execution most frequently used. When the
decree awards the possession of property to a party the appropriate writ is a
writ of assistance, called, in Courts of law, a writ of possession; and when
the Court awards the restoration of property, the appropriate writ is a writ of
restitution. An execution, or fieri facias, against the goods and chattels, lands
and tenements, of the defendant, is now the ordinary process for enforcing the
collection of money on a decree. 2 When, however, the decree is against a
corporation, the complainant may sue out a distringas; or may, at his election,
sue out a fieri facias to be levied as well on the choses in action as on the goods,
chattels, lands and tenements of the corporation and in case of levy on choses ;
in action, the Court may appoint a receiver to collect the same. 3 The following
is the ordinary form of
AN EXECUTION, OK FIERI FACIAS.

State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Shelby county:
You are hereby commanded
that, of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, 4 of
Richard Roe and Robert Roe, you cause to be made the sum of four hundred and forty
dollars, and the costs hereon endorsed, to satisfy a decree that John Doe, recovered aeainst
them in the Chancery Court at Memphis, on July 5, 1890; and to have said money and this
writ, with your return thereon, at the next term of said Court, to be held at the Court
House in Memphis, on the 4th Monday of December next.
Witness, E. B. McHenry, Clerk and Master of said Court, the 4th Monday of June, 1890."
E. B. McHenry, C. & M.
27 Ante, §§ 201-204. fective as against corporations whose assets may con-
28 Post. §§ 918-922. sist^ in whole or in part, of choses in action. Under
1 See, ante, § 647. a distringas the property is seized and delivered, or
2 Code, §§ 2998-2999. Formerly, all decrees, ex- held, according to the demand of the writ, and the
cept for land, were enforced in Chancery by process order of the Court.
of attachment. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1032. Deaderick V. 4 If the execution is against a corporation it
Smith, 6 Hum., 146. The decree then required the should read "that of the choses in action, goods and
defendant to pay the complainant, but now the de- chattels, lands and tenements of," etc. Code, § 3000.
cree usually is that the complainant recover of the 5 The execution is tested of the first diy of the
defendant, the amount decreed. term next before the date of issuance. Code, § 3001.
An award of an execution is not necessary in a The teste is important from the fact that the execu-
decree for a money recovery: the law awards an tion is a lien on the debtor's personal property from
execution. Hyder V. Butler, 19 Pick., 289. its teste. An execution may be levied upon the per-
3 Code, § 3000. This section does not^ mean that sonalty of a judgment debtor alive on the day of its
the distringas is to be levied, etc. it is the fieri
: teste but dead on the d<ty of its issuance. Trust
facias that is to be levied, as well on the choses in Company v. Weaver, 18 Pick., 60.
action as etc. thus making the latter writ more ef-
;
519 FINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY. § 654
If the execution be against an executor, or administrator, in his representa-
tive capacity, the command should be
"that of the goods and chattels, rights and credits of I J, deceased, in the hands of L, K
his executor [or, administrator,] to be administered, you cause to be made the sum [&c, as
in the above form.}
If the execution be against a corporation, the command to the Sheriff should
read:
"You are hereby commanded that, of the choses in action, goods and chattels, lands and
tenements, 6 of [the corporation, naming it,] you cause to be made the sum [&c, as above.]
The provisions of the Code, 7 and Caruther's History of a Lawsuit, cover so
fully the law and practice relative to executions, (their form and general re-
quisites, their issuance and proceedings thereon, what is liable to levy, how
levies and garnishments are made, delivery bonds and proceedings thereon, sales
by execution and conveyances of realty sold,) that it would be an unnecessary
consumption of space to consider further any of those matters, the practice
in reference thereto being the same in the Chancery as in the Circuit Court.
§ 654. —
Orders of Sale. If the execution has been levied on land and re-
turned without a sale, an order of sale will be awarded on motion. So, if there
be any property, real or personal, in the custody of the Court, whether by at-
tachment, levy of execution, or otherwise, the Court will, on motion, award
an order of sale to the Sheriff to sell such property, whenever proper in en-
forcement of a decree. Such an order may be as follows
ORDER TO SELL PROPERTY LEVIED ON.
B. M. Pond,
vs. [ No. 3214.— Order to Sell.
Martha L. Trigg.
In this cause, on motion of complainant's Solicitor, and it appearing from the Sheriff's
return that an execution was levied upon the following lot: [describe it,] but that no sale
thereof was made for want of time, it is ordered and decreed by the Court that the Sheriff
proceed to sell said lot as required by law, and that an order of sale issue to him accordingly.
If the property has been attached, or has come into the custody of the Court
otherwise than by the levy of an execution upon it, the Clerk and Master may
be ordered to sell it. The following is the form of an order of sale, where an
execution has been levied on land and returned for want of time to sell 8 :
ORDER OF SALE.
To the Sheriff of Shelby County
Whereas, an execution issued, on March 22, 1871, from the Chancery Court of Shelby
county, to ^he Sheriff of said county, upon a decree in said Court in favor of B. M. Pond
against Martha L. Trigg, for the sum of five thousand dollars and the costs of the
cause, which execution was returned as follows "No personal property of the defendant to
:
be found in my county upon which to levy this writ, and I therefore levied it on one lot in
the city of Memphis, Tennessee, being lot No. 74, north-west of Adams street and Front row,
fronting twenty feet on Front row and running back between parallel lines sixty-nine feet,
parallel with. Adams street east to an alley, as the property of the defendant, Martha L,.
Trigg, March 24, 1871, And this levy being too late to advertise and sell according to law,
I return this writ unsatisfied, and ask an order of sale. Marcus J. Wright, Sheriff."
And whereas, at the April, 1871, term of said Chancery Court, an order was by it made
that the Sheriff of Shelby county proceed and sell said lot so levied on as aforesaid, and
that an order of sale issue to him
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to proceed and sell said lot, as the law directs, to
satisfy said decree and the costs; and have the proceeds of said sale, together with this writ,
at the next term of said Court, to be held at the Court House in Memphis on the first Mon-
day in October next.
Witness [&c, as in an execution; see, ante, §653.]
An order of sale in an attachment suit, and in any other ease where the
property ordered to be sold is in the custody of the Court, is so similar to the
foregoing that it can easily be drawn, the draftsman being careful (1) to so
6 Code, § 3000. An execution can be levied upon I admirable digest of our decisions relative to execu-
onlv a leeral title. Evans v. T.anrt Co.. R Pick.. .148. I tions.
§655 FINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY. 520
describe the property as to identify it, (2) to show that the property is in the
custody of the Court, by attachment, or in tbe baDds of a receiver, or of some
other officer of the Court, and (3) that the Court bas ordered the property to
be sold, specifying the manner and terms of sale, if any; and (4) to command
the Sheriff, or other proper officer, to sell the property as required by the
decree, and, if no requirements, then to sell it according to law.
§ 655. —
Writs of Possession, or Assistance. If the decree be that the com-
plainant recover, or be put in possession of, specific property, real or personal,
the Court may enforce the same by a writ of possession, or other process suffi-
cient for that purpose. 9 The writ of possession, often called in the books a
writ of assistance, is the ordinary process used by the Court to put a party,
receiver, sequestrator, or other person, into possession of property when he
is entitled thereto, either upon a decree, or upon an interlocutory order. 10
A
writ of possession is usually awarded and issued in the following cases 1, :
When on a bill to recover a tract or lot of land on the strength of complainant's

title, the Court decrees in his favor 2, "When in a suit to recover possession of
;
a tract or lot of land, the complainant obtains the relief prayed 3, When the ;
complainant has been deprived of the legal title to, or the possession of, a tract
or lot of land by the unequitable conduct of the defendant, and the Court
decrees in complainant's favor; 4, When in a case of resulting trust, the Court
adjudges the land to be the property of complainant, and vests him with the
legal title 5, When a tract or lot of land is sold by the Master, and the sale
;
confirmed to the purchaser; 6, When receivers or sequestrators are appointed

to take possession of a tract or lot of land, and the party in possession refuses to
surrender, or a tenant of a party refuses to attorn and 7, When in any other
;
case, the Court adjudges a party entitled to the possession, whether perma-
nently or pending the suit. The writ may be awarded whenever applied for. 11
A
writ of possession will, also, issue to put a party, a receiver, sequestrator,
or other person, in possession of personal property, whenever, in cases similar
to the foregoing, the Court, by decree or interlocutory order, adjudges him
the possession and awards such writ.
WE.IT OP POSSESSION.^
State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Union county :
Whereas, in the case of A B, vs. C D, in our Chancery Court at Maynardville, it was

ordered and decreed that a writ of possession issue to put said A [or, B E
F the receiver
appointed in said case,] in possession of the following tract of land [He're insert a full
:
description.]
are, therefore, hereby commanded to take with you the force of your county, if nec-
You
essary,and immediately enter upon said tract of land, and eject and remove therefrom every
person thereon, and put said A B, [or, B F,] in full and peaceable possession thereof. 13
And return to said Court at its next term, to be held in the Court House in Maynardville,
on the 2d Monday in November, 1891, how you have executed this writ, by proper endorse-
ment hereon.
Witness, Coram Acuff, Clerk and Master of said Court, the 2d Monday of May, 1891.
If the writ be for personal property, its command to the Sheriff will be
"to take with you the force of your county, if necessary, and immediately take said
property out of the possession of any person having it in custody, and put the said A B, [or,
R F,] in full and peaceable possession thereof."
If a person not a party, or not the tenant or agent of a party, or not the
9 Code, §§2997; 3251; 3259; Irvine v. McBee, 5 See Johnson V. Tomlinson, 13 I.ea, 610; and ante,
Hum., 554. If the property is out of the State, the § 647, note 8.
Court will compel the defendant to execute proper 12 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 476; Code, §3359.
conveyances. See, ante, § 652.
r
13 A writ of possession is not executed until the
10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1062; Payne V. Baxter, 2 person, in whose behalf and for whose benefit the
Tenn. Ch., 518. writ issues, is put into the full possession of the
„, ,
11 Collier v. Railroad, 5 Cates, 96. It would entire premises specified in the writ. Farnsworth V.
seem that the writ could be issued by the Clerk and Fowler, 1 Swan, 1.
Master on application, as it is a form of execution.

521 FINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY. §656
vendee of a party after the bill was filed, is in possession, he must nevertheless
surrender the property to the Sheriff on his demand, and apply to the Court by
petition to have the possession restored to him. 14
§ 656. —
Writs of Distringas. The statute allows a party in whose favor a
decree is rendered against a corporation, to sue out a distringas, or a fieri facias,
to be levied as well on the choses in action as on the goods, chattels,
lands and tenements of the corporation. 16 Under the old Chancery practice, a
distringas was issued as a sort of original process, to enforce the appearance of a
corporation by seizing its property 16 but now, under the Code, it is in the na-
;
ture of final process. 17 The following is the form of

A WRIT OF DISTRINGAS.
To the Sheriff of Davidson county
Whereas, a decree was rendered by the Chancery Court at Nashville in favor of A B,
against the Commercial Bank of Nashville, for the sum of one thousand dollars and costs, and
a writ of distringas ordered to issue to enforce said decree
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to distrain the choses in action, goods and chattels,
lands and tenements of the said Commercial Bank within your county, and the same to
keep until the further order of said Court, unless sard debt and costs are fully paid. Herein
fail not, and make return how you have executed this writ at the next term of said Court, to
be held, [&c, as in case of an execution; see, ante, § 653.]
A
writ of distringas is practically obsolete, or nearly so but it may be used ;
to advantage when choses in action, or rents, belonging to a corporation are

sought to be reached; because, in such a ease, the Court may appoint a re-
ceiver to collect the choses in action, and the rents. 18
§ 657. Writs of Restitution: When
Issued, and Obtained. How
writ of —A
restitution is a process to restore to a person, ordinarily the defendant, certain
specific property taken from him by process, or surrendered by him on order
of the Court, in the progress of a suit. It may be issued 1, to restore to the :
defendant property replevied by the complainant, in case the replevy bond is

insufficient in form, or in amount of penalty, or in respect to the solvency of
the sureties; 19 or, 2, to restore to the party entitled property attached in the
suit; 20 or, 3, to restore to the party entitled specific property involved in the
litigation of which he has been wrongfully dispossessed by process, or on the
order of the Court 21 or, 4, to restore property, not covered by the decree of the
;
Court, taken by the Sheriff from the party entitled and delivered to a party
not entitled 22 or, 5, to restore to a stranger to the suit property of his, which,
;
by order of the Court, or by a misconstruction of an order, or by mistake under

an order, has been taken out of his possession and delivered to a party to the
suit, or to a receiver or sequestrator in the suit 23 or, 6, to restore to the de-
;
fendant land of which he has been dispossessed by the order of the Court in an
ejectment, or detainer, or other suit when the decree in favor of the complain-
ant is reversed on bill of review, or on appeal or writ of error or, 7, to restore ;
to the other party in an ejectment or detainer suit, the land of which one party
has become possessed, as complainant or defendant when, pending an appeal,
14 If the claimant's right to the possession as of the nature of a writ of sequestration, as a re-
against the parties to the suit is clear, the Court ceiver may be appointed to collect the choses in ac-
will determine the matter summarily, and order the tion. See, 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 75-76.
property to be returned to him Johnson v. Rider,
'
;
18 Awrit of distringas, or a writ in the nature of
2 Shan. Cas., 62; or will order it to be delivered up a writ of distringas, may also be used when the
to the claimant, pending an inquiry as to its owner- Court decrees that a party is entitled to the posses-
ship, on his giving bond and sufficient security to sion of specific personal property, possessing an ex-
restore it, in case the decision upon his claim should trinsic value to the person entitled thereto. Car.
be against him. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1059. Lawsuit, § 425. This sort of writ would be proper
15 Code, § 3000. to enforce the return of property in a replevin suit
16 Smith's Ch. Pr., 144. A corporation, being ai in Chancery.
ideal and invisible person, could not be attached, 19 Code, § 3392.
and the writ of distringas issued to attach its prop- 20 Code, § 4449.
erty, and thus enforce its appearance. 1 Barb. Ch. 21 Caruthers v. Caruthers, 2 Lea, 71.
Pr., 75. Corporations are now brought before the 22 Blair v. Pathkiller. 5 Yen?.. 230: W a ll»n «
$657 FINAL PROCESS AGAINST PROPERTY. 522
his security for rentsand damages becomes insufficient; 24 or, 8, to restore to
a tenant not sued the premises of which he was dispossed by a writ of posses-
sion, his possession as tenant being prior to the suit. 25
1. A Writ Nature of an Injunction, will also lie in favor of
of Restitution, in the
a party who has paid a judgment or decree in whole or in part which was
afterward reversed. It sometimes happens that after a decree has been paid,
c partly paid, the party so paying has had the decree reversed, on a writ of
error, or on a bill of review, and in such a case he is entitled to a writ of
restitution in the nature of an execution. 26
But to entitle a party to a writ of restitution on reversal of the decree, such
reversal must be final and not leave questions open which when decided, may
show the party is not entitled to the writ. 27
2. A Writ of Restitution, How Obtained. If the person injured by being wrong-
fully deprived of his property is a party to the suit in which the order was
made or the writ issued, he can bring the wrongful dispossession before the
Court by motion supported by affidavit when the facts do not otherwise ap-
pear 2S but if he is not a party, he must present his sworn petition to the Court
;
in the cause, fully setting up the facts of which he complains, and praying
to be allowed to file his petition in the cause and become a party, pro hac vice. 29
The matter is, ordinarily, inquired into and disposed of summarily, 30 unless
the grounds of the motion are seriously contested, in which case, the Master
may be ordered to report as to the facts, or the Court may decide the contro-
versy directly, on the proofs submitted. In case of a petition the petitioner may
be required to give a prosecution bond. 31
The following is the form of a writ of restitution
WRIT OP RESTITUTION.
State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Roane county
Whereas, in the case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al., in our Chancery Court at Kings-
ton, it was ordered and decreed, on petition of John Jones, that a writ of restitution issue to
restore him to the possession of the following tract of land [Here insert a full description
:
of the land,] of which he was unlawfully dispossessed under a writ of our said Court, you
are, therefore, hereby commanded, without delay, to take with you the force of your county,
if necessary, and immediately enter upon said tract of land, and eject and remove therefrom
every person thereon, and restore said John Jones to the full and peaceable possession thereof.
And return to our said Chancery Court at its next term to be held at the Court House in
Kingston, on the 2d Monday of November, 1884, how you have executed this writ, by proper
endorsement thereon.
Witness, William Clark, Clerk and Master of our said Court, the 2d Monday of May, 1884.
William Clark, C. & M.,
by James C. Pope, D. C. & M.
If the writ be for personal property, its command to the Sheriff will be
"to take with you the force of your county, if necessary, and immediately take said prop-
erty out of the possession of any person having it in custody, and restore it to the full and
peaceable possession of said John Jones."
24 Shan. Code, §§4994-4999; Acts of 1879, ch. 85. 27 18 Ency. PL & Pr., 877.
25 Hickman v. Dale, 7 Yerg., 149; Blair V. Path- 28 See, post, §§ 784-785.
killer,5 Yerg., 230. 29 See, post, §§ 792-794.
26 Gates v. Brinkley, 4 Lea, 710. The judgment 30 Hickman v. Dale, 7 Yerg., 154.
or decree of the Supreme Court should, on reversal 31 For a form of a petition, and a further and
in such a case, specify the sum to be recovered by fuller consideration of the frame of a petition, see,
the execution. post, § 797.
523 SEQUESTRATIONS TO ENFORCE DECREES. §658
ARTICLE V.
SEQUESTRATIONS TO ENFORCE DECREES.
§ 658. Sequestrations Generally Considered. § 660. Duties of Sequestrators.
§ 6S9. Powers of Sequestrators. § 661. Form of the Writ of Sequestration.
—
Sequestrations Generally Considered. If the Court see proper in the
§ 658.
first upon issuance of an attachment for not obeying a decree
instance, or if
the delinquent cannot be found, a writ of sequestration may issue against the
estate of such delinquent to compel obedience to the decree. 1 The process of
sequestration is a writ or commission, directed to certain persons, 2 nominated
by the complainant, empowering them to take possession of the defendant's
real estate, and receive the rents and profits thereof; and to seize all his per-
sonal estate not exempt from execution, and to keep the same in their hands
until the defendant shall have performed the decree, and cleared his contempt. 3
If necessary, the Court may order the sequestrators to sell the personal prop-
erty; and if the delinquent be required, by the order or decree, to deliver to
any person, or to deposit in Court, or elsewhere, books, papers, writings, or
any other articles or things, the sequestrators have power to seize them and
hold them subject to the order of the Court. 4
A writ of sequestration is indispensable to enforce a decree when the de-
fendant has property in this State, but cannot be found on a writ of attachment
for contempt, or evades service of the decree, or is out of the State, and the
decree commands the defendant to do some affirmative act, such as to execute
a conveyance, or lease, of lands outside of the State, or to execute a release or
acquittance of a mortgage, judgment, or lien of record in another State, or to
do some other act which cannot be directly or indirectly done by a decree
proprio vigor e. 5
If either party die during a sequestration, there must be a revivor, not only
of the suit, but of the sequestration; and if the suit should be abated, the se-
questration would be abated also. 6
—
Powers of Sequestrators. Sequestrators are clothed with great pow-
§ 659.
ers,but the defendant being in contempt cannot be heard to complain. The ob-
ject of a sequestration is to coerce the defendant into performing a decree, or,
on his failing so to do, to indemnify the complainant for such failure. To effect-
ually accomplish this object, the sequestrators may seize all the property of
the defendant of every kind and character whatsoever, real or personal, 7
except such as is exempt from seizure by statute. They may break open doors
to houses, and may open rooms, safes, and boxes, and take possession of all
their contents; may seize all the products of the defendant's farms, and all the
rents of his real estate, and, if any tenants refuse to attorn or pay rents, the
Court will compel them, as in case of receivers. In a proper case, the Court
will order the sequestrators to sell all the personal estate of the defendant;
and if any property is of a perishable nature, it is generally ordered to be sold,
as of course. The Court will, also, authorize them to lease the .real estate of the
defendant. If sequestrators are obstructed in the execution of their duties,
the Court will aid them by a writ of possession and it is a contempt of Court
;
1 Code, § 4487. 3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1050.

2 The usual number is four, but if a less number 1 2 Dan Ch Pr.. 1050-1057.
would be adequate, the Court may, no doubt, appoint 5 Sec, Cede, §s 4478-4487.
a less number, even one. Bond may be required of o 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1059-1061.
the sequestrators. 7 Including choses in action.
§660 SEQUESTRATIONS TO ENFORCE DECREES. 524
to disturb them in their possession of property taken under the sequestration,
and the Court will enjoin any suit brought against them to recover property in
their possession as such. 8
§ 660. Duties of Sequestrators.— Sequestrators are officers of the Court, and

their duties and liabilities are substantially the same as those of receivers. They
act under the orders of the Court as directed from time to time. They must
seize all the estate of the defendant within reach, and must be diligent in get-
ting possession of it. They are accountable for all they receive, and must make
and file with the Clerk and Master a complete inventory of everything that
comes into their hands, giving items, amounts and dates. They have no au-
thority to apply the money or property they receive, otherwise than as
ordered by the Court, but should hold all moneys in their hands subject to the
order of the Court. 9
The powers, duties and liabilities of sequestrators, and the course and pro-
cedure by and against them, are so nearly identical with those of receivers,
that to enumerate them and specify them would be only to repeat what is said
en these matters in the Chapter on Receivers. The following summary will
show this identity 1, The Court will put sequestrators in possession by proper
:
process when necessary, and will require the tenants of the defendant to
attorn to them 2, It is a contempt of Court to disturb the possession of seques-
;
trators, and if they are dispossessed the Court will restore them to possession;
3, They are accountable for all that they receive and must make reports, from
;
time to time, of all that comes into their hands, and must pay over all balances
in their hands; and 4, A
party claiming sequestrated property by title para-
mount must apply to the Court for an order of restoration, or for leave to sue
the sequestrators. 10
§ 661. —
Form of the Writ of Sequestration. The writ is, in the main, a re-
cital of the order for the sequestration and the form of the writ must, there-
;
fore, be varied to meet the circumstances of each particular case. 11 The fol-
lowing is a form 12 of
A WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION".
To John -Smith, William Jones, James Grant, and Charles Stokes
Whereas, the Chancery Court at Nashville did, on the 10th day of June, 1890, in a suit
therein pending between John Doe, complainant, and Richard Roe, defendant, order the said
Richard Roe within ten days after notice, to execute, acknowledge, and deliver to said John
Doe, a deed with covenants of warranty and seizin for a certain tract of land in the State
of Kentucky, in said decree fully described, and to pay the costs of said suit;
And whereas, an attachment issued against the body of said Richard Roe for his contempt
in not obeying said decree, and was returned "Not found."
And whereas, the said Court, on the 27th day of June, 1890, in said suit, ordered a writ of
sequestration against the estate of the said Richard Roe, directed to you, all of which fully
appears of record in said suit, in our said Court of Chancery
You, or any two or more of you, are, therefore, hereby commanded, and fully authorized
and empowered, to enter upon, all the lands, tenements and other real estate whatsoever of
the said Richard Roe, and to take, collect, and sequester, not only all the rents and profits
of said lands, tenements and other real estate, but also all his goods, chattels, choses in action,
and personal estate whatsoever, and detain and keep the same in your possession under
sequestration, until the said Richard Roe shall fully perform said decree, and clear his said
contempt, and said Court shall make an order to the contrary.
Witness, [as in case of an execution; see, ante, § 653.]
The primary object of the sequestration is to compel the defendant to per-
form the decree, but the Court may apply the proceeds of the sequestration to
the satisfaction of the complainant's demand. 13
8 2 erty to be restored, without a reference to the Mas-

ter. Ibid,
112 Dan. Ch. Pr., 10S1.
12 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 2365; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 383;
698.
13 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1056.
525 PROCEEDINGS ON REMANDMENT. §662
ARTICLE VI.
PROCEEDINGS IN ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES ON REMANDMENT.
662. Proceedings on Remandment from the 664. Proceedings on Remandment for the
Supreme Court. Execution of an Order or Decree.
663. Proceedings on Remandment from the 665. Proceedings on Remandment from a
Court of Chancery Appeals. Federal Court.
§ 662. Proceedings on Remandment from the Supreme Court. On the —

remandment of a cause from the Supreme Court, the first step is to produce the
procedendo remanding the cause, and the accompanying decree of the Supreme
Court, and to move the Court to have them spread on the minutes, and the
cause re-entered on the docket, both of which motions are allowed, of course.
When a remanded cause has thus been re-entered on the docket, it stands
exactly as it did when the appeal was granted, except in so far as changed by
the decree of the Supreme Court. The decree of the Chancellor appealed from,
and the erroneous orders and rulings of the Chancellor excepted to before or
at the hearing, are affirmed, modified, or annulled, as required by the decree of
remandment.
1. If the bill was improperly dismissed on motion, the defendant must, on
remandment, plead, demur, or answer, under the rules.
2. If the bill was improperly dismissed on demurrer, the defendant must
plead or answer, under the rules.
3. If the bill was improperly dismissed in consequence of complainant's
supposed wrongful failure to comply with some rule, or interlocutory order,
the cause will stand on the docket exactly as it stood when dismissed, to be
thence proceeded in according to the practice of the Court, as though never
dismissed.
4. Where the Chancellor erroneously refused a material motion, as for an
amendment to a pleading, or deposition, or for leave to file some pleading, or
document, or pauper oath, or bond, or for a reference, or for a report, or for
the recommittal of a report, or for the taking or retaking of a deposition, or
for a continuance, or in reference to some other matter, on the reinstatement
of the cause, the motion refused by the Chancellor will be granted, and the
cause will proceed thereafter as though such motion had been allowed origi-
nally, and no appeal had ever been taken.
5. Where the order of remandment gives the appellant leave to make addi-
tional parties, or to file a new or an amended pleading, bond, or pauper oath,
or to introduce additional evidence, or to do some other thing, on the reinstate-
ment of the cause the appellant will be allowed so to do, and thereafter the
cause will be proceeded in as though such thing had been originally done in
the Chancery Court, and no appeal had ever been taken.
6. Where a demand for a jury was erroneously denied, on remandment a
trial by jury will be allowed. On the other hand, where a jury trial was erro-
neously granted, on remandment the cause will be proceeded in as though
such trial had been refused by the Chancellor instead of granted. 1
7. Where, in case of a trial by jury, material errors were committed by the
Chancellor in admitting or excluding evidence, or in charging or failing to
charge the jury, or in refusing a new trial on some other ground, on remand-
ment a new trial will be granted, and the cause proceeded with as though the
§663 PROCEEDINGS ON REMANDMENT. 526
Chancellor had granted a new trial originally and there had never been an
appeal. On
the new trial, however, the errors corrected by the Supreme Court
will be carefully avoided.
8. Where, in any matter, the Supreme Court has reversed or modified the
action of the Chancellor, on remandment such matter will stand reversed or
modified accordingly.
9. Where, in any matter, the Chancellor failed to act whether moved on so
to do or not, and the Supreme Court decree of remandment indicates what the
Chancellor should have done, such action will accordingly be done, or if not
rtone will be deemed to be done, and the case proceeded in accordingly.
10. Where any other act or omission of the Chancellor is corrected by the
Supreme Court, or, where the Supreme Court, on its own motion, directs some
act to be done, or undone, or omitted to be done, or in some other matter re-
verses or revises what was done, or omitted to be done, by the Chancellor, on
remandment of the cause, the decree of the Supreme Court will, in all respects,
be carefully complied with.
After the cause has been remanded, and re-instated on the docket by order
of the Chancellor, it is further proceeded in according to the practice of the
Court from that stage where the appeal was taken to a final decree.
If the cause is remanded for the execution of an order or decree no order of
re-instatement is necessary, as will appear in a following section. 2
OBDEE OF BE-INSTATEMENT.
Frank Frank, ]
vs. ! Order of Re-instatement.
Ananias Fraud. J
In this cause, Leon Jourolmon, Esq., the Solicitor of the complainant, Frank Frank, pro-
duced the procedendo and decree of the Supreme Court reversing the decree of this Court
heretofore pronounced and appealed from, and moved the Court to enter said procedendo
and decree Qn the minutes of the Court and to reinstate the cause on the docket, all of which
motions are allowed. Said procedendo and decree are as follows
PBOCEDENDO.
[Here insert it in full.]
DECREE.
[Here insert it in full.]
The Clerk and Master is directed to re-enter the cause on his docket, which is done
accordingly.
[Supposing the appeal was from a decree sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the bill,
and that the Supreme Court reversed the decree, overruled the demurrer and remanded the
cause "for answer to the bill and further proceedings according to the practice of the Court,"
add:]
And, thereupon, the demurrer of the defendant to the bill having been overruled by the
Supreme Court, and the cause remanded for answer to the bill and further proceedings, the
defendant moved the Court for thirty days in which to file his answer, which motion was dis-
allowed, and the defendant ordered to answer the bill on or before tomorrow, [or some other
specified day.]
§ 663. Proceedings on Remandment from

the Court of Chancery Appeals.
The proceedings on remandment from the Court of Chancery Appeals
of a cause
are in every particular identical with those above set forth in case of remand-
ments by the Supreme Court, mutatis mutandis, so that it is unnecessary to re-
state them.
§ 664. Proceedings on Remandment for the Execution of an Order or Decree.
Ordinarily on the remandment of a cause by the Supreme Court, or the Court
of Chancery appeals, no further action can be taken in it until it has been re-
instated on the docket by order of the Chancery Court. This often causes a
Long, needless and vexatious delay, as six months might intervene between the
pronouncement of the decree of the Appellate Court and the next term of the
Chancery Court whose decree had been affirmed, modified, or reversed.
2 See, post, § 664.
f527 PROCEEDINGS ON REMANDMENT. §665
To remedy this evil, it has been enacted that when a case is remanded by
the Supreme Court, or the Court of Chancery Appeals, for the execution of
an order of reference, order of sale, or for other proceedings directed in the
decree of the Appellate Court, or in the decree of the Chancery Court as af-
firmed by the Appellate Court, such case is deemed to be re-instated in the
Chancery Court from the time of filing with the Clerk and Master a certified
copy of the decree or mandate of the Appellate Court; and thereafter such
case may be proceeded in in accordance with the decree of the Appellate Court
without any action of the Chancery Court thereon and as fully and effectively
;
as if the decree of the Appellate Court had been re-decreed, or spread of record,
in the Chancery Court, in term time, by order of the Chancellor. 3 As soon
as a certified copy of the decree or mandate of the Appellate Court is received,
the Clerk and Master will file it, copy it upon his rule docket, and notify the
Solicitors of record in the case of the filing of the decree or mandate 4 and, ;
thereupon, the Clerk and Master will, unless otherwise directed by consent of
such Solicitors, proceed to execute such decree or* mandate as fully and speedily
as though so ordered by the Chancellor.
Under this salutary statute the delays incident to appeals are, in many
cases, greatly lessened, and the termination of a litigation greatly speeded.
§ 665. Proceedings on Remandment from a Federal Court. When a case —
has been removed from the Chancery Court to a Federal Court and been
afterwards remanded to the Chancery Court, the pleadings, depositions and
proofs which were filed in the Federal Court during the pendency of the case
there, are as valid and may be used as fully as if originally filed in the Chan-
cery Court. 5 And* where the original depositions and pleadings and proofs
cannot be obtained from the Federal Court, certified copies may be used
instead of the originals. 6
3 Acts of 1901, ch. 10, sec. 1. ground that the Master's action was premature. The
4 Ibid, sec. 2. A cause having been remanded for Supreme Court affirmed the decree. Madison v.
an order of reference to be made as to complainant's Ducktown S. C. & I. Co., MSS., Knoxville, Septem-
damages, the Master proceeded to take proof and ber, 1905.
assess the damages without an order by the Chan- 5 Acts of 1903, ch. 17, sec. 1.
cellor so to do; and, on his action being sustained 8 Ibid. sec. 2.
by the Chancellor, the defendant appealed on the
§666 AMENDED BILLS. 528
PART VI.
BILLS IN CHANCERY RELATING TO ORIGINAL
BILLS.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
Article I. Amended Bills.
Article II. Supplemental Bills.
Article III. Defences to Amended and Supplemental Bills.
ARTICLE I.
AMENDED BILLS.
§ 666. How Defects in a Bill May be Reme- § 673. Statutory Provisions Relating to
died. Amending Bills.
S 667. Amendment of Bills Generally Con- § 674. When Amendments May be Made
sidered. Further Considered.
S 668. A Bill Amended, and an Amended
675. How Leave to Amend is Obtained.
Bill.
676. Form and Manner of Amending Bills.
§ 669. When
an Amended Bill is Proper.
677. Effect of an Amended Bill.
§ 670. Difference Between an Amended and
a Supplemental Bill. 678. Summary of the Essentials of Amend-
§ 671. What Amendments May be Made. ed Bills.
§ 672. What Amendments are Not Allowed. § 679. Form of an Amended Bill.
§ 666. How Defects in a Bill May be Remedied. —After a suit has been com-
menced by original bill, it may need amendment in consequence of defects of
various kinds. A
bill may be defective in its original structure, either (1)
from the want of a full statement of the material facts, or (2) from the want
of proper parties, or (3) from the want of asking suitable discoveries, or (40
from other like defects, where no event has occurred subsequent to the insti-
tution of the suit, affecting the rights or interests of the parties. In such a
case, the defect may be cured either by an amendment of the bill, or by an
amended bill. On the other hand, a suit may be perfect in its institution and ;
yet, by some event, subsequent to the filing of the original bill, it may become
(1) defective, so that no proceeding can be had, either as to the whole, or as
to some part thereof, with effect; as, when, although the parties to the suit
remain before the Court, some event, subsequent to the institution of the suit,
has either made such a change in the interest of those parties, or given to
some other person such an interest in the matters in litigation, that the pro-
ceedings, as they stand, cannot have their full effect, in which ease the defect
may be remedied by a supplemental bill; 1 or (2) the suit may become abated,
l It may
be well, however, to state that the present A bill may be amended at any time before a decree;
practice in Tennessee on the subject of amending 2, Matter which has occurred since the original bill
bills is somewhat different from the practice as laid was filed may be incorporated in an amended bill; and
down in Story, Daniel and older works on Chancery 3, The differences between an amended and a sup-
Pleadings. In the following particulars our present plemental bill are, in other respects, but little more
practice differs somewhat from the old practice: I, than nominal, in ordinary practice. See, post, § 670.
529 AMENDED BILLS. §667
so that there can be no proceeding in it at all, either as to the whole, or as to
a part thereof as when, in consequence of the death of parties, or of marriage
;
of female parties, or of some other event subsequent to the suit, there is a want
of parties before the Court, by or against whom the suit can, in whole or in
part, be prosecuted or defended, in any of which cases a bill of revivor in some
of its forms may be filed. 2
§ 667. Amendment of Bills —
generally Considered. The rights of the parties
to a suit are ordinarily determined as though the decree was pronounced
on the very day the bill was tiled; for the object of the suit is to have a decision
of the matters in controversy existing at the time the suit is brought. It
would seem manifestly just and logieal, therefore, to incorporate into the
original bill, either by interlineation, or an a separate paper, (1) any matter
necessary to the rights of the complainant, and proper to be brought before
the Court, that was in existence when the bill was filed, but for sufficient
reason was omitted, and (2) to add to the bill any new parties made necessary
by such additional facts. And such is the practice of the Courts, their object
being to enable the complainant to get before the Court every matter and every
party necessary to a full adjudication of the matters of controversy. And
although amended bills are sometimes allowed to bring before the Court mat-
ters occurring since the suit was brought, nevertheless such a practice creates
confusion, and should not be encouraged; but the complainant should be re-
quired to file a supplemental bill. 3
§ 668. A Bill Amended, and an Amended Bill. There is a difference be- —
tween amending an original bill on its face and filing an amended bill. In our
practice, when an amendment can be made in the body of the bill by interlinea-
tion, or by writing it on the margin, it can be so made at any time before the
defendant has made defence, or even after demurrer, and before argument
thereof, without leave but, if made at any other time, leave of the Court must
;
be had. 4 Any amendment may be made on the face of the bill that would be
proper to be made by an amended bill, provided the amendment be not too
voluminous to be incorporated into the original bill by interlineation, or inser-
tion on the margin. 5 If, however, such an amendment is too long to be inserted
in the body of the original bill, the Court will require it to be brought forward
on a separate paper as an amended bill, or as an amendment to the bill. When
the new matter is written on the face of the original bill, the bill is a bill
amended when it takes the form of a separate bill, it is an amended bill. 6
;
The new matter, and the new parties, that may be brought before the Court
are governed by the same rules and considerations whether the bill is amended
on its face, or an amended bill is filed. In either case, amendments to a bill are
always considered as forming a part of the original bill, and relate to the
filing of the bill. 7
§ 669. —
When an Amended Bill is Proper. When a complainant has filed
his bill, and is advised that the same does not contain such material facts, or
make all such persons parties, as are necessary to enable the Court to do com-
plete justice, he may alter it by inserting new matter subsisting at the time of
exhibiting his bill, of which he was not then apprised, or which he did not
think necessary to be stated, and may add such parties as shall be deemed nec-
2 Sto. Eq. PI., §328. time to answer the same. In such cases, the amend-
3 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 59-63, and note; post, §§ 680- ment is deemed to have been made in the body of
692. the bill. Lyon v. Browne, 6 Bax., 64. This prac-
4 Code, §§ 4333-4337. tice, however, should not be encouraged, as the con-
5 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 422, note. venience of all parties is promoted by having the
6 There is a sort of intermediate method of mak- bill and its amendments all together, instead of hav-
ing amendments to bills frequently adopted in term ing to search the minutes through to see what
time. Instead of either amending the bill on its amendments to the bill may be found therein. The
face, or filing an amended bill, the complainant is Court should require the amendment to be incor-
allowed to amend his bill by an entry on the min- porated in ,the bill, as well as entered on the min-
utes, setting out the very words of the amendment utes. See State v. Goldberg, 5 Cates, 298.
§670 AMENDED BIIXS. 530
essary; or in
case the original bill shall be found to contain matter
riot relevant, or no longer necessary to complainant's case, or parties which
may be dispensed with, the same may be struck out; and the original bill, thus
added to or altered, is termed an amended bill.
But although it is the practice to call a bill thus altered an amended bill,
the amendment is in fact esteemed but as a continuation of the original bill,
and as forming part of it; for both the original and amended bill constitute
but one record. 8 An original bill cannot be properly amended by incorporating
anything therein which arose subsequently to the commencement of the suit.
Matters which have since occurred, and which are material to perfect the com-
plainant's case, are proper for a supplemental bill. 9
Amendments to a bill are of two sorts, those which relate to parties, and
those which affect the substance of the case amendments relating to parties :
are either by addition, or omission of them or by changing the situation of the

;
parties, by striking out the name of a co-complainant and making him a de-
fendant, as in the case of an infant heir-at-law who has been improperly made
a complainant. A
complainant ought not to introduce facts by amendment,
which have occurred since the filing of the original bill, because as the amend-
ments are held to constitute part of the same record as the original bill, which
can only relate to facts which were in existence at the time when it was orig-
inally filed, the introduction of matters of a subsequent date would render the
bill incongruous. Matter, therefore, which has occurred since the original bill
was filed, should be brought before the Court hy supplemental bill, and not
by amendment to the original bill. 10
§ 670. The Difference between an Amended and a Supplemental Bill. The —
technical distinctions between an amended bill and a supplemental bill are-
two 1, No matter not in existence when the original suit was brought can be
:
brought forward by an amended bill, but to bring forward such matter is the
especial office of a supplemental bill. 2, Matter in existence when the original
bill was filed must be brought before the Court by amendment, if the answer
has not been filed but, if the answer has been filed, such matter must ordinarily
;
be brought forward by supplemental bill. 11 However, inasmuch as under our

practice a bill may be amended after answer filed, 12 this practically abolishes
the latter distinction between the two bills, and the effect of this has been great-
ly to obliterate the former distinction. An examination of our Reports will show
that all distinctions between an amended bill and a supplemental bill are often
ignored, and amended bills are frequently allowed to be filed when, in strict
practice, supplemental bills should have been filed, and this is done without
challenge. Hence, it may be safely laid down as a rule of our Chancery prac-
tice, that, at least as to matter in existence when suit was brought, an amended
bill may be filed whenever a supplemental bill will lie. 13 The result is, what-
ever is said in the next article in reference to supplmental bills, will apply to
amended bills as to matter in existence when the original bill was filed. 14
§ 671. What Amendments May be Made. If, at the hearing, the record —
appears to be defective for want of proper parties, the Court will allow the
cause to stand over, for the complainant to amend his bill by adding parties
or, where the parties are too numerous to be brought before the Court, the
complainant will be allowed to alter the form of the bill, by making it a bill
of complaint on behalf of himself and others the complainant will be permitted
:
8 Morrow Fossick, 3 Lea, 131; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.

v. 2Dan. Ch. Pr., ISIS, note; Sto. Eq. PI., §§332-
401. Daniel says that an amended bill must be ad 336; 88S; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 63.
dressed to the same Chancellor to whom the original io 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 402-403; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 63;
bill was addressed, although a change of Chancellor: 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1515, notes.
has occurred since the original bill was filed. 1 Dan, 112 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1515-1530, notes; 2 Barb. Ch.
Ch. Pr., 402. This is a striking proof of the dispo- Pr., 59-63; Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 332; 336; 885.
sition of the Courts to regard the original bill and 12 Code, § 4336.
the amended bill as practically one pleading. In 13 In many cases, the name "amended and supple-
Tennessee, however, regard is had more to the office mental bill" is used in our practice.
than to the officer, and it would be proper to address 14 See, post, § 682.
the amended bill to the incumbent Chancellor.
531 AMENDED BILLS. § 671
to show why he cannot bring the necessary parties before the Court. So, also,
where a matter has not been put in issue, with sufficient precision, the Court
has, upon hearing the case, given the complainant liberty to amend the bill,
for the purpose of making the necessary alteration. And the Court will, at the
hearing, permit the prayer of the bill to be amended, so as to make At more con-
sistent with the case made by the complainant. And where a complainant has
amended his bill, and by accident has omitted to insert in the amended bill the
prayer for relief, although it was in the original bill, the Court will allow the
complainant to re-amend his bill by inserting it. "Wherever improper sub-
missions have been made in a bill on behalf of infants, the Court will, at hear-
ing, order that the bill be amended by striking out the submissions. Upon
the same principle, where an infant heir-at-law had been made a co-complain-
ant, the Court ordered the cause to stand over, with liberty to the complainant
to amend his bill by making the heir-at-law a defendant. 15
And it may be said, generally, that any amendment may be made necessary
to enable the complainant to get the merits of his case fully before the Court
and to enable the Court to do full justice to all parties interested in the con-
troversy. New parties may be made either complainant or defendant; com-
plainants may be made defendants, and defendants may be made complain-
ants any new matter may be brought forward, pertinent to and consistent with
;
the case stated in the original bill; new or additional process, ordinary or
extraordinary, may be asked; the prayers may be changed; and, in short, any
addition, or alteration, may be made that is in furtherance of the object of the
original bill, and not inconsistent therewith, or repugnant thereto, provided
that such addition or alteration does not make an entirely new suit.
The most usual grounds for amending bills are the following:
1. To Make Mew Parties, such new parties consisting, ordinarily, of persons
who are: (1) liable to complainant's demands; or (2) who have an interest
in the subject-matter of the suit; or (3) will be entitled to some of the pro-
ceeds; or (4) will be subject to some of the liabilities of the suit; or (5) who
have probable rights; or (6) who have set up claims to the subject-matter of
the suit, that should be adjudicated; or (7) persons who should be bound by
the decree either in order to remove clouds from the title, or to give the pur-
chaser a good title, or to prevent further litigation in reference thereto,
Courts are very liberal in allowing new parties to be made, and when the
defendants already in Court are not prejudiced thereby, and when no delay
will result from the amendment, no terms are ordinarily imposed.
2. To Bring Forward Newly Discovered Facts that increase or strengthen com-
plainant's equities, or destroy or diminish the defendant's set-offs, or de-
fences. Sometimes it is necessary to file a bill, especially an attachment or
injunction bill, in so great haste that it is impracticable to thoroughly investi-
gate the case in all its branches and details. In such a case, this investigation
should be made as soon after the bill is filed as possible, and application to
amend should be promptly made after its necessity is discovered.
3. To Take Advantage of Disclosures in the Answer. It is very common for the
answer to disclose facts, or set up defences, previously unknown to the com-
plainant, in consequence of which it becomes necessary to make such correc-
tions in, or additions to, his bill, either as to facts, or as to parties, or as to
both, as will enable him to meet, avoid, or overcome these disclosures, if against
his interest, or to take advantage of them, if in his favor. 16 Such amendments
are allowed with great liberality, and ordinarily without terms, if the facts
were unknown to complainant when he filed his bill, and if the application to
amend is made at the first opportunity after the filing of the answer, because
one of the offices of an answer is to disclose and discover facts unknown to the
complainant. 17
§672 AMENDED BII^S. 532
§ 672. What Amendments
are not Allowed.—Amendments can only be
granted where the bill is defective in parties, or in the prayer for relief, or in
the omission or mistake of a fact or circumstance connected with the substance,
but not forming the substance itself, nor repugnant thereto. 18 The new mat-
ters set up in the amended bill must be germane to the original bill, and have
a connection with the matters set up in the original bill. 19 An amended bill
will not be allowed, where the relief sought is inconsistent with that of the
original bill nor where the new matter is repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
;
the original bill, 20 even though stated in the alternative; 21 nor where a new
title or cause of action is sought to be set up that is barred by the statute of
limitations, or in any other way barred, lost or discharged; 22 or that would
make the bill multifarious, or in any other respect demurrable. 23 Nor will an
amendment be allowed at the hearing whose effect would be to shift the burden
of proof as to a particular matter from the complainant to the defendant. 24
A complainant cannot by amended bill abandon the original claim set up
and aver a new one thus, he cannot sue first in his own right and afterwards
;
amend so as to sue as administrator. 25 Nor will an amended bill be allowed

which seeks a relief directly in conflict with the relief prayed in the original
bill. And these rules are not changed by the fact that the same person has
the one right as an individual, and the other as administrator. 26 Nevertheless,
where the new matters are at all germane to the original bill, and grow out of
the same transaction, great liberality is allowed in making amendments, pro-
vided they do not make out an entirely new case, 27 and this is especially true as
to amendments for want of proper parties before the Court; all amendments,
however, to be made on the payment of costs where the amendment causes de-
lay, or creates costs.
If,at the time of filing the original bill, the complainant had no title to the
relief prayed, he cannot make out a title by so amending his bill as to introduce
facts which have subsequently occurred. 28 Nor can such a sole complainant
amend by adding as complainants parties who have a title; nor can parties
who have a title have themselves made complainants by amended bill, when
the original complainant has no title. But if the original complainant has
any such interest as to make him a proper party, then new parties may be
niade. 29
The Court will not, after answer filed, allow amendments as to facts known
to the complainant when he filed his bill, unless some sufficient excuse is given
for the omission. 30
§ 673. Statutory Provisions in Relation to Amending Bills. According —
to the Code, the complainant may amend his bill before the defendant has
taken out, or the Clerk issued, a copy thereof, and in small matters not affect-
ing the merits, afterwards, without costs. 31
Material amendments may be made as of course, without application to the
Chancellor, after copy of the bill has been issued or taken out, and before the
defendant has made defence, upon complainant paying the costs of furnishing
a copy of the amendment to such of the defendants as have received or taken
out copies of the original bill, and of the notice to be served upon all the de-
fendants of such amendment amendments may also be made after demurrer
:
and before argument thereof, upon the same terms. 32
18 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 401, note. Searcy, 5 Hum., 587; Coleman V. Pinkard, 2 Hum.,
19 Tappan V. Railroad Co., 3 I,ea, 106. 185; Rogers V. Simpson, 10 Heisk., 655.
20 Bynum v. Ewart, 6 Pick., 658; Hill v. Harri- 2a Moody v. Fry, 3 Hum., 567; Gilliam v. Spence,
man, 11 Pick., 300. 6 Hum., 163.
21 Masson 0. Anderson, 3 Bax., 302; Coleman v. 27 Hoganv. McFarland, 6 Bax., 104.
Pinkard, 2 Hum., 190; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 408. 28 Dan. Ch. Pr., 401, note.
1
22 Trousdale v. Thomas, 3 Lea, 71S. 29 Franklin V. Franklin, 2 Swan, 522.
23 Rogers v. Simpson, 11 Heisk., 655. 30 Crowder v. Turney, 3 Cold., 551; 1 Dan. Ch.
24 Allen V. Dayton Hotel Co., 11 Pick., 480. Pr., 401, notes; Marr v. Wilson, 2 I,ea, 229.
25 Bosley t>. Phillips, 3 Tenn. Ch., 649; Tilman v. 31 Code, § 4332.
32 Code, § 4333.
In all other cases the complainant can amend his bill only by leave of the
Chancellor given in open Court, or at Chambers, and upon such terms as he
may impose. 83 But the Court may, at any stage of the cause, even after argu-
ment, 34 if it be thought necessary to justice, permit amendments to the bill,
upon such terms as may appear reasonable. 35
The following form of notice of amendment before answer filed will serve
as a guide to the Clerk and Master:
NOTICE OP AMENDMENT OF A BILL BEFORE ANSWER FILED.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court at Clinton.
Richard Roe.
Mr. Richard Roe >•
You are hereby notified that on the 17th day of June, 1905, the complainant amended his
bill in the above entitled cause, as follows
On the first page, in line 9, he added after the words "on that day,'' the following words
"and at the same time complainant paid him forty-seven dollars." 1
On the second page, at the end of line 3, he added these words [Here insert them.] :
On the same page, he struck out all the words between the words "on said contract," in
line 10, and the words "Complainant further shows," in line 16.
I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of said amendments.
This June 17, 1905. J. C. Scruggs, C. & M.
This notice need not be served on any of the defendants except those who
have received or taken out copies of the bill; but all of the other defendants
will be notified that the bill has been amended. These notices may be served
in the same manner as notices to take depositions. The original notices, with
the officer's return endorsed on them, should be filed in the cause and the
facts noted in the Master's rule docket.
§ 674. When Amendments may be Made, Further Considered. As a gen- —
eral rule, a bill may be amended at any time between its filing and the adjourn-
ment of the term at which the final decree is pronounced, 36 under the terms
and conditions stated in the preceding section; and these amendments may
cover any, or every, part of the bill, may bring in new parties, change the
position of parties on the record, whether complainants or defendants, bring
new matters before the Court consistent with the original bill, ask for other
process, ordinary or extraordinary, change the prayer, and in any other way
filter the original bill provided always, the changes are in furtherance of the
:
objects of the original bill, and are not inconsistent with them, or repugnant
to them. Even after a bill has been in part dismissed on demurrer, and a
term elapsed, a bill may be amended, and the amendment will relate back to
the filing of the original bill, and restore and preserve an attachment lien. 37
But, while amendments may thus be made at any time while the bill is pend-
ing, it is nevertheless, true that the difficulty of getting leave to amend in-
creases with the lapse of time since the bill was filed, and the liability of the
party amending to pay costs increases in like proportion. 38
An amendment may be made at the hearing so as to bring the beneficiaries
before the Court; 39 and if objection for such want of necessary parties is
made in the Supreme Court, a decree on the merits will be made, and the cause
will be remanded to enable persons having interests to be made parties, or
to become parties by petition, and take under the decree already rendered. 40
If upon the argument of a demurrer, it appears that the ground for demur-
ring can be removed by amendment, the Court, in order to avoid putting the
complainant to the expense of filing a new bill, instead of deciding upon the
33 Code, §§ 4344; 4410; post, § 775. ments is, to allow them when proper, but to onerate
34 Code, § 433 5.' the party applying with enough of the costs to secure
35 That is, after argument at the hearing. diligence and skill. This matter will be found fully
36 Code, §4332-4337; Lookout Bank v. Susong, 6 considered in §§ 526-528, ante.
Pick., 590. 39 Perkins v. Hays, Cooke, 189; Code, §4337;
3T T.rtnlrn,,t "Rank 11 Snortticr f. PiV1<- ^00- Patt-nn Cnnk 1J. TTarllpv. Cnnkiv 465
§675 AMENDED BILES. 534
demurrer, gives him liberty to amend his on payment of the costs incident
bill
to the amendment ; and where the demurrer is for want of parties, the Court
generally annexes to the order allowing the demurrer, leave to the complainant
to amend his bill by adding the necessary parties. 41 Our practice is very liberal
on the subject of adding new parties, either complainant or defendant; 42
and on sustaining a demurrer for want of a necessary party, it would be revers-
ible error to dismiss the bill the bill should stand over with leave to amend. 43
:
Costs should, however, be imposed as the price of the amendment, either where
there has been delay, or where the amendment increases the costs of the
litigation.
§ 675. —
How Leave to Amend is Obtained. Leave to amend a bill, or to
file an amended bill, is not required unless made after argument of demurrer,
or after answer filed but after such argument or answer, the complainant can
;
amend his bill, or file an amended bill, only by leave of the Chancellor given
in open Court, or at Chambers, and upon such terms as he may impose. 44 If
the bill is one not required to be under oath, and the application to amend will
not create any delay, the Court is liberal in granting leave.
"When an amended bill is sought to be filed, after defence made, it should be
drawn, and sworn to, before allowed to be filed. 44a 1, It should be drawn so that
the Court may see that it contains matter proper for an amended bill; 45 and
2, It should be sworn to as evidence that the amendment is in good faith, and
not a mere invention otherwise the amendment may be wholly false, or wholly
:
immaterial, or repugnant, or inconsistent with the original bill, or otherwise

radically defective.
"When leave of the Court is necessary to file an amended bill, some excuse
must be given for the omission to insert, in the original bill, the matters sought
tc be set up in the amendment, if such matters were in existence and known
to complainant when the original bill was filed; and the application to amend
must be made as soon as the necessity for such an amendment is discovered. 46
But bills required to be under oath are allowed to be amended with great
caution. When a complainant wishes to amend a sworn bill, he must present
the proposed amendment in writing so that the Court can see that it is a proper
matter for an amendment. He must, also, swear to the truth of the proposed
amendment, and show a good reason for not incorporating it into the original
bill. The application to amend must be made as soon as the necessity for it is
discovered. 47
An application to strike out an allegation from a sworn bill, or to make
alterations in it, should be supported by affidavits showing how the mistake
occurred. The Court may refuse to allow a sworn allegation to be stricken
out, and may require a supplemental statement on a separate paper, in the
nature of an amended bill. 48
§ 676. Form and Manner of Amending Bills. —If the amendment is short,
and can be interlined, or written on the margin of the bill, the Court may allow
such a course; but if the amendments are long or numerous, they should be
made on a separate paper, thus:
41 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 417-419. of attention, nor the opportunity of thoroughly in-
42 Code, §2798; 2869. Code, §2799, applies to vestigating the facts, possessed by the English Solic-
Chancery practice, then why not Code, § 2798? Hill itors. The result is, amendments are oftener needed.
v. Bowers, 4 Heisk., 27S; Speak v. Ransom, 2 Tenn. Nevertheless, as he who seeks Equity must do
Ch., 210; Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch., 140. See, Equity, the party "seeking to amend should^ be on-
also, Code, §§4337-4338; Perkins V. Hays, Cooke, erated with costs enough to enforce proper diligence.
189; Cook v. Hadley, Cooke, 446; Franklin 7'. Code, §§ 2863-2871; 2878; 4333-4338; and cases cited,
Franklin, 2 Swan, 521; Birdsong V. Birdsong, 2 Head, ante, §§ 429; 526. See note 33, supra.
290; Gray v. Hays, 7 Hum., 588; Saylors v. Saylors, 44a ] Dan. Ch. Pr., 401, note.
3 Heisk., 525, 533. 45 Bosley v. Phillips, 3 Tenn. Ch., 649.
43 Gray i>. Hays, 7 Hum., 588. 46 Marr v. Wilson, 2 Lea, 229; Crowder v. Tur-
44 Our Courts are liberal in granting amendments. ney, 3 Cold., 551.
Our Solicitors are frequently compelled to file bills 47 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 401, note; Marr v. Wilson, 2
in term time, amid the complications, embarrass- Lea, 229.
ments, confusion and pressure of other business, and 48 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 425, note.
have neither the time to give the case that measure
AMENDMENTS TO A BILL.
John Doe, i
vs. \ No. 3489.

Richard Roe. J
Amendments to the bill of complainant in this cause, made pursuant to an order of the
Court, entered of record on the 1st day of April, 1890:
1. In the third line of the second paragraph of the bill, after the words "and on that day,"
add "or within a short time thereafter."
2. After the words [name them] in the fifth line of the third paragraph, add the following
[specifying the matter to be added.]
3. Strike out all the words in the fourth paragraph of the bill after the words [naming :
them.] L. A. Gratz, Sol. for Complainant.

Amendments to a bill should not be made by interlineations and erasures on
the face of the original bill, except when the changes are very slight but the ;
Court should require amendments to be made on a separate paper, especially

where erasures, or extensive changes, are to be made. The practice of amending
pleadings by erasures, and interlineations, on their face, ought not to be toler-
ated by the Courts. 483,
If an injunction, a receiver, or other extraordinary preliminary relief, is
desired by virtue of an amendment, the proper practice is to file an amended,
or a supplemental, bill in due form, and verify it. No extraordinary prelim-
inary relief should be granted, except upon sworn pleadings drawn up in
proper form. The price of extraordinary process is meritorious facts, set forth
in proper form, and duly verified on the personal knowledge of the affiant.
§ 677.The Effect of an Amended Bill.—"When an amended bill is filed, the
new matter set up in it is deemed to be incorporated into the original bill. The
amended bill is only a continuation of the original bill, and a component part
thereof, the two bills constituting but one record; 49 and the defendant may
make a new defence to the entire bill as amended if he desires. 50
An amendment, or amended bill, not introducing a new cause of action or
a new party, relates back to the filing of the original bill, and preserves the
lien on property secured by the original bill: 51 indeed, the original and
amended bills are in law but one bill, the amendment becoming a part of the
original bill and the original bill becoming pro tanto modified. 52 But, if the
amendment brings forward a new cause of suit which is barred by the statute of
limitations, or makes a new complainant who is barred, the amendment will
not so relate back as to defeat the bar, but will take effect from the day it is
made. 53
If the new matter does not affect any of the defendants who have already
answered, no new process need be served on them, and no additional answer
need be filed by them. As to the new parties, they must be regularly brought
into Court, by proper process, and as to them the original and amended bills
constitute in effect one original bill, and they have every right of defence there-
to that can be made to an original bill, 54 including the right to file a cross-bill.
But the new defendants, who have these rights, must not be defendants who
are mere successors in interest of parties already before the Court, for such
privies will be bound by the acts of those to whose interests they succeed. 55
When an amended bill makes new parties complainant in privity with the
original parties, and sets up no new cause of action, the depositions previously
taken are admissible against the defendants; 56 but when an amended bill
brings new parties before the Court who have had no chance to cross-examine
48a Puterbaugh's Ch. PI. & Pr., 204. The practice Beadle, 2 Head., 511; Lookout Bank v. Susong, 6
of allowing amendments by erasures and interlinea- Pick., 590.
tions is not only a temptation to unauthorized doc- 50 Seay D. Ferguson, 1 Tenn. Ch., 287.
torings of pleadings, but is also destructive of that 51 Bryan v. Zarecor, 4 Cates, 503.
certainty which is one of the essentials of pleading. 52 Miller v. Taylor, 3 Shan. Cas., 461.
High v. Batte, 10 Yerg., 338. 53 Trousdale v. Thomas, 3 Lea, 715.
48 Morrow V. Fossick, 3 Lea, 129; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 54 State v. Nashville S. Bank, 16 Lea, 111.
§ 678 AMENDED BILLS. 536
the witnesses, it is in effect an original bill as to them, and no proof taken
before they were made parties can be read against them. 57
§ 678. Summary of the Essentials of Amended Bills. The following sum- —
mary comprises most of the essentials of amended bills
1. Material amendments may be made, either by interlineation or by an
amended bill, at any time before plea, or answer filed, or before argument of
demurrer, without application to the Chancellor. 58
2. An amendment can be made after answer or plea filed, or argument of
demurrer, only by leave of the Chancellor given in open Court, 59 or at
Chambers. 60
3. The amendment may be made at any time by leave of the Court, even after
the hearing. 81
4. If the amendment is sought to be made, or the bill to be filed, after plea or
answer, the application for leave should be made at the earliest opportunity
after the necessity for it becomes known; and any delay should be explained
by affidavit. The amendment should be sworn to in such a case.
5. The new matter must be either to supply some deficiency in the frame of
the bill, or be some necessary party omitted, or some facts pertinent to the
controversy not already alleged.
6. The new matter must not be inconsistent with the original bill, nor must
it constitute a new and different ground of suit.
7. The new parties, if complainants, must be the privies of the original par-
ties, or have concurrent rights, or a community of interests.
8. The amendment should not consist of any matter that has come into exist-
ence since the commencement of the suit, but should be confined to matters
that might have properly been included in the original bill, being matters in
existence when the suit was instituted.
9. No new process is required unless the amendment makes new parties de-
fendant, and then only as to the new parties.
10. The original and amended bills become one original bill as to the new
parties and they have the same rights of defence as parties to an original bill.
;
11. An amended bill may, in Tennessee, be filed whenever a supplemental bill

may be filed, except when sought to be filed by a defendant to the original bill,
or by a new party, or to bring before the Court new matter that has come into
existence since the original bill was filed.
§ 679. —
Form of an Amended Bill. An amended bill should recite the filing
of the original, and all the subsequent steps taken in the cause, including issu-
ance and service of subpoena, and the filing of an answer, if such are the facts,
as will be more fully seen by the following form:
AN AMENDED BILL.
To Hon. Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at Chattanooga:
John Doe, a resident of Polk county, complainant,
vs.
Richard Roe, a resident of Hamilton county, defendant.
i.
That, on the 9th day of July, 1890, he filed his Original hill on your Honor's said Court
against the said defendant, Richard Roe, alleging, among other things, that [here state briefly
the material allegations of the original bill] In said original bill, complainant prayed that
[here set forth the substance of the prayers.] All of which allegations and prayers will fully
appear by reference to said original bill.
II.
And now, by leave of your Honor, complainant brings this amended bill into your Honor's
said Court, and shows to the Court that [here set out the new matters, new parties, and such
other additional, or amendatory, or explanatory matters, as the amended bill is intended to
set forth.]
57 State v. Nashville S. Bank, 16 Lea, 111. I
SO See, post, § 775.
es Code, §§ 4332-4333- 61 Code, § 4337.
59 Code, § 4334. !
537 SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. §680
The premises considered, the complainant prays

1st. That proper process issue to bring [any new parties, made by the amended bill, before
the Court.]
2d. That all the defendants to this amended bill be required to answer it, but not on oath.
[If an answer from any defendant is unnecessary, so state, and except him from answering.}
3d. That complainant have [the particular relief he seeks by his amended bill if any, spec-
ifying it.]
4th. That complainant may have, also, such other and further relief as he may be en-
titled to. Lewis Shepherd, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, as in § 162, ante.]
ARTICLE II.
SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS.
§ 680. Supplemental Bills Generally Consid- § 686. When a Supplemental Bill May be
ered. Filed.
§ 681. Difference Between Amended Bills § 687. How Leave is Obtained to File a Sup-
and Supplemental Bills. plemental Bill.
§ 688. Frame of a Supplemental Bill.
§ 682. Supplemental Bills on Facts Prior to
§ 689. Form of a Supplemental Bill.
the Original Bill.
§ 690. An Original Bill in the Nature of a
§ 683. Supplemental Bills on Pacts Subse- Supplemental Bill.
quent to the Original Bill. § 691. Frame of an Original Bill in the Na-
§ 684. A Supplemental Bill Must Not Bring ture of a Supplemental Bill.
Forward a New Title. § 692. Cost Bond and Process on Amended
§ 685. Essentials of Supplemental Bills. and Supplemental Bills.
§ 680. Supplemental Bills generally Considered. —A

supplemental bill, as
its name implies, is a bill to supply some defect in the original frame or struc-
ture of an original bill. In many cases, an imperfection in the frame of the
original bill may be remedied by an amendment. Generally, a mistake in the
bill in the statement of a fact, or in the omission of a party, should be corrected
by an amendment, and not by a supplemental bill. But the imperfections of
a bill may remain undiscovered while the proceedings are in such a state that
an amendment to the bill will be permitted, according to the strict practice of
the Court 1 or the deficiencies may have occurred after the suit was brought,
j
and therefore not be properly the subject of an amendment. 2 By the strict

practice of the Court, no amendment to an original bill is generally allowable
after the parties are at issue upon the points of the original bill, and witnesses
have been examined. 3 Nor is it generally allowable to introduce into the bill,
by amendment, any matter which has happened since the filing of the bill. In
such cases, a supplemental bill is the appropriate remedy. And such a sup-
plemental bill may not only be for the purpose of putting in issue new matter,
which may vary the relief prayed in the original bill but, also, for the purpose ;
of putting in issue matter which may prove the complainant's right to the
relief originally prayed. "Whenever a supplemental bill is not a supplemental
suit,but only introduces supplementary matter, the whole record constitutes
but one cause. The original and a supplemental bill make, in effect, but one
pleading, and any particular, wherein they are in conflict, is to be regarded as
not well pleaded. 4
l In Tennessee, an amended bill may be filed at plemental bill is not kept steadily in view, the Courts
any time, even at the hearing, by leave of the Court. having more regard to the substance of the bill than
Code, §§ 4332-4337. But such amended bill should to its name.
not set up any facts, or any rights, except such as 2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1515, note.
existed when the suit was broueht. Ante. §§ 670: 3 But in such a case, an amended bill mav be filed.
§681 SUPPLEMENTAIv BILES. 538
And, may
be stated generally, that a supplemental bill may be filed to
so it
bring before the Court: 1, Matters pertinent to the original suit which have
occurred since the original bill was filed; 2, Matters which previously existed
but which cannot be added to the original bill by way of amendment because
the defendants have answered; 3, Matters necessary to obtain an additional dis-
covery 4, To add new parties and 5, To remedy defects in the praver of the
; ;
bill. 5
After the Court has decided upon the suit as framed, it may be necessary to
bring some other matter before the. Court to obtain the full effect of the de-
cision or before a decision has been obtained, but after the parties are at issue
;
upon the points in the original bill, and witnesses have been examined, some
other point appears necessary to be made, some material fact must be put in
issue, some new party made, or some additional discovery is found requisite.
In either event, a supplemental bill is the proper method of bringing these
new matters before the Court, at this stage of the suit, unless the Court permit
the original bill to be amended. 6
§ 681. Difference between Amended Bills and Supplemental Bills. In Ten- —
nessee, the difference between an amended bill and a supplemental bill, as to
bringing forward facts, parties and rights that were in existence when the
original bill was filed, has practically become almost obliterated and even the ;
difference between these two kindred bills as to facts, parties, rights, and
interests, that have come into existence since the original bill was filed, is not
always observed. Nevertheless, as heretofore shown, 7 there is a marked dif-
ference between the bills in the latter case, a difference that is not only emphat-
ically declared in all the treatises on Equity pleading, but is also based on
hound principle. 8 In this volume, the distinction will be recognized, more to
facilitate a logical discussion of the subject of non-original bills, than to per-
petuate the difference in their designations. Besides, the former practice
throws much light on the present practice, and no one can become a good
pleader without understanding the former practice. 9
§ 682. Supplemental Bills on Facts prior to the Original Bill. Nothing —
which occurred prior to the filing of the original bill ought to go into a supple-
mental bill, unless the original bill has been answered; in which case, an
amended bill not being always properly allowable, any new matter necessary to
be put in issue may be introduced by supplemental bill, whether it occurred
before or after the filing of the original bill. 10 But under our practice, a case
seldom, if ever, happens when an amended bill will not be allowed to set up
matter which was in existence when the original bill was filed, if a supplemental
bill would lie for the same purpose; and hence, as shown elsewhere, there is
no longer any practical difference between an amended bill and a supplemental
bill, as to facts in existence, at the commencement of the original suit. 11
§ 683. Supplemental Bills on Facts Subsequent to the Original Bill. —When
5 Lube's Eq. PL, 188, note. New events, or new in ordinary practice, supplemental bills are generally
matters, which do not change the parties nor their termed amended bills. Nevertheless, the distinction
rights and interests, but support the rights and in- in the text as to matter arising after suit brought, is
terests in the original bill and add new means of a true and a practical one, and is adhered to by the
holding the property and rights claimed, may be best pleaders, and favored by those Chancellors most
brought forward by a supplemental bill. Riddle v. anxious to preserve logical differences, and maintain
Motley, 1 Lea, 468. those distinctions necessary to the science of plead-
a Sto. Eq. PL, § 335; Code, § 4335. ing.
7 See, ante, § 670. 9 See, ante, § 670, for a fuller statement of the
8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1515, note; 1530, note; and Sto. original distinction between these bills. The_ main
Eq. PI., §§332; 336; 885; where the authorities are cause of the obliteration of the distinctions in the
fully cited. names of bills in our State has grown out of the
It will be seen by reference to the Code, §§ 4332- practice of the Courts in judging of the character of
4337, that a bill may be amended after answer filed. a bill by its contents, rather than by its appellation,
The old practice required a supplemental bill to bring acting on the maxim that Courts of Equity look at
forward matter of amendment after answer filed.. the substance and not at the forms of things, and
Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 332; 890, and notes. have more regard to matter than to manner. North-
Inasmuch as under our practice a bill can be man 1), Liverpool Insurance Co., 1 Tenn. Ch., 313;
amended, or an amended bill filed, after answer, the Cheek V. Anderson, 2 Lea, 194; Hunt v. Wing, 10
distinction heretofore made between an amended bill Heisk., 144; Brandon v. Mason, 1 Lea, 624.
and a supplemental bill as to matter existing when 10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1530, note.
the original bill was filed, no longer exists. Indeed, 11 Ante, § 670.
539 SUPPLEMENTAL BILES. §684
new events, ornew matters, have occurred since the filing of the bill, a supple-
mental bill is, in many cases, the proper mode of bringing them before the
Court; for, generally, such facts cannot be introduced by way of amendment
r,o the original bill. But such new events, or new matters, must not change the
rights or interests of the parties before the Court; they must merely refer to
and support the rights and interests already in the bill. 12 A
supplemental bill
may, also, be brought, not only to insist upon the relief already prayed for in
the original bill, but upon other relief different from that which was prayed
for by the original bill, where facts which have since occurred may require it'. 18
Thus, if a surety, while seeking indemnity against his principal, has the debt
to pay, he must by supplemental bill bring this fact before the Court. sup- A
plemental bill changing the character of the original bill, or introducing mat-
ters arising since the original bill, cannot be filed without leave of the Court
but any objection for want of leave will be waived by failing to make it at
the proper time. 14
If the interest of a complainant, who is suing in another's right as adminis-
trator, executor, guardian, or trustee, terminates by death, resignation, re-
moval, or otherwise, the person who succeeds him as the representative of the
same right, may file a supplemental bill to bring himself before the Court, for
he becomes entitled to the same property under the same title. In these cases,
there is no change of interest which can affect the questions between the par-
ties, but only a change of the person in whose name the suit may be prose-
cuted. 16 But, ordinarily, where no question is sought to be raised as to the
right of the new complainant to revive the suit, it may be done on motion, and
this is the usual practice. This revivor by supplemental bill, or motion, may be
had either before or after a decree but if the case is out of Court, it can only
;
be done by supplemental bill, or by scire facias. 16

Where the subject-matter and the title remain the same, a supplemental bill
may introduce matter which may vary the relief to which the complainant is
entitled; 17 and so may a supplemental bill bring forward new matter in sup-
port of the original cause of action. 18
§ 684. A Supplemental Bill must not Bring Forward a New Title. —To en-
title the complainant to file a supplemental bill, and thereby to obtain the bene-
fit of the former proceedings, it must be in respect to the same title, in the
same person, as stated in the original bill. 19 Thus, if a person should file an
original bill, as heir-at-law, and it should turn out, upon an issue and hearing
of the cause, that he is not the heir-at-law, and he afterward purchases the title
of the true heir-at-law, he cannot file a supplemental bill to have the benefit
of the former proceedings for he claims by a different title from that asserted
;
in the original bill. His true course would be to file an original bill. 20 So, on
a bill to remove a cloud, a title acquired after suit brought cannot be relied on
in an amended bill, but an original bill must be filed to set it up. 21
If the complainant has no title when he files his original bill, he cannot sub-
sequently acquire a title, and then bring it forward by a supplemental bill
but if a complainant had a good inchoate title when he filed his original bill,
and afterwards perfects that title, he may set up this latter fact in a supple-
mental bill. The supplemental matter must not contradict the statements of
the original bill. 22 A
complainant cannot support a bad title by acquiring a
good o*ne after the filing of his original bill, and then bringing it forward by
amended or supplemental bill. 23
12 Riddle v. Motley, 1 Lea, 468. If the amend- 17 Adams Eq., 413.
ments changed the rights or interests of the parties, IS Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 151;
they would make a new suit, and would be proper 502; Horton V. Thompson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 580; Ridley
for an original bill in the nature of a supplemental V. Motley, 1 Lea, 468.
bill. Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 336; 345-352. 19 Wing v. Champion, 1 Tenn. Ch., 517.
13 Sto. Eq. PI., § 336. 20 Sto. Eq. PL, § 339.
14 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.. T534r Sto. Kn. PI.. 8 333. 21 lôve V. Moser. 1 Cates. 143.
685 SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. 540
§ 685. Essentials of Supplemental Bills.—The following is a summary of
the essentials of supplemental bills:
1. A
supplemental bill cannot be filed without leave of the Court.
2. A
supplemental bill may be filed at any stage of the suit, even after a
decree and may be filed by a stranger, or a defendant, to the original suit, as
;
well as by a complainant.
3. The application to file the bill should be made at the earliest opportunity
after the necessity for it becomes known, and all delays must be explained by
affidavit.
4. A supplemental bill should beverified by the oath of the complainant.
5. The purposeof the bill must be either (1) to supply some deficiency in
the frame of the original bill, or (2) to bring forward some facts pertinent to
the controversy not already alleged, or (3) to make some necessary party not
before the Court, or (4) to do any two or more of these things. 24
6. A
person who acquires an interest in the relief prayed for, or who acquires
or succeeds to the interest of a complainant, may come before the Court by a
supplemental bill.
7. The new matter in the amended bill must not be inconsistent with the
original bill nor must it constitute a new and different, cause of action.
;
8. While a supplemental bill may contain matter that was in existence at

the commencement of the suit, nevertheless its more appropriate province is
to bring before the Court facts which have since occurred.
9. A supplemental bill will not lie when the same object can be accomplished
by amending the original bill.
10. A supplemental bill will lie, before defence made, to set up matters in
existence when the original bill was filed: but this is the proper province of
on amended bill.
11. No new process is required, unless the bill makes new parties defendant,
and then only as to the new parties.
12. The original and supplemental bills become one bill as to the new par-
ties, and they have the same rights of defence to both bills as parties to an
original bill.
13. If the new parties are mere successors in interest to former parties, the
proof on file may be read by, or against, the new parties.
14. When a defendant, or a new party, wishes to bring a matter before the
Court, connected with a pending suit, he should do so by a supplemental bill,
especially if the matter has come into existence since the original bill was filed.
15. new prosecution bond should be given, or pauper oath filed in lieu. 25
A
§ 686. When a Supplemental Bill may be Filed. —A supplemental bill may
be as well after, as before, a decree and the bill, if after a decree, may
filed, ;
be, either (1) in aid of the decree, that it may be carried fully into execution;
or (2) that proper directions may be given upon some matter omitted in the
original bill, or not put in issue by it, or by the defence made to it; or (3) to
bring new parties before the Court; or (4) it may be used to impeach the
decree, which is the peculiar case of a supplemental bill, in the nature of a
bill of review, of which we shall treat hereafter. But where a supplemental bill
is brought in aid of a decree, it is merely to carry out, and to give fuller effect,
to that decree, and not to obtain relief of a different kind on a different prin-
ciple the latter being the province of a supplemental bill in the nature of a
;
26
bill of review, which cannot be filed without the leave of the Court.
After a decree upon the merits winding up an insolvent corporation, on an
appeal therefrom, a supplemental bill may be filed to realch other property of
24 When a bill brings forward both new matter mental bill without forfeiture of any of complain-
and new parties, it is properly an original bill in the ant's rights.
nature of a supplemental bill. Sto. Eq. PI., § 345. 26 But a new bond or oath is not essential, unless
But as the name of the bill is immaterial, if it con- objection is made for want of it. See, ante, § 71.
26 Sto. Eq. PI., § 338.
tain proper substance, it may be called a supple-
the corporation, and bring other creditors before the Court, who are seeking
to subject such property by independent suits. 27
A supplemental bill for the purpose of adding new parties may be filed even
after a hearing and decree, when it appears that such parties are necessary. In
such case, the cause is continued with leave to make new parties. 28 The Court
will sometimes, on its own motion, direct a supplemental bill to be filed, if,
upon the hearing, the justice of the case, in its own opinion, requires it. 29 A
supplemental bill after a decree, however, must not seek to vary the principles
of the decree, but to perfect it and make it more effectual. decree can only A
be changed by a bill of review. 30
§ 687. Leave is Obtained to File a Supplemental Bill. A supple-
How —
mental bill bringing forward new matter, or changing the original bill, cannot
be filed without leave of the Court. 31 In order to obtain this leave, the bill
must be properly drawn up and sworn to, and if there has been any delay since
the occurrence of the facts now first brought forward, this delay must be satis-
factorily explained by affidavit. 32 If the affidavit be satisfactory, the Court will
then examine the bill, and if it be a proper bill to be filed, leave will be granted
on such terms as to- costs as will both secure the defendant against the laches
of the complainant, and insure diligence on the part of parties making amend-
ments. 33
A supplemental bill ought to be filed as soon as practicable after tfio new
matter is discovered. For, if the party proceeds to a decree after a discovery
of the facts upon which his new claim is founded, he will not be permitted
afterwards to file a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review, founded
on such facts. 34 On the other hand, if an objection is meant to be taken by the
defendant, that a supplemental bill brings forward matters, which might have
been introduced by way of amendment, or at an earlier period of the cause,
he should do it before he makes answer to the supplemental bill. It will be
too late to take the objection at the hearing. 35
§ 688. —
Frame of a Supplemental Bill. A supplemental bill must state the
fact of the pendency of the original bill, and briefly give the proceedings there-
on; and if the supplemental bill is occasioned by an event subsequent to the
original bill, it must state that event, and the consequent alteration with respect
to the parties, if any; and, in general, the supplemental bill must pray that
all the defendants interested in the new matter may appear and answer to the
new charges it contains. If the supplemental bill is not for a discovery merely,
the can.se must be heard upon the supplemental bill at the same time that it
is heard upon the original bill, if it has not been already heard and if the cause ;
has been already heard, it must be further heard upon the supplemental matter.
If the alteration or acquisition of interest happens to a defendant, or a person
necessary to be made a defendant, the supplemental bill may be exhibited by
the complainant in the original suit against such person alone, and may pray a
decree upon the particular supplemental matter alleged against that person
only unless the interests of the other defendants may be affected by that de-
;
cree. The supplemental bill should not, however, state the circumstances of
the case at length. All that is requisite is, that it should state so much of the
suit as shows the nature of the case, and the ground of relief. Where a sup-
plemental bill is merely for the purpose of bringing formal parties before the
Court as defendants, the parties defendants to the original bill need not, in gen-
eral, be made parties to the supplemental bill. And, as a rule, if new parties
are brought before the Court upon a supplemental bill, the original defendants
27 Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 151; 32 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1523, note.
502; affirmed in 6 Lea, 564. 33 2 Barb. CH. Pr., 73-74.
28 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1533, note. 34 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 74; Sto. Eq. PL, § 338 a; 2
29 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1523, note. Dan. Ch. Pr., 1523-1530.
30 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1536, note. 35 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 333; 338 a.
§689 SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. 542
need not be made parties to the supplemental bill, unless they have an interest
in the supplemental matter, or their interests require that the new defendant
should be a party to the suit. The facts brought forward by the supplemental
billshould be material to the matters in controversy, otherwise a demurrer will
lie bill. 36
to the supplemental Neither an amended nor a supplemental bill can
contain new matter which contradicts, or is inconsistent with, the statements
of the original bill 37 for a supplemental bill, when properly before the Court,
;
is an addition to the original bill, and becomes a part of it, so that the two are
to be taken as one amended bill, and heard together. 38
A supplemental bill must be sworn to, or the supplemental matter otherwise
verified, and it should be made to appear that it was filed at the first oppor-
tunity after the supplemental matter was discovered, or the delay fully ex-
plained. 39
As the name and form of a bill is immaterial if necessary substance exists, 40
an original bill containing the necessary substance will be treated as a bill of
revivor and supplement in the nature of a cross-bill, and appropriate relief
granted. 41
§ 689. —
Form of a Supplemental Bill. The form of a supplemental bill is,
in the main, similar to the form of an ordinary original bill, the principal dif-
ferences being (1) that it begins by a recital of the filing of the original bill,
and the proceedings thereon; and (2) ends by praying, among other things,
that the complainant may have the benefit of all the proceedings upon the
original suit.
A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL.
To the Hon. A. S. Key, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Madisonyille
John Jones, a resident of Loudon county, complainant,
vs.
George Brown and Henry Smith, both residents of Monroe county, defendants.
Complainant respectfully shows to the Court:
i.
That January 9, 1890, he filed his original bill in this Court against the
on, or about,
defendant, George Brown, stating therein, among other things, the following: 1st. That
[setting forth briefly the substance of the original bill, dividing the recital into sub-sections,
numbered 1st, 2d, $d, &c., i2 ] and 4th, praying that [setting forth the prayer in concise form.}
II.
That said defendant, Brown, was served with process and answered said bill, alleging in
his answer that [setting forth briefly the substance of his answer.]
in.
That upon the issue thus made, proof has been taken, and [showing what further steps
have been taken in the cause, if any.] For a fuller account of said bill, answer, and other
proceedings in the cause, reference is made to the original record.
IV.
And now,by way of supplement to his said original bill, complainant further shows unto
your Honor, that, since the examination of witnesses in said cause, [or since the last step
taken in said cause, such as an interlocutory decree, or a final decree,] he has discovered that
[here show the new facts he desires to bring forward, and how they affect the rights of the
complainant, and make liable the defendant, or the new party or parties to be brought before
the Court. 43 ]
36 gto. Eq. PI., § 343. The recital of the answer should be equally as
37 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1515, note. brief.
38 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1536, note. 43 Thus, in the case supposed, the bill would al-
39 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1523, note. lege: That on- examining said defendant Brown as a
40 See, ante, § 43. witness in said cause, complainant first learned, and
41 Brandon v. Mason, 1 Lea, 624. now charges the fact to be, that the defendant Henry
42 The recital should be a brief summary of the Smith, as said administrator, never did pay over, or
bill, thus: stating therein, among other things, the otherwise account for, to his said guardian, all that
following: was lawfully due said guardian from the estate of
1st. That the defendant Brown, as his guardian, complainant s father, but only paid over to him the
received on or about July 9, 1886, the sum of two sum of thirteen hundred dollars, whereas the fact is
thousand dollars from Henry Smith, the adminis- he was then, and has ever since been, accountable
trator of complainant' s father, and has failed to pay to complainant's said guardian and to complainant,
over the same to complainant, who has attained the
t
not only for the whole of said sum of two thousand
age of twenty-one, and who, after attaining his ma- dollars, but for a much larger sum, as complainant
t
jority had demanded the same, with lawful interest will show at the hearing; and complainant avers and
thereon. * charges that the defendant, Henry Smith, is liable as
2d. That said bill prayed for a decree against administrator to him for about the sum of three _
said Brown for said sum and interest. thousand dollars, including interest, all of which he
has fraudulently withheld.
To the end, therefore, that the said defendant, Henry Smith, 44 [if a new defendant is.
made,] may show cause, if any he can, why complainant should not have the relief by him
prayed in his said original bill, and in this bill, complainant prays
1st. That proper process issue to bring said defendant, Henry Smith, [if a new party is
made,] into Court, and require him to answer the said original bill [if a new party be made,]
and this supplemental bill.
2d. That in his answer he make full answer [here make the usual requirements as to the
special matters to be answered; or, if his oath is waived, so state.]
3d. That complainant may have the same relief from his said original bill, as if said de-
fendant, Henry Smith, had been made a party thereto. [This prayer is one applicable in a
case of a new party.]
4th. That complainant may have the following further relief, 45 [here pray for the addi-
tional relief, if any, appropriate to the new facts.]
5th. That complainant may have such further and other relief as in Equity he may be
entitled to. Sam E. Young, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, § 164.]
§ 690. An
Original Bill in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill. supple- —A
mental bill is properly applicable to those cases only where the same parties,
or the same interests, remain before the Court; but when new parties, with
new interests arising from events since the institution of the suit, are to be
brought before the Court, an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill
becomes necessary. 46 It is called an original bill in the nature of a supple-
mental bill, because it is original as to the new parties and new interests and ;
it is supplemental also, being an appendage to the former bill as to the old par-
ties and the old interests. 47 Thus, where a husband and wife are defendants
to a bill, if, by the death of the husband, a new interest arises to the wife, the
suit becomes defective and an original bill in the nature of a supplemental
;
bill becomes necessary to bring that interest before the Court for she is not ;
bound by the answer put in during her coverture. So, if a person, pendente lite,
becomes assignee of the interest of a party in the suit, and wishes to take part
in it, he must bring forward his claim by an original bill, in the nature of a
supplemental bill. 48 In like manner, if the complainant has made an assign-
ment in bankruptcy, and his assignee in bankruptcy wishes to have the benefit
of the suit, he must file an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill. 49
§ 691. Frame of an Original Bill in the Nature of a Supplemental Bill.
A billfor this purpose must state the pendency of the original bill, briefly
give the proceedings upon it, specify the event which has determined the in-
terest of the party by or against whom the former bill was exhibited, and the
manner in which the property has vested in the person who has become entitled.
It must then show the ground upon which the Court ought to grant the benefit
of the former suit to or against the person, who has become so entitled and it ;
must pray the decree of the Court, adapted to the case of the complainant in
the new bill. This bill, although partaking of the nature of a supplemental
bill, is not merely an addition to the original bill, but another original bill,
which, in its consequences, may draw to itself the advantage of the proceedings
on the former bill. 50
§ 692. Cost Bond and Process on Amended and Supplemental Bills. Proper —
process issues, as of course, on a supplemental bill, and, also, on an amended
bill which so prays hence, in such cases, a new prosecution bond, or pauper
:
oath, should be filed, 51 especially if a new party is made, or a new cause of suit
set up.
44 Process should not be prayed against any parly all accounts be taken necessary to ascertain the exact
whose answer is not required. If new parties are amount.
made, and their answers only desired, no process 46 Sto. Eq. PI., § 349.
should be prayed against the original defendants. 47 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 345-346.
45 In the supposed case, this further relief would 48 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 347-348.
be: That a decree be rendered by your Honor, re- 49 Northman v. Insurance Cos., 1 Tenn. Ch., 312.
quiring the defendants, George Brown and Henry The name of the bill is immaterial. Ibid. See, ante,
§693 DEFENCES TO AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. 544
ARTICLE III.
DEFENCES TO AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS.
693. Defences to Amended and Supple- § 695. Answers to Amended and Supple-
mental Bills Generally Considered. mental Bills.
§ 696. When an Answer to an Amended Bill
694. Demurrers to Amended and Supple- Must be Field.
mental Bills. § 697. Proceedings After Answer.
§ 693. Defences to Amended and Supplemental Bills generally Considered.

Defence may be made to an amended, or to a supplemental, bill, (1) by motion
to dismiss; (2) by demurrer; (3) by plea; (4) by answer; and (5) by dis-
claimer. What has been said, heretofore, in reference to these various defences,
applies as well to amended and supplemental bills as to original bills. Any
ground, sufficient to base a motion to dismiss an original bill, will be sufficient
in case of an amended, or a supplemental, bill, if applicable thereto.
§ 694. Demurrers to Amended and Supplemental Bills. A demurrer will —
lie to an amended or supplemental bill, or to a bill in the nature of a supple-
mental bill, whenever it appears upon the face of the bill that the complainant
has no right to file it, he being either not the original complainant, or there
being no such privity between him and the original complainant as entitles
him to take the place of the latter in the litigation. 1
As has already been shown, if the new matter sought to be brought forward
was in existence when the original bill was filed, such matter is the proper sub-
ject of an amendment to the original bill or of an amended bill; but if the new
matter has come into existence since the filing of the original bill, it is properly
the subject of a supplemental bill. 2 The distinction,. however, in our practice,
between an amended bill and a supplemental bill no longer practically exists 3 ;
and, as a consequence, a demurrer will no longer lie because a supplemental

bill is filed when the same end could have been attained by an amendment of
the original bill. But if a supplemental bill upon matter arising subsequent to
the filing of the original bill is brought against a person, who was not a party
to the original bill, and who claims no interest arising out of the matters in
litigation in it, the defendant to the supplemental bill may demur; especially,
if the supplemental bill prays that he may answer the matters charged in the
original bill. 4
So, if the new facts or events shall have arisen subsequently to the filing of
the original bill, but those new matters are immaterial to the relief sought under
the original bill, or are such as may come before the Master under the proper
decretal order, in the original cause, a demurrer will lie. For, if the new facts
or events are not material, they are irrelevant; and if material, and yet they
are now properly within the reach of the Court, or before the Master under
the original cause, there is no ground why the record should be encumbered
with superfluous matter. Another ground of demurrer to a supplemental bill
is that the new matter is not properly supplemental to the matters in litigation
between the parties to the original bill but makes a new and different case. 5
;
If the new matters would make the original bill multifarious, then such new
matter would not be the proper subject of an amended or a supplemental bill,
and to the extent of such multifarious matter, the bill containing it would be
demurrable. The original and amended bills when relating to the same subject
1 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 612-613. See, ante, § 684. 4 See Sto. Eq. PI., § 614
2 See, ante, §§ 670; 681. 5 Sto. Eq. PI., § 615-616.
3 See, ante, §§ 680; 683.
545 DEFENCES TO AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. § 695
are treated as one bill when demurred to but a defendant who has answered
;
the original bill cannot, on the filing of an amended bill, rely on any ground of
demurrer to which the original bill was subject.
The form of a demurrer to an amended or supplemental bill is as follows:
DEMXTRREE, TO A SUPPLEMENTAL OB AMENDED BILL.
John Doe, 1
vs. ! In the Chancery Court, at Memphis.

The defendant, Romeo Roe, demurs to the supplemental [or, amended,] bill filed against
him in this cause.
1st. Because the matter of said supplemental [or, amended,] bill is wholly inconsistent
with, and antagonistic to, the matter of the original bill and is not matter proper for a
;
supplemental [or, amended,] bill.

2d. Because [State any other grounds of demurrer, and conclude as in § 310, ante.]
§ 695. Answers to Amended and Supplemental Bills. Pleas will lie to —
amended and supplemental bills, but they are so seldom filed as to be practically
unknown. The common defence on the facts is made by answer. This answer
may include a demurrer, if there be proper grounds therefor. If the defendant
has not answered the original bill, the usual practice is to answer both the
original and supplemental bills in the same answer. 7
If a new defendant is made, he must answer both the original and supple-
mental matter, for as to him it is a new suit if new matter only is inserted in
;
the supplemental bill, the original defendants need answer the new matter
only. 8
The answer is subject to all the rules as to form, substance, verification, filing,
and exceptions, that apply to answers to original bills. 9
The following is the form of an answer to an amended or a supplemental
bill, the form in each case being the same
ANSWER TO AN AMENDED OR EITJPPLEMENTAL BILL.

John Doe, |
vs. In Chancery, at Nashville.

f-

The answer of the defendant, Romeo Roe, to the amended [or, supplemental,] bill, [or,
1o the original and amended bill, or, to the original and supplemental bill,] filed against him
[and others] in this cause.
This defendant, for answer, says [Here set out the answer and conclude as
: in case of an
ordinary answer to an ordinary bill.]
§ 696. When an Answer to an Amended Bill Must be Filed. In all cases —
where an amendment of the bill is made after answer filed, and an answer
thereto is necessary, the defendants are allowed thirty days after the order,
or after notice of the amendment, if notice is required by the order, to answer
and failing so to do, or to obtain further time, the matter of amendment may
be taken as confessed, subject, however, to be set aside, by the Master before
the cause is set for hearing, or by the Chancellor at any time, on good cause
shown, accompanied by a full and sufficient answer, and upon such terms as
may be imposed. 10
§ 697. —
Proceedings After Answer. After the answer has been put in, and
issue joined, the amended and supplemental bill and the original bill proceed
pari passu, practically as one suit. If proof be needed on the issues raised by
the amended or supplemental bill, and the answer thereto, it must be made
as in case of an ordinary original bill but a supplemental suit being merely
;
a continuation of the original suit, whatever evidence was properly taken in

the original suit, may be made use of in both suits, even though not entitled
in the supplemental suit. If there has been no decree in the original suit,
before the supplemental bill is filed, both bills will be heard together, 11 and
Sfitate « Mite-hell. 2(1 Pic-W . 3.1ft. 1 2 "Rarh. <Th Pr. 77

§ 697 DEFENCES TO AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL BILLS. 546
one decree will be made in both. been a decree in the original
If there has
suit, the two causes must nevertheless be heard together, so far as further
orders may be needed in the original cause. If there be no further orders in
the original cause, the supplemental bill must be heard alone; and if it is filed
after decree, it, must be heard on its own pleadings and evidence- 12
:
If the supplemental bill has been improperly filed, or if not proved, it will be
dismissed at the hearing; but such dismissal will not affect the complainant's
rights to the relief he seeks on his original bill. 13
12 Smith v. St. Louis Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 151; I 13 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 78-79.
502; Horton V. Thompson, Ibid, 575; 2 Barb. Ch.
Pr., 79. i
547 filtLS OF REVIVOR. §698
CHAPTER XXXIV.
ABATEMENT AND REVIVOR.
Article I. Revivor.
Bills. of
Article II. Statutory Methods of Revivor.
Article III. Bills Akin to Bills of Revivor:
Article IV. Defences to Proceedings to Revive.
ARTICLE I.
BILLS OF REVIVOR.
698. When a Suit in Chancery is Abated. 704. What Matters are in Issue Upon a
699. Bill of Revivor. Bill of Revivor.
700. When a Revivor is Unnecessary. 705. Some General Results of a Revivor.
701. The Proper Parties to a Bill of Re-
vivor.
706. Summary of the Rules Relative to Re-
vivors.
702. When the Widow Should be Made a
Party.
707. Revivor of Decrees.
703. When a Defendant May File a Bill of 708. Frame of a Bill of Revivor.
Revivor. 709. Form of a Bill of Revivor.
§ 698. —
When a Suit in Chancery is Abated. Whenever a suit in Chancery
becomes defective, for want of parties before the Court, by or against whom
it can, in whole or in part, be prosecuted, it is said to be abated.
1 An abate-
ment, in the sense of the common law, is an entire destruction of the suit, so
that it is quashed and ended. But in the sense of Courts of Equity, an abate-
ment signifies only a present suspension of all proceedings in the suit, from the
want of proper parties capable of proceeding, or being proceeded against,
therein. At the common law, a suit when abated, is absolutely dead. But in
Equity a suit, when abated, is merely in a state of suspended animation; and
may be revived. The death, or marriage, of one of the original parties to the
suit, is the most common cause of the abatement of a suit in Equity. As the
interest of a complainant usually extends to the whole suit, therefore, upon the
death of a complainant, or the marriage of a female complainant, all proceed-
ings become abated. Upon the death of a defendant, likewise, all proceedings
become abated as to that defendant. 1 But upon the marriage of a female de-
fendant, the proceedings do not abate, although her husband ought to be named
in the subsequent proceedings. 2 Suits by public officers, in their official ca-
pacity, do not abate by the death of the individual holding the office, or by the
expiration of his term, and no revivor in the name of his successor is necessary. 3
If any property or right in litigation, vested in a complainant, is transmitted
to another, the person to whom it is transmitted, is entitled to supply the de-
fects of the suit, if it has become defective merely; and to continue it, or at
least to have the benefit of it, if it is abated. So, if any property or right,
before vested in a defendant, becomes transmitted to another person, the com-
plainant is entitled to render the suit perfect, if it has become defective, or
to continue it, if it is abated, against the person to whom that property or right
is transmitted.
l When a party dies, the suit dies as to such party. partv is an absolute nullity. Morrison v. Deaderick.
The suit may, however, be resurrected by a scire 10 Hum., 342. But see, post, §888; and note 4,
facias, or a bill of revivor; but, until such a resur- infra.
§699 BIHS OF REVIVOR. 548
An abatement suspends proceedings. 4 An attachment for contempt, or an
injunction, or a receivership, is not affected by the death of the complainant.
11' the party attached, or enjoined, wishes
to be relieved from his situation, he
must apply to the Court and the Court will ordinarily make an order that he
;
be discharged, or the injunction dissolved, if the suit be not revived in a given

time. 5
SUGGESTION OF DEATH OF A PARTY.
John Doe, ]
vs. }
Richard Roe, et al. j
In this cause the death of the defendant, Richard Roe, [or, the complainant, John Doe,] is
suggested and proved [or, admitted.]
If no step be taken to revive a suit, an order may be had at the second term
after the entry of proof of death, 6 abating the suit, as follows
ORDER ABATING A SUIT.

John Doe,
I'S.
Richard Roe, et. al.
In this cause the death of the defendant, Richard Roe, having been suggested and proved
[or, admitted,] at the January, 1905, term of this Court, and no steps having been taken to
revive the suit, it is ordered that the suit be abated and discontinued, and that complainant
and Henry Doe, his prosecution surety, pay the costs of the cause, for which let an execution
issue.
§ 699. Bill of Revivor. —

According to the general practice of Courts of
Equity, the mode of reviving and continuing suits, where there has been an
abatement, is by a bill of revivor; and such a bill will lie whenever a party
is disabled by death, marriage, bankruptcy, or otherwise, from further prose-
cuting or defending a suit, provided the interest of such party in the subject
or object of the suit survives or continues, 7 to a person not already a party.
If the interest of a party dying so determines, that it can no longer affect the
suit, and no person becomes entitled thereupon to the same interest (which
happens in the case of a tenant for life, or a person having a temporary or con-
tingent interest, or an interest defeasible upon a contingency,) the suit does not
so abate, as to require any proceeding to warrant the prosecution of the suit
against the remaining parties. But, if the party so dying be the only complain-
ant, or the only defendant, there will necessarily be an end of the suit, if there
is no subject of litigation remaining.
8
A suit for divorce and alimony cannot
be revived. 9
Whenever there is an original bill and a cross-bill thereto, if an abatement
takes place, there must generally be a bill of revivor in each cause. But if
the bills regard an account, and there is a decree for an account, the two
causes become thereby so consolidated that one bill of revivor, praying for
10
a revivor of the whole, will revive both causes.
If a man marries an administratrix, and a decree is obtained against him and
his wife for a demand out of the assets of her intestate, and the wife dies before
the decree is executed, the suit is abated; and the complainant must revive
it against the administrator of the wife before any further proceedings can be
4 While an abatement exists as to a sole complain- bill of revivor is not filed within a reasonable time.
ant or sole defendant, no step can be taken in the But this ruling is substantially the same as that
cause, whatever, except steps to abate or revive. stated in the text. The distinction made in this case,
The Court may, however, make orders relative to between a supplemental bill to bring in devisees and
property in the custody of the law. a bill or revivor to bring in heirs, no longer exists
Unless the defendant was brought into Court by in our practice. See Northman v. Liverpool Co., 1
publication, in which case a sale of the decedent's Tenn. Ch., 317.
land without revivor is valid. Dunlap v. Harvey, 3 o Churchwell )\ Bank, 1 Heisk., 782. But the
Cates, 620; Code, §§3533-3534; 4380. order of abatement will be set aside, if at any -time
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1543-1544. It is said in Thomp- during the term of its entry, steps are taken lo
son )'. Hill, 5 Yerg., 418, that an injunction against revive.

an execution at law stands dissolved by the death of
->
Code. § 2845.
the defendant to the injunction bill, but that his rep- s Sto. Eq. PL, § 356.
resentative cannot take out execution without being i) Swan v. Harrison, 2 Cold., 354; Owens r. Suns,
guilty of contempt of the Court, unless he obtains 3 Cold., 544.

leave of the Court, which leave will be granted if a 10 Sto. Eq. PI., § 363.
549 BILLS OF REVIVOR. § 700
Lad in the cause against the husband for the assets in the hands of the wife,
;
as administratrix, are primarily liable to satisfy the decree, 11 and the husband
is not liable beyond the amount of such assets which came into his or her hands
after the marriage. 12
§ 700. When —
a Revivor is Unnecessary. The death of one of the parties to
a suit does not, however, produce such an abatement of it as to suspend all
further proceedings, unless the interest of such party, or that which he repre-
sents, survives to some other person not already a party to the suit. If the
v-hole interest of a party dying survives to another party to the suit, so that
jjo claim can be made by or against the representatives of the party dying, the
proceedings do not abate. If a bill is filed by or against trustees or executors,
and one dies, not having possessed any of the property in question, or done
any act relating to it, which may be questioned in the suit or, if a bill is filed ;
by or against husband and wife, in right of the wife, and the husband dies
under circumstances which admit of no demand by or against his representa-
tives, there is no abatement. If a surviving party can sustain the suit, as in the
case of several creditors, complainants on behalf of themselves and other cred-
itors, no revivor is necessary. If the entire interest of the decedent, on his
death, descends to other parties before the Court, as in a partition or eject-
ment suit, or in a suit by or against partners, or joint-owners, in such case there
is no abatement, and no need of a revivor, for the persons remaining before the
Court have in them the whole interest in the matter in litigation. 13
If the interest of a party dying absolutely terminates with his death, there
is no abatement this happens on the death of a tenant for life, or on the death
:
of any party having a temporary or contingent interest, 14 terminating with

his death. So, if the interest of a female in a suit terminates upon her mar-
riage, no revivor against her husband would be necessary.
If, upon the death of the husband of a female complainant, suing in her
right, the widow does not choose to proceed in the cause, the bill is considered
as abated, and she is not liable for the costs. But if she takes any step in
the suit after her husband's death, she makes herself liable to the costs from
the beginning. If she thinks proper to proceed in the cause, she may do so
without a bill of revivor for she alone has the whole interest, and the husband
;
was a party in her right, and therefore the whole advantage of the proceedings
survives to her so that if any judgment has been obtained, even for costs, she
;
will be entitled to the benefit of it. If a female complainant marries pending

a suit, and afterwards, before revivor, her husband dies, a bill of revivor be-
comes unnecessary, her incapacity to prosecute the suit being removed. But
the subsequent proceedings. ought to be in the name, and with the description,
which she has acquired by the marriage. And if the wife dies, pending a suit
by herself and husband for an account of the rents of her estate, her personal
representatives are not necessary parties to a bill of revivor. 15
If the complainant, in a bill of interpleader, should die after a decree that
the defendants should interplead, there will be no abatement of the suit; for
by such a decree the suit is terminated as to the complainant, although the
litigation may still continue between the defendants under the decree of inter-
pleader; and in that event the cause may still proceed, without any revivor
against the representatives of the complainant. 10
Suits by public officers in their official capacity do not abate by the death
of the individual holding the office, or the expiration of his term, and no revivor
in the name of his successor is necessary. 17
§ 701. —
Proper Parties to a Bill of Revivor. The party whd succeeds to the
rights of the decedent in the litigation is the proper person by or against
11 Sto. Eq. PI., § 360. | 15 Sto. Eq. PI., § 361.
12 M. & V.'s Code, § 3432. i 16 Sto. Eq. PL, § 362.
13 Sto. Ea. PI.. §357: Gilchrist v. Cannon. 1 I 17 Felts v. Mavor. 2 Head. 656: Polk v. Phimmpr-
§701 BILLS OF REVIVOR. 550
whom the bill of revivor should be filed. 1 * If land is involved, the decedent's
heirs or devisees, or executors holding it under a will, must be made parties;
,
if
no land be involved, his administrator or executor must take his shoes.
If a creditor, who sues on behalf of himself and all other creditors, dies, the
suit may, be revived by his personal representative. If the latter does not
choose to revive it, then any other creditor, at least any one who has proved
his debt under a decree before the Master, may, by a supplemental bill, con-
tinue the cause, and proceed therein for the benefit of all the creditors. And
this is on the ground that the creditor, so reviving, was really one of the
original complainants, the suit being for his benefit. 19
A suit which has become entirely abated may be revived as to part only of
the matter in litigation, or as to a part by one bill, and as to the other part by
another. 20 Thus, if the rights of a complainant in a suit upon his death become
vested, a part in his real, and a part in his personal, representatives, the real
representatives may revive the suit, so far as concerns his real estate, and the
personal representatives, so far as concerns his personal estate. 21 But the bet-
ter practice would be to allow only one bill to be filed, and to require that all
those not joining in it as complainants be made defendants. The. rule is gen-
eral that if some complainants, entitled to file a bill of revivor refuse to join it,
they may be made defendants. 22
A bill of revivor, properly so called, lies only by or against the persons who
are the proper representatives of the deceased party as to the matters in con-
troversy. If the suit respects the personal assets only of the deceased party,
his executor or administrator is the proper party, by or against whom the bill
is to be filed. If the suit respects the real estate of the deceased party, his heirs
or devisees are the proper parties to the bill of revivor. 23 If the suit respects
both the real and personal estate, then both the real and personal representa-
tives must be parties to the bill. 24 The one question to be answered in consider-
ing the proper person to revive, or to revive against, is who, in law, stands in
the shoes of the decedent. 25 Hence, if a decedent has parted with his interest
pending the suit, it may be revived by or against the successor in interest,
instead of the personal representative or heir. 26 Where after a defendant dies,
his heirs transfer their interest to a third person before any revivor, the latter
should be made a party by a bill of revivor and supplement. 27 So, if the dece-
dent was a bankrupt, the suit should be revived in the name of his assignee in
bankruptcy. 28
If there are several complainants, and the defendant dies, some of them may
proceed to revive without the others, if the latter refuse for the obstinacy
;
of some of the parties shall not hinder the rest from asserting their own inter-
est. But in such cases the original complainants, who refuse to join, should be
made defendants to the bill of revivor. 29
A test for the complainant to apply, when a defendant dies, is to ascertain :
which set of his representatives is necessary to enable him to obtain the full
relief he seeks on the pleadings as they stand. And a test for the defendants
to apply, when a revivor is sought against them by the complainants, is: to
ascertain whether the estate they derive from the decedent can, in any way,
be directly affected by a decree on the pleadings as they stand. 30
If the decedent is a complainant and a next friend, a new next friend or
guardian must be obtained to prosecute the suit, unless the person for whom
the decedent sues has become sui juris, in which case no revivor is necessary.
If the decedent is a complainant guardian, a new guardian must revive, or a
is Code, §§2855: 2859. See, ante, §113. 26 Code, § 2850.

19 Sto. Eq. PL, § 36S. 27 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1541, note.
20 Sto. Eq. PL, § 367. 28 Moffit v. Cruise, 7 Cold., 137.
21 Sto. Eq. PL, § 367. 20 Sto. Eq. PI., § 359.
22 Sto. Eq. PI., § 369. 30 The Chapters on Parties will throw, light on
23 Sto. Eq. PL, § 354 o. the question of the proper persons to revive or re-
24 Preston v. Golde, 12 Lea, 267. vive against; especially §§ 113-116.
25 Code, §§2855; 2859.
551 BILLS OF REVIVOR. §702
next friend may revive, on motion, in lieu of the deceased guardian. If the
suit is against a decedent guardian, in the right of hisward, it must be revived
against the new guardian, 31 but in ease there be no new guardian the Court
would, on motion, appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the person under
disability. Where the abatement is occasioned by the marriage of a female
complainant, the suit may be revived by the husband and wife jointly, unless
the suit was for the wife's separate property, free from her husband's control,
in which case a next friend must revive for her, and her husband must be made
a. defendant.
32
A suit by an administrator may, on his death, be revived by his administrator,

or by an administrator de bonis non of the original decedent. 33
§ 702. —
When the Widow Should be Made a Party. When the suit is liable
to affect lands in which the widow of the deceased defendant has rights of
homestead and dower, she should be made a party by bill of revivor, so that she
may be bound by the decree, if she have no rights, and so that her homestead
and dower may be assigned before sale, if she have such rights, or so that, if she
elect, the land be sold free from homestead and dower, and she be given the
money value thereof out of the proceeds.
The widow's right to homestead is not derived through the heirs of her
husband, and on his death, survives directly to her, and becomes hers and, on ;
the death of her husband, if she be not made a party to a suit affecting the land
in which she claims a homestead, she may litigate her claims in an independent
suit. 34 Hence, it is manifest that, when a claim for homestead can be set up,
the widow must be revived against. The heirs do not represent her, or her in-
terests; on the other hand, there is some conflict between her rights of home-
stead, and the heirs' rights, to the same land. 35
§ 703. When a Defendant may File a Bill of Revivor. —A
defendant may
file a bill of revivor after a decree, in case he has a beneficial interest therein,
or can derive a benefit from the further proceedings in the cause. This is es-
pecially true after a decree ordering an account, for in such a case both parties
are actors. And it would seem, on principle, that where a defendant had con-
current interests with the complainants in the benefits of the relief sought, or
had any beneficial interest in the relief sought, he would be entitled to file a
bill of revivor 36 and this right is now fully established by statute. 37
;
If one or more of several complainants die, and the suit is not revived within
the two terms allowed, the defendant may revive, or elect to proceed to trial
with the surviving complainant, or may have the suit abated, if revivor is nec-
essary. 38 But when a bill of revivor is filed by a defendant, it merely substan-
tiates the suit, and brings before the Court the parties necessary to see to the
execution of the decree, and to be the objects of its operations, rather than to
litigate the claims made by the several parties in the original pleadings, except
so far as they remain undecided. Nor will a revivor by a defendant take from
the complainant the conduct of the case, unless so ordered by Court. 39
When any sole executor or administrator is complainant or defendant, and
dies, the suit may be revived by or against the executor, administrator de bonis
non, or other successor in interest of the decedent. 40
§ 704. What Matters are in Issue upon a Bill of Revivor. defendant —A
to a bill of revivor cannot, in his answer to the bill, go into the merits of the
controversy in the original suit. 41 If it is alleged in the bill of revivor that he
stands in the shoes of the decedent as regards the matters in controversy, that
31 Code, § 2859. If the suit is by the ward and 35 Collins V. Boyett, 3 Pick., 334; see, also, 3
against a guardian in his own wrong, in such a case, Pick., 148-154.
on the guardian's death, the suit must be revived 36 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1539; Sto. Eq. PI., § 372.
against his administrator, or executor. 37 Code, §§2856; 2859; See Brandon v. Mason,
32 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1538. 1 Lea, 615.
33 Wood v. Tomlin, 8 Pick., 514. 38 Code, §§2851-2852.
34 Williams v. Williams, 7 Bax., 116; see, ante, § 39 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1540; Sto. Eq. PL, §376.
125 40 r<i^f S 5!8«
§705 BILLS OF REVIVOR. 552
is the only issue. 42
If he is not the heir, or the executor, or administrator, or
ether successor in interest, of the decedent as alleged, on his denial thereof the
complainant in the bill of revivor must prove it, or fail to sustain his bill. On
the other hand, if the complainant seeks to revive the suit in his own name as
heir, executor, administrator, or other successor, of the decedent, the defendant
may deny this, and unless the allegation be proven, the bill must be dismissed.
The matters in issue upon a bill of revivor are the matters of issue presented
by that bill, and not any matters presented by the original bill.
The only thing for litigation on a bill of revivor is whether the new party
brought before the Court has the representative character imputed to him, 43
and whether the time has elapsed within which a bill of revivor is permissible. 44
If, however, the complainant in the bill of revivor does not properly present the
question of revivor in his bill for instance, if he made a mis-statement of the
;
original bill material to the matter of a revivor, the defendant, in his answer to
the latter bill, may correct such mis-statement and so may he, in any case, by
;
his answer to the bill of revivor, bring before the Court any matter proper for
the Court's consideration on the question of revivor, or of the proper person
to take the shoes of the decedent. Hence, the general rule that upon a bill of
revivor, the sole questions before the Court are the competency of the party
to revive, and the correctness of the frame of the bill to revive. 45
Wherever a suit abates by death, and the interest of the person whose death
has caused the abatement is transmitted by operation of law to an heir at law,
or an executor, or administrator, so that the title cannot be disputed, the only
question in issue is whether the person seeking to revive, or sought to be revived
against, is that representative.
If a suit abates by the marriage of a female complainant, and no act is
done to affect the rights of the party but the marriage, no title can be disputed
the person of the husband is the sole fact to be ascertained^ 46
"Where a bill of revivor is filed against a non-resident as devisee without at-
tachment of property, a pro confesso only creates an issue, and the death of
the testator, «,nd the devisee as alleged, must be proved before any decree can
be pronounced. 47
§ 705. Some General Results of a Revivor. Bills —
of Revivor, in all their
varieties, the new parties in the
when sustained, have the effect of putting
shoes of those they represent, whether the privity be of blood or of estate, by
operation of law or act of the parties. 48 On revivor, the suit stands in the
same condition as the original bill at the time of the abatement, and is con-
sidered as pending from the filing of the original bill, so as not to be affected
by the statute of limitations. If the defendant has not answered the original
bill, he must answer it after the revivor or, if a pro confesso had been properly
;
taken on the original bill, the benefit of it will accrue to the complainant in
the bill of revivor. 49
If the original bill has been answered, no further answer is required, 50 or
r.llowed, unless a discovery of assets is desired from the personal representative
of the deceased defendant the depositions of witnesses, if any have been taken,
;
may be read at the hearing, or for any other purpose for which the original
parties might have used them and, if the cause has proceeded to a final decree,
;
51
it will continue in force against the new party.
On a revivor, the new party occupies the shoes of the original party, and is
bound by his answer, if filed, and by all orders and decrees affecting him, and
by all agreements made by him. 52 And this is especially true of a personal rep-
Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea, 271.

42 48 On the subject of privities, see, ante, § 165.
2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1545, note.
43 49 Sto. Eq. PL, § 380; Lewis V. Outlaw, 1 Tenn.,
Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
44 (Overt.) 142; Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea, 271.
2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1509, note; Lewis )'. Outlaw,
45 1 50 Lewis 0. Outlaw, 1 Tenn., (Overt.) 143; Berri-
Tenn., (Overt.) 140. gan v. Fleming, 2 Lea, 271.
46 Sto. Eq. PI., § 364. 51 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1540; 1545.
47 Anderson v. McNeal, 4 Lea, 303. 52 Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
553 BILLS OF REVIVOR. §706
Tesentative, and of heirs, whether adults or minors, who can take up the de-
fence only at the point where the decedent left. 53
The new party brought before the Court by revivor, not only stands exactly
in the same plight and condition as the party whose place he takes, but as he
receives the benefits of all former proceedings, if any, so he is bound by all the
liabilitites thereof, if any, and may be subject to all the costs of the proceedings
from the beginning of the suit. 54 But, when the husband of a female complain-
ant revives a suit after marriage, he gives security for the costs, in which
case the original prosecution sureties are discharged from all liability for sub-
sequently accruing costs. 55
§ 706. Summary of the Rules Relative to Revivors. The following are the —
principal rules governing revivors when a defendant dies:™
1. The Personal Representatives" are the proper persons to revive against,
when the relief sought against the decedent would in any way have made him
liable for any debt, duty, or damage, or in any way have affected his title,
rights, interests, or claims, in or to, personalty of any sort, including money,
debts, choses in action, bonds, stocks, securities, real or personal, leases of land,
yoods, merchandise, and chattels of all kinds.
2. The Real Representativesss are the proper persons to revive against, when
the relief sought against the decedent would, in any way, have affected his
title, rights, interests, or claims, in, or to, real estate, not including leases on
lands, but including all lands the legal title to which was in him to secure debts,
or in him for any other trust purpose.
3. Both the Real and the Personal Representatives must be revived against when
the relief sought would have affected both the real and the personal estate of
the decedent, as shown in the two preceding paragraphs.
The following are the principal rules ,as to who are the proper persons to
revive a suit when the complainant dies:
1. The Personal Representatives are the proper persons to revive, if the object
of the suit is to declare, protect, secure, recover, enforce, or otherwise affect,
rights to, or interests in, personalty of any kind the term personalty here in-
:
cludes money, debts, duty, damages, choses in action, bonds, stocks, securities
real and personal, leases of land, goods, merchandise, and chattels of all sorts.
2. The Real Representatives are the proper persons to revive, if the object of
the suit is to declare, protect, secure, recover, or enforce, rights to, or interests
in, real estate.
Both the Real and the Personal Representatives are the proper persons to re-
3.
vive a suit, if rights to, or interests in, both real and personal estate, are sought
to be declared, protected, secured, recovered, enforced, or otherwise affected.
And the whole matter may be still further summarized as follows 1. If the :
suit affects the personal estate exclusively, the personal representative must
exclusively take the decedent's place. 2. If the suit affects the real estate ex-
clusively, the real representatives must exclusively take the decedent's place.
3. If the suit affects both the real and the personal estate, both the real and the
personal representatives of the decedent must take his place.
And the fundamental test of the proper set of representatives to take the
decedent's place is which set will be directly benefited or injured by the relief
:
,
53 Brooks V. Gibson, 3 Shan. Cas., 760. heirs when there is no executor or administrator,
54 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1540; Lewis V. Outlaw, 1 and a revivor is sought by or against them as per-
Tenn., (Overt.,) 140; Berrigan V. Fleming, 2 tea, sonal representatives under the Code. § 2849.
271. 58 The term, "real representatives," in this Chap-
55 Code, § 2861. ter includes heirs, devisees, and the assignees of
56 By defendant is here meant a defendant against realty transferred during the litigation. It will,
whom relief is prayed, and not a defendant whose also, include the executor when the will devises
rights and interest are concurrent, in whole or in him any title to the realty in dispute; and, if there
part, with those of the complainant. be a widow with homestead rights, she would, also,
57 The term, "personal representatives," in this be included among the real representatives, and
Chapter, includes executors and administrators, and should be made a party defendant along with the
§707 BILLS OP REVIVOR. 554
sought. The set liable to either benefit or injury, as the direct result of the
suit, is the proper set to take his place.
§ 707. Revivor of Decrees. —A decree may be
revived by and against the
same parties, by and against whom
a pending suit may be revived and the ;
procedure is the same, as heretofore stated. 69 The revivor may be on a bill

tiled for that purpose, or on a scire facias, under the statute.
Where a bill is filed by a complainant to revive a suit after a decree, and to
prosecute the decree, it is not competent for the defendant in his answer to
resist the revival, by stating matter which existed before the decree, or which
has arisen since, affecting the merits of the decree and such matter, if stated,
;
will be treated as impertinent. The reason is, that if the facts existed before
the decree, and the proper time for making them a part of the defence has
been permitted to pass by, the omission cannot be supplied in this manner and ;
if new matter has arisen since the decree, varying the situation of the parties,
other means exist for bringing it forward. The right of a party to prosecute
a decree, and to do what is necessary for that purpose, cannot depend upon
the merits of the decree. 60
Where a bill of revivor is brought by a defendant after a decree, it merely
substantiates the suit, and brings before the Court the parties necessary to
see to the execution of the decree, and to be the objects of its operations, rather
than to litigate the claims made by the several parties in the original pleadings,
except so far as they remain undecided. 61
Any event that has transpired since the decree was entered, whereby the
decree has been satisfied, discharged, released or barred, may be set up in de-
fence to any attempt to revive the decree, whether such attempt be by a bill
of revivor, or by a scire facias. 62 The defendant to the decree may, also, plead
and show that the decree is barred by the statute of limitations. 63
When a decree is revived, it is not proper to pronounce a new decree for
the amount of the former decree and accrued interest; for that can be done
only in a suit brought on the former decree. On a revivor, the proper decree
is to order that the original decree be, and stand, revived in favor of the new
party thereunto entitled, or against the new party standing in the decedent's
shoes, as the case may be. 64 The following will serve as a form in case of a
revivor, omitting the caption and recitals of the decree
REVIVOR OF A DECREE.
therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court, that the decree, made in this cause, on
It is,
July 9, 1885, in favor of the complainant, John Doe, and against the then defendant, Richard
Roe, for the sum of one thousand dollars, and the costs of the cause, [or, for the tract of
land in said decree described,] be and the same is in all things revived against Robert Roe,
as the administrator, [or, heir at law,] of said Richard Roe; and that execution issue on said
decree of July 9, 1885, for said sum of one thousand dollars, interest thereon, and for said
costs, and, also, for the costs of this proceeding, to be levied on the goods and chattels, rights
and credits, in the hands of said Robert Roe to be administered, [or, if the revivor is against
the heir as to said land, add, after the word "revived," against Robert Roe, the sole heir
at law of said Richard Roe; and that a writ of possession issue to put the complainant in
possession of said tract of land, and that an execution issue against said Robert Roe, as ad-
ministrator, for the costs adjudged against his intestate in said decree of July 9, 1885, and
against him in his own right for the costs of this proceeding to revive said decree. 65 ]
If the original decree or the record in the cause, or both, have been lost, mut-
ilated, or destroyed, it maybe revived, either by a bill of revivor, or by a
still
66
scire facias, for, in contemplation of law, the decree is regarded in existence.
-
§ 708. Frame of a Bill of Revivor. A bill of —
revivor must state in brief
terms: (1) the filing of the original bill, (2) who were the complainants and
59 See, ante. § 574. 05 The heir would not be liable for the costs of
60 Sto. Eq. PL, § 370 o. the original suit, such costs being a charge against
61 Sto. Eq. PI., § 376. the decedent's personal estate. In such a case, it
62 Bank V. Vance, 9 Yerg., 471; Mcintosh V. Paul, wouid be proper to revive against the heir as to the
6 Lea, 47. land, and against the administrator as to the costs.
63 McGrew v.Reasons, 3 Lea, 485. 00 Whitworth v. Thompson, 8 Lea, 485.
64 Whitworth v. Thompson, 8 Lea, 487.
555 jbills of revivor. § 709
defendants to it, (3) what its prayer or object was, (4) the several proceedings
thereon, (5) the abatement, (6) the title of the complainant to revive the suit,
(7) so mueh new matter, and no more, as is requisite to show how the com-
plainant becomes entitled to revive, and (8) must charge that the cause ought
to be revived, and to stand in the same condition, with respect to the parties
to the original cause as it was at the time when the abatement happened and ;
it (9) must pray, that the suit may be revived accordingly. It may likewise be
necessary, in many cases against personal representatives, to charge that they
have assets, and to pray that the defendant may answer the bill of revivor;
for an admission of assets, or an account of the personal estate may be requisite,
from the representative of a deceased party. In this latter case, if the defend-
ant does admit assets, the cause may proceed against him upon an order of
revivor merely. But if he does not make that admission, the cause must be
heard for the purpose of obtaining the necessary accounts of the estate of the
deceased party, to answer the demands made against it by the suit. And the
prayer of the bill, therefore, in such a case usually is, not only that the suit
may be revived, but also, that in case the defendant shall not admit assets to
answer the purposes of the suit, such accounts may be taken. And, so far, the
bill is in the nature of an original bill. But upon a bill of revivor proper, the
sole questions before the Court are the competency of the parties to revive or
be revived against, and the correctness of the frame of a bill of revivor. 67
If a defendant to an original bill dies, before putting in an answer or after ;
an answer to which exceptions have been taken or after an amendment to the;
bill, to which no answer has been filed the bill of revivor, although requiring
;
in itself no answer, must pray that the person, against whom it seeks to revive
the suit, may answer the original bill, or so much of it as the exceptions taken
to the answer of the former defendant extend to, or as the amendment, remain-
ing unanswered, requires. 88
§ 709. —
Form of a Bill of Revivor. The form of a bill of revivor will, per-
haps, better appear by an illustration, than by description.
BIIX OF REVIVOR.
To the Hon. Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Huntingdon,
for the county of Carroll
John Doe, complainant, 1
vs. f Both residents of Carroll county.
Robert Roe, defendant. J
i.
That on July 10, 1890, he Court against Richard Roe to re-

filed his original bill in this
cover a debt due him from said Roe, [or, to recover a tract of land in said bill described, or,
otherwise, as the case may be_, briefly stated.] The said Richard Roe was made a defendant
to said bill by due process, and answered the said bill, [if such be the fact;] and depositions
were taken in the cause, and other proof filed, [*/ such be the facts;] and the cause was heard,
and the following final decree was pronounced [setting out the decree in full. If no decree
was pronounced, this part of the bill will be omitted, of course.]
ii.
Since said billwas filed, [or, since said answer was filed;or, since said proof was filed;
or, since said decree was pronounced,] the said defendant to said original bill, Richard Roe,
has died intestate, [or, testate,] and Robert Roe, the defendant to this bill, has been appointed
his administrator, [or, has duly qualified as his executor, or, if real estate is involved, is his
sole heir at law, or, his sole devisee] and succeeds to all of the rights and liabilities of the
said Richard Roe, deceased, in said original cause.
in.
Complainant is advised that he is entitled to have said suit [or, decree,] revived against
the said Robert Roe as the administrator [or, executor, or, heir, or, devisee,] of the said
Richard Roe, deceased and he, therefore, prays
;
1st. That said Robert Roe be made a party defendant to this bill by service of subpoena,
[or, by publication, if he is a non-resident;] and that he be required to answer this bill, but
his oath to his answer is waived.
§710 STATUTORY METHODS OP REVIVOR. 556
2d. That said suit, [or, decree,] may
be revived against him as the administrator [or
executor, or, heir, or, devisee,] of said Richard Roe, deceased, and may on such revivor stand
in the same plight and condition as it was at the time of the death of said Richard
Roe.
3d. That complainant may have such other and further relief in the premises as equity
may and as to your Honor shall seem meet.
require,
Hawkins & Hawkins, Solicitors.
If thecomplainant seeks to revive in his own name as administrator, execu-
tor, heir, or devisee, he will recite in his bill the death of the original complain-
ant, and that he is his administrator, executor, heir, or devisee, and will pray
that the suit, or decree, be revived in his name as such administrator, executor,
heir, or devisee, against the defendant, and to stand in the same plight and
condition in which it was at the time of the death of the original complainant
and for general relief.
ARTICLE II.
STATUTORY METHODS OF REVIVOR.
§ 710. Revivor by Motion. § 714. Extent of the Liabilities Resulting
§ 711. Revivor by Scire Facias, or Notice. From a Revivor.
§ 712. What a Scire Facias Against Heirs
Should Show. § 715. Forms Used in Reviving Causes.
§ 713. Defences to a Scire Facias, How § 716. Statutory Provisions Relative to the
Made. Abatement and Revivor of Suits.
§ 710. —
Revivor by Motion. The tendency of the times is toward simplicity
in pleading and mere formalism is more and more departed from. Our statutes
;
provide two simple and efficacious methods of revivor one, by mere motion, :
and the other by scire facias, or notice. 1

The person entitled to the place of the deceased party, whether complainant
or defendant, may, on his own motion, and, of course, on proper proof of his
title, take the place of such deceased party, and have the cause revived in his
name. 2 If all parties should consent, no proof of the person's title to revive
would be necessary. If his title to the place of the deceased party is not ad-
mitted, he may prove it by oral evidence, if he is an heir, or an assignee; by
written evidence if a vendee by letters of administration or guardianship, if an
;
administrator or guardian and by production of the will and record proof of

;
its probate and his qualification, if an executor.

So the adverse party, whether complainant or defendant, may revive the
suit against the proper person entitled to the place of the deceased party, with
the consent of that person, on mere motion, 3 whether such person be complain-
ant or defendant.
The husband of a female complainant may make himself a party complainant
4
by motion, on giving bond with good security for the prosecution of the suit ;
and the suit may be revived, at any time before the final disposition thereof,
against the husband of a female party, on motion with his consent. 5
A suit may be revived in the name of infants by their next friend, by motion,
they being the heirs and successors of a deceased complainant.
Code, §§4425; 2855-2856.
-1 While, however, the cisely the same whether the revivor be attempted or
statutory methods render a bill of revivor unneces- consummated by a bill of revivor, or by motion, or
sary, in many cases, it must not be, on that account, by scire facias; and, as a consequence, the rules and
supposed that the rules and principles governing principles defining the rights, duties, arid liabilities
bills of revivor, and proceedings thereon, are in any of the parties set forth in the first Article of this
t
way superseded, or abridged. On the contrary, all Chapter are eoually applicable to this Article.
of those rules and principles apply with full_ foroe 2 Code, § 2851; 2855.
when a revivor is 'undertaken, either by motion or 3 Code, § 2856.
by scire facias. The motion, or scire facias, super- 4 Code, § 2861.
sedes the bill of revivor as a pleading, only; the 5 Code, § 2862.
rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties are pre- Code, § 2855; Jones V. McKenna, 4 Lea, 630.
557 STATUTORY METHODS OP REVIVOR. §711
ORDERS OF REVIVOR ON MOTION.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe.
The death of the complainant, John Doe, haying been duly suggested and proved, [or,
admitted,] by consent of parties, and on motion of Daniel Doe, this suit is revived in his
name as the administrator, [or, executor, or, heir,] of said John Doe, deceased.
[Or, if there be no consent, this form may be used:
The death of John Doe was this day duly suggested and proved in open Court; and, there-
upon, came Daniel Doe and produced and filed his letters of administration on [or, his letters
testamentary as executor of] the estate of said John Doe, and moved the Court to revive this
cause in his name as such administrator [or, as the executor of said John Doe,] on considera-
tion whereof said motion was allowed, and said cause revived in the name of Daniel Doe
as such administrator, [or, executor,] and ordered to stand in the same plight and condition
as it was in at the time of the death of the said John Doe.
[Or, if the revivor is against a party, it may be as follozvs:
In this cause, the death of the defendant, Richard Roe, was this day suggested and proved
in open Court, and by consent of Robert Roe, given in open Court, this cause is revived against
him as the administrator, [or, executor, or, heir,] of said Richard Roe, deceased, and is or-
dered to stand in the same condition as when Richard Roe died.
§ 711. —
Revivor by Scire Facias, or Notice. If the person entitled to the
place of the deceased party, does not on his own motion, or by his consent,
Decome a party by revivor, the adverse party, whether complainant or defend-
ant, may revive against him by scire facias, or notice. 7 And so, where a female
party marries during the progress of a suit, a revivor may be had against her
husband, by scire fa-cias, at any time before the final disposition of the suit. s
The scire facias, or notice, may issue in term time, or in vacation, 9 upon
motion of the complainant; and it need only (1) give the names of the parties;
and (2) recite the filing of the bill, (3) the pendency of the suit, and (4) the
death or marriage, as the case may be, of the particular party, and (5) require
the person against whom it is issued to appear, and show cause why the suit
should not be revived against him, as the person entitled to the decedent 's place
in the subject-matter of the litigation, or as the husband of the married female
party. 10 On the return of the scire facias duly executed, the Clerk and Master
in vacation, or the Court in term time, will make an order of revivor, as a mat-
ter of course, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. 11
If any additional matter is to be set up, by way of amendment or supplement
to the original bill, the method of revivor by scire facias, or notice, will be
inadequate, and the Ordinary Chancery procedure by bill of revivor, in some one
of its various forms, must be resorted to.
§ 712. What a Scire Facias Against Heirs Should Show. If no person will —
administer on the estate of a deceased plaintiff or defendant, the suit may be
revived by or against the heirs of the decedent. 12 The statute evidently contem-
plates a revivor by or against the heirs as the representatives of the personal
estate, rather than of the real estate. The existing practice allowed a revivor
by or against the heirs as the representatives of the real estate, and hence there
was no need of a statute for such a revivor. For this reason, if the suit affects
both the realty and the personalty of the decedent, (as a suit to rescind a land
sale,) and the defendant sought to be charged dies, and an ordinary scire facias
issues against his heirs, the presumption of law arises that the revivor is sought
against them solely as heirs at law, that is, as representatives of the decedent 's
real estate and the heirs have the right to rely on that presumption and no
; ;
decree can properly be rendered against them, on such a revivor, holding them
liable on a personal judgment, as the representatives of the decedent's personal
estate. 13 Hence, if the complainant in any suit, and especially in one of the
character mentioned where the defendant may be held liable for either a real
7 Code, § 2856. 11 Code. §2857; Brown v. Rocco, 9 Heisk., 197.
» Code, § 2862. The scire facias should be made returnable to, and
n Code, §§2857; 4426. the cause revived at, a rule day. Code, §5 4429-
10 Cnrfe 88 4428: 2859; Winter v. Shankland. 3 4418. See. tost. S 1163.
§713 STATUTORY METHODS OP REVIVOR. 558
or personal recovery, seeks to revive against the heir's of such defendant, and
to hold them liable as representatives both of the real and personal estate of the
decedent, the scire facias must so state on its face, or -a revivor based thereon
will be deemed to be against them in their capacity as heirs only; and on such
revivor no money judgment can be rendered against them as the representatives
of the personal estate. And before a revivor can be had against the heirs as
personal representatives, it must be shown that there is no person who will
administer, and the scire facias must aver this on its face. It would, also, be
proper where the scire facias is awarded by the Court, to show in the order that
it was suggested that there was no administrator, and no one who would ad-
minister, and that for this reason scire facias issue to notify the heirs (naming
them) to show cause why the suit should not be revived against them as the
personal representatives of the decedent, as well as, the real representatives. 14
§ 713. Defences to a Scire Facias, How Made. The defences to a scire —
facias are the same as to a bill of revivor/ 5 and when a revivor is sought by
motion, scire facias, or notice, under the statutory provisions, the persons pro-
ceeded against may resist the revivor upon any sufficient ground, such as that
Ihey are not the executors, administrators, devisees, or heirs, or are not all of
them, 16 or are not the guardians, or the assignees, or have no interest in the
litigation. Or, to express these defences briefly: the defendant to the pro-
ceedings to revive, whether such proceeding be by motion, or by scire facias,
may show either that he does not stand in the shoes of the decedent, or that he
hos no interest in the suit.
"When such a contest arises, the proof may be made in open Court, or by the
depositions of witnesses taken upon notice, or by proof before the Clerk and
Master on a reference. 17 This last method is the most convenient and most con-
sistent with Chancery practice. Proof of witnesses, orally examined in open
Court, should not be heard except by consent of all adverse parties, and in such
case they must all be capable of giving their consent. 18
§ 714. Extent of the Liabilities Resulting from a Revivor. This question —
has already been somewhat considered, but more especially in view of the non-
statutory practice. 19 It may be stated, as a general rule, that the parties made
such by a revivor occupy the shoes of the decedent, and are entitled to the
rights he possessed, and are subject to all the liabilities he had incurred, down
to and including the day of his death, and to none other. 20 If there be any
burdens, they must bear them and if there be any benefits, they are entitled to
;
them.
But when a revivor takes place against persons who represent the estate of
the decedent, they cannot be held liable beyond the value of such estate.
Hence, on a revivor against an executor or administrator, or against heirs when
there is no administrator, they can be held liable only to the extent of the
assets, or of the complainant's proportion of the assets, in their hands subject
to the decedent's debts. And when a revivor is had against heirs, both as per-
sonal and as real representatives, the execution can be levied only on the goods
and chattels of the deceased in their possession subject to execution; and, if
14 Preston v. Golde, 12 Lea, 267. The Code lan- 17 Campbell v. Hubbard, 11 Lea, 6; Mayfield v.
guage, (§ 2849), is, "If no person will administer on Stephenson, 6 Bax., 401.
the estate of a deceased plaintiff or defendant, the 18 In Mayfield v. Stephenson, 6 Bax., 401, where
suit may be revived by or against the heirs of the , a revivor was had by the administrator and heirs of
decedent." An allegation in the order, and in the the complainant, on motion, and it not appearing in
scire facias, that no one "will" administer would be the record in what way the heirship was proven, the
difficult of direct proof. The fact, however, that no Supreme Court says they "must assume that the
one has administered, and that reasonab!e time has
i
persons named as heirs in this order [of revivor in
elaspsed for any one desiring it to have himself ap- their names] were either admitted to be the heirs, or
pointed administrator, will be accepted by the Court proven to be, to the satisfaction of the Court." On a
as proof that no one will administer. Besides, if the collateral attack, this revivor was held good. From
heirs desire to protect themselves from liability to this it may be inferred that parol proof of heirship
be revived against, they or some one or more of in such cases is admissible, if the fact of heirship is
them can do so by administering themselves. not controverted.
16 Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359, 19 See, ante, 5 705.
381. See, post, § 720-722. 20 Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
16 Mayfield v. Stephenson, 6 Bax., 397.
559 STATUTORY METHODS OF REVIVOR. §715
no such goods, or not sufficient, then only on the lands and tenements of the
deceased which may have descended to the heirs, subject to execution. 21 No
property, real or personal, that would not be liable to the decedent's debts in
case of administration, would be subject to execution against heirs.
§ 715. —
Forms Used in Reviving Causes. The following forms illustrate the
statutory methods of proving the death, marriage, and representative capacity
when a revivor
of parties, is sought:
PROOF OF DEATH AND ffltARRlAGE, AND ORDER FOR A SCIRE FACIAS.
John Doe,
vs.
In this cause, the death of Richard Roe and the marriage of Rachel Roe were duly proved
in open Court; [or, before the Master at the April, 1891, rules,] and it being suggested that
Robert Roe is the administrator, [or, sole heir,] of said Richard Roe, .deceased; and that
John Smith is the husband of said Rachel Roe, on motion of complainant, it is ordered that
a scire facias issue to make, these facts known to;said Robert Roeand said John Smith, and
to summon them to appear at the next term of this Court, [or, at the June rules of this Court,
or, before the Clerk and Master of this Court on the 1st Monday in June next,] to show
cause, if any they or either of them have, why this suit should not be revived against the
said Robert Roe as administrator [or, sole heir,] aforesaid, and. against said John Smith as
the husband of said Rachel Roe.
The foregoing form will adequately indicate the phraseology to be used by
the Master, in like cases, when the death or marriage of a party is proved
before him on a rule day, and a scire facias to revive applied for. The follow-
ing is the usual form of a scire facias in the Chancery Court
SCIRE FACIAS TO REVIVE.
To the Sheriff of Blount county
Whereas, a bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Maryville, on May 1st, 1890, by John
Doe against Richard Roe and Rachel Roe, which suit is still in said Court, pending and
undetermined
And whereas it was suggested at the April, 1891, term of said Court [or, before me, at the
April, 1891, rules of said Court,] that said Richard Roe was dead, and that Robert Roe was
his administrator [or, sole heir,] and that said Rachel Roe had married John Smith
And the said complainant having moved for a scire facias against said Robert Roe and
John Smith to show cause, if any they have, why this suit should not be revived against
them respectively as such administrator [or, heir] and husband; and the said Court having,
at said April, 1891, term, ordered a scire facias to issue;
You are, therefore, commanded to make these facts known to said Robert Roe and said
John Smith, and to summon each of them to appear before the said Chancery Court at its
next term, to be held in the Court House, in Maryville, on the 3d Monday in October next,
[or, to appear before me, at my office, in the Court House in Maryville, on the 1st Monday
of June, 1891,] to show cause, if any they, or either of them, have, why the said suit should
not be revived against the said Robert Roe as the administrator, [or, heir,] of said Richard
Roe, deceased, and against said John Smith as the husband of said Rachel Roe.
This May 4, 1891. W. C. ChumlEa, C. & M.
ORDER OF REVIVOR, ON A SCIRE FACIAS.
John Doe,
vs.
In this cause, the scire facias heretofore ordered to be issued, having been issued and duly
served on Robert Roe and John Smith more than five days before the first day of this term,
[or, if the revivor be at rules, before this the first Monday of June, 1891^] and neither of
them, having shown any cause why this suit should not be revived against the said Robert
Roe as the administrator [or, heir,] of Richard Roe, and against the said John Smith as the
husband of Rachel Roe, it is, therefore, ordered that this suit be revived against them re-
spectively accordingly.
ORDER OF REVIVOR BY CONSENT.
In this cause, being admitted that the defendant, Richard Roe, has died, and the defend-
it
ant, Rachael Roe, has married, since the last term of the Court, and that Robert Roe is the
§716 STATUTORY METHODS OF REVIVOR. 560
administrator, [or, heir,] of said Richard Roe, and that John Smith is the
husband of- said
Rachel Roe, and said Robert Roe and said John Smith in open Court, [or, by their respective
bolicitors,] admitting these facts, by their consent this cause is revived
against said Robert
Roe as said administrator, [or, heir,] and against said John Smith as said husband, and is
ordered to stand in the same plight and condition in which it was at the time of said
death
and marriage.
If the revivor is on motion, or by consent of the parties, the orders would be
as follows, omitting the style of the cause
ORDERS OF REVIVOR, ON MOTION.

In this cause, the death of John Doe, the complainant, was this day proved in open Court-;
;nd thereupon came David Doe, and presented his letters of administration on the estate of
said John Doe, deceased, [or, proved that he was the heir at law of said John Doe, deceased,
and moved the Court to revive this cause in his name as the administrator [or, heir,] of said
John Doe, deceased, which motion was by the Court allowed, and the cause revived accord-
ingly, and ordered to stand in the same plight and condition in which it stood at the death
of the said John Doe.
ORDER FOR SCIRE FACIAS TO REVIVE A DECREE.

John Doe, ]
vs. } Order for Scire Facias.

Richard Roe. J
In this cause the complainant by his Solicitor, suggested and proved the death of the de-
fendant, Richard Roe, and further suggested that Roland Roe was his administrator [or
executor, or heir, or devisee,] and moved that a scire facias issue against him, the said
Roland Roe, to show cause, if any he have, why the decree rendered against Richard Roe in
this Court in favor of complainant on the day of —
19 — —
[giving its date,] should not be
,
,
revived against him as such administrator [or executor, or heir, or devisee.]

Whereupon, and on consideration of the record in the cause, said motion is allowed and
said writ 2 - ordered to be issued.
ORDER REVIVING A DECREE.

John Doe, ]
vs. \ Order reviving Decree. •_ :
Richard Roe. J
In this cause, the scire facias heretofore ordered to be issued against Roland Roe, as the
administrator [or executor, or heir, or devisee,] of the defendant, Richard Roe, now deceased,
having been issued and duly served on said Roland Roe more than five days before the
first day of this term, and he having shown no cause why the decree rendered against the
defendant, Richard Roe, now deceased, in favor of complainant on the... .day of...., 19...., [giv-
ing its date,] should not be revived against him, the said Roland Roe, as the administrator
[or executor, or heir, or devisee, 23 ] of said Richard Roe, on motion of complainant and on
consideration of, the record in the cause, it is ordered adjudged and decreed, that said
motion be allowed and said decree revived, and that complainant have and recover. 24 [Here
set out the decree revived, but substituting the name of Roland Roe as administrator, or
executor, or devisee of Richard Roe, in the place and stead of the name of Richard Roe.]
It is further ordered and decreed that the Solicitor's lien of Charles H. Smith, Esq., on
said former decree attach to the decree hereby revived. The defendant, Roland Roe, as
administrator, [or executor, or heir, or devisee,] will pay the costs incidental to the scire
facias and revivor of said decree, for which an execution is awarded.
§ 716. Statutory Provisions Relative to the Abatement and Revivor of Suits.

It is provided by the Code that no action shall abate by the death, marriage,
or other disability of any of the parties, complainant or defendant, or by the
transfer of any interest in the suit by any party, if the cause of action survives
or continues. 25
1. Statutory Provisions Relative to Abatement by Death. No civil actions COfft-
inenced, whether founded on wrongs or contracts, except actions for wrongs
affecting the character of the plaintiff, shall abate by the death of either party,
but may be revived. The intervention of a term between the death of a part/
und the qualification of the personal representative shall not work an abatement
or discontinuance of the suit. Nor shall the suit' abate or discontinue for the
22 If the decree related to land it must be revived against the heir, or devisee. See, ante, §§ M3; 701.
against the heir, or devisee; if to personalty or debt, 24 The complainant is only entitled to interest
against the administrator or executor. See, ante, from the date of the decree. Rogers r. Hollings-
S 701. worth, 11 Pick., 357.
If the decree affects realty, the revivor
>-''>
must be I
25 Code, § 2845.
561 STATUTORY METHODS OP REVIVOR. § 716
death of either party, until the second term after the death ias been suggested
and proved or admitted, and entry to that effect made of record, 26 -
2. Statutory Provisions Relative to Revivors. If no person will administer on
the estate of a deceased plaintiff or defendant, the suit may be revived by or
against the heirs of the decedent. If the decedent has parted with his interest
pending the suit, it may be revived by or against the successor in interest
instead of the representative or heir. 2T
Where one or more of several plaintiffs, not partners, dies, the person entitled
to represent the decedent may revive, by motion, at any time before the cause
is tried or abated. But, if the suit is not thus revived within the two terms
allowed, the defendant may revive or elect to proceed to trial with the surviving
plaintiff, or abate the suit, if revivor is necessary.
When any sole executor or administrator is plaintiff or defendant, and dies,
the suit may be revived by or against the executor, administrator de bonis non,
or other successor in interest of the decedent.
No appeal or writ of error in any cause or court shall abate by the death
of either plaintiff or defendant, but may be revived by or against the heir, per-
sonal representative, or assign, under the foregoing rules. 28
The action may be revived by the proper person, entitled to the decedent's
place, by motion alone. And by the adverse party against such proper person,
by consent of that person, on mere motion and, without consent, by scire facias
;
or notice. The scire facias or notice may be sued out in term time or vacation,
and the order to revive be made as of course, unless good cause to the contrary
be shown on the return of the process. 29
Where a suit is commenced in the name of one person for the use of another,
and the nominal plaintiff dies, the suit may be prosecuted, without revivor, as
i L the death had not happened.
30
Suits abated by the death of either party may be revived by or against the
heir, personal representative, guardian or assign, as the case may be, who may
be legally entitled to the decedent's place in the subject-matter of litigation. 31
3. Statutory Provisions for Revivor in Case of Marriage. No action in a Court
of law or Equity by or against a woman abates by her marriage, but may be
revived by or against her husband. The husband of a female plaintiff may
make himself a party plaintiff by motion, and by giving bond with good security
to prosecute the suit with effect, or to pay the costs of suit, as in other cases.
On the execution of such bond, the original security for the prosecution is dis-
charged from liability for subsequently accruing costs. The suit may be re-
vived at any time before final disposition thereof, against the husband of a
female defendant by motion, with his consent, or by scire facias without
consent. 32
4. Statutory Provisions in Chancery Practice. The following statutory provis-
ions, in the Chapter devoted to the Practice of Courts of Chancery, are to be
construed along with those hereinabove given, and as parts of one general
system of revivors
Upon the death of a defendant, or marriage of a female defendant, the suit
iiiay be revived by scire facias or notice to the heirs, or personal representatives,
or husband, without the necessity of filing a bill of revivor. The Clerk and
Master shall issue this scire facias, or notice, at any time, upon motion of the
complainant, entering the same upon his rules, and including in each writ issued
to any county all the parties residing in that county. Persons made defendants
under these sections, may make the same defence to the revival of such suits,
as if made parties by the former practice of the Courts of Chancery. The
scire facias need only give the names of the parties, and recite the filing of the
26 Code, §§ 2846-2848. |
30 Code, § 28S8.
§717 BILLS AKIN TO BILLS OF REVIVOR. 562
bill,pendency of the suit, and death or marriage as the ease may be, and there-
upon require the parties against whom it is issued, to appear and show cause
\vhy the suit should not be revived. Bills of revivor, amended, and supple-
mental bills, if resorted to, may be filed at any time in the Clerk's office; and
the process may be made returnable, and the suit revived at a rule day. 33
AETICLE III.
BILLS AKIN TO BILLS OP REVIVOR.

§ 717. Original Bills in the Nature of Bills I § 718. Bills of Revivor and Supplement,
of Revivor. | § 719. The Name of the Bill Immaterial.
§ 717. Original Bills in the Nature of Bills of Revivor. In most of the cases —
already stated, there is no other fact to be ascertained than whether the new
party brought before the Court has the character imputed to him. If he has,
the revivor is of course. But there are many cases, in which there are other
facts which may be brought into litigation besides the mere question of the
character of the new party and to such cases, therefore, the simple bill of re-
;
vivor does not technically apply. Under such circumstances, an original bill,
m the nature of a bill of revivor, is the appropriate pleading to bring those
facts before the Court, and to put the original proceedings again in motion, and
to enable the new party to have the benefit of the former proceedings. 1 Thus,
if the death of a party, whose interest is not determined by his death, is at-
tended with such a transmission of his interest, that the title to it, as well as
the person entitled, may be litigated in the Court of Chancery, as in the case of
a devise of real estate, the suit is not permitted to be continued by a bill of
revivor. An original bill upon which the title may be litigated, must be
filed. 2
The ground of this distinction between bills of revivor, and bills in the nature
of bills of revivor, is that the former, in case of death, are founded upon mere
privity of blood, or representation by operation of law the latter, upon privity ;
of estate, or title by the act of the party. In the former case, nothing can be
in contest, except whether the party be the heir or personal representative;
in tlifi latter, the nature and operation of the whole act by which the privity of
estate or title is created, is open to controversy. Thus, for example, the heir
may be made a party by a bill of revivor-; for his title is by mere operation of
law. But the devisee must come in by a bill in the nature of a bill of revivor
for he comes in as a purchaser under the testator, in privity of estate or title,
Avliich may be disputed. 3
A bill in the nature of a bill of revivor cannot be brought, except by some
person who claims in privity with the complainant in the original bill. Thus,
for example, if a bill is filed by a devisee under a will, and afterwards the will
is set aside, or a subsequent will is proved, by which the same property is
devised to another devisee; in such a case, the heir, or latter devisee, as the
case may be, cannot, by a bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, avail himself
oi: the proceedings in the original suit; for there is no privity between the
complainant in the original suit and the complainant in the supplemental bill.
But if the bill had been filed by the devisor himself for some matter touching
the estate devised, then the heir or second devisee might file a supplemental bill
in the nature of a bill of revivor, notwithstanding the first devisee has already
33 Code, §§4425-4429; Ch. Rule, XI; §1200, post, I 2 Sto. Eq. PI. §378.
l Sto. Eq. PL, § 377. 1 3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1508, note; Sto. Eq. PI.. 379-
563 BILLS AKIN TO BILLS OF REVIVOR. §718
filed such a bill ; for he derives his title solely from the devisor, independently
oi the first devisee. 4
An original in the nature of a bill of revivor, should generally state the
bill,
same facts as a of revivor. It should state the filing of the original bill,
bill
the proceedings upon it, the abatement, and the manner in which the interest
of the party dead has been transmitted. It should, also, charge the validity
of the transmission, and state the rights which have accrued by it, and should
pray that the suit may be revived, and the complainant have the benefit of all
the former proceedings thereon. 5
Where a bill, in the nature of a bill of revivor, is filed by any one not a
party to the original suit, all of the parties to the original suit, who have any
interest in the further proceedings therein, should be made parties to such bill,
either as complainants or defendants. 6
§ 718. Bills of —
Revivor and Supplement. This bill is a mere compound of
and of a supplemental bill, and in its separate parts it must be
a bill of revivor
framed and proceeded upon in the same manner. It becomes proper where not
only an abatement has taken place in a suit, but defects are to be supplied, or
new events are to be stated, which have arisen since the commencement of the
suit. 7 Thus, if a suit becomes abated, and by any act besides the event by
which the abatement happens, the rights of the parties are affected, as by a
devise, under certain circumstances, although a bill of revivor merely may
continue the suit, so as to enable the parties to prosecute it; yet, to bring before
the Court the whole matter necessary for its consideration, the parties must,
by supplemental bill, added to and made part of the bill of revivor, show the
devise, or other act by which their rights are affected. 8
§ 719. The Name
of the Bill Immaterial. —
As already stated, the name of a
bill is immaterial in our practice. Our Courts look at substance of bills, and
allow or disallow them accordingly. 9 It matters not whether a bill is called a
bill of revivor, or an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, or a bill
of revivor and supplement, or an original bill in the nature of a bill of revivor
and supplement, or whether it is given any name at all if it contain the proper
;
averments, and makes the proper persons parties, and has the proper prayer,
it is a proper bill. 10 Nevertheless, it is important to know the various varieties
of bills of revivor, in order to fully comprehend the cases to which they apply,
the term when they are to be filed, the facts they must allege, and tbe relief
to be prayed. Hence, in drawing a bill of revivor, of any kind, while it is nec-
essary to insert all the essentials hereinbefore set out, it is not necessary to call
the bill by any other name than a bill of revivor indeed, it is not necessary to
;
name it at all.
4 Sto. Eq. PL, § 385. 10 Northman v. Iîverpool Ins. Co., 1 Tenn. Ch.,
5 Sto. Eq. PI., § 386. 312. See, ante, §§ 43; 269. Nihil facit error nomi-
6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1508, note. nis cum de corpore vel persona constat. (An error of
7 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1546, note. name amounts to nothing when there is certainty as
8 Sto. Eq. PI., § 387. to the thing or person.)
9 Murphy v. Johnson, 23 Pick., 552.
§720 DEFENCES TO PROCEEDINGS TO REVIVE. 564
AETICLB IV.
DEFENCES TO PROCEEDINGS TO REVIVE.
§ 720. Defences to a Revivor. - 00 „
R r
^ to
•
I
t. t>
§ 722 Defence Plea ln Bar
§ 721. Demurrers to Bills of Revivor. |
'
-
—
Defences to a Revivor. It is very seldom that any defence exists, or
§ 720.
is made, to a bill of revivor, or to a scire facias; but (1) when the complainant
to such a proceeding is not entitled to have the suit revived in his name and for
his benefit; or (2) when the defendant to the bill, or scire facias, is not the
proper person to revive against; or (3) when the proceeding is to revive a
decree, and the defendant can show that the decree has been paid, released, or
otherwise discharged, or is barred by the statute of limitations, in any of such
cases the defendant may demur to the bill, or scire facias, if the matters of de-
fence appear on its face, and may plead to the bill or scire facias, if the matter
of defence does not appear on its face. The defences to a scire facias are the
same as those to a bill of revivor, 1 and the latter have heretofore been fully
considered. 2
§ 721. Demurrers
to Bills of Revivor. —
If a bill of revivor, or a bill in the
nature of a of revivor, does not show a sufficient ground for reviving the
bill
suit, or any part of it, either by or against the person by or against whom it
is brought, the defendant may, by demurrer, show cause against the revival.
Indeed, although the defendant does not demur, yet, if the complainant does
not show a title to revive, he will take nothing by his suit at the hearing. A
demurrer to a bill of revivor, or to a bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, may
be: (1) either for want of privity, or (2) for want of sufficient interest in the
party seeking to revive, or (3) for some imperfection in the frame of the bill.
l. For Want of Privity. We
have already had occasion to consider in what
cases a bill of revivor, technically so called, may lie and, it was then stated, ;
that it is confined to cases of representation of the party deceased by the mere

appointment and operation of law. Thus, the executor or administrator alone
is the party by or against whom a bill of revivor, technically so called, will lie
as to matters touching the personalty of the deceased and the heir at law of ;
the deceased is the only party by or against whom a bill of revivor will lie as
to matters touching the realty. This is properly a privity by operation of law. 3
On the other hand, there may be a privity of right and title under the deceased,
by a transfer or conveyance of that right and title to a person, who is not in
by mere operation of law, and is not the personal or real representative of the
deceased. In such a case, a pure bill of revivor will not lie by or against such
person but a bill in the nature of a bill of revivor will. In each of these cases
;
if the appropriate bill was not brought by the party, seeking to revive, a demur-
rer would formerly have lain 4 but now, in our practice, the name of the bill is
;
immaterial, if the substance be material.

It is laid down by Story, that, (1) if an administrator de bonis non should
seek, fey a pure bill of revivor, to revive a decree, obtained by a former admin-
istrator, a demurrer would lie; for the administrator de bonis non comes not
in, in privity with the former administrator, who obtained the decree; but
paramount to him, and purely as the representative of the intestate and (2) if ;
a bill of revivor should be filed by or against the assignee of a bankrupt or an
i Allen & Hill, exrs., v. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359. I 3 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 617-618.
2 See, ante, § 704. I
* Sto. Eq. PL, § 618.
565 DEFENCES TO PROCEEDINGS TO REVIVE. § 722
insolvent, or the committee of a lunatic's estate, or a purchaser, or a devisee of

the estate in question, a demurrer would lie for the want of the proper right of
representation in such a bill 5 but in Tennessee, no demurrer would lie in such
;
eases, the distinction between a pure bill of revivor, and a bill in the nature
of a bill of revivor, being one merely of name and not of substance.
Nevertheless, there must be privity of estate between the party by or against
whom the bill of revivor is brought and the deceased party, or a demurrer will
liefor that reason; but it is immaterial whether this privity be by operation of
law or by contract of the parties, as it is also immaterial whether the bill be
called a bill of revivor, or a bill in the nature of a bill of revivor, or whether
6
any name at all be given it.
2 .For Want of Interest. Ordinarily, if the party seeking to revive, has no

interest in the further proceedings, and can derive no benefit from them, he
is not entitled to a bill of revivor, and a demurrer will therefore lie. defend- A
ant may have such an interest as will entitle him to a bill of revivor, as for
example in cases of account, 7 in suits for partition or sale for partition, or when
he has concurrent rights with the deceased complainant, or in any other case
where he will take a benefit under the decree.
3. Tor Some Imperfection in the Frame of the Bill. The proper parties must
be made to such a bill, to the end that the Court may be able to make a com-
plete decree, leaving no roots for subsequent litigation to spring from; and if
the bill of revivor is deficient in parties, a demurrer will lie to it on that
ground. 8 If, however, the defect of parties existed before the abatement, a
demurrer will not lie to a bill of revivor for want of the deficient parties, the
only office of a bill of revivor being merely to put the cause in the same plight
and condition in which it was at the abatement. 9 "Where, however, any defect
exists in the original bill, either for want of proper parties, or for want of
proper allegations, or for want of any matter proper to be brought forward by
an amended or a supplemental bill, it would be proper to incorporate all of,
these matters in the bill of revivor, which would then be properly termed a
bill in the nature of a bill of revivor and supplement.
And in general, whenever the bill shows on its face either that the complain-
ant has no right to revive the suit, or that the defendant is not a proper party
against whom the suit should be revived, because not in the chain of representa-
tion, a demurrer will lie. And if the statements in the bill of revivor do not
show a title to revive, or a liability to be revived against, or if the bill is other-
wise fatally defective, the complainant cannot, on demurrer, supply the defect
by reading the record of the original bill, although that record be referred to
in the bill of revivor. 10
§ 722. —
Defence by Plea in Bar. If any of the foregoing defences do not
appear on the face of the bill, or scire facias, it may be brought forward by a
plea in bar. The defendant to the proceeding to revive may, by a negative plea,
deny that he is the, or a, heir, administrator, executor, husband, or other proper
successor, of the original defendant or he may, by a negative plea, deny that
;
the party seeking to revive in his own name, is the heir, administrator, execu-
tor, husband, or other proper successor, of the original complainant. If the
proceeding is to revive a decree, the defendant to the proceeding may, in addi-
tion to the foregoing defences, plead that the decree has been paid, released,
or otherwise discharged, or is barred by the statute of limitations.
5 Sto. Eq. PI., § 619. As

8 to the proper parties to a bill of revivor,
6 Ante, § 43. see, ante, %% 113-116; 701.
^ Sto. Eq. PI., § 621. 9 Sto. Eq. PI., § 624.
10 Sto. Eq. PL, § 626.
§ 723 BILLS TO EXECUTE DECREES. 566
CHAPTER XXXV.
BILLS TO CARRY DECREES INTO EXECUTION.
Form
Decrees Tt-c
k tvi T>-ii r> § 724. of a Bill to Carry a Decree Into
8 723. Bills to
*.
Carry t-v «.-
Into Execution. I
-g ecut : on
§ 723. Bills to Carry Decrees into Execution. bill to carry a decree into—A
execution is proper where a party's rights have become so embarrassed, by
events subsequent to the decree, that no ordinary process upon the original
decree will be effectual to carry it into execution. This happens, generally, in
cases where parties have neglected to proceed upon the decree until subsequent
events make it necessary to have the decree of the Court to settle and ascer-
tain their rights under it. 1 Sometimes such a bill is exhibited by a person who
was not a party or who does not claim under any party to the original decree
;
but who claims in a similar interest or who is unable to obtain the determina-
;
tion of his own rights, till the decree is carried into execution. Or, it may be
brought by or against any person, claiming as assignee of a party to the decree.
The Court, in these eases, in general, only enforces, and does not vary, the de-
cree. But upon circumstances it has sometimes considered the original direc-
tions, and varied them in case of. mistake. And if it would be inequitable to
enforce a decree, the Court may refuse to do so for this purpose the Court has :
full power to look into the merits of the case. 2 But, although the original
decree may be controverted, upon a bill to carry it into execution, it is only
the defendant in the new suit who can call it in question the complainant never ;
can. He must, if not satisfied with the decree, impeach it by a bill of review, or
some similar proceeding. 3
A bill to carry a decree into execution is generally in part an original bill,
and in part a bill in the nature of an original bill, and it is sometimes a bill of
revivor, or a supplemental bill, or both, as the exigencies of the case may re-
quire. And the frame of the bill, and the course of proceeding upon it, varies
accordingly. 4
§ 724. Form of a Bill to Carry a Decree into Execution. The bill should —
recite the fact of the filing of the original bill, the proceedings thereon, the de-
cree pronounced, and why the decree has not been executed, and should pray
that it be enforced. The following is a form of
A BILL TO CABBY A DECBEE INTO EXECUTION.
To Hon. David M. Key, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at Chattanooga
John Doe, administrator of James Doe, deceased, a resident"
of Hamilton county, complainant,
vs.
Richard Roe, Robert Roe, Rachel Roe, and Rosanna Roe,
all residents of Hamilton county, defendants.

I.
That year 1860, a bill was filed in your Honor's Court at Chattanooga, by James
in the
Doe, against Roland Roe, to enforce a vendor's lien said James had in and to the following
tract of land, in said town of Chattanooga, on the bank of the Tennessee river Beginning :
1 Huddleston V. Williams, 1 Heisk., 581. I 217. The name of the bill is immaterial if its alle-
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1585-1586; Sto. Eq. PL, §5 429- gations be sufficient. Brandon 1*. Mason, 1 Lea, 624.
430, notes. It may be called a supplemental bill. Herd v. Bew-
.1 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 88. ley, 1 Heisk., 524; see, ante, § 43.
4 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 88; Chestnut v. Frazier, 6 Bax.,
567 BIIXS TO EXECUTE DECREES. § 724
[&c, giving metes and bounds,] containing about .five acres, which tract said James had
its
conveyed to said Roland by deed, retaining an express lien on its face to secure the payment
of the unpaid purchase-money, amounting to about four hundred dollars. Said bill prayed
for a decree for said four hundred dollars, and for a sale of said land to satisfy said lien debt.
The bill was answered by said Roland, the defendant thereto and such further proceedings
;
were had that in December, 1861, a decree was pronounced granting the prayer of the bill,
and adjudging that said Roland owed said James four hundred dollars of the said purchase-
money, and ordering a sale of said tract to satisfy the decree.
ii.
Complainant further shows that said decree was never executed for the following reasons
1st. Soon after its rendition, the war between the United States and the Confederate
States broke out, and in consequence thereof the Courts were closed, and have only been
recently reopened.
2d. Since said decree, all the record of the cause has been totally lost, 3 so that the original
file, the orders on the minutes of the Court, and the decree cannot be found; .and complainant
is credibly informed, and verily believes, and on that information and belief avers, that they
were all totally burned and destroyed during said war.
3d. The same James Doe became of unsound mind during the war, and so continued until
his death intestate, which occurred in Chattanooga on June 10, of the present year. Your
complainant is his only heir at law, and is also administrator, appointed and duly qualified
by the County Court of Hamilton County, and entitled to all his estate, real and personal, in
his two-fold character of heir and administrator.
4th. Since complainant's appointment as administrator, his intestate's papers have come
into his hands, and he has discovered thereby all the facts herein alleged in reference to
said suit and decree, none of which facts were known to him before.
5th. The said Roland Roe was killed early in said war, and the defendants, who are
adults, are his only heirs, he leaving no widow, no personal estate whatever, and no will, and
no one having ever administered on his estate. The defendants are all living on said land,
and are claiming to own it under said deed to their father.
in.
The papers and records in said cause and said decree having been thus lost and destroyed,
and all of the original parties to the suit being dead, complainant is advised that it will be
necessary to file this bill (1) to revive said suit, (2) to supply said lost papers and said decree,
and (3) to carry said decree into execution; and therefore, the premises considered, he prays:
IV.
1st. That those named as defendants in the caption of this bill be served with proper pro-
cess and required to answer this bill, but not on oath.
2d. That said lost papers and said decree be set up and supplied, according to law and
the practice of this Court.
3d. That said decree be revived in complainant's name as said administrator, and against
said defendants as the heirs at law of said Roland Roe; and that, if an administrator of said
Roland Roe be necessary, your honor will appoint one, more than six months having elapsed
since his death, and no administrator having ever been appointed, and no person will apply
or can be procured to administer his estate: h>
4th. That said decree of December, 1861, for said sum of four hundred dollars, and for
the sale of said land, be, by decree of your Honor, set up and carried into execution, and said
tract of land sold, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the satisfaction of said decree. 6
5th. And that complainant have such other, further, and general relief as he may be en-
titled to. Burch Cooke, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, -ante, §§155; 164.]
5 Although the papers in a cause may be lost, in I as still existing, and in force. Randall v. Payne, 1
fact; nevertheless, in the eye of the law, they are not Tenn. Ch., 145; Whitworth v. Thompson, 8 Iêa, 485.
lost, and litigants are entitled to the benefits of them I See Chestnutt r. Fra7»er, 6 Bax., 217.
§725 CROSS BILLS. 568
CHAPTER XXXVI.
CROSS BILLS.
725. Cross Bills Generally Considered.
§ 732. Frame
of a Cross Bill.
726. Relation of a Cross Bill to the Orig-
inal Bill.
§ 733. Form
of a Cross Bill.
§ 734. Answer as a Cross Bill.
727. Cross Bills for Relief, When
Proper.
§ 735. Form of an Answer Filed as a Cross
728. Cross Bills When Not Proper.
Bill.
729. What Relief Can be Obtained by a
$ 736. Prosecution Bond, and Process on a
Defendant Without a Cross Bill.
Cross Bill.
730. In What Cases a Cross Bill Should be
§ 737. Defences to a Cross Bill.
Filed.
§ 738. The Hearing on a Cross Bill.
731. Time for Filing a Cross Bill.
§ 725. —
Cross Bills generally Considered. When a defendant cannot effectu-
ally make
his defence, or assert his rights in the subject-matter of a litigation,
by an answer to the bill and especially when he needs some affirmative remedy
;
or relief, he may file a cross bill for that purpose. A

cross bill, as its name
implies, is a bill brought by a defendant in a suit against the complainant in
the same suit, or against the complainant and other defendants in the same
suit, touching the matters in question in the original bill. A
bill of this kind is
usually brought, either (1) to obtain a necessary discovery of facts, or (2) to
bring before the Court new matter in aid of the defence to the original bill,
or (3) to obtain full relief for all the parties to the matters in controversy, or
(4) some affirmative relief touching the matters of the original bill. 1 cross A
bill which seeks no discovery or relief, and makes no defence, which was not
equally available by way of answer to rhe original bill, is unnecessary, and
will be dismissed, on motion, or demurrer. 2 A
cross bill may be filed by a de-
fendant, not only against the complainant, or against the complainant and one
or more of the defendants, but it may also bring in new parties when necessary
for the complete determination of the matters involved in the original suit; 3
but the complainant in the original suit, should be made a defendant to the
cross bill in all cases. 4 A
cross bill may bring new parties before the Court,
but they do not thereby become parties to the original bill. New parties cannot,
however, be made by cross bill, unless they are connected with the original
matter in litigation. 5 The cross bill for a discovery gives a perfect reciprocity
of proof to each party, derivable from the answer of each but inasmuch as all ;
parties to a suit are now competent witnesses, a cross bill, for a discovery only,
is seldom filed, and is almost obsolete. 6
§ 726. The Relation of a Cross Bill to the Original Suit. It must be kept —
in mind that a cross bill is an auxiliary suit, a dependency of the original litiga-
1 Perkins Oil Co. v. Eberhart, 23 Pick., 428, citing Baxter, Chancellor Cooper held that new parties
the above section of this book, then § 662. could not be brought in by cross bill. 1 Tenn. Ch.,
2 Sto. Eq. PL, § 389; Montgomery V. Olwell, 1 405. Chancellor Cooper in 2 Tenn. Ch., 785, refers
Tenn. Ch., 169; Hergel v. Laitenberger, 2 Tenn. to Odum v. Odum [Owen] as sustaining Cobb r.
Ch., 251; Woodard V. Bird, 21 Pick., 671; Huffmas- Baxter; but in Odum v. Owen, 2 Bax., 446, it was
ter v. Payne, 3 Shan. Cas., 119. an answer filed as a cross bill, and not an indepen-
3 Pollard v, Welford, IS Pick., 120, citing the dent cross bill. It is well settled that a new party
above section of this book, then § 662. cannot be brought in by an answer filed as a cross
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1548-1549, notes; Hergel v. Lai- bill. McGavock v. Morrison, 3 Tenn. Ch., 355;
tenberger, 2 Tenn. Ch., 251. It will not be a cross Hall V. Fowlkes, 9 Heisk., 754; post, § 734.
bill unless it makes the complainant in the original o When, however, a defendant needs the evidence
bill a defendant. Ibid. of the complainant as to some single point, or as to
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1548, notes; Stockard v. Pinkard, a very few points, it may be a good policy to obtain
6 Hum., 121; Hildebrand V. Beasley, 7 Heisk., 121; a discovery from him by cross bill, rather than to
Huffmaster v. Payne, 3 Shan. Cas., 119; Henderson examine him as a witness, and thereby incur the
v. Anderson, MS. Knoxville, 1880. In Cobb v. risks incident to his own self cross-examination.
569 CROSS BILLS. §727
tion, and can be sustained only on matter growing out of the original bill. 7
It is for thisreason a cross bill must be heard with the original bill. If a cross
bill be set for hearing, the legal effect thereof is to set the original bill for
hearing, also for the cross bill incorporates itself with the original bill, and the
;
two bills really constitute one cause. 8 And even when the decree on a cross
bill alone has been appealed from, so wedded are the two bills that the appeal
takes them both up and, in the Supreme Court, the whole case on both bills is
;
open for re-adjudication so much so, that there the decree on the original bill,
;
though not appealed from, may be reversed. 9

The dismissal of the original bill by the complainant ordinarily carries the
cross bill with it, or the answer when filed as a cross bill; 10 but when either
the cross bill, or the answer filed as cross bill, sets up grounds for affirmative
relief on which proof has been taken, the dismissal of the original bill by the
complainant does not carry with it the cross bill, or answer filed as a cross bill
but leaves such cross bills in Court for prosecution to final decree. 11
New and incongruous matter cannot be introduced into the litigation by
means of a cross bill, except as a basis for an equitable set-off. Thus, on a bill
to wind up a partnership, the defendant cannot by cross bill be allowed to have
an account as to a prior and different partnership, 12 unless he seeks, on suffi-
cient grounds, to set off one against the other.
§ 727. Cross Bills for Relief, When Proper. —A cross bill for relief may be
filed whenever any question arises
between the defendant and the complainant,
or between two defendants to a bill, that cannot be determined completely
. without a cross bill, or cross bills, to bring every matter in dispute completely
before the Courts to be litigated by the proper parties, and upon the proper
proofs. In such a case, it becomes necessary for some one or more of the de-
fendants to the original bill to file a cross bill against the complainant and one
or more of the other defendants to that bill, and thus bring the litigated points
fully before the Court. 13 When a cross bill seeks affirmative relief, it partakes
of the nature of an original bill, and consequently the relief sought must be
such as the Court has jurisdiction to grant. 14
As this species of bill is a mode of defence, a defendant is sometimes of nec-
essity obliged to resort to it in cases where, by the rules of pleading in Equity,
he would not be able to avail himself of the matter of his defence in any other
way. Thus, if the matter of defence arises after the cause is at issue, as if the
complainant has given the defendant a release, or if there has been a payment,
or an award, or a recovery in another suit for the same cause of action, or if
any other thing has happened, since answer was filed, to terminate the com-
plainant's right of recovery, or to make it inequitable for him further to pros-
ecute his suit in whole or in part, the defendant must set these matters up by a
cross bill. In such cases a cross bill is somewhat in the nature of a plea since
the last continuance, at common law. 15
A cross bill being generally considered as a defence to the original bill, or
as a proceeding necessary to a complete determination of a matter already in
litigation, the complainant in the cross bill, is not, at least, as against the com-
plainant in the original bill, obliged to show any ground of Equity to support
the jurisdiction of the Court. It is treated in short as a mere auxiliary suit,
or as a dependency upon the original suit. 16
§ 728. Cross Bills, When Not Proper. —A
cross bill is proper only when it is
related to the subject-matter of the original suit; and its principal, if not ex-
7 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1548, note; Hergel V. Laitenber- .UPartee V. Goldberg, 17 Pick., 664; Sto. Eq. PI.,
ger, 2 Tenn. Ch., 251; Sto. Eq. PL, §399; Beal i>. § 399, note.
Smithpeter, 6 Bax., 356. 12 Carey V. Williams, 1 Lea, 53.
8 Hergel V. Laitenberger, 2 Tenn. Ch., 251; Cocke 13 Sto. Eq. PI., §392; Perkins Oil Co. v. Eber-
V. Trotter, 10 Yerg., 213. hart, 23 Pick., 428, citing the above section of this
9 Woodrum v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Swan, 218. See, book, then § 664.
also, Napier v. Elam, 6 Yerg., 108; Randall v. Payne, 14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 398.
1 Tenn. Ch., 148. 15 Sto. Eq. PI., §393; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1550.
10 Res accessaria sequitur rem principaletn. 16 Sto. Eq. PI., § 399; Mitf. Eq. PI., 82.
elusive, offices are 1, to bring before the Court, more fully than can be done
:
by an answer, some defence to the bill in connection with its subject-matter;

or 2, to obtain some affirmative relief arising out of the matters set forth in the
bill, and which could not be had on answer only or 3, to obtain a discovery in
;
aid of the defence to the original bill. 17 In any event, a cross bill must be con-
fined to the matters referred to in the bill, or to matters equitably connected
therewith. 18 Hence, a cross bill cannot inject a new cause of action into the
suit, cannot bring forward matters not referred to in the original bill and not
equitably connected therewith, nor set up matters wholly without the scope of
the original bill. All such new, independent and distinct matters involve a new,
independent and distinct suit, and must be set up in an original bill. 19
A cross bill setting up matter wholly original is misnamed a cross bill, and is
in substance and in fact an original bill, and may be stricken from the files on
motion, as not belonging to the suit in which it is filed, or may be demurred to
because the matter it brings forward is not connected with the matter contained
in the original bill, but is wholly foreign thereto. 20 If, however, such a bill is
answered, it is the duty of the Chancellor, on his own motion, to order such so-
called cross bill to stand as an original bill, and to be docketed as such, and to
be proceeded with as an original bill; in which case a cross bill may be filed
to it, if desired.
Inasmuch as the Chancery Court has now full jurisdiction of all matters of
purely legal cognizance, except certain suits for unliquidated damages, and
inasmuch as the Code authorizes the uniting in one bill of several matters of
Equity, distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, 21 it would be no
breach of the spirit of our legislation, and of our liberal Chancery practice, to
allow in a suit by one complainant against one defendant a cross bill (1) to set
up a legal as well as an equitable matter connected with the matters in question,
or (2) to set up a cause of action, equitable or legal, that is distinct and uncon-
nected with the matters in question 22 by way of set off, as in the Circuit
Court. 23
§ 729. WhatRelief can be Obtained by a Defendant Without a Cross Bill.
The general rule of Chancery pleading is that a defendant cannot obtain any
affirmative relief either against a co-defendant, or against the complainant, as
to the subject-matter of the suit, without a cross bill; 24 but in Tennessee, the
practice is to render such a decree, upon the pleadings and proof, as will settle
all the rights of either complainants or defendants in and to the subject-matter
of the suit, as against each other, and as will, also, settle the rights of the de-
fendants, as between themselves, in and to the subject-matter of the litigation.
Our Courts so mold their decrees as to make a final and complete disposition
of the entire subject-matter, determining the rights of all the parties in refer-
ence thereto, regardless of their attitude as complainants or defendants upon
IT Sto. Eq. PI, §§ 389-392; Montgomery V. Olwell, 20 Campbellv. Foster, 2 Tenn., Ch., 402; Hergell
1 Tenn. Ch., 169; Hergel v. Laitenberger, 2 Tenn. V. Laitenberger, 2 Tenn. Ch., 251. But, ordinarily,
Ch., 254; Beal v. Smithpeter, 6 Bax., 358. if the parties do not complain of such an irregularity,
18 Sto. Eq. PI., § 401; Campbell V. Foster, 2 Tenn. the Chancellor will not. Ibid.
Ch. 402; Macey v. Childress, 2 Tenn. Ch. 441. The 21 Code, § 4327.
rule stated in the text is not always rigorously ad- 22 See, Lewis V. Glass, 8 Pick., 147, where it is
hered to, and our Courts sometimes evince a dispo- said_ that matters for relief not referred to in the
sition to relax it. See Lewis v. Glass, 8 Pick., 147. original bill, and not within its scope, may be set
19 Carey v. Williams, 1 Lea, 53 ; Cohen V. Wool- up in a cross bill.
ard, 2 Tenn. Ch. 686; Dan. Ch. Pr., 1743. If new, 23 Code. §§ 2918-2922. There is as much reason
original and distinct matters could be brought for- to apply these sections of the Code to Chancery pro-
ward by cross bill, the defendant to such a cross bill cedure as there is to apply sections 2902 (as to
would himself have the right to file a cross bill grounds for pleas in abatement), and section 2934,
against such a cross bill, and so ad infinitum! (abolishing general demurrers) : all three sections
When a cross bill is in substance, an original bill, are in the same chapter, and the first section of this
any defence may be made to it which could have been chapter confines them to "legal proceedings," Code,
made to it if filed as an original bill, including a § 2880; but the Courts hold that they apply to pro-
plea in abatement, or a demurrer, to the jurisdiction ceedings in Chancery. However, in Cooper & Stockell
when the cross defendant is not suable in the county v. Stockard. 16 Lea, 140, it is said that this chapter
where the cross bill is filed; and all this is true of of the Code applies exclusively to actions at law;
an answer filed as a cross bill. Chattanooga Pole Co. and_ such seems to have been the purpose of the
v. Young, Knoxville, 1904. Such a cross bill is, codifiers.
also, demurrable because not properly a cross bill. 24 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1550.
See, post, § 737.
the record. 25
But a defendant can have no relief on an answer setting up mat-
ters for relief not referred to in the original bill, and not within its scope. 28
But no adjudication will, ordinarily, be made which will result in a recovery
in behalf of a defendant, especially a recovery requiring process for its enforce-
ment, unless such defendant has concurrent rights with the complainants, but,
because of disability, or non-residence, or some other sufficient cause, he is made
a defendant to the bill, and his rights therein set out, and affirmative relief
prayed in his behalf, as (1) in suits for partition, or sale for partition; or (2)
suits by wards against their guardians; or (3) suits by some of the owners of
a common fund; or (4) suits by some creditors or other persons in behalf of
themselves and all others having concurrent rights or (5) suits to sell the lands
;
of a decedent to pay debts; or (6) suits to wind up an insolvent estate, or an

insolvent partnership, or an insolvent corporation; or (7) suits to enforce a
trust for the benefit of creditors, or others, and the like. But a cross bill is
not necessary to obtain the benefit of credits, or other matters of discharge, or
of an adjudication sustaining the defendant's title when assailed, or of a decree
for balance due defendant on a bill for an account. 27
In all doubtful cases, however, a cross bill, or an answer filed as a cross bill,
is the safer practice; and is indispensable when a defendant seeks (1) a recov-
ery of land, chattels, or money; 28 or (2) a rescission, or reformation, of a con-
tract, or deed; or (3) a specific performance, when the bill is for a rescission;
or (4) an injunction; or (5) an equitable set-off; 29 or (6) a writ of possession.
§ 730. In What Cases a Cross Bill should be Filed. It may be stated that, —
as a rule, a cross bill works no injury to the party filing it and, if he fails to ;
obtain the benefits anticipated therefrom, he is seldom, if ever, left in any

worse position as a result of filing the cross bill. For this reason, a cross bill
is often filed when there is good reason to believe that the relief sought thereby
could be obtained under the bill and answer, the Solicitor of the defendant
deeming a cross bill a prudent precaution. 30
Cross biffs should be filed in the following cases
1. When the complainant impeaches a mortgage, trust deed, or express lien
on land; and the defendant is able to defeat the bill, and desires, in the
same suit, to enforce the mortgage, trust deed, or other lien, by an affirmative
decree. 31
2. When the bill attacks the defendant's deed, and seeks to have it declared
a cloud on complainant 's title and the defendant, on the other hand, seeks
;
to have his said deed declared the better title, and to be put in possession of
the land, or to have his possession and title quieted by injunction, or to have a
recovery for taxes paid, or betterments made, on the land, 32 or other affirmative
decree.
3. When the object of the bill is to have notes, or other written instruments,
declared void, and delivered up to be cancelled and the defendant not only can
;
show that the note, or other instrument, is legal, but, also, desires to enforce it
bv an affirmative decree in the same suit.
25 Henshaw V. Wells, 9 Hum., 568; Ingram v. interests. The Chancellor is often embarrassed by
Smith. 1 Head, 411; Elrod v. Lancaster, 2 Head, doubts as to his right, or power, to grant the defend-
571; Gentry v. Gentry, 1 Sneed, 87; Allen v. Baugus, ant relief on the original pleadings; and, in conse-
1 Swan, 404; LaGrange R. R. v. Rainey, 7 Cold., quence of these misgivings, sometimes concedes a
457; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1370, note; Sto. Eq. PL, § 392, scant relief to a defendant, to whom a larger meas-
note; Code, §§2970-2974; Davis v. Reaves, 7 Lea, ure of relief would have been cheerfully granted,
585. had he filed a cross bill, putting all the facts in issue,
2C Lewis V. Glass, 8 Pick., 147, citing the above and praying such larger relief. Equity delights to
section of this book, then § 665. do complete justice, and not by halves. See, ant?,
27 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1550-1551, notes; Allen v. Al- § 38. And for this reason favors cross bills.
len, 11 Heisk., 387; Polk V. Mitchell, 1 Pick., 634; 31 Where a bill seeks to enforce a mortgage, the
Fisher v. Stowell, 1 Pick., 316; LaGrange and M. defence that the mortgage was obtained by fraud
R. R. v. Rainey, 7 Cold., 420. may be made by answer; in such a case a cross bill
28 Bussey v. Gaut, 10 Hum., 238. is not necessary. The answer must, however, specify
29 Elsey v. Stamps, 10 Lea, 709; Mrzena v. Bruck- the defence. Genther v. Fagan, 1 Pick., 491. See,
er, 3 Tenn. Ch., 161. Griffith V. Security Association, 16 Pick., 410- and
30 This precaution is often deemed advisable on ante, § 358.
the ground that parties should not experiment with 32 Strother v. Reilley, 21 Pick., 48.
the Court, and should not unnecessarily hazard their
4. Where, in an ejectment suit, the defendant will be able to show that he is
a tenant in common with complainants, and is entitled to, and desires to have,
pay for his improvements, and to have the land partitioned, or sold for parti-
tion, in the same suit.
5. Where the bill is filed to sell the land of a decedent to pay his debts, and
the widow, or the heirs, claim any title to, or interest in, the land, and desire
to have that title, or interest, affirmatively declared and enforced, in the same
proceeding.
6. Where, on a bill for the general distribution of an estate or, on a bill to ;
wind up a partnership or, on a bill for a general accounting, 33 the defendant

;
has claims against the complainant, or one defendant has claims against the
fund sought to be distributed, proper for an independent bill, he may bring the
claim forward by cross bill, either as a means of obtaining a set-off, or as a
means of collecting his debt. 34
7. Where the complainant seeks to enforce a vendor's lien, the defendant
should file a cross bill, if he seeks to obtain relief because of failure of the com-
plainant's title, in whole or in part; or, because of breach of any of the com-
plainant's covenants or, because of any fraud, especially if he wishes to recover
;
back any of the purchase price already paid.

8. Where the matters in controversy cannot be so settled as to do full justice
to the, or a, defendant without bringing other parties before the Court, a cross
bill is necessary for that purpose.
9. Where, on a bill to wind up an insolvent estate, or an insolvent partner-
ship or, on a bill to distribute a fund among creditors, or others, a defendant
;
has any lien on the fund, or superior Equity thereto, it is always prudent to
assert his priorities by a cross bill.
10. Where a specific performance of a contract is sought by a bill, the de-
fendant, if he seeks a rescission, or seeks to have the balance of the purchase-
price paid him, or seeks to recover back what he has already paid on the con-
tract, should file a cross bill for that purpose.
11. Where, since the defendant's answer was filed, a new defence has arisen,
as where a release has been obtained, or payment has been made, or there
have been an accord and satisfaction, or a reference to arbitrators, or an award,
or the title of the complainant has been ended by his death, or bankruptcy, or
where in any other way the complainant's cause of action has ceased to exist,
in whole, or in part, since the answer was filed, the defendant must file a cross
bill in order to set up these new defences.
35
12. Where the bill seeks a recovery on a deed, note, or other written instru-
ment, executed by the defendant, and the defendant seeks not only to defeat
any recovery thereon because of failure of consideration, fraud, duress, drunk-
enness, infancy, coverture, or because the consideration was illegal or against
public policy, or because of any other defence vitiating such deed, note or
other instrument, but seeks, also, to have such deed, note or other instrument
delivered up and cancelled, and, if a deed, declared a cloud on his title, he must
file a cross bill.
And it may be stated, generally, that a cross bill must be filed whenever the,
or a, defendant needs (1) to bring a new party before the Court; or (2), desires
to obtain the benefit of new facts, or new defences, which have come into being
since the suit was commenced; or (3), needs some affirmative relief against the
complainant, or a co-defendant, 36 and especially, (4), if such affirmative relief
consists in the allowance of a set-off, or in the recovery of money or property,
or the enforcement of a right by injunction, execution, sale, or writ of posses-
33 But, where, on a bill for an account, a balance on a bill filed for contribution by a surety. Gross
is found to be due the defendant, he is entitled to V. Davis, 3 Pick., 226.
a decree for such balance, without filing a cross bill. 35 This sort of cross bill is in the nature of a plea
See, Decrees, ante; see, also, Allen v. Allen, 11 puis darrein continuance at common law. 2 Dan.
Heisk., 387; Fisher v. Stovall, 1 Pick., 316. Ch. Pr., 1550, note. See, ante, § 524, note.
34A cross bill is necessary when a defendant sure- 36 Lewis V. Glass, 8 Pick., 147, citing the above
ty seeks a contribution against his co-sureties, even section of this book, then § 666.
sion, or in the reformation, cancellation, or surrender, of some instrument
sued on.
§ 731. —
The Time for Piling a Cross Bill. No leave of the Court is necessary
for the filing of a cross bill, but the proper time for filing is at the time of the
filing of the answer to the original bill and if not then filed the delay should
;
be accounted for, or the proceedings on the original bill will not be stayed.
This rule as to time, however, is not applied when the cross bill is filed against
a co-defendant, nor when the delay has been occasioned by some act of the
original complainant. A
cross bill must, as a general rule, be filed before the
time of taking proof in the original suit has expired, unless the complainant in
the cross bill will rest his case upon the testimony already taken. This rule is,
however, not inflexible. The Court may, at the hearing, direct a cross bill to
be filed in order to settle all the rights of all the parties; and if new matter
arises after a decree, and while the cause is in the Supreme Court, a cross bill
will lie. 37 But, except in such cases, a cross bill cannot be filed after the hear-
ing on the original bill, unless directed by the Court. 38 When a defendant
resorts to a cross bill, he must first answer the original bill, before he can re-
quire the complainant therein to answer his bill. 39
§ 732. The Frame of a Cross Bill.—A cross bill should briefly set forth 1, :
The fact and date of the filing of the original bill 2, The names of the parties
;
to the original bill; 3, The general objects, and the prayer of the bill; 4, The
proceedings in the cause since the original bill was filed; 5, The rights of the
party exhibiting the cross bill, which are necessary to be made the subject of
cross litigation or the ground on which he resists the- claim of the complain-
;
ant in the original bill, if that is the object of the cross bill; and 6, Should
pray for proper process, and relief. A cross bill should not introduce new and
distinct matters, not embraced in the original suit for, as to such matters, it is
;
an original bill, and they cannot properly be examined at the hearing of the
first suit. 40 The rules forbidding the introduction of scandalous and imperti-
nent matter in bills, apply to cross bills, and indeed to all other kinds of bills,
and to all pleadings of all sorts, whether filed by the complainant, or by the
defendant. 41
The case set up in the cross bill must be consistent with the defence made in
the answer. 42
§ 733. —
Form of a Cross Bill. If a vendee of land by deed should file a bill
against the vendor, to be released from his purchase, and to have the purchase-
money notes delivered up and cancelled, because of fraud, accident, or mistake,
the defendant might file a cross bill, and pray for judgment on his purchase-
money notes, and have the land sold in enforcement of his lien. 43 In such a
,
case, the cross bill would be as follows
FORM OF A CROSS BILL.
To the Hon. J. Somers, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Dresden
John Den, a resident of Weakley county, complainant,
vs.
Richard Fen, a resident of the same county, defendant.
i.
That, on the third day of last November, the defendant, Richard Fen, filed his original bill
in this Court against your complainant, setting forth therein that he had purchased from com-
plainant the following tract of land, in the 3d civil district of Weakley county: Beginning,
[describe it by metes and bounds, if possible; if not, give the best description obtainable;]
37 Kirtland v. M. & T. R. R., 4 Lea, 414. 42 Sto. Eq. PL, § 399, note.
38 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1548-1549, notes, Montgomery t'. 43 Upon the hearing, the Court may dismiss the
Olwell, 1 Tenn. Ch., 169; Brown v. Bell, 2 Tenn. original bill, and grant the relief prayed by the
Ch., 287. cross bill. Enochs v. Wilson, 11 Lea, 230; McNairy
39 Code, § 4408. v. Eastland, 10 Yerg., 314; Chestnut v. Frazier, 6
40 Sto. Eq. PI., § 401. Bax., 217.
41 Ante, § 150.
containing one hundred acres, more or less, and praying (1) that he might be relieved from
said purchase, because of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations relative to the number of
acres, and the title to said land and (2) that the two purchase-money notes, given by him
;
to complainant, might be delivered up, and cancelled,; and (3) that the whole trade might
be rescinded; and (4) for general relief. This bill your complainant has this day answered
fully, meeting and denying all the equities set up in said original bill. Reference is made to
said billand answer for their contents in full. .
Complainant further shows unto your Honor that said two notes are for five hundred dol-
lars each, both dated June 1, 1886, and one of them due one year, and the other two years,
after date, each drawing interest from date; and, to secure their payment, an express lien
was retained on said land, in the face of the deed executed and delivered to the defendant
for said land. Said deed is on file in said cause, and is referred to for a fuller description of
its contents said two notes are herewith filed, marked "Exhibit A," and "Exhibit B," and
;
are made a part of the bill, and they, along with said deed, will be read at the hearing as
evidence.
in.
Complainant further states that said notes are overdue, and are wholly unpaid; and that,
since the defendant filed his said bill, he has begun to cut the valuable timber on said land,
and convert said timber into railroad ties. Said timber is absolutely necessary to said land
for fencing, building, firewood, and other farm purposes, and its destruction is waste, and will
cause irreparable injury to said land, and greatly impair its value. The defendant is insolv-
ent, and said land will be inadequate security if much of its timber is cut off.
rv.
The premises
considered, complainant prays
1st. That proper process issue to compel the defendant, Richard Fen, to answer this bill;
but his oath to his answer is waived.
2d. That a writ of injunction be directed by your Honor to issue, to restrain the defendant
from cutting any more of said timber for any other than strictly farm purposes.
3d. That complainant have a decree for the amount due on said two notes, and that said
amount be declared a lien on said land, and that said land be sold in satisfaction of said lien
on a credit of six months, and in bar of all equity of redemption.
4th. That complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
This is the first application for an injunction in this case.
Emerson Etheridge, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, as in §§ 161-164, ante.}
§ 734. —
An Answer as a Cross Bill. One of the improvements made in Chan-
eery pleadings by our Code, is the right it gives a defendant to convert his
answer into a cross bill. The provisions of the statute are as follows
The defendant may, by proper allegations, file his answer as a cross bill,
and require a discovery from the complainant; in which case a demurrer or
pleas may be filed, or other proceedings had upon the answer as upon a cross
bill. And the Court shall act upon all the matters properly involved in the
pleadings and give such relief, either for the plaintiff or defendant, as the na-
;
ture of the case may require to do complete justice.* 4 If the defendant file an
answer by way of cross bill, he may waive the oath of the complainant to his
answer thereto. 45
An answer filed as a cross bill under these provisions is not confined to a
discovery, but may well be based on any proper matters of Equity growing
out of the original bill, or connected therewith, entitling the defendant to
affirmative relief on a cross bill separately filed. 40
"When it is considered that the public welfare is promoted by making a speedy
end to litigation, that a multiplicity of suits should always be prevented when
possible, and that Equity delights to do complete justice and not by halves, it
is manifest that the policy of the statute allowing an answer to be filed as a
cross bill should be favored and furthered by the Courts. 47 It has accordingly
been held that, where the parties, improperly made defendants to an answer
filed as a cross bill, do not object to being thus brought before the Court, before
44 Code, §§4323-4324. relief,according to the nature of the case.'' Code, §

45 Code, § 4409. 4315. This language would seem to imply that a
40 Odam v. Owens, 2 Bax., 446; Hall u. Fowlkes, defendant might get "counter-relief" by praying for
9 Heisk., 753. it. without a cross bill. See, on this point, ante, §
47 The Code, in denning an answer, says that it 373.
should contain "a prayer for dismissal or counter-
575 cross bills. § 735
filing their answer, it is too late for them to object afterwards and the Court ;
will adjudicate all the matters involved in the cross bill and the answer thereto.
Where parties waive objection to the jurisdiction in such cases, it is the duty
of the Court to hear the cause upon its merits. 48
Any matter that would be a proper matter for a separate cross bill at the
time the answer is filed, may be incorporated in the answer, and on such incor-
poration any relief may be prayed that could, on the facts, be obtained by
means of a separate cross bill. An answer thus drawn may be filed as a cross
bill, and in addition to its office as an answer to the bill, will have all the rights
incident to a separate cross bill, except the right to bring new parties- before
the Court. 49 And having all the rights of a separate cross bill it is, also, sub-
ject to all the duties of such a cross bill, and a prosecution bond must be
given, and process, and copy of the cross bill, must issue to bring those mada
defendants before the Court, in their new character as defendants to the cross
bill.
When an answer is filed as a cross bill it cannot bring any new party, or new
matter, before the Court it must be confined to the matters set up in the origi-
;
nal bill, and matters incident thereto; it can be filed as a cross bill against the
complainant only; 50 or, at most, against some other party to the suit. 51 But,
if no objection is taken to an answer filed as a cross bill against new parties,
and the defendants to such cross bill submit to answer, it is too late to object
to the irregularity at the hearing and, in such a case, the Court will decree on
;
the merits. 52
Under our practice, an answer filed as a cross bill is not strictly a defensive
pleading. On such an answer, the original bill may be dismissed, and affirma-
tive relief granted on the prayers of the cross bill such relief, however, should
:
relate to the subject-matter of the original litigation. Thus, on a bill filed to

set aside a deed, or to enforce a mortgage, or to have a note cancelled, or to
reform a contract, the defendant may, on answer filed as a cross bill, (1) have
said deed declared valid, and his lien for purchase-money enforced; or (2) have
said mortgage declared void, and removed as a cloud on his title; or (3) have
said note declared binding, and a recovery decreed him thereon; or (4) have
said contract declared correct, and have it enforced.
§ 735. Form of an Answer Filed as a Cross Bill. —When a defendant intends
to fileanswer as a cross bill, he must first answer the bill fully. In this
his
answer he may, however, weave the facts on which the prayers of his cross
bill will be based; or he may reserve such facts until he has answered, and
then allege them. The following general form will indicate how an answer and
cross bill are joined. 53
ANSWER FILED AS A CROSS BILL,
John Doe, 1
vs. > In the Chancery Court, at Knoxville.
The answer and cross-bill of Richard Roe to the bill filed against him and others, in the
above entitled cause.
This defendant, for answer to said bill, says
i.
That he admits that [here insert such matters, if any, in the preliminary statements of the
bill, as the defendant admits.} But the allegation that [here insert what is denied] is
denied, and the complainant is required to prove it, this defendant having no knowledge, in-
formation, or belief relative thereto.
ii.
Further answering, the defendant says [here give his answer to other allegations, his expla-
nations, and his history of the controversy.]
48 Campbell v. Foster, 2 Tenn. Ch., 409; Burem V. Ch., 355; Huffmaster V. Payne, 3 Shan. Cas., 119.
Foster, 6 Heisk., 338; Odam V. Owens, 2 Bax., 446; 51 Masson V. Anderson, 3 Bax., 300.
Hall v. Fowlkes, 7 Heisk., 753. 52 Odam v. Owen, 2 Bax., 446; Hall v. Fowlkes,
49 See, ante, §§405; 732-733. 9 Heisk., 745. See Article on Waiver, ante, §71.
50 Hall v. Fowlkes, 9 Heisk., 754; Morrow v. 53 For a fuller form of an answer filed as a cross
Morrow, 2 Tenn. Ch., 554; Hergel v. Laitenberger, bill, see Joinder of Defences, ante, §405.
2 Tenn. Ch., 251; McGavock V. Morrison, 3 Tenn.
§ 736 cross bills. 576
in.
And now having fully answered the said bill, and being advised that, on the facts by him
hereinbefore alleged, he is entitled to relief, he assumes the character of cross-complainant,
and prays
1st. That this answer may be filed, deemed and treated as a cross-bill, and that a sub-
poena and copy hereof be served on the complainant to the original bill, John Doe, to compel
him to answer this cross-bill, but his oath to his answer is waived.
2d. That [here insert the special relief the complainant in the cross-bill deems himself
entitled to.]
3d. That he may have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to at the
hearing. L. A. Gratz, Solicitor.
If any extraordinary process is sought, the answer and cross bill must be
sworn to, even when the oath to the answer has been waived by the complian-
ant in the original bill. If the defendant does not wish to swear to his answer,
he must file a separate cross bill.
§ 736. Prosecution Bond and Process, on a Cross Bill. On the filing of a —
cross bill, or of an answer as a cross bill, before any process can issue a prosecu-
tion bond, or pauper oath in lieu, should be filed 54 and in case of an answer ;
filed as a cross bill the Clerk and Master and the complainant in the original
bill may ignore it as a cross bill until a prosecution bond is given, or a pauper
oath filed. 55 An answer filed as a cross bill should, like a cross bill, pray for
an answer as well as for proper relief.
§ 737. —
The Defences to a Cross Bill. Every defence may be made to a
cross bill that can be made to an original bill, except objections to the local or
personal jurisdiction of the Court; and even these objections may be made
by plea in abatement, or demurrer, if the cross bill brings forward new matters
55a
to which, if in an original bill, such objections would lie. The defendant
to the cross bill may 1, Move to
: dismiss the cross bill because (1) it is unnec-
essary, the same defences being admissible, or the same relief obtainable, by
means of an answer; or (2) because no prosecution bond was given; or (3)
because of the want of some other prerequisite to the issuance of the subpoena
to answer or (4) because of manifest want of Equity on its face or 2, The
; ;
defendant may demur to the cross bill or 3, He may plead in bar any single
;
matter that would be a defence; or 4, He may answer the cross bill. But he is
not required to answer it until his own bill has been answered.
But the ordinary defences to a cross bill are made by a motion to dismiss,
by demurrer, or by answer. As a rule, all the grounds of demurrer to an origi-
nal bill are equally applicable to a cross bill. When a cross bill is proper, has
already been fully considered, 56 but it may be generally stated that a cross bill
has only two offices 1, It is a means of making a more effectual defence than
:
can be made by an answer and 2, It is a means of obtaining some affirmative

;
relief connected with the subject-matter of the original suit not obtainable by
means of an answer. Hence, it follows that a cross bill cannot bring before
the Court any matters distinct from, and independent of, the matters sought to
be litigated in the original suit. No matter is proper for a cross bill that would
make the original bill multifarious, if incorporated in the latter, and this may
be deemed a test of the propriety of the matter in a cross bill.
If cross bills were not thus confined to the matters in litigation in the original
suit, the new matters brought forward by the cross bill might be so distinct as
to constitute really a new original suit, on a new, original, and independent
cause of action, in which case a second cross bill might lie to the first cross
bill, and thus cross suits be multiplied without end. If, therefore, a cross bill
should be filed containing matters distinct and independent from those con-
tained in the original bill, it would be open to demurrer for this cause. 57 If,
54 Curd v. Davis, 1 Heisk., 575; Harrell v. Harrell, cuit Court when he pleads a set off. See Hall
4 Cold., 377. Fowlkes, 9 Heisk., 754.
55 Ibid. But where an answer as a cross bill
filed 55a See, ante, § 728, note 19.
without prosecution bond, or pauper oath is an- 56 See, atne, §§ 727-730.
swered, it is too late to require a bond at the hearing. 67 Sto. Eq. PI., § 631. See, ante, § 728.
No cost bond is required of a defendant, in the Cir-
577 CROSS BHJ.S. §738
however, such a multifarious cross bill should be answered and regularly heard
on the proof, the Court would probably decree as to the distinct and inde-
pendent matters, treating the cross bill pro tanto as in the nature of an original
bill.
§ 738. The Hearing on a Cross Bill. —A

cross bill is usually heard along with
the original bill, and as a part of the original cause. The two bills and their
respective answers and proofs are deemed one record, and, ordinarily, one and
the same decree closes the litigation raised by both the original and the cross
bill. 58 At the hearing, the cross bill may be dismissed and relief granted on the
original bill, or the original bill may be dismissed and relief granted on the
cross bill, or relief may be granted on each bill, or both bills may be dismissed.
At the hearing, the original bill and the answer thereto are generally first
read, then the cross bill and its answer; then the original complainant reads
his proof in chief; the complainant in the cross bill next reads his proof as to
all the issues raised by both bills and answers, including his rebutting proof,
and the original complainant concludes the reading of the evidence by putting
in any he may have in rebuttal. The Solicitor for the original bill, ordinarily,
has the right to open and close the argument as well as the evidence but, if the ;
cross bill confesses and avoids the issues raised by the original bill, or otherwise
shifts the burden of proof, the Solicitor for the cross bill would have the
right to open and close both the evidence and the argument. 59
58 Cocke V. Trotter, 10 Yerg., 213. In Carroll own equities, and a final decree pronounced thereon.
1).Taylor, 18 Pick., 451, it is said that where a cross But such a cross bill would seem to be, in reality,
bill sets up equities which do not affect the equities an original bill under a misnomer.
of the original bill, and the original bill is not ready 50 See, ante, % 534, note 20.
to be disposed of, the cross bill may be heard on its
§739 MOTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 578
PART VII.
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS IN SUITS IN CHAN-
CERY, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
MOTIONS IN COUET, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Motions Generally Considered.
Article II. Motions by the Complainant.
Article III. .Motions by the Defendant.
Article IV. Motions Common to Both Parties.
Article V. Motions by Strangers and Quasi Parties.
Article VI. Motions about Paying Money into, or out of, Court.
ARTICLE I.
MOTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 1

739. and Petitions Denned
Motions and
Distinguished.
§ 742. Practical Suggestions Concerning Mo-
tions.
740. The Main Divisions of Motions.
741. The General Law of Motions.
§ 743. How Motions are Heard.
§ 739. Motions and Petitions Defined and Distinguished. motion is an —A

oral application to the Court, the Chancellor, or the Master, for some order in
relation to the suit in which the application is made and a petition is a zvritten
;
application addressed to the Court, or Chancellor, for some order in relation

to the suit in which the petition is prayed to be filed. When the application is
by a party to the suit, and is based on matters apparent of record, it is usually
made by motion; when the matters do not sufficiently appear of record, the
motion in reference thereto must be supported by an affidavit of the necessary
facts not of record and when there must be brought before the Court, not only
;
new facts, but also new collateral issues, the application is generally by peti-
tion. 2 When a stranger seeks to make an application to the Court, he should
always do so by petition; but a party, or a quasi party, may, as a rule, present
any matter orally, accompanied, when necessary, by affidavits. stranger can- A
not make a motion before the Master, or present him a petition he can only be ;
heard by the Chancellor in open Court. If, however, a stranger's case is urgent,
and his equities sufficient, he may file an original bill in the nature of a cross
bill, 3 and in this way get a hearing before the Chancellor, at Chambers and the ;
Chancellor may, in a proper case, allow such a bill to be filed as a petition in

1 Motions have been already largely considered. terested in the subject-matter or objects of the suit,
See, ante,§§214-219; 233-239; 514-525. The stu- should bring forward his claim by an original bill, in
dent referred to these sections, and to the Index.
is the nature of a supplemental bill, or in the nature of
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1587. a cross bill, as the case may be. Comfort V. McTeer,
3 Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch., 140. Where a 7 Lea, 661. See, ante, § 690. But see Banks v.
third person claims under, or in privity with, a Banks, 2 Cold., 548, where, however, no objection
litigant, the proper mode of bringing his interest be- seems to have been made by the complainant. See,
fore the Court is, by an original bill in the nature Code, § 2799.
of a supplemental bill it cannot, ordinarily, be done
:
by petition. Where there is no privity, a person in-

579 MOTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. § 740
the original cause. As a general rule, however, no such practice is known in
Equity as allowing a stranger to become a defendant to a pending suit, on his
own application, over the objection of the complainant, especially where he
sets up a right not noticed in the bill, for this would be to try rights without any
issue joined. 4
§ 740. The Main Divisions of Motions. Motions are divided into (1) mo- —
tions of course, and (2) special motions.
1. Motions of Course, in our practice, are motions, whether made in Court, at
Chambers, or at rules, the opposite party would have no right to resist, without,
at least, supporting affidavits. Indeed, a motion of course is one which may
properly be made without notice to the other party, and without his having the
right to be present when it is made, because there is no discretion to refuse it,
when properly made. Motions of course include motions for (1) orders for
publication, (2) for appointment of guardians ad litem, (3) for a judgment pro
confesso, (4) for a scire facias to revive, (5) for a revivor, when no defence
is made, (6) for a vacation of a pro confesso, and leave to file an answer, before
final decree, in case of defendants not served with subpoena, (7) for amendment
of bills, before argument of demurrer, (8) for amendment, or perfection, of
prosecution bonds, (9) for an order specifying which of several parties notice
to take proof shall be served on, (10) for an attachment to compel an answer,
(11) for a judicial attachment, (12) for the appointment of an administrator, on
a bill filed for that purpose, (13) for the abatement of a suit after lapse of two
terms since proof of complainant's death, and (14) for an order of sale when
land has been levied on, and not sold.
2. Special Motions are those which the Chancellor may, in the exercise of his
discretion, either grant or refuse 5 and on which the opposite side would have
;
the right to be heard. Whenever the Chancellor is bound to exercise his dis-
cretion, he is bound to hear the other side, if it demand a hearing and he is ;
generally bound not to exercise that discretion, until he has given the other side
a chance to be heard. Special motions are generally allowed, or disallowed,
ttpon consideration of the record, or of an affidavit, or of a petition, and after
argument heard thereon. All motions, not of course, are special.
§ 741. —
The General Law of Motions. It may be stated as a general law of
motions, founded on essential justice, that (1) the more rigorous the motion,
ob (2) the more damaging its effects upon the opposite party, or (3) the more
it prevents a hearing of the opposite party on the merits, or (4) the more it
closes the door against the right to plead, or (5) to make proof, or (6) the
more technical, or arbitrary, it is in nature, operation, or effect, the more strict
the Court should be in not allowing it, unless the party making it shows clearly
that he has fully, and in good faith, complied with every preliminary or prere-
quisite to such motion, that he is clearly entitled to it, and the other party
ci early liable to be so moved against.
On the other hand, motions that do not shut the door against a party's right
to plead, or make proof motions that can readily be relieved against, if erro-
;
neous, or unduly oppressive; motions promotive of a right founded in substan-

tial justice motions for the protection of the rights of parties under disability
;
motions looking to the speeding of a hearing on the merits and motions, ordi- ;
narily denominated motions of course, will be readily allowed, no objections

appearing on their face, or aliunde.
§ 742. Practical Suggestions Concerning Motions. It is of great import- —
ance to know what motion to make in reference to a particular matter; and
where doubt exists either as to the kind of motion, or as to whether the motion
can be supported by the record, you should thoroughly investigate these matters
in advance and not needlessly consume the time of the Court by bringing up
;
~* Stretch V. Stretch; Comfort v. McTeer, cited I 5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1592.

above. '
§743 MOTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 580
the matter before you are fully prepared to inform the Court as to all matters
connected with your motion.
Having mastered the facts and law applicable to your motion, you should
next reduce your motion to writing, and prepare a brief to support it, if it is
likely to be antagonized. Any motion worth the making is worth entering on
the minutes. Besides, both the Court and the opposite party have a right to
know exactly what your motion is, and a motion in parol is liable to be mis-
understood, misconstrued, or misremembered and it should, therefore, be com-
;
mitted to writing before it is presented to the Court.

If the record does not adequately present the facts on which your motion
is to be based, prepare your petition, or affidavit, or obtain the other necessary
evidence, before you make the motion. Why waste the time of the Court, and
why advertise your own want of knowledge or diligence, by making a motion
the record will not sustain?
After your motion has been made, see that it is entered on the minutes and, ;
after the Court has ruled on your motion, have the action of the Court entered
of record, also. If you have supported your motion by affidavits, or other extra-
neous matter not of record, incorporate them in a way-side bill of exceptions,
if the Court rules against you, and you deem your motion of sufficient import-
ance to perpetuate the facts on which it was based.
Nothing so admirably displays an accomplished Solicitor as the appropriate-
ness of his motions, the precision of their frame, the production of the neces-
sary authorities to support them, and the ready marshaling of the facts in the
record on which they are based. 6
§ 743. How —
Motions are Heard. When the time for hearing a motion has
arrived, the Solicitor who appears on behalf of .the motion should bring it to
the attention of the Court. If the motion is based on the record in the case,
after briefly stating his motion he should read, if necessary, such and so much of
the record as may be necessary to enable the Court to comprehend the prem-
ises. 7 If the motion is based on a petition or affidavit, or other document, that
fact should at once be brought to the Court's attention, and so much of it read
as may be sufficient to give the Court the necessary information as to the
grounds of the motion.
After the facts in the case have been duly presented, and the reasons and
authorities in support of the motion stated, in case such are deemed necessary,
the Solicitor supporting the motion will give way to the adverse side, the"
Solicitor representing which will, thereupon, briefly state his objections to the
motion, if any, and will read any other part of the record, or present any other
affidavits or documents necessary and proper to inform the Court and support
his own contention. Having done this, he will briefly present his reasons and
authorities, if any be deemed necessary, why the motion should not be allowed.
The Solicitor 8 making or supporting the motion will then conclude the argu-
ment and, if the Court wishes to further consider the matter, the Solicitor will
;
pass the papers up, or see that they are sent to the Chancellor's chambers.
6 A very large part of a Court's time is often person present. As to showing cause, see, ante, § 62,
wasted by abortive motions. No Solicitor should rise sub-sec. 8.
to make a motion unless (1) the time is opportune, 7 Solicitors should keep in mind that the probabili-
(2) the right to make the motion has fully matured, ties are that the Chancellor knows little or nothing
(3) he fully understands his case, and the purpose as to the grounds of the motion, or the necessity or
and effect of the motion, (4) and has at hand the expediency thereof, until duly made known to him
record, petition or affidavit, requisite to sustain the by the counsel in the case: hence the importance of
motion. A Solicitor should know that he is right a full and clear statement of the case. As to when
before he undertakes to go ahead in making motions. a motion is heard, see, ante, § 531, sub-sec, 6.
All motions must be based: 1st, on the record in 8 Where there are more Solicitors than one on a
the cause; or 2d, on an affidavit, or something equiva- side, ordinarily the junior Solicitor on each side
lent in force, such as some other record, or some opens, and the senior Solicitor concludes the argu-
writing under seal, or a certificate; or 3d, on a peti- ment. The counsel that opens should, ordinarily,
tion bringing forward matters not otherwise appear- have consideration for the ability of his colleague,
ing; or 4th, on some matter of which the Court can and not undertake to consume all the time and make
take judicial notice, or can inquire about, orally, of all the argumentation allowable for his side, for
the Solicitors or officers of Court, or of some other the senior counsel is presumed to be more able and
equally willing.
581 MOTIONS BY the; complainant. § 744
ARTICLE II.
MOTIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT.
§ 744. Motions by the Complainant to Get § 747. Motions by the Complainant to Pre-
the Defendant Into Court. pare the Case for Hearing.
§ 745. Motions by the Complainant to Per- § 748. Motions by the Complainant to Pro-
fect His Pleadings. tect or Enforce His Rights Pend-
§ 746. Motions by the Complainant to Pro- ing the Litigation.
duce an Issue. § 749. Motions in Reference to Decrees.
§ 744.Motions by the Complainant to Get the Defendant into Court. Until —

the defendant is properly before the Court by service of subpoena, or by at-
tachment of his property and publication, or by publication alone, the complain-
ant 's main duty is to take the necessary steps to bring him in. If the subpoena
has not been served he should move for an alias, or a judicial attachment, as
heretofore shown. If the defendant has died, ,or, being a woman, has married,
before service of process, proper steps to revive the suit must be taken as
shown elsewhere.
§ 745.Motions by the Complainant to Perfect his Pleadings. The complain- —
ant usually allowed to do all that is necessary to present his case fully and
is
fairly to the Court, provided he take the right method, in the right time. As
already shown, he may amend his bill at any time before the defendant has
made defence, or in case a demurrer is filed, at any time before argument there-
of, without application to the Chancellor. In all other cases, however,
he must obtain leave of the Chancellor to amend his bill, such leave to be ob-
tained on motion in open Court, or at Chambers. 1 If the Court be in session
when the necessity for the amendment is discovered, the better practice is to
move the Court for leave to amend. The proper time to make the motion, is
the very first opportunity after the discovery of the deficiency sought to be
remedied; all Courts require diligence and vigilance, but Courts of Equity
most of all.
The following are the principal motions by a complainant, looking to the
perfection of his pleadings, and to adapting them to the facts of his case, and
to the relief he desires
1. Motions to Amend His Bill.2 The motions may, under certain limitations
elsewhere shown, be made at any time between the filing of the bill and the final
decree. The difficulty of obtaining leave, and the price to be paid therefor,
being generally, in direct proportion to the length of time elapsed since the an-
swer was filed. These motions are: 1, Motions to amend by correcting some
date, or amount, or name, or description of property 2, Motions to amend by ;
making new parties, or new allegations as to old parties, or by doing both 3, ;
Motions to amend by bringing forward new matters in existence when the bill
was filed, so as to enlarge the scope of the bill, or to sue on an additional ground,
or on an additional claim, or for an additional debt, or for an additional piece
or pieces of property, real or personal, or to set up any additional Equity; 4,
Motions to amend by dismissing his bill as to any defendant, or defendants, or
as to any debt, piece of property, claim, demand, Equity or other matter, set
forth in his original, or amended, or supplemental bill 5, Motions to amend the
;
prayer and 6, Motions that include any two or more of the preceding matters.
;
2. Motion for Leave to File an Amended Bill.* If the changes sought to be

made in the original bill are few and short, and can be easily made by inter-
lineations, or on the margin, the Court will allow the original bill to be
1 See, ante, § 675. I 2 Code, §§ 4332-4335. See, post, § 775.

I 3 See, ante, § 675.
§ 746 MOTIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT. 582
amended, on its face, if no answer has been filed, or if the defendant does not
desire to answer as to the amendments. But if the changes are too numerous,
or too voluminous, to be easily incorporated into the body of the original bill
or, if new issues are raised and new parties are made, after answer filed, the
complainant must move the Court for leave to file an amended bill, in which
case he should have the amended bill drawn and ready to exhibit to the Court,
along with an affidavit explaining his delay; and if the delay has been great
and much proof has been taken, the proposed amended bill should, also, be
sworn to, as an evidence of good faith.
3. Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Bill.* If some event has happened,
or some matter or fact has arisen, or come into existence, since the filing of the
original bill, and such event, matter, or fact, in any way so materially changes
the rights of the complainant-, or the duties of the defendant, as to make it nec-
essary or proper to bring it, and any consequent new parties before the Court,
this must be done by a supplemental bill and leave to file such a bill must be
;
obtained from the Court, or Chancellor' at Chambers, in the same way as leave
is obtained to file an amended bill.
4. Motion to Kevive.s If the complainant dies, the person entitled to revive
may do so, on motion, supported by proper evidence of his rights. So, the
husband of a female complainant may become a party complainant, on
motion, supported by proof of his marriage, and on filing a prosecution
bond. If a female defendant marries, the marriage must be suggested
and proved, and an order for a scire facias against the husband moved for.
If a defendant dies, the death must be suggested and proved, and an order for
a scire facias against his proper representatives moved for. If a scire facias
has been already executed and no defence made thereto, the complainant must
move the Court to revive the cause. The subject of reviving suits is fully
treated of in a previous Chapter.
5. Motion to Have an Administrator Appointed." Where the estate of a de-
ceased person should be represented, and there is no executor or administrator,
or the executor or administrator is adversely interested, the Court will on
motion appoint an administrator ad litem.
—
Motions by the Complainant to Produce an Issue. 7 After the bill
§ 746.
is filed,the duty devolves on the complainant to take every step necessary to
bring the suit to an issue, so that the taking of proof may begin. The following
are the principal motions to be made for this purpose
1. Motion for a Guardian ad Xitem.« Aguardian ad litem may be appointed
for a minor, or for a person of unsound mind, by the Court, by the Chancellor,
or by the Master, on motion, supported by a sworn bill, or by affidavit, showing
that the defendant is under such a disability.
2. Motion for a Pro Confesso.o If an adult defendant, who is sui juris, has
failed to make defence as required by the subpoena, or order of publication, the
complainant may have his bill taken for confessed, on motion, supported by the
return on the subpoena, or by proper proof of publication. He may, however,
obtain a pro confesso from the Master, on like proof.
3. Motion for a Judicial Attachment. id If a subpoena to answer is returned
endorsed, "not to be found in my county," the complainant may, on motion,
supported by such return, obtain a judicial attachment against the estate of
the defendant.
4. Motion for an Attachment to Compel an Answer.u If the defendant has been
served with a subpoena to answer, and fails to answer, and the complainant
desires an answer under oath, he may move for an attachment against the body
4 See, ante, § 687. 8 See, ante, § 216.

5 See, ante, § 745. o See, ante, § 217.
6 See, post, § 985. 10 See, post, § 883.
7 See, ante, % 514. 11 See, ante, § 219.
583 MOTIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT. § 747
of the defendant, supporting his motion by a subpoena showing service, or by
an affidavit of such service.
5. Motion to Set a Plea or Demurrer Down for Argument." If the complainant
conceive any plea, or demurrer, to be naught either for the matter or manner
of it, he may move the Court to hear argument as to its sufficiency.
6. Motion to Have a Cause Revived." If a defendant dies, or a female defend-
ant marries, the complainant may revive against the decedent's proper repre-
sentative, or against the husband, by bill of revivor, or by scire facias. To
obtain the latter, a motion must be made, supported by proof of the defendant 's
death, or marriage. The complainant may take steps to revive before the
Master, without waiting for the Court to come. On the return of process duly
executed, a revivor may be had on motion, in case no defence is shown in due
time.
7. Motion for an Administrator." If an administrator becomes necessary in
the progress of the suit, and the Court has the right to appoint one, it may be
done on motion, supported by a proper record. If the bill is filed to have an
administrator appointed, the Chancellor may make the appointment at Cham-
bers.
8. Motion for Creditors to File Their Claims. 15 If a bill is filed to wind up an
insolvent estate, or an insolvent corporation, or partnership, on motion of com-
plainant, supported by the proper record, the Court will order creditors to be
notified to file and prove their claims.
§ 747. Motions by Complainant to Prepare his Case for Hearing. There —

are motions to be made by the complainant looking to the preparation of his
suit for trial. Most of these motions will be found in the Article on Motions
Common to both Parties; 16 but tbe following are specially applicable to the
complainant.
1. Motion Where the Defendant Fails to Answer Interrogatories.!? If a non-res-
ident defendant fails to answer duly filed interrogatories, by a given day, speci-
fied in a peremptory order by the Court, or Clerk, requiring such interrogato-
ries to be answered, the complainant may, on motion, have such defendant's
answer taken off the files, and the bill taken for confessed. 18
2. Motion to Strike a Pleading or Other Paper From the File." If the defendant,
or the Clerk for him, file any pleading, or other paper, in a cause without
lawful authority, or if a defendant file any paper in a cause not proper to be
filed, the complainant may, on motion, have such pleading or paper stricken
from the files. Thus, if a plea, or additional plea, or amended plea, or an origi-
nal or amended demurrer, or an original or amended answer, is filed after the
time therefor has expired, or without leave where leave is necessary, it may
he stricken from the files, on motion of the complainant. If a plea or answer,
that must be sworn to, is filed without verification, or, if no verification is
needed, is filed without being signed by the defendant, or his Solicitor, or if
it be the plea or answer of a person under disability, and is filed in person, or
by Solicitor, and not by guardian, or next friend, or if any paper of any kind
has been improperly filed by the defendant, or a defendant, it may be taken off
the files, on motion of the complainant.
§ 748. Motion by Complainant to Protect or Enforce his Rights Pending
—
the Litigation. During the progress of the cause, the complainant is frequently
obliged to ask the Court for some interlocutory order to prevent the removal,
injury, transfer, or destruction, of the property in litigation, or to more fully
secure or protect it, or to sell it, or to collect the rents and profits of it, or some
12 See, ante, § 262. should show, by affidavit, a good excuse for his de-
13 See, ante, § 745, sub-sec. 4. fault, and should fully answer the interrogatories
1* See, § 745, sub-sec. 5. before the term ended, the Court would set aside
16 See, post, §§ 1001; 1035; 1335. the order pro confesso, on his paying the costs of
16 See, post, §§ 753-762. the cause.
17 See, post, § 1122. 19 See, ante, |§179; 233, note 3; post, 751, sub-
18 Code, §| 4463-4464. If, however, the defendant sec. 7-
§ 749 MOTIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT. 584
order to enforce a previous order of the Court, or to compel obedience to a
previous order, or to prevent interference with the orders or officers of the
Court. These interlocutory orders are obtained on motion and must, usually,
;
be supported by a sworn petition, or by affidavit. The following are some of

such motions:
1. Motion for an Injunction or Restraining Order.20 A
complainant may move
for an injunction, or a restraining order, at any time before a final decree,
either on the bill, if it lays sufficient ground, or on a sworn petition. If a
ground for an injunction arises pending the litigation, it may be obtained on
motion, supported by a sworn petition: in such a case a restraining order is
usually entered on the minutes, if Court is in session. If Court be not in session,
application must be made to the Chancellor, at Chambers.
2. Motion for a Receiver.21 If a receiver becomes necessary during a litiga-
tion, the complainant may have one appointed on motion supported by an affi-
davit, or a sworn petition. If Court be not in session, application must be
made to the Chancellor, at Chambers, such application to be supported by the
original bill, or by petition, or by both, due notice being given to the other
party.
3. Motion for an Attachment for Contempt.22 If a defendant, or other person,
has violated, or refused to obey, any writ or order of the Court, or has inter-
fered with any officer of the Court, the complainant may have him attached
for contempt, on a petition filed for that purpose.
4. Motion for Alimony Pending the Suit. 23 If a wife, in a bill for divorce,
shows a meritorious case, and prays for alimony pending the suit, the Court
will, on motion, make her a suitable allowance until the next term. She may
strengthen her motion by an affidavit, showing her necessities. The Court will
be more liberal, if she is, also, ready for trial, and the defendant seeks a con-
tinuance.
5. Motion to Require Money, Choses in Action, or Other Personalty, to be De-
posited With the Master.24 When there is any particular fund, especially a
trust fund, in litigation, or any specific chose in action, chattel, or any other arti-
cle of personal property, the custody, or ownership, of which is in dispute, the
party thereunto entitled, ordinarily the complainant, may move the Court to
require the party in possession to pay, or deliver it into Court, subject to the
future orders of the Court. Such motion is generally supported by both the bill
and the admissions in the answer.
6. Motion to Pay Out, Transfer, Loan or Impound Punds in Court. Any money in
the Master's hands, that cannot be, at once, paid out, may, on motion, be loaned,
subject to the order of the Court, or for a definite period. So, funds may, on
motion, be transferred from one cause to another, entries showing this being
made in each cause. So, funds in Court may, on motion, supported by a sworn
pleading, or by a petition, or sometimes by an affidavit, be impounded to await
the decision of the cause to which it belongs, or to be held subject to the de-
cision in another cause.
§ 749. Motions in Reference to Decrees. —
After a decree has been pro-
nounced, often necessary to take some steps in Court, in order to get its
it is
full benefit. Some of these steps are the following
1. Motion for an Instanter Execution. If a defendant is making away with his
property, or threatening to do so, or other sufficient cause be shown, the com-
plainant may move for an instanter execution, supporting his motion by affi-
davit. 25
a. Motion for Judgment on a Note. "Whenever a note given for property sold,
or money loaned, is overdue, judgment may be had thereon on motion, sup-
ported by the note, and the record in the cause. 26
20 See, post, § 890. 24 See, post, §§ 765-769.
21 See, ante, § 176. 26 Code, § 3010.
22 See, post, §§845-848; 918-923;
26 See, ante, § 643.
23 See, post, §§ 1097-1098.
585 MOTIONS BY THE DEPENDANT. §750
3. Motion
to Set Aside the Satisfaction of a Decree. If property which has
been sold to satisfy an execution is recovered from the purchaser, the satisfac-
tion may be set aside, and a scire facias awarded to have the decree revived,
on motion supported by affidavit. 27
ARTICLE III.
MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT.
§ 750. Motions Looking to a Dismissal of
the Suit. § 752. Motions to Set Aside, or Modify, In-
§ 751. Motions by the Defendant to Perfect terlocutory Orders.
His Defence.
§ 750. Motions Looking to a Dismissal of a Suit. The complainant is re- —

quired not only to properly institute his suit, but also to keep it in due progress
towards a final decree, and not allow any deficiencies to arise, or to remedy
them in case they do arise. For any failure herein his suit is liable to be dis-
missed. If at any time during the progress of a suit, a ground for its dismissal
exists, the defendant may take advantage of it by motion; and, as a rule, he
must make his motion at the first opportunity after his right thereto arises. If,
instead of moving to dismiss, he takes some other affirmative step, he will not
ordinarily be allowed to go back and make a motion to dismiss. The following
are some of the principal grounds of motions to dismiss
1. Motions for a Rule on Complainant's Solicitor to Show His Authority.* If the
defendant has good reason to believe that the bill has been filed without any
proper authority from the complainant, he may, on making such an affidavit,
move the Court for a rule on the Solicitor who filed the bill to produce his
authority to appear for the complainant and all proceedings will be suspended
;
until such authority is produced, or proved.

2. Motion to Dismiss the Bill. If the bill is liable to be dismissed for any rea-
son before demurrer, it may be done on motion, the motion specifying the
ground on which it is based, and accompanied by the proper proof when the
ground is outside of the bill itself. The grounds of such motions have hereto-
fore been stated. 2
3. Motion to Require a Better Prosecution Bond.3 If the prosecution bond is,
or- becomes, insufficient either (1) in the amount of the penalty by reason of
the costs of the suit being great, or (2) in the solvency of the security by reason
of the death, removal from the State or the insolvency of the surety, on affidavit
of the fact, a motion may be made that the complainant be required to give a
sufficient prosecution bond, or to justify his sureties.
4. Motion to Dispauper the Complainant. 3a If the complainant is prosecuting
the suit on the pauper oath, the defendant may have him dispaupered at any
time before the hearing, on showing by the testimony of disinterested persons
that the allegation of poverty is probably untrue.
5. Motion for a Rule on the Complainant to Take Steps.* If the complainant
fail to keep his suit moving on towards a final decree, by putting it at issue,, or
by keeping it duly revived, or by furnishing the Master with evidence for a
report, or by not complying with some order made, or by not amending his bill,
27 Code, §§ 2990-2996. The law should be liberal to poor persons. Heatherly

1 See, ante, § 233. v. Hill, 8 Bax., 170. The law of England allowing
2 See, ante, §§ 268-271. paupers to sue without paying costs was passed in
3 See, ante, § 234. 1495, and is more liberal to poor litigants than ours.
3a Code, 3 194. But dispaupering should be cau- See, 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 37-44, 111.
tiously done. Brumley v. Hayworth, 3 Yerg., 423. 4 See, ante, §239; Code, §§4389-4390.
§ 751 MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. 586
or by otherwise failing to exercise due diligence, the defendant may make a
rule in the Clerk's office on the complainant to take the necessary step in the
progress of the suit, and on his failure to do so, the defendant may, in open
Court, move the Chancellor for a peremptory rule on the complainant.
6. Motion Where the Complainant Pails to Answer Interrogatories. s If a non-
resident complainant fails to answer duly filed interrogatories by a given day,
specified in a peremptory order by the Court, or Clerk, requiring such interrog-
atories to be answered, the defendant may, on motion, have the bill dismissed. 1
7. Motion to Abate a Suit.6 If the death of the complainant has been proved
and so entered on the minutes, the defendant may move to abate the suit if it
is not revived during the second term after such entry.
§ 751. Motions by the Defendant to Perfect his Defence. The defendant, —

within certain limits, is allowed to do what is reasonably necessary, to present
his defence, so as to enable him to fully avail himself of all the law and the facts
applicable to his case.
1. Make Defense. <& If the defendant needs addi-
Motion for Further Time to
tional time within which to make his defense, he should apply therefor to the
Master, or to the Chancellor, unless the Court be in session, and then to the
Court.
2. Motion to Require the Complainant to Elect.' When the complainant is Su-
ing the defendant both at law and in Equity, at the same time and for the same
matter, the Court will, on motion of the defendant, require the complainant
to elect which of the two suits he will prosecute. Such motion cannot be made,
however, until the defendant has answered. If the complainant considers that
the bill and action at law are for different matters, and that he ought not to be
compelled to elect, he may resist the motion.
3. Motion to Pile a Cross Bill.® If the defendant needs a cross bill, either the
better to make his defence, or to obtain some affirmative relief connected with
the subject matter of the suit, he may, on motion, obtain leave to file a cross
bill for that purpose. The cross bill should ordinarily be presented and read in
support of the motion and if there has been any delay, such delay should be
;
accounted for by affidavit, or the Court will not stay the hearing of the original
cause.
4. Motion to Amend a Pleading.' The defendant cannot amend any of his
pleadings, whether a demurrer, a plea, or an answer, without leave; this leave
can only be obtained on motion in open Court, or at Chambers, accompanied by
the proposed amendment. If a sworn answer is sought to be amended, the
amendment tendered must, also, be verified and the occasion and the necessity
;
for the amendment must be clearly shown by affidavit.

5. Motion for Leave to Withdraw an Answer.io Sometimes the Court will al-
low an answer to be withdrawn, and a demurrer to be filed to the bill. The
motion for such leave must be accompanied by an affidavit clearly showing why
the demurrer was not originally filed.
6. Motion by Wife for Leave to Answer Separately." Whenever a wife 's inter-
ests are antagonistic to her husband's, or when she dissents from his answer,
or is living apart from him, she may on motion, supported by evidence of the
fact, obtain leave to answer separately.
7. Motions to Strike Pleadings, and Other Papers, from the File." If a com-
plainant, or the Clerk for him, files any pleading, or other paper, in a cause,
6 Code, §§ 4463-4464. If, however, the complain- but_ it is a_ common practice to move for leave, es-
ant should, by affidavit, before the term closed, ex- pecially if it is desired to have the original and cross
cuse his default, and should fully answer the inter- suit heard together. The proper time to file a cross
rogatories, the Court would set aside the order of bill is when the answer is filed. See, ante, §§400:
dismissal, and restore the cause to the docket, on the 728-729.
payment of all the costs of the suit. 9 See, ante, § 745.
6 See, ante, § 698. 10 See, ante, § 232.
ea See, ante, § 237. 11 See, ante, % 236.
7 Cocke V. Dodson, 1 Tenn. (Overt.), 169; 1 12 Cox V. Breedlove, 2 Yerg., 499: Wilson i\ Wil-
Barb. Ch. Pr., 247; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 815-817. son, 10 Yerg., 200. Dance v. McGregor, 5 Hum
8 A cross bill may be filed as a matter of right, 428. See, ante, § 747, sub-sec, 2.
587 MOTIONS BY THE DEFENDANT. § 752
•without lawful authority so to do, or if a paper, not proper to be filed by the
complainant, has been filed by him, the defendant may, on motion, have such
pleading, or other paper, taken off the files. Thus, if a bill is filed without
authority, or is unknown to the forms of the Court, or if an amended or sup-
plemental bill, or bill of review for new matter, is filed without lawful authority,
it may, on motion of the defendant, be taken off the files.
§ 752. Motions to Set Aside, or Modify, Interlocutory Orders. "When any —

interlocutory order has been made on motion of the complainant, on account of
which the defendant is aggrieved, he may bring such order before the Court on
motion, supported by affidavit, 1 2a and move the Court, or Chancellor at Cham-
bers, to set aside or modify such order, or otherwise release him from its effect,
in whole or in part. Among such motions are the following
1. Motion to Set Aside a Pro Confesso.is A pro confesso may be set aside on
motion, supported by affidavit excusing the delay, and a sworn answer showing
a meritorious defence and in some cases, without an affidavit or a sworn an-
;
swer. A pro confesso may also be set aside by the Master at rules, upon a good
cause shown, and the filing of a sufficient answer. 14
2. Motion to Dissolve an Injunction." "When a defendant, or even a third
party, feels aggrieved, or is injured by an injunction, he may move for its dis-
solution, supporting his motion by a sworn answer, or by showing want of
equity in the bill, or in case of a stranger, by a petition. This motion may, also
be made before the Chancellor at Chambers.
3. Motion to Vacate the Appointment of a Receiver." "When the debt is paid, or
the suit compromised, or a bond is given to comply with the decree of the Court,
or when in any case a receiver is no longer necessary, on motion for that pur-
pose, the receiver will be discharged, and the property in his hands restored to
the former possessor. So, a motion may be made to vacate an order appointing
a receiver, such a motion being supported by a sworn answer. This motion may
be made before the Chancellor, in vacation.
4. Motions to Discharge o>r Seduce a Levy or Bond." "Where more property has
been attached than is necessary to satisfy the debt and costs, or when a re-
plevy bond is excessive, the levy or bond may be reduced on motion supported
by a sworn answer, or by a sworn petition, and notice to the other side. This
motion may be made before the Chancellor as well in vacation as in term. A
levy or bond may be, also, discharged in proper case, on like procedure.
12a As to showing cause in support of a motion, 16 See, post, § 854.
ee, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8. 16 See, post, § 917.
13 See, ante, §§207-213; 888-890. 17 Code, § 4451.
14 Code, § 4420.
§ 753 MOTIONS COMMON TO BOTH PARTIES. 588
ARTICLE IV.
MOTIONS COMMON TO BOTH PARTIES.
§ 753. Motions in Reference to Pleadings, or
§ 758. Motions for a Reference to the Mas-
Other Papers, Improperly Filed.
ter.
§ 754. Motions Where More Suits Than One
§ 759. Motions in Reference to a Master's
About the Same Subject-Matter.
Report.
§ 755. Motions to Consolidate Similar
§ 760. Motions in Reference to the Trial.
Causes.
§ 761. Motions in Reference to Sales.
§ 756. Motions inReference to Evidence.
§ 762. Motions in Reference to the Correc-
§ 757. Motions in Reference to Rulings by
tion of Errors.
the Master.
§ 753. Motions in Reference to Pleadings, or other Papers Improperly Filed.

If any pleading, exhibit, deposition, or other paper, has been filed without law-
not entitled,
ful authority, or is filed after the lapse of the limit allowed, or is
or not marked filed, or for any reason ought not be on the file, it may, on
is
motion of any party aggrieved, be taken off the files, or, as it is sometimes
expressed, stricken from the files. All motions to strike a pleading or other
paper from the files, are- heard summarily by the Court, the grounds of these
motions being ordinarily apparent on the face of the record. When a pleading
is alleged to be filed by a Solicitor without his alleged client's authority, the
motion by the adverse party to take it off the files should be based on an affi-
davit of such want of authority; and it may be stated, as a general rule, that
*v hen the ground of a motion to strike from the files is based on matters outside
of the record, such matter must be made to appear by affidavit.

§ 754. Motions where More Suits than One about the Same Subject-Matter.
It frequently happens that there are pending in the same Court two or more
suits relating to the same subject-matter, such as: (1) suits by different cred-
itors to reach the same property or fund of a common debtor; (2) suits by dif-
ferent beneficiaries of the same trust; (3) suits by different claimants of liens
on the same property (4) suits brought by different next friends of the same
;
person under disability against the same defendant as to the same matter; (5)
suits by different persons, whether administrators, executors, legatees, distrib-
utees, or creditors, to administer the same estate; (6) suits by different wards
against the same guardian about the same general default; (7) suits by different
creditors, legatees, or distributees, against the same executor or administrator
for the same devastavit, or default; and (8) suits of like character in which all
or most of the evidence in one case would be pertinent in the other cases, and
the decree of recovery in one case would probably have to be considered in the
other cases in order to properly distribute the fund, or otherwise equitably ad-
judicate the respective and perhaps conflicting rights and claims of the parties
in the other cases.
"Where two or more suits of the foregoing character are brought in the same
Court, the Court will, on motion of the complainant in the suit first brought,
stay the proceedings in all the other suits, except in so far as they, or any of
them, seek to have adjudicated matters not set up in the first suit. Or, if it
appears that a subsequent bill is more comprehensive, or otherwise better
adapted to have all the matters in controversy fully determined, the Court may,
on motion of the complainant in such bill, stay proceedings on all the other bills,
unless the complainant in the bill first filed will so amend his bill as to cover
the field included by all the other bills. 1 The Court will, in such cases, con-
1 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 797-798.
589 MOTIONS COMMON TO BOTH PARTIES. •§755
sider in what way the interests of all the parties may be best promoted, looking
to the saving of costs, an early hearing, and a complete decree settling all the
various equities of all the parties in all the suits. "Where the complainants in
the different suits are seeking the same fund, or to share in the same recovery,
the Court will ordinarily allow the complainants in the stayed suits to become
parties to the suit allowed to be prosecuted or will allow the preferred bill to
;
be so amended as to bring before the Court all the parties and all the matters of
the other bills, and to .pray for an injunction against the further prosecution
of the other suits 2 or, where the same property or fund is claimed by different
;
complainants from the same defendant, will allow the latter, when he sets up
no claim of his own, to file a bill of interpleader.
§ 755. —
Motions to Consolidate similar Causes. Instead of staying proceed-
ings, the Court will, in any of the foregoing eight cases, except the fourth,
order all of the causes to be consolidated, if no party object to the motion. 1 *
This is a more common and a more convenient practice than the practice of
staying the subsequent suits; inasmuch as it enables references, reports, and
decrees to be made in the consolidated cause, sufficiently comprehensive to in-
clude all the various matters of controversy contained in each, and all the
various equities and priorities, however numerous, and however conflicting;
and enables the Court to properly distribute the fund, when a fund is involved,
and to adjudicate all questions as to the title, when the title is involved, and
allother matters.
The practice of consolidating causes where the same fund or property is
being sought by different creditors and claimants in different suits in the same
Court, is a most salutary one, greatly to be favored. It lessens the costs, and
thereby enables the debtor to pay more of his debts it lessens the labor of coun-
;
sel and it enables the Court to administer the fund to the greatest advantage,
;
and with the fewest difficulties to all, besides preventing a multiplicity of

trials.
It must not be forgotten, however, that a consolidation of causes, whether
by consent, or by order of the Court without consent, does not change the rules
of Equity pleading, nor the rights of the parties, those rights must still depend
on the pleadings in the respective causes, and the evidence applicable thereto 4 ;
and an appeal in one case will not" necessarily carry up the other case, or
cases. 5
"Where several suits are brought by different creditors against the same in-
solvent corporation in different Chancery Courts, that Court in which is filed
the bill embracing the whole matter in litigation may enjoin the creditors in
the other suits from prosecuting their independent suits, and require them to
come in under the general bill on which the injunction was granted. 8 If none
of the bills is filed as a general creditor's bill, any of the complainants may file
an amended and supplemental bill as well for himself as for all other creditors,
and claimants who may choose to make themselves parties, and pray for all
proper accounts, that the property be sold, and assets administered under the
orders of the Court, that a receiver be appointed, and for general relief. Upon
such an amended and supplemental bill being filed, the complainant would be
entitled to fiats for an attachment and an injunction against the common
2 Hadley V. Freedman's S. & T. Co., 2 Term. Ch., consolidation, with all the costs of the cause there-
122; 130; Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. after accruing, consolidations in proper cases will
Ch., 502. See Article on General Creditors' Bills. generally be consented to by all parties. The Court
3 The Court cannot, ordinarily, compel a consoli- may, on its own motion, consolidate causes claiming
dation against the consent of the parties. Knight «. the same fund against the same defendant. Clement
Ogden, 3 Tenn. Ch., 409; Ogburn v. Dunlap, 9 Lea, V. Clement, 5 Cates, 40.
.
See, ante, § 754.
162. The Court should, however, hear the causes at 4 Brevard v. Summar, 2 Heisk., 105 ; Lofland v.
the same time, and onerate the parties refusing Coward, 12 Heisk., 546; Masson v. Anderson, 3 Bax.,
to consent to a proper consolidation with all the 290. Ogburn v. Dunlap, 9 Lea, 169.
extra costs caused by the refusal to consolidate. Par- 5 Ogburn V. Dunlap, 9 Lea, 162.
ties should not be allowed to consume a fund, or 6 Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch.,
oppress a defendant, by an unnecessary multiplica- 502; same case, 6 Lea, 564. See Article on General
tion of costs. By adopting the practice of taxing Creditors' Bills, post, §§ 1033-1034.
the parties, refusing to agree in a proper case to a
debtor and his estate on giving proper bonds and the Court will restrain all ;
7
creditors from suing in any other cause.

The statute provides that if separate suits to enforce mechanic's liens be
brought in the same Court they shall be consolidated. 8 So, on the filing of
an insolvent bill by the personal representatives, or a creditor, the Chancellor
may enjoin all other suits against the estate. 9
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE CAUSES.
John Doe, et al,
vs. \ No. 546.
Henry Jones,
Richard Roe, et al,
vs. } No. 561. Order of Consolidation.
Sarah Brown, et. al,
and
William Smith, et. al,
vs. \ No. 571.
On motion of complainant John Doe, [or, by consent of parties,] and it appearing that
these three suits relate to the same subject-matter, it is ordered by the Court that they be
consolidated, and considered and heard together, and that the proof hereafter taken in either
cause may be read as to all the causes, provided notice to take depositions be served by the
defendants on John Doe, Henry Jones, and William Smith, and by the complainants on Rich-
ard Roe and Sarah Brown, or on their respective Solicitors.
When two or more causes are consolidated or heard together, the decree will
have the following title, commencement, and recitals
DECREE IN CAUSES, CONSOLIDATED, OR HEARD TOGETHER.
John Doe, et al.,
vs. \ No. 546.
Henry Jones,
Richard Roe, et al.,
vs. \ No. 561. Consolidated Causes.
Sarah Brown, et al.,
and
William Smith, et al,
vs. \ No. 571.
Richard Roe, et. al;
These three causes were heard together by consent of all parties, [or, if the causes have
heretofore been consolidated, begin thus: These three causes having heretofore been consol-
idated and ordered to be heard together, came on for hearing] this June 24, 1893, before Hon.
John K. Shields, Chancellor, upon all the pleadings and proofs on file, and all the record in
each cause, on consideration of which the Chancellor was of opinion that [Here give the
Chancellor's findings of fact, if it is desired to set them out specifically.} and it is so
adjudged and decreed.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that [Here set out the decree,
following the specific findings, if they have been previously given. See §§ 566-568.]
§ 756. Motions in Reference to Evidence. During the progress of a suit —
many questions arise in reference to the taking of depositions, the production
of documents, the extension of the time for taking proof, the exceptions to de-
positions, and other matters relative to the proof. Among such questions are
the following:
1. Motion to Produce Documents. If the defendant's answer shows that he
has in his possession, or under his control, any documents, or books, relevant
to the matters in dispute, their production in the Master's office may be ob-
tained on motion, supported by the pleadings themselves. So, if the complain-
ant has a document, or book, in his possession, or under his control, the Court
may order it to be produced and filed with the Master, on motion supported
by affidavit, or other competent proof, or on motion supported by a cross bill
and answer thereto.
2. Motion as to Notice to Take Depositions. If either party desires the length
of the notice for taking a deposition to be enlarged, or restricted, he may move
7 Hadley v. Freedman's S. & T. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., I 8 Code, § 3546.
122; 130. I » Code, §§ 2383-2384.
591 MOTIONS COMMON TO BOTH PARTIES. § 757
therefor, supporting his motion by an affidavit. So, he may move for an order
that service of notice on one or more of several adversaries shall be notice to
all. Both of these orders may be made by the Master, on like motion.
3. Motion to Extend the Time for Taking Proof. Either party may move for
an order extending his time for taking proof, or for an order opening the cause
tor further proof, supporting his motion by a special affidavit, or affidavits.
These motions may be made before either the Chancellor at Chambers, or before
the Master in vacation.
4. Motion to Ee-Examine a Witness. A witness may be re-examined as to the
same matters, on leave obtained from the Chancellor or Master, by motion, sup-
ported by an affidavit showing cause. A witness may be cross-examined; or,
it his deposition has been suppressed, it may be retaken, without any order for
that purpose.
5. Motion in Reference to Exceptions to Depositions. If amendments are needed
to a deposition to obviate exceptions, or if a party's exceptions have been over-
ruled by the Master, or sustained and an appeal taken, he may obtain leave to
make the amendment, or have it made, or may obtain the action of the Chan-
cellor on his exceptions, by bringing the matter forward by motion, supported
in case of amendments by affidavit. It will be too late to make these motions
after the trial of the cause has begun. These motions may be made in vacation,
before the Chancellor, on notice.
§ 757. Motions in Reference to Rulings by the Master. The Master is —
clothed with large powers, and may at his office make many rulings. Any of
these rulings may be appealed from and revised or reversed by the Chancellor.
These rulings usually consist of: (1) sustaining, or overruling, exceptions to
answers (2) allowing, or disallowing, a pro confesso; (3) extending, or refusing
;
to extend, the time for answering (4) setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a
;
pro confesso; (5) overruling, or sustaining, exceptions to depositions; (6) ex-

tending, or refusing to extend, the time for taking proof; (7) reviving or re-
fusing to revive, a cause (8) admitting, or rejecting, evidence on the taking of
;
an account or the making of a report.

In all of these cases the appeal should be entered in writing at the time it is
taken, and should be brought before the Chancellor by motion, supported by all
the papers the Master had before him.
§ 758. —
Motions for a Reference to the Master. As a rule, the Court will not
refer a matter to the Master, except on a hearing of the cause but if the par-
;
ties consent to such a reference, it will be ordered on mere motion. The Court
will, also, on mere motion, order a reference to the Master in the following cases
previous to the hearing 1, To report on the advisability of a partition, or sale
:
of land; 2, To report whether it is necessary to sell the land of a decedent to

pay his debts 3, To report the assets and liabilities of an insolvent estate and
; ;
4, to report whether it is manifestly to the interest of minors or married women

to sell their land for their maintenance and education, or for reinvestment. The
frame and form of these references will be found in the chapters treating of
these particular suits.
If any pleading filed in the cause is unnecessarily prolix, or contains unnec-
essary and false allegations of a scandalous nature or grossly impertinent, the
opposite party may, on motion, have the pleading referred to the Master to be
revised, or the Court may order particular parts of the pleading to be stricken
out. 10
§ 759. —
Motions in Reference to a Master's Report. The subject of Master's
reports and of proceedings thereon have been fully considered in a separate
Chapter. 11 The following are the principal motions in reference to a Master's
report
10 Code, §4316. I " See, ante, §§611-620.

1.Motion to Take up the Exceptions to a Master's Report. "When a Master's
report has been excepted to, it is ordinarily heard on the exceptions when the
case is regularly reached on the docket but it is in the discretion of the Chan-
;
cellor to hear the report and the exceptions earlier, on motion supported by
sufficient cause. If the term of the Court is short, and a recommittal and new
report is desirable instanter, so as to expedite the final disposition of the cause,
the Court will, ordinarily, take up the report and exceptions on motion, especi-
ally if the arguments will be brief and pointed.
2. Motion to Confirm a Master's Report. When the time for filing exceptions to
a Master's report has expired, and no exceptions have been put in, the party
in whose favor the Master has reported may call up the report on motion and
have it confirmed. This is the usual practice in all the cases mentioned in the
preceding section, where a reference will be made previous to the hearing. The
report will be confirmed when the cause is reached on the docket, of course, if
not excepted to.
3. Motion to Recommit a Report. If a Masters' report be founded on illegal
evidence, or if there be evidence not considered by the Master, or not filed when
his report was made, the party injured, may, on motion, supported by the
record, or by affidavit, have the report recommitted. The affidavit should show
why the new evidence was not taken before the report was made, and should
Lave all the definiteness and particularity required on a motion for a new
trial.
§ 760. —
Motions in Reference to the Trial. There are various motions per-
taining to the trial which must be made before the hearing has been entered
iipon these motions are generally the following
:
1. Motion for a Trial by Jury. Either party may, upon motion made at the
proper time, have a jury to try and determine any material fact in dispute. No
affidavit is needed in support of this motion.
2. Motions in Reference to Evidence. Before the trial begins each party should
see to it that all his evidence is marked filed, that none of his depositions stand
suppressed, and that none of his exceptions to depositions are undisposed of.
He may bring these matters before the Court by mere motion, but must do so
before the trial begins, or it will be too late.
3. Motion for a Continuance. When the case is reached on the docket, either
party not ready for trial may move for a continuance, supporting his motion
by affidavit, or by an agreement signed by the opposite party. The affidavit
must, in all cases, be special, and must be strong in proportion to the length
of time the affiant has had to prepare for trial.
§ 761. —
Motions in Reference to Sales. When the Master is ordered to make
a sale of land, there are often various motions required before the sale is per-
fected and the purchaser gets a title, and among them are the following
1. Motion to Confirm a. Sale. If a report of a sale is on file, either party, or
the purchaser, may move for a confirmation, after the time for excepting to
the report has expired.
2. Motion to Set Aside a Sale. If a sale has been irregularly or unlawfully
made, it may be set aside on motion, supported by a record, or other proof of
the irregularity or illegality of the sale. The purchaser, himself, may make the
motion, supporting it by a petition, showing defect in the title, or great defi-
ciency in quantity, or any other fact entitling him in Equity to be relieved.
3. Motion to Open Biddings. If any party in interest is dissatisfied with the
price bid for land, and can secure an advanced bid of at least ten per cent., he
may have the biddings opened, on motion supported by a petition, and the writ-
ten offer of the proposing advance-bidder, tendering good security for his pro-
posed bid.
4. Motions to Revive a Decree of Sale. If for any reason, except a satisfaction
593 MOTIONS COMMON TO BOTH PARTIES. § 762
of the decree, the Master fails to sell land ordered to be sold, the decree of sale
may be revived, on mere motion.
5. Motions for the Benefit of the Purchaser. If the purchaser wishes to have
a lien declared paid, or to obtain a deed, or to have a reference as to encumb-
rances, or as to taxes, or to have a writ of possession awarded him, he may move
therefor, supporting his motion, when encumbrances are alleged, by affidavit or
other evidence thereof.
6. Motions for an Order of Sale. "When the Sheriff levies on land and returns
the execution unsatisfied for want of time to advertise and sell, on motion of
the party interested in having the land sold, the Court will award an order of
sale to the Sheriff to sell the land.
§ 762. —
Motions in Reference to the Correction of Errors. If either party is
aggrieved by a decree, he must apply to the Court in due time by motion, or
otherwise, for the appropriate remedy. These remedies will be more fully
shown hereafter they are, in brief, as follows
;
1. Motions to Correct the Minutes. Sometimes an erroneous entry is made on

the minutes, or an erroneous order is made by the Court in such eases the party
:
aggrieved may move to have the minutes corrected, or the erroneous order re-
vised, or set aside, supporting his motion by affidavit when the error is not
shown by the record itself.
2. Motion for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis. If a decree is rendered against a
party by reason of an error of fact in a proceeding of which he had no notice,
or which he was prevented by disability from showing or correcting, or in which
he was prevented from making defence by surprise, accident, mistake, or fraud,
without fault on his part, he may reverse the same by a writ of error coram
nobis, which may be had upon notice, supported by a petition.
3. Motion to Rehear a Cause. If an erroneous decree has been pronounced,
and the term of the Court has not ended, the party aggrieved may move for
a rehearing, supporting his motion by a petition.
4. Motion to File a Bill of Review. If an erroneous decree has been made, and
the term has closed, or thirty days elapsed, the party injured may file a bill of
review if the bill be based on newly discovered evidence, leave to file it must
;
be had. This leave must be obtained by motion, supported by a petition, or

by the proposed bill properly framed for that purpose, and duly sworn to.
5. Motion to Correct a Decree. Any clerical error, mistake in the calculation
of interest, or other mistake in a decree, may be amended on motion, supported
by the record, or the Chancellor's notes.
6. Motion Retax Costs.
to If costs have been improperly, erroneously, or
illegally taxed, or omitted to be taxed, the party aggrieved may move the Court
to retax the costs, and include costs omitted, or correct errors made. The
motion must be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the errors or omis-
sions complained of.
7. Motion for an Appeal. If any party is dissatisfied with any decree, he may
move for an appeal, supporting his motion by a proper appeal bond, or by the
pauper oath, or he may get time within which to file his bond or oath.
§ 763' MOTIONS BY STRANGERS AND QUASI PARTIES. 594
ARTICLE V.
MOTIONS BY STRANGERS AND QUASI PARTIES.
§ 763. Motions by Strangers to the Suit. |
§ 764. Motions by a Quasi Party.
§ 763. —
Motions by Strangers to the Suit. As a rule, no person can be heard
in reference to a suit, or in reference to the property or matters involved in the
litigation, unless he is a party to the suit, or the agent or Solicitor of a party.
There are, however, certain persons, who, while not parties to the pleadings,
are parties to some of the subsequent proceedings in a cause, such as (1) persons
who file claims or come in under a decree in the cause (2) receivers, trustees ;
and guardians, appointed by the Court, (3) reported bidders for, and pur-
chasers of, property sold by order of the Court, and (4) the sureties on notes
and bonds filed in a cause; these persons are often termed quasi parties, and
they have the right to make any motion required by their interest, or their
duties but persons who are neither parties nor quasi parties, will not, as a rule,
;
be heard except by a sworn petition. The following are the most common
motions by persons not parties to the suit
1. Motion for Leave to Become a Party. If any person, not a party to a suit
for the recovery of property, has an interest in the property involved in the
litigation, he may present a petition to the Court and move for leave to become
a party defendant, to the end that he may assert his rights in the premises. 1
2. Motion for Leave to File a Claim. When the estate of a decedent, or the as-
sets of an insolvent firm, corporation, or other person, is being administered in
the Chancery Court, any creditor may, on motion, supported by a petition, have
leave to become a party and prove his claim. The petition should specify the
claim, and show that it is a subsisting bona fide indebtedness.
3. Motion for Leave to Reclaim Property in the Custody of the Court. If a stranger
has an interest in, or title to, any property in the custody of the Court, he may
obtain leave to assert his rights, by motion supported by a petition, the petition
setting forth the rights of the petitioner with precision and particularity. 2
4. Motion for Leave to Sue a Receiver. The Court will not allow its receiver,
or other officers, acting under its orders to be harassed by suits in other Courts. 3
Hence leave must be obtained, by motion, supported by petition or affidavit,
before any suit can be brought against a receiver. The petition should detail
the rights of the petitioner, and show the necessity of enforcing them against
the receiver. 4
§ 764. Motions by a Quasi Party.—All persons who (1) have been reported
as bidders for, or purchasers of property ordered by the Court to be sold, or
(2) who have been by the Court or Master appointed receivers, trustees, or
guardians, or (3) who are named as creditors in a bill to administer assets, 6 or
(4) who have filed claims in a cause, or come in under a decree, or (5) who
are sureties on any note, bond or other obligation filed in a cause, are, in a
limited sense, parties; that is, they have a right to be heard by the Court in
any matter affecting the property by them purchased or bid for, or their rights,
liabilities or duties as receiver, trustee, guardian, claimant, or surety. And so
the Master, or his deputy, the sheriff, or his deputy, or any other officer of the
Court, may move the Court for directions or instructions in any matter growing
1 Code, § 2799. I 3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1743.

2 The practice in such cases is stated in the Chap- 4 See Chapter on Receivers, post, § 910.
ter on Petitions. See, post, §§ 794-795. I 5 Allen & Hill, exrs., r. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359.
595 MOTIONS BY STRANGERS AND QUASI PARTIES. § 764
out of the proper discharge of their official duties, all other parties interested
having due notice thereof. Such motions would require the support of affida-
vits, or petitions, when the facts do not fully appear of record. The following
are the principal motions in such cases:
1. Motions by a Purchaser of Property at a Master's Sale. If a purchaser of prop-
erty at a Master's sale desires a reference as to alleged encumbrances, 6 or
as to disputed titles, or disputed boundaries, or desires to be relieved from his
purchase, he may make a motion therefor, supporting it by a petition fully
setting forth the particulars. He may have a reference as to unpaid taxes, or
may have an order for a deed, or for a writ of possession, or have a lien declared
paid, on mere motion, provided he is entitled thereto, and the Court has not
lost its jurisdiction of the suit.
2. Motion to Have Satisfaction of a Decree Set Aside.If a stranger buys prop-
erty at an execution sale, and such property is recovered from him, he may on
motion supported by affidavit, have a scire facias against the defendant in
order to have the satisfaction set aside, and the original decree revived for his
benefit. 7
3. Motions in Regard to Bids. A person who has rights as a bidder or pur-
chaser at a Master's or receiver's sale, may, when his interests so require, bring
those rights to the attention of the Court. If the facts do not fully appear in
the Master's or receiver's report, he may bring them before the Court by peti-
tion. Thus, if the Master should fail or refuse to report David Doe as the
highest and best bidder, he may bring the matter before the Court by petition,
and have the report corrected or the biddings opened.
4. Motions by a Receiver, Guardian, or a Trustee. If a receiver, guardian or
trustee desires to be discharged, or to have his accounts passed on, or to have
an allowance made him, or to report any matter to the Court relating to his
duties, or to obtain instructions from the Court, he may bring the matter before
the Court by motion, supported by the record, or a report, or a petition, or an
affidavit, according to the character of the matter, and the necessity for showing
forth facts not otherwise appearing.
5. Motions by Claimants. A creditor or claimant may except to a Master's
report as to his debt or claim, or may by motion supported by petition or affida-
vit, bring any matter before the Court in reference to his debt or claim, or in
reference to any other claim which he seeks to resist.
6. Motions by Sureties. Sureties on any note or bond executed in the cause
may, by motion, bring before the Court any matter affecting their liability s :
they may have a reference to the Master as to any payments or credits they
may claim, and may invoke the decision of the Court on any question involving
their rights or duties. Sureties on bonds desiring to be released may be heard
on motion for that purpose, on giving the notice required by law. 9
a Code, § 3310. I
8 Crudington v. Hogan, 21 Pick., 448.
7 Code, §§ 2990-2996. I
o Code, §§ 3665-3671.
§765 MOTIONS ABOUT MONEY IN COURT. 596
ARTICLE VI.
MOTIONS ABOUT PAYING MONEY INTO, OR OUT OF, COURT.
§ 765. When Money Will be Ordered to be
§ 767. When a Defendant Will be Ordered
to Pay Into Court.
Paid Into Court.
§ 766. When a Complainant Will be Ordered § 768. Investment of Money Paid Into Court.
§ 769. Discretionary Powers of the Court in
to Pay Into Court.
Paying Money.
§ 765. When Money will be Ordered to be Paid into Court. There are many —
eases wherein the Court will order money, or ehoses in action, to be paid into
the Clerk's office before a final decree. This order is ordinarily made on the
defendant, but it may be made on the complainant, also. The order is, how-
ever, never made against a defendant unless he admits (1) that he has the
money, or chose in action, in his possession, or under his control; (2) that it
.belongs to the complainant; and (3) that it is a trust fund. 1 There are cases,
however, where a defendant will be ordered to pay in money that is not trust
money, but in such cases the defendant must clearly admit that he has a fund
in his possession belonging to one or more of the parties to the suit, that he
is willing the Court may determine its disposition, and he must make a tender
of it in his answer, without actually depositing it with the Clerk and Master.
A
complainant will be ordered to pay money into Court when, on his own ad-
mission in his bill, he owes the defendant a certain sum which it is equitable he
should pay before he can require the defendant to do equity, or before he
can, in good conscience, ask the interposition of the Court as against the
defendant.
When money has been paid into Court upon an order, such payment is merely
a collateral security, and is not to be taken as the property of the opposite
party, until so adjudged upon the hearing: it belongs to the party who may
be eventually found entitled to it, and it may be ordered to be returned to
the party paying it in, if, on the hearing, he show a right to it. 2
An order for the payment or transfer of a fund should always be entitled in
the cause to which the fund belongs. A
fund may be transferred from one
cause to another upon petition filed in the cause from which the transfer is
sought, 3 in which case, there should be an order of record in such cause show-
ing the transfer, and, also, an order of record in the cause to which the transfer
is made, showing the receipt of the fund, and whence derived.
§ 766. When a Complainant will be Ordered to Pay into Court. Under the —
operation of that beneficent jurisdictional maxim, He who seeks Equity must
do Equity, 4 the Court will require a complainant to do things which the Court
could not require of him if he was a defendant. If a complainant, seeking
Equity, admits that he has in his possession money, or ehoses in action, belong-
ing to the defendant, or admits that he is indebted to the defendant in a definite
sum, the Court will require him to do Equity, at least to the extent of his admis-
sion, by paying into Court the money, or thing, admitted to belong to the de-
fendant and compliance with this requirement by the complainant will be the
;
condition on which relief, temporary or permanent, will be granted him. The

ordinary cases in which this preliminary order is made are the following
1. Payment Into Court as the Condition of Injunction Belief. If in a bill ten-
1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1770-1774.

1 A trust fund is a appear in the record, the transfer may be made on
ward of Chancery. motion.
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1778. i Ante, § 39.
3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1803. If the facts sufficiently
597 MOTIONS ABOUT MONEY IN COURT. §767
dered for a fiat for injunction, the complainant admits any money to be due
the defendant, or fails to allege any sufficient Equity against any part of the
matter sought to be enjoined, the Chancellor may require the complainant to
pay into Court the amount admitted to be due, or not sufficiently contested,
before any injunction as to the residue. 5
2. Payment Into Court by a Trustee Seeking the Aid of the Court. When an ex-
ecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or other fiduciary, has a trust fund in
his hands, and applies to the Court for its instruction as to how such funds
should be disposed of, the Court will, on motion of a defendant, order the fund
to be paid into Court. 6
3. Payment Into Court by a Purchaser Who Seeks a Specific Performance. pur- A
chaser, in possession of the land, or a non-resident purchaser, filing a bill for
specific performance, will be required to pay the unpaid consideration money
into Court. 7
4. Payment Into Court by a Party Seeking Kedemption. Where a bill is filed
by the debtor to enforce his right of redemption, alleging tender and refusal
of the purchase-money, the money should be brought into Court when the bill
is filed and if not, the Court may order the complainant to pay it in. 8
;
5. Payment Into Court on a Bill of Interpleader. On a bill of interpleader be-

ing filed in reference to money, or a chose in action, the complainant may be
required to pay it into Court. 9
6. Payment Into Court by Other Complainants. When a partner owes the firm
an individual debt, he will not be allowed to come into Equity for an account,
without paying his private debt, for he who seeks Equity must do Equity. 10
§ 767. When a Defendant will be Ordered to Pay into Court. It may be —
stated as a general rule that to obtain an order upon a defendant to pay money
into Court before the final hearing, it must appear that he who asks for such
an order has an interest in the money, and that he who holds it has no equitable
right to it, but holds it in trust and these facts must so appear as not to be open
:
to any further controversy; and must, ordinarily, appear by the admission of

the defendant in his answer, or in an affidavit, or in a written stipulation. 11
The Court will not make such an order where the defendant either denies the
possession of a trust fund, or denies the complainant's right to it. 12
The ordinary cases wherein a defendant will be ordered to pay money, or
choses in action, into Court before final decree, are when a guardian, executor,
administrator, trustee, or other fiduciary, admits in his answer that he has
trust funds in his hands belonging to the complainant, in which case the Court
will, on motion of the latter, order such funds to be paid into Court. This
order will be made on a defendant, who is a trustee by implication, as well as
on an express trustee and where only a part of the fund claimed is admitted by
;
the defendant to be in his hands, the Court will order that part to be paid in.
The Court will order trust funds to be paid into Court, without any allegation,
or proof, that there has been any abuse of the trust, or that the fund is in
danger pending the litigation but in all such cases it must clearly appear that
;
the fund is a trust fund, and not a mere debt. 13

§ 768. —
Investment of Money Paid Into Court. Where a fund in Court is
likely to remain there longer than six months, the Court will, on application
of any party in interest, order it to be loaned out, or otherwise invested.
Where funds belong to an infant, or a non compos, who has no general guardian,
or belong to a beneficiary, who is entitled to the interest only, or belong to
heirs, legatees, or distributees, who are non-residents, or unknown, or are in
litigation in another cause, or in another Court, or in any case where the in-
5 Ch. Rule, VI, § 4; see, post, § 1195. 10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1776-1777.
6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1772, note. 11 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1770-1773, notes; 1779-1780.
7 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1775. 12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1780.
8 Simmons V. Marable, 11 Hum., 437. 13 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1770-1774.
» See, post, §§ 1106-1115.
§769 MOTIONS ABOUT MONEY IN COURT. 598
terest of the parties entitled will be manifestly promoted thereby, the Court
will direct the Master to loan or invest such funds, specifying in the decree
the manner and length of such investment. 14
No money paid into Court can lawfully be loaned out by the Master, or
otherwise by him invested, without an express order of the Court. 15
Where money is in Court, or has been invested by order of the Court, the fact
that some of the parties to the cause have married, or died, or that the suit
has otherwise abated, will not prevent the Court from making all necessary
orders to pay out the fund to the parties entitled 16 nor will such facts prevent
;
the Court from taking judgment on notes given for loaned money, or from
taking other steps necessary to secure or collect notes or other property in the
custody of the Court.
§ 769. Discretionary Powers of the Court in Paying out Money. Where a —
party before the Court has a clear right to a fund, or to any part thereof, he
is entitled to a decree therefor, in accordance with his right and the Court is ;
bound to pronounce such a decree, where properly demanded. But there are
occasionally small sums of money in the Master's office, long unclaimed, or be-
longing to minors, or persons of unsound mind: in such cases, Courts of Chan-
cery, by virtue of their general inherent powers to do Equity, and act as gen-
eral guardian of persons under disability, will exercise a large discretion, in
ordering these small sums to be so paid out as to do those entitled the most
good. Thus, where the amount belonging to a minor, or non compos, is too small
to warrant the expense of a general guardian, the Court may order it to be
paid to his guardian ad litem, or next friend, or to his parent, or to a near kins-
man, or other trustworthy person, with orders to apply it as the best interests
of the party under disability may require. 17 Where there is a small sum due
an infant wife, the Court may order it to be paid to her, on the joint receipt of
herself and husband, when her necessities require it. Where a fund belongs
to unknown heirs, and has remained long unclaimed in the Master's office, the
Court may distribute it among the known living heirs, on their written agree-
ment to refund when ordered, but without requiring any refunding bond.
Where there is a fund in Court, belonging to the estate of a decedent, too small
to justify administration, the Court may order it to be paid out to the person
who would have been entitled to administer, or to some other trustworthy
person, to be expended for the benefit of those entitled. And in general, in
very small matters, where persons are under disability, the Court may, as their
general guardian, exercise a discretion not at all permissible in larger matters. 18
14 As to the investment of proceeds of sale of land tion of such minor, or may direct the fund to he
for partition, see Code, § 3321; and, in case of sale paid to the natural guardian of such minor, or other
for re-investment, see Code, § 3338, which is impera- persons having the care of such minor, to be applied
tive. Mason v. Tinsley, 1 Tenn. Ch., 154. See, for the support and education of the minor, subject
post, § 972. to such terms and conditions as the Court may im-
15 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1789. pose.. Acts of 1899, ch. 177.
16 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1799. IS The general doctrines of this section will be
IT 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1800-1803, notes. Where the found fully supported by 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1794-1803,
fund does not exceed the sum of one hundred and notes; and by the common practice of Chancerv
fifty dollars, and the minor has no general guardian, Courts. See, Article on Suits Where the Chancery
the Court may disburse the same through the Clerk Court Acts as Guardian, post, §§968-971.
and Master for the support, maintenance and educa-
599 JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS. § 770
CHAPTER
XXXVIII.
MOTIONS AT CHAMBERS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
Article I. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers.
Article II. Proceedings before the Chancellor at Chambers.
ARTICLE I.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS.
§ 770. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at § 773. Jurisdiction ofChancellor at
the
Chambers Generally Considered. Chambers Make
a Final Decree.
to
§ 771. Jurisdiction to Rule on Demurrers, § 774. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at
Pleas, or Any Motion, or Other Chambers to Grant an Appeal.
Application. § 775. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at
§ 772. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers, Under Acts Prior to
Chambers to Confirm Sales. 1903.
Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers Generally Considered.

§ 770.
The powers of the Chancellor at Chambers in Tennessee have always been
greater than those ordinarily exercised. Some Chancellors refrained from ex-
ercising many of these powers because of the inconvenience to them and to
suitors, especially when there were only two or three Chancellors for the whole
State, and the Courts were often a hundred miles from a suitor and other ;
Chancellors seeing these powers not generally exercised had misgivings as to

their existence, or hesitancy as to their exercise.
Formerly in England 1 the common law Courts were held at stated periods,
and were attended by crowds of people, visitors, witnesses, litigants, attorneys,
barristers, bailiffs and other officers of the Court with their insignia of office,
and above all loomed the Judge, gowned in black silk, like a big woman, with
a monstrous white wig on his head. On the other hand, the Chancery Court was
in session, directly or indirectly, nearly all the time. There were in attendance
upon it no visitors, no witnesses, few or no litigants, only a few lawyers called
"Solicitors," and only one or two bailiffs.' A
very large proportion of the
Court's business was dispatched by the Masters, of whom there were several,
or by Vice-Chancellors and these did the business of the Court, not so much in
;
term time as at Chambers, the Court having exclusive jurisdiction, not only of
all equitable litigation, but also of the persons and estates of minors, idiots
and lunatics, appointing their guardians and caring for their estates and the
expenditures thereof.
But in North Carolina and Tennessee, at first, the Chancery Courts and the
Circuit Courts were held at the same times and by the same Judges, and the
Equity business was generally postponed until the law business was over, and
the jurors and witnesses discharged, and the Judges and lawyers anxious to
close the term so as to go to their homes, or to the next Court. And after the
adjournment of the Court, the Judge and the lawyers, in most of the county
seats, were not seen until the lapse of four months, when the new term of the
Circuit Court began. The Judges being thus inaccessible, very little Chambers
business was transacted, and in consequence, Chancery litigation was greatly
prolonged.
l The Judicature of England was greatly changed in 1875. See, ante, § 9.
§771 JURISDICTION OE the; chancellor at chambers. 600
As the State grew in population and wealth, however, and the Chancery
Courts were separated from the Circuit Courts, and the number of Chancellors
increased, and a Chancery Court held in almost every county, and later in every
county, business at Chambers began to revive, Chancellors resumed the exercise
of their jurisdiction at Chambers; by legislation, and by Court rules, the
powers of the Chancellors at Chambers were enlarged and denned, and by re-
cent legislation, 2 these powers have been still more enlarged, until now it is
more difficult to tell what the Chancellor may not do at Chambers than what
he may do, especially with consent of parties.
In general, the Chancellor's jurisdiction at Chambers now extends from the
hearing of the simplest motions, such as to amend pleadings, to the supremest
acts of adjudication, such as the rendition of final decrees and their enforce-
ment by all necessary final process, as will be, hereinafter, more fully shown.
§ 771. Jurisdiction to Rule on Demurrers, Pleas, or Any Motion or Other
—
Application. The Chancellor has jurisdiction to hear and determine, in vaca-
tion and at Chambers, all issues 3 and questions arising on demurrers, dilatory
pleas, 4 motions and applications to amend pleadings, 5 and for any action, 6 in
any cause pending in his Division, either by consent of parties, or on notice by
the party desiring such action, such notice to be given in the same way and
manner as in case of motions to dissolve injunctions, 7 as shown below. 8
The language of the statutes is broad enough to include any motion and the
adjudication of any question that can be made in open Court during the pro-
gress of a suit. 9 ,
§ 772. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers to Confirm Sales. On —

application of a party interested, and ten days' notice to the opposite party, the
Chancellor may at Chambers confirm sales of land, where the report of sale
has been on file for thirty days, and has not been excepted to, and the biddings
not raised provided the Clerk and Master certifies, under his official seal, that
;
there is, in his opinion, no reasonable prospect of the bid being raised as much
as three per cent. But if the Clerk and Master certifies that there is a reasona-
ble prospect of the bid being raised as much as three per cent., no action shall
be taken on such motion, and the papers shall be returned to the Clerk and
Master that he may receive advanced bids. 10 The Chancellor, however, is not
hound to confirm a sale when the Clerk and Master certifies that there is no
reasonable prospect of such advanced bid, but he has full discretion in the mat-
ter, and may confirm the sale, or refer the matter back to the Clerk and Master,
to receive advanced bids, if any be made. No sale, however, shall be confirmed
unless the parties in interest, or their Solicitor of record, shall have been given
ten days notice of the time and place of the application therefor in case the
' :
party in interest is a non-resident, such notice shall be filed with the Clerk and
Master for ten days, and it shall be so noted on his rule docket. 11
§ 773. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers to Make a Pinal Decree.
"While it is entirely proper to give the Chancellor power at Chambers to pass
on any issue or question that may arise in a suit in Chancery, preliminary to
2 See Acts of 1903, ch. 248; and Acts of 1905, ch. powers conferred on the Chancellor by the second
427. clause of the first section of this Act cannot be ex-
3 It would seem from the use of the word "issues,*' ercised out of the county where the suit is pending,
that "issues" of fact arising on dilatory pleas,_ might unless by consent of the parties.
be within the statute, one of its objects being to 7 Past, § 854.
"expedite" the litigation by getting everything out 8 See Article on Procedure, post, § 778.
of the way of a final hearing on the merits. 8 The words of the Act of 1903 are "all issues and
4 By "dilatory pleas" is ordinarily meant pleas in questions arising on demurrers, dilatory pleas, mo-
abatement; but as pleas in abatement are now heard tions and applications to amend pleadings;" and the
along with the merits of the controversy, as hereto- words of the Act of 1905, "any action desired." As
fore shown, (see, ante, § 261,) they need no longer an "issue" or "question" of fact may arise on a
delay the final decision of the cause. It would re- "dilatory" plea, it would seem from the letter of
quire only a liberal interpretation of the statute to the law, that the Chancellor could determine it, not-
hold that any plea, whether in abatement or in bar, withstanding the Act of 1897, ch. 121. See, Pleas
which is insufficient, is dilatory, as such a plea delays in Abatement, ante, §§ 260-261.
a hearing on the merits. 10 Acts of 1903, ch. 248, sec. 2.
5 Acts of 1903, ch. 248, sec. 1. 11 Ibid.
6 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, sec. 1. The vacation
601 JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS. §774
a final hearing on the merits, on the adverse party being notified of the appli-
cation for such action, it would be going too far to allow the Chancellor to
make a final decree at Chambers, except by consent. And so the statute pro-
vides that the Chancellor shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, by final
decree, any cause pending in his Division, except a divorce suit, 12 but that this
jurisdiction shall depend on the consent of the parties, or their Solicitors.
"When, however, a cause is thus submitted to him for adjudication, he is not
obliged to pronounce a final decree in it, for he may find it unripe for such an
adjudication, either because of defective pleadings or defective proofs, in which
ease he may make any order necessary to fully prepare the cause for final hear-
ing he may remand it to the rules for proof on a particular point, or generally,
;
or he may order pleadings to be amended, or new parties made, or a cross bill

to be filed, or any other act or thing done, necessary to enable him to do justice,
and adminster equity between the parties, 13 or to expedite the litigation.
§ 774. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers to Grant an Appeal.
Any party dissatisfied with any decree rendered 14 at Chambers, under this and
the foregoing sections, may, at the time the decree is rendered, or within
twenty days thereafter, pray for an appeal, 15 which the Chancellor may permit,
and may allow the appellant not to exceed thirty days in which to give bond,
or otherwise comply with the terms of the decree. 16 The order granting the
appeal, if made at Chambers, shall be endorsed by the Chancellor, and trans-
mitted to the Clerk and Master, and by him entered, as in case of the decree
appealed from. 17
A bill of exceptions will lie to any act or omission of the Chancellor at Cham-
bers, when it would lie term time. 18
in a like case at
§ 775. Jurisdiction of the Chancellor at Chambers, under Acts Prior to 1903.
The Chancellor is vested with extensive powers during vacation by statutes
passed prior to 1903. These powers are wholly unaffected by the Acts of 1903
and 1905, except in so far as they have been thereby confirmed or enlarged.
No notice is required to authorize the Chancellor to discharge any of the
powers specified in this section, except the following 1, Hearing motions, :
and making orders to prepare a ease for hearing 2, Making orders to carry ;
orders or decrees into execution; 3, Regulating and revising the actions and
rulings of the Master 4, Dissolving or modifying injunctions and appointing
;
receivers and 5, Discharging or reducing any levy or bond in an attachment

;
suit, in all of which cases, five days' notice shall be given by the party desiring
the action of the Chancellor.
The powers of the Chancellor at Chambers based on legislation prior to 1903
are as follows
1. Powers in Relation to Extraordinary Process. The Chancellor may in vaca-
tion (1) grant injunctions, attachments of property, and ne exeats; 19 (2) may
appoint receivers; 20 (3) may. discharge or reduce any levy in an attachment
12 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, sec. 1. of error, a liberal construction would allow an appeal
13 The submission of a cause for a final decree as a matter of right, and a writ of error from any
carries by necessary implication, authority to do any final Chambers decree after its entry on the minutes,
less act in connection with the case. Omne majus or in the minute book, and especially after the au-
dignum continet in se minus dignum. (Kvery matter thentication and approval thereof by the signature of
of large importance includes what is of less import- the Chancellor at the succeeding term of his Court.
ance.) Cui licet quod majus non debet quod minus A decree thus entered and approved becomes in fact
est non licere. (He to whom the greater power is a decree of the Court; this is shown by the fact that
granted ought to have the lesser power.) final process issues thereon. -See sees. 3, 7 and 9, of
14 The statute says "entered," but this is evidently Act of 1903; also, § 2 of the Act of 1905. If not
a typographical error, as it says the appeal may be then a decree of the Court, 'or in every respect as
prayed for "at the time the decree is rendered." effective as a decree of the Court, the statute would
Ibid, | 4. See, ante, § 502, note 2. probably be unconstitutional. If a term of the
15 The Act expressly allows an appeal only when Court should open before the time for appealing had
"the Chancellor in the exercise of his discretion per- expired, an appeal could be taken in open Court as
mits an appeal;" and, as it has been decided that no soon as the decree was entered on the minutes and
writ of error will lie from decrees made at Chambers, approved by the Chancellor.
(Lindsay V. Allen, 4 Cates, 637,) a strict construc- 16 Ibid. § 4.
tion of the Act would prevent any revision of final 17 Ibid.
decrees rendered at Chambers, unless by "permis- is Ibid.
sion" of the Chancellor. But, as the Acts were, 19 Code, § 4434.
manifestly, not intended to restrict appeals or writs 20 Code, § 4452.
§ 776 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS. 602
case ; (4) may
discharge or reduce any bond in cases of injunction, he exeat,
and attachment; 21 (5) may dissolve, or modify, injunctions; 22 (6) may grant
an attachment for a defendant who fails to answer, 23 or for any other person
guilty of a contempt; 24 and (7) may grant a habeas corpus where a defendant,
or other person, has been committed by him for a contempt, 25 and discharge the
prisoner. 28
2. Powers in Relation to Proceedings in the Master's Office. The Chancellor may,
at Chambers, hear and determine appeals from the rulings of the Master: (1)
on exceptions to answers; (2) on receiving and filing an answer; (3) on excep-
tions to depositions, (4) in granting or refusing a pro confesso order; (5) in
setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a pro confesso order; (6) in appointing,
or refusing to appoint, a guardian for a person of unsound mind, or a guardian
ad litem for an infant; (7) in reviving, or refusing to revive, a cause on scire
facias or bill of revivor, (8) in extending, or refusing to extend, the time for
taking proof, and (9) in any other case wherein the Master has done any act,
made any order, or refused to do an act or make an order, either on a rule day,
or at any other time in vacation. 27
3. Other Powers at Chambers. The Chancellor may, at Chambers: (1) order
publication for creditors on an insolvent bill 28 (2) may appoint an administra-
;
tor on a bill filed for that purpose, and order the sale of the decedent's prop-
erty; 29 (3) may hear and determine any motion necessary and proper to pre-
pare a case for final hearing; 30 (4) may make orders and issue process to carry
a decree into execution; (5) may appoint special commissioners to take ac-
counts; (6) may appoint persons to serve original, mesne, or final process; 31
(7) may appoint guardians ad litem; (8) may swear parties to bills or to an-
swers; (9) may appoint special terms for any of his Courts; 32 and (10) may
issue a peace warrant, 33 a search warrant, 34 and a warrant for the arrest of
a fugitive from justice from another State. 35
ARTICLE II.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS UNDER THE

ACTS OF 1903 AND 1905.
§ 776. The Chambers of the Chancellor.
§ 777. How
Causes are Heard at Chambers.
781. How Orders and Decrees at Chambers
are Authenticated.
§ 778. Notice or Consent Required for Hear-
ings at Chambers. 782. Force and Effect of Orders and De-
§ 779. Forms of Proceedings at Chambers, crees at Chambers.
and of Entries Recording the Same.
783. Exceptions to Orders and Decrees
§ 780. Orders and Decrees at Chambers How
Entered of Record.
Made at Chambers.
§ 776. —
The Chambers of the Chancellor. The office room assigned the Chan-
cellor in the Court House is called his "Chambers" and if there be no such;
room, then his private office, or his quarters at the hotel, or any place where
21 Code, § 4451. 20 Code, §§2213-2215.
22 Code, §§ 4444-4445. 30 Code, § 4410.
23 Code, §§ 4360-4367. 31 Code, §§4410-4415.
Ch. Rule, VII, §2; post, §1196.
24 32 Code, § 3941.
Code, §§ 3723; 4482-4483. The Chancery Court,
25 33 Code, § 4943.
but not the Chancellor, may grant a habeas corpus, 34 Code, §§4943; 5320.
in any case, under the Act of 1877. 35 Code, §§ 4943; 5345.
26 Code, § 4367. See Chapter on Contempts, post, The Chancellor is, authorized to solemnize the rites
§§ 918-924. of matrimony, Code. § 3949; and visit the Insane
27 Code, § 4416. Asylum, Code, § 1523.
28 Code, § 2371.
603 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS. %777
he transacts business, is, for euphemism, called his "Chambers." Sometimes
when the proceeding is very important, or the number of attendants large,
Chambers proceedings are held in a Court room. But wherever the place may
be that the Chancellor transacts any business as a Chancellor, that place, pro
hac vice, becomes his Chambers, provided it be not his Court room, while his
Court is in session and he presiding.
While, ordinarily, the attendance of the Sheriff, or a deputy is not necessary
or required, at Chambers, nevertheless cases may and do arise when the pres-
ence of such an office may be necessary, especially while the Chancellor is
exercising some of the enlarged jurisdiction conferred on him by the Acts of
1903 and 1905. In any event, the Chancellor may command the attendance of
the Sheriff at his Chambers whenever, in his discretion, such attendance is nec-
essary or important.
And so, for like reasons and in like manner, the attendance of the Clerk and
Master may be required at Chambers, and he may be required to bring with
him any files or papers in his office needed in the matter pending.
§ 777. —
How Causes are Heard at Chambers. The Chancellor hears and de-
termines the questions presented to him under the preceding Article, at the
time and place specified by consent, or in the notice but if he can do so without
;
disregarding some other public duty, or without great personal inconvenience,

he is required to fix an early date and convenient place at which he will hear
the same. At such hearing he has all the powers he possesses at a regular term
of Court, as to the questions submitted to him for his determination. 1 The file
of papers in the cause being heard may be looked to by the Chancellor in deter-
mining the questions submitted to him. 2
If the matter to be acted on by the Chancellor at Chambers, is a matter of
minor importance, the hearing on it, if any hearing is required at all, will ordi-
narily be informal but if the matter is one of grave consequence, especially if
;
argument is to be heard, and parties and witnesses or spectators are present,

the hearing will approximate, in formality and dignity of procedure, a like
hearing in open Court, and the same procedure will be observed.
The Chancellor will first satisfy himself that the parties are consenting to
his jurisdiction, or that the notice required by the statute has been duly given
for, without consent or legal notice, he would have no right to act in any case
under the Acts of 1903 and 1905.
§ 778. Notice or Consent Required for Hearings at Chambers. A party —
desiring to bring any matter, or the hearing of any cause, before the Chancellor
at Chambers must, (1) obtain the consent of parties adversely interested, or
(2) give the notice required by the statute; but no cause can be heard and
determined by final decree unless the parties, or their Solicitors, consent to
such hearing. 3
In all cases, except for a final hearing and the confirmation of land sales, the
notice of the intended application shall be given in the same way and manner
as in case of motions to dissolve injunctions. 4 If any party has been pro con-
fessoed a copy of the notice filed with the Clerk and Master of the Court where
the cause is pending, for five days will be sufficient, provided the. Clerk and
Master enters it on his rule docket. Guardians, guardians ad litem, and Solic-
itors representing parties under any disability, may consent and give notice
under this section. 5 The power to act at Chambers under this section cannot,
x Acts of 1903, ch. 248, § 1. 854. In case of confirmation of land sales, ten
2 Ibid, § 5. days' notice is required, and consent for a final hear-
3 It would be well for the Chancellor to require a ing.
written consent in all cases of final hearing. The 5 Act of 1905, ch. 427, § 1. This means that guar-
writing, will save many differences of opinion and dians, guardians ad litem and Solicitors representing
much contention as to what was included in the con- parties under disabilities of any kind, may bind those
sent. The losing party will seek to restrict the con- they represent in any case under the Acts of 1903
sent, and the winning party will want to enlarge it. and 1905 either by bringing matters before the Chan-
See, post, § 1141, sub-sec. 4. cellor at Chambers, or consenting to their being
4 See Article on the Dissolution of Injunctions, § brought.
§ 779 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCEEEOR AT CHAMBERS. 604
however, be exercised outside of the county in which the suit is pending, unless
by consent of parties.
§ 779. Forms of Proceedings at Chambers, and of Entries
Same. —The following forms may be of some benefit in proceedingsRecording the
at Chambers
under this and preceding sections
NOTICE OP AN" APPLICATION TO THE CHANCELLOR.
John Doe, ]
vs. [ No. 713.— In Chancery at Bristol.
Richard Roe. J
The defendant is hereby notified that at 10 a. m. on the 12th day of September, 1905, in
the office of the Clerk and Master at Bristol, Tenn., I will apply to Chancellor Hal H. Haynes
for an order overruling the demurrer [or plea] filed by him in this cause [or for such other
order or action of the Chancellor as may be desired.]
This Sept. 1, 1905. Campbell & BorEn, Solicitors for Compl't.
ORDER MADE AT CHAMBERS.
John Doe,
vs. No. 713. — In
Chancery at Bristol.
Richard Roe.
This cause came on to be heard before me this Sept. 12, 1905, in the office of the Clerk
and Master at Bristol, on application of the complainant that the demurrer [or plea,] of the
defendant be overruled, and it duly appearing that legal notice of this application has been
given [or, and the defendent having waived notice, or the defendant being present in person,
cr by Solicitor, as the case may be,] on consideration of the premises, the Chancellor is of
opinion that said demurrer is bad, and the same is therefore overruled, [or, that said plea is
insufficient and dilatory, and the same is therefore overruled and disallowed,] and the de-
fendant is required to answer the bill on or before the 30th instant. 6
This order made on Sept. 12th, 1905, and the Clerk and Master will enter it at once on the
minutes of his Court.
Hal H, Haynes, Chancellor.
ENTRY ON THE MINUTE BOOK.
Chancery Court at Bristol, Tenn. 7
Order and Decrees, made at Chambers by Chancellor Hal H. Haynes, since the last term
of said Court.
John Doe,
—
1
vs. No. 713.

[ In Chancery at Bristol.
Richard Roe. J
[Here insert the foregoing order in full, including its date and the Chancellor's signature,
then add:]
The above order received by me through the Post Office [or by express,] Sept. 13, 1905.
John Smith, C. & M., and entered in the minute book, [or on the minutes,] Sept. 13, 1905.
John Smith, C. & M.
PRAYER POR, AND GRANT OF, APPEAL, a
John Doe,
vs. No. 713. —-In Chancery at Bristol.
Richard Roe.
The defendant, Richard Roe, prays an appeal from the decree of the Chancellor at Cham-
bers overruling his demurrer in this cause, and the Chancellor being of opinion that an appeal
is proper, grants said appeal, and allows the defendant thirty days in which to give bond,
[or, file a pauper's oath.]
The Clerk and Master will enter this order on his minutes, [or, in his minute book;] and,
on the appeal bond being filed [or oath taken] in season, will forward a transcript of the
record in the cause to the Supreme Court.
Sept. 12, 1905.
'
Hal H. Haynes, Chancellor.

This prayer for, and grant of, an appeal, may, when made at the time the
decree is pronounced, be entered just below the decree, and on the same paper.
§ 780. Orders and Decrees at Chambers, How Entered of Record. The —
orders and decrees made by the Chancellor at Chambers, under this and the
preceding section, must be in writing and signed by the Chancellor, and trans-
6 The is the Saturday before the next rule
30th 8 An appeal is the only method of obtaining a re-
day, and the defendant does not answer on or
if vision of a decision at Chambers. A writ of error
before day,
that a pro confesso can be entered will not lie. Lindsay l\ Allen, 4 Cates, 637. But
against him on the following Monday. see, ante, § 774, note 15.
7 If the entry is on the unclosed minutes this head
line may be omitted.
605 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS, §781
mitted by him, under seal, by registered letter or express, to the Clerk and
Master of the Court where the respective causes are pending, and the Clerk;
and Master shall note upon each the exact time of its receipt by him and he ;
shall enter it and all endorsements thereon, at once in his minute book, under
an appropriate heading, 9 showing that it is an order or decree made at Cham-
bers; and when so entered it shall have the same force and effect as if made
and entered at term time. 10
If the minutes of the Court shall have been left open, 11 then the orders and
decrees made at Chambers may be entered on the open minutes as in term
time, under an appropriate sub-head, thus Orders and Decrees made at Cham-
: '
'
bers." Each order and decree should have at its foot, in addition to the en-,
dorsements on the decree and the date it was made by the Chancellor, an entry
showing when it was made on the minute book.
§ 781. How Orders and Decrees at Chambers are Authenticated. At the —
next term12 of the Court, after the entry of a Chambers order or decree on the
minute book, or in the minutes, the Chancellor is required to examine it, and if
found correct he approves it and signs the minutes.
CHANCELLOR'S APPROVAL OP THE MINUTES.
The foregoing [or orders and decrees,] made by me at Chambers since the last
order,
term of the Court have been examined and found correct, and are hereby approved.
November 4, 1905. Hal H. Haynes, Chancellor.
If any error be discovered in any order or decree he will have it corrected
so as to conform to the original decree.
The Chancellor may leave his record of the term's proceedings unadjourned
until Court in course, in which event, any order or decree made at Chambers
may be entered on the minutes as in term time, and shall be as effective as if
made during term time provided that all the steps are taken by the applicant,
;
the Chancellor and the Clerk and Master, that are required to be taken by
them, in case of orders and decrees at Chambers when the record is closed. 13
Orders and decrees so entered have all the force and effect of orders and de-
crees made and entered in term time and if the decree is final it may be ap-
;
pealed from, and if not appealed from may be enforced by execution, writ of
possession or other proper final process as in case of other final decrees. 14 But
when the record is left open the Chancellor may close it at any convenient
time, but in any event not later than the next regular term of the Court. 15
§ 782. Force and Effect of Orders and Decrees at Chambers. Any final —
decree at Chambers, made pursuant to the preceding sections, when entered by
the Clerk and Master, either in his minute book or on the unclosed minutes
of his Court, has the same force and effect as if made and entered at term
time, 16 and may in like manner be appealed from, and if not appealed from is
enforced by executions, writs of possession, and other final process therein pro-
vided and it is the duty of the Clerk and Master, after the expiration of thirty
;
days from the entry of a final decree upon the minutes of his Court, to issue
all necessary process, as in case of final decrees made and entered in term
time. 17
9 An appropriate heading would be: be done at the next term, whether regular or special.
Chancery Court at Bristol, Tennessee. Besides, the Act of 1905, ch. 427, § 2,, requires objec-
Orders and decrees made at Chambers by Hon. tions to Chambers orders and decrees to be made
Hal. H. Haynes, Chancellor, since the last term "before or during the next regular or special term
of this Court. of Court succeeding the entry of such order or-
10 Acts of 1903, ch. 248, §§ 1 and 3. decree on the minutes."
11 There is a difference between an entry made in 13 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, § 2.
the minute book and an entry made on the minutes; 14 Acts of 1903, ch. 248, sees. 3, 7, and 9.
the former is made when the minutes of the preced- 15 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, § 2.
ing term have been closed, and so a fuller caption is leActs of 1903, ch. 248, §§3, 7, and 9;' Acts of
required. When the minutes of the Court have been 1905, ch. 427, § 2. It is clear that the two Acts
left open by the Chancellor, then a Chambers order give a Chambers order, or decree, when entered by
may be entered on the minutes under the caption the Clerk and Master, all the efficacy of a Court-
given in the text. order or decree.
12 The Act says at the next regular term, but as 17 Acts of 1903, ch. 248, § 7.
this is merely directory, the authentication can better
§ 783 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CHANCELLOR AT CHAMBERS. 606
And what is and effect of a final decree at Chambers, is,
true as to the force
a fortiori, true of any order made at Chambers.
§ 783. Exceptions to Orders and Decrees Made at Chambers. If proper —
notice 18 of an application to the Chancellor at Chambers was not given to the
exceptant, or if the Chancellor heard the question presented at an adjourned
time and place whereof the exceptant had no notice, or if in any way the ex-
ceptant was not sufficiently notified, or if notified failed to be present on good
grounds, or if in any way unjustly prejudiced by the order made, or by the
transmission or entry thereof, and he desires to except to the order, or if he
desires to except to a decree on the merits made without his consent, he must
make his objections and take the proper steps to present them before or during
the next regular or special term of the Court succeeding the entry of the order
or decree or the irregularity or want of notice, or other failure to comply with
;
the provisions set out in this section, will be deemed waived and the defect
cured. 19
IS If the defendant to the application was present I 19 Acts of 1905, ch. 427, § 2.
at the hearing thereof that cures want of, or defect
in, a notice. I
607 AFFIDAVITS. §78-*
CHAPTER XXXIX.
AFFIDAVITS.
784: Office of an Affidavit.
785. By Whom Affidavits Should be Made. § 789. Forms of Affidavits to Bills, Petitions,
786. Requisites and Frame of an Affidavit. Pleas, and Answers.
787. Weight and Effect of an Affidavit. § 790. Before Whom Affidavits Must be
788. Affidavits to Bills, Petitions, Pleas and Made.
Answers.
§ 784. Office of —
an Affidavit. An affidavit is a statement reduced to writing,
and sworn to before some person authorized to administer the oath. 1 The or-
dinary offices of an affidavit are (1) to aid in supporting or opposing, an
application for an order of the Court, whether such application be based on a
motion, or on petition; (2) to serve as a substitute for an officer's return of
service of process, notices and other papers, (3) to verify bills, answers and
pleas, when verification is necessary; and (4) in general, to bring before the
Court facts which do not otherwise appear in the record of a cause.
Affidavits are ordinarily needed in support of motions in the following cases
(1) motions for publication when personal service is dispensed with; (2) mo-
tions for the appointment of guardians ad litem; (3) applications for process
without bonds for costs or damages; (4) applications for an injunction; (5) for
an attachment of property; or (6) for a receiver; (7) motions to set aside a
pro confesso; (8) to extend the time for taking proof; (9) to re-examine a wit-
ness to the same facts; (10) for a continuance; (11) for an attachment for
contempt; (12) for better prosecution surety; (13) for a new trial, or re-
hearing; (14) for leave to file a bill of review for new facts;. (15) for retaxa-
tion of costs, and (16) for all other cases wherein the grounds of the motion do
not already sufficiently appear of record.
Affidavits are not a part of a Court record, even if filed, unless made so by
a bill of exceptions, or by an order on the minutes in the nature of a bill of
exceptions: All affidavits read in a cause should, however, be duly filed, and
the Court may decline to hear them until they are filed.
§ 785. —
By Whom Affidavits Should be Made. As a general rule, an affidavit
should be made by the person who "has personal knowledge of the facts, unless
a good reason is shown for its being made by some other person. An affidavit
may be made by an agent, or by a Solicitor, when he has personal knowledge
of the facts 2 but, as a rule, not otherwise. The leading affidavit should be made
;
by the party himself, unless he is sick, or absent,' or the suit is being conducted
by an agent, or attorney in fact corroborating affidavits may be made by any
:
one having personal knowledge of the facts. 3 Where, however, the facts are
peculiarly and personally within the knowledge of the Solicitor, his affidavit
1 1Barb. Ch. Pr., 597; 3 Greenl. Ev., §380. In sufficientreason given for their not being so made;
judicis non creditur nisi juratis. (In judicial pro- and all writings referred to in affidavits should be
ceedings nothing is believed unless sworn to.) See, exhibited, or a sufficient excuse given for not so
ante, § 62, sub-sec. 2. The Judges, Solicitors, attor- doing. See Topp V. White, 12 Heisk., 201; 1 Dan.
neys, clerks, sheriffs, and other officers of the Court, Ch. Pr., 395, note; Cook V. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496-
are all sworn, and what they do and say officially is Totten v. Nance, 3 Tenn. Ch., 264.
under the sanction of their respective oaths. The affidavit of a Solicitor is, ordinarily, insuffi-
2 And his affidavit should show that he is ac- cient to supply the place of an affidavit by his client,
quainted with the facts, Cheatham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., unless the Solicitor show that the facts deposed to
_
668. are within his personal knowledge and not within

3 Barb. Ch. Pr., 599.
1 The general rule of evi- the knowledge of his client, or unless some other
dence, that the best evidence obtainable must be pro- good reason be given why the party himself does
duced, is as applicable to affidavits as to other evi- not depose in place of his Solicitor. This rule holds
dence. Affidavits should, therefore, be made by those good in case of affidavits to amend bills or answers,
best acquainted with the facts to be proved, or a in which case the party must swear to the amend-
§786 AFFIDAVITS. 608
should always accompany that of his client, especially when diligence, good
faith, surprise, or want
of notice is involved, during the progress of a suit.
"When a married woman sues by next friend, her bill should be sworn to by
herself, unless the facts upon which the bill rests are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the next friend, and the bill, or affidavit, so shows. 4 The next
friend of an infant generally signs and swears to the bill, unless the infant best
knows the facts, and is of a suitable age, in which case he may sign and swear
to the bill. 5 The bill of a corporation must be sealed with the seal of the cor-
poration, if it have one, and if it needs verification, must be sworn to by some
officer or agent who knows the facts set out in the bill. 6 Petitions should be
sworn to by the petitioners, and not by agents, or Solicitors. 7 Answers must
be sworn to by the defendants filing them, if adults and of sound mind if in- ;
fants, or of unsound mind, their guardians, or guardians ad litem must swear to

their answers.
§ 786. Requisites and Frame of an The ordinary parts of an
Affidavit. —
affidavit are: 1, The proper The venue; 3, The name of the
title or style; 2,
deponent; 4, The substance, or statement of facts; 5, The conclusion; 6, The
signature; and 7, The oath and jurat. These parts will be separately con-
sidered. 8
1. The Title, or Style, of the Cause. An affidavit must be correctly entitled in
the cause, or matter, in which it is made and an affidavit made in one cause can-
;
not be read for the purpose of obtaining an order in another cause. 9 But in
proceedings for contempt against a witness, or other person not a party to the
suit, all affidavits subsequent to the order for the attachment should be en-
titled in the name of the State, on the relation of the party prosecuting the
attachment against the person attached. 10 In entitling an affidavit where the
parties are numerous, it is sufficient to give the name of the first complainant,
and of the first defendant, adding "and others," or "et al. Thus, John Doe,
11
ct al., vs. Richard Roe, et al.
2. The Venue. The venue should appear on the face of the affidavit, so that
it may be known in what county and State the oath was taken. The venue
may be placed next below the style of the cause or it may be prefixed to the
;
jurat. If the affidavit is sworn to in open Court, and the jurat so shows, that
is sufficient evidence of the venue.
3. The Name of the Affiant. The person making the affidavit should begin
his statement by giving his name and place of residence, and if he is a party,
or has any connection with the suit, or is a' solicitor, witness, or officer, he
should so state. It is, also, often important to state his age and business; these
facts often add force to his statements. 12
4. The Substance, or Statement of Facts. An affidavit must be pertinent to the
application based on it, and must be free from prolixity, impertinence, and
scandal. 13 An affidavit should give all the necessary circumstances of time,
ment: his Solicitor may, however, make a supple- 8 The requisites of an affidavit given in this sec-
mentary affidavit. Cook v. Bee, 2 Tenn. Ch., 343; tion will be found in 3 Greenl. Ev., §8 380-382; and
Wilson V. Wilson, 2 Lea, 17. The affidavit may be in 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 600-604.
by one of two partners. Cheatham V. Pearce, 5 9 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 600. The reason of this rule is.
Pick., 668. An affidavit to a petition by an "agent," that the misentitling of an affidavit will exempt the
without any explanation as to the character of his deponent from the punishment of perjury, although
agency or his knowledge of the facts, is a nullity. his oath is false. Ibid.
fReid v. Hoffman, 6 Heisk., 440. io 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 600.
i Smith v. Republic L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 631. 11 Et al. is the correct abbreviation for
both com-
In Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 313, it was held plainants and defendants, and for both the singular
that the next friend is the proper party to make oath and plural numbers. See Reukert v. Elliott, 11 Lea
to the truth of the facts set forth in the bill. There 242; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 380.
is really no necessary conflict between the two cases; 12 3 Greenl. Ev., § 380.
if the married woman has personal knowledge of the 13 It is scandalous and impertinent in an affidavit
facts, and the next friend has not, she should swear to draw inferences, or state arguments, reflecting
to the bill, and vice versa; the question being, which on the character, or impeaching the motives of the
one has the necessary personal knowledge of the adverse party, or his Solicitor. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 602-
facts, on which the equity of the bill is based. See, 603. The Court should refuse to hear an affidavit
Reid v. Hoffman. 6 Heisk., 440. containing scandalous and impertinent statements
5 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 361. See, ante, § ISO. What is there said as to bills is.
6 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 395, note; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 361. true of all papers filed in a cause.
7 Johnson v. Murray, 12 Lea, 109.
609 AFFIDAVITS. §787
place, and manner, and other material incidents; and its matter should be suffi-
cient, when considered by itself, or in connection with other affidavits, to war-
rant the application based on it, or supported by it. The matter it contains, and
all the material circumstances attending it, should be stated positively, so that
the Court may be fully informed as to the truth of the matter. An affidavit
should give facts, 14 and not hearsay, opinions, inferences, or conclusions of law.
"When the deponent swears to words spoken, it is a proper precaution to add,
"or words to that effect." Affidavits ought also to be legibly written in ink,
and in one handwriting, without any interlineations or erasures, except such
as are noted before signing.
5. The Conclusion. After the substance, or statement of facts, has been set
forth, an affidavit usually concludes thus: "And further this deponent saith
not." This conclusion, however, is not essential; it is intended to mean that
the deponent has no further knowledge on the subject and it would be highly ;
culpable in the deponent to suppress any facts that would nullify, or materially
modify, the statements made. 15
6. The Signature. An affidavit must be duly signed at the foot thereof, on
the right hand side. If the affiant can possibly sign, his own name, he should
do so if not, he should make his mark, and his signature should be duly
;
witnessed.
7. The Oath, and Jurat. The deponent must not only be duly sworn to the
truth of the contents of his affidavit, 16 but the officer must, also, certify that
fact, in a jurat written at the foot of the affidavit, upon the left hand side the :
jurat should be duly dated, and signed officially.

An affidavit in support of a motion or petition is usually in the following
form:
FORM OP AN AFFIDAVIT.^
John Doe, et al.,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Loudon, Tenn.
Richard Roe, et al.
John Den, 18 being duly sworn, says that he is a resident of Loudon, Tenn., is 38 years of
age, and is a farmer and school teacher and that he knows of his own personal knowledge
;
the following facts [Here set forth the facts and circumstances, particularly, giving dates
:
and localities.'] And further this deponent saith not. John Den.
Jurat,
Subscribed and sworn to, [or, affirmed,]
before me, [in open Court,l this Aug. 23, 1890.
N. H. Greer, C. & M.
§ 787. —
Weight and Effect of an Affidavit. Courts act only on what is sworn
to; 19 and when a fact, or state of facts, is duly verified by the affidavit of a
competent person, the Court accepts such affidavit, for the particular occasion,
as absolutely true 20 unless it is highly improbable, or unreasonable, or is self-
;
contradictory, or vague and unsatisfactory, or is merely on information, or is

contradicted by the record. Thus, where an affidavit, whether of a party, or of
another person, is required in support of a motion, or petition, (which is its
proper office,) it is ordinarily received for that.purpose as conclusive evidence of
14 Anact is a thing of time, place and circum- this affidavit, by you subscribed, are true. So help
stance. Broom's Leg. Max., 102; and facts are com- you, Cod."
posed mainly of acts. An affidavit should specify 17 See Index, for other and fuller forms of affida-
time, place, quantity, quality, circumstance, incident vits.
and limitation. Every fact should be faithfully pho- made by more than one per-
18 If the affidavit is
tographed in connection with its immediate surround- son statement will begin thus: "IS F, aged 38
its
ings; and every complete statement of a fact includes years, and
I J, aged 29 years, both farmers and res-
considerations of quantity, quality, time when, place idents of said county, being duly sworn, severally
where, circumstances in which, incident to what, and depose and say: and first, this deponent, IS F, for
limitations how and by what. himself says that" [here giving his statements in
15 A deponent who would suppress facts, known full]. "And the deponent, I J, for himself, says
to him, that would change the force or effect of that" [here give his statements. And then if there
his affidavit, is guilty of perjury in his heart. The be facts to which both may severally swear, the affi-
wilful suppression of a material truth is equivalent davit may proceed thus:] "And these deponents fur-
to the wilful suggestion of a material falsehood. ther severally say: [giving the balance of the affi-
10 The oath administered to the deponent is as davit.]
follows: "You swear lor affirm] that the contents of 10 Jurato creditur in judicio.
20 Greenl. Ev„ §§ 384-385.
§788 AFFIDAVITS. 610
the facts it contains. And the like effect should be given to them by the Master,
when used in support of motions before him.
§ 788. Affidavits to Bills, Petitions, Pleas, and Answers. All bills and peti- —
tions that pray for extraordinary process, such as bills for injunctions, attach-
ments, ne exeats, and receivers all bills for divorce, for the appointment of ad-
;
ministrators, for the sale of the property of persons under disability, or to set
up lost instruments, or to have an inquisition of lunacy, or for a mandamus,
or for a writ of replevin, all bills in the name of the State against corporations,
public trustees, and usurpers of office, and all bills of interpleader, bills for the
administration of insolvent estates, for the perpetuation of testimony, to take
testimony de bene esse, and to review decrees on facts, and all bills setting out
facts requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or process by publica-
tion, 21 must be sworn to and all answers 22 must be sworn to, unless the bill
;
waives an answer under oath, or unless it be the answer of a corporation. 23

All pleas must be sworn to, unless they are based on matters of record in the
Court. And all petitions presented to the Court during the progress of a suit,
on which the action of the Court is sought, must be verified.
The force of a bill, petition, or answer, depends greatly on the character of
the affidavit attached to it for no bill, petition, or answer can be any stronger
;
than its verification and if the verification is on mere information and belief,
;
the pleading is but little more than hearsay. 24 So, if the verification is direct
and positive, but by a third person who is not shown to be acquainted with the
facts, it has but little force. 25 An injunction bill, sworn to on information and
belief, is utterly inadequate to' withstand a motion to dissolve the injunction,
when the answer is sworn to positively, and directly, on the personal knowledge
of the defendant. On the other hand, vain is the effort to dissolve an injiuiction,
when the answer is sworn to on information and belief, and the bill is on the
direct personal knowledge of the complainant 26 the difference between the two
;
is the difference between hearsay and evidence. An answer on information

and belief simply makes an issue, even when an answer on oath is called for. 27
§ 789. Forms of Affidavits to Bills, Petitions, Pleas, and Answers. The —
form and substance of affidavits to bills, petitions, and answers, are substan-
tially as follows:
AFFIDAVIT TO A BILL, PETITION, OR ANSWER.
County of Campbell. )
John Doe [the complainant, or petitioner, or defendant^ makes oath [or, affirms,] that
the statements in his foregoing bill [or, petition, or, answer,] are true of his own knowledge,
except as to the matters [therein stated to be on information and belief, and these matters
he believes to be true. John Doe.
Jurat,
Sworn to [or, affirmed,] and sub-
scribed* before me, March 30, 1891.
John J. Graham, C. & M.
ANOTHER FORM OF AFFIDAVIT TO A BILL, PETITION, OR ANSWER.
County of Campbell. J
John Doe, [the complainant, or defendant,} makes oath [or, affirms,] the statements in his
foregoing bill,[or, petition, or, answer,] made as of his own knowledge, are true, and those
made on information and belief, he believes to be true. John Doe.
[Jurat, as above.']
21 See, ante, § 161. 27 Wilkin v. May, 3 Head, 175; McKissick, V.

22A joint answer must be sworn to by all the de- Martin, 12 Heisk., 313. Bills and answers are often
fendants. Cook v. Dews, 2 Tenn. Ch., 496. sworn to, in such a defective or indefinite manner,
23 As to sworn answers of corporations, see §§ 379, that they cannot be regarded as sworn to at all.
note 20; 789. The author has had numerous bills presented to him,
24 See Reid V. Hoffman, 6 Heisk., 440; and Smith as Chancellor, for fiats, with nothing to them to show
v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 631; Davis verification except the jurat. The distinction between
v. Reaves, 2 Lea, 651. an affidavit and a jurat is sometimes overlooked. See
25 Topp V. White, 12 Heisk., 201. Lookout Bank v. Noe, 2 Pick., 21.
26 1 High on Injunc; §35; 2 Ibid, §§1505-1507;
see Chapter on Injunctions, post, §§ 838-843.
611 AFFIDAVITS. §790
If the complainant makes his mark, the better practice is to begin the affidavit
thus:
John Doe [the complainant, or petitioner, or defendant,] makes oath [or, affirms,] that
he has heard his foregoing bill [or, petition, or answer,] read and knows the contents thereof
and that the statements therein made as of his own knowledge are true, and those made as
on information and belief, he believes to be true. His
Witness: John X Doe.
John Brown. mark
[Jurat, as above.]
"When a bill, petition or answer is sworn to by an agent, Solicitor, or attor-
ney, the affidavit should show that fact; and should, also, show the affiant's
knowledge. 28
AFFIDAVIT OF AN AGENT, OK, SOLICITOR.
County of Campbell. J
Hawk Powers makes oath

that he is the Solicitor [or, agent, or, attorney in fact,] of the
complainant that he has read [or, heard read,] the above bill [or, answer,]
[or, defendant,]
and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, 29 except
as to the matters therein stated to be on the information and belief of the complainant, [or,
defendant,] and that as to those matters he believes it to be true. Powers.Hawk
[Jurat, as above.]
This form will do when a bill, or answer, is filedby a corporation, and is
sworn to by its president, or other chief officer. In such a case, the following
form may be used, also
AFFIDAVIT TO THE PLEADING OF A CORPORATIONS
County of Shelby. J
Frank Faithful makes oath that he is the president [or, secretary, or treasurer,] of the
Coal Mountain Company, the complainant [or, defendant,] corporation, and that the fore-
going bill [or, answer,] of said company is true of his own knowledge, except as to the
matters therein stated to be on information and belief, and that as to those matters he believes
it to be true and he hereto affixes the seal of said company in further attestation of the
;
truth of its bill [or, answer.] Frank Faithful, President.

[Jurat, as above.] (L. S.)
AFFIDAVIT TO A PLEA IN ABATEMENT^ OR A PLEA IN BAR.32

County of Campbell, j
The defendant, Richard Roe, makes oath that his foregoing plea is and
true [in substance
in fact.] Richard Roe.
this June 7, 190S. Winston Baird, C. & M.
§ 790. Before Whom
Affidavits Must be Made. —
Affidavits to bills, petitions,
pleas and answers, and, also, to any statement or writing used for judicial pur-
poses and needing verification, may be made before any Judge, Justice of the
Teace, Clerk of Court, or Notary Public in this State, and in another State
before any Judge or Justice of the Peace, accompanied by a certificate of his
official capacity by the Clerk of his Court, or before any State Commissioner or
Notary Public under their seals of office. 33 The Court or Clerk and Master may
appoint a special commissioner to administer oaths either in this or any other
State. 34
28 Cheatham v. Pearce, 5 Pick., 668. 32 See Pleas in Bar, ante, § 340.

29 Reid v. Hoffman, 6 Heisk., 440. 33 Code, §§4331, 4398. But in Fawcett V. Rail-
30 A bill or answer of a corporation, needing veri- way Co., 5 Cates, 246, it was held that a pauper
fication, must be sealed with the corporation seal, oath taken before a Notary Public in another State
and sworn to by some officer or agent, 2 Barb. Ch. was void.
Pr., 361; see, ante, §379, note 20. 34 Code, § 4399.
31 See Pleas in Abatement, ante, § 254.
§791 PETITIONS. 612
CHAPTER XL.
PETITIONS.
791. Petitions Generally Considered.
792. Petition by a Party to the Suit.
§ 796. When a Petition is Not Proper.
§ 797. The Frame and Form of a Petition.
793. Petition by a Quasi Party to the Suit.
794. Petition by a Stranger to the Suit.
§ 798. When and Where a Petition Must be
Filed.
795. Frame and Form of a Petition Pro
Interesse Suo. § 799. The Hearing of a Petition.
§ 791. Petitions Generally Considered. —A

petition is a written request, ad-
dressed to the Chancellor, setting forth some matter of fact, or ground of com-
plaint, as to which the petitioner prays the Chancellor to make some order, or
give some direction. 1 Petitions for interlocutory orders must, of course, be
filed in some cause in the Court, and must invoke the action of the Court in
reference to some matter connected with such cause. A petition must always
state by whom it is presented it may be filed by any one who can file a bill but,
; ;
if the petitioner is under any disability, he or she must appear by guardian, or

next friend. A
petition must state the material facts upon which the applica-
tion contained in it is based, must conclude with a prayer for the particular
order desired, and must be sworn to, 2 •
Where an application to the Court is by some party to the suit, and is based
on some matter contained in the record, it may be made by motion but where ;
the application is based on matters not contained in the record, or where it is

made by a person not a party to the suit, it must be made by petition. When a
stranger files a petition he may be required to give a cost bond but a petition ;
by parties to the suit seeking some incidental relief can be prosecuted without
a bond for costs. 3
§ 792. —
Petition by a Party to the Suit. The most common cases wherein a
party is required to file a petition are 1, Where, when a defendant is made a
:
party by publication, or by attachment and publication, he, or his heirs, or rep-

resentatives, after a final decree on a pro confesso, desire to contest the com-
plainant's bill 4 2, Where a party desires to discharge, or reduce, a levy or bond,
;
in proceedings under extraordinary process; 5 3, Where a party seeks to have

biddings opened, or reopened; 4, Where a party has been aggrieved by some
interlocutory order, which the Court has yet the power to modify, or vacate;
5, Where a party desires to bring before the Court a case of contempt, not com-
mitted in its presence; 6 6, Where a party, imprisoned for contempt, seeks to
be released on a habeas corpus;"1 7, Where a party applies for a writ of error
coram nobis, 6 or a rehearing 9 and 8, Where a party seeks a restraining order, or
;
an injunction, or receiver, on grounds arising during the litigation.

§ 793. —
Petition by Quasi Party to the Suit. A quasi party is a person who,
1 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 160?. The term petition, in our Heisk., 294. In this Chapter, however, the term pe-
practice, is acomprehensive term, including not only tition is used in the narrower sense stated in the
written requests for interlocutory orders, but even a text. See, ante, % 133.
written ground of complaint, on which- a subpcena 2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1604-1605.
may issue, to 'which an answer may be filed, and by s Yowell ex parte, 7 Heisk., 561.
means of all which rights may be adjudicated, and i Code, §§3533; 4380; 4381; ante, §213.
decrees pronounced and enforced. A divorce may 5 Code, § 4451; Markham V. Townsend, 2 Tenn.
be had, land may be partitioned, or sold for partition, Ch., 715.
and some other suits may be begun, by petition. In- 6 Ch. Rule, VII, §§ 2; 1196, post.
deed, if the proper objection is not made by the 7 Code, § 3722.
proper party, and at the proper time, the Court may, 8 Code. § 3111.
on petition and answer thereto, adjudicate matters Ch. Rule, XV, § 1; post, §§ 1204; 1217-1220.
proper for an original bill. Majors V. McNeilly, 7
613 PETITIONS. §794
while not a formal party complainant or defendant, is, nevertheless, before the
Court in some capacity, ordinarily, either (1) as a creditor who has been al-
lowed to file a claim, 10 or (2) as a purchaser of' property sold and so reported
by the Master; 11 or (3) as a surety on a note, or bond, filed in the cause; 12 or
(4) as a receiver, sequestrator, or other person, acting under the immediate and
special order of the Court, in some particular cause.
A quasi party may ordinarily bring before the Court, by motion, any matter
pertaining to his interest in the suit, and may support his motion by affidavit,
when necessary. In the following cases, however, he must file a petition: 1,
Where he is named in a bill to administer assets as a creditor, but is not made
a party, and wishes to set up his claim in the suit 2, Where a creditor desires
;
to contest the claim of some other party, or to assert some other right not appa-
rent on the record; 3, Where a purchaser at a Master's sale, wishes to be re-
lieved from his purchase, or to recover back the purchase-money, or to have
an abatement in the price 13 4, Where a receiver, or sequestrator, or other
;
officer, of the Court wishes to bring forward some matter connected with the
cause wherein he is interested, such matter not otherwise sufficiently appearing,
such as that he has been interfered with, or sued while in discharge of his duty,
or wishes the direction of the Court, or desires to be discharged; 14 5, Where
any quasi party wishes to bring any matter, pertinent to the cause, and material
to his interests, before the Court, and the grounds of motion do not sufficiently
appear on the face of the record.
§ 794. —
Petition by a Stranger to the Suit. When a person, not a party,
desires to take some step, assert some right, or obtain some benefit, in a cause
pending in Court, he must do so by petition. The most usual cases are 1, :
Where a creditor of an estate, being administered in Chancery, desires to file

and prove his claim and it matters not whether such estate be that of a dead
;
or of a living person; all that is requisite is that the Court is undertaking to

distribute the assets among those lawfully entitled to share in the distribution. 15
A creditor, not made a party, may come in by petition when an administrator,
or a creditor, files a bill to sell the land of a decedent to pay debts or when a ;
bill is filed to wind up an insolvent estate 16 or when an insolvent firm, or an

;
insolvent corporation, is being wound up in Chancery. 2, Where a person has

an interest in the subject-matter of the suit, or in the recovery sought or ob-
tained, he must make himself a party by petition, if he seeks to assert that
interest. Thus, where a person has an interest in a trust fund, or trust property
of any kind, in the custody of the Court, or sought to be administered or dis-
tributed in Court 1T or where the benefit of a recovery, or of a fund, enures to
;
the benefit of a third person not before the Court; 18 or where a third person
claims the specific property in litigation, or an interest therein; 19 or where a
suit is brought by a few of many having concurrent rights or interests, in behalf
of all in any such case he must file a petition. 20 3, Where property, which has
;
10 Ewing V. Maury, 3 Lea, 381. claim with the Master within time, he will save the
11 Eagan V. Phister, 5 Sneed, 298. bar of the statute, and be entitled to a report in his
12 Majors v. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 299. favor. Camp v. Sherley, 9 Lea, 255. If the parties
13 Deaderick v. Smith, 6 Hum., 138. But after acquiesce in the claims being filed, without petition,
the sale is confirmed, and the term is past, a sale in an insolvent proceeding, the owners of such claims
can be set aside only for fraud, accident, or mistake; thereby become quasi parties, with the right to be
and then an original bill must be filed. Spence v. heard and to appeal. Ewing v. Maury, 3 Lea, 381.
Armour, 9 Heisk., 167. See, Foster v. Bradford, For_ fuller statement of the practice in adminis-
1 Tenn. Ch., 400. tration suits, see the Chapter on that subject.
14 Receivers, sequestrators, and others acting un- IT Birdsong v. Birdsong, 2 Head, 289.
der the immediate special orders of the Court, are 18 Saylors o. Saylors, 3 Heisk., 533.
officers of the Court, and are treated as such; never- 19 Code, § 2799; Hill V. Bowers, 4 Heisk., 272;
theless, they at times assume relations to the suit Treece v. Treece, 5 Lea, 221. A petition in such a
somewhat analogous to quasi parties, and are liable case should be verified by affidavit. Hunt V. Wing,
on their bonds as quasi parties. 10 Heisk., 139. The petitioner must show an in-
15 Richardson v. Richardson, Thomp. Cas., 66. terest in the property. Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn.
16 Code, § 2373; Miller V. Taylor. 2 Shan. Cas., Ch., 140; and the claim to the property must not
462; Reid v. Huff, 9 Hum., 359. But if a debt is have been acquired pending the litigation. Exchange
specified in an insolvent bill as valid, it is not nec- Bank v. Andrews, 12 Heisk., 306.
essary for the creditor thus named in the bill, to 20Sto. Eq. PI., §§90; 96; 99; 104; 208.
file a petition: he is a quasi party, and by filing his
§795 PETITIONS. 614
been seized by a receiver, sequestrator or other person, acting under the orders
of the Court, or which has been otherwise impounded, or which is about to be
sold,by the Court, or is otherwise in jeopardy, belongs to a stranger 21 to the
suit,whose title is paramount to that of any of the parties, the person claiming
the paramount title must file a petition in the Court, by whose authority the
property has been seized, setting forth his title, and praying to have the prop-
erty returned to his possession. Such a petition is a petition pro interesse suo.
The reasons why a petition is necessary in the above cases are, ordinarily,
the following: 1, The Court has no jurisdiction to determine any question in
dispute unless it is raised by some proper pleading 2, Proof cannot lawfully be
;
taken upon any matter or issue not presented or raised by some proper plead-
ing 3, No person is bound by a decree in a cause or matter to which he was not
j
a party 4, ; A
stranger to a cause, if allowed to take proof, or to contest a mat-
ter, or to intermeddle, might greatly increase the costs and yet have given no
security to pay the same.
§ 795. Frame and Form of a Petition Pro Interesse Suo. When a receiver, —
sequestrator, or other officer of the Court, seizes, or is put in possession of,
property under a special order of Court, and such property is claimed by a
stranger to the suit, the latter will not be allowed forcibly to reclaim the prop-
erty, nor to replevy it, nor bring any other sort of suit against such officer in
reference thereto for the Court will consider any such proceeding a contempt
;
and will deal with the offender accordingly. 22

The only courses open to such claimant are 1, to present a petition pro
:
interesse suo 23 in the cause wherein the receiver or other officer is acting, setting
forth in such petition his rights to such property, and when and under what
circumstances he was deprived thereof, and praying for a writ of restitution;
or 2, if his title is prior and superior to that of any of the litigants, he may
f'']e an original bill against those litigants claiming the property, and set forth
his title, and enjoin them from interfering with his property. 233-
The Court will order the petition to be filed, and give the complainant in
the original bill leave to answer it if he so desire. If the answer dispute the
title of the petitioner, the Court will either summarily dispose of the matter, 24
or, if desired by either party, will refer the matter to the Master to hear proof
and report on the petitioner's claim. 25
The petitioner must ordinarily show that his title to the property in question
is paramount to that of any of the parties to the suit and if he claims under ;
any party to the suit he must show that he acquired his title before the bill was
filed, and paid a valuable consideration therefor; and if he have any written
evidences of title he should file them with his petition. His petition must be
verified by his affidavit. The following is a form for such a petition
PETITION PRO INTERESSE STJO.

John Doe, 1
vs. } In Chancery, at Kingston.
Richard Roe, et al. )
To the Hon. W. B. Staley, Chancellor.

Yourpetitioner, John Jones, a resident of Roane county, respectfully shows to your Honor
that on the 1st day of June, 1884, the Sheriff of Roane county, by virtue of a writ of posses-
sion, placed Henry Crumbliss, the Receiver in this cause, in possession of the following prop-
erty belonging to petitioner [Here describe the property.']
:
Petitioner represents to your Honor that said property was not liable to said seizure
that said property is his own, and has been in his possession for....years, [stating how long,]
21 If the property of a stranger to the suit is contempt of Court to sue the Sheriff for doing what
levied upon, or otherwise seized by a Sheriff, under the Court commanded him to do.
a general writ of attachment or execution, the stran- 22 See, ante, § 794, note, 21; post, §§ 894; 910.
ger may recover it in replevin, or sue for its con- 23 Ibid, § note.
656,
version but if a Sheriff should seize any property
;
23a Haynes Rizer, 14 Lea, 247.
v.
of a stranger by virtue of a special writ directing 24 liickman Dale, 7 Yerg., 154.
v.
him to seize it, the latter must apply to the Court 25 If petitioner's claim is disputed he may be re-
by petition for its return to him. It would be a quired to file a cost bond.
615 PETITIONS. §796
and that he acquired his title thereto in the following manner. [Here state how, and if he
have any paper title let him file it as exhibit A to his petition.}
Petitioner, therefore, prays that the said Receiver be directed to restore said property to
him, and that a writ of restitution issue, if necessary.
And petitioner prays for general relief. James SeviEr, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, § 789.]
If the decision is in favor of the petitioners, an order of the Court, to its

officer in possession of the disputed property, to restore it to the possession
of the petitioner, is ordinarily sufficient; but if not a writ of restitution will
be awarded. 26
§ 796. When a Petition is not Proper. —While our own practice is liberal,
in allowing a stranger to interevene by petition, to set up his claim to property,
or to a fund, in controversy in the Chancery Court, as shown in the preceding
section, nevertheless, to allow a third person to inject new matter into a liti-
gation, not germane to the issues presented by the pleadings, would be to
allow interminable confusion, incongruous issues, and general multifariousness,
wholly at variance with every principle of true pleading, and tending in-
evitably to vexatious perplexity, alike to the litigants and to the Chancellor.
For these reasons, no intervention should be allowed in any case where the
new matters sought to be introduced are irrelevant, multifarious, incongruous,
or otherwise proper for an original bill. 27
And, while the Code allows any and all matters to be brought forward in a
suit between one complainant and one defendant, 28 nevertheless, where there
are more parties than two, the Chancellor should not allow matters, wholly
foreign to the objects of the original pleadings, to be introduced by petition.
Such a practice is not only in violation of the fundamental rules of Equity and
good pleading, 29 but tends greatly to confuse and delay the final determination
of the cause, increases instead of diminishing costs, 30 and multiplies grounds
of appeal to the Supreme Court. It may be stated, as a general rule, that no
matter should be allowed to be introduced into a cause by a petition which is
(1) proper matter for an independent original bill; or (2) which could be
brought forward by an amendment to the bill, or by an amended or supple-
mental answer, or by a cross bill, on the part of the defendant; or (3) which,
if contained in the bill, would make it multifarious, or if set up in the answer
would be impertinent and no defence or (4) which would tend to create con-
;
fusion, perplexity or delay, without any compensating advantages.

To avoid the perplexities, resulting from the anomalous and reprehensible
practice of filing improper petitions in a cause, and taking issue and making
decrees on them, our Supreme Court constrained by the statute, 31 and prompted
by a most commendable disposition to do justice despite such gross irregulari-
ties, have dealt with such petitions as though they were original bills, and have
given the consequent relief. 32
§ 797. —
The Frame and Form of a Petition. A petition for an interlocutory
order contains all of the essentials of a supplemental bill, except the prayer
for process, and does sometimes pray that notice of its filing may be given to
26 For form of the writ, and other information in result in an increase of costs, and in expensive and
reference to the writ, and to a petition pro interesse vexatious delays.
suo, see, ante, § 657. 31 Code, §4516.
27 See Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch., 140. 32 Majors V. McNeilly, 7 Heisk., 294; Richardson
28 Code, § 4327. v. Keel, 9 Lea, 74; Horn V. Denton, 2 Sneed, 125,
29 Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch., 140. as construed in State v. Kellar, 11 Lea, 404.
. The
30 Many of these illogical and anomalous inter- Supreme Court being forbidden to reverse any de-
ventions result from a niggardly disposition to save cree, unless for errors which affect the merits, Code,
a few dollars in costs. Chancellors should be slow 4516. the duty of maintaining the rules of good plead-
to allow any practice, which will retard or confuse ing devolves almost exclusively upon the Chancellors.
the orderly determination of the matters presented An examination of our reports will show that it is
by the original pleadings, even though there be a possible for our Chancellors to introduce some whole-
probability that two or three dollars may possibly some reforms in Chancery pleading. The Supreme
be saved thereby. While Courts should be cautious Court has again and again admonished the inferior
not to cause or allow unnecessary costs, nevertheless, Courts on this subject. Roberts v. Stewart, 1 Yerg.,
neither justice, nor those rules whereby justice is 390: Cherry v. Hardin, 4 Heisk., 203; Maupin v.
evolved, should be sacrificed upon the altar of a Whitson, 2 Heisk., 1.
false economy. These attempts to save' costs often
S798 PETITIONS. 616
those adversely interested. It must (1) be addressed to the Chancellor of the
Court in which it is to be filed (2) it must specify the cause to which it relates,
;
and in which it seeks for some order; (3) it must contain in detail the facts,
or matters, which justify or authorize the order sought and (4) must pray for ;
the particular order desired, and may, also, pray for general relief.
33 A peti-
tion should be signed and sworn to 34 and, like all other
;
pleadings, must avoid
scandalous and impertinent matter.
PETITION BY A CREDITOR.
John Doe, Admr., &c,
vs.
Richard Roe, et at.
To the Hon. B. M. Estes, Chancellor

Peter Poe, a resident of Shelby county, Tennessee, respectfully shows to your Honor that
David Doe, the intestate of the complainant, died justly indebted to your petitioner in the
sum of two hundred dollars, evidenced by a note of hand, dated July 8, 1888, due one year
after date with interest from date. This note is made part of this petition, and is herewith
filed, and marked "Exhibit A." Said note was given to John Jones in part payment of the
tract of land sought to be sold in this cause; and to secure its payment a lien was retained
on the face of the deed, executed by said Jones to said David Doe, for said land. Said note
was by said Jones, for value received, in due course of trade, and before maturity, endorsed
and transferred to petitioner, and is now his property, and wholly unpaid.
Petitioner prays to be allowed to become a party to this cause, and to have said note and
debt declared a preferred claim, and paid in full out of the proceeds of said land when sold.
Petitioner prays for all necessary orders, references, and decrees, and for general relief.
George B. Peters, Solicitor. 35
County of Shelby. j
Peter Poe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing petition are true [to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief.] PETER PoE.
before me, May 1, 1890.
Ferd. De Soto, J. P.
A petition may be amended on proper application at any time, even during
the argument. Leave to amend is almost of course, 36 if applied for in due
season.
§ 798. When and Where a Petition Must be Filed. In contemplation of —
law the Courts are always open for the filing of any pleading, deposition, pe-
tition, affidavit, proof, or other paper or document, relating to any matter pend-
ing in Court, or to any new matter any person desires to bring before the
Court, whether Court be in session or not. 37 So, a petition may be filed at any
time, and if it relate to a matter in Court should be filed in the cause to which
it relates, and should be so entitled. The question of the right of the person
to file it, and of its sufficiency and truthfulness, are questions to be determined
by the Court when properly raised.
§ 799. —
The Hearing of a Petition. If a petition is in the nature of a formal
motion, and all the facts necessary to its due consideration appear of record,
or otherwise, in the cause, it is summarily heard and disposed of, after the
manner of a motion. If, however, the facts alleged in the petition do not other-
wise appear, and are denied, or at least not admitted, the Court usually directs
the Master to hear proof and report as to the facts. If the facts alleged in the
petition do not entitle the petitioner to the relief he seeks, or if the relief he
seeks is not proper to be granted in that cause, or in that form, or by such a
summary course of procedure, the opposite party may move the Court to dis-
33 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1604-1605. The practice is well settled, however, that either a
34 Hunt v. Wing, 10 Heisk., 139; 151. billor petition may be signed by the Solicitor, alone.
35 A petition, like a bill, may be signed by the pe- Swan V. Newman, 3 Head, 289; Litton V. Armstead,
titioner in person, but the Solicitor who draws the 9 Bax., 514.
petition generally signs it, and has his client swear 36 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1610.
to it. Judge Cooper, in Johnson V. Murray, 12 Lea, 37 Bledsoe v. Wright, 2 Bax., 471. When a right
117, says the practice is objectionable of permitting may be barred, or embarrassed, by delay, the peti-
petitions to be filed, signed and sworn to, by agents tion should be filed at once, whether the Court be
and Solicitors, instead of by the parties themselves. in session or not.
617 petitions. § 799
miss the petition, assigning his grounds this motion is in the nature of a special
;
demurrer, and, if successful, the petition is dismissed.

If the petition presents an issue of fact, the opposite party may plead to it,
or he may answer it, 38 as though it were a bill; and if it presents an issue
of law, he may demur to it, although the common practice is to move to dis-
miss it.
38 The sworn answer of a complainant to the peti- | tion of an intervening creditor merely makes an
I
issue. Irvine v. Dean, 9 Pick., 346.
§ 800 INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. 618
CHAPTER XLL
SUITS FOR INJUNCTIONS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.
Article I. Injunctions Generally Considered.
Article II. In What Cases Injunctions will be Granted.
Article III. How Injunctions are Obtained, Issued, and Served.
Article IV. Pleadings in Injunction Suits, and Reliefs Granted.
Article V. Violations of Injunctions, and Remedies Therefor.
Article VI. The Dissolution of Injunctions.
Article VII. Injunction and Refunding Bonds, and their Breach.
ARTICLE I.
INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 800. The Injunctive Power Generally Con-
§ 802. Office of ;i Temporary Injunction.
sidered.
§ 803. Office of a Mandatory Injunction.
§ 801. Injunctions Denned.
§ 800. The Injunctive Power Generally Considered. The main object of —

civilized society and the chief purpose of law is to secure to every individual
his life, liberty and property. 1 The common law aimed to protect a man's right
to his property by punishing the violation of that right. But such protection
did not always protect the damages awarded the owner of the property were
;
not always paid, and when paid were often inadequate, especially when the
injury could not be repaired by payment of damages.
But when the Chancery Court was established with its peculiar powers and
processes, borrowed largely from the Roman law, it did not undertake so much
to punish, as to prevent, the violation of the rights of property. Acting on its
maxim, Equity acts specifically and not by way of compensation, the Chancery
Court laid its mighty hand upon the would-be violator, and commanded him
to desist from the wrong he was doing, and refrain from doing the wrong he
was threatening, menacing him with both bodily imprisonment and pecuniary
punishment, if he persisted. When a matter was in dispute the Chancery Court
forbade a party to take the law in his own hands, but required him to abide the
decision of the Court; and, in a proper case, compelled him to put matters
in statu quo, and thus undo his own wrong.
In no one particular, perhaps, has the immense superiority of the jurispru-
dence of Equity over that of the common law been so manifest as in its remedy
by injunction to prevent a wrong, in place of the common law remedy of dam-
ages after the wrong had been committed and yet no process of Chancery was
;
so vigorously resisted by the lawyers of England and Lord Coke, as the great ;
champion of the common law, regarded the process of injunction, especially

when it interfered with suits and judgments at law, as a high handed violation
of the fundamental law of England.
§ 801. Injunctions Denned. —A
writ of injunction is a judicial process, 2
operating in personam, and requiring the person, to or against whom it is di-
rected, to do or refrain from doing a particular thing. The process is restora-
l For what the word "property" includes, see, I 2 The process of injunction is termed the "right
ante, § 56; post, § 804, note 2, Equitable property, arm of the Court of Chancery." 1 Barb. Ch Pr
§ 882. I 615.
619 INJUNCTIONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED. §802
tive as well as preventive, being used both in the enforcement of rights, and
the prevention of wrongs. In general, however, it is used to prevent future
injury rather than to afford redress for wrongs already committed and it is, ;
therefore, to be regarded more as a preventive than a remedial process.

With reference to their character, 3 injunctions are either, 1, Mandatory,
commanding the defendant to do a particular thing; or 2, Prohibitory, com-
manding him to refrain from doing a particular thing. With reference to their
duration, injunctions are either temporary or perpetual.
1. Temporary Injunctions, frequently called interlocutory or preliminary in-
junctions, are such as are granted at any time before final hearing, generally
upon the presentation of the bill to the Chancellor and continue until the com-
;
ing in of the answer, or until a hearing upon the merits, or the further order
of the Court. A temporary injunction is provisional in its nature, and does
not conclude a right.
2. Restraining Orders are interlocutory injunctions granted during a litiga-
tion to prevent the enforcement of some order made in the cause, or to stay
the hand of a party or an officer of the; Court, or to enjoin persons not parties
from bringing suit as to a matter pending wherein assets are being admin-
istered, or granted in any other case when necessary to prevent any inequitable
or illegal act injurious to any party. '
3. Perpetual Injunctions are granted only at a final hearing upon the merits,
and usually form a part of the final decree, and are conclusive upon all the
parties. Indeed, a perpetual injunction is, in effect, a decree of the Court
whereby a defendant is perpetually inhibited from the assertion of an assumed
right, or perpetually restrained from the commission of an act which would be
contrary to Equity and good conscience.
§ 802. Office of a Temporary Injunction. —
The office of a temporary, or
interlocutory, injunction is to preserve the subject-matter in controversy in
its then condition and, without determining any question of right, merely to
;
prevent the further perpetration of wrong, or the doing of any act whereby the
right in controversy may be materially injured, or endangered. It cannot be
used for the purpose of taking property out of the possession of one party,
and putting it into the possession of another; nor does it, ordinarily, go to
the extent of ordering a defendant to undo what he has already done, since it
might thereby do the defendant an injury as great as that of which the com-
plainant complains. The jurisdiction being ordinarily exercised to prevent the
further continuance of injurious acts, rather than to undo what has already
been done, on an interlocutory application for an injunction, Courts of Equity
will, except in extreme cases, only act prospectively, and interpose such re-
straint only as may suffice to stop the mischief complained of, and preserve
matters in statu quo.
§ 803. Office of Mandatory Injunctions. —
While Courts of Equity rarely
allow interlocutory mandatory injunctions, their jurisdiction so to do is firmly
established. The principal office of an interlocutory mandatory injunction is
to compel the defendant to restore the subject-matter of controversy to the
situation it was in before the commission of the act complained of. Courts of
Equity, however, rarely directly command the doing of a positive act on an
interlocutory application; they reach the same result indirectly, by framing
the injunction so as to prohibit the defendant from doing the reverse of what
3 The common injunction, mentioned in the old obtained after issue was joined, the suit proceeded
reports and books of practice, was the writ of injunc- to judgment, but stopped there until the determina-
tion which issued, as of course, upon the default or tion of the suit in Equity. Hendrick V. Dallum, 1
delay of the defendant in answering the bill; and Tenn., (Overt.), 427; 2 Sto. Eo. Jur., § 892; Chad-
its effect upon a pending suit at law was determined well v. Jordan, 2 Tenn. Ch., 636; Patterson v. Gor-
by the progress of that suit at the date of the issu- don, 3 Tenn. Ch., 20. The common injunction has
ance of the .writ. If the injunction was obtained ceased to exist in this State, every injunction being
before the declaration at law was filed, but before now special. Patterson v. Gordon, 3 Tenn. Ch., 21.
plea, the suit proceeded to issue, but no further; if
§804 WHEN INJUNCTIONS WILL BE GRANTED. 620
desired to do. Even then the jurisdiction is exercised with extreme cau-
lie is
tion,and is confined to cases where the Courts of law are unable to afford
adequate redress, or where the injury cannot be compensated in damages. 4
Mandatory injunctions, issued after a final decree and in enforcement thereof,
are in the nature of an execution, and are sometimes called judicial writs; 5
they will be found more fully considered in the Chapter on Decrees. 6
ARTICLE II.
IN WHAT CASES INJUNCTIONS WILL BE GRANTED.

§ 804. Injunctions Generally Considered. § 815. Injunctions Against Commissioners,
I 80S. Injunctions in Behalf of Sureties. and Public Officers.
§ 806. Injunctions in Behalf of Creditors. § 816. Injunctions Against Illegal Taxes.
§ 807. Injunctions in Behalf of Married § 817. Injunctions Against Taking Private
Women. Property Without Compensation.
808. Injunctions Pertaining to Partner- § 818. Injunctions Against Public and Pri-
ships. vate Corporations.
809. Injunctions Pertaining to Executors § 819. Injunctions Against Waste, Trespass-
and Administrators. es, and Similar Wrongs.
§ Pertaining to Mortgages,
810. Injunctions § 820. Injunctions Against Nuisances.
Trust-Deeds, and Title-Bonds. § 821. Injunctions to Protect Easements.
§ 811. Injunctions Pertaining to Written § 822. Injunctions to Protect Franchises.
Contracts. ? 823. Injunctions in Other Cases.
§ 812. Injunctions to Prevent a Cloud Upon § 824. Mandatory Injunctions, When Grant-
Title. ed.
§ 813. Injunctions to Protect the Process § 825. Cases Not Proper for Injunctive Re-
and Officers of the Court. lief.
§ 814. Injunctions Against Suits, Judgments, § 826. Form of Bill to Enjoin and Abate a
and Executions. Nuisance.
§ 804. —
Injunctions Generally Considered. The various cases in which the
Chancery Court will interfere by injunction, are almost as numerous as the
matters which fall within its equitable jurisdiction x but it may be laid down ;
as a fundamental rale, applicable to all cases, that, wherever a legal or equita-

ble right exists, whether arising from contract, from the legal or equitable
ownership of property, 2 or otherwise, the violation of that right will be en-
joined on proper application to the Chancery Court, unless the legal remedy of
compensatory damages would be full, adequate, and complete. 3 If damages
cannot be compensatory from the nature of the injury, an injunction will be
granted, 4a for, in such a case, the injury will be irreparable. 5a
The old rule, that an injunction would not be granted when there was a
plain, adequate remedy at law, has lost much of its force in Tennessee (1) in
consequence of the Chancery Court being now clothed with full authority to
determine all actions triable at law except suits for unliquidated damages 6a ;
and (2) in consequence of the Court's statutory injunctive powers to restrain

the injury, removal, or destruction of property, real or personal, involved in
the litigation. 7 By virtue of the letter and spirit of these two statutes, an
4 High on Injunc, 3; Post v. Railroad, 19 Pick., 3 Weaver v. Davidson County, 20 Pick., 320, cit-
184, citing the above section [then § 784] of this ing the above section [then § 786] of this book.
book. See, post, § 819, note, 62. 4a 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1338. Weaver v. Davidson
5 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 861. County, 20 Pick., 320, citing the above section of this
6 See, ante, §§32; 651; see, -also, post, §824. book, then § 786.
1 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1620. 5a. As to what is meant by "compensatory dam-
2 A man's property consists not only of his lands ages" and "irreparable injury," see, post, § 819,
and tenements, goods and chattels, rights and credits, note 62.
as generally understood, but he has, also, a property oa Acts of 1877, ch. 97. See, ante, §§ 21; 26-29.
right to his life, person, limbs, liberties, health, rep- 7 Code, § 3767.
utation, occupation and labor, and to the enjoyment
of his senses of sight, smell, hearing and taste, and
of the moral sense. See, ante, § 56.
621 WHEN INJUNCTIONS WILL BE GRANTED. §805
injunction may be properly granted: (1) to restrain the violation of any right
of the complainant, incident to the subject-matter of the suit; (2) to restrain
any tortious conduct of the defendant, that is injurious or destructive to the
property in litigation (3) to restrain the removal of any specific personal pro-
;
perty sought to be recovered in the suit; and (4) to restrain any other act of
the defendant injuriously affecting complainant's rights in or to the subject-
matter of the litigation. And in none of these cases will the fact that the com-
plainant may have a plain and adequate remedy at law, be at all material in
considering the jurisdiction of the Court in granting the injunction, for the rea-
son that the Court has, and is, exercising jurisdiction in the very suit wherein
the injunction is sought.
§ 805. —
Injunctions in Behalf of Sureties. Injunctions are granted in behalf
of a surety against a suit at law by the creditor whenever by any act of the
creditor, or principal debtor, or a co-surety, the surety has been released, or
discharged, as where the debt has been paid, or novated, or where the contract
has been changed, or the time of payment extended, without the surety's con-
sent, 8 or where the creditor delays to sue after notice or demand. 9
§ 806. —
Injunctions in Behalf of Creditors. An injunction will be granted
against debtors and their privies, in behalf of creditors, in the following cases
1, To prevent the fraudulent transfer or removal of the debtor's property,
whether in his hands, or in the hands of a mala fide purchaser, or of a trustee 10 ;
2, To prevent the waste, removal, or transfer, of property on which the com-

plainant has a lien 3, To prevent a multiplicity of suits, the cost of which will
;
absorb the common fund. 11

No injunction, however, will be granted on behalf of a mere general 12 cred-
itor, to prevent the debtor selling or encumbering his property, when no
grounds therefor are alleged except the fact of indebtedness, the insolvency
of the defendant, and the fear that he may sell or encumber. 13
§ 807. Injunctions in Behalf of Married Women. —A
wife is entitled to an
injunction against her husband and his creditors or bargainees, to protect her
homestead rights, or her rights to her separate estate, or to the rents and profits
of her realty and on filing a bill for divorce and alimony, or for maintenance,
;
against her husband, she is entitled to an injunction to prevent him (1) from
interfering with her conduct or person; (2) from interfering with the custody
of the children, or property, in her possession; (3) from collecting the rents-
and profits of her separate estate, or of her realty; (4) and from selling or
encumbering his own property, or selling any choses in action, or other per-
sonalty belonging to her.
§ 808. —
Injunctions Pertaining to Partnerships. Courts of Equity will en-
join members of a partnership from doing acts inconsistent with the duties of
a partner, or with the partnership agreement, or violative of the rights of the
complaining partner. A
partner may be enjoined from excluding his co-
partner from the partnership business, or books; or from misappropriating
partnership assets. And where a dissolution is prayed and a receiver is proper,
the Court will enjoin any or all of the partners from collecting any firm debts,
14
or interfering with the firm assets or books, or doing any act in the firm name.
§ 809. Injunctions Pertaining to Executors and Administrators. Injunc- —
tions will be granted on application of executors or administrators 1, Against :
8 2 High on Injunc, §1375; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ or decree for his debt, or lien or equity to secure it.
324-326; 2 Ibid., § 883. See "Sureties," and "Quia Such a creditor is sometimes called a creditor at-
Timet," in our Digests. large.
9 See, post, § 962. The obligations of a surety are 13 High on Injunc, §§131; 326; 2 Ibid., 1403;
1
strictissimi juris, and cannot be extended beyond McKeldin V. Gouldy, 7 Pick., 677, citing the above
the limits of his engagement. Hardison v. Yeaman, section of this book, then § 788. Some lien, trust,
7 Cates, 639. fraud, or inequitable conduct must be alleged to ob-
10 Code, §§ 4283-4289; 2 High on Injunc, § 1402. tain such an injunction. Ibid.
11 2 High on Injunc, § 1406. 14 2 High on Injunc, §§ 1330-1358.
12 A
general creditor' is one who has no judgment
any creditor suing after the suggestion of the insolvency of the estate and the
transfer of the administration to the Chancery Court; 15 and 2, Against the
widow, or any creditor, distributee, legatee, or other person, improperly in-
terfering with the assets of the estate.
Injunctions will be granted in behalf of the person entitled against executors
or administrators to prevent (1) their appropriation of exempt property, or
(2) the waste or misapplication of the assets of the estate, or (3) selling prop-
erty bequeathed when not needed to pay debts, or (4) doing any other act not
authorized by the will, or the law.
§ 810. Injunctions Pertaining to Mortgages, Trust Deeds, and Title-Bonds.
The Court of Chancery is often applied to for injunctions relative to matters
connected with mortgages, trust deeds, and title-bonds, the applications coming
sometimes from the owner of the lien, and sometimes from the debtor.
1. Injunctions in Behalf of the Mortgagee, or Creditor. The property in such a
case is devoted to the payment of the money advanced, or of the debt thereby
secured; and the Chancery Court will grant injunctions against any cutting
of timber, removal of fixtures or buildings, or other waste, by the maker of a
mortgage or deed of trust, or holder under a title-bond, or other person in pos-
session or control of the premises; mortgaged or conveyed in trust, or held
under a title-bond, where such waste will make the security insufficient. An
injunction will also be granted to protect the rights of a mortgagee to chattels,
by enjoining their removal, sale, or injury. 18
2. Injunctions on Behalf of the Debtor. The enforcement of a mortgage or
trust deed will be enjoined on application of the maker or his assignee, (1)
when it was obtained on fraud (2) when there has been a total failure of con-
;
sideration; (3) when the complainant is not bound, by reason of some accident,
or mistake, in its execution, against which Equity will relieve (4) when the ;
debt secured by the instrument has been fully paid, or (5) is barred by the
statute of limitations. 17 An injunction will not be granted, however, to enjoin
a sale in such cases, unless notice of the application be given to the trustee, or
mortgagee, as hereafter shown. 18
§ 811. Injunctions Pertaining to Written Contracts. The Chancery Court —
will, in some cases, enjoin the attempted violation of a valid contract, or the
attempted enforcement of an invalid contract.
1. The Enforcement of an Invalid Deed, Note, or Other Contract in Writing Will
be Enjoined when its existence, or possession by the defendant, may result in
some injury to the maker. Thus, when a deed, note, or other contract in writ-
ing is not binding in Equity, because executed by accident or mistake, or
obtained by fraud, or without lawful consideration, or is void for any other
reason, a Court of Equity will not only enjoin its enforcement, or transfer,
but will, also, order it to be delivered up for reformation if erroneous, or for
cancellation if void, or voidable. 19
3. The Violation of Valid Contracts Will be Enjoined in any case when such
contract would be specifically enforced by the Court, as in ease (1) of restrictive
covenants in deeds, leases, and other instruments, creating equitable covenants
(2) of contracts of a negative nature, such as agreements not to carry on a
particular trade, not to build in a certain way or place, not to run trains past
a particular station without stopping, not to publish a rival book or news-
paper, 20 not to remove fixtures, not to use leased property in a particular way
or for a specified purpose, not to allow property leased or conveyed to be used
for the manufacture or sale of spirituous liquors, and generally not to allow
or do any other thing that may lawfully be stipulated against. 21
15 Code, §§ 2382-2384. 10 Yerg., 83; McMinn v. Richmond, 6 Yerg., 1;
ie See Moore v. Knight, 6 Lea, 427; 1 High on Owens v. Mynatt, 1 Heisk., 675. See "Cancellation,"
Injunc., §§478-481; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§1345; 1348, and "Cloud on Title," in our Digests.
notes; 1 Jones on Mortg., § 684. 20 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§1341-1344; 2 High on In-
IT 2 Jones on Mortg., §§ 1801-1820. junc, §§ 1167-1181.
is See §§ 828-829. 21 2 High on Injunc, §§ 1134-1158.
19 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§1375-1377; Jones V. Perry,
§ 812. Injunctions to Prevent or Remove a Cloud upon Title. The title to —
real estate will be protected by the Chancery Court against any illegal act or
instrument likely to cast a cloud upon it, or bring it into question. Hence,
the Court will, on application of the owner, enjoin any sale of his land that
will not pass the title, and that may illegally subject him to suit, whether such
sale is attempted by a Sheriff under a void proceeding, or a satisfied judgment,
or execution, or by a trustee, or attorney in fact, under a void or satisfied
instrument, or by any other person not having lawful authority. The Court, on
like application, wili enjoin any party who has a void or invalid grant, deed,
mortgage, or other writing, to the complainant's land, from setting up any
claim thereunder, or attempting to enforce it and will, at the hearing, declare
;
such deed, grant, or mortgage, a cloud on complainant's title, and will order
it to be delivered up and cancelled, and the cloud removed. 22 And a wife may
have removed from her title, or her homestead, any cloud caused in any of the
foregoing ways, or caused by any deed or other conveyance made by her
husband, or by herself, without her privy examination. 23
§ 813. Injunctions to Protect the Process, and Officers of the Court, and
—
Purchasers under its Decrees. Courts of Chancery do not allow any other
Court to interfere with their processes, or their officers, or with purchasers
under its decrees. 24 Any interference, by suit or otherwise, with the subpoenas,
injunctions, attachments, or other writs of the Chancery Court, or with the
officer executing the same, will be restrained by injunction, and if necessary
by attachment of the person of the wrong-doer. So any interference, by suit
or otherwise, with the rights, duties, powers, or possession, of a receiver, se-
questrator, special commissioner, or Clerk and Master, will be enjoined; and
if necessary the intermeddler will be attached for contempt of the Court. 25
The Chancery Court has full power and inclination to afford perfect redress to
all persons wronged by its processes, or officers, and requires all such persons
to apply for redress to it, by petition filed in the particular cause wherein the
alleged wrong was committed.
§ 814. Injunctions Against Suits, Judgments, Decrees, and Executions.
Whenever a person is liable to be injured inequitably by a suit brought, or a
judgment rendered, or an execution issued or levied, 26 he may protect himself
by an injunction. 27
Injunctions Against Suits at Law Before Judgment"* will be granted on ap-
1.
plication of the defendant to the suit in the following cases

1. "Where the suit is founded on a deed, note of hand, or other contract in
writing, not binding on the defendant, because of a failure of consideration,
or of some fraud, or accident, or mistake, in its execution, the plaintiff in the
suit not being an innocent purchaser. 29
22 Johnson v. Cooper, 2 Yerg., 524; Jones v. Perry, of law to obtain or enforce judgments contrary to
10 Yerg., 83; Almony V. Hicks, 3 Head, 41; Carter Equity and conscience. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1360.
n. Taylor, 3 Head, 30; Merriman v. Polk, 5 Heisk., 27 When a party brings a suit he impliedly con-
717; see, "Cloud on Title," "Rescission," and tracts with the Court that in the prosecution of such
"Cancellation," in our Digests; 1 High on Injunc, suit he will do nothing contrary to good reason and
§§372-381; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 711a. See Bills Quia good conscience, and the Court, as the representa-
Timet. post, % 1042. tive of the State, impliedly contracts with such party
23 Coleman V. Satterfield, 2 Head, 260; Cantrell to give him such a judgment as in good reason and
v. County, 3 Tenn. Ch., 426; McCallum v. Petti- good conscience he ought to have on the facts al-
grew, 10 Heisk., 394. As to clouds on homesteads, leged and proved. To this extent the Court requires
see Marsh V. Russell, 1 I,ea, 543; Williams v. Wil- the defendant to submit. But if the plaintiff ohtains
liams, 7 Bax., 116; Collins v. Boyett, 3 Pick., 334: a judgment by suppressing or fabricating evidence,
.1High on Injunc, §438; See "Quia Timet," and or by taking an unconscientious advantage of the
"Homestead," in our .Digests. Such a bill will lie defendant, or by any other fraud, a Court of Chan-
without possession, and in behalf of a mere war- cery, on due application, will enjoin the plaintiff
rantor. Jones v. Nixon, 18 Pick., 95. from enforcing a judgment so obtained, and thus
24 Cope v. Payne, 3 Cates, 128 taking advantage of his own wrong, provided such
25 Turner V. Breedon, 2 Lea, 713; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., defendant really had a meritorious defence, and was
§891; 1 High on injunc, §§54; 57. guilty of no negligence or other fault in the case.
26 The jurisdiction, power, and utility of the 28 Injunctions in such cases operate on the par-
Chancery Court were originally based, to a very ties, and not upon the Courts where the suit at law
large extent, upon the necessity of some injunctive is pending. Burke v. Ellis, 21 Pick., 702.
instrumentality to prevent plaintiffs using the Courts 29 1 High on Injunc, § 47. The ground of the
2. Where a multiplicity of suits 30
are brought by the same plaintiff, or
different plaintiffs, against the same defendant concerning the same subject-
matter. 31
3. "Where the defence is (1) purely equitable, 32 or (2) legal and equitable,
or (3) is hampered by difficulties, complications or embarrassments, too con-
fusing or perplexing for investigation and solution by a jury; 33 and
4. "Where, in any other case, a party plaintiff has an unfair advantage at
law, whereby he may make the Court of law an instrument of injustice, and
obtain a judgment therein contrary to Equity and good conscience. 34
The fiat to a bill to enjoin a suit at law on a money demand should require
the defendant to confess judgment at law as the condition of the injunction;
otherwise, the complainant after litigating in Chancery may dismiss his bill
and renew the litigation at law. 34a
The following is the form of a bill to enjoin a suit at law, and of a proper
flat for such a bill
BILL TO ENJOIN A SUIT UPON A NOTE.s^b
[For address and caption see, ante, §§ 155-164.]
Complainant respectfully shows to the Court
That on December 4, 1846., Roland Roe brought a note for four hundred dollars to him and
requested him to sign it, saying that the note had been executed to him by Henry Den,
complainant's father-in-law, that Den was slow in paying it, and that he, Roland Roe, wanted
complainant to sign the note the better to warrant him in urging Den to pay it. Complain-
ant, being young, not quite twenty years of age, and inexperienced in business, and feeling
flattered by the praises of said Roland Roe as to complainant's ability to get his father-in-law
to pay the note, and as to complainant's general capacity to do things; and being, also, assured
by said Roland Roe, that, in no event, would he ever call on complainant to pay the note,
that his signature to it would be a mere form, and mere personal favor, signed said note,
relying on said assurances, without receiving any consideration therefor, and without any
purpose of being bound thereby.
II.
That soonafter complainant signed said note said Roland Roe died, intestate, and the
defendants are his administrators. As such administrators they called on complainant to
interference of the Chancery Court in such cases is, tracted in writing to convey to the defendant, or a
that the defendant is enabled to make a better de- trustee sues the beneficiary.
fence in Equity, or to obtain some substantial relief 3. Where an equitable estoppel is relied on. Moses
not obtainable at law. Chadwell v. Jordan, 2 Tenn. V. Sanford, 2 Lea, 655.
Ch., 637. 4. Where the defence is the fraud of the plaintiff
A Court of Equity should not, ordinarily, grant in procuring the instrument sued on, or some acci-
an injunction to stay proceedings at law before judg-. dent_ or mistake, in its execution, or illegality in its
ment, unless the party applying for the injunction consideration, and some affirmative relief is necessary
will confess judgment in the suit at law, such judg- to protect the defendant, such as the reformation
ment to be dealt with as the Court granting the in- of the instrument,- or its cancellation and surrender.
junction may order. It is inequitable to allow the Pom. Eq. Jur., 1363; Broyles v. Arnold, 11 Heisk.,
defendant at law to litigate the same matter in both 488; Porter V. Jones, 6 Cold., 313.
Courts; and, unless he is required to close the legal 5. Where a discovery from the plaintiff at law is
contest, by confessing judgment in the suit at law, necessary for the defence. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 624. But
he may, after a long litigation in Chancery, dismiss a discovery can now be had at law, Code, § 3891.
his bill, and then renew his defence in the Court 6. Where new parties are necessary to complete
of law. Chadwell v. Jordan, 2 Tenn. Ch., 633; justice.
Perkins v. Woodfolk, 3 Bax., 412; Rhinehart v. 33 Newborn v. Glass, 5 Hum., 521; Lindsley v.
Murray, 15 Lea, 471; Mathews v. Douglass, Cooke, James, 3 Cold., 477. Cases where there is a multi-
136; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1623-1624; Mullins v. Aiken, .
plicityof contracts, or where there are mutual ac-
2 Heisk., 538; King V. Baker, 1 Yerg., 451; Haynes counts of a complicated nature, would come under
«. Bank, 22 Pick., 425, citing this note and the this head.
above section of this book, then § 796. 34 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 885. But the fact that en-
30 Two suits are a multiplicity. Pearl v. Nash- forcement of a judgment would be against con-
ville, 10 Yerg., 179. See Ducktown Co. V. Fain, 1 science, will not, ofwarrant an injunction.
itself,
Cates, 56. However unjust and unconscionable the demand may
31 1 High on Injunc, §§ 61-65; Tarbox v. Harten- be, on which judgment was. obtained, if, through
stein, 4 Bax., 78. neglect or carelessness, no defence was interposed
32 The following are illustrations of equitable de- at law, relief will not be granted in Equity. 1 High
fences : on Injunc, § 166.
1. Defences based on fraud, accident, or mistake, 34a Haynes v. Bank, 22 Pick., 425, citing the
and requiring parol evidence to vary_, reform or can- above section, then § 796, of this book. See note
cel a note, deed, or other written instrument, sued 29, supra. But the Chancery Court has no jurisdic-
on, or to show a condition annexed. Perry v. Pat- tion to enjoin proceedings in a Court of concurrent
terson, 5 Hum., 133; Breeden V. Griggs, 8 Bax., 163; jurisdiction in a case where such Court can do as
Bell v. Gamble, 9 Hum., 117; Cornelius V. Morrow, complete justice. Such a bill is demurrable. Dixon
12 Heisk, 630; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1624. V. Railroad. 7 Cates, 362. See, ante, § 294.
2. Defenres setting up an equitable title against 34b This bill is based on Bell v. Gamble & Mont-
the legal title sued on, as where a mortgagee sues gomery, admrs., 9 Hum., 117. As to the nature of
at law the mortgagor to recover the land mortgaged, the fiat on such a bill see note 29, supra, and Haynes
'
or a vendor sues at law to recover land he had con- V. Bank, 22 Pick., 425.
625 WHEN INJUNCTIONS WIIA B£ GRANTED. §814
pay said note, when he protested that he was not and stated to them the foregoing
liable,
facts,. But, notwithstanding said facts, the defendants have brought suit on said note in the
_
Circuit Court of Knox county. Complainant could plead that he was under twenty-one years
of age when he signed said note, but he is not willing so to do; first, because that is not
his real defence, and second, because such a plea is not only humiliating to him, but he is
advised that it implies he -would otherwise be bound to pay said note.
in.
The premises considered, complainant prays:
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That a writ of injunction issue, by order of your Honor, restraining and prohibiting
the defendants, and their attorneys and agents, from further prosecuting said suit against
complainant on said note in said Circuit Court, and from prosecuting any similar suit in
any other Court; and that at the hearing said injunction be made perpetual, and said note
cancelled.
3d. That complainant have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
T. Lyon, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, §§161; 164.] ;
FIAT.
To the Clerk and Master at Knoxville
File this bill, and on complainant giving an injunction bond in the penalty of one thousand
dollars, conditioned as required by law, issue an injunction prohibiting the defendants from
proceeding in their said suit against complainant any further than to take judgment orii said
note ; which they are allowed to do. Complainant will withdraw any plea he may have filed
in said suit, and allow the suit to proceed to judgment. No
steps shall be taken, on said judg-
ment without leave of the Chancery Court, in this cause.
Feb. 10, 1848. Williams, Chancellor.
2. Injunctions Against Judgments at Law. The Chancery Court is not a Court
empowered to review proceedings in other Courts, and to correct errors and
irregularities in their proceedings. 35 This jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme
Court. 36 The Chancery Court will not, therefore, enjoin a judgment at law
merely because of any irregularity or error committed by the Court rendering
the judgment; and, in order to make out a case that will authorize the Chan-
cery Court to enjoin a judgment at law, the defendant to such judgment must
make out some one of the following cases:
1. An injunction against a judgment, at law will be granted on application of
the defendant to the judgment, if he show (1) that he had a valid legal defence
to the suit on the merits, and (2) that he was prevented from making that
defence by the fraud of the plaintiff, or by some surprise, accident, or mistake,
and (3) that there was no negligence, or other fault, on his part, or on the
part of his agents, or attorneys. 37 The defendant to the "judgment must show in
his bill all of these essentials. 38
2. Injunctions against judgments at law will also be granted when the de-
fendant to the judgment had a good defence on the merits, but one not availa-
ble in a Court of law 39 or if available it was hampered by difficulties, compli-
;
cations, or embarrassments, too confusing and perplexing for investigation

and solution by a jury. 40 And it may be stated as a general principle, that any
35A bill of injunction will not lie to enjoin a 36 Greenlaw V. Kernahan, 4 Sneed, 371; Glenn l).
judgment rendered by a Justice of the Peace, or a Maguire, 3 Tenn. Ch., 695; Kindell v. Titus, 9
Circuit Court, when the only complaint is the erron- Heisk., 738.
eous action of the Justice of the Peace, or Circuit 37 1 High on Injunc, § 114; Kearney v. Smith, 3
Court (1) in allowing or disallowing amendment, or Yerg., 127; Prater V. Robinson, 11 Heisk., 391 •
(2) in allowing or disallowing demurrers, pleas or Kirkpatrick v, Utley, 14 Lea, 96; Taylor v. Railroad,
other defences, or (3) in admitting or rejecting evi- 2 Pick., 233; Williams v. Pile, 20 Pick., 273. A
dence, or (4) in allowing or disallowing claims or judgment based on the appearance of an attorney
credits, or (5) in allowing or disallowing motions, or without authority may be enjoined. Courtney v
(6) in denying what was law or applying what was Dyer, 2 Shan. Cas., 360.
not law, or (7) in granting or refusing an appeal, or 38 Hickerson v. Raiguel, 2 Heisk., 335; Rowland
(8) in accepting or refusing a bond or pauper oath, v. Jones, 2 Heisk., 321.
or (9) in doing or refusing to do some other thing
.
39 For illustrations of defences not available at
during the progress of the suit. All such errors com- law, see. supra, note 32.
mitted by a Justiee of the Peace must be corrected bv 40 1 High on Injunc, §114; Frierson' v. Moody,
the Circuit Court on appeal, or certiorari; and all 3 Hum., 561; Newbern v. Glass, 5 Hum., 520; Ches-
such committed by the Circuit Court must be cor- . ter v. Apperson, 4 Heisk., 639; Cornelius v. Thomas.
rected by the Supreme Court on appeal or writ of 1 Tenn. Ch., 283.
error, or in some cases by a supersedeas.
facts which prove it to be against conscience to execute a judgment at law, and
of which the injured party could not have availed himself in a Court of law,
or of which he might have availed himself but was prevented by fraud or acci-
dent, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will au-
thorize a Court of Equity to interfere by injunction to restrain the adverse
party from availing himself of such judgment. 41
3. Void and voidable judgments and decrees will be enjoined without show-
ing any facts, except such as demonstrate their nullity. 42 If a judgment or
decree is, for any reason, void or voidable, 43 as where vitiated by fraud, acci-
dent or mistake, or where the Court had no jurisdiction of the person, or of
the subject-matter, such a judgment may be enjoined. 44 judgment of the A
Supreme Court, if void or voidable, for any reason, may be enjoined in Chan-
cery; 45 and proceedings in this State, based upon a judgment rendered in
another State, may be enjoined for any cause which would authorize an in-
junction against a judgment of one of our own Courts. 46
4. If the defendant to the judgment has any set-off, and the plaintiff is in-
solvent, or has removed from the State, an injunction will be granted against
the judgment. 47
Neverthelesss, while a Court of Chancery will, in a proper ease, enjoin a
judgment at law, it will not stop there, but will either grant a new trial in
the Circuit Court, 48 or will itself determine the rights of the parties and grant
the plaintiff at law the recovery he was entitled to, if any, 49 or deny him any
recovery, if he is not entitled to any. 50
3. Injunctions Against Executions at Law, or in Chancery, will be granted in
the following cases
1. Where the judgment is void, 51 or voidable, or has been fully paid, or
otherwise satisfied, or is barred by the statute of limitations. 52
2. Where the execution is levied upon the land of a person hot a party to
the lawsuit. 53
§ 815. Injunctions Against Commissioners and Public Officers. —Whenever
41 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., 887; Scurlock v. Scurlock, 8 pearance. Bell Williams, 1 Head, 229; 1 High on
V.
Pick., 629, citing the above section of this book, Injunc, §§238-239; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1625, note;
then, § 796. Grader V. Coltart, 3 Shan. Cas., 562. Or if ren-
42 In such cases, the Chancery Court will not in- dered in the wrong county in a local suit. See,
quire whether the defendant at law had a valid ante, § 177, notes 17; 30. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1567;
defence. It is enough if he show that the judgment Douglass v. Joyner, 1 Bax., 32. See, also, Smith v.
or decree complained of is void. Ridgway v. Bank, St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 506; Walker
11 Hum., 523; Bell v. Williams, 1 Head, 229. v. Day, 8 Bax., 77; Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea,
43 There is a wide difference between a void 604.
judgment and a voidable judgment. See, ante, 45 Kinzer v. Helm, 7 Heisk., 672; Smith v. Van
§§ 446; 565. A void judgment binds nobody; it bars Bebber, 1 Swan, 110; Newman v. Justices, 1 Heisk.,
nobody; it is a nullity, and no judgment at all; and 791; Murphy v. Johnson, 23 Pick., 552.
justifies no act done under it. Holmes V. Eason, 8 46 Wilson v. Robertson, 1 Tenn., (Overt.) 266;
Lea, 760; Finley v. Gaut, 8 Bax., 151. A voidable Winchester v. Jackson, 3 Hay., 305; Turley v. Tay-
judgment, however, binds everybody, and justifies lor, 6 Bax., 382; Gettys v. Gettys, 3 Lea, 261;
every act done under it, until reversed or set aside. Chancy v. Bryan, 11 Lea, 589.
A voidable judgment may be reversed by the Su- 47 Gregory v. Hasbrook, 1 Tenn. Ch., 218; Howe
preme Court, on appeal or writ of error, but cannot S. M. Co. v. Zachary, 2 Tenn. Ch., 478. These set-
be revised, corrected, or set aside, by the Chancery offs may have existed when the suit at law was in-
Court, except for fraud, accident, or mistake, in stituted, or may have been subsequently acquired.
obtaining it, and then only on a bill filed for that Fields v. Carney, 4 Bax., 137. But if in existence
purpose. A voidable judgment, though full of errors, when the suit was instituted, and if pleaded and
is as valid as a judgment perfectly regular, when- passed on in the suit at law, no injunction will lie.
ever offered in evidence in either the Chancery or Gregory v. Hasbrook, 1 Tenn. Ch., 218. See "Set-
Circuit Court. Greenlaw v. Kernahan, 4 Sneed, 371. off," inour Digests.
If the Court rendering the judgment in question had 48 Kirkpatrick V. Utley, 14 Lea, 96; Prater r.
jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-matter, Robinson, 11 Heisk., 394. New trial at law awarded.
and had authority to make such a judgment, the fact Holcomb r. Canady, 2 Heisk., 610; Burem v. Fos-
that there was no evidence to support the judgment, ter,6 Heisk., 333.
or that gross irregularities appear in the record, are 40 Jones v. Kincaid, 5 Lea, 677.
matters wholly immaterial on a collateral attack. 50 Hickerson v. Raiguel, 2 Heisk., 329. See, post,
And what is here said of void and voidable judg- §§ 1206-1209.
ments is equally true of void and voidable decrees. 51 Rucker V. Moore,Heisk., 729; Insurance Co.
1
As to the diiference between void and voidable de- v. Webb, 22 Pick., 425. As to the distinction be-
crees and judgments, see Greenlaw v. Kernahan, 4 tween void and voidable judgments, see, ante, §§ 446-
Sneed, 371; Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 254; Kindell 565.
v. Titus, 9 Heisk., 738; Finley V. Gaut, 8 Bax., 151; 52 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 876.
Pope v. Harrison, 16 Lea, 82; Vanvabry v. Staton, 63 Merriman v. Polk, 5 Heisk., 717; 2 Dan. Ch.
4 Pick., 351. See "Judgments" in our Digests, for Pr., 1624; 1 High on Injunc, § 119. Executions
many other cases. See, also, ante, §§ 446; 565. based on Chancery decrees that are void may, also,
44 Caruthers V. Hartsfield, 3 Yerg., 366; McNairy be enjoined. Douglass v. Joyner, 1 Bax., 34; Smith
v. Eastland, 10 Yerg., 310. It will be absolutely v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 502.
void, if rendered without service of process, or ap-
627 WHEN INJUNCTIONS WILE BE GRANTED. §816
commissioners, or public officers, appointed by the Legislature, the Governor,
the County Court, or a public corporation, or other authority, undertake to do
some act not authorized by the Constitution or laws of the State, or by the
particular order or authority under which they act, they will be enjoined by
the Chancery Court on the application of any person liable to be irreparably
injured by their illegal or unauthorized act. 54
Sheriffs, Clerks and Masters, and Solicitors, should not be enjoined merely
because they are doing their duty in obedience to process, or the order of the
Court, 55 except, perhaps, as a means of notifying them of the granting of the
injunction. If no relief is prayed against them, the bill should so state, so as
to relieve them of the necessity and expense of making defence. If, however,
they are guilty of any misconduct, or have the property in dispute in their pos-
session, or under their control, 56 they may both be made parties, and be re-
quired to answer.
§ 816. —
Injunctions Against Illegal Taxes. No injunction can be granted
against the collection of a tax due the State, 57 but if a county or city, or other
public corporation, attempt through its officers to collect any tax not warranted
by the law, or the Constitution, the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to enjoin
the collection of such a tax, 58 and any one tax-payer may sue on behalf of
himself and all others, and enjoin the collection of the entire tax. 59
§ 817. Injunctions Against Taking Private Property without Compensation.
Private property cannot lawfully be taken for public roads, streets, bridges,
building sites, or other public purposes, or for railroads or turnpikes, without
just compensation being paid, previous to the taking, or statutory security
given; and Courts of Chancery will enjoin any attempt to unlawfully deprive
the owner of his property for any of said purposes, provided the suit be brought
in due season.
§ 818.Injunctions Against Public and Private Corporations. Courts of —
Chancery by injunction, prevent corporations doing illegal acts.
will,
1. Public Corporations May be Enjoined from doing any act in violation of
their charters, or doing any act not authorized by their charters. 60 They may
be enjoined from levying particular taxes, or paying or issuing particular
bonds, or incurring or paying particular debts, or making particular contracts,
or holding particular elections, or doing other particular acts, when such con-
duct is in violation of law or their charters. Public corporations include coun-
ties, as well as towns and cities, and the County Court may be enjoined in
any of the foregoing instances.
2. Private Corporations Will be Enjoined from doing any acts not authorized
by their charters, or from misappropriating their funds or assets, or from mak-
ing and enforcing unauthorized assessments, or from engaging in a business,
or entering into contracts not authorized by their charters, or from over-issu-
ing stock; 61 or from doing any other act not authorized by their charters, or
by some statute.
§ 819. Injunctions Against Waste, Trespasses, and Similar Wrongs. Courts —
of Chancery will aid the owner of real estate, or of an interest therein, to pro-
1 ect his property or interest against persons guilty of waste, trespass, or other
irreparable mischief. 62
54 See "Quia Timet," in our Digests.

55 Montgomery V. Whitworth, 1 Tenn. Ch., 176. 61 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1650, note.
62 "Adequate compensation" and "compensatory
See, ante, § 94.
56 Weakley v. Woodward, 2 Ch. Apps., 586; 2 damages" seem to mean such compensation, or dam-
High on Injunc., § 1551. See, ante, § 94. ages, as will fully remunerate the party injured, "and
57 But a bill will lie when the officer is acting enable him to put himself in as good a condition as
under a void process, for then quoad hoc he is not he was before the injury of which he complains.
an officer. Alexander v. Henderson, 21 Pick., 431. And what is meant by "irreparable damages," "irre-
58 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 893 a; University !). Cheney, 8 parable mischief," and "irreparable injury," seems
Cates,' 259. to be such damage, mischief, or injury, as, (1)
59-Keesee V. Board of Education, 6 Cold., 127; either materially impairs the value of the fee, or (2)
Hunter v. Justices, 7 Cold., 49. is estimable only by conjecture, and not by any
60 Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 17 Pick., 181. accurate standard, or (3) is so often repeated as to
§819 WHEN INJUNCTIONS WILI, BE GRANTED. 628
1. Waste is the destruction or injury of lands, mines, quarries, wells, springs,
fields, fruit,shade or ornamental trees, gardens, shrubbery, meadow, timber,
houses, improvements, or fixtures, by one rightfully in possession, but not own-
ing the fee, to the prejudice of the heir or of him entitled to the reversion or
remainder; or to the prejudice of a mortgagee, tenant in common, or maker
of a title-bond; and, on the application of such person, an injunction will issue
to prevent any irreparable waste begun or threatened by the dowress, home-
steader, tenant by the courtesy, tenant for life, tenant in common, mortgagor,
holder under a title-bond, lessee, or purchaser under a parole agreement
avoided by him, 63 or their privies, agents, or servants. 84
In real actions, and in actions for the recovery of personal property in
specie, the Court in which the suit is pending, may restrain the injury, removal
or destruction of the property by injunction until the cause is finally dis-
posed of. 65
2. Trespasses are akin to waste, the distinction being that waste is the
abuse or destruction of property committed by a person, who while not abso-
lute owner has, nevertheless, a present right to its legitimate use, while a tres-
pass is an act injurious to, or destructive of, property by one who has no right
whatever to its use. 66 Where trespasses on realty are likely to result in irre-
parable injury, or in a multiplicity of suits, or where such trespasses cannot be
compensated in damages, 67 either by reason of the peculiar character of the
property, or by reason of the insolvency of the trespasser, an injunction will
lie to restrain such trespassers, on a bill therefor being filed by the owner of
the land. 68
3. Similar Wrongs include (1) those cases where a person so uses his own
property, or so exercises his own rights, as to irreparably injure another and ;
(2) those cases where personal rights are so wantonly invaded as to work great
discomfort, inconvenience, or annoyance to the complainant, such as acts en-
dangering life or limb, or disturbing sleep, or injuring health, and acts that
tend to mortify complainant's feelings by publications, and the like.
The following form may be of value in framing bills to stay waste it is so :
drawn as to apply to any one of various cases

BILL TO STAY WASTE.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155 ;164.]
i.
That he the owner of the fee [or the mortgagee, or a tenant in

is common,] of the
following tract of land [Here describe it; see, ante, § 172.]
:
ii.
That said tract of land is now in possession of defendant C D, who has a life estate
therein as the endowed widow of E D, [or as a tenant by the courtesy, or as a homesteader, or
who is a tenant in common with complainant, or who has mortgaged said land to complainant,
or who holds under a title bond from complainant, or who went into possession under com-
plainant on a parole agreement of purchase, which he has avoided and repudiated, or who is
a lessee of complainant, or who is a tenant under the defendant C D. 6sa ]
necessitate a multiplicity of suits, or (4) is irrepar- §697-738; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§928-929. Now that
able because of its injury to health, comfort, or our Courts of Chancery have jurisdiction to try the
convenience, or because of the insolvency of the legal title, to real and personal property, its power to
defendant. See 10 A. & E Ency. of Law, §§ 817-856; do complete justice, in every case of trespass, is
876-884; 939-940; 3 Pom.' Eq. Jur., §§1347-1358; 2 greatly enlarged; and they will enjoin (1) the cut-
Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 913-929 e. ting of timber, shrubbery, fruit trees, or any other
63 Code, § 3405. trees; (2) the digging of coal, stone, or mineral;
64 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1629-1630; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., (3) the injury or removal of fences, houses, fixtures,
§ 1348; 1 High on Injunc, §§ 649-696; 2 Sto. Eq. or other improvements, or other property; (4) the
Jur., §§ 909-919. See, "Waste," in our Digests. interference with springs, or streams, or roads, or
65 Code, § 3767. This section, and the Act of rights of way, or easements; (5) injuries to riparian
1877, ch. 97, have greatly enlarged the jurisdiction
p
rights; or (6) any other act violative of the com-
of the Court in cases of waste, trespass, nuisance plainant's rights of property, or use or possession of
and injury to easements. See, ante, § 36. To con- property. As to injuries to riparian rights, see
.
stitute waste there must be a lasting injury to the Webster Harris, 3 Cates, 668.
v.
estate, and a permanent depreciation of its value. 6 8a Show fully and clearly the character of the
Lunn v. Oslin, 12 Pick., 28. defendant's possession, and if a tenant of the owner
66 Walker v. Fox, 1 Pick., 161. of the life estate is committing the waste, make him
67 1 High on Injunc, §650; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1631. a defendant, also.
68 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §1357; 1 High on Injunc,
_
That the defendant C D, [or E F, the tenant of C D,] is committing waste on said tract
of land by cutting down and selling the valuable trees 68b growing on said land which is
now inadequately timbered. He has already felled a large number of said trees, including a
very large and valuable black walnut tree hitherto preserved for ornament, shade, and its
fruit; and, unless restrained by your Honor's order, will probably continue to cut, sell and
remove the valuable trees on said tract. 08c [Or, if the zvaste consists in destroying valuable
shade, fruit or ornamental trees, or opening mines or quarries, or impairing the permanent
value of houses, fixtures, meadows, fields, roads or waters, specify the particulars and
character of such injuries, and wherein they permanently injure the value of the tract.']
rv.
That an attachment be necessary or expedient, here lay grounds therefor by showing

[If
the defendant is insolvent and is consuming or removing, or has removed, the cut timber,
or coal mined, or stone quarried, or other subjects of the waste, from the said tract of land for
sale or use. 6S &]
v.
The premises considered, complainant prays

That subpoena to answer issue [&c; see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
1st.
2d.That your Honor grant him a writ of injunction to restrain the defendant [or de-
fendants,] his [or their] servants, workmen and agents from committing waste, spoil, or
destruction upon the said tract of land, or any part thereof, and especially from cutting down
timber or other large trees, and from cutting down fruit, ornamental or shade trees [specify-
ing the various acts of the defendant or defendants complained of.]
3d. That complainant have a decree against the defendant [or defendants,] for the dam-
ages done by the waste and other injuries committed on said tract of land as herein set out.
4th. That an attachment issue to impound the trees cut down as aforesaid, and to impound
the lumber made from them [or to impound the coal mined, stone quarried, or other subject
of the waste,] and that a receiver be appointed to take possession of and sell the same.
Sth. That complainant have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
This is the first application for writs of injunction and attachment, and for a receiver, in
this case.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, § 789.] Joseph Story, Solicitor.
§ 820. —
Injunctions Against Nuisances. The Chancery Court will, on appli-
cation of the person injured, enjoin all nuisances 69 which interfere with the
health or comfort of the complainant, or endanger, depreciate, or destroy, his
property or his business; such as (1) acts or occupations which cause noxious
noises, sights, vapors, smokes, odors, or stenches; (2) the erection of houses
for the storage of powder, or oil, or other explosive combustibles or the build- ;
ing of stables, steam factories, slaughter houses, glue or soap factories, brick
kilns, bawdy-houses, 70 or other offensive establishments, near the complain-
ant's house (3) an injury to complainant's water-rights by diversion,, destruc-
:
tion, or pollution, of the water; (4) the obstruction of complainant's rights of

way over roads, streets, or bridges; (5) an injury to complainant's land by
mill-dams and other interferences with running water; 71 or (6) any similar
act injurious to comfort, health, property or business, not to be adequately
compensated for in damages. And the Court will not only enjoin a nuisance,
but will award damages caused by the nuisance. 72
§ 821. —
Injunctions to Protect Easements. Courts of Equity will interfere
by injunction, on behalf of the party injured, to protect his rights to easements,
68b Arbor dum crescit, lignum cum crescere nescit. right to one's health, and the right to the enjoyment
(It is a tree as long as it is growing; it is wood of one's senses of sight, smell, hearing and taste,
when it ceases to grow.) for without the enjoyment of these life itself cannot
68c Trees not essential to the value of a tract may be enjoyed; and whatever materially impairs any of
be cut and sold if necessary to make new fields of these rights is a nuisance. What grossly violates
more value, or if the proceeds are applied in im- one's moral sense is, also, a nuisance. Weakley 1'.
provements on the land. Page, 18 Pick., 178. Since the Act of 1877 the
68d In such a case complainant is entitled to an _
Chancery Court can, as a law Court, determine
equitable attachment to be levied upon the subject of whether the matter complained of is a nuisance, and
the waste. See, post, § 882. if so, can then as an Equity Court enjoin it. This
69 The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to rule reconciles many_ inconsistent decisions.
do complete justice in cases of nuisances has been Ti Coulter v. Davis, 13 Lea, 451; Naff v. Martin,
fully effectuated by the statute giving the Court 2 Shan. Cas., 451; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1629; 1639-1641,
power to determine the legal titles and rights of the notes; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§1349-1351; 1 High on
parties. Formerly, the Court often refused to act Injunc, §§ 739-847; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 921-927. See
until the legal titles and rights of the parties had "Nuisances," in our Digest. See "Bill to Enjoin
been determined by a suit at law. 2 Dan: Ch. Pr., and Abate a Nuisance," post, § 826.
1629; 1639, notes. 72 Richi v. Chattanooga Brewing Co.. 21 Pick..
70 Next after the right to life no rights are more 651. See, ante, §§ 36; 38.
deserving of protection and vindication than the
and will enjoin (1) the closing of a right of way, or road, or a public square, or
:
public graveyard; 73 (2) the destruction or impairment of rights to water for

mills, factories, or domestic use 74 or (3) the removal or weakening of a party
;
wall, or any serious interference with it. 75 The Court will, also, enjoin the
violation of contracts or covenants granting or creating easements. 70
§ 822. Injunctions to Protect Franchises. Where the Legislature has —
granted a franchise, the Chancery Court will protect it by injunctive process.
Among these franchises are (1) right of turnpike, bridge and ferry companies
:
to collect tolls; and (2) right of railroad, telegraph and other companies to
operate under their charters, and to possess and enjoy the exclusive privileges
and franchises conferred by their charters. 77
§ 823. Injunctions in Other Cases. There are many other eases in which —
a Chancery Court will grant an injunction to prevent wrongs, unconscientious
conduct, and irreparable injury, among which are the following
1. The Transfer of Specific Property will be enjoined, when, if transferred,
irreparable loss would result to the owner, or beneficiary, or lien owner; or,
in case of negotiable securities, to the maker or endorser. 78
2. Tlie Violation of Any Trust, either (1) by the executor; administrator,
guardian, or other trustee executing the trust; or (2) by any stranger inter-
meddling therewith, will be enjoined. 79
3. The Collection of Purchase-Money for Land will be enjoined 80 when the
title fails in whole or in part, or is in controversy, or there is a breach of the
covenants, 81 and there has been a fraud in the sale, 82 or the vendor is insolv-
ent, 83 or the contract is executory. 84
4. Tenants Will be Enjoined from doing acts in violation of their lease or
of good husbandry, from removing manure or crops, from plowing up meadow-
lands, from injuring orchards, shrubbery, walks or buildings, from sowing
seeds of deleterious crops or vegetation, or from committing any waste. 85
5. The Enforcement of a Penalty, or a Forfeiture, will be enjoined when it was
inserted in the contract merely to secure the enforcement of some act, or the
enjoyment of some right, or benefit, and adequate compensation may be made
for the breach, especially when the forfeiture was occasioned by accident,
fraud, surprise, or ignorance. 86
6. The Following Acts will, also, be enjoined (1) the infringement of trade- :
marks; 8 7 (2) the disclosure of secrets of trade, title, composition, or manufac-

.
ture; 88 (3) the publication of private letters, or other private writings; 89 (4)
imd in general, the breach of any contract, the commission of any tort, or the
violation of any right, when the legal remedy would be inadequate. 90
§ 824. Mandatory Injunctions, When
Granted. Mandatory injunctions are —
seldom granted before a although they may be granted on inter-
final hearing,
locutory applications. The Court, however, seldom commands the defendant to
73 Brew V. Van Deman, 6 Heisk., 433; Crutchfield 84 Topp V. White, 12 Heisk., 165; Buchanan v.
v. Car Works, 8 Bax., 242. And will require the Alwell, 8 Hum., 516. The
bill in such a case must
defendant to remove his obstructions. Leake v. specifically set fraud or defects of title
forth the
Cannon, 2 Hum., 169. relied on. Jones V. Fulghum, 3 Tenn. Ch., 193.
74 Cox v. Howell, 24 Pick., 130. But a purchaser, after deed made and possession
75 1 High on Injunc., §§ 848-896; 3 Pom. Eq. taken under it, cannot, in the absence of fraud,
Jur., §1351; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 295-297 a. concealment, or misrepresentation, enjoin the collec-
76 2 Pom.
Eq. Jur., § 689; 3 Ibid, § 1342. tion of the purchase-money, because of breach of
77 1 High
on Injunc, §§ 897-933. any of the covenants, unless the seller is insolvent.
78 3 Pom.
Eq. Jur., § 1340. Land Co. l>. Hill, 3 Pick., 578. And this is so even
79 3 Pom.
Eq. Jur., §§ 1339-1340. when the vendor had no title. Brown v. Woods, 1
80 A
purchaser in oossession under a deed must Cold., 610.
ordinarily rely upon the covenants and warranties in 85 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1655; 1656.
his deed, and, in the absence of fraud or insolvency so 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 1314-1315; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
on the part of his vendor, must pay the purchase- §§433-460.
money, and this is so even when the vendor has no 87 2 High on Injunc, §§1063-1085; 2 Sto. Eq.
title. Brown v. Woods, 1 Cold., 610; Land Co. v. Jur., §951; Filley t>. Rosenbaum, 3 Shan. Cas., 395;
Hill, 3 Pick., 578. Simmons Medicine Co. V. Mansfield Drug Co., 9
81 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1653, note. ,
Pick., 84. But State Courts have no jurisdiction to
82 Ingram v. Morgan, 4 Hum., 66; Topp V. White, enjoin the infringements of patents and copyrights.
12 Heisk., 165. 88 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., 5 952: 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1651.
83 Young V. Butler, 1 Head, 640; Baird V. Good- 80 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 944-949.
rich, 5 Heisk., 20. 00 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1338.
631 whbn injunctions wiivL be granted. §825
do any positive act by an interlocutory order; it contents itself, in an interlo-
cutory proceeding, with prohibiting the defendant from doing the reverse of
what he is desired to do. Mandatory injunctions are never granted, unless
the injury is irreparable, and unless the complainant uses extraordinary dili-
gence in applying for it in eases where delay or acquiescence would be preju-
dicial to the defendant. 91
1. Mandatory Interlocutory Injunctions would seem to be proper, (1) where
the act complained of is a gross violation of a property right, and was done
in great haste, or in secrecy, and manifestly to avoid a prohibitory injunction
or (2) was a high-handed outrage on complainant's plain rights of use or pos-
session, and the act is yet warm, and the mandatory injunction restoring the
statu quo, while doing the complainant exceeding great benefit, will do the de-
fendant but little or no injury. 92 A
mandatory interlocutory injunction will
ordinarily be granted (1) to compel the defendant to undo acts done during
the progress of the suit; 93 or (2) to undo, remove, or discontinue, a nuisance or
trespass of an irreparable nature. 94
Amandatory interlocutory order, or injunction, will also be granted to re-
quire one party to permit the other to inspect a house, if necessary for the pur-
pose of the suit or to permit him to have access to the furniture in a house for
;
the purpose of valuation 95 or to permit him to inspect a mine for the purpose
;
of determining the extent of the injury done by the party in possession to the
party applying for the order. 98
2. Mandatory Final Injunctions frequently form a part of final decrees. 97
In such cases, the decree and injunction command and require the defendant
to do some affirmative act, such as (1) to surrender the possession of property,
real or personal, or choses in action, or deeds, or other papers; or (2) to exe-
cute deeds, releases, acquittances, or other instruments; or (3) to pay money
into Court; or (4) to do some ministerial acts as an officer; 98 or (5) to abate a
nuisance; or (6) to maintain a bridge, or road, when so bound by law; 99 and on
bis default in any of these cases, the defendant will be committed to jail until
he performs the act, or otherwise purges his contempt. 100
§ 825. Cases not Proper for Injunctive Relief. The Chancery Court sits —
to declare, protect and enforce the rights of property, 101 the obligations of
contracts, express and implied, and the duties imposed by conscience and good
faith in reference to property, and not to inflict penalties, or to interfere with
the procedure in criminal cases, or to deal with political or ecclesiastical 102
91 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1359; Post V. Railroad, 19 the removal of water pipes wrongfully laid in com-
Pick., 184; citing the above section of this book, then plainant's soil; (10) to compel a water company to
§ 806. *
continue its supply of water when such supply has
92 See 10 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 789-790; 2 Dan. been wrongfully and oppressively discontinued; (11)
Ch. Pr., 1613; 1661-1662, notes; High on Injunc., to compel the restoration of a party wall; (12) to
§§358; 708; 792; 804; 1150; 1158. compel a partner to return partnership books to the
93 2 Sto . Ed. Jur., §229 6, note; Leake v. Can- firm s office, the articles of co-partnership requiring
non, 2 Hum., 169. them to be kept there; and (13) generally, in any
94 10 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 789. Thus, the Court case where the injury is of so serious or material a
will enjoin (1) a sewer from being kept open, or (2) character that the restoration of things to their
the continuance of a malicious obstruction to an former condition is the only remedy that will meet
easement, or (3) the continuance of a continuing the requirements of the case. See, 22 Am. Law
trespass. Ibid. Register, 403-407, and cases there cited; and High
95 2 Dan.'Ch. Pr., 1663. on Injunc, §§ 792; 1331.
96 1 High on Injunc.. § 737. Mandatory interloc- 97 1 Sto. Eq. Tur., § 861
utory injunctions will be granted in the following 98 Condon V. Maloney, 24 Pick., 82.
cases: (1) to compel the restoration of running 99 Dyer Co. v. Railroad, 3 Pick., 712.
water to its natural channel when wrongfully di- 109 See Chapter on Contempts, post, § 918.
verted therefrom to complainant's great injury, such 101 See, ante, § 56, for definition of the word
natural channel running through his lands; (2) to property.
compel the removal of a very great nuisance, sud- 102 Travers v. Abbey, 20 Pick., 665. The Chan-
denly created, where irreparable injury would result cery Court will not review the action of a Church
before a final hearing; (3) to compel the removal of affecting the status of its members among themselves.
obstructions placed in complainant's right of way; Nance v. Busby, 7 Pick., 303. A Church is an im-
(4) to compel the removal of obstructions from a perium in imperio in dealing with religious matters
navigable river; (5) to compel the return of water and with its members as to such matters, and is not
to a mill or factory where the flow has been wrong- in those respects subject to Gesar. The Chancery
fully cut off; (6) to compel the closing of a sewer; Court can consider ecclesiastical matters only when
(7) to restore to a wife the possession of her sep- necessarv to the determination of some property
arate estate where the husband has wrongfully ex- right. Ibid. And so of political matters.
cluded her therefrom; (8) to compel the opening of
a public highway wrongfully closed; (9) to compel
matters, or to intermeddle with co-ordinate departments of the government. 103
Equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the commission of crimes, or to enforce
mere moral obligations, or the performance of mere moral duties nor will it ;
interfere for the prevention of an illegal act merely because it is illegal in all ;
cases, an injury to the legal or equitable rights, or property, of the complainant

must be involved. 104
The Chancery Court will not grant an injunction (1) to stay proceedings in
a criminal proceeding nor (2) to stay proceedings on a mandamus, information,
;
or writ of prohibition; 105 nor (3) to stay proceedings on an award in a Court of

law, except for fraud, accident, or mistake nor (4) to stay any proceedings
;
in a suit in a Court of law, unless there be some special ground for equitable
relief not equally available in the latter Court; nor (5) to stay proceedings on
a judgment in a Court of law, unless there be some special grounds of equitable
relief existing before the judgment, or some other ground of relief arising since
the judgment, not equally available in the latter Court; 106 nor (6) to stay pro-
ceedings in a suit in another Court of Chancery, or Court exercising Chancery
jurisdiction, in a matter the latter Court may properly determine; 107 nor (7)
will an injunction be granted against the exercise of discretionary powers by
corporations or their officers, where there is no fraud; nor (8) against the ex-
ercise of discretionary powers by any public officer; 108 nor (9) will an injunc-
tion be granted against a non-resident, upon whom personal process has not
been served; 109 nor (10) will the Court, by a mandatory injunction, undertake
to enforce the performance of continuous duties; 110 nor (11) to make an order
that it cannot enforce, especially an order in reference to matters outside of
the State; 111 nor (12) will an interlocutory injunction lie against an officer
collecting State taxes; 112 nor (13) against an officer of the United States dis-
charging a duty under an Act of Congress 113 nor (14) will an injunction lie for
;
violations of statutory copyrights; 114 nor (15) against a person proceeding

under the national bankrupt laws; 115 nor (16) will an injunction of any sort
be granted, in any case manifestly unfit for injunctive relief.
§ 826. Form of Bill to Enjoin and Abate a Nuisance. The following form —
of a bill to enjoin and abate a nuisance will be found applicable to many cases
constantly arising:
BILL TO ENJOIN AND ABATE A NTJISANCE.no
[For address and caption, see, ante, § 164.]
I.
That he the owner and possessor of the following tract of land in

is the....civil district of
Blount county. [Insert description; see, § 172.]
II.
That there a grist and saw mill on said tract using the water of Mill creek for power.
is
This mill has been so located and operated over thirty years, without interference, interrup-
tion or dispute, except as hereinafter stated. Said mill is operated by what is called an
undershot water-wheel, the water flowing through a mill race from said creek, and has .always
been so operated and cannot be operated any other way without very heavy expense and
;
the purchase of a site for another dam higher up the creek, and of a right of way for a mill
race thereto.
103 The Chancery Court cannot restrain the Legis- 108 2 High on Injunc, §§1186; 1240; 2 Sto. Eq.
lature from passing, nor the Governor from approv- Jur., § 955 a.
ing, an unconstitutional bill. Bates V. Taylor, 3 109 1 High on Injunc, § 33.
Pick., 319; nor can it command the Governor to do 110 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1663.
an official act. Ibid. 111 W. U. Telegraph Co. v. W. & A. Railroad, 8
104 High on Injunc, § 20. Bax., 54; 1 High on Injunc, § 33. Extra territorium
105 High on Injunc, § 20. If the party proceeding jus dicenti impune non paretur. Broom's Leg. Max.,
by indictment is the complainant, however, the Court 104.
may require him to abandon the prosecution. 2 Dan. 112 Acts of 1867-8, ch. 79, sec. 16.
Ch. Pr., 1621. 113 2 High on Injunc, 1322.
106 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 893. in 2 High on Injunc, § 989.
iot Deaderick v. Smith, 6 Hum., 138; Smith v. St. US 1 High on Injunc, § 300.
Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 506. 110 This bill is based on Naff V. Martin, 2 Shan.
Cas., 451. See, ante, §820.
633 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. 827
That about a year ago the defendant bought and took possession of the tract of land on
said creek below complainant's said tract and adjoining the same, and at once began the
construction of a mill and dam thereon, the dam being thrown across said creek very near
complainant's land, and not more than one hundred yards from his said mill. The result is
that defendant's dam backs the water of the creek up on complainant's mill-wheel, and so
retards the current that there is not force enough in the same to turn the wheel.
rv.
That complainant, to avoid trouble, at great expense raised his mill-wheel two feet, and
so changed his dam and race as to give a swifter and larger flow of water. But no sooner
had complainant completed this work than the defendant raised the height of his dam, and
thus caused the back water to flow up on complainant's wheel as injuriously as before. And,
in addition to saiddam of defendant, he has allowed a very large fallen tree to remain across
said creek, thus increasing the back flow of water, and completely drowning the wheel of
complainant's mill, whereby complainant is prevented from grinding and sawing for his
customers as was his wont, to his great financial injury and the ruin of his business.
v.
Complainant would further show to your Honor that as the result of said dam and fallen
tree on defendant's land, the back water of said creek in wet weather flows over a large
part of complainant's meadow, and some of his plowed land, doing great damage thereto
and also drowns complainant's spring, from which his family and tenants and employees get
their drinking and cooking water. Complainant offered to remove said tree at his own
expense, but the defendant refused him permission so to do.
VI.

That subpcena to answer issue [See, ante, §§158; 164.]
1st.
That an injunction issue to restrain and prohibit the defendant from allowing said
2d.
dam and tree to remain as aforesaid and that said dam and tree be declared a nuisance and
;
abated by the Sheriff at the defendant's expense. 117

3d. That complainant may be granted damages 118 for the injuries done as aforesaid, and
have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, §§ 161 164.]
; Will A. McTeer, Solicitor.
ARTICLE III.
HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED, ISSUED, AND SERVED.
§ 833. Discretion of the Chancellor in Grant-
§ 827. How Injunctions are Obtained.
ing Injunctions.
§ 828. When Notice of the Application for an
§ 834. Form of a Writ of Injunction.
Injunction is Required.
§ 835. Issuance and Service of the Injunc-
§ 829. When Notice of the Application May tion.
be Required.
§ 836. When a Prayer for an Injunction is
§ 830. Forms of Fiats for an Injunction. Not Necessary.
§ 831. Injunctions on the Pauper Oath.
§ 837. When Injunctions Will be Continued,
§ 832. Second Applications for Injunctions. or Made Perpetual.
§ 827. —
How Injunctions are Obtained. An interlocutory injunction may
be obtained at any time, 1 in vacation, as well as in term, and whether the Court
be sitting or not and may be obtained at any stage of the suit, from the time
;
the bill is drawn and verified to the hearing of the cause, on a proper case there-
for being made out. The application should, however, be made without delay,
or the writ may be refused because of the acquiescence or laches of the com-
plainant. 2
117 The Court may order the defendant to abate Richi l\ Chattanooga Brewing Co., 21 Pick., 651- 1
the nuisance, say in ten days, and on his failure so Pom. Eq. Jur., 181; 237; 2 Jaggard on Torts, 807.
to do direct the Sheriff to do so, at the defendant's See, ante, § 36. The Chancellor can call a jury to
expense. See Leake v. Cannon, 2 Hum., 169. assess the damages, if he so desire.
lis The Chancery Court has inherent jurisdiction 1 It may be obtained on Sunday. 2 High on In-
to abate a nuisance, and in the same suit award junc, § 1584. See, ante, § 186.
damages for the injuries caused by the nuisance. 2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1663.
§828 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. 634-
A fiat for an interlocutory injunction is ordinarily obtained before the bill

is filed,upon application therefor to some Judge, or Chancellor, at Chambers.
Whenever his bill praying for an injunction 3 has been drawn and sworn to, 4
the complainant may, without any notice whatever to the defendant, 5 except as
hereafter shown, 6 present it to any Chancellor, Circuit Judge, or Judge of a
special Court, 7 for a fiat. The application is made wholly ex parte, and at Cham-
bers 8 unless the bill has already been filed, in which case it may be made to
;
the Court where filed.

If, after the bill has been filed, the necessity for an immediate injunction
should arise, and the Court not be in session, the complainant may draw an
amended or supplemental bill, stating the new facts and showing the
urgency, and obtain a fiat from the Chancellor at Chambers. If the Court be in
session an injunction may be obtained in the same way, or on petition, or on
motion supported by affidavit. 9 If the Court be in session, a restraining order
Avill be granted of record, if the defendant is before the Court.
§ 828. When Notice of the Application for an Injunction is Required. An —

injunction cannot be granted to stay the sale of real estate, under a deed of
trust or mortgage, with a power of sale, executed to secure the payment of
loaned money, on application of the borrower, unless the complainant gives
twenty days' notice to the trustee or mortgagee of the time when, the place
where, and the Judge, or Chancellor, before whom, the application for the in-
junction is to be made and no Judge, or Chancellor, can act upon the applica-
;
tion, unless it is accompanied by proof evidenced by return of a sheriff, con-

stable, or attorney, that the notice has been served on the 'trustee or mortgagee,
or he is not to be found in the county of his usual place of residence, or is a,
non-resident. 10
In order, however, that the complainant may have time to give the required
notice, the Judge, or Chancellor, may grant a fiat for an interim injunction 11 to
postpone the sale until the application for an injunction can be acted on at the
regular hearing thereof, on notice. This fiat may be in the following form
INTERIM FIAT.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court, at Huntingdon
Upon complainant filing this bill, and giving an injunction bond in the penalty of one
thousand dollars, conditioned to pay such costs and damages as the Court may adjudge
against him, you will issue the injunction prayed for in the bill, such injunction to continue
in force until [here specify the day, allowing the time requisite to enable the complainant to
give the twenty days' notice;] on or before which day a further order will be made, on notice
to the defendant.
January 29, 1891. Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor.
Such order may be, also, in the following words
FIAT TO DELAY A LAND SALE.
To the Clerk and Master, at Huntingdon':
Upon the foregoing bill being filed, and prosecution bond being given, issue an order to
the defendant [trustee or mortgagee,] commanding him to postpone the sale of the property
mentioned in the bill until the complainant has time to give the required notice of his fore-
going application for an injunction, and until said application has been acted on.
January 29, 1891. Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor.
On the day specified in the notice, the application for an injunction will be
3 An interlocutory injunction will not be granted 7 Code, §§3946; 4434; Flippin f. Knaffle, 2 Tenn.
unless prayed for in the bill. 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 862- Ch., 243.
863. S Rutherford Metcalf, 5 Hay., 64. Even though
V.
4 The bill must be sworn to either by_ the com- the Chancellor, or Judge, should be on the bench, he
plainant or by some other person acquainted with is deemed at Chambers, unless the bill has been filed,
the facts; and the affiant must make oath that he is or unless some order in reference to it is to be made
personally acquainted with the facts stated in the on the minutes.
bill. 2 High on Injunc, §§ 1567-1569; 2 Dan. Ch. 2 High on Injunc., § 1566.
Pr., 1619. See, ante, § 789. 10 Acts of 1873, ch. 10; Plowman v. Satterwhite,
But the Judge, or Chancellor, may require notice 3 Tenn. Ch., 1; Smith v. Republic Life Ins. Co., 2
to be given. See § 829, post. Tenn. Ch., 631.
c. The exception is in reference to injunctions to U 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1666.
stay the sale of realty under mortgage or deed of
trust.
635 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. §829
further heard. At this hearing, the defendant may resist the granting of the
injunction, for want of Equity on the face of the bill or, he may apply for an
;
adjournment of the hearing to give him time to answer the bill. If an adjourn-
ment is applied for, the defendant has the right to ten days' time during which
he may file his answer before the same Judge, or Chancellor; and thereupon
the motion for an injunction shall be heard upon the bill and answer. 12 At this
hearing the Judge, or Chancellor, may (1) refuse any injunction; or (2) may
grant an injunction as prayed in the bill, or (3) may refuse an injunction on
condition that the defendant will execute a refunding bond or (4) may grant ;
an injunction on the complainant paying what he admits to be due; 13 or

(5) may make such other order as Equity may require. The order of the
Judge, or Chancellor, shall be reduced to writing and signed by him, and en-
closed with the bill, answer and exhibits, in a sealed envelope, and transmitted
to the Clerk of the Court in which the bill is to be filed. 14
The defendant may voluntarily appear without notice, and present his an-
swer, and resist the grant of the interlocutory injunction. He is under no
obligation to wait for notice, or process 15 and he may, in any case, anticipate
;
an application for an injunction, and request the Chancellor, or Judge, to hear

him before acting on the application, if one should be made.
§ 829. When Notice of the Application May be Required. Ordinarily the —
Chancellor, or Judge, grants a temporary injunction, ex parte, on reading the
bill and accompanying papers, if any, except as shown in the preceding section
but where (1) a delay of a few days will work the complainant no injury, and
a bond by the defendant will abundantly protect and indemnify him, and (2)
where an injunction, though warranted by the bill, will nevertheless affect
innocent third parties, the Chancellor applied to, if the bill be addressed to
him, 16 may refuse to act on the application until the defendant is notified
thereof, and has opportunity to be heard. 17 For this purpose, the Judge, or
Chancellor, may retain the bill until the day fixed in the notice. On such day,
the defendants may present their sworn answer to the bill, and otherwise resist
the application for an injunction. In such case, the Judge, or Chancellor, may
( 1) refuse to grant the injunction or (2) may grant it on bond, or on bond and
;
other terms; or (3) may grant it on condition that it stand dissolved, when the
defendant files with the Master a bond in a given penalty with two good sure-
ties conditioned to pay the complainant such sum as the Court may at any time
award him as debt, damages, or otherwise, for the wrongs complained of; (4}
or he may order an 'injunction to issue, unless the defendant give such a bond
instanter. The following would in such case be the form of the fiat
FIAT FOB A LIMITED INJUNCTION.

To the Clerk and Master, at Clarksville
Issue an injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving a proper injunc-
tion bond in the penalty of one thousand dollars; but said injunction to stand dissolved when
the defendant, E F, files with you a bond, in the penalty of one thousand dollars, with two
good sureties, conditioned to pay the complainant such sum as the Court may at any time
award him as debt, damages, or otherwise, for the wrongs complained of in his bill.
Aug. 7, 1890. George E. Seay, Chancellor.
The following is a form for the condition of the bond, in such a case
CONDITION OF THE BOND.

The condition of the above obligation is such that, whereas an injunction was granted in
the case of A
B, vs. E F in the Chancery Court at Clarksville, on condition that it should
stand dissolved when the said E F shall file with the Master of said Court the bond specified
in said order, now if the said E F shall pay the complainant such sum as the Court may at
12 Acts of 1873, ch. 10. acted on by any other than the Chancellor of the
13 Ch. Rule, VI, §4. See, post, § 1195. Court in which the bill is to be filed.
14 Acts of 1873, ch. 10. 17 Alittle more care should, perhaps, be exercised
15 Plowman V. Satterwhite, 3 Tenn. Ch., 3; 2 High by our Judges, and Chancellors, in acting on applica-
on Injunc, § 1574. tions for injunctions. Chadwell V. Jordan, 2 Tenn.,
16 The suggestions of this section cannot well be 637.
§830 HOW INJUNCTIONS AR£ OBTAINED. 636
any time award him as debt, damages, or otherwise, for the wrongs complained of in the
bill in said cause, then this obligation to be void, but otherwise to remain in full force.
If the bill be to stay proceedings to collect money in a Court of law, the fiat
should require the bond to be conditioned that the defendant refund to the
complainant any money the Court may so order on final hearing. 18
When an injunction will operate harshly upon the defendants, and yet they
are probably infringing the rights of the complainant, the Chancellor, instead
of granting an unconditional injunction, may give the defendants the option of
giving a bond to indemnify the complainant against the wrongs complained of.
In such a case, the fiat would be as follows
CONDITIONAL FIAT.
To the Clerk and Master, at Nashville:
Issue the writ of injunction prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving a bond
therefor in the penalty of ten thousand dollars, unless within five days the defendants file
with you a bond in like penalty, conditioned to pay the complainant all damages the Court
may award him for the wrongs and injuries alleged in the bill. If the defendants file said
bond, it shall be deemed a waiver of all objections to the jurisdiction to the Court to award
said damages, in case the defendants are legally liable therefor.
July 29, 1880. A. G. Merritt, Chancellor.
Such a fiat should not be granted, however, in any case of clear invasion of
the complainant's rights, or in any case where damages would be inadequate
compensation.
If the bill is to enjoin the sale of real estate under a mortgage or deed of
trust to secure loaned money, notice must be given the defendant, in all cases,
as shown in the preceding section.
§ 830. —
Forms of Fiats for an Injunction. 19 If the Chancellor, or Judge,
deem that a ease for a temporary injunction is made out as prayed, he will
endorse on the bill his
FIAT FOB, AN UNLIMITED INJUNCTION.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court, at Nashville
Issue a writ of injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving bond 20
and security in the penalty of [naming the sum,] condition as required by law.
Aug. 6, 1890. A B, Chancellor [or, Judge.]
If the complainant is entitled to an injunction, but not to the extent prayed
in his bill, the fiat will show to what extent an injunction is allowed, or to what
extent it. is disallowed 21 thus;
FIATS FOU LIMITED INJUNCTIONS.

Issue a writ of injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, except in so far as the bill prays
[stating the particular prayer, or part of prayer, as to which no injunction is allowed,] on
complainant giving bond [&C, as in the preceding fiat.]
Or thus:
Issue a writ of injunction so as to enjoin the defendant from [stating the particular prayer
allowed;] but no further or otherwise, on complainant giving bond [&c, as in the preceding
fiat.]
Onapplication to enjoin a suit at law to recover a debt, especially if such

debt evidenced by writing, the fiat should require the complainant to confess
is
judgment at law, or withdraw his plea and allow judgment by def ault, 2ia the
18 Code, § 4448. tion is ordered. Ch. Rule, VI, §4; § 119S, sub-sec,
19 Some forms nf fiats have already been given. 4, post. This rule is declaratory of the pre-existing
See, ante, § 174; 828. practice.
20 For pauper cases, see, post, § 831. 2iaBut if this is not done, and the bill is dismissed,
21 If the complainant admits any money to be due the Court on dismissing the bill and dissolving the in-
the defendant, or fails to allege any sufficient Equity junction, should dispose of the matters in controversy,
against any part of the matter sought to be enjoined, and render a decree against the complainant for the
the Judge, or Chancellor, must either (1) order the amount due from him, and against his sureties on
issuance of an injunction as to that part of the mat- the injunction bond for interest and costs Haynes
ter only for which sufficient Equity is alleged, or (2) V. Bank, 22 Pick., 425, citing § 796 and note of this
enjoin the whole matter on condition that the com- book; now § 814, note 29. Or the plaintiff in the suit
plainant, besides giving the usual injunction bond, at law, on the dissolution of the injunction and dis-
pay into Court the amount admitted to be due, or missal of the bill, may file the record of dismissal as
otherwise perform the fiat as to any part of the mat- res adjudicata and have judgment thereon at law.
ter sought to be enjoined and as to which an injunc- Haftman v. Hartman, 2 Shan. Cas., 486.
637 HOW INJUNCTIONS AR^ OBTAINED. §831
law Court being enjoined from proceeding at law further than
plaintiff in the
judgment, without the consent of the Chancery Court. The following are forms
of conditions to fiats
CONDITIONS OF FIATS FOB LIMITED INJUNCTIONS AGAINST SUITS AT
LAW.
This fiat is granted on condition that the complainant withdraw his plea in the Circuit
Court, and allow a judgment by default to be entered against him, and the defendant is
allowed to take said judgment, by default, 22 but will be enjoined from taking any further step
whatever in said Circuit Court suit, and especially from suing out any final process, or other-
wise in any way attempting to enforce said judgment by default, without leave of the Chan-
cery tCourt in this cause.
Or thus:
This fiat is granted on condition that the complainant agrees that all the matters in con-
troversy between him and the defendant in the Circuit Court, may be fully and finally adjudi-
cated in this suit, and that a decree may be rendered herein against him for any sum found
at the hearing thereof, to be due from him to the defendant. The filing of said injunction
bond will be deemed as a conclusive acceptance of this condition.
Mandatory injunctions usually prohibit the reverse of what is required to be
done. The following is a form of a
FIAT FOB A MANDATOBY INTEBLOOUTOBY INJUNCTION.
To the Clerk and Master, at Dresden
Issue a writ of injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving bond
therefor in the penalty of one thousand dollars, conditioned to pay the defendant all damages
that he may be entitled to by reason of said injunction. Let the injunction inhibit and
restrain the defendant from continuing the obstructions in the road mentioned, and from
keeping the gate across said road locked. 23 [Or, Lett the injunction inhibit and restrain the
defendant from keeping the partnership books in his exclusive possession, and from keeping
them away from the office of the firm, and from in any way interfering with their use and
examination by any of the complainants or their attorneys.] 24 January 30, 1885.
J. Somers, Chancellor.
Upon endorsing his fiat on a bill, the officer granting the fiat must enclose
the bill and fiat, and accompanying papers, in a sealed envelope, directed to
the Clerk of the Court to whom the fiat is addressed, which envelope can be
opened only by the Clerk, or his deputy. 25
As soon as the complainant delivers to the Clerk the required bond, 26 if one
be required, and otherwise complies with the requirements of the fiat, the Clerk
will issue the injunction specified in the fiat.
§ 831. —
Injunctions on the Pauper Oath. 27 The Chancellor, or Judge, grant-
ing the may, in a proper case, order an unlimited injunction to issue, on the
fiat
pauper oath; but this should rarely, if ever, be done, except, perhaps, in the
following cases (1) where a wife sues her husband, and makes a strong prima
:
facie case; (2) where the defendant appears by the bill to have pauperized the
complainant, or taken advantage of his poverty, or otherwise manifestly de-
frauded him; (3) where the suit is by an administrator, guardian, or next
friend, and great merits are shown in the bill. An injunction is a tremendous
22 See; ante, § 814, note 29. See preceding note. Judges that an injunction may issue on the pauper
23 This fiat was granted in a case where the de- oath, whenever it may issue on a bond; and the
fendant had so obstructed complainant's right of result has been a multiplication of pauper oath in-
way as to prevent his egress or ingress with vehicles, junctions, intended sometimes to harrass defendants,
and had forbidden the removal of the obstructions. and sometimes to release levies, or gain time or other
See, also, Leake v. Cannon, 2 Hum., 169. inequitable advantages, all tending to bring both this
24 3 Dan. Ch. Pr., 2323. Other forms of fiats for process and'the Court itself into disrepute. While
mandatory interlocutory injunctions: Issue [&c v as the granting of temporary injunctions is confided to
above, down to Let.] Let the defendant be enjoined the discretion of the Judges, and Chancellors, it is a
from allowing the obstruction complained of to re- legal discretion to be controlled by well settled rules.
main in the road referred to. [Or, in another case: The power, while necessary to the protection of the
citizen, is a tremendous one, and may easily be mis-
Let the defendant be enjoined from continuing in
possession of the house and lot described in the bill, used. Its exercise involves the most delicate respon-
sibility, and requires the greatest wisdom and cau-
and from in any way interfering with the complain-
ant's assumption of exclusive possession and use tion. M. & M. R. R. v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 217;
thereof.] [Or, in a third case: Let the defendant Chadwell v. Jordan, 2 Tenn. Ch., 637. Extraordi-
be enjoined from allowing the nuisance complained nary, indeed, should be the case to justify an un-
of to continue.] limited injunction under the pauper oath, where the
25 Code, §§ 3947; 4438. injunction will work grievous injury to the defend-
26 For the character of this bond, see, post, § 860. ant, or deprive him of a lien, or other right.
27 It seems to be considered by some Circuit
§832 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. 638
exercise of judicial power, and operates on the defendant without giving him a
hearing, and he who asks it ought to give some more substantial evidence of
his good faith, and of his confidence in his cause, than a pauper oath.
When an injunction is applied for, on the pauper oath, exceptional care is
required in order to prevent gross injustice being done in the name of justice.
The Chancellor must have regard to the rights and interests of the defendant
as well as to those of the complainant; and to grant an injunction under the
pauper oath, in the same way and to the same extent as if an injunction bond
were given, would often be manifestly inequitable, and sometimes grossly
unjust. The writ should, in pauper cases, be rigidly confined to what is abso-
lutely necessary to the complainant's protection. All that he can equitably de-
mand is ultimate safety, if his claim be found to be just; and the defendant
should not be required to do more, or to forego more, or to incur more risks,
or disadvantages, than are unavoidable in securing the complainant against loss.
As a general rule, therefore, if an injunction is sought, under the pauper oath,
to stay a suit at law before judgment, the plaintiff at law should be allowed to
proceed to judgment, but no further; and if a judgment is sought to be en-
joined, he should be allowed to have execution, and a levy, but no sale. If per-
sonal property has already been levied on, or should be levied on by permis-
sion given in the fiat and injunction, the sheriff should be required to retain
possession of it, until further order, unless the complainant will give a replevy
bond as in attachment suits. 28 If the answer is sworn to and meets the Equity
of the bill, the injunction will, on motion, be dissolved upon the defendant giv-
ing a refunding bond. If the injunction be retained, the property levied on
would remain impounded in the Sheriff's hands, subject to the orders of
the Court, or to be replevied, if so allowed. If the property levied on is per-
ishable, it should be sold, and the proceeds paid into Court, subject to the final
orders in the cause. 29 In this way, the rights of both parties may be well
guarded, and no grievous wrong inflicted upon either. 30 The following forms
of fiats in pauper cases are suggested
FIATS FOR INJUNCTION ON PAUPER OATH.
To the Clerk and Master, at Nashville
Issue a writ of injunction as prayed in the foregoing bill, on bond therefor being given
in the penalty of five hundred dollars, or on the pauper oath being taken. If the pauper oath
is taken, let the injunction be so limited as to allow the defendant to proceed in his suit at
law as far as judgment; but no further; [or, if judgment has already been taken, then say:
to proceed as far as to have his execution issued and levied, but no further; or, if execution
has already been levied on personalty, then say: If the pauper oath is taken, let a limited
injunction issue to restrain the Sheriff from making the sale of the property levied on, but,
requiring him to retain it in his custody until the further order of the Court, unless the prop-
erty be replevied by the complainant as in attachment suits, 31 which he is hereby authorized
to do. But if the property is of a perishable nature, or expensive to keep, 32 then add: but if
not replevied, then such and so much of the property levied on as is of so perishable a nature,
or so expensive to keep, as to render a sale thereof necessary for the interest of the parties,
the Sheriff will proceed to sell, at the time and place by him advertised, and will pay the
entire proceeds of such sale into the office of the Clerk and Master of the said Chancery Court,
to be disposed of as said Court may order.]
At Chambers, March 12, 1877. W. F. Cooper, Chancellor.
§ 832. —
Second Applications for Injunctions. No injunction can be granted
by any Judge, or Chancellor, at Chambers, unless the complainant states in his
bill that it is the first application for such process. 33 If an injunction is
28 Code, §§ 3509-3511. An injunction has the 30 Bridges V. Robinson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 720; same
effect of releasing a levy on personal property, un- case, 3 Tenn. Ch., 352. The author knows of several
less otherwise ordered by the fiat. See § 846. This cases where plaintiffs in executions at law lost their
fact is often a temptation to a defendant at law, to debts in consequence of personal property subject to
obtain an injunction under the pauper oath ex- execution, being released by injunctions issued under
pressly to get property released, so that he may put the pauper oath, and the bills of complaint ultimately
it forever out of the reach of the plaintiff. Judges dismissed for want of Equity, or because not sus-
should not allow one who claims to seek Equity to tained by the proof.
perpetuate such an iniquity. 31 Code, §§ 3509-3510.
29 Equity, when having no rule of its own, follows 32 Code, § 3505.
the law, and the attachment law is a good guide in 33 Code, § 4435.
such a case. See Code, §§ 3501-3506.
639 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. §833
applied for and refused, at Chambers, no other application can be granted,
except by the Court in which the bill is filed. 34 If such Court deem the com-
plainant entitled to an injunction on his original bill, or on his bill as amended,
if amended, an injunction may be granted him. When, therefore, an injunction
has been refused at Chambers, and such refusal endorsed on the bill, the com-
plainant may, notwithstanding such refusal, file his bill in the proper Court,
and there renew his application for an injunction.
It is within the discretion of a Court of Equity to revive an injunction after
it has been dissolved; and, upon proper showing of complainant's right to
relief, the injunction will be reinstated, the Court being regarded as always
open for this purpose. And where sufficient facts are stated in a supplemental
bill to warrant an injunction, it will be granted, although the injunction
granted on the original bill has been dissolved. And when an interlocutory
injunction is allowed, but the bill is afterwards dismissed, for want of prosecu-
tion, the final order of dismissal does not operate as res judicata upon the ques-
tions involved. But when a second bill is filed to obtain a second injunction
in relation to the same subject-matter and between the same parties, it is not
enough to allege new grounds of Equity not suggested in the former bill; it
must be shown that the new Equity alleged did not exist at the time the original
hill was filed, or, if it existed, that it was unknown to the complainant. Nor
will an injunction once dissolved be reinstated simply upon new evidence, no
new ground of Equity being stated which was not alleged in the original bill. 35
While the right of the party complaining to amend his bill, and renew the
application, even after a dissolution upon the merits, clearly exists, yet the
exercise of the right is guarded with much caution. And where an injunction
has been dissolved for want of Equity in the bill, an ex parte injunction will not
be granted upon an amended bill, or upon a new one supplying the Equity of
the old, but the Court will require notice to the opposite party. 36
§ 833. Discretion of the Chancellor in Granting Injunctions. In granting —
temporary relief by interlocutory injunctions, Courts of Equity in no manner
anticipate, the ultimate determination of the question of right involved. They
merely recognize that a sufficient case has been made out to warrant the pre-
servation of the property, or rights, in issue, in statu quo, until a hearing upon
the merits. 37 In order to sustain an injunction for the protection of property
pendente lite, it is not necessary to decide in favor of the complainant upon the
merits, nor is it necessary that he should present such a case as will certainly
entitle him to a decree, upon the final hearing. The Court will, however, upon
an application for an interlocutory injunction, consider the probability of the
complainant ultimately establishing his demand. 38
34 Code, §§ 4434-4436. When a bill is presented should be dependent on a' Judge's whim, or mood, or
to a Judge, or Chancellor, at Chambers, he may favor. If the complainant is entitled to the injunc-
allow it to be then and there amended, if complain- tion, it is his right, and the Chancellor is in duty
ant so desires. But the practice of some Judges of bound to grant it; and it would be tyranny and
allowing the complainant to retain his bill upon an usurpation to withhold the grant. On the other
injunction being denied is reprehensible: it results hand, if the. complainant is not entitled to an in-
in giving the complainant an opportunity to experi- junction, it would equally be tyranny and usurpation
ment with other Judges in hopes of finally finding to bestow the grant. Where, however, it is doubtful
one whose discretion has been emasculated by indif- whether an injunction should be granted, after duly
ference, or diluted by an excess of amiability. considering the equities alleged, and the relative ad-
The Code requires the Judge or Chancellor refus- vantages and disadvantages which would result to
ing an injunction to endorse such refusal on the the parties from granting or refusing the writ, in
bill, and sign his name thereto. Code, § 4437. The such a- case an injunction should be denied. A
object of this is to notify all other Judges, and Judge has discretion to do what in law he is in duty
Chancellors, of the fact of such refusal. In such bound to do but no discretion to deny any man any
;
case, if the complainant desires to further prosecute of his rights, or to give any man more than his
•
his suit, he may file his bill in the proper Court, and rights; nor has he any discretion to withhold from
there make a second application for an injunction. any one what the law gives him, or to give to any
Code, § 4436. one what the, law withholds from him. Discretio est
35 High on Injunc, §§39; 1586. scire per legem quid sit justum. t
(Discretion is to
36 Ibid, § 41. know by means o.f the law what is just.) See pref-
37 It is frequently said that the_ grant or refusal ace to Lube's Eq. PI., (Wheeler's, Ed.), XII-XIII;
'
of an injunction is a matter of discretion. This is M. & M. R. R. Co. v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 226; Flippin
true if such discretion arises from a consideration of v. Knaffle, 2 Tenn. Ch., 238; ante, § 583, note 4;
the fixed rules of law and Equity, and is governed post, §§ 857; 902.
by an impartial purpose to rigidly apply those rules 38 High on Injunc., § 5.
to the case at hand. In this State no man's rights
§834 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. 640
Where the legal right
is not sufficiently clear to enable a Court of Equity to
form an opinion, will generally be governed, in deciding an application for
it
a preliminary injunction, by considerations of the relative convenience and in-
convenience which may result to the parties from granting or withholding the
writ. And where, upon balancing such considerations, it is apparent that the
act complained of is likely to result in irreparable injury to the complainant,
and the balance of inconvenience preponderates in his favor, the injunction will
be granted. But where, on the o'ther hand, it appears that greater danger is
likely to result from granting than from withholding the relief, or, where the
inconvenience seems to be equally divided as between the parties, the injunc-
tion will be refused, and the parties left as they are. 39 And if the complainant's
rights may be as well secured by a final injunction, and are not prejudiced by
a refusal of the temporary injunction, the Court may refuse the interlocutory
application, especially when the injuries which would result to the defendant,
if the relief were improperly granted, would greatly exceed the benefits which
might result to the complainant, if the injunction were properly granted. If,
however, a clear case of irreparable injury is shown as likely to result to com-
plainant, unless the injunction is granted, and it does not appear that the
issuing of the writ will work any such injury to defendant, the relief will be
granted. 40
An injunction will not ordinarily be granted, even in cases where the com-
plainant would otherwise be entitled to the writ, if it appears (1) that he has
consented to, acquiesced in, or otherwise waived, the wrong complained of or ;
(2) that he has been negligent or guilty of laches in making his application;
or (3) that damages will be adequate compensation; or (4) that his own mis-
conduct, or negligence, occasioned or contributed to the wrong or injury com-
plained of; or (5) that by reasonable diligence such wrong or injury could have
been avoided; or (6) that he has been guilty of participation in the iniquity
complained of, so that his hands are not clean or (7) that the injunction would
;
be injurious to innocent third parties, who should be heard before hurt or (8) ;
that the writ would be contrary to some statute, or to public policy; or (9)
that, for any other reason, the injunction would be contrary to Equity and good
conscience.
§ 834. —
Form of a Writ of Injunction. The form of the writ is unimportant,
provided it contains enough to give the defendant notice of the fact that he
is enjoined from doing the acts complained of in the bill. The writ should state
(1) the fact of the bill being filed by the complainant against the defendant,
(2) in what Court filed, (3) a brief statement of the allegations showing the
wrong complained of, (4) the prayer for an injunction, (5) the granting of a
fiat for an injunction, (6) the command to the Sheriff to make known to the
defendant what he is enjoined from doing, (7) the direction to the Sheriff when
to return the writ, and (8) should be duly tested and signed by the Clerk and
Master. The writ should be sufficiently explicit upon its face to apprize the
defendant what he is restrained from doing, without compelling him to resort
to the bill to ascertain what the injunction means. 41
If the object of the suit is to restrain proceedings in another Court, the in-
junction will be awarded against the defendant, his attorneys, and agents. If
the object of the suit is to restrain the commission of waste, or other inequitable
39 Flippin v. Knaffle, 2 Tenn. Ch., 238; 2 Dan. Ana it is not a sufficient ground for interfering that,
Ch. Pr., 1640; 1664; 1 High on Injunc, § 13. if there be no such intention on the part of the de-
40 1 High on Injunc. § 13. An injunction, being fendant, the injunction can do no harm. The Chan-
"the strong arm of Equity," should never be granted cellor will not interfere when the evidence shows
except on a clear case of irreparable injury, and that there is no probability of defendant doing the
with a full conviction on the part of the Chancellor act which is sought to be restrained. So, if it is
of its urgent necessity. To justify the Chancellor in apparent upon an application for an injunction that
granting the relief he must be reasonably satisfied the relief sought is disproportioned to the nature and
that there is an actual intention on the part of the extent of the injury sustained, or likely to be sus-
defendant to do the act which it is sought to enjoin, tained, the Chancellor will decline to interfere. 1
or that there is probable ground for believing that, High on Injunc. § 22.
unless the relief is granted, the act will be done. 41 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1674; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 620.
641 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE OBTAINED. § 835
act, the injunction is awarded against the defendant, his servants, workmen,
and agents. 42 The following is a form of
A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AGAINST A SUIT AT LAW.
Gibson County. j
To the Sheriff 43 of Gibson county
Whereas, A
B has filed a bill in the Chancery Court at Trenton against E F, alleging
among other things, that E F has fraudulently obtained a judgment against him for five
hundred dollars, before Charles Smith, a Justice of the Peace of Gibson county, and praying,
among other things, for a writ of injunction to restrain said E F from taking any steps to
enforce or collect said judgment;
And whereas, the Hon. Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor, has directed me to issue an injunc-
tion as prayed in said bill.
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make known to the said F, that he is strictly E
enjoined and commanded to take no step in person, or by agent, to enforce or collect said
judgment, and that he desist and refrain from any action to that end, until the further order
of said Court. Herein fail not, and make due return of this writ to said Count, on the
first Monday of October next.
Witness R. Z. Taylor, Clerk and Master of said Court, at office, the first Monday in April,
1890. R. Z. Taylor, C. & M.
GENERAL FORM OF A WRIT OF INJUNCTION.

State of Tennessee,
County.
To the Sheriff of county
Whereas, [insert the name of the complainant,] has filed his bill of complaint in our
Chancery Court at [insert the name of town where the Court is held,] against
[insert the name of the defendant,] charging among other things, that, [here insert the sub-
stance of the charges in the bill on which the injunction is sought 44 ] and praying, among:
other things, the issue of a writ of injunction to restrain the said [here insert the name-
of the defendant,] his agents and servants, from [doing the act, or acts, complained of, spec--
5
ifying them.* ]
And whereas, the Hon. Chancellor, [giving his name,] has directed me to issue a writ
,
of injunction as prayed in said bill

You are, therefore, hereby commanded to make known to the said [here insert the
name of the defendant^] his agents and servants, that he and they are strictly enjoined and
commanded to take no step and proceed no further in [doing the act or acts complained of,
specifying them, 46 ] but that he and they absolutely desist and refrain therefrom until the
further order of our said Court. Herein fail not, and make due return of this writ to our
said Court on the Monday of — —
[insert the date of the next term of said Court.]
Witness , Clerk and Master of our said Court, at office, in [insert the name of
the town where the Court is held,] the....Monday of...., 19.... [insert the date of the previous-
term of said Court.] David Hart, C. & M.
The Issuance and Service of an Injunction. As soon as the bill has.
§ 835. —
been and the proper prosecution and injunction bonds given, or pauper
filed,
oath taken, the Clerk and Master will issue a copy of the bill, a subpoena to
answer, and a writ of injunction. 47 If there is urgency, the Master may issue-
the injunction first, and put it in the hands of the Sheriff for service but in ;
such case, the copy of the bill and subpoena should be made out and servedl
with possible diligence. 48
all
The ordinary mode
of serving an injunction is by reading it to the defendant
but if he evade, or attempts to evade, the service of the writ, the officer must,
leave a copy at the usual residence of the defendant, and state the fact on his-
return, which will be deemed a sufficient service. 49
§ 836. When a Prayer for an Injunction is not Necessary. —As a rule, an
42 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1673; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 620. The 46 For instance: in cutting valuable trees on said'
injunction is generally issued in all cases against the tract and in removing those already cut
defendant, his attorneys, servants and agents. Speak 47 Code, §§ 4339, 4439.
v. Ransom, 2 Tenn. Ch., 213. 48 In matters of great urgency, and at the request
43 The was formerly addressed, not to the
writ of the complainant, the Chancellor or Judge granting
Sheriff, but to the defendant, and to his counsellors, the fiat may address a notice of the fact to the
attorneys and agents. I Barb. Ch. Pr., 620. defendant, and may authorize any person to serve it
44 For instance: the defendant is cutting valuable Code, § 4415; or the fact that a fiat has been granted
trees on the tract of land on which he is living, and may be communicated to the defendant, verbally, or-
removing them therefrom. in writing, by the complainant, or his agent; or may
45 For instance: cutting any more trees on said be telegraphed to him. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1674 See
§"845
tract and from removing those already cut. post,
49 C<'ode, §§4346; 4443.
§837 HOW INJUNCTIONS ARE) OBTAINED. 642
interlocutory injunction will not be granted unless prayed for in the bill, 50
but where the Court has taken property into its custody, it will interfere by in-
junction to prevent any injury to it, or intermeddling with it, either by litigants
or others. So, where a Court is administering a fund for the benefit of creditors
generally, it will enjoin a creditor from bringing a separate suit against the
debtor, or his representative, when such creditor has the right to come in and
prove his debt under the general bill. 51
An injunction will, also, be issued without a prayer therefor in the bill when
the complainant is proceeding against the defendant both in Chancery and in
some other Court, at the same time and for the same matter. In such cases,
as already stated, 52 the defendant may require the complainant to elect in which
Court he will proceed, and if he elects to proceed in Chancery, he will be en-
joined from further proceeding in the other Court, unless, under special circum-
stances, he is allowed to sue in both Courts.
The Court will, likewise, without a prayer for that purpose, enjoin persons
from interfering with the process or officers of the Court, or suing the latter
in another tribunal. 53 An injunction will issue in any such case, on motion in
open Court, or before the Chancellor of the Court at Chambers; such motion
to be supported by a sworn petition detailing the necessary facts.
The interlocutory injunctions granted in the foregoing and similar cases are
generally called "restraining orders."
An injunction may, also, be moved for and obtained, on sufficient grounds,
at any time during the pendency of the suit and, if at the hearing, a mandatory
;
or perpetual injunction is necessary for the purposes of complete justice, it

will then be granted, although not prayed for in the bill. 54
§ 837. When Injunctions will be Continued, or made Perpetual. Often an —
interlocutory injunction is the only exercise of the injunctive power necessary
for the purposes of justice, the final decree settling the rights of the parties in
such a manner that a continuation of the interlocutory injunction is unneces-
sary but there are, also, many cases where the rights and interests of the com-
;
plainant require that the temporary injunction be continued, or made perpetual,

in the final decree. This is especially true in cases where the principal relief
sought by the bill is injunctive, as in suits (1) to abate nuisances, (2) to enjoin
a fraudulent, or satisfied, or void judgment, (3) to remove a cloud, (4) to
enjoin the use or transfer of a forged, fraudulent, or void deed, note, or other
paper, 55 (5) to stay waste, or trespass, or other tortious invasions of complain-
ant's rights, or (6) to quiet titles and prevent a multiplicity of suits.
An interlocutory injunction is superseded by the decree made at the hearing
of the cause, and, if such injunction is intended to remain in force, it must be.
properly continued by the final decree. An injunction may be had at the hear-
ing, even when not prayed for in the bill, or when the interlocutory injunction
was dissolved. An injunction can only be made perpetual at the hearing of the
cause and when made perpetual it continues in force notwithstanding some of
;
the parties to the suit may marry or die. 56 The phraseology used in making
the temporary injunction perpetual is as follows
DECREE OE PERPETUAL INJUNCTION.

[After adjudicating the merits of the controversy, but before the adjudication of costs,
or a reference to the Master, or other subordinate matter, add:]
And the temporary injunction heretofore granted in this cause prohibiting and restraining
the defendant from [doing so and so, specifying what,] is hereby continued and made per-
petual.
50 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 1614. 54 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1683. See, ante, §§651; 824.
51 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1615; Smith v. St. Louis M. L. 55 But, ordinarily, the Court will order such
Ins Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 502; Macey V. Childress, 2 paper to be delivered up and cancelled. 2 Dan. Ch.
Tenn. Ch., 26.
52 See, ante, § 328. 56 Justice V. McBroom, 1 Lea, 555; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr..
53 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1618. 1680-1683; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 613-615.
643 PLEADINGS IN INJUNCTION SUITS. § 838
ARTICLE IV.
PLEADINGS IN INJUNCTION SUITS, AND RELIEFS GRANTED.
§ 838. The Frame of the Bill in an Injunc-
tion Suit.
§ 842. Frame of an Answer to an Injunction
Bill.
§ 839. General Form of an Injunction Bill.
§ 840. Special Form of Injunction Bill.
§ 843. Form of an Answer to an Injunction
Bill.
§ 841. Frame and Form of a Bill for a Man-
§ 844. Reliefs Granted in Injunction Suits.
datory Injunction.
§ 838. The Frame of the Bill in an Injunction Suit. The character of the —
averments in a bill for an injunction has been heretofore considered, 1 but the
importance of the subject may justify further observations.
1. The Frame of an Injunction Bill Generally Considered. As a preliminary in-
junction is an extraordinary exercise of judicial authority, so the party invok-
ing such exercise should present a bill therefor cogent enough to justify the
Chancellor in awarding such powerful process, ex parte. In a bill that seeks
no preliminary order, such as an order for a receiver, an injunction, or an at-
tachment, all that is ordinarily necessary is a plain, direct, and positive aver-
ment of the facts out of which the complainant's rights arise, and on which the
relief he seeks depends. Such a bill is a mere pleading, and ordinarily need not
be sworn to. When, however, a preliminary order is sought, and especially an
injunction, the bill partakes of the nature both of a pleading, and of an affidavit
in support of that pleading. As a pleading, it should show a clear right to the
relief against the wrongs complained of and, as an affidavit, it should set forth
;
in detail, clearly, directly, and positively, the facts and circumstances of the
case, the aggravating and inequitable conduct of the defendant, and how the
injury threatened if allowed to happen, or the injury being perpetrated if
allowed to continue, will not only work irreparable injury to the complainant's
rights or property, but be, also, manifestly contrary to Equity and good con-
science.
An injunction being a harsh remedy, will not be granted, in the first instance,
except upon a clear prima facie case, and upon positive averments of the equities
upon which the application for relief is based. And while it is not essential that
complainant should' establish his case, upon an application for an interlocutory
injunction, with the same degree of certainty that would be required upon the
final hearing, he must nevertheless allege positively the facts constituting his
grounds for relief. Thus, the mere allegation of irreparable injury will not
suffice to warrant an injunction, but the facts must appear on which the allega-
tion is predicated in order that the Court may be satisfied as to the nature of
the injury. Nor will merely argumentative allegations, or inferences from the
facts stated, suffice to meet the requirements of the rule. The relief will not or-
dinarily be allowed where the facts upon which complainant 's equities rest, are
stated only upon information and belief but they should be made to appear by
;
positive averments founded on complainant's own knowledge or that of some

person cognizant of the facts. Nor will it suffice that the averments of the bill
are made upon the information of the party complaining, without stating his
sources of information. And an injunction granted ex parte, where some of the
material allegations of the bill are stated on information and belief, can not
be sustained in the absence of proof of their correctness. Nor do the mere
apprehensions and fears of complainant unsustained by facts establishing their
1 See, ante, % 142, sub-sec. 2.
§838 PLEADINGS IN INJUNCTION SUITS. 644
probability, constitute a sufficient ground to warrant interference by injunction,
since such fears may exist without any substantial reason. Therefore before
injunctive relief will be granted, not the complainant, but the Court, must be
satisfied that a wrong is about to be committed which will be irreparable in its
nature. 2
The bill must contain all the definiteness of detail, the particularity of fact,
and circumstance, the fullness and precision of statement essential to a special
affidavit in the gravest of matters. The grounds on which the preliminary in-
junction is sought must be set forth specifically and positively, and on personal
knowledge. If any averments are based on information at all, the source of the
information should be stated, and the complainant should aver his belief in its
credibility. The bill should show definitely, on its face, what allegations are
made on complainant's own knowledge, and what on information and belief.
The bill should be sworn to positively, and the affidavit should so show. If an
agent or Solicitor swear to it, his affidavit should show that he is the agent, or
and has personal knowledge of the facts set forth
Solicitor, in the bill, and he
must swear that they are true of his own knowledge, and his affidavit should so
show. 3
If the facts and circumstances of the case are not within the personal know-
ledge of the complainant, he should state them on his information and belief,
and annex the affidavit of the person from whom he obtained the information,
or the affidavit of some other person having knowledge of the facts alleged, that
the material allegations of the bill are true on his own personal knowledge of
the facts. 4
The bill should contain a specific prayer for an injunction, both as a process
and as a part of the relief prayed. An interlocutory injunction will not be
granted unless prayed for, either in the original bill, or in a subsequent supple-
mental pleading. 5 The Court will, however, readily allow the prayer of the bill
to be amended so as to pray for injunctive relief, when the facts alleged warrant
such relief.
And, finally, the bill must state that it is the first application for an injunction
in the case. 6
2. The Frame law. It is an extraordinary ex-
of a Bill to Enjoin Proceedings at
ercise of power on the part of one Court to interfere even indirectly with the
proceedings or process of another Court, and the party who asks the Court of
Chancery so to do should present all the particulars of the case on which he
bases such a request, so that the Chancellor may clearly see from the facts and
circumstances detailed in the bill that the inequitable conduct of the defendant
justifies injunctive interposition.
The bill for an injunction to stay proceedings at law should show: (1) the
nature of the suit at law (2) the Court in which it is pending (3) the date of
; ;
its commencement (4) the steps taken in it, such as the filing of the declaration,
;
demurrer, plea, etc.; (5) the defences made to the suit, if any, particularizing
the nature and matter of the defence, if any has been made, (6) and all the facts
which demonstrate that some injustice would be done to the complainant, or
that he would be deprived of some legal or equitable right, or of some equitable
defence, if his adversary were admitted to proceed to judgment, in the suit at
law. If the bill fails to give these details, the injunction ought to be refused. 7
If the bill be filed after judgment, the complainant should, in addition to the
2 1 High on Injunc, §§ 34-36. such a bill being dissolved on the incoming of an

3 Furnace Co. V. Railroad, 5 Cates, 711, citing the answer fully meeting and denying the equities of the
above section, then § 785, of this book. bill, especially if such an answer be on the personal
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1619, note; 2 High on Injunc, §§ knowledge of the defendant, and the affidavit there-
1567-1569. A bill sworn to by the complainant, or to so shows. See, ante, 788.
by his Solicitor, or agent, on knowledge, information 5 1Dan. Ch. Pr., 388; 2 Ibid, 1619; 2 High on
and belief, without showing clearly how much is on Injunc, § 1573.
the knowledge of the affiant, is not sufficient either 6 Code, § 4435.
(1) to obtain a temporary injunction in any, except 7 Chadwell »). Jordan, 2 Tenn. Ch., 639; tevan v.
ordinary cases, where it can not do the defendant any Patton, 2 Heisk., 108; 1 High on Injunc, § 56.
harm; or (2) to prevent an injunction granted on
foregoing facts, show: (1) the facts constituting his defence to the suit at law;
(2) in what way he was prevented from making that defence, giving the par-
ticulars in full and (3) showing and averring that neither he nor his attorneys
;
were guilty of any negligence or fault in not making the defence. 8 If the
ground of injunction be that the defence is an equitable one, or one embarrassed
by difficulties and complications, the complainant must show particularly and in
detail, (1) wherein the defence is an equitable one, or (2) wherein and how
it was embarrassed by difficulties and complications. 9 General and indefinite
charges in such cases will not avail the Court requires specifications of the par-
;
ticular facts relied on. 10

3. The Frame of a Bill to Stay tlie Enforcement of a Written Instrument. There
is no more solemn act in business dealings between men than a contract duly
agreed upon, reduced to writing, and signed; and when a party to such an
instrument, especially if it be a deed, mortgage, note of hand, or account stated,
is seeking to enforce it, cogent indeed must be the case that will justify a Court
or Chancellor in requiring the owner of such instrument to stay his hand.
Hence it is that great particularity is required in the frame of a bill praying an
injunction in such a case. If fraud be alleged as vitiating the instrument, all
the facts and circumstances constituting such fraud must be particularly and
fully set forth. If some mistake or accident is alleged as the ground of relief,
all the particulars of the mistake or accident must be circumstantially detailed,
and it should be further shown that the. complainant has been guilty of no neg-
lect or delay in the matter. General allegations of fraud, accident, or mistake
amount to nothing in such a case. 11 In hearing parole testimony to reform or
rescind deeds, mortgages, notes of hand, accounts stated, and other written
instruments, the Chancery Court is violating one of the most sacred rules of the
common law, 12 and acting contrary to the presumptions of evidence. Therefore,
clear, cogent, particular, precise, and circumstantial should be the allegations
of a bill for reformation or rescission; and complainant's hands must be clean
and his feet swift, and any apparent delay in filing his bill must be fully
explained.
§ 839. —
General Form of an Injunction Bill. An injunction bill frequently
has more objects than the obtaining of an injunction, as hereafter shown. An
injunction is often only the primary or preliminary object; other relief is de-
sired. A study of the doctrine o'f relations and the following general form will
enable the Solicitor to draw an injunction bill in a precise, lucid and logical
manner, and to exhibit his equities and the defendant's iniquities in bold relief.
GENERAL FORM OF AN INJUNCTION BILL.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155-164.]
I.
That [If relations exist between the complainant and defendant, so state and give the
particulars. 13 If no relations exist, begin the bill by alleging complainant's interest in or
14
title to the property, franchise or right in controversy, 'describing it with particularity. ]
That [If relations have been alleged, state what rights accrued to complainant as the result
thereof, or what duties were imposed on the defendant. If no relations have been alleged,
show how and wherein complainant has been using or enjoying the particular property, fran-
chise or right, in controversy.],
in.
That [// relations exist, show in what way the defendant has violated, is violating or
threatens to violate the rights of complainant, or the duties of the defendant, arising from
such relations, giving the circumstances with, particularity, and the. times and places of such
violation, and show wherein complainant has been or will be damaged by such violations.
If no relations exist, show how, when and where the defendant is interfering with complain-
8 Greenfield V. Frierson, 7 Heisk. 636.
11 Borches & Co. v. Arbuckle Bros., 3 Cates, 498
Fort v Orndorff, 7 Heisk., 167; Borches & Co. 12 See, ante^ § 442.
Arbuckle Bros., 3 Cates, 498. 13 See, ante, §§ 165-169.
v.
10 Ibid. 14 See, ante, § 172.
ant's title, possession or interest, to or in the property, right or franchise in controversy, and
specify wherein- and how much such interference has injured or will injure the complainant,
stating the facts and circumstances with particularity.]
IV.
That [If there be any other matter material to the controversy here set it out. If a decree
for money is sought and there be any ground to attach the defendant's property, specify such
1
ground, and describe the property if known; and be sure to describe it if complainant has
any lien on it, or if it is an equitable estate.™]
v.

1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, as in § 164.]
2d. That your Honor declare and enforce complainant's rights and equities in the premises,
[specifying what sort of relief complainant desires, consistent with the: facts he has alleged.]
3d. That [If a reference to the Master is necessary to take and state an account between
the parties, so pray, [see § 600] or .if an attachment is desired, pray that an attachment issue
[see §§ 871-873] ;or if a receiver is desired, pray for the appointment of one [see sees. 905-906],
if any other action is desired prior to the hearing, such as an order on the defendant to Ale
certain documents, or the like, so pray, having first laid grounds therefor in the body of the
bill.]
4th. That an injunction issue by order of your Honor, to enjoin and restrain the defend-
ant from [doing what complainant does not wish him to do, specifying the inequitable conduct
or actions of which complainant specifically complains], and that at the hearing said injunction
be made perpetual.
5th. That complainant may be awarded damages for the injuries done to him as herein-
before set out. [// complainant has not been materially damaged, this prayer will be omitted.]
This is the first application for an injunction [or attachment, or receiver,] in this case.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, § 789.] Walter Cocke, Solicitor.
An injunction bill should be verified by the oath of the complainant, unless
the facts in it are better known to his agent or Solicitor, and then by the one
best acquainted with the facts. 16 Where the facts are within the knowledge of
another person, and the complainant desires to strengthen his bill against a
motion to dissolve the injunction on answer, he may annex the affidavit of such
other person to his bill, as follows
CORROBORATING AFFIDAVIT TO AN INJUNCTION BILL."
County of Roane. )
John Jones makes oath that he is familiar with all the material matters stated in the fore-
going bill, and has actual knowledge thereof, and from such knowledge knows that the mat-
ters of fact therein stated are true. And he further swears that he has no interest whatever
in the event of this suit. John Jones.
[Annex jurat; see, ante, § 789, and note.]
§ 840. Special Form of Injunction Bill. —As further aids to inexperienced
draughtsmen the following special form of an injunction bill is given. Other
forms of special injunction bills are given in other sections of this book, and
may be found by consulting the Index of Forms.
BILL TO ENJOIN SALE UNDER TRUST DEED, HAVE ABSOLUTE DEED
DECLARED A MORTGAGE, AND IMPEACH NOTE FOR USURT.is
That they are husband and wife, and in March, 1903, while in financial distress, he bor-
rowed four hundred dollars from the defendant, for which he gave his note for four hundred
and fifty dollars, due in six months, and secured its payment by a deed of trust on their
homestead, being the house and lot [or farm] where they live, situated, [locating and describ-
ing it; see, ante, § 172.] Complainant, Dove Doe, joined in said note and deed of trust.
II.
That complainants not being able to pay said note at maturity, the defendant advertised
said house and lot [or farm] for sale for cash, such being the provision in said deed. There-
is See, § 871. Ferrin );. Woods, 3 Bax., 242. The Chancery Court
16 See, ante, §§ 788; 838, note, 4. will relieve against a judgment at law containing
IT 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 47-48; 2 Ibid, 362-363. usury when the defence as to usury was complicated.
ISA bill to recover usury paid must state such Chester v. Apperson, 4 Heisk., 639; but not when the
facts as will show the amount borrowed, the amount defence was adequate. Parham v. Pulliam, 5 Cold..
of usury in the transaction, and when paid. Mc- 497.
upon complainants went to him, and on September 5, 1903, gave him a new note for five hun-
dred and fifty dollars, due in three months, and secured its payment by a new deed of trust on
said house and lot, [or farm] authorizing him to sell the said property for cash if said note
was not paid when due.
in. .
That complainants again failing to pay the defendant what said new note called for, said
house and lot [or farm] were [or was] again advertised for sale for cash in hand. Complain-
ants again went to see the defendant, and after the defendant had made many threats to
force the sale if the note was not paid before the day of sale, and after complainants had
secured a reliable prospect to obtain the money, and so informed the defendant, the latter
became very friendly and confidential, and told complainants that he would not sell the
house and lot, [or farm] but would give them a year's more time to pay said note, if they
would deed said house and lot [or farm] to him as security.
IV.
Complainants being in great distress, and not knowing what better to do, but hoping for
the best, accepted said offer, and on January 13, 1904, by deed duly acknowledged, conveyed
said house and lot, [or farm] absolutely to the defendant; and the defendant has had said
deed registered, notwithstanding his positive promise not to have it registered within said
year, but to return it to complainant unregistered if said debt was paid within said year.
v.
That said house and lot, [or farm] have [or has] become far more valuable in consequence
of the building of a railroad in the neighborhood, and complainants were offered fifteen
hundred dollars cash for it by a solvent and reliable would-be purchaser, and he and they
on March 5, 1904, went to the defendant and tendered him the sum of five hundred and
thirty dollars, the full amount of said note, principal and interest, and called for said deed.
Thereupon the defendant said the house and lot [or farm] were [or was] his, and exhibited
his said absolute deed therefor. After considerable altercation, the defendant offered to
deed said house and lot, [or farm] to said would-be purchaser for said fifteen hundred dol-
lars, and give complainants one-half thereof, less the principal and interest of said five
hundred dollar note; that is to say, said note was to be deducted from complainants' said
half.
VI.
That complainants refused to accept said proposition, and the defendant was very much
enraged in consequence, and swore he "would have satisfaction yet ;" and accordingly on the
28th of this month, March, 1904, he advertised said house and lot [or farm,] for sale under
said trust deed, dated September 5, 1903 and such is his litigious reputation, and such the
;
complications in the title from the facts aforesaid, that complainants verily believe and so
charge that would-be bidders will be deterred from bidding. On the day said sale was ad-
vertised the defendant offered complainants two hundred dollars to surrender to him the
possession of said house and lot [or farm,] which offer they rejected.
Complainants continue their said tender of five hundred and thirty dollars, and file said
money with this bill.
VII.
The premises considered, complainants pray:

1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c., see, ante, §§ 158-164.]
2d. That an injunction issue to restrain and enjoin the defendant from selling or offering
to sell, or in any way encumbering, said house and lot, [or farm,] or any part thereof, either
under said trust deeds or under said absolute deed.
3d. That all of said deeds be declared null and void, and clouds on their title, and can-
celled; but complainants are not so entitled as to said absolute deed, then that it be de-
if
clared a mortgage and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled.
4th. That said note for five hundred and fifty dollars be declared usurious, and be abated
to the extent of the usury, and that complainants be not held bound or estopped by the
amount of their tender, they tendering said amount out of abundant caution, not that they
considered that amount honestly and lawfully due, but being in distress tendered all the
defendant could claim, hoping he would accept it, and thus terminate their thralldom.
5th. That complainants may have such further and other relief as they may be entitled.
Wright & Wright, Solicitors.
~)
State of Tennessee,
Roane County. J
John Doe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing bill are true of his own know-
ledge, except the matters therein stated to be on information and belief, and these matters
he believes to be true. John Doe.
this March 30, 1904.
James G. Crumbliss, C. & M.
§ 841. Frame and Form of a Bill for a Mandatory Injunction. The frame and —
form of a bill for a mandatory injunction in no respect differ from the frame
and form of a bill for a prohibitory injunction, except in the form of the prayer.
In fact, ordinarily, the prayers are o.f the same nature, as it is customary for a
writ of mandatory injunction not to command the defendant to do or undo
what is desired, but to prohibit him from allowing it to remain undone or
done. 18a All the particularity, and positiveness, and directness of allegation,
and detail of circumstances, and affidavit of knowledge, required in a prohibi-
tory injunction bill must be observed when a mandatory injunction is sought,
for a mandatory injunction is a more stringent remedy, and the bill must pre-
sent a specially strong case.
BILL FOB, MANDATORY INJUNCTION.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155-164]
i.
That he is the owner and in possession of the following tract of land [Here describe
: it;
see, ante, § 172.] This tract he purchased from the vendor of the defendant, November 13,
1894. ii.
Complainant first took possession of said tract, under a lease from his vendor, and while
liolding under said lease, built a substantial fence around the entire tract. Said tract is
cut off from any public road, the land of the defendant intervening. When complainant
purchased said tract his vendor owned and was in possession of all the land now owned by
both complainant and defendant. While complainant was his vendor's tenant he used a road-
way through his vendor's land leading to the public road, and also used the water from a
spring and small creek on his vendor's land and when complainant took his deed he re-
;
quested that his right to use said roadway, spring and creek should be recognized, but he was
told by his vendor that the word "appurtenances" in the deed was sufficient, and that satis-
fied him. in.
That about three months ago, and after complainant and his family had been in free and
uninterrupted possession, use and enjoyment of said roadway, spring and creek for more than
ten years under his said deed, defendant purchased from complainant's vendor the balance
of the latter's land, including the part intervening between complainant's tract and the public
"highway, on which part are said roadway, spring and creek; and very soon after his purchase
he notified complainant that he, complainant, must stop using said roadway, spring and creek,
asserting that complainant had no right thereto, and that his, defendant's, deed excepted
nothing, and made no mention of complainant's right or liberty to use said roadway, spring
and creek.
IV.
That as complainant disregarded said notice, defendant, with a force of hands, erected a verv
high and strong fence that completely shuts complainant off from said roadway, spring and
creek, and thus totally deprives him of water for his family and stock, and of a road by which
he and his family can reach the mill, the church, school house, stores, blacksmith shop, and
other places of barter, bargain and sale. Complainant has three children of school age, who
are thus shut off from school.
That said roadway, spring and creek are so situated that their use by complainant in no
ay damages the defendant, being in and through a piece of woods half a mile from de-
v.-
fendant's house, spring and road; and during the ten years complainant has used said road-
way, spring and creek, he has done so exclusively and adversely, under a claim of right,
and such right was never questioned by his vendor or any other person, and complainant
never supposed that his use of said roadway, spring and creek, was liable to be interrupted
or defeated. Complainant paid four hundred dollars for his said tract, and has put valuable
improvements thereon since his purchase, hauling the lumber over said roadway, so that the
tract is now worth one thousand dollars including said roadway, spring and creek; but is of
very little value if said roadway, spring and creek are permanently cut off from it.
VI.
The premises
1st. That subpeena to answer issue, [&c., see, ante, §§ 1S8; 164.]
2d. That a mandatory injunction issue by order of your Honor, requiring and commanding
the defendant forthwith to remove said fence and any and all other obstructions to complain-
18a See preceding section. As Courts of Chancery mand the defendant to do or undo what is necessary
regard substance rather than form, and directness for immediate affirmative relief. Circuitus est evitan-
rather than indirectness, there is an increasing dis- dus. (Indirect action should be avoided.)
position on the part of Chancellors to directly com-
ant's full 'and free use of said roadway, spring and creek, for himself, his family, servants, vis-
itors, and stock as before said fence was built; and that defendant be enjoined and prohibited
from allowing said obstructions to remain where they now are, and enjoined and prohibited
from in any way interfering with or obstructing the full and free use of said roadway, spring
and creek by complainant, his family, servants, visitors, and stock.
3d. That complainant be allowed damages for the injury done him by the construction
of said fence, and by being shut off from the use of said roadway, spring and creek, as afore-
said.
4th. That complainant have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
Will A. McTEER, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, § 789.]
FIAT FOB A MANDATORY INJUNCTION.

To the Clerk and Master at Maryville:
On prayed (therein, on complainant giving
this bill being filed, issue a writ of injunction, as
bond and restrain the defendant, his agents
therefor, as required by law. Let the writ inhibit
and servants from continuing the obstructions mentioned, and from allowing them to remain
as such, and from in any way obstructing or interfering with the full and free use and en-
joyment of the roadway, spring and creek by the complainant, his family, servants, visitors,
and stock.
November 13, 1905. Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor.
Or the fiat may
be in the following form, which, while not so usual, is more
consistent with the principles of Equity, and is growing in favor
FIAT FOB, A MANDATORY INJUNCTION.

To the Clerk and Master at Maryville:
File this and, on a proper injunction bond being given, issue a writ of injunction
bill,
as prayed, commandingthe defendant, his agents and servants, forthwith to remove the
fence complained of, and prohibiting him and them from in any way obstructing or interfering
with the full and free use and enjoyment of the said roadway, spring and creek by the
complainant, his family, servants, visitors, and stock.
November 13, 1905. Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor.
§ 842. —
Frame of an Answer to an Injunction Bill. If the defendant is con-
tent to submit to the injunction, he may answer so much of the bill as is a
pleading; but, if he wishes to have the injunction dissolved or modified, he
must, also, answer so much of the bill as is an affidavit. In such a case, the
answer becomes both a pleading and a counter affidavit; and, in its character
as a counter affidavit, it must specifically, directly, fully, and cogently meet
and deny the particular facts and pertinent details averred in the bill. If there
be explanatory or exculpatory facts and circumstances, suppressed in the bill,
they should be fully set forth. If there be writings throwing light on the con-
troversy they must be exhibited. Every matter in the knowledge of the defend-
ant, relating to the wrongs alleged in the bill, must be fully and frankly dis-
closed. The allegations and denials must be on the personal knowledge of the
defendant, and the answer should so show on its face. Every Equity set up in
the bill must be squarely and unhesitatingly met, and overwhelmed; not by
general averments or by sweeping denials, but by taking up each material alle-
gation' in the bill and snowing its falsity, or reconciling it with the defendant's
innocence, or showing that the complainant has misconstrued it, or distorted
it, or garbled it. And when the affidavit portion of the bill has been thus com-
pletely met, the defendant must swear to the answer positively, and on his own
knowledge, and the affidavit to his answer must so show.
§ 843. Form of an Answer to an Injunction Bill.—The following is the form
of an answer to an injunction bill. The student, however, is cautioned that the
forms of both bills and answers in this book have been made as concise as possi-
ble in order to economize space. The pleader must keep in mind that in equita-
ble matters the Chancery Court acts on circumstances; so all bills and answers
setting up equitable matters, and especially in injunction suits, must set forth
the circumstances.
ANSWERS AND CROSS BILL IN AN INJUNCTION SUIT.20
[Por title and commencement, see, ante, §405.]
John Doe and wife, Dove Doe, ]
vs. ! In Chancery at Kingston.
Richard Roe. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, for answer and cross-bill to the bill filed against him in
said cause, says
1.
That he admits that complainant borrowed the four hundred dollars from him as alleged
in the 1st paragraph of their bill, and gave him the note and trust deed as alleged, to secure
its repayment; but they neglect to state that the other fifty dollars was a fee paid him for
examining the title to the land, drawing the trust deed, and attending to the discharge of a
prior trust deed and note given to another party, and also as a bonus for said loan, all of
which defendant avers are the real facts, and complainants willingly and cheerfully agreed
thereto, and gave said four hundred and fifty dollar note and said trust deed understanding^,
willingly and gladly, for it enabled them to save their home.
n.
Further answering, defendant admits the 2d paragraph of the bill to be true, but com-
plainants fail to state that said five hundred dollar note includes the interest on the prior
note, the defendant's fee for drawing the new trust deed, and a note for twenty dollars and
accrued interest held by defendant on complainant John Doe, and ten dollars cash advanced
to complainants at the time, which defendant says are the real facts of the transaction and ;
he says that said five hundred dollar note and new trust deed were executed willingly, freely
and understanding^, and complainant, Dove Doe, was privily examined as to said deed
all of which will more fully appear by reference to said deed,- which is made an exhibit to
this answer, and marked A.
in.
Further answering, the defendant denies the whole of the 3d and 4th paragraphs of the
bill, except so much thereof as alleges the advertisement of said property for cash, and the
subsequent delivery of an absolute deed for said house and lot, [or farm,] to defendant. The
facts are that complainants were completely at the mercy of defendant, and instead of fore-
closing the trusrt deed, and buying in the property, as would most probably have been the
result, the defendant without any extra charge for drawing the deed and without requiring a
new note for principal and interest, gave complainants further time to pay the debt. Buit he
denies that there was any definite contract as to withholding said deed from registration, or
giving them a year's time to pay the debt, defendant's understanding being that they might
pay the debt any time before the deed was registered.
IV.
Further answering, defendant denies the statements in the Sth paragraph of the bill in
manner and form as charged, and says the real facts are that defendant obtained a purchaser
for said house and lot, [or farm,] which he admits has increased in value, but when said
would-be purchaser found complainants in possession thereof, and setting up a claim thereto,
he proposed to -trade with them for a much less sum, and he offered defendant the sum of
five hundred and thirty dollars in payment of said five hundred dollar note and demanded a
deed to him for the land, all of which defendant refused, as he believed he had the right to
do. Defendant did offer to sell said property to said proposing purchaser for fifteen hundred
dollars, and to divide the money as alleged in the bill, but this they refused to accept. De-
fendant made said offer out of compassion for the complainants, and not because he recog-
nized any right on their part to any portion thereof.
v.
Further answering, defendant denies the charges in the 6th paragraph of the bill in the
manner and form as charged, but he admits that he is offering to sell said property under
said second trust deed, and that he, through a third person, offered complainants two hundred
dollars to surrender the possession of said property to him, and he did this to quiet his title
and prevent a law suit, and he is advised he had a right so to do.
VI.
Further answering, defendant denies and singular the allegations in said bill not here-
all
inbefore specifically admitted, and says they are not true. And now having fully answered
said bill, the defendant files this, his answer, as a cross-bill, and the premises considered,
prays
1st. That subpoena to answer issue, requiring the complainants in the original bill to
answer this cross-bill but their oath to their answer is waived.
;
2d. That in the event said deed be declared a mortgage, it or said second trust deed, be
foreclosed, and said house and lot, [or farm,] sold on a credit of six months, in bar of re-
21 and
demption, to satisfy said five hundred dollar note and the accrued interest;
3d. That he be given such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
Sam
C. Brown, Solicitor.
19 This answer under oath, defendant's oath not
is 21 This relief could, probably, be had on the an-
having been waived by the bill. swer, but a cross bill is safer. See, ante, §§ 400; 728-
20 This answer and cross bill is the defence set up 729: 732-733.
to the bill in § 840, ante.
651 RELIEFS GRANTED IN INJUNCTION SUITS. §844
County of Roane. j
Richard Roe makes oath /that the statements in his foregoing answer and cross-bill, made
as of his own knowledge are true, and those made as on information and belief be believes
to be true. Richard Rob.
before me, this April 10, 1904.
James G. Crumbliss, C. & M.
§ 844. Reliefs Granted in an Injunction Suit. —
The primary object of a bill
of inunction is to stay the hand of the defendant, and the ordinary aim of the
defendant is to shake the injunction loose, but there are often other reliefs
obtainable.
1. Reliefs Granted the Complainant. The complainant by his bill obtains, ordi-
narily, various reliefs 1st, He obtains a temporary injunction against the acts
:
of the defendant complained of 2d, "Whatever legal or equitable claims, if any,

;
he has against the defendant, he can have adjudicated, and a proper decree
therefor 3d, If he has been injured by the trespasses, or other wrongs enjoined,
;
he can obtain compensation or damages 22 therefor; and 4th, If a perpetual in-

junction is necessary he can have his temporary injunction made perpetual at
the hearing.
2. Beliefs Granted the Defendant. Equity delights in putting an end to litiga-
tion, and strives in one and the same suit to determine all the matters involved
in the controversy, so that no other or second suit, either at law or in Chancery,
may be necessary. 23 If, therefore, the bill enjoins the enforcement of an execu-
tion, judgment, lien, mortgage, or deed of trust, or the collection of a note, ac-
count, or other claim or equity, or the assertion of rights or claims to specific
property, the defendant on setting forth his claims and equities fully, clearly
and particularly, either in an answer filed as a cross bill, or in a separate cross
bill, may have a cross decree against the complainant for whatever may be due
him, and have his lien, if any, enforced by the sale of the property bound there-
by, or may have his rights to the specific property declared and enforced. If th-i
defendant has been injured by the injunction he may obtain damages therefor,
without a cross bill, on motion and reference to the Master, at the final
hearing. 24
Supposing the allegations in the foregoing bill to enjoin a sale under a trust
deed have been substantiated by the proof, and having regard to the prayer
of the answer and cross bill to said bill, the decree in the cause would be as
follows
DECREE GRANTING RELIEF AND COUNTER RELIEF.
John Doe and wife, Dove Doe, ]
vs. Decree.
Richard Roe. J
This cause was heard this December 14, 1904, before Chancellor Hugh G. Kyle, on the
original bill, the answer and cross-bill, the proof in the cause, including the various notes
and deeds referred to in the pleadings, the instanter report of the Master and the exceptions
thereto, and upon argument of counsel, from all which, the Chancellor being of opinion that
the absolute deed executed and delivered on January 13, 1904, superseded the two deeds of
(rust and was intended as a mortgage, doth so declare and decree; and the Chancellor being
further of opinion that the five hundred dollar note, referred to in the pleadings, is usurious,
and that the lawful amount due thereon, according to the instanter report of the Master,
which is confirmed and all exceptions thereto overruled, is the sum of four hundred and sixty
dollars, principal and legal interest, doth so declare and decree; and the Chancellor being
further of opinion that Richard Roe, the complainant in the cross-bill, is entitled to have said
absolute deed enforced as a mortgage, doth so declare and decree.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed, that unless said sum of four hundred and
sixty dollars, and accruing interest, and one-half of the costs of this cause are paid into Court
by the complainants within sixty days from this day, the Clerk and Master will sell to the
22 Wherethe defendant has damaged the complain- equity, ante, % 39. Equity delights to do complete
ant, even if such damages be to property, the Chan- justice and not by halves, ante, % 38. When Chan-
cery Court will award damages therefor, the hill so cery has jurisdiction for one purpose, it will take
praying. See, ante, § 36. jurisdiction for all purposes, ante, % 36.
23 See Maxims: He who seeks equity must do 24 See, post, § 862.
845 VIOLATIONS OP INJUNCTIONS, AND REMEDIES. 652
highest and best bidder the house and lot, [or farm,] described in the bill, and in said deed,
which description is as follows [Here insert the description.] Said sale will be at the Court
:
House door, and on application of said Richard Roe, will be on a credit of six months and
in bar of redemption. The Master will take a note from the purchaser for the purchase money,
with good sureties, and will retain a lien on the land for additional security; and will report
his action to the next term, or to the Chancellor at Chambers, if so ordered.
The complainant John Doe, along with Henry Doe, his' prosecution surety, and the de-
fendant, Richard Roe, will each pay one-half of the costs of the cause, for which executions
will issue, respectively, after the next term, if not paid out of the proceeds of said sale.
ARTICLE V.
VIOLATIONS OF INJUNCTIONS, AND REMEDIES THEREFOR.
§ 845. When an Injunction Becomes Effec- § 847. What Constitutes a Violation of an
tive. Injunction.
§ 848. How a Violation of an Injunction is
§ 846. The Effect of an Injunction. Punished.
§ 845. When
an Injunction Becomes Effective. —An
injunction becomes ef-
fective as to the party enjoined only from the time of actual notice. But to
render an injunction binding and operative upon a defendant, it is not neces-
sary that he should have been officially apprised of its existence, or actually
served with the writ. If the defendant has heard the order of the Court grant-
ing an injunction, or has in any manner received actual notice of its existence,
he is as effectually bound by its provisions as if actually served with process.
So, if an injunction has been properly granted, it will be effective if served upou
defendants beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, or the limits of the State, it
only being necessary that they should be apprised of the order of the Court to
render it binding. 1
§ 846. —
The Effect of an Injunction. An injunction operates in personam,
and binds the defendant, his Solicitors, attorneys, agents and servants, and
renders it unlawful for them to do the act therein prohibited, 2 or to fail to do
the act therein commanded. If the act prohibited be nevertheless done, the
Court will deal with it as though not done, unless the rights of innocent third
persons prevent, and then the defendant is liable to make indemnity for his
unlawful act. 3 A judgment taken in violation of an injunction will be perpet-
ually enjoined on petition in the cause wherein the injunction was granted. 4
If an injunction be issued on a misstatement of facts, or without the requisite
conditions precedent, the defendant must, nevertheless, obey it until he can ob-
tain its dissolution, or discharge or he will be punished for his contempt. 5 The
;
inadvertent grant of an injunction neither makes it void, nor impairs its

efficacy. 8
If the injunction stays proceedings at law, no further step can be taken,
unless the fiat or a subsequent decree so allow. 7 But the suing out of an injunc-
tion against a judgment at law is a release of errors; 8 and if the complainant's
1 1 High on Injunc, § 17; Farnsworth V. Fowler, 1 Cold., 284; Greenwald v. Roberts, 4 Heisk., 494;
1 Swan, 1; Boils v. Boils, 1 Cold., 284; Baxter v. Wilhoit v. Castell, 3 Bax., 423.
Washburn, 8 Lea, 21; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1685, note. 4 Patterson v. Gordon, 3 Tenn. Ch., 18.
2 The prohibition includes all acts, whether direct 5 Rutherford o. Metcalf, 5 Hay, 58; 2 Dan. Ch.
or indirect. What cannot be done directly cannot be Pr., 1684.
done indirectly. Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibe- 6 Graham v. Merrill, 5 Cold., 638.
tur omne per quod devenitur ad illud. 7 See, ante, § 830.
3 Farnsworth v. Fowler, 1 Swan, 1 Boils V. Boils,
; 8 Code, § 3107.
653 VIOLATIONS OP INJUNCTIONS, AND REMEDIES. §847
dismissed, he cannot further contest the judgment at law by prosecuting
bill is
an appeal from such judgment, or by writ of error, or otherwise. 9
An injunction, restraining a sale of personalty levied on under an execution,
has the effect of releasing the levy, and restoring the property to the defend-
ant's possession. 10 If the officer sells notwithstanding the injunction, he may
be held liable for the value of the property, and is punishable for contempt. 11
A
perpetual injunction, granted at the hearing, is a decree, and it continues
operative notwithstanding the death of the parties to the suit, and its violation
is punishable whenever committed. 12
§ 847. What Constitutes a Violation of an Injunction. The Chancery Court —
exacts the most implicit obedience from those against whom its mandates are
directed. It matters not what irregularities may affect the proceedings, nor
what error the Court, or Judge, may have committed in granting the injunction,
nor what the hardship obedience thereto will impose on the defendant so long ;
as the injunction is in force it must be scrupulously observed, and implicitly

obeyed. And the defendant is not allowed to sit in judgment on the equity of
the bill, or on the rightfulness of the writ, or upon the jurisdiction of the Court
his one duty is to obey. If the writ has been improvidently granted, instead
of complaining of it, or violating it in any way, the defendant should at once
apply for its modification, or dissolution. It matters not what the intent of the
defendant was, in case of any violation of the injunction; nor what honest
motives may have prompted his conduct if the command of the writ has been ;
violated, disregarded, or evaded, the defendant is guilty of contempt, and will

be punished accordingly. Even the advice of counsel is no protection or excuse
it only makes another contemner. 13
The defendant is bound to obey the injunction in both its letter and its spirit,
even in the smallest matters he is not allowed to judge whether this or that
;
is immaterial or unimportant. Nor is he allowed to permit another to violate

the injunction without remonstrance he must not only obey the writ himself, ;
but he must restrain his employees, servants, tenants, agents, and attorneys, if
in his power so to do. An officer executing final process for the defendant's
benefit is deemed his agent. 14
A defendantbound by the injunction from the moment he learns of its
is
existence, regardless of the means of information. Notice by letter, telegram,
word of mouth, or other means, will be sufficient to bind him. If, after such
notice, he does any act violative of the spirit of the injunction, he is as guilty
as though he had been previously notified by the Sheriff. He cannot shield
himself, in such a case, under the pretext that the writ had not been served on
him, or had been defectively served. 15
§ 848. How
a Violation of an Injunction is Punished. Violations of injunc- —
tions are punished by process of contempt. The mode of proceeding is else-
where described. 17 The object of the proceeding for contempt is twofold; first,
to punish the guilty parties; secondly, to compel restitution to the party in-
jured. 18 The person violating an injunction may be imprisoned until the wrong
done is rectified, by placing matters and persons in statu quo, or by the payment
of damages; 19 and, in estimating these damages, regard may be had to any
circumstances of aggravation or mitigation, attending the disobedience of the
Perkins v. Woodfolk, 8 Bax., 411. The effect having a writ whose execution had been enjoined
of the injunction is equivalent to a solemn agree- must stay his hand as soon as he learns that an in-
ment of record, that whatever errors exist in the junction has been granted.
12 Justice v. McBroom, 1 Lea, 555.
judgment at law shall go for naught. Overton <».
Henly Robertson, 4 13 Blair v. Nelson, 8 Bax., 1; 2 High on Injunc,
Perkins, Mart. & Yerg., 369; v.
Yerg 172. §§ 1417-1418.
10 Overton v. Perkins, Mart. & Yerg., 373; Mc- 14 2 High on Injunc, §1551.
15 Baxter v. Washburn, 8 Lea, 21; Farnsworth r.
Caney Lawson, 3 Head, 257; Telford v. Cox, 15
«.
Lea, 298. This is the reason why such an injunction Fowler, 1 Swan, 1; Boils V. Boils, 1 Cold., 284; 2
in such a case should never be granted on the pau- High on Injunc, §§ 1420-1424; 1444.
481; Chester 17 See, post, §§ 918-922.
per's oath. Conway v. Jett, 3 Yerg., v.
18 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1684.
Apperson, 4 Heisk.. 654.
11 Stinson V. McMurray, 6 Hum., 339. The officer 19 Code, § 4109.
849 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. 654
injunction. Where the violation of the injunction is wilful, and results in
serious injury to the complainant, the defendant will be onerated with all
losses, and the damages allowed may be such as to combine punishment for the
violation with compensation to the party injured. 20 The damages should be
assessed by a jury if requested by either party; but in the absence of such
request, they may be assessed by the Master on a reference. 21
If a perpetual injunction by the Supreme Court, on final decree, is violated
after the death of the complainant, it would be necessary for his heirs to file
a bill of revivor and supplement in the Chancery Court wherein the cause
originated the Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction of such bill. 22
;
ARTICLE VI.
THE DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS.
849. Dissolution of Injunctions Generally
§ 854. When, Where, and How Injunctions
are Dissolved.
Considered.
§ 855. Proceedings on the Hearing of a Mo-
850. Dissolution for Want of Equity on
tion to Dissolve.
the Face of the Bill.
§ 856. When Affidavits May be Read on a
851. Dissolution on Bill and Answer.
Motion to Dissolve.
852. When an Injunction Will Not be Dis- § 857. The Discretion of the Court, How
solved on Bill and Answer.
Exercised on Motions to Dissolve.
853. Dissolution for Want of Diligence in
§ 858. Effect of a Dissolution, and of a Re-
Prosecuting the Suit.
fusal to Dissolve.
§ 849. Dissolution of Injunctions generally Considered. An interlocutory —

injunction will be dissolved: 1, Where there is a want of equity on the face
of the bill to support the injunction; 2, Where the statements in the bill on
which its Equity rests are fully met, and wholly overcome, by the positive
denials of the answer; or 3, Where there has been a want of diligence on the
part of the complainant in the prosecution of his suit.
If an injunction was granted (1) on an unsworn bill, or (2) on a bill that
did not state it was the first application for an injunction; or (3) if the writ
was issued after the time fixed by the fiat, or the rules of the Court, for filing
a bond had expired, such an injunction may be discharged, on motion, for irreg-
ularity. 1
If a defendant deem the injunction oppressive
for any reason, he should at
once make proper
application for its dissolution, or modification 2 and so, if a ;
person, not a party to the suit, be injuriously affected by the injunction, he

may apply by petition to have it set aside, or modified so as not to affect him. 3
An injunction will not be dissolved because of a defect or deficiency in the
injunction bond, or any mere technical errors that can be amended. 4
The dismissal of the bill operates ipso facto as a dissolution of the interlo-
cutory injunction based upon it. And if, at the hearing on the merits, a per-
manent injunction is denied, the preliminary injunction is necessarily termi-
nated although the better practice is to have it expressly dissolved in the final
;
decree. 5 When, on a final decree, an injunction is dissolved, an appeal from

such decree reinstates the injunction. 6
20 Robins v. Krazier, 5 Heisk., 100. In this case, 2 Rutherford v. Metcalf, 5 Hay., 58.
three hundred dollars were allowed the complainant 3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1676, note; 2 High on Injunc, §
as damages, the defendant having turned him and 1617; Speak v. Ransom, 2 Tenn. Ch , 210; 1 Barb.
his family out of doors, on a cold rainy night in the Ch. Pr., 646.
winter, in violation of an injunction. 4 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 640; 2 High on Injunc, § 1622;
21 Code, §4442; Robins v. Frazier, 5 Heisk., 100. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1678, note.
22 Justice v. McBroom, 1 Lea, 555. 6 2 High on Injunc, § 1476; Perkins V. Woodfolk,
l 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 646; 2 High on Injunc, § 1469; S Bax., 413; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1675.
1615. o Foley v. Leath, 3 Shan. Cas., 353.
655 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. 850
The three principal grounds of motions to dissolve are (1) want of equity, :
(2) denial of the equity alleged, and (3) want of diligence in prosecuting the
suit;, they will be separately considered.
§ 850. Dissolution for Want
of Equity on the Pace of the Bill.—If the bill be
so devoid of equity that, admitted by the answer to be true, all injunctive
if
relief would be denied at the hearing, the Court will, on motion and without any
answer, dissolve the injunction granted on such a bill. A motion to dissolve
an injunction, for want of equity on the face of the bill, is in the nature of a
demurrer, and all the material allegations of the bill relied on, as ground for
an injunction, are taken as true, 7 and will be given a construction favorable to
the relief prayed for. And an injunction will not be dissolved for want of
equity on the face of the bill, if the bill disclose merits, even though its allega-
tions be obscure, and theframe of the bill be inartificial. If the bill be devoid
of equity on its face, the injunction will be dissolved on motion, and the defend-
ant need not wait for service of subpoena on him before making the motion. 8
§ 851. —
Dissolution on Bill and Answer. As heretofore shown, an injunction
bill is both a pleading and an affidavit; and a sworn answer is, also, both a
pleading and an affidavit. The affidavit part of the bill is in the nature of
evidence on which to obtain ex parte interlocutory relief and the affidavit part ;
of the answer is in the nature of a deposition for all the purposes of the suit.
When, therefore, a motion is made to dissolve an interlocutory injunction
on bill and answer, there comes a struggle for mastery between the affidavit
of the complainant and the affidavit of the defendant; it is oath against oath.
In such a contest, every allegation of fact in the bill not met. and denied in the
answer is deemed to be true; and every allegation on the complainant's own
knowledge is deemed to be true, when not substantially denied on the defend-
ant's own knowledge. 9 Positive affirmative averments, made on complainant's
own knowledge, cannot be overcome either (1) by silence, or (2) by evasion,
or (3) by feeble denials on personal knowledge, or (4) by positive denials on
information and belief, or (5) by setting up new matters by way of avoidance. 10
On the other hand, an answer, made on the defendant's own personal know-
ledge, will overcome the allegations of a bill made or sworn to on information
and belief. 11
On the hearing of a motion to dissolve an injunction on bill and answer, the
answer must be sworn to for an answer not sworn to will not sustain a motion
;
12 If the oath of the defendant to his

lo dissolve, however strong its denials.
answer is waived, he may, nevertheless, swear to it for the purpose of having
the injunction dissolved; and this he may do without leave of the Court.
13 If
the defendant is a corporation, and has answered under its corporate seal, such
answer will not sustain the motion the answer must be sworn to by some officer,
;
agent, or member, of the corporation personally acquainted with the facts set
7 High on Injunc, § 1469. and belief will have but little weight on a motion
8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1676, note. to dissolve, when its material allegations are directly
9 Tyne V. Dougherty, 3 Tenn. Ch., 52; Yale n. and positively denied by an answer based on the per-
Moore, 3 Tenn. Ch., 76; 2 High on Injunc. §§ 1470- sonal knowledge of the defendant, and so sworn to;
1472. and on the other hand, a bill based on the personal
10 2 High on Injunc, §§1472; 1475; 1481; 1505. knowledge of the complainant, or the person swear-
But where, from the nature of the case, the defending to it, will not be overcome by an answer, how-
ant can have no personal knowledge of the facts, ever direct and emphatic its denials, if sworn to on
the Court sometimes acts upon an answer sworn to information and belief. And a bill or answer sworn
on information and belief; as where the transaction to on "knowledge, information and belief" is no
was with the intestate, and his administrator answeid stronger than if sworn to on information and belief
alone, unless it affirmatively show on its face what
on information and beliet. But as a rule, such an
answer, even from an administrator, will not warrant allegations are based on personal knowledge, and
what on information and belief. See Chapter on
a dissolution. 2 High on Injunc, § 1507.
11 2 High on Injunc, 1525; 1567-1569. .
Affidavits, ante, § 788.
13 Ch. Rule, VI, § 1; § 1195, post. It must be re-
12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1677: Smith v. Republic L. Ins.
The bill membered that a bill on which an injunction is
Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 631; Ch. Rule, VI, § 1.
sought, and an answer an which a motion to_ dissolve
being sworn to must of course be met by a sworn
answer. On motion to dissolve, much depends on an injunction is to be based, are both pleadings and
affidavits conjoined. See, ante, §§838; 842.
the frame of the pleadings and the character of the
affidavits thereto. A bill sworn to on information
§852 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. 656
up in the answer and his affidavit to the truth of the bill must show this per-
;
sonal acquaintance, and should not be on information and belief. 14

To sustain a motion to dissolve an injunction on bill and answer, the answer
must not only be sworn to, but it must also be positive, direct, and full, and
based on the personal knowledge of the defendant, and must broadly confront
and wholly deny all the material facts upon which the equity of the bill is
founded. On such an answer, the injunction will ordinarily be dissolved; 15 for
positive and full denials, based on personal knowledge of the facts, will neu-
tralize positive allegations. 16
If the allegations of the bill are based wholly, or in part, on information and
belief, such allegations cannot stand against the positive denial of the defend-
ant on his own personal knowledge. On the other hand, if the statements of the
bill are made on the personal knowledge of the complainant, and sworn to as
such, ineffectual will be the denials of the defendant, made on information and
belief. 17
answers of all the material defendants must be
It is a general rule that the
in and perfected, before an injunction will be dissolved on bill and answer;
but if the defendant, on whom the gravamen of the charge rests, has fully
answered, that may be sufficient. It is settled, also, that if the complainant has
been negligent in having the subpoena served on a part of the defendants, or in
compelling them to answer, those who have answered may have the injunction
dissolved on their answers alone, if otherwise entitled. 18
The burden of disproving the equities of the bill rests upon the defendant;
and if, upon the hearing, a reasonable doubt exists in the mind of the Court
as to whether the Equity of the bill is overcome by the answer, the injunction
will not be dissolved, but will be continued until the hearing. 19
The fact that a sworn answer has been excepted to for insufficiency will not
prevent a dissolution of the injunction, on bill and answer, if in fact the
answer is sufficient. But the Chancellor may look at the exceptions on the
hearing of the motion to dissolve. 20
§ 852. When an Injunction will not be Dissolved on Bill and Answer. An —
answer will not sustain a motion to dissolve (1) if it be weak in its denials,
or (2) be on information and belief, or (3) be evasive, or (4) contradictory,
or (5) if its statements are extremely improbable, or (6) if any material allega-
tion of the bill is not denied, or (7) if the answer to any essential part of the
bill is unsatisfactory, or (8) if the answer is insufficient in important par-
ticulars or (9) where the answer admits the Equity of the bill, and sets
;
up new matter in avoidance or (10) where fraud is the gravamen of the bill 21
;
;
or (11) where the dissolution of the injunction would work very great mischief
to the complainant; or (12) where the injunction is the real remedial part of
the bill; or (13) where the dissolution of the injunction involves a decision of
the cause on its merits, or (14) where a dissolution would be equivalent to a
decision of the case against the complainant. 22
14 Fulton Bank «. N. Y. & S. Canal Co., 1 Paige, of that earnest candor which is an essential of truth.
(N. Y.) 311; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 735, notes. See, ante, The answer must do more than deny the facts of
§§ 384, note; 788-789. the bill in manner and form as alleged; the substance
15 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1677, note; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., of the charge must be met and traversed.
641. 17 Tyne V. Dougherty, 3 Tenn. Ch., 52; 2 High
16 Much depends on the frame of the pleadings. on Injunc, §§ 1505-1525; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1677-1678,
If the bill be weak, indirect, or alternative in its notes; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 640.
allegations; or if its statements are indefinite, gen- 18 Barb. Ch. Pr., 639; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1676-1677-
1
eral, or limited by qualifications, it will be overcome 2 High on Injunc, §§ 1528-1535. Where fraud is
by an answer that has the opposite characteristics; charged, all of the defendants implicated must an-
and so, an answer that is deficient in positiveness, swer before a dissolution will be granted. 2 High
directness, clearness, frankness, and precision, will on Injunc, § 1532.
be ineffectual to overcome a bill whose allegations 19 2 High on Iniunc, § 1470; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 643.
are strong, positive, direct and precise. Before the 20 2 High on Injunc, § 1602; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1676,
injunction will be dissolved, the answer must swear note.
away the equity which is its life. 21 2 Dan. Cr. Pr., 1676-1678, notes; 2 High on
On a struggle between the bill and the answer, Injunc, § 1512.
the victory depends on the fullness, frankness, and 22 Owen v. O'Brien, 2 Tenn. Ch., 295; 2 High on
savor of the truth, manifest in one rather than in Injunc, §§ 1508-1524. As to the admissibility of
the other. Aliteral, formal, technical denial of the affidavits at the hearing of a motion to dissolve, see,
charges, especially if made seriatim, lacks the flavor § post, 856.
657 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. § 853
§ 853. Dissolution for Want of Diligence in Prosecuting the Suit. He who —
invokes and obtains the aid of so tremendous a power as the writ of injunction,
is bound to exercise the greatest possible diligence in doing all that is required
of him in the prosecution of his suit and if he fail so to do, the injunction will,
;
on motion, be dissolved, unless there be specially strong reasons to the con-

trary. The principal instances of want of diligence are the following (1) where
the complainant, after fiat granted, fails in a reasonable time to give bond, or
otherwise comply with the conditions precedent contained in the fiat; (2)
where the injunction bond is, or becomes, for any reason insufficient, and the
defect is not remedied in a reasonable time after order made; (3) when the
complainant fails to prepare his case for hearing with due speed, either by
failing to bring the defendants before the Court, or by failing to make the nec-
essary parties, or by failing to take or file his proof in due season, or by failing
to keep the suit properly revived. 23
§ 854. When, and Where, and How, Injunctions are Dissolved. An injunc- —
tion may be dissolved or modified on motion, at any time after the granting
of the fiat, such motion being based either upon a want of equity on the face
of the bill, or upon the bill and answer. 24 The motion to dissolve or modify
may be made in term time, in open Court or, if the Court be not in session, it
;
may be made before the Chancellor of the Division in which the bill is filed,
at Chambers. 25 If the motion is in open Court, one day's notice thereof would
be sufficient; 26 if the motion is in vacation, five days' notice thereof must be
given to the complainant, or his Solicitor. 27 The notice must, in all cases, state
upon what the motion is based, whether for want of equity on the face of the
bill, or upon bill and answer. 28 The following is a form of
NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISSOLVE.
A B, ]
vs. \ In the Chancery Court, at Trenton.
C. D. J
Mr. A B:
At 10 a.on the 9th day of this month, (August,) before the Hon. H. J. Livingston,
m.,
Chancellor, at his Chambers, in the Court House at Trenton, Tenn., I will move that the
injunction in said cause be dissolved, [or, modified;] which motion will be based on the
want of equity on the face of the bill, [or, on bill and answer. 29 ]
August 4, 1890. C D.
A final decree dismissing the bill operates, ipso facto, as a complete disso-
lution of the injunction; and a formal order of dissolution is unnecessary. 30
§ 855. Proceedings on the Hearing of the Motion to Dissolve. At the time —
and place specified in the notice of the motion, when to be made at Chambers,
the defendant appears with a certified copy of the bill, or of the bill and
answer, according as the motion is based on the want of equity in the bill, or
on bill and answer. If the complainant be present he reads the bill, if not pres-
ent the defendant reads both bill and answer, and makes his argument in sup-
port of his motion. If both sides be present, the defendant will open and con-
clude the argument. 31 The Chancellor endorses his decision ordinarily on the
notice, or writes it upon a separate sheet of paper, in substance as follows
23 A want of diligence on complainant's part is Tenn., (Overt.), 196. James County V. Hamilton
always a cause for dissolving an injunction. 2 Dan. County, 5 Pick, 237. The Chancery Rules of 1858,
Ch. Pr., 1667; 1675, notes; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 639; 1 required one day's notice of the motion in open
High on Injunc, §§1490; 1504. A complainant in Court; but these rules have been repealed.
an injunction suit should be held to a degree of dil- 27 Code, § 4444.
igence proportionate to the stringency of the injunc- 28 Ch. Rule, VI, § 2.
tion; and no continuance should be allowed him after
29 Ch. Rule, VI, § 2. The notice should be served,
he has had reasonable time to get in his proof, except and service proved, as in case of notice to take proof;
on a dissolution of the injunction. Much should be ante, % 482.
required by the Court of those who require much 30 Perkins v. Woodfolk, 8 Bax., 413; 2 Dan. Ch.
of the Court. Pr., 1675; 2 High on Injunc, § 1476.
, ...... 312 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1599. Upon the hearing of a
24 Ch. Rule, VI, §2; post, 1195; Code, §§4444-
4445. motion to dissolve an injunction, the burden of dis-
25 Code, § 4444. proving the equities of the bill rests upon the de-
26 No notice is absolutely required if the motion fendant. 2 High on Injunc., § 1470.
be made in open Court. Renfroe V. Dickinson, 1
§ 856 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. 658
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISSOLVE.
A B, 1
vs. > In Chancery, at Trenton.

C, D. J
The motion to dissolve the injunction in this cause, coming on to be heard before me this
day, at Chambers, on consideration thereof, it is ordered by me that said motion be overruled;
[or, that said motion be allowed, and the injunction is hereby accordingly dissolved; or,
is dissolved on condition that the defendant shall give a bond, with two good sureties, in the
penalty of one thousand dollars, conditioned to pay complainant such sum as the Court may
at any time award as debt, damages, or otherwise, for the wrongs complained of in the bill
or, is dissolved on the defendant executing a refunding bond in the penalty of dollars ; 32
or, such other order as may be proper.'] August 9, 1890 H. J. Livingston, Chancellor.
This order transmitted to the Clerk and Master, who should enter it in full
is
on his rule docket, or at least note it thereon.
Instead of dissolving the injunction, the Chancellor may modify it, and
adjust it to the equities of the situation or may order the injunction bond to
; (
be increased in penalty. "Where the injunction ties up property, and is there-

fore in the nature of an attachment, the Chancellor may allow a refunding bond
to be given, and order that, upon such bond being filed, the injunction stand
dissolved. This refunding bond may be conditioned like a replevy bond in an
attachment suit. 33 On the dissolution of an injunction the rule is to require a
refunding bond from the defendant where there is a reasonable probability that
the parties may not be in statu quo at the final hearing of the cause. 34
An order dissolving an injunction does not prevent the Court from reviving
it for sufficient reasons, either before or at the hearing nor does such an order
;
authorize the defendant to do what he had been enjoined from doing. On the
dissolution of an injunction the defendant may act, but he acts at his own
peril; 35 unless the order of dissolution expressly adjudge otherwise. 36
Upon the hearing of a motion to dissolve an injunction upon bill and answer,
the fact that the answer has been excepted to, or that the time to file excep-
tions has not elapsed, will not postpone the hearing of the motion to dissolve,
but the Chancellor may dispose of the motion, without passing upon the ex-
ception. 37
§ 856. When Affidavits may be Read on a Motion to Dissolve. On the hear- —
ing of a motion to dissolve an injunction, the complainant will, ordinarily, be
allowed to read affidavits, 38 to corroborate his bill and rebut the answer, in
the following cases: (1) where the dissolution of the injunction would work
very great mischief to the complainant; or (2) where the injunction is the real
remedial part of the bill; or (3) where the dissolution of the injunction involves
a decision of the cause on its merits. 39 In such cases, the hearing of the motion
is equivalent in effect to a hearing of the cause and the dissolution of the
;
injunction, on such a hearing, would be more injurious to the complainant than

the dismissal of his bill, and consequent dissolution of the injunction, at the
final hearing, for then he could appeal, and thus continue the injunction
until final decree in the Supreme Court.
§ 857. The Discretion of the Court, how Exercised on Motions to Dissolve.
T!pon an application to dissolve an injunction, the Court or Chancellor will
32 Code, §4448; see, post, §861. ant should be allowed to rebut his answer by affi-
33 Code, § 3509. davits; and counter-affidavits should not be heard,
34 Scruggs V. Myers, 2 Shan. Cas., 353. unless perhaps, to bring forward facts not known
35 M. & M. R. R. v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 217. to the defendant when he filed his answer. The
36 But any adjudication must be made in Court, reason of this rule is, that if the complainant elects
and not at Chambers. Code, § 4413. to make a witness of the defendant, he should be
3T Ch. Rule, VI, § 3. "bound by his answer; whereas, if the defendant vol-
38 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1668; 1676, notes; 2 High on untarily swears to his answer when his oath has
Injunc, §§ 1576; 1603; Davis v. Fulton, 1 Term., been waived, the complainant should have the right
(Overt.), 132; Moredock v. Williams, 1 Tenn., to contradict him. If affidavits and counter-affidavits
(Overt.), 325. Whether, and by whom, affidavits may be read, in any case, the hearing of the motion
may be read on the hearing of a motion to dissolve expands into a hearing of the cause, and this would
on the bill and answer, are questions not definitely not be proper or expedient, unless the parties agree
settled; but, on principle, the true rule would seem that the decision of the motion may be equivalent to
to be this: if an answer on oath has been called for, the decision of the cause.
and a discovery is sought, no affidavits should be 30 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1668; 1676, note; 2 High on
allowed to be read by either party; but, if the de- Injunc, § 1603.
fendant's oath to his answer is waived, the complain-
659 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. § 858
weigh the relative convenience and inconvenience which would arise from its
continuance, or its dissolution and if upon such weighing, it appears that the
;
continuance of the injunction is likely to work less mischief than would result
from its dissolution, the motion to dissolve will be overruled. 40 If there is a
probable right, and a probable danger to that right without the intervention
of the Court through its injunctive process, the injunction ought not to be
interfered with. 41 A
dissolution sought upon a pure question of law should
not be granted, unless the question is plain beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 After
all, the true rule in deciding motions to dissolve seems to be to do what a sound
discretion requires. 43
In continuing an injunction, the Chancellor may require of the complainant
additional security, or a bond with new and enlarged conditions; 44 or may
dissolve the injunction on the defendant giving a bond to indemnify the com-
plainant in ease the latter obtains a decree. Whenever the ground of the
injunction is mainly the insolvency of the defendant or the failure of the
defendant to pay a price, or a debt, the Chancellor will ordinarily dissolve the
injunction on the defendant, giving a bond to satisfy the final decree in the
cause, if against him. And, in general, it may be stated that when there is a
reasonable doubt whether the injunction is necessary to protect the rights of
the complainant, the injunction will be continued, for the burden rests on
the defendant of satisfying the Court that the injunction should be dissolved. 45
§ 858. The Effectof a Dissolution, and of a Refusal to Dissolve. If the —
injunction the substantive relief sought, then its dissolution may operate
is
as practically a decision of the cause although the final decree may not be
;
pronounced until a subsequent day or term. Nevertheless, if the defendant has

answered, and an injunction at the hearing will be of any benefit, the complain-
ant may proceed to prove his case; and, if, at the hearing, he shows himself
entitled to an injunction, it will then be granted.
On the other hand, if the injunction is merely collateral to the main object
of the suit, or merely ancillary to the relief sought, the dissolution of the in-
j unction does not affect the merits, and the suit proceeds as though no injunc-
tion had ever been granted and dissolved and if, at the hearing, the complain-
;
ant shows himself entitled to an injunction, the Court will then award the
writ.
And if, in either of the foregoing cases, a new and sufficient cause of injunc-
tion arises before the hearing, a new interlocutory injunction may be obtained
on application by petition, setting up in detail the facts constituting the new
ground of injunction. 46 But the injunction will not be reinstated on the old
ground, simply because the complainant alleges in his petition that he has
47
lately discovered new evidence in support of his bill.
If a dissolution of the injunction is refused, the suit proceeds as though the
motion to' dissolve had not been made. 48 If a new and sufficient ground of dis-
solution subsequently arises, a new motion to dissolve may be made on such
ground. The refusal to dissolve does not in any way prejudice the defendant's
rights at the hearing.
The effect of a total dissolution on the defendant is to restore him to every
right of which the injunction deprived him and he may proceed as though no
;
49 If the injunction, however, is dissolved in part

injunction had been granted.
only, the defendant is restored to such rights only as the dissolution gives;
the balance of the injunction remaining in full force.
40 2 High on Injunc, § 1495.

45 Owen V. Brien, 2 Tenn. Ch., 295 ; 2 High on
41 Owen V. Brien, 2 Tenn. Ch., 295. Injunc, §§ 1470; 1510.
46 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 644-645.
42 Nashville S. Bank v. Mayor, 3 Tenn. Ch., 33S.
47 Lowry v. McGee, 5 Yerg., 238.
43 2 Dan. Ch'. Pr., 1677-1678, notes; 2 High on
discre- 48 2 High on Injunc, § 1536.
Injunc., § 1516. As to the proper exercise of
note 37; and 40 But he will proceed at his own peril. The dis-
tion, see, ante, §§ 583, note 4; 833,
solution of the injunction is no adjudication that his
post, % 902.
44 2 High on Injunc, § 1626.
§859 INJUNCTION AND REFUNDING BONDS. 660
ARTICLE VII.
INJUNCTION AND REFUNDING BONDS, AND THEIR BREACH.
§ 859. Injunction Bonds Generally Consid- § 862. Remedies on Injunction and Refund-
ered. ing Bonds.
§ 860. Form of Injunction Bonds. § 863. The Measure of Damages on Injunc-
§ 861. Refunding Bonds. tion Bonds.
§ 859. Injunction Bonds generally Considered. Before issuing the writ of —

injunction, it is the duty of the Clerk and Master to take from the complainant
both a prosecution and an injunction bond, unless the suit is prosecuted on the
pauper oath, in which case an injunction bond may, also, be dispensed with,
if the fiat so allow. If the suit be to enjoin a judgment at law, the penalty of
the bond shall be double the judgment or sum sought to be enjoined, and in
all other cases the penalty will be five hundred dollars, unless the fiat designate
some other amount. 1 In cases where the statute does not prescribe the con-
ditions of the bond, the Judge may, in his fiat specify those conditions. 2
In taking an injunction bond in obedience to a fiat, the Master is doing a
judicial act; and the bond, when accepted, even though not acknowledged be-
fore him, becomes invested with the verity and force of a record. 3
"Whenever the security on any injunction bond is to be taken in any county
other than that in which the Court is held, the Clerk and Master may appoint
a commissioner in the county where the security is to be taken to judge of the
sufficiency of the bond and security, and to take the same as he himself might
do. 4
§ 860. —
Form of Injunction Bonds. All injunction bonds are made payable
to the defendant, and should be in the penalty prescribed by law, or the fiat of
the Chancellor. The following are the statutory forms
AN INJUNCTION BOND.
[After judgment at Law.]
We, A
B, [the complainant,] C and D E
F, [his sureties,] acknowledge ourselves indebted
to G [the defendant,] in the penal sum of one thousand dollars 5 but this obligation shall
H, ;
be void, if the said A

B shall pay the amount of the judgment at law sought to be enjoined
in the Chancery Court at Memphis, in the case of said B against said AH, with interest, G
damages, and costs, or shall perform the decree of the said Court, in case the injunction is
dissolved, and shall also pay such damages as may be sustained by the wrongful suing out
of the injunction. 6
[To be duly dated, signed, and witnessed.]
INJUNCTION BOND.
[Before judgment at Law. 7 ]
We, A B, [the complainant,] C D and E F, [his sureties,] acknowledge ourselves indebted
conduct lawful.
is M. & M. R. R. v. Huggins, 7 T Thereno statutory provision in reference to
is
Cold., 217; 225. the condition of bonds, except where proceedings in
1 Code, §§ 4439-4440. a Court of law are sought to be ejoined. Hubbard
2 Hubbard V. Fravell, 12 Lea, 313-315; Ranning V. V. Fravell, 12 Lea, 319. Where such proceedings are
Reeves, 2 Tenn. Ch., 267; and cases there cited. not involved, the conditions should be to pay the
3 Ward v. Cullom, 2 Cold., 353. But a bond taken costs and damages awarded by the Court on dismiss-
by the Master which is broader in its conditions, or ing the bill; unless there be special conditions pre-
greater in its penalty, than the law or the fiat re- scribed in the fiat. Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, 623.
quired, will be good only to the extent required. The Judge may, in his fiat, specify the conditions.
Hubbard v. Fravell, 12 Lea, 304; and cases there Ranning v. Reeves, 2 Tenn. Ch., 267, and cases there
cited. cited. A
proper condition for a bond where no suit
4 Code, § 4441. As to the justification of sureties at law is involved would seem to be this: To be
on bonds, see, ante, § 181. void on condition the complainant shall pay to the
5 The penalty of the bond must be double the defendant all such costs and damages as the Court
amount of the judgment or sum sought to be en- may award the defendant on dissolving the injunc-
joined. Code, § 4440. tion, or dismissing the bill.
6 Code, § 4439, sub-sec. 1.
661 INJUNCTION AND REFUNDING BONDS. §861
to G H, [the defendant,] in the penal sum of five hundred but this obligation shall dollars; 8
be void, if the said A
B shall pay all costs and damages awarded by the Chancery Court, on
dismissing the bill filed by said A
B against said G H, in said Court, if the same should
be dismissed. 9
This bond will be appropriate for all injunction suits, except those brought
to enjoin a judgment at law already rendered. 10 Either of the foregoing bonds
can also be made a prosecution bond by adding to its conditions the following
or similar words and : shall, also, pay any and all costs that may at any time be ad-
judged against the said A B, in said suit. 11
§ 861. Refunding Bonds. —Where a refunding bond will fully indemnify

the complainant, and where the defendant's answer fully meets and denies the
equities alleged in the bill, the Court will, as a rule, dissolve the injunction, on
the defendant executing such a bond. Such a bond should be required in every
ease, where an injunction is dissolved before the hearing, and there is reason to
believe the parties will not be in statu quo at the hearing. 12
If an interlocutory injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment at law for
money be dissolved, the Code makes it the duty of the Chancellor to require of
the defendant a refunding bond, in a penalty double the amount of the sum
allowed to be collected, payable to the complainant, and conditioned to refund
the amount collected, if so ordered on final hearing and the Court may render ;
a decree upon such bond against any or all of the parties executing the same. 13
In such a case the form of the order dissolving the injunction may be as
follows
ORDER DISSOLVING AN INJUNCTION ON A REFUNDING BOND.
A B,
vs.
C D.
In this cause, the motion of the defendant to dissolve the injunction on bill and. answer
having been heard, this Aug. 16, 1890, on consideration thereof, and it appearing that the
answer fully meets and denies the whole equity of the bill, it is ordered by the Court that
said injunction be dissolved, upon the defendant giving a refunding bond in the penal sum
of nine hundred dollars, with at least two good sureties.
The following is a form of refunding bond proper to be executed in such a
A REFUNDING BOND.
We, C D, [the defendant,] EF and G
acknowledge ourselves indebted to
H, [his sureties,]
A B, [the complainant,] in the penal sum of nine hundred dollars; 14 but this obligation to
be void if the said C D
refund ito said A
B the amount collected on the judgment mentioned
in the bill of said A
B against said C D, in the Chancery Court at Memphis, with interest,
if so ordered by said Court on final hearing, or otherwise comply with the final decree of
said Court, in reference to the money so collected.
8 The penalty will be such sum as the Chancellor, plainant in the above named suit, and agree to pay
Judge, or Court, granting the injunction shall order, all damages, interest, and other sums, that
costs,
and if no sum be named, then the penalty shall be may at any time be lawfully adjudged against said
five hundred dollars. Code, § 4440. complainant, in said cause, either for wrongfully
9 Code, §4439, sub-sec. 2; Rogan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, suing out the injunction, [or, attachment] prayed
623. In neither of the foregoing bonds is it any for, or for any other cause. [Dated, signed by the
part of the condition that the injunction suits be
sureties, and witnessed as in § 181, ante.]
prosecuted with effect. The statute does not recog-
12 Davis v. Fulton, 1 Tenn., (Overt.), 121; Moore-
nize any such condition, and it is, besides, mere use-
less verbiage, the payment of costs in Chancery not dock v. Williams, 1 Tenn., (Overt.), 325.
•depending on the successful prosecution of a suit. 13 Code, § 4448.
See, ante, § 181. .14 The penalty must be in double the sum allowed
10 Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, 623. to' be collected. The sum to be collected is generally
11 The following short form of a bond would the whole judgment, but the order sometimes allows
seem to be fully sufficient in all injunction or attach- only a part of the judgment to be collected. The
ment suits, to cover all possible cases, costs included. following is ,
ANOTHER FORM OF A REFUNDING BOND:

SHORT FORM OF BOND. We, C D.[the defendant] E F and G H
[the
A B, "1
acknowledge ourselves indebted, and firmly
sureties],
vs. I In the Chancery Court, at Memphis. bound, unto A B, [the complainant] in the sum of
CD. , .
one thousand dollars.
such
We acknowledge ourselves the sureties of the com- The condition of the above obligation is that;
§ 862 DISSOLUTION OF INJUNCTIONS. 662
§ 862. Remedies on Injunction and Refunding Bonds'. When proceedings —
on a judgment at law for money is enjoined in whole or in part, the object of
the law in requiring the complainant to give a bond to pay said judgment if
the injunction is dissolved is, to secure the speedy payment of the judgment,
in case of such dissolution. 15 When, therefore, such an injunction is dissolved,
whether by an interlocutory order, or by a final decree, such order or decree is
required to contain a judgment on said bond against the complainant and his
sureties for such amount as the Court may order, 16 being generally the amount
of the judgment enjoined, and the interest thereon.
In cases other than injunctions to stay proceedings on a judgment for money,
if the injunction be dissolved either by an interlocutory order or by the final
decree, the defendant may, in the final decree, or in a subsequent order at the
same term, have a reference to the Master, or a trial by jury, to ascertain the
damages suffered by the defendant in consequence of the wrongful suing out
of the injunction. 17 Such a reference may be in the final decree immediately
following the adjudication upon the merits, thus
REFERENCE TO THE MASTER.
[After giving the style of the cause., and the final decree in full, then add:} And it ap-
pearing to the Court that an injunction bond was given in this case by the complainant B, A
with C D and E F as his sureties, in the penal sum of one thousand dollars, conditioned to
pay such costs and damages as this Court may award on dismissing the bill, and the defend-
ant suggesting that he has suffered damages by reason of the injunction sued out in this cause,
on his motion, the Master is directed to hear proof, including the proof on file, and report
to the present [or, next] term
1st. The amount of damages, if any, sustained by the defendant by reason of the suing
out of the injunction in this case. 18
In like manner, should turn out at the hearing that the bill to enjoin a
if it
judgment was properly filed, and if a refunding bond was given on dissolving
the injunction, the Court may, in the final decree, render a judgment on such
bond against any or all the parties executing it, for the amount of the judg-
ment collected from the complainant, and interest thereon. 19 Such judgment
may follow the decree on the merits sustaining the bill, thus
JUDGMENT ON REFUNDING BOND.
[After giving the style of the cause, and the final decree in full, then add:] And it ap-
pearing to the Court that the sum of four hundred dollars was collected from the complainant
on said judgment, after the interlocutory injunction was dissolved; and that the defendant
gave a bond, with E F and G H
as his sureties, to refund the amount collected if so ordered
by the Court on final hearing; it is therefore adjudged and decreed that the defendant and
his said sureties pay into Court said sum of four hundred dollars, and the further sum of
twenty-one dollars, the interest thereon since collected, in all, four hundred and twenty-
one dollars, within thirty days, and in default thereof an execution will issue against
the defendant and said C D and E F, for said sum of four hundred and twenty-one dollars,
and the costs incident to said execution, they being each and all adjudged liable to complain-
ant for said sums, which, when paid in, will be paid over to the complainant, or to his Solic-
itor of record.
whereas, on the Sth day of February, 1891, in the 15 The injunction bond is taken in lieu of the de-
case of said A B against the said C D, pending in posit of the money with the Master, under the pre-
the Chancery Court at Jamestown, it was ordered vious practice. Black »). Caruthers, 6 Hum., 90;
that the injunction previously granted in said cause, Chester v. Apperson, 4 Heisk., 654.
restraining said C D from proceeding further in the 16 Code, §4447; Black v. Caruthers, 6 Hum., 87.
collection of a certain judgment which he recovered 17 Code, § 4442. The ordinary practice is to have
against said A B, in the Circuit Court of Fentress a reference to the Master.
County, on the 10th day of September, 1890, for five 18 This is the usual form of the reference; but it
hundred dollars and the costs of suit, should be dis- would be well to have the Master's report more
solved, upon the said C D executing a refunding nearly resemble a special verdict, in which case the
bond with good and sufficient security in the sum of reference would be as follows:
one thousand dollars. Now, if the said C D shall, 1st. What damages, if any, the defendant suffered
in case said Chancery suit be decided against him on by reason of the injunction sued out in this cause,
the final hearing thereof, refund the amount with specifying the kind and degree of such damages.
interest, which he shall, in the meantime, have col- 2d. What would be reasonable compensation to the
lected upon said Circuit Court judgment, and shall defendant for such damages.
otherwise comply with the decree of said Chancery 3d. What, if any, exemplary damages should be
Court, then this obligation to be void; otherwise, to allowed, and for what reason.
remain in full force and effect. 18 Code, | 4448.
[To be duly dated, signed and witnessed.]
663 INJUNCTION AND REFUNDING BONDS. §863
§ 863. The Measure of Damages on Injunction Bonds. No damages will be —
allowed which are not the actual, natural, and proximate, result of the injury
arising from the suspension or violation of the defendant's vested legal rights
by the injunction. Damages that are remote, speculative, or contingent, will
not be allowed. In the absence of malice in suing out the injunction, vindictive
or punitive damages will not be allowed but simple compensation for the loss
;
sustained, will be the measure of the damages. 20 Interest is allowable, how-

ever, as a part of the damages. And if losses happen in consequence of com-
plainant's failure to have a receiver appointed in a partnership suit, or loss
happen because the receiver failed to do his duty, the complainant may be
held liable therefor, on his injunction bond for it was his duty to have a re-
;
ceiver promptly appointed, and then to see that the receiver did his duty in the
premises. 21
In ascertaining the damages resulting from an injunction, the following
matters may be regarded: (1) loss of rents and profits, or damage to crops or
property, by being prevented from taking possession; (2) injury to business,
reputation, and credit, by being prevented from properly attending thereto;
(3) depreciation in the value of the property while subject to an injunction
prohibiting its sale (4) the loss of the debt whose collection was enjoined by
;
reason of the debtor becoming insolvent during the progress of the suit, and
(5) any other loss or injury, naturally or directly referable to the injunction,
and flowing therefrom as an immediate consequence. 22
In estimating the damages, regard may be also had (1) to the presence or
absence of probable cause for resorting to the writ; (2) to the good or bad
faith of the complainant in bringing the suit (3) to the presence or absence
;
of any circumstance of fraud, malice, or oppression, in the proceedings. If

good faith and probable cause appear, compensatory damages only will be
allowed; if, on the other hand, there appears bad faith, fraud, malice, or op-
pression as a motive for the suit, or a reckless disregard of the defendant's
rights and interests, or an utter absence of probable cause for bringing the
suit, vindictive damages may be allowed. 23
In estimating the amount of damages the opinions of witnesses, unsupported
by facts or reasons, are entitled to no consideration. Opinions are not evidence,
except in cases of experts. 24
20 Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479; 2 High on Injunc, 24 On the worthlessness of opinions as proof, see
§§ 1663-1666. Davidson V. Bowden, 5 Sneed, 129; Bush V. Jones,
21 Terrell v. Ingersoll, 10 Lea, 77; Downs v. Allen, 2 Tenn. Ch., 190; Stretch V. Gowdey, 3 Tenn. Ch„
10 Lea, 670. 569; Woodfolk v. N. & C. R. R. Co., 2 Swan, 429;
22 2 High on Injunc, §§ 1663-1675. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 440. See, post, § 1068, note.
23 Doll v. Cooper, 9 Lea. 576, and cases there
cited.
§864 NE EXEATS. 664
CHAPTER XLII.
SUITS PRATING NE EXEATS; AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.
§ 864. Ne Exeats Generally Considered. § 867. Frame of a Bill for a Ne Exeat.
§ 865. In What Cases a Ne Exeat Will be § 868. Proceedings in Execution of a Nc
Granted. Exeat.
§ 866. How a Ne Exeat is Obtained.
§ 864. Ne Exeats Generally Considered. —

The writ of ne exeat, 1 although fallen
into almost total disuse, is, nevertheless, directly recognized by our statutes,
and indirectly recognized by our Constitution. 2 It is one of the extraordinary
processes of a Court of Chancery, and is as much a writ of right as any other
process used in the administration of justice, and must, therefore, be granted
whenever a proper case is presented. 3 The abolition of imprisonment for debt
has not deprived the Court of the power to issue a writ of ne exeat in cases of
equitable cognizance but the writ will not be granted upon a mere legal de-
;
mand sued on in Chancery. 4 The object of the writ is to detain the person of
the defendant in order to compel him to perform the decree of the Court, in
cases where his departure would endanger the rights of the complainant, or
their effectual enforcement. 5
A
ne exeat will issue only upon an equitable demand suits for alimony, and :
for an account, are, however, deemed equitable demands. This equitable de-
mand, when for money, must be certain in its nature, not contingent, and must
be due, except in suits for alimony and an accounting. 6 The amount of the
indebtedness must be stated the indebtedness must be alleged to be just, and
;
its payment or collection must be alleged to be endangered by the departure

of the defendant from the State. There need, however, be no allegation that
the defendant is going out of the State for the purpose of avoiding the payment
of the debt. 7
An injunction may be granted at the same time a ne exeat is ordered, and on
the same bill, and in the same fiat, if prayed for, and a proper case made out. 8
1 In the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Ch. Pr., 654; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 520; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
the full name of this writ is ne exeat regno; but in 1711. Where a money recovery is sought, proceed-
the State of Tennessee, its full name is ne exeat
' ings by attachment of property have, in practice,
republica. superseded ne exeats. Indeed, our attachment laws
2 For its direct recognition, see Code, § 4434. It are in the nature of a substitute for writs of ne
is indirectly recognized in the Constitution by the exeat, when a judgment in personam is not sought,
establishment of the Chancery Court, and by the or is not necessary. Instead of attaching the body
continuance of existing laws, the writ of ne exeat of the defendant the practice now is to attach his
being one of the powers of the Chancery Court. property. Cox v. Breedlove, 2 Yerg., 516.
Const., Art. VI, §8; Art. XI, § 1; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 5 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 647; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1698. The
1698, note 1; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 647; Smith V. Koontz, decrees of the Chancery Court were formerly in
4 Hay, 189; Edwards V. Massey, 1 Hawks, (N. C), personam, and enforced by process of contempt, and
352. imprisonment. The result was that if the person of
3 2 Dan. Ch.
Pr., 1698, note; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 647. the defendant could not be reached, the decree could
4 Barb. Ch. Pr., 653; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1700, note.
1 not be enforced, when the payment of money was or-
The imprisonment for debt prohibited by our Con- dered. Hence, the necessity of keeping the defend-
stitution is imprisonment under legal process for ant within reach of the process of the Court. But
failing to pay an adjudicated debt. This sprt of now that the Chancery Court can issue an attach-
imprisonment is quite a different thing from_ impris- ment against a defendant's property, the writ of
oning a man for endeavoring to evade the jurisdic- ne exeat is no longer necessary, in ordinary cases.
tion of the Court, the latter no more being an im- 6 12 Ency. of Forms. 1053.
prisonment for debt than is an imprisonment for Tl Barb. Ch Pr., 650-653; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1702-
failing to give a bail bond, or for failing to perform 1708. It is sufficient if the complainant swears to
the decree of the Court. Code, §§3392; 4478-4481; the amount to the best of his belief; but it is not
2528. The last section (2528) authorizes the arrest sufficient to make oath that the complainant is in-
and commitment of a guardian who fails to account. formed, or fears, or apprehends, that the defendant
The only object of a ne exeat is to prevent the de- may leave the State. Ibid. See, also, Nelson V.
fendant from going out of the State, and thus es- Fuld, 5 Pick., 466, which holds that an affidavit for
caping the jurisdiction of the Court over his person; an attachment on "information and belief" is in-
and the only condition of the bond he is required to sufficient.
give, is that he will not depart from, or leave, the 8 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 648.
State, without the permission of the Court. 1 Barb.
665 NE EXEATS. §865
§ 865. In What Cases a Ne Exeat Will be Granted. The Court will issue —
the writ whenever one party has a claim against another which can be enforced
only in a Court of Equity, and the enforcement of which will be endangered if
the defendant is allowed to leave the State. 9 The one great object of the writ
is to secure the jurisdiction of the Court over the person of the defendant, to
the end that, by process of contempt, he may be compelled to perform the
decree of the Court. 10
§ 866. Howa Ne Exeat is Obtained. —A
writ of ne exeat is obtained in pre-
cisely the same way an injunction is obtained, that is, upon a prayer therefor
in a bill, or upon an application therefor in Court, based on a petition or affi-
davit, in the cause. 11 The writ may be applied for at any time during the pro-
gress of the suit. No notice of the application need be given to the defendant,
the writ being granted ex parte, at Chambers, by any Judge, or Chancellor, or
in open Court by the Chancellor, or Judge, presiding.
§ 867. —
Frame of a Bill for a Ne Exeat. A ne exeat is in the nature of an
attachment of the body of the defendant, and its object is to detain his body
until he gives security for the debt alleged in the bill. What is said else-
where 12 as to the frame of an injunction bill applies with full force to a ne exeat
bill, and, therefore, need not be repeated.
The bill, petition, or affidavit, on which the prayer for a ne exeat is based,
must allege (1) the amount 13 and nature of the indebtedness, when a debt is
sought to be recovered; (2) that it is due and justly owing to the complainant;
(3) that the defendant intends to leave the State; and (4) that complainant's
debt, or his remedies to enforce his rights, would be endangered by the defend-
ant's departure from the State.
The following forms of material allegations in a bill, petition, or affidavit for
this writ, will serve as illustrations
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS EOR A NE EXEAT IN DIVORCE SUIT.

That the defendant has no property subject to attachment, known to complainant, but has
a large amount of money, and evidences of debt, in his possession, the proceeds of property
sold by him to defeat complainant's claim fpr alimony; and he has declared that he intends
at once to leave the State and take with him every dollar he owns, and would never pay her
a cent. 14
9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1699. Ne exeats have issued cases: 1. Against a guardian to compel him to ac-
from the Supreme Court pending suits there to pre- count. 14 Ency. pi. & p r ., 321; and see, Code,
vent the defendant from removing property. Cox V. §2528; 2. Against a husband who has his goods
Breedlove, 2 Yerg., 516. packed, and is about to leave the State with another
10 It would seem that a ne exeat is a writ neces- woman without making any provision for his wife,
sary for the purposes of justice when the defendant, the complainant. 12 Ency. of Forms, 1054; 3.
by leaving the State, can defeat the power of the Against a defendant about to leave the State taking
Court to grant effectual relief, or evade the relief '
with him slaves, or other property of peculiar value.
granted; especially when the relief consists in com- Ibid; 4. Against a defendant who has converted his
pelling the defendant (1) to execute to the complain- property into money and is about to leave the State
ant a deed for land, or other property, situated in to avoid paying alimony or a trust debt. 16 A. & IS.
another State, or (2) to release a lien or mortgage Ency. of Law, 378.
on property in another State; or (3) to give a receipt In these days of rapid transit, this writ may prove
against, or acknowledge satisfaction of a judgment, more efficacious, in many cases, than an injunction,
or decree, or bond, or other obligation, in another or an attachment of property. Justice is dearer than
State; or (4) to do some other act which the Court the right to go abroad, and this writ should be
could not effectually do by the direct and inherent awakened from its slumbers when it is necessary to
operation of its own decree. The object of the writ prevent justice from being wrecked. And it is worth
is to enable the Court to act upon the person of the remarking in this connection, that neither our Con-
defendant in such cases. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 647; 651- stitution nor our statutes in any way lessen, limit, or
652; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1698, note; .2 Sto. Eq. Jur., impair, any of the powers, privileges, or jurisdiction,
§§ 1471-1472, note. rightfully incident to a Court of Equity; Code,
A writ of ne exeat would, also, be essential to §§4279; 4481; 4488; but, on the contrary, its powers
and jurisdiction have been greatly enlarged, and
justice (1) where, in a divorce suit, the defendant is
threatening to take the children and his exempt prop- made more extensive and efficacious. See, ante,
erty out of the State: or (2) where a trustee intends §§ 14-21.
11 The entire practice relative to obtaining a writ
to leave the State with trust property in his posses-
sion or (3) where, under the Code, §§ 4283-4285, a of ne exeat is identical with that of obtaining a writ
discovery is sought; or (4) in any other case where of injunction, and its repetition here is, therefore,
the Court could not do complete justice without hav- unnecessary.
12 See, ante, §§ 142, sub-sec. 2; 838-840.
ing the person of the defendant within its jurisdic-
13 The amount need not be stated in a suit for
tion. See, Smith v. Koontz, 4 Hay., 189; Cox v.
Breedlove, 2 Yerg., 516; Denton v. Denton, 1 Johns. . alimony, or for an accounting. 12 Ency. of Forms,
Ch., 364. 1053.
, , „
. , .
14 Ibid,
Writs of ne exeat have issued in the following 1056.
867 NE EXEATS. 666
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS FOE A NE EXEAT IN SUIT AGAINST ADMINIS-
TRATOR, GUARDIAN, OR OTHER TRUSTEE.
That the defendant is largely indebted to complainant by reason of complainant's estate
having gone into his hands, as guardian, [or executor, or administrator, or trustee,] but the
exact amount he owes complainant can only be ascertained on a discovery from him and an
accounting, but that defendant has not only refused to acquaint complainant with the amount
of the estate he has received belonging to complainant, and account therefor, but has lately
declared his intention to leave the State. Complainant avers that the defendant is justly
indebted to him by reason of the premises in the sum of one thousand dollars, a large part, if
not all of which, is in his possession, so complainant is informed and believes and so charges.
The defendant has no property, known to complainant, subject to attachment.
It will be sufficient to allege that the defendant is threatening to leave, or to

allege facts and circumstances evincing an intention to leave. The bill or
petition must be sworn to, on personal knowledge of the party or person
swearing to it, and not on mere information and belief. The affidavit as to the
intent, threats, or circumstances showing an intent, to leave the State, may be
made by a third person who personally knows the facts. The bill must pray
expressly for the writ, if it is desired before the bill is filed but, after the bill
;
is filed, the writ may be applied for and obtained by a sworn petition, or by
motion supported by affidavit. 15 The bill, petition, or affidavit, must state that
it is the first application for a ne exeat in the case.
10 The following is the
form of a
PRAYER FOR A NE EXEAT.
That the writ of ne exeat republica issue, to stay the said Richard Roe, [defendant,'] from
departing from or leaving the State without the express permission of your Honor's Court.
Upon a bill laying sufficient grounds for a ne exeat, and praying therefor, and
duly verified by the complainant, or by some third person 17 having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged, the Chancellor will, at Chambers, endorse his
fiat for the writ, in the same manner as in case of an application for an injunc-
tion. If he refuses the writ, he will so endorse the bill. In either event, he will
seal up the bill, and transmit it to the Clerk and Master, as in case of injunction
bills.
FIAT FOR A NE EXEAT.
To the Clerk and Master, at Cleveland
Issue a writ of ne exeat as prayed in the foregoing bill, upon the complainant giving;
bond therefor in the penalty of [naming the sum. ls ) The Sheriff will take a bail bond in
the penalty of [double the debt claimed in the bill,] conditioned as required by law.
Aug. 13, 1890. D. C. Trewhitt, Judge.
On receipt of the bill containing a fiat, and the execution of bond therefor by
the complainant, the Clerk and Master will, at once, issue a
WRIT OF NE EXEAT.
State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Bradley county
Whereas, John Doe has filed a bill in the Chancery Court at Cleveland against Richard
Roe, alleging among other things that said Richard Roe is justly indebted to him in the
sum of [naming the amount. If the bill alleges any other ground of suit, state it briefly,]
and that said Richard Roe designs quickly to leave the State, as by oath appears and said ;
John Doe praying for a writ of ne exeat to stay the departure- of said Richard Roe.
Now, therefore, by the fiat of Hon. D. C. Trewhitt, Judge, to me directed, you are hereby
commanded without delay to cause said Richard Roe to give a good and sufficient bail bond
in the penalty of [amount named in the flat,] conditioned not to leave the State of Tennessee,
without the permission of said Court; and if said Richard Roe fail, or refuse, to give such
bond, then you will commit him to the common jail of your county, there safely to be kept
until he give such bond, or until the further order of said Court.
15 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 648-650; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1706- 18 No bond seems to be required by the statute;
1709. but the Chancellor should require one similar to an
18 Code, §§4434-4435. attachment bond. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1714.
17 * Barb. Ch. Pr., 649-650.
667 ne exeats. § 868
You will report your action on this writ as soon as executed, and return with the writ
said bond, if given.
Witness, [&c, as in case of other writs.] W. H. McKamy, C. & M.
§ 868. —
Proceedings in Execution of a Ne Exeat. If the defendant fails to
give the bond, he will be arrested, and committed to jail, as on a capias. In-
deed, the writ of ne exeat is executed in all respects like a capias, and bond
taken in the same way. The following is the form of a
NE EXEAT BAIL BOND.

We, Richard Roe, [the defendant,] and Robert Roe and Roland Roe, [his sureties,] ac-
knowledge ourselves indebted to the State of Tennessee for the use of those entitled, in the
sum of [amount named in the writ.]
But this obligation to be void if the said Richard Roe, who has been arrested upon a writ
of ne exeat issued in the case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, in the Chancery Court at Cleve-
land, shall not leave the said State without the permission of said Court.
As witness our hands [&c, as in other bonds.]
The defendant may, if arrested, give bond at any time thereafter to the
Sheriff,and be discharged; or, if the Court be in session, he may, by leave of
the Court, give his bond to the Clerk and Master, or enter into a recognizance
on the minutes, as in a criminal case.
The defendant may have the ne exeat discharged (1) for want of equity on
the face of the bill, or (2) on a denial of the equity by a sworn answer, or (3)
for want of a diligent prosecution of the suit, or (4) by paying into Court, or
giving bond to pay, the amount sued for. 19 It may be stated, generally, that
whatever would justify a dissolution of an injunction, or the discharge of an
attachment of property, will justify the discharge of a ne exeat.
If the defendant has given bond, he must not leave the State without leave
of the Court, or without having the writ discharged, or the Court will render
judgment against him and the sureties on his bond for the penalty thereof,
or for the debt, if it be less than the penalty. "When the ne exeat is discharged,
the Court orders the bond given by the defendant to be cancelled 20 and if the ;
Court considers that the writ was improperly obtained, it may direct an inquiry
to the Master as to the damages sustained by the defendant, and may render
judgment therefor upon the bond given by the complainant for the ne exeat. 21
19 1 Bart. Ch. Pr., 655-657. I 21 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1714.
20 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1712, note. I
§ 869 ATTACHMENT BILLS. 668
CHAPTER XLIII.
SUITS IN CHANCERY FOR ATTACHMENT OP PROPERTY.

Article I. Attachment Bills, and Proceedings Thereon.
Article II. Defences, Decrees, and Subsequent Proceedings.
ARTICLE I.
ATTACHMENT BILLS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
869. Office of an Attachment Bill. 877. How
the Defendant is Brought Into
870. When an Attachment Bill Will Lie. Into Court.
871. Frame of an Attachment Bill. 878. Amendment of Attachment Proceed-
872. What Bills Must Allege: "This is ings.
the First Application for an Attach- 879. When
an Amended, or an Ancillary,
ment." Attachment
Bill Will Lie.
873 Form of an Attachment Bill. 880. Ancillary Attachments.
874.Attachment Bond. 881. A Garnishment Bill.
875 Who May Issue the Writ of Attach- 882. Property Attachable in Equity, but
ment. Not at Law.
876. Forms of Writs of Attachment. 883. Judicial Attachments.
§ 869. Office of an Attachment Bill. —

Ordinarily, a debtor must be brought
before the Court by service of subpoena, and a judgment pronounced against
him, before his property can be seized, or an execution issued against him.
But when service of process is impossible, or difficult, or when the debtor is
endeavoring to put his property beyond the reach of the creditor, the law not
only dispenses with personal service of process upon the debtor, but, also,
authorizes the seizure of his property before any decree adjudging him to be
liable. The office of an attachment bill is to set forth such a state of facts as
will entitle the complainant creditor to have the property of the defendant
debtor seized, or otherwise impounded, at the very beginning of the suit, and
held subject to the satisfaction of the complainant's demand, when ascertained
by the Court, and fixed by its decree.
§ 870. When an Attachment Bill Will Lie. Whenever any person 1 has a —
debt or demand due, 2 or a claim for damages, cognizable in the Chancery Court,
he may file an original attachment bill, to have the property of the defendant
debtor attached, in the following cases:
1. Where the debtor, or defendant, resides out of the State.
3
.2. Where he is about to remove, or has removed himself, or property, from

the State.
3. Where he has removed, or is removing himself, out of the country pri-
vately.
4. Where he conceals himself, so that the ordinary process of law cannot be
served upon him.
1 The term, "person," in the statute includes not erty of his principal, as a security for his liability,
only natural persons, but also, officers, partnerships, whether the debt on which he is bound be due or
corporations, counties, and the State. Code, § SO. not. Code, § 3457.
2 An attachment may, in like manner, be sued out 3 If the debtor and creditor are both non-residents,
upon debts or demands not due, in any of the cases and residents of the same State, the creditor is not
mentioned in this section, except in the case of a entitled to an attachment, unless the bill alleges that
debtor or defendant residing out of the State. Code, the property of the debtor has been fraudulently re-
§3456. moved to this State to evade the process of the law
.
Any accommodation endorser or surety may, in in the State of their residence. Acts of 1871-2:
like manner, sue out an attachment against the prop- Code, § 3455 a.
669 ATTACHMENT BILI,S. § 871
5. "Where he absconds, or is absconding, or concealing himself or property.
6. "Where he has fraudulently disposed of, or is about fraudulently to dispose
of, his property.
_
7."Where any person, liable for any debt or demand, residing out of the State,
dies, leaving property in the State. 4
8. Where any non-resident, having choses in action or other property in this
State, is indebted to another non-resident, who is himself indebted to a person
resident or non-resident, such person, without having first recovered a judg-
ment at law, may file a bill to have such choses in action or other property
attached, making said non-resident debtors and the person in possession of the
property defendants. 6
9. "Where a bill has been filed, and the subpoena has been returned Not to '
'
be found in my county," as to all or any one of the defendants, residents of

the county, the complainant may have an alias and pluries subpoena for the de-
fendant, or, at his election, sue out attachment against the estate of such de-
fendant. This attachment is called a judicial attachment and, upon the return ;
of the attachment levied on any property of the defendant, the cause proceeds
against such defendant in all respects, as if originally commenced by attach-
ment. 6
10. "What is termed an equitable attachment may be had, on the fiat of a
Judge or Chancellor, against property described in the bill as in danger of
being transferred or being removed from the jurisdiction of the Court, when
(1) the complainant has a lien upon it, or (2) has a beneficial interest in it,
or (3) has been deprived of it by fraud, 7 or (4) when it cannot be reached by
execution, 8 or (5) when the party is indebted to the Court. 9
§ 871. —
Frame of an Attachment Bill. Inasmuch as a proceeding by an
original attachment of property is purely statutory, and is, also, in derogation
of the ordinary rights of the defendant under the law, the complainant is
bound to substantially comply with the requirements of the statute, and to take
the steps prescribed as a condition precedent to a valid decree. The bill must
contain
A
Statement of the Nature of the Debt or Demand Claimed." The bill should:
1.
show what the debt or demand is based on, as that it is, (1) an account for
goods, or for chattels, or for labor, or for professional services, or for board,,
or for rent; or (2) for money loaned, had, or received; or (3) that it is based
on a note of hand, due bill, bill of exchange, stated account, insurance policy,,
or other written evidence of debt or (4) that it is founded on a breach of con-
;
tract, specifying the breach.

2. The Amount of the Debt or Demand. The precise amount of the debt or de-
mand sued for should be stated. An attachment will not lie for an indefinite
amount of indebtedness. The officer executing the writ cannot determine the-
amount of the defendant 's property to seize, unless the writ specifies the exact
amount of the complainant's claim. If, from the nature of the case, or the
complication of accounts and dealings, the complainant is unable to state the
exact amount due, it will be sufficient for him to state in his bill that the amount,
11
is about the sum named, or is such an amount, more or less.
3. An Averment that the Claim is Just. "While it is the safer rule to specifi-
cally aver that the claim sued on is just, using the very words of the statute,,
nevertheless, if the other averments of the bill clearly show that the claim ia
4 Code, §§3455; 3461. 7 McKeldin v. Gouldy, 7 Pick., 677; August v.
Code, § 3461 a. Attachments in all the foregoing

5 Seeskind, 6 Cold., 166.
8 See, post, §§ 1005-1035.
cases are called original attachments.
Code, §§ 3466-3467. A return, "The defendant 9 Rutland v. Cummings, 7 Hum., 279.
10 Code, § 3469; Sullivan v. Fugate, 1 Heisk., 20..
not found in my county," will not authorize this
must "The defendant not to be This is a leading case. 1 Meigs' Dig., § 251.
writ. The return be,
ti Dougherty v. Kellum, 3 Lea, 646.
found in my county." Welsh V. Robinson, 10 Hum.,
264. The publication cannot be made until after the
return day specified in the subpoena. Grewer V.
Henderson, 1 Tenn. Ch., 76.
a just one, the failure to state that the debt or demand sued on is a just one
will not affect the validity of the proceeding. 12
4. An
Allegation of One or More of the Statutory Grounds of Attachment. If the
bill fails to show a statutory cause of attachment, the whole proceeding will be
"void, unless there be grounds outside of the attachment on which to sustain the
jurisdiction of the Court. The bill may, however, state in the alternative, or
otherwise, more than one of the causes for which an attachment may be sued
out. 13 But a cause of attachment cannot be joined in the alternative with a
iact that is not a cause for an attachment. 14
5. An Allegation That the Bill is the First Application for an Attachment in the
Case. This is necessary, if the bill seeks to attach the equitable property of the
defendant. Whether it is necessary, in a bill to attach property attachable at
law, will be hereafter considered 1B but, until the Supreme Court decides other-
;
wise, it is prudent to make such allegation in all attachment bills.

6. The Owners of Both the Legal and the Equitable Titles Must be Made Parties,
When. If the bill seeks to attach the equitable property of the defendant, the
owner of the legal title must be made a party. 16 On the other hand, if the bill
seeks to attach the legal property of the defendant, and this property is en-
cumbered by any Equity such as a vendor's lien, mechanics' lien, or other stat-
utory lien, the owner of such encumbrance must be made a party. 17
7. The Property Sought to be Attached Must be Described, When. In all cases of
equitable attachment the property must be described and it is well to describe
;
it, where known, in a bill for a legal attachment in either case the bill will be
:
a lien on the described property by lis pendens from the filing of the bill. 18
8. The Bill Must be Sworn to. The affidavit to the bill is an indispensable
pre-requisite to the issuance of an attachment. Until the affidavit is made,
there is no authority for the issuance of an original attachment: and if it is
issued without the affidavit, it is a nullity. 19 But if the defendant appears and
answers, without taking proper steps to have the bill dismissed, or the attach-
ment discharged, it would seem to be a waiver of the affidavit; 20 and the
absence of an affidavit, in such a case, would not affect the validity of the
decree. 21 If the bill is not sworn to before the issuance of the attachment, the
subsequent verification of the bill will not so retroact as to validate the invalid
writ. 22
The affidavit to the bill may be made by the complainant's agent or attorney,
and the authority of the latter to act will be presumed in the absence of evi-
dence that he was not authorized to swear to the bill. 23 The ground of attach-
ment must be positively averre'd in the bill. An allegation that "complainant
is informed and believes that" a particular ground exists, without a positive
averment that such ground does, in fact, exist, would tender an immaterial
issue, and would be insufficient. 24 The ground of attachment must be directly
and positively averred, so as to tender an issue of fact, and not an issue as to
whether complainant had information, or believed, that the fact was so and so.
But, when the bill directly avers one or more causes of attachment, it may be
sworn to "on information and belief."
An attachment bill is both an affidavit and a pleading as an affidavit, it must
;
contain the necessary statutory statements specified in the Code, § 3469 and ;
as a pleading, it must specify a cause of action cognizable in the Court where

filed.
12 Alston v. Sharp, 2 Lea, 523; Boyd V. Gentry, 21 The object of the attachment proceedings is to
12 Heisk., 628; Lowenstine v. Gillespie, 6 Lea, 643; get jurisdiction of the defendant; and, if he appears
Hart v. Dixon, 5 Lea, 336. and answers, he cannot afterwards have the suit
13 Code, § 3470. dismissed because the attachment was a nullity; he
14 Haynes v. Powell, 1 Lea, 352; Jackson v. may, however, have a void attachment discharged.
Burke, 4 Heisk., 610. 22 Watt V. Carnes, 4 Heisk., 532.
15 See, post, § 872. 23 Code, § 3469; Baker v. Huddleston, 3 Bax., 1.
16 See, ante, § 127. 24 Nelson V. Fuld, 5 Pick., 466. This case holds
17 Ibid; Jackson v. Coffman, 2 Cates, 271. that the allegations must be of a fact susceptible of
18 See note 43, infra. issue and proof; and overrules Bank v. Berry, 2
19 Watt V. Carnes, 4 Heisk., 532; Maples V. Tunis, Hum., 443.
11 Hum., 108. There must be an act already performed, or one
20Johnson t>. Luckadoo, 12 Heisk., 270. to be performed, the preliminary steps or circum-
671 ATTACHMENT BILLS. §872
§ 872. What Bills must Allege "This
the First Application for an At-
is
—
tachment." Code, sections 4434-4435 require the party applying for an at-
tachment to state in his bill or petition that it is the first application for such
process.
These sections are substantially the Act of 1821, ch. 7, Sec. 1, and the Act of
1835, ch. 4, Sec. 9, with the word "attachment" interlined in the Act of 1821;
and while, out of abundant caution, Solicitors have construed the word to in-
clude ordinary statutory attachments of property, it is very doubtful whether
this construction is supported by the context.
1st. Attachments of property in the Circuit and Justices' Courts require no
statement as to "first application. 24a Besides, in these Courts alias or second
writs of attachment of property are granted, on mere motion, without new
bond or affidavit 25 and judicial attachments of property also issue without new
;
bond, or any affidavit. 26

2d. But if these Code sections (4434-4435), apply to ordinary attachments of
property in the Chancery Courts, then they equally apply to attachments of
property in both the Circuit and Justices' Courts by the express requirement
of the Code 27 and as they are not construed to apply to the latter Courts they
;
should not be applied to the Chancery Courts. Code, section 4435, requires
the statement as to the "first application" to be made in the bill, or petition,
whereas, in attachments of property in the Circuit Courts, and in suits before
Justices of the Peace, there is neither bill nor petition but a mere affidavit whose
substance is prescribed, 28 thus showing conclusively that the section (4435),
does not refer to ordinary attachments of property in any Court. Again, in
attachments of property in the Circuit Court, and before Justices of the Peace,
the Clerk of the Court, or the Justices of the Peace, respectively, grant the
attachments, and the fiat of a Judge, or Chancellor, is not necessary. 29 Why
then the necessity of such a fiat in Chancery? Indeed, in ordinary statutory
cases of attachment of property in Chancery, the Clerk and Master can grant
the writ without the fiat of the Chancellor, another reason why ordinary at-
tachments of property are not meant by said Code sections. 30
On the other hand, there are some good reasons why the word "attachments"
does not mean attachments of the person.
1st. The practice is to issue such attachments without any bill, petition or
fiat.
2d. Attachments of the person to compel an answer to a bill are issued on
mere motion supported by the return on the subpoena, and not on a bill or
petition. 31
3d. A
second attachment of the person to compel an answer is granted, as
32 without bill, or petition, or fiat.
of course, on forfeiture of bail,
4th. An attachment of the person to enforce a decree issues without bill,
33
petition or fiat, upon the officer's return, or upon affidavit.
But there are attachments that satisfy all the requirements of the sections
under consideration, to-wit, equitable attachments of property.
stances of which have already been developed and to;" and § 3766 is to the same effect. Besides
become capable of proof. McHaney v. Cawthorne, 4 ordinary attachments of property are not "herein
Heisk., 508; Tackson v. Burke, 4 Heisk., 610.
provided for," but are provided for in a preceding
No good reason occurs Chapter, devoted to the subject, and wholly foreign
24a Code, '§§ 3469-3477.
this statement should be required in the Chan- to Chancery practice. Code, §§ 3455-3538.
why 28 Code, § 3469.
cery Courts and not in the Circuit and Justices
20 Code, § 3474. In Green V. Lanier the failure
This is in direct contradiction to allege that the bill was the first application for an
§ 3517.
25 Code,
of 3435, if the latter refers to ordinary statutory
§
attachments of property.
26 See, ante, § 870, sub-sec. 9; post, § 883.
Heisk., 662.
30 Code, §§ 4434-4435.
^
attachment was considered a mere irregularity.
W?
5
The latter section says, 31 Code, §4361; Ch. Rule, VII, §8. See, ant/-,
27 Code H
3766; 4454.
"The provisions of this article, [Article VIII, which §201.
32 Code, 4363. See, ante, 8 203.
includes said sections 4434-4435] will apply to all §
33 Code, 4479. See, ante, § 652.
cases in any of the Courts in which the
extraordi- §
nary process herein provided for may be resorted

§873 ATTACHMENT BILLS. 672
1st.Equitable attachments of property can issue only on the fiat of a Chan-
cellor, or Judge. 34
2d. Such attachments are technically "extraordinary" process in the meaning
of said sections. 35
3d. They are issued exclusively by the Chancery Courts). 36
4th. They are leviable on equitable interests, whereas ordinary attachments
are not leviable on any but legal interests. 37
5th. They are issuable under the inherent jurisdiction of the Chancery Court,
where property is in danger of being transferred, or removed beyond the ju-
risdiction of the Court, and complainant (1) has a lien on it, or (2) has a bene-
ficial interest in it, or (3) has been deprived of it by fraud. 38 Process, in a
case like this, is eminently and technically "extraordinary," within every in-
tent and requirement of the sections in question. 39
6th. Inasmuch as Code, sections 4283-4291, authorize equitable attachments of
property by lis pendens, such attachments may well have been included in the
sections in question (4434-5) so as to require the fiat of the Chancellor, and
thereby attain more force and dignity.
But in view of the present practice* and the uncertainty as to the require-
ment of the statute, the only safe course for Solicitors is to put said allegation
in all bills and petitions praying an attachment of property, whether of a
legal or equitable nature.
§ 873. —
Form of an Attachment Bill. An attachment bill should be as full,
particular, and specific, in its averments of the nature, origin and history of
the cause of suit, as an ordinary original bill; but, inasmuch as it is generally
drawn in haste, it is, for that reason, frequently more brief and pointed than
an ordinary bill. The frame and form of the bill may be easily understood by
the following:
GENERAL FORM OF AN ATTACHMENT BILL.
To the P. Smith, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at
Hon. John Morristown
John Doe, a resident of Hamblen county, complainant,
vs.
Richard Roe, a non-resident of the State.
i.
That the defendant is justly indebted to him in the sum of [stating the amount, and speci-
fying the nature and character of the debt or demand, whether it is based on a note, account
for work and labor done, goods sold, services rendered, breach of contract, or other matter.]
n.
The defendant resides out of the State, [or has done, or is doing, some other act that en-
titles the complainant to an original attachment. In setting out the ground of attachment,
use the very language of the Code.]
in.
That the defendant is the owner of the following property situated in the County of
Hamblen [Here specify the property particularly, and give its locality. This will give you a
:
lien on it from the tiling of the bill.] The defendant may be the owner of other property in
the State, which is not now known to complainant.
IV.
1st. That an attachment issue and be levied on the property of the defendant above de-
scribed, and on any other property that may be found, belonging to him, of value sufficient
to satisfy complainant's said debt, and the costs of the cause.
34 See, post, § 875. Warren, 12 Heisk., 562; and this explains Code,
35 An ordinary attachment under the general at- §§ 4345-4346, where it is said that "the mode of
tachment laws cannot, technically, be considered service of an attachment ["in the practice of Chan-
"extraordinary" process, from the standpoint of cery Courts"] shall be by reading the same to each
Equity practice, but is, technically, a. statutory defendant named therein." This creates a lien by
process in ordinary use both at law and in Chancerv. lis pendens.
36 See, post, § 875. 30 Graham t). Merrill, 5 Cold., 622; August «.
37 I,ane v. Marshall, 1 Heisk., 34; Rice V. O'Keefe, Seaskind, 6 Cold., 166. The Code provides that
6 Heisk.. 646; Lyle v. Langley, 6 Bax., 287; Hill- such an attachment shall be served, not necessarily
man v. Werner, 9 Heisk., 587; and see, post, § 875. by a levy, but by reading it to the defendant, or if
38 McKeldin V. Gouldy, 7 Pick., 677; Rutland v. he evade service by leaving a copy at his usual resi-
Cummins, 7 Hum., 279; post, §875: In ordinary dence; §§4345-4346. The lien in such a case would
cases of attachment of property a seizure of the arise from the lis pendens. See, ante, § 66.
property is essential to the jurisdiction of the Court, 40 The maxim, communis error facit jus, will
but in cases of equitable attachment such is not the hardly apply in such a case.
case. August v. Seaskind, 6 Cold., 165; Avery v.
673 ATTACHMENT BILLS. §873
2d. That on such levy being made, publication be made for the defendant according to
law in attachment cases, requiring him to answer the bill, but his oath to his answer is waived.
3d. That, if the defendant at any time comes into this State, a subpoena ito answer be is-
sued, and served on him.
4th. That complainant be granted a decree for the amount due him an said note, [account,
()/• other ground
of indebtedness, stating it,] principal and interest, and that the property at-
tached be sold in satisfaction of the decree.
This is. the first application for an attachment in this case. 41
Nat B. Jones, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit and jurat, as in the following form.]
The following is an illustration of an attachment and garnishment bill, com-

bined with a bill for discovery and relief:
ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT BILL."

To the Honorable Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Chat-
tanooga :
John Doe, a resident of Hamilton county, complainant,

vs.
Richard Roe, a non-resident of the State, and John Smith and Sarah Smith,
his wife, both residents of Hamilton county, George Jones, a resident of Polk
county, and John Brown, a resident of Meigs county, defendants.
i.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, is justly indebted to him in the sum of ten thousand
dollars, being the amount of a promissory note, this day paid by complainant as surety for
said Roe, on a note of hand executed by him, and by complainant as his surety, to the First
National Bank of Chattanooga. Said note is herewith filed as an exhibit, and marked A,
and made a part of the bill and will be read at the hearing.
;
1
ii.
That said defendant, Richard Roe, resides out of the State of Tennessee, and is a citizen
and resident of the State of Georgia; [or, that he is about to remove, or has removed himself
or property, from the State; or, that he has removed, or is removing himself out of the
county privately; or, that he conceals himself so that the ordinary process of law cannot be
served upon him; or, that he absconds, or is absconding, or concealing himself or property;
or, that he has fraudulently disposed of, or is about to fraudulently dispose of, his property.
More than one cause of attachment may be alleged, in the alternative, or otherwise.]
in.
That said defendant, Roe, is the legal owner of the house and
lot, No. 816, Seventh street,
Chattanooga, worth about one thousand dollars, being the lot purchased by him from William
Jones, by deed registered in the Register's office of Hamilton county, June 10, 1890, in book
K, on pages S61-S62.* 3
IV.
That said Richard Roe has an equitable interest in the house and
lot, No. 963 Eighth
street, Chattanooga, which he sold to his co-defendant, John Smith,and being the lot whereon
the latter now resides. The legal title to said lot was, however, vested by the deed in the
defendant, Sarah SmitK, who is the wife of said John Smith and he, the said John Smith, ;
executed to said Roe a note for one thousand dollars, the balance of the purchase-money
due for said house and lot, to secure the oaymert of which balance the said Roe retained an
express lien in the deed he made said Sarah Smith for said property. Said note by said
Smith to said Roe is overdue and complainant charges that it is in the possession of said
;
Roe, and is the property of said Roe.

v.
That the defendant, John Smith, is otherwise largely indebted to said Roe, as complainant
is informed and verily believes, and has in his possession various evidences of debt, choses
in action, and other property, and assets of the said Richard Roe.
VI.
That the defendant, George Jones, who is a' citizen and resident of Polk county, has in
his hands various choses in action, and claims, and other property and assets belonging to
defendant Roe,, and is, also, as complainant is informed, believes, and charges, largely in-
debted to said Roe, who left his business in the hands of said Jones when he, Roe, left this
41 See preceding section as to this allegation. during which all transfers are void. Sharpe v. Hun-
42 See Judgment Creditors' Bills, §§ 1005-1027. ter. 7 Cold., 389. But, practically, the filing of the
43 Any transfer, sale, or assignment, made after bill is equivalent to a lien upon the property men-
the filing of an attachment bill in Chancery, or after tioned in it. Lacey v. Mnore, 6 Cold., 348: Vance
the suing out of an attachment at law, of property v. Cooper, 2 Heisk., 93. This lien, however, does not
mentioned in the bill, or attachment, as against the apply to a contest between creditors: i,t is confined to
complainant shall be inoperative and void. Lode, sales or transfers by the debtor. Bank v. Mitchell,
The filing of the bill does not, however, 2 Shan. Cas., 58.
§ 3507.
create a lien; it operates rather as a lis pendens.
State and moved to Georgia. The said Jones has a schedule of the debts due the defendant
Roe, in Tennessee, as complainant is informed and verily believes and said Jones is fully ;
conversant with said Roe's business.

VII.
_
That the defendant, John Brown, sold to the defendant, Roe, the house and lot, No. 83
Hfth street, Chattanooga, worth about three 'thousand dollars, and gave him a bond for title.
The defendant, Roe, has fully paid for said house and lot, but has not received from said
Erown any deed therefor. The said Brown resides in Meigs county, and is made a party
for the purpose of having the legal title to said house and lot divested out of him, and vested
in the purchaser at the sale hereinafter prayed, 44 and for the other purposes herein set forth.
VIII.
Therefore, the premises considered, complainant prays
_
1st. That all those named as defendants in the caption of this bill be made such by service
of subpoena on the residents, and by publication as to Richard Roe, who is a non-resident,
and that they all be required to answer the bill.
2d. That an attachment be issued and levied on all the right, title, and interest, legal and
equitable, the defendant, Richard Roe, has in and to each of the three houses and lots de-
scribed in the bill, and any other attachable property belonging to him that may be found;
and that, after the levy of such attachment, publication be made notifying him thereof, and
requiring him to appear and defend this suit at the first rule day coming seven or more days
after the last publication but his oath to his answer is waived. If said Roe at any time comes
;
into the State, let a subpoena be served upon him.

3d. That the defendant, George Jones, answer fully and particularly, on oath, what notes,
accounts, claims, or other evidences of debt, or other property, were left with him, or in any
way put into his possession, or under his control, by the defendant, Richard Roe, at or about
the time the latter left Chattanooga, or since; and what has become of them, specifying all
such property belonging to said Richard Roe, or in which he has any interest whatever, giving
and amount, and where now deposited. He will, also, answer fully
full particulars, the kind,
and particularly how much he has collected for said Roe, since the latter left Chattanooga,
from whom the several amounts have been collected, and how much was in his hands when
the writ in this cause was served on him, and from whom collected, or from what source re-
ceived, belonging in whole, or in part, to said Roe. And the defendant, Jones, will make a
full, detailed, and specific, exhibit of the state of his accounts with, and of his indebtedness
to, said Roe, at the day of the filing of this bill.
4th. That all the other defendants be required to answer as garnishees, on oath, and fully
discover: (1) Wherein, and in what amounts, they, or any of them, were indebted to their co-
ciefendant, Richard Roe, at the time the subpoena was served upon them in this cause. (2)
What property, debts, and effects of said Roe were in the possession, or under the control,
of either of them at said time, or at any time since and they will specify the kind and amount
;
of each and all of said items of property. (3) What property, debts and effects of said Roe
are to their knowledge and belief in the possession or under the control of any other, and
what person or persons, specifying the kind and amount. Each of said defendants will answer
separately for himself, or herself, and will specify every debt, note of hand, or other chose
in action, every account, claim, or other asset, and the kind and character of any other prop-
erty in the possession or under the control of either of them belonging to said Richard Roe,
or in which he has any interest whatever, giving full particulars.
5th. That all the property, choses in action, and effects of the defendant Roe, in the hands
of the defendants John and Sarah Smith, Jones, and Brown, and all of the debts due from
said John and Sarah Smith, Jones, and Brown, to said Roe, be attached in their hands as
garnishees ; and that said John and Sarah Smith, Jones, and Brown, be. required and enjoined
not to pay any debt due by either of them, or that may hereafter become due, to said Roe,
or to any one for him and to retain in their possession all the property of the said Roe now
;
or hereafter in their custody, or under the control of either of them. 45

6th. That a decree be pronounced in complainant's favor against said Roe for the full
amount due from him to complainant by reason of the premises; that all of the property
attached, and all of the amounts due from the defendants, John and Sarah Smith, Jones, and
Brown, to said Roe, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be subjected to the satisfaction
of such decree.
7th. That the said lot belonging to the defendant Roe in fee, and the said lot whereon he
has a vendor's lien, and the said lot for which he has a title-bond, be sold to satisfy said
decree; that said sales be on a credit of not less than six months, nor more than two years,
and in bar of all right of redemption.
8th. That, if necessary, a receiver be appointed to collect, or convert into money, any
debts, notes, or other choses in action, or property, belonging to the defendant Roe, in the
hands or under the control of the other defendants.
9th. That all necessary orders be made, and all necessary accounts be taken, to ascertain
44 When equitable property is sought to be reached O'Keefe, 6 Heisk., 646; Lyle v. Longley, 6 Bax.,
by an attachment, the bill should proceed against it 287; Hillman ». Werner, 9 Heisk., 587.
as such, and make the holder of the legal title a 45 Code, §5 3478-3480.
party. Lane V. Marshal, 1 Heisk., 34; Rice v.
675 ATTACHMENT BILLS. § 874
the true amount due complainant, and to adjust any and all equities between the defendant
Roe and any of his co-defendants.
10th. And that complainant have such other, further, and general relief as he may be
entitled to under the pleadings and proof in the cause.
This is the first application for either an attachment, or an injunction, in this cause.
Wm. H. DeWitt, Solicitor.
Hamilton county. )
W. H. DeWitt makes oath that he is (the Solicitor 48 of John Doe, the complainant in the
foregoing bill, and that the statements in said bill are true, of his own knowledge, except
those made as on information and belief, and those he believes to be true
Wm. H. DeWitt.
before me July 14, 1890.
J. B. Ragon, C. & M. ,
To the Clerk and Master at Chattanooga:
Issue writs of attachment and injunction 47 as above prayed, on proper bonds being given
therefor.
July 14, 1890. S. A. Key, Chancellor.
To the Clerk and Master
The defendant, Richard Roe, may be in Hamilton county in a few days, and you will issue
a subpcena for him to the Sheriff of said county, framed according to the statute. 48
W. H. DeWitt, Solicitor.
§ 874. —
Attachment Bond. It is the duty of the officer to whom application
for an attachment is made, to require the complainant, his agent or attorney,
to execute a bond in double the amount claimed to be due, with sufficient
security, payable to the defendant, and conditioned that the complainant will
prosecute the attachment with effect, or, in case of failure, pay the defendant
all costs that may be adjudged against him, and also, all such damages as he
may sustain by the wrongful suing out of the attachment. The affidavit and
bond must be filed, by the officer taking them, in the Court to which the attach-
ment is returnable, and shall constitute a part of the record in the cause. 49
The following is the form of an
ATTACHMENT BOND.
We, A, [the complainant,] B and C [his sureties,] acknowledge ourselves indebted to D &
E, [the defendants,] in the sum of [double the amount claimed to be due] dollars. But this
obligation to be void if the said A
shall prosecute with effect an attachment this day obtained
by him in the Chancery Court at Kingston, against the property of said and E, or in case D
of failure shall pay all costs that may be adjudged against him, and, also, all such damages
as the defendants may sustain by the wrongful suing out of said attachment. [To be dated,
signed, and witnessed.]
attachment suit may be prosecuted under the pauper oath. 50 If the
An
bond be defective, or even if there be no bond, the Court will allow the com-
plainant to give a sufficient bond 51 and, on such bond being given, it relates
;
52
back to the date of the writ, and validates the levy made under it.
§ 875. Who may Issue the Writ of Attachment. The writ of attachment —
may be granted, signed, and issued, by any Judge of a Circuit, Criminal, or
53 or by the Clerk
Special Court, by any Chancellor, or Justice of the Peace,
49 Code, §§ 3471-3472.
46 This affidavit may be made by the agent or
Code, § 3469. 50 Barber v. Denning, 4 Sneed, 267. In this case,
Solicitor of the complainant.
47 Attachments may be granted by any Chancellor, the Court refers to the hardship that "might result to
Special those who are unable to bear the expenses of a law-
or by any Judge of a Circuit, Criminal, or
suit, or give security for the necessary process, if the
Court. Code, §§ 4434; 3463. Where one or more of
attachment is doors of the Courts were shut against them for want
the statutory grounds for an original
of ability to give the required security for costs and
alleged, the Clerk and Master may issue an
attach-
fiat; but where the bill seeks to set damages." It would seem from this that it would
ment without a devices to be prudent for a complainant, who seeks an attach-
aside a fraudulent conveyance, or other
hinder and delay creditors; August v.
Seeskind, 6 ment under the pauper oath, to make oath that owing
or where the attachment is not original to his poverty he is not able to bear the expense of
Cold 172;
to the enforce- the action, or give security for the attachment
or ancillary, but merely incidental
ment of some right, as m foreclosing a deed of trust
the Court, or
prayed, and that he is justly entitled to the redress
sought.
the attachment can be granted only by Clerk 51 Code, §3477; Lillard v. Carter, 7 Heisk., 604.
Chancellor; and if issued by the
a Judge, or Dill.n v. The bond should be allowed to be given even after
and Master, on his own fiat, it is void 875. a motion has been made to dismiss the suit, or dis-
O'Donnell, 4 Bax., 213. See, post §
Upon application of charge the attachment, for want of a sufficient bond.
48 Code (M. & V.), 5 4203. 52 Brooks V. Hartmann, 1 Heisk., 36. In a suit
issue a subpcena
the complainant the Clerk will by a firm the bond may be signed in the firm name.
is executed, no
against the defendant; and, if it. attachment
made. The original Ibid.
publication shall be 63 Thompson v. Carper, 11 Hum.. 543.
merely ancillary as soon as the subpcena
is
Becomes
served.
and Master of the Court in which the bill is filed. 54
There is no need of the fiat
of a Judge to authorize the Clerk and Master to issue an original or ancillary
attachment in any case where, had the suit been brought in the Circuit Court,
the writ could have been issued by the Clerk of that Court. 55 The only cases
where a fiat of a Judge or Chancellor is necessary are 1, Where the bill is filed :
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property, or other devices resorted to

for the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors 56 and 2, Where the writ is ;
not authorized by the attachment law, but is issued under the inherent powers
of the Court, 57 or in pursuance of authority conferred on the Court by some
statute other than the one authorizing original attachments. 58 Where the bill
seeks to reach the equitable estate of the debtor, and makes the holder of the
legal title a party merely in order to divest him of that title, it is prudent, if
not necessary, to have a fiat for the attachment prayed. 59
§ 876. Forms of Writs of Attachment. The writ must be adapted to the —
state of facts on which it is based, and the character of the officer by whom it
is granted, issued, and signed. The form of the writ, 60 when issued by the Clerk
and Master, without a fiat, is as follows:
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BY THE CLERK AND MASTER.
Knox county. j
Whereas, A B has filed a sworn bill of complaint, in the Chancery Court at Knoxville,
against C D, stating therein that said C D is justly indebted to him in the sum of four
hundred dollars, and alleging a cause of attachment' against the estate of said C D, and said
A B, having given bond as required by law in attachment cases, and having prayed an attach-
ment against said estate, you are therefore hereby commanded to attach so much of the estate
of the said C D as will be of value sufficient to satisfy said debt, and the costs of the suit;
and such estate, unless replevied, so to secure that the same may be liable to further proceed-
ings thereon at the next term of said Chancery Court, to be held on the fourth Monday of
November next; when and where you will make known how you have executed this writ.
Witness, W. L. Trent, Clerk and Master of said Court, this August 2, 1891.
If the attachment is granted, signed, and issued by any officer other than the
Clerk and Master, without a fiat, its recital and termination should be as
follows
FORM OF WRIT WHEN ISSUED BY A JUDGE, CHANCELLOR, OR JUSTICE OF
THE PEACE.
Knox county. J
Whereas, A B
has presented to me, E F, Judge, [Chancellor, or, Justice of the Peace,]
his bill of complaint duly sworn to, stating therein that C D is justly indebted to him in the
sum of four hundred dollars, and alleging a cause of attachment against the estate of said
54 Code, §3463; August V. Seeskind, 6 Cold., 178. 60 The following is the statutory form of the writ
55 Allen V. Gilliland, 6 Lea, 529. of attachment:
56 Code, §§ 4288-4289; August V. Seeskind, 6 State of Tennessee, )
Cold., 166. An attachment, ton the ground that the County J
defendant has fraudulently disposed of his property, To the Sheriff County, Greeting:
(Code, § 3455, sub-sec. 6), is quite a different sort Whereas, A B, (or C D, as the agent or attorney
of attachment from that granted on a bill to set of A B), hath complained on oath to me, E I?,
aside a fraudulent conveyance, under Code, § 4288. Judge, (Chancellor, Justice of the Peace, or Clerk),
Tarbox v. Tonder, 1 Tenn. Ch„ 166. that G His justly indebted (or liable) to the said
57 Dillin V. O'Donnell, 4 Bax., 213. The attach- A B in the sum of dollars; and affidavit
ment in this case was to impound trust property. having also been made in writing, and bond given,
See, post, § 882. as required by law in attachment cases, you are
58 As where the writ is necessary to secure the hereby commanded to attach so much of the estate
property in a replevin suit; Code, § 3392; or is of the said G H
as will be of value sufficient tn sat-
necessary to impound property in aid of a creditor, isfy the debt and costs according to the complaint;
under Code, §§ 4282-4287; Graham v. Merrill, 5 Co"d., and such estate, unless replevined, so as to secure
622; 638; or is issued under some statute giving a that the same may be liable to further proceedings
lien on property to secure mechanics, laborers,
fur- thereon, to be held at the Court, to be held
nishers and others. Brooks v. Gibson, 7 Lea, 271; for the County of on the day of
Lane V. Wood, 1 Shan. Cas., 648; Lumber Company next (or before a Justice of the Peace of
V. Loeb, 2 Cates, 251. For statutory liens, see, post, County, on the day of ), when and
where you will make known how you have executed
59 See Lane V. Marshall, 1 Heisk., 30. See, ante, this writ.
§ 872; and post, § 876. Witness, E F, Judge of the Court, (Chan-
-677 ATTACHMENT BILLS. §877
C D, and bond 61
having been given as required by law in attachment cases, you are, therefore,
hereby commanded [etc., as in the preceding form, down to]
Witness, E F, Judge of the Circuit Court, [Chancellor, or, Justice of the Peace,] this Sep-
tember 23, 1890. E F, Judge, [Chancellor, or, Justice of the Peace.]
If the writ is granted, signed and issued by a Judge, Chancellor, or Justice
of the Peace, he should endorse that fact 62 on the bill, and forthwith file the
bill, and the attachment bond, in the Court to which the attachment is return-
able. 63 If the Judge or Chancellor merely endorses the fiat on the bill to the
Clerk and Master to issue the writ, then the latter will take the bond. The
following is the form of a
FIAT FOR AN ATTACHMENT.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at Knoxville:
Issue a writ of attachment, as prayed in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving a bond
therefor as required by law, [or, taking the pauper oaith.]
Sept. 23, 1890. S. T. Logan, Judge.
The following is the
FORM OF WRIT WHEN BASED ON A FIAT.
Knox county. )
To the Sheriff of Knox: county
Whereas, A
B has filed a sworn bill of complaint, in the Chancery Court at Knoxville,
against C D, stating therein that said C D
is justly indebted to him in the stun of four
hundred dollars, and alleging a cause of attachment against the estate of C D, and [that said
C Downs the following property in your county: here copy the description in the bill] and
praying that [said property and] the [other] property of said C be attached: D
And whereas, the said A
B has obtained a fiat from the Hon. S. T. Logan, Judge, directing
me to issue the attachment as prayed, on bond being given, [or pauper oath being taken,] as
required by law in attachment cases:
Now, therefore, you are hereby commanded to attach fthe above described property and]
so much of the [other] estate of the said C D
as will be of value sufficient to satisfy said debt
and the costs of the suit [&c, as in the preceding form.]
If the bill does not describe any particular property, and specially pray that
it maybe attached, the attachment will issue against the defendant's property
generally, omitting the words in parenthesis in the foregoing form.
The officer granting the attachment may direct counterpart writs of attach-
ment to issue to any county where property of the defendant may be found. 64
It would be well to pray for such counterparts in the bill.
§ 877. How the Defendant is Brought into Court. In original attachment —

suits, when no subpoena is served on the defendant, he must be brought before
the Court, both by a levy of the attachment upon his property and by publica-
tion duly made. As soon as the writ of attachment is returned, with a levy
endorsed thereon, the Clerk will enter on his rule docket an order of publica-
tion, 65 in substance, as follows:
day 02 In Lyle V. Longley, 6 Bax., 289, the Chancellor
«e!lor, Justice of the Peace, or Clerk) this
of 18—. endorsed on the bill when presented to him the fact
,
says the writ shall be substantially in that he had issued the attachment. The word,
The Code "assumed," in the opinion of the Court, should be
this form, thus showing that its substance is
more
considered than its phraseology. If the essen- issued. This endorsement might be thus: ''This
to be
Code, |S 347b- bill having been presented to me by the complainant,
tials are in the writ, it is sufficient.
3477. These essentials are: 1, The style of the and an attachment writ prayed from me, and the en-
'To the closed attachment bond having been given, I there-
writ, "State of Tennessee;" 2, The address,
;" 3, The fact that a fore granted and issued an attachment to the Sheriff
Sheriff of (the proper county)
of Carter county, returnable to the next term of the
sworn complaint has been made in writing against Chancery Court for said -county. April 17, 1865,
ex-
the defendant, alleging that a just indebtedness It would be well.
The amount of such indebtedness; 5, The Seth J. W. Lucky, Chancellor,"
ists- 4
defendant's estate; The also, for the Chancellor (Judge, or Justice of the
command to attach the 6,
Peace,) to endorse the attachment bond as follows:
statement where and when the writ is to be returned; "Taken by me. April 17, 1865. Seth J. W. Lucky,
and 7, the signature of an officer authorized toofissue the Chancellor." The Clerk and Master should endorse
It is probable that the third and
fourth
it
inserted on on both bill and bond the date they were filed in his
foregoing are not essentials, and may be
return of the writ, by leave of the Court. In We Court.
cs Code, §§ 3471-3472.
writ did
v Longley, 6 Bax., 286, the fact that the 64 Code, § 3465. Counterparts mav be subsequently
signed or
not bear any date showing when it was obtained upon good cause shown. Ibid. As to what
issued, did not vitiate it. And see Swan V. Roberts,
2 Cold., 162. ........
61 The officer granting and issuing the
attachment
is "good cause." see, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
65 Code, §§ 3518-3524. Great care should be taken
issuing the to have the order of publication, and the publication
must take an attachment bond before itself, in strict conformance with the statute; for, if
Code, S 3471. In Lyle v. Longley, 6 Bax.,
writ! the publication omit any essential, the whole pro-
Chancellor.
286, the writ was issued by the
ORDER OP PUBLICATION.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Knoxville.
Richard Roe.
It appearing from the bill in this case, which is sworn to, that Richard Roe is justly in-
debted to John Doe, the complainant, and that he resides out of the State, [or, as the case
may be, setting out the cause alleged in the bill for the attachment;] and an attachment
having been issued and levied on the defendant's property, 68 it is ordered that publication be
made for four consecutive weeks in the Knoxville Journal, requiring the said defendant to
appear before said Chancery Court on the fourth Monday of November next, and make his
defence to the bill filed against him in this cause, otherwise said bill will be taken for con-
fessed, and the cause proceeded with ex parte. This Sept. 22, 1890.
This notice must be published for four consecutive weeks in the newspaper
designated in the order, the last publication to be at least one week before the
time fixed for the defendant's appearance. 67 This notice, when published, in-
stead of being headed "Order of Publication," or "Non-resident Notice,"
should be headed in bold type, thus
To Richard Roe,
so that he, or his friends, may the more readily see it.
68
however, the defendant can be personally served with process, the Clerk,
If,
upon application of the complainant, will issue a subpoena, and if it is executed,
no publication will be made. The subpoena will be in the usual form except
that it will contain on its face a notification to the defendant that an original
attachment suit has been commenced against him. 69
If the defendant appears in person, or by Solicitor, before publication is
made, publication is unnecessary. 70 But while appearance in an attachment
suit gives the Court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, it does not give
jurisdiction of the property sought to be attached that depends on the validity
:
of the attachment proceedings. 71

§ 878. Amendment of Attachment Proceedings. The attachment laws were —
formerly strictly construed, and serious defects in proceedings by attachment
were not curable by amendment; but now, by positive statutory requirements,
the attachment law is liberally construed; and the complainant may, at any
time before a final decree, amend any defect of form in the bill, the affidavit
thereto, the bond, attachment writ, or other proceeding; 72 and no attachment
bill will be dismissed, or writ of attachment abated, or levy of attachment dis-
ceeding founded upon it is an utter nullity. Bains forms necessarily state the name of the form, not
17.Perry, 1 Lea, 37. The essentials of the published Intending that this name should be published, but
notice are: 1, The names
of the parties to the suit; intending to specify the particular form given. AIT
2, The style of the Court to which the attachment is publication notices should begin with the name of the
made returnable; 3, The eau.«.e alleged for suing out person to be notified just as a letter is addressed lo
the attachment; 4, The fact that the attachment has the_ person to whom it is written. The publication
been levied on the defendant's property; 5, The time notices are, as a rule, much too long, thus making
and place at which the defendant is required to ap- the publication fees too large: they have entirely too
pear, and defend the suit; and 6, The name of the much beginning and too much ending. Some of
Clerk and Master of the Court testing the notice. them, also, describe the land levied on by metes and
Code, § 3522; Riley V. Nichols, 1 Heisk., 19; Bains bounds: this is but little short of downright oppres-
V. Perry, 1 Lea, 37. The order for publication need sion to the party who has the costs to pay, and causes
not be as precise as the published notice. Allen v. a suspicion that the Master's office is run in the in-
Gilliland, 6 Lea, 531. terest of the newspaper making the publication.
66 The property need not be described, but if de- 69 Acts of 1871, ch. 134; M. & V.'s Code, §4203.
scribed the description should be very short. The body of this subpcena would be as follows:
67 Code, § 3523. Twenty-eight days will be suffi- "Summon Richard Roe to appear, on or before the
cient in which to make this publication. Thus, a fourth Monday of November, next, before the Chan-
notice published on the 19th and 26th of August, and cery Court at Knoxville, to answer the bill of John
on the 2d and 9th of September, respectively, would Doe; and, also, notify the said Richard Roe that said
be sufficient if the day fixed for the defendant's ap- suit is commenced against him by an original attach-
pearance was September 16th. Lowenstein v. Gilles- ment. And have you, then and there, this writ."
pie, 6 Lea, 641. The law requiring the_ last publica- If this subpcena is served on the defendant it be-
tion to be at least one week before the time fixed for comes the leading process, and brings the defendant
the defendant's appearance does not apply to any but into Court; and the original attachment, thereupon,
attachment suits. See, ante, § 198. becomes an ancillary attachment.
68 See, ante, § 198. The method many Clerks 70 Allen v. Iron Co., 2 Shan. Cas., 388.
pursue of heading their non-resident notices with the 71 Stewart v. Smith, 3 Shan. Cas., 686.
name of the notice is as absurd as though the editor 72 Code. §§ 3475; 3477: 4335. A motion to amend
of a newspaper should head his paper thus: "A an attachment affidavit is too late after verdict and"
Newspaper;" or, as though an artist should write judgment. Dickinson 1?. Redmon, 3 Shan, Cas., 620.
above his painting: "A Picture." Books giving
679 ATTACHMENT
BILLS. § 879
charged, because of any defect in, or want of, bond, if the complainant, or his
agent or Solicitor, will substitute a sufficient bond. 73
"While, however, amendments will be liberally allowed in attachment suits,
nevertheless, ordinarily there must be something on which to engraft the
amendment. Hence, where there is no statement of the nature or amount of
the debt or demand, or no writ of attachment, or no affidavit to the bill, or no
ground of attachment alleged, or no bond, there can be no amendment as to
these several matters, for there is no root of substance on which to engraft the
amendment. 74 The statute, however, allows a bond to be given after the issu-
ance of the writ, even when no bond at all has been given. 75
§ 879. When an Amended, or an Ancillary Attachment Bill will Lie. If, —
after an ordinary bill has been filed, there exists or arises any ground for the
attachment of the property of the defendant, an amended bill 76 may be filed,
stating briefly the fact that the original bill has been filed, the parties thereto,
the Court where pending, the nature and amount of the debt or demand sued
for, and the fact that the claim is a just one, and alleging, in addition, some
statutory cause of attachment, and praying that an ancillary writ of attach-
ment issue. 77
An ancillary attachment bill may be filed at any time between the filing of
the original bill and the final decree. Its only office is to hold the property of
the defendant attached for the satisfaction of the decree which may be ren-
dered; the attachment issued upon it is not a leading process, and does not
bring the defendant into Court. 78
The procedure in case of an ancillary attachment bill is precisely the same
as in case of an original attachment bill the bill must be sworn to, bond must
:
be given, and a writ of attachment must issue. The attachment writ must fol-
low the bill or affidavit, as the case may be and recite the filing of the original
;
and amended bills, the nature of the suit, in what Court pending, 79 the amount
of the debt or demand, and that the cause of action is just and must command ;
the Sheriff to attach enough of the defendant's estate to satisfy the debt
claimed, and the costs of the suit, and conclude like an original writ of attach-
ment. 80
FORM OF AN ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT.
State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Hamilton county:
Whereas, John Doe has filed an original bill of complaint in the Chancery Court at Chatta-
nooga, against Richard Roe, to collect a debt of one thousand dollars due from him, on a
note of hand and whereas the said John Doe has, also, filed in said Court, against said Rich-
;
ard Roe, an amended bill of complaint, duly sworn to, alleging the pendency and contents
of said original bill, and that the said debt is due by note of hand, and amounts to one tho.isand
dollars, and is a just debt, and that the said Richard Roe owns the stock of goods, wares,
and merchandise, in the building, No. 46 Main Street, Chattanooga, and having alleged a
cause of attachment against the estate of said Richard Roe, and praying for an ancil-
lary writ of attachment to be levied on said property, and on all other attachable property
of said Roe and affidavit having been made to said amended bill, and bond given as required
;
81 for an attachment having been granted by Hon. S. A.

by law in attachment cases; [and a fiat
Key, Chancellor, if such be the case,] you are, therefore., hereby commanded to attach said
stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, and so much of the other attachable estate of the
73 Code, §3477. See, also, Code, §5 2863-2872. of an ancillary attachment. See, also, Robb v. Par-
74 McReynoIds V. Neal, 8 Hum., 12; -Maples «. ker, 4 Heisk., 58.
77 An ancillary writ of attachment would probably
Tunis. 11 Hum., 108; Lillard v. Carter, 7 Heisk.,
604; Watt v. Carries, 4 Heisk., 534. Where the affi- be authorized, upon an affidavit therefor being filed,
davit has not been made at all, it cannot be made as and bond given, in the original cause, in the same
an amendment. MrEeynolds V. Neil, 8 Hum., 13; way as in the Circuit Court; and without any amend-
Watt v. Carnes, 4 Heisk.. 534; but where it was ac- ed bill being filed.
78 Ingle v. McCurry, 1 Heisk., 26; Walker v. Cot-
tually made, but by accident was not signed by the
trell, 6 Bax.. 266; Maxwell v. Lea. 6 Heisk., 249.
Clerk, such defects may be amended. Scott v.
79 An ancillary attachment is void unless the suit to
White, 1 Thomp. Cas., 38; Wiley v. Bennett, 9 Bax.,
be aided is properly described. Dickinson v. Red-
581.
75 Code, § 3477. mond. 3 Shan. Cas., 620.
. „ . 80 Thompson v. Carper, 11 Hum., 542. This is a
76 This amended bill should contain all the essen-.
tials of the affidavit reauired for an ancillary
attach- leading case. Robb v. Parker, 4 Heisk., 58.
81 No fiat is necessary, except where it would be
ment in the Circuit Court. Such a bill must be
sworn to, and an attachment bond must be given. 1 necessarv in case of an original attachment. See,
Meigs' Dig., § 284; Thompson v. Carper, 11 Hum., ante, § 875.
542. This is the leading case as to the requirements
.
said Richard Roe as will be of value sufficient to satisfy the debt and costs, according to the
complaint; and such estate, unless replevied, so to secure that the same may be liable to
further proceedings thereon in the Chancery Court at Chattanooga on the 1st Monday 82 of
August next, when and where you will make known how you have executed this writ.
Witness, J. B. Ragon, Clerk and Master 83 of said Court, this 4th day of June, 1890.
J. B. Ragon, C. & M.
Or, instead of filing an amended bill, the complainant may file an affidavit
with the Clerk and Master, containing the substance of an ancillary attachment
bill, and have an ancillary attachment issued, as is done in the Circuit Court.
§ 880. —
Ancillary Attachments. An ancillary attachment may be issued on
a sworn bill, original or amended, laying proper grounds, and praying therefor
or, after an original bill has been filed an ancillary attachment may issue, on
affidavit alone, therefor. In either case an attachment bond must be given.
The substance of the bill or affidavit, and of the ancillary writ, have already
been given. 84
An ancillary attachment may be granted, signed and issued, by the same
officers who are authorized to issue an original attachment, upon a sworn bill,
or upon affidavit, laying grounds, and upon bond being given. The writ may
issue simultaneously with the original subpoena. 85 An ancillary attachment
does not bring the defendant into Court, or give the Court jurisdiction over
him. 86 There must be service of a subpoena on the defendant to bring him
before the Court, in such a case. The only office of the ancillary writ is to hold
the defendant's property for the satisfaction of the decree which may be ren-
dered against him. 87 If a subpoena and an original attachment issue at the
same time, and the subpoena is served, it becomes the leading process, and
the original attachment becomes, in effect, an ancillary attachment. 88
The defendant may have the ancillary writ dismissed, on motion, for want of
any of the prerequisites to its issuance or he may, by plea in abatement, deny
;
the cause alleged for suing out the writ. 89 If the motion or plea is sustained,
the attachment is discharged but this will not prevent the complainant from
;
prosecuting his suit to a final decree. 90 The Court may hear the cause upon
the merits, and upon the plea in abatement to the ancillary writ, at the same
time, 91 or the plea in abatement may be tried previous to the hearing on the
merits. 92 The following is the form for an ancillary attachment, issued on an
original bill so praying
AW ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT.
To the Sheriff
of Campbell county
Whereas, A B has filed a sworn bill of complaint in the Chancery Court at Jacksboro
against C D, stating therein that said C D is justly indebted to him in the sum of four
hundred dollars, due by account [note, breach of contract, or, as the case may be;] and said
A B having alleged in his said bill a cause of attachment against the estate of said C D,
and having given bond for said attachment,
You are, therefore, hereby commanded ]&c, as in an original attachment.]
If an affidavit is filed for an ancillary attachment, the above form will be
modified as follows:
ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT.
To the Sheriff of Campbell county
Whereas, A B has complained on oath to me, that C D is justly indebted to him in the
sum of four hundred dollars, due by account, [or, as the case may be,] and that he has filed
82 The writ may
be made returnable to a rule day. 01 Lite v. Overton, 12 Heisk., 675.
Code, §§4348-4349; 4354; Fellows V. Cook, 10 92 Robb V. Parker, 4 Heisk., 58; Price V. Bescher,
Heisk., 81. 12 Heisk., 372. The better practice, however, is to
83 This ancillary writ may, also, be issued by any have but one hearing, at which all the issues may be
Chancellor, or by any Judge of a Circuit, Criminal, determined.
or Special Court, in the same manner as an original The filing of a plea in abatement to the ancillary
writ. writ in no way affects the merits of the suit, or the
84 See, ante,
§ 879. answer; and, on the other hand, the filing of a de-
85 Walker V. Cottrell, 6 Bax., 257. murrer, plea in bar or answer to the bill, in no way
86 Maxwell v. Lea, 6 Heisk., 247. affects a plea in abatement to an ancillary writ, and
87 Ingle v. McCurry, 1 Heisk., 26. does not overrule it. The office of such a plea in
88 Bivins v. Matthews, 7 Bax., 256; Templeton V. abatement is to discharge the ancillary writ of attach-
Mason, 23 Pick., 625. ment, and release the property attached, and not to
89 Robb V. Parker, 4 Heisk., 58. discharge the defendant, or to end the suit. The
80 Price v. Bescher, 12 Heisk., 372. result is, a plea in abatement to the ancillary writ
681 ATTACHMENT BILLS. § 881
a bill inthe Chancery Court at Jacksboro against said C D, to recover said sum, which suit
is still pending, and affidavit having been made in writing,
and bond given, as required by
law in attachment cases and said
; A
B having prayed an ancillary attachment in aid of his
said suit against the estate' of said C D
You are, therefore,, hereby commanded [&c, as in an original attachment writ.]
If the ancillary attachment is issued in obedience to a fiat of a Judge, or
Chancellor, the writ should also so state, as will be seen by reference to the
form in case of an original attachment. 93
§ 881. A Garnishment BilL^When a debtor is liable to be proceeded
against by original or ancillary attachment, and a third person has property,
or choses in action, or effects, of the debtor in his possession, or is indebted
to the debtor, such third person may be made a co-defendant to the original
attachment bill, or to an amended bill ancillary thereto, and may be required
to answer on oath 94 ;
1. Whether he is, or was at the time of the garnishment, indebted to the

defendant; if so, how, and
to what amount.
2. Whether he had
in his possession, or under his control, any property, debts,
or effects, belonging to the defendant, at the time of serving the subpoena, or
has at the time of answering, or has had at any time between the date of ser-
vice of the subpoena and the time of answering and if so, the kind and amount.
;
3. Whether there are, to his knowledge or belief, any and what property,
debts, and effects, in the possession or under the control of any other, and
what, person. «
4. Such other questions as may tend to elicit the information sought.

95
The bill, whether original or amended, may pray that all the effects, property,
choses in action, and debts, in the hands of the garnishee defendant belonging
or owing to the debtor defendant, be attached, and that the garnishee defendant
be enjoined from paying such debts, or disposing of, or in any way transferring
such property, choses in action, and effects. If, after service upon him of a
copy of the bill, the garnishee defendant shall pay the debt attached, or secrete
the effects of the debtor defendant, or buy in any other claim against the latter,
he will be liable to the same extent as before the payment, secreting, or pur-
chase. 96
In a garnishment bill, the person owing the debt, or the defendant to the
judgment, or the owner of the legal title to the property, sought to be attached
must be made a party. 97
§ 882. Property Attachable in Equity, but Not at Law. There are various —
properties subject to attachment in a suit in Chancery which are not so subject
in an action in a Court of law. These properties are divisible into two classes
(1) those that are so equitable in their nature as not to be cognizable at
law,
and (2) those cognizable at law, but whereon or whereto the complainant has
some claim of such a nature that under certain circumstances the Chancery
Court will impound them to await the event of the suit.
1. Properties Strictly Equitable, and Not Cognizable at Common Law include (1) :
99
the'interest of a mortgagor in the property mortgaged; (2) property in one
man's name and hands for the use of another; (3) the interest of a man m
property bought with his money by another and title taken in the latter 's name
the and fully contested in Chan-
may be freely
and an answer to the bill may both be proceeded in bill
Bank, 6 Cold., 474; Mayor «.
McCrae
at the same time, pari passu; and there is no
incon- cery. V.
See, ante, §§ 260- Potomac Bax., 296; and the garnishee
Ins. Co., 2
sistency or conflict between them.
defendant may there be held liable in spite of his
261.
93 See, ante, § 876. .
denials; and he may be compelled, by process of
contempt, to disgorge the est„t.? <•' the debt--r de-
.
94 The oath of the garnishee may be waived in

Chancery. Code, §4317. If, however, the oath De fendant in his possession. Code, §§4284; 4478-4481.
waived, the answer of the garnishee cannot be ex- For a form of garnishment bill, see ante, % 873; see.
also, the form of a judgment creditor's bill, post
cepted to' for insufficiency. See, ante, §§«360; 422.
95 Code, §§ 3088-3089; 3478-3482 § 1018.
A garnishment billm the Chan- 97 Railroad v. Todd, 11 lleisk., 556; A. & E.
96 Code, § 3508.
Ency. of Law, 1116-1128; nvte, §§91; 127.
cery Court is a very effective method of reaching 09 So, the interest of the grantor in land absolutely
of any kind in possession
debts, assets, or property
ln~
of or owing by, a third person, and belonging to
debtor. The answer of the garnishee defendant to
(4) the equity of redemption in property sold subject to redemption; (5)
property of one man held by another in pledge or as security, or in trust (6) ;
property given away, sold, conveyed or devised to defraud creditors; (7) the
assets of an insolvent partnership, corporation, or decedent; (8) a legatee's
or heir's estate in the hands of an executor or administrator before final settle-
ment; (9) vendor's liens, express or implied; (10) liens of mechanics, laborers,
and material men; (11) liens of contractors, and laborers, on railroads; (12)
liens on boats for building, repairing and equipping; (13) all other statutory
or equitable liens; (14) choses in action; (15) money in the hands of a Court;
(16) a debt due the defendant but the amount whereof can only be ascertained
by an accounting, and adjusting of mutual accounts and conflicting equities;
(17) money due on a contingency necessary to be adjudicated between the
defendant and other claimants; (18) land held under an agreement to convey;
(19) property conveyed in trust for the benefit of creditors; (20) the residue
after such trust is satisfied, if any: (21) interests in a corporation or joint
stock company, not represented by certificates, or other paper evidences; (22)
a wife's separate estate; (23) all property of such a character that the creditor
cannot reach the debtor's interest in it without bringing both the debtor and
the holder of the legal title before the Court; (24) resulting trusts; and (25)
generally, all other property which, in Equity, is liable for the debts of its
owner or beneficiary, and which cannot be reached by execution at law.
2. Properties Cognizable at Law, but Whereon or Whereto the Complainant Has
Some Claim of such a nature, that, under certain circumstances the Chancery
Court will impound them by attachment, or injunction, including: (1) property
of which complainant has been deprived by fraud or tort; (2) property on
which complainant or his debtor, has a lien; (3) property in which complainant
has a beneficial interest: but in each of these eases it should appear that the
property is in danger of being transferred to an innocent purchaser, or re-
moved beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, 100 and the circumstances are not
such as to justify a statutory attachment. 101
In suits to subject equitable property to the satisfaction of its owner's debts
the Chancery Court requires that the holder of the^ legal title thereto be, also,
brought before the Court, to the end, 1st, that he may assert his rights in the
premises, and 2d, that the purchaser at the Court sale may get a full title, and
3d, that the property may bring the better price. 102
§ 883. —
Judicial Attachments. If a subpoena to answer is returned, "Not
to be found in my county, " as to any defendant who is a resident of the county,
the complainant may have either an alias or a pluries subpoena for such de-
fendant or may, at his election, have a judicial attachment against the estate
;
of such defendant. 103 But a bona fide temporary absence from the State will
not justify a return of "non est inventus," and a judicial attachment. The fol-
lowing is the form of
A JUDICIAL ATTACHMENT.
To the Sheriff of Davidson county
Whereas, a subpoena was issued from the Chancery Court of Davidson county, on the 10th
day of May last, directing you to summon C D
to appear before said Court on the 1st Monday
of June last, to answer the bill filed against him in said Court by A
B, who alleges that said
CD is justly liable to him in the sum of four hundred dollars, which subpoena was returned
by you, "Not to be found in my county," whereupon it was ordered by the Court that a judicial
attachment issue against the estate of said C D
You are, therefore, hereby commanded [&c, as in §876, ante.}
conveyed on the face of the deed when such deed is quarried, especially if the defendant is insolvent. In
intended for a mortgage. such cases an injunction is often granted, and a re-
too The Chancery Court has inherent jurisdiction ceiver appointed, which two processes are little more
to attach or impound such property under such cir- than the equivalent of an attachment.
cumstances. McKeldin v. Gouldy, 7 Pick., 677. 102 See, ante, 8§ 91; 127.
101 An equitahle attachment will lie, at the suit of 103 Code, § 3466. Section 3468 of the Code, which
the owner of the land, to impound waste, such as Mr. Hicks, in his Manual, terms "a regular misap-
timber cut, coal mined, or marble, stone or slate
683 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. §884
This writ is ordered to issue by the Court, upon motion therefor, supported
by a subpoena with the return, "Not to be found in my county." This return
implies that the defendant was a resident of the county to which the subpoena
issued, at the time of the institution of the suit, and that after diligent search
for him, he is not to be found, being either actually absent from the county or
evading the service of process. 104
No affidavit is required, and no attachment bond need be given, to entitle
the complainant to this writ; the Sheriff's return, if in the language of the
statute, is all-sufficient. The following is the form of an
OBDEE, AWABDING A JUDICIAL ATTACHMENT.
A B,
vs. No. 892.
C D. J
In this cause, the complainant moved the Court for a judicial attachment against C D,
the defendant; and it appearing that a subpoena to answer issued to the Sheriff of this
county, who has duly returned the same to the present term, "The defendant not to be found
in my county" it is ordered that said motion be allowed; and a judicial attachment is
awarded against the estate of C D. Upon the return of said attachment levied upon the
property of the defendant, the Clerk and Master will make publication as to said defendant,
notifying him to appear as required by law. 105
ARTICLE II.
DEFENCES, DECREES, AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS/
§ 884. Defences in Attachment Suits. § 888. When Attachment Decrees May be
§ 885. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Set Aside.
Suits Not Overruled by Defences to § 889. How Attachment Decrees are Set
the Merits. Aside.
§ 886. Disposition of the Property Attached. § 890. Petition to Set Aside a Decree, and
§ 887. Decrees in Attachment Suits. Proceedings Thereon.
§ 884.
1
—
Defences in Attachment Suits. There are some defences peculiar to
suits commenced by original attachment. If there be, on the face of the record,
a want of any of the prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of original attach-
ment, the bill may be dismissed on motion; 2 and if any of said prerequisites are
wanting, in fact, but do not so appear on the face of the record, the fact may
be made to appear by a plea in abatement. 3 If an original attachment bill show
on its face no cause for an original attachment, it will be dismissed on de-
murrer. 4
If the ground alleged for an attachment be false, the defendant may put
such ground in issue by a negative plea in. abatement; 5 but such plea must
6
traverse all the grounds of attachment alleged in the bill.
prehension," and Milliken & Vertrees say is ''mean- county,*' will not sustain a judicial attachment: the
ingless," does not follow the original statute, as will return must be, "The defendant not to be found in
be seen in James V. Hall, 1 Swan, 297, and 1 Scott's my county." Welch v. Robinson, 10 Hum., 264.
Rev., 467. The original act says "No judicial pro- 105 The Clerk must make the same order of publica-
cess," &c. ; and a scrutinous comparison of sections tion on his rule docket, and publish the same sort of
22 and 23 of the original act will show that the pro notice, as in cases originally commenced by attach-
cess referred to in the original act war (1) a judicial ment. Code, § 3467; Lyle v. McCurry, 1 Heisk., 26.
attachment against a garnishee, allowed by section 1 See, ante, §§ 246; 255-259.
2 Code, §4386; sub-sec. 4; see, ante, §271.
22, (Code, § 3489), "grounded on an original attach-
ment;" and (2) an execution when the defendant 3 For instance, if the bill was in fact subsequently
was personally served with subpcem. The ter-n sworn to, or was subsequently amended so as to
"judicial process" in the or < trial act is not synony- allege a statutory cause of attachment, the fact of
mous with judicial attachment, but includes judicial such subsequent and unauthorized interpolations, not
attachment, garnishment, and execution; and section otherwise appearing, may be made to appear by a
3468 of the Code means, in the light of the original plea in abatement; and, if such plea be found true,
Act, that a defendant's estate shall not be subjected the bill will be dismissed, if the jurisdiction of the
to sale by order of Court unless the defendant has Court is founded on the original attachment. See
been brought into Court by an original attachment Code, §§3471; 3476.
proceeding, or by service of subpoena. James v. 4 Fay v. Jones, 1 Head, 443.
5 Tarbox v. Tonder, 1 Tenn. Ch., 163; Pigue v.
Hall, 1 Swan, 297.
104 Welch V. Robinson, 10 Hum., 264; Jam^s v. Young, 1 Pick., 263.
Hall, 1 Swan, 297; Grewar v. Henderson, 1 Tenn. 6 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk., 713. For forms
Ch., 76. Areturn, "The defendant not found in my of pleas in abatement, see, ante, § 259.
§884 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. 684
The defences, predicated on the absence, insufficiency, or falsity, of the pre-
requisites to the issuance of the writ of attachment, must all be made before
or when an answer or plea in bar is filed they cannot be made in the answer.
;
But the omission to make any of these defences does not in any way preclude
the defendant from demurring to the bill as a pleading, 7 or from filing a plea
in bar to the bill, or an answer contesting the equities set up in the bill. After
a plea in bar, or an answer, it is too late to object to any irregularities, or
deficiencies, in the attachment proceedings. 8
If the defendant intends to dispute any of the grounds alleged for an original
r:ttachment, he must do so by a plea in abatement; he cannot put any of them in
issue by denying them in his answer. If he files an answer, without, at the
same time, or previously, filing a plea in abatement, he is deemed to waive any
defence to the jurisdiction of his person he might have made based on the falsity
of the grounds alleged for the attachment. 9 But, under the Act of 1897, the
defendant can plead in abatement to the attachment, and plead in bar or
f.nswer at the same time, the old rule that a plea in bar, or answer, waived a plea
in abatement previously filed, being thereby abrogated. 10 By the same Act, it
is further provided that when a plea in abatement, and a plea in bar or answer,
are filed at the same time, they shall both be heard at the same time, and judg-
ment rendered on each. If, at such hearing, the plea in abatement be found
true the suit will be dismissed without any adjudication on the merits of the
bill; and if found false, the suit will be decided on its merits in favor of the
complainant or defendant as Equity may require. loa
In cas,e of an ancillary attachment, however, the defendant may, without the
aid of the Act of 1897, plead in abatement to it, and at the same time answer
the bill on the merits. 14 The reason of the distinction is: that an original at-
tachment is a means of enforcing the personal attendance of the defendant;
whereas, an ancillary attachment is a mere means of impounding the defend-
ant's property, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Court over the
person of the defendant, and in no way affects the merits of the controversy. 15
Ordinarily a plea in abatement brings forward new matter, 16 that is to say,
it alleges matter not contained in the bill, and not otherwise appearing else-
where in the record of the cause. But a plea in abatement to an original, or
an ancillary writ of attachment, does not usually bring forward any new matter,
but denies the ground or grounds of attachment alleged in the bill. If there
be more than one ground of attachment alleged, whether alleged in the alter-
native or otherwise, the plea must traverse all of them. 17 The following forms
will serve as guides:
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT TO AN ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see, ante, § 254.1
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea in abatement to the original attachment sued out
and levied in this cause, says,
That he did not reside out of the State, when the bill in this cause was filed ; but that he
7 An attachment bill is an affidavit and pleading 10a Railroad V. McCollum, 21 Pick., 623. At the
combined. hearing of the suit on the plea in abatement and at
8 Johnson V. Luckadoo, 12 Heisk., 270; see, ante, the same time on bill and answer, if the plea be
§ 232. The defences to an ancillary attachment writ found true the bill must be dismissed even though
are not, however, overruled by a plea in bar, or an- complainant has proved his case on the merits, unless
swer. Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735. the defendant makes a tender, in which case the
Foster v. Hall, 4 Hum., 346; Boyd v. Martin, 9 complainant may accept what is tendered. Ibid.
Heisk., 386. But such acceptance would be in the nature of an
10 Acts of 1897, ch. 121; Railroad v. McCollum, accord and satisfaction, and would bar any further
21 Pick., 623; Sewell V. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates, recovery in another suit.
271. It had been previously held by the Supreme 14 Price v. Bescher, 12 Heisk., 373; Robb V. Par-
Court, after much vacillation, that a defendant ker, 4 Heisk., 58; Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735.
brought into Court by attachment of his property 15 The pleader must keep in mind, that a defence
might plead in abatement to the attachment and to the attachment is one thing, and a defence to the
answer to the merits; and that the general Equity merits is another, and wholly different, thing: he
rule that an answer overrules a plea in abatement may succeed in one and fail in the other.
has no application in attachment suits under our 16 Ante, % 253.
practice. Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick.. 735. See Battclle 17 Cooke v. Richards, 11 Heisk., 713.
& Co. V. Youngblood, 16 Lea, 355; Simpson l). Rail-
way Co., 5 Pick., 304; Bivins v. Mathews, 7 Bax.,
256; Wilson v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 31.
685 DEFENCES A ND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. § 885
then was, and ever since has been, a citizen of the State, and a resident of Claiborne county.
That he was not about to remove, nor had he removed, himself or property from the State,
when the bill in this cause was filed but he then was, and has ever since continued to be, :i
;
citizen of the State, and a resident of Claiborne county.

That the property levied on under the original attachment sued out in this cause was not,
at the time of said levy, and has never since been, the property of this defendant.
Wherefore, he prays that said attachment be abated and quashed, the property released,
and the suit dismissed
[Annex affidavit, 1 * as in § 254, ante.]
John P. Davis, Solicitor.
PLEAS IN ABATEMENT TO AN ANCILLARY ATTACHMENT.
[For title, commencement, and conclusion, see, ante, § 254.]
The defendant, Richard Roe, for plea in abatement to the ancillary writ of attachment sued
out and levied in this cause, says, That he had not removed, nor was he removing, himself
out of the county [naming the county specified in the bill,] privately, at the time the bill in
this cause was filed but that he then was living openly in said county, attending openly to
;
his business, and has so continued to do ever since. That he had not absconded, nor was he
absconding or concealing himself or property, at the time the bill in this cause was filed; but
that he was then living openly in the county of Claiborne, the county of his usual residence,
attending openly to his ordinary business, and that he and his property have been in said
county ever since, openly and unconcealed.
Wherefore, he prays that said ancillary writ of attachment be abated and quashed, and
that the property levied on thereunder be released and discharged.
[Annex affidavit as in § 254, ante.]
P. G. Fulkerson, Solicitor.
It will be seen by an examination of the foregoing pleas, that they mainly

consist of an emphatic and absolute denial of the ground of attachment alleged
in the bill. 19
On a plea in abatement being filed in an attachment case, the same proceed-
ings take place as in other cases of pleas in abatement, as already shown. 20
The issues of fact raised by a replication may be determined by the Chancellor,
or, on proper demand, by a jury; and, where the plea is negative in its nature,
and consists of a denial of the ground of attachment alleged in the bill, the
burden of proof is on the complainant. 21
If the plea in abatement to an original attachment is sustained, the attach-
ment is quashed, the property discharged, and the bill dismissed at the com-
piainant's cost. But the effect of sustaining a plea in abatement to an ancillary
attachment is merely to abate the writ, and discharge and release the property
the suit as to the merits of the controversy is, in no way, affected by the decision
of the plea in abatement, in such a case. If the defendant fails in his plea in
abatement to the original attachment writ, either on a motion to strike it out,
or upon argument as to its sufficiency, or upon an issue of fact as to its merits,
he may plead in bar to the bill or answer it, and rely upon any defences h&
22 But when a plea in
might have made had he not pleaded in abatement.
abatement is overruled, after a trial on the facts, if the defendant has no plea
in bar or answer on file, and makes no application for leave to make further
23
defense, a pro confesso and final decree may be rendered against him.
When the defendant pleads in abatement to the attachment and at the same
time answers the bill on the merits, as he may now do, at the hearing he may
v,'in on his plea but fail on his answer, or vice versa, or may win on both or
lose on both.
§ 885. Pleas in Abatement in Attachment Suits Not Overruled by Defences
to the Merits. —
In Equity pleading, the plea in abatement is to the bill, and a
demurrer, plea in bar, or answer will overrule the plea in abatement, because
all of these latter defenses are, also, to the bill;
and the plea in abatement is
22 Acts of 1897, ch. 121; Railroad v. McCollum, 21
is This affidavit must be positive, and not on
Pick., 623; Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison, 4 Cates,
"knowledge, information and belief." Wrompelmier
271.
v. Moses, 3 Bax., 467.
23 Sewell v. Tuthill & Pattison. 4 Cates, 271;
19See Wilson v. Eifler, 7 Cold., 33.
20 Ante, §§262-264,
Bivins v. Mathews, 7 Bax., 256; Wilson v. Eifler, 7
21 Wrompelmier v. Moses, 3 Bax., 472; Jackson «.
Cold., 31. For forms of decrees, see, ante, §§ 264--
265.
Burke, 4 Heisk., 614.
§ 886 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. 686
least favored and is deemed to be waived by a subsequent pleading. But in an
attachment suit the plea in abatement is not to the bill but to the attachment;
hence, a demurrer, or plea in bar, or answer to the bill, will not overrule the
plea in abatement to the attachment, for they are not aimed at the attachment
but at the bill, and there is no conflict or inconsistency in the two defenses being
simultaneously made in an attachment suit, the plea in abatement being in-
tended to defeat the attachment and release the property, while the demurrer,
plea in bar, and answer are intended to defeat the bill, and prevent an adverse
decree on the merits. 23a
§ 886. —
Disposition of the Property Attached. The defendant may replevy
the property attached, upon giving the bond required by the statute. This
bond may be taken by the officer levying the attachment, if tendered before he
returns the writ and may be taken by the Clerk, after such return. 24 If the
;
property be not replevied, and the exigency require it, the Court may at any
time appoint a receiver to collect, manage, and control, the property, or sell
the same. 25 The following is the form of
A REPLEVY BOND.
We, A, [the defendant,] B, and C, [his sureties,] acknowledge ourselves indebted to D,
[the complainant,] in the sum of {double the amount of the complainant's demand, or at the
defendant's option, double the value of the property attached,] dollars. But if, in the event
the said A
is cast in the suit with said D, in the Chancery Court at Knoxville, wherein the
property of said A
has been attached, he, the said A, shall pay the debt, interest, and costs,
sued for, [or (if the bond is in double the value of the property) shall pay the value Of the
property attached,] then this bond, which is given to replevy said property, is to become
void. 26
The bond, if given to the Sheriff, must be returned by him with the attach-
ment. The bond, whether taken by the Sheriff or Clerk, constitutes a part of
the record in the cause, and a decree may be entered upon it, in case the de-
fendant is cast in the suit. 27
REFERENCE TO THE MASTER ON A REPLEVY BOND.
John Doe,
vs. \ No. 914.
Richard Roe. J
[Follow form of decree in § 887, post, down to paragraph il, and then insert the following:
And it appearing that an attachment issued in this cause and was on the 26th day of
January, 1900, levied upon the following property of the defendant, Richard Roe, [describing
it], and that on the 27th day of January, 1900, the defendant, Richard Roe, replevied said
property by executing a replevy bond with Roland Roe as his surety, conditioned to "pay the
debt, interest and costs sued for, or the value of the property attached," and (the value of said
property not sufficiently appearing, the Master is directed Ito hear proof and report instanter
what was the reasonable value of said property at the time it was replevied.
§ 887. Decrees in Attachment Suits.—The attachment and publication are
in lieu of personal service upon the defendant; and, after the levy of the
attachment, and expiration of the time specified in the published notice for the
defendant to make defence, the complainant may proceed as though the de-
fendant had been brought into Court by personal service of subpoena. 273 The -
defendant must, also, make his defences as though he had actual notice of the
suit. If he fail to make any defence, the complainant may not only have a
decree pro confesso, but a final decree, at the appearance term, without further
proof, 28 except in certain cases; 29 for, on such a pro confesso, the allegations
in the bill are to be taken as admitted, except in the cases referred to. 30
In the final decree, the property levied on should be specifically described,
and the Clerk and Master ordered to sell it; or, if it be personalty in possession
of the levying officer, he may be ordered to sell it. And if the property attached
23a Bank v. Foster, 6 Pick., 735. But now see 27a Code, §3524; Walker v. Cottrell 6 Bax 258
Acts of 1897, ch. 12; ante, 8 258. 28 Code, §§3526; 4371; Claybrook v. Wade. 7
24 Code, §§3509-3513. Cold., 555; ante, § 209.
25 Code, § 3503. 29 For these excepted cases, see, ante 206
26 Code, §3509 80 For pro confessos, and proceedings thereon, see,
27 Code, §§ 3513-3514. ante, §§ 205-213.
687 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. § 887
is not sufficient to satisfy the decree, execution may be awarded for the resi-
due. 31 If, however, execution is awarded, in the first instance, by the decree,
and no order of sale awarded at all, this is a waiver of the attachment lien, and
in such case the Clerk has no authority to issue an order of sale. 32
But, where the defendant is brought into Court by attachment of his property
and publication thereon, a judgment against him is quasi in rem, and valid
only to the extent of the money realized from the property attached. per- A
sonal judgment and award of execution in such a case becomes coram non
judice, is null and void. 33
and
Wherethe defendant, in an original attachment suit, does not appear, the
Court may stay final judgment not more than twelve and not less than six
months from the return of the writ of attachment, unless the attachment is
sued out because the defendant is a non-resident, and then the stay must be
allowed, unless sufficient cause appear to the contrary. 34 The stay may be
allowed by providing that if the decree is not satisfied by a day named, which
must be six months or more from the return of the writ, the decree should be
enforced by sale of the property attached, and by other necessary process. 35
The full limit of the stay should be allowed in all cases where the complainant
pues under the pauper oath. 36
DECREE IK AN ATTACHMENT STTIT.st
John Doe, ]
vs. No. 914.
}•
Richard Roe. J
This cause came on this 25th day of August, 1900, to be finally heard before the Hon.
Joseph W. Sneed, sitting by interchange with the Chancellor, upon the original bill, the writ
of attachment and the return thereon, the answer of the defendant, and the proof, and upon
argument of counsel, on consideration whereof the Court decrees as follows
i.
That the complainant have and recover of the defendant, Richard Roe, the sum of twelve
hundred dollars, the amount due on the note sued on; and, also, all the costs of the cause.
n.
That the property attached following [Here set it out, as
in this cause, consisting of the :
described in the bill, or in the Sheriff's return on the attachment^ be subjected to the satis-
faction of this decree, and be sold by the Clerk and Master, [or, by the Sheriff,] in the
manner prescribed by law, [or, if land be attached, the Court may order the Clerk and Master
to sell it on a credit as in other cases of land sales. See, ante, §626.]
in.
If the proceeds of said sale shall not satisfy this decree, an execution 38 will issue for the
balance that may be due hereon.
DECREE ON AN ATTACHMENT BILL.
John Den,
vs. \
654.
Richard Fen. J
This cause came on heard before the Hon. W. B. Staley, Chancellor, on this 7th day
to be
oi June, 1885, on the the exhibit thereto, the writ of attachment and return thereon,
bill,
the judgment pro confesso heretofore regularly taken and entered against the defendant, [and
the proof in the cause, if there be any proof other than the exhibit, and the pro confesso.]
i.
And appearing to the Court from an inspection of ithe note, filed as exhibit A to the
it
complainant's bill, that there is due thereon to the complainant from the defendant the sum
of one thousand two hundred and thirty dollars, principal and interest to this day, it is so
decreed. And more than six months having elapsed since the return of the attachment, it is,
therefore, ordered and adjudged that the complainant have and recover of the defendant,
said sum 'of one thousand two hundred and thirty dollars, and all the costs of this cause.
31 Code, § 3536; 3538. . .

Cold., 154; Boggs v. Gamble, 3 Cold., 148. The stay
32 If the decree awards an execution only, this js runs not from the decree, but from the return of the
an abandonment of the attachment lien. Staunton writ; hence, if the decree is pronounced six months
Heisk., after the return of the writ, no stay need be allowed.
v. Harris, 9 Heisk., 579; Hurst v. Liford, 11
622. Hence, to continue the attachment hen, the Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Cold., 562; Mulloy v. White,
decree must award an order of sale. Mullendore ». 3 Tenn. Ch., 9.
Hall, 2 Ch. Apps., 273.
36 Claybrook v. Wade, 7 Cold., 562.
33 Paper Co. v. Shyer, 24 Pick., 444. An execu- 36 The reason of this appears in Mulloy
t>. White,
tion, however, can issue on all other judgments
in 3 Tenn. Ch., 9.
37 For a form of a decree on a plea in abatement,
attachment suits. .
34 Code, §§ 3527-3528. This stay is discretionary, see, ante, §§ 264-265.

except in case of non-residents. Swan v. Roberts, 2
88 But no execution can issue when the defendant
§ 888 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. 688
ii.
And appearing that a certain tract of land, lying in the 7th civil district of Knox county,
it
adjoining the lands of A, B. C, and D, containing 100 acres, has been attached in this cause,
it is decreed by the Court that, unless the defendant, within three months from this date,
shall pay and satisfy this decree, the Master, after advertising according to law, shall proceed
to sell the said tract of land, or so much
thereof as necessary, at public sale, to the highest
and best bidder, at the Court House door
in Knoxville, to satisfy this decree. And
on special
application of the complainant, both in his bill and at the bar, it is decreed that said land
be sold on a credit of twelve months, and that when said sale is reported and confirmed, no
right of redemption or repurchase shall exist in the defendant, or his creditors, but that such
sale shall be absolute.
The Master will take a note with approved security, bearing interest from its date, for the
purchase-money, and retain a lien on the land as further security. He will report to next term
of the Court his action in the premises, until which time all further and other matters are
reserved.
FINAL DECREE ON REPLEVY BOND IN ATTACHMENT SUIT.
John Doe,
vs. \
]
No. 914. —
Final Decree.
Richard Roe. J
This cause came on to be further and finally heard this 27th day of January, 1906, upon
the pleadings and proof, the writ of attachment and the return thereon, and the report of
the Master, which report being unexcepted to is confirmed, on consideration of all which it
is ordered and decreed -that the complainant have and recover of the defendant, Richard
Roe, the sum of two hundred and sixty dollars, the amount due on the note sued, and all the
costs of the cause.
And it appearing from the said return that the property attached in this cause was re-
plevied by the defendant giving bond therefor in the penality of six hundred dollars, with
John Friend and Frank Jones as sureties thereon, conditioned to pay the debt, interest and
costs sued for, or the value of the property attached, if the defendant was cast in the suit;
and it appearing from said report that the value of said property when replevied was three
hundred dollars, it is further ordered and decreed that execution issue against the defendant
Richard Roe, and his said sureties, John Friend and Frank Jones, for said sum of two hundred
and sixty dollars, and costs.
And on his motion, a lien is declared on this recovery to secure the reasonable fee of
Charles H. Brown, complainant's Solicitor.
§ 888. When Attachment Decrees May be Set Aside. In all cases of at- —
tachment, sued out because the defendant resides out of the State, or has merely
removed himself or property from the State, the judgment or decree by default
may be set aside, upon application of the defendant and good cause shown,
within twelve months thereafter and defence permitted, upon such terms as
;
the Court may impose. In all other cases of judgment or decree by default in
attachment suits, the defendant cannot deny or put in issue the ground upon
which the attachment was issued, but may, at any time thereafter, and within
one year after the suing out of the attachment, commence an action on the
attachment bond, and may recover such damages as he has actually sustained
for wrongfully suing out the attachment and, if sued out maliciously, as well
;
as wrongfully, the jury may, on trial of such action, give vindictive damages. 39
Persons laboring under the disability of coverture, infancy or unsoundness
of mind, at the rendition of the judgment or decree by default, have six months,
after the removal of such disability, to appear and show cause against such
judgment or decree. 40
The death of the defendant proceeded against by attachment, without per-
sonal service, whether the death occur before or after the commencement of
the action, does not render the proceedings void, but his heirs or representa-
tives, as the case may be, have the right within three years from the rendition
of final judgment or decree, to make themselves parties, by petition showing
merits, verified by affidavit, and contest the complainant's demand. 41
The judgment or decree, if executed before it is set aside, under any of the
foregoing provisions, will be a protection to all persons acting under it, and
will confer a good title to all property sold by virtue thereof. 42
is brought into. Court by attachment of his property 40 Code, 5 3532.
and publication thereon. Paper Co. V. Shyer, 24 41 Code, § 3533.
Pick., 444. See, supra, note 33. 42 Code, § 3534.
39 Code, §§ 3529-3531.
§ 889. How Attachment Decrees are Set Aside. The statute does not pre- —
scribe how attachment decrees may be set aside,, further than that it is done
"upon application" of the defendant, and good cause shown. 43 In some of the
reported eases, the application has been by motion, supported by affidavit; 44
in others, by motion supported by a petition 45 and in one case by an original
;
bill. 46 If the application is supported by a sworn statement of the necessary

facts, the applicant will not be denied relief because of the form of that state-
ment. 47 Nevertheless, the proper method of making the application is by a
sworn petition, 48 and this petition may, in order to save the bar of the statute,
be filed in vacation, provided, of course, the motion is made at the term next
following. 49 The petition may, also, pray to have the decree superseded. 50
The petition should clearly set forth the following:
1. That a decree has been rendered against the petitioner; stating in the
petition when, and in what Court, rendered, and in whose favor.
2. That the decree was rendered in a suit begun by an original attachment.
3. That the attachment was sued out, because either the petitioner resided
out of the State, or had merely removed himself or property from the State,
as the case may be. 51
4. And the petition must, in addition to the foregoing statements, show "good
cause for setting the decree aside. Good cause means such a state of facts as,
'
'
if true, would rebut or destroy the equity, or cause of action, alleged in the
bill, and show that, on the merits of the case, the petitioner has a good defence,
and the decree is unjust. 52
5. The petition must be sworn to, and the verification should be on the peti-
tioner's own knowledge, and not on information and belief. 53
The complainant in the suit is entitled to notice of the filing of the petition,
but a regular subpoena need not issue for this purpose. If the complainant
seeks to resist the petition, the proper practice is to test its sufficiency by a
motion to dismiss the petition, because insufficient. No defence to the petition,
by answer or other denial of its allegation, is permissible and, on the hearing ;
of a motion to dismiss, the Court cannot look at anything outside the petition,
unless there be some matter of record that invalidates it. If, upon its face,
the petition shows sufficient facts and merits, and is not fatally contradicted
by the record, no facts aliunde can be set up to defeat the petitioner's right
to have the decree set aside, and to make defence to the bill, upon such terms
as the Court may impose. The petition need not be accompanied by an answer
to the bill; 54 its office is to open the door for an answer; and this done, it has
served its purpose and becomes functus officio. 65 But if the petition contains all
the matters of defence the petitioner desires to set up, it may be allowed to
stand as an answer to the bill. 56
§ 890. Petition to Set Aside a Decree, and Proceedings Thereon. —In order
43 Code, § 3529. one of the causes. In other words, where the bill
44 Cain v. Jennings, 3 Tenn. Ch., 131. alleges one of said two causes, along with others, the
45 Bledsoe v. Wright, 2 Bax., 471; Smith v. Fos- petitioner must aver that one of said two causes was
ter. 3 Cold., 139. in fact true, and hence the real cause for the attach-
46 Gill v. Wyatt, 6 Heisk., 88. ment. Smith v. Foster, 3 Cold., 139; Gill v. Wyatt,
6 Heisk., 88.
47 Ante, §§43; 269; 681; 719.
It would be well for the petitioner to aver, also,
48 This application when made in the Circuit Court
that he had no notice whatever of said suit, or of
is in the nature of an application for a new trial;
said decree, until' after the decree was rendered, and
Smith v. Foster, 3 Cold., 139; and may there well be
but when the term ended at which it was made.
made by motion, supported by affidavit;
52 "Good cause" means merits.
made in the Chancery Court it is in the nature of a Cain v. Jennings,
The practice in setting 3 Tenn. Ch., 131; Gill v. Wyatt, 6 Heisk., 88. See
petition for a rehearing.
aside decrees, in other than attachment cases, is by section on Good Cause, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8.
petition. Code, §§4380-4381. See, ante. §212. 53 Affidavits may be filed in support of the petition,
49 Bledsoe v. Wright, 2 Bax., 471. In this case, but they are not necessary. See Smith v. Foster, 3
Cold., 139; Sneed V. Hall, 3 Cold., 255; Brown V.
Judge Turney says that "in contemplation of the
organic law, the Courts are always open." Brown, 2 Pick., 277.
54 Metcalf v. Landers, 3 Bax., 35.
so Metcalf v. Landers, 3 Bax., 35.
55 Brown V. Brown, 2 Pick., 277.
51 If there are several other causes of attachment
alleged in the bill, the petitioner must allege that he 58 Metcalf v. Landers, 3 Bax., 35. The words, in
was, in fact, a non-resident at the time the bill was the opinion in this case, on p. 37, "allowed to stand
filed, if this be one of the causes, or had merely
re- on an answer," should no doubt read, allowed to
moved himself or property from the State, if this be stand as an answer.
§ 890 DEFENCES AND DECREES IN ATTACHMENT SUITS. b90
more fully to show the nature of a petition to set aside a decree in an. attach-
ment suit, the following form is given: 57
PETITION TO SET ASIDE A DECREE.
John Doe, ]
vs. V No. 683.— In the Chancery Court, at Smithville.
Richard Roe. J
To Hon. B. M. Webb, Chancellor:

Your petitioner, Richard Roe, respectfully shows to the Court:
i.
That on the 2d day of June, 1891, a decree by default was rendered against him in said
cause and Court in favor of the said complainant, John Doe, for one thousand dollars, and
costs of suit, which decree is still in full force, and unappealed from.
n.
Said decree based upon a proceeding by original attachment levied upon petitioner's
is
property, upon the ground that he resided out of the State. Petitioner avers that he was a
non-resident when said attachment writ was issued, and that he had no knowledge or notice
whatever of the said suit, or of any of the proceedings therein, until after the said decree had
been pronounced, and the term closed at which it was rendered.
in.
Said decree wholly unjust. The allegation in the bill, on which it is based, that the
is
petitioner owed the complainant Doe the sum of one thousand dollars, on account, was
utterly false. Petitioner did not, when the bill in this case was filed, or when said decree
was rendered, owe the complainant anything. Before petitioner left Tennessee, he and the
complainant had a full and final settlement, and the latter gave your petitioner a receipt in
full, which is made a part of this petition, and marked A. Said pretended account on which
said bill is based is utterly unfounded, and was abandoned by complainant, when said settle-
ment was made.
IV.
Said decree ordered the Clerk and Master to sell the property of petitioner therein de-
scribed, and said property has been advertised for sale, and will be sold unless said sale is
superseded, 68 or restrained.
v.
The premises considered, your petitioner prays
1st. That notice of this petition be issued by order of your honor, and served on said
complainant
2d. That this petition be considered, also, an answer to said bill, and that, on the hearing
of this petition, said decree, and also the decree pro confesso, be set aside, and vacated, and
this petition allowed to stand as an answer 59 to said bill.
3d. That, in the meantime, a restraining order be granted and issued to stay all further
proceedings under said decree, and on said advertisement of sale. 00
4th. And that petitioner have such other, further and general relief, as he may be en-
titled to.
This is the first application for a restraining order in this case.
W. V. Whitson, Solicitor.
State of Tennessee, j
DeKalb county. j
Richard Roe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing petition are true.
[Jurat, as in § 797, ante.] Richard Roe.
RESTRAINING ORDER.
To the Clerk and Master at Smithville:
You are hereby restrained from proceeding further under the decree and advertisement
of sale referred to in the foregoing petition.
You will also file this petition, 01 and issue the notice to the complainant prayed for therein
July S, 1891. B. M. Webb, Chancellor.
If, at the hearing, the prayer of the petition is granted, the following order
would be entered on the minutes
ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE DECREES.
John Doe, )
vs. \
No. 683.
Richard Roe. J
The petition filed in this cause by the defendant, Richard Roe, praying that the decrees
57 For another form, see, ante, § 212. I would be necessary; if the Master is enforcing the
58 Metcalf V. ganders, 3 Bax., 37. decree, a restraining order is sufficient.
59 Metcalf V. Landers, 3 Bax., 37. 01 The petition may be filed in vacation Bledsoe
60 If an order of sale has issued, a supersedeas I v. Wright, 2 Bax., 471.
pronounced herein, at the last term may be set aside, coming on to be heard this day, the
Chancellor isof opinion that petitioner is entitled to the relief by him prayed.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court that the decrees pronounced in this
cause at the last term, both the decree pro confesso and the final decree based thereon, be va-
cated, set aside, and for nothing held; that the cause be reinstated on the trial docket, and
the petition be allowed to stand as an answer to the bill, and be refiled as such, accordingly.
And thereupon this cause was remanded to the rules for proof generally.
§891 SUITS FOR RECEIVERS. 692
CHAPTER XLIV.
SUITS FOR RECEIVERS; AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.
Article I. Receivers Generally Considered.
Article II. In What Cases a Receiver will be Appointed.
Article III. Time and Manner of Appointing Receivers.
Article IV. Powers, Duties, and Liabilities, of Receivers.
Article V. Settlements, Removal, and Discharge, of Receivers.
ARTICLE I.
RECEIVERS GENERALLY CONSIDERED.

§ 891. Office of a Receiver. § 893. Of What a Receiver May be Ap-
pointed.
I 892. Who May be Appointed Receiver. § 894. Effect of a Receivership.
§ 891. Office of a Receiver. —

The Courts of this State are all vested with
power to appoint receivers for the safe-keeping, collection, management, and
disposition, of property in litigation in such Court, whenever necessary to the
ends of substantial justice. 1
A receiver is a person appointed by the Court (1) to receive the rents and
profits of land, or other property, (2) to sell property in the custody of the
Court when so ordered, (3) to collect notes, accounts, and other choses in action
belonging to a suit, (4) to care for property which is the subject-matter of the
litigation, and (5) to do any other acts in reference to property in the custody
of the Court, that the Court may direct. He is an officer of the Court; and is
regarded as truly and properly the hand of the Court. 2
A receiver is appointed for the benefit of the interested party who makes the
application, and for the benefit of all others who may eventually be found to
have an interest in the property, or its proceeds and the object of his appoint-
;
ment is to preserve the subject-matter of the litigation, or its rents and profits,
from waste, loss or destruction, so that there may be some harvest after the
labors of the controversy are over. 3
The appointment of a receiver, however, does not involve the determination
of any right, or affect the legal title of either party and is, by no means, to be
;
construed as deciding any of the issues involved in the controversy. The

appointment is made for the benefit of the party who may ultimately appear
to be entitled to the property or its proceeds. 4
"Where it would be difficult, inconvenient or perplexing, for one receiver to
.take charge of two or more separate estates, or stocks of goods, or sets of
accounts, the Court will appoint more than one receiver.
§ 892. —
Who May be Appointed Receiver. Any person may be appointed
receiver the rule, however, is to appoint a person who is not only wholly dis-
;
interested in the subject-matter of the litigation, but has, also, especial fitness
for the particular duties he will be required to discharge. person whose duty A
it would be to watch, check, and control, the receiver should never himself
be appointed receiver nor should the person be appointed whose neglect, mis-
;
conduct, or fraud, has occasioned the litigation. 5

l Code, § 3768. Such interlocutory appointment 2 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 658; High on Rec., §§ 1-2.
cannot be appealed from, suspended by a supersedeas, 3 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 658.
or revised upon a bill of review. High on Rec, 4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1741; post, §894.
§ 26; Baird V. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 394; Bramley r.. 5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1732.
Tyree, 1 Lea, 531; Roberson V. Roberson, 3 Lea, 50.
693 SUITS FOR RECEIVERS. §893
The Judge, or Chancellor, may, however, appoint a partner willing to act
without salary, or may appoint one of the parties with the consent of the others,
or if no one else can readily be obtained to accept, may appoint the Clerk and
Master, or his deputy. 6
§ 893. Of What a Receiver May be Appointed.—The property a receiver is
most commonly appointed to take charge of is: (1) property levied on by
attachment, or execution, and liable to perish or deteriorate, pending the suit
(2) goods, wares, and merchandise, involved in the litigation; (3) judgments,
notes, accounts, and other claims, attached or impounded by garnishment (4) ;
partnership property of all kinds; (5) corporation property of all kinds; (6)
real estate belonging to tenants in common, or encumbered by liens belonging
to other parties, and by them sought to be enforced (7) assets of a deceased;
person; (8) trust property of all kinds; (9) proceeds of waste committed on
real estate; (10) rents and profits of real estate, or of coal, iron, or other
mines, or of quarries, or of turnpikes and railroads. Indeed, it may be stated,
generally, that a receiver may be appointed of any kind of property, or of the
proceeds of any kind of property, real, personal or mixed, legal or equitable,
that may be disposed of by the decree of the Court in the cause. And, on
1he other hand, the Court has no right to appoint a receiver of property that
is not subject to execution or attachment, except in a suit by a wife for divorce
and alimony, and except in cases where the purpose of the receivership is to
protect or preserve the exempt property for the benefit of the owner thereof.
§ 894. Effect of a Receivership. —A receiver
is appointed on behalf of all
parties,, and not of any one and the ;apppintment alters no right, and adjudges
no question. The appointment is merely to hold the property for the benefit
of the party who may ultimately appear to be entitled to it; and when such
party is ascertained, the receiver will be considered his receiver. 7 As the
result of these principles, if any loss happens by the destruction, or deteriora-
tion of the property, or by the misconduct of the receiver, such loss must be
borne by the estate in his hands, as between the parties to the suit. 8
As soon as his bond has been accepted by the Clerk and Master, the receiver's
appointment is complete, and the title and right of possession to the property
committed to him, instantly vests in him as of the date of his appointment 9 and ;
it is the duty of all the parties to the suit to surrender to the receiver any of
the property in their possession, or under their control. The tenants of the
parties will also attorn to the receiver and pay their rents to him, including all
rents in arrears 10 and if any of the property has been levied on, between the
;
date of the receiver's appointment and the execution of his bond, the Sheriff
must surrender it to the receiver. 11
If any party refuse to surrender to the receiver the property in his possession,
or any tenant refuse to attorn to him, such party or tenant may be attached
far contempt, or a writ of possession may be awarded to put the receiver in
possession. 12
A
reciever is an officer of the Court, and is considered as truly and properly
the hand of the Court. 13 For this reason, the possession of a receiver is deemed
the possession of the Court and any attempt to disturb it, in any way, without
;
the leave of the Court first obtained, will be a contempt of Court; and the
6 Under the English practice, the Master often v. Williams, 11 Heisk., 412; Brien V. Paul, 3 Tenn.
appointed the receiver, and therefore could not act Ch., 360; Johnson v. Hanner, 2 Lea, 11.
as receiver himself. In this State, however, he never 8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1741. Res perit suo domino.
does, and is therefore eligible; indeed, he is often See, ante, § 64.
.the best possible man to be appointed, especially in oHigh on Rec, §§ 136; 152.
small matters. The statute contemplates the appoint- 10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1742.
ment of the Master as receiver, and provides that he 11 Hie* on Rec, % 136.
12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1742.
shall give a special bond to cover his liability as
such. Code, §§328; 329; 4553; Williams v. Bow- 658; Berry v. Jones, 11 Heisk,
13 1 Barb. Ch. Pr.,
man, 3 Head, 679: State v. Cole, 13 Lea, 367 210; Ross v. Williams, 11 Heisk., 412; Payne ti.
7 i Barb. Ch. Pr., 658; High on Rec, §5 2; 134- Baxter, 2 Tenn. Ch., 517.
135- 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1741; Fulton v. Davidson, 3
Heisk., 623; Wall v. Pulliam, 5 Heisk., 369; Ross
§895 WHEN A RECEIVER WILL BE APPOINTED. 694
person making it will be restrained by injunction, or committed for his con-
tempt. 14 It is the duty of the Court to protect its receiver not only against
violence, but against suits at law. 15 A receiver is not liable to be sued without
leave of the Court appointing him, and if any person claims property in posses-
sion of a receiver, or any interest therein by a title superior to that of *he
parties to the suit, he must, even when his right is clear, file a petition in
the cause and obtain an order from the Court for a reference to the Master
as to his title or interest 16 or the Chancellor may determine the question sum-
;
marily, when there is no complication in the claim or, if the matter be of suffi-;
cient importance, may allow the claimant to bring suit to determine the con-
ti'oversy. 17
ARTICLE II.
IN WHAT .CASES A RECEIVER WILL BE APPOINTED.

§ 895. The Appointment of Receivers Gen- § 899. Receivers in Suits to Recover Realty.
erally Considered. § 900. Receivers in Suits to Protect Trust
§ 896. Receivers in Suits by, or against, Property and Liens.
Partners. § 901. Receivers to Protect Rights in Prop-
§ 897. Receivers in Suits against Debtors. erty Where no Trusts Exist.
§ 898. Receivers in Suits against Corpora- § 902. The Chancellor's Discretion, How Ex-
tions. ercised.
§ 895. The Appointment of Receivers generally Considered. The Chancery —

Court has power to appoint receivers for the safe keeping, collection, manage-
ment, and disposition, of property in litigation in such Court, whenever nec-
essary to the ends of substantial justice 1 and it may be laid down, as a general
-,
rule, that a receiver will be appointed whenever there is good ground to be-
lieve that the property itself, or its proceeds, belong, in whole or in part, to
the complainants, or that they are entitled to its use, or to have it or its pro-
ceeds, or both, applied to the satisfaction of their claims, and the defendant
in possession is so misusing the property or proceeds, or so acting with reference
thereto, as to jeopardize the complainant's rights or interests. 2 To give the
Court jurisdiction, however, to appoint a receiver there must be a cause
pending. 3
Where at the hearing, the Court decrees that the defendant is not entitled
to the possession of the property, and the defendant is insolvent, or appeals on
the pauper oath, the Court may appoint a receiver before granting the appeal,
it an appeal is prayed, and may refuse an appeal from the order appointing a
receiver. 4
14 Payne V. Baxter, 2 Tenn. Ch., 517; Conley V cases agree that a receiver is proper, if the fund or
Deere, 11 Lea, 274. property, or its proceeds or profits, are in danger;
15 See, ante, § 40; and, post, § 910. and the most usual cases for a receiver are (1)
16 Conley v. Deere, 11 Lea, 276. either to prevent fraud, or (2) to secure the rents
17 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1743-1744; Payne V. Baxter, 2 or profits, or (3) to save the subject of litigation
Tenn. Ch., 517; Brien v. Paul, 3 Tenn. Ch., 357: from waste or material injury, or (4) to rescue it
High on Rec., § 139; Sto. Eq. Jur., § 833 a. from probable deterioration, spoliation or destruction,
1 Code, §§3768; 4452. The appointment of a re- or (5) to prevent its removal from the jurisdiction
ceiver is in the nature of extraordinary process. of the Court. And the appointment can only be
Hamilton v. Wyne, 3 Shan., 34. See Code, § 3766, made at the instance of a party who has an acknowl-
and the title of the Chapter containing the section. edged interest, or a strong picsumpt'On of title in
See, also, the title of the Article containing Code. himsflf alone, or in common with others. 2 DaiK
§§ 4434 and 4452. Ch. Pr., 1715-1716, notes; High on Rec, §§ 1-39
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1715-1729, and notes. The im 3 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 659.
mediate moving cause of the appointment oi a i It would seem that if the Court desires to have
_
ceiver is the preservation of the subject of litigation the receiver, appointed by a final decree, act pending
or the rents and profits of it, from waste, spoliation, an appeal from that decree, the proper course to
loss, destruction, or removal, during the litigation, so pursue is to set aside the final decree and the con-
that there may be some harvest, some fruits to gath sequent appeal, and by an interlocutory order ap-
er, after the labors of the controversy are over point a_ receiver, and put him in possession; and, on
1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 658; High on Rec, §4. All the this being done, to pronounce a final decree on the
695 WHEN A RECEIVER WILE BE APPOINTED. § 896
§ 896. Receivers in Suits by, or against, Partners. In suits between part- —
ners, or between partners and their privies in estate, a receiver will ordinarily
be appointed 1, "When the defendant is wilfully mismanaging the partnership
:
property 2, When the defendant has been guilty of fraud in partnership mat-
;
ters ; 3, When
the defendant has assumed exclusive control of the business and
assets of the firm 4, When the conduct of the defendant is in gross violation
;
of the articles of the partnership 5, When irreconcilable dissensions and dis-

;
agreements exist between the partners as to the management of the firm busi-
ness, and loss is a probable result thereof 6, When the mutual confidence has
;
been destroyed by the conduct of the defendant 7, When, in any other case, a
;
dissolution has actually taken place by the death of all the partners, or by efflux
of time, or is sought upon sufficient grounds or 8, When the partner in pos-
;
session of the assets is enjoined from selling or collecting them. 5

In suits against a firm by creditors or other third parties, a receiver will ordi-
narily be appointed: 1, When the firm is insolvent and there is a contest be-
tween rival creditors over its assets 2, When the assets of the firm, or of some
;
member of the firm, have been attached or levied on by conflicting executions

at law; 3, When some member of the firm has become a bankrupt; and 4,
When, in any case, it becomes necessary to ascertain the net interest of any
member of the firm, either to subject it to the payment of his debt, or to deliver
it to his administrator, executor, legatee, or assignee. 6
§ 897. Receivers in Suits against Debtors. —A

receiver will be appointed on
behalf of a creditor, in the following cases
1. Where a Debtor is Enjoined from collecting his debts, or from disposing of
property liable to waste, or expensive to keep. 7
2. Where a Debtor Has Made an Assignment, which is assailed as fraudulent,
on strong grounds, or which the assignee fails or refuses to properly enforce,
or when the trustee is acting fraudulently, and in either event the property is
liable to deteriorate, or debts or other assets are liable to be lost. 8
3. Where Personal Property Has Been Levied on, or garnished, in an attachment
suit, and is perishable, or expensive to keep, or liable to deteriorate in quality
or price, or consists of merchandise, or notes, or accounts. 9
4. Where Many Executions or Attachments Have Been Levied on the Same
Property, and the cost of a multiplicity of suits will greatly lessen the net fund
to be paid to the various creditors, the Court will, on a proper bill for that pur-
pose, appoint a receiver, settle the priorities of the parties, and distribute the
fund accordingly.
5. Where a Judgment Creditor Seeks to Subject Property, Held in Trust for the
debtor upon a bill filed after an execution has been returned, unsatisfied in
whole or in part. 10
§ 898. Receivers in Suits against Corporations. A receiver will be put in —
charge of the property, assets and franchises of a corporation, on application
of a creditor or stockholder: 1, When it becomes insolvent; 2, When its
11 or
merits, and grant an appeal from such final decree, receiver. High on Rec, §509; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
but refuse an appeal from the interlocutory order 1727.
appointing a receiver. See Merrill v. Elam, 2 Tenn. A partner who enjoins his co-partner from collect-
Ch., 513; Payne v. Baxter, 2 Tenn. Ch., 519; Brien ing partnership assets, is bound to see that a re-
v Paul, 3 Tenn. Ch., 360; Hoge V. Hollister, 8 Bax., ceiver is promptly appointed; and is liable for all
533; Enochs V. Wilson, 11 Lea, 228; High on Rec, loss occasioned by the neglect of the receiver to
collect the assets, or to account for those collected.
§§ 25-29.
No appeal will lie from an interlocutory order ap- Terrell v. Ingersoll, 10 Lea, 77.
pointing a receiver, nor will such an order be super- 6 See, generally, High on Rec, §§526-537; 507;
seded by the Supreme Court when it was discretion- 512.
ary. Enochs v. Wilson, 11 Lea, 228; Johnson v. 7 Terrell V. Ingersoll, 10 Lea, 85.
Hanner, 2 Lea, 8. 8 High on Rec, § 412.
5 See, generally, High on Rec, §§472-529; Pars,
o Code, § 3503; Spradlin v. Bratton. 6 Lea, 685.
on Part., 312-321; 2 Dan. Ch., Pr., 1727-1729. The io Code, §§ 4283-4286; Johnson v. Tucker, 2 Tenn.
general rule is, that if the complainant shows such a Ch., 398. See, generally, High on Rec, §§ 400-404.
en- ii Code, § 3431.
state of facts as, if proved at the hearing will
title him to a dissolution, the Court will
appoint a
§ 899 WHEN A RECEIVER WILE BE APPOINTED. 696
franchises are not used, or have been granted to others, in whole or in part; 12
or 3, "When its choses in action have been levied on. 13
Areceiver of a corporation will be appointed on a bill filed in the name of
the State against a corporation 1, When a corporation does or omits acts
:
which amount to a surrender or forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a

corporation; or 2, "When it exercises powers not conferred by law; or 3, "When
14 or
it fails to exercise lawful powers essential to its corporate existence; 4,
"When in any case its dissolution has been decreed, and the collection and distri-
bution of its assets becomes necessary. 15
§ 899. —
Receivers in Suits to Recover Realty. Although as a rule the Chan-
eery Court is reluctant to appoint a receiver on a bill to recover the possession
of realty, nevertheless, one will be appointed when the complainant clearly
shows that the legal title and the immediate right of possession and enjoyment
are both in him, and (1) that he has been deprived of the possession by fraud,
or (2) that there is imminent danger of irreparable injury to the property if
left in the defendant's possession; or (3) that there is a strong probability
arising from the fraud, mismanagement, or insolvency, of the defendant that
the complainant will lose the rents and profits of the land, unless a receiver is
appointed. 16 "Where, however, the contest between the parties grows exclus-
ively out of conflict of legal titles without any equitable circumstances affecting
the conscience of the defendant, a receiver will not ordinarily be appointed. 17
But after a decree in favor of the complainant, the Court, will consider that as
evidence of his right, and will appoint a receiver when necessary to preserve
the rents and profits of the land from loss, pending a motion for a new trial,
or a rehearing, or an appeal. 18
If, however, on an application for the appointment of a receiver to collect
rents of real property, the defendant in possession will agree to pay the rents
and profits into Court, and will give bond and security so to do, the application
for a receiver will be denied. 19
§ 900. Receivers in Suits to Protect Trust Property and Liens.— Courts of
Chancery exercise all powers deemed necessary to protect property charged
with a trust, and will appoint receivers:
1. Where an Executor, Administrator, Guardian or Other Trustee, is SO acting as
to endanger the safety of the trust property, whatever its character or is mis- ;
applying the property, or its proceeds;. or is otherwise violating his trust duties
to the detriment of the beneficiaries, especially if he is insolvent, or has left the
State, 20 or is dead, or non compos, or has resigned. 21
2. Where the Trusteeship is in Dispute, as in a contest over a will, or over the
tippointment of an administrator, 22 guardian, or trustee, and the estate of the
decedent, or the trust property, real or personal, is liable to deteriorate, or the
12 Code, §§4294-4295; Marr v. Union Bank, 4 tions for the recovery of personal property in specie,
Cold., 482. the Court in which the suit is pending may restrain
13 Code, § 3000. the injury, removal, or destruction, of the property
14 Code, §§3409; 3417; 3426. by process of injunction, until the cause is finally
15 As to receivers of corporate property, see, gen- disposed of; and the Courts are vested with power
erally. High on Rec, §§ 287-312. to appoint receivers for the safe keeping, collection,
16 High on Rec, §§ 553-575. management, and disposition of property in litiga-
17 Richmond V. Yeates, 3 Bax., 204; State V. Al- tion in such Courts, whenever necessary to the ends
len, 1 Tenn. Ch., 512; Davis v. Reaves, 2 Lea, 649. of substantial justice. Code, §§ 3767-3768. These
Formerly, a Court of Equity had, ordinarily, no two sections have more significance than is usually
jurisdiction to try the legal title to land, and when attributed to them,
it exercised the power to appoint a receiver, pending 18 High on Rec, § 577; Merrill v. Elam, 2 Tenn.
an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court, the Ch.. 513; Payne v. Baxter, 2 Tenn. Ch., 517; Enochs
equities of the complainant had to be very strong to V. Wilson, 11 Lea, 228.
justify this interposition of the Chancery Court. 10 High on Rec, § 595 ; Johnson v. Tucker, 2
But now, that, under the Act of 1877, the Chancery Tenn. Ch., 398.
Court has full jurisdiction to try the legal title, it 20 Roberson t>. Roberson, 3 Lea, 50; Bowling l<
will appoint a receiver in cases where formerly such Scales. 2 Tenn. Ch., 63.
power would not have been exercised, especially 21 See, generally, High on Rec, §§692-718;
2
where there is any waste, or where the defendant is Dan. Ch. Pr., 1723.
insolvent. The Code enlarges the powers of the 22 Smiley v. Bell. Mart. & Yerg., 380; High on
Courts in granting injunctions and appointing re- Rec, § 46; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1725-1726.
ceivers; and provides that in real actions, and in ac-
697 WHEN A RECEIVER WILE BE APPOINTED. § 901
rents or profits are liable to be lost, or the assets are liable to be wasted, by
reason whereof complainant's rights or interests are imperilled.
3. Where a Mortgage, Trust Deed or Other Express Lien on property, real or
personal, is sought to be enforced, and such property is being so misused, or
wasted, or neglected, by the defendant that the security is greatly endangered,
and likely to be lost, or rendered inadequate, especially if the debtor fails to
keep the taxes paid, or has abandoned the property, or is insolvent, or if the
mortgage debt is overdue, and the land mortgaged is inadequate security. 23
§ 901. Receivers to Protect Rights in Property where No Trusts Exist.
Receivers will be appointed wherever imperatively necessary to protect the
complainant's rights to property, real or personal, in cases where there are no
trust relations or duties
1. Where Complainant is a Tenant in Common, or otherwise interested benefi-
cially with the defendant in the proceeds, profits, uses, or enjoyment, of prop-
erty, real or personal, and the defendant wholly excludes him therefrom, and
refuses to accord to him his rights, and especially if he is insolvent. 24
2. Where the Property Belongs to an Infant, or to a person of unsound mind,
or has escheated to the State, 25 and there is no guardian, or personal represent-
ative, or other person lawfully entitled to take the same into possession, and
properly care and account for it, until those entitled are able to do so. 29
3. W :
here a Tenant for Life, or Vendee Under a Title Bond, or Other Party in
Possession of Property, real or personal, not having absolute title thereto, fails
to keep down the taxes, 27 or .to discharge encumbrances, or to keep inflammable
property insured, or to keep up the repairs, whereby the rights of those entitled
to the remainder, or to other interest in, or liens on, the property, are in -danger
of being lost or greatly injured.
4. Where, in a Suit for Alimony or Maintenance, the defendant fails to provide
for complainant, or to pay the instalments of alimony or maintenance ordered
by the Court, and especially in suits for maintenance where the land is charged
with the complainant's support. 28
5. Where, in Any Case, it is Necessary to the Ends of Substantial Justice to safely
keep, manage, collect, sell, rent or otherwise dispose of, property in litigation. 29
§ 902. The Chancellor's Discretion, How Exercised. The appointment of a —
receiver, when any sort of case is made out, is purely a matter of discretion.
This discretion, however, acts according to equitable rules, and is the discretion
of a. sworn officer, anxious to do his duty impartially, and is not the whim or
caprice of an irresponsible or indifferent person. 30 In exercising this discretion
on an application to appoint a receiver,
1. The Folio-wing Considerations Will Weigh in Favor of the Application:
1. That the defendant has been guilty of fraudulent or other inequitable con-
duct, jeopardizing complainant's rights.
2. That the defendant is insolvent, and is enjoying the property or its
proceeds.
3. That the defendant has not properly cared for the property, or has mis-
managed or misused it, or has displayed incapacity or indifference, jeopardizing
complainant's rights.
4. That the defendant has failed to pay the taxes, or to keep the property
duly insured when insurance is expedient, or stipulated.
23 Williams V. Noland, 2 Term. Ch., 151: Johnson 26 High on Rec, §§ 725-736.
V. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch., 401; Cone v. Paute, 12 27 Darnsmont v. Patton, 4 Lea, 597; High on
Heisk., 506; Bidwell v. Paul, 5 Bax., 693; High on Rec, §§609-613; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1716, note; 2 Sto.
Rec, §643; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1719, note. See Ful- Eq. Jur.. § 838.
ghum v. Cotton, 6 Lea, 591. 28 Code, § 2470; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1724, note.
If the defendant will give bond and security to
,
20 Code, §§ 3767-3768.
account for the rents and profits, if required to pay 30 See, ante, §§583, note 4; 857; 833, note 37.
the debt, a receiver will not be appointed. Williams Judex bonus nihil ex arbitrio suo facia*, nee prop-
v. Noland, 2 Tenn. Ch., 151; Johnson v. Tucker, 2 ositione domestical voluntatis, sed juxta leges -ef jura
pronunciet. (A good judge does nothing according
Tenn. Ch., 401. „ n „„, „. .
24 Cass^tty v. Capps, 3 Tenn. Ch., 524; High on to his own arbitrary will, nor from the prompting of
Rec § 604. social pleasure, but decides in accordance with law
25 State v. Allen, 1 Tenn. Ch., 512; High on Rec, and justice.)
§594.
§903 TIME AND MANNER OF APPOINTING RECEIVERS. 698
5. That the parties interested are numerous, and no one of them has any
particular right to the possession of the property.
6. That the property is charged with a trust, and the trustee's conduct is
questionable.
7. That a receivership can do no one any particular harm, and may be of
great benefit to those entitled to the propery, or its proceeds. On the other
hand,
2. The Following Considerations Will Weigh Against the Application for a Re-
ceiver :
1.That the complainant has been guilty of laches, or inequitable conduct.

2.That the complainant is not clear and emphatic in the allegation of his
equities, or his bill is sworn to on information and belief.
3. That the appointment is likely to greatly injure the defendant, while the
advantages to the complainant will be comparatively small.
4. That the benefits of a receiver are likely to be counterbalanced by the
trouble, confusion, expenses, or losses that will probably result from the ap-
pointment.
5. That there is no urgency, and an appointment would produce no benefits,
even if the defendant would not be particularly injured thereby.
6. That the defendant is willing to comply with all orders necessary to secure
the rights of the complainant, and to preserve the property, or fund, or its
proceeds; and is willing to give bond therefor. •
The Chancellor will, also, in exercising his discretion, consider whether upon
a view of the whole case there is a probability (1) that the Complainant will be
entitled to recover; and (2) that he will be injured if the defendant is allowed
to retain the possession of the property. 31
If the answer is on oath, and it fully and fairly denies the equities of the bill,
and the evidence adduced in support of the bill fails to overcome the denials
of the answer, a receiver will not be appointed. 32 Nor will the Court appoint
a receiver if it will injuriously affect a person not a party to the suit. 33
ARTICLE III.
TIME AND MANNER OF APPOINTING RECEIVERS.

§ 903. When and by Whom Receivers are § 907. Notice of the Application for a Re-
Appointed. ceiver.
§ 904. How the Application for a Receiver is
§ 908. Form of the Order Appointing a Re-
Made.
ceiver.
§ 90S. Frame of a Bill for a Receiver.
§ 906. Form of a Petition for a Receiver. § 909. The Receiver's Bond.
§ 903. When and by Whom Receivers are Appointed. Before a receiver —

can be appointed, there must be a cause pending in the Court, proper for such
appointment. The application for a receiver may, however, be made the very
day the bill is filed, or on any day thereafter, during the progress of the cause,
or on final decree. 1 The appointment may be made before the defendant has
answered, or even been served with process, or been notified of the application,
when sufficient grounds are shown, and the necessity of immediate action is
31 See, ante, §§ 583, note 4; 857; 833, note 37. 33 High on Rec., §33; 84; Mays v. Wherry, 3
32 High on Rec., § 24. The complainant will be Tenn. Ch., 34.
allowed to read affidavits in support of his motion. 1 Henshaw Wells, 9 Hum., 568; Merrill
v. e.
High on Rec, § 85. Elam, 2 Tenn. Ch., 513; Hieh "n P»c §§ 103-110.
699 TIME AND MANNER OF APPOINTING RECEIVERS. §904
apparent. 2 A prayer in the bill for a receiver is not necessary, if a case proper
for a receiver is made out. 3
When a defendant is entitled to relief against a co-defendant, the Court may,
in a proper case, appoint a receiver upon the application of the defendant en-
titled to relief; 4 for Courts of Equity have regard to the rights of the parties,
rather than to their situation as complainants or defendants.
Receivers may be appointed by any Chancellor, or Circuit Judge, in vaca-
tion, 5 and by the Chancellor alone during term time. If the application for
the appointment of a receiver is made in vacation, reasonable notice 6 of the
time and place of such application, and of the person before whom it will be
made, must be given to the opposite party, 7 or good cause shown why such
notice should not be given. 8
§ 904. How the Application for a Receiver is Made. The application for a —
receiver is usually made by a prayer therefor in a bill, or in an amended or
supplemental bill, or in a petition. Such a prayer, however, is unnecessary;
if the bill lays a foundation for the appointment of a receiver by stating facts
showing the propriety of such an appointment, the Court, looking at substance
and not form, will, on motion, appoint a receiver, although there is no prayer
therefor in the bill. 9 Indeed, the necessity for the appointment of a receiver
frequently occurs after the bill has been filed. If new facts arise pending the
litigation, making necessary the appointment of a receiver, they may be brought
before the Court by a supplemental bill, or by petition.
§ 905. —
Frame of a Bill for a Receiver. The bill that seeks the appointment
of a receiver should be both a pleading and an affidavit
1. As a Pleading, it should show complainant's cause of action clearly, and
his right to, or interest in, the particular property or fund in litigation, and
Low he is entitled to its possession or proceeds, in whole or in part.
2. As an Affidavit, it should set forth fully the particular facts that show the
danger the property, or fund, or the proceeds are in, and the necessity for a
receiver to rescue the property, proceeds, or fund, from danger, loss, or destruc-
tion; and if there be any special acts of neglect, mismanagement, fraud, or
wilful disregard of complainant's rights, such acts should be specified and
detailed. 10 The facts set forth should be on the complainant's own knowledge,
or on the personal knowledge of the person swearing to the bill or petition, an
affidavit on information and belief being insufficient. 11
The bill must not only lay a proper foundation for the appointment of a
receiver, but if the application for a receiver is to be made before answer, or
before the hearing, it should, also, pray for such appointment. If, however,
an immediate appointment is not wanted, such a prayer is not indispensable. 12
2 Code, § 4452; High on Rec, §§ 103-107; 2 Dan. when clearly entitled
receiver, against a co-defendant,
Ch. Pr., 1734-1736. Our practice is more liberal to such relief. Henshaw V. Wells, 9 Hum., 584.
than the former English practice in granting injunc- 8 Code, § 4452. Good cause would be (1) the non-
tions and receiverships on ex parte proceedings and residence of the defendant, (2) inability to find him
at Chambers: and receivers are often appointed by a after reasonable effort. (3) where notice would pos-
Judge, or Chancellor, at Chambers, even before the sibly result in the defendants wasting the property,
bill is filed, but to take effect when the bill is filed. or removing it out of the Court's jurisdiction, or
In counties remote from a Judge, or Chancellor, transferring it or assigning it, (4) where the prop-
such a procedure is often absolutely necessary to erty is likely to perish, or greatly deteriorate, before
prevent a failure of justice. Sometimes, the same notice could be given, or (5) any other fact showing
fiat contains an order for an injunction and attach- that notice itself, or the delay necessary for notice,
ment and a receivership, a receivership being often would result in irreparable injury. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
the necessary consequence of an attachment of notes 1735, notes; High on Rec, §§ fll-117. See, ante,
and accounts, or of goods, wares and merchandise, § 62, sub-sec. 8, as to "good cause."
or of property perishable by nature, or expensive to 9 Merrill v. Elam, 2 Tenn. Ch.. 515; High on
keep. But to justify such action, the bill must make Rec. §83; Troughber v. Akin, 1 Cates, 451, citing
out a case of great urgency. High on Rec, §§ 103- the above section, then § 855.
106. 10 See the form of a petition in the following sec-
3 Merrill V. Elam, 2 Tenn. Ch., 515; High on tion.
Rec. 5 83. 11 Davis v. Reaves, 2 Lea, 649.
4 v. Wells. 9 Hum., 584.
Henshaw 12 The necessity for the appointment frequently
5 Code, §§ 3948; 4452. occurs after the bill has been filed, in which case the
6 What is reasonable notice must be determined by Court will make the annointment on motion, sup-
the Judge, or Chancellor, hearing the motion. Much ported by petition or affidavit, without requiring the
depends on the urgency of the application and the bill to be amended, or a supnlemental bill to be filed,
necessity for immediate action. Instanter notice unless new parties must be brought before the Court
may be reasonable in one case, and five days in an- before a receiver can be anpointed. Henshaw 0.
other. Wells, 9 Hum., 568; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1734.
7 A defendant may move for the appointment of a
906 TIME) AND MANNER OP APPOINTING RECEIVERS. 700
The bill or petition should also show upon its face that it is the first applica-
tion for a receiver. 13
§ 906.
.
—
Form of a Petition for a Receiver. "When the necessity for a receiver
arisesduring the progress of a litigation, the proper mode of making the appli-
cation is by a petition, or by motion supported by affidavit, where new parties
are not necessary. The following is a form of a
PETITION FOR A RECEIVER."
William L. Bramley, et ah,
vs.
]
\ No. 683. — In the Chancery Court, at Lawrenceburg, Tenn.
Thomas J. Tyree, et al. J
To the Hon. George H. Nixon, Chancellor:
Your petitioners, the complainants in the above named cause, respectfully show to your
Honor
i.
That on the 3d day of January, 1878, they filed their original bill in said cause, alleging
(1) that the defendants had executed to petitioner Bramley, as trustee, for the benefit of the
other petitioners, a deed of trust on certain lands in said bill and deed described, said lands to
be sold by said trustee if the debts by said deed secured were not paid by March 30, 1878;
and alleging (2) that said defendants were in possession of said lands, and were stripping
the same of all its valuable timber, and committing other waste thereon, thereby greatly im-
pairing the value of said land, and impairing the security given petitioners by said deed of
trust; and (3) praying that the commission of waste be enjoined, alnd after the period fixed
therefore in the deed, (March 30, 1878,) that said trust be executed by a sale of said lands,
and the distribution of the proceeds among those thereunto entitled. Reference is here made
to said original bill, and said deed now on file in this cause, for a fuller statement of their
contents, and we pray your Honor to consider them as a part of this petition, on the hearing
thereof.
II.
Petitioners, in addition to what is stated in their said bill, now state to your Honor, that on
January 26, 1878, Eliza P. Tyree, wife of said Thomas J. Tyree, by her next friend, filed her
original bill in your Honor's said Court against petitioner and her husband, to have said
trust deed set aside, and have a resulting trust in said lands declared in her favor. All of
the defendants to her said bill, except her husband, have answered the same, denying all of
its equities but the pendency of her said suit throws such a cloud on the trustee's title to said
;
lands that a sale thereof, before the removal of such cloud, would result in their being
sacrificed.
in.
Petitioners would further state that it will probably be many months before the said suit
by said Eliza P. Tyree is terminated; that the object of said suit is to embarrass petitioners
in enforcing said trust; that said defendants are both insolvent, and nothing can be made out
of them by legal process, outside of said lands; that said lands will fall far short of paying
the debts secured by said trust deed, and that the rents and profits of said lands will be re-
quired to pay the residue of said debts.
IV.
Petitioners believe and charge that the object of the defendants in committing said waste,
and in bringing the said suit of said Eliza, is to obtain all they can out of said lands by
stripping it of its timber, and by holding the possession and enjoying the rents as long as
possible,, relying on their utter insolvency to shield them from the just claims and redress of
petitioners, whose said security is becoming less and less every day, while said debts are be-
coming more and more every day by the accumulation of interest. The time fixed in said
trust deed for its enforcement has now expired, and the trustee has now the right to proceed
with the sale of said lands; but such sale is not now desirable for the reasons already stated.
v.
The premises considered, petitioners pray:
1. That your Honor will forthwith appoint a receiver to take charge of all of said lands,
and collect the rents and profits thereof, and hold them subject to your Honor's orders in
this cause.
13 Code, § 4435. The Code seems to regard a re- Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 307. Besides, if more than one
ceivership as in the nature of extraordinary process. application is made, there may be more than one
See title of Chapter 20. preceding § 3766, and title receiver appointed, one by one Judge, and another
to Article VIII, preceding § 4434, where receiver- by another Judge, and thus unseemly conflict might
ships are termed "extraordinary process," as they, arise. In case of two receivers for the same property
also, are in §§ 3869 and 4454. When one considers being appointed, the one first appointed will be
that the order appointing a receiver, not only puts deemed the rightful one, and the subsequent appoint-
him into immediate possession of the property, re- ment will be deemed improvident, and will be re-
quires the parties to surrender the property, and voked. High on Rec, §§ 152; 173.
their tenants to attorn to him, but also, sometimes 14 This petition is based on the case of Bramlev t;.
awards a writ of possession or assistance, the extra- Tyree, 1 Lea, 531.
ordinary character of the proceeding becomes mani-
fest. Roberson V. Roberson, 3 Lea, 50; Baird V.
701 TIME AND MANNER OF APPOINTING RECEIVERS. §907
2. That at the hearing, said rents and profits be applied to the satisfaction of the debts
secured by said trust deed.
3. That your Honor will make all such other and further orders as may be necessary to
protect, secure, and enforce petitioners' rights and equities in the premises.
This is the first application for a receiver in this cause.
'
John H. Fuzzell, Solicitor.

[Annex affidavit by the trustee, or one of the other petitioners: see, § 789, ante.] •
The application may also be made by motion, when all the necessary parties
are before the Court. If the facts supporting such a motion do not otherwise
appear, they must be made to appear by affidavit. These affidavits, however,,
should be as full, particular, and precise, as a bill or petition filed for the same
purpose. 15
At the hearing of an application for a receiver on bill and answer, it ia
proper for the Court to hear affidavits on behalf of the complainant. 16
§ 907. Notice of the Application for a Receiver. Reasonable notice of the* —
time and place of the application for the appointment of a receiver, and of the-
Judge or Chancellor to whom the application will be made, must be given the
defendant, or good cause shown why such notice should not be given. 17 The.-
following is a form of a
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR A RECEIVER.
A B,
vs. In Chancery, at Tazewell.
C D.
Mr. C D
Take m. on August 20, 1890, before Chancellor John P. Smith,,
notice, that I will, at 10 a.
at the office of the Clerk and Master, in Jonesboro, move for the appointment of a receiver
in said cause, as prayed in the bill, [or, in the amended or supplemental bill.l
Aug. 14, 1890. A
B, by John P. Davis, Solicitor.
This notice should be served in the same manner as a notice to take deposi-
tions, and the complainant should have the original notice with the officer's
return thereon, or affidavit of service, at the time he makes his motion.
If no notice can be given, because of the extreme urgency of the matter, or-
because the defendant is a non-resident, or cannot be found, or for other good
cause, affidavit should be made showing the fact, unless it appears in the-
bill, or otherwise.
§ 908. Form of an Order Appointing a Receiver. If on the reading of the —

bill, or the bill and affidavit, the Judge, or Chancellor, should be of opinion
that a case for the instanter appointment of a receiver is made out, he will make-
the appointment in writing, substantially as follows
ORDER APPOINTING A RECEIVER, AT CHAMBERS.
A B,
vs. In Chancery, at Tazewell.
C D. ,
The motion in this cause for the appointment of a receiver coming on this day to be heard'
before me, at Chambers, on consideration thereof it is allowed and E F is hereby appointed :
receiver of all the property described in the bill, and on his giving a receiver's bond, with two
18 he will enter upon the discharge of
sufficient sureties in the penalty of two thousand dollars,
his duties as such receiver, and will at once proceed at public or private sale, as he may
deem best, to convert into money all the personal property and choses in action mentioned in
the bill the real estate he will rent out for the term of one year from expiration of the pres-
;
ent lease; the rents of the current year he will collect and account for. The Clerk and Master-
will give him a copy of this order as his evidence of authority, and if possession of any of"
said personal property is refused him, or if the tenants of the said real estate refuse to attorn
to him, the Master will issue a writ of possession to the Sheriff to put the receiver into the-
full and peaceable possession of all the property so withheld. The receiver will report his
action in the premises to the next term of said Court. The Clerk and Master will file this,
order in the cause, and note it on his Rule docket.
Aug. 20, 1890. John P. Smith, Chancellor.
15 High on Rec, §§ 84-89. 18 The penalty should be double the probable-
16 High on Rec!| § 85. amount of money, or personal property, committed to.
17 Code, § 4452!' What would be good cause has the receiver. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1736.
heretofore' been shown. See, ante, I 904, note 8.
§909 TIME AND MANNER OF APPOINTING RECEIVERS. 702
This order may be endorsed on the notice, or on the bill or copy of the bill,
or may be written on a separate sheet of paper. When written and signed, it
will be delivered or mailed to the Clerk and Master.
If the Court be in session, the motion for the appointment of a receiver may
be made, at any time after the appearance of the defendant, on the bill, or on
the bill and petition, or on the bill and affidavits, or on an amended or a sup-
plemental bill and the order for the appointment will be substantially the same
;
as the order at Chambers above given, and the proceedings consequent on the
order are the same.
Sometimes the same bill prays and makes out a case for an injunction, attach-
ment, and the instanter ex parte appointment of a receiver. The following is
a form for a
FIAT FOR AN INJUNCTION AND AN ATTACHMENT; AND AN OEDEE AP-
POINTING A RECEIVER.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at Crossville
Upon this bill being filed and prosecution bond given, issue (1) the injunction as prayed,
upon an injunction bond in the penalty of five thousand dollars being given; (2) the attach-
ment as prayed, upon a proper bond therefor being given, and (3) on said bill being filed
and bonds given, and said process issued, George W. Jones, of Cumberland county, is ap-
pointed receiver to take charge of all the property described in the bill, and also of all such
property as may be found by the Sheriff in executing said attachment. The receiver will,
before entering upon the discharge of his duties, execute a receiver's bond in the penalty of
five housand dollars, properly conditioned, the sureties to be approved by the Master. The
receiver will at once sell all the personal property that is of a perishable nature, or expensive
10 keep the notes of hand and accounts he will at once collect and convert into money the
; ;
stock of goods, wares, and merchandise, the fixtures, and the balance of the personal property,
he will sell at private sale, provided he can get a satisfactory bid within thirty days, and if
not he will then sell at auction. He may take notes with two good personal sureties, payable
with interest from date, and due the first day of the next term of said Court, for all sales
over fifty dollars. Before selling said stock of goods, he will make a complete inventory
thereof. He will require the tenants of the defendant to attorn to him, and pay over to him
all rents, including any in arrears. He may pay any back taxes on said property, and may
insure the same if expedient. AH- the defendants to this suit are enjoined to deliver to the
receiver all the property in their 'possession, or under their control, hereby committed to him.
If the receiver is denied possession of any of said property, or if any tenant refuses to attorn,
the Clerk and Master will issue a writ of assistance, 19 directed to the Sheriff of the county
where the property is situated, to put the receiver into possession thereof. The receiver is
empowered to bring all suits by him deemed necessary to fully execute this trust ; and all per-
sons are enjoined from suing him without permission of said Court. 20 The receiver will
report his action in the premises to the next term, and will file with it an itemized statement,
showing every piece of property by him received, and the price for which sold, and all sums
by him expended, and on what account, and the money and property in his hands.
Ordered at Chambers, August 16, 1891. Thos. M. McConnell,
Chancellor of 3d Division.
The Chancellor will, instead of appointing a receiver, sometimes give the
defendant the option of giving a bond to pay the complainant what the Court
may decree him, thus
CONDITIONAL APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER.
To the Clerk and Master Unless the defendant give a five hundred dollar bond in this
:
cause, with two good sureties, within five days after notice hereof, such bond conditioned to
pay the complainant the value [or, the rents,] of said [property, describing it briefly,] John
Smith is hereby appointed receiver to take possession of said property, and sell [lease, secure,
or otherwise deal with,] the same on the best terms obtainable, on due public notice. The
receiver will, before acting, give bond in the penalty of one thousand dollars. The Master will
forthwith notify the defendant of this order, and the defendant is hereby enjoined from in
any way removing, encumbering, or disposing of, said property, until and unless he shall
give said bond; and on his giving said bond, this order in reference to a receiver will stand
vacated and annulled. July 30, 1891.
A. J. Abernathy, Chancellor.
§ 909. —
The Receiver's Bond. Upon the making of the order appointing a
receiver, whether made at Chambers or in open Court, the Clerk and Master
19 The writ of assistance ordered above is merely a I 20 See, post, § 911.
writ of possession, under another name. Ante,
§ 655. I
703 POWERS AND DUTIES OF RECEIVERS. §910
will at once notify the receiver, and take from him or from the complainant
the required bond and security, 21 and give him a certified copy of the order of
appointment. The following is a form for the
RECEIVER'S BOND.
Know all men by these Presents
That we, E F [the receiver,] and G H and I J, [his sureties,]
acknowledge ourselves in-
debted to the State of Tennessee, for the use of those entitled, in the sum of two thousand
dollars.
But this obligation to be void if the said E F, who has been appointed receiver in the
cause of A B vs. C D, in the Chancery Court at Nashville, shall promptly take charge of, and
duly and faithfully account for, all the property of which he has been appointed receiver and ;
shall make and file all proper inventories and reports, and pay over or account for all moneys
that may or should come into his hands, and obey all orders of the Court to him addressed,
and otherwise faithfully discharge all the duties of his trust. 22
As witness [&c, duly dated, signed, and witnessed.]
The Chancellor or Judge may require the complainant applicant to give the
bond, instead of the receiver, in which case the condition of the bond will be
substantially the same as given above. 23
AETICLE IV.
POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF RECEIVERS.
§ 910. Putting the Receiver Into Possession. I § 912. The Duties of a Receiver.
§ 911. The Powers of a Receiver. |
§ 913. The Liabilities of a Receiver.
§ 910. Putting the Receiver into Possession; and Suits Resulting. The —
order appointing a receiver should clearly specify the property committed to
his custody; and should enjoin all the parties to the suit, their agents and attor-
neys, to surrender to the receiver all of such property in their possession, or
under their control, and all books and papers relative thereto. The Court will
award a writ of possession, called in Chancery a writ of assistance, to put the
receiver into possession of any property denied him; and to eject all tenants
who refuse to attorn to the receiver. If any person, whether a party to the suit
or not, in any way interferes with the property, or with the proper discharge of
the receiver's duties, he will be enjoined or attached, according to the flagrancy
of his conduct. Ali persons who claim rights as against the receiver should
come before the Court by petition, setting forth their rights and praying relief. 1
No suit can be brought against a receiver without express leave of the Court
appointing him, when all persons are enjoined from suing him; and it is a
contempt of Court to bring such a suit without such leave. The possession of
the receiver is the possession of the Court appointing him and all the property ;
in his hands is in the custody of the Court. 2 But if no order has been made for-
bidding suits against a receiver, he is subject to suit, especially if operating a
railroad; but the plaintiff if successful, must file his judgment in the case where-
,
in the receiver was appointed. In case of a suit against a receiver he may peti-
tion the Court for instructions, or for an injunction, which latter may be granted
or refused. 3 If a receiver is in possession of, or claiming, property belonging
to one not a party to the suit, such person can file an original bill against the
parties to the suit claiming the property, and enjoin them from interfering with
21 Code, §§ 3948; 4453. receiver in his bond, as a notice to him and his
22 The following condition would be sufficient. sureties of what they are.
But this obligation to be void, if said E F, who has 23 Code, §§3948; 4453.
been appointed receiver in s the cause of A B vs. 1 For practice in such a case, see, ante, §§ 794;
C D, in the Chancery Court at Nashville, shall faith- 894.
fully discharge all the duties imposed on him by 2 High on Ret, §§134-172; Tones v. Moore, 22
law, or the said Court. Code, 5 § 3948; 4453. It is Pick., 188.
well, however, to set out the principal duties of the 3 Burke V. Ellis, 21 Pick., 702.
§911 POWERS AND DUTIES OF RECEIVERS. 704
such property, or beclouding his title. 4 Such a suit is not against the receiver,
in the ordinary sense, although he may be made a party defendant.
If any of the property described in the bill is in the possession of a person
not a party to the suit, the proper practice is to amend the bill and make such
person a party, and then extend the authority of the receiver over such party
and property 5 or the Court may authorize the receiver to bring suit for such
;
property. 8
§ 911. —
The Powers of a Receiver. As a general rule, a receiver has no
powers to exercise, and no duties to perform, other than those conferred and
imposed by the order appointing him, and by the course and practice of the
Court, in such cases. 7
He has the power to take possession of all the unleased property, and obtain
the attornments of all the tenants of the leased property, and to collect all the
debts and claims committed to him. A
receiver cannot sue to recover property
never in his possession, nor to collect a claim or debt, nor to enforce any right,
unless generally or specially empowered by the Court so to do and when he ;
sues he should aver, or show on the face of his bill, that he has been so em-
powered. 8 If empowered to collect notes, accounts, and other choses in action,
he may bring suit 9 for that purpose, if necessary, in his own name. Where
property is in the possession of a third person, who claims the right to retain
it, the receiver must either sue him, or the complainant must make him a party
to the bill, and have the receivership extended over him. 10 receiver ap- A
pointed in another State cannot sue in this State to recover property never in
his possession. 11
§ 912. —
The Duties of Receiver. The receiver, as soon as he has been quali-
fied to act, should set to work diligently to discharge every duty imposed on
him by the order of the Court. If he has been given the custody or manage-
ment of personal property, he will at once take it all into his possession, and
will demand all the choses in action, books, papers, and writings, relative to
the business or property put into his custody. All the parties to the suit are
usually enjoined to deliver up to the receiver all securities, notes, account books,
papers, and other property, in their possession belonging to the business, and
in case of their refusal to obey the order, the receiver should bring the matter
to the attention of the party at whose instance he was appointed.
He will, as soon as he takes possession, make a complete inventory of the
property, including therein every item, sufficiently described to identify it. If
authorized to sell, he will at once take all steps necessary to realize a fair price
and if authorized to collect notes, accounts, or other choses in action, will at
once proceed to do so, bringing suit whenever necessary.
When real estate has been committed to his custody, management, control,
and disposition, he must at once take possession of it; or if tenants be in pos-
session, he must require them at once to attorn to him, and pay him the rent,
including all that may be in arrears. If unable to obtain possession, or attorn-
ment, or the rents, he should report the fact to the Solicitor of the complainant
in order that the necessary steps may be taken to obtain possession, or to pro-
cure the attornment; and if such Solicitor fail to take action, the receiver
should apply to the Court for instruction and assistance. 12 He must rent out
such real estate as is not under lease, and must be diligent in collecting all the
rents and profits of the estate, including all back rents due the defendant. He
4 Haynes v. Rizer, 14 Lea, 252. See proceedings 9 Wray v. Jameson, 10 Hum., 186. But the re-
by petition pro interesse suo.ante, §§ 794; 894. ceiver should be careful to institute no important
5 Highon Rec, § 145; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1750, note. suit without express leave of the Court.
Eq. Jur., §§ 833a-833b.
6 2 Sto. But when a re- 10 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1750, note.
ceiver sues at law he must stand on his legal rights, 11 Bank V. Motherwell, 11 Pick., 172
like any other plaintiff; and recover on the strength 12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1749; 1752. He is not obliged
of his legal title.A Court of law is not concerned to take property from a third person, or even from
in maintaining the dignity of the Chancery Court in the defendant himself, by force, without an express
such a suit. Conley v. Deere, 11 Lea, 274. order of the Court so to do. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1749,
7 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1748, note. note.
8 Simmons v. Taylor, 22 Pick., 729.
705 SETTLEMENTS AND DISCHARGE OF RECEIVERS. §913
may expend small sums in making customary and necessary repairs, without
previous order of the Court and may pay back taxes, or any debt that, if left
;
unpaid, would cause the title to the property to fail, provided it is manifestly to
the interest of the parties that he pay such taxes or debt. If property, such as
a mill, is deteriorating and expensive to keep, the receiver may be ordered to
sell before the final hearing. 13
It is the duty of the party, on whose application a receiver is appointed, to
see that he discharges his duties, and that all necessary orders are made from
time to time to compel him to act and account, according to law and any loss, ;
which may occur by the negligence of such party, must, as between him and the
other parties to the cause, fall upon him. 14
§ 913. —
The Liabilities of a Receiver. A receiver must be careful to keep
within his powers, and to fully, prudently, and faithfully, discharge all his
duties. He will be responsible for all losses occasioned to the estate by his
wilful default, or gross negligence. If he places money received by him in
improper hands, he will be charged with all loss. 15 He must account for all
the property and money that went into his hands, or that could have been ob-
tained or collected by reasonable diligence.
Property in the hands of the receiver, being in the hands of the Court, any
loss, depreciation, or destruction of it, without his fault, must fall upon the
owners. 18 He is not liable for interest, unless he has received interest, or used
the funds, or failed to pay over when required. 17
If the receiver fail to report, or fail to pay over the balance in his hands,
when ordered by the Court, he may be committed to jail until he complies with
such order. The Master may, also, be required to report what amount the re-
ceiver is liable for, if it does not otherwise appear; and when the amount is
ascertained, the Court may render a decree therefor against the receiver and
the sureties on his bond.
"When any question of difficulty arises in the discharge of his duties the re-
ceiver should bring it before the Court by petition in the cause, and pray the
advice and direction of the Court in the matter. 18
ARTICLE V.
SETTLEMENTS, REMOVAL, AND DISCHARGE OF RECEIVERS.
§ 914. Receivers' Allowances. I § 916. Receivers' Accounts and Reports.
§ 915. Compensation of Receivers. I § 917. Removal and Discharge of Receivers.
§ 914.
—
Receivers' Allowances. In passing upon his accounts a receiver will
be allowed: (1) any expenditures authorized by the Court; (2) any expenses
necessarily incurred for the benefit of the estate committed to his charge, and
(3) all taxes, or other public charges by him paid. Among the expenditures
ordinarily deemed necessary are included (1) expenses of caring for and
guarding the property, when necessary; (2) indispensable repairs; (3) insur-
ance, when prudent to insure. 1
But a receiver will not ordinarily be allowed (1) expenses incurred for ser-
vices which he could have rendered himself, or (2) compensation paid or prom-
ised a deputy when he was not absolutely necessary, or (3) fees paid attorneys
13 Gleaves v. Ferguson, 2 Shan. Cas., 560. IT Fulton v. Davidson, 3 Heisk., 647; High on
14 Terrell v. Ingersoll, 1-0 Lea, 77 ; Downs v. Rec., 5 804; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1756.
Allen, 10 Lea, 670. 18 High on Rec, § 188.
IB 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1751. l High on Rec, §§180; 797-798.
16 Wall v. Pulliam, 5 Heisk., 365. Res perit suo
domino. See, ante, § 64.
§915 SETTLEMENTS AND DISCHARGE OF RECEIVERS. 706
or Solicitors, or (4) improvements made to the property, or (5) unauthorized
additions to the stock of goods, or business in his hands, or (6) for losses in-
curred by taking insufficient security, or (7) for costs or expenses of any kind
which, by proper diligence or action, might have been avoided; or (8) any
compensation for his services, when he fails to properly discharge his duties, or
fails properly to make settlement, or account for moneys in his hands. The re-
ceiver should first obtain the consent of the Court, or of the parties, before tak-
ing any affirmative step, or assuming any responsibility. 2
§ 915. Compensation of Receivers. —A
receiver is entitled to such compen-
sation as usually allowed by law, or contract, for similar services. The usual
is
commission is five per cent, of the amount collected and disbursed; but this
amount may be increased in cases of special difficulty; and decreased where
the amount is large, or the labor or responsibility inconsiderable. In all cases,
the compensation should be such as is reasonable for the services of a person
competent to perform the duty. A
percentage of five per cent, is only a general
guide, and not an invariable rule. 3 He may, also, have an allowance for extra-
ordinary trouble or expense, and for counsel fees, if incurred with the approba-
tion of the Chancellor, or Court. 4 His compensation is- allowed and paid,
usually, out of the proceeds of the property that went into his hands but, if ;
there were no proceeds, his compensation will be taxed as a part of the costs of
the cause. 5
A
surviving partner who serves as receiver is, ordinarily, entitled to no com-
pensation, especially when appointed at his own request. 6
A
receiver who fails to settle and pay over when so ordered, or who fails to
make reports when so ordered, or who is guilty of fraudulent or negligent con-
duct causing loss or delay, forfeits all right to compensation. 7
§ 916. Receivers' Accounts and Reports. receiver must make a full and —A
true report to the Court whenever required, 8 showing what has come into his
hands, what expenses he has incurred, and the condition of the estate. These
reports should be minutely itemized, and accompanied with vouchers for every
expenditure made. If the items are numerous, they may be put in an inventory,
or schedtile, and the sum total entered in the report, the inventory or schedule
being filed therewith. The following is a form of a
RECEIVER'S REPORT.
A B,
vs. In Chancery, at Crossville.
C D. ,
To the Chancellor:
I submit the following report as receiver in said cause
I.
The property that came hands:

into my
1. The stock of goods mentioned in the bill. (See inventory, exhibit A.)
2. Articles levied on by Sheriff O P, and delivered to me. (See inventory, exhibit B.)
3. Notes of hand, accounts, &c. (See inventory, exhibit C.)
The house and lot on
4. the north-east corner of John and Fourth streets, occupied by
James Brown as tenant.
ii.
The cash that has into my hands:

come
1. Proceeds of the sale of said stock of goods. (See said exhibit A.) - - $1,683.40
2. Proceeds of the sale of the property turned over to me by Sheriff O P
(See sale list, exhibit D.) 21310
2 High on Rec, §§ 797-818; 180; Conley V. Deere, 7 Stretch v. Gowdey, 3 Tenn. Ch., 567; 2 Dan. Ch.
11 Lea, 274. Pr., 1155; High on Rec, §818.
3 Fulton V. Davidson, 3 Heisk., 643; Stretch i\ 8 If the report will include nothing but rents, he
Gowdey, 3 Tenn. Ch., 565.; High on Rec., §§ 781-796. must make a full report and settlement at least once
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1745-1747; High on Rec, 790. a year. Lowe v. Lowe, 1 Tenn. Ch., 515; Stretch e.
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1753; Stretch v. Gowdey, 3 Gowdy, 3 Tenn. Ch., 565.
Tenn. Ch., 565; Hayes v. Ferguson, 15 Lea, 13. Courts of Equity are disposed to hold receivers to
But if the complainant was not entitled to the re- great strictness in rendering their accounts; and no
ceiver, he may be taxed with the costs of the re- delays or negligence will be tolerated. High on
ceivership. Lockhart V. Gee, 3 Tenn. Ch., 332. Rec, § 797.
6 Piper V. Smith, 1 Head, 93 Berry v. Jones, 1
;
Heisk., 206: Brien V. Harriman. 1 Tenn. Ch., 467;

Todd l). Rich, 2 Tenn. Ch., 107; High on Rec, § 795.
707 SETTLEMENTS AND DISCHARGE OF RECEIVERS. § 917
3. Proceeds of notes, accounts, &c. (See said exhibit C.) - - - 841.00
4. Rent of said house and lot, for 7 months, Jany. 1 to Aug. 1, 1890, at $20.00
per month, - 140.00
Total collections from all .sources, $2,877.50
oni
$10.00
18.00
26.00
- - 19.50
12.00
1.20
§ 917 SETTLEMENTS AND DISCHARGE OF RECEIVERS. 708
time, or in vacation and the application for a change in the receivership should
;
be on notice to both the receiver and the opposite party. The ordinary causes
for removal are (1) that the receiver is a biased kinsman to one of the parties;
:
(2) that his conduct or declarations show that he is a partisan of one of thy
parties; (3) that he is incompetent mentally or physically; (4) that he has
abandoned or is otherwise grossly neglecting his duties; (5) that he fails to
give a proper bond when required, and (6) that he has become a bankrupt.
If the Court is made certain that the appointment of a receiver was improvi-
dently made, the appointment will be revoked on motion.
2. Discharge of Receivers. Ordinarily, before a receiver will be discharged, he
is required to make a full settlement with the Master; and that settlement must
be reported and confirmed, and the full balance found against him paid into
Court. On the settlement with the Master, all parties in interest are entitled
to notice in order to have the opportunity of being present, and examining or
cross-examining the receiver on oath; and, also, of introducing any evidence
they may have to show the incorrectness or deficiency of the receiver's report.
If all parties are satisfied with the correctness and sufficiency of his reports,
the trouble and expense of a reference to, and settlement with, the Master is
avoided, by a consent order confirming the receiver's report, fixing his compen-
sation and ordering his discharge, and the cancelling of his bond, on his paying
into Court the full balance due from him.
If a receiver is appointed before answer, and the answer fully and fairly
denies the equities of the bill, and is not overcome by the proofs adduced by the
complainant, the receiver will, on motion of the defendant, be discharged. 10
When a receiver has accepted the office by giving bond, he cannot be dis-
charged on his own application, without showing some reasonable cause but if ;
he becomes a bankrupt, or falls into bad health, he will be discharged. re- A

ceiver will, also, be discharged if the complainant's demand is satisfied, or if
the receivership becomes unnecessary but, as his appointment is for the benefit
;
of all parties, he will not be discharged on the ex parte application of the party
who had him appointed. 11
10 High on Rec, § 24.
11 As to the discharge of receivers, see, generally, 2 Dan. Ch. Vr , 1765; High on Rec, §§ 832-848.
709 ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. 918
CHAPTER XLV.
ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT.
§ 918. Contempts Generally Considered. § 922. Punishment for Contempts.
§ 919. Nature and Kinds of Contempts.
§ 920. Proceedings in Contempts in the Pres- § 923. Proceedings in Contempts Before the
ence of the Court. Master.
§ 921. Proceedings in Contempts Out of the
Presence of the Court. § 924. Effect of a Contempt.
§ 918. —
Contempts Generally Considered. A court of law operates upon the
property of parties to a suit, but a Court of Chancery often operates upon the
person of the parties, commanding them to do certain specified acts. It is mani-
fest that, if the Court had no power to enforce obedience to such decrees, they
would be wholly ineffectual, and would be absolutely disregarded. The viola-
lion of the decree of a Court is termed a contempt, and the Court of Chancery,
from the beginning of its existence, has exercised the power to punish such
violations,by process of attachment. 1
The power to punish for contempt is one of the highest prerogatives of a
Court of Justice and, upon its bold and prudent exercise, depend the respect,
;
the dignity, and efficiency, of Courts as arbiters of human rights. The mandates
of a Court of Chancery must in all cases be obeyed, according to the spirit of
the decree, promptly, faithfully and without question, or evasion. The party,
upon whom the order or command of the Court operates, is not- allowed to spec-
ulate upon the Equity of the bill, or the legality or regularity of the order, or
decree, or of the writ issued thereon; but his simple duty is to obey: and when
he disobeys it is a duty the Court owes, to itself and to the public, to punish
him at once. 2
§ 919. —
Nature and Kinds of Contempts. Under our statutes, the power o?
the several Courts to issue attachments, and inflict punishments for contempts
of Court, limited to the following cases
is
1. Thewilful misbehavior of any person in the presence of the Court, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.
2. The wilful misbehavior of any of the officers of the Court, in their official
transactions.
3. The wilful disobedience or resistance of any officer of the Court, party,
juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command of the Court.
4. The abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the process or proceedings
of the Court.
5. Wilfully conversing with jurors in relation to the merits of the cause, in
the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise tampering with them. 3
6. The failure of a defendant to answer a bill in the time and manner required
by law. 4
1 The power to punish contempts summarily, by violation of them, a Court of Chancery would be
process of attachment, has been coeval with the ex- useless. Underwood's case, 2 Hum., 46.
istence of Courts; and to Courts of Chancery it is 2 Nelson, 8 Bax., 1.
Blair v. See Article on en-
indispensable. .Their decrees are sometimes (1) af- forcement of decrees by process of contempt., ante,
firmative, and require an act to be done, as that one §§ 32; 652.
party shall convey by deed, or shall surrender up an 3 Code, § 4106. As to the enforcement of judg-
instrument to be cancelled: and sometimes (2) nega- ments and decrees by attachments for contempt in
tive and restraining, as that a party shall refrain the'natureof an execution, see Code, §§ 3IC4; 4478;
from doing a specified act. Without the power to 4483; and §§651-652, ante.
enforce these decrees by punishing disobedience and i Code, §§ 4360-4368.
§ 920 ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. 710
'
7. The omission
to perform an act required by an order or decree of the
Court ;performance of an act, forbidden by such an order or decree. 5
or, the
8. Any other act or omission expressly declared by law to be a contempt. 6
Contempts for failing to answer a bill are termed ordinary contempts, and all
other contempts are termed extraordinary contempts. 7 Ordinary contempts
have already been considered. 8
§ 920. Proceedings in Contempts in the Presence of the Court. If any of —
the foregoing contempts are committed in the presence of the Court, the offend-
ing party may be arrested by the officer waiting upon the Court, upon the
verbal order of the Chancellor, without process or notice, and the contemner
shall not be bailable but the Court may proceed at once to fine, or imprison, or
;
both. 9 The proceedings in such a case are summary, but the power to so pro-
ceed is vital to the respectability, safety, and existence of the Court, 10 and
should be exercised unhesitatingly, fearlessly, and vigorously.
But, inasmuch as there are no pleadings to show the grounds of the Court's
jurisdiction and judgment, it is indispensable to the validity of such a summary
proceeding that the judgment show on its face (1) one or more of the statutory
:
acts of contempt; (2) that such statutory act was committed in the presence of
the Court and (3) the penalty inflicted. 11 The following is the form of such a
;
JUDGMENT FOR CONTEMPT.

The State,
vs.
John Lawless.
On this August 16, 1891, Court being in session, the defendant, John Lawless, did so wilfully
misbehave in the presence of the Court by loud talking as to obstruct the administration of
justice; and, for such wilful act of contempt, it is ordered arid adjudged that said defendant,
he being present in Court, be fined the sum of twenty dollars and be committed to the county
;
jail for twenty-four hours, and that he pay all the costs of this proceeding. An execution
will issue for said fine and costs, and a mittimus will issue for his commitment.
§ 921. Proceedings in Contempts Out of the Presence of the Court. In all —

cases of contempts of Court committed out of the presence of the Court, except
contempt by a defendant in failing to answer a bill, 12 or contempt by a witness
in failing to appear or answering questions, the mode of proceeding is as fol-
lows The party complaining of the alleged contempt, must file a petition in
:
the cause wherein it was committed, stating the contempt complained of, and
by whom committed. The petition must be sworn to, and must be supported by
such affidavits, returns of officers, or certified copy thereof, or other papers, as
will fully show how the contempt arose. 13
If such petition show sufficient cause, the Chancellor will order the Clerk and
Master to issue an attachment for the body of the contemner, fixing in the order
the time and the place for his appearance, to answer the petition and also, the ;
amount and character of the bail-bond to be taken. 14 The following is a

form of a
PETITION FOR AN ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
A B,
vs. In Chancery, at Carthage.
C D. .
To the Chancellor of said Court

AB, complainant in said cause, respectfully shows to your Honor, that the injunction
awarded in the cause was duly issued by the Clerk and Master, and duly served on the defend-
ant C D, prohibiting him from cutting trees upon the complainant's tract of land in said injunc-
tion described, and from removing therefrom any of the trees already cut thereon but that ;
said defendant since said service has cut other trees, and has removed all that had been cut
5 Code, §§4108-4109; 4106, sub-sec. 3; 3104. exclusively to extraordinary contempts, and rot to
6 Code, § 4106, sub-sec. 6. contempts by a defendant for failing to answer a
7 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 269-270. bill, or to contempts of a witness for failing to ap-
8 Ante. §§ 201-204. pear, or to testify. See sub-sections 6-8 of the Rule.
9 Ch. Rule, VII, § 1. Nor does said rule apply to contempts in not per-
10 State v. Galloway, 5 Cold., 3J8. forming the decrees of the Court.
11 Ch. Rule, VII, 5 1; post, 5 1114; State r. 13 Ch. Rule, VII, §2, sub-sec. 1; ? 1 106.
Galloway, 5 Cold.. 337. 14 Ch. Rule, VII, § 2, sub-sec. 2. But if the con-
12 Ch. Rule, VII, §2 (§1196,) evidently applies
711 ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. §922
prior to said service. Complainant charges that said cutting and removal were in wilful dis-
obedience of said injunction, and in contempt of Court; and he, therefore, prays for an at-
tachment for the body of the defendant, and that he answer hereunto.
Complainant files herewith the affidavits 15 of William Jones and Henry Brown, marked
exhibits A
and B, respectively, to this petition, and will read them at the hearing in support
of the petition; as he will, also, read the bill, writs of injunction, and return thereon.
This is the first application for an attachment in this case. 16
E. L. Gardenhire, Solicitor.
The petition being duly sworn to, the Chancellor will endorse thereon his
FIAT FOR AN ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
To the Clerk and Master at Carthage :
and issue an attachment 17 for the body of C D, returnable to the first

File this petition;
day of the next term of your Court. The Sheriff will take a bail-bond 18 from the defendant
for his appearance at the next term, in the penalty of one thousand dollars, 19 with two good
sureties, conditioned to be void if the defendant appear and file his answer to said petition,
on the first day of the next term, and do not depart from the Court without its leave.
August 20, 1891. B. M. Webb, Chancellor.
_
If the petition is presented in open Court, the order for the attachment will
be entered on the minutes, and will be substantially the same as the foregoing
iiat. Neither a fiat nor an order should contain any adjudication, that the de-
fendant has been guilty of the alleged contempt, but may allege that it appears
to the Court that there is a probable cause for an attachment. 20
Upon the appearance and answer of the contemner, or on the production of
his body, and refusal to answer, at the time and place designated, the Chancellor
will hear the case upon the petition, affidavits and exhibits, and the answer
thereto, in case the contemner answers and, if he fails to answer, then upon the
;
case made by the petition. For good cause shown, the Chancellor may give the
defendant further time to answer. 21 The answer of the defendant denying the
contempt, is not conclusive but evidence may be heard in support of the peti-
;
tion, and, also, in support of the answer. 22

If the contemner fail to appear as required by his bond, judgment will be ren-
dered thereon against him and his sureties, for the full amount thereof and an ;
alias attachment ordered to issue. In case an alias attachment is issued, and the
contemner arrested thereon, no bail shall be taken, unless the contemner show
good cause for his default, either before the Clerk and Master, 23 in vacation, or
before the Chancellor in term time. 24 If the party charged with the contempt
be in the custody of an offieer, or in jail, the Court, or Chancellor, may award a
writ of habeas corpus to bring him up to answer for his alleged misconduct. 25
§ 922. —
Punishment for Contempts. The punishment for extraordinary con-
tempts is by fine or imprisonment, or both, such fine, however, not to exceed
fifty dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten days. 26 But if the con-
tempt consist in an omission to perform an act ordered by the Court, which it
is yet in the power of the contemner to perform, he may be imprisoned until he
performs it. If the contempt consist in the performance of an act, forbidden by
an order of the Court, the contemner may be imprisoned until the act is rectified
by placing matters and person in statu quo, or by the payment of damages. 27
All attachments for the non-performance of decrees, are in the nature of an
tempts is for not performing a decree, no bail shall 19 If no penalty is fixed, it will be two hundred
be taken. Code, §§4110; 4481. and fifty dollars. Code, §4111.
15 In proceedings for contempt against 'a party to 20 2 BarbJ Ch. Pr., 276.
the suit to compel the defendant to answe-, or to .21 Ch. Rule, VII, § 2, sub-sec. 3; post, 1196.
enforce the performance of a decree, or order, the 22 See Underwood's --case, 2 Hum., 46. It is a
affidavits, both before and after the attachment, common practice to hear the testimony, orally, in
should be entitled in the original cause. In pro- open Court on the trial of a case of alleged contempt.
ceedings for contempt against witnesses, and others, The defendant is a competent witness.
who are not parties to the suit, the affidavits pre- 23 The statute reads "commissioner"; this is man-
vious to the order for the attachment should be ifestly a typographical error. See Code, §§ 4368;
entitled in the original cause; but all subssqucni 4375; 4420, sub-sec. 3.
affidavits should be entitled in the name of the State. 24 Ch. Rule, VII, § 2, sub-sec. 4. Sub-sec. 5 is
on the relation of the party prosecuting the attach- not clear. It can hardly mean that the Master may
ment, against the person prosecuted. 1 Barb. Ch. enter judgment on the bond in vacation, and award
execution thereon: and vet such is its language.
"lis Code, §§ 4434-443S. See, ante, § 872. 25 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 278.
17 For form of an attachment, see, § 202 ;
post, 26 Code, 5 4107.
27 Code, §5 4108-4109. See Violation of Injunc-
18 JBut no bail will be taken, if the contempt is tions; ante, §§ 845-848.
in not performing a decree. Code, §§ 4110; 4481.
§923 ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. 712
execution, on the service of which no bail is taken, but the party will be com-
mitted to jail, there to remain until he performs the decree.
28 witness who A
refuses to answer legal interrogatories, may be committed by the Court until
he consents to give his testimony. 29
ORDER OF COMMITMENT FOR NOT PERFORMING A DECREE.
A B,
vs.
C D.
The petition filed in this cause, praying an attachment against the defendant, C D, for not
performing the decree of the Court in this cause commanding him to execute to the complain-
ant a deed for the tract of land 30 described in said decree, coming on to be heard, and the
defendant being in Court, under arrest on the attachment heretofore issued against him on
said petition, and his answer to said petition showing no sufficient excuse for not performing
said decree, it is adjudged by the Court that the. defendant is in contempt for not performing
said decree and it is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the defendant be committed to the
;
jail of Smith county, there to remain until in presence of two proper witnesses he shall have
duly executed and acknowledged the deed specified in said decree, and exhibited in said peti-
tion, and that a mittimus issue accordingly.
The order of the Court convicting a party of a contempt should recite the
substance of the alleged misconduct, and that the defendant is guilty thereof.
The mittimus should follow the decree, and command the Sheriff "to take the
body of the said C D, and him safely and closely keep in' the jail of Smith
county, until he shall have duly executed and acknowledged the deed speci-
fied in the said decree." 31 The following is the form of a
MITTIMUS.
Smith county. j
To the Sheriff of said county
Whereas, in a cause in the Chancery Court of said county, wherein A
B is complainant and
C Dis defendant, it was ordered, at the May term, 1891, of said Court, that the said defend-
ant, C D, be committed to the jail of Smith county, there to remain until [he shall do what
the decree requires of him, here inserting the language of the order or decree of commitment.']
You are, therefore, hereby commanded to take the body of the said C D, and him safely
and closely keep in the said jail, until he shall have duly [complied with said order of com-
mitment, specifying what is required of him.}
As witness my hand, this May 20, 1891. C. W. Garrett, C. & M.
If any one is illegally committed for an alleged contempt, he may be dis-
charged on a habeas corpus. If legally committed, he cannot be discharged until
the time of his imprisonment has expired, if such time be limited by the order
of commitment but if he is imprisoned until he performs the decree, he cannot
;
he discharged until he has so done. He may, however, obtain a habeas corpus

from the Court, or the Chancellor in vacation, and be discharged upon purging
bis contempt, and upon such conditions in respect to his compliance with the
decree as the Chancellor may think proper. In such a case, the adverse party,
his agent or attorney, if in the State, is entitled to reasonable notice of the hear-
ing of the writ of habeas corpus, and may interrogate the party in contempt upon
his oath, and controvert the truth of his statements by other proof. 32
An appeal to the Supreme Court will lie from a judgment imposing either a
fine or imprisonment for a contempt committed not in the presence of the
Court. 33 If the contempt is in the presence of the Court, the defendant's rem-
edy in case of his conviction is by writ of error and supersedeas. 34
§ 923. Proceedings in Contempts Before the Master. If a witness, after —
having been duly summoned, fails to appear before the Master, he is guilty of a
28 Code, § 4481. Chancery Rule VII, it would imus should specify particularly how long the con-
seem, does not apply to contempts for not obeying temner is to be imprisoned, or what he is to do to
the decrees of the Court. entitle him to his discharge. Ibid.
29 Ch. Rule, VII, sub-sec. 7; post, 1196. Page v. 32 Code, §§ 4482-4483.
State, 11 Lea, 202. 33 Baxter V. Fleming, 6 Bax., 331.
30 The tract was situated in Kentucky, and the 34 Hunrlhausen n. Insurance Co., 5 Heisk., 702;
Court here could not divest and vest title, to land State V. Warner, 13 Lea, 52. In the latter case it is
there, by the operation of its own decree, propria intimated that even an appeal will lie in such a
vigore. case.
31 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 279; 374. The order and mitt-
713 ATTACHMENTS OF THE PERSON FOR CONTEMPT. § 924
contempt ; and, upon the return of an officer, or proof by affidavit, of such ser-
vice, it is the duty of the Master to issue an instanter attachment for such wit-
ness. The attachment should designate the penalty of the bail bond to be given
by the bond to be conditioned for his appearance before the Chan-
witness, the
cellor, at atime and place to be specified, if practicable, or before the Court at
the next succeeding term, if it be not then in session, to show cause why h«
should not be fined, or committed according to law for contempt. 35 The fol-
lowing is a form of such
AN ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT.
State of Tennessee,
To the Sheriff of Anderson county:
We command you to attach John Reckless so as to have his body [before our Chancellor at
the Clerk and Master's Clinton, on September 2, 1890, at 10 a. m., or,] before our
office, in
Chancery Court at Clinton, at its next term, then and there to show cause why he should not
be fined or committed according to law, for a contempt by him committed against the State,
in failing to appear before the Master, when summoned as a witness, in the case of B vs. A
CD.
You will take a bail-bond from said John Reckless, with two good sureties, in the penalty
of two hundred and fifty dollars, conditioned for his appearance at the time and place above
designated to show cause as aforesaid. Herein fail not, and have you then and there this
writ, with a return showing how you have executed the same.
Witness James C. Scruggs, Clerk and Master of said Court, at office in Clinton, August
18, 1891. James C. Scruggs, C. & M.
If a witness should appear before the Master, and refuse to answer legal
questions, it is the duty of the Master to commit him to jail, until he consents
to give his testimony. 36 In such cases, the mittimus should show on its face
that the witness is committed for refusing to answer legal interrogatories, and
shall require the Sheriff to safely and closely keep him in custody, in the county
jail, until he consents to give his testimony.
The Master, while engaged in taking depositions, is vested with all the pow-
ers of the Court to preserve order, prevent interruption, and control the con-
duct of the parties in the examination of witnesses, 37 and may summarily im-
pose a fine not exceeding ten dollars. 38
The Master may, on application of the complainant, issue an attachment
against a defendant for want of an answer, where the time for answering has
expired, and the defendant has been served with subpoena. 39
§ 924. —
Effect of a Contempt. He who seeks Equity must do Equity, and he
who has done iniquity shall not have Equity. Therefore, it is a general rule
that a party who is in contempt will not be heard by the Court, when he wishes
to make a motion or ask a favor and, if the contempt consists in his failure to
;
answer, he will not be allowed to file any other pleading, in the particular cause
wherein the contempt arose. His first duty is to purge his contempt, and the
only steps he can take are to apply to the Court (1) to set aside the proceedings
against him because they are irregular, and (2) to be discharged on the ground
that he has purged himself of his contempt, by doing the act for the non-per-
formance of which the contempt was incurred, and confessing judgment for the
costs occasioned by his contumacy. But a party in contempt in one cause, is not
thereby in contempt in another cause, even though the parties in such other
cause be the same; and he is free to make motions and to file pleadings in the
cause wherein he is not in contempt. 40 Nor will the fact that a party is in con-
tempt prevent him being heard in opposition to any special application or mo-
41
tion which the other side may make.
35 Ch. Rule, VII, sub-sec. 6; post, 1196. be punished for his contempt, on proper proceedings.
36 Ch. Rule, VII, sub-see. 7; Code, §3823. Code, § 4099, sub-ser. 2.
37 Code, §§3858; 4112. 39 Code, §4360; Ch. Rule, VII, sub-sec. 8; post,
38 Code, § 4107. If the imposition of a fine should § 1196. See, ante, § 201.
fail to preserve order, prevent interruption, or con-
40 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 281-282; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., SOS-
trol the conduct of any party examining a witness, SOS; Gaut «. Gaut, 10 Hum., 464; Rutherford V.
the Master should sue out a warrant for the arrest Metcalf, 5 Hay., 58. If a party file a pleading while
of the offender for obstructing the administration of in contempt, it will be stricken from the file on
justice. It would seem that the Master has no motion. Ibid,
power to commit the offender. But the Master may 41 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 282.
report the offender to the Court, and he may there
§ 925 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. 714
PART VIII.
PARTICULAR SUITS IN CHANCERY SPECIALLY
CONSIDERED:
CHAPTER XLVI.
SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS.
Article I. Suits in Relation to Express Trusts.
Article II. Suits in Relation to Resulting and Constructive Trusts.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS IN RELATION TO EXPRESS TRUSTS.

§ 925. Trusts Generally Considered. § 928. 'Answer of an Executor to a Bill for
§ 926. Cases of Express Trusts. an Accounting.
§ 927. Frame and Form of Bills in Cases of
Express Trusts. § 929. Suits to Construe Wills, or Trusts.
Trusts Generally Considered.

§ 925. —A
trust, in the most enlarged sense in
which that term is used in our jurisprudence, is a beneficial interest in property,
real or personal, distinct from the legal possession and ownership thereof. In
trusts, the legal title and possession of the property are in one person, called
a trustee the equitable title and beneficial use of the property are in another
;
person, called a cestui que trust, or beneficiary. The trustee holds the direct
and absolute dominion over the trust property, in the view of Courts at law
vhile, in the view of Courts of Equity, the trustee is a mere steward to hold,
manage and account for the proceeds of, trust property for the exclusive bene-
fit of the beneficiary. In the sight of a Court of law, the beneficiary has no in-
terest in the trust property while in the sight of a Court of Equity, the bene-
;
ficiary has all the enjoyable interest. In short, the trustee holds the legal title
and the possession of the trust property, but all the benefits arising from the
property, its income or profits, belong wholly, or in part, to the beneficiary. 1
As a general rule, property of every kind and form, real and personal, may
be made the subject of a trust. Any person, who has the capacity to hold and
riispose of property, can impress a trust upon it; and, generally, any person
capable of holding property, may be made a trustee, or a beneficiary. Courts
of Chancery have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters arising out of trusts of
{illkinds, express, resulting and constructive. 2
—
Cases of Express Trusts. Express trusts are those directly and
§ 926.
affirmatively created and declared (1) by the grantor; or (2) by a Court; or
(3) by operation of law coupled with the assent of the person assuming the
duties of the trust. The trusts devolved on special commissioners, receivers,
Clerks and other persons appointed to do some act or series of acts for another's
benefit, are instances where express trusts are created by a Court and the du- ;
ties devolved by the statutes upon administrators, executors, guardians and

public officers, especially those who give official bonds, are instances of express
trusts created by operation of law and the assent of the person assuming the
1 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §964 See, ante, §46. |
implied trusts, thus resolving all trusts into: (1) ex-
2 Resulting and constructive trusts are often called I
press trusts, and (2) implied trusts.
715 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. §927
duties. 3 The most common cases wherein a Court of Chancery is called upon to
act in relation to express trusts are suits: (1) to enforce marriage settlements,
mortgages and trust deeds to secure debts; (2) to enforce assignments of prop-
erty for the benefit of creditors; (3) to compel executors, administrators,
guardians, receivers, Clerks and all other express trustees, to account for and
pay over, to those entitled, the trust funds or other property that are, or should
be, in their hands; (4) to compel all such persons to faithfully execute and
carry out their trust duties of every character whatsoever, and, when necessary,
to remove them and appoint other trustees; and (5) to advise and direct execu-
tors, administrators with the will annexed, and other trustees as to the con-
struction or execution of a complicated or obscure will or other trust instru-
ment, especially where there is contention among the beneficiaries as to its
meaning.
§ 927. Frame and Form of Bills in Cases of Express Trusts. All express —
trusts result from relations, and reference is made to the various preceding
sections treating of relations in the framing of bills. 4 The draughtsman will
(1) state the relation of the defendant to the complainant as shown in the pre-
ceding sectian, and state how it was created; (2) will show what equitable
estate of the complainant the defendant is liable for; and (3) in what particu-
lar, or particulars, the defendant has failed to do his duty towards complainant
in reference to said estate and (4) will pray the Court to redress the wrongs
;
complainant has suffered, to compel the defendant faithfully to discharge his

trust, to order an account when necessary to ascertain the defendant's financial
liability, and to render a money decree against him when he is liable thereto.
BILL OF WARD AGAINSTI HIS GUARDIAN.
David Doe, a resident of Clay County, complainant,
vs.
John Doe, Richard Roe and Peter Poe, residents of Clay County, defendants.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §.§ 155; 164.]
i.
That he becameentitled to a valuable estate as a distributee of the estate of his father,

[giving his father's name], and being then a minor, the defendant, John Doe, became his
guardian, giving bond as such in the County Court of Clay county, with the defendants, Rich-
ard Roe and Peter Poe, as his sureties thereon. A
certified copy of said guardian bond and
of the record of said guardian's appointment will be read at the hearing of this cause, if
necessary.
ii.
the sums of money belonging to complainant that went, or should have gone, into the
That
hands of the said guardian amounted to, at least, the sum of two thousand dollars and com- ;
plainant reserves the right to show that the amount was much larger. The said guardian not
having made a full exhibit of his guardianship, and the facts being largely within his exclusive
knowledge, complainant is consequently unable, at present, to state with more definiteness the
exact amount received by his said guardian.
in.
said guardian failed to make his settlements with the County Court Clerk of said
That
County, as required by law; and when called on by complainant for a settlement, claimed
to have in his hands "only a few hundred dollars, not exceeding four hundred, if that," to
use his own language, and even this sum he has not paid, nor tendered to complainant.
IV.
Complainant being thus greatly wronged by the said John Doe, his guardian, and by the
said Richard Roe and Peter Poe, said guardian's sureties, comes into your Honor's Court of
Chancery, and prays
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, see, ante, §§158; 164].
2d. That said defendants answer this bill [but not on oath], and that the said John Doe,
set out in his answer, or file as an exhibit thereto, a full, complete and detailed statement of
each and every sum by him received as guardian of complainant, when and from whom re-
ceived, and in what manner the same was invested or applied.
3d. That an account be taken and stated by the Master to show what estate of complainant
said guardian received, and what balance he owes the complainant, and that complainant have
a decree for such balance against all of the defendants.
3 See cases cited in 3 King's Dig., § 5121, and 1 I * See, ante, §§ 165; 167-169.
Meigs' Dig., § 553. I
§928 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. 716
4th. That, if it turns out that said guardian has made any settlement with the County
Court Clerk, said settlement be set aside and a new settlement or account be made in your
Honor's Court, and that on such new settlement the guardian be charged compound interest.
Sth. And that complainant may have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to
Bob Cox, Solicitor.
BILL FOR DISTRIBUTIVE SHAKE.
To Hon. George E. Seay, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at Gallatin:
John Doe and David Doe, residents of Sumner county, complainants,
vs.
Richard Roe, administrator of Daniel Doe, deceased, and Robert Roe
and George Smith, all residents of Sumner county, defendants.
i.
That Daniel Doe died, intestate, in Sumner county on March 10, 1888; and letters of ad-
ministration on his estate were taken out in said county by the defendant, Richard Roe, on
April 3, 1888. The defendants, Robert Roe and George Smith, are the sureties of said Rich-
ard Roe on his bond as said administrator.
ii.
Complainants are the sole distributees of the estate of said Daniel Doe, deceased, and
are entitled to the whole of said estate, after all lawful debts, charges, and other claims against
the same have been paid. The assets of said estate are largely more than sufficient to pay
said debts, charges, and claims and there remains a large balance in the hands of said admin-
;
istrator, which he fails and refuses to pay over to complainants, said balance being about
•eight hundred dollars.
in.
The premises considered, complainants pray
1st. That process issue to bring the defendants into Court and make them answer this bill,
but their oaths to their answers are waived.
2d. That an account be taken to show how much said administrator is indebted to com-
plainants and that a decree be rendered against him, and his co-defendants as his said sure-
;
ties, for the amount found to be due complainants; and

3d. For general relief.
John Doe,
David Doe.
[The bill must be verified by affidavit, as in §789, ante.]
§ 928. Answer of an Executor to a Bill for an Accounting. When a bill is —

fled against an administrator, executor, guardian or other trustee, he should
display no resentment in his answer, unless his integrity is assailed, and even
then a dignified response is most proper. He should remember that he-is hand-
ling other people's money, and knows all the facts relative thereto, while the
beneficiaries may know little or nothing, and that a bill in Chancery is often
the best method of obtaining the information they desire. The following is a
form of an
ANSWER OF AW EXECUTOR TO BILL BY DISTRIBUTEES.!*
[For title and commencement, see, ante, §380].
I.
That he admits the death of George Doe, the father of complainants, and that he left a
will which has been duly probated, and that this defendant has qualified as executor thereof,
having been appointed in and by said will, and is now discharging his duties as such, and ex-
ecuting said will.
ii.
This defendant also admits that complainants are the heirs and distributees of said testator,
and that his co-defendants, Henry Roe and William Roe, are legatees under said will, and
that his co-defendant, Mary Doe, is the widow and a legatee of said testator.
in.
Further answering, the defendant says that he duly filed with the County Court Clerk of
Knox county a just, true, and perfect inventory 6 of all the goods and chattels of his testator,
properly verified and in due course of administration has made sale of the same to the
;
highest bidder, and returned to said Clerk a true account of such sale duly sworn to, which the
County Court ordered to be recorded. 7 This defendant is also collecting all notes, accounts
and debts due or belonging to his testator, and is liquidating his testator's indebtedness as
rapidly as possible; and defendant refers the complainants to said inventory and account for
further and fuller information relative thereto; and says they show all the gosds and chattels,
rights and credits, accounts and choses in action that came into his hands as such executor.
This is not intended as an answer to the fore- I 6 Code, §2241.

going bill. 7 Code, §§ 2243-2244.
717 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. § 929
Further answering, this defendant says that he is greatly delayed in his execution of said
will, and in the settlement of said estate, by the pendency of several suits against him as ex-*
ecutor, one of said suits pending in the Chancery Court at Knoxville, and the other in the
Circuit Court at Clinton; the former suit seeks to recover an alleged debt of about four
thousand dollars, and the latter suit is instituted to recover the testator's coal mine near
Briceville, in Anderson county; and if either suit is successful the testator's estate will be
insolvent, and there will be nothing' due the complainants except such interest as they may
h.ave, if any, in the exempt property, real and personal.
v.
Further answering, the defendant denies that he has wasted any of his testator's
assets, or failed to take all necessary and proper steps to possess himself of all of his testa-
tor's estate and he would be obliged to the complainants, if they or any of them, will point
;
out to him any asset not reduced to possession by this defendant, or any claim against the
estate as to which there is a good defence; and this defendant can but regard their failure
so to do in the past, or failure to specify in their bill any act of waste, neglect, mispayment,
or other breach of trust, as good evidence of his correct discharge of his duties as executor,
VI.
Further answering, this defendant says that he admits there are serious complications in
said will, and grave doubts as to the proper interpretation of parts thereof, and he believes
that it will be necessary to have your Honor construe said will if it should turn out that
said estate is solvent; but this defendant did not deem it wise and proper to file a bill for
such construction and advice as long as there were doubts whether there would be any part
of said estate left after said suits were ended, and all of testator's debts were paid, especially
as the doubtful parts of said will applied to the residue of the estate after certain legacies
and preferred bequests had been paid.
VII.
In conclusion, this defendant says he is perfectly willing and really glad to have a chance
to submit to your Honor what he has done and is doing as executor, and to have all accounts
taken, by your Honor deemed necessary; but he is advised that complainant's bill is prema-
turely filed, and might have been demurred to on that ground, but this defendant deemed it his
duty as executor to submit, at any time when called on, a statement of what he has done and
is doing, and therefore he has answered.
And having fully answered, he prays to be dismissed with his costs.
Jas. C. Ford, Solicitor. Richard Roe, Executor.
§ 929. —
Suits to Construe Wills, or Trusts. An executor, or administrator
with the will annexed, or a trustee, is not required to run risks arising from a
reasonable doubt or doubts as to the meaning of the instrument he is required
to execute, especially if antagonistic parties in interest are insisting upon an-
tagonistic constructions and he can file a bill in the Chancery Court, making
;
all the parties interested in, or claiming under, the instrument parties defend-
ant, and have the instrument construed, and his path blazed out for him. The
Court will, also, in such a case, on his application, allow him to execute his
trusts under the direction of the Court, in the same cause.
The bill, in such a case, is in the ordinary form, and the following statement
of a case, and the consequent prayers, will show their special character
BILL TO CONSTRUE A WILL, OB A TRUST.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
i.
That he is the executor of the will of A

B, [or .the trustee of a trust created by the deed
of A. B.] Said will was duly probated [or said deed was duly registered] on April 4, 1905,
and is exhibited hereto, marked A, and made a part hereof; and complainant has given bond
?nd security and duly qualified to carry out and administer the trusts imposed on him by
said will [or deed.]
ii.
That complainant hoped he would be able to execute said will [or trust] without any
special trouble but so it is grave doubts have sprung up in his mind as to the true meaning,
;
intent, purport and construction of the following portion of said will [or trust Here set
:
it out in full, giving its very words, spelling, punctuation, &c]

Complainant was of opinion that said paragraph meant [so and so, giving his construction
thereof.] But so it is the defendant A
insists that it means [so and so, giving A's contention;]
'
and he demands of complainant that [complainant shall do so and so, stating what A's claim
is under the will or trust.] On the other hand, the defendant B insists that both complainant
and said A are wrong in their construction of said will [or trust;] and insists that it means.
§930 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. 718
[so and so, stating B's contention in full.] Complainant further shows to the Court that [here
slate any other construction given by any other person interested in said paragraph. one No
r.ot interested can be heard.]
in.
Complainant is advised that the following part of said will [or deed] is so indefinite that
he cannot safely act on any construction he may give it, to-wit: [Here set out the part re-
ferred to.] Complainant is, also, advised that it is his duty to apply to your Honor for ad-
vice and direction, to the end that he may so discharge the trust created by said paragraph,
and all the other doubtful paragraphs and provisions of said will [or trust], that none of the
parties interested therein may suffer loss, and that he, himself, may riot become liable as the
result of an error of his judgment.
IV.
[After stating various parts of the will {or trust) needing construction, and giving
all the
fairly and fully the contentions of those interested in the construction; and after the usual
prayers for process, then add:] 2d. Complainant further prays that said will, [or trust] be
established, and the trusts therein performed, and the rights and interests of all parties under
the same be declared. 3d. Complainant further prays the Court to construe the aforesaid
portions of said will, [or trust;] and to state clearly what are complainant's duties thereunder,
and what the rights of the contending defendants are, if any, thereunder; and, in order that
complainant may be relieved from all risks and liabilities incident to the contentions, and
conflicting rights and claims, of the defendants, he prays the Court to retain the cause in
Court until said will [or trust] shall have been fully executed and performed, and all of com-
plainant's duties and trusts fully executed and performed, to the end that complainant
may, then, also, obtain his discharge as executor [administrator with the will annexed, or
trustee,] and his release from all liability as such thereafter; and for such further and other
relief as he may be entitled to.
Horace Maykard, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit and jurat as in § 789, ante.]
ARTICLE II.
SUITS IN RELATION TO RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS.

§ 930. Cases of Resulting Trusts. § 931. Cases of Constructive Trusts.
§ 930. —
Cases of Resulting Trusts. Resulting trusts are those which arise
where the legal estate is disposed of, or acquired, without bad faith, and under
such circumstances that equity infers or assumes that the beneficial interest in
said estate is not to go with the legal title. These trusts are sometimes called
presumptive trusts, because the law presumes them to be intended by the par-
ties, from the nature and character of their transactions. They are, however,
generally called resulting trusts, because the trust is the result which Equity
attaches to the particular transaction. 1
Resulting trusts arise 1, When property is conveyed, or devised, on some
:
trust which fails, in whole or in part 2, When land is conveyed to a stranger

;
without any consideration, and without any use, or trust, declared; 3, Where
the property is purchased and the title taken in the name of one person, but the
purchase price is paid by another; and 4, Where the purchaser pays for the
land but takes the title, in whole or in part, in the name of another. 2
BILL TO ESTABLISH A RESULTING TRUST.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§155; 164.]
I.
That, relying on the friendship and integrity of the defendant, he placed in his hands on
1 1 Perry on Trusts, § 124; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § Equity imputes to him an intention to discharge this
1030-1031. No one is presumed to intend to part duty. When the consideration, or purpose, for
with his property, and especially his land, without which a conveyance is made fails, or in any way
j
some consideration and he who furnishes the con-

; becomes ineffectual, the bargainor is deemed in
sideration-money is presumed to intend to acquire Equity to intend that the legal title shall revert to
a corresponding beneficial interest in the lands pur- him.
chased therewith. So, when the consideration-money
. These general principles determine nearly all the
is trust funds, or belongs to another, the person buy- questions arising in cases of resulting trusts
ing property therewith is presumed to intend that 2 2 Sto. Eq. Tur. §§ 1196-1210; 2 Pom. Eq'., lur.,
the purchase shall enure to the benefit of the person §§ 1032-1043. Resulting trusts may be, and generally
who is beneficial owner of the purchase-money paid. are, proved by parol. The following are some illus-
Reason and conscience so determine his duty, and trations of trusts set up by parol in our Courts: 1,
the 10th day of April, 1905, the sum of one thousand dollars, [or whatever it was complainant
gave defendant in money, or other property; if property, describe it particularly,), under an
agreement that the defendant would invest the same in a tract of land for the sole use and
benefit of complainant, and take the deed in complainant's name. [// any particular kind of
land was to be bought, as land for farming, or coal mining, or manufacturing, or building-
sites, so state.]
ii.
That it was a and an express condition of said deposit,
distinct part of said agreement,
that the defendant was
to be merely the agent of complainant, was to take the title to the
land when purchased, in complainant's name, and it was at no time contemplated by complain-
ant that the defendant was to take the title in his own name, nor was there any suggestion,
or talk, of that kind.
in.
That the defendant, on the 15th of April, 1905, in pursuance of said agreement, purchased
from one John Jones, the following tract of land. [Here, describe it by location, corners,
courses and distances, as set out in the deed to the defendant, and give the location.] The
complainant paid for said land, as appears from the face of the deed made to him for said
land, the sum of one thousand dollars, but whether he paid that amount or less, complainant
has no knowledge, and calls on the defendant to prove what was paid.
IV.
That, in violation of his agreement with complainant, the defendant took the title of said
tract of land to himself as though he was the real purchaser, the name and interest of com-
plainant not appearing, nor being in any way mentioned in said deed. A certified copy of
said deed is filed with the bill, marked Exhibit A.
v.
That since said deed was executed and delivered
to the defendant, said tract of land has
greatly appreciated in value in consequence of the building of a railroad in its vicinity,
[or in consequence of some other fact, stating what it is. But no claim of appreciation of
value is essential to the bill, such an appreciation, if any, being alleged merely as complain-
ant's explanation of defendants bad faith in the matter.]
VI.
That on complainant discovering that the defendant had taken to himself the title to said
land, and had the deed made to himself, he called on the defendant to transfer the title and
possession of said land to him, and offered to pay the costs of such transfer, and to pay the
registration fee, and taxes, growing out of said conveyance to the defendant, but the defendant
refused to make said transfer unless he was paid five hundred dollars for his services in
buying said land and he claimed that he had bought said land for himself, and said he would
;
refund to complainant said sum of one thousand dollars, which he admitted he had paid
said John Jones for the land.
VII.
The premises considered complainant prays
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c. See, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2d. That the complainant be adjudged to be the equitable owner of said tract, and to be
entitled to the legal ownership and possession thereof and that all the title and interest of the
;
defendant in and to said land be divested out of him and vested in complainant in fee simple,
and that he be given a deed therefor, and writ of possession.
3d. That complainant have such further and other relief as the nature of his case may
require. A. J. Agee, Solicitor.
The bill need not be sworn to unless some extraordinary relief is prayed. If
the defendant has received any rents, or profits, from the property, it should
be alleged, and an account should be prayed, and, in a proper case, a receiver.
If the defendant is trying to sell the property, that should be alleged, and an
injunction prayed to prevent him.
DECREE ESTABLISHING A RESULTING TRUST.
[For title, commencement and recitals, see, ante, § 567.]
On
consideration whereof the Court is of opinion and doth adjudge and decree that the
tract of land described in the bill was purchased and paid for by the defendant with com-
plainant's money, given him by complainant in trust, and that, therefore, an equitable title to
said land results to complainant, and that he has the right to have the legal title to said land.
Where land was purchased with partnership funds, Where there is an agreement for the redemption of
but title taken in the name of the purchasing partner; real estate sold at a judicialsale, or under a trust
2, Where a deed by father to son is shown to be for deed; and 7, Where a deed absolute on its face
the benefit of the mother;'. 3, Where a devise to A,, was intended as a mortgage. 3 King's Dig., § 5139.
is proved to be for 'the benefit of B; 4, Where a hus- But, in such cases, the proof must be most convinc-
band sells his wife's property on an agreement to ing and irrefragable. Hyden V. Hyden, 6 Bax., 406.
invest the proceeds for her benefit, but takes the title That is, the presumption in favor of the writing is
in his own name; 5, Where a judgment creditor strong, and it requires strong proof to overcome it.
buys in property at a judicial sale under a parol See, ante, §§ 445-447.
agreement to hold it as security for the debt; 6,
§ 931 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. 720'
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that all the right, title and claim of the
defendant in and to the tract of land described in the bill lying in the civil district of
county, and bounded as follows [insert courses and distances,] be, and the same is,
:
hereby divested out of him and vested in complainant in fee simple and the Clerk and Master ;
will make to him, and acknowledge for registration, a deed conveying said land to him in
fee simple.
The defendant will pay all the costs of the cause, for which an execution is awarded. A
writ of possession will issue instanter to put complainant in possession of said tract of land.
§ 931. Cases of Constructive Trusts. Constructive trusts are so called be- —
cause they are constructed by Courts of Equity in order to satisfy the de-
mands of justice, without reference to any presumable intention of the par-
ties 3 they include cases 1, Where a person procures the legal title to property
;
:
in violation of some duty, express or implied, to the true owner or, 2, Where ;
title to property is obtained by fraud, duress, or other inequitable means; or,

3, Where a person makes use of some relation of influence or confidence to ob-
tain the legal title upon more advantageous terms than could otherwise have
been obtained; or, 4, Where a person acquires property with notice that an-
other is entitled to its benefits. In all such cases, Equity, for the purpose of
doing justice in the most efficient manner, constructs a trust out of the trans-
action, and makes a trustee out of the person thus acquiring the title. 4
The most common illustrations of constructive trusts are the following: 1,
Where another's property has been wrongfully, and with notice of his rights,
converted into a different form; 2, Where one party has, with notice, obtained
money or securities which equitably belong to another 3, Where the legal title ;
to property is held merely as a security, as when an absolute deed is really a

mortgage; 4, Where an executor, administrator, guardian or other trustee,
ruakes profits out of the trust fund or estate 5, Where a partner or trustee ob- ;
tains in his own name the renewal of a firm or trust lease 6, Where a purchaser ;
at a forced sale undertakes to buy in property for the debtor, or for his heirs,
or for the benefit of a creditor 7, Where an administrator, executor, guardian,
;
or other trustee, wrongfully acquires the trust property, by purchase from

himself, or otherwise 8, Where a person acquires trust property with notice,
;
or without consideration; 9, Where a personal representative pays legatees or

distributees before creditors; 10, Where a corporation distributes its capital
stock without paying its debts 11, Where a vendee does not pay for the land
;
12, Where an advantageous contract has been obtained from a person under
age, intoxicated, or of weak mind 13, Where an advantageous bargain has been
;
obtained by means of a relation of trust, confidence, or undue influence 14, ;
Where property has been obtained by fraud, duress, or by means of an uncon-

scientious bargain 15, Where a devise or legacy has been prevented by fraud
;
and 16, Where, in any other case, a person fraudulently prevents an act from
being done. 5
BILL TO ENFORCE A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, BY HAVING A DEED DECLARED
A MORTGAGE.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 1SS; 164.]
i.
That on the day of , — [give the date

19 ,
of land [describe
the deed was made,] he was the owner
of the following tract [or lot] : it.]
II.
That being greatly in debt, and harrassed by his creditors, and having no money, he applied
3 Smith's Eq. Jur , 178. extract a right therefrom. Whenever, therefore, a
* 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.', §1044; 1 Perry on Trusts, § person takes the title to such property, or its profits
166. or proceeds, in his own name, in violation of this
Whoever deals, in any way, with property which implied contract, a Court of Equity will specifically
another owns, or has a beneficial interest in, with execute the contract by dealing with him as a trus-
notice of such ownership or interest, impliedly con- tee, and treating him as one intending to do right,
tracts that he will do nothing prejudicial to the rights rather than as one intending to perpetrate a fraud.
of such other person; and that he will, in all his In other words, Equity puts a charitable construction
dealings with such property and its profits and_ pro- upon his conduct, ana thus converts his misconduct
ceeds, do whatever good reason and good conscience into what is called a constructive trust.
require. Equity imputes to every person an inten- 5 2Sto. Eq. Jur., §§1195-1294; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
tion to fulfil his obligations, and will not allow any- §§ 1044-1058; and see "Trusts" in our Digests.
one to talte an advantage of his own wrong, or to
to the defendant for counsel and assistance, which he pretended to be very willing to give;
and after much conversation and the suggestion of various plans, it was agreed that the
defendant would" advance complainant enough money to satisfy his most urgent creditors, and
that he would go complainant's security on notes of hand to his other creditors, and that
defendant should be 'secured for the money actually advanced, and indemnified against loss
on said notes by a mortgage on complainant's said tract [or lot] of land.
in.
That on the day after said agreement had been made, but before any steps had been taken
under it, defendant brought to complainant an absolute deed for said land, stating that it was
a simpler way to settle their affairs, that he did not know how to draw a mortgage, and that
as soon as he, defendant, was fully paid he would deed said tract [or lot] of land back to
complainant.
IV.
That complainant was dissatisfied with this change in the agreement, but being depressed
by his circumstances, and comforted by the repeated assurances of the defendant that every-
thing would come out all right, he executed said deed, and delivered it to defendant, and it
has been duly registered.
v.
That about three months after said transaction complainant, having some money, offered
to pay one of said notes, when, to his surprise, he was informed that the defendant had paid
it. Complainant, thereupon, went to the holders of said other notes, and learned from them
that their notes had all been paid by the defendant. [If any of said notes were discounted,
state the fact, and the rates of such discount,]
VI.
That complainant, thereupon, went to see defendant in order to have an understanding as
to the sum total he owed him, when, to his great surprise, the defendant insisted on being
allowed, not only the benefit of said discount, but also, either two hundred dollars for his
services, or fifteen per cent, interest on the money he had advanced. This insistence caused
some angry words, and the conference was ended by defendant declaring complainant could
do as he chose as he, the defendant, had the farm, [or lot,] and could do with it as he chose.
VII.
That, much alarmed, complainant went to another friend, who agreed to pay defendant off,
and take a deed of trust on said tract of land but when they went to the defendant, he
;
refused to take the principal and interest due him; said the title to said tract [or lot] was in
him, and that he and complainant should settle their affairs by themselves, or they would not
be settled at all.
VIII.
Complainant therefore prays :
'
1st. That subpoena to answer issue, [&c. See, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2d. That said deed to defendant be declared a mortgage, and the amount due the defendant
ascertained, so complainant can pay it into Court.
3d. That defendant be enjoined from selling or encumbering said tract [or lot] of land.
4th. That complainant have such other, further and general relief as his case may justify,
and to your Honor may seem meet.
W. R. Peters, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit. See, ante, §§ 161 ; 164.]
The complainant may, in his bill, tender the amount due defendant, in which
case he must bring the money into Court, and deliver it to the Clerk and Master
when he files his bill, and take a receipt for the amount tendered and paid in
let the receipt show it is for money tendered in the cause.
If the decree is may be
for complainant on the foregoing bill, it as follows
DECREE DECLARING A DEED TO BE A MORTGAGE.
I.
On consideration whereof it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the deed referred to
in the pleadings was intended as, and is, merely a security for the money advanced and notes
signed by the defendant as surety, and is declared to be in equity a mortgage that complain- ;
ant is liable to the defendant only for the real sums paid by the defendant, in discharge of
said notes, and for interest on the cash advanced by defendant, and on the sums actually
paid on said notes, and it being agreed, without a reference, 6 that the sum total of said pay-
ments by the defendant, principal and interest, is sixteen hundred and seventy-one dollars,
it is so adjudged and decreed.
II.
It is further ordered and adjudged and decreed that said sum is a lien on said tract [or
The usual course in such a case is to refer to I the Master the question as to the amount of the in-
I debtedness.
§ 931 SUITS IN RELATION TO TRUSTS. 722
lot]of land, and that, unless it, and accruing interest, are paid into Court, in sixty days, the
Clerk and Master will sell said tract, [or lot] of land, on a credit of six, twelve, eighteen,
and twenty-four months, [&c, see, ante, §626.]
m.
All further questions are reserved until the incoming of the Master's report of sale, or
his report that complainant has paid said sum into Court.
At the next term, if the money has been paid into Court, it will be decreed to
the defendant, and all the right, title and interest he has in and to said tract
[or lot] of land will be divested out of him, and vested in complainant, and
the Master directed to make complainant a deed therefor. If the money has
not been paid, the sale of the land will be confirmed, and out of the proceeds,
the amount due the defendant, less the costs of the cause, will be paid, and the
balance, if any, paid to complainant. The costs of the cause will be adjudged
against the defendant, if the Chancellor deems it proper.
723 SUITS ARISING PROM FRAUDS. §932
CHAPTER XLVI.
SUITS ARISING PROM FRAUDS, ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES.
Article I. Suits Arising from Actual Frauds.
Article II. Suits Arising from Constructive Frauds.
Article III. Suits Arising from Accidents and Mistakes.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS ARISING FROM ACTUAL FRAUDS.
932. The Rationale of the Law as to Fraud, § 934. Frame and Form of Bills in Suits to
Accident and Mistake. Undo Fraud.
933. Suits in Cases Resulting From Actual § 935. Frame and Form of Bills to Set Aside
Frauds. Judgments or Decrees for Fraud.
§ 932. of the Law as to Fraud, Accident and Mistake. Every

The Rational —
person who has
business dealings with another has the right to expect that he
will, in every matter connected with such dealings, do whatever good reason
and good conscience require. Indeed, each party to a business transaction,
before entering upon any negotiations relative thereto, impliedly contracts
with the other or others that, in making and performing his engagements hon-
esty, frankness and fidelity will characterize his conduct. 1
In consequence of the mutual consciousness of this implied obligation, neither
party to an express contract, ordinarily, deems it necessary to inquire of the
others, whether such is the understanding. If such inquiry should be made,
the party interrogated would almost invariably respond with an emphatic af-
firmative, accompanied with emotions or expressions of real or pretended indig-
nation because of the implication of distrust contained in the question. This
implied contract not only precedes and enters into every express contract, but
every express contract is impliedly conditioned upon its faithful performance.
If this fundamental antecedent implied contract is analyzed it will be found
to contain the following elements:
1. Neither party will make to the other any material representations concern-
ing the subject-matter of the contract that are not true. 2
2. Neither party will conceal from the other anything, within his knowledge,
material to the subject-matter of the contract, that the other party ought to
know, and cannot easily ascertain by himself. 3
3. Neither party has done, nor will do, anything to hinder, delay or defeat a
4
faithful compliance with the contract on his part.
4. If one of the parties has trust or confidence specially reposed in him by
1 The law requires good faith in all transactions was any intention to deceive or not, and where a
between man and man. Craddock u. Cabiness, 1 loss must happen to one of two parties it must be
Swann, 483, ante, § 58. Bad faith is treason to man- borne by him whose conduct occasioned it. Hence it
kind, and if generally practiced would destroy human is a settled rule in Equity that where a person makes
society. See, ante, § 48. Pide abrogata, omnis hu- a statement of fact which is actually untrue, and
mana societas tollitur. (Good faith abolished, all
.
he has at the time no knowledge of the matter, he is
human society is destroyed.) chargeable with fraud and his claim that he be-
;
2 While atlaw before a misrepresentation can be lieved in the truth of his statement is wholly imma-
fraudulent, it must be made with a guilty knowledge terial. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 887. A person, however,
is allowed to fairly commend.
of its falsity, in Equity such knowledge .is not nec- Simplex commendatio
essary. A person making' an untrue statement, with- non obligat.
Suppressio
out knowing or believing it to be untrue, and without S veri est suggestio falsi. Fraus est
any intent to deceive, may be chargeable with actual celare fraudem.
fraud in Equity. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§884-885. The 4 Afraudulent conveyance to defeat a creditor vio-
injury to the other party is the same, whether there lates this implied contract.
§933 SUITS ARISING FROM FRAUDS. 724
the other, or has special power or influence over the person or property of the
other, he will not avail himself of these advantages to the other 's detriment.
5. The express contract when finally agreed on, if to be reduced to writing,
shall be so worded as to express the real meaning of the contract and shall ;
be so executed, as to formalities, as to make the contract obligatory, and en-

forceable in Court.
6. If the contract has been reduced to writing, and by accident or mistake,
fails to express correctly the contract really made, at the request of the party
injured the other party will consent so to reform the writing as to make it con-
form to the contract.
7. After the contract has been consummated, each party will, in good faith,
do all that the contract requires of him.
8. Neither party will take advantage of any material mistake by the other
concerning the subject-matter of the contract, or his rights or duties relative
thereto, such mistake having materially influenced his consent to the contract,
and not being the result of any negligence or bad faith on his part.
9. Neither party will insist upon the other doing anything not fairly required
of him by the contract.
10. If the contract is in writing and should be lost or destroyed, it will be re-
executed, if required by either party having an existing interest in it.
11. If the performance of the contract is, or becomes, impossible by reason of
its very nature, or of something wholly uncontemplated by either, or wholly
beyond the power of the performer to provide against, then performance, so
far as impossible, is to be excused.
The first six elements of the implied contract above set forth are conditions
precedent, and the last five are conditions subsequent. It is, also, an element
of the implied antecedent contract, that
12. If any of the implied conditions precedent are violated, the party thereby
injured shall have the right to rescind the contract; and that
13. If any of the implied conditions subsequent are violated, the party there-
by injured will be compensated and made whole by the other.
Violations of the first four elements of the implied contract are frauds viola- ;
tions of the other elements constitute inequitable conduct all of such violations
:
are redressible in the Chancery Court.

§ 933. Suits in Cases Resulting From Actual Fraud. Fraud, in the sense of—
a Court of Equity, properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments, which
involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, or of trust or confidence justly re-
posed, and which are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconsci-
entious advantage is taken of another. 5
Actual fraud is the intentional doing or saying of something, or the inten-
tional concealment of something, material to a business transaction, by a party
thereto, whereby the other party is induced to act or not to act, to his injury,
the former party contemplating such a result, or such a result being the reason-
able and natural consequence of his conduct. The following are illustrations
of actual frauds, and of how they will be relieved against in Equity 1, Deeds, :
mortgages, contracts, notes, bonds, wills, settlements, and other writings, ob-
tained, or executed, or surrendered or cancelled, in whole or in part, as the
result of fraud by the defendant upon the complainant, will be reformed, re-
executed, cancelled, delivered up, enjoined, executed, or otherwise dealt with
as may be necessary for the protection or enforcement of the complainant's
rights; 2, Judgments, or decrees, or awards obtained, or cancelled, or dis-
charged, as the result of fraud on the part of the defendant, will be enjoined
5 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §187; Belcher v. Belcher; 10 The result is the term has an element of elasticity
Yerg. 131, Smith V. Harrison, 2 Heisk., 243. Courts that enables the Court to adapt it to all the various
of Equity refuse to define fraud, preferring to be left exigencies resulting from the manifold devices re-
unshackled by definition in their contests with this sorted to in order to obtain some undue advantage.
Protean adversary of good conscience and good faith. See Smith v. Harrison, 2 Heisk., 242.
725 SUITS ARISING PROM FRAUDS. § 934
or enforced as the complainant's rights may require; 3, Money, or other prop-
erty, obtained by the defendant through fraud will be declared a trust fund
] or complainant's benefit, and the defendant, and all claiming under him, not
bona fide purchasers, will be compelled to surrender it, or account for it and 4, ;
A deed, or other contract, obtained by the defendant at a shockingly inadequate

consideration, especially if accompanied with circumstances showing imposition
or undue advantage, will be set aside. 6
§ 934. Frame and Form of Bills in Suits to Undo Fraud. All frauds grow —
out of relations, and are those violations of the duties arising from relations, 7
caused by bad faith. Therefore, in drawing a bill in a suit based on the fraud-
ulent conduct of the defendant
1st. Specify the relations between him and the complainant, their nature and
origin, whether imposed by kinship, law, or social duty, or arising from con-
tract, express or implied.
2d. State particularly, and in circumstantial detail, in what way the de-
fendant took advantage of those relations, and wherein he violated the confi-
dence complainant reposed in him, and in what manner he deceived complain-
ant, and by what misrepresentation, concealment, or other act or acts of bad
faith obtained from him money, property, or a contract, or a release, or dis-
charge from some contract or obligation, or deceitfully or treacherously engi-
neered complainant into a situation wherein he has suffered, or must suffer,
loss, and the defendant has obtained, or will obtain, a benefit.
3d. Show what action of the Court is necessary to neutralize the effects of
the defendant's inequitable conduct, and restore complainant to his rights, and
make him whole and specify what extraordinary process, such as an injunction,
;
attachment or receiver, is necessary the better to secure his rights and property,
and stay the inequitable conduct of the defendant and detail the facts and ;
circumstances justifying such remedies.

4th. Then pray for all ordinary and extraordinary process needed, and for a
decree undoing the defendant's acts of bad faith and giving complainant what
he is entitled to, and requiring the defendant to do, or praying the Court to do,
everything necessary to put complainant as nearly in statu quo as possible,
under the circumstances and when a money equivalent is necessary, onerating
;
the defendant with the payment of as much money to the complainant as may
be requisite to make complainant perfectly whole.
5th. And, finally, pray for general relief, and state that your bill is the first
application for an injunction, attachment and receiver, or any one or more of
those writs, in the case.
Be particular to give in full the facts and circumstances constituting the
breaches of good faith, for the Court will pay no attention to general charges
of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, deceit, and imposition, when unac-
companied by the details and particulars thereof. 8
A large proportion of the suits in Chancery considered under other heads in
this book could well be considered under the head of fraud, actual or construc-
tive but are considered elsewhere for convenience of treatment and of refer-
;
ence.
BILL TO SET ASIDE A DEED, OR OTHER INSTRUMENT, FOR FRAUD.
[For address and caption, see ante, § 155-164.]
i.
That on the....day [insert the date of the deed, or other instrument, was made,}
of....l9....
he owned [in fee, and was in possession, if such be the fact,] the following house and lot [or
farm, or other property] real or personal describe it fully; see, ante, § 172.]
:
ii.
That on said day he was induced by the defendant to sell and convey [or mortgage, or
6 See 2 Sto. Eq. Jur %% 186-257; 2 Pom. Eq- Jur.,
. An examination of these sections will be of benefit.
I
$5 872-909; and "Fraud" in our Digests. See, also, ante, 5 408.

7 For the nature of relatives, see, ante, §§ 165-169. I 8 See, ante, §§ 142, sub-sec., 3; 838.
give a deed of trust on, or a bill of sale for] said house and lot [or farm, or other property
described in paragraph i.] to him for the consideration of [here specify the consideration.]
That [Here show whereof the fraud consisted, such as (1), a consideration that was worth-
less; (2), a promise never performed and never intended to be performed; (3), other prop-
erty to which he had no title; (4), note of hand on insolvent parties represented by him to be
solvent; (5), bank notes, or other notes, worthless for any reason, stating the reason; (6),
or that complainant was made drunk; or (7), put under duress by threats, or false representa-
tion of danger of arrest; or (8), that the consideration was a bet, or money
lost in gambling;
or (9), some other illegal or immoral consideration. Explain fully, and
in detail, all the par-
ticulars and circumstances of the fraud alleged, and if any relations of trust or confidence
existed between complainant and defendant be particular to set them forth.] 9
IV.
That [If there be any facts or circumstances sufficient to awaken a reasonable apprehension
that the property may be sold by the defendant, specify them as grounds for an injunction.
Also specify any acts of waste committed, or being committed by him, especially sales or
destruction of timber.]
Complainant therefore prays:
1st. That subpeena to answer issue, [&c, see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That said deed [bill of sale, mortgage, deed of trust, or other writing,] be declared
void as having been obtained by the fraud of the defendant; that all right, title and interest
of the defendant to said house and lot [or other property described in paragraph i,] be di-
vested out of the defendant and vested in complainant, and that complainant be put in pos-
session thereof.
That [If the facts justify an injunction or receiver,] an injunction issue to restrain
and inhibit the defendant from selling or encumbering said property, or committing any
v-aste thereon, and that a receiver be appointed to take possession of said property, and of
its rents or profits, pending this suit.
4th. That complainants recover of the defendant the rents and profits of said property
while in his possession, or under his control, and the value of all timber cut [and any other
profit made by him, specifying it.]
Sth. That complainant have such other, further and general relief as he may be entitled
to, and to your Honor may seem meet.
This is the first application for an injunction [and receiver] in this case.
Hugh L. McClung, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, see, ante, §§ 161 ; 164.]
§ 935. Frame and Formof Bills to Set Aside Judgments, or Decrees, for
Fraud. —A impeach and set aside a judgment or decree for fraud, or
bill to
imposition, must state the judgment or decree, and the proceedings which led
to it, and then set out the fraud, or circumstances of imposition. 11 AH of the
parties to the original suit liable to be affected by the relief sought, are neces-
sary parties to the bill, even though no fraud, or other misconduct, is alleged
against them. 12 The prayer should be to have the judgment or decree set aside
and annulled, and, if necessary to the rights of the complainant, that a new
decree be made giving the relief he" may be entitled to, and especially such
relief as will avoid the effects of the judgment or decree annulled.
It may be said that, as a rule, to entitle a party to this relief, it must be made
evident that, if a defendant, he had a defence on the merits, and, if a complain-
ant, he had a right to the relief sought, and this loss of a defence, or failure to
obtain relief, must in all cases be occasioned by the fraud or act of the prevail-
ing party, or by mistake or accident on the part of the losing party, unmixed
with any omission, neglect, or default on the part of himself or his agents. 13
BILL TO IMPEACH A DECREE FOR FRAUD."
To the Hon. A.
Abernathy, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
J. at Pulaski
William West, a resident of Maury county, complainant,
vs.
F.dward East, a resident of Giles county, defendant.
i.
That he and the defendant, down to January S, 1890, were partners in trade in Giles county,
9 See, ante, 8§ 46; 165-169. 12 Paul v. Wiles, 1 Tenn. Ch., 519; Walker v.
11 Jones V. Williamson, 5 Cold., 376; Maddox 1'. Day, 8 Bax., 83.
Apperson; 14 Lea, 604; Sto. Eq. PL, §428. A bill 13 Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 596.
will not lie to impeach a decree for fraud, and at the 14 As to the character of the allegations, see, ante,
same time review it. But such a bill may be dis- §§ 142; 838; 934. The bill is not required to be
missed as to qne phase and maintained on another.
Murphy v. Johnson, 23 Pick 552. ,
727 SUITS ARISING FROM FRAUDS. § 935
under the style ofEast & West that on said day, in consequence of irreconcilable differences,
;
the firm was dissolved and on the same day the defendant filed a bill against complainant in
;
this Court, alleging that the firm was largely indebted, that the assets were not sufficient
to pay said indebtedness, that complainant was largely indebted to the firm, that he and the
complainant could not agree upon a plan to wind up the firm's business, and praying, (1) for
an account between them, (2) for the ascertainment of the indebtedness, (3) for the con-
version of all assets into money, (4) for the payment of all debts, (5) for a decree against
the complainant for what he might owe the firm, and (6) for an injunction, and a receiver,
and general relief.
ii.
Complainant was in failing health when said bill was filed, and just ready to go to Cali-
fornia for rest, and for the benefit to be derived from the climate; and not wishing to be
delayed by any litigation he, on the day he was subpoenaed to answer said bill, entered into a
compromise in writing with the defendant, wherein and whereby it was stipulated and agreed
that said bill should be at once dismissed at the cost of the defendant, East, and in consid-
eration thereof, complainant transferred to him all his interest in the firm's assets, and in
addition paid him one thousand dollars in mules, in consideration whereof the defendant
bound himself to assume and pay all the costs of said suit, and all the indebtedness of said
firm. Said compromise agreement is now in complainant's possession, and will be filed and
read at the hearing.
in.
Relying x>n said agreement, which was in all respects fully complied with by the com-
plainant, he at once proceeded to California, not doubting that his partnership troubles were
all over. But so it is, the defendant in utter violation of said agreement, and in violation of
good faith, proceeded with said suit, took on order pro confesso against complainant, an
interlocutory decree for an account, and a final decree on the account as stated and reported
by the Master. Said final decree adjudges that complainant was indebted to said firm in
the sum of thirty-two hundred dollars, and adjudges one-half of the costs of the said suit
against Complainant.
IV.
Said pro confesso, account, report, and decrees were all taken at the term recently ad-
journed; and complainant was put on inquiry relative thereto by seeing a two-line notice of
the case, in the proceedings of said term, published in a Pulaski newspaper, sent him by a
friend, containing an obituary notice of complainant's father, who died a short time before
the last term of this Court. Complainant at once opened correspondence with friends, and
ascertained the foregoing facts in reference to said suit.
v.
Complainant further shows to the Court, that he at once returned to Giles county, and de-
manded of the defendant an explanation of his "said conduct. Defendant pretended that the
indebtedness of the firm was larger than he supposed when he made said written agreement,
that the said mules were not worth one thousand dollars, and that by the death of com-
plainant's father, complainant had become possessed of abundant means and ought to pay
him for his trouble and expense in winding up the partnership business. Complainant charges
that said judgment was obtained as a means of black-mailing him, and in order to fraudu-
lently coerce money out of him; and that the defendant is thereby endeavoring to convert
the machinery of your Honor's Court of Equity, beneficently devised to uncover and dis-
comfit fraud, into an engine of iniquity and oppression, in violation of good conscience and
contrary to good faith. Complainant avers that all the aforesaid pretences of the defendant
are utterly false, except the statement that by the death of his father complainant has become
possessed of a large estate. This statement is true, and this fact was too strong a temptation
for the defendant to resist, and hence said fraud.
VI.
An execution has issued on said decree, and has been levied on complainant's lands by
the Sheriff of Giles county, said lands being situated therein, and he has advertised them for
sale to satisfy said decree.
VII.
Complainant is advised that all of the said proceedings in said case, after the filing of said
bill, were and are a fraud upon your Honor's Court, and a fraud upon complainant, and con-
trary to good conscience and good faith; and therefore, the premises considered, he comes
into your Honor's Court and prays
1st. That all proper process issue to bring the defendant, William West, into your
Honor's Court, and to make him answer this bill, but his oath to his answer is waived.
2d. That an injunction may issue by fiat of your Honor restraining and inhibiting the
defendant from further proceeding in the enforcement of said decree, and from transferring
the same; and that your Honor grant complainant a restraining order addressed to the said
.Sheriff of Giles county, requiring him to stay all proceedings on said execution until further
orders of your Honor.
brought within three years. Goodman v. Tenn. M. in impeaching a decree than an adult. Hurt v. Long,
Co., 1 Head, 178. An infant has no more rights 6 Pick., 445.
3d. That, on the hearing, the decree in said cause of East vs. West be declared to be
utterly void for fraud, and that said injunction may be made perpetual.
4th. And that complainant may have such further and other relief as he may be entitled
to on the facts of the case.
[Annex affidavit. See, ante, § 789.] P. C. Smithson, Solicitor.
ARTICLE II.
SUITS IN RELATION TO CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUDS.
§ 936. Suits in Cases of Constructive Frauds. § 938. Frame and Form of a Decree in Case
§ 937. Frame and Form of Bills for Viola- of Constructive Fraud.
tions of Fiduciary Relations.
§ 936. Suits in Cases of Constructive Fraud. —

Constructive frauds are acts,
statements or omissions, which operate as virtual frauds on individuals, or
which, if generally permitted, would be prejudicial to the public welfare, and
are not clearly resolvable into mere accident or mistake, and yet may have
been unconnected with any selfish evil design, or may amount, in the opinion
of the person chargeable therewith, to nothing more than what is justifiable or
allowable. 1 Constructive frauds mainly consist of the following
1. Frauds against Law, or Public Policy,such as (1) usurious and gaming con-
tracts; (2) contracts in restraint of marriage; (3) contracts in restraint of
trade (4) contracts in reference to buying or selling offices, or illegally influ-
;
encing public officers; (5) contracts to suppress criminal prosecutions; and (6)
contracts founded upon illicit intercourse, or upon the doing of some act in
violation of law, or upon failing to do some act required by law. 2
Z. Frauds upon Persons wholly, or partially, Incapable of Contracting, such as,
(1) contracts with persons under age, or of unsound mind; (2) contracts with
persons intoxicated, or under duress; (3) contracts with persons in great
pecuniary necessity and distress; (4) contracts with persons very ignorant, or
illiterate; (5) contracts with sailors, expectant heirs, reversioners and others
having expectant interests; and (6) contracts in any case where influence is
acquired and abused, or where confidence is reposed and betrayed. 3
3. Frauds Presumed because of the Fiduciary Relations of the Parties, as in
cases of very advantageous contracts by (1) a guardian with his ward, (2) an
executor or administrator with a distributee or legatee, (3) a trustee with the
beneficiary, (4) an agent with his principal, (5) an attorney with his client, (6)
a parent with his child, (7) a husband with his wife, (8) a physician with his
patient, (9) a priest with a penitent, and (10) or by any other person occupying
a position of special trust and confidence towards the party from whom he ob-
tains a gift, or a contract unduly advantageous. 4
4. Frauds on Sureties as (1) in cases where the creditor, upon sufficient con-
sideration, gives the principal debtor further time for payment, without the
surety's consent; (2) in any other case of a subsequent contract between the
principal debtor and the creditor to the detriment of the surety; and (3) any
case where the creditor does any act injurious to the surety, or omits any act
he is bound to do, and the surety is injured by such omission. 5
l Smith's Eq. Jur., 71. Constructive fraud is sim- the party benefited to prove his good faith. 2 Pom.
ply a term applied to a great variety of transactions, Eq. Jur., §922.
having little resemblance either in form or in nature, 2 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 929-936; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §J
which Equity regards as wrongful, and to which it 260-306.
attributes the same or similar effects as those which 8 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 307-346; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§
follow from actual fraud, and for which it eives the 943-945.
same or similar relief. It embraces: (1) Contracts 4 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§307-330; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§
illegal, and, therefore- void; (2) transactions voida-
ble because contrary to rjublic policy; and (3) trans- e 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§326; 383; 883; 2 Pom. En.
actions merely presumptive of fraud and requiring Jur., § 907.
729 SUITS ARISING FROM FRAUDS. § 937
&. Frauds on Creditors as (1) in case of secret agreements by an insolvent
debtor with any creditor to pay him more than his proportionate share to join
in a composition; (2) where an insolvent debtor makes voluntary conveyance
of his property, and (3) cases where a debtor makes conveyances, or suffers a
judgment, in order to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. 6
§ 937. Frame and Form of Bill for Violations of Fiduciary Relations. —
consideration of the doctrine of relations in former sections, 7 and of the frame
of a bill to undo fraud in the preceding Article, 8 will greatly aid a draughtsman
in drawing a bill under this section but as a further aid the following general
;
form is given
GENERAL FORM OF BILL FOR VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONS.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155; 164.]
i..
That [Here show that complainant had an estate as a ward, distributee, legatee, beneficiary,
principal, or otherwise, and that the defendant is, or was, guardian, executor, trustee, agent,
attorney, or in some other confidential relation, and as such had the custody, control or
management of complainant's said estate, describing such estate.]
n.
That [Here show, if such be the fact, that complainant was not fully informed as to the
amount or value of his said estate in the hands of the defendant, or under his control, or
zrithin his knowledge ; and if defendant kept back full information, or gave misinformation,
in reference to said amount or value, or in any way misled or deceived complainant, so
state, and give the particulars, and show what efforts, if any, complainant made to ascertain
the said amount, or value.]
in.
That [Here show in zvhat way complainant was dependent on the defendant for informa-
tion as to the value, amount, or character of his said estate, and what confidence or trust
complainant reposed in him, especially if he was his agent, attorney, parent, physician, kins-
man, or other adviser; and in what way the defendant took advantage* of complainant':
dependence on him to secure the title to said estate, or a part thereof, giving the particulars.]
IV.
That [Here show that the property thus acquired by the defendant was worth greatly
more than the consideration complainant received, or if the property was money that the
amount complainant received was greatly less than the amount justly due him, or, as the case
may be, show how, wherein and to what extent the defendant defrauded the complainant,
giving the particulars.]
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c; see,ante, §§ 158-164.]
2d. That said [transaction, specifying it,] be
set aside as fraudulent and therefore void;
rnd that complainant be restored to the possession of said property [if real estate or personal
property capable of restoration, if not, then omit all after the word "void" and insert:] and
that complainant have a decree against the defendant for the difference between the con-
sideration he received and the real value of the property the defendant acquired as aforesaid.
[If the property ivas money, then let the decree be for the difference between the amount
complainant received and the amount he was entitled to.]
3d. That [If an account is necessary to ascertain the amount due complainant, so pray:
see, ante, § 159, sub-sees. 6, 10-12.] *
4th. That complainant may have such other further and general relief as he may be
entitled to. P. G. Fulkerson, Solicitor.
§ 938. Frame and Form of Decree in Case of Constructive Fraud. As —

already stated, a decree when in behalf of the complainant, usually follows the
special prayers of the bill. 9 If money was fraudulently obtained from the com-
plainant the decree will be against the defendant for the amount he justly owes
6 2. Sto. Eq Jur., §§ 349-379; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., tract, or other written agreement, fraudulently
96S-974. framed, as to make it express the real intention of
Reliefs Granted in Case of Fraud. —
The jurisdic- the contracting: parties; (3) by requiring the wrong-
tion of the Chancery Court in cases of fraud, actual doer specifically to perform the obligations resting
or constructive, is co-extensive with the injury done, upon him according to their very spirit, and thus
and the remedy required therefor. In framing and giving the defrauded party the very right of which
applying thfse remedies, the power of the Court is the other sought to defraud him; and (4) by com-
practically limited only by the requirements of jus- pensating the party defrauded when no other remedy
tice. The most important of these equitable reliefs is adequate, or practicable.
are conferred: (1) by rescinding or cancelling the 7 See, ante, §§ 165-168.
contract, conveyance or judgment fraudulently ob- 8 See, ante, § 936.
tained, and thereby relieving the injured party from 9 See, ante, %% 566; 581.
its obligations; (2) by so reforming the deed, con-
'
§ 939 SUITS ARISING FROM ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES. 730
the complainant, with interest; if land was obtained the deed will be declared
fraudulent, and all the title conveyed thereby divested out of the defendant
and reinvested in the complainant; if personal property was obtained it may
be restored, or, as is the usual rule, a decree pronounced against the defendant
for the difference between its value and what he paid for it. Where real or
personal property is restored to the complainant a lien may be declared on it
to secure to the defendant the repayment of the consideration by him paid
for it. If a reference to the Master is necessary it will be ordered, and, as a
rule, the costs are adjudged against the defendant.
DECREE IN CASE OF CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.

[For title, commencement and recitals, see, ante, §§ 567-568.]
On consideration whereof it is ordered, adjudged and decreed
1st. That the relation of guardian and ward [or other relation, stating it] existed between
complainant and defendant when the deed was executed [or, receipt given, or other trans-
action occurred, specifying it,] and that the defendant as such guardian, administrator,
agent, attorney, [or other trustee or adviser] took undue advantage of such relation and
obtained an unconscientious bargain from the complainant, as alleged in the bill.
2d. That said deed [receipt, or other writing, specifying it,] be cancelled, and set aside,
and all the right, title and claim of the defendant in and to the tract of land by said deed
conveyed to him be, and the same hereby are divested out of him and vested in complainant
as an indefeasible inheritance in fee simple, forever, and that a writ of possession issue to
put complainant in possession of said tract, which is described as follows [Here copy the :
description given in the deed: see, ante, § 172] The defendant will pay all of the costs of
the cause, for which execution will issue.
AETICLE III.
SUITS ARISING FROM ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES.
§ 939. Cases Arising From Accident. § 941. Frame and Form of Bills in Cases
§ 940. Cases Arising From Mistake. Arising From Accidents and Mis-
takes.
§ 939. —
Cases Arising From Accident. Accident, as remedial in Equity, may
be defined to be an unforeseen and injurious occurrence, not attributable to mis-
take, negligence or misconduct. 1
The following accidents will be relieved against in Equity 1, When a deed, :
bond, note, will, or other valuable instrument in writing, has been accidentally
tost, mislaid, destroyed, or materially mutilated or defaced; 2, Where, in con-
sequence of failure to pay a debt, or redeem a mortgage, or comply with any
other specific duty, by a day named, a penalty or forfeiture has been incurred,
which can be compensated for in damages; 3, Where trustees, agents, bailees,
executors or administrators have suffered loss of trust funds or property, by
inevitable accident, such as fire, robbery, reasonable confidence disappointed,
or the like, without any negligence or misconduct on their part 4, Where, by ;
accident, a power was defectively executed and 5, Where by some unavoidable

;
accident a party has been prevented from making his defense at law, and in
consequence an unjust and oppressive judgment has been rendered against
him. 2
§ 940. —
Cases Arising From Mistake. A mistake may be defined to be an
act which would not have been done, or an omission which would not have
occurred, but from ignorance, forgetfulness, inadvertence, mental incompe-
tence, surprise, misplaced confidence, or imposition. 3
1 Smith's Eq. Jur., 36. Accident is an unforeseen would be against good conscience for him, under
and unexpected event, whereby, without negligence the circumstances, to retain. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.. § 823;
or misconduct on his part, and contrary to his own 1 Sto. Eq. Jur
, § 78.
intention and wish, a party loses some legal right or 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §8 75-109; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
See 1
becomes subjected to some liability, and another §§ 823-837; and "Accident" in our Digests.
person acquires a corresponding legal right which it 3 Smith's Eq. Jur., 45. Mistake exists, in a legal
731 SUITS ARISING PROM ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES. §940
The following mistakes of law and fact will be relieved against 1, Where :
arbitrators intending to follow the law, mistake the law 2, Where an endorser ;
promised to pay under a mistake of mixed law and fact as to his liability 3, ;
Where a party erroneously supposed he was acquiring a valid title, being mis-
taken both as to law and fact; 4, Where a party surrenders a valid title in
ignorance of plain law; 5, Where both parties believe the seller's title to be
f.ood, when in fact it is defective or void; 6, Where a line was agreed on be-
tween two adjoining farms upon a mistake as to the calls of the deeds; 7,
Where land is sold by the acre and there is a mistake as to the number of acres
S, Where land is sold and the deed conveys more or less than the contract
called for 9, Where legatees divided notes believed to be good, and some prove
;
to be worthless; 10, Where a redeeming creditor paid under belief that the
execution sale was valid; 11, Where money is paid by mistake; 12, Where a
deed of trust misdescribes a note intended to be secured; 13, Where a note
was misdrawn by mistake; 14, Where a settlement includes items, or omits
items, by mistake, accident or fraud; 15, Where in drawing any writing a
material error has been made by accident, or by mistake of law or fact, such
error being the error of the draftsman 16, Where a will on its face shows an
;
error 17, Where a person parts with a right or title in ignorance of its exist-
;
ence 18, Where, at the time of the sale, the property sold had ceased to exist,
;
having been destroyed by flood or fire, or having died, or a life estate had
terminated, and the purchaser ignorant of the fact; 19, Where a testator can-
celled a former will under a belief that a later will was properly executed^ when
it was not; 20, Where a party surrenders, or cancels, a note of hand, bond,
deed, or other instrument, either in ignorance of his rights thereunder, or on
mistaken belief that the instrument had been paid or otherwise become of no
effect; and 21, Where a power has been defectively executed, in favor of a
charity, a purchaser, creditor, wife or child. 4
In all cases of mistake in written instruments Courts of Equity will interfere
only between the original parties, or those claiming under them in privity —
such as personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees, assignees, judgment
creditors or purchasers from any of them with notice of the facts. As against
bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice, Courts of
Equity will grant no relief. 5
The following mistakes of law, or fact, will not be relieved against 1, Where :
the obligee releases one of the obligors on a bond thinking the other would
continue bound; 2, Where a payee releases one surety thinking the other, or
others, will continue liable 3, Where a person releases, or accepts satisfaction
;
from, one of several joint trespassers, thinking the others would continue liable
4, Where a note was drawn calling for usurious interest, in ignorance of the
law; 5, Where a widow failed to dissent to her husband's will in time, being
ignorant of the limit of dissent; 6, Where the purchaser of land knew of a
vendor's lien, but thought there was enough personal property to satisfy it;
7. Where an administrator paid to a mother and children what wholly belonged
to the mother, under a mutual mistake of law: he was required to account to
her for the residue; 8, Where a party sells land in ignorance of a mine on it,
the purchaser not practicing any fraud; and 9, Where the price of an article
has been suddenly greatly enhanced, the seller not knowing it, and the buyer
practicing no deception. 6
sense, where a person acting upon some erroneous affecting interests, rights or liabilities, under an ig-
conviction, either of law or of fact, executes some norance or error with respect to the rules of law
instrument, or does some act, or omits to do some controlling the case, Courts will not, in general, re-
act, which, but for that erroneous conviction, he lieve him from the consequences of his mistake 2
would not have executed, done or omitted. Hayne's Pom. Eq. Jur., § 842. Mistakes, to be remediable in
Outlines of Equity, 132; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §839. But Equity, must cause a loss to the party complaining
the doctrine is settled that, in general, a mistake which the other party ought not in reason and con-
of law, pure and simple, is not an adequate ground science to take advantage of.
or relief; for ignorantia juris non excusat. Where a i See 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§110-183; 2 Pom. Eq.
party with knowledge of all the material facts, and Jur., §§838-856; and "Mistake" in our Digests.
without any other special circumstances giving rise 6 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 165.
to an Equity in his behalf, enters into a transaction 6 See authorities next above cited.
§ 941 SUITS ARISING PROM ACCIDENTS AND MISTAKES. 732
§ 941. Frame and Form of Bills in Cases Arising From Accidents, and Mis-
takes. —
The frames and forms of bills to set up instruments lost, destroyed or
mutilated by accident, and of bills to reform instruments because of mistake,
will be found in the Articles treating of such bills, 7 and reference is made
thereto. Great particularity of details is required in framing such bills; the
circumstances attending, or causing the accident or mistake complained of
should be fully set forth, and it should be shown that complainant was free
from any fault in the matter, and in no way responsible for the accident or
mistake.
The bill should be filed promptly after the happening of the accident, or the
discovery of the mistake, or the delay should be accounted for.
BILL TO CORRECT A MISTAKE IN A DEED.s
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155, 164.]
I.
That on November 9, 1905, he sold to the defendant the following tract of land in civil
district No. 4, in Dickson county, [Here set out the corners, courses, and distances accord-
ing to the deed.]
ii.
That the defendant contractedto pay thirty-five dollars per acre for said tract, and it was
agreed that a survey should be made to ascertain the number of acres, and a man was em-
ployed to make the survey. In the meantime and before the deed was drawn, defendant paid
complainant one hundred dollars and gave his note for four hundred dollars, and was to give
his notes for the residue when the acreage was ascertained as the result of said survey. *
in.
Thatafter said survey was made, but before its result was known to complainant, de-
fendant came to complainant's house, bringing with him the deed and notes for the land.
Complainant inquired as to Ithe result of the survey, but defendant stated that he did not
know, but was willing to take the farm at thirty-five dollars per acre for thirty acres, and
urged complainant to sign the deed he had drawn calling for "thirty acres, more or less,"
defendant saying he had urgent official business at home, and was in a hurry to leave. So
complainant signed and delivered the deed, and took the defendant's notes for five hundred
and fifty dollars, the balance of the purchase money.
IV.
Thatsince delivering said deed complainant has ascertained that said tract contains forty-
five acres, fifteen more than he was paid for. Complainant will here state that the defendant
was with the surveyor when said survey was made, and stayed that night with the surveyor,
making calculations from the latter's field book, and that when said deed was signed he well
knew that said tract contained largely over thirty acres and complainant would probably
;
have ascertained this fact from the surveyor, who was present as defendant's companion,
but had not made his calculations as to the acreage, had not defendant hurried him to sign
the deed, and hastened away as soon as the signing had been done, hardly waiting for the
ink to dry on complainant's signature. Complainant will further state that he is an old and
feeble man, and was sick the day he signed the deed, and wanted the signing put off until
the acreage was ascertained, but the defendant would not agree so to do, and urged imme-
diatefaction so complainant signed.
:

That subpoena to answer issue [&c. see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
1st. :
2d. That he be given a decree against the defendant for the price of said fifteen acres at
thirty-five dollars per acre, and that such decree be declared a lien on said tract of land, and
if not otherwise paid, the land be sold to satisfy the same.
3d. That if necessary said deed be reformed so as to show that the land contained forty-
f've instead of thirty acres, and that the consideration was fifteen hundred and seventy-five
dollars, instead of ten hundred and fifty dollars, as mistakenly stated in said deed.
Robert M. Jones, Solicitor.
7 See Article on Suits to Set up Lost Instruments, I » This bill is based on Barnes v Gregory, 1 Head,
§§942-944; and Article on Suits for the Reforma- 230.
don of Written Instruments, §§ 945-946.
733 SUITS TO SET UP AND REFORM WRITINGS. §942
CHAPTER XLVII.
SUITS TO SET DP, REFORM AND RESCIND WRITINGS.
Article I. Suits to Set up Written Instruments.
Article II. Suits to Reform Written Instruments.
Article III. Suits to Rescind Written Instruments.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS TO SET UP WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

! Have Re-executed,
942. Suits to Set up, or up Lost or Destroyed Instru-
to Set
Lost or Destroyed Instruments, or ments, or Records.
Records. § 944. Statutory Method of Supplying Lost
i
943. Frame and Form of Bills and Decrees Instruments, Papers and Records.
Suits to Set up, or Have Re-executed, Lost or Destroyed Instruments.

§ 942.
When a written contract, such as a note of hand, deed, will, lease, partnership
agreement, or other valuable instrument, or a Court record, has been accident-
ally lost or destroyed, under circumstances not attributable to any reprehensi-
ble negligence on the part of its owner, on his application and due proof the
Chancery Court will set it up and enforce it. 1 If the loss or destruction was
caused by the fraud, negligence or other misconduct of the defendant, and the
instrument was originally executed by him, the Court will, by attachment,
compel him to re-execute it, if such re-execution is essential to the complain-
ant's enjoyment of his rights thereunder. In the same suit in which an instru-
ment, or record, is set up or instrument re-executed the Court will, on a bill
framed for the purpose, proceed further and fully enforce complainant's rights
thereunder.
§ 943. Frame and Form
of Bills to Set up Lost or Destroyed Instruments,
or Records. —The
should describe the instrument or record as fully as
bill
possible, and should set out, on its face, or in an exhibit if the instrument or
record will cover more than a page, as perfect a copy as complainant can make
and, if an instrument, will allege its execution by the defendant, or by some
one authorized to bind him, and show the consideration therefor paid by com-
plainant; and will set forth the loss, destruction, or mutilation of the instru-
ment or record, and the circumstances thereof; and should show that com--
plainant was guilty of no negligence or blame in the matter. The bill should,
also, show how and wherein complainant is injured by such loss, destruction or
mutilation, and should pray that said instrument or record be set up and estab-
lished, and declared in force and operative; and, in a proper case, may pray
that the instrument or record be enforced, or the relief sought in the suit whose
record is set up be granted. 1 The bill should be sworn to. 2
BILL TO SET UP A LOST NOTE.
[For address and caption of the bill, see, ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
i.
That on or about the first day of July, 1905, the defendant, John Jones, for value received,,
executed and delivered to complainant his promissory note for five hundred dollars payable
six months after date with interest from date, which note is still the property of com-
plainant and wholly unpaid.
ii.
That on, or about, the fourth day of July, 1905, said note was lost [or mutilated, or de--
1 Hale v. Hord, 11 Heisk., 242. I

2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§ 82, 88.
§943 SUITS TO SET UP AND REFORM WRITINGS. 734
stroyed] in the following manner: [Here state briefly the circumstances of the loss, mutila-
tion or destruction, if known, to complainant ; if not known he should so state, but should
aver that he was guilty of no blame or negligence, but was wholly without fault in the
matter.]
m.
That complainant drew a true copy of said note, except the signature of the defendant
thereto, and requested the defendant to sign and return it, or to make him a new note in the
place of the one lost [or mutilated, or destroyed] and offering to indemnify him against any
and all loss that might arise from the original note coming up against him, but the defendant
refused and still refuses to sign said copy, or to renew said lost note. Complainant renews
his said offer of indemnity, and will cheerfully submit to any order your Honor may make
for the indemnity of the defendant against said note.
IV.
That complainant has made diligent search for said lost note among his valuable papers
and in all receptacles and places where he keeps valuable papers, or where said lost note
would in any probability be, but has utterly failed to find the same, and so he alleges and
charges that said note is utterly lost, and that he will inevitably lose the same and the money
due and payable thereon, unless your Honor's Court will give him relief and remedy.
v.
1st. That. subpoena to answer issue [err.: see, §§ 158; 164.]
2nd. That said lost note be set up and established by decree of your Honor's Court, and
be declared unpaid and payable, and that your Honor pronounce a decree against the defend-
ant for the amount due on said note, principal and interest, and award execution therefor,
and for the costs of the cause, in complainant's favor.
3rd. That complainant have further and other relief. ,
Wm. York, Solicitor.

A bill to set up a negotiable instrument must be sworn to, 3 and should offer
a bond of indemnity to the defendant against liability arising from such lost
instrument returning to torment him. 4 The Court may, however, stay the
decree until such bond is given, when no bond is tendered in the bill. 5 The
defendant may make any defences to the bill that could be made to a bill suing
directly on the note if in existence, such as non est factum, payment, the statute
of limitations, infancy, failure of consideration, illegal consideration, duress,
fraud, or the like.
DECREE TO SET DP A LOST NOTE.
Upon consideration whereof it is ordered and decreed by the Court that complainant was
the owner of the note set out in his bill, and that the same has been lost [mutilated or de-
stroyed] without fault on his part, and that he is entitled to have it set up and established,
as his property, and that the defendant owes the same, and that it is due and wholly unpaid.
It is, therefore, decreed that said note be set up and established, and the defendant pay
the complainant the sum of six hundred and ten dollars, the amount due on said note, prin-
cipal and interest, and that he, also, pay the costs of this cause, and on his failure so to do
in the time required by law an execution will issue.
The execution in this case will be stayed until complainant files with the Clerk and Master
a bond in the penalty of twelve hundred and twenty dollars, with two solvent sureties to be
approved by the Clerk and Master, to indemnify the defendant against any loss to him by
having to pay said note or any part thereof to any other person.
BILL FOB THE RE-EXECDTION OP A DEED.
[For address and caption of the bill, see, ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
i.
That on the 23d of September, 1905, the defendant executed and delivered to him a war-
ranty deed for the following tract of land in the State of Kentucky. [Here give the county
in which the land lies, and otherwise describe it as described in said deed.] The consideration
expressed in said deed was one thousand dollars, all of which was paid by complainant when
the deed was delivered.
n.
That after the execution and delivery of said deed, complainant entrusted it to the defend-
ant to take to Kentucky and have it probated and registered in said county, the defendant vol-
unteering to do so, stating that he had some business in said county. Complainant gave de-
fendant two dollars to pay the fees for probating and registering said deed.
8 See, ante, 5 161. 1 5 Lowry v. Medlin, 6 Hum., 450.
* 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §5 83-88. I
ni.
That, on defendant's return complainant went to see him to get the deed, but he pretended
he had forgotten it, and would send for it. Thereupon, complainant, after waiting a month
or more, wrote to the register of deeds of said county and was informed by him that no such
deed had been left with him, or been registered in his office. Complainant's suspicion being
aroused he made inquiries and learned that defendant was denying ever having sold said land
to complainant and was trying to sell it to other parties, pretending to ithem that the deed
had been cancelled and destroyed without registration.
IV.
Complainant thereupon, through his attorney, called upon the defendant to make him
another deed, or produce the original. This he refused to do, and pretended to become very
angry, setting up various pretences and conflicting explanations, but admitted that the deed
had been made by him.
v.
That, inasmuch as the land is situated in the State of Kentucky and, therefore, out of the
jurisdiction of your Honor's Court, complainant is advised that his remedy is to apply to your
Honor for a decree to compel the defendant to re-execute said deed. Ba
VI.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c; see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That the defendant be required to re-execute said deed; and that, in the meantime,
he be enjoined from setting up any claim ito said tract of land, or in any way transferring or
encumbering the same.
3d. That complainant may have such other, further and general relief as the nature of his
case may require.
This is the application for an injunction in this case.
first
Ed. P. McQueen, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit and jurat. See, ante, §§ 161 ; 164.]
§ 944. Statutory Method of Supplying Lost Instruments, Papers and Rec-
ords. —The Code6 provides a summary method of supplying instruments, papers
and records, and under its provisions any record, proceedings, or paper, if lost,
or mislaid unintentionally, or fraudulently made way with, may be supplied,
upon application, under the orders of the Court, by the best evidence the nature
of the case will admit of. 7 Papers are often supplied in the Chancery Court un-
der this statute. 8 To entitle a party to supply a record, paper, or proceeding,
lost, mislaid, or made away with, it must be made to appear:
1. That such a record, proceeding, or paper once existed in the Court where-
in the application to supply is made, if it be a pleading, deposition, or other
part of a file, it must, also, appear that it was filed in the cause. 9
2. That such record, proceeding, or paper is lost, mislaid unintentionally, or
fraudulently made away with and that due and diligent search has been inef-
;
fectually made for it in the place where it should be, or was last known to be
and that the last or proper custodian of it does not have it, and cannot find it
on due search, and does not know where it is, and believes it is lost, or mislaid
unintentionally, or fraudulently made away with.
3. On such facts being made to appear by the affidavits of the Clerk and
Master, 10 and of the Solicitors in the cause, or other person 11 last having it in
his possession, if such be the case, the Court will, if satisfied that these affidavits
make out a case under the statute, order the record, proceeding, or paper to bo
supplied by the best evidence that the nature of the case will admit of. This
5a When land is situated in another State, but the the custodian of the files and records of the Court;
defendant lives in this State, and is before the Court that such a record, proceeding, or paper was in his
by service of subpoena, the Court may by process of office, according to his own knowledge, or according
contempt compel him to execute deeds or other in- to some record on his rule docket, trial docket, or
struments. See, ante, § 652. execution docket, as the case may be; that he has
6 Code, §§ 3°01-3908a. This statute in no way, made diligent search for it in his office, and in such
limits the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court Pow- other place or places as it is likely to be found, and
ers v. FitzhuKh, 10 Hum., 417; Hale v. Hord, 11 that he has been unable to find it; and that it is
Heisk., 242. See, ante, § 37. lost, mislaid, or fraudulently made away with. The
7 Code, § 3907. deputy clerk's affidavit is inadmissible, ordinarily
8 The practice in such a case is fully set out in Cornelius v. Bank, 3 Tenn. Ch.. 7.
Cornelius V. City Bank, 3 Tenn. Ch., 5. 11 The affidavit of such Solicitor or other person
9 Mullins v. Aiken, 2 Heisk., SSI; Baker ». Mayor. must, also, be filed. Indeed, the Solicitors of both
Ibid, 117. These and similar cases show the impor- parties should make affidavit of the existence of the
tance of the Clerk's entries of the filing of papers in record or paper; that they have made diligent search
his rule docket. for it, and cannot find it; and that they verily be-
„, .
10 The Clerk being the custodian, his affidavit must lieve it is lost, or mislaid, or fraudulently made away
always be made, showing that he is the Clerk and with.
§ 945 SUITS TO SET UP AND REFORM WRITINGS. 736
evidence is ordinarily the affidavits of the Clerk, Sheriff, and Solicitors, best
acquainted with the facts. The Clerk generally makes affidavit to all writs by
him issued, or bonds by him taken, or other papers drawn by him the Sheriff ;
makes affidavit to all returns made by him, and to the fact that he had the lost
writ; the Solicitors make affidavit to all pleadings or other papers by them
drawn respectively; and the entries on the rule docket, the trial docket, and
the execution docket, will be regarded as in the nature of a record to aid in
supplying the lost record, proceeding, or paper.
4. On such affidavits and other evidence being presented to the Court, the
Court judicially determines whether (1) they constitute the best evidence the
nature of the case will admit of; and (2) if so, whether they are sufficiently
clear, cogent and definite to enable the Court to adjudicate that the record,
proceeding, or paper, exhibited to the affidavits, is substantially a copy of the
record, proceeding, or paper, allowed to be supplied. If the Court determines
this affirmatively, an order will be entered on the minutes showing the loss, the
order to supply, the fact that the record, proceeding or paper has been duly
supplied under the order, and that it is ordered to be filed in the cause, and to
be substituted for, and have all the force and effect of, the original record, pro-
ceeding, or paper.
5. If the lost papers consist of depositions, the Court may, in its discretion,
order the testimony to be retaken, if the witnesses are alive. 12 The following
is the form of an order where a paper has been supplied under the statute 13 :
ORDER SUPPLYING A LOST PAPER.

Tohn Doe,
vs. \ No. 678.
Richard Roe. J
In this cause, it appearing fromithe affidavits of the Clerk and Master, and of the Solicitors
of the parties, that the file [or some other paper, naming it,] in this cause is lost or mislaid
unintentionally, or fraudulently made way with, so that it cannot be found or had and the ;
Court being satisfied from said affidavits, [and from an inspection of the rule docket, the trial
docket, and the execution docket, if any of them are put in evidence,] that said file [or other
paper] once existed, and that it has been lost, or mislaid unintentionally, or been fraudulently
made away with, it is so ordered and adjudged.
The Court, therefore, orders that said file [or other paper] be supplied by the best evidence
the nature of the case will admit of. Thereupon, the complainant [or, defendant,] presented
to the Court alleged copies of (he bill, prosecution bond, subpoena to answer and return there-
on, the answer of Richard Roe, 14 and the deed filed as an exhibit to the bill [or other paper or
papers sought to be supplied] along with the affidavits of the Clerk and Master, the deputy
Clerk and Master, the Sheriff, the Solicitors of both parties [and of any other person depos-
ing,] from all of which the Court being satisfied that said copies are substantial copies, it is
ordered and decreed by the Court that each and all of said copies be filed in the cause, and
be substituted for the originals, and have all the force and effect thereof, and be and con-
stitute the file in this cause.
ARTICLE II.
SUITS TO REFORM WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.
§ 945. Suits for the Reformation of Written I § 946. Effect of Reforming a Written Instru-
Instruments. ! ment.
§ 945.Suits for the Reformation of Written Instruments. When an agree- —

ment is made and reducedto writing, but through mistake, inadvertence or
fraud, the writing fails to express correctly the contract really made, the Court
of Chancery will reform the instrument so as to make it conform to the real
12 Code, § 3908. 14 The Court may order each party to supply his
13 This statute is one of many instances, in which own pleading. Cornelius «. City Bank, 3 Tenn.
the remedies of Equity have been granted' to the Ch., 8.
Circuit Courts by statute. See, ante, § T„ where
many other instances are given.
intention of the parties-; and, in a proper case, after such reformation, the bill
so prayingj the Court will enforce the instrument by a decree for the amount
due the complainant,, if a money demand; or, in a proper case, a decree award-
ing the possession of the. property sued for to the complainant.
BILL TO REFORM A DEED.
[For address and caption of the bill, see, ante, §§ 155-164.]
i.
That the complainant contracted with the defendant to purchase from him the- following
tract of land. [Describe it. by, its location and boundaries, and state its acreage.']. And the
defendant contracted to convey said tract to complainant and make and deliver to him a>
deed therefor with full covenants, and acknowledge the same for registration, for the fol-
lowing consideration: [Here state the consideration, and if it has been, paid so state, and'
if not paid show, the facts in reference to payment.]
n.
That the defendant did on the 8th day of April, 1905, execute, deliver and acknowledge
for registration a paper writing which complainant then believed to convey the above boun-
dary of land, and complainant fully paid the purchase money [or has done the acts required
as the consideration, specifying them.]
That on comparing the metes and bounds in said deed with the tract of land above agreed
to be sold to him complainant finds and so charges that [Here show the mistake whether in
metes and bounds, or otherwise.]
in.
That complainant has ground to charge that the defendant made a mistake in drawing-
[If
the deed, or the draughtsman made the mistake, let him so charge. If he has grounds to
charge that the defendant acted knowingly and fraudulently in having the deed so drawn,
let him so charge.]
IV.
That complainant has called on the defendant to correct said deed and make it conform
to their contract, or make and deliver to him a new deed so conforming, but the defendant
refused and still refuses so to do.
v.
That [If the defendant is withholding any part of the land belonging to complainant so
allege, and give the facts relating thereto fully.]
vi:
The premisesconsidered, complainant prays :
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]

2d. That' said deed be reformed so as to express the real contract of the parties thereto,
and especially that the mistake alleged be corrected.
3d. That [If the defendant is withholding any part. of the land covered by the deed as it.
should be reformed, pray that complainant be given possession thereof.]
4th. That [If complainant desires any extraordinary process or relief, let him pray thereof,
having laid the necessary grounds therefor in the body of the bill.]
5th. That complainant have such further and, other. relief as he, may be entitled to.
J. H. Wallace, Solicitor.
The bill need not be sworn to unless some extraordinary process is prayed,
in which case add
This is the first application for an injunction, [attachment, or receiver] in this case.
DECREE OP REFORMATION.
[Forof cause, commencement and recitals of decree, see, ante, § 567.]
title
It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the complainant is entitled to have
the deed referred to in his bill reformed as prayed; and the Clerk and Master will execute,
acknowledge for registration and deliver to complainant a deed with full covenants convey-
ing to him in fee simple forever the tract of -land described in the bill, bounded as follows
[Here give the boundaries of the deed, as reformed.]
That all. the right and title of the defendant to said tract of land be divested out of him
and vested in the complainant, and that a writ of possession issue to put the complainant in
full possession of said tract, and of every part thereof.
That the defendant pay all the costs of the cause, for which an execution will issue.
If the instrument as reformed calls for the payment, of money, the decree, in
,
a proper case, will adjudge the amount due complainant thereon, and award an
execution therefor.
§ 946. Effect of Reforming a Written Instrument. When a written agree- —
ment has been reformed, it stands in all respects, and has identically the same
§947 SUITS TO RESCIND WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. 738
force and effect, between the parties, as though originally made in its reformed
condition, for Equity regards that as done which ought to have been done. The
reformed instrument is substituted for, and is in lieu of, the original instru-
ment, and takes effect from the date of the original instrument. The change is
made nunc pro tunc, and the reformed instrument becomes the only evidence of
the original agreement.
On the reformation of an instrument, the rights of the respective parties
thereto are determined exclusively by the instrument as reformed; and those
rights are precisely the same, no more and no less, for each and all of the par-
ties, as they would have been had the reformed instrument been the one orig-
inally by them signed. The result is, the complainant is generally required to
go one step further in his bill for reformation, and pray for the enforcement of
the reformed contract if a deed, for instance, has been reformed as against a
:
defendant in possession, or claiming an interest, complainant may pray for a

writ of possession, or a decree adjudicating the title, or both. So, whatever the
character of the instrument reformed, if the complainant has rights under it
needing affirmative enforcement, he may, in the same suit, have the instrument
reformed, and enforced as reformed. If a defendant is sued on an instrument
that may be reformed to his advantage, he may file a cross-bill and have it re-
formed, and then rely on the reformed instrument as a defence to the original
unit. 1
ARTICLE III.
SUITS TO RESCIND WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS.

§ 947. Suits for the Rescission and Delivery-'
-
|
§ 948. Form of Bill for Rescission,
up of Written Instruments. !
§ 947.Suits for the Recission and Delivery-up of Written Instruments.

When a written instrument, such as a note of hand, bond, deed or mortgage,
has been obtained by fraud, force, or duress, or is based on an illegal or im-
moral consideration, or has been paid or otherwise discharged, but is retained
by the payee, on application by the maker of such instrument and the proof of
such facts, the Chancery Court will rescind and cancel the same, and require
the defendant to deliver it up, and will enjoin him from setting up any claim
under it, or in any way attempting to enforce it, and if he has instituted any
legal proceedings on such instrument will enjoin them.
But a recission will not be allowed for fraud unless the complainant dis-
affirmed the deed, or other instrument, promptly on discovering the fraud, and
consistently adhered to such disaffirmance 2 and he must file his bill promptly,
;
for if he sleep on his rights he will be repelled. 3 On a bill for recission because
the consideration was grossly inadequate, the Court will inquire 1st, would a
sane man, uninfluenced by some cause not explained, make such a contract
2d, would the defendant if a fair man take such a contract; and 3d, if he would,
ought a Court of Equity to permit him to do it. 4
§ 948. —
Form of Bill for Recission. The bill must be definite and certain,
and must aver positively the facts on which the complainant relies for relief;
1 See Helm v. Wright, 2 Hum., 72, where a mis- adequacy of price as a ground for rescission, see
take in a bond was corrected, and the bond as cor- Talbott V. Manard, 22 Pick., 60. It is contrary to
rected substituted for the original bond in a suit in good conscience for a defendant to insist on retain-
the Circuit Court. The decree of correction is set ing the benefit of a bargain when the consideration
out in the report. paid by him is shockingly inadequate, and the com-
2 Precious Blood Society v. Elsythe, 18 Pick., 40; plainant is financially ruined or disastrously injured
Street R. Co. V. Giardino, 8 Cates, 368. by the transaction, while the defendant can be put
3 See, ante, § 49; Talbott V. Manard, 22 Pick., 60. in statu quo.
i Hansard V. Sharp, Thomp. Cas., 73. As to in-
739 SUITS TO RESCIND WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. § 948
general allegations and conclusions of law are not adequate nevertheless, it is ;
not necessary, nor indeed proper, for a complainant to set forth all the details
and minute facts constituting the grievance of which he complains.
The bill may contain an alternative prayer for damages in case the recission
prayed for is not granted. 1
BILL FOR THE RESCISSION AND DELIVERY-TJP OE A MORTGAGE.
[For address and caption of the bill, see, ante, §§ 155-164.]
i.
That on December 25, 1904, he executed and acknowledged in presence of two witnesses,
a deed of mortgage to the defendant on [specifying the property conveyed.} This mortgage
has not yet been registered.
li.
That [Here specify under which, said mortgage Tvps executed,
in detail the circumstances
giving the details thereof showing fraud, duress, drunkenness, or considerations contrary to
law or public policy, and that the defendant was an actor in the matter.}
in.
That [Show that complainant was an innocent victim, if such was the case; or if there be
any circumstances which mitigate his participation in the immoral or illegal considerations
state them.}
IV.
That [If the defendant isabout or likely to use said instrument to the detriment of com-
plainant give all the facts so showing, in order to lay ground for an injunction.}
v.
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §§ 158; 164]
2d. That the defendant be required to deliver up said mortgage; and that he be enjoined
from having the same registered, and from setting up any claim to, or under, it, and that
it be declared void and cancelled; and that whatever title it may have conveyed to the
defendant be divested out of him and reinvested in complainant, [or, if the land has been
sold and the purchaser is a defendant and his conduct equitable and the purchase-money not
paid, pray for a judgment against the first purchaser for the full amount due and against
the second purchaser for the amount due from him on his purchase, and declare a lien on
the land therefor and pray a sale of the land on credit and in bar of the equity of redemption,
if necessary.}
3d. That he may have such further and other relief as the nature of his case may require.
David A. Wood, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit. See, ante, §§ 161 164.] ;
On a bill for recission the complainant must tender whatever consideration

he may have received, if any, and offer to do whatever is necessary to place the
defendant in statu quo. 1
The answer to a bill to rescind a sale of land for failure of title should fully
2
set forth complainant's title, if defendant resists the rescission.
lHill «. Harriman, 11 Pick., 3»0. I
2 Topp 1). White, 11 Heisk., 165.
§949, SUITS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 740
CHAPTER XLVIII.
SUITS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
§ 949. Cases for Specific Performance. § 951. Decree for a Specific Performance.
| 9S0. Frame and Form of Bill for Specific
Performance.
§ 949. —
Cases for Specific Performance. A contract is an agreement between
two or more parties to do, or not to do, some specified thing. To constitute a
\alid contract enforceable in a Court of Equity there must be 1, The reciprocal
or mutual assent of two or more persons, competent to contract 2, A considera- ;
tion deemed sufficient in law and 3, A thing to be done which is not forbidden
;
by law, or a thing not to be done, the performance of which is not commanded

by law. "When a contract is found to be valid all a Court can do is to enforce it.
The mere fact that one party or the other may have obtained an advantage does
not justify a Court in an endeavor to mitigate the hardship for the law allows ;
a party to obtain an advantage, provided he occupies no relation of trust or

confidence, or practices no fraud, or does no act to mislead or deceive the other
party. Courts of Equity do not stand as the guardian of all persons who con-
tract to see that absolute equality prevails between them. 1 When a contract
is binding on the parties it is binding on the Courts, for Courts have jurisdic-
tion only to enforce contracts between parties, not to make contracts between
them. 2 If a contract is so indefinite or uncertain as to convey no reasonable
meaning, it is void for vagueness; if it provides for the doing of something
unlawful to be done, or for the omission of something required by the law to be
done, it is void for illegality if the party seeking to avoid it, was incapable at
;
the time of contracting by reason of some disability, as infancy, coverture,

duress, drunkenness or want of mental capacity, then the contract is void for
want of a competent party; and if the consideration is wanting or is illegal,
the contract is void for want of a legal consideration. If a contract has all the
essentials of validity, and is certain in its terms, is based on an adequate and
valuable consideration, is fair and just in all its provisions, is free from any
fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, or mistake, is capable of being enforced
without hardship to either party, and if compensation in damages for its breach
is impracticable, or would be inadequate, a bill will be maintained for its
specific performance. 3 The broad ground of jurisdiction in such cases is the
inadequacy, or the impracticability, of damages to do complete justice to the
1 Talbott D Manard, 22 Pick., 60. 6. Qui facit per alium facit per se. (He who
2 The following are the principal maxims relating does an act by means of an agent is considered in
to the law of contracts, not already given law as doing it in person.)
7. Delegatus non potest delegare. (An agent can-
MAXIMS RELATING TO CONTRACTS. not transfer his authority to another;) nor can a
1. Modus et conventio vincunt legem. (When trustee.
there is an agreement its terms prevail against what 8. Respondent superior. (The principal is respon-
otherwise would be the law.) But Equity will relieve sible for the acts of his agent.)
against an inequitable agreement. Snell's Pr. Eq., 9. Ratihabitio mandato arquiparatur. (When a
290. principal ratifies what his agent does, such ratifica-
2. Privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat. tion is equivalent to an order to do what was done.)
(The agreements of private individuals will not be 10. Memo potest plus juris ad alium trans ferre
allowed so to operate as to diminish the effect of a quam ipse habet. (No one can transfer to another a
public law.) greater right than he himself possesses.)
3. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus. 3 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §8 1401-1405. ACourt of
(He who arquires property or a right must take it Chancery will not specifically enforce a contract
subject to all its encumbrances.) when (1) it is illegal or immoral; or when (2) it is
4. Pacta qua turpem causam continent non sunt without consideration; or (3) when the contract
observanda. (Contracts based upon immoral or involves personal skill or knowledge, as to sing, or
illegal considerations are not enforceable by law.) perform in public; or when (4) the contract is to
5. Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio (No right of construct buildings, or make repairs; or when (5)
action arises out of a contract based on no consid- there is a want of mutuality, as where one of the
eration.) parties is an infant. Snell's Pr. Eq., 519-522.
"741 SUITS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 950
§
injured party. Hence, where damages are practicable, and would be adequate,
the Court, as a rule, will not compel a specific performance, but will leave the
complainant to his remedies at law, or will itself award damages. If the con-
tract relates to lands, or an interest in them, and in addition to all of the fore-
going requirements is, also, in writing, a specific performance will be decreed
as of course, for no damages can adequately represent real estate. On the other
hand, chattels of all kinds, can ordinarily, be duplicated in the market, or can
be reproduced; and hence, a pecuniary compensation is both practicable and
adequate, unless, as it sometimes happens, the article has a special value, such
as a keepsake, a family relic, heirlooms, paintings, gems, coins, statuary, rare
works of art, manuscript, title papers, and the like, in all of which cases a
specific delivery is ordinarily decreed. 4
The most ordinary cases for a specific performance are (1) agreements ia :
writing to buy or sell land; (2) contracts to give or renew leases; (3) contracts
to give a mortgage (4) contracts to insure (5) contracts for chattels of special
; ;
value; and (6) agreements of separation between husband and wife.

Frame and Form of Bill for Specific Performance. In drawing the
§ 950. —
billthe contract must be fully set out, and the consideration specified, and
complainant must offer to do all that the contract requires of him.
BILL FOR A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
[For address and caption of bill, see, ante, §§ 155; 164.]
i.
That on the 1st day of September, 1905, [give the date of the contract,] the defendant
was the owner and in possession of the following lot [or tract] of land situated in the
County of Knox, [give the county in which the land lies, and remember the bill must be
filed in that county. See, ante, §177. // the contract does not relate to land, here state the
substance and subject-matter of the contract,] and bounded as follows [here insert the :
description contained in the contract, and if this description is not definite enough give,
also, the description in the deed under which the defendant holds.]
n.
That the defendant being so seized and possessed of said lot [or tract] of land, did, on
said 1st day of September, 1905, [give the date of the contract,] contract in writing, signed
by him and delivered to complainant, to convey to complainant, for the consideration of
one thousand dollars, said lot [or tract] of land, with the usual covenants. [In this para-
graph of the bill give the details of the contract, if not given in paragraph I, and especially
set forth the consideration complainant is to pay, or what he is to do as the consideration
of the contract.] Said contract is hereto exhibited, and marked A.
in.
That, [Here, show for and to what extent complainant has complied with conditions
precedent binding on him, if any, thus:] in accordance with the terms of said contract, the
complainant did on the day said contract was executed, pay defendant the sum of two
hundred dollars, which is receipted for on the face' of said contract [or, for which defendant
gave him a receipt, if such be the fact.] On the 1st day of November, 1905, complainant
paid the defendant on said contract the further sum of three hundred dollars, and took his
receipt therefor, which is hereto exhibited, and marked B and on making this payment ;
complainant called on the defendant to make and deliver said deed of conveyance, when
defendant, greatly to complainant's surprise, insisted the deed was not to be made until the
entire consideration was paid. [Here show what reasons and excuses, if any, the defendant
gives for not performing his contract.]
iv. ,
[If the defendant is doing any act, or threatening to do any act, in reference to the
That
subject-matter of the contract which materially impairs or will impair its value, or is threat-
ening to convey it, so allege and give the particulars, as foundation for an injunction, thus:]
the defendant is having many of the most valuable trees on said tract of land cut down to be
converted into lumber, and has offered to sell said tract to another party.
v.
The premises
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, as in §§ 158; 164, ante.]
2d. That said agreement be specifically performed by order of your Honor, and that any
and all orders, injunctions, attachments of the person, and other process necessary to that
end be made and awarded by your Honor, and duly enforced.
4 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 709; Womack ». Smith, 11 Hum., 478; 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1402.
§951 SUITS FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 742
3d. That an injunction issue [if necessary, to restrain the defendant from doing the acts
complained of in the bill, thus:] to restrain the defendant from cutting the valuable trees
on said tract, or committing any waste thereon, and that he, especially, be enjoined from
selling or encumbering said tract.
4th. That complainant have such further and other relief as the facts will justify.
[// there is a prayer for an injunction, add:] This is the first application for an injunction
in this case. Charles H. Smith, Solicitor.
The bill need not be sworn to unless an injunction, or other extraordinary
process, is prayed for.
If any money has been tendered by the complainant out of Court, the bill
should so state, and should renew the tender; and the money should be filed
with the bill.
The bill may pray in the alternative for a specific performance, or, in case
that cannot be had, for damages for the defendant's breach of the contract;
or, in a proper case, such damages may be awarded under the prayer for gen-
eral relief. And if the amount of the damages does not appear at the hearing,
the Master may be directed to hear proof and report thereon. 5
§ 951. Decree for a Specific Performance. —The following decree will indi-
cate the general character of such decrees
DECREE FOR A SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
[Here insert title, commencement and recitals: see, ante, § 567.]
From all of which the Court is of opinion that complainant is entitled to the relief by
him specially prayed, and it is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the agreement
set out in the bill of complaint be specifically performed by the defendant.
It is further ordered and decreed that the defendant execute, and acknowledge for regis-
tration before two competent witnesses in the Master's office, and deliver to the Master for
the complainant a deed conveying to the complainant the following lot [or tract] of land
[describing it by courses and distances, or other sufficient description^ with covenants of
warranty and seizin. 6 If the parties differ as to the form of the deed the Master will settle
the same. [If any transfer is to be made in writing to specifically perform the contract, or
any transfer of property, so specify in the decree, and if a writ of possession is necessary,
award it, thus:] And, on the delivery of said deed to the Master, a writ of possession will
issue to put complainant in full possession of said tract [or lot] of land. A lien is hereby
declared on said land to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase-money, which
may be paid into the Master's office by the complainant for the defendant.
The defendant will pay all the costs of the cause down to the execution of the writ of
possession.
And either party is given liberty to apply to the Court as occasion may require. 7
IS Sto. Eg. Jur., §794; Pom. Eq. Jur , 1410; I §§646-661; see, also, Brakfield v. Anderson, 3 Pick.,
Bracken v. Martin, 3 Yerg., 58; Acts of 1877, ch. 97. 206.
6 See Chapter on How Decrees are Enforced, ante, I 7 See, ante, §§ 566, note 31; 579.
743 SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. §952
CHAPTER XLIX.
SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING.
952. Accounts Generally Considered. § 956. Form of Bill and Decree to Open a
953. Suits for an Accounting Where the Stated or Settled Account.
Account is Open.
954. Form of Bill and Decree for an Ac- § 957. Suits to Open Settlements Made by
Executors, Administrators, and
counting Where the Account is
Guardians.
Open.
§955 Suits to Open, or Surcharge and Fal- § 958. Proceedings in the Master's Office on
sify a Stated or Settled Account. an Accounting.
§ 952. —
Accounts Generally Considered. An account is a detailed statement
of the mutual demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties arising
out of contracts or some fiduciary relation. 1 Accounts are either: 1, Open; 2,
Stated or 3, Settled.
;
1. An Open Account is one of which the balance has not been struck, or which
is not accepted by both parties.
2. A stated Account is one, 1, that has been made out and agreed to, or 2, ren-
dered and admitted to be correct, or 3, rendered and acquiesced in, or 4, not
objected to in a reasonable time.
3. A Settled Account is one that has been stated and paid. 2
Settlements of executors, administrators and guardians, made in the County
Court, in pursuance of law, are to be taken as prima facie correct 3 and if adult ;
parties in interest are present when such settlements are made, they have, as
to such parties, all the force and effect of stated accounts. 4
The Chancery Court will, on a proper bill filed for that purpose and sus-
tained, open either a stated or settled account, 1, where by reason of some
mistake, or omission, or accident, or fraud, or undue advantage, the account is
vitiated, and the balance incorrectly fixed; 5 and 2, where by reason of some
relation of trust or confidence between the parties, the complainant was at a
disadvantage, and as a consequence the account is inequitable. 6
When, however, the bill is filed to open the settlement of an executor, admin-
istrator or guardian, made in the County Court, no fraud, or undue advantage,
or other special Equity need be alleged, 7 unless the complainant was present
when the settlement was made in which event, the settlement has all the force
;
and effect of a stated account, and must be impeached in the same way. 8
Where the fraud, mistake, undue advantage or imposition is gross, the Court
will direct the whole account to be opened and taken dc novo; but where the
mistake, omission, inaccuracy, fraud, or imposition is not shown to affect or
stain all the items of the transaction, the Court will, ordinarily, allow the ac-
count to stand, with liberty to the complainant, to surcharge and falsify it. 9
The effect of such a course is to leave the account in full force except in so far
as the complainant can prove errors and mistakes. Sometimes the Court con-
fines the complainant to the particular items of error or mistake set forth in
1 Bouv. Law Die, "Account." 5 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., | 523; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 667-668.
2 Ibid "Account Stated;" Smith's Eq. Jur., 261. e 1 Sto. Eq. Jur , 527a. But in the absence of
Philips v. Belden, 2 Edw Chy., (N. Y.) 1: Murray fraud, and after a long delay, it requires very clear
V. Toland, 3 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.) 569; and Desty's
' proof to surcharge and falsify settled accounts.
notes to both cases, Law. Ed.: 1 Sto. Eo. Jur., § 5?6; Patton v. Cone, 1 Lea, 14.
Sto. Eq. PL, §798; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 665, note; Bus- r Elrod «. Lancaster, 2 Head, 571; Hilly v. Har-
sey v. Gaut, 10 Hum., 238; Craighead v Bank, 7 rison. 7 Cold., 191.
Yerg., 409. 8 Turney v. Williams. 7 Yerg., 172.
3 Code, §§ 2305; 3786; see, ante, % 333. 1 Sto. Eq. jur., § 523; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 667-668.
4 Turney e. Williams, 7 Yerg., 172; Matlock i.
Rice, 6 Heisk., 33.
§ 953 SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. 744
his bill, treating the account as, in other respects, conclusive. 10 The Court is
more reluctant to open a settled account than a stated account and, except in ;
cases of apparent fraud, or many errors, will allow the account to stand, and
give complainant leave to surcharge and falsify. 11
Where a party is given leave to surcharge and falsify, the burden of proof
is on him; but where the account is opened in toto, and a general accounting
ordered de novo, each party must prove his own charges and his own credits. 12
§ 953. Suits for an Accounting Where the Account is Open. Where par- —
ties have business dealings, involving many items, or where in consequence of
relations of trust, or confidence, one party has handled the estate of the other;
or done business for him, involving a series of transactions, or numerous items,
a bill for an accounting will lie in behalf of the party entitled to a settlement.
Bills of this character are usually brought by wards against their guardians,
by principals against their agents, by one partner against another, by clients
against their attorneys, by landlords against tenants, by a guardian against
his predecessor, by beneficiaries against their trustees, by legatees, distributees
and creditors against executors and administrators, and by one or more tenants
in common against another, or other tenants in common, when the respective
defendants have failed duly to exhibit an account for the funds or other prop-
erty in which the complainant has an interest, and to pay over whatever may
be due or belong to him.
The bill in such a suit, should start out by stating clearly the relations 13 of
the parties, and that in consequence of such relations various sums of money
or other property of the complainant went, or should have gone, into the pos-
session, or under the control, of the defendant, giving items, dates, values, and
circumstances. The bill should then show that the defendant has rendered no
account of such money and property and the profits thereof or, if he did render ;
any, that it was imperfect and incorrect, that complainant refused to accept
it in any respect, and so notified the defendant; and allege, if known, the bal-
ance due complainant on a fair accounting and pray for an account to be taken
;
by the Clerk and Master and for a decree for the amount found due. If the
defendant has any sureties bound for his good conduct they should be made
defendants, and their suretyship alleged in the body of the bill.
A bill that seeks to open and reform a stated or settled account, or to set
aside such an account, or to surcharge and falsify any settlement made by
executors, administrators or guardians, is a very different bill from one for an
accounting where the account is open.
§ 954. Form of Bill and Decree for an Accounting Where the Account is
—
Open. The following forms indicate how the bill and decree should be framed
in ordinary cases for an accounting where the account is open
FORM OF BILL EOF. AN ACCOUNTING, WHEN THE BILL IS OPEN.
[For Address and Commencement of bill see § 164, ante.}
i.
That [Here show the relation of the parties, how and when it originated, and what it
related to.]
II.
That [Here show the business dealings resulting from the relations of the parties, and
what matters were entrusted to, or assumed by, the defendant, and give a full history of all
the various transactions engaged in by the defendant, and as fully as possible the moneys
and other property belonging to complainant which went into his hands, or could have gone
by due diligence.]
in.
That [Here detail any misrepresentations, concealments, frauds or other acts of bad faith,
by the defendant, if any and any promises by him to account, make corrections, or pay over
;
the moneys or property belonging to the complainant. 14 ]

10 1 Sto Eq. Jur., § 523. I 12 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 525.
11 1 Sto'. Eq. Jur., § 527; Patton v. Cone, I Lea, 13 See §§ 165-169, ante.
14. I
14 If the defendant has rendered an account which
745 SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING- §954
IV.
That defendant has done, or is about to do, anything making an attachment or
[If the
injunction 'expedient, specify such inequitable conduct.]
v.
That[If the defendant has any sureties for the faithful discharge of his duty to complain-
ant, so state, giving their names, and the nature of their obligation, and insert their names
as defendants in the caption of the bill.]
The premises considered the complainant prays
1st. That subpcena to answer [See § 164, for prayer for process.]
2nd. That the defendant be required to set out in his answer a full and detailed account
of all moneys, notes of hand, accounts, or other evidences of debt, and all property of every
kind that came into his hands, and show what disposition he made of them. [And if the
defendant is charged with having sold, transferred, given away or otherwise disposed of any
property not accounted for, pray he may be required to specify the same and to state what
consideration he received therefor. And if he has failed to account for any money or prop-
erty, pray that he be required to state why he so failed, and what has become of the same.]
3rd. That an account be taken and stated by the Clerk and Master showing all the moneys,
accounts, choses in action and other evidences of debt, and all property, that went into the
defendant's hands, or should by due diligence have gone into his hands by virtue of his being
the guardian, [agent, attorney, trustee, executor, administrator, .partner, tenant in common,
or other confidee, 15 ] and what disposition he has made thereof, and what profit he made, or
could by due diligence have made out of the money and property that went, or might have
gone, into his hands as such guardian, [agent, trustee, administrator or other confidee."]
That the Master show in his said report what balance is due complainant, after allowing
the defendant all just credits, but no compensation, and that a decree be rendered in favor
of complainant against the defendant [and his s3id sureties, if any, and they are sued,] for
said balance.
4th. That an injunction issue to restrain the defendant from [stating the acts of defendant
to be restrained.] Also, that an attachment issue and be levied upon the property of the
defendant. And, also, that complainant have such further and other relief as he may be
entitled to. David K. Young, Solicitor.
The bill should be sworn to, if it seeks an injunction or attachment, and
should allege that it is the first application for such process.
The decree in favor of the complainant for an account should specify the
rules to govern the Master, and blaze out his road as definitely as possible so
as to prevent too wide a range of proof and investigation. 10 The decree in
lorm ordinarily follows the special prayer of the bill in stating what matters
the Master will inquire into and report on, coupled with such directions as the
Chancellor may see fit to make to limit and define the scope of the inquiry.
DECREE EOB AN ACCOUNTING.
[For title, commencement and recitals see ante, § 567.]
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the matters of account in controversy be and are
referred to the Clerk and Master to take and state an account between the complainant and
defendant concerning the business of [stating the business, if any] and all transactions relat-
ing to or growing out of the same, [and, if a partnership is involved, add: charging each
party with the several sums by them respectively drawn or received from the firm assets on
their individual account; also interest 17 thereon.] The Master is authorized to compel the
production of all such books, papers, documents and other writings as may be in the posses-
sion or power of the parties, or either of them, and shall be called for by either party, or he
shall think proper to be produced before him in taking such account. The Master shall
require each party, before the taking of depositions is begun, to produce and file with him a
charge or statement in writing, duly signed, of all the several items which he claims the other
party should be charged with, giving the date, character and amount of each item, and no
item not contained in these several statements will be considered by the Master, unless on
good cause shown, 18 he allow said statement, or statements, to be amended by the insertion
of additional items or the alteration of the original items. 19
The Master will so state and take said account as to show the balance which either party
iray owe the other, and he will report hereon to the next term of the Court, until which
time all other matters are reserved. The Master shall have liberty to state any special cir-
cumstances.
is false the bil l must so state, and show that com'
j 17 Interest is charged against a partner on the
plainant at once rejected it and so notified the de- balance found due from him on the day of the dis-
fendant, for if complainant retained the account an solution of the partnership, such dav being the proper
unreasonable time without such notice the Court may time to make a rest, and adjust the balance of the
decide that he accepted, or acquiesced in the account, partnership account. Blake's Ch. Pr., 235
which would convert the open account into a stated 18 See, ante, § 62, sub-sec. 8, for what is meant by
account. "good cause shown."
15 See note 35 to § 46, ant*. 19 These statements of charge and discharge will
16 See § 599.
§ 955. Suits to Open, or Surcharge and Falsify, a Stated or Settled Account.
If a bill is filed for an account, when there exists a stated or settled account be-
tween the parties, the defendant may plead or set up in his answer the stated or
settled account, 20 and thus defeat the suit. To avoid this defence, the bill must
set forth the facts connected with the account, and show that by reason of some
acts of fraud, oppression, imposition or undue advantage, or of some gross and
manifest error, or by reason of some relation of trust or confidence between the
parties, the complainant should not be bound by the account. The bill must
specify the fraudulent acts, impositions, undue advantages, or gross and mani-
fest errors complained of, or the relations of trust or confidence existing and ;
where the ground for opening the account is fraud, or a relation of trust or
confidence, the bill must set forth such facts as will show the account to be in-
equitable. 21 General charges of fraud, mistake, error, injustice, or undue
advantage, are wholly insufficient either in a bill to open a stated or a settled
account, or in a bill to surcharge and falsify such an account, but the complain-
ant must give the specific acts and facts complained of. This is especially true
of a bill to surcharge and falsify which will not be sustained unless the specific
mistakes, omissions and errors are pointed out, and proved as stated. 22
But while a complainant must specify the errors he insists on, it is not neces-
sary to prove all that he specifies if he prove some, he is entitled to a decree
;
giving him liberty to surcharge and falsify. Where one party is allowed to
surcharge and falsify the other may do so, too. 23
What is meant by "surcharging" is showing the omission of an item in the
account for which the complainant is entitled to credit, and "falsifying" is
showing a charge against him in the account which is false, and should be
stricken out. 21 A
surcharge seeks to have credits inserted which have been
omitted, and a falsification seeks to have debits omitted which have been in-
serted. And it must be borne in mind that there is a marked difference be-
tween a bill to open a stated or a settled account for a general accounting de
novo, and a bill that merely seeks to surcharge and falsify such an account. On
a bill praying for the opening of a stated or a settled account, if sustained and
a general accounting ordered, the account complained of is wholly set aside
and stands for nought 25 and each side must prove the charges and credits for
;
which he contends. 28 The Court will not ordinarily open a stated or settled
account in toto, even on a bill filed for that purpose, unless the assent of the
complainant was obtained by fraud or imposition, or was given by inadvertence
or mistake, or unless there were relations of trust or confidence between the
parties but will allow the account to stand, and give complainant the right to
;
surcharge and falsify it on a reference to the Master. 27 The burden of proof

is always on the party who seeks to surcharge or falsify,
28 but when an account
is opened generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting a
charge or claiming a credit. 29 On a bill to surcharge and falsify a stated ac-
count the parties will be limited to such matters as they have specifically al-
leged to be overcharges, errors and omissions, 30 for, on such a bill, the account
be found of great value by the Master. They will tled upon an erroneous principle, unless a confiden-
prove to be charts to guide him through the laby- tial relationship existed between the parties. Ibid.
rinths and mazes of a tangled mass of testimony, 23 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 525,
and a heterogeneous conglomeration of facts and note.
figures. Such statements are required by the rules 24 Bouv. Law. Die, "Falsify," "Surcharge;" 1
of Chancery practice. See Blake's Ch. Pr., 218- Sto. Eq. Jur., §.525.
228: 1 Barb. Ch. Pr.. 493; 503-509; 2 Ibid, 494-497; 25 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668. The account will be
2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1221-1222; Hicks v. Chadwell, 1 wholly unravelled and the parties will not be bound
Tenn. Ch., 251; Myers l>. Bennett, 3 Lea, 184. For by deductions agreed upon between them on taking
form of such statements, see, post, § 958. the former .account. Ibid. While it stands for nought
20 See, ante, §§142; 333; 838; 934; 1 Dan. Ch. as an account it will nevertheless be evidence against
Pr., 667. the party who made it out, in so far as he charges
21 It seems to be well settled that a bill to open a himself, or credits the other party.
settled account must specify the errors in the ac- 26 Philips v. Belden, 2 Edw. Ch , (N. Y.) 1.
count. Sto. Eq. PL, § 800, note. 27 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 523.
22 Raht v. Mining, 5 Lea, 22. While Courts will 28 Philips v. Belden, 1 Edw. Ch., (N. Y.-) 1.
20 Ante, § 333; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668.
not hesitate to relieve against an error apparent on
the face of the account, there is a general disin- 30 Philips v. Belden, 1 Edw. Ch., (N Y.) 1;
clination to unravel an old account, even when set- Stoughton v. Lynch, 2 Johns. Ch., 210.
isimpliedly admitted to be correct, except in so far as overcharges, errors and
omissions are alleged.
"Where a bill impeaches a stated account, and alleges that the complainant
has no counterpart of it, and calls on the defendant to file a copy of it with his
answer, the defendant must do so and if on inspection of such a copy the com-
;
plainant discover errors therein, he will be allowed to amend his bill to allege
them. 31 So, if at any time, new errors or new frauds, or other new grounds
for impeaching the account be discovered, the complainant may put them in
issue by amending his bill. If, however, he is allowed to surcharge and falsify
the account, he is not confined to the errors and omissions alleged in his bill and
proved at the hearing, but may show others at the taking of the account or-
dered, unless the order of reference expressly forbid.
In general, where fraud, imposition, undue advantage, or fiduciary relations
are shown to exist, the Court will incline to open up the whole settlement; in
cases of accident, mistake, omission or inaccuracy, the Court will ordinarily
allow the account to stand, with liberty to the complainant to surcharge and
falsify; or, in a weak case, the Court may open the account only as to the
matters specially set out by complainant in his bill. 32
§ 956. Form of a Bill and Decree to Open a Stated, or a Settled Account.
The following general forms will illustrate both the form and the frame of bills
and decrees to open stated or settled accounts:
BILL TO OPEN A STATED, OR A SETTLED ACCOUNT.
[For address and commencement see, ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
i.
That, [Here show the relations of the were partners, or merchant

parties, as that they
and customer, or principal and agent, or guardian and ward, or landlord and tenant, or
trustee and beneficiary, or that they had other business relations resulting in the various
trinsactions of debit and credit entering in the account complained of. See ante, §§ 165-169.]
II.
That [Here show that while said relations were in existence, or in a short time after they
had ceased, the complainant and defendant had a settlement of their business, which was
reduced to writing. If the account was made out by defendant alone and delivered to the
complainant, or sent to him, so state.]
in.
That [Here show each and every error, omission or mistake, in the account complained
of. Remember that a general allegation of mistake or injustice will not be sufficient. You
must put your finger on each and every item of the account you dispute, and must specify
each and every item you claim has been omitted from the account. It is sometimes well to
give the history of the items omitted or mischarged, so as to show that your complaint in
reference to it is equitable.]
IV.
That, [Here show when this settlement took place, and the circumstances in which it was
made; and if there was any hurry or confusion, any promises made to correct errors, any
failure to produce vouchers or other papers, or any other act or omission that interfered
with a full and honest and intelligent settlement, state these incidents in full, giving the
particulars. If the account was made out by the defendant alone, and delivered to the com-
plainant, or sent to him, so state; and if there was any delay in complaining, explain why
the latter did not complain at once, why he delayed calling the defendant's attention to the
errors and omissions in the account. If the account has been paid, explain fully how the
complainant happened to pay it, and if any inducements were held out, or promises or repre-
sentations made to obtain payment, state these facts fully, or allege, if sufch be the fact, that
the errors were not discovered until after payment; and remember it is harder to open a
settled account than a stated account. 33 ]
v.
That, [Here show any fraud, imposition, undue advantage, act of oppression, concealment,
or misrepresentation, on the part of the defendant whereby the complainant was misled, or
deceived, or his suspicions quieted, or his objections met, or his confidence obtained, or his
assent procured. If any relation of trust or confidence existed between the parties, show
the facts fully. 34 ]
31 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 667. I 33 Patton v. Cone, 1 Lea, 14; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur..
§ 527.
32 Webb & Meigs' Digest, "Accounting." I .34 See, ante, §§ 46; 48; 449; 932.
§956 SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. 748
That, [// the defendant has made any promises to correct the errors complained of, so
state,and show his subsequent refusal so to do. If there has been any delay in filing the bill
give the reason thereof fully.']
VII.
Tha't, [If the on the account, so state, specifying when the suit
defendant has sued at latv
was brought, and in what Court, and what steps have been taken. See, ante, § 814, and notes.
If the defendant is threatening to sue, or to assign the account, so charge. If any other
ground for an injunction, or attachment, exists, give such ground. See, ante, §§ 871-873.]
VIII.
That, [If complainant never had a counterpart of said account or has lost or mislaid it,
so state, and pray that the defendant file a copy of it with his answer. In such a case reserve
the right to amend your bill, if, on inspecting said account, you deem it advisable.]
IX.
The premises considered, the complainant comes into your Honor's Court and prays:
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c. : see, ante, §§ 158 164. If an injunction is neces-
;
sary to stay a suit brought on the account, or to prevent the defendant from suing, or from
transferring the account, so pray: if an attachment is desired, and grounds therefor have
been laid, so pray. See, ante, § 158.]
2d. That said account be opened and set aside, and that a general account of all dealings
and transactions between complainant and the defendant be taken and stated by the Master
on a reference for that purpose; and that on said reference, said stated [or settled] account
be held for nought.
[If, however, a general accounting is not desired but only liberty to surcharge and falsify,
then pray:} That complainant be allowed to show the said errors and omissions and mis-
takes in said account; and that the said account be opened for that purpose, and be referred
to the Master, and complainant be given liberty to surcharge and falsify the same.
3d. That complainant may have such other further and general relief in the premises as
the nature and circumstances of this case may entitle him tQ, and as, to your Honor shall
seem meet.
4th. This is the first application for writs of injunction [and attachment,] in this case.
J. C. J. Williams, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit as in § 789, ante.]
The decree will, of course, follow the special prayer of the bill and the opinion
of the Chancellor, and specific instruction should be given the Master as to the
particular matters of law or fact in controversy.
DECREE OPENING A STATED ACCOUNT.
[For the style of the cause, commencement and recitals, see, §567, ante.]
From all of which it appears that the complainant is entitled to have the account referred
to in the bill opened and set aside, and to have an account in this Court.
It is therefore ordered and decreed by the Court that said account be opened and set
aside and for nothing held. And the Master is directed to take and state an account of all
dealings and transactions between the parties. [If the account is to be limited to any par-
ticular business, such as partnership, agency, trust, &c, then add:] growing out of the part-
nership, [agency, trust or other business] referred to in the bill. The Master will, before
entering upon the account, require each of the parties to file a sworn statement of the credits
he claims, and the charges he admits, 35 and no items not set out in these statements shall be
considered by the Master in stating the account. [// any special directions as to particular
charges and credits are deemed necessary by the Court, here give them. se ]
[If necessary further order:] And for the better taking of said account, both parties are
required to produce all books and papers in their custody or power relating thereto.
All other questions are reserved until the incoming of said report.
If the decree merely opens the account for the purpose of allowing it to be
surcharged and be as follows
falsified, it will
It is therefore ordered and decreed by the Court that said account be opened, and that
any of the parties have liberty to surcharge and falsify the same. The Master will restate
the account between the parties, and report the same to the next term. In restating the
account he will allow the accourt set up by the defendant to stand except in so far as Jt may
be successfully surcharged or falsified by the complainant. [If the Court should limit the
liberty to surcharge and falsify then add:] But the complainarit will be limited to the items
37
of surcharge and falsification set forth in the bill.
All other questions are reserved until the incoming of said report.
35 2 t)an. Ch Pr., 1221-1222, note. This is good 37 The Court mav. also, allow the defendant to
practice. surcharge and falsify when once the account is
36 The Court should settle the principles upon opened, because when opened for one oartv, it is
which the account will be taken, and may order cer- equally open for both parties. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 668.
tain claims to he allowed, and others to be disal-
lowed. Ante, %% 599-600.
749 SUITS FOR AN ACCOUNTING. § 957
If the items of surcharge and falsification are few, and the proof all in, the
Chancellor may reform the account without a reference to the Master, and
make a final decree at the hearing. 38
§ 957. Suits to Open Settlements Made by Executors, Administrators and
—
Guardians. When a bill is filed to open an official settlement made by an ex-
ecutor, administrator or guardian, it is not necessary to allege any fraud, im-
position or undue advantage, unless the complainant, then an adult, was pres-
ent at the making of the settlement, or had due notice thereof. It is sufficient
to show that the complainant is interested in the settlement, and has been ag-
grieved by errors, omissions and false credits therein and that a just and legal
;
settlement will benefit him. If however the complainant was an adult, and
present at the settlement, or after attaining majority, ratified the settlement,
or acquiesced therein, he must then show fraud, oppression, imposition, undue
advantage, or other equitable circumstances, to entitle him to an opening of
the settlement.
The bill should, as a rule, be filed, not only against the personal representative
or guardian, but also against his sureties on his official bond, so as to make them
liable for the decree obtained.
On an accounting before the Master, the official settlement by the personal
representative and guardian will be taken as prima facie correct. 39
BILL TO OPEN A GUARDIAN'S SETTLEMENT.
Complainant respectfully jhows to the Court
I.
That the complainant, while a minor, became entitled to a large estate [showing when,
how, and the amount, and that it all went into the defendant's hands.* ]
ii.
That the defendant was appointed guardian of complainant, [showing when, in what
Court; and if you seek to hold his sureties liable, show who they were. Show, also, that all
of said estate went, or should have gone, into the defendant's hands.]
in.
That the defendant, in his settlements with the Clerk of the County Court, falsely and
fraudulently demanded and received credit for the following items, [shoiving each item as-
sailed.] The facts relative to said items are as follows [showing specifically such facts as
:
invalidate the credits, and render them inequitable, or illegal.]

IV.
That the defendant, in said settlement, falsely and fraudulently neglected and failed to
charge himself with the following sums of money, and items of property, by him received,
or that might by due diligence have been by him received, as such guardian [specifying each :
sum of money, and each piece of property, he should have been charged with in said settle-
ment, and the particular circumstances connected with each.* 1 ]
v.
That, the defendant had not thus: obtained said false and fraudulent credits, and had not
if
falsely and fraudulently kept back said sums, and pieces of property, and failed to charge
himself therewith, he would have been liable to complainant in the sum of three thousand
dollars more than his said settlement shows, and more than he paid over, or offered to pay,
to complainant, and he, as such guardian, [and the other defendants, as his sureties, if they
ore sued,] is liable 42 to complainant therefor, on his said bond, and by virtue of his said
trust; and is liable to pay complainant compound interest thereon.
VI.
In said settlement, the defendant is allowed undue compensation ;

[show wherein,] and
for his said frauds he should be denied any compensation whatever.
VII.
1st. For proper process [&c: see, ante, §§155;164.]
2d. That complainant be allowed to surcharge and falsify said settlement, and to show
said errors, omissions and fraudulent charges, and to have said settlement reopened gen-
erally, to the end that the complainant may show by proof, not only said errors, but any
others he may hereafter discover.
38 Gray v. State, 11 Pick., 317; McLean if. State, 41 The Court will not sustain a bill to open an
8 Heisk., 286. This while good law is not good prac- account stated, unless specific errors therein are dis-
tice. See, ante, § 597, note 12. tinctly pointed out. Sto. Eq. PI., § 251.
39 Code, § 3786. 42 The sureties of the guardian on all his bonds
40 The items charged against the .guardian, by the should be sued in the same suit with him.
County Court Clerk will, of course, be. all charged
against him in the. bill.
3d. That the Master take and state an account between complainant and defendant, show-
ing therein, fully and in detail, the various amounts justly chargeable to the defendant, and
the various amounts he is justly entitled to credit for; that, in taking said account, said false
and fraudulent settlement with the said Clerk be wholly disregarded, and for nought held,
[complainant never having had any notice thereof, and being then an infant,] and that said
settlement be made anew. That no compensation be allowed the defendant, and that he be
charged with compound interest.
4th. And that complainant may have all such further and other relief as he may be
entitled to. Andrew Gamble, Solicitor.
J. W. Culton, of Counsel.
DECREE FOB, AN ACCOUNTING, WITH LIBERTY TO SURCHARGE AND
FALSIFY.
The Court doth order and decree that the account stated on the... .day of 19...., ,
[giving its date,] do stand, with liberty to either party to falsify or surcharge the same.
And the Master is ordered to take a general account of all dealings and transactions between
the complainant and defendant from the foot of said stated account, and report what shall
appear to be due from either party to the other on the balance of the account when taken.
It is further ordered and decreed that the stated account dated the ._. day of 19 , —
[giving a date after the other stated account,] be opened and set aside, and not considered
by the Master.
§ 958. Proceedings in the Master's Office on an Accounting. The proceed- —
ings in the Master's office on a reference for an account have been heretofore
considered somewhat extensively, 43 and need not be repeated.
The Master should require the parties to file their respective statements of
charge and discharge at an early day after the decree, and should not begin the
examination of witnesses until both of said statements have been filed. Ordi-
narily, in examining witnesses, it is best to examine the parties and their
respective clerks, bookkeepers and cashiers first, beginning with the complain-
ant for by so doing it will be found that so many items in the respective state-
;
ments are undisputed as to render any further testimony in reference to them

unnecessary.
The Master should not allow these statements to be amended on mere motion,
but only on good cause 44 shown, and no additions should be allowed by a party
after he and his clerks, bookkeepers and cashiers have been examined, except
for good cause shown by affidavit. 45 These statements are in the nature of
pleadings, and if they could be amended on mere motion their value would be
greatly impaired.
COMPLAINANT'S CHARGE BEFORE THE MASTER.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ Complainant's Charge.

Richard Roe. J
The complainant insists that upon the reference pending in this cause the defendant should
be charged with the following sums of money
1. 1903, Jany. 1. Cash paid „ $100.00
2. Feb. 2. Money paid for defendant to John Smith, on note 360.00
3. Mch. 4. Price of horse, saddle and bridle : 140.00
April 16.
4. Bill of goods (Bill annexed) „ 30.00
[And so on to the end of the charges.]
Complainant reserves the right to amend this charge, or add new items, as he may be
advised.
Nov. 21, 1905. John Doe
DEFENDANT'S DISCHARGE BEFORE THE MASTER.
John Doe, |
vs. \ Defendant's Discharge.

Kichard Roe. J
The defendant insists that upon the reference in this case he, the defendant, is entitled to
the following credits
1. 1903, Jany. 10, Cash paid complainant _ $200.00
2. March 5, Value of horse 90.00
3. March 31, Personal services, for 1 month „ 50.00
43 See, ante, §§ 603-610. j
45 This good cause should be such as would war-
t
44 For what is meant by "good cause," see, ante, rant a rehearing of a decree because of newly dis-
5 62, sub-sec. 8. I
covered evidence. See, post, §§ 1215-1219.
4. April 30, Paid a note for complainant, (Note attached) 184.00
5. July 31, Rent of house for 3 months, May, June and July, 1903 30.00
6. Aug. 1, Taxes paid for 1900 116.00
[And on to the end of the items of discharge.]
And defendant claims interest on each of the above items from the date thereof until the
making of the Master's report.
And defendant craves leave to add to, or alter, this discharge as he may be advised.
Nov. 25, 1905. Richard Roe.
If either party finds that he has accidentally omitted any items or claims in
his statement of charges or discharge, he may file a further statement thus
FURTHER CHARGE BY COMPLAINANT BEFORE THE MASTER.
John Do6, "1
vs. V Further Charge.

Richard Roe. J
Complainant hereby adds to his charge in this cause dated Nov. 21, 1905, as follows:
1. Complainant insists that the defendant should be charged with interest on the several
items and amounts specified in his original charge from their respective dates.
2. Since the original charge was filed, to-wit, on Nov. 25, 1905, complainant has been com-
pelled to pay as defendant's surety on a note to John Brown, (note attached,) $68.00.
And complainant craves leave to further alter, or amend, his said charge.
Nov. 26, 1905. John Doe.
And so the defendant may likewise amend or alter his discharge thus, on
showing cause
FURTHER DISCHARGE OF DEFENDANT BEFORE THE MASTER.
John Doe, ]
vs. Further Discharge of Defendant.
J-
Richard Roe. J
The defendant hereby adds to his discharge, dated Nov. 25, 1905, the following
1. 1903, May 2. One
suit of clothes returned $16.00
2. June 13. One car ticket for complainant's wife to St. Louis and return 20.00
And defendant craves leave to further alter or amend his said discharge.
Nov. 27, 1905. James H. Grant, Solicitor.
§959 SUITS IN RELATION TO PARTNERSHIPS. 752
CHAPTER L,
SUITS IN RELATION TO PARTNERSHIPS.

959. Partnerships Generally Considered. § 961. Pleadings, Decrees and Procedure in
; 960. Suits by Partners to Wind up a Part- a Suit to Wind up a Partnership.
nership.
§ 959. —
Partnerships Generally Considered. A partnership is a union of
two or more persons on an agreement to place their money, effects, labor or
skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and to divide the
profit and bear the loss in certain stipulated proportions. Each of the partners
has an interest in the assets of the firm, and' each is personally responsible for
its contracts and liabilities. 1 Each partner is an agent of the firm, and by
using the firm name may bind the firm by contract as to any matter relating
to the business of the firm. 2 While individuals as between themselves they are
a unit as to all others, so far as the firm's business is concerned.
Courts of Equity will dissolve a partnership before the regular time of its
expiration, in case, by reason of the ill-feeling between the partners or other
circumstances, it is impracticable to carry on the undertaking at all, or at
least according to the stipulations of the articles, or beneficially or in ease of ;
the insanity, permanent incapacity, or gross misconduct of one of the parties.

And a partnership will also be dissolved at the instance of a partner who was
induced to enter into it on false representation. On the other hand, in case of
a partnership existing during the pleasure of the parties, with no time fixed
for its renunciation, Equity will grant an injunction against a dissolution, if a
sudden dissolution is about to be made in bad faith, and would work irrepar-
able injury. And an injunction will be granted to prevent a partner from
doing acts injurious to the partnership. Where a dissolution has taken place,
not only will an account be decreed, but, if necessary, a receiver will be ap-
pointed to close the business, and make sale of the property. 3
The creditors of the partnership have a right to the payment of their debts
out of the partnership funds, before the private creditors of either of the part-
ners. On the other hand, the separate creditors of each partner are entitled
to be first paid out of the separate effects of their debtor, before the partner-
ship creditors can claim anything. 4 The partnership property of all kinds is
regarded in Equity as a trust fund to secure the partnership debts.
The partnership creditors may in the first instance proceed against the exec-
utors or administrators of a deceased partner, leaving them to their remedy
over against the surviving partner. 5
§ 960. —
Suits by Partners to Wind up a Partnership. Inasmuch as one part-
ner cannot sue another in a Court of law, while the relation exists, all such
suits must be instituted in the Chancery Court. In partnership suits, inter scsc,
all of the partners must be made parties, either complainant or defendant, and
when one or more partners wish to file a bill against one or more partners all
of the partners who do not wish to join in the bill must be made defendants,
end if a partner is dead his personal representative must take his place either
as complainant or defendant.
1 Mann v. Taylor, 5 Heisk., 269. 4 Pennington v. Bell, 4 Sneed, 200; House v.
2 Venable v. Levick. 2 Head, 354; Mclntire v. Mc- Thompson, 3 Head, 515; Jackson Ins. Co. v. Partee,
Laurin, 2 Hum., 71; Crouch & Emerson v. Bowman, 9 Heisk.. 298; Allen v. Bank, 6 Lea, 562.
3 Hum., 209; Sto. Part,, 5 102. 5 Smith's Eq. Jur., 353.
3 Smith's Eq. Jur., 349-350.
753 SUITS IN RELATION TO PARTNERSHIPS. § 961
§ 961. Pleadings, Decrees and Procedure in a Suit to Wind up a Partner-
ship. — In a suit by one partner against another, the following forms may be
found useful:
BILL TO DISSOLVE AND WIND UP A PARTNERSHIP.
[Insert address and caption as in §§ 155 ; 164, ante.]
i.
That on the 1st of January, 1895, he and the defendants formed and entered into a part-
nership agreement for the purpose of conducting a mercantile business under the name and
style of John Smith & Co. Said agreement was in writing, and will be filed at the hearing
or sooner if required. [If the agreement was verbal so state, and give its substance so far as
necessary to the litigation.']
ii.
That the complainant and the defendants were each to put into said business. [Here
state what each partner was to pay in in money, or property, and what in services, if not
already stated,] all of which complainant did faithfully according to his said agreement, and
he has done all other things stipulated by him or lawfully required of him.
m.
That the defendants, James Smith and John Brown [Here state what they were to do, if it
has not been already stated. If either or both of them failed to do what they had agreed to
do, so state.]
IV.
That said partnership was to continue five years, unless sooner dissolved by mutual con-
sent, but after the lapse of two years from its beginning the defendant, John Brown, formed
habits of intemperance to such an extent as to disqualify him to be a manager or partner in
a mercantile concern, and, notwithstanding his promises to reform, or retire from the part-
nership, he has totally failed to do either, but persists in participating in the business and
profits of the partnership, much to the embarrassment of complainant and to the hazard of
the concern. [If any losses by bad bargains, or bad conduct of said Brown, so state in a
general way, giving amount of losses when known.]
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2nd. That said partnership be dissolved, and that a receiver be appointed with full power
and authority to wind up the business of the partnership, to collect and receive all money,
debts and property now due or to become due to the said partnership, or to any of the part-
ners as partners to pay all debts of the partnership now due or to become due to manage
; ;
and conduct the business of the partnership as long as it can profitably be done, or until
otherwise ordered by your Honor, and then to sell all the property and effects of the part-
nership and make distribution of the profits according to the respective interests of the par-
ties therein.
3rd. That [If there be any allegations that any of the parties has received or become ac-
countable in any way to the firm, or has taken or received more than his share of the property
or profits of the concern, the bill should pray that] an account be taken of all the partner-
ship dealings so as to show the liability of each partner to the firm.
4th. That [If the conduct of any defendant, as set out in the bill, is such that he should be
enjoined from collecting any of the firm's debts, or meddling with the firm's assets, or doing
any act detrimental to the business of the partnership, there should be a prayer to that effect]
5th. That [If a defendant has fraudulently disposed of any of his property, or of any of
the firm's property, and the bill makes out a case for relief against the transferree, he should
be made a defendant, and an attachment prayed for to be levied upon such property, and the
sale of the attached property prayed for, the Proceeds to be applied towards the liquidation
of the fraudulent partner's liability to the firm.]
6th. And that complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
James A. Greer, Solicitor.
The bill must be sworn to, if an injunction or attachment is prayed; ami
there should be added to it the allegation That this is the first application for
:
an injunction or attachment in this case.

If the defendants are unable to defeat a dissolution of the partnership, or
do not so desire, they will file an answer consenting thereto.
ANSWER CONSENTING TO A DISSOLUTION.
[For title and commencement, see, ante, § 380.]
The defendants, answering the bill in said cause, do not admit the various charges of
misconduct against them in the bill, but deny each and all of them. However, being advised
that it is to their interest not to resist a dissolution of their partnership with complainant
§961 SUITS IN RELATION TO PARTNERSHIPS. 754
they, therefore, consent thereto, and unite with the complainant in praying for the appoint-
ment of a receiver, and a speedy winding-up of the affairs and business of the partnership,
the collection of its assets, the payment of its debts, and the division of the residue among
the partners according to their respective interests.
And now, having fully answered, the defendants pray to be dismissed with their costs.
Sam A. BreazealE, Solicitor.
The answer must be sworn to unless the defendant's oath is waived. If
necessary, the answer while consenting to a dissolution and receivership, may
dispute any material allegations of misconduct, especially such as make the
defendant liable to the firm, and such as charge misappropriation of the firm's
property, or fraudulent transfer of property, or other inequitable conduct.
DECREE DISSOLVING A PARTNERSHIP.
i
'
L
That the partnership heretofore existing between- the complainant and the defendants be,
and the same is hereby dissolved; and that Frank Dealer be and he hereby is appointed
receiver to take into his possession all the property and assets of said partnership of every
kind and wheresoever found, and reduce the same to cash by sale or collection as speedily
as may be consistent with the interests of the parties to. this suit, and to collect all debts
due the said partnership, and to pay all just debts owing by said partnership.
ii.
That the complainant and defendants forthwith deliver to said receiver all the books and
papers of -the firm, and all cash on hand, and all accounts, securities, notes of hand, or other
evidences of debt, and all the merchandise, fixtures, furniture and other property and effects,
of every kind whatsoever belonging to the said partnership, to be by him accounted for in
this case.
in.
That the receiver be authorized to bring all suits he may deem necessary to collect the
debts due the said partnership, and with the consent of the partners may compromise any
doubtful claim whether in behalf of or against said partnership.
IV.
That the receiver before entering on the discharge of his duties under this decree shall
give bond [&c. See § 909.] The receiver will report to the Court from time to time as to
the progress made by him, and duties discharged.
v.
That the Master take and state an account 6 of all dealings and transactions by and between
complainant and the defendants as partners from the commencement of the partnership to
this day; and for the better taking of said account the parties are respectfully required to
produce and leave with the Master all books, papers and writings in their custody or under
their control relating thereto. If, in taking said account any special matter shall arise the
Master is at liberty to state the same in his report.
VI.
All further questions are reserved until the incoming of said reports ; and any of the
parties are at liberty to apply as occasion may require.
6 The method of taking a partnership account is: others in order that all cross-claims may be settled.
1. To ascertain how the firm stands in relation to Myers V. Bennett, 3 Lea, 184; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1249.
third parties. 2. To ascertain what each partner is The parties should employ a competent bookkeeper
entitled to charge in account with his co-partners. to make out a balance sheet, showing the exact
3. To apportion between the partners all profits to status of the firm business. Ibid. The procedure in
be divided, or losses to be made good,
*
and ascertain
J
an accounting has heretofore been considered. See,
what, if anything, each partner must pay to the ante, §§ 603-610; 958.
755 SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION. § 962
CHAPTER LI.
SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION.
Article; I. Suits for Exoneration.
Article II. Suits for Subrogation.
Article III. Suits for Contribution.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS FOR EXONERATION

§ 963. Frame and Form of Bill for Exonera-
§ 962. Suits for Exoneration of Sureties.
tion of Sureties.
§ 962. —
Suits for Exoneration of Sureties. Entire good faith is required
between debtor and creditor and sureties. And if a creditor does any act
affecting the surety, or if he omits to do any act of duty which he is required
to do by the surety, or otherwise bound to do, and that act or omission may
prove injurious to the surety or if a creditor enters into any stipulations with
;
the debtor, unknown to the surety, and inconsistent with the terms of the
original contract, the surety may set up such act, omission or stipulation, as a
defence to any suit brought against him, in a Court of law or Equity. So that
if a creditor stipulates with his debtor, in a binding manner, upon a sufficient
consideration, to give further time for payment, without the consent of the
surety, the latter will be thereby discharged, if the arrangement might be
injurious to him. Mere delay on the part of the creditor, at least if some other
Equity does not intervene, unaccompanied with any valid contract for such
delay, will not amount to laches, so as to discharge the surety for the creditor ;
is under no obligation to press the principal for payment. However, sureties

are not obliged to wait for their principal to bring suit, but are entitled to
come into a Court of Equity, after a debt has become due, and compel the
debtor to exonerate them from their liability by paying the debt. 1
If a surety requests the creditor to sue forthwith, stating that he will con-
sider himself no longer bound as surety if the creditor fails to do so, he will
be discharged by the creditor's failure so to sue, if his principal was solvent 2
when the notice was given, but becomes insolvent after the expiration of the
time probably required to prosecute the suit to judgment if it had been prompt-
ly instituted as requested. 3
§ 963. Frame and Form of Bill for Exoneration of Sureties. The bill must —
allege (1) the fact of suretyship and how arising, (2) the solvency of the prin-
cipal debtor when the right of action on the obligation accrued, (3) that, after
such right accrued and while the principal was solvent, complainant notified
the creditor to bring suit at once on said obligation or he, the complainant,
would stand as surety no longer, 4 (4) that after such notice the creditor failed
to sue in a reasonable time, (5) that in the interim between such notice and the
bringing of suit by said creditor, against complainant on said obligation the
principal debtor became insolvent, and (6) should pray that said creditor '3
suit be enjoined and complainant discharged from liability on said obligation.
1 Smith's Eq. Jur., 84-86; Crowder V. Denny, 3 Heisk., 152. But see Jackson v. Huey, 10 Lea, 184
Head, 360; Greene v.Starnes, 1 Heisk., 583. See 3 Rice V. Simnson. 9 Heisk., 811; Love V. Allison,
Digests; and, ante, § 805. 2 Tenn. Ch., Ill; Hancock v. Bryant, 2 Yerg., 475;
2 The solvency of the principal need not be shown McGuire v. Bank, 9 Hum., 440.
beyond a reasonable doubt, but will be determined, 4 Or would be no longer liable or responsible, or
like all other facts, by the preponderance of prob- would consider himself discharged or released, or
abilities. See, ante, § 445 ; and Thompson v. Wat- some equivalent expression.
son, 10 Yerg., 362; and Hopkins ». Spurlock, 2
§ 964 SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION. 756
BILL FOE, EXONERATION OF A SURETY.
i.
That on February 1, 1903, John Doe executed his note to the defendant for one thousand
dollars, due one year after date, and complainant signed, said note as surety.
ii.
That John Doe was then solvent, and continued so solvent until on or about April 19,
1905, when his stock of goods was totally consumed by fire, and was wholly uninsured, his
loss being about five thousand dollars.
in.
That on March 1, 1904, complainant notified the defendant, in presence of a witness that
he would not stand as surety for John Doe any longer, and requested defendant to bring
suit on said note at once, or he would consider himself discharged. Complainant a few days
afterwards wrote to the defendant to the same effect.
IV.
That, notwithstanding said notices,, the defendant failed to bring suit until the 2d day of
the present month, (May 2, 1905,) when he sued complainant and said John Doe in the
Circuit Court of Anderson county, where said suit is now pending. If defendant recovers
a judgment on said note against said Doe and complainant, complainant will have the whole
of it to pay as said Doe is totally insolvent, and has been ever since April 19, 1905.
v.
1st. That subpcena to answer issue, [&c. see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
That the defendant be enjoined from further prosecution of said Circuit Court suit
2d.
and from attempting to collect said note in any other way, as against complainant; and that
at the hearing said injunction be made perpetual.
3d. That complainant have such other, further and general relief as the nature of his case
may require.
M. H. Hollingsworth, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, §§164; 789.]
ARTICLE II.
SUITS FOR SUBROGATION.

§ 964. Suits for Subrogation and Substitu- |
§ 965. Form of Bill for Subrogation and
tion. Substitution.
—
I
§ 964. Suits for Subrogation and Substitution. Subrogation is the substi-

tution of one person in place of a creditor, whose debt he has paid under com-
pulsion not being liable primarily therefor, and to whose rights as to the col-
lection of that debt he, thereupon, succeeds. So, whenever a surety, or other
person secondarily liable, discharges a debt, he is entitled to the benefit of alt
collaterals or liens which the creditor held as security; and the person sec-
ondarily liable is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor against
the person primarily liable. In such cases, Equity regards the payment by th<3
surety, or other person secondarily liable, as equivalent to a purchase of the
creditor's rights, equities and collaterals as against the debtor primarily liable;
and the Court will treat such payor as an assignee of the creditor, to that ex-
tent. So, a creditor is entitled to the benefit of any indemnity, or collateral
security, given by the debtor to his surety. Where, in any case, one not pri-
marily liable pays a debt, or discharges an encumbrance or lien, being under
legal compulsion so to do, he will in Equity be substituted to all of the cred-
itor's rights against the person primarily liable. 1
The following are the most usual cases of substitution and subrogation
1. Where a surety discharges the debt or obligation of his principal.
2. Where a co-surety pays a judgment that is a lien on the other surety's
land. 2
1 Bittiqk v. Wilkins, 7 Heisk., 307; Eberhardt 2 He is entitled to enforce the. lien as to one-half
i). I
Wood, 2 Tenn. Chy., 438, affirmed in 6 hen, 467'; of the judgment. Holt v. Strain, 2 Shan. Cas., 166
3 Pom Eq. Jur., § 1419.
3. "Where anyone not primarily liable pays the debt or discharges the obliga-
tion of the one primarily liable.
4. "Where a purchaser, for his own protection, discharges an incumbrance
on the purchased property.
5. "Where a junior encumbrancer for like reason pays off a prior encum-
brance.
6. Where a person advances money to discharge an incumbrance on an
agreement that he should succeed to the rights of the encumbrancer.
7. Where a devisee, heir, or legatee satisfies a debt against the estate for
which others are equally liable.
8. Where any person, for his own protection, or the protection of some
interest he represents, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable.
9. "When an insurance company pays in full a loss, it thereby becomes sub-
rogated to the rights of the insured against the party causing the loss, and
against other insurers.
§ 965. Form of Bill for Subrogation and Substitution. The following bill —
illustrates one of the most common cases for subrogation and substitution
BIUL FOR SUBROGATION AND SUBSTITUTION.
I.
That on June 3, John Doe, borrowed one thousand dollars from the
1903, the defendant,
defendant Richard Roe, and to secure the repayment thereof he executed to said Richard
Roe a note for said sum, due one year after date, with complainant and defendant Henry
Doe as sureties.
n.
That when said note was brought thereon by the defendant Richard Roe,
became due suit
against complainant and the defendants John Doe and Henry Doe, and judgment recovered,
which judgment complainant was compelled to pay on September 30, 1905, the sum he so
paid, being eleven hundred and three dollars, including the costs of the suit.
in.
That the defendant John Doe applied the said one thousand dollars borrowed from de-
fendant Richard Roe to the purchase of the following tract of land: [describe it], but took
the title in the name of his son, the defendant, Henry Doe, who claims it as his homestead.
IV.
That about the time suit was brought on said note, as aforesaid, the defendant John Doe
assigned and transferred to defendant Richard Roe, as further security, a note of hand for
three hundred dollars executed to said John Doe by the defendant George Jones, and now
due and wholly unpaid.
v.
That the defendant John Doe insolvent, and the defendant Henry Doe has.no visible
is
property subject to execution, except said tract of land, which he claims as his homestead.
Complainant charges and avers that said purchase by defendant John Doe in Henry Doe's
name was in fraud of creditors, and to hinder and delay them, and that said Henry Doe
aided his father therein, and agreed to deed said land to him when called on so to do, and
in the meantime to hold it for him.
VI.
The premises considered the complainant prays

2d. That complainant be subrogated and substituted to all the rights and collaterals of the
defendant Richard Roe as against the other defendants that said tract of land, and said note
;
made by the defendant George Jones, be held liable to reimburse complainant for what he
paid on said judgment and interest thereon.
3d. That the transfer of said land to Henry Doe be declared fraudulent and void, but if
that be not done that a resulting trust in favor of John Doe be declared thereon, and com-
plainant declared to have a lien thereon, by virtue of the premises; that defendants, John
Doe and Henry Doe be enjoined from transferring or encumbering said land, and that an
attachment issue and be levied upon it to secure complainant's claim.
4th. That complainant be given a decree for the amount due him, from the defendant John
Doe as principal, and from the defendant Henry Doe as co-surety on said thousand dollar
note; that a decree be rendered against the defendant George Jones for the amount due on
said note made by him, to be collected by execution; that said tract of land be sold on a
credit of six months and in bar of redemption, and its proceeds, along with the proceeds of
§ 966 SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION. 758
the decree against said Jones, be applied to the satisfaction of
the decree in favor of com-
plainant.
Sth. That complainant may have such further and other relief as the nature of his case
may require.
This is the first application for an injunction and attachment in this case.
G. W. Montgomery, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit. See, ante, §§ 164 ; 789.]
ARTICLE III.
SUITS FOR CONTRIBUTION.

966. Suits for Contribution by Co-Sureties, and Other Co-Sharers of Liabilities.
Co-Principals, Co-Debtors, Co- § 967. Form of Bill for Contribution Between
Owners, Co-Heirs, Co-Partners Partners.
,§ Suits for Contribution by Co-Sureties, Co-Principals, Co-Debtors,

966.
Co-Owners, Co-Heirs, Co-Partners, and Other Co-Sharers of Liabilities. Where —
two or more persons are bound by a common charge, not arising from a tort,
and one of them pays more than his share of the common liabilities, he can
compel the other or others to reimburse him. This rule of Equity is based on
the broad principle that where one person has discharged more than his share
of a debt or obligation which others are equally bound with him to discharge,
the others ought in conscience to refund to him enough to reduce his burden
to an equality with theirs. 1 In a Court of Chancery equality is Equity. 2 This
rule applies as between co-principals, co-sureties, co-owners of property, co-
insurers, co-heirs, co-devisees, co-legatees, co-owners of party walls, co-partners,
co-directors and co-stockholders in a corporation, and even to co-tort-feasors,
when the one asking relief was not primarily liable, or was innocent of the
tort. 3
If a co-surety is dead his personal representative may be sued for the de-
cedent's proportion; and if a co-surety is insolvent, he may be wholly ignored
and treated as no surety but in such a case the bill should state the fact of hi3
;
insolvency as the reason he is not sued. 4

BILL FOR CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN CO-STJRETIES.
I.
others, were co-sureties on a guardian bond for

That he and the defendants, along with
one thousand dollars, payable to the State of Tennessee, to secure the faithful discharge of
duties by John Smith as guardian of Henry Brown and William Jones.
II.
That in consequence of the alleged defaults of said John Smith as said guardian, a decree
was rendered against him in the Chancery Court of Hamblen county on the 18th day of
April, 1905, in favor of his said wards, Henry Brown and William Jones, for the sum of
seven hundred and ten dollars, and costs of the suit aggregating seven hundred and fifty-
'
three dollars.
in.
said decree execution issued and was levied on complainant's property.
That on Com-
plainant called on the defendants to come to his relief, and contribute and pay their propor-
tionate parts of said decree, and thus relieve his property, but this they all failed to do, in
consequence of which the whole burden fell On complainant, and he was so compelled to pay,
and has paid the full amount called for by said execution, to-wit, the sum of seven hundred
and seventy dollars, and took the sheriff's receipt therefor, dated June 5th, 1905, the day he
paid said amount, a copy of which receipt is filed with the bill marked exhibit A, and' the
original will be produced at the hearing, or sooner, if required.
IV.
That the defendants are the only bond who are solvent, and for that
co-sureties on said
reason they alone are sued. Complainant has besought them to help him bear the burden
1 Riley v. Rhea, 5 Lea, 115; Stephens v. Meek, 6 3 Maxwell r. R. R. Co., 1 Tenn. Ch., 8.
Lea, 226; Crowder v. Denny, 3 Head, 360. 4 Smith's Eq. Jur., 347
2 See, ante, § 47.
of said payment and contribute their proportion thereof, but they have failed so to do, and
so complainant despairing of their doing equity comes to your Honor and prays
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c.: see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2nd. That he be given a decree against the defendants for their ratable proportion of the
amount paid by complainant as aforesaid, and of the interest thereon, and for the costs of
this cause, and -~
3d. That he have such further and other relief as the nature of his case may require.
T. A. Peace, Solicitor.
§ 967. Formof Bill for Contribution Between Partners. The right to con- —
tribution often arises between partners. The following bill will serve as a form
in such a case.
BILL FOR CONTRIBSUTION BETWEEN PAB.TNEB.S.
i.
That he and the defendant were formerly partners, but that on the 18th day of April,
1900, said partnership was dissolved by mutual consent, and, on January 8, 1902, all the
partnership matters, so far as then known to complainant, were settled and adjusted between
him and the defendant, all the. debts of the partnership, so far as then known to complainant,
having been previously paid.
> n.
That on May 1st, John Jones recovered a judgment against complainant and de-
1903,
fendant in the Circuit Court of Knox county, Tennessee, for five hundred and twenty dollars,
on a note made to him in St. Louis, Missouri, by the defendant in the firm name, whereof
complainant knew nothing when said settlement between him and the defendant was made.
Complainant charges that the defendant got the exclusive benefit of the consideration of
said note, and that the partnership got none.
in.
That as the defendant got the exclusive benefit of the consideration of said note, com-
plainant insisted that he should satisfy said judgment without any contribution from com-
plainant, but this he not only refused to do, but has failed and refused to pay even his one-
half of said judgment, and complainant was compelled to pay, and has paid the amount due
on said judgment, an execution having issued therefor and been levied upon his property.
w.
That the said judgment amounted to five hundred and sixty dollars, and was paid on July
1. 1903, to the Sheriff of said county of Knox, and his receipt therefor taken, which will be
duly proved, and produced at the hearing, if denied.
v.
2d. That he be given a decree against the defendant for the amount paid on said execu-
tion, and interest thereon and costs of this suit; but if your Honor holds that the defendant
is only liable to contribute and pay complainant one-half of said amount then he prays there-
for, and for all the costs of this suit.
3d. That he have such further and other relief as the nature of his case may require.
P. C. Smithson, Solicitor.
§968 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. 760
CHAPTER LII.
SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY.
Article I. Suits Where the Chancery Court Acts as Guardian.
Article II. Suits to Sell the Property of Infants and Wives.
Article III. Suits Relating to Persons of Unsound Mind.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS WHERE THE CHANCERY COURT ACTS AS GUARDIAN.
968. Suits Where the Court Guards the § 970. Suits Where the Court Guards the
Interests of Wives. Interests of Minors and Lunatics.
969. Frame of Bill to Enforce a Wife's § 971. Frame of Bill by Next Friend Against
Equity. a Guardian.
§ 968. Suits Where the Court Guards the Interests of Wives. Courts of —
Equity act for those who by reason of some disability of nature or of law are
unable to act for themselves; 1 and wives being under a disability of law and
sometimes of both law and nature, frequently require the care of the Court for
their welfare.
Courts of Equity standing in loco parentis will not suffer the husband to obtain
possession of the wife's property without making a suitable provision for her
and her children, unless she being capable of giving her consent voluntarily
Vi'aives her right to a settlement. If the wife be not of full age she is incapable
of giving her consent, and in such case, the Court will not take her examina-
tion, nor suffer her to waive her Equity 2 and will act in spite of her protesta-
;
tions. 3 Husbands, and especially young husbands, cannot always be depended

on to guard providently the financial interests of their wives, and often them-
selves need a guardian's supervision as much as, and sometimes more than, do
their wives.
The Chancery Court will not, however, on its own motion, reach forward and
intervene in a wife's behalf; but when its protecting care and power are in-
voked, the Court is ever ready to act and whether the application be made by;
the wife herself, or by next friend,. relative, guardian, or even a third person in
her behalf, is immaterial, when the Court has the opportunity to declare and
enforce the wife's Equity to a suitable provision out of her personal estate
before it passes into the hands of her husband, or his assignee. 4
The Equity of the wife is enforced 1, Incidentally, when the husband, or his
:
assignee, is before the Court asking its aid to reduce her property to his pos-
session 5 and 2, Directly at the suit of the wife, or of her trustee, guardian or
;
next friend, asking the interposition of the Court in her behalf in which case :
the party in possession of the wife's estate- will, if necessary, be enjoined from
turning it over to the husband, or his assignee, until due provision has been
made for her and her children.
This right of a wife to a provision out of her property before the husband or
his assignee has reduced it to possession, is the creature of Courts of Equity,
and the assignment of her personal property, though duly probated, is not
1 See, ante, § 35. 5 In such case if the wife is not a party she
2 Phillips V. Hassell, 10 Hum., 197. should, by next friend, file a bill in the nature of a
3 Pillow v. Thomas, 1 Bax. 122; Murphy v. Green, cross bill and enjoin her husband, or his assignee,
2 Bax.. 405. from proceeding in his suit except concurrently with
4 Pillow- v. Thomas, 1 Bax., 128; Phillips V. Has- hers, and she should have the two suits consolidated
sell, 10 Hum., 197: Murphy V. Green, 2 Bax., 405; and heard together.
Dan. Ch. Pr., 90-109. 6 Dearin v. Fitzpatrick, Meigs, 551.
761 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. §969
valid as to the wife, and will be set aside on application to the Chancery Court
before the assignee takes possession. 7 But if the husband or assignee is suf-
fered to reduce the wife's property to his possession the Court will not under-,
take to follow it. 8
§ 969. Frame of Bill to Enforce a Wife's Equity.—To aid the pleader in
drawing an ordinary bill under the foregoing section the following frame is
given. If a suit is pending by the husband or assignee to reduce her estate to
his possession this bill will be so changed as to recite such fact, and to pray
that her bill be filed as an original bill in the nature of a cross bill, and that the
two causes be consolidated and heard as one;
FRAME OF BILL TO ENFORCE A WIFE'S EQUITY.
To the Honorable Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at
,
Mary Doe, wife of John Doe, who sues by Henry Jones, her next friend, all residents
of Knox county, complainant,
vs.
John Doe, and George Brown, executor of Thomas Jones, deceased, and Henry Brown
and James Doe, his sureties as such executor, all residents of Knox county, de-
fendants.
i.
That [Here show what personal estate the complainant has, whence derived, as from her
father's estate, or from some legacy, and that it is in the hands of the defendant George
Brown.]
ii.
That [Here show her age, that she is the wife of the defendant, John Doe, and give the
number and ages of her children, and if she is a feeble woman, or any of her children are
feeble, so state, and if there be any other reason why her fortune should not go into his
hands, so state. If he has assigned it, in whole or in part, so state, and make the assignee a
defendant.]
in.
That \Show
that the debts of her deceased father have been paid, and that the time has
arrived for his executor, the defendant, George Brown, to pay over to her her distributive
share of her father's estate, specifying the amount, and if she has made any demand therefor
so state, and state his response.]
IV.
That, [If the husband or his assignee is making efforts to induce the executor to pay to
him said share, so state. If any other facts exist showing the necessity for an injunction to
protect said share, state them fully and particularly.]
v.
That, [Show. that the defendants Henry Brown and lames Doe are the' sureties of George
Brown as such executor.]
VI.
1st. That subpeena to answer issue against all of the said defendants requiring them to
answer the bill fully and on oath [or fully, but not on oath.]
2nd. That the amount due complainant from the defendant George Brown and his said
sureties be decreed to her, and be settled uoon a trustee, or otherwise safely invested for
her sole and separate use, free from the liabilities and control of her said husband. [If this
amount has not been fixed by settlement with the Clerk of the County Coui*t, or otherwise,
and an accounting is necessary to ascertain the amount then pray:] and that all necessary
accounts be taken to ascertain said amount. „
3d. That an injunction issue to restrain the defendants, or any of them, from in any way
interfering with complainant's said equity, and to restrain the defendant, Georee Brown,
from paying it, or any part of it, to any of the defendants or to any one else. This is the
first application for an injunction in this case.
4th. That complainant may have such other, further, and general relief as the nature of
her case may require. Eugene Webb, Solicitor.
[To be sworn to: see, ante, § 789.]
§ 970. Suits Where the Court Guards the Interests of Minors and Lunatics.
The Chancery Court has jurisdiction of the persons and estates of infants, and
of idiots and lunatics, and other persons of unsound mind, and may appoint
guardians for them, and have their estates cared for and their interests pro-
moted to the same extent and in the same manner as do the County Courts ;'
7 Coppedge *. Threadgill, 3 Sneed, 579; see Smith s Dearin v. Fitzpatrirk, Meitrs, 551.
f>. Grcr, 3 Hum., 118; McElhatton v. Howell, 4 9 See,ante. § 24. Originally, in North Carolina,
Hay., 19 from which State our laws were derived, the Chan-
§ 971 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. 762
and, in many very important particulars, more fully. Thus, the Chancery
Court may make fuller provision for the education of the infant, and for its
medical or surgical treatment in extreme cases, and may expend a part or all
ol the infant's estate for these purposes, when necessary for its permanent
welfare and the Court may exercise a much larger discretion in dealing with
;
the property of idiots, lunatics and other persons of unsound mind as hereafter
shown. 10 A guardian may trespass on the corpus of his infant ward's estate,
m case of sickness, death, marriage, or for other good reason, or urgent neces-
sity, and the Chancery Court will ratify such action, on his showing a state of
facts that would have justified such an allowance on a bill filed by him in Chan-
cery for that purpose, and on his giving good reason for not appealing to the
Court in advance. 11 But it is better for the guardian to get authority for such
expenditures in advance by bill applying therefor; for, even when the Court
ratifies his action in such matters, it often taxes him with the costs; whereas
on a proper bill, filed in advance, costs and counsel fees will be paid out of the
ward's estate. If a guardian fail to make his settlements as required by law,
fails to renew his bond, or converts his ward's funds by paying his individual
debts with the same, or fails to keep it loaned on good security, but uses it as
his own in making his personal expenditures, it is cause for his removal. 12
The Chancery Court delights to help those who cannot help themselves, and
whenever the estate of an infant, idiot, or lunatic is being wasted, or converted,
whether by a parent, guardian, or stranger, the Court, on a bill filed by any one
as next friend, 13 will right the wrong, and hold the wrongdoer liable, treating
him as a trustee, when necessary to promote the interest of the beneficiary. 14
"Whenever it is necessary for the welfare of an infant, idiot or lunatic to
convert his realty -into personalty, or his personalty into realty, or to invest his
money, or to ratify or avoid his contracts, the Chancery Court has authority
to order it to be done, and to superintend the execution of its order. In short
the Chancery Court, acting in loco parentis, and as general guardian for minors,
idiots, lunatics and persons of unsound mind, will do for them and their prop-
erty, what they themselves would in all probability have done if possessed of
good reason and good conscience.
§ 971. Frame of Bill by Next Friend Against a Guardian. The followin-r —
frame of a bill is given to aid the Solicitor of the next friend in drawing a *>ill
to cover the usual delinquencies of a general guardian. Of course, all of the
enumerated delinquencies never exist in any one case, and, as a rule, it is
enough if any one of them exists.
FRAME OP BILL BY NEXT FRIEND AGAINST A GUARDIAN.
To the Honorable H. B. Lindsay, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Knoxville.
The State of Tennessee, for the use of Sarah Brown, an infant, [or idiot, or lunatic,
or person of unsound mind,] who sues by John Brown, her next friend, both res-
idents of Knox county, complainant, 15
vs.
Charles Brown, guardian of said Sarah Brown, and Henry Brown and George Brown,
his sureties as such guardian, and Richard Roe, all residents of Knox county, de-
fendants.
eery Court, by its inherent power, had exclusive 12 Fincher v. Monteith, 5 Lea, 144. If a guardian
jurisdiction of the persons and estates of infants; wilfully neglects, or obstinately refuses, to exhibit
and when, for greater local convenience, the County his account, the Court may attach him until he does
Courts were given jurisdiction thereof, it was ex- so. Code. § 2528.
pressly provided in the statute, (Act of 1762. ch. 5, 13 Stephenson V. Stephenson, 3 Hav., 123; Miles
§ 26) that "the powers of the Court of Chancery n. Kaieler, 10 Yerg., 10; Benton 17. Pope, 5 Hum.,
over orphans and their estates should not be 393; Johnson v. Hunter. 9 Bax. 186; Cohen i>.
abridged" thereby. 1 Scott's Rev., 105. And this Shyer, 1 Tenn. Ch.. 192; Green «. Harrison, 3 Sneed,
provision has existed in our statutes evpr since. 131. See, ante, §§ 103-108. Wards may by next
Code, § 2493. See Oakley V. Mitchell, 10 Hum., friend, recover trust property sold by their guardian
256; Lake v. McDavitt, 13 Lea, 26; Talbot V. Pro- without authority. Gross V. Gillenwaters, 2 Sban.
vine, 7 Bax., 510. Cas., 537.
io See, post, § 984. See, also, Code, §§ 3708-3719. 1 1 Nflsnn «. Allen, 1 Ycrg., 374.
Imbecility from old age is covered by the statute. 15 Tbe till may be filed by the minor or lunatic by
Porter v Porter, 3 Hum., 589; Fentress v. Fentress, next fjieid, directly, v-ithout using the name of the
7 Heisk.,' 431. State. See, ante, §§ 927; 957. For form of caption
ll Owens V. Pearce, 10 Lea, 45; Hobbs r, Harlan, and commencement, see, ante, § 156.
10 Lea, 268. The County Court has no jurisdiction
over these matters. Mitchell v. Webb, 2 Lea, 152.
763 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. § 971
The complainant, the State of Tennessee, suing for the use of Sarah Brown, an infant,
who sues by John Brown, her next friend, respectfully shows to the Court i
I.
That [Here show what estate and rights Sarah Brown has, and, if land, give its location
and value.
n.
That [Here show that the defendant Charles Brown is her guardian, and specify in what
way, and to what extent he is violating his trust, such as failing to settle with the County
Clerk, or to renew his bond, or, if he has settled, charge that the settlement is false and
fraudulent, and specify in what particulars ; or that he fails to keep the trust money loaned
or properly invested; if the estate is land show that the guardian has let it greatly deteriorate,
or does not keep it leased or under proper cultivation, or so use it as to derive a reasonable
profit therefrom. If the guardian is, in any way, neglecting his duty, specify in what way;
if he is speculating on the assets so state, and particularize how; if he is using the assets for
his own use or profit, so charge; if he has sold any property to Richard Roe without
authority specify it, and give the facts in full; if he is committing any waste of the estate,
or allowing Richard Roe, or any others, to commit any, specify in what way; if he has bought
any property with his ward's money and taken the title in his own name, or is loaning his
zrard's money to Richard Roe, or any one else, and taking notes in his individual name, give
the particulars in full so as to identify the property so bought, or the notes so taken; if he
has used the ward's estate to pay his own debts to Richard Roe, or to any other person, or
is lending her money on insufficient security; if he fails to collect from Richard Roe a large
sum of money owing by said Roe to complainant, give the facts and circumstances; and show
any other default on his part as guardian.]
in.
That [Here any ground that may exist for an injunction to prevent any act by
set forth
the guardian or any other defendant, especially Richard Roe, that if done will be prejudicial
to complainant's rights and interests, giving the particulars, and showing clearly the neces-
sity for such injunction.]
IV.
That [If it be necessary to attach any of the property of any of the defendants to secure
the payment of the money due complainant, and if any statutory or equitable ground of attach-
ment exist, state it.]
v.
That the defendants, Henry Brown and George Brown, are the sureties of the defendant
Charles Brown as guardian of Sarah Brown, and along with him have given bond, dated
August 14, 1905, payable to the State of Tennessee in the penalty of five thousand dollars,
conditioned for the faithful discharge of the duty of said Henry Brown as said guardian;
and complainant charges and avers that the condition of said bond has been broken by de-
fendant Charles Brown by the various violations of his said duty hereinbefore set out and
alleged.
VI.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §§ 1S8; 164.]
2d. That an injunction be ordered by your Honor [&c: ante, § 158, sub-sees., 3, 4.]
3d. That an attachment issue and be levied [&c. : see, ante, § 158.]
4th. That an account be taken between Sarah Brown and the defendant Charles Brown,
showing therein, fully and in detail, the various matters and moneys justly chargeable to
him, and various matters and moneys he is justly entitled to credit for; that he be hell
liable for the reasonable rents of said lands, and for all waste by him committed or per-
mitted thereon, and for the reasonable value of the said property of Sarah Brown by him
appropriated or converted, that the title to the said tract of land by him purchased with
complainant's money, from the defendant Richard Roe, and deed taken in his own name,
be divested out of him and vested in complainant; that no compensation be allowed him,
and he be charged with compound interest; that a decree be rendered in Sarah Brown's
favor against him and his said sureties for the full amount found due from him, and that he
be removed as guardian and a new guardian be appointed, and that the defendant Richard
Floe be held liable to Sarah Brown for all trust money and property by him received as
aforesaid, and that he be held to account for the same as trustee; that all attached property
be sold to satisfy Sarah Brown's claims, and that she may have all such further and other
relief as she may be entitled to.
This is the application for an injunction or an attachment in this case.
first
G. W. Pickle, of Counsel. W. R. Turner, Solicitor.
[Attach affidavit to bill: see, ante, §§ 161 164.] ;
972 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY. 764
In case of a bill by a next friend against the guardian of a lunatic the above
frame will be found helpful, the necessary changes being very few, and such
only as will readily occur to the pleader. The liabilities and defaults of the
guardian of an idiot or lunatic are mainly the same as those of the guardian
of an infant, and the bill against him is mainly the same.
ARTICLE II.
SUITS TO SELL OR LEASE THE PROPERTY OF INFANTS AND WIVES.
972. When a Sale or Lease May be Made. § 976. Report of the Master as to the Sale.
973. The Frame of a Bill to Sell. § 977. Action on the Report, and Final Pro-
974. Proceedings on Behalf of the 'Defend- ceedings.
ants. § 978. Proceedings to Confirm a Sale Pre-
975. Reference to the Master to Ascertain viously Made.
the Facts. § 979. Proceedings to Authorize or Ratify a
Purchase of Land by a Guardian.
§ 972. —
When a Sale or Lease May be Made. Property is valuable only as a
means of support and education and a small estate belonging to an infant
;
cannot be better invested than in educating and supporting him. 1 It, also,
often happens that a very advantageous sale may be made of an infant's or
married woman's property, or that the property should be sold because dilap-
idating, or unproductive, or encumbered. It is, therefore, provided by the
Code, that, whenever a sale of the property, real or personal, of an infant or
married woman is (1) necessary for their support, education, and maintenance,
or (2) is manifestly for their interest, the Chancery Court may consent to and
decree a sale thereof. 2 And the jurisdiction may be exercised as to any kind of
property, and whether the interest or estate of the person under disability, or
any of the parties litigant, is in possession, reversion, or remainder, or subject
to any limitation, restriction, or contingency whatsoever; 3 except, that in no
case shall property be sold, if it be claimed under a will which expressly directs
otherwise. 4 Even property wherein persons not in being may have an interest
may be sold, if all those interested, then in being, are before the Court; and
sale is necessary, or manifestly for the interest of such persons then in being,
having a common interest with those who may come into being. 5
But the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court in the foregoing matters does not
depend exclusively on the Code; that Court has inherent power over the per-
sons and estates of infants, 6 and has plenary jurisdiction, iipon proper plead-
ings and process, to control and sell, or consent to the sale of, the real estate of
minors, and to compromise their rights. 7 Indeed, it may be said, generally,
that the Chancery Court has inherent power to convert realty into personalty;
and in so doing can bind the rights and interests, legal or equitable, vested or
contingent, present or future, of all persons whether in esse or in posse, and
1 Whenever a person is disabled by law or nature when manifestly for their interest. Note to original
to rare for their own persons or property, a Court edition. —
And it has been so held since th^ original
of Chancery will art for them, and do all that may edition of this work was published. See Ricardi V.
be necessary for the welfare of their persons, the Gaboury, 7 Cates, 484. The Court will in a proper
education of their minds, and the management or case, confirm, or consent to, a sale or lease already
disposition of their property. The Court will appoint made or negotiated. Ibid. Post, § 979.
guardians, remove guardians, and compel guardians 3 Code, § 33?7.
to do their duty, and, when proper, will authorize 4 Code, § 3340. But see Porter t>. Porter, 1 Bax.,
guardians to expend a part or all of the principal of 299.
their ward's estate in maintaining or educating 5 Code, §3337; Gray v. Barnard, 1 Tenn. Ch.,
them; and will sell the lands of the ward for that 298.
purpose. See. ante, 5 35 o Oaklev V Mitchell, 10 Hum., 256; Lake and
2 Code, §§3323; 3333. Inasmuch as the greater wife <\ McDavitt, 13 Lea. ?6.
contains the less, the Court could, it would seem, 7 Wilson v. Schaefer, 23 Pick., 300: Hurt v. Long,
consent to and decree a long lease of their property 6 Pick., 445; Lenow v. Arrington, 3 Cates, 720.
whether sui juris, or under disability, who are before the Court by service of
process or by virtual representation. 8
§ 973. The Frame of a Bill to Sell.—The bill may be filed by the husband of
the wife, and by the regular guardian of the infant, against the person under a
ilisability 9 and should be filed in the county where the property, real or per-
;
sonal, sought to be disposed of, is, or where the p'erson under disability at the
time resides, at the option of the complainant. 10
The bill should set forth fully and particularly: (1) the age, circumstances
and condition of the party under disability, (2) what other property, if any,,
such person owns, or is in any way entitled to; (3) and the causes or reason
why a sale of the particular property is sought; and (4) must be sworn to. 11
The following is a form of a
BILL TO SELL LAND OF MINORS FOR THEIR EDUCATION.
To the Hon. Thos. M. McConnell, Chancellor, holding
the Chancery Court at Manchester
John Rogers, guardian, &c, a resident of Coffee county, complainant, !
vs. .
f-
Henry Clark and Mary Clark, residents of the same county, defendants. J
I.
That the defendants, Henry Clark and Mary Clark, are infants, without mother or father-
living, and complainant is their regular guardian. Said Henry Clark is eighteen years old,
and said Mary Clark is twelve years old; and the residence of all the parties is in Coffee
county.
IL
The defendants are the owners, as tenants in common, in fee simple, of a tract of land in
the Sth civil district of said county, bounded as follows Beginning on a rock, Charles
:
Erown's corner, [and giving the metes and bounds,] to the beginning, containing about one-
hundred acres. They own no other realty, and the value of their personal estate is less than
fifty dollars to each, and is money.
in.
said tract of land is worth about five hundred dollars, and is unencumbered, except
That
the taxes on it for the last year are unpaid. The land has no improvements except a small
cabin and a clearing of about one acre. It yields no revenue whatever, and complainant has
no means, as guardian, sufficient to pay taxes. 12
IV.
. Thedefendant, Henry, is an apt, energetic, and industrious boy, and desires to qualify
himself to be a civil engineer. It will cost about one hundred and fifty dollars, to complete
his education for that business, coupled with what he can himself earn. He has already
partially qualified himself for the business, and has a talent and a fondness for it.
v.
The defendant, Mary, a bright child, with a talent for music, and has an aunt, Mary
is
Brown, who will keep her, if complainant as guardian will help pay for her musical educa-
tion. This is an opportunity too valuable to he lost.
VI.
Complainant believes that it is manifestly for the interest of his wards, as. well as necessary
13 and therefore prays
for their support and education, that said land be sold;
1st. That they be made parties to this bill by service of subpoena; that the defendant,.
Henry, answer in person as well as by guardian ad litem, and that a guardian ad litem and
Solicitor be appointed for both of them.
2d. That said tract of land be sold, and the proceeds.be used for the purposes above stated.
3d. That such other relief be granted as the rights and interests of the defendants and the-
duties of complainant may require John Rogers, Guardian.
[To be sworn to by complainant in person, and on his own knowledge. See, ante r § 789.] .
8 Ridley v. Halliday, 22
607; Pick., Ricardi v, same to the defendant, [purchaser'}, for six hundred'
Gaboury, 7 Cates, 484. dollars, a sum believed to be one hundred dollars
9 Code, § 33^4. The bill may, also, be filed by a more than could be obtained at public sale; and' be,
next friend. Code, §§ 3335; 3339; Mason v. Tinsley, the said purchaser,, ia ready and wilting to pay for
I Tenn. Ch., 154.
the same in such installments as your Honor may
10 Code, § 3326; Williams v. Williams, 10 Heisk ,
prescribe, and has paid complainant one hundred
dollars, as a forfeit, which sum is paid into Court
11 Code, §3329; Greenlaw, IV Greenlaw,, 16 Lea, with the filing of this bill.
435. And in such case, the foregoing, prayer will be so
12 If the guardian has no means of paying the changed as to pray:
taxes, this, alone, will justify the sale of an infant's 2d. That the said sale of said tract to the defendt-
land. Greenl™ v. Greenlaw, 16 Lea,. 435. ant, [purchaser], be ratified and confirmed,, and the
13 If the bill is filed' to confirm a sale already ne- proceeds be used for the purposes above stated; See
gotiated complainant, the proposing purrhaser
by further, as to confirming a sale, post, § 979.
should be a defendant, and paragraph VI
made When a sale is sought to be confirmed', the- pur-,
would read as follows: Complainant realizing, the chase money must be paid into Court. Mason v.
necessity of a sale of said land, has negotiated the Tinsley, 1 Tenn. Ch., 1-54.
§ 974. Proceedings on Behalf of the Defendants. On or after the return —
clay of the subpoena duly served on the defendants, the Court, if in session, or
the Chancellor or Master, 14 if in vacation, will appoint a guardian ad litem for
the infant defendants, and for a defendant who is a married woman, and the
guardian ad litem may be required to give a bond 15 faithfully to discharge his
trust. If the person under disability is not represented by counsel, the Court
will appoint counsel for such a person, and fix the compensation, which shall
be the same whether a sale is ordered or not, and shall in no event exceed one
hundred dollars. 16
The infant, if over fourteen years of age, and the married woman, must
answer the bill in person 17 and in their answer should fully and truthfully set
;
forth any facts material to their interests and to the suit, not contained in the
bill; and should deny, or correct, any misstatements in the bill; and should
state their own wishes in reference to the sale, and to the application of the
proceeds. Their answer must be sworn to.
§ 975. Reference to the Master to Ascertain the Facts. The Court may —
hear the case without a reference but the usual practice is to direct the Master
;
to examine unexceptionable and disinterested witnesses, and to put such ques-

tions as will elicit the whole truth, and will enable the Court to obtain a full
understanding of the r«al facts of the case. 18 If the case is heard without such
a reference, the Court will be obliged to determine it upon such proof as the
parties may themselves see fit to present. But proof there must be, and cogent
proof, to authorize a decree, and no consents of parties sui juris will bind an
infant. 18a The following is a form of an
ORDER OF REFERENCE.
John Rogers, guardian, &c, 1
vs. (
Henry Clark, et al. J

This cause, coming on for orders before the Hon. Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor, on
this Sept. 6, 1891, on the bill the answers of the defendants, by Charles Wilson, their guardian
ad litem, and the answer of said Henry Clark in person the Court, in order to ascertain the
;
real facts, is pleased to direct the Master to examine disinterested and unexceptionable wit-
nesses, and report upon the facts established by the proof:
1st. What estate each of the defendants possess, its kind and value, and the net income
derived therefrom ; and how they are being supported.
2d. What is the age of each of the defendants and has each or either of them, any and
;
what talent for any particular business, trade, or profession; and what have they been doing
for the last year ?
3d. Whether a sale of the land described in the bill is necessary for the support, education,
and maintenance of the defendants, or is otherwise manifestly for their interest, and why.
And what is a reasonable minimum price for said tract of land.
The Master will base his conclusions on the facts proven by the witnesses, and not on their
opinions; and he will examine such witnesses, and put such questions, as will elicit the whole
truth and will report against a sale unless the testimony leaves no reasonable doubt as to its
;
propriety.
He will report to the present or next term of the Court.
§ 976. —
Report of the Master as to the Sale. The Master is expected to use
extraordinary diligence and good faith in ascertaining the facts, in cases of
this character, and in reporting them to the Court. 19 His report will be in the
nsual form; but, as an illustration of its character, the following form is given
of the Master 's response to the 3d head of inquiry, in the foregoing reference.
14 The Master may appoint the guardian ad litem cellor. The Master should appoint no one as guar-
and Solicitor. Beaumont v. Beaumont, 7 Heisk dian ad litem, or Solicitor, who is at all in sympathy
226. with a proposing purchaser.
15 Code, § 3324. As to guardians ad litem gener- 17 Code, § 3325. Their guardian ad litem should
erally, see, ante, §§ 106-108. The guardian in these also answer for them. He should, as a rule, content
proceedings cannot file a cross bill to have a sale himself with a formal answer, unless he knows, or
confirmed. Browning -V. Browning, 11 Lea, 106. has reliable information of, facts that should be made
16 Code, § 3330. Counsel not appointed by the known to the Court. He should never make any ad-
Court are not entitled to any compensation out of missions except as to the infancy of his ward, and
the fund in Court; they sometimes really represent the ward's ownership of the property. For form of
third parties who are more anxious to buy the prop- a formal answer, see. ante, § 383.
erty than guard the interests of the person under 18 Code, §§ 3331-3334
disability. For this reason, the Court should rely 18a Sawyers v. Sawyers, 22 Pick., 597.
on the guardian ad litem, or next friend, rather than i» Code, §§ 3331-3334.
on counsel not appointed by the Master, or Chan-
REPORT AS TO NECESSITY, OB, PROPRIETY, OP A SALE.
As to the necessity, or propriety, of the proposed sale.

On this point, the Master reports that the facts clearly show
1st. That the sale prayed for is necessary for the support, education, and maintenance of
the defendants, because (1) the defendants are both orphans; (2) the personal estate of each
of them is only thirty-nine and 43-100 dollars, which is in money in their guardian's hands,
[Dep. of John Rogers, p. 2, q. 3; and exhibit A;] (3) they have no other source of income or
support, except their own labor, [Dep. of John Rogers, p. 3, q. 4;] (4) Henry Clark is learning
civil engineering, is apt, industrious, and capable; and for one hundred and seventy-five
dollars can complete his studies, and be prepared to engage in the business of civil engineer-
ing, which is a good business, and he has a talent and a fondness for it, [Deps. of William
Brown, pp. 2-4, q. 2; Charles Jones, pp. 1-3, q. 2; and Henry Clark, pp. 2-4, q. 3;] (5) Mary
Clark has a talent for music, and her aunt, Mary Brown, a professional musician of good
repute, will board, clothe, and educate her for forty dollars a year. [Deps. of Mary Clark,
pp. 2-5, qs. 2 and 3; and Henry James, pp. 1-2; q. 1.]
2d. And said sale is, also, manifestly for the interest of the defendants, because: (1) the
land yields no revenue; and cannot be made to yield any, without converting it into a farm,
which would require a large expenditure of msney, [Deps. of Henry Farmer, pp. 2-4, qs. 2
and 3; and John Rogers, p. 6, q. 7;] (2) the defendants have no means of paying the taxes,
and the guardian has been compelled to sell timber for that purpose from the land, which is
now deficient in good timber, [Dep. of John Rogers, p. 7, q. 8;] and (3) the land is covered
with scrubby timber, and is being damaged by several large and growing wash-outs through
its midst, [Dep. of Henry Farmer, p. 5, q. 4.]
All of which is respectfully submitted. Sept. 8, 1891.

John S. Moore, C. & M.
The other heads on which the Master is required to report will be reported
on with equal fullness and exactness, to the end that the Court may have that
full understanding of the circumstances and condition of the person under dis-
ability required by the statute. 20 The Master should summon witnesses who best
know the facts and should not depend on witnesses suggested to him by the
parties. 21
§ 977. Action on the Report, and Pinal Proceedings, It is the duty of the —
Chancellor to hear the proof read, and to set aside the Master's report, on his
own motion, even though unexcepted to, if not fully satisfied that the case for
a sale is clearly made out, 22
If the Master's report is confirmed, the Court orders the land to be sold. No
guardian, next friend, or witness, can purchase at the sale, or at any time after-
wards until five years from the removal of the existing disabilities and a sale ;
to any such person is void. 23 The Court will see that the proceeds of the sale,
if made for education or support, are so applied and if made for reinvestment, ;
are invested in lands, bonds of this State, or of the United States, or loaned on
good mortgages on realty. 24
The following will serve as a form of
DECREE ORDERING A SALE.
John Rogers, guardian, &c, ]
vs. [
Henry Clark, et al. J
This cause, coming on to be heard, this Sept. 19, 1891, upon the pleadings, including the
answer of the minor defendant, Henry Clark, [in person, if over fourteen years of age, and]
by guardian ad litem and Solicitor, and proof, and report of the Master, which report is in
the words and figures following
1.
[Here set it out, in full.]

And said report being unexcepted to, and the Court being fully satisfied that the case for a
sale of the land of the defendant,, Henry Clark,' for his education and support, is clearly made
out by proof of facts established by unexceptionable and disinterested witnesses, the conclu-
sions of the Master are fully ratified and approved, and his report in all things confirmed.
20 Code, § 3334. 24 Code,§ 3338. A witness is not disqualified to
21 See, Hunt v. Glenn, 11 Lea, 16. purchase unless he testifies to some material fact
•22Code, S 3334. necessary for a decree of sale. Hunt c. Glenn, 11
23 Code, § 3339. Lea, 16.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Court, that the tract of land, described in
complainant's bill and in the Master's report, be sold by the Master, in the manner provided
by law, to the highest bidder, on a credit, six, twelve, eighteen and twenty-four months.
The Master will take notes from the purchaser, for the instalments, drawing interest from
date, with good personal security, and will, also, retain a lien on the land for further security.
He will not sell said land for less than five hundred dollars; 25 and will not sell to the
guardian, next friend, or any witness in the cause. He will report to the next term of the
Court.
in.
Said sale is ordered both because it is manifestly to the interest of the defendants, and
because the proceeds are necessary for the support, and especially for the education, of the
defendants; and said proceeds will be paid out for said purposes, under the order of this
Court, to the end that the defendants may receive the full benefit thereof. And the cause
will be retained in Court until the funds are all disbursed, and the purpose of this proceeding
fully attained.
If the bill is dismissed, the Court may adjudge all the costs of the cause
against the complainant, personally, including the counsel fees of any counsel
appointed by the Court. 26
§ 978. Proceedings to Confirm a Sale by a Guardian. In any case where it —
would be proper, on a bill filed for that purpose, to sell the property, real or
personal, of an infant or a married woman, the Court may confirm or adopt a
sale, already made by the guardian or husband, or consent to a sale proposed to
be made. 27 When the action of the Court is sought in such a case, a bill must
be filed for that purpose in the same manner as when a sale sought, and the
same proceedings must be had, the same answers put in, the same kind of wit-
nesses examined, and the same report made. In such a ease, however, the pur-
chaser, or proposing purchaser, should also, be made a defendant. The bill,
after reciting the facts showing a proper case for a sale, should then proceed
to show that an advantageous sale has been negotiated, and should state its
terms, and pray that it be ratified, and confirmed. The form of such a bill is
the same as a bill for a sale, with the changes indicated in the marginal notes. 23
On such a bill being filed and answered, the Master, in addition to the mat-
ters referred to him on a bill for sale, 29 will be directed to report
REFERENCE TO MASTER AS TO CONFIRMATION OF A SALE.
Whether the sale referred to in the pleadings is an advantageous one, and whether it
4th.
is manifestly for the interest of the defendant under disability to confirm the same, stating
the facts and reasons.
If there be any probability of a higher price being obtained than that offered
by the proposing purchaser, it would be prudent to decree a private sale of the
property, and direct the Master to accept the proposed offer, if no higher bid
was obtained before the next term of the Court, or before some other fixed
period.
On confirmation of such a sale, the proceeds will be applied, or reinvested,
as in other cases of sale.
§ 979. Proceedings to Authorize or Ratify a Purchase or Exchange of Land
—
by a Guardian. On proper bill filed therefor under the rules hereinbefore
stated, and on suitable references and reports showing that the interests of the
minor will be manifestly promoted by the purchase of real estate made or pro-
posed by the general guardian, the minor being before the Court, represented
by a guardian ad litem, and answering in person if over fourteen years of age,
the Court may authorize or ratify the proposed purchase of real estate by the
25 In a sale of this kind, it is proper to fix a fare of the party under disability. See Code,
minimum price for the land. .Horn V. Denton, 2 §§3324; 3330-3332; 3334-3335; 3339; Hunt v. Glenn,
&need, 126. 11 Lea, 16; Porter v. Porter, 1 Bax., 302.
20 Code, § 3335. The object of the statute is to 27 The language of the Statute is. the Court "may
guard well the interests of those under disability consent to and decree a sale," Code, § 3323; and
and extraordinary care is required of the Court, " to give consent, or order the sale," Code, § 3334;
extraordinary good faith is required of the regular Hurt v Long, 6 Pick., 445.
guardian, the next friend, the guardian ad litem, 28 See, ante, § 973.
and the witnesses, and extraordinary impartiality and 20 See, ante, § 975, for the remainder of the order
diligence are required of the Master, and all are of reference.
expected and required to seek nothing but the wel-
769 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. §980
general guardian with his ward's money, being careful to see that the title of
the minor to the land will be good.
And so, on like proceedings, the Court may authorize or ratify an exchange
of lands, when clearly shown to be to the manifest interest of the minor.
ARTICLE III.
SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND.

§ 980. The Jurisdiction of Chancery Over § 982. Proceedings on an Inquisition of
Persons of Unsound Mind. Lunacy.
§ 983. Appointment of a Guardian.
§ 981. How Jurisdiction is Exercised. § 984. The Guardian's Duties and Powers.
§ 980. The Jurisdiction of Chancery Over Persons of Unsound Mind. The —

Chancery Court has jurisdiction to take care of the financial affairs of persons
<vho are mentally incompetent to promote or protect their own interests; and
to make any decree in reference to their estates, required for the well-being of
iheir persons or their property. The Court may do anything in reference to
tbeir property which they would, in good reason and good conscience, have
been bound to do, if capable of making contracts. And by statute the Court is
fiven jurisdiction over the persons and estates of idiots, lunatics, and other
persons of unsound mind, 1 where the estate exceeds five hundred dollars. 2
§ 981. How Jurisdiction is Exercised. Whenever a person of unsound —
mind has an estate in excess of five hundred dollars, and no regular guardian,
any person 3 may file a sworn petition in the Chancery Court of the county
where the non compos resides, 4 setting forth the facts in regard to the person
and property of the supposed idiot, or lunatic, alleging that his estate exceeds
five hundred dollars, 5 and making him a defendant. 6 The following is a form of
A PETITION FOB AN INQUISITION OF LtTJNACY.
To Hon. B. M. Webb, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Jamestown
the :
The petition of Frank Friend, )
against [
John Need, both residents of Fentress county. J

Petitioner would respectfully show
i-
That the defendant, John Need, has recently become [or is] a person of unsound mind,
so that he has not capacity sufficient for the government of himself and property. He has a
wife, Susan Need, and two young children, dependent on him for support. He is also con-
siderably indebted.
ii.
The said John Need owns the following property(1) a farm of one hundred acres in the
:
2d civil district of said county of Fentress, adjoining the farms of Henry Jones, John Tate,
George Smith, and perhaps others, and worth one thousand dollars (2) two horses, three ;
cows, various agricultural implements, and a set of household furniture; and (3) a small
stock of merchandise, worth about six hundred dollars.
in.
In consequence of the mental unsoundness of said John Need, his business has fallen into
confusion, and his property is being wasted. His creditors are not being paid, and his debts
are not being collected. And unless a guardian is appointed to take charge of his estate, it
will suffer irreparable injury.
1 Code, §§3681; 4298. A person incapable >f in personam. The statute designates the person pro-
governing himself or property may have a guardian ceeded dgainst as "the defendant" and speaks of
appointed for him under the statute;. Fentress. Vi "both parties" and "either party," Code, §§ 3693-
Kentress, 7 Hfisk., 428. 3707, and requires the defendant to be notified, and
2 Code, § 3692. served with a copy of the petition. Code, § 3695.
3 2 Barb. Ch. Pr„ 228. The defendant is treated by the statute as having all
4 Code, 5 3682. the rights of a sane man, until the jury determine
5 Code, §§ 3691-3692. that he is not sane.
1
See, Dozier, ex parte, 4 Baic,
CiThe proceeding is riot ex parte, or in rem-, but
§ 982 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. 770
IV.
Therefore, the petitioner prays
1st. That a writ of inquisition issue to inquire and ascertain whether the defendant be a
person of unsound mind and that defendant be' given due notice thereof.
;
2d. That if so found, a guardian be appointed to. manage his person and estate; and
3d. For general relief.
L. T. Smith, Solicitor. Frank Friend.
[Annex affidavit and jurat as in § 797, ante. 7 ]
Upon this petition being presented to the Chancellor, either in Court, or at
Chambers, he will endorse on the petition an order for a writ to be issued, on
bond being given. The following will serve as a form of
THE CHANCELLOR'S FIAT.
To the Clerk and Master of said Court
Upon the petitioner giving bond, with good security, in the sum of five hundred dollars,
conditioned as required by the statute, 8 you will issue a writ of inquisition as prayed, and
do all such acts in connection therewith as are required of you by law.
June 4, 1890. B. M. Webb, Chancellor.
WRIT OF INQUISITION.
County of Fentress. J
To the Sheriff of said county:
You are hereby commanded to 'summon a jury of twelve freeholders to meet at a day and
place to be designated by you, to inquire and ascertain by their verdict, whether John Need
is an idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind 9 and if so, the value of his estate, of what it
;
consists, and who would be his heirs, and next of kin, were he to die intestate. 10
Witness, O. C. Conatser, Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court of said county, at office,
in Jamestown, the 4th day of June, 1890. O. C. Conatser, C. & M. 11
Summon, also, the following persons to attend at the time and place fixed for the inquisi-
tion, to testify in behalf of the petitioner Dr. John Jones, George Brown, and Henry Smith.
:
O. C. Conatser, C. & M.
§ 982. Proceedings on an Inquisition of Lunacy The Clerk and Master —
will cause the defendant to be served with a copy of the petition, and notice
of the time and place of holding the inquest, at least five days previous there-
to. 12 The following will serve as a form of
THE NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT.
Frank Friend, ]
vs. V In the Chancery Court, at Jamestown.
John Need. J
Mr. John Need:.
Take notice, that a writ of inquisition to inquire as to your alleged unsoundness of mind
has been issued in said cause by the Chancery Court of Fentress county; and the inquest
will be held on June IS, 1890, in the Court House of said county, beginning at nine o'clock,
a. m., when and where you can attend, if you wish, with your witnesses. June 6, 1890.
RETURN OF THE OFFICER.
This notice, and a copy of the petition in the cause, came to hand June 6, 1890. true A
copy of this ndtice, and said copy of the petition, were delivered to the defendant, and the
contents thereof fully made known to him. This June 7, 1890. A. J. Mace, Sheriff.
The defendant should be represented by counsel employed by himself, or
friends. Both parties are entitled to process of subpoena, and an attachment,
if necessary, to be issued by the Clerk, to compel the attendance of witnesses.
At the trial, the Clerk and Master presides, and receives the verdict. 13 The
jury must not only hear the testimony, but should inspect and examine the
defendant himself. 14 The Clerk must take down the testimony of the witnesses,
T Code, § 3691. 13 Code, §§ 3696-3697.
8 Code, § 3693. 14 Code, § 3697. But the defendant mav be con-
» Code, § 3694. fined in a distant asylum, he mav have wandered off.
10 Code, § 3699. it may be dangerous to his health of mind for him
11 This form follows the form given in the Code, to be examjned, or even to be present, so that it may
8 3683. be impracticable or inexpedient for the jury to in-
12 Code, § 3695. As the Sheriff designates the spect and examine him. In such a case, his exam-
time and place, he should fix the time far enough ination is probably not essential to the validity of
ahead to enable the Clerk to give the five days' no- the proceedings. The next section of the Code,
tice. It would be well for the Sheriff and Clerk to (§ 3698) says, "his examination, if made, shall be
agree on a time and place in order to avoid confus- taken down," thus showing that the statute contem-
ion. Notice to the defendant is essential. Dozier, plates circumstances when an examination will not
ex parte, 4 Bax., 81. be made. Code, §§ 3706-3707,. would, also, seem to
771 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. § 983
and the examination of the defendant, if made, and return them with the ver-
dict to the Chancellor in Court. 15
The verdict of the jury may be endorsed on, or attached to, the writ of in-
quisition, as follows
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY.
Slate of Tennessee, 1
Fentress county. J
The undersigned jurors, having been duly summoned and sworn, to inquire and ascertain
whether the within named John Need is an idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind, upon
oath, do say:
1. That he is of unsound mind, so that he has not capacity sufficient for the government
of himself, or of his property.
2. That the value of his estate is about two thousand dollars, and consists of the farm,
stock of goods, two horses, three cows, various agricultural implements, and set of household
furniture, specified in the petition, and various debts due him; and
3. His next- of kin and heirs, were he to die intestate, are his two children, James and
'
Jane Need, both infants he has, also, a wife, Susan Need.

;
As witness our hands, this June IS, 1890. [To be signed by all the jurors.]
This verdict, received by me from
the jurors, this June 15, 1890.
If the jury cannot agree, the Clerk may issue a new writ to the Sheriff, who
shall summon twelve other freeholders, before whom the matter shall be again
tried, and in the same manner. The defendant is entitled to a new notice of
the time and place of the new inquest. The second jury must hear the wit-
nesses anew, and inspect and examine the defendant for themselves. The Clerk
must issue process for witnesses, preside over the trial, and take down the tes-
timony, as in the first trial. If the second jury does not agree, the evidence on
both trials must be returned to the Court, and submitted to the Chancellor, who
may order a new inquisition, or decide the case for himself upon the testimony
thus returned, and such other testimony as may be offered, and may inspect
and examine the defendant, if he think proper. 16
At the first term of the Court after the return of the inquisition, either party
may move the Court to set the verdict of the jury aside, and grant a new trial.
Upon this motion, the Court hears the evidence, and the examination of the
defendant, as taken down and returned by the Clerk and Master, and also,
such affidavits as may be competent and proper, and grants or refuses a new
trial. Upon setting aside the verdict of the jury, the Chancellor may, at his
discretion, order another inquest to be held, or may pronounce a final decree
upon the facts, 17 adjudging the defendant to be of unsound mind, and appoint-
ing a guardian, or adjudging him sane and dismissing the petition.
If the defendant die pending the litigation, even after an appeal to the
Supreme Court, the suit abates, and cannot be revived against his administrator
even as to the costs accrued. 18
§ 983. —
Appointment of a Guardian. If the jury find the defendant of un-
sound mind, it is the duty of the Clerk to appoint a guardian to take care of
the defendant, and manage his estate, until the next term of the Chancery
Court, at which time the Court will appoint a regular guardian, 19 unless the
verdict of the jury is set aside.
If the defendant is finally adjudged to be an idiot, lunatic, or person of un-
sound mind, the Court will appoint a regular guardian for his person and estate.
The following is a form of an order based upon the verdict of a jury
imply that the Chancellor may determine the case however, counting as so much evidence in defend-
without inspecting and examining the defendant. ant's behalf. A defendant, even if not insane, can-
_
The appearance of the defendant may be enforced not be much injured by having a good man appointed
by attaching his person. Yourie v. Nelson, 1 Tenn his guardian. Juries should regard the matter from
Ch., 275. a business point of view, from a dollar-and-cent
15 Code, 3698.
§ standpoint; and not treat it as a criminal prosecu-
16 Code, §5 3701-3707. tion. The true question is: has the defendant suffi-
17 Code, §§ 3703-3705. It is a calamity, and not a cient capacity for the eovernment of himself and
crime, fora person to become insane; and the proof Sroperty? Code, § 3683; Fentress v. Fentress, 7
to sustaina charge of insanity need not, therefore, (eisk., 428.
be beyond a reasonable doubt. A preponderance of 18 Posey v. Pnsey, 5 Cates, 588.
evidence is sufficient, the presumption of sanity, 10 Code, § 3700.
§984 SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND. 772
ORDER APPOINTING A GUARDIAN.
Frank Friend, ]
vs.
John Need.
This cause coming on to be heard before the Chancellor, this July 20, 1890, upon the peti-
tion to have the defendant declared a person of unsound mind, and to have a guardian
appointed for his person and estate, and upon the writ of inquisition and the verdict of the
jury, and the evidence, which verdict is as follows
I.
[Here copy the verdict in full.]

ii.
And thereupon the defendant moved' the Court to set aside the said verdict, and grant
him a new trial and the Court having heard the evidence, and the examination of the defend-
;
ant as taken down and returned by the Clerk and Master, and the affidavits 20 in support of
the motion, and the argument of counsel, overruled said motion, and refused a new trial. 21
in.
It is, therefore,ordered and adjudged that said verdict be and the same is hereby in all
things confirmed, the Court being of opinion that it is well sustained by the evidence, and that
the defendant, John Need, is a person of unsound mind.
IV.
And the Master having appointed Frank Friend guardian of the defendant's person and
estate, and the Court being satisfied that he is a suitable person for said trust, it is ordered
that said Frank Friend be, and he is hereby, appointed the regular guardian of the person
End estate of 'the defendant, John Need, upon his being duly sworn and giving bond as such
in the penalty of five thousand dollars, with two sufficient sureties to be approved by the
Master, and conditioned faithfully to discharge all his duties as such guardian.
v.
The said guardian will at once make out and
file with the Clerk and Master of this Court,
a full and true itemized inventory of all the real and personal estate of said John Need,
which report the Clerk will enter upon his Book of Guardian Settlements.
VI.
The costs of this cause, including a fee of /twenty-five dollars to James C. Taylor, Esq.,
the defendant's counsel, will be paid by the said guardian out of the estate. of his ward.
Should the defendant afterwards hecome restored in mind, he may, on appli-
cation by petition to the County Court, have a jury appointed to inquire into
the condition of his mind and if found of sound mind, and competent to con-
;
trol himself and property, the Court will declare him of sound mind and the ;
guardianship of his person and property thereupon ceases, and he may demand
a settlement of his guardian. 22
§ 984. The Guardian's Duties and Powers. The guardian should report —
his receipts and disbursements, and make settlements and renew his bond, in
the Master's office, in strict compliance with the law governing guardians of
infants. In addition to these duties; (1). He may file a bill in Chancery to
have a child of his ward, coming of age or marrying, decreed a portion of the
ward's estate. 23 This bill is in the nature of a bill for partial partition, and all
persons should be made parties who would have any interest in the ward's es-
tate, in case of his death intestate, including his wife, if any. (2). He may file
a petition in Chancery, to have his ward's property, 24 real or personal, sold
when manifestly for the ward's interest, or the interest of the ward and his
family. 25 To this petition the ward should be made a defendant, .and the pro-
ceedings should be similar to those upon a bill by a guardian of an infant to
26 The same state of facts that would justify the sale
bell his ward's property.
of an infant's property would justify the sale of the property of a person of
unsound mind; and in the latter 's case the welfare of his family may be con-
sidered along with his own.
20 These affidavits are such as would be proper in 2-t An interest in expectancy may, also, be sold.
support, or rebuttal, of a motion for a new trial in Code, § 3328.
the Circuit Court. 25 Code, §§ 3716-3719. The statute evidently
21 Code, 5 3704. means that this petition shall be in the form of a
22 Acts of 1887. rh 149. hill. The term, petition, is elsewhere used in sim-
23 Code. §§ 3708-3715. The bill may, also, be filed ilar cases as svnonymous with a bill. Code, §§ 3270;
by the child coining of age, or marrying, in which 3274; 3294; 3298: 3324-3326.
case, the guardian must be made a party defendant 20 See, ante, §5 972-973.
along with the others indicated in the text.
773 SUITS TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR. §985
CHAPTER LIII.
SUITS TO ADMINISTER THE ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.

Article I. Suits to Appoint an Administrator.
Article II. Suits to Sell a Decedent's Land to Pay His Debts.
Article III. Suits to Administer Insolvent Estates.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR.
§ 985. When and How an Administrator § 987. Proceedings After the Filing of the
May be Appointed in Chancery. Bill.
§ 986. Frame and Form of the Bill.
§ 985. When and How an Administrator May be Appointed in Chancery.

Ordinarily, the County Court appoints administrators but there are two states ;
of facts in which the Chancery Court may appoint an administrator

1. "Where six months have elapsed since the death of a person, and no one
will apply, or can be procured, to administer on his estate. 1 In such a case a
bill may be filed for the express purpose of having an administrator appointed.
2. Where a suit is pending in the Chancery Court, 2 and the estate of a de-
ceased person is involved, and there is no executor or administrator of such
estate, or the executor or administrator thereof is interested adversely thereto,
the Chancellor may, on motion, appoint an administrator ad litem of such estate
for all the purposes of that particular suit. An administrator ad litem, so ap-
pointed, will not be required to give any bond, except in cases where it be-
comes necessary for him to take control or custody of the property or assets of
his intestate, in which case he must give a bond with good security, and in such
amount as the Chancellor may order. This bond will be conditioned as in case
of an ordinary administrator's bond. If the death of the decedent does not
appear of record in the cause, it may be made known to the Court by the affi-
davit of any person interested in the case. The Master may make the appoint-
ment in vacation, on the facts being made to appear. 3 The order of appointment
when made in Court may be as follows
ORDER APPOINTING AN ADMINISTRATOR AD LITEM.
John Doe, ]
vs. I- No. 618.
In this cause it appearing from the record [or, from the affidavit of John Doe, the com-
plainant,] that the defendant, Robert Roe, is dead, intestate, and that no administrator has
been appointed to take charge of his estate and it being necessary to have said estate repre-
;
•
sented in this suit, on motion of the complainant it is ordered by the Court that Richard Roe
be appointed administrator ad litem of the estate of said Robert Roe, and no bond is required
of him [or, and it appearing that it will be necessary for said administrator ad litem to take
into his control and custody the property and assets of his intestate, it is further ordered by
the Court, that, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, the said Richard Roe will
execute an administration bond 4 with good security, in the penalty of one thousand dollars,
conditioned as required by law. Such bond will be filed as a part of the record in this cause.
1 § 2209.
Code, It would seem that the lapse of 3 Acts of 1889, ch. 137; Denning v. Todd, 7 Pick.,
six months without any one applying to the County 422.
Court, is presumptive evidence that no one will 4 For the form_ of an administrator's bond, see,
apply, or ran be procured to administer. Code, § 22?3 This form is suitable for an adminis-
2 An administrator ad litem cannot be appointed trator ad litem.
by the Supreme Court. Ragio v. Collins, 17 Pick.,
662.
§986 SUITS TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR. 774
§ 986. Frame and Form of Bill for Appointment of Administrator. If the —
next of kin desires to have an administrator appointed, or any creditor of the
deceased so desires, he may file his bill for that purpose in the Chancery Court
of the county in which the deceased resided at the time of his death, or in
which his estate or effects were at the time of his death. 5 If the bill is filed by
a creditor, it must be on behalf of all other creditors who may wish to come
in and be made parties; and the distributees and heirs must be made defend-
ants. If the bill is filed by the next of kin, or any of them, it must be on behalf
of all the distributees and heirs, and against all creditors who may be made or
become defendants. 6
The bill, by whomsoever filed, will set forth (1) the death of the deceased;
(2) where he resided, or where his effects were, at the time of his death; (3)
of what those effects consisted, and their probable value (4) that six months ;
have elapsed since his death (5) that no person will apply or can be procured
;
to administer; and (6) will pray that an administrator be appointed, with such
other specific prayers as are required by the facts, and for general relief. 7 The
BILL TO HAVE AN ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED.
To Hon. Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at Huntingdon.
George Rich, a resident of Haywood county, on behalf of himself and all
other creditors of William Kent, deceased, complainant,
vs.
Susan Kent, George Kent, and Charles Kent, residents of Haywood county,
defendants. t

i.
That in June, 1889, William Kent died intestate, leaving defendant Susan Kent his widow,
and defendants George Kent and Charles Kent, his only children, distributees, and heirs at
law, said Charles Kent being a minor without regular guardian.
II.
The
said William Kent, at the time of his death, resided and had considerable estate in
Haywood county, and six months have elapsed since his death, and no person will apply or
can be procured to administer on his estate.
m.
The was indebted to complainant, by note,
said William Kent, at the time of his death,
for one thousand dollars, dated May 10, 1888, and payable one day after date, which note,
with the interest thereon, remains wholly unpaid, and is herewith filed, marked exhibit
A, and prayed to be taken as a part of this bill. Said note was given in settlement of
balance due complainant on dissolution of a partnership between the complainant and said
William Kent.
IV.
The William Kent died seized and possessed of a tract of land in the 10th civil dis-
said
trict of Haywood county, containing about one hundred acres, adjoining the lands of James
Jones, George Cole's heirs, and others, being the same on which the said defendants now
reside. Said land, subject to the homestead and dower rights of the widow, is available
assets for the payment of the liabilities of said, estate, and is well worth two thousand dollars.
Said decedent, also, left considerable personal estate, including two horses, three cows, a
mule, a large flock of sheep, and a mowing machine; and complainant is informed and be-
lieves, and on that information and belief charges, that the said decedent left about one
•
thousand dollars in money, and a considerable amount in collectible choses in action, all of
which is now in possession of his said widow.
v.
The said William Kent is largely indebted to others
complainant, and his said
beside
estate was acquired mainly with what he obtained from Nevertheless his
his creditors.
widow and heirs, the defendants, are unwilling to pay said indebtedness, and have conspired
to deny and conceal a large part of said personal assets, especially the said money and choses-
in action; and are seeking to defraud said creditors, and appropriate the whole estate among
themselves; and to aid in this, they not only refuse to administer on the decedent's estate,
but discourage others from administering.
VI.
No year's support or exempt property has been set apart to the widow, nor has homestead
5 Code, §5 2209-2210. have an administrator appointed, and this her inter-
6 Code, §§2211-2212. The widow is a distributee ests may often require.
under the statute, and is a necessary party to a 7 Code, §§ 2209-2210.
creditor's bill. She may, also, file a bill herself to
775 SUITS TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATOR. §987
or dower been assigned her, but she has said tract of land and said chattels in her pos-
session.

1.
That process issue to cause the defendants to appear, and that they be required to answer
this bill fully, but not on oath; and they may be required and enjoined to deliver to the
administrator, when appointed, all the money, choses in action, and other personalty, not
exempt from execution, belonging to said William Kent at his death; and that a guardian
ad litem be appointed for said Charles Kent, who is a minor.
2.
That an administrator of said estate be appointed by your Honor; that all necessary ac-
counts be taken of the assets, real and, personal, of the said decedent, and that due distribu-
tion thereof be made among the creditors of his estate; that homestead and dower be assigned
the said widow, and the remainder interest in said tract of land be sold for the satisfaction
of the liabilities of said estate, if necessary; that the administration of said estate be con-
ducted under the authority of this Court, in accordance with the statute for such case made;
and that general relief be granted.
3.
That publication be made for all other .creditors of said estate who may wish, to come
forward and have themselves made parties, and file and prove their claims.
Hawkins & Hawkins., Solicitors.
The should be sworn to by the complainant, especially if he seeks the
bill
immediate appointment of an administrator, or guardian ad litem.
§ 987. Proceedings After the Filing of the Bill.—Upon the filing of the bill,
Ihe Court in term time, or the Chancellor in vacation, 8 will appoint an admin-
istrator of the estate upon such terms as he may think best. The following is
a form of an
ORDER APPOINTING AN ADMINISTRATOR.
George Rich, &c,
vs.
Susan Kent, et al.
In this cause, it is ordered by the Court that Charles Smith be appointed administrator of
the estate of William Kent, deceased; and the said Charles Smith thereupon appeared in
open Court and accepted said appointment, and having been sworn to perform the duties of
such administrator, and having given bond in the sum of two thousand dollars, with Henry
Smith and George Rich, his sureties, conditioned for the faithful performance of all the
duties required of him by law in the administration of said estate, he is 'clothed with all the
powers of administrator of said William Kent, deceased; and letters of administration will
issue to him on his demand.
The said administrator will forthwith demand, and take into his possession, all the personal
estate of said decedent liable to his debts, wheresoever and in whosoever's hands found ; and
convert the same into money, and report a true inventory thereof to this Court, at its next
term. 9 The defendants are hereby commanded and enjoined to deliver to said Charles Smith,
all money, choses in action, and other personalty, not exempt from execution, belonging to
said William Kent at his death.
The Master will make publication for all creditors of said William Kent to come forward,
and have themselves made parties, and prove their claims.
The administrator thus appointed becomes a partyto the suit, and is bound
by any order or decree in the cause. 10 He
under the same responsibilities is
as a receiver in Chancery, and must make reports to the Court in the same
manner. He may be removed from office for neglect or improper conduct, as a
receiver may be, and when he is removed, or dies, or resigns, the Court may
appoint a successor. 11
An administrator thus appointed is not in any way limited in his powers or
jurisdiction, but has all the authority of a general administrator appointed by
8 If the order is made in vacation, it will be as estate, except such as is exempt from execution;
follows: and the defendants are hereby commanded and en-
CHAMBERS ORDER APPOINTING AN joined to deliver to him all money, choses in action,
ADMINISTRATOR. and other personalty, not exempt from execution, in
In this cause it is ordered by me that Charles their possession or under their control, belonging
_
Smith be appointed administrator of the estate of to said William Kent at his death. The Master will
William Kent, deceased. Before he enters upon the notify the defendants of this order.
duties of his trust, however, he will be duly sworn February 10th, 1890.
by the Clerk and Master. The administrator will give Albert G. Hawkins, Chancellor.
bond with surety in the penalty of two thousand dol- See, Code, §§ 2213-2215.
lars, payable to the State, conditioned as reauired by Code, § 2214.
law in such eases. After the giving of said bond, io Code, § 2216.
the said administrator will take into his possession 11 Code, § 2218.
and sell all the perishable property belonging to the
§988 SUITS TO SELL DECEDENTS' LANDS TO PAY DEBTS. 776
the County Court, 12 and must discharge
the duties of a general adminis-
all
trator, except that his settlements are made with
the Clerk and Master.
The administration is conducted under the authority of the Court, in the
same manner, and under the same rules, as the administration of an insolvent
estate in Chancery; and creditors must have themselves made parties, and
prove their claims reports of assets and liabilities are made the real estate
; ;
is sold, when necessary; and the assets distributed in the manner hereafter
shown in treating of the administration of insolvent estates. 13
ARTICLE II.
SUITS TO SELL A DECEDENT'S LANDS TO PAY HIS DEBTS.

§ 988. When and How a Decedent's Lands § 992. Petitions by Creditors and Claimants
May be Subjected to His Debts. to Become Parties.
§ 989. Form of an Administrator's Bill to § 993. Reference to the Master to Ascertain
Sell Lands. the Facts.
§ 990. Frame and Form of a Creditor's Bill § 994. The Master's Report of Assets and
to Sell a Decedent's Land to Pay Liabilities.
His Debts. § 995. Decree of Sale.
§ 991. Defences to the Bill by Heirs and § 996. Proceedings Subsequent to the Sale.
Others.
§ 988. When and How a Decedent's Lands May be Subjected to His Debts.
When an executor not authorized by will to sell and convey real estate, or an
administrator, has exhausted the personal estate of the deceased in the pay-
ment of his debts, leaving just debts or demands against him unpaid, or paid
by the representative out of his own means, and the deceased died seized and
possessed of real estate, such executor or administrator may file a bill in the
Chancery Court, 1 to have such land, or enough thereof, sold to satisfy such
debts or demands. 2
The bill must be filed in the county where the land or some portion of it lies,"
and it must allege, as jurisdictional facts: 1, The death of the owner of the
realty sought to be sold 2, The appointment of complainant as his executor, or
;
administrator; 3, The exhaustion of the decedent's personalty in the payment

oi' his bona fide debts; 4, The existence of debts or demands against him re-
maining unpaid, or paid by the representative out of his own means; and 5,
That the deceased died seized and possessed of real estate, some portion of
which lies in the county where the bill is filed. 4
The bill should specify particularly the names of the creditors, and the
amounts of the debts, or the demands of each, for the satisfaction of which
the land is sought to be sold; and should also describe the various tracts of
land by metes and bounds, or other description sufficient to identify them, 5
and should pray for the sale of such real estate, or such portions thereof, as
may prove least injurious to the heirs and legal representatives, and be suffi-
cient to satisfy the debts or demands set forth in the bill, and shown to exist.
The heirs, devisees, legatees, widow, and all persons having any legal or
equitable interest in the land, must be made parties defendant: and if the title
12 Todd V Wright, 12 Heisk. 447; Shown v. Mi originated by the bill, whether set forth in the bill,
Mackin, 9 Lea, 604. or not. Dal'as V. Read, 6 Yerg 53; Kendall v. Ti us,
,
,13 Code, §2219. See, post, §997, for proceedings 9 Heisk., 727. No sale can take place until there
in the administration of an insolvent estate. has been an account and a report confirmed, showing
1 The Chancery" Court has inherent jurisdiction to a deficiency of personal assets, and the consequent
wind up the estates of decedents and sell their lands necessitv of a sale of realty. Frazier v, Pankey, 1
to pay their debts. Allen V. Shanks, 6 Pick., 359. Swan, 75; Jones V. Douglass, 1 Tenn. Ch.. 359. It
2 Code, § 2267. The jurisdiction of the Court in is not enough that the necessity for a sale aopear
such a case is not limited to one thousand dollars. probable; it must actually appear, and be so adjudi-
Bashaw fl. Temple, 7 Cates, 596. cated, and adjudicated upon the facts, those facts to
3 Code, §§ 2267; 2270. be ordinarily ascertained by a Master's report, show-
4 Griffith v. Philios, 9 Lea, 417. ing the due exhaustion of the personalty, and bona
5 See, ante, § 172. fi/te debts outstanding. Wsde v. Fisher, 10 Heisk.,
o Code, § 2267. All debts can be paid that are 490; Kendall V. Titus, 9 Heisk., 727.
shown to exist in the course of the investigation
777 SUITS TO SELL decedents' lands to pay debts. § 989
of the deceased is equitable, the holder of the legal title must also be made a
party. All persons known to have claims against the estate should be made
parties, and called on to prove their claims before the Master when the account
prayed for is taken.
§ 989. Form of an Administrator's Bill to Sell Land.—The frame and
ordinary allegations of an administrator's bill to sell land to pay the decedent's
debts are substantially given in the preceding section. If there be any liens
or other encumbrances on the land, the owners thereof must be made parties
and if the decedent held the equitable title only, the holder of the legal title
must be made a party. The following will serve as a
GENERAL FORM OE A BILL TO SELL LAND TO PAY A DECEDENT'S DEBTS.
[Address and commencement of bill as in §§ 155-156, ante.]
i.
That in the month of [giving month and year] A

B [the intestate] departed this life, in-
testate, at his residence in [give name] county, leaving the said [naming the defendants who
are] his only children and heirs at law, whose places of residence are respectively as stated
in the caption of the bill. Complainant is the administrator of said estate, duly appointed by
the County Court of said county at its [stating month and year of] term and then and there ;
duly qualified as such. [The said defendant, O P, is a minor without a general guardian.]
II.
The whole of the available personal assets of said estate, for the payment of debts,
amounted to about the sum of one thousand dollars, and complainant has applied them all to
the payment of the debts and liabilities of said estate, leaving bona fide debts, as he believes,
outstanding and unpaid to the amount of about one thousand dollars, to-wit: 1. judgment A
in the Circuit Court of said county, rendered on [giving date,] in favor of the defendant,
C D, for one hundred dollars and costs of suit, now amounting to one hundred and twenty-
three dollars in all. 2. A
note, executed to G
H, and by him endorsed ito the defendant
C D, due one year after date, for three hundred dollars, dated January 1st, 1889, and drawing
interest from date; and 3, An account claimed by E
F, for about five hundred dollars, for
services as attorney-at-law in said suit of C D
against said intestate. There may be other
claims against said estate, which have not yet been presented.
in.
The said AB
[the intestate] died seized and possessed of one hundred and sixty acres ot
land, more or less, lying in the 8th civil district of [give name of] county, and bounded as
follows :[Here describe it by metes and bounds.] This land is the only asset now left for '
the payment of said outstanding debts. [If there be tiny homestead or dower rights attaching
to this land, so state, and state whether they have been assigned.]
IV.
1st. That process issue against the resident defendants aforesaid, and that publication be
made as to said non-resident defendants, to cause said defendants to appear.; and that they
be required to answer this bill fully and particularly, but their oaths to their answers are
waived. [That a guardian ad litem be appointed to answer for said minor, O. P.]
2d. That an account of the assets and liabilities of said estate be taken, to the end that it
may appear whether the personal estate of said intestate has been duly exhausted, and
whether a sale of said land is necessary.
3d. That said land, or so much thereof as may be necessary, be sold to pay said outstand-
ing liabilities of said estate and also any bona fide debts and charges against said estate
;
which may be found to exist in favor of any other creditors not named herein who may
choose to come forward and become parties to this proceeding, and establish their claims to
the satisfaction of the Court, before the proceeds of said sale are paid out.
4th. That he may have all such further and other relief, as the nature of his case may
require. Jesse L. Rogers, Solicitor.
[The bill need not be sworn to unless it falls within some of the exceptions stated in § 161,
ante.]
Inasmuch as bills of this character are often filed, the following more speeial
and complicated form of a bill is given, as a further guide to draftsmen
BILL TO SELL THE LAND OF A DECEDENT.
To the Hon. John P. Smith, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Dandridge
John Wilson, administrator of James Wilson, deceased, a resident of Jefferson ]
county, complainant,
vs.
Henry Wilson, Henry Jones, Charles Stiles, George Brown and his wife, Susan
Brown, Sarah Wilson, senior, and Samuel Wilson, a minor without general
guardian, all residents of Jefferson county, and Sarah Wilson, Junior, a non-
resident of the State, defendants.
i.
That James Wilson died intestate in Jefferson county, where he resided, on June 1,
leaving as his only heirs at law the complainant and the defendants, Henry Wilson, Susar
Brown, formerly Wilson, Samuel Wilson, a minor without regular guardian, and Sarah
Wilson, junior. He, also, left a widow, the defendant, Sarah Wilson, senior. George Brown
is made a party in the right of his wife only. Complainant was on June 15, 1888, appointed
and duly qualified as the administrator of the estate of said James Wilson, deceased; and
has been acting as such ever since.
ii.
The
personal estate of said decedent, available for the payment of his debts, amounted tc
seven hundred and twenty dollars, all of which has been exhausted in discharging the indebt-
edness of said decedent and settlement therefor has been made with the County Court Clerk
;.
of Jefferson county, and such settlement duly approved.

in
There remains outstanding and unpaid the following demands against the estate of said
decedent 7 :
1. One note for sixty dollars, and accrued interest, executed to Henry Jones, Sept. 1, 1886
and due in one day thereafter and now alleged to be the property of said Henry Jones.
;
2. One judgment in favor of Charles Stiles, for four hundred dollars, rendered Oct. 10,
1885, by James Johnson, a J. P. for Jefferson county, credited Jan. 15, 1886, with two hundred
dollars.
3. Three hundred and ten dollars, which Henry Brown claims to be due him for money
alleged to have been paid July 15, 1886, by said Brown as stayor of said decedent, on a judg-
ment rendered against the latter, by John Wright, a J. P. of Jefferson county, Sept. 4, 1885.
4. The defendant, Henry Wilson, has presented a sworn account for two hundred dollars
against said estate for nursing and caring for the decedent in his last illness.
Two years and six months not having elapsed since complainant was appointed adminis
trator, there may be other claims against said estate not yet presented.
Complainant knows of no evidence or facts whereby he can controvert the justice of said
demands, and he calls upon the widow, heirs, and distributees, of the said James Wilson, to
contest the same, if they so desire. 8
IV.
Said decedent at his death was the owner in fee of the following tracts of land and three :
town lots in Jefferson county Tract No. 1 being his homestead, where he died, containing
:
four hundred acres, beginning at a black walnut on the bank of French Broad river, [and s-J
en, giving the metes and bounds exactly as they appear in his deed.] Tract No. 2 containing
one hundred and forty acres beginning [&c, giving metes and bounds as in the deed.] The
three town lots are on Main street in Dandridge, and are known in the plan of said town as
lots No. 24, No. 25 and No. 26, all adjoining, each fronting on said Main street, and running
back two hundred feet to a ten-foot alley, the said lot No. 24 beginning at a stake, the junc-
tion of Main and Blount streets [&c, describing each lot according to the deeds, or other-
wise, so as to fully specify the bounds of each.]
v.
Neither homestead nor dower have been assigned to said widow, but she and her said
minor son, Samuel, are occupying the Home Farm, worth about two thousand dollars, as a
homestead. All of the lots and tracts hereinabove described are liable for said decedent's
debts, subject to the homestead rights of said widow and minor, and subject to the widow's
right of dower. Complainant believes and so charges that the said three town lots will bring
enough to pay all of the outstanding indebtedness of his intestate and that it would be to
;
the interest of the heirs to sell said three lots rather than sell either of said two farms, either
of which is worth at least two thousand dollars.
VI.
Complainant, therefore, prays
1st. That subpoena issue against the resident defendants, and that publication be made as
to the defendant, Sarah Wilson, who is a non-resident of the State.
2d. That a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor defendant, Samuel Wilson, he
having no regular guardian.
3d. That all the defendants be required to answer the bill fully and on oath, except the
defendants, Henry Wilson, Henry Jones, and Charles Stiles, whose oaths to their answers are
waived.
4th. That an account be taken of the assets and liabilities of said estate, and of what
bona fide debts of said estate are outstanding and unpaid, including those hereinbefore set
out, and such others as may be duly presented by petition in this cause, and duly proved.
7 Both the bill and the report of the Master should payment of which the land is sought to be sold, or
show (1) the amount of the personal assets, (2) the fails to set out any other jurisdictional fact. Many
bona tide debts outstanding, (3) the names of the doubtful claims are frequently allowed, which, if
creditors, and (4) the amount due each; and the they had been set out in the bill, and thus had
sale should be made to pav these specific debts. attention drawn to them, could have been success-
Young v. Young, 12 Lea. 335 Where there arc fully resisted. Administrators should be held to the
minors, their guardian ad litem should demur to the strict law when they seek to sell the realty.
bill, if it fails -to set out the specific debts for the 8 The heirs have the right to contest the justness
779 SUITS TO SELL decedents' lands to pay debts. § 990
.5th. That the defendants, Henry Wilson, Henry Jones, and Charles Stiles, be required to
prove their claims before the Master at the taking of said account.
6th. That a sale be made of such part of said real estate as may be sufficient to pay all of
the outstanding indebtedness of said estate, including costs, counsel fees, and compensation
to complainant for his services as administrator; and, if necessary, that the homestead of
said widow and minor, and the dower of <the widow, be laid off, to the end that the remainder
interest of the heirs in the land so assigned may be sold.
That complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to under
7th.
the pleadings and proof in the cause, and as may be necessary to enable him properly and
effectually to discharge his trust. 9 Allen G. Mathews, Solicitor.
§ 990. Frame and Form of a Creditor's Bill to Sell a Decedent's Lands to
Pay His Debts. —A bona fide creditor may, likewise, file the bill, in which event
the suit should be for the benefit of all other bona fide creditors of the estate;
and the personal representative, the widow, heirs, legatees, devisees, and other
persons interested in the land, or in the proceeds thereof, should be made de-
fendants. Other creditors must come forward by petition, which the adminis-
trator or other party interested may answer. The justness of all claims filed
may be contested before the Master. The proceedings upon a bill by a creditor
are the same as on a bill by the personal representative.
The following would be the form of the caption and commencement of the
bill when filed by a creditor
CAPTION AND COMMENCEMENT OE A CREDITOR'S BILL.

Charles Stiles, a resident of Jefferson county, who sues in behalf of himself and
all other creditors of the estate of James Wilson, deceased, complainant,
vs.
John Wilson, administrator of said James Wilson's estate, Henry Wilson, Henry
Jones, George Brown and wife, Susan Brown, Sarah Wilson, senior, and
Samuel Wilson, a minor without general guardian, all residents of Jefferson
county, and Sarah Wilson, junior, a non-resident of the State; defendants. _
The complainant, who sues in behalf of himself and all other creditors of the estate of
James Wilson, deceased, respectfully shows to the Court
That [A creditor's bill contains the same allegations as an administrator's bill, and must
show the same facts, except (1) that it must allege that complainant is a bona fide creditor of
said estate, and state the origin or character of the indebtedness, and (2) it may state why the
complainant did not wait for the administrator to Me the bill: this latter statement is not
essential, but if a good reason be given, such as an unreasonable delay on the part of the
administrator, it gives the bill a better savor.]
§ 991. Defences to the Bill by Heirs and Others. Inasmuch as the personal —
estate is the primary fund for the satisfaction of a decedent's debts, the per-
sons to whom his lands descend, or have been bequeathed, and all other persons
interested in the lands, or the proceeds thereof, have a right to require that all
creditors be satisfied out of the personal estate, and that the lands or their pro-
ceeds be not subjected to the payment of the decedent's debts until the personal
estate has been exhausted in due course of administration. When, therefore,
a bill is filed, whether by the personal representative or by a creditor, to sell
a decedent's lands to pay his debts, the heirs, widow, devisees, and the other
persons interested in the land, or in its proceeds, have the right to show: 1,
That the alleged debts, for which the land is sought to be sold, are illegal, or
unjust, or have been paid, or are within the statute of frauds, or are barred
by the statutes of limitation, or are otherwise not recoverable; or 2, That if
recoverable, nevertheless the land should not be held liable for their satisfac-
tion, for the reason that personal assets sufficient to pay the same came, or by
due diligence should have come, into the hands of the personal representative
or 3, That the personal assets have been wasted, that false claims have been
paid, and that the estate has been so otherwise misadministered that the ad-
ministrator is liable on his official bond for enough to satisfy the debts sought
to be made a charge on the decedent 's land ; or 4, That seven years have elapsed
since the death of the decedent.
of all debts set forth in the. bill, and of all brought I a The bill need not be sworn to, except for the
forward during the progress of the cause. I purposes stated in § 161, ante.
An administrator de bonis non cannot maintain a bill to sell the decedent's
land to pay debts until there has been a settlement with the previous admin-
istrator, showing that the personal assets have been legally administered. 10
The following general form of an answer will serve as a guide in case the
heirs deem it necessary to contest the sale of the land described in the bill
GENERAL FORM OF AN ANSWER TO A BILL TO SELL LAND.
[For and commencement, see §380, ante.]
title ,
These defendants, jointly and severally answering the bill filed against them in this cause,
say:
i.
They admit
the death and intestacy of A
B [the intestate], deceased, and the appointment
and qualification of complainant as administrator of the estate of said intestate, as stated in
the bill and that the legal heirs .of the said decedent are as stated in the bill. They, also,
;
admit the descent to them of the real estate described in the bill. [Here set up any claim
or facts relative to homestead or dower, if any.]
ii.
Further answering, they say that the complainant may have paid off some debts that
,
were owing by said intestate, but respondents do not know to whom, or to what amount.
Neither do they know whether or not any or all of the claims mentioned in the bill are just,
nor whether there are any bona fide debts against the estate, yet outstanding and unpaid
and they require strict proof upon these points. [Here set up any defences known to any of
the debts or claims set out in the bill. Rely on the statute of limitations as to said debts, if
available, and plead the seven-year statute as against all claimants, if available.]
in.
Respondents have no personal knowledge as to whether or not complainant has exhausted
the personal estate in the payment of debts, but according to their information and belief, he
lias not done so, but has, or should by due diligence have had, about one thousand dollars
in his hands as such administrator, which has not been applied to the payment of debts; or
otherwise duly accounted for; and according to the best of their information and belief, it
will not be necessary, to sell said real estate to pay debts, if said personal estate is duly col-
lected and properly applied. [If the administrator has made no settlement with the County
Court, so allege. If you can show any assets he has not collected, or has not accounted for,
specify them.]
IV.
And now, having fully answered, these respondents pray to be hence dismissed with their
reasonable costs. Beaty Cecil, Solicitor.
[The answer must be sworn to, unless the oath thereto is waived in the bill. §380, ante.]
§ 992. Petitions by Creditors and Claimants to Become Parties. Any cred- —
itor, not made a party to the bill, who desires his debt paid out of the proceeds
of land,. must come forward by petition, and prove his claim before the Master.
And any person claiming the land, or any interest therein, not made a party
to the bill, may assert his rights by petition, 11 or he may file an original bill
end enjoin the sale. Form of such petitions, and proceedings thereunder, have
been heretofore given. 12
§ 993. Reference to the Master to Ascertain the Facts. No decree of sale —
can be made, until the truth of the jurisdictional facts stated in a preceding
section, has been satisfactorily shown to the Court and no debts can be paid ;
out of the proceeds of the sale except those shown to* exist during the progress
of the cause. If there be any creditor whose debt has not been set forth in
the bill, he must have himself made a party by petition, showing therein the
nature and amount of the debt, and why it was not presented to the personal
representative.
To ascertain whether a sale should be made, the Court will make a reference 13
to the Master to take and state an account with the administrator, to ascertain
whether there be a deficiency of personal assets, and, also, to report what bona
f.de debts are owing to creditors, or to the personal representative. return A
of nulla bona on an execution against the administrator is not sufficient to
authorize a decree to sell a decedent's lands to pay his debts. There must be
10 Woodfin V. Anderson, 2 Tcnn. Ch., 331; Jones 13 This reference will be made whether the bill
v. Douglass, 1 Tenn. Ch., 357. be filedby the personal representative, or by; a cred-
11 See, ante. §§795; 797, and post, §1003, where itor. No sale can be ordered until a deficiency of
forms of petitions are given. personal assets has been adjudged. Frazier v. Pan-
12 Ibid. key, 1 Swan, 75; Jones v. Douglas, 1 Tenn. Ch., 359.
781 suits to seix decedents' lands to pay debts. § 994
an investigation of the administrator's accounts, and a report thereon by the
Master. In taking the account, it should be shown 1, What personal assets :
the administrator received, or might by due diligence have received; 14 2, What

buna fide debts and charges he has paid 3, What bona fide debts and charges are
;
outstanding against the estate, and to whom owing; 4, Whether the personal
estate has been duly exhausted in the payment of bona fide debts and charges
and 5, What real estate the decedent died seized and possessed of, and what
part thereof should be sold to pay the outstanding indebtedness. The follow-
ing is a form of
REFERENCE TO THE MASTER.
John Wilson, admr., &c, "I
vs. V No. 543.

Henry Wilson, et al. J
In this cause, on motion of complainant's solicitor, the Master is directed to hear proof
and report to the present or next term of the Court
1. What personal assets of the estate of James Wilson, deceased, came or ought by due
diligence to have come, to the hands of the complainant as administrator of said estate,
showing in the report the total gross amount, and specifying the amount from each principal
source.
2. What bona and charges against said estate have been paid by the administra-
fide debts
and giving the total amount.
tor, specifying the principal expenditures,
3. Whether the personal assets of said estate have been duly exhausted in the payment
of bona fide debts and charges.
4. Whether any bona fide debts and charges against said estate remain outstanding and
unpaid and if so, the amount and nature thereof, and to whom owing.
;
5. What real estate the said James Wilson died seized and possessed of, and what is its.
reasonable minimum value.
6. Whether will be necessary to sell any or all of said real estate, to pay said outstanding-
it
debts or charges; and if not necessary to sell all, the sale of what part will prove least injurious
to the heirs and legal representatives.
7. [On allegation or suggestion that said real estate is encumbered, add the following:].
Whether any of said real estate is encumbered, if so, the nature and amount of the er.cumb-
lance, and the ownen thereof.
The Master on no claim not specified in the pleadings, or in a petition duly
will report
filed,unless the parties waive a petition. 16 If any petitions be filed, he will notify the adminis-
trator and the Solicitor of the defendants thereof. Petitions and claims may be filed any
time prior to the closing of the account.
§ 994. The Master's Report of Assets and Liabilities. The Master will —
proceed in the usual manner, in making his report. 16 No claim will be reported
on not set forth in the pleadings, or duly brought forward by petition, unless
the parties in interest allow claims to be filed before the Master without peti-
tion. The following will serve as a form of
THE MASTER'S REPORT.
John Wilson, admr., &c, 1
vs. > No. 543.
In obedience to the order of reference made in this cause at the last [or present] term
of the Court in relation to the necessity of selling the land of complainant's intestate to pay
debts, the Master respectfully reports as follows
i.
The personal assets of the estate of James Wilson, deceased, which came, or ought by due
diligence to have come, to the hands of the complainant, as the administrator of said estate,
are as follows
1. Cash on hand at decedent's death, $216.40
(Dep. of John Wilson, page 5, q. 12.)
2. Amount of the administrator's sale of personal property, 840.00
(Ex. A to dep. of John Wilson.)
3. Cash collected, (principal and interest,) from John Smith, upon a note exe-
cuted by him to the decedent, - - 618.00
(Dep. of John Smith, page 2, q. 3.)
Total amount of personal assets, - $1,674.40'
14 The administrator is responsible for all_ the may be filed without petitions, in which case those
personal assets, wheresoever found within the limits filingclaims have all the rights of parties. Ewing v.
of the State. Gilchrist V. Cannon, 1 Cold., 581. Maury, 3 Lea, 389; Caruthers v. Caruthers, 2 Lea,
15 If a creditor is not a party to the bill, he must 264. The Master should notify the administrator-
make himself a party by a petition setting forth the and the Solicitor of the heirs, of the filing of all
nature and the amount of h»s claim. Reid v. Huff, 9 claims and petitions. Reid v. Huff, 9 Hum., 345.
Hum., 345. But if all parties acquiesce, claims 18 See, ante, §§ 603-610.
ii.
The administrator has paid the following bona fide debts and charges against said estate
1. Funeral expenses of said decedent, - $ 63.00
2. Judgment and costs in favor of John Johnston against the decedent, 1.604.10
(Dep. of John Wilson, p. 7, q. 16; and copy of judgment.)
3. Charges and fees paid County Clerk, - - 8.60
(Ex. B to dep. of John Wilson.)
Total amount of debts and charges paid, $1,675.70

in.
The personal assets of said estate have been duly exhausted in the payment of the bona
tide debts and charges above named.
rv.
The following bona fide debts and charges against said estate remain outstanding and
unpaid
1. Judgment in favor of Charles Stiles, interests and costs, $418.20
(Ex. C to dep. of John Wilson.)
2. Note by the decedent to Henry Jones, due Jan. 1, 1890, including interest, 63.11
3. Amount expended in making sale of personal estate, 12.45
(Ex. D to dep. of John Wilson.)
4. Fee due Pickle& Turner, for services as attorneys in the suit of Charles
Stiles complainant,
vs. - - 50.00
(Dep. of W. R. Turner, p. 2, q. 3.)
5. Amount due the administrator for excess of disbursements over receipts, 1.30
6. Amount due complainant for services as administrator, not yet fixed,
Total outstanding liabilities, not including amount due complainant as admin-
istrator, $545.06
v.
The only real estate of which James Wilson died seized are the two tracts of land and
the three town lots described in the bill. 17 [Exhibits E, F, G, H, and I, to dep. of John
Wilson.] Each of the two tracts is well worth $2,000; one of the town lots is worth $500,
and the two others are worth each $200. It is to the interest of the heirs to sell the three
town lots. [Dep. of Geo. Brown, p. 4, q. 10.]
VI.
It willbe necessary to sell two, if not all three, of said town lots to pay said outstanding
debts and liabilities, the amount due the administrator, and the costs of this proceeding.
All of which is respectfully submitted, this June 12; 1890.
Dan. H. Meek, C. & M.
The Master must be sufficiently specific in his report to enable any party
in interest to except to any item thereof ; and the proceedings upon exceptions
filed are the same as in ordinary cases. 18
§ 995. —
Decree of Sale. On the confirmation of the Master's report showing
the existence of specific debts, the exhaustion or insufficiency of the personalty,
and the necessity of a sale of a sufficiency of the real estate to pay the dece-
dent's debts, the Court decrees a sale accordingly. 19 If homestead and dower
rights exist, they must be determined and set apart, before the sale is made,
so that there may be no conflict between the rights of the purchaser and those
of the widow and minor heirs.
DECREE OE SALE.
John Wilson, admr., &c, 1
vs. \ No. 543.

This cause came on to be further heard before Chancellor John P. Smith, on this 14th
day of June, 1890, on the pleadings and proof in the cause, and especially on the report of
the Master to the present term of the Court, which report is as follows
[Here copy it.]
And said report being unexcepted to is in all things confirmed.
1.
And it appearing to the Court from the said report that the personal assets of the estate
of James Wilson, deceased, have been duly exhausted by the administrator in the payment
of bona fide debts and charges against said estate, leaving bona fide debts and charges
against the same still outstanding and unpaid to the amount of five hundred and forty-five
37 If the lands are not described in the bill, or in 19 It is error to decree a sale before adjudicating
exhibits thereto, the Master should describe them in debts against the estate. Miller v. Taylor, 2 Shan.
his report sufficiently to fully identify them. They Cas., 461. The inheritance fathers have left their
should be described by metes and bounds in the de- children should be dealt with reverently by the
cree of sale See, ante, § 172. Courts, and saved from sacrilege. See, post, % 1141,
is See, ante, § 615-617. sub-sec, 6.
783 SUITS TO SELL DECEDENTS' LANDS TO PAY DEBTS- §996
dollars and sixcents, not including the amount due the administrator for his services as such,
and the cost of this proceeding;
ii.
And further appearing from said report that said James Wilson died seized of two cer-
it
tain tracts of land and three town lots, fully described in the bill, and in the deeds exhibited
to the said report; that it would be least injurious to the heirs to have said town lots sold
rather than either of the farms, and that it will be necessary to sell all three of said lots
to pay said outstanding liabilities said lots being described as follows
; [Here describe them
:
according to the title papers, so as fully to identify them.]

in.
decreed by the Court that the Master, after advertising according to law, 20
It is, therefore,
proceed to sell said three town lots at public sale, at the Court House door in Dandridge, to
the highest and best bidder, on a credit of six and twelve months [except the sum of one
hundred dollars, which he will require to be paid in hand, 21 ] taking notes drawing interest
from date, with approved security, for each installment of the purchase-money, and retaining
a lien on the land for further security. The Master will report his action in the premises to
next term of the Court, until which time all further questions are reserved.
§ 996. —
Proceedings Subsequent to the Sale. The proceedings preliminary
to,during, and subsequent to, the sale, are the same as in ordinary cases; 22
and the decree confirming the sale, and divesting and vesting title, is in the
usual form. The Master should pay out the proceeds of the sale, not the
administrator.
DECREE CONFIRMING SALE.
John Wilson, admr., &c, "I
vs. V No. S43.

H enry Wilson, etal. J
This cause came on to be heard before Chancellor John P. Smith, on this 12th day of De-
cember, 1890, on the pleadings and proof, and especially on the Master's report of sale to the
present term, which report is in the words and figures following:
[Here cvpy the report in full.]
i.
Andsaid report, being unexcepted to, is by the Court, in all things confirmed. It is, there-
fore, decreed that all the right, title, and interest, of all the parties to this suit, complainant
and defendant, and especially of such as are the heirs at law of James Wilson, dec'd, in and
to said three lots of land, be divested out of them and vested in said purchaser, Charles Stiles,
subject to the lien aforesaid for the unpaid purchase-money. On paying the legal fees there-
for, the said purchaser may have a copy of this decree for registration as a muniment of title
to said land; or, if he so prefer, the Master will make him a deed conveying to him said three
lots as an indefeasible inheritance in fee simple forever.
On demand of the purchaser, a writ of possession will issue to put him into the possession
of said three lots.
II.
the proceeds of said sale 23 as paid in, the Master will retain enough to pay all the
Out of
costs of this cause, and then will pay pari passu:
1. The amount due on the judgment in favor of Charles Stiles.
2. The amount due on the note of Henry Jones.
3. The fee of fifty dollars due Pickle & Turner.
4. The sum of one hundred dollars to complainant, in full of all services rendered, and
all expenses incurred, and all sums paid out of his own means.
5. The sum of fifty dollars to Allen G. Mathews, Esq., for his services as Solicitor of
complainant in this cause.
6,. The sum of ten dollars to George James, the guardian ad litem of Samuel Wilson.
This sum will be charged to said Samuel by the Master in paying out the residue in his hands
to the distributees.
7. Whatever balance may remain in the hands of the Master after making the above pay-
ments, and paying the costs of the cause, he will pay out to the heirs of James Wilson, de-
ceased, share and share alike. The amounts due any of the parties who are sui juris may be
paid to their Solicitors of record in this cause.
20 Inasmuch as the statute provides how lands shall 21 As a rule no cash payment should be required,
be sold under a decree, it is not necessary to encum- for reasons heretofore given; but if unpaid taxes, or
ber the minutes, and consume the time of the Court, other pressing liens, exist, it may be necessary to
by reciting these statutory provisions. Code, §§ require a cash payment sufficient for their discharge.
2145o-2155. If, however, special directions to the See, ante, § 623, note 11.
Master are given, such as directions to advertise by 22 Ante, §§ 621-627.
posters, or hand-bills, or in special newspapers, or 23 The proceeds of the sale should be paid out by
directions to sell oh the premises, or directions to the Master. under the orders of the Court, and not
#
subdivide the land and sell in lots, such directions by the administrator. The administrator's bond does
.will be inserted here. not cover the proceeds of realty sold to pay debts.
Gambill v. Campbell, 12 Heisk., 739.
§997 SUITS TO ADMINISTER INSOLVENT ESTATES. 784
ARTICLE III.
SUITS TO ADMINISTER INSOLVENT ESTATES.

I 997. Jurisdictional Facts. 1002. Order Sustaining Bill, and Transfer-
| 998. Frame of Bill, ring the Settlement.
g 999. Form of Bill. 1003. Petitions by Creditors, and Claimants.
§ 1000. Proceedings on Bill, at Chambers. 1004. Taking the Account, and Final Dis-
§ 1001. Proceedings to Bring Parties in In- tribution.
terest Before the Court.
§ 997. Jurisdictional Facts.— The administration of the estates of decedents

is ordinarily within the exclusive jurisdiction of the County Court but where ;
the assets of an estate, real and personal, amount to, or exceed, one thousand
dollars in value, 2 are insufficient to pay the debts of the estate, according to
the complainant's information and belief, and the estate has been reported
insolvent to the County Court, or to its Clerk, the personal representative, or
any creditor, may file a bill in the Chancery Court and have the administration
of such estate transferred from the County to the Chancery Court. 3
The executor or administrator may, as the representative of the creditors of
an insolvent estate, file a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of property;
and when such conveyance is set aside, the assets recovered must be distributed
pro rata among the creditors. 4 Any creditor may, also, file such a bill. But
the suit cannot be maintained unless: (1) the estate be insolvent, (2) and such
insolvency duly suggested, and (3) the conveyance shown to be fraudulent.
Inasmuch as the assets of an insolvent estate are distributed ratably among
all the general creditors, and as the suit, whether instituted by a personal rep-
resentative or by a creditor, is for the common benefit of all entitled to share
in the assets, the statute provides that the suit shall be conducted on equitable
principles, and after the manner of a general creditor's bill. 5
§ 998. Frame of Bill. —
The bill must be filed in the county where the will
was proved, or the letters of administration granted, or where the personal
representative resides, or is served with process 6 and may be filed at any time
;
after the estate is reported insolvent to the County Court, or its Clerk, or
Deputy Clerk. 7 The bill should set forth 8 :
1. That the assets of the estate, real and personal, amount to as much as one
thousand dollars, in value. 9
2. That the assets are insufficient to pay the decedent's debt, and the costs
of administration, according to the complainant's information and belief. 10
3. All the debts the complainant knows, or believes, are owing by the de-
2 Code, § 2362, amended by Acts of 1871, ch. 106; 5 Code, § 2363. The pleadings and practice in a
M. & V.'s Code, § 3207. But, where there have been general creditors' bill are given, post, S§ 1030-1035.
no suggestion and advertisement of the insolvency of 8 Code, § 2362.
an estate in the County Court, the Chancery Court 7 Code, §§ 2328; 2366; Wade v. Fisher, 10 Heisk.,
has jurisdiction to sell a decedent's land to pay his 495; Boxley v. McKay, 4 Sneed, 286.
debts, even when his estate is less than one thousand 8 Code, § 2364.
dollars in value. Bashaw v. Tempie, 7 Cates, 596. It is not necessary that the insolvency of an
3 Code, §§ 2364; 2381. The Chancery Court, in estate should be certain; the probability of insolvency
administering an insolvent estate, has, in addition is sufficient. Often by virtue of the prudent man-
to its own powers, all the powers of the County agement of the Chancery Court an estate is s^ved
Court in such a case. Code, §'2382. from insolvency. The Code, §8 2379; 2388; 2389;
4 Code, § 2395. When the personal representative 2392, dearly shows that the law contemplates a
files the bill, it must (1) be on behalf of creditors, probability of insolvency and a possibility of sol-
(2) it must allege that the estate is insolvent, and vency. Indeed, the suggestion of insolvency is often
that the insolvency has been suggested, (3) that there a mere precaution of prudence on the part of an
are bona fide debts against the estate, (4) that there administrator.
were bona fide debts when the alleged fraudulent deed 10 If this allegation is omitted, the bill may be
was made, and (5) that the sale of the land so dismissed on motion, if made at the first term after
fraudulently conveyed is necessary to pay the dece- the filing of the bill, but the omission may he sup-
dent's debts. Boxley v. McKay,. 4 Sneed, 286; Pitts, rli-d by a sworn amendment to the bill. Code, §
admr., t>. Poole, 7 Pick., 70. 2365.
785 SUITS TO ADMINISTER INSOLVENT ESTATES. § 999
ceased, giving names of creditors and the amount of each debt, where possible
also, all disputed claims against the estate, the amount of each, and the names
of the claimants.
4.. That the estate is insolvent, and its insolvency has been duly reported to
the County Court, or its Clerk, or Deputy Clerk, as the case may be. 11
If the personal representative file the bill, he may do it in his own behalf,
as well as in behalf the widow, heirs, and legatees, or distributees, of the estate
against all such of the creditors and claimants as are named therein and sought
to be enjoined, and all others interested and not named as complainants; 12
Lut the better practice is to join the widow, heirs, and legatees or distributees,
as defendants. 13 If a creditor file the bill, he must file it in behalf of himself
and all other creditors and persons interested in the estate, and who may wish
to come in under the decree and must file it against the personal representa-
;
tive, and such other persons as are sought to be enjoined; 14 the widow, heirs,
devisees, distributees, and legatees, should also be made defendants, especially
when the deceased died seized of real estate. 18
All persons who are suing or threatening to sue the administrator, either at
law or in Equity, should be made defendants, and if any suits, or threatened
suits, are vexatious or liable to be costly or oppressive, the facts should be fully
set forth in the bill, and an injunction should be prayed against the commence-
ment or prosecution of all suits against the estate. 16
§ 999. —
Form of Bill. The form of the bill is substantially the same, whether
filed by an administrator or executor, or by a creditor. 17 The following form
will serve as a precedent:
BILL TO WIND UP AN INSOLVENT ESTATE.
To the Hon. Andrew Allison, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court, at Nashville
John Smith, a resident of Davidson county, and administrator of William
Smith, deceased, complainant,
vs.
Nancy Smith, the widow, and Sarah Smith and Thomas Smith, the heirs of said
William Smith, John Jones, Thomas Johnson, Henry Stokes, George
Brown, and Robert Moore, all residents of Davidson county, and all others
interested in the estate of William Smith, deceased, defendants.
i.
That William Smith, a citizen of Davidson county, died on the 2d day of February, 1890,
intestate, and on the first Monday of March, 1890, complainant was duly appointed by the
County Court of said county, and dulv qualified, to administer upon his estate. Nancy Smith
is the widow, and Sarah Smith and Thomas Smith are the only heirs of said decedent. The
said widow has had duly assigned to her a year's support, the exempt personalty, and home-
stead, and dower.
ii.
The assets of said estate, real and personal, subject to the decedent's debts, exceed one
thousand dollars in value, but are insufficient to pay the decedent's debts and the costs of ad-
ministration, according to complainant's information and belief; and he has accordingly re-
ported the insolvency of the estate to said County Court. A
certified copy of said report of
insolvency is herewith filed as a part of this bill, marked A.
11 The bill will not He until after the suggestion CAPTION OP A CREDITOR'S BILL.
of insolvency to the County court, or its Clerk. John Jones, a resident of Davidson County, who
Campbell v. Bryant, 2 Shan. Cas., 146. sues in behalf of himself and all other creditors of,
12 Code, § 2367. and persons interested in, the estate of William
13 It would seem from a scrutiny of the statute Smith, deceased, complainant,
that one of its objects was to save something for the vs.
widow, heirs, and legatees or distributees, out of the John Smith, the administrator, Nancy Smith, the
wreck that would probably result from many suits widow. Sarah Smith and Thomas Smith, the heirs
against the administrator, and from the loose methods and distributees of said William Smith, Henry
of administration prevalent in the County Court. It Stokes, Thomas Johnston, Robert Moore, and
is in this view- that the administrator may sue in George Brown, all residents of Davidson county,
behalf of the widow, heirs, and legatees or distribu- defendants.
tees, and thus befriend them.
14 Code, § 236S. It would be well for the creditor to show why he
15 Code, §5 2379-2380. filed the bill, instead of
waiting for the admin-
16 Code. § 2383. One of the main obiects and ben- istrator to. file "it; this, however, is
not necessary. If
efits of this proceeding is the saving of the costs in- the administrator is too slow, or
incompetent, or in
cident to a multiplicity of suits; and consequently, all collusion with any creditor or heir, or is otherwise
suits commenced or threatened should be enjoined. remiss in the discharge of his trust, it would be
17 If the bill is filed by a creditor, its caption proper for any creditor to file the bill, without wait-
would be in the following form: ing for the administrator to do so.
The following debts complainant believes to be justly owing by said estate:

1. Ajudgment against the decedent in favor of the defendant, John Jones, rendered July 2,
1889, by the Circuit Court of Davidson county, amounting to nine hundred and eighteen
dollars debt, and forty-two dollars costs.
2. Anote of hand for six hundred dollars, executed by the decedent on June 12, 1889, to
the defendant, Henry Stokes, bearing interest from date, and one year after date.
3. An account for one hundred dollars by Dr. Thomas Johnson for medical and profes-
sional services rendered the decedent in the years 1889 and 1890.
4. There are other claims against said estate for various minor amounts, believed to be
just, the largest of which are the following: (1) Thomas Cook, (account,) $10.00; George
Dalton, (account,) $8.00; Samuel Long, (note,) $12.00; and Edmund Gray, (account,) $42.00.
rv.
The defendant, Robert Moore, has brought suit against complainant in the Circuit Court
of Davidson county for five thousand dollars, which the said Moore claims the estate owes
him for a breach of contract by the decedent. Complainant believes said claim is unjust.
Said Moore has had a subpoena issued for a large number of witnesses, and if he obtains even
a small recovery, the costs will probably be very great.
v.
The defendant, George Brown, claims that the decedent owes him a large balance on a
settlement made between them as partners two years ago, and he threatens to bring a suit to
enforce his claim. The decedent stated on his death-bed that he owed said Brown nothing,
and complainant believes such to be the fact.
VI.
There are several other persons who assert that they have claims against said estate,
some of which may be just, but complainant has no means of ascertaining their correct 1
ness, except by having them duly established by proof before the Master, in your Honor's
Court.
The personal estate of said William Smith, consists of about six hundred and eighteen
dollars, the proceeds of a small stock of merchandise, of notes, and accounts, and of some
horses, and cattle, and other property converted into money by complainant, a full inventory
of all which has been filed in said County Court. The real estate of which he died seized and
possessed consists of (1) one house and lot, No. 46, on John street, Nashville, worth about
fifteen hundred dollars, and which has been assigned as homestead and dower to his widow
(2) and a lot No. 216, on Sanders street, Nashville, worth about fifteen hundred dollars.
The deeds to said two lots are herewith filed as exhibits to this bill, marked B and C, and
will be read at the hearing.
VIII.
1. That all those named as defendants in the caption be made such by service of subpoena,
but that no copy of the bill be issued, unless expressly ordered by your Honor. That an
abstract of the bill be made out by the Clerk and Master, and be made known to such of the
defendants as your Honor may require 18 but answer under oath is waived as to each of the
;
defendants.
2. That the administration of said estate be transferred from the County Court of Davidson
county to this Court; 10 and to this end that all necessary references be ordered, and all
proper accounts be taken, and proper distribution of the estate be made among those entitled. 20
3. That all further proceedings in reference to the administration of said estate in the
said County Court be enjoined 21 that the commencement or prosecution of all suits at law,
;
and of all other suits in Equity against complainant be enjoined; 22 that the defendant Robert
Moore be specially enjoined from further prosecuting his said suit at law against complainant;
and that the defendant George Brown be enjoined from bringing any suit against complainant
in reference to said estate.
4. That all persons, defendants included, having claims against said estate be required to
present and substantiate them in this cause by legal proof before the Master 23 within such
time as your Honor may order, or be forever barred. 24
5. That said real estate be sold, subject to the widow's homestead and dower rights, and
the proceeds thereof, as well as the proceeds of the personal estate of the decedent, be applied
m due course of administration, and paid out to those thereunto legally entitled and that ;
proper allowance be made complainant for his services as administrator; and that proper
allowance be made his Solicitors for their services in this cause.
6. And that complainant, and the widow and heirs of the decedent 25 have such other and
further and better relief as they or any of them may be entitled to, under the pleadings and
proofs in the cause.
John M. Lea, Solicitor.
18 Code,§§ 2369-2370 This abstract is given in S3 Code, g§ 2371; 2373; 2386.
1001, post.. 24 Code, § 2376.
19 Code, § 2381. 25 The bill is for the benefit of the widow and
20 Code, §§ 2387 2392. heirs, and the administrator acts' in their behalf.
21 Code, §2381. Code, 2367.
§
22 Code, § 2383.
The bill should be sworn to, as it both seeks preliminary injunctive relief,
and transfers the jurisdiction of the cause.
§ 1000. —
Proceedings on Bill, at Chambers. If the Court be not in session
when the bill is filed, it must be presented to the Chancellor, at Chambers, for
his action. If he thinks a copy of the bill should be issued, he will so order;
and will designate such of the defendants as shall be served with process. 26
He will, also, order proper publication to be made. 27 If any suits have been in-
stituted, or are threatened against the administrator, the Chancellor may en-
join them, or make other orders in reference to them in his discretion, having
in view the rights of the parties suing, as well as the interest of the estate. 28
The following form for a fiat would be adapted to the bill in the preceding
section.
CHANCELLOR'S FIAT ON AN INSOLVENT BILL.
To the Clerk and Master at Nashville
File the foregoing bill issue abstract of the bill and subpoena, to be served on all named
;
as defendants in the caption of the bill. Make publication in the Nashville Banner for four
weeks, notifying all creditors of William Smith, deceased, and all other persons interested in
his estate, to come forward and exhibit their demands, and have themselves made parties to
the bill, within the time prescribed by law. 29 Issue an injunction against Robert Moore and
George Brown as prayed in the bill, without bond therefor. Andrew Allison, Chancellor.
June 4, 1890.
§ 1001. Proceedings to Bring the Parties in Interest Before the Court. As —
soon as the bill is filed, and prosecution bond given, the Clerk and Master will
issue the abstract and process required by the Chancellor's fiat. The following
abstract of the foregoing bill will serve as a form.
ABSTRACT OF BILL.
John Smith, admr., &c, 1 „
vs. [Abstract of the Bill. No. 7163.
Nancy Smith, et al. J
The bill inthis cause is filed against the widow, heirs, and creditors, of William Smith,
deceased, and alleges
1. That complainant is the administrator, that Nancy Smith is the widow, and that Sarah
and Thomas Smith are the only heirs of said William Smith. That the year's support, the
exempt property, homestead, and dower, have all been set apart to the widow.
2. That the assets of the estate exceed $1,000; but that the estate is insolvent, and has
been so reported to the County Court.
3. That the estate owes the following debts: (1) John Jones, $918.00 debt, and $42 costs,
on a judgment; (2) Henry Stokes, $600 on a note; (3) Dr. Thomas Johnson, $100 on an
account, and (4) other smaller amounts to various other parties.
4. That Robt. Moore has brought suit in the Circuit Court of Davidson county against
the estate for $5,000 on an alleged breach of contract, believed to be unjust.
5. That George Brown is threatening to sue the estate for an alleged balance due him
as a partner of the deceased.
6. That there are other persons asserting claims against said estate.
7. That the personal estate of the decedent amounts to about $618; and his real estate
consists of two lqts in Nashville, worth about $1,500 each, one of which, No. 46 John street,
has been assigned the widow as homestead and dower the other, No. 216 Sanders street.
;
8. The bill makes all said persons defendants, waives their answers under oath; and
prays to have said estate administered in Chancery as an insolvent estate; and to have all
suits against the administrator enjoined, especially the said suit of Robt. Moore, and the
threatened suit by George Brown.
[Signed] John M. Lea, Solicitor,
and duly sworn to by the complainant.
26 Code, §§ 2369-2370. The reason why creditors and claimants are ex-
27 The Clerk and Master may, also, make the cluded, unless they come in within a limited time,
order for publication to be made. Code, § 2371. is, because, (1) otherwise, the Court would not
28 Code, §§ 2383-2384. know how to distribute the fund; and (2) those who
29 Code, §§2370-2371; 2376. The publication no- are vigilant should not be kept out of their rights
tice sometimes requires all claims to be filed within by the laches of the negligent. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
six months, or be barred. But there is no law au- 1204-1205, notes. A creditor who comes in after a
thorizing such a procedure. If, however, the funds distribution may sue those who have drawn out the
have all been distributed before a creditor comes fund for his pro rata. An executor, administrator,
forward, he would be forced to compel those who trustee, or Clerk of Court, who has paid out such
had received the funds to contribute to his just pro funds, under the order of the Court, cannot, how-
rata. Creditors may present their claims within the ever, be held personally liable for any funds by
time prescribed by law. Code, § 2376; that is, them so paid or distributed. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1206-
within the ordinary time for suits against adminis- 1207.
trators. See, Code, §§2393-2393.
1 certity that the foregoing is a correct abstract of said bill, and that the prayer for an
injunction has been granted by the Chancellor.
June 5, 1890. Geo. K. Whitworth, C. & M.
This abstract will be substituted for a copy of the bill itself, unless the Chan-
cellor order the whole bill to be copied. 30
The Master will, also, make due publication for creditors and others inter-
ested to have themselves made parties. If the Chancellor's fiat does not order
publication, the Master may order it. 31 The following is a form of
PUBLICATION NOTICE TO CREDITORS.32
To the Creditors of William Smith, deceased:
John Smith, admr., &c, ]
vs. In Chancery, at Nashville.
Nancy Smith, et al.
All creditors, and other persons interested in the estate of William Smith, deceased, are
hereby ordered to come forward, and exhibit their demands, and have themselves made
parties to the bill in this cause, within the time prescribed by law, or they will be forever
barred. 33 This order will be published for four consecutive weeks in the Nashville Banner.
This June 5, 1890. Geo. K. Whitworth, C. & M.
When
a non-resident creditor's claim exceeds one hundred dollars, a copy
o.tthe abstract may be forwarded to him by the Clerk at his usual place of
residence, by mail and this shall be equivalent to service of process. 34
;
§ 1002. Order Sustaining Bill, and Transferring Settlement.

If the bill —
omit any jurisdictional fact, may
be dismissed on motion, or on demurrer, at
it
the first term, after it is filed, unless properly amended on affidavit. 35 If it
contain the proper allegations, 36 the Court will, on motion of any party, sustain
the bill, and order the administration of the estate to be transferred from the
County Court, and further proceedings therein in the County Court enjoined.
This order may be in the following form:
ORDER SUSTAINING THE BILL,
lohn Smith, admr., &c,
vs. \ No. 7163.
On
motion of complainant, and it appearing that the bill in this cause is properly filed,
it isordered by the Court that the bill be sustained and that the administration of the estate
;
of William Smith, deceased, be transferred from the County Court of Davidson county to
this Court. The institution of any and all suits against said estate is hereby enjoined, and
the Master will so state in notice to creditors. All persons having claims against said estate
will file them in this cause by petition accompanied by a proper prosecution bond. The Clerk
oi said County Court will forthwith transmit to this Court all inventories, reports, settlements,
vouchers, and other original papers, in his office, relating to said administration; and, also, a
transcript of all orders, decrees, and other entries, in the cause, on the minutes of his Court.
And all proceedings relative to said administration in the County Court are hereby enjoined,
this Court now assuming exclusive jurisdiction of such administration, and of all matters
properly incident thereunto.
It is not necessary for all the parties to be before the Court to enable an
order or decree to be made, provided such and so many of them are before the
Court, as to enable the Court to do complete justice in the particular matter. 37
§ 1003. —
Petitions by Creditors and Claimants. If the bill seeks to sell land
that the decedent did not own at his death, the owner may become a party by
petition and make defence; 38 or he may file an original bill, and enjoin the
suit. 39 Any person having a claim against the estate, and not made a party,
must file a petition to become a party, and prove his claim. This petition will
(1) be addressed to the Chancellor, (2) will give the style of the cause in which
30 Code, § 2369. As a rule, the saving of expense 35 Code, § 2365. See, also, ante, §§ 430-432.
by the issuance of an abstract is insignificant. 3G Perhaps there should be proof of the sugges-
31 Code, §2371. tion of insolvency, if demanded by any defendant.
32 This is merely the name of the notice, and 37 Code, § 2385.
should not be published. See, ante, § 198. 3S Code, § 2799; See, ante, §§ 794-795.
33 Code, §§ 2371; 2376. 39 Haynes v. Rizen, 14 Lea, 252. See, ante, § 795.
34 Code, § 2372. The object of this notice is to
enable the creditor to file his claim before a distribu-
tion is made.
789 SUITS TQ ADMINISTER INSOLVENT ESTATES. § 1003
it isto be filed, (3) will state the amount and character of the claim, and how
evidenced, and (4) will pray for leave to petitioner to file the petition, to
become a party, to the cause, and to prove his claim and to have it allowed,
and paid out of the assets of the estate. If the petitioner has any lien on the
property sought to be sold, entitling him to priority of satisfaction, or has any
equity superior to those of the general creditors, he should set it forth in his
petition, with due precision and particularity along with the written evidences
thereof, if any. The petitioner should, also, offer to contribute to the expenses
of the suit, in case the expenses cannot be paid out of the funds sought to be
reached. 40 The following form will show the character of such a petition:
PETITION BY A CREDITOR TO BECOME A PARTY.
John Smith, admr., &c, ^
vs. }•
"
No. 7163. — In Chancery, at Nashville.
To the Hon. Andrew Allison, Chancellor:
Your petitioner, Robert Roe, a resident of Nashville, Davidson county, respectfully snow 9
to the Court:
1.
That William Smith, deceased, complainant's intestate, died justly indebted to him in the
sum of one thousand dollars, evidenced by a note of hand, dated Aug. 3, 1889, due one day
after date, which, with interest, is wholly due and unpaid. [// the claim is based on account,
or is for work and labor, or for services, or for goods or chattels, or for any other matter, so
state, and specify it fully and particularly, giving its amount and date.]
11.
Your would have sued the complainant as administrator of said William Smith,
petitioner
deceased, had he not been restrained from so doing by the pendency of this suit, and your
Honor's injunction. Petitioner is, therefore, constrained to pray your Honor to allow him
to become a party to this cause, to the end that he may prove his said debt, and have a decree
for the amount thereof, and have it paid out of the assets to be administered in this cause.
He. files said note as a part of this petition, and marks it A.
in.
Your would further show that said note was given by said William Smith as
petitioner
evidence of the amount he owed your petitioner as part of the purchase price of the house and
lot No. 216 Sanders street, Nashville, sought to be sold in this cause; and to seen re the pay-
ment of said note, a lien was expressly retained on the face of the deed executed by petitioner
to said William Smith, for said house and lot, as will be seen by reference to said deed, now
on file in this cause, and marked exhibit C to complainant's bill. Petitioner, therefore,
claims a prior and superior lien and equity to the proceeds of said house and lot. and prays
your Honor to decree him satisfaction in full in preference to the general creditors of said
estate. [If the, petitioner has any right or claim to priority of satisfaction based on any con-
tract, or statutory lien, or any attachment or judgment lien, so specifically show, giving the
facts in full, and praying to have his priority of satisfaction decreed and enforced.]
IV.
Petitioner prays your Honor to allow him to file this petition in this cause, and to become
a party to the cause, for the purposes aforesaid and for general relief. ;
And he hereby offers to contribute to the expenses of the suit, in any way your Honor may
deem it equitable for him so to do. John J. VertrEES, Solicitor.
[To be duly sworn to by the petitioner, fir by his agent, or Solicitor, as shown in §789,
ante.]
The complainant's answer, under oath, to such, a petition merely makes an
issue, and has no probative force. 41
The Court may, by consent of parties, allow claims to be filed without the
necessity of a formal petition. But even in such a case, unless the claim is
itself evidenced by writing, it should be reduced to writing, specifying its date,
character, and amount, and should be signed by the claimant, and sworn to.
Such a claim could be put into the form of a proven account, thus
INFORMAL CLAIM.
John Smith, administrator of William Smith, deceased,
To John Doe, Dr.
1889. Aug. 2. To 20 bus. corn, - - $ 10 00
4. " 60 " wheat, - - - - - 75.00
" 20. " 10 days' work on barn, - - 15.00
$100.00
40 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1213-1214. I 41 Irvine v. Dean, 9 Pick., 346.
Davidson County. J
Personally came John Doe, and made oath that the foregoing account is just and correct,
and is all unpaid, and due to him, and is entitled to no credits.
Sworn to and subscribed before ] John Doe.
me, July S, 1891.
Geo. K. Whitworth, C. & M.
§ 1004. Taking the Account, and Final Distribution. After the time al- —
lowed by law for creditors to have themselves made parties has expired, 42 the
Court will, on motion of any party, direct the Master to take and state an
account of the assets and liabilities of the estate. The order of reference may
be as follows:
ORDER FOR AN ACCOUNT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES.
John Smith, admr., &c, 1
vs. \ No. 7163.
In this cause, on motion of the complainant's Solicitor, it is ordered by the Court that the
Master report to the next term of the Court
i.
What assets, real and personal, William Smith died seized and possessed of, specifying the
main items thereof, and describing the real estate fully.
ii.
Whatpersonal assets came, or ought by due diligence to have come, to the hands of the
administrator, specifying the main items thereof, and giving the total amount.
ill.
Whether the year's support, the exempt personalty, and homestead and dower, have been
duly set apart for the widow, and in what real estate, homestead and dower have teen
assigned, if assigned.
IV.
What bona and charges against said estate have been paid by the administrator,
fide debts
if any ; to what creditors paid, and the amount paid to each.
v.
What bona debts and charges against said estate remain outstanding and unpaid,
fide
specifying each creditor, the amount due him, and the total amount.
VI
Whether there are probably any other bona fide debts against the estate outstanding and
unpaid and if so, in whose hands.
;
VII.
The Master will report on any other matter that may be proper to enable the Court to
properly distribute the assets, real and personal, of the decedent among those lawfully entitled
thereto.
All other matters are reserved until the incoming of said report.
The Master will consider all claims presented by petition, or filed without
petition by consent of the administrator, down to the closing of the account.
Notice of all claims presented to the Master shall be given to the complainant,
or his Solicitor, and if not admitted by him to be just, the claimant must sub-
stantiate them by legal proof, which shall be reduced to writing and filed. 43
Notice of claims filed should, also, be given the Solicitors of the principal cred-
itors and they may contest a claim, even where admitted by the complainant to
;
be just, and may except to the report allowing it.

Creditors whose debts are not due must become parties, and present their
claims, or be barred; and, to save the bar, any creditor may present his claim
to the Master in vacation, and apply to become a party. 44
The report of the Master, and the exceptions thereto, and the proceedings
thereon, and the decree to sell the realty, are substantially the same as in a suit
to sell land to pay debts. 45 The estate of the decedent having been all con-
verted into money, and the total liabilities ascertained, a final decree is pro-
nounced in substance as follows
42 This will be two years and six months after risk of the estate being distributed before they do
qualification of the personal representative. The sue.
Court will not, ordinarily, delay a year longer f"r 43 Code, § 2386.
the benefit of non-resident creditors. Code, § 2372, 44 Code, §§ 2375-7378.
is probably intended to warn non-residents to sue 45 See, ante, §§ 994-996.
within the two years and six months, or run the
FINAL DECBEE.
John Smith, admr., &c, ]
vs. \ No. 7163.
This cause, coming on this Jan. 12, 1891, before Chancellor Allison, to be further and finally
heard upon the whole record in the cause, including the report of the Master, showing the
various creditors, and the amounts due each, and the total amount for distribution among
them, and the exceptions of the defendants, Robert Moore and George Brown, to the Master's
report, filed Jan. 10, 1891 the Court, after due consideration of said exceptions, overruled
;
each and all of said exceptions, and confirmed said report, and ordered it to be spread on the
minutes, 46 which is done in the words and figures following
[Here copy it, in full.]
It is, therefore, adjudged and decreed by the Court, that the Master, after deducting from
the funds in his hands all the costs of the cause, and after paying John M. Lea, Esq., a fee
of five hundred dollars for his services in the cause, will distribute the balance of said funds
pro rata among the creditors, as set out in his said report of Jan. 10, 1891, hereinabove copied,
and made part of this decree.
The proceeds of the sale should be disbursed by the Clerk and Master under
the order of the Court, and not by the administrator. 47 If the estate should ,
prove to be solvent, and there be a surplus after paying the debts and costs,
the Court will distribute this surplus among those entitled, taking refunding
bonds, if necessary. 48
46 If the report is voluminous, the Court should I 47 Moses v. Moses, 1 Shan. Cas., 414.
order it to be recorded in the Insolvent Book. Code, 48 Code, §§ 2392-2393.
M. & V., | 3237. [
§ 1005 SUITS WHERE JUDGMENTS CANNOT BE OBTAINED. 792
CHAPTER LIV.
SUITS BY CREDITORS WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW.
Article I. Suits where Judgment at Law Cannot be Obtained.

Article II. Suits where Judgment at Law Has been Obtained, but Execution
at Law Cannot be Levied.
Article III. Suits where Judgment at Law Has been Obtained, but a Dis-
covery of Property by Bill is Necessary.
Article IV. Suits where a Creditor Has Obtained a Judgment in Another
State and Has Exhausted his Legal Remedy There.
Article V. Suits where Judgments at Law May be Had, but Executions at
Law Cannot be Levied.
Article VI. Suits by General Creditors for their Pro Rata of an Insolvent
Debtor's Property.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS WHERE JUDGMENTS AT LAW CANNOT BE OBTAINED.
1005. Suits in Cases Where no Original § 1007. Frame of Bills Where Judgments at
Process Can be Eexecuted. Law Cannot be Obtained.
1006. Suits in Cases Where the Demand is § 1008. Form of Bills Where Judgments at
Law Cannot be Obtained.
Purely of an Equitable Nature.
§ 1005. Suits in Cases Where no Original Process 1 Can be Executed. The —

Code provides that in all cases (1) where personal service of process cannot be
made at law, and where no original attachment at law will lie, and no judgment
at law can be obtained and, also, (2) in cases where the demand is purely of an
;
equitable nature, the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to subject legal and
equitable interests in every kind of property, 2 except property held in trust for
the defendant, when the trust has been created by, or the property so held
has proceeded from some person other than the defendant himself, and the
trust is declared by will duly recorded, or deed duly registered. 3
In the first class of cases above mentioned, (where no judgment can be ob-
tained at law,) the following facts must all co-exist, and must all be specifically
alleged in the bill
1. No Personal Service of Process Can be Made at Law. This must arise either
from the non-residence of the defendant, or from some of the other causes men-
tioned in the Code where personal service of process cannot be made at law. 4
2. No Original Attachment at Law Will Lie.s This, of course, must arise from
the fact that the defendant has no property liable to levy at law. He may
have equitable interests in property, but these cannot be levied on at law.
3. No Judgment Can be Obtained at Law. This results, of course, from the
other two facts above set out. For, if no process can be served either on the
defendant's person or on his property, a Court of law would have no jurisdic-
tion to render a judgment against him. 6
§ 1006. Suits where the Demand is Purely of an Equitable Nature. These —
comprise the second class of cases named in the Code section, (4287,) now being
considered. 7 In this class are included none of the essentials specified in the
1By "original process" is meant either a subpoena 5 Allen
Gilliland, 6 Lea, 535.
v.
to answer or an original attachment of property. When
these three facts co-exist then a bill will
2 Code, 4287.
§ lie under Code,
§ 4287. Herndon c. Pickard. 5 Lea,
3 Code,§ 4283. 702. See, also. Gnham v. Merrill, 5 Cold., 622.
4 See, ante, §§ 196; 870. T See, ante, % 1005.
793 SUITS WHERE. JUDGMENTS CANNOT BE OBTAINED. §1007
preceding section; all that is necessary to give the Court jurisdiction, prima
facie, is to allege such a state of facts as to show that the demand is purely of
an equitable nature, that is, a demand not cognizable in a Court of common
law, but cognizable in a Court of Equity only. This class of cases includes all
those heretofore enumerated in treating of the exclusive and inherent jurisdic-
tion of the Chancery Court, 8 wherein the Circuit Courts have no concurrent
jurisdiction. 9
§ 1007. Frame of Bills where Judgments at Law Cannot be Obtained. In —
drawing a bill in the first class of cases above mentioned, care should be taken
to show that complainant has a just claim against the defendant, giving its
nature with particularity and preciseness, so that the Court may see that the
claim is a just one; and, also, so that, on a pro confesso a final decree may be
pronounced. The draughtsman should then show that the complainant has
not been able to recover a judgment at law against the defendant because the
latter was not in reach of process, and had no property liable to attachment at
law; and that therefore complainant has no remedy except in the Chancery
Court. The bill should then set forth the equitable interests owned by the de-
fendant, such as: 1, a mortgage; 2, a vendor's lien; 3, a mechanics' or other
statutory lien 4, an interest in a partnership 5, an interest in land bought in
; ;
another's name with the defendant's money; 6, a debt due but that cannot be
realized until the debtor's assets have been marshalled 7, property in another's ;
name but belonging in Equity to the defendant; 8, property held in trust for
the benefit and enjoyment of the defendant on an agreement in parol; 9, prop-
erty held in trust for the defendant under a will not recorded or under a deed
not registered; 10, property conveyed to another by the defendant in fraud of
his creditors; 11, property of defendant devised to another in fraud of com-
plainant; and 12, any other property. interest, or estate, of the defendant visible
to the eye of Equity, but hidden from the sight of the law by the veils of form,
or concealed under the cloaks of fraud. 10 These interests should be as fully
described and as definitely located as possible, and the names of the* persons
given who have the possession of them, and the legal title, or ostensible legal
title. The bill should make all such persons defendants, and, if deemed advisa-
ble, they should be compelled to set forth and discover the nature, location
and value of any and all property in their custody or control, or within their
knowledge, or, in the custody or control of any other person, belonging to the
defendant debtor, or in which he has any interest or concern. An attachment
should be prayed against all of the defendant debtor's property, leeal as well
as equitable, and especially against the property described in the bill; and all
of the defendants should be enjoined from selling, transferring, encumbering,
concealing, or in any way disposing of the property described, or of any other
property, legal or equitable, to which the defendant debtor has any title or
interest, or has the benefit or use of.
§ 1008. Form of Bill where Judsrment at Law Cannot be Obtained. The —
draughtsman should keep in mind the essentials of the bill as stated in the
preceding section, and also what is said about the consideration of relations 11
in drawing a bill. The following. general form will aid him in the class of cases
it belongs to :
BILL WHERE JUDGMENT AT LAW CANNOT BE OBTAINED.

[For address and caption see, ante, §§ 155; 164.]

i.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, is justly indebted to him in the sum of dollars
and interest thereon from the day of 19 ,
8 See, ante, §5 23-25. 10 For various kinds of equitable property, see,

B Of course, if the Circuit Court has jurisdiction ante, \ 882.
of any case it cannot be "purely of an equitable 11 See, ante, §§165-169.
nature."
§1009 SUITS WHERE EXECUTION CANNOT BE LEVIED. 794
That, [Here show the ground of said indebtedness, as a note of hand, an account, breach
of contract, or otherwise. See forms of bills in §§ 873 1079.] ;
iii.
That, [Here show that the defendant, Richard Roe, is a non-resident, or for some other
statutory reason process cannot be served upon him. See, ante, §§ 196; 870.]
IV.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, has, so far as complainant knows or believes, no prop-
erty liable to attachment at law, and complainant has made diligent inquiry for such property.
[If an attachment has been sued out at law and been returned "nulla bona," so state, and tell
what became of the suit; showing it is ended.]
v.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, [Here show what equitable interests he has, describing
and locating it, and naming the owner of the legal title, who must be made a defendant.']
VI.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That complainant be given a decree against the defendant, Richard Roe, for the
amount he owes complainant by reason of the premises, including interest.
3d. That, [Here pray that the equitable interests described in the bill be sold along with
the legal estate; and that, after any prior liens are satisfied, the remainder of the proceeds
of such sale be applied to the payment of complainant's debt.]
4th. That the defendants be enjoined from selling, transferring or encumbering said prop-
erty, or any part thereof, or any other property, legal or equitable of the defendant, Richard
Roe, and that an attachment be issued and levied thereon.
Sth. That complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to, and to
your Honor may seem proper.
This is the first application for an attachment or injunction in this case.
Clem J. Jones, Solicitor.
AKTICLE II.
SUITS WHERE JUDGMENT AT LAW HAS BEEN OBTAINED, BUT EXECUTION

AT LAW CANNOT BE LEVIED.
§ 1009. Suits to Set Aside Fraudulent Con- § 1015. Defences and Decrees in Suits to Set
veyances. Aside Fraudulent Conveyances.
§ 1010. Ordinary Badges of Fraud. § 1016. Suit to Set a General Assignment as
§ 1011. When Fraud Will be Presumed. Fraudulent.
§ 1012. Conveyances When Fraudulent in § 1017. Some Practical Suggestions in Suits
Law. to Set Aside Fraudulent Convey-
§ 1013. Frame of Bill to Set Aside a Fraud- ances.
ulent Conveyance. § 1018. Suits in Aid of a Judgment Creditor
§ 1014. Form of Bill to Set Aside a Fraud- Where no Fraud is Alleged.
ulent Conveyance.
Suits to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances.

§ 1009. The law favors cred- —
itors. The Constitution has established Courts for the benefit of those who have
been injured in person, property, or character 1 and the Legislature has enacted
-,
many laws to enable complainants to obtain redress for injuries done or rights
withheld, and to have relief decreed to them, according to right and justice.
All of a debtor's property, real and personal, excepting such as is specially
exempted by statute, is, in the eye of the law, a fund for the benefit of his cred-
itors. This fund he is not allowed to give away to the injury of those to whom
he indebted, for the law requires every man to be just before it permits him
is
to be generous, honesty being deemed a greater virtue than generosity, espe-
2
cially when that generosity is at another's expense. Neither does the law
1 Const, of Term., Art. I, § 17. tracted on the faith of that property being a means
2 It is a fraud in law and dishonest in morals, for of its payment. While much has been said and
a man to give to others what is required to pay his written, in and out of the Courts, about the rapacity
debts. The very property he gives away may have of the creditor class, it is certain that creditors, as
been directly or indirectly purchased with the money a rule ! are more slow in collecting than debtors are
he owes; or the debt he owes may have been con- swift in paying; and, as a rule, creditors invent no
795 SUITS WHERE EXECUTION CANNOT BE LEVIED. §1010
allow a debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors by making conveyances,
or suffering judgments, or by putting his property out of their reach, or by
covering it up, by sham deeds or other colorable transactions, or by resorting
to any other device. The law makes all such conveyances, judgments, transac-
tions and other devices utterly void, except (1) as against the fraudulent debtor
himself, and (2) as 'against an innocent purchaser from him, or from his as-
signee. 3 Fraudulent conveyances are void, not only as to existing creditors, but
also, as to subsequent creditors. 4 Any one is a creditor within the meaning
of the statute who has a just right of recovery, whether such right be based
on contract or on a tort, or be reduced to a judgment or not. 5 But in order to
invalidate a transfer for a valuable consideration, it must be shown that it
was made with a fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor, and that the
grantee had notice of this intent, and participated in it. 6
Fraudulent intent is, sometimes a question of law. Every man is- presumed
to intend the necessary consequences of his acts; and if an act necessarily de-
lays, hinders, or defrauds, creditors, then the law presumes that the act was
done with fraudulent intent. If the law adjudges the effect of the conveyance
to be to delay, hinder, or defraud, creditors, then the transfer is to be regarded
as fraudulent, though this may not have been the intention of the parties to
the transfer. In such a case, the intent to defraud is a question of law. 7
§ 1010. —
Ordinary Badges of Fraud. Inasmuch as frauds are generally se-
cret, and have to be tracked by the foot-prints, marks and signs made by the
perpetrators, 8 and discovered by the light of the attending facts and circum-
stances, these evidences are termed "badges of fraud." 9 The most common
badges are the following 1, The fact that the debtor is embarrassed 2, that
: ;
a suit is pending or threatened 3, that he transfers all of his property 4, the

; ;
transfer secretly or hurriedly made; 5, false recitals of consideration or other

matters in the deed 6, giving an absolute deed as a mere security 7, inade-
; ;
quacy of actual consideration; 8, unusually long credit given to the vendee; 9,

the retention of the possession of property conveyed; 10, the enjoyment of the
use, benefit, rents, proceeds, or other profits of the property conveyed; 11, acts
more devices, and put forth no more efforts, to ob- and honest which the law justly pronounces fraud-
tain payment, than debtors do to postpone, evade, or ulent and corrupt; but he is not, therefore, to escape
defeat payment. All the laws made to_ enable cred- from the consequences of such an act. The law
itors to collect their debts were necessitated by de- must have a more certain standard of measuring
lays of debtors in payment, 'or by their inventions men's' intents than each individual's varying and
and devices to hide their property _ by pretended capricious notions of right and wrong. Whatever a
sales, or fraudulent gifts, or other tricks to deceive man's opinions of his own acts may be, there are
or thwart their creditors, or avoid the payment of certain rules, founded in experience and established
honest debts. The distress caused by the failure of by law, for determining the validity of transfers
a debtor in paying is often as great as that caused under the statute; and if these rules are trans-
by the success of a creditor in collecting. gressed, the transfers are void, without regard to
3 Code, § 1759. This statute is based on the North the opinions of the parties. Bump on Fraud Conv.,
Carolina Act of 1715, ch. 38, which in, turn is based 25. A -debtor's evidence as to his intent is not re-
on the English statute, 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5, anno, garded as anything more than an expression of his
1570. opinion as to the character of the transaction; and,
The fraudulent conveyance is not permitted to unless supported by other evidence, is entitled to
stand as security for money advanced bv the con- but little weight. Ibid, 593-594. If the question of
veyee. Lazell V. Powell, Thomp. Cas., 195. fraudulent intent could be determined by the parties,
A fraudulent conveyance is in violation of the the statute might as well be repealed. No man can
implied fundamental antecedent contract between the be the judge of his own case: it is for the jury or
parties that neither has done or will do anything to the Chancellor, under the law and facts of the case,
hinder, delay, or defeat a faithful compliance with to judge of the intent of the parties. The parties
the contract on his part. See, ante, §§ 58; 932. may admit that they made a conveyance^ to defraud
4 Young v. Pate, 4 Yerg., 164; Nicholas v. Ward,' creditors, and yet, if no creditor was, in fact, de-
1 Head, 325. frauded, the conveyance would be good; whereas,
5 Patrick v. Ford, 5 Sneed, 532; Code, §4288.
they may deny, and truthfully deny, that a partic-
ular conveyance was made to defraud creditors, and
Formerly, no one was deemed a creditor unless he
yet,, if the effect of such a conveyance was to hinder
had a judgment.
Carmichael, 9 Yerg., 325; Mills V. or delay a single creditor, the law adjudges it to be
6 Peck V.
fraudulent. It is an unnecessary, and often a cruel
Haines, 3 Head, 332; Bump on Fraud. Conv., 582. strain of a defendant's conscience for his Solicitor
7 The statute against fraudulent conveyances re- the conveyance in question was
for to ask him whether
fers to a legal intent, and not a moral intent; made, or taken, with any intent to hinder, delay, or
one man's right does not depend on another mans '
defraud, any creditor.
moral sense. The moral sense is much stronger in
8 See, ante, § 448.
some men than in others. The statute supposes that s> T!ump on Fraud. Conv., 31; 2 Meigs' Dig.,
every one is capable of perceiving what is wrong;
do §1522; Waite on Fraud. Conv., §§224-242. A
and, if he does what is forbidden, intending to
say that he did not intend "badge of fraud" is any fact that throws a suspicion
it, he is not allowed to
A man's moral perceptions on the transaction and calls for an explanation.
to do a forbidden act.
Ibid.
may be so perverted as to imagine an act to be fair
connected with the transfer out of the usual course of such transactions when
bona Me; 12, unusual mode of payment 13, relationship of the parties 14, long
; ;
credit in connection with the insolvency or non-residence of the vendee 15, the ;
use of unusual clauses and expressions in the deed 16, the use of general and
;
sweeping terms to describe the property conveyed, 10 and 17, antedating the con-
veyance and other papers connected therewith, if* any.
What weight shall be given to any one or more of these badges is a question
for the jury, or Chancellor and how many of them are necessary to exist in a
;
given case to prove the fraud depends on the other facts and circumstances ex-
isting in that case. 11
§ 1011. When Fraud Will be Presumed. 12-^-A Court of Equity will not pre-
sume fraud in the absence of any proof on which to found the presumption;
but when inculpatory facts are proved, which are termed badges, or signs, of
fraud, the Court will presume its existence. In finding fraud a Court of Equity
will act on a lower degree of proof than what is required in a Court of law. 13
Fraud will be presumed in the following cases
,
1. Where the conveyance is voluntary, that is without a valuable considera-

tion, and creditors are hindered or defrauded by such conveyance, whatever be
the real intent of the debtor. 14
2. Where the debtor remains in possession of personalty after an absolute
conveyance thereof; but, in this case, the presumption may be rebutted. 15
3. Where the assignment reserves a benefit to the assignor; or the assignor
is allowed to retain the possession of the property. 16
4. Where the property assigned is consumable in use, and the assignment
gives the debtor the right to use it. 17
5. Where the assignment keeps the proceeds of the property away from the
creditors for a period exceeding the law's delay. 18
6. Where fictitious debts are secured by the deed of assignment. 19
7. Where the deed of trust requires creditors to receipt in full, or get noth-
ing. 20
8. the consideration of an absolute conveyance is grossly inadequate. 21
Where
If the complainant's evidence place the conveyance attached under a great
(suspicion of fraud, the burden is then cast on the vendee to prove the bona
fides of the transaction, or, at least, remove the suspicion. And if the considera-
tion is impeached by the bill, and the proof casts suspicion upon it, the burden
is then on the vendee to show that a valid consideration was paid. 22
§ 1012.Conveyances when Fraudulent in Law. When the consideration —

is greatly inadequate, or was obtained under suspicious circumstances, but
actual fraud is not shown, the Court will consider the conveyance voluntary to
the extent of the value of the property in excess of the price paid, and will
declare such conveyance fraudulent in law, and treat it as a mere security for
the consideration actually paid. 23 But where fraud is proved the conveyance
will not be permitted to stand as security for the money paid. 24
§ 1013. Frame of Bill to Set Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance. Where a —
debtor has made any conveyance, or suffered anv judgment, or resorted to any
other device, to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or anv of them; or, where
he has given away any of his property, whether fraudulently or otherwise, the
proper remedy is by a bill in the Chancery Court, against the debtor and the
10 Bunin on Fraud. Conv., 31-60; Waite on Fraud. 18 1 Meigs' Dig., § 235.
Conv., §§224-242; and see "Fraudulent Convey- 17 Ibid.
ances." in our Digests. li Ibid.; BumD on Friud. Conv., 412.
11 Qua non valeant singula, juncta juvant. Ante, 10 1 Meigs' Dig., § 235.
§ 448. note; Bump on Fraud. Conv., 601. 20 Ibid.
12 On the subject of the prnnf and the presump- 21 2 Pom. En. Jur., 5 927.
tion of fraud, see. ante. §§ 448-449. 22 2 Meigs' Diij., § 1527.
13 Smith's Ea- Jur., 57; see. ante, 5 448. 23 Alley v. Connell, 3 Head, 578; Turbeville
14 Bump on Fraud. Cnnv., 271. Gibson, 5 Heisk., 586.
15 2 Meigs' Dig., § 1522. 24 Lazell v. Powell, Thomp. Cas., 195.
797 suits where; execution cannot be levied. § 1014
fraudulent grantee, or bargainee, or the voluntary grantee, or donee, or their
representatives or assigns. The bill in such a case should:
1. Set out the facts, showing that the vendor or donor is indebted to the com=
plainant, the date and amount of such indebtedness, and how evidenced. Jf the
debt be evidenced by a note, or other writing, it should be exhibited to the bill,
and filed with it.
2. It should, also, show what property said vendor or donor had, describing-
and locating it, and show to whom it has been transferred, how and when and ;
any and all inequitable or illegal facts or circumstances connected with such
.
transfer, and invalidating the same.

3. The bill should positively aver and charge that such transfer was for
the purpose of hindering, or delaying, or defrauding the complainant, or other
creditor or creditors of the vendor or donor and should allege that the vendee
;
or donee had knowledge of such purpose, or that he paid nothing for the prop^
erty, or both.
4. The bill should pray for an attachment to impound the property, and an
injunction to restrain the conveyee from transferring it; and should, also, pray
to have the sale, transfer or gift set aside, and the property subjected to the,
satisfaction of the complainant's debt; and for general relief.
The bill may be filed for the benefit of the complainant alone, 243, or he may-
tile it in behalf of himself and of all the other creditors of the fraudulent
vendor. 25 The complainant will, however, ordinarily file the bill for his own ex T
elusive benefit, unless the property is of value sufficient to pay all of the debts,
or unless the litigation threatens to be very onerous, and the complainant de-
sires all the help he can get. So any number of creditors may join as com-
plainants in one bill, each setting forth his separate claim in a separate para-
graph. 26 But where such bill must be sworn to, each of such co-complainants,
or his agent or Solicitor, must verify it.
A
bill may be filed to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made by a deceased
debtor whose estate is insolvent. In such a case, however, it must be a general
creditors' bill; and it must allege that the insolvency of the decedent's estate
has been suggested to the County Court, or to its Clerk. 27
§ 1014. Form of Bill to Set Aside a Fraudulent Conveyance. The substance —
of the bill, as given in the preceding section, and the following form, will enable
the draftsman to frame a bill for any ordinary case of fraudulent or voluntary-
conveyance.
BILL TO SET ASIDE A FKAITJDDXENT CONVEYANCE.
To the Hon. William B. Staley, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Knoxville.
John Doe, a resident of Knox county, complainant, 28
vs.
Richard Roe and Roland Roe, both residents of Knox county, defendants.
The complainant respectfully shows to the Court :
i.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, is justly indebted to him in the sum of one thousand,
dollars, evidenced by a note of hand, dated January 1. 1880, and due one day after the. date,
thereof, which note, with the accrued interest, is wholly unpaid. [If the indebtedness is
evidenced by a judgment, or by any writing, so state. Show the amount, date, and character
of the debt, and any special equities attaching to it, if any.]
ii.
The said Richard Roe being thus indebted to complainant, and intending or contriving not
24a A judgment at law is not necessary to enable 28 If the bill is filed in behalf of all the creditors,
the complainant to maintain the bill. Code, § 428S. the caption should so show; thus:
25 Code, § 4288. John Doe, a resident of Knox rounty, who sues for
28 Thus: himself and all the other creditors of Richard Roe,
1. Complainant A respectfully shows to the Court [the grantor or donor,] complainant,
that the defendant, C, is justly indebted to him in vs.
the sum — of dollars, evidenced, &c. Richard Roe, [the fraudulent or voluntary grantor
or donor,] and Roland Roe, [the fraudulent or
2. Complainant B respectfully shows to the Court
that the defendant, C, is justly indebted to him in voluntary grantee or donee,] both residents of
the sum of — dollars, evidenced, &c. Knox county, defendants.
All of the complainants will join in charging the The complainant, who sues in behalf of himself
fraud. and all the other creditors of the defendant, Richard
27 Code, 5 2395; Boxly v. McKay, 4 Sneed, 286. Roe, respectfully shows to the Court:
See, ante, § 997, note 4.
to pay said on August 6, 1881, convey to his co-defendant, Roland Roe, who is,
debt, did,
also, his brother, [show the relationship of the parties, if any,] the following tract of land in
the 10th civil district of Knox county [Describe it by metes and bounds, or, at least, so as to
:
fully identify it. 2a ] This conveyance was made and contrived of fraud, covin, collusion, and
guile, to the intent and purpose to delay, hinder, and defraud, the creditors of said Richard
Roe of their just and lawful debts; 30 and especially, to delay, hinder, and defraud, complain-
ant of his said debt.
in.
Thedefendant, Roland Roe, took said conveyance from his co-defendant, well knowing
the fraudulent purpose and character thereof, and with intent to aid said Richard Roe to
hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, especially complainant, of their just debts. And
complainant avers that said conveyance was collusively made and that there is a secret ;
agreement between the defendants whereunder the said Roland Roe is to hold said land in
secret trust and for the benefit of his co-defendant, Richard Roe. [If there be anything
showing such a trust, or showing any collusion between the parties, or showing that the
grantor is to have any benefit, or to have any rents or profits, or to retain the possession,
state these facts fully and particularly.]
IV.
Said conveyance recites that it was made on the consideration of one thousand dollars in
hand paid. Complainant charges that this recital is absolutely false, that no cash was paid
at all; and that if any was pretended to be paid it was a mere device in furtherance of the
covin, collusion, and fraud whereby the defendants were contriving to hinder and delay
complainant. [If any relationship, or business connection, or special confidence, existed
between the parties, state the facts. Show, also, any facts, or circumstances, that impeach
the recitals of the deed as to the payment of the alleged consideration.]
v.
The premises considered, the complainant prays 31 :
1st. That those named as defendants in the caption be made such by the issuance and
service of all proper process requiring them to answer this bill but their answer on oath is ;
waived.
2d. That the complainant may have a decree against the defendant, Richard Roe, for the
amount due him as hereinabove shown, principal and interest, and for the costs of this suit;
[and, if the suit is in behalf of the other- creditors, then add: and that all the other creditors
of the defendant, Richard Roe, who may come in under this proceeding and prove their
debts, may have decrees against him for the amounts justly due them, respectively.]
3d. That said conveyance to the defendant Roland Roe be decreed to be fraudulent, null,
and void, as against complainant, [and if the suit is brought in behalf of all other creditors,
then add: and as against all the other creditors of the defendant, Richard Roe;] and that
said tract of land be sold on a credit of not less than six nor more than twenty-four months,
and in bar of all equity or right of redemption and the proceeds of said sale be applied to
;
the satisfaction of the debt of complainant [and of all the other debts that may be proved by
the other creditors of said Richard Roe, who may come in under this bill.]
4th. That all other creditors of said Richard Roe may be allowed to come in by petition,
filed in vacation or in term, and prove their debts, and have a decree therefor. That this
bill be sustained as a general creditors' bill and that due notice be given by public advertise-
;
ment that all of said creditors may become parties to this cause who desire, to obtain the
benefits of this proceeding. [// the suit is for the exclusive benefit of the complainant, this
paragraph of the prayer will be omitted.]
5th. That to secure and impound said property, a writ of attachment be issued by fiat of
your Honor, and be levied on said tract of land; and that an injunction, also, issue to inhibit
and restrain the defendant Roland Roe from selling, encumbering, or in any other manner
disposing of said property, or any part thereof. This is the first application for writs of
attachment and injunction in this case.
6th. Complainant prays for all such other, further, and general relief as he [or the other
creditors who may come in under this bill] may be entitled to on. the facts as alleged and
proved. James Comfort, Solicitor.
Webb & McClung, of Counsel.
[The bill must be sworn to, as in §789, ante.]
The attachmentin this case must issue on the fiat of a Judge or Chancellor,
j.ndcannot be issued by the Clerk and Master without.
§ 1015. Defences and Decrees in Suits to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances.
The usual defences are 1, That the defendant does not owe the debt alleged; or
:
29 This description is important, as it gives com- 31 If the suit is in behalf of all the other cred-
plainant a lien upon the property specifically de- itors of the fraudulent grantor, then say:
scribed, from thefiling of the bill. Unless the prop- Thepremises considered, the complainant, in
erty is specified, the lien will only date from the levy behalf of himself and all the other creditors of
of the attachment. Richard Roe, prays:
30 It is well to follow the phraseology of the
statute, even though somewhat stiff and antiquated.
Code, § 1759.
799 SUITS WHERE EXECUTION CANNOT BE LEVIED. § 1016
2, That it is barred by the statute of limitations; or 3, That it is based on a
usurious consideration, or on some other illegal or immoral consideration; or
•1, That it is without consideration in whole, or in part; or 5, That there was
ro fraud in the conveyance. The defendant may deny the alleged fraud in his
answer. 32 The decree, if for the complainant,
1. Should adjudge that the principal defendant, (the vendor,) is indebted
to the complainant by reason of the facts alleged and proved, specifying the
amount of the debt, principal and interest where it draws interest.
2. The decree should next adjudge that the conveyance complained of in the
bill (describing the property, and, if land, giving its boundaries and location,)
was made with intent to hinder and delay complainant in collecting the said
debt and that the vendee defendant knew of this intent and aided therein, and
that, therefore, such sale was fraudulent and void, as against complainant.
3. The decree should finally order the sale of the land, or other property,
mentioned in the bill, describing the property if not already described in the
decree, specifying the terms of the sale, and directing how the proceeds should
be distributed.
4. If any property not described in the bill has been attached order its. sale,
also and direct an execution to issue for any residue after the proceeds of the
;
sale have been exhausted in satisfying the decree.

GENERAL FORM OE DECREE SETTING ASIDE A FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
[For title of cause, commencement and recitals, see, ante, § 567.]
ii.
That the defendant John Brown is justly indebted to the complainant in the sum of eight
hundred and ten dollars, the principal and interest due on the note [or judgment, or account,
or contract sued on, or otherwise. Specify the amount of debt the Court finds the defendant
owes, and out of what arising.]
in.
That the defendant John Brown sold and conveyed to his co-defendant James Brown the
tract of land described in the bill with intent to hinder and delay the complainant in collecting
his said debt, the defendant James Brown well- knowing the intent and purpose of the con-
veyance, and aiding therein, and that therefore such sale and conveyance is fraudulent, null
and void as against complainant.
IV.
That said tract of land, to-wit: [Here describe it by metes and bounds and by location.^
be sold on a credit of six and twelve months and in bar of the equity of 'redemption, the
complainant so praying: that out of the proceeds of such sale, when confirmed, there be
paid 1st, the costs of the cause; 2nd, the amount of the debt herein described to complainant
and interest to date of payment, and 3rd, the balance, if any, to the defendant James Brown.
If, however, the proceeds of said sale should be insufficient to pay the costs of the cause, and
the debt of complainant as herein decreed, an execution will issue against the defendant John
Brown for the residue.
But if the complainant fail to establish the fraud he may have a decree for
theamount of his claim. In such a case, however, he will be taxed with all the
costs down to the decree. 33
§ 1016. Suit to Set Aside a General Assignment as Fraudulent.-Îf a gen-
eral assignment for the benefit of creditors fails to comply with the statute, or
gives the trustee an unreasonable time to close the trust and pay the creditors,
it is fraudulent in law, and may be set aside. The following is the usual form of
33a
bill in such a case :
BILL ATTACKING A GENERAL ASSIGNMENT.

i.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, is justly indebted to him in the sum of two thousand
dollars, and interest thereon from November 24, 1900: said indebtedness evidenced by a note
of hand of that date, due one year after date with .interest from date. No part of said note
has ever been paid.
82 Templeton v. Mason, 23 Pick., 625. course excepted, if a beneficiary. This bill is based
33 Code, § 4292. on the three cases referred to in the following notes,
33a The bill should be filed against the grantor and and is an illustration of what can be done by a party
grantee of the deed of assignment, and against all the who, in the words of Judge Neil, is "diligent and
beneficiaries named in said deed, complainant of wise." Scheibler V. Mundinger, 2 Pick., 694.
§ 1017 SUITS WHERE EXECUTION CANNOT BE LEVIED. 800
ii.
That on October said Richard Roe pretended to make a general assignment of all
3, 1902,
his property for the beneht of his creditors, the deed of assignment being made to the de-
fendant Richard Fen. The other defendants and complainant are the creditors named in the
bill. Said deed is hereto attached, marked A, and maue a part of the bill.
Hi.
Complainant knows nothing of the validity or amounts of the alleged debts of Richard
Roe to the defendant creditors, and if at any time in the progress ol this suit it becomes
necessary to have such validity and amounts established, complainant requires satisfactory
proof thereof.
IV.
Complainant charges that said deed of assignment is fraudulent and void as against him.
1st. The description of the personal property sought to be conveyed is wholly insufficient,
the language of the schedule being, "all notes and accounts due me," the grantor. 34
2d. 'ihe said schedule is not verified by the oath of the grantor, the words "sworn to and
subscribed before me," the clerk, not being an affidavit. 38
3d. The delay required by said deed for converting the property conveyed into money is
unreasonable and oppressive to complainant and the other creditors of said grantor and
operates as a fraud upon them by hindering and delaying them in the collection of their
debts. 38
All three of said defects in said deed will more fully and at large appear by reference
to said deed which is made a part of the bill.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §§ 1S8; 164.]
2d. That said deed of assignment be declared fraudulent and void, and that an injunction
issue to prohibit the defendant, Richard Fen, as trustee or otherwise, from taking any steps
under said deed, and from in any way meddling with the property in said deed or schedules
mentioned, or described.
3d. That an attachment issue and be levied upon all of said property, and especially upon
the leasehold interest in the storehouse, and upon the goods, wares and merchandise, notes
and accounts, in said deed of assignment and said schedules mentioned, or described.
4th. That a receiver be appointed to take charge of all said property, and convert the same
into cash as rapidly as may be prudent.
Sth. That complainant be given a decree for the amount due him on said note, principal
and interest, and that enough of the proceeds of said property be applied to satisfy the same
and the costs- of the cause.
6th. That complainant have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
This is the first application for an injunction, attachment or receiver in this case.
T. L. Carty, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, §§ 164 ; 789.]
§ 1017. Some Practical Suggestions in Suits to Set Aside Fraudulent Con-

—
veyances.. If the defendant vendor and vendee do not become witness in their
own behalf, the complainant may be compelled to make witnesses of them him-
self. In either event, make them specify when, where and from whom the ven-
dee got the money to make the payments for the land, and what the vendor
has done with the money by him so received. Make them show the place, day
and hour when the writings were drawn, and signed and who were present.
Prove by them that the vendee knew the vendor was in debt, especially to com-
plainant, and was liable to be sued. Ask them in reference to conversations
between them, or talk by either of them, in reference to the vendor's debts, and
his liability to the sued. Prove the existence of as many badges of fraud 37
as possible by themselves, or by other witnesses. Show that the vendee was
in a situation to know of his vendor's indebtedness.
If the defence is fabricated, the chances are that the defendants in their de-
positions will contradict each other, or the statements in their answers. Be
particular in examining them to question them closely as to the time, place and
circumstances of the conveyance do this at the very outset of their examination
;
and repeat it at the very close and note inconsistencies, if any.

;
§ 1018. Suits in Aid of a Judgment Creditor where No Fraud is Alleged.

'TheCode gives the Chancery Courts exclusive jurisdiction to aid a creditor by
judgment or decree, to subject the property of the defendant which cannot be
34 Scheibler «. Mundinger, 2 Pick., 674. I 36 Bank v. Martin, 12 Pick:, 1.
Zi Ibid; Lookout Bank v. Noe, 2 Pick., 21. 37 See, ante, § 1010.
801 SUITS WHERE EXECUTIONS CANNOT BE LEVIED. §1018
reached by execution, to the satisfaction of the judgment or decree, under the
provisions of the Code. 88 This is a comprehensive and far reaching statute, and
includes all manner of judgments and decrees for money, no matter by what
Court rendered or whether the amount exceeds fifty dollars or not, 39 and sub-
jects to their satisfaction all property of the defendant that cannot be levied
on under an execution; and it is not necessary to have an execution issued,
and returned "nulla bona," before filing the bill, nor is it necessary to charge
in the bill that the defendant has fraudulently transferred or concealed his
property, or that a discovery is necessary. 40
The complainant has a lien upon the equitable interest of the defendant in
real estate or other property from the filing of the bill but he may acquire a ;
lien from the rendition of the judgment or decree by causing a memorandum

Ihereof, within sixty days from its rendition, to be registered as provided in
Code sections 2984, 2985, and by filing his bill within thirty days from the return
of the execution unsatisfied. 41
If the property reached by the bill is insufficient to satisfy complainant's
demand, and the defendant is receiving the rents but fails to pay the taxes, a
receiver may be appointed. 42
The character of the property that may be reached under this section is
described in another section. 43
Abill will not lie under Code, § 4282, in behalf of a judgment creditor to
reach property that may be levied on at law, for, having a judgment already,
he can have an execution on it. 44 Nor will it lie in behalf of a complainant who
has no judgment, on the sole ground that the defendant is insolvent and com-
plainant fears he may sell or encumber what property he has. 45
The following is a form of a bill under this section
BILL BY A JUDGMENT CREDITOR.
[For address and commencement, see, ante, §§ 156; 164.]
i.
That on May 1890, he recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of McMinn county
1,
against the defendant, Richard Roe, for five hundred and ten dollars, and costs of suit. [On
this judgment an execution issued, and was returned June 10, 1890, "no property found.''
This allegation is unnecessary* 6 except in cases specified in Code, §§ 2984-2986.]
11.
That the defendant, Richard Roe, has no property subject to execution at law; but on
April 12, 1889, he conveyed by registered deed to the defendant, Henry Fen, a tract of land
in the 2d civil district of said county in trust to secure to him the payment of an alleged debt
oi four hundred dollars. Said tract of land is bounded as follows [Give description: see,
:
ante, § 172.] Said tract of land is well worth one thousand dollars.
in.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c., see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2d. That said tract of land be sold, 1st to satisfy whatever, if anything, may be due the
defendant Henry Fen under said deed of trust; and 2d, that what balance of the proceeds
of sale may remain be applied to satisfy complainant's said judgment; that said sale be on a
credit of twelve months and in bar of redemption.
3d. That complainant have such further and other relief as may be consistent with equity.
Geo. G. Williams, Solicitor.
38 Code, §4282; Stark «. Cheatham, 2 Term. Chy., 4282, as taken from the Act of 1832. See Johnson 1\
302. Tucker, 2 Tenn. Chy., 399; Hooberry v. Harding. 3
39 Putnam v. Bentley, 8 Bax., 84; State v. Coving- Tenn. Chy., 684, and Turley v. Taylor, 3 Lea, 172.
ton, 4 Lea, 58; Malone v. Dean, 9 tea, 338; Piano See, also, Bryan V. Zarecor, 4 Cates, 516-517, where
Co. v. Schell, 6 Cates, 41Q. contradictory statements are inadvertently made.
40 Considerable confusion in the reported cases on 41 Code, §4286; Stark v. Cheatham, 2 Tenn. Ch.,
Code § 4282, has arisen from dealing with § 4282 as 302. No attachment is necessary to make good this
a mere prelude to §§ 4283-4286, whereas I 4282 is an lien.
independent section, originating with the Code of 42 Cone v. Paute, 12 Heisk., 506; and Johnson «.
1858. Porter v. Lea, 4 Pick., 792-3; and §§4283, Tucker, 2 Tenn. Ch., 398.
4284, 4285, 4286 and 4287 are taken from the Act of 43 See, ante, § 882.
1832, which was copied from the New York Act of 44 Bryan v. Zarecor, 4 Cates, 513.
1828. Jourolmon v. Massengill, 2 Pick., 119, 121. 45 McKeldin v. Gouldy, 7 Pick., 677, citing § 788,
In various decisions of our Courts, and in Thompson (now § 806,) of this book. Such complainant can
& Steger's Code, section 4282 is credited to the Act take his decree and execution under the Act of 1877,
of 1832. Even Judge Cooper, one e-f the authors of and no more. Ibid.
the Code of 1858, several times refers to section 48 Stark v. 'Cheatham, 2 Tenn. Ch., 300.
§ 1019 SUITS WHERE A DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY. 802
If there be any grounds for an attachment, or injunction, or receiver, they
should be specifically alleged, and then the bill should state that it is the first
application for such process, and must be sworn to.
ARTICLE III.
SUITS WHERE JUDGMENT AT LAW HAS BEEN OBTAINED BUT A DISCOV-

ERY OF PROPERTY IS NECESSARY.
§ 1019. When
a Bill of Discovery Will Lie. § 1023. Form of the Bill of Discovery.
§ 1020. Character of the Discovery Enforced. § 1024. Character of the Orders to Compel
§ 1021. Rights Acquired Under the Bill. the Discovery.
§ 1022. Frame of the Bill of Discovery.
§ 1019. When a Bill of Discovery will Lie. The Code 1 provides that a —
creditor whose execution has been returned unsatisfied in whole, or in part, may
iile a bill in Chancery against the defendant in the execution, and any other
person or corporation, to compel the discovery of any property, including
stocks, choses in action, or money due to such defendant, or held in trust for
him, except when the trust has been created by, or the property so held has pro-
ceeded from some person other than the defendant himself, and the trust is
declared by will duly recorded or deed duly registered.
To sustain such a bill the complainant must allege and prove 1st, that he is :
a creditor by judgment or decree on which an execution has issued and been

returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; 2d, that the defendant, (who is the
judgment debtor,) has property legal or equitable, or both; and 3d, that this
property has been so concealed that it can be reached only by aid of a discovery.
Such a bill will not lie to reach property capable of being reached on an execu-
tion by levy or garnishment, 2 nor money in the debtor's possession. 3
§ 1020. Character of the Discovery Enforced. The statute aims to aid the —
judgment creditor, to the utmost limit of the powers of a Chancery Court, in
his efforts to ferret out the assets and estate of his debtor, and to uncover all
receptacles of property and open all doors to deposits. And not only is the
creditor authorized to search the conscience of the judgment debtor, and of any
other person or corporation, by interrogatories in his bill, in order to ascertain
what stocks, choses in action, money or other legal or equitable property, of
the judgment debtor is in their possession, or under their control, or within their
knowledge, including money, stocks, choses in action, or other property held in
trust for him, but he may, also, take their depositions, or, if opportunity permit,
cross-examine them to the uttermost to compel them to disclose all they may
know, and to disgorge all they may have, pertinent to the relief sought by the
bill.
Under Code sections 4283, 4284, 4285, the debtor defendant may be compelled
to disclose what property in any way belongs to him, including stocks, choses
in action, or money, due him or held in trust for him, with the exception above
stated; and where such property is, and, if in another's possession, the name
and place of residence of such person and when the existence of any property
;
is disclosed by the answer of the defendant or defendants, either in their

answers to the bill or to interrogatories or questions propounded, the Court
will compel the party in possession to surrender the same into the custody of
the Court, and it will be subjected to the satisfaction of complainant's judg-
ment or decree.
If any of the defendants fail or refuse to make full disclosures in answer to
the or to interrogatories or questions, or having made disclosures, or, the
bill,
facts otherwise appearing, fail or refuse to surrender, or pay into Court, money,
stocks, choses in action, or other property due or belonging to the debtor de-
1 Code, § 4283. I tion, then § 979, of this book.
2 Bryan v. Zarecor, 4 Cates, 503, citing above sec- I 3 Webb v. Jones. 13 Lea, 200.
803 SUITS WHERE A DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY. § 1021
fendantj or held in trust for him, with the exception stated, or refuse to make
all necessary transfers to pass the title or possession of such property, when
duly ordered by the Court, the defendants so failing or refusing may be im-
prisoned by process of contempt until they comply. 4
§ 1021. —
Rights Acquired Under the Bill. The complainant has a lien upon
all of the judgment debtor's property from the filing of his bill, but he may
acquire a lien from the rendition of his judgment or decree, by causing a mem-
orandum thereof within sixty days from its rendition to be registered as pro-
\ ided in Code sections 2984-2985, and by filing his bill within thirty days from
the return of the execution unsatisfied. 5
§ 1022. —
Frame of the Bill of Discovery. As the object of the law is to com-
pel the discovery of the judgment debtor's property and to prevent its transfer,
payment or delivery to any other person, so the bill of complaint should be
equally as vigorous and far-reaching. 6
The bill in such a case should contain the following averments and prayers
1. It should commence by stating the recovery of the judgment on which the
bill is founded. The name of the Court rendering the judgment, the names of
the parties, the amount of the judgment, and its date, should all be set forth
with substantial accuracy.
2. It should next show that an execution duly issued upon said judgment,
specifying when and to the Sheriff of what county and that said execution has ;
been duly returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part. The very words of the
return ought to be given but this is not essential.
;
3. It should aver that the defendant has property, specifying it, and showing
its character, amount, form, and whereabouts as nearly as possible, and if in
the hands of third parties, so stating, and making such averments and charges
in reference to such property, and to the possession or control thereof by any
of the co-defendants, as the complainant is justified in making.
4. It must pray for process, and for a discovery of the property of the judg-
ment debtor, and to subject the same to the satisfaction of the complainant's
judgment, whether such property could be levied on or not. 7 The discovery
called for should be of the most searching character probing the knowledge,
memory and conscience of the defendants to the uttermost. If an injunction
or an attachment, or both, are necessary and proper, they may be prayed for,
also.
§ 1023. —
Form of the Bill of Discovery. The subject of Bills of Discovery
will hereafter be fully treated, and reference is made to the Chapter on the
subject. 8
The following form will indicate the character of bill contemplated by the
.statute under consideration;
BILL OF DISCOVERY BY A JUDGMENT CREDITOR.
To the Honorable Oliver P. Temple, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Knoxville
John Doe, a resident of Knox county, complainant,
vs.
Richard Roe, Robert Roe, John Smith, William Brown and Henry Jones,
all residents of Knox county, defendants.
Complainant respectfully shows to the Court: 9
i.
That at the January term, 1876, of the Circuit Court of Knox county, he recovered a judg-
ment for five thousand dollars and costs of suit against the defendants, Richard Roe and
Robert Roe, said Robert being the surety of said Richard on the note on which said judg-
ment was based.
il.
In February, 1876, an execution was duly issued, on said judgment, to the Sheriff of Knox
4 Cresswell V. Smith, 8 Lea, 688. This statute was turn. (Worthless is that power which is never used.)
intended to be efficacious, and there is no reason 7 Code, §4284; Bryan v. Zarecor, 4 Cates, 518.
why the Court should not make it so. In a republic 8 See, post, §§ 1116-1121.
no one, not even a debtor, should be superior to the o This bill is based on a form in 2 Barb. Ch. Pr.,
law. Let it not be said, De legibus non curat debt- 587-593. Our statute is very similar to that of New
tort York. Cresswell v. Smith, 8 Lea, 700. See, Code.
5 Code, §4286. .
.
§8 3088; 3478-3495.
6 Vana est ilia potentia qua nunqnam venit in ac-
§ 1023 SUITS WHERE A DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY. 804
county, being the county then and now of the said two defendants' residence. Said Sheriff
made diligent search for goods and chattels, lands and tenements, but was unable to find any,
and so he returned said execution wholly unsatisfied, for that reason, his return so showing.
[If any money was collected on the execution, so show, and show that the balance of said
execution is unsatisfied.]
in.
Complainant charges and avers that the defendant Richard Roe, shortly before said judg-
ment, was a merchant in the town of Knoxville, and had been doing a large business; and
complainant charges and avers that many persons are indebted to him in various amounts,
large and small; and that he holds many notes, due bills, accounts stated and open,
county warrants, bonds, coupons, and various other securities and evidences of debt, to a
large amount, and has goods, wares and merchandise, choses in action, and chattels, ot
various kinds and divers amounts, in his possession, or under the control or possession of
others for his use, advantage or benefit, or subject to his order, or wherein he is in some
manner beneficially interested; all of which property, debts, choses in action, and other
estate, might and ought to be applied to the satisfaction of complainant's said judgment.
[Specify any debts, choses in action, or other effects of the principal defendants due from,
or in the hands of, the other defendants.]
IV.
Complainant charges and avers that the said defendant Robert Roe was possessed of con-
siderable estate when he became security on said note, but about the time suit was brought
on said note he put all of his property out of sight of a Court of law. Complainant charges
and avers that said Robert is the owner of, or in some way or manner beneficially interested
in, some real estate in this State, or some contract or agreement relating to real estate, or
the rents, profits or issues of some real estate, or some interest in some real estate also that
;
the said Robert is the owner of, or in some way beneficially interested in some real estate
also that the said Robert is the owner of, or in some way beneficially interested in, the stock,
property or profits of some company, incorporated or unincorporated, or in the stock, property
or profits of some company or partnership; or has some other sources of income, or some
other kind of estate held for him by some one as friend, agent, bailee, tenant, clerk, custodian
or trustee or has money, county warrants, notes, bonds, coupons, certificates, accounts,
;
securities or other choses in action, or evidences of debt or deposit, deposited in some bank,
or with some company, firm or person to his credit, or for his use or benefit, or in trust for
him, or in some way to be subject to his order or be applied according to his direction or
suggestion. [If any specific facts are known, charge them fully and particularly.]
v.
Complainant further charges, and avers that the other defendants John Smith, William
Brown and Henry Jones, are indebted to said Richard and Robert, or to one of them, or
have money, county warrants, notes of hand, due bills, accounts, trust deeds, mortgages,
stock certificates, bonds, coupons, or other evidences of debt, or securities, or valuable papers,
or property of some other kind, belonging to said Richard or said Robert, or to both; or
subject to the order, or control, of either said Richard, or said Robert, or of both; or
held for the benefit of one or the other of them, or of both; or in which the said Richard
and Robert, one, both, or either, have some beneficial interest, or some right of use, enjoy-
ment or profit, whether said property is held in the name of said Richard or Robert or of
either of them, or in the name of any or all of the defendants or of any two or more of
them, or held in any other manner or form. [If any of these defendants are known
or believed to have any property of any kind belonging to their co-defendants, or held for
their use or benefit, or to be in any way their debtor, trustee, bailee, agent, depositary or
donee, as to any debts, effects, choses in action, interests or estates, of any kind, specify the
supposed facts fully and particularly.]
VI.
And if the said Richard or Robert Roe have made any assignment or transfer of any of
their property or effects, complainant charges and avers that such assignment or transfer is
merely colorable, and made with a view and for the purpose of placing the same beyond the
reach of complainant's said judgment and execution thereon, and of enabling the said Richard
and the said Robert, one or both, to control and enjoy the same, and have the use, benefit,
and proceeds thereof; and so it would appear if they would state and set forth when and to
whom such transfer or assignment was made, and what was the kind, amount and value of
the property, debts, choses in action, or effects so assigned or transferred, and what were the
terms or conditions, express or implied, upon which such transfers or assignments were made,
and what disposition has been made of the property so assigned or transferred, and in whose
possession the same now is, or what has been done with the same, or the rents, profits, pro-
reeds, or income thereof. Complainant claims, and calls for, a full and complete discovery
of all such property, debts, claims, effects, and things in action, belonging in any way to said
Richard or Robert Roe, or to both and of all agreements or understandings, express or
;
implied, and of all trusts, whereby any property, debts, choses in action, or other effects, or
the use, benefit, income, rents, issues, or profits thereof, are held for the use or benefit, or at
the disposal, of said Richard or Robert, or of both ; and of every assignment or transfer,
bailment or pledge, gift or donation, which either or both of said last named defendants has,
80S SUITS WHERE A DISCOVERY IS NECESSARY. § 1023
or have, made directly or indirectly pf his or their property, debts, choses in action, or other
effects, or of any part thereof, and of the person or persons to whom such assignment, trans-
fer, bailment or pledge, gift or donation, has been made directly or indirectly, in whole or in
part; the amount and value of the property, debts, choses in action, or other effects so as-
signed or transferred; and the trusts, conditions, limitations, agreements, or understandings,
express or implied, upon which such assignment, transfer, bailment, pledge, donation or
gift, was made, and all the facts and circumstances relating thereto; and particularly what
is the situation of said property, debts, choses in action, or other effects, assigned, transferred,
delivered, pledged, donated or given away, directly or indirectly, at the time of the filing of
this bill, and in the possession, or under the control of what persons the same is, at such
filing. [If any specific facts, or supposed facts, are charged, identifying any particular chattel,
debt, chnse in action, or other property or estate, legal or equitable, of the principal defend-
ants, call for a discovery in reference thereto.]
VII.
Complainant charges and avers that the defendants, John Smith, William Brown, and
Henry Jones, have jointly or severally confederated and agreed, directly or indirectly, ex-
pressly or impliedly, to aid said Richard and Robert Roe, one or both, in covering up his or
their property, effects, debts, choses in action, and other estate, and have themselves posses-
sion or control, directly or indirectly, of some of the property, effects, debts, choses in action,
and other estate of said Richard and Robert, or of one or the other of them; or that other
persons hold some of said property, effects, debts, choses in action, stocks, moneys, checks,
bonds, county warrants, coupons, certificates, or evidences of property, debt, deposit, stock, or
interest, in pledge or in bailment for the said Smith, Brown, and Jones, or for one or more
of them, and they, the said Smith, Brown and Jones, one or more of them, hold the same by
some agreement, trust, or understanding, express or implied, for said Richard or Robert
Roe, or both of them. [Here specify any fact or facts complainant has reason to believe to
be true, showing that any of the foregoing general charges are true.]
VIII.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue as to all of those named as defendants in the caption of
this bill, and that they all be made parties defendant hereto, and be required to abide and
perform your Honor's orders and decrees.
2d. That each of said defendants be required to answer this bill fully and particularly,
upon his oath, paragraph by paragraph, according to the best of his knowledge, remembrance,
information, and belief; and that each of them be compelled to set forth and discover the
nature, character, kind, amount, value, and whereabouts of all the property, debts, choses in
action, effects, and other interests or estate of the said Richard and Robert Roe, or of either
cf them, whether in the hands of any of the defendants, or of any other person as bailee,
pledgee, donee, trustee, lessee, mortgagee, or desuositary, direct or indirect.
3d. That each of said defendants, Richard Roe and Robert, answer fully and particularly
to the best of their knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief, (1) whether they, or
cither of them, at the time of the filing of this bill, owned directly or indirectly any and
what property, debts, notes, accounts, choses in action, county warrants, certificates of de-
posit, or of indebtedness, stocks, bonds, coupons, shares, or interests in any company or firm,
corporated or incorporated, of any kind whatsoever or (2) whether any and what person or
;
persons, or company, or corporation, at the time of the filing of this bill, held for them, or
for either of them, directly or indirectly, or as trustee, pledgee, bailee, or donee, any prop-
erty, debts, notes, accounts, money, choses in action, checks, county warrants, certificates of
deposit or of indebtedness, stocks, bonds, coupons, shares or interests in any firm, company
or corporation, or other estate, or evidence thereof, of any kind or character whatsoever, and
the amount and value thereof; or (3) whether they or either of them have, since the execu-
tion of said note, assigned, transferred, donated, given, pledged, bailed, or delivered to any
and what person, firm, company, corporation, or partnership, any of his or their property or
effects, money, choses in action, county warrants, accounts, claims, stocks, bonds, coupons,
checks, certificates of stock, interest, deposit, pledge, bailment, gift or trust, or any other
kind or evidence of property, or of the use, benefit or enjoyment thereof whatsoever; and
when, to whom, for what purpose, and upon what terms, conditions, understandings, or
agreements, verbal or written, express or implied, direct or indirect, such assignment, trans-
fer, donation, gift, pledge, bailment, or delivery was made; and what has become of said
property, effects, or estate; and whether they, the said Richard and Robert, or either of them,
or any member of the family of either, or any person for either of them, or for any member
of the family of either of them, since such transfer, assignment, donation, gift, pledge, bail-
ment, or delivery, have received any of the benefits, or any of the rents, issues, income,
interest, hire, or other profits of any of said property, effects, or estate, of any kind, character,
or amount, or in any shape or form whatsoever, and the kind, amount, and value thereof.
4th. That each of the defendants, Smith, Brown, and Jones, answer fully and particularly
to the best of their knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief, (1) whether they, or
either of them, have in their possession, or under their control, or whether any other person,
or persons, for them, or either of them, have in his, her, or their possession or control, as
debtor, assignee, transferree, vendee, lessee, trustee, bailee, or donee, any property, money,
§ 1024 SUITS BY FOREIGN CREDITORS AGAINST FOREIGN DEBTORS. 806
goods, chattels, effects, debts, claims, notes, accounts, county warrants, checks, bonds, cou-
pons, certificates, or evidences, or shares, of stock or interest in any firm, company, or cor-
poration, or other choses in action, or evidences of property, interest, or estate, belonging to
said Richard and Robert Roe, or either of them, directly or indirectly, or wherein said
Richard and Robert, or either of them, are interested, directly or indirectly, or wherefrom
the said Richard and Robert, or either of them, or the family, or any member thereof, of
either of them, receive, derive, obtain, or in any way have any benefit, use, profit, income,
interest, rent, or issue; and the kind, character, amount, and value of such property, estate,
or effects and (2) whether they, or either of them, at the time of the filing of this bill, was
;
in any way indebted to said Richard and Robert Roe, or to either, or to any other person
for their use and benefit, or to the use and benefit of either of them, aiid how and to what
amount; and (3) whether there are, to their knowledge or belief, or to the knowledge or
belief of either of them, any and what property, debts, and effects in the possession or under
the control of any other and what person, belonging to said Richard and Robert Roe, or to
either of them, or to any other person for their use and benefit, or the use and benefit of
either of them, or of the family, or any member of the family of either or both of them,
directly or indirectly. [Interrogate them as to all special facts charged against them in the
bill; and call on them to show fully what they have done with property alleged to have been
in their custody.]
Sth. That each and all of the defendants be enjoined and restrained from selling, assign-
ing, transferring, delivering, negotiating, discharging, receiving, collecting, encumbering, or
in any way or manner disposing of, or intermeddling with, any debts, demands, claims, ac-
counts, money, property, checks, bonds, coupons, county warrants, or other effects, due or
belonging, directly or indirectly, to said. Richard and Robert Roe, or to either of them, or to
anybody for them, or either of them, and from assigning, transferring or delivering to any-
body any of the property, goods, chattels, money, debts, claims, accounts, notes, checks,
bonds, coupons, county warrants, certificates or evidences of debt, deposit, snares or interest
in or with any person, firm, company, or corporation, or other choses in action, or property
or evidences of property, or of any interest in property, a discovery whereof is in this bill
sought and prayed for.
That on the incoming of the answers of the defendants, or sooner if necessary, a
6th.
receiver be appointed of all the property, choses in action, effects and other estate of said
Richard and Robert Roe and that the proceeds of all of said property, effects, and estate be
;
applied to the satisfaction of complainant's said judgment, and of the costs of this-suit.
7th. That complainant may have a decree for the amount of his said judgment at law, and
the costs of said suit at law and that he may have all such further and other relief as he
;
may be entitled to at the hearing.

This is the first application for an injunction, or a receiver, in this case.
L. C. Houk, of Counsel. A. Caldwell, Solicitor.
[Affidavit and jurat as in § 789, ante.]
§ 1024. Character of the Orders to Compel the Discovery. —If the defend-
ants, or any of them, answer the bill, giving in detail full and direct
fail to fully
answer to each specification and requirement of the bill, the answer so deficient
may be excepted to, and, if, after exceptions sustained, the defendant in default
fails to make a sufficient answer, the complainant may have him attached, or
may have an order taking his bill for confessed. 10
ARTICLE IV.
SUITS WHERE A CREDITOR HAS OBTAINED JUDGMENT IN ANOTHER

STATE, AND HAS EXHAUSTED HIS LEGAL REMEDY THERE.
§ 1025. When a Bill by a Foreign Creditor § 1026. Frame of the Bill.
Will Lie Against a Foreign Debtor. § 1027. Form of the Bill.
§ 1025. When a Bill by a Foreign Creditor Will Lie Against a Foreign

—
Debtor. Under the Code, when a judgment has been recovered in another
State against a resident of such State, and the creditor has exhausted his legal
remedy, the real or personal property of the debtor in this State may be sub-
jected to the satisfaction of such debt, by bill stating the facts under oath,
and filed in the County in which the property is situated. 1 non-resident A
10 See, ante, § 424. And if the bill alleges money 1 Code, § 4297. Taylor v. Badoux, 8 Pick., 249;
or other property of the debtor defendant in the Bank v. Motherwell, 11 Pick., 172. The Code, says
hands of his co-defendant a final decree may be pro- the bill is to be filed in the "district in which," &c.
nounced subjecting the same. See, ante, § 177. note 15.
807 SUITS tY FOREIGN CREDITORS AGAINST FOREIGN DEBTORS. § 1026
creditor without a judgment cannot maintain a bill against a non-resident
debtor either under Code, § 4297, or under the general principles of Equity
.
jurisdiction. 2
§ 1026. —
Frame of the Bill. The bill should be drawn with great precision
as the inclination of our Courts seems to be to construe the statute strictly. 3
The bill should open by declaring and reciting the judgment complainant has
obtained against the defendant, and when, where, and for what amount ob-
tained, and should aver that such judgment is unpaid, and in full force and
effect and that on said judgment an execution issued and was returned wholly
;
unsatisfied, or satisfied only in part, as the case may be, giving the amount
realized on the judgment, if anything, and giving the dates of the issuance and
return of the execution.
If the property of the defendant is known it should be described so as to
identify it, for this would operate as a lis pendens; and an attachment should
be prayed as further security.
The draughtsman should be careful to show that the defendant is a resident
of the State in which the judgment was recovered, and that the complainant is
a resident of the same state. 4
If the bill shows that all of. the defendant's property in the State of his resi-
dence has gone into the hands of a receiver, or that the defendant is insolvent*
the issuance and return nulla bona of an execution become unnecessary, and the
bill may be filed at once. 5
It is not necessary for the complainant to allege that the property of the
defendant has been fraudulently removed to this State to evade the process of
the' law in the State of their residence. 6
Lands descended to heirs in this State cannot be reached in this proceeding
to satisfy a judgment against the administrator in another State. 7
§ 1027. Form of the Bill.—The form of the bill is well indicated in the pre-
ceding section, but the following illustration may be of service
BILL TO ENFORCE A FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
[For address and caption see, ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
I.
That on the.... day of....l9..~ [insert the date of the judgment^ he recovered a judement for
seventeen hundred and ten dollars, and the costs of the suit, in the law Court of Cincinnati,
Ohio, on which judgment an execution duly issued, and was returned on the.... day of....l9....
[give the date] "nulla bona," all of which will more fully appear by reference to said judg-
ment, execution and return, certified copies whereof are herewith filed, marked A, B and C,
respectively. Said judgment remains in full force and effect. Complainant and defendant
both resided in Ohio when said judgment was rendered, and have resided there ever since,
and now reside there.
ii.
said defendant owns the following tract of land in Blount county, Tennessee.
That
[Here describe it, and specify any other property he owns in this State, real or personal, giv-
ing the county where situated.]
in.
1st. That an attachment issue and be levied on said tract of land, and on any other property
of the defendant to be found in the State.
2d. That on such levy being made, publication be made according to law in attachment
suits, notifying the defendant thereof, and requiring him to appear and answer the bill,
3d. That complainant have a decree against the defendant for the amount due him on said
2 Gasget v. Scott, 9 Yerg., 244. v. Motherwell, 11 Pick., 172, both parties resided in
3 There seems to be no reason for the, disfavor of the same State; but does the law so require?
the Courts, unless it be that it was the first statute 5 Davis' exrs., v. Fulton, 1 Overton, (Tenn.), 121;
ever passed in Tennessee dispensing with service of Bank V. Motherwell, 11 Pick., 172. t.ex neminem
subpeena upon the defendant. Gilman V. Tisdale, 1 cogit ad vana seu inutilia peragenda. (The law forces
Yerg., 285; Davis, exrs., v. Fulton, 1 Overton, no one do vain or useless things.)
to
<Tenn.) 121. 6 Tivlor »>. BaH<v, x 8 Pick., 249 The Art of 1871,
,
4 Such seems- to be the holding of the Courts, but ch. 122, Code, § 3455a, does not modify Code, § 4297,
has not been directly decided. See Gilman v. Tisdale, but anrclies to the general attachment laws. Ibid.
1 Yerg., 285. In Davis' exrs.. v. Fulton, 1 Overton, 7 Gilman v. Tisdale, 1 Yerg., 285.
121; in Taylor v. Badoux, 8 Pick., 249; and in Bank
§1028 SUITS TO SUBJECT PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMEN. 808
and if the same is not paid by a given day, that said tract of land be sold. [See,
judgrilent,
§1626; 844; 977; 995.]
4th. That complainant have such further and other relief as his case will warrant and as
your Honor may deem meet.
This is the first application for an attachment in this case.
J. E. Cassady, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit; see, ante, §164; 789.]
ARTICLE V.
SUITS WHERE JUDGMENTS AT LAW MAY BE HAD, BUT EXECUTIONS AT
LAW CANNOT BE LEVIED.
§ 1028. Suits to Subject the Separate Prop- § 1029. Suits to Marshal Securities.
erty of Married Women.
§ 1028. Suits to Subject the Separate Property of Married Women. When- —
ever real or personal property is given, granted or devised to a woman after
marriage, or in contemplation of marriage, for her separate use, and free from
Ihe control of her husband, it will be deemed a separate estate; and as to such
property, Equity considers her a single woman, conceding to her the power to
charge it with debts or engagements 1 this power she exercises by express words
:
or by clear implication, 2 in writing, or by parole. 3

Equity regards her engagement as in the nature of an allotment of enough of
her separate estate to discharge her liability: and in subjecting this estate to
the satisfaction of her engagement, the Chancery Court regards the separate
estate as the debtor, and a bill to enforce such an engagement is in the nature
of a proceeding in rem, rather than in personam.'1 The bill should, therefore,
specify and locate the property 5 held by the wife as her separate estate, and
aver an express engagement on her part to pay the debt, or discharge the
5a
liability, out of such estate.
The following will indicate the frame and form of a
BILL TO SUBJECT A WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.
[For address and caption, see ante, §§ 155 ; 164.]
i.
That, [Here show the relations of the parties out of which the liability of the wife arose.
Such as goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered for the use of herself and. family,
or money loaned her to pay obligations, or the like.}
ii.
That, [Here show that complainant made said advances on the express stipulation of the
wife that she would pay him out of her separate property, and that complainant made said
advances on the faith of such stipulation. If a writing was executed by her in evidence of
her engagement, so state, and set it out in full, and make it an exhibit to the bill.}
in.
That at the time said note was executed, [or said engagement entered into] the defendant
[zvife] ownedthe following property as her separate estate. [Here describe the property and
give its location so as to fully identify it.}
IV.
That, [// the husband is insolvent, so allege, and make him a defendant whether he signed
the note or other writing, or not.}
v.
That [If there be any other material matter, here allege it.}
1 See Woodfolk v. Lvon, 14 Pick., 269. 4 Tnrdan v.Everett, 9 Pick., 390.

2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1379. 5 The property must be located within the jurisdic-
3Eckerly v. McGhee, 1 Pick.. 661. Such contracts tion of the Court. Flannigan v. Grocery Co., 14
are, however, generally in writing. But a writing, Pick., 599.
such as a note, not expressly binding the separate es- _5a"I bind my separate estate for the payment of
tate cannot be shown by parole to be so binding. this note," inserted in the body of the note is suffi-
Ibid. cient. Warren i>. Freeman and wife, 1 Pick., 513.
809 SUITS TO MARSHAL SECURITIES. § 1029
VI.
1st.That subpoena to answer issue [&c.; see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That complainant have a decree against the defendant [wife] for the amount due
him, including interest, and that enough of her said separate property be sold to satisfy the
same. 6
3d. That he have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
Young, Solicitor. David C.
The bill need not be sworn to unless some defendant is a non-resident or
some extraordinary process is prayed no injunction or attachment is necessary
:
to fix a lien upon the property, the filing of the bill creating a lien, the doctrine
of lis pendens applying in such a case. 7
§ 1029.
—
Suits to Marshal Securities. "Whenever one creditor has a lien
upon two funds, or two parcels of property, and another creditor has a lien
upon only one of them, the Chancery Court will require the former creditor to
seek satisfaction first out of that fund or property upon which the other cred-
itorhas no lien. 8
Thus, where one creditor (A) is secured by two or more funds, (say two, X
and Y,) and another creditor (B) is subsequently secured by only one of said
funds, (say X,) a Court of Chancery on due application will compel A to ex-
haust first the fund, Y, before resorting to fund, X; and if A has exhausted
the fund, X, without observing this rule, the Chancery Court will subrogate
B to A's right against fund, Y. And this rule applies, also, in favor of two or
more creditors against one or more prior creditors.
BILL TO MARSHAL SECURITIES.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 15S ; 164.]
i.
That the defendant Richard Roe, is indebted to him in the sum of six hundred dollars.
[Shozv the amount of the indebtedness, and that it is secured on farm, lot or fund A, stating
how secured, and specifying the security, and giving its date.]
ii.
That the defendant Richard Roe is, also, indebted to his co-defendant, Roland Roe, but
the amount of such debt complainant does not know. This debt owing to Roland Roe,
alleged by him to be eight hundred dollars, is secured by a deed of trust, [mortgage, lien, or
in some other way; specify how,] on said [farm or lot A, specifying the property,] and also
on [another piece of property B, describing it.] Said deed of trust [mortgage, or lien,]
in favor of Roland Roe, is dated the....day of... .190 {give date.]
in.
That the deed of trust, [mortgage, or other of defendant, Roland Roe, is a prior
lien,]
and superior lien to that of complainant, and he sell said [farm, lot, or, &c, A,]
is about to
without recourse to said [lot B.] having advertised it for sale under his said deed of trust.
Complainant is informed and believes, and so charges and avers, that said farm is not worth
and will probably not sell for more than the amount of the debt to defendant Roland Roe,
in which event complainant's said security will become worthless.
rv.
That he has requested the defendant Roland Roe to first sell said [lot B,] but he has
refused so to do. [It is not necessary to make such an allegation, but if the request was made
and refused, so state.]
v.
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [&c, see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That an injunction issue to restrain and prohibit the defendant, Roland Roe, from
selling [farm, lot, or &c, A.]
3d. That the debt due the defendant, Roland Roe, if any, be set up and established in your
Honor's Court, and that complainant have a decree for his debt also, and that said two
[tracts of land, lots or &c, A
and B,] be sold on a credit of not less than six nor more than
twenty-four months, and in bar of the equity of redemption, and that the proceeds of said
two lots [or tracts] be marshalled, and the debt to the defendant Roland Roe be first paid, if
he be found entitled thereunto, and that out of the proceeds of the sale of said [farm, lot
or &c. A] complainant's said debt be paid.
6 If the property is realty, and a sale in bar of re- I 8 White v. Fulghum, 3 Pick., 285 3 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
:
demotion is desired, so pray. See, ante, | 626. §1414: 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §§642-645.
7 Jordan v. Everett, 9 Pick., 300. I Gilliam V. McCormack, 1 Pick., 597.
§ 1030 SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS. 810
4th. That complainant have such other, further and general relief as the nature of his
case may require.
J. W. Gaines, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit, see, ante, §§ 161 789.] ;
If the property is not fully worth both debts, and is deteriorating in value,
or uninsured, or the taxes unpaid, state these facts in the bill and pray for a
receiver. 10
ARTICLE VI.
SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS FOR THEIR PRO RATA OF AN INSOLVENT
DEBTOR'S PROPERTY.
§ 1030. Rationale of the Pro-rating of the § 1033. Frame of a General Creditors' Bill.
Assets of an Insolvent Debtor.
§ 1031. When a General Creditors' Bill Will § 1034. Form of a General Creditors' Bill.
Lie.
§ 1032. Rationale of a General Creditors' § 1035. Proceedings on a General Creditors'
Bill. Bill.
§ 1030. The Rationale of the Pro-rating of the Assets of an Insolvent

Debtor. —As a rule, the assets of an insolvent debtor are, directly or indirectly,
composed of what he has obtained from his various creditors, and failed to
pay back or otherwise make good so that, in effect, these assets are indirectly
;
the equitable property of these creditors, the legal title only being in the
debtor, and he in Equity holding these assets in trust for his creditors as the
equitable owners. Hence, the insolvent debtor has no equitable or moral right
to take the whole, or an undue proportion, of his assets to pay one or more
of these general creditors, for that would be using the equitable shares of the
ol.her creditors in those assets to pay those thus preferred; nor has any one
of these general creditors any equitable or moral right to the whole, or an
undue proportion, of his debt, for, if he got more than his equitable propor-
tion of the assets, he got more or less of the proportions of the other general
creditors, and would be liable, in Equity, to account therefor.
It is manifest that the only way in which such assets can be equitably dis-
posed of is to return to each general creditor his proportion of the whole with-
out taking from any other what is his. It will thus be seen that the assets of
an insolvent debtor constitute a quasi trust fund wherewith to pay his debts.
These assets are the crop produced by his debts, and are often a part of the
very money or property or services received from the creditors. Every person
v?ho labored for this debtor on account, or loaned him money, or sold him
property on credit, did so on the faith that the debtor's assets would constitute
a fund from which he would be reimbursed. But, as these assets, the common
fund for the payment of all the creditors and in Equity belonging to all, are
not sufficient to pay each creditor one hundred per cent, of his debt the onlv
equitable rule of distribution is to pay each one as large a per cent, as the
sssets will warrant, giving each one the same proportion of his debt, and thus
administering that equality in which Equity takes delight. 1
§ 1031. When
a General Creditors' Bill Will Lie. Whenever there is a —
f and which aCourt of Equity will distribute ratably among all the creditors
of the owner of that fund, then any one of the creditors may file a bill in
behalf of himself and of all the other creditors of said owner against said
owner, in order to have the fund prorated among such creditors. 2 And if the
common debtor has assigned said fund to a third person for the benefit of his
10 See, ante, §§ 895-902. I ration, partnership, or individual. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.,
1 Ante, §47. § 410; Bank of Rome v. Haselton, 15 Lea, 230. See,
2 This owner or common debtor may be a corpo- ' ante, § 47.
811 SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS. §1031
creditors, such assignee must be made a defendant, also. If any of the common
ereditotrs have filed separate bills exclusively for their own benefit, on a gen-
eral creditors' bill being filed praying to have the individual suits enjoined,
the Court will enjoin them, and will require the complainants therein to come
in under the general creditors' bill. A
complainant, who has filed an individ-
ual bill, will, however, be allowed to so amend it as to make it a general cred-
itors' bill, if such amendment be made before a general creditors' bill has
been filed. The most common cases for the filing of general creditors' bills, and
bills in the nature of general creditors' bills, are the following:
1. Bills to Wind up Insolvent Corporations. The assets of an insolvent corpora-
tion constitute a trust fund for the benefit of all the general creditors of such
corporation.
2. Bills to Wind up an Insolvent Estate. The assets of an insolvent estate are
required by statute to be distributed ratably, under the statute among all the
general creditors, as heretofore shown. 3
3. Bills to Enforce Trust Deeds and Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors.
When an individual, partnership, or corporation makes a trust deed or assign-
ment for the benefit of all his or its creditors, or for the benefit of those therein
named, any creditor entitled to share in the fund may file a bill on behalf or
himself and all other creditors in order to assert, protect, and enforce his and
their common rights to the property conveyed. But in such a case the bill
must show that the assignee or trustee is unable or unwilling to execute the
trust, or is guilty of inequitable conduct endangering the interests of the bene-
ficiaries, or that for some other sufficient reason the Court should execute the
frust.
4. Lands of a Decedent to Pay His Debts. "When such a bill is
Bills to Sell the
filed by a
creditor it must be filed in behalf of all the other bona fide creditors
of the decedent.
5. Bills by a Creditor to Have Administrator Appointed. When a bill is filed in
Chancery to have an administrator appointed, if filed by a creditor, it shall be
on behalf of all other creditors who may wish to come in and be made parties
od the usual terms; and the distributees and heirs may be made parties de-
fendants and if the bill is filed by the next of kin, or any of them, it shall be
;
on behalf of all the distributees and heirs against the creditors, who may be-
come defendants.
6. Bills to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances Made by an Insolvent Decedent.
Such a conveyance when set aside enures to the benefit of all the general cred-
itors of the decedent, and the bill must, therefore, be in behalf of all such
creditors.
7.Bills to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances of a Living Debtor creditor may A
file such a bill for himself alone, or he may file it in behalf of himself and all
other creditors of the fraudulent debtor, in which latter case it becomes a
general creditors' bill. 4
8. Bills to Enforce the Liens of Mechanics, Laborers, and Material Men are akin to
general creditors' bills. 5 The property to which the lien attaches is in the
nature of a trust fund for the common benefit of all the lien-holders. The bill
may be filed in behalf of all having liens, and on such a bill all other suits to
enforce like liens may be enjoined.
s See, ante, §§ 997-1004. ing to the complainant in each the benefit of the at-
4 In such a case, there is a growing practice of tachment in the bill already filed. Such a bill would
joining, as complainants in the same bill, several not, however, be multifarious, but would be deemed
creditors whose debts and claims against the defend- as in the nature of a general creditors' bill. Code,
ants are wholly separate and distinct, and praying § 4288.
one attachment, and decrees for the debt due each of 5 See Code, §§ 3544-3546. They would not, in
the defendant. No objection is apparent to such a strictness, be general creditors' bills, but rather bills
practice; but in such a case the bill should be sworn in the nature of general creditors' bills. The bills,
to by, or on behalf of. each of the comrlainants. If however, are framed in the sume way, and allow all
the defendant should demur to such a bill because of the claimants to come in under them; and the pro-
its multifariousness, the Chancellor would not do ceedings on the bills are substantially the same as in
more than require separate bills to be filed by each case of general creditors' bills.
complainant against the defendant, Code, § 4326, giv-
§1032 SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS. 812
9. Bills to Enforce Liens on Boats are in the nature of general creditors' bills,
and may be filed in behalf of all the parties having such liens. On such a bill
all persons who have prior liens on the boat may, also, be made parties to the
bill."
10. Bills to Enforce the Liens of Contractors and Laborers on Railroads, and the
Liens of Employees of Corporations, Partnerships and Merphants, are, also, in the
nature of general creditors' bills, and may be filed on behalf of the complain-
ant, and of all other persons having liens on the defendant 's property.
In case of bills to enforce any of the next three foregoing classes of liens,
the property to which the lien attaches may be regarded as a common fund in
which all the lien holders are entitled to share ratably.
•
§ 1032. —
Rationale of a General Creditors' Bill. If all or many of those
entitled to a common fund were allowed to institute separate suits therefor,
it is manifest that the costs of the various suits would consume all, or a large
part of the fund, and thus nothing be left for the creditors. Besides, if the
fund belongs to all the creditors in common, ratably, it would follow, in strict
law, that no one of them has the exclusive right to subject any part of it to
the satisfaction of his individual claim, regardless of the rights of the othei-
creditors. And in the third place, if the fund belongs ratably to many cred-
itors, it is impossible to distribute it among those rightfully entitled thereto,
unless all the creditors have a chance to be heard in one and the same suit,
wherein their respective claims can be properly adjudicated, and the right
fiven to all to prove their own claims and contest the claims of others.
Whereas, when a suit is brought by one creditor in behalf of himself and all
the other creditors of a common debtor, in order to have a common fund dis-
tributed pro rata among the creditors, the expenses of litigation are reduced to
a minimum, all the creditors have a right to be heard, and by one decree all of
their various equities may be effectually adjudicated, and the fund divided
equitably, according to each his proper pro rata. And so it may be said that
the main object of general creditors' bills are (1) to prevent a multiplicity of
suits, (2) to make an equitable distribution of a common fund, and (3) to
prevent the accumulation of costs. 6a
Equity delights in equality, and whenever the Court is not embarrassed by
superior liens, or equities, it will apportion a fund in its eustody pro rata among
the creditors of the owner of that fund, 7 whether such owner be an individual,
a partnership, a corporation or a deceased debtor. 8
§ 1033. Frame —
of a General Creditors' Bill. In drawing a general cred
itors' bill the followingmatters should be kept in mind
1. The bill must show on its face, either in the caption, or in the prayer, thai
it is filed in behalf of the complainant and of all the other creditors 9 of the
insolvent estate, person, firm, or corporation.
2. It must be filed against the insolvent debtor, and the persons in charge
of his or its assets; and against any and all persons intermeddling with said
assets, or trying by suit or otherwise to appropriate them, or any part of them.
3. The bill must show on its face that the complainant is a bona fide creditor
of the insolvent defendant; and should file the evidence of his debt, if any: 1
''
if he is a judgment creditor, he should so allege; and if execution has issued

on his judgment and been returned nulla bona, he should so show, and should
filea certified copy of the judgment, execution and return.
4. The bill must positively allege the insolvency of the debtor or estate whose
assets are to be administered, if the suit be against the estate of a decedent,
e See Emory I. & C. Co. v.

Code, 5§ 3557-3562. o A bill filed in behalf of the complainant alone is
Wood, 198; Ferguson v. Vance, 3 Lea, 90.
6 Heisk., not a general creditors' bill. Parks v. Saw Co., 20
ea Spenrer Goodlet. 20 Pick., 648, citing the
v. Pick., 23.
above section of this book, then § 967. rv 10 A general creditor can maintain th D bill. Trades-
7 See, Ante, § 47. man Co. v. Car Wheel Co., 11 Pick., 634.
8 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 410.
/0-
^ V
813 SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS. § 1034
the billmust show that the insolvency of the estate has been suggested to the
County Court, or to its Clerk. If the suit is against a person, partnership, or
corporation, it, is always well to show that an execution has issued against the
defendant, and been returned unsatisfied.
5. The bill should specify as fully as practicable the character, location and
amount of the assets of the defendant debtor and, so far as possible, the names
;
of the principal creditors, where they reside, and the amount due each, and on
what account. These creditors should all be made defendants.
6. If any fraudulent conveyances' are assailed, the property alleged to be so
conveyed must be described, the fraud charged specifically, and the conveyee
made a defendant.
7. bill should pray: (1) that it may be allowed to be filed in behalf of
The
complainant and of all the other creditors of the defendant debtor (2) that all ;
those named as defendants in the caption be made such by the issuance and
service of all proper process; (3) that all of said creditors not made parties be
allowed to come in by petition, and file and prove their respective claims in
the cause, and have the benefit of all decrees made therein and that all cred-
;
itors be notified hereof by due publication; (4) that all suits against the de-
fendant debtor, and all persons intermeddling with the assets sought to be
administered, be enjoined; (5) that a receiver be appointed to take possession
of all the property, real and personal, and all the choses in action, franchises
and other assets of the defendant debtor; and that such receiver convert all
of said property into money; (6) that all accounts be taken necessary to show
t,he amount of said assets, the prior liens thereon if any, the names of the cred-
itors and the amount due each, and who have liens and who none; and (7)
that after paying the costs, and expenses of the suit, including complainant's
counsel fees, the amounts due the preferred creditors be paid, and the balance
of the assets prorated equitably among the general creditors. ,
§ 1034. Form —
of a General Creditors' Bill. The frame of the bill, as given
in the preceding section, may be better understood by an examination of the
following form:
GENERAL CREDITORS' BILL.
To the P. Smith, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Tazewell
Hon. John
John Doe, a resident of Knox county, complainant, who sues on behalf of himself
and all other creditors of the River Improvement Company,
vs.
The said River Improvement Company, a corporation under the laws of Tennessee,
whose principal office is in Claiborne county, and whose chief officers reside
there, and Henry HU1 and David Doe. both residents of said Claiborne county,
and Richard Roe, John Smith, and Jesse James, non-residents of Tennessee, j
Complainant, who sues in behalf of himself and of all the other creditors of the said River
Improvement Company, respectfully shows to the Court:
i.
That he is a bona fide creditor of the defendant, the River Improvement Company, as
follows
1. has a note for five thousand dollars executed to him by said Company on January
He
4. 1891, and due ninety days after date, all of which is owing to him and unpaid.
2. He has an account against said Company for work done on the Clinch river, under a
.written contract with said Company, amounting to four thousand dollars, all of which is due
him and unpaid.
3. He has a judgment against said Company for three thousand and sixty-one dollars
and costs of suit rendered by the Circuit Court of Knox county against said Company at its
May term, 1891, and that on said judgment an execution has duly issued to the Sheriff of
Claiborne county, and been duly returned by the Sheriff of said county wholly unsatisfied.
ii.
The said note, the said account, and a certified copy of said judgment, execution, and
return, are hereto attached as exhibits, and marked A, B, and C, respectively.
The defendant Company is, also, largely indebted to various other persons, to-wit to P. G.
:
Fulkerson and J. H. S. MorYison, about one thousand dollars each for attorneys' fees; to
C. H. Rogers in a large sum, believed to be about five thousand dollars to G. W. Montgomery
;
about one thousand dollars, and to T. W. Stone and E. A. Hurst, in various large sums, aggre-
gating several thousand dollars. Said Company, also, owes various other persons various
amounts.
in.
The liabilities of said Company complainant is informed and believes, and on that belief
charges and avers, will not fall below thirty thousand dollars; whereas its assets will not
exceed twenty thousand dollars in value. The Company has ceased to do business, its office
is closed, and its corporate franchises are not used. Said Company is unable to pay its debts,
and is insolvent.
rv.
The principal assets of said Company are
1. Its boom in the- Clinch river, in Claiborne .county, including the logs, chains, pillars,
and ropes, belonging thereto.
2. The logs in said boom, and logs at many places on Clinch river, and its tributaries
above said boom.
3.The saw mill near said boom, including the engine, boiler, gearing, attachments, and
tools, thereunto belonging, and the shed covering said mill.
4. The lumber now sawed and stacked near said mill and other lumber there unstacked.
;
5. The following tracts of land in Claiborne and Hancock counties [Describing each :
tract by metes and bounds.]

6. The office furniture of said company in their office at Tazewell, consisting of desks,
chairs, tables, safe, stove, book-case, books, maps, drawings, &c, &c.
7. The Company has, also, large debts coming to it from various parties; but how much
can be realized therefrom complainant is not advised, and does not know.
v.
The
defendant, Richard Roe, is justly indebted to the said River Improvement Company
in the sum of three thousand dollars for money collected by him for said Company and
not accounted for. He is a non-resident of the State, but owns a valuable house and lot at
Cumberland Gap, adjoining the lots of Daniel Boone, David 'Crockett, and Simon Kenton.
VI.
Shortly before complainant obtained his said judgment against the defendant Company,
it conveyed a valuable tract of. timber land in the 4th civil district of Hancock county to the
defendant John Smith. Said tract adjoins the lands of John Brown, James Jones, and
Charles Clark, and contains about three thousand acres, being the tract conveyed to said
Company by said C. H. Rogers, to whom' a portion of the purchase-money is yet due. The
said conveyance to said John Smith was made by the defendant Company for the purpose of
hindering, delaying and defrauding complainant and the other .creditors of said Company,
and no consideration really passed, but said Smith holds said tract of land under a secret
trust for the benefit of Jesse James, the president and general manager of said Company.
VII.
The defendants Henry Hill and David Doe are each prosecuting a separate suit against
the defendant Company, in the Circuit Court at Tazewell, claiming five thousand dollars
each as damages for an alleged breach of contract; and they have each attached said mill,
logs, lumber, and office furniture of the defendant Company. And complainant avers, on
information and belief, that other creditors of the said Company are threatening to bring
suit against said Company, so that its assets are in great danger of being consumed by the
costs incident to a multiplicity of suits..
VIII.
1st. That he may b^ allowed to file this as a general creditors' bill, in behalf of himself
and of all the other creditors of the said River Improvement Company; and that the bill be
by your Honor sustained as such.
2d. That all of those named as defendants in the caption of this bill be made such by
the issuance and service of subpoena as to all the residents and by due publication notices
as to all the non-residents; and that they each and all be required to answer this bill; but
the oath to the answer of each is waived.
3d. That all of the bona fide creditors of the defendant Company be required to prosecute
••heir claims and demands against said Company in this Court and in this cause; and to that
end that they be allowed to file their petitions in term or in vacation, exhibiting their respec-
tive claims and demands, and to prove the same before the Master and that they be granted
;
all the benefits of this proceeding to which complainant may be entitled; and that the
Master be directed to notify by due publication all the creditors of said Company to file their
claims in this cause.
4th. That a judgment be rendered against the defendant Richard Roe for the amount
due from him to the defendant Company as aforesaid, and that an attachment issue and be
levied on the said house and lot owned by him at Cumberland Gap; and on any other property
he may own in this State.
Sth.That the aforesaid conveyance by the defendant Company to John Smith be declared
.fraudulent and void; and that the said tract of land so fraudulently conveyed be attached by
the levy of an attachment thereon, and be sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction
of the debts of the defendant Company.
,815 SUITS BY GENERAL CREDITORS. §1035
6th. That the defendants Henry Hill and David Doe be enjoined from further prosecuting
•their said suits in the Circuit Court against the defendant Company ; and that all other cred-
itors be enjoined from instituting any suit or suits against the defendant Company in any
Court, or on any account; and that said Henry Hill and said David Doe, and all the other
creditors of the defendant Company be required to prosecute their claims in this Court, and
in this cause.
7th. That a receiver be appointed to take into his possession all of the property of the
defendant Company, of every sort whatsoever, real, personal, or mixed; and that said re-
ceiver be empowered and directed to convert all of said property into money, at the earliest
practicable moment; and that he be authorized and directed to bring all suits necessary
to collect debts due the defendant Company, or to assent its rights or claims to any property:
.and to do all other acts necessary to collect or protect the assets of the defendant Company.
8th. That the Master be directed to take and state an account showing:
(1) The amount of the assets of the defendant Company;
. ^2) The names of the preferred creditors, if any, and the amount due each, and the par-
_
ticular asset on which each has a lien or superior equity;

(3) The names of the general creditors, and the amount due each;
(4) The probable amount of the costs and expenses of the suit, including the expenses
and compensation of the receiver, and a reasonable counsel fee for the Solicitors of the
complainant; and
(5) The pro rata of the general creditors out of the fund subject to distribution among
'
them.
9th. That the property herein attached and prayed to be attached be sold on a credit of
six months, and in bar of the. right of redemption.
10th. That complainant and the other creditors of the defendant Company be granted all
'
such further and other relief as they may be entitled to.
This is the first application for an attachment, injunction or receiver in this cause.
John P. Davis and E. A. Hurst, Tully R. Cornick, Jun.,
Of Counsel. Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit and jurat, as in § 789, ante.]
§ 1035. Proceedings Upon a General Creditors' Bill. The bill being filed —
on behalf of all persons entitled to share in the common fund, the complainant
therein should, at the earliest practicable moment, obtain an order of the
• Court sustaining the bill as a general creditors' bill, and ordering that pub-
• lication be made for the creditors to appear and file their petitions 11 and prove
their claims, in that particular cause 12 and, if no injunction has already been
;
granted, the Court should, thereupon, restrain the prosecution of all other
suits by any of the common creditors. The following is the form of such an
order
ORDER SUSTAINING A GENERAL CREDITORS' BILL.
John Doe,
vs. No. 987.
The River Improvement Co., ei al. .
i.
The bill cause having been read, and it appearing to the Court that it is filed in
in this
•_ behalf of the complainant and all other creditors of the defendant corporation, and the insol-
vency of the defendant appearing by the return of nulla bona on the execution exhibited to
the bill, [or by the judgment pro confesso heretofore taken and entered against it, or by the
admission in its answer, or by the admissions of its Solicitor in open Court,] it is ordered
by the Court that the bill be sustained and ordered to stand as a general creditors' bill, and
as such enure to the benefit of all creditors who may claim its benefits, or come in under it.
II.
And the Clerk and Master is ordered to make publication in some newspaper notifying
all the- creditors of the defendant of the filing of the bill in this cause, and requiring them to
come in by petition,*' 3 and file and prove their respective claims against the defendant, on or
:. before the first day of August, 1892, [allowing at least six months,] or they may be excluded
from the benefits of this proceeding. ,
in.
And on motion of the complainant, the institution of any separate suits by any of said cred-
it The complainant's answer under oath to such claimants, will require such steps to be taken by the
petitions has no probative force, and merely makes complainant as will enable all persons interested in
an issue. Irvine v. Dean, 9 Pick., 346. the fund to set up their respective claims. Th s is the
:
12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1203-1204; Bank of Rome v. rule of the Court, whether this fund belong to the
Haselton, 15 Lea, 230-231. estate of a decedent, or to an insolvent partnership,
In accordance with its fundamental rule to so companv, or corporation; and whether the fund to
determine a matter in controversy that all persons be distributed belongs to creditors, legatees, distribu-
interested in it may have a chance to be heard, the tees, or other claimants. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 991.
Court in all cases relating to the distribution of a . 13 For the form of a petition, see, ante, § 1003.
fund distributable among various creditors or other
itorsor claimants against the defendant corporation is hereby enjoined; and all parties to
any and all suits now pending against said corporation are enjoined from proceeding further
in them than to judgment; and the Master will so state in said publication notice.
IV.
All creditors filing petitions in this cause will execute and file proper prosecution bonds, or
take the pauper oath in lieu thereof. Such petitions may be filed without other leave than
this order.
v.
After the time for filing claims has expired, the Master will state an account showing who
are the bona fide creditors, the amounts of their respective debts, and any liens or priorities
that may exist in favor of any of the creditors.
This order can be made only in open Court, or by consent, or at Chambers
on notice; 1 * and cannot then be made until insolvency is shown as stated in
the decree, or is shown and adjudged on a reference to the Master for that
purpose.
The publication notice to creditors by the Clerk and Master may be as
follows
ADVERTISEMENT FOR CREDITORS.
To the Creditors of the River Improvement Company.
In obedience to an order made by the Chancery Court at Tazewell, in the case of John
Doe vs. The River Improvement Co., et al., the creditors of said company are, hereby, notified
to have themselves made parties to said cause by petition, and to file and prove their claims
against said company in said cause, on or before the first day of August, 1892, or they may be
excluded from the benefits of said suit, and from sharing in the assets of said company.
Said creditors and claimants are, also, hereby notified that by order of said Court, in
said cause they, and each of them, are enjoined from instituting any suit against said com-
pany, otherwise than by petition in said pending cause; and all parties now suing said com-
pany are enjoined from proceeding in their suits further than to judgment.
This August 3, 1891. I. G. Leabow, C. & M.
•
If a receiver be necessary, as is often the case, the Court, or the Chancellor

at Chambers, will appoint one, and order him to sell all the property, real and
personal, eollect all the debts of the defendant, and convert all of his or its
estate into money. 15 The Master will, at the expiration of the time allowed for
filing claims, be directed to take and state an account, showing (1) the amount
of the assets, (2) the claims entitled to priority of satisfaction, and (3) the
names of the general creditors, and the amount due each. This report 16 will
be subject to exception by any creditor or claimant.
The Court will pay allthe expenses of the suit out of the fund, or assets of
the insolvent defendant, including among these expenses (1) the expenses
and compensation of the receiver; (2) the costs of the litigation, and (3) the
(
reasonable fees of the Solicitors of the complainant in prosecuting the suit.

The Court will, however, adjudge against a petitioner any costs that he should,
in Equity, pay as the result of any false claim, or of any inequitable eonduct or
contention on his part. 17
If the bill is not sustained as a general creditors' bill, the complainant may,
nevertheless, prosecute the suit for his own exclusive benefit. And if, on the
taking of the account, the complainant is shown to be not a creditor, the Court
will sustain the bill for the benefit of those who are shown to be creditors, for
the suit has become the suit of all who have filed petitions and cost bonds to
become parties. 18 But in such a case some petitioner ought to be substituted
as complainant so that the suit may proceed inter partes. The complainant has
control of the suit, and may dismiss it at certain stages. 19
14 See, ante, § 775. |
17 Bank of Rome v. Haselton, 1? tea, 253.
15 See Chapter on Receivers, ante, §§ 891-917. I 18 Fall v. B. & L. Association, 21 Pick., 26
16 -For form of report, see, ante, § 994. I 19 See, ante, §§ 523-524.
817 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. §1036
CHAPTER LV.
SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS.
1036. Liens Generally Considered. 1040. Forms of References and Decrees in
1037. Liens Specially Considered. Relation to Liens.
1038. General Rights of Parties Having 1041. Forms of Bills to Enforce Contract
Liens. Liens.
1039. Frame and Form of Bills to Enforce
Liens.
§ 1036. —
Liens Generally Considered. A lien is defined to be "a hold or
claim which, one person has upon the propertj r of another as a security for
some debt or charge." 1 Whoever owns property subject to a lien owns only
what remains of it after the lien has been discharged. There are four kinds
of liens, all enforceable in Chancery: 1, Common Law Liens; 2, Equitable
Liens 3, Statutory Liens and 4, Contract Liens.
; ;
1. Common Law Liens are those liens which are recognized in the Courts of
common law; and include 1, a general lien, which is the right to retain the
property of another to secure a general balance of accounts and 2, a particular ;
lien, which is a right to retain the property of another on account of labor

employed or money expended upon that identical property. 2 common law A
lien is simply the right of a creditor to retain possession of the chattel until
some debt or demand due the creditors is satisfied; and possession is so essen-
tial to the lien that, if it be voluntarily surrendered by the creditor, the lieu
is at once extinguished. 3
are the principal common law liens: 1, common carriers'
The following
liens; 2, innkeepers' liens; 3, bailees' liens; 4, pawnees' or pledgees* liens; 5,
factors' liens; 6, brokers' liens; 7, bankers' liens; 8, wharfingers' and ware-
housemen's liens; 9, attorneys' liens; and 10, execution liens.
2. An Equitable Lien is not an estate or property in the thing itself, nor a
right to obtain possession of the thing. It is simply a right of a special nature
over the thing, constituting a charge or encumbrance upon it entitling the
owner of such right to subject the property so charged or encumbered to the
satisfaction of that particular claim of his which constitutes the charge or
encumbrance. 4 In short, an equitable lien on property is a right to subject
that particular property td the satisfaction of a debt which is a charge upon
that very property.
As has been stated, a common law lien ordinarily depends on the creditor
retaining the possession of the chattel to which the lien attaches. On the other
hand, an equitable lien exists although the encumbered property be in posses r
sion of the debtor indeed, as a rule, the debtor retains the possession, in cases
;
of equitable liens, and the creditor seldom has the right to keep or demand the
possession when he has such right, it grows out of special contract.
:
The following are the principal equitable liens: 1, vendors' liens; 2, lis
pendens liens 3, liens of creditors on assets of insolvent partnerships and in-
;
solvent corporations 4, liens of vendees for their debts when their deeds are
;
declared mortgages; 5, liens on property bought with trust money; 6, joint

owners' liens; 7, partners' liens; and 8, bona fide improvers' liens.
3. A statutory Lien is a right given by statute to subject certain property to
l Bouv. Law Die., "Lien. 1
3 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1233.
1 2 Kent's Com., .634. t 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1233.
§ 1037 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. 818
the satisfaction of a particular debt, such debt being ordinarily in some way
connected with the property, or growing out of it, or contracted on the faith
of it. Statutory liens partake largely of the character of equitable liens. In
both classes of liens the possession of the property to which the lien attaches
is in the debtor, and the creditor ordinarily has no right to the possession. His
rights are mainly to have the property sold, and enough of its proceeds applied
to pay his lien debt.
The following are the principal statutory liens: 1, landlords' liens; 2, me-
chanics' liens; 3, material men's liens; 4, boat creditors' liens; 5, liens of cor-
poration, partnership and mercantile employees; 6, liens of creditors on a
decedent's land; 7, farm laborers' liens; 8, liens of railroad contractors and
laborers; 9, cotton-sellers' liens; 10, wharfage liens; 11, pasturage and season
liens; 12, innkeepers' liens; 13, tax liens; 14, attachment liens; 15, judgment
liens; and 16, liens of judgment creditors on a return of nulla bona and bill
filed.
4. A Contract Lien is one created by the express agreement of the owner of
the property on which the lien is fixed, and gives the lienor the right to sell or
have sold the property in satisfaction of a stipulated debt, usually on a speci-
fied contingency. The principal contract liens are those created (1) by deed
of trust, (2) by mortgages, (3) by reservations in deeds to secure purchase-
money unpaid, and (4) by other writings, or (5) by parol agreement that
specified property shall stand as security for certain debts.
Any of these liens may be enforced by a bill in Chancery when the amount
due is large enough to give the Court jurisdiction.
§ 1037. —
Liens Specially Considered. The principal liens enforced in Chan-
cery are the following, the substance and character of each being briefly and
generally indicated, without attempting to specially and precisely define any
of them:
1. Liens of Vendors on Land. A
lien for the purchase-money exists in favor
of the vendor on land sold by him 1, When the vendee takes a clear deed, but
:
executes a mortgage or a trust deed expressly to secure the purchase-money;

2. When the vendor gives the vendee a title-bond only and 3, When the vendor ;
on the face of his deed to the vendee expressly retains a lien to secure the un-
paid purchase-money 4, When the deed by the vendor shows on its faee that
;
a part of the purchase-money is unpaid, an Equity exists in such vendor's

favor, which will become a lien on the land upon the filing of a bill to enforce
such Equity. In all the foregoing cases, the lien may be enforced against the
vendee, or against any person holding under or through him, with notice,
actual or constructive 5, When no express lien is given or retained, and the
;
deed shows on its face that the purchase-money has been paid, when in fact it
has not been, the vendor may, by filing a bill, obtain a lien on the land against
the vendee, or against any person holding under or through him, who bought
with notice of the fact that the purchase-money was still owing to the com-
plainant.
When the vendor has an express lien, the lien passes to, and may be enforced
by, the assignee of the purchase-money notes.
2. Liens on Lands to Secure Debts. All mortgages, 5 and all trust deeds, how-
soever drawn, are deemed in Equity as mere securities, notwithstanding any
stipulations that the title is to become absolute on certain conditions and such ;
conveyances constitute mere liens, and must be enforced as such.

3. Other Liens on Land. A
judgment or decree is a lien on the defendant's
land; a lien is created by levying an attachment or execution upon land; a
recognizance in Court constitutes a lien on the obligor's land; and assessed
taxes are a lien on the land assessed.
5 An absolute deed given in payment of a pre-exist- I ing debt, or to secure borrowed money, is deemed a
I
mortgage.
§19 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. § 1037
.
4. Liens of Contractors and Laborers on Railroads. A
lien exists upon a T&iU
road: (1) to secure the principal contractor for work done and materials fur-
nished in constructing the road, or its appurtenances; and, (2) to secure sub-
contractors, laborers, and furnishers of material, when their principal con-
tractor fails or refuses to pay them. The principal contractor's lien continues
for six months after the performance of the work, or the delivery of the ma-
terial, and until the termination of any suit commenced within that time to
enforce the lien. The lien of sub-contractors, laborers and furnishers of ma-
terial to contractors, does not exist unless and until they give certain written
UQtices specified in the statute, and then such lien is only to the extent of the
indebtedness of the person notified to the debtor of the person giving the
notice. 6
5. Liens of Employees of Corporations, Partnerships and Merchants. All employ-
ees and day laborers of corporations, partnerships and individual merchants
doing business in this State, have a lien upon the corporation, partnership or
individual property, real and personal, to secure payment for their labor and
services performed for such corporation, partnership or individual. 7
6. Liens of Mechanics and Material Men. All persons who do any of the work
on, or furnish any of the materials, fixtures or machinery, for any building or
improvement, constructed or repaired, on any lot or tract of land, or who put
any fixtures or machinery thereon, by special contract with the owner or his
agent, have a lien upon such lot or tract of land to secure payment for such
work, materials, fixtures, and machinery. 8
7. Liens on Boats. A lien exists on any steam or keel boat, her tackle and fur-
niture, (1) to secure payment for work done or material or articles furnished,
in building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping such boat; and (2) to
secure payment for wages due the hands of such boat. 9
8. Liens for Wharfage. The owners and proprietors of wharves and landings
where wharfage is allowed by law, have a lien on all boats, rafts, and other
water crafts, and their loading, for the. payment of their wharfage fees. 10
0. Liens on Crops. The statutes give a lien on the crop growing or made, on
a particular tract of land 1, to secure the payment of the rent due the land-
:
lord; 11 2, to secure payment for supplies, labor, money, implements of indus-

try, or work stock, furnished by the owners of the land to lessees, or by lessees
12
to sub-tenants, and used in the cultivation of the crop 3, to secure payment
;
for the necessary supplies of food and clothing furnished by the landlord or
13
his agent to the tenant to enable him to make the crop 4, to secure payment
;
for labor or service in cultivating the soil and making the crop. 14
10. Liens of Cotton Sellers. When merchants, factors or cotton brokers sell
eotton, they have a lien upon the cotton sold, to secure payment of the pur-
chase-money agreed to be paid. 15
11. Liens on Tobacco. Liens exist in favor of all persons who make advances
in money on tobacco, in barns, storage-houses, warehouses, sheds or else-
where. 16
Liens Upon Animals. Liens exist 1, upon any animal to secure the pay-
12.
ment of pasturage, or for service of the male 2, upon the offspring of the male
;
17 and
to secure the payment for the season; 3, upon all stock received by livery
stable keepers for board and feed, to secure the payment of all reasonable
charges. 18
13. Liens Upon Other Personal Property. A lien, exists 1, upon the furniture,
baggage, wearing apparel or other goods and chattels of any guest or patron
6 M. &
V.'s Code, §§ 2774-2783. 12 Code, § 3S42 a.
7Acts of 1897, ch. 78. 13 M. & V.'s Code, § 4285.
8M. & V.'s Code, §§2739-2750; Acts of 188?, ch. 14 M. & V.'s Code, §2771.
103: Lumber Co. p. Loeb, 2 Gates, 251. 15 M. & V.'s Code, § 27.6J.
9 Code, § 1991. 16 Acts of 1905, ch. 6,
10 Code, § 1993. 17 M. Ik V.'s Code, n
2756-2759.
is M. & V.'s Code, 5 2760.
11 Code, § 3539.
§1038 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. 820
of a hotel, boarding-house or lodging-house, to secure the payment of all sums
due for board or lodging; 19 2, upon any material or article left with an artisan
to be manufactured or repaired and not called for, to secure payment for stor-
age, repairs or other necessary expenses; 20 3, lawyers have liens upon moneys
by them collected, and upon their client's papers, to secure their reasonable
fees and 4, a lien exists on property expressly pledged to secure the payment
;
of a debt, or the performance of a duty.

§ 1038. General Rights of Parties Having Liens. The ordinary purpose —
of a lien is to secure the payment of a debt fastened by operation of law,
Equity or contract upon a particular piece of property; and the Chancery
Court treats this particular property as a security for the debt; and, if the
debt is not duly paid, the owner of the lien, (sometimes called the lienor,) has
the right to file a bill in Chancery, and have such property sold in satisfaction
of his debt.
§ 1039. Frame and Form of Bills to Enforce Liens. —Any of the foregoing
liens may be enforced by a bill in the Chancery Court 21 and there is no special ;
form for such a In drawing the bill, the draftsman should state definitely
bill.
iind particularly, the ground, origin, or occasion, of the lien; when and how
it originated the amount of the lien, on what property it rests, and who is the
;
owner thereof; and if notice to the defendant is necessary to bind him, such
notice must be alleged. The property should be fully described; and, if it be
land, the description should be by metes and bounds. The bill should pray to
have the lien declared, and enforced by a decree of sale and "for general relief. ;
Different bills to enforce different liens on the same property may be con-
solidated; or one bill may be filed by a lienor against the owner of the prop-
erty and all the other lienors, in the nature of a general creditors' bill; or one
lienor may file a bill in behalf of himself and all other lienors against the owner
of the property, each bill praying that the various lien debts be ascertained,
the property sold, and the proceeds administered according to the priorities
of the various lienors.
If an injunction, attachment or receiver is prayed for the bill should state
that it is the first application therefor. An attachment in such a case can issue
only on the fiat of a Judge or Chancellor. 22 Such an attachment is ancillary. 2 ! -
GENERAL FORM OF BILLS TO ENFORCE LIENS.

[Address and commencement of the bill as in §§ 155 ; 164, ante.]
I.
That [Here show how and when the alleged lien originated, stating the contract, particu-
larly. Give any special facts or circumstances throwing light on the nature, origin or extent,
of the lien. If any notice is necessary to make the defendant liable, or if any notice is re-
quired by the statute to fix the lien, show that such notice was given; and show that all
other antecedent steps necessary to establish the lien were duly taken.]
II.
That [Here show what efforts have been made, if any, to obtain payment without recourse
to the Court; and if no efforts, why. This is not necessary, but is proper; and sometimes
affects the adjudication of costs.]
19 M. & V.'s Code, §§ 2784-2786. 7. Vendors' Liens. M. & V.'s Code, §§ 4306-
20 M. & V.'s Code, §§ 2763-2766. 4309.
21 The statutes in reference to the. enforcement of 8. Statutory Liens on Personalty. Acts of 1889,
said liens are as follows: ch. 12. This statute applies to cases where no spe-
1. Mechanics' Liens. M. & V.'s Code, §§2747; cific remedy by statute exists. See Lumber Co. v.
4286-4289; Acts of 1889, ch. 103. Loeb, 2 Cates, 251.
2. Liens on Craps. M. & V.'s Code, §§ 4280- 22 Lumber Co. v. Loeb, 2 Cates, 251; Lane v.
4285; 2772. Wood, 1 Shan. Cas., 648.
3. Li'ns on Boats. M. & V.'s Code, §§2752; _
23 An attachment in aid of a statutory lien is an-
4293-4305. cillary, and not intended to enforce the defendant's
4. Cotton-Sellers' Liens. M. & V.'s Code, § 2762. appearance: a subpoena to answer must issue, or pub-
5. Railroad Contractors' and Laborers' Liens. lication be made, to bring the defendant into Court.
M. & V.'s Code, §§ 2774-2783. Barnes v. Thompson, 2 Swan, 313; Brown v. Brown.
6. Liens of Employees of Corporations and Part- 2 Sneed, 431.
nerships. M. & V.'s Code, §§ 2768-2770.
821 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. § 1039
in.
That [Here specify, locate, and fully describe, the property bound by the lien, if such de-
scription has not already been given.]
IV.
That any person besides the principal debtor is interested in said property, or is setting
[If
up any claim to it, or is secondarily liable for complainants debt, give the facts relative
thereto, fully, and make him a co-defendant. If there be any superior liens on the property,
so show, and make the holder thereof a co-defendant.]
v.
That need for it, and a statutory or other ground of attachment exist, state
[If there be
such ground. If there be any necessity for an injunction, and sufficient cause, specify in
detail the facts and circumstances warranting such an injunction.]
VI.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, as in § 164, ante.]
2d. That complainant have a decree for the full amount of his said debt, principal and
interest; and that he be declared to have a lien on the property hereinbefore described, to
scure the amount of said debt.
3d. That to enforce said lien, said property be sold on a credit of not less than six nor
more than twenty-four months, and in bar of all equity of redemption; and that the proceeds
of said sale be applied to the satisfaction of this decree, and in discharge of said lien.
4th. That an attachment issue and be levied upon said property; and an injunction issue
to restrain the defendant [from doing the act or acts specially complained of, stating them
briefly.]
5th. That complainant have all such further and other relief as he may be entitled to at
the hearing.
[If an attachment or injunction is prayed for, add:] This is the first application for an
attachment [and injunction] in this case. H. M. Goins, Solicitor.
[The bill should be duly sworn to; see, ante, § 789.]
BILL TO ENFORCE A MECHANIC'S LIEN.

[Address and commencement of the bill as in §§155; 164.]
i.
That by special contract with the defendant, he constructed and built for him a dwelling-
house on a lot of ground belonging to the defendant, in the 10th civil district of Knox county,
complainant furnishing all the materials, and doing all the work, according to said special .
contract.
< ii.
By the terms of said special contract, complainant was to be paid the sum of one thousand
dollars cash, whenever said house was finished. [Here specify the terms of payment.]
Complainant avers that he has fully complied with the terms of his said special contract, that
said house was> fully finished on the 9th day of June, 1891, and was on that day delivered
to, and accepted by the defendant; and he and his family at once moved into it, and are now
living in it.
III.
The day after possession was delivered as aforesaid, complainant demanded said sum of
one thousand dollars, to which he was then entitled in accordance with the terms of his said
contract. The defendant, thereupon, began to find fault with some of the workmanship and
some of the material, but said he would call on complainant in a few days and arrange
matters with him. But so it is he has not so done; and complainant has now waited one
month in vain, although he has sent word to the defendant and written to him, urging
payment.
IV.
Said lot of ground on which said dwelling-house was built, as aforesaid, is in the 10th
civil districtof Knox county, adjoining the lands of John Doe and Richard Roe, and
bounded as follows Beginning on a maple [and fully describing it by metes and bounds,]
:
to the beginning, containing ten acres, more or less. Complainant is advised that he has a
lien on said lot of ground to secure the pavment of the amount justly due him for constructing
and building said dwelling-house, and for furnishing the material therefor, as aforesaid.
Less than one year has elapsed since said work was finished and said materials furnished.
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c; see, ante, § 164.]
2d. That complainant may have a decree against the defendant for said sum of one
thousand dollars, and for interest thereon from June 9, 1891, and for all the costs of this
cause.
3d. That to secure the payment of this decree, and the better to enforce complainant's lien
on said lot of ground, an attachment be issued and levied thereon. This is the first appli-
cation for an attachment in this case.
4th. That at the hearing complainant's said lien be declared, and that said lot of ground
be sold on a credit of not less than six nor more than twenty-four months, and in bar of
all equity of redemption, and that the proceeds of said sale be applied to the satisfaction of
this decree.
Sth. That complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to at the
hearing. L. A. Gratz, Solicitor.
If the bill be filed by a journeyman or other person employed by the con-
tractor to do work or furnish materials, its material allegations will be as
follows
BILL BY A JOURNEYMAN OB SUB-CONTRACTOB.
I.
That John Doe, [the principal contractor,] was employed by Richard Roe, [the owner of
the land,] by special contract to build a dwelling-house on a lot of ground in the 10th civil
district of Knox county, said Doe to do all the work and to furnish all the material, for
which the said Roe agreed to pay him the sum of one thousand dollars, when said house
should be fully and duly completed and finished, according to the terms of said contract.
II.
That complainant was employed by said Doe

to do the brick-work on said house, and to
furnish the brick, mortar, lime, sand and hair, requisite and necessary to said brick-work.
Under his said contract complainant built the brick foundations for said house, built the
chimneys, laid the hearths, and made the walks. Complainant files herewith an itemized ac-
count of all the material by him furnished, and all of the work by him done, under his said
contract with the defendant Doe, which account is correct, just and true, and owing to the
complainant, and amounts to the sum of one hundred and nine dollars, all of which is due
from said Doe, and wholly unpaid.
in.
Within thirty days after said material was furnished and said work done, complainant
notified the defendant Roe in writing that he claimed a lien on said lot of ground for the
work by him done, and the material by him furnished, as aforesaid. Complainant, also,
within said thirty days filed with the County Register of Knox county a sworn statement
of the amount due for such work, labor and materials, and said Register duly registered said
statement and affidavit.
iv.
Complainant not having been paid said account by either of the defendants, and having
given the notice aforesaid and caused it to be registered, and less than ninety days having
elapsed since he gave said written notice, he is advised and claims that he has a lien on
said lot of ground to secure the payment of the amount due him on his said account, which
account is herewith filed, marked A, and made a part of this bill. Said lot of ground is
bounded as follows [Describe it fully, by metes and bounds, if practicable.]
v.
[The prayers are substantially the same as those in the preceding form; and the bill
should be stvorn to.]
§ 1040. —
Forms of References and Decrees. When payments have been
lnade as to which there is some dispute, or there is a dispute as to the amount,
character or value of work done or materials furnished, or as to whether com-
plainant has complied with his contract, or as to any other matter affecting
the right or amount of recovery, the Chancellor generally narrows the dispute
down to a few questions of fact and refers them to the Master.
The following is given as a general illustration of the form of an order of
reference to the Master
ORDER OF REFEBENCE AS TO AMOUNT OF LIEN DEBT.
John Doe, I
vs. \No. 619.

This cause came on to be heard this 10th day of June, 1890, before Chancellor W. S.
Bearden, upon the original bill, the answers of all three of the defendants thereto, the
cross-bill of the defendant, Sarah Roe, and the answer thereto, and the proof in the cause,
including the stipulation signed by all the parties except Sarah Roe, and upon argument of
counsel, from all of which,
i.
The Court is of opinion that the defendant, Richard Roe, was the owner of the lot upon
Which the dwelling-house, and' other improvements 'specified in the bill, were made at the
time they wejremade; ^nd thatthe deed made-by him to his wife, Sarah Roe, not having been
registered, and being based on no valuable consideration, but having been made to defraud
complainant and other creditors, is void, and of no effect as against complainant, and the de-
fendant, Charles' Stokes, and it is So adjudged and decreed accordingly.
ii.
It therefore, decreed by the Court, that the complainant has a mechanic's and furnisher's
is,
lien upon
said house and lot, and all the improvements thereon, to secure the payment of all
the work by him done, and of all the materials, by him furnished, in erecting the houses,
and making the improvements, specified in his bill, on the lot described in the bill ; and
that he has a right to have said lien enforced by a sale of said lot and improvements as
prayed by him.
in.
But because it does not fully appear how much is due from the defendant, Richard Roe,
"for said improvements, and how much of the debt due from said Roe to complainant belongs
to the defendant, Stokes, the Court orders the Master to consider the pleadings and compe-
tent proof now on file, and such further competent evidence as may be produced by either
or both parties, and report to the next term
1. What amount was originally due from the defendant, Richard Roe, to the complainant
for the construction of the dwelling-house referred to in the bill, after deducting payments
made to the complainant before the assignment by complainant to the defendant, Stokes.
In fixing this amount, the Master will take the written contract between the parties as
prima facie proof of the true amount, but will allow such deductions and payments as the
defendant, Richard Roe, may prove, and such additions as complainant may prove, by reason
of changes made in the contract after it was signed. The Master will report whether the
$300.00 check was Cashed, and if not, why not.
2. How much of the debt due from the complainant to the defendant, Charles Stokes,
did the defendant, Richard Roe, pay, and under what sort of contract; and what payments
said Roe made to said Stokes by virtue of said assignment.
3. Whether said dwelling-house was constructed according to contract; and if not, what
deduction should reasonably be made from the contract price, by reason- of imperfect ma-
terials or defective workmanship, or for any other of the violations of contract alleged in the
answer and Sarah Roe.
cross-bill of
4. What amount does the defendant, Richard Roe, owe complainant for building the out-
bouses and fences on the lot containing said dwelling-house, after deducting all payments
made by said Roe, or his wife, and all credits for defective work, if any be shown. If Roe
or his wife made any payment on this account to the defendant, Stokes, it will be allowed
as a credit.
5. What balance is due from the defendant, Richard Roe, and what part of said balance
belongs to complainant, and what part thereof to the defendant, Charles Stokes.
The Master will not look at so much of the testimony of the defendant, Roe and wife,
as seeks to set up conversations with complainant prior to the signing of the contract to
build the dwelling-house; such testimony being inadmissible to vary said contract. All the
receipts evidencing payments made by the defendant, Richard Roe, now on file will be
allowed, except the check hereinbefore referred to, and the Master will inquire as ordered in
reference to that.
The cross-bill of Sarah Roe is dismissed, and all costs thereof, including the costs of wit-
nesses examined relative to the question of her title, will be paid by her and her prosecution
surety, John Bright, for all of which execution is awarded.
'The following forms of decrees enforcing liens illustrate the general frame
of decrees in such cases. In all cases the decree should show that the debt is
a lien, and should specify the property to which the lien attaches, and should
order its sale in. enforcement of the lien.
GENERAL FORM OF DECREE TO ENFORCE LIENS.
On consideration whereof, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court:
1st. That the defendant is indebted to the complainant in the sum of —
dollars, the
amount due for [specifying what, whether for work in building a house, or material furn-
ished for such building, or repairing, or equipping a boat, or work or materials in constructing
a railroad, or labor and services performed for a corporation, partnership, or individual
merchant,] and interest thereon from the....day of~..19.„. [insert date when the work was
done, or materials furnished, or services rendered,] making in all the Sum of —
dollars.
2d. That said sum is a lien on said house and lot [or railroad, or boat, or the property of
said corporation, or partnership, or individual merchant,] and complainant is entitled to
have Said lien enforced by the sale thereof, unless previously paid and discharged. Said
bouse and lot are described as follows [Here insert location and description; if a railroad,
:
locate it by termini and county; if a boat, give her name, name of her owners or officers and
river on which sailing; if a corporation or partnership, or individual merchant, locate their
property and place of business.]
3d. And unless said debt, and the costs of the cause, which are adjudged against the
defendant are paid into Court, in sixty days, it is Ordered and decreed that the Clerk and
Master sell said house and lot [or other property. Por forms of decrees of sale, see, ante,
§§626; 844; 977; 995; 1069,] and out of the proceeds of said sale he will pay first the costs
of this cause, then pay complainant the amount due him on this decree, and the remainder,
if any, to the defendant. If the proceeds of said sale fail to satisfy this decree an execution
will issue for the balance unpaid.
An examination of the foregoing decree will show that it contains only
three parts: 1, An adjudication that the defendant is indebted to the com-
plainant in a certain sum on a certain account, specifying each; 2, That this
debt is a lien on the property for building which the debt arises, or is a lien on
such other particular property on or concerning which the work was done,
the services rendered, or the materials furnished; 3, That, in the event said
debt is not paid by a fixed date, the Clerk and Master is ordered to sell the
property, and pay the costs of the cause and said debt out of the proceeds.
As the proceeds of the property may not satisfy the decree it is prudent to
award an execution for the balance.
DECREE ENFORCING A MECHANIC'S, FURNISHER'S OR LABORER'S LIEN.
{After giving the style of the cause, and adjudging the amount of the indebtedness, see,
ante, §§567-568, then proceed as follows:]
And it further appearing that complainant has a mechanic's [or furnisher's, or laborer's,
or other] lien to secure said indebtedness, upon the following lot of ground [or tract of
land:] [Here describe it as described in the bill, or proof,] and that an attachment has been
duly levied thereon.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed, that complainant has such a lien, and has
the right to have said lot [or tract] sold in satisfaction of said lien, and in payment of said
indebtedness; and that if the same is not oaid and satisfied within sixty days from this day,
the Clerk and Master will, after advertising according to law, sell said lot of ground [or
tract of land] to the highest and best bidder [&c, as in § 626, ante.]
§ 1041. —
Forms of Bills to Enforce Contract Liens. Where a debt is secured
by a mortgage with power of sale, or by a deed of trust, the bill should allege,
and the proof show, some reason for coming into Court; or, whilt granting
the relief prayed, a portion of the costs may be adjudged against the complain-
ant. 24
In drawing decrees it would be well, in case of any difficulty, to refer to
what is said on the subject in the Chapter on Decrees. 25
BILL TO ENFORCE A VENDOR'S LIEN.

[Address and commencement of the bill as in §§155; 164.]
i.
That on January 2, 1889, he sold to the defendant the following tract of land in Blount
county. [Here describe it fully, by metes and bounds.] The consideration price for said land
was one thousand dollars, five hundred dollars of which was paid cash in hand, and for the
other five hundred dollars the defendant executed and delivered to complainant a note, pay-
able with interest one year after said January 2, 1889. Said note is herewith filed as a part
of this bill, and marked A.
ii.
Complainant executed no deed to the defendant for said land, but gave him a bond for
title [or, complainant made the defendant a deed for said land, but expressly retained a lien
on the face of said deed to secure the payment of said five hundred dollars; or, complainant
made the defendant a deed for the land, which deed shows on its face that said note was a
part of the consideration price for said land; or, complainant executed and delivered to the
defendant a deed for said land, said deed showing that the whole of said one thousand
dollars was paid in hand on the day of sale, but in fact only five hundred dollars was then
paid, and said note was given for the residue.]
in.
Said note for five hundred dollars has long been overdue, and is wholly unpaid, principal
and interest. [If any part of it has been paid, so state, specifying the amounts and dates of
the credit.]
24 See, ante, § 587. I 05 See, ante, §§ 566-568.

IT.
. [If the defendant cutting and removing valuable timber, is allowing the taxes to fall in
is
arrears, is failing to keep the property insured when the building on it. constitutes its chief
value, or if, in any way, the security is greatly endangered by the defendant's misconduct
or gross negligence, show the facts with fullness and particularity, so that the Court may see
that the land is liable to become insufficient to secure the purchase-money.]
V.
The premises considered, the complainant prays
That subpoena to answer issue [&c: see, ante, §164.]
1st.
2d. That he may have a decree against the defendant for the amount due him on said note,
[or notes;] and a lien be declared to exist in his favor on said tract of land to secure the
payment of this decree.
3d. That in enforcement of complainant's lien, and in satisfaction of this decree, said tract
of land be sold on a credit [&c, as in the foregoing forms.]
4th. [If an injunction or receiver is necessary, then pray:] That an injunction issue by fiat
of your Honor to inhibit and restrain the defendant, his agents and employees, from cutting
or removing any trees or timber on or from said tract, [and that a receiver be appointed to
take charge of said property, and to collect the rents and profits thereof, and to keep down
the taxes, and see that the property is kept well insured.] This is the first application for
an injunction [and receiver] in this case.
5th. That complainant may have such further and other he may be
relief as entitled to.
Will A. McTEER, Solicitor.
BILL TO ENFORCE A DEED OF TRUST.

To the Hon. B. M. Webb, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Jamestown, for the
county of Fentress
John Brown, a resident of Fentress county, complainant,
vs.
William Johnson and George Smith, both residents of the same county, defendants.
i.
That on the 10th day of June, 1888, he loaned the defendant, Johnson, one thousand
dollars, for which Johnson executed and delivered to complainant his note, due January 1,
1889, which note is made a part of this bill, and attached hereto, and marked A.
ii.
Tosecure the payment of said note, defendant Johnson executed a trust deed to his
co-defendant, George Smith, conveying to him, in trust, the following tract of land in the
2d civil district of Fentress county, bounded as follows [Here set out its bounds with
:
frecision,] containing one hundred acres, more or less. Said trust deed [or, a certified copy
of said trust deed,] is herewith filed as an exhibit to the bill, and marked B.
m.
If said note was not paid at maturity, said Smith was required by said deed to sell said
land. Said note is the property of complainant, and overdue and wholly unpaid, but said
Smith, who is thereby seeking to aid his co-defendant, Johnson, fails and refuses to sell said
land, though often requested by complainant so to do. [Show why the trustee refuses to
act, or that he does refuse or fail to act.]
IV.
Therefore, the premises considered, complainant prays
1st. That the defendants be made parties hereto by the service of process, and be required
to answer this bill, but not on oath. [If the trustee has the trust deed in his possession,
then add: Respondent Smith will file said trust deed with his answer; or complainant will,
at the hearing, read a certified copy thereof.]
2d. That said trust deed be enforced, and the land therein conveyed be sold to satisfy
complainant's said debt, and the interest thereon and the costs of this suit; and that said sale
be on a credit of not less than six nor more than twenty-four months, and in bar of the
equity of redemption.
3d. That complainant may, also, have such further and other relief as he may be en-
titled to. Luther T. Smith, Solicitor.
BILL TO FORECLOSE A MORTGAGE.
[Address and commencement of bill, as in §§ 155; 164, ante.]
i.
That on the 10th day of August, 1887, the defendant executed to him a mortgage on the
following tract of land, in Marion county: [Here describe it fully, following the description
in the mortgage, if it be full.] Said mortgage is herewith filed as an exhibit, marked A.
ii.
That mortgage was made to secure to complainant the payment of a note for ten
said
thousand dollars, executed to complainant by the defendant for money loaned him, on the
§1041 SUITS TO ENFORCE LIENS. 826
same day, and due one year thereafter, with interest from date. Said note is the property
of complainant, and is overdue, and wholly unpaid, except the sum of eight hundred dollars,
paid January 5, 1890. Said note is made a part of this bill, and is hereto attached, and
marked B.
iii.
Said mortgage provides that in Case said note was not paid at maturity, the said land
should become absolutely the property of complainant,' but he is advised that a Court oi
Equity regards such an instrument as a mere security for the debt.
IV.
Said land is in possession of the defendant, who refuses to surrender it, and relies on his
rights as a mortgagor in a Court of Equity. He is not properly caring for said land, and
is allowing it to greatly deteriorate. He is having all the valuable timber cut off the land
for railroad ties. The land is not now worth more than the mortgage debt. He has not
paid the taxes thereon for the last year; and none of the buildings thereon are insured. He
is wholly insolvent. [Allege any facts showing that the value of the land is being lessened,
or the security endangered, and showing the necessity of an injunction and a receiver.]
v.
1st. That subpeeria to answer issue [&c: see, ante, § 164.]
2d. That said mortgage be foreclosed, that, said tract of land be sold to. satisfy complainant's
said debt, and the costs of this suit; and that said sale be on a credit of not less than six nor
more than twenty-four months, and in bar of the equity of redemption. [If the mortgage
contains a power of sale, so show, and pray that the sale may be on the terms specified
in such mortgage.]
3d. That complainant have a decree for the amount due him on said note, principal and
interest, and that if the proceeds of said sale do not satisfy this decree, that he may have
m execution for the balance due thereon. 26
4th. That an injunction be issued, by fiat of your Honor, to inhibit and restrain the
defendant from cutting, removing, or selling any more of the trees or timber on said land
and that a receiver be appointed to take possession of said land, and apply its rents and
profits, including the timber now cut, (1) to the payment of said taxes, (2) to the insurance
of the buildings on said land [if the buildings constitute a large proportion of the value
of the security,] and (3) to the discharge of the interest on said note. This is the first
application for an injunction or a receiver in this case.
5th. That complainant may have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
Bright & Earley, Solicitors.
[Annex affidavit and jurat: see, ante, § 789.]
20 Nolen V. Woods, 12 Lea, 616.

827 SUI^TS TO PROTECT INTERESTS IN LANDS. §1042
CHAPTER LVI.
SUITS TO PROTECT AND RECOVER REAL AND PERSONAL

PROPERTY.
Article I. Suits to Protect Interests in Land.
Article DZ. Suits to Recover Interests in Land.
Article III. Suits to Recover Escheated Property.
Article IV. Suits to Recover Personal Property.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS TO PROTECT INTERESTS IN LANDS.

§ 1042. Suits Quia Timet. I § 1044. Suits to Redeem.
§ 1043. Suits to Protect the Homestead. I
§ 1042. —
Suits Quia Timet. Bills quia timet 1 lie where a person has reason-
able fears of being subjected to future inconvenience, probable or even pos-
sible to happen by the neglect, inadvertence or culpability of another, in which
case the Court will quiet his apprehensions by removing the cause. 2 The main
objects of such a bill are 1, to guard against possible or prospective injuries,
:
and 2, to preserve the means by which existing rights may be protected from
future or contingent violations. 3 Under this jurisdiction the Chancery Court
1. Will cancel a void or voidable deed, bond, note or other instrument, that
iaay be used in the future to complainant's detriment.
2. "Will appoint a receiver, when there is danger of trust property being
misused, or the trustee is insolvent, or his bond insufficient.
3. Will remove clouds from one 's title, or prevent an act which will create a
cloud. 4
4. Will enjoin the establishment of a new county that will reduce an old
county below its constitutional area. 5
5. Where a surety is in danger of being injured by the creditor's delay in
bringing suit, he may bring the creditor and principal debtor before the Court,
and have a decree on the obligation in question in favor of the creditor against
the principal. 6
6. Where the principal is dead the surety may, by bill, compel his executor
or administrator to exonerate him. 7
7. In any case where the complainant is secondarily liable for any debt he
may bring his principal and the creditor into Court, and have a decree against
his principal and himself and in favor of the creditor for the debt, and if the
creditor has any collateral security, or any lien of any sort, to secure such debt,
the complainant may have such collateral or lien applied to the payment of the
debt and satisfaction of said decree. 8
8. Where a tenant for life, or other party in rightful possession of land, is
1 Because he, [complainant,] fears [some injury to 6 Bradley v. Commissioners, 2 Hum., 428.
his rights.] 6 See cases in the Digests under "Sureties." See,
2 Anderson v. Talboit, 1 Heisk., 407. 410. also, ante, §§ 805; 962.
3 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 258; See, ante, 7 Miller v. Speed, 9 Heisk., 198.
Injunction, §§ 811-812; Exoneration of Sureties, 8 Deckard v. Edwards, 2 Sneed, 93, 102 : McNairy
§ 962 Rescission, § 947.
;
v. Eastland, 10 Yerg., 310; Greene V. Starnes, 1
4 Saunders V. Everett, 3 Tenn. Ch., 520. See Heisk., 582; Watson v. Sutherland, 1 Tenn. Ch.,
ante, 5 812. 211. See, Subrogation, ante, § 964.
§ 1043 SUITS TO PROTECT INTERESTS IN LANDS.' 828
doing, or threatening to do, some act detrimental to the rights of the remainder
man, the latter may, on a bill quia timet, enjoin the party in possession from
doing such act.
§ 1043. Suits to Protect the Homestead. A conveyance of the homestead—

without his wife joining therein as required by the statute is void so far as she
is concerned and she may, by next friend, file a bill in Chancery to have such
;
sale declared a cloud upon her homestead, and the purchaser perpetually en-
joined from attempting to enforce it. Her husband must be made a defendant
along with the purchaser. So the husband, or any head of a family, may file
a bill to protect his homestead when levied on illegally, or in any case when his
right is put in jeopardy.
BILL BY WIPE TO PROTECT HEP. HOMESTEAD.

[For address and caption see, ante, §§ 155; 164.]
Complainant, Mary Doe,
wife of the defendant, John Doe, suing by James Buck, her next
friend, respectfully shows to the Court
I.
That she is the wife of the defendant John Doe, and that down to April 1, 1905, she
and her said husband were in possession of the following tract of land [or, house and lot;
locating it and describing it: see, ante, § 172.]
ii.
That said tract of land [or house and lot] was the only real estate owned by her husband
on said April 1, 1905, and was then occupied by her husband and his family, herself included,
as their homestead. On said day her husband sold and conveyed said tract of land [or house
and lot] to his co-defendant, John Short. Complainant did not join in said conveyance, and
in no way participated therein. 9 On the other hand, she positively refused to sign the deed,
having regard to the fact that her husband owned no other land, and that she was the mother
of six children, the oldest of them thirteen years old.
in.
That her husband has acquired no real estate since said conveyance by him, and if he and
she should be dispossessed under said conveyance they would have no home or land of their
own to go to.
IV.
That [If the defendant, Short, obtained said conveyance for an inadequate consideration,
or in payment of old debts, or on any other unmeritorious consideration, state the facts. If
he is threatening to take any legal steps to obtain possession, so state. If he has been endeav-
oring to persuade or pay complainant to sign and acknowledge said conveyance, state the
circumstances.}
v.
Complainant resolved never to voluntarily give up her said homestead until another is
is
provided for her, and there is no prospect of another therefore, she comes to your Honor
:
and prays
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [&c. : see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2d. That said conveyance by her husband to his co-defendant, John Short, be declared
null and void and of no effect, and a cloud on her homestead rights and that said defendant,
;
John Short, be perpetually enjoined at the hearing from in any way asserting, or attempting
to assert, any claim to said tract of land under said conveyance, and that her right to said
homestead be declared and quieted.
3d. That she have such further arid other relief as her case may require, and your Honor
may deem proper. James Sevier, Solicitor.
§ 1044. —
Suits to Redeem. Whenever the right to redeem land exists,
whether by contract, decree, or operation of law, and the party in possession
under the contract, decree or sheriff's deed refuses to surrender the possession
on tender of the redemption money, or disputes complainant's right of redemp-
tion, the proper remedy is a bill in Chancery to enforce such right. The right
to redeem land exists: (1) where the mortgagee, or his assignee, is in posses-
sion, and the mortgage debt has been duly paid or tendered; and (2) where
the land has been sold subject to redemption, and the amount of the bid and
interest has been duly paid, or tendered.
The wife is not bound by any participation, un-l less she signed and acknowledged the deed as re-
|
quired by the statute.
829 SUITS TO PROTECT INTERESTS IN LANDS. § 1044
BILL TO REDEEM.
i.
That on the 19th day of April, 1901, he was the owner in fee of the following tract of
land in the 4th civil district of Campbell county, adjoining the lands of William Allen^ Alex-
ander Lloyd, and others, and bounded as follows Beginning on a stake at the ndfthwest
:
corner of the Baptist Church lot, [giving description by corners, courses and distances, or
other adequate description: see, § 172, ante.]
II.
That on said day said tract of land was sold [Here show how it was sold, whether by the
Sheriff under an execution, or by the Clerk and Master of a Chancery Court, and not in bar
of redemption, or by a Comity Trustee. If under execution or decree, specify the Court,
ond if by a County Trustee state of what county. If sold under a mortgage or deed of trust
with power of sale, so state, and briefly describe the instrument.]
in.
That at said sale the defendant became the purchaser at the price of six hundred dollars
[If any one redeemed from the purchaser, so state, and give the facts, and make him the
defendant. If the original purchaser has parted with his interest in the land state the facts
and make his assignee or vendee the defendant, or one of the defendants.] The defendant
is in possession of said land under his said purchase, and has so been in possession ever since
the 2nd day of August, 1901, enjoying the rents and profits thereof [If the defendant is not
in possession by self or tenant, omit this allegation.]
IV.
That on the 2nd day of January, 1902, complainant tendered to the defendant the sum of
[stating the amount of money tendered, which, of course, must be the full amount paid for
the land at said sale, and interest thereon to the day of the tender. If the tender or payment
is made to the Clerk of the Court under whose judgment or decree the land was sold, so state,
and explain why not made to the purchaser, 10 ] which he refused to receive, denying com-
plainant's right to redeem and claiming that he owned the land free from any liability of
redemption by complainant. [// the money was paid to the Clerk and refused by the defend-
ant, so modify the above allegation.]
v
The premises considered, complainant now brings said redemption money into Court,
principal and interest, and continues the tender thereof and prays
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c. : see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2d. That complainant's right to redeem said tract of land be declared and enforced, and
the title and possession thereof be restored to him as fully as though said sale had never
been made.
3d. That the defendant be compelled to account for the rents and profits of said land
while in his possession or under his control, and that a reference to the Master be had to
ascertain the amount due.
4th. That complainant have such further and other relief in the premises as may be just
and equitable. W. A. Owens, Solicitor.
If the defendant is committing any waste on the land, so charge in the bill,
and specify the character and amount of such waste, and if it be considerable,
and the redemption money insufficient to cover it, pray for an injunction
against the waste, and also for a receiver. In such a case the bill must be
verified.
10 Acts of 1870, ch. 111. The party entitled to of redemption is absolutely denied. Rogers v. Tin-
redeem has the right to pay the redemption money dell, 15 Pick., 356. If the Clerk received the money,
to the Clerk. If the money has been paid to the but the defendant refused it, and claims the land,
Clerk of the Court no tender is necessary; nor is denying complainant's right to redeem, so allege.
any tender necessary where the complainant's right
$1045 SUlTg TO RECOVER LAND. 830
ARTIQLE II.
SUITS TO RECOVER INTERESTS IN LAND.

1045. An Ejectment Bill. § 1049. Frame and Form of Decrees in Suits
1046. Form of an Ejectment Bill. to Recover Land.
1047. What a Complainant in an Ejectment § 10S0. Orders and Bonds to Secure Rents
Suit Must Prove. in Case of Appeal.
1048. Defences to an Ejectment Bill.
§ 1045. An Ejectment Bill. —A

bill may be filed in the Chancery Court (1>
to recover land when the title of the complainant is disputed, or (2) to recover
the possession of houses or lands when the complainant's right of possession is
denied or disputed. 1 In drawing an ejectment bill it is, ordinarily, not neces-
sary to do more than (1) to aver that the complainant is the owner in fee of,
or has a present subsisting life-estate in, or has a leasehold estate, or has an
undivided interest as tenant, in common, or has an easement, or some other
specified valid subsisting legal interest, in the particular land described in
the bill, and a right to the immediate possession thereof; 2 (2) to describe the
land so as to identify it; (3) to show when and how the defendant obtained
possession, or what acts of ownership he is exercising, what damage he is
doing to the fee, if any, and, generally wherein and how he is interfering with
the complainant's rights or interests in or to said land; (4) to specify what
rents and profits the defendant has, or might have received, or is liable for,
and what timber he has cut, coal mined, stone or marble quarried, buildings
<ir fences removed, or other waste committed, and the value thereof; 3 (5) to
pray to have the complainant's rights to said land declared and enforced, to
L.ave him put in possession thereof, to have the defendant's deed or other evi-
dence of title, if any, declared a cloud on complainant's title, and removed,
and the defendant perpetually enjoined from setting up any further claim to
said land under said title, and (6) to pray for an account of the rents and
profits received, and of the waste committed, by the defendant, and a decree
therefor, and for general relief. If the defendant has any color of title, it
may be prudent to specify it, and show its infirmity, and pray to have it
declared a cloud. The land, lot, or house sued for should be described accord-
ing to the complainant's title papery; and the suit must be brought in the
county where the land, or some part of it, is situated. The bill need not be
sworn to, unless it prays for some extraordinary process.
If the complainant is entitled to the immediate possession of the house, lot,
or tract sued for, it is not necessary to allege title or if he has title in common
;
with others, or has a mere life-estate or a leasehold interest, it is not necessary
1 In other words, whenever an ejectment suit or a the Chancery Court of its jurisdiction. Frazier V.
forcible entry and detainer, or a forcible or unlawful Browning, 11 Lea, 25 3.
detainer suit will lie in the Circuit Court, a bill will 2 Code, §§3229; 3235.
3 An ejectment bill in Chancery is more effective
lie in Chancery for the same relief.
The jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to enter- than an ejectment suit in the Circuit Court, because
tain an ejectment bill was well settled before the Act rents and the value of waste can be recovered, and
of 1877, ch. 97. Almony v. Hicks, 3 Head, 39; waste and trespasses can be enjoined, in the same
Buck v. Williams, 10 Heisk., 277; Coal Creek M. & suit; wbereas, in the Circuit Court, the value of the
M. Co. v. Ross, 12 Lea, 8; and Ross v. Scott. 15 waste and the rents cannot be recovered in the eject-
Lea, 489; Walsh V. Crook, 7 Pick., 388. Now, ment suit. And tenants in common may recover the
under the Act of 1877, the jurisdiction of the Chan- land by an ejectment bill, and by the same bill have
cery Court is co-extensive with that of the Circuit the land partitioned.t
Burks v. Burks, 7 Bax., 357.
Court in suits to recover possession of land. Smith But an ejectment bill by one tenant in common
v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 743. And the fact that the land does not enure to the benefit of his co-tenants.
is of less value than fifty dollars does not deprive Williams v. M. & M. Co., 7 Cates, 578.
83 SUITS TO RECOVER LAND. § 1046
to define the extent or character of his title it will be sufficient for him to
:
allege that he is owner of, and entitled to. the possession of, the tract sued for.
Nevertheless, as a rule, it is better pleading to specify the character and extent
of the complainant 's title and interest, because, although when he sues for th<s
whole, he can recover such a part and such an interest as he may be entitled
tp, nevertheless an excessive or general claim, when not justified by the proo£>
may cause such an increase of costs that the complainant may be taxed with s,
part thereof as a penalty for not specifying his title or claim more precisely.
If the bill be to recover possession alone, in the nature of a detainer bill, it
need allege only (1) that the complainant is entitled to the immediate posses-
sion of the tract or lot of land, describing it, and (2) that the defendant unlaw-
fully detains the same from him and may pray for a decree for rents, as weU
;
as that the complainant be restored to the possession of the premises sued for.
The value of the land, or of the interest claimed, or of the use or rents of
the land, is immaterial to the jurisdiction of the Court, 4 whether the bill seeks
to recover the land on the strength of title, or seeks to recover the possession
only.
§ 1046. Form of an Ejectment Bill. The following — form will help to illus-
trate the general requisites of an ejectment bill:
AN EJECTMENT BILL.
To the Hon. Henry R. Gibson, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Huntsville
John Claimer, a resident of Scott county, complainant,
vs.
George Possessor, James Waster, and Henry Trespasser, all residents of Scott
county, defendants.
i.
That he is owner in fee of [or, that he owns for and during the term of his natural
the
life, or, that he owns for and during the term of the natural life of Sarah Brown, the widow
of John Brown, or, during the term of the natural life of John Brown, tenant by courtesy
<vf the lands of Sarah Brown, his deceased wife, or, that he owns an undivided one-fourth
tnterest in fee, or for hislife, as tepant in common with the said defendants; or, that he is
the owner of a leasehold estate of five years in] and entitled to the immediate possession or,
the following tract of land, situated in the 2d civil district of Scott county: Beginning on a
large walnut, [and so on, describing the land precisely, according to the description by metes
and bounds in the complainant s deed, or other evidence of title,} to the beginning, containing
two hundred acres, more or less, and adjoining the lands of Charles Brown and Henry
White.
ii.
Complainant further shows to the Court that, notwithstanding his ownership of said land
[or, of said interest in said land;] and notwithstanding he is, and has ever since the 1st day
of May, 1890, been entitled to the ppssession, use, and enjoyment of said land, and of the
rents, profits, and fruits thereof, the defendant, George Possessor, on the 1st day of June,
1890, took possession of said land, and has continued in possession thereof ever since, using it
as his own, and appropriating the rents and profits. And the defendants, James Waster and
Henry Trespasser, have been, by agreement with said George Possessor, cutting valuable .
trees on said land, and are now engaged in cutting and destroying other trees on said land,
and removing them therefrom. [Specify all acts of waste or trespass committed by the
defendants, or by any of them.] The destruction of said trees is an irreparable injury to
said land.
in.
Thedefendant, George Possessor, has recently obtained a grant from the State for five
thousand acres of land. This grant covers complainant's said tract, and is a cloud on his title
thereto. Complainant holds under an entry and grant thirty-six years older than defendant's,
and complainant's privies had twenty years' possession- under the grant from which com-
plainant's title is derived. The other defendants are claiming to hold and act under their
co-defendant, George Possessor.
rv.
Thepremises considered, complainant nrays:

1st. That process issue [&c, as in §§ 1S8; 164, ante.}
2d. That the defendants be enjoined from cutting any trees, or committing any other waste,
•on said tract of land; and that they be enjoined from removing, selling, or jn any way dis-
4 The Chancery Court has jurisdiction even when I the land is of less value than fifty dollars. Frazier
I
v. Browning, 11 Lea, 253.
§1047 SUITS TO RECOVER LAND. 832
posing of the trees already cut on said land ; and that a receiver be appointed to sell the said
trees already cut, and hold the proceeds subject to the order of the Court.
3d. That the title and right of possession to said tract of land be decreed to complainant,
and that he be put in the possession thereof by decree of your Honor's Court. _
4th. That complainant be given a decree for all the rents and profits of said land while in
the defendants' possession, and for the value of all trees cut on said land by the defendants,
or by any of them; and that full damages be allowed complainant for any and all waste and
other injury done said land by the defendants, or any of them, and that an account be taken
to ascertain the value of said rents and profits, the value of the said trees cut, and the amount
of damages for waste and injury to said land. 5
Sth. That the said younger entry and grant of the defendant, George Possessor, be declared
void, and a cloud on complainant's title, and removed as such; and that the defendants be
perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim, or doing any acts whatsoever, under or by
virtue of said entry or grant.
6th. And that complainant be given such other and further relief as he may be entitled to
at the hearing.
This is the first application for an injunction or receiver in this case.
Jim F. Baker, Solicitor. John Claimer.
[Annex affidavit to the bill, as in § 789, ante.]
Notice to the defendant
At the hearing of this cause, I will introduce and read as proof the following documentary
evidence
1st. A grant for said land from the State of Tennessee to Thomas Chambers, No. 12,643,
based on entry 819, by Dennis Angel, made in the entry taker's office in Scott county, on May
21,1853. Said grant is dated July 1, 1854.
2d. A deed for said granted land from Thomas Chambers to James Williams, made Sep-
tember 3, 1860. This deed is registered in Scott county.
3d. A decree made March 30, 1869, by the Chancery Court of Scott county in the case of
Henry Adkins vs. James Williams et al., vesting the title of said land in me, the complainant.
I will introduce the original record in the cause.
4th. A deed by J. M. Newport, C. & M., conveying said land to me by virtue of said Chan-
cery decree. May 20, 1891. John Claimer,
By Jim F. Baker, Solicitor.
§ 1047. What
a Complainant in an Ejectment Suit Must Prove. The com- —
plainant must show a valid subsisting legal or equitable interest in the real
property sued for, and the right to the immediate possession thereof; 6 and, if
the defendant is not in possession, must, also, show that he, the defendant, is
claiming an interest therein, or was exercising acts of ownership thereon when
the bill was filed. 7
A 1, By a grant from the State; or 2, bj'
legal title is ordinarily proved:
connected conveyances from the grantee; or 3, by seven years' adverse posses-
sion under a color of title or 4, by a decree divesting the title out of the de-
;
fendant and vesting it in the complainant or 5, by a deed from the defendant,

;
or from a Sheriff or Court Commissioner, conveying the defendant's title,

when so authorized: or 6, by a superior deed, or title-bond, from the party
under whom the defendant claims; or 7, by proof that the defendant was a
tenant whose term has expired, or been forfeited; or 8, by proof by the com-
plainant mortgagor that the mortgage debt has been paid, when the mortgagee
8
is defendant and in possession.
§ 1048. Defences to an Ejectment Bill.—The complainant must introduce

the same character and quantity of proof in support of an ejectment bill in
Chancery, as is required in an ejectment suit in the Circuit Court; and, on the
other hand, the defendant may make the same defences. 9
The defendant may make defence by plea in abatement, motion to dismiss,
demurrer, plea in bar or answer, or he may disclaim in whole or in part or if ;
See Bains v. Berry, 1 Lea. 37. 8 See Digests for the decisions.
6 Code, § 3229. The complainant in the Chancery o An ejectment bill must not be confounded with
Court can sue on an equitable interest coupled with bills to set up and enforce equitable rights to, or
the right of immediate possession. Thus, he can sue interests in, realty, or to remove clouds; the latter
his vendee, in possession under an absolute deed, are strictly bills in Eouity, and the character of the
which is really a mortgage, and the mortgage debt proof and of the relief are quite different, as is,
paid; or he can sue a defendant holding under a also, the character of the defences made. An eject-
sheriff's deed when the redemption money has been ment bill, ordinarily, seeks to enforce legal rights,
paid. only.
7 Code, 8 3231.
833 SUITS TO RECOVER LAND. § 1048
he is entitled to any affirmative relief against the complainant, or against the
complainant and a co-defendant, he may file a cross bill. The defence on the
merits is usually made by answer or by answer as to so much of the land sued
;
for as the defendant claims, and by disclaimer as to the residue.

The usual defences to an ejectment bill are (1) a denial of the complainant's
:
title; (2) the plea of title in the defendant; 10 and (3) the plea of the statute of
limitations. 11 These pleas may be, and generally are, set up in an answer. The
plea of innocent purchaser is not available against a pure ejectment bill. 13
The following forms will indicate how the foregoing defences are usually made
in an answer
ANSWER DENYING THE COMPLAINANT'S TITLE."
Further answering, the [or, this] defendant denies that the complainant has any title what-
ever to the land described in his bill, or to any part thereof, or to any interest therein; and
denies that the complainant has any right whatever to the possession of said land, or of any
part thereof; and the [or. this] defendant will require the complainant to prove his title and
right of possession by strict legal proof. The defendant denies, also, that he is guilty of un-
lawfully withholding the said tract of land, or any part thereof. 14
ANSWER SETTING DP TITLE IN THE DEFENDANT.
Further answering, the [or, this] defendant says that the title to the land described in the
bill 15 is in him that he has been in peaceable continuous adverse possession thereof, [in
;
person and by those through whom he claims,] for more than twenty years before the bill
was filed, claiming title thereto in fee; and the [or, this] defendant relies on and pleads said
twenty years' possession and, also, pleads that he had had actual continuous adverse posses-
;
sion of said land for more than seven years before the complainant's bill was filed, and he
pleads the statute of limitations of seven years in bar of said bill. 10
ANSWER PLEADING SEVEN YEARS' POSSESSION UNDER COLOR OP TITLE.
Further answering, these defendants say that before the bill was filed in this cause, they,
[by themselves and those through whom they claim, or, by those through whom they claim.
as the case may be,] had had seven years' actual continuous adverse possession of the land
described in the complainant's bill [or, of the following tract of land, describing it,] holding
by conveyance [devise, grant, or other assurance of title, specifying his title-paper,] purporting
to convey to these defendants an estate in fee; and these defendants say that they have
a good and indefeasible title in fee to the land so described in their said conveyance, [devise,
grant, or other assurance of title;] and they, also, plead and rely on the statute of limitations
of seven years in bar of said bill.
If the defendant claims a part, only, of the land sued for, he must state dis-
tinctly in his pleadings the extent of his claim, or he will be taxed with all, or
at least, a part of the costs of the cause even though he succeeds to the extent
of his possessions, or actual claim. The defendant cannot, however, dispute
the title of the complainant to the zvhole tract, and, in the same answer, dis-
claim as to a part of the, tract. 17
The following is the form of an answer and disclaimer to an ejectment bill,
when the defendant claims only a part of the land sued for
ANSWER AND DISCLAIMER TO AN EJECTMENT BILL.
John Doe, 1
vs.
f
—
No. 423. In the Chancery Court, at Kingston, Tenn.
This defendant, Romeo Roe, for separate answer and disclaimer to the bill filed against
him and others, in this cause, says
i.
That when the cause was filed he was. and now is,' "in possession of the following
bill in this
tract of land 18: [Here describe it by metes and bounds, according to the defendant's deed
or other writing, if he have any; if none, describe it by natural objects, fences, or other
sufficient description.] This defendant then claimed, and now claims, said tract of land
10 See Plea of Title in the Defendant, ante, § 327. he must carefully and definitely specify the bounds
11 See, ante, § 331. of the tract he claims; and disrlaim as to the re-
12 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., 5§ 743; 765. mainder of the land sued for in the bill.
13 When the complainant's title is denied he must io It is prudent to add the plea of the statute of
show a title against all the World; and the defendant seven years to the defence of twenty years' posses-
can, in such a case, show an outstanding title without sion; and, also, to the defence of seven years' pos-
specially pleading it. Bleidorn v. Pil^t Mt. Coal session Under a color of title.
Co., 5 Pick.. 166: Woods v. Bonner, 5 Pick., 411. 17 See, ante, 8 395.
14 Code, § 3239. IS Code, §§ 3231; 3234.
15 If the defendant does not claim the whole tract,
§. 1049 SUITS TO RECOVER LAND. 834
as his own, and denies that the complainant has, or at the commencement of this suit, had,
ciny title or just claim thereto whatever, or any right to the possession thereof whatsover.
ii.
Further answering, defendant says, that he had had the actual, open, notorious, and
this
adverse, possession of the above described tract of land for more than seven whole contin-
uous years before said bill was filed, and that such possession still continues and now exists;
and he relies upon said adverse possession, for said term of seven years before this suit was
brought, as a bar to this suit, and pleads the statute of limitations of seven years, in and
for such case made and provided, as a defence to complainant's bill.
in.
Further answering, this defendant says, that as to the remainder of the tract described in
the bill, he is not in possession thereof, nor was he in possession thereof, or claiming any
interest therein, or exercising any acts of ownership thereover, 19 at or before the bringing
of this suit and as to such remainder, this defendant says he never at any time claimed it,
;
or any interest therein, and now disclaims all and every right, title and claim therein and
thereto, legal and equitable.^
IV.
Further answering, this respondent says that he admits that he has had the use and benefit
of the land described in the first paragraph of this answer, and has enjoyed the fruits, rents,
and profits thereof; and says he was entitled so to do, the land being his.
And now, having fully answered, this defendant prays to be dismissed with his costs.
Romeo Roe.
Wright, Solicitor.
T. A.
Where a defendant disclaims, his answer should be signed by him in person,
.md must be sworn to as in case of other answers, unless his oath is waived. 20
§ 1049. Frame and Form of Decrees in Suits to Recover Lands. As already —
stated in the Chapter on Decrees. 21 a decree for a complainant usually follows
the special prayer of the bill: so a decree in a suit to recover land, if for the
bill, will usually give the complainant what he specially prays for, and declares
the nature and extent of his title and interest to and in the premises sued for,
and awards him the possession. If the suit is for possession only the decree
will declare him entitled to the possession. If complainant is, also, entitled to
any rents and profits, and to damages for waste, 22 the decree may order the
Master to report the amounts thereof.
DECREE ON AN EJECTMENT [OB RETAINER] BILL.
On consideration whereof it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, by the Court:
1st. That complainant is the owner in fee of, [or has a life interest in, or is entitled to
the possession of,] the tract of land described in the bill, [or, of the following portion of
the tract of land described in the bill, describing it: see, ante, § 172,] and has the right to the
possession thereof; 23 and a writ of possession will issue to put him in possession. Said
land so adjudged to the complainant is described as follows [Here give corners, courses,
:
and distances, and location, if not before given in the decree. Se'e, ante, § 172.]
2d. That the Master hear proof and rtport to the next term of the Court, the reasonable
value of the rents and profits of said tract of land while in the possession of the defendant,
or of those holding under him; and, until the incoming of such report, all other questions
are reserved.
The defendant will pay all the costs of the cause, for which an execution will issue.
§ 1050. Orders and Bonds to Secure Rents in Case of Appeal. If the decree —
is in favor of the complainant, he is put in possession at once, unless the de-
fendant appeals and gives bond for double two years' rent of the premises.
If the defendant appeals without giving bond, the complainant gives a like
bond, and is put into possession. If the party giving the bond is finaUy de-
feated a decree is rendered against him and his sureties on said bond for the
value of the accrued rents and the costs. 24
The party appealing may take the pauper oath as to the costs, but not as to
19 Code, § 3231. The complainant has the right §§ 393-398.
to show, by proof, that this disclaimer is false, and 21 See, ante, §§ 566-568.
thus onerate the defendant with the costs of the _ 22 The complainant would be entitled to damages
suit, and obtain a writ of possession^ But no writ of for waste if in his bill he prayed an injunction to
possession can be had unless complainant shows that stay waste being committed. See. ante, §5 36; 38.
the disclaimer is false. McDonough V. Prater, 2 23 This clause will be omitted in a detainer decree.
Shan. Cas., 114. 24 Acts of 1879, ch. 85.
20 See Article on Disclaimers to Bills, ante,
835 SUITS TO RECOVER LAND. § 1050'
the rents. If the bond by the party in possession at any time becomes deficient
the Court in which the suit is pending will require new and sufficient security,
or return the possession to the other party. 25
The following would be the form of a prayer and grant of appeal in such a
case:
From the foregoing decree the defendant prays an appeal to the next term of the Supreme
Court to be held at Knoxville, and having given bond for rents and costs said appeal is
granted. [Or, but having failed to give a bond for rents and costs, and the complainant
having given such bond, a writ of possession will issue instanter to put him in possession of
the premises described in the decree. Upon the defendant executing a bond for costs, or
taking the pauper oath, his prayer is granted.]
BOND BY DEFENDANT TO COVER, RENTS ON APPEAL.

John Doe, 1
vs. In Chancery at Nashville.

J-
Richard Roe. J
We, Richard Roe, John Jones, and Henry Long, acknowledge ourselves indebted to John
Doe in the penal sum of dollars, [insert double the value of tsvuo years' rent of ihs
premises;] but this obligation to be void if said Richard Roe shall pay the costs and damages
which said John Doe may sustain by his failure to obtain possession of the premises by him
recovered in the above entitled cause, and will abide by and perform the judgment of the
Supreme Court rendered on the final hearing of said cause.
[Bond to be duly dated^signed and witnessed.]
The following are forms of bonds to be given on an appeal in such cases
BOND BY COMPLAINANT TO COVER RENTS ON APPEAL.
John Doe, ]
vs. In Chancery at Nashville.

J-
Richard Roe. J
We, John Doe, and Charles Brown and John Smith, acknowledge ourselves indebted to
Richard Roe in the penal sum of dollars [insert double the value of tivo years' rent
:
of the premises:] but this obligation to be void if said John Doe shall pay all costs and
damages which may be sustained by said Richard Roe from sard John Doe for wrongfully
enforcing a writ of possession awarded him in the above entitled cause, and will abide by
and perform the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered on the final hearing of said cause.
[Bond to be duly dated, signed and witnessed.]
BILL TO RECOVER LAND, TO HAVE A RECEIVER AND REMOVE A CLOTTD.20
Complainants respectfully show to the Court:
1.
That they are the owners in fee of the house and lot, No. 26, street, in the city of Home
Nashville, said lot fronting 25 feet on said street and running due north between parallel
lines about two hundred feet to Jones alley; and is bounded on the east by the lot of William
Price and on the west by the lot of George Jones. This lot complainants inherited from
their father, James Doe, who has recently died intestate, leaving no widow, and complainants
are his only heirs at law.
n.
That said house and lot are in the possession of the defendant, Rachel Roe, who pretends
that she bought the same from complainants' father, but complainants charge that there is
no foundation in law for such pretence; and that if she has any writing of any sort, it was
obtained by fraud, imposition or undue influence, while their father was unlawfully cohabit-
ing with her, and was weak in mind and body, and completely in her power; and if she has
any such writing, or deed, for said house and lot from their father, complainants call on
her to produce and file it with her answer, and to state what consideration she paid therefor.
in.
That the rents of said house and worth ten dollars per month, and the defend-
lot are well
ant has had possession thereof ever since June 10, 190S, the date of their father's death, now
nearly six months; and she is utterly insolvent, having no visible property except some cheap
household and kitchen furniture, worth not exceeding fifty dollars.
IV.

2d. That the title and right of possession to said house and lot be decreed to complainants,
and that they be given a decree against the defendant for the reasonable rents of said house
and lot since the date of their father's death.
is Ibid I Pick., 282: and for an answer and cross bill to it,
26 This bill is based on Vaughn V. Vaughn, 16 | see, ante, § 405.

§1051 SUITS TO RECOVER ESCHEATED PROPERTY. 836
3d. That a receiver be appointed to take possession of said house and lot and collect the
rents, pending this litigation; and that if the taxes are unpaid, and the house uninsured, he
pay the taxes and insurance out of said rents.
4th. That if the defendant has any paper writing purporting to be a deed or conveyance
of any interest in said house and lot, that it be declared fraudulent and void, and be cancelled
as a cloud on their title.
Sth. That they have such other and further relief as they may be entitled to.
This is the first application for a receiver in this case.
James Trimble, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, §§ 164; 789.]
ORDER, IN REFERENCE TO A RECEIVER.

application for the appointment of a receiver in this case coming
The on for hearing at
Chambers is continued until the incoming of the defendant's answer.
This November 22, 190S.
John Allison, Chancellor.
It in this ease if the Chancellor had appointed
would have been not improper
a receiver, as prayed, unless the defendant within five days gave bond and
security for the rents.
ARTICLE III.
SUITS TO RECOVER ESCHEATED PROPERTY.

§ 1051. When Property Escheats to the State. I § 1052. Frame and Form of Bill to Have
I
Property Declared Escheated.
§ 1051. When Property Escheats to the State. The State has the ultimum —
dominium, or eminent domain, over all property within its territory x and when ;
any person dies intestate in the State, leaving no widow or relatives, all of his
property, real and persona), escheats to the State, for the use of the common
school fund; 2 and it is the duty of the District Attorney to file a bill in the
Chancery Court of the County wherein the escheated land is situated, in the
name of the State, and without security, to have the land declared escheated, 3
and to have it sold. 4
§ 1052. Frame and Form

of Bill to Have Property Declared Escheated.
The District Attorney of the county in which the land lies in case of land, or
in which the decedent resided at the time of his death in case of personal prop-
erty, files the bill and the following frame and form may aid him in formulat-
;
ing his bill
GENERAL FORM OF AN ESCHEAT BILL.

[For address and caption see the form next after this.]
Complainant, the State of Tennessee, suing by , her District Attorney,
respectfully shows to the Court
I.
That [Here show that has died intestate in county, without

issue, and leaving no ividow, nor relatives entitled to his estate.]
II.
That said was at his death the owner of the following real and personal property
in said county: [Here describe it.]
in.
That, [Here show who, if any one, has been appointed administrator, and make him a
defendant; and show what, if anything, has been done ivith the personal estate.]
IV.
That, [Here show who is in possession of the real estate, and what profits or rents, if any,
have accrued to him therefrom, and make him a defendant.]
1 Townsend v. Townsend, Peck, 17. | 3 Code, (M. & V.) § 2144a; State 1>. Allen, 2 Tenn '
2 Code, § 2138. | Ch. f 42.

I 4 Code, (M. & V.) §2144d.
837 SUITS TO RECOVER ESCHEATED PROPERTY. § 1052
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c, as in §§158; 164, ante.]
2d. [For remainder of bill see the form following.)
BILL TO DECLARE AND ENFORCE AN ESCHEATS

To Hon. F. H. Heiskell, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Memphis
The State of Tennessee, complainant,
vs.
Thomas L. Beasley, a resident of Shelby county, and the unknown )
heirs of Harris Goldberg, deceased, defendants. \

Complainant, The State of Tennessee, suing by George S. Yerger, her District Attorney,
respectfully shows to the Court:
i.
That Harris Goldberg died January 17, 1897, leaving no widow

intestate in Shelby county,
or children, or other relative or heir, but seized and possessed of the following lot of land.
[Describing it.]
ii.
That the defendant, Thomas L. Beasley, is in possession of said claiming it under a

lot,
tax deed, which complainant charges is void, 1st, because such deed based on a sale madeis
after said Goldberg's death; 2d, because defendant, Beasley, when he made his said purchase
and took said deed, was the agent of said Goldberg in possession of said lot; and 3d, he had
funds in his hands as such agent sufficient to have paid said taxes, and it was his duty to
have so applied them and so complainant charges that his said purchase was fraudulent
;
and void, and that said deed is a cloud on complainant's 'title to said land.
in.
That Richard Roe was appointed administrator of the personal estate of said Goldberg,
and that all of his debts have been paid, leaving said lot free from all lawful claim by any
creditor or other person; but defendant Beasley is in possession of said lot, enjoying its rents
and profits, claiming under his deed as aforesaid.
IV.
That complainant has made names and residences of the heirs and
diligent inquiry for the
relatives of said Goldberg, any, but has been unable to ascertain whether there be any,
if
and so complainant charges that there are no such heirs nor relatives, and that therefore said
lot of land is complainant's property by escheat, and was her property when said tax sale
was made, whereby said sale was void, the tax lien having become merged into the complain-
ant's fee title to the lot.
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue against defendant, Beasley, requiring him to appear
and answer this bill, but his oath to his answer is waived.
2d. That publication be made, as required by law, calling upon the unknown heirs of
said Harris Goldberg, and all persons, claiming under him, in any manner or way whatever,
to enter their appearance and answer this bill. /
3d. That, if no lawful claimant to said lot of land appear, said tax deed be declared a cloud
on complainant's title and removed, and the said lot be sold, and its proceeds applied under
the statute in reference to escheats.
4th. That, in the meantime, a receiver be appointed to take charge of said lot, rent out
the same, and account for the rents and profits thereof; and that the defendant, Beasley,
be required to account for all rents and profits by him received from said lot since the death
of said Goldberg.
5th. That complainant have such further and other relief as to your Honor may seem
proper.
This is the first application for a receiver in this case.
George S. Yerger, District Attorney.
5 This bill is based on the State v. Goldberg, 5 Cates, 298.

§1053 SUITS TO RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY. 838
ARTICLE IV.
SUITS TO RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY.
§ 10S3. A Replevin Bill. § 1055. Form of the Bond, and Writ of Re-
plevin.
§ 1054. Form of a Replevin Bill. § 10S6. Proceedings Upon a Replevin Bill.
§ 1057. A Detinue Bill Its Frame and Form.
:
§ 1053. A Replevin Bill. A replevin bill — may be filed in the Chancery

Court in any ease where a replevin suit may be brought in the Circuit Court. 1
Formerly, a replevin bill would not lie in Chancery, unless the property pos-
sessed some peculiar extrinsic value as an heir-loom, a family relic, a picture,
silver plate, a ring, or some other article of peculiar, uncommon, or unique
character, or unless it possessed some other special value not to be compen-
sated in damages; but under the Act of 1877, 2 the Chancery Court now has
jurisdiction in a replevin suit in any case triable in the Circuit Court.
The bill in such a case should contain the substance of the affidavit for the
writ, and the substance of the declaration, at law and should aver 1, that the ;
complainant entitled to the possession of the property proposed to be replev-

is
ied, describing it with reasonable certainty; 2, that the defendant has seized,
or detains the same and 3, that it was not subject to such seizure, detention or
;
execution and 4, should pray for a writ of replevin, and for the value of the
;
hire or use of the property from a day named. 3 The bill must be sworn to by
the complainant, his agent or attorney. 4
§ 1054. —
Form of a Replevin Bill. The following is the form of a replevin
bill, omitting the address and commencement which are in the usual form ;
A REPLEVIN BILL.
I.
That he the owner, and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession, of a certain,
is
pair of bay horses, about eight years old, with a star in their foreheads and a small R
branded on the left shoulder of each and of a certain set of double nickle-plated harness
;
worn by said horses and of a certain two-horse family carriage, all now or lately in the
;
stable and carriage-house, No. 27 Jockey street, in the city of Memphis, Shelby county.
II.
That said property unlawfully detained from the complainant by the defendant; and
is
has been so unlawfully detained for the period of twenty days, during which time the defend-
ant has had the possession and use thereof. None of said property is subject to detention by
defendant; and the detention thereof is wholly unlawful. Said property was bequeathed
to complainant by his father; and for that reason has great extrinsic value to the complainant,
'
not to be estimated in money. .
1 The fact that the property is of less value than means of money, and not susceptible of being com-
fifty dollars is no objection to the jurisdiction. See pensated for by anv practical or certain measure of
Frazier v. Browning, 11 Lea. 253. damages. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 177; 185; Womack r.
2 Ch. 97. A replevin suit is not for any injury Smith, 11 Hum.. 478.
to the property, but merely to recover its possession, A replevin bill in Equity is more effective than a
and the value of the hire or use thereof during the replevin at law. At law. the defendant may so con-
detention. Colbv v. Yates, 12 Heisk., 267. ceal the property that the officer may be unable to
A replevin bill, before the Art of 1877, could be find it, while in Equity the Court will, by process of
filed to enforce the specific delivery of property to attachment, compel the defendant to surrender the
the complainant when the property was of peculiar propertv.
value and importance, and the loss could not be fully 3 Code, 85 3374-3376.
compensated in damages. 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 709. 4 The affidavit must be before the Clerk of the
The Chancery Court has always had jurisdiction to Court in which the bill is filed; and such affidavit
compel the restoration, or delivery of possession, of mav be "n the affiant's information and belief.
specific chattels of such a peculiar, uncommon, or Code, § 3376.
unique character that they cannot be replaced by
'839 SUITS W RECOVER PERSON' AL PROPERTY. § 1055
That said pair of harses is reasonably worth, five hundred dollars; said harness is reasori-
worth one hundred and twenty-five dollars, and said carriage is reasonably worth four
.ably
hundred dollars; and. the use of said horses, harness and carriage, is reasonably worth thi-ee
J
dollars a day. .
'
IV.
The premises considered, complainant prays:'
That the defendant be brought into Court by the issuance and service of alt necessary
1st.
and proper process, and be required to answer this bill, but his oath to his answer is
waived.
2d. That a writ of replevin be at once issued by the Clerk and Master [by command of
your Honor, 6 ] to have >said property taken out of the possession of the defendant and de-
livered to the complainant.
3d. That, the title of the complainant to said property, and his right to the immediate
and exclusive possession- thereof, be decreed, and duly enforced by all 'necessary orders.
4th. That complainant be given a decree for the value of the hire and use' of said property
while, so detained from him as aforesaid. ^ ,
5th. That complainant have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to, either
in law or equity. W. H. Buttram,, Solicitor.;
A replevin bill must be sworn to by "the complainant, his agent or attorney.*
While the Clerk and Master may issue the writ of replevin without the fiat of
a Chancellor, or Judge, .there may be cases when it might be prudent to obtain
such a fiat, in which case the following form may be used
FIAT FOE, A WRIT OF REPLEVIN.
To the Clerk and Master at Memphis
Issue the writ of replevin prayed for in the foregoing bill, on complainant giving a proper
replevin bond, in the penalty of twenty-two hundred dollars. [Double the value of the
property to be replevied^) July 3, 1890. B. M. Estes, -Chancellor.
§ 1055. Form of the Bond, and Writ of Replevin. Bond must be given in —
double the value of the property, conditioned to be void if the complainant
abide by, and perform, the judgment of the Court. 8 The proceedings on a
replevin bill are substantially the same as on a replevin suit in the Circuit
Court. The Clerk will issue the writ of replevin in the usual form, upon the
bill being sworn to and filed, and the proper bond given. No fiat of a Chan-
cellor or Judge is, ordinarily, necessary to authorize the issuance of the writ.
The following forms will serve as a guide both for the bond and the writ
REPLEVIN BOND. -
We, John Doe and Henry Doe, acknowledge ourselves indebted to Richard Roe in the
sum of twenty-two hundred dollars but this obligation to be void if the said John Doe abide
;
by and perform the decree of the Chancery Court at Memphis in the case of John Doe vs.
Richard Roe. This July 8, 1890.
John Doe,
Henry Doe.
WRIT OF REPLEVIN,
To the Sheriff of Shelby county
Summon Richard Roe to appear on or before the 1st Monday of August next, at the
office of the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at Memphis, to answer the bill of John
Doe; and have you then and there this writ.
Said bill prays that a writ of replevin issue to put the complainant in possession of a pair
of bay horses, about eight years old [and so on, describing the property exactly as it is
described in the bill.) Said property is alleged to be in the possession of the defendant Rich-
ard Roe. [And the Hon. B. M. Estes, Chancellor, having ordered me to issue said writ of
replevin, ! you are, therefore, commanded to take said property out of the possession of said
Richard Roe, and deliver it to the said John Doe; and make due return hereon of the manner
in which you have executed this writ.
Witness my hand this July 8, 1890. E. B. McHEnry, C. & M.
5 The writ can probably be issued by the Clerk costs, but must give bond in double the value of the
and Master, without any fiat by the Chancellor, as property, notwithstanding. Creamer v. Ford, 1
the Circuit Cnnrt Clerk issues it without any fiat. Heisk., 307. The Clerk will be liable for failing to
6 Code, § 3376. take the bond. Code, § 3393.
7 Code, § 3377. 9 This will be omitted if there be no fiat.
8 Code, § 3377. The complainant may pauper the
§1056 SUITS TO. RECOVER PERSONAL PROPERTY. 840
§ 1056. Proceedings —
Upon a Replevin Bill. The writ of replevin will issue
and be executed same manner as in the Circuit Court but the defendant
in the ;
will file his answers, or make other defence to the bill, and the parties will take
their proof and try the cause, according to the practice in the Chancery Court.
All of the provisions of the Code applicable to replevin suits in the Circuit
Court 10 apply equally to replevin suits in the Chancery Court, subject to the
modifications necessitated by the pleadings and practice in use in the latter
Court and the rights, duties and liabilities of the officers of the Court, and of
;
the parties, are the same as in the Circuit Court, except that a Court of Chan-
cery may, when necessary, use its extraordinary process to enforce its orders,
and more fully effectuate the ends of justice.
§ 1057. —
A Detinue Bill: 11 Its Frame and Form. The only difference be-
tween a detinue bill and a replevin bill is that the former does not seek to ob-
tain the possession of the property in dispute until the end of the suit; there-
fore, if the foregoing bill is filed as a detinue bill the second prayer will be
omitted. 12 A
detinue bill need not be sworn to, and may be prosecuted on an
ordinary cost bond, or on a pauper oath.
10 Code, §§ 3374-3393. 12 If complainant is given a decree for the prop-
11 In a detinue suit the complainant must show a erty a writ of possession will be awarded. Code,
general or special property in the subject-matter, § 2997.
and the right to its immediate possession when the
bill was filed. Robb v. Cherry, 14 Pick., 72.
841 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. §1058
CHAPTER LVII.
SUITS TO PARTITION LANDS, OR THEIR PROCEEDS.
Article I. Partition by Division.
Article II. Partition by Sale.
Article III. Gross Value of Life Estates.
ARTICLE I.
PARTITION BY DIVISION.
1058. When Land May be Partitioned, or § 1062. Duties of the Commissioners in Mak-
Sold. ing Partition.
1059. Frame of a Bill for Partition, or Sale. § 1063. Report of the Commissioners, and
1060. Form of a Bill for Partition in Kind.' Action Thereon.
1061. Proceedings After the Filing of the § 1064. Decree of Partition, on Report of
Bill. Commissioners.
§ 1058. —
When Land May be Partitioned, or Sold. The policy of the law is
to give each person his own, in severalty, and not to force a person to continue
in partnership with another. Hence, any person having an estate of inheri-
tance, or for life, or for years, in lands, and holding, or being in possession
thereof, as tenant in common, or otherwise, with others, is entitled to partition
thereof, or sale for partition 1 and the fact 1, that the premises are subject to
j
a life estate by dower, or courtesy, or encumbered by mortgage, or otherwise;

or 2, that some of the joint owners are infants, and that it is not to their inter-
est that the property should be partitioned; or 3, that the several estates and
interests of the parties are altogether different and distinct, does not affect
the right of partition. The Court may set apart, to such of the parties as de-
sire it, their shares in severalty, leaving the shares of others, if desired, in
common and may leave the shares of the minors in common, if to their
;
interest. 2
The Court will not partition a tract of land while the legal title to it is in
dispute. In such a case, the bill should be filed by the tenants in common, or
some of them, against the adverse claimants or possessors, making defendants
of such tenants in common as do not join in filing the bill; and, on such a bill,
pray first to have the legal title settled, and then for partition, or sale for par-
tition, among those entitled. 3 Nor will the Court partition, or sell for partition,
a tract when the title of the parties is purely equitable. But if , in such a case,
the parties have a right to the legal title, the holder of the legal title may be
brought before the Court, and the legal title divested out of him, and vested in
the other parties and partition, or sale for partition, thereupon decreed. The
;
Court of Chancery, under the Act of 1877, and previous Acts, and under its
inherent jurisdiction, has power to adjust all claims and titles, legal and
equitable, and to determine the rights of all parties. 4
1 Code, § 3262. See Bierce v. James, 3 Pick., 538, several New York decisions are referred to, in con-
where it was held that "holding and being in pos- nection with our own Reports.
session" should read "holding or being in posses- 3 Hopkins v. Toel, 4 Hum., 46: Burks V. Burks, ?
sion." Bax., 357: Carter v. Taylor, 3 Head, 30: Almony d.
2 Code, §§ 3263-3265. Our statute on the subject Hicks, 3 Head, 39; Dean v. Snelling, 2 Hcisk., 489.
of partition closely follows the statute of New York, 4 See cases above cited: and Code, § 3277; Acts
and was, in part, copied from it. For this reason, of 1877, ch. 97; Gass V. Hawkins, 1 Thomp. Cases,
238.
;§io59 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. 842
Any person entitled to a partition of premises is equally entitled to hare such
premises sold for partition: 1, Where the premises are so situated that parti-
tion thereof cannot be made or 2, Where the premises are of such description
;
that it would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that the same
should be sold instead of partitioned. 5
§ 1059. —
Frame of a Bill for Partition, or Sale. The bill for partition in
land, or for sale for partition, 6 may be filed in the county in which the land or
any part of it lies, or in which the defendants reside. 7 The bill should set forth
as far as known: 1, the names of the owners; 2, their residence; 3, which of
them are infants, or married women, and if married, to whom married; 4, the
description of the property, and its situation 5, the title by which it is held
;
and possessed; 6, the interest of each of the parties; 7, in case any one or more
of the persons interested, or the share or quantity of their interest, be un-
known, or be uncertain, or contingent, or the ownership of the inheritance
sought to be partitioned shall depend on an executory devise, or the remainder
shall be a contingent remainder, so that such parties cannot be named, the
facts shall be set forth 8, such other facts shall be stated as may be necessary
;
to show the various rights and equities 8 of any and all parties; and 9, should
pray for a division of the property by partition, if practicable or advisable,
among the claimants, according to their respective rights and titles; and if
partition is not practicable, or advisable, a sale may be prayed for. 9 If the
land is adversely held the bill may be filed 1, to recover the possession and clear
the title, and 2, to partition it, making, of course, all the tenants in common
parties as well as the adverse claimants. 10
Every person having any interest in the property, whether in possession or
otherwise, and every person entitled to homestead, dower, courtesy, or other
estate for life or for years, or having a mortgage or other lien on the property,
should be made a party. 11 The decree of partition will, however, not affect
any tenants, or persons having claims as tenants in dower, by the courtesy, or
for life, to the whole of the premises, 12 unless their claims are expressly ad-
judged.
§ 1060. —
Form of a Bill for Partition in Kind. All of the tenants in common
may join in a bill for partition; 13 but, as a rule, the adults desiring a partition
!>y the Court, join in the bill, and make all the other tenants in common, and
other parties having any interest of any kind in the land, defendants. This
is the correct practice, as it enables the Court the better to protect the interests
of the minors, and to adjudicate the rights of all parties. 14 The following is
a form 15 of a
BILL FOR PARTITION IN KIND.
5 Code, § 3293. Exactly what is meant by its ownership of the land, back rents, improvements,
being manifestly for the advantage of the parties encumbrances existing, or discharged by any of the
that the property be sold, is not so clear when it is parties for the common benefit, can elect for" infants,
considered that section 3296 allows a_ sale when par- reinvest the shares of persons under disability, en-
tition is not advisable, and that section 3297 allows force the equities of married women, and determine
a sale for satisfactory cause shown. The spirit of and adjust every matter between the parties on prin-
the law seems to be that a sale will be ordered when ciples of Eouity. and in accordance with law.
plainly for the interest of the parties. Code, § 329S. 9 Code, 55 3?70-3272; 3296. For proper parties in
See, Post. 5 1065. a suit for partition, see, ante, § 126.
6 The billmay apply, in the alternative, for parli- 10 Burks v. Burks, 7 Bax.. 357.
•tion, if practicable or advisable; and, if otherwise, 11 Code, 55 3271; 3263; 3291.
for sale. Code, § 3296. The form of a bill praving 12 Code. § 3292.
for a sale is given below, §1066; and is adapted by 13A minor can, by next friend, file a bill for
foot-notes to a bill for partition. partition. Freeman v. Freeman, 9 Heisk.. 301; and
7 Code, § 3268. If all the claimants join in the minors may, by next friend, join as complainants in
petition, or assent to the partition, it may be filed in a partition suit. Burks V. Burks. 7 Bax., 353. Hus-
any county in the State. Code, § 3269. band and wife may join as complainants, unless their
8 The statute providing for partition does not de- interests are antagonistic, or unless she be of un-
prive the Chancery Court of the iurisdirtion right- sound mind. Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head,
fully belonging to it over the subject of partition, 460; Kindcll v. Titus, 9 Heisk., 744: Stephens V.
and over sales of realtv for the purposes of division. Porter. 11 Heisk., 344.
Code, 5 3267. The Chancery Court can adjudicate 14 See, ante, § 101.
.and settle every question of law or eauity between 15 For a form of a bill to sell land for partition,
the various owners and claimants relative to the see, post, § 1066.
843 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. § 1061
John Scott and Samuel Scott, both residents of Weakley county, complainants, )
vs. L
Henry Charles Scott, a minor without guardian, George Jones, Mary
Scott, (
Jones, and Franklin Pierce, all residents of Weakley county, defendants. I

i.
That Winfield Scott died intestate in Weakley county, on July 4, 1884, the owner in fee
of the following tract of land, in the 3d civil district of said county. Beginning on a large
rock, George Jones' corner, [and then continuing the description by metes and bounds to the
beginning,] containing eight hundred acres, and worth about four thousand dollars. His deed
for said tract is herewith filed as an exhibit marked "A," and will be offered in evidence
at the hearing.
ii.
The said Winfield Scott left the following his only children and heirs at law: (1) John
Scott, (2) Samuel Scott, (3) Henry Scott, (4) Charles Scott, a minor without regular guard-
ian, and (5) Mary Jones, formerly Scott, wife of George Jones. Each of said children have
an equal estate of inheritance in said land, by descent from said father. The said Winfield
Scott left surviving him no widow and there is no encumbrance on said land known to
;
complainants. Franklin Pierce is made a defendant because he claims to own the share
of the defendant Mary Jones.
m.
The said tract of land capable of being advantageously partitioned among the parties
is
entitled, and complainants therefore pray
1st. That those named as defendants in the caption be made such by service of subpoena,
and be required to answer the bill.
2d. That a guardian ad litem be appointed for Charles Scott, who is a minor without gen-
eral guardian.
3d. That the rights, titles, and interests of the parties in the premises be declared, and
especially the conflicting claims of the defendants, Mary Jones and Franklin Pierce; and that
partition of said tract be made between the parties according to their respective rights.
4th. They, also, pray for general relief; and if a partition be impracticable, or unadvisable,
they pray for sale of said land, and a partition of the proceeds. 18
Emerson Etheridge, Solicitor.
The need not be sworn to, unless it prays for extraordinary process, or
bill
lor publication, or for a guardian ad litem.
§ 1061. Proceedings After the Filing of the Bill. The defendants may —
plead, demur, or answer to the bill. If any of them dispute complainant's
right to a partition, or are minors, lunatics, or non-residents, the complainants
must make such proof as would entitle him to a recovery in ejectment. 17 The
complainants may have a reference to the Master to hear proof and report
1. Whether the complainants, or any, and which of them, have such an in-
terest in the land described in the bill as entitled them to a partition thereof;
and if so,
2. What isthe nature and extent of their respective interests
3. What share or part of the premises belongs to each of the other parties
to the suit.
4. Whether partition is practicable, or advisable.
The last head of reference will be impertinent, unless the bill pray for par-
tition, or sale, in the alternative or unless the answer of some of the defendants
;
ask for a sale. 18

If the Court is satisfied from the proof, or from the Master's report, that
complainants and defendants are tenants in common, and are entitled to a
partition in kind, a decree to that effect will be pronounced, declaring the
rights of the parties, and the extent of their respective interests in the prem-
ises. 10 The following is a form of a
DECREE FOR PARTITION.

John Scott, et al.,
vs.
Henry Scott, et al. „
This cause came on to be heard before the Hon. J. Somers, Chancellor, on this 4th day
16 Code, § 3296. 18 Code, §§ 3796-3297.
17 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 295. The statutes of New 19 Code, §3277.
York in reference to partition are almost identical
with ours.
§1062 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. 844
of June, 1885, on the pleadings and proof in the cause, including the answer of Charles Scott
by his guardian ad litem, and the exhibit to the bill.
And it appearing to the Court that the complainants, John Scott and Samuel Scott, and
the defendants, Henry Scott, Charles Scott, and Mary Jones, are the heirs at law of Winfield
Scott, deceased, and as such are entitled, by descent, to equal undivided interests, as tenants
in common in the tract of land described in the pleadings, to-wit a tract lying in the 3d :
civil district of Weakley county, beginning on a large rock, George Jones' corner [and
then continuing the description by metes and bounds to the beginning,] containing eight hun-
dred acres, more or less, the rights of the parties are declared accordingly; and it is ad-
judged and decreed that partition of said tract be made in accordance with their rights and
interests so declared, and so as to allot to each of them an equal one-fifth part of said tract,
quality and quantity relatively considered.
ii.
Andthe Court appoints John Price, James Baker, and Richard Page, the county surveyor
of Weakley county, each being a respectable freeholder, commissioners to make partition
of said land among the parties according to their respective rights and interests, as herein-
before declared.
m.
The said commissioners, having first been duly sworn, will divide the said tract of land,
and make the allotment of the several shares, according to the rights of the parties as ad-
judged in this decree, having due regard to the relative quality and quantity of the several
shares. They will plainly designate the several shares by. posts, stones, marked trees, or
other permanent monuments. And if exact partition of said land cannot be made among
said parties, agreeably to their rights aforesaid, without material injury to such parties, or
some of them, the commissioners will make the partition as nearly equal as they can, and
charge the larger shares for the benefit of the smaller shares, with the sums necessary to
equalize all the shares, or, if they find that said tract cannot be partitioned without great
prejudice to the owners, the commissioners may so report.
IV.
The commissioners this decree, and will report their action in
will be given a copy of
writing to the next term of the Court, describing the land divided, and the shares of each
party, by metes and bounds, or other sufficient designation, and filing a plat of the tract, as
partitioned, with their report.
v.
It is further adjudged and decreed that the defendant, Franklin Pierce, has no title to, or
interest in, said tract of land.
VI.
The adjudication of the costs, and all other questions, are reserved until the incoming of
said report.
§ 1062. Duties of the Commissioners in Making Partition. The Court ap- —

points three or more respectable freeholders, any three of whom may perform
the duty, to make the partition in accordance with the decree of the Court. 20
The commissioners before taking any step as such must be severally sworn to
do justice among the parties, to the best of their skill and abilities, according
to the directions of the Court. 21
In making partition, the commissioners shall give each party such a propor-
tion of the land, quality and quantity considered, as the decree adjudges him,
and they will designate the several shares, by posts, stones, marked trees, or
other permanent monuments, and they may employ a surveyor, with the neces-
sary assistants, to aid therein. 22
If exact partition cannot be made without material injury to the parties, or
some of them, the commissioners may make partition as nearly equal as they
can, and charge the larger shares with the sums necessary to equalize all the
shares 23 or they may abandon the partition, if satisfied that the premises, or
;
any portion thereof, are so situated that a partition cannot be made without
great prejudice to the owners. 24
If homestead or dower has never been assigned to any party entitled thereto,
the Court may order the same to be set apart by the commissioners; but such
20 Code, § 3279.In some Divisions, the practice County Surveyor, his deputy, or anv Justice of the
is toappoint three commissioners, one of them a sur- Peace, may administer the oath. Code, § 3280.
veyor. If the Unds lie in different counties, the 22 Code. § 3281. Stake corners are not in com-
Court may appoint separate sets of commissioners pliance with the statute.
for each county, or one set for all the lands. Code, 23 Code, § 3283.
5 3286 24 Code, § 3299.
21 The Clerk, the officer summoning them, the
845 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. §1063
assignment will not prevent the premises, including the part covered by the
dower, being partitioned among the claimants. 25
The Clerk should give the commissioners a copy of the decree, and a com-
mission authorizing them to proceed. The following is a form of the
COMMISSION TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
To John Price, James Baker, and Richard Page:
You have been appointed by the Chancery Court of Weakley county commissioners to
partition the land described in the decree of said Court in the case of John Scott, et al., vs.
Henry Scott, et al., in accordance with the rights of the parties as declared in said decree.
"You are authorized to make said partition, to go upon the said land for said purpose, and to
employ a surveyor, with necessary assistants, to aid you in making the partition.
You will make due report of your action in the premises, and a copy of the said decree
is hereto annexed for your information and guidance.
June_ 20. 1S85._ B. B. Edwards, C. & M.
Their commission, and the copy of the decree, should be delivered to them
after they have been sworn.
§ 1063. Report of the Commissioners, and Action Thereon. The commis- —
sioners must make a report in writing, signed by at least three of them, showing
what they have done, describing the land divided, and the shares of each party,
by metes and bounds, or other sufficient designation, 26 and showing how much
each of the larger shares is charged with, if anything, and how much each of
the smaller shares shall receive, if anything, in order to equalize all of the
shares. 27
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS.
John Scott, et al.,
vs.
Henry Scott, et al.
The undersigned, appointed by your Horor commissioners to make partition of the lands
having been duly sworn by the Clerk and Master,
in this cause, respectfully report that, after
we went on the premises, and carefully examined the same, and made partition thereof
between the parties according to their respective interests, as set forth in your Honor's
decree, as follows
1st. We set apart in severalty and allotted to John Scott, as his share, the tract numbered
1, on the annexed plat, and bounded as follows Beginning on a large rock the beginning
:
corner of the whole tract [&c, describing it by metes and bounds,] to the beginning, con-
taining sixty acres, more or less, which share we value at nine hundred dollars.
2d. We set apart in severalty and allotted to Samuel Scott, as his share, the tract num-
bered 2, on the annexed plat, and bounded as follows: Beginning [giving the description
by metes and bounds,] to the beginning, containing one hundred acres, more or less, which
share we value at eight hundred dollars.
3d. We set apart in severalty and allotted to Henry Scott, as his share, the tract numbered
3, on the annexed plat [&c, as in No. 2.]
4th. We set apart in severalty and allotted to Mary Jones the tract numbered 4, on the
annexed plat [<S-c, as in No. 2.]
Sth. We set apart in severalty and allotted to Charles Scott, as his share, the tract num-
bered 5, on the annexed plat, [describing it by metes and bounds,] which share we value at
seven hundred dollars. ,
6th. We charge the share allotted to John Scott with the sum of one hundred dollars, to
be paid by to Charles Scott in order to equalize their shares with the others in value.
him
John Scott's share has most of the buildings, and it was considered best to give him enough
land to make a farm, which could only be done by charging him for the surplus.
7th. The said annexed plat is made a part of this report, signed by the, surveyor, Richard
Page, and marked exhibit A
to this report. A
bill of the costs of the partition is also
annexed.
All of which is respectfully submitted, this July 20, 1886.
John Price,
James Baker,
Richard Page,
Commissioners.
25 Code, §§ 3289-3290. 27 Code, § 3283; Hardin v. Cogswell, 5 Heisk.,
26 Code, § 3282. The Chancellor should not con- 549; Burdette v. Harwood, 15 Lea, 491.
firm any report, unless the shares are described by
metes and bounds.
§1064 SUITS TO PARTITION LAND BY DIVISION. 846
BILL OF COSTS.
John Price, three days, $3.00
mileage, 20 miles, 1.00 $4.00
James Baker, three days,- 3.00

Richard Page, three days, 3.00
" two " as surveyor, 6.00 9.00
John Smith, chain-carrier, two days, - - 2.00

The report of the Commissioners has the force and effect of a special verdict
when it sets out the reasons for giving some tenants more land and some less
than an aliquot part. 28 The report of the commissioners may be excepted to
by a party dissatisfied therewith, and for sufficient cause may be set aside,, or
corrected, or amended. If the report is. set aside, a new set of commissioners
may be appointed. 29
§ 1064. Decree of Partition, on Report of Commissioners. If the report of —
the commissioners is confirmed, the Court will, in the decree of confirmation,
divest and vest title according to the terms of the report. The following will
serve as a guide in drawing such a decree
DECREE CONFIRMING A PARTITION.
John Scott, et al.,
vs.
Henry Scott, et al.
This cause, coming on this, January 9, 1887, to be finally heard before Chancellor J.
Somers,
I.
Upon the whole record in the cause, and especially on the report of the commissioners
appointed to make partition, which report is in the words and figures following:
[Here set out the report, in full.]
And said report being unexcepted to, is, by the Court, in all things confirmed, and said
partition ratified and approved.
II.
It is, therefore,adjudged and decreed by the Court, that all the right, title, and interest,
of each and all the parties to this suit, in and to each of said shares or lots of land, be
divested out of them and each of them, and be vested in the respective parties to whom the
commissioners have allotted them, in their foregoing report, to be by the said parties
respectively held in severalty forever, as set forth in said report. And the Master will, on
demand of any of the said parties, and the payment of the legal fee, execute, acknowledge
for registration, and deliver to such party, a deed conveying to such party in severalty the
particular share of land allotted to him in said report, as his muniment of title.
in.
It is further adjudged and decreed that the complainant, John Scott, pay into Court for
the defendant, Charles Scott, the sum of one hundred dollars, in order to equalize their shares
with the others and a lien 30 is declared on the share of John Scott to secure the payment
;
of said sum and interest from this day. This lien may be enforced by motion, if necessary,
at the next or any subsequent term.
IV.
It further ordered and decreed that each of the parties to this suit, except George
is
Jones and Franklin Pierce, pay one-fifth of the costs of the cause. Charles Scott will pay
his guardian ad litem, H. Clay James, Esq., a fee of twenty dollars.
v V.
The and the costs chargeable to Charles Scott will be paid out of said one hundred
said fee
dollars when paid into Court. Executions are awarded to enforce this decree as to said one
hundred dollars, and, also as to costs, unless the same are paid within sixty days.
28 Hardin v. Cogswell, 5 Heisk., 549; Burdette ». holders; and it has been decided that their report
Norwood, 15 Lea, 491. can be impeached only for fraud, partiality, mistake,
20 Code, §3284; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 301. If the or gross error of judgment. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1159,
ground of the exception does not appear on the face note. The commissioners are regarded as having a
of the report, or on the face of the exhibits thereto, character similar to arbitrators. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
the party excepting would be required to support his 1154-1156. The Court should require a strong case
exceptions by affidavit, or by a sworn petition, cor- to be made out before setting aside the report.
roborated by affidavits. The Court will not lightly 30 Code, § 3284.
regard the sworn report of three respectable free-
847 SUITS TO SELL LAND FOR PARTITION. § 1065
ARTICLE II.
PARTITION BY SALE.
§ 106S. When Land Will be Sold for Parti- § 1067. Reference to the Master as to the
tion. Advisability of a Sale.
§ 1068. Report of the Master as to a Sale.
§ 1066. Form of a Bill for Sale of Land for § 1069. Decree for Sale, and Disposition of
Partition. Proceeds.
§ 1065. When
Land Will be Sold for Partition. The cases wherein land —
will be sold for partition have been already considered. 1 These cases resolve
themselves into two classes: 1, Cases where partition is impracticable; and 2,
Oases where a sale is plainly for the advantage of the parties. 2
1. Where Partition is Impracticable. Where the premises are so situated that
partition thereof cannot be made, the parties are entitled to a sale for division.
Thus, where the premises are a house and small lot, or a mill, mill-seat, mill-
race, or a railroad, or a canal, or a lot containing a manufacturing plant, or a
mine, or a quarry, or the like, partition in kind would be impracticable.
2. "Where a Sale is Plainly Advantageous. Where the premises are of such de-
scription thatit would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that they
should be sold, instead of partitioned', the Court will so decree. The test,
whether it is manifestly for the advantage of the owners that a tract of land
should be sold instead of partitioned, is whether it will bring more money when
sold as a whole than the several shares would bring in the aggregate when sold
separately to different purchasers, after a partition in kind. 3 If the tenants
in common would, very probably, realize more money by having the tract sold
as a whole, or sold in fewer parts than there are shares, than they would very
probably realize by selling their respective shares after a partition, then it
would be manifestly to their advantage that the land should be sold instead of
partitioned in kind. The advantage the statute refers to is a financial advan-
tage, and the money value of the whole tract as compared with the aggregate
money value of the several shares after partition in kind, is the test of advan-
tage.
When the land is adversely held or claimed, the bill can be so framed as to
first settlethe title and then sell for partition, making the adverse claimants
defendants, and so praying. 4 And when some of the tenants in common have
not received their proportion of the rents and profits they may have an ac-
counting against those who have received more than their proportion, and the
amount due may be paid out of the latter 's share of the proceeds, on proper
pleadings. 5
The Chancery Court has inherent power to convert realty into personalty;
and in so doing can bind the rights and interests, legal or equitable, vested or
contingent, present or future, of all persons, whether in esse, or in posse, and
whether sui juris or under disability, who are before the Court by service of
53,
process, or by virtual representation.
§ 1066. Form of a Bill for Sale of Land for Partition. Tb,ere is no differ- —
ence between the form of a bill for partition in kind, and a bill for sale for
1 See, ante. 5 1058. price than the land would probably sell for as
2 Code § 3293. As to what is meant by manifest whole.
advantage, see, Code, 8 § 3296-3299 4 Burks v. Burks. 7 Bax., 357.
3 Or will the probable price of the various shares,
o Omihundro ». Elkins, 1 Cates, 711.
if laid off and separately sold,

aggregate a greater 5a Ridley V. Holliday, 22 Pick., 607.
§1066 SUITS TO SELL LAND FOR PARTITION. 848
partition, except that greater care should be manifested, both by the parties
and by the Court, to have before the Court all the parties in any way interested
iu the land, or in its possession, use, or proceeds, or having any mortgage, trust,
Jien, or other encumbrance, or entitled to any estate for life, or for years, on
the whole tract, or any part, or parcel, or share, thereof. 6 The following is a
form of a
BILL FOE SALE FOB PABTITION.
To the Hon. Albert G. Hawkins-, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Jackson
James Todd and George Todd, both residents of Madison county, complainants,
vs.
F.dward Todd, Emily Todd, Jane Todd, William Brown. James Brown, Charles
Johnson, George Johnson, a minor, Emily Jones, James F. Jones, and George
Cash, all residents of Madison county, and Robert Todd, Henry Todd, John
Todd, and Sarah Todd, non-residents of Tennessee, and residents of Texas,
defendants.
I.
That Edward Todd, senior, died about three months ago, seized and possessed in fee of
the following tract of land, in the 2d civil district of Madison county: Beginning on a
walnut, near [&c., giving description by metes and bounds, according to his deed,] containing
two hundred acres, more or less. His deed is herewith filed, marked exhibit A, and will be
read at the hearing. The said Edward Todd, senior, left no widow, and there are no en-
cumbrances 7 on said tract known to complainants, except a vendor's lien held by the defend-
ant, George Cash, the exact amount of which is to complainants unknown; and said Cash is
called on to establish said amount by proof.
II.
The saidEdward Todd, deceased, had the following lawful children: (1) James Todd,
(2) George Todd, (3) Edward Todd, (4) Emily Jones, formerly Todd, wife of James F.
Jones, all of whom are living and parties to this suit, (5) Columbus Todd, who is dead,
leaving as his sole heirs, Emily Todd and Jane Todd, (6) Susan Brown, formerly Todd, now
dead, leaving as her sole heirs, William Brown and James Brown, (7) Catherine Johnson,
formerly Todd, who has died since her father, leaving a husband, Charles Johnson, and an
only heir, George Johnson, a minor, without a guardian, and (8) Houston Todd, who has
died since his father, leaving a widow, Sarah Todd, and Robert Todd, Henry Todd, and John
Todd, as his only heirs. The said Edward Todd, senior, deceased, had another son, William
Todd, but he died many years before his father, unmarried, and without issue.
in.
The said parties are owners of said tract of land, or have interests therein, as tenants in
common, or otherwise in the following proportions, or manner: (1) James Todd, (2)
George Todd, (3) Edward Todd, (4) Emily Jones, and (S) George Johnson, each own an
. undivided one-eighth in the fee; (6) Emily Todd and James Todd, heirs of Columbus Todd,
each own an undivided one-sixteenth; (7) William Brown and James Brown, heirs of Susan
Brown, each an undivided one-sixteenth; (8) Robert Todd, Henry Todd, and John Todd,
heirs of Houston Todd, each an undivided one twenty-fourth. Charles Johnson, as husband
of Catherine Johnson, is tenant by the courtesy of the one-eighth that descended to his wife;
and Sarah Todd is entitled to dower in the one-eighth that descended to her husband, Hous-
ton Todd. James F. Jones is made a party solely as the husband of Emily Jones, and George
Cash claims a vendor's lien on the whole of said tract, and insists that it is superior in equity
to the rights of all the other parties.
IV.
The said tract of land is worth about one thousand dollars, it is not near any town, and
is adapted exclusively to farming uses and it would be manifestly for the advantage of the
;
parties that it be sold for partition, instead of partitioned in kind, there being on it only one
house, one spring, and a small quantity of timber. 8
v.
The residences of the various tenants in common and life tenants are as stated in the
caption, and George Johnson is a minor without general guardian.
VI.
Therefore, the premises considered, complainants pray:
1st. That all those named as defendants in the caption be made such by service of sub-
poena on the residents, and by publication as to the non-residents, and that they all be required
to answer the bill, Jbut the oath of the defendant Cash to his answer is waived.
Code, §§ 3309-3315. For the frame of a bill for 8 If the bill seeks a partition in kind, this para-
partition, or sale, see, ante, § 1059. graph will be entirely omitted. With this exception,
7 It is the duty of parties, when a sale is applied and with the exr-ention of the prayer, bills for sale
for, or ordered, to disclose any encumbrance unon and bills for partition are alike.
the premises, or any part thereof. Code, §§ 3309-
3315.
849 Suits to sell land for partition. §1067
2d. That a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor defendant, George Johnson, to
make defence for him.
3d. That the rights of the parties to said land be settled and declared by the decree of the
Court, and that the said tract of land be sold, and the proceeds, after satisfying the said lien
Of the defendant Cash, if any, be divided among the parties in accordance with their re-
spective rights 9 and to this end that all necessary references to the 'Master be made. 10
;
4th. That the tenancy by the courtesy of Charles Johnson, and the dower rights of Sarah
Todd, in said land, be sold with the rest of the land, to the end that the purchaser may get
an unencumbered title in fee, said Charles Johnson and Sarah Todd being willing, as com-
plainants are informed and charge, to take the value of their respective interests in money. 11
Sth. That the defendant Cash may set up and establish by proper proof any lien he may
have to said land, and show fully and clearly the nature and amount thereof.
6th. And complainants, also, pray for general relief.
T. C. Muse, Solicitor.
The bill need not be sworn to unless it prays extraordinary process, or for
publication, or for a guardian ad litem, or for a receiver.
§ 1067. Reference to the Master as to the Advisability of a Sale. After the —
answers of the defendants are all in, or decrees pro confesso entered against
those not answering, if the right of complainants to a sale is disputed, or there
be minors, or persons Of unsound mind, or non-residents, who are defendants,
on motion of complainants the Court will order a reference to the Master.
REFERENCE TO THE MASTER AS TO A SALE.
James Todd, et al., 1
vs. \ No. 816.
F.dward Todd, et al. J
The praying a sale for partition, but the facts not sufficiently appearing,
bill in this cause
it is ordered by the Court that the Master hear proof, and report instanter, [or, to the next
term of this Court.]
1st. Who
are the owners of the premises sought to be sold, and the respective rights,
titles, and and what share or part belongs to each. 12
interests, of the parties therein,
2d. Whether the premises are so situated that partition thereof cannot be equitably made,
or whether they are of such description that it would be manifestly for the advantage of the
parties that the same should be sold, instead of partitioned.
3d. Whether there are any encumbrances on the premises not disclosed in the pleadings;
and if so, what, and to whom belonging. 13
4th. What would be a reasonable minimum price for the premises. [This inquiry may
be omitted if all the parties are sui juris.']
In ascertaining the necessity of a sale, the true question for the Master to
decide is, whether the property sold as a whole, or sold in fewer subdivisions
than shares, would bring a larger price than the various shares would bring in
the aggregate. 14 In other words, whether the aggregate value of the several
parcels into which the whole premises must be divided will, when distributed
9Code, § 3302. any are discovered, the Court may order them to be
10 If the bill seeks a partition, this clause will be paid, ormay relieve the purchaser of his purchase, if
as follows: 3d. That the rights of the parties to the encumbrance was not made known at the sale.
said land be settled and declared by the decree of Code, §§ 3309-3315. The Master should search the
the Court, and the same be .partitioned between the records for encumbrances, and should examine such
parties according to their respective rights, and that persons as appear to be creditors. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr.,
commissioners be appointed for that purpose. 307.
11 Code, §§ 3305-3307. This clause of the bill, and 14 The following questions may be propounded to
the one next following, will be omitted when' parti- witness as to the expediency of a sale:
tion alone is sought. Q. 1. How near to said tract do you live; and
12 This inquiry is necessary to enable the Courts what opportunities have you had to become ac-
to settle the rights, titles, and interests, of the par- quainted with it? Answer fully.
ties to and in the property. Code, §§ 3277; 3302. Q. 2. Describe said land; and give the number and
Without this, the Court might sell property to which character of its improvements, houses, barns, stables,
none of the parties, had any title. In strict practice, cribs, fences, cleared fields, and other improvements,
a decree settling the title of the parties should pre- if any; and show where they are situated.
cede the reference as to the advisability of a sale. Q. 3. What is said tract best adapted to, consider-
Jones v. Douglass, 1 Tenn. Ch., 357; and the title of ing its character, location and quantity; to farming,
the complainant, if not admitted by the answer, manufacturing, building, mining, grazing, or timber?
should be such as would enable him to recover in State whv. fully.
ejectment. Larkin v. Mann, 2 Paige, (N. Y.) 27. Q. 4. What would be a reasonable price for said
If any of the parties claim under a will, or under a tract if sold as a whole? [or, if subdivided into two
conveyance, the Master should require it to be filed; or three lots, and so sold?]
and he may require an abstract of the title to be Q. 5. What would be a reasonable price for each
furnished. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 307. of the shares in said land, if said tract should be
i
13 Code, § 3309. It is the object of the law, and subdivided into as many shares as there are tenants
the duty of the Court, to give the purchaser a perfect in common, and each share ov/ned by a different
title, discharged from all encumbrances, unless the person ?
decree otherwise specify on its face. The purchaser Q. 6. Would it be to the interest of the parties to
may, after sale, have a reference to ascertain whether sell said tract, or to divide it in kind? Give fully
there are any encumbrances on the premises; and, if your reasons for your opinion.
§1068 SUITS TO SELL LAND FOR PARTITION. 850
among the different parties in severalty, be materially less than the value of
the same property as a whole, or as subdivided into fewer parts than there are
shares. 15
If the realty held in common is 1, a house or 2, a house and lot; or 3, a lot
;
so small that any share would be too small to be readily salable or 4, a farm ;
so small, that any share would be too small to support a family ; or 5, a quarry,
coal bank, iron or other mine; or 6, a manufacturing plant; or 7, property,
otherwise partitionable, held under a long lease from the ancestors or previous
owners, 16 or fitted up at great expense to be operated as a whole, a sale should
be ordered, unless the other defendants are infants, or desire their shares to be
left in common, and the complainant can have his share set apart in severalty
without great prejudice to the others. 17 If there be any uncertainty as to the
boundaries of the land, or the number of acres in it, it should be surveyed be-
fore sale, and if any party is under disability a minimum price for the land
should be fixed. 18
§ 1068. —
Report of the Master as to a Sale. The Master should diligently
inquire as to the facts, especially where persons under disability, non-residents,
or unknown heirs, are interested, and where encumbrances are probable. He
can call before him any witness he deems necessary for the discovery of the
truth. The following is the form of a
REPORT OP THE MASTER AS TO A SALE.

James Todd, et al.,
vs. No. 816. —Master's Report as to Sale.
Edward Todd, et al. _
The undersigned would respectfully report that, in obedience to a decree made in this
cause, requiring him to report:
1st. As to the rights, titles and interests of the various parties in and to the land described
in the bill;
2d, As to the manifest advantages of a sale, rather than a partition in kind ; and,
3d, As to encumbrances, if any
He has considered the proof, which has been taken in the cause, and reports as follows
1st. That Edward Todd, Senior, died intestate, seized and possessed in fee of the tract
of land described in the bill; and that it descended to his heirs, in the manner and to the
extent declared in the bill. [Dep. of James Todd; pp. 4-5, gs. 8-10; and Exhibit thereto.] A
2d. That said heirs and their respective interests or shares in said land are as follows:
(1) James Todd, a son, (2) George Todd, a son, (3) Edward Todd, a son, (4) Emily Jones,
a daughter, and (5) George Johnson, heir of Catherine Johnson, a deceased daughter of said
Edward Todd, Senior, deceased, each own an undivided one-eighth (%) of said land, (6)
Emily Todd and James Todd, heirs of Columbus Todd, a deceased son, (7) William Brown
and James Brown, heirs of Susan Brown, a deceased daughter of said Edward Todd, Senior,
are each entitled to an undivided one-sixteenth (1-16) of said land; and (8) Robert Todd,
Henry Todd and John Todd, heirs of Houston Todd, a deceased son of said Edward Todd,
Senior, own each an undivided one-twenty-fourth (1-24) of said land.
3d. Charles Johnson as husband of said Catherine Johnson, deceased, is tenant by the
courtesy of the one-eighth undivided interest belonging to said George Johnson.
4th. Sarah Todd is entitled to dower in the one-eighth undivided interest belonging to
said heirs of her deceased husband, Houston Todd. [Deps. of James Todd, pp. 5-p, qs. 14-
16; and Sarah Todd, pp. 1-3, qs. 1-2 and 5.]
11.
It would be manifestly to the advantage of the parties that the land should be sold instead
15 Clason v. Clason, 6 Paige, (N. Y.) 541. Thus, sum than the tract would sell for as a whole, or than
if the property, taken as a Whole, would he reason- the various shares would sell for after a partition.
ably worth, say one thousand dollars, and if the In all such cases, a sale is manifestly advantageous;
various shares after partition would not be reason- and it, also, gives the tenants in common a fair
ably worth more than eight hundred dollars, in the chance to buy, if they desire; and, also, a chance to
aggregate, then a sale would be manifestly advan- prevent the lots from selling too low. This plan
tageous. Or, if the propr-ty when subdivided, into often satisfactorily solves contests as to -whether a
say two or three tracts, would aggregate a greater tract should be sold, or partitioned.
price than the several shares would aggregate, if 16 I n sucn a casej t h e S ai e w ;u j, e made subject to
sold after partition, then a sale would be advantag- the rights of the lessee, who will become the tenant
eous. Oftentimes, a tract can be advantageously of the purchaser. Woodworth v. Campbell, S Paige,
divided into a smaller number of tracts or lots than
there are tenants in common, and a sale of the tract 17 Code, §'§ 3264-3265; 3299.
as thus subdivided will, often, produce a much larger 18 Horn v. Denton, 2 Sneed, 126.
851 SUITS TO SEIX LAND FOR PARTITION. §1069
of partitioned. 10 [Deps. of James Todd, p. 10, q. 17; George Harris, p. 2, q. 1; Charles
Cooper, p. 4, q. 3.] It is very probable that it would bring a larger price if subdivided into
two lots, and so sold. [Dep. of James Todd, p. 11, q. 18]
Hi.
A reasonable minimum price for said tract of land is seventeen hundred dollars, and
James Todd offers to start the bidding at that sum.
IV.
There appear no liens or encumbrances on said land, except
to be
1st. A lien for twenty-one dollars, State and county taxes for the years 1889 and 1890,
[Dep. of James Tolson, p. 1, q. 1;] and
2d. A vendor's lien belonging to the defendant, George Cash, the principal and interest
of which, down to this date, amounts to one hundred and twenty-three dollars. [Dep. of
George Cash, pp. 1-3, q. 2; and exhibit A thereto.}
Respectfully submitted, Jany. 4, 1891. C. & M. R. A. Hurt,
§ 1069. Decree for Sale, and Disposition of the Proceeds. report of —The
the Master is subject to exceptions, modifications, or recommittal, as in case of
all other reports. If the report in favor of a sale is confirmed, a sale will be
ordered if the report should show no advantage or necessity of a sale, on con-
;
firmation thereof, the bill will be dismissed unless complainants amend- their
bill and pray for partition, or unless the defendants pray for a partition. The
DECREE FOB SALE.

James Todd, et al., ]
vs. }
Edward Todd, et al. J
This cause came on to be heard this January IS, 1891, before Chancellor Albert G. Hawkins,
1.
Upon the pleadings and proof, and the report of the Master, which report is as follows
[Here copy the report, in full.]
And said report being unexcepted to, is, by the Court, in all things confirmed.
11.
And
the Court being satisfied that the facts are as set out in said report, the respective
rights and interests of the parties are adjudged and settled accordingly, the share of each
party being as reported by the Master.
in.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed bythe Court, that said tract of land be sold for par-
tition, 20 and that the Master sell the sameaccording to law, on the premises, on a credit of
six and twelve months, to the highest and best bidder, taking notes with security drawing in-
terest from date, and retaining a lien on the land for further security. The Master will not
sell said tract for less than seventeen hundred dollars. [This minimum may be omitted
when all the parties are sui juris.] But will report the highest bid received. Said tract is
described as follows [Here describe it, by metes and bounds.]
:
IV.
The Master will report his action to the next term, until which time all further questions
19 The Master may add facts on which he

the will not bid on the lots, but will reserve their bids
bases his conclusion thus: The tract contains about until the whole tract is offered; and thus the smaller
two hundred acres, and is adapted especially to farm- bidders will, be prevented from getting the lots de-
ing. There is only one house on it, one spring, and sired by them, and for which they would, under
a small quantity of timber, all in one corner of the proper competition, have given a larger sum in the
farm. The house is nearly as valuable as all the aggregate than the tract sold for as a whole. When
rest of the farm. ...
Mere opinions of witnesses as to the advisability
....
sold as a whole first, the larger bidders are forced to
compete, both with themselves and with the smaller
of a sale are of no value, and are entitled to no con- bidders, when the subdivisions are offered for sale.
sideration, except in so far as they are sustained by In such a case, the foregoing decree would con-
the facts and reasons given by the witnesses. Opin- tinue, in substance, as follows:
ions are but little more than guesses. No decree can DECREE FOR SALE IN LOTS AND AS A
be founded on such incompetent testimony, and the WHOLE.
Master should wholly disregard it. Davidson ):.
Bowden, 5 Sneed, 129; Woodfolk v. N. & C. R. R. And it appearing to the Court from the proof [or,
from the Master's report; or, And it being suggested
Co., 2 Swan, 429; Stretch v. Gowdey, 3 Tenn. Ch.,
to the Court by the parties.] that said tract of land
565. Real estate dealers may give their opinions,
they being experts.
may be advantageously sold in subdivisions, it is
..... ordered by the Court that the Master employ a com-
20 Often it is advantageous to subdivide a tract,
petent surveyor, and have him subdivide said tract
and sell it by subdivisions. A tract may frequently into two or more lots, as may appear to the best
be advantageously divided into two or more tracts, interests of the parties, making a plat of the sub-
as
or lots, when it would not bear subdivision into
divisions, and describing them by metes and bounds.
many lots as there are shares. In such cases, a sale And at said sale, the Master, after selling said tract
is to the interest of the parties. If, in such a case,
and as a whole, will then sell it, on the same terms, as
the land is ordered to be sold, both as a whole, subdivided, and will adopt that sale which produces
in lots, it should be sold as a whole first,
for this
buy the largest sum. If sold in lots, he will describe said
will prevent combinations among bidders to
it as
suit themselves. lots by metes and bounds in his report, and file said
a whole, and then subdivide it to an exhibit thereto.
If sold first in lots, the parties who desire the
whole plat as
§ 1069 SUITS TO SELL LAND FOR PARTITION. 852
are reserved, especially questions relative to the disposition of the proceeds of the sale, and
the discharge of the encumbrances reported by the Master.
After the sale has been made and confirmed, 21 and the costs and encumb-
rances paid out of the pro'ceeds, the shares of the adult parties, not under any
disability, in the remainder of the proceeds will be paid over to them, or on
their order. 22 The decree ordering the sale, or the decree confirming it, should
specifically show the proportionate interests of the respective parties so the
Clerk and Master may know how to distribute the proceeds of the sale. The
Code explicitly provides for the method of paying out the shares of all parties,
under any disability, and of reinvesting such shares, as well as the shares of
parties unknown or non-resident. 23
If the money of any infant, or person of unsound mind, is ordered to be paid
to the guardian of such person, such payment should be on condition that the
guardian execute a special bond in the Chancery Court to secure the proper
accounting for such money. Such bond may be in the following form
GJOARDIAN'S SPECIAL BOND.
Know all' men by these Presents:
That we, Roland Roe, John Smith, and Henry Brown, hereby obligate and bind ourselves
to pay the State of Tennessee thesum of [double the amount to go into the guardian's hands]
dollars.
But this obligation to be void if the said Roland Roe, who has been, by the County [or.
Chancery] Court of Knox
county, appointed guardian of Romeo Roe, a minor, [or, person
of unsound mind,] shall faithfully discharge all of his duties as such guardian, and especially
shall duly account for and pay over all moneys by him received belonging to his said ward
from the Chancery Court of Knox county in the case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al.,
or in any other case in said Court; and shall perform any and all decrees of said Chancery
Court in reference to said moneys.
Witness our hands, this August 12, 1881.
Acknowledged in open Court by all the makers, with") Roland Roe,
each of whom I am personally acquainted and ; John Smith,
!
accepted and approved. Aug. 12, 1881. Henry Brown.

I
W. B. StalEy, Chancellor. J
The following is the form of an order directing the money of the ward to be
paid to the guardian
ORDER TO PAY MONEY TO GUARDIAN.
John Doe,
vs. !• 987.
Richard Roe, etal.
day came Roland Roe, and presented his letters as guardian of the
In this cause, this
defendant, Romeo Roe, a minor [or person of unsound mind], and moved the Court to direct
the Master to pay over to him the money in Court in this cause, belonging to his said ward,
which motion the Court declined to allow, except on a bond being given in this Court to
cover said fund.
Thereupon the said guardian, Roland Roe, presented the following bond
[Here copy the bond, in full.]
And said bond having been acknowledged in open Court by said Roland Roe, John Smith
and Henry Brown, to be their several acts and deeds, and the Chancellor having examined
said sureties on oath as to their solvency, and being satisfied that they are solvent and fully
worth, above all exemptions and liabilities, more than twice the penalty of said bond, said
bond is by the Court approved and accepted, and ordered to be entered in full on the minutes
of the Court, which is hereinabove done! And thereupon it was ordered that the Master
pay to said Roland Roe, as guardian aforesaid, all the funds in this cause belonging to his
said ward, and take and file his receipt therefor. Said receipt will be taken and entered on
the Rule Docket, in full.
21 For form of a decree of confirmation, see, ante, I 23 Code, §§ 3317-3322. As to the duties of Mas-
§ 630. |
ters in paying out, see, post, §§ 1167-1168.
22 Code, § 3316. 1
853 GROSS VALUE OF LIFE ESTATES. §1070
ARTICLE III.
GROSS VALUE OF LIFE ESTATES.

§ 1070. Value of a Life Estate, How Ascer- § 1071. Mortality Tables, and Their Value.
tained. § 1072. Annuity Tables, and Their Value.
§ 1070. Value of a Life Estate, How

Ascertained. The Court is often called —
on to fix a gross sum as the value of a life estate, either in lands or in personalty.
The most frequent occasion for the exercise of this power is in suits to sell
land encumbered by dower, homestead, a tenancy by the courtesy, or other
estate for life. 1 In our State there is no arbitrary rule, based on the average
expectancy of life, whereby the value of a life estate can be ascertained. Each
case is determined on its own facts, the object being to ascertain the market
value of the life estate in money, as practical business men would estimate it,
if it were put on the market for sale. 2
The principal facts entering into the estimate of this value are 1, the age :
of the life-tenant 2, his health generally, and at the time 3, his habits affecting
; ;
his health; 4, the longevity of his parents, and 5, the presence, or absence, of
hereditary disease in his parents or their children. The witnesses examined
should know the life-tenant, his age, health, habits, and constitution and, hav- ;
ing stated fully their knowledge on these points, should then give their estimate
of the value of his life estate in the particular fund. 3 The witness, especially if
he is the family physician, may also state how many years the life-tenant will
probably live, considering his age, health, habits, and constitution; and
whether the probable duration of his life is above or below the general average
of persons of his age.
The testimony of life insurance agents may, also, be taken to show the aver-
age expectancy of life of persons of the same age as the life-tenant, according
to the tables used by reputable life insurance companies. And proof as to the
expectancy of life of the life-tenant, and of the general mortality of the com-
munity in which he lives, would also be admissible.
The Clerk and Master, or Court, after considering: 1, the mortality and an-
nuity tables proved to be reputable, if any be introduced 2, the evidence of the ;
witnesses as to the age, health, habits, and constitution of the life-tenant and ;
3, the opinion of the experts, if any, as to the probable duration of the life in
question, will first determine the number of years the life-tenant will probably
live, and then, on that probability, estimate the value of the life-estate in the
fund.*
§ 1071. —
Mortality Tables, and their Value. The expectancy of life is ascer-
tained by the average mortality of large numbers and, for convenience, these ;
averages are gathered into tables. There are several such tables, English and
American and any of them, shown to be used by reputable insurance compa-
;
nies, would be admissible with such other proof as the parties may offer,
;
either as to the condition of the individual, or the general mortality of the

community in which he lives. 5
1 Code, § 3307. Washburn, in his work on Real Property, Vol. I,

2 Carries «. Polk, 5 Heisk.. 244. page 248. says that the Carlisle Tables are generally
3 Ibid; Washb. on Real Prop., 248; Railroad v. used in the United States. The American Experience
Ayres, 16 Lea, 729. Mortality Table, and the Combined Experience, or
4 See eases cited in preceding note. Actuaries', Table are the ones generally used by
5 Railroad V. Avres, 16 Lea, 729. There is com- Ameriran Life Insurance Companies, and have been
paratively little difference between the various life adopted by the statutes and decisions of several of
.
tables in general use. In Carnes v. Polk. 5 Heisk., the States. The Portsmouth or Northampton Table
248, the Supreme Court says that the Carlisle Tables is, also, recognized by the Courts.
may be used in connection with other proof; and

§ 1072 GROSS VALUE OF LIFE ESTATES. 854
The differences between these various tables are comparatively slight, thus
mutually demonstrating their general accuracy. Four of the most valuable
tables are here given:
MORTALITY TABLES.
SHOWING THE EXPECTATION OF LIFE AT VARIOUS AGES.
&55 GROSS. VALUE.OE.LlEE ESTATES. § 1Q72
ANNUITY TABLES,
SHOWING THE VALUE OP AN" ANNUITY OF ONE DOLLAR, AT SIX PEB CENT.,
ON A SINGLE LIFE, AT ANY AGE PROM TWENTY TO
NINETY-SIX YEARS, INCLUSIVE:
Age of
§ 1072 GROSS VALUE OF LIFE ESTATES. 856
a tract of land worth $300.00. Her dower would be one-third of this amount, or $100.00.
Interest on $100.00 for one year is $6.00. Multiply $6.00 by 11,035 mills, the value of an
annuity of one dollar at 37 years by the Northampton table, and the product is $66.21, which
is the gross value of her right of dower in said land, or in $300.00. By the Carlisle table,
her dower would be worth 12,354 mills multiplied by $6.00, or $74.12 while by the Wiggles-
;
worth table her dower would be worth 11,472 mills multiplied by $6.00, or $68.83.
857 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. §1073
CHAPTER LVIII.
SUITS IN CHANCERY IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW.

§ 1073. Frame of Bills in Suits Based on Judgment, Decree, Award, Stated
Matters Actionable at Law. Account, Fine, or Penalty.
§ 1074. Suits on Common Law Counts. § 1078. Suits on Accounts From Another
County, or State.
§ 1075. Suits Recover Money Agreed to
to
be Paid as Liquidated Damages. § 1079. Forms
of Bills in Other cases Ac-
tionable at Law.
§ 1076. Suits to Recover Unliquidated Dam-
§ 1080. Forms of Decrees in Cases Action-
ages. able at Law, Where There is a
§ 1077. Suits to Recover Money Due on a Money Recovery.
§ 1073. Frame of Bills in Suits Based on Matters Actionable at Law. In —
suits based on matters actionable in the Circuit Court, the material allegations
of the Bill will correspond in substance and in verbiage with the material
allegations of a declaration at law on the same cause of action. 1 The Code'
forms of declarations 2 can be incorporated almost bodily into a bill on the
same ground of suit, striking out the words The plaintiff sues, ' at the begin- '
' '
ning of the declaration, and inserting in lieu:

i.
That he sues the defendant for [&c, using the balance of the Code form of declaration,
and then adding prayers for process, for a decree for the amount claimed, and for general
relief.']
Thus, as an illustration, take Code form No. I, 3 in a suit by an endorsee
against an acceptor of a bill of exchange the bill, omitting the address and ;
caption, would be as follows

i.
That he sues the defendant for five hundred dollars, and says that sum is due him on a
bill of exchange here to the Court shown, drawn by E F, on the....day of....l9.... [at...., if a
foreign billl upon the defendant [at....,] and accepted by him, payable to one G H, on the
...day of..-19...., and by him and one J K, endorsed to complainant. The said bill not being
paid at maturity, was duly protested for non-payment; and the amount thereof, with interest
4
and protest fees, is unpaid.
ii.

2d. That complainant be given a decree against the defendant for, [or that the complain-
1 Mr. Daniel says: Although the rules of pleading Ch. Pr., 362. In pleadings in Equity the same form
in Courts of Equity, especially in case of bills, are of words as are used in pleadings at law, may gen-
not so strict as those adopted in Courts of law, yet, erally be introduced with advantage. Ibid., 363.
in framing pleadings in Equity, the draftsman will In drawing bills to enforce a legal cause of action,
do well to adhere as closely as he can to the general the_ declaration proper at law in such a case can
rules laid down in the books which treat of common easily be transformed into a bill in Chancerv. as the
law pleadings, whenever surh rules are applicable to forms given in this section clearly show. Where a
the case which he is called upon to present to the bill is a mere pleading, it should, in its essential
Court: for there can be no doubt that the stated averments, be as concise and direct as a declaration
forms of description and allegation which are adopted at law; but when it is both a pleading and an affi-
in pleadings at law have all been duly debated under davit, it should clothe the skeleton of the pleading
every possible consideration, and settled upon solemn with the muscles, flesh, and features of the real case,
deliberation; and that, having been established by and infuse into it all the breath, energy, and passion
long usage, experience has shown them to be pref- of life. The failure to keep this distinction in mind
erable to all others for conveying distinct and clear results in many bills being so drawn as to possess
notions of the subject to be submitted to the Court; "
many of the elements of an affidavit when none of
and if this be so at law, there appears to be no them are at all neressary in the particular cases to
reason why they should not be considered as equally be brought before the Court. See, ante, %\ 141; 170;
applicable to pleadings in Courts of Equity, in cases and post, § 1079.
where the object of the pleader is to convey the 2 Code, § 2939.
same meaning as that affixed to the same terms in 3 Ibid.
the ordinary Courts [of law]. * * * And where 4 So as will be seen by comparison, the bill
far,
it is to express things for which adeouate legal or follows the declaration, word for word; and the only
technical expressions have been adopted in pleadings additions are prayers for process and for special and
at law, the use of such expressions will be desirable general relief.
as best conducing to brevity and clearness. 1 Dan.
§1074 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT. LAW. 858
ant have and recover of the defendant, or that the defendant be required to pay complainant, 5 ]
said sum of five hundred dollars, and all the costs of the cause.
3d. That complainant may have such further and other relief, as he may be entitled to, and
as to your Honor may seem meet. H. Y. Hughes, Solicitor.
§ 1074. —
Suits on Common Law Counts. Suits brought in a Court of law
on an open account, or on an account stated, or for money loaned the defendant,
or for money paid by the plaintiff for the defendant, at the latter 's request, or
for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, or for work and
labor done by the plaintiff for the defendant at the latter 's request, or for
poods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered to the defendant by the
plaintiff, are called suits on the common courts. Such suits may now be brought
in the Chancery Court by bill. The following form of bill can easily be adapted
to all suits of this character, and all similar suits:
GENERAL FORM OE BILL ON COMMON COUNTS."
i.
That the defendant is indebted to' him- in the sum of five hundred dollars due on the....
day of— .19.... [insert date] by account; [or, for money loaned by complainant to him on the
.—day of— 19— [insert date] or, on an account stated between complainant and defendant
, ;
on the.— day of-..19— [insert date] or, for goods wares and merchandise, (or specific articles
, ;
naming them) sold to defendant by complainant on the— .day of— 19— [insert date] or, , ;
for money paid by complainant for the defendant at the latter's request, on the.... day of— 19—
[insert date], or for work and labor done for the defendant by complainant at the defendant's
request, on the .... day of 19...., [insert date], which sum of money with the interest
,
thereon from said day is now justly due.

II.
That [Tf there be any grounds for an attachment, allege them here as shown in suits by
attachment, ante, § 873].
in.
1st. That Subpoena to answer issue [&c, see, ante, §§155; 164.]
2d. That he be given a decree against the defendant for the amount due by reason of
the premises and interest thereon. 7
3d. That complainant may have such further and other relief as the nature of his case
may require. H. N. Cate, Solicitor.
§ 1075. Suits to Recover Money Agreed to be Paid as Liquidated Damages.
Whenever the parties to a contract agree that in the event of its breach a cer-
tain amount shall be paid, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether this amount
is to be treated as liquidated damages, or as a penalty. If it be liquidated dam-
ages, then it can be recovered as in the nature of a fixed liability if it be a ;
penalty, then only enough of it can be recovered to indemnify complainant

against the loss sustained by breach of the contract. In either event, suit can
be brought on the agreement, and the Court will determine. whether the con-
tract is to be construed as liquidating the damages, or as fixing a penalty and ;
will decree accordingly. The court will peer through the form of the contract
into its heart, and see whether the amount specified to be paid was really in-
tended as a mere security for the contract, or as a fixed, definite and un-
changeable sum to be paid without diminution. If the injured party can be
adequately compensated by damages, and these damages can be reasonably
well ascertained, the Court will incline to regard the amount specified as a pen-
alty, and will allow so much of it to the party injured as will make good his
loss.
5 Either of these three forms of decreeing may be of which the Court has no jurisdiction. See, Code.
used: the 1st is most common, the 2d most like a § 4327; ante, § 149.
common law form, and the 3d most like a Chancery For form of a decree on common counts, see, post,
form. 1080.
6 Any one or more of these counts may be joined 7 The Code form of declaration in the Circuit
in one bill if against one defendant. Indeed, on a
_
Court in suits on the common counts, joins a demand
bill against one defendant as many distinct and un- for interest as well as principal. See Code, § 2939,
connected matters of suit may be united as the com- form 8. See "Interest," ante, § 563.
plainant has against him, not including any matters
859 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. § 1076
BILL TO COLLECT LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. 1
-
[For address and caption, see, ante, •§§ 155 K 164.]
Complainant respectfully shows to the Court:,
I.
That he and the defendant on the—day of.... 19...., [insert the true date,] entered into
an agreement to [here specify with particularity the details of the agreement.)
ii.
That complainant was very solicitous to have said work done [in the manner, or] on or
before the date specified in said agreement [Show the reasons in full why the agreement
specified the payment of damages for the. default, but beware of using the word "penalty"*
anywhere in the bill.]
in.
That the defendant realized the importance to complainant of [state what the damages
zvere intended to effect,] and readily agreed to pay said damages as a liquidated debt, on
his default.
rv.
That the amount of damages so agreed to be paid was intended as a reasonable liquida-
said
tion of the loss that would accrue to complainant in case of defendant's failure to comply
with said agreement; and the defendant having failed to complete said building in the time
and manner specified in said agreement [or having failed to do the thing specified in said
agreement, stating what it was] said amount has become due and payable to complainant.
v.
2d. That your Honor give complainant a decree against the defendant [if there are several
bound, say defendants] for the amount of said liquidated damages, and interest thereon' from
the....day of.... 19— the date of said breach of agreement.
.,
3d. That complainant have such other, further arid general relief as the nature of his case
may require. C. T. Rankin, Solicitor.
§ 1076. Suits to Recover Unliquidated Damages. The Chancery Court has —

jurisdiction to award unliquidated damages for breach of any contract, obliga-
tion or duty, or for any injuries resulting from negligence. The following is a
form of
BILL FOE, UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES EOB, BREACH OE CONTRACT.
i.
That on the.... day of— 19....

[give the date] he made a certain contract with the defendant
,
[if in writing, so state] whereby for the consideration of [specify the consideration] the de-
fendant contracted and bound himself to [here set out what the defendant was bound to do,
using the very words of the contract.]
ii.
That notwithstanding the terms of said contract the defendant failed to [here specify
ivherein the defendant failed to comply with the contract: give particulars.]
in.
That consequence of defendant's said breach of said contract, complainant was greatly
in
injured and suffered great loss in this. [Here state fully and particularly wherein complain-
ant's damages consist.] And he, therefore, sues for thousand dollars for said damages.
rv.
That complainant made any efforts to induce defendant to comply with the contract,
[//
so state. If there be any aggravating circumstances connected with defendant's- conduct in
reference to said contract, so state; and in each case give the particulars.]
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue \&c, see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That complainant may be awarded said sum of thousand dollars as damages for
said breach of contract [It may be well to remember that Chancery very seldom awards puni-
tive damages; as a rule, damages are compensatory in Chancery.]
3d. That complainant may have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to,
and as your Honor may deem meet. J. Will Taylor, Solicitor.
§ 1077. Suits to Recover Money Due on a Judgment, Decree, Award, Stated

—
Account, Fine or Penalty. The ordinary way of enforcing a judgment or
decree for money is by an execution based on such judgment or decree; but
when a judgment or decree is about to be barred by the statute of limitation,
8 The Chancery Court is loth to enforce a penalty, I Equity jurisdiction will not enforce a penalty. See,
even under the Act of 1877. Courts with none but | ante, § 296.
§ 1078 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. 860
or has been rendered in some other state or country, or some obstacle to its
enforcement exists, or where the complainant desires to reach equitable assets
for its satisfaction, in any of these cases, it may become important for the
owner of such judgment or decree, whether he be the judgment creditor or own
the judgment by assignment, to bring suit on such judgment or decree; and
he may do so by bill in Chancery. So, an award of money may be enforced in
the Chancery Court. An account that has been agreed to, or signed by the par-
ties, or that has been acquiesced in by the defendant, is regarded as a stated
account, and the amount shown by it to be due may be recovered by a bill in
Chancery. Pines imposed by law or in accordance with some law, or ordinance,
and pecuniary penalties imposed by law for its violation, and all money due
on a qui tarn action, may be recovered in Chancery. In all such cases the law
implies a promise to pay the amount adjudged, awarded, stated or imposed.
BILL TO RECOVER MONEY DUE UNDER THIS SECTION.
i.
That on he recovered a judgment [or decree, or obtained an award,

the....day of... .19— .
against the defendant, or stated an account with him, or a fine or penalty was imposed on
him] in the sum of... .dollars, [stating exact amount] all of which is unpaid.
ii.
That any circumstances attending the award, or the stating of the account, to show
[state
that the defendant participated, or that he agreed to the award or to the account, or acqui-
esced therein.']
in.
That[state any efforts to collect said judgment, or decree, or award, and give the reasons,
if any, why efforts have not been made to collect the same, and explain any delay.]
IV.
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [&c, see, ante, §§158; 164.]
2d. That complainant may have and recover of the defendant the amount due on said
judgment [decree, award, account stated, fine or penalty,] and interest thereon.
3d. That he have such further and other relief as his case may require, and may be just.
O. T. TindEll, Solicitor.
§ 1078. Suits on Accounts From Another County, or State.—When suit is
brought on a sworn account coming from another county, or State, 9 the bili
should explicitly aver that the suit is brought on the account, that the account
comes from another county or State, and that it is duly verified; and profere
should be made of the account by making it an exhibit to the bill. 10 The allega-
tions may be substantially as follows
AVERMENTS OF A BILL ON A SWORN ACCOUNT.
That the defendant is justly indebted to him in the sum of one hundred dollars (100.00,)
due on an account coming from another county of this State, to-wit Morgan county, :
[or, coming from the State of Missouri.] Said account was duly verified in said county
[or, State] by the affidavit of complainant to its correctness, and said affidavit is certified
according to law. Complainant brings this suit on said account to recover the amount due
thereon, and herewith exhibits said account and marks it "A," and makes it a part of this
bill."
When such an account is the foundation of the suit, the defendant must
deny the account in his answer, and must swear to that denial, otherwise the
account will be conclusive upon him. 12 If the defendant's oath to his answer is
waived, that does relieve him from the necessity of denying the account on
oath, as already shown. 13 He may, however, limit his affidavit to such denial,
if he so desires, thus
AFFIDAVIT DENYING AN ACCOUNT.
County of Roane. J
Richard Roe, the defendant, makes oath that so much of his foregoing answer as denies
9 Code, § 3780; M. & V.'s Code, § 4529. 12 Code, § 3780; Williams v. Lenoir, 8 Bax., 399.
10 Hunter v. Anderson, 1 Heisk., 1. 13 Ante, § 374.
li Hunter v. Anderson, 1 Heisk., 1 ; Wilkhorn v.
Gillespie, 6 Heisk., 329.
861 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. § 1079
the account sued on by the complainant is true ; and that said account is not just or correct
in whole, or in part. Richard Roe.
[Annex a proper jurat: see, ante, § 789.]
§ 1079. Forms of Bills in Cases Actionable at Law. —The Chancery Court
now having statutory jurisdiction of most of the cases actionable at law, it
may be of importance to the inexperienced pleader to know that any good de-
claration at comman law can readily be transformed into a good bill in Chan-
cery. This is especially true of declarations on awards, in assumpsit, on bills
of exchange and promissory notes, against common carriers, on covenants, in
debt, and on insurance policies. 14 As illustrations of how this may be done, the
following bills are given, each of which is based on a declaration at law, for the
same cause of action as is set forth in the bill:
BILL TO ENFORCE AN AWARD.
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 1SS; 164, ante.]
i.
That there were divers controversies between the complainant and the defendant con-
cerning their mutual accounts, debts, and dealings; and, thereupon, they on the 8th day of
August, 1890, by their mutual agreement in writing, submitted and referred said controversies,
[and all other mutual demands between them,] to the final award and determination of A, B,
and C, [naming the arbitrators;] and in and by said writing further agreed [here set out any
other material parts of the agreement,] that the award of the said A, B, and C, or any two
of them, being duly made in -the premises, [in writing, or, and duly notified to the parties,
as the case may have been,] should be final and binding.
n.
And complainant avers that the said A, B, and C, after duly hearing both complainant
and defendant, did, on August IS, 1890, make and publish their award [in writing,] and did
thereby award and finally determine, that there remained a balance due from the defendant
to the complainant of five hundred dollars, to be paid to the complainant [on demand.]
m.
Notwithstanding said agreement and award, the defendant has failed to pay said sum of
five hundred dollars, or any part thereof, and refuses to pay any part thereof, though often
thereunto requested.
rv.
The premises considered, complainant prays:
1st. [For process, as in § 164, ante.]
2d. [For a decree for the amount due on said award, as in § 159, sub-sec. 7.]
3d. For such further and other relief as complainant may be entitled to.
Clem J. Jones, Solicitor.
BILL AGAINST A COMMON CARRIER.
A bailor, who delivers goods .to be transported, 1
vs.
[
A common carrier who fails to deliver. J
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 155 ; 164, ante.]
i.
That complainant, on January 8, 1888, delivered to the defendant in the city of Memphis,
Tenn., two hundred bales of cotton, worth three hundred dollars a bale, on a contract that
the defendant would deliver said cotton to Complainant in the town sf Newport, Tenn., in
good order, the defendant, for a valuable consideration, contracting so to do, in a reasonable
time. The defendant was a common carrier for hire at the time he [or, it] made said
contract.
ii.
That none of said cotton has ever been delivered, although the time for so dnins; has long
since expired and complainant is damaged two thousand dollars thereby.
;
, in.
1st. [For process, &c., as in §164, ante.]
2d. That complainant have a decree against the defendant for the value of said cotton at
Newport at the time it should have been there delivered, and for interest on the amount from
that date, and for all damages he has suffered by the breach of said contract.
3d. For general relief. H. N. Cate, Solicitor.
BILL TO RECOVER A DEBT DUE BY NOTE, OR ACCOUNT.
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 155 ; 164, ante.]
14 Declarations in all these cases may be found in the notes to 2 Greenleaf on Evidence.
§ 1079 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. 862
i.
That the defendant is sum of one hundred ?nd ten dollars due by
indebted to him in the
note, dated May
1891, and due one day after date, and herewith filed as a part of this
1st,
bill, and marked exhibit l; 10 [or, due on account for goods, wares and merchandise; or, on
an account for work and labor done, herewith filed as a part of this bill, and marked exhibit 1
or, due for money paid out for the use and benefit of defendant in payment of taxes on a
tract of land in Knox county, of which complainant and defendant are owners_ a-s tenants
in common or, due for professional services as physician, or attorney at law, or, for the rent
;
for the year 1890, of the tract of land on which the defendant lived in said year, [describing
tt briefly.]
n.
1st. That the defendant be made a party to this suit by the service of subpoena to answer,
[or by publication, if he is a non-resident;] but his oath to his answer is waived.
2d. That complainant be given a decree against the defendant for the amount due on said
note, [or account,] including the interest thereon from the maturity thereof, [cr from the
filing of the bill, in case of an account.]
3d. That complainant may have such other and general relief as he may be entitled to at
the hearing. B. L. Risedan, Solicitor.
BILL BY ENDORSEE AGAINST THE MAKER OE A NOTE."
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 155; 164, ante.]
i.
That the defendant, on August 8, 1890, by his promissory note in writing, for value received,
promised one E F to pay him, or his order, one thousand dollars in ninety days from said
date. Said note is herewith filed as a part of this bill, and marked A.
ii.
That the said E F duly endorsed said note to the complainant, in due course of trade, for
value, and before the maturity thereof; [if such be the fact and it is important to so allege,
or, waiving demand, protest and" rrotice, if such be the fact]
in.
That of said note, principal and interest, is due and unpaid, and that although the de-
all
fendant has often promised to pay said note, he yet fails so to do.
IV.
1st. [For process as in § 164, ante.]
2d. For a decree in his favor for the amount due him on said note, principal and interest.
3d. For such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
F. D. Owings, Solicitor.
BILL AGAINST THE MAKER OF A NOTE.
The administrator of the payee of a note,
vs.
The executor of the maker of the note.
[Address and commencement, as in §§155;. 164 ante.]
i.
That A
B, [the maker,] on June 4, 1888, for a valuable consideration, executed and deliv-
ered to C D, [the payee,] a promissory note for five thousand dollars, payable to the said
C D, ninety days after date, with interest from date, all of which is unpaid and now due.
Said note is herewith filed as part of this bill, marked A.
ii.
That since the delivery of said note the said A

B has died testate, and the defendant
is his executor; the said C D
has also died, but intestate, and the complainant is his admin-
istrator.
in.
[The prayers are the same as the preceding bill. See, ante, §§ 158 ; 164.]
BILL AGAINST THE ENDORSER OP A NOTE.
The endorsee oi a note,
vs.
An endorser of the note.
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 155; 164, ante.]
i.
That on March 4, 1889, A B [the maker] made and delivered his promissory note for eight
15 The following is a fuller form, but, perhaps, no payable to complainant ninety days after the date
better: thereof, with interest from date, all of which note,
I. principal and interest, is unpaid and now due. Said
That the defendant, on May 1, 1891, for a val- note is made a part of this bill, and filed herewith,
uable consideration, executed and delivered to com- marked A.
plainant a promissory note for five thousand dollars, la This bill is based on 2 Green. Ev., 8 155, note.
863 SUITS' IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. § 1079
hundred dollars to the defendant, due ninety days after date; and that on the same day
[or, thereafter,]the defendant endorsed and delivered said note to complainant, for value
and in due course of trade, waiving demand, protest and notice, [if such be the fact.]
ii.
That said note was presented to said A B, [maker,] at maturity and payment demanded
it was not paid, and due notice of its dishonor was given the defendant, but he has failed to
pay the same or any part thereof. Said note is filed herewith as part of this bill, and marked
A. [If demand, protest and notice were waived by the defendant endorser, they need not
be averred.]
m.
1st. For process [as in § 164, ante.]
2nd. For a decree against the defendant for the amount due. on said note, principal and
interest.
3rd. For general relief. Henry T. Cooper, Solicitor.
BILL ON A WRITTEN CONTRACT.

[Address and commencement as in §§ 1SS; 164, ante.]
i.
That, on August 9, 1889, the defendant contracted with him in writing to deliver to him
at his storehouse in Sevierville, within one month from that day, two thousand bushels of
good merchantable wheat, in good sacks.
ii.
That as part consideration complainant paid the defendant two hundred dollars in cash
on said day, and agreed to pay him eighteen hundred dollars more when said wheat was all
delivered according to said contract. Said contract is filed herewith as part of this bill, and
marked A.
in.
That the defendant has failed to deliver any of said wheat to complainant, although the
time agreed upon for so doing has expired; and said failure has damaged complainant five
hundred dollars.
IV.
1st. [For process as in § 164, ante.]
2d. For a decree against the defendant both for said two hundred dollars and for the
damages he, complainant, has sustained by reason of the breach of said contract.
3d. For general relief. James R. Penland, Solicitor.
BILL ON A POLICY OF INSURANCE."
[Address and commencement, as in §§ 1SS; 164, ante.]
i.
That he owned had a lease on] a certain dwelling [or, store] house in Sevierville,
[or,
Tenn., on July 1, 1891, worth one thousand dollars; and he continued to own [or, have a
lease on] said house until the destruction of said house by fire, as hereinafter shown.
ii.
That the defendant Company, on said July 1, 1891, in consideration of a premium in

money then and there paid to it therefor by the complainant, made and delivered to com-
plainant a policy of insurance upon said house, and thereby promised the complainant to
insure five hundred dollars thereon from said July 1, 1891, until July 1, 1892, against all such
immediate loss or damage as should happen to said house by fire to the amount aforesaid,
to be paid to complainant in sixty days after notice and proof of the same; upon condition
that complainant in case of such loss should forthwith give notice thereof to the defendant
Company. [And so on, specifying the terms of the policy on this subject. 1 *] All of which
will more fully appear by reference to said policy, which is hereto exhibited marked A.
in.
That after the execution and delivery of said policy, and before the expiration thereof,
to-wit, on September 4, 1891, the said house was accidentally burned, and by misfortune
totally consumed of which loss the complainant forthwith gave notice to the defendant
;
Company, and made the proofs, required of him by said policy of insurance, and in all par-
19
ticulars complied with his part of said contract.
rv.
That, though requested, and though sixty days after such notice and proof of said loss
17 This bill is based on a declaration in 2 Greenl. 19 If the policy specifies any acts to be done by the
Ev., § 404, note. complainant as a condition precedent to payment,
IS The bill should show what complainant was re- such as notice of the loss, and proofs of the loss, the
quired by his policy to do to entitle him to the in- bill must aver a performance of such conditions.
surance money, following the conditions set forth on
the face of the policy.
§1080 SUITS IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. 864
have elapsed, the defendant Company has never paid said sum of five hundred dollars to the
complainant, or any part thereof.
v.
1st. That all proper process issue to bring the defendant Company before the Court, and
to require it to answer this bill.
2d. That the complainant have a decree against the defendant for the amount due him on
said policy, and for interest thereon after the lapse of said sixty days.
3d. That complainant may have such further and other relief as he may be entitled to.
Geo. L. Zirkle, Solicitor.
§ 1080. Forms of Decrees in Cases Actionable at Law Where there is a
Money Recovery. —
The following forms of decrees will, along with what has
already been said, sufficiently indicate the form of a decree in cases actionable
at law where there is a mere money recovery
DECREE EOB DEBT ON A LEGAL DEMAND.
John Doe,
vs. —
Richard Roe, et al.
This case came on to be heard, this May 27, 1895, before Hon. H. B. Lindsay, Chancellor,
upon the original [and amended] bills, the answer of the defendant, Richard Roe, the judg-
ment pro confesso as to the other defendants, the exhibits to the bill and the other proof in
the cause, from all which it appearing that the defendants are indebted to the complainant
on the promissory note [or on the account, or on the contract sued on, 20 ] in the sum of eight
hundred and ten dollars, principal and interest.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that the complainant have and
recover of the defendant said sum of eight hundred and ten dollars and all the costs of the
cause, for which execution is awarded.
SHORTER. FORM OF DECREE FOR DEBT.
John Doe,
vs. —
Richard Roe, et al.
This cause was heard this day on the pleadings, [pro confesso] and proof, on consideration
whereof it was adjudged and decreed that the complainant have and recover of the defend-
ants the sum of eight hundred and ten dollars, and all the costs of the cause, for which
execution is awarded.
This form contains all the essentials of a valid decree, and is expressly author-
ized by the Code. 21
DECREE ON AN AWARD.
[For title, commencement and recitals, see, ante, §§ 567.]
On consideration whereof the Court is of opinion that complainant is entitled to the relief
prayed for in his bill, and it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that he have and
recover of the defendant the sum of five hundred dollars, the principal of the award sued
en, and the further sum of forty dollars as interest thereon from [stating the day zvlien the
award began to draw interest,] making in all the sum of five hundred and forty dollars, and,
also, the costs of the cause, for all of which an execution will issue. On motion of James
C. Ford, complainant's Solicitor, a lien is declared on the recovery in this decree to secure
his reasonable fee.
DECREE FOR DEBT ON A COMMON COUNT.
On consideration whereof the Chancellor is of opinion that the complainant is entitled
to the relief by him prayed for in his bill. It is therefore decreed that he have and recover
of the defendant [or defendants] the sum of five hundred dollars, the principal of the claim
sued on, and the further sum of eighty dollars as interest 22 thereon from May 1st, 1891, the
day it was due, [or from the filing of the bill,] making in all the sum of five hundred and
eighty dollars, and also the costs of the cause, for all of which let an execution issue.
20 It is not necessary to specify in the decree the 21 Code, § 4476.
particular ground on which the decree is based. It 22 Interest will, of course, be calculated from the
would be sufficient to say "from all of which it ap- date fixed by the Chancellor, if any is allowed. When
pearing that the defendant owes the complainant interest will be allowed, see, ante, § 563.
eight hundred and ten dollars, principal and interest.
It is therefore decreed that the complainant have and
recover," &c, as above. See next form.
865 SUITS IN THE NATURE OF A QUO WARRANTO. §1081
CHAPTER UX.
SUITS IN THE NATURE OP A QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDING.
§ 1081. Suits Against Corporations, Public § 1083. General Form of Bill Against Cor-
Trustees and Usurpers. porations, Trustees and Usurpers.
§ 1082. Frame of a Bill Against Corpora-
tions, Trustees, and Usurpers.
§ 1081. Suits Against Corporations, Public Trustees and Usurpers. The —

Chancery Court, both inherently and by statute, has extensive jurisdiction over
corporations, and also over persons acting as officials without authority. A bill
will lie against the person or corporation offending in the f ollowing cases
1. Whenever any person unlawfully holds, or exercises, any public office or
franchise within this State, or any office in any corporation created by the laws
of this State
2. "Whenever any public officer has done, or suffered to be done, any act
which works a forfeiture of his office
3. "When any persons act as a corporation within this State without being
authorized by law
4. Or, if being incorporated, they do or omit acts which amount to a surren-
der or forfeiture of their rights and privileges as a corporation
5. Or exercise powers not conferred by law;
6. Or fail to exercise powers conferred by law, and essential to the corporate
existence. 1
A
bill will, also, lie (1) to bring the directors, managers and officers ot a
corporation, or the trustees of funds given for a public or charitable purpose,
to an account for the management and disposition of property intrusted to
their care, (2) to remove such officers or trustees on proof of misconduct, (3)
to prevent malversation, peculation and waste, (4) to set aside and restrain
improper alienations of such property or funds, and to secure them for the bene-
fit of those interested; and (5) generally to compel faithful performance of
their duty. 2
A
bill will not lie by citizens in their own names to discharter an incorpo-
rated town the suit must be in the name of the State, by her local Attorney
;
General, on their relation. 3 But citizens and taxpayers may maintain a bill
to have a charter declared void when antecedent essentials were not complied
with. 4
The provisions of the Code, § 3410, in reference to suits against the officers
of corporations, and against public trustees, do not limit the jurisdiction of
the Chancery Court over such matters, but confirms and enlarges that jurisdic-
tion; and in suits in that Court against said officers and trustees, there is
plenary jurisdiction to make all such orders, either in Court or at Chambers,
and all such decrees, and issue all such process, as may be necessary to prevent
or remedy wrongs threatened or done, to restore what has been wasted, anil
to effectually enforce the full and faithful performance of every duty.
§ 1082. Frame ofa Bill Against Corporations, Trustees and Usurpers.
The county in which the office is usurped or held, or the cor-
bill is filed in the
poration or supposed corporation holds its meetings, or has its principal yjlace
of business 6 or, if against public trustees, in the county where one or more of
;
1 Code, 3409.
I The chapter of the Code contain- 3 Hooperv. Rhea, 3 Shan. Cas. 145 ; State v.
ing this section covers matters in the nature of "a quo White's Creek Turnpike Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 166;
warranto. State v. McConnell, 3 Lea, 337; State V. State McConnell, 3 Lea, 334.
v.
Johnson, 8 Lea. 74. 4 Hooper v. Rhea, 3 Shan. Cas., 145.
2 Code, §3410. 6 Code, §3411. The Code says the suit is to be
§1083 SUITS IN THE NATURE OP A QUO WARRANTO. 866
them may be found; 7 and should set forth briefly, and without technical forms,
the grounds upon which the suit is instituted.
8 Inasmuch as the proceeding is
supposed to be in the interest of the public, and in furtherance of public justice,
the State must or the consent of the State must be had, if a private
file the bill ;
When the State sues alone the bill is brought

citizen should wish to file the bill.
in her name as complainant by the Attorney General 9 for the circuit containing
the county in which the suit is to be instituted. When he sues he must be di-
rected so to do by the General Assembly of the State. The bill may also be
brought by the State alone, when the Governor and the Attorney General of
the State concur. When a private citizen sues, the bill is still in the name of
the State, by her Attorney General for the proper circuit, on the relation of
such citizen. 10
When the bill is filed against a person for usurping an office or a franchise,
in addition to the other necessary allegations, the name of the person rightfully
entitled to the office, or franchise, with a statement of his right thereto, may be
added, and he made a defendant, if he is not the relator and the trial should, ;
if practicable, determine the right of the contesting parties. 11 If there be sev-

eral claimants to the office or franchise, they may all be made defendants, so
the Court may in one suit determine their respective rights. 12 But the validity
of any election which may be contested under the Code by the party who seeks
this remedy cannot be tried in this proceeding. 13
It would seem that, in view of the enlarged jurisdiction of the Chancery
Court, the bill, in case of usurpation of office, might well be entertained not
only to oust the usurper and put the complainant in possession of the office, but
would also he sustained if it went further and sought to recover the fees of
the office and the damages the complainant has sustained by reason of the acts
of the defendant. 14
Under the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court to award a mandatory injunc-
tion, a peremptory mandamus, and all necessary writs to oust usurpers, or
officers who have forfeited their offices, 15 and in view of the fact that in Chan-
cery names and forms are immaterial, the Court has plenary power, on one and
the same bill, regardless of its technical name, 16 1st, to compel an officer or usur-
per to put things in statu quo, or do any other act the rights of the complainant
or of the public require 2d, to put the complainant, or the rightful person, in
;
his place and 3d, to make against the defendant a decree for such damages as
;
complainant may be entitled to. But such a bill must be brought by the District-
Attorney and signed by him.
§ 1083. General Form of Bill Against Corporations, Trustees and Usurpers.
The following general form will aid in drawing a bill under this Chapter
brought in "the county or district," meaning that, ceeding. It merely prevents the adjudication in the
when there is a Chancery Court for the county, the suit for ouster being pleaded in bar of a second suit
bill is filed in the county, but where a Chancery for damages, based on the same cause of action. If
Court is held in a district composed of two or more the original suit was in the Circuit Court a second
counties the bill is filed in the district. See, ante, suit for damages might be necessary, but no reason is
§ 177, note 15. apparent why there should be two suits in the Chan-
7 See, ante, § 178, sub-sec. IS. cery Court about the same matter.
8 Code, § 3415. The dictum in State ex rel. v. Wright, 5 Heisk.,
8 The statutes sometimes denominate this officer, 612, is not conclusive of this question, the decision
"District Attorney." See, Code, § 519, 527, 669, 715, not being on the point whether the damages may not
716, 719, 900, 981 (Shan.) 1026, (Shan.) 1445, be recoverable in the original suit. Besides, the de-
(Shan.) 1557, 1629 (Shan.) 1903a, 214J<i. 3-^S, cision was made in 1871, and before the passage of
3952c, 3961, 5090a, 5568, S596, 5597, and 5598. This the Acts of 1877 enlarging the jurisdiction of the
seems to be the better designation, and avoids all Chancery Court over matters previously of legal cog-
confusion. There should be but one Attorney Gen- nizance. Boni judicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex
eral, and his jurisdiction co-extensive with the State. lite oriatur. (It is the duty of a good judge to put
See Shannon's Supplement to the Code, pp. 198, 211, an end to l t'gaticn, and ôt to allow one suit to beget
:
763, and 764. another.) See, ante, §§36:38.

10 Code, §§ 3411, 3412. As to the meaning of the 15 Code, §§3409; 3419-3420.
word "District," in these two sections, see ante, 18 The persistent spirit of technicality, though con-
§ 177, note 15. stantly forbidden to enter the portals of Equity, still
11 Code, §§ 3419-3420. frequents its Courts, and often prompts its der-ees.
12 Code, 3422.
§ But its malign influence there is always on the vane;
13 Code, 3423 ; State ex rel. V. Wright, 10 Heisk.,
§ and the disposition to do complete justice in every
237; Anderson v. Gossett, 9 Lea, 644. suit is constantly increasing.
14 Ante, Code, § 3421, does not prohibit such a pro-
867 THE NATURE OF A QUO WARRANTO.
SUITS IN §1083
BILL AGAINST CORPORATIONS, TRUSTEES AND USURPERS.
To the Honorable Hugh G. Kyle, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Huntsville
The State of Tennessee, which sues by W. H. Buttram, her
Attorney-General, on the relation of A
B, a resident of
Scott county, complainant,
vs.
C D and E F, residents of the same county, defendants.
The complainant, the State of Tennessee, which sues by W. H. Buttram, her Attorney-
General, on the relation of A
B, a resident of Scott county, respectfully shows to the Court:
, i.
That, [Here set forth the particular act of usurpation or forfeiture, or other improper
conduct complained of.]
ii.
That, [Here set forth the title of the relator to the office or franchise, or his rights in the
premises, if any. If no relator, show wherein' the usurpation consists, or how the interests
and rights of the public are jeopardized; and, in case trustees are sued, specify the particular
wrong conduct complained of.]
in.
That, [Here set forth the facts, if any, that require an attachment of property, or an
injunction, or a receiver, or two or all of these, or any other extraordinary preliminary
proceeding. 11 ]
rv.
1st. That subpcena to answer issue [&c., see, ante, §§ 155; 164.]
2d. That the defendant be enjoined from [doing the act or acts complained of; that their
property be attached, if an attachment, statutory or equitable, be necessary and allowable;
and that a receiver be appointed, if a proper case for such action.]
3d. That an account be taken [when trustees are sued, to show how the trustees have
managed the estate, what disposition they have made of the trust funds, and money, and
other property which are or should be in their hands. Specify any special acts of misman-
agement, malversation, peculation, waste, improper alienations, or other misconduct, for
which an accounting should be had. 1& ]
4th. That, at the hearing [Here specify the substantial final relief desired, keeping in
mind the Code sections on the subject as well as the general powers of the Chancery Court. 19 ]
5th. That, [in the event the relator is shown to have been injured by the conduct of the
defendant, and to be entitled to an accounting for fees and moneys and property by him
received, or should have been received, that] an account be taken thereof, and complainant
be given a decree for all damages by him sustained by reason of the acts or omissions of
the defendant. 20
6th. That complainant have such other and further relief as the nature of the case may
require.
This is the first application for an injunction, attachment, or receiver, in this case.
W. H. Buttram, Attorney General.
If the bill is filed on the relation of a private individual, he is liable for such
costs as are not adjudged against the defendant, 21 and may be required to give
a bond for costs. If he obtains an attachment, or injunction, or both, he must
give a bond or bonds to cover damages. If the bill is by the State alone no
bond is required for costs.
The bill must be sworn to if any extraordinary process is sought, the relator
making the affidavit when the bill is on relation. The bill in all cases on re-
lation must be signed by the District Attorney. 22
17 Code, § 3417. 20 See preceding section.
18 Code, §3410. 21 Code, § 3414.
19 Under the Code sections governing this proceed- 22 The State ex rel. v. Campbell, 8 Lea, 74. And
ing, and its' jurisdiction to award a mandamus, or a the District Attorney may dismiss the bill without the
mandatory injunction, and to enforce its decrees by consent of the relator. State ex rel, v. Turnpike Co.,
attachment of the person, the Court's powers are all 4 Cates, 615; State ex rel. v. Agee, 21 Pick., 588.
sufficient for every emergency. See, ante, §§ 36; 38.
§1084 SUITS FOR A MANDAMUS. 868
CHAPTER LX.
SUITS FOR WRITS OF MANDAMUS.
§ 1084. Suits for Mandamus Generally Con- § 1086. Form of Bill for a Writ of Man-
sidered. damus.
§ 1085. Pleadings in Suits for Mandamus, § 1087. Forms of Writs of Mandamus.
and Proceedings Thereon.
§ 1084. Suits for Mandamus Generally Considered. The Chancery Court —
has full jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus upon bill or petition, mak-
ing the necessary allegations, and duly sworn to. 1 The object of a mandamus
is to compel the defendant to do some specific ministerial act, which the law
requires him to do, but provides no adequate and specific remedy in case of
his non-performance. It is usually resorted to where an official refuses to do
some specific ministerial act which it is his duty to do, and there is no other
adequate and specific remedy for his default or refusal. 2 The Courts are more
liberal in granting this writ than formerly, the remedy being freely applied
when necessary. 3
It is a general rule thatwhenever a statute gives power to, or imposes an
obligation on, a particular person to do some particular act, or perform some
particular duty, and provides no specific remedy for non-performance, a
mandamus will be granted. 4
While origiDally a mandamus suit was strictly a common law proceeding,
our Code has greatly changed the pleadings and practice and made them con-
form to those in Chancery; 5 and now the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to
award the writ, it would seem that the Court after awarding and enforcing the
mandamus, might well go further, the bill so praying, and decree to complain-
ant any damages he might be entitled to by reason of the wrongful conduct
of the defendant in the premises. 6 The statute giving the Chancery Court
jurisdiction does not convert that Court into a law Court, but merely enlarges
its jurisdiction, pro tanto, as a Court of Equity, and enables it in addition to
its powers as a Court of Equity, to administer justice in cases where a mandamus
is necessary and the rule in Chancery is that where the Court has jurisdiction
;
for one purpose it will take jurisdiction for all purposes, and determine the
entire controversy. 7
§ 1085. Pleadings in Suits for Mandamus, and Proceedings Thereon. The —
bill is in the name of the State, on the relation of the person interested, who is
treated as the real complainant, so far as the pleadings and procedure arc- con-
cerned, and must give a prosecution bond. The rules of pleading and practice
in the Chancery Court are proper in a mandamus proceeding. Indeed in many
respects the pleadings and practice in a suit for a mandamus, under our Code,
resemble those in the Chancery Courts in a suit for a mandatory injunction 8
1 Hawkins v. Kercheval, 10 Lea, 535. And the be recovered in an ejectment suit at law, but are re-
suit may be brought in Chancery when the amount coverable in an ejectment suit in Chancery. The
claimed is under fifty dollars. State ex ret. V. Alex- present mandamus bill in Chancery is as different
ander, 7 Cates, 156. from a mandamus proceeding at common law as an
2 See Digests, under the title "Mandamus," for ejectment suit in Chancery is different from an eject-
cases where the writ will and will not be granted. ment suit at common law.
3 Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Wisdom, 5 Heisk., 7 See, ante, §§36; 38. It is a maxim of the Chan-
125, 152. cery Court that Equity will not decree a suit where it
i Winters v. Burford, 6 Cold., 328; M. & O. R. R. may decree a remedy. Fran. Max., p. 42. Indeed
Co. i>. Wisdom, 5 Heisk., 152. the jurisdiction and practice in mandamus is almost
5 State, ex rel. v. Williams, In this
2 Cates, 549. identical with mandatory iniunctions. See Condon v.
case the practice in a mandamus suit. is fully troated. Maloney, 24 Pick., 82; Hawkins v. Kercheval, 10 Lea,
6 Because damages are not awarded in a mandamus 535.
suit at law is no conclusive reason why they may not 8 There are a bill, a fiat, an alternative writ, an
be awarded in Chancery. The mesne profits cannot answer, issues of fact for a jury, third parties allowed
869 SUITS FOR A MANDAMUS. § 1085
or for a specific performance. 9 On the bill being duly sworn to and presented
to the Chancellor, 10 he will endorse his fiat thereon for an alternative mandamus
as on a bill for an injunction or attachment. On the writ being served on the
defendant he will do the act required of him, or show cause in his answer at
the next term of the Court, or at the next rule day required by the practice of
the Court, why he should not be compelled to do what the writ requires. If
an issue of fact is made by the pleadings the Court may determine it or submit
it to a jury. If a third person is interested, he may, on being notified by the
defendant, become a party defendant, and file an answer upon giving security
for costs. 11 It would seem from sections 3571 and 3573 of the Code that the
defendant may disclose in his answer a third person claiming title to, or interest
in, the matter in controversy and that if such third person fails to have himself
;
made a party by answering, it would be proper for a subpoena to issue requiring

him to answer, and if he is a non-resident or unknown, 12 publication must be
made against him, and in either case pro confesso taken against him if he fail
to appear and answer. So, it would seem that the complainant might make
such interested person a party defendant to the petition, if aware of his interest
before the petition is filed.
If the defendant desires to take advantage of any defect in the application
for a mandamus, or in the form or substance of the bill, he should do so before
filing his answer, by a motion to dismiss, or by a demurrer, or such defect will
be waived. 13
If the defendant makes default by not answering the bill, or fails to make
other effective defense by motion to dismiss or demurrer, or if a decision is
made against him after appearance, the Court will direct a peremptory man-
damus to issue against him.
It is ordinarily unnecessary to actually issue a peremptory writ, as the
defendant either submits to the decree awarding it, or appeals. If the writ
should issue, however, it will be similar in form to the alternative writ, but will
peremptorily command the defendant to do forthwith what the decree requires
of him, and to return the writ showing he has fully complied with its com-
mands. If the defendant fail to comply with a peremptory writ of mandamus,
an alias writ is the proper remedy, and in addition the delinquent may be
punished for contempt. 14 If upon the incoming of the answer the complainant
deems it insufficient, he may move for a peremptory writ, which motion would
be, in effect, a demurrer to the return, the answer under our Code being the
return required by the alternative writ. 15 If the answer shows on its face suf-
ficient cause why the peremptory writ should not issue, complainant must
prove its falsity, and the issues made by the pleadings will be determined by
the Chancellor, or by a jury, as in other cases in the Chancery Court. 16
Great particularity is required in the answer to the bill, and if the answer
fail to deny important facts alleged in the bill, every intendment will be made
to intervene, publication as to non-residents, pro con-

t
,10 In the sight of our Tennessee jurisprudence an
fessos, a peremptory command, and costs discre- alternative writ of mandamus may be considered ex-
tionary, all. as in Chancery proceedings. Code, §§ traordinary process grantable by any Judge or Chan-
3567-3575. Indeed the two proceedings are practically cellor. Code, §§3946; 4434.
identical, the only material difference being that a The bill may be presented in open Court, and in-
bill for a mandamus is in the name of the State, on stead of a fiat thereon, an order of record made
the relation of the complainant, and even this differ- awarding the alternative writ.
ence is not required by the statute, and perhaps not 11 Code, § 3571.
necessary; and, in any event, is purely technical, and 12 Code, § 3573. Perhaps for the vorl "unVnown,"
absolutely without substance, as the writs in both in- we should read "his residence unknown." for the
stances (injunction and mandamus,) run in the name Court would hardly proceed against an unknown per-
of the State. son by mandamus.
9On a bill for a specific performance, or for a man- 13 The State, ex rel. -o. Board of Inspectors, 6 Lea,
datory injunction, as on a bill for a mandamus, the 12. See, Waiver, ante. § 71.
defendant is coerced into doing a particular art he is 14 State, ex rel. v. Memphis, 2 Shan. Cas., 185.
under obligation to do, and the proceedings in each 15 Cide. § 3570: State, ex rel. v. Williams, 2 Cates,
suit are almost identical. So a petition for manda- 549. Or the complainant may set the cause down for
mus in Chancery is entirely at home in that Court. hearing on bill and answer, which is the same in
Condon v. Malonev, 24 Pick., 82; Hawkins V. Ker- substance. Ibid.
cheval, 10 Lea, 535. 16 Code, § 3570, 3572.
§1086 SUITS J/OR A MANDAMUS. 870
against it: allegations of the bill not denied, nor confessed and avoided, will
be taken as true. 17
§ 1086. Form of Bill for a Writ of Mandamus. —There is nothing technical
about the form of this bill except that in the name of the State, on the
it is
relation of the petitioner. Practically, the entire litigation is on the lines of
Chancery pleadings, practice and procedure.
BILL FOE A MANDAMUS.
To the Honorable H. B. Lindsay, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Jacksboro
The State of Tennessee, on the relation of
John Jones, 18 a resident of Campbell county,
vs. Bill for a Mandamus.
John Smith, a resident of the same county,
defendant.
The State of Tennessee, suing on the relation of John Jones, respectfully shows to the
Court
That, [Here shozv what right or office defendant is withholding from the complainant.
Be particular to state fully and clearly the rights of complainant, and if any notice, or other
preliminary act is required to mature these rights, show that these requirements have been
fully complied with. The essential facts must be positively averred.]
II.
That, [Here show that demand has been made upon defendant to do the act the com-
plainant insists upon, stating time and place of the demand, and that the defendant refused,
and still refuses, to do the act.]
ill.
That complainant has no adequate remedy for the wrongs he complains of except the
State's writ of mandamus, and he therefore prays your Honor,
1st. To order an alternative writ of mandamus to issue requiring the defendant to [Here
specify fully and particularly the act required to be performed the precise thing the com- —
plainant wishes the defendant to do;] or show cause at the next term of your Honor's Court,
[or, at the next rule day after the service of the writ] why he has not done so, and upon
his failure so to do, or upon a decision against him at the hearing, that a peremptory writ
of mandamus issue.
2d. That complainant be given a decree against the defendant for damages for wrong-
fully withholding from him. [Here specify the right or office withheld, and any special
damage or other wrong done by the defendant to the complainant, in connection with the
subject-matter of the litigation.] .
3d. That he have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
William J. Bryan, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, §§ 161 789.] ;
The bill must be sworn to before a Judge, Justice of the Peace or Clerk of the Circuit
Court. 19
FIAT FOB, AN ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS.
To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at Jacksboro
File this bill and issue the writ of alternative mandamus as prayed, on the complainant
givirg bond for costs, or taking the pauper oath in lieu.
This April 1, 1895. H. B. Lindsay, Chancellor.
17 State, ex rel. V. Williams, 2 Cates, 549. This is said that the suit must be in the name of t'le State
the true rule of both law and logic; and should be on the relation of the party complaining In nearly
applied and enforced as to all answers in Chancerv. all of the reported cases prior to Whitesides v.
See, ante, § 455, note. As to the necessity of a full Stuart, the suits were brought directly in the name
and empiric answer, see, State, ex. rel. v. Alexander of the petitioners. In Hawkins V. Kercheval, 10
7 Cates, 156. •
Lea, 542, a bill in Chancery in the nature nf a
IS The person, on whose relation the bill is filed, is mandamus suit was sustained; in Brannon V. Wright,
generally termed the "relator." but the Code terms 5 Cates, 692, it was held that the State was not a
him the "petitioner." Code, 3574. Indeed, it would necessarv party in a suit in Chancery on a guardian's
seem that this rroceeding is largely statutory, and bond. What interest has the State in a suit by a
that the Code did not rontemplate that the petition teacher to collect her salary? Arrington v. Cotton,
should he in the name of the State, at all; and. there- 1 Bax., 316. When a mandamus suit is instituted
fore, did not contemplate anv relator. See Hawkins in the Chancery Court, under our statutes, it should
v: Kerrheval, 10 Lea, 535, which was a bill treated as not be smothered by the effete technicalities of the
a mandamus suit. No one should have any right to common law. Let us favor precedents which make
sue in the name of the St^te, without express au- for simplicity and eouity, and not bow down to those
thority from the State. This authority has been technical rules which once drove Justice from her
given generally in suits on official bonds, (Code, _
native seat in the Courts of common law. The rul-
§ 27970 and specially in case of (1) motions on ing in Whitesides V. Stuart, 7 Pick., 710, is ana-
official bonds, aeainst Sheriffs, Clerks and other offi- chronistic and savors of the mediaeval: it is an addi-
cers CCode, § 3584;) (2) suits against administrators tion to the statute, but not an improvement.
and executors on their bonds, ("Code §2231;) and in Whitesides v. Stewart, 7 Pick., 710; Code,
(3) proceedings against corporations, usurpers, and 5 3567. But an affidavit before a Chancellor or a
public trustees, (Code, § 3409;) but is not givn in Clerk and Master is probahlv within the equity and
case of bills or petitions for a mandamus. Never- intendment of the Act of 1877.
theless, in Whitesides ii. Stuart, 7 Pick., 710, it is
871 SUITS FOR A MANDAMUS. §1087
§ 1087. —
Forms of Writs of Mandamus. For the information of the Clerks
and Masters the following forms of writs of mandamus are given
ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Campbell County, j
To John Smith 2 ° :
Whereas, John Jones, as relator, on the 1st day of April, 1895, presented his bill to the
Hon. H. B. L,indsay, Chancellor, alleging that you [Here give a brief but clear statement
of the specific act the defendant has failed to do,] as will more fully appear by reference to
the copy of said bill herewith served upon you and whereas the said Chancellor has ordered
;
an alternative writ of mandamus to issue as prayed in said bill.

You are therefore commanded to [Here state .what complainant, in his bill, prays the
defendant be compelled to do, using substantially the special prayer of the bill,] or appear at
the next term of the Chancery Court at Jacksboro, to be held on the Monday in ,
1895, [or, at the next rule day of said Court,] and show cause why you have not done so;
and that you then and there return this writ along with your answer to said bill. 21
This April 1, 1895. Winston Baird, C. & M.
If the defendant's answer fails to show sufficient cause why the peremptory
writ should not issue, complainant will move that the writ be issued. This
motion is equivalent to a demurrer to the return for not stating facts sufficient
to constitute a defence. 22
MOTION AND ORDER FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

The State of Tennessee, on the relation of John Jones,
vs.
John Smith.
In this cause the complainant this day moved the Court for a peremptory writ of
mandamus, and argument having been heard, and the Court being of the opinion that the
answer of the defendant fails to show cause, it is therefore ordered and decreed by the Court,
that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue commanding the defendant forthwith to [Here
show what the defendant is required to do, following substantially the prayer of the bill for
special relief.] The defendant will return this writ on or before [specifying the time^
showing thereon, or therewith, how he has executed the same. He will also pay all the costs
of this cause, for which an execution will issue.
If the complainant so desires, and the Court deems it proper, a reference may
be made to the Master for an account to show what debt, or damages, the
complainant is entitled to by reason of the wrong done. 23
PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
County of Campbell. \
To John Smith
Whereas, in the case of John Jones against you in the Chancery Court of said county it
was ordered and decreed by said Court that you [Here set out so much of the decree as
specifies what the defendant John Smith is to do, and when and how he is to do it,] all of
which more fully and at large appears in said decree.
Now, therefore, you are hereby commanded and enjoined forthwith to do and perform
what is required of you by said decree, and that you especially and immediately [Here set
out what the defendant is required to do as shown in the preamble of this writ.] And you
are further commanded to answer this writ at the next term of the Chancery Court of said
county to be held at the Court House in Jacksboro on the Monday of 1895, ,
and show in your answer how you have executed this writ.
This July 1, 1895. Winston Baird, C. & M.
The Sheriff executes the writ by serving a copy of it on the defendant, and
making a return on the original that he has so done, giving the date of such
service.
20 The writ is addressed to the defendant. For- returnable to the Court, ^nd not to the Chancellor at
merly writs of injunction were, also, addressed to Chambers. Whit'sides >'. Stewart, 7 Pick., 710.
the defendant. See, ante, § 834, note 43. 22 State, ex rel., v. Williams, 2 Cates, 549.
21 Code, § 3S69. The alternative writ must be 23 See, ante, § 1084.
§1088 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY. 872
CHAPTER LXI.
SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY.
Article I. Matters Relating to the Jurisdiction.
Article II. •
Pleadings and Procedure.
Article III. Trial, Orders, and Decrees.
ARTICLE I.
MATTERS RELATING TO THE JURISDICTION.
§ 1088. Marriage and Divorce Generally Con § 1090. Local Jurisdiction of the Court.
sidered.
§ 1089. Grounds of Divorce. § 1091. Restoration of Conjugal Rights.
§ 1088. Marriage and Divorce Generally Considered. The relation of hus- —

band and wife is not only a personal relation, depending on the consent of the
parties for its continuance, but it is, also a status, which is established and
enforced by law, and can only be changed, or abrogated by law. A divorce
suit, in consequence, not only involves the persons to it, but it also involves a
thing, a status, the marriage relation and it is, therefore, a proceeding partly
;
in personam and partly in rem. And it is on this latter ground that a divorce
can be granted, and the children of the marriage given to a resident, when the
other party is a non-resident, each State having the right to determine the
status of its own citizens. 1
So far as a divorce suit relates to the status of the parties, or their children,
it is a proceeding in rem; and so far as it relates to alimony, it is a proceeding
in personam. And for this reason, while a valid decree of divorce can be pro-
nounced in favor of a resident against a non-resident defendant, no valid decree
for alimony can be rendered against a non-resident defendant, unless he is
before the Court by service of subpoena, or by voluntary appearance, 2 or unless
he has property within the jurisdiction of the Court; and in the latter case,
only to the extent of such property indeed, the proceeding against such prop-
:
erty is, in effect, a proceeding in rem, also, when the Court has no jurisdiction
of the person of the defendant.
As parties cannot marry in this State without the consent of the State, such
consent being manifested by a license issued by a County Court Clerk, so they
cannot unmarry, or divorce themselves, without the consent of the State. This
consent our Constitution authorizes the Legislature to grant, through the
Courts, for such causes as may be specified by law. 3 And before a Court has
authority to give this consent for the State, the complainant must allege and
prove one of the causes of divorce, specified by the law of the State.
§ 1089. —
Grounds of Divorce. The jurisdiction to grant divorces is statu-
tory; and the grounds of divorce are statutory; 4 and, in consequence of the
interest the community has in the enforcement of all marital obligations, the
Court is always careful, not only to keep within the limits of its jurisdiction,
but to require the complainant to allege and prove everything necessary to
clearly justify the divorce prayed. The following are the causes of divorce
from the bonds of matrimony:
1 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 746; 751. common law marriages are void. Smith v. Bank,
2 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 762. 7 Cates, 12.
8 Const, of Tenn., Art. XI, § 4. All marriages 4 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 749.
in this State must conform to our statutes, and
873 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY. §1090
1. That either party, at the time of the contract, was, and still is, naturally
impotent, and incapable of procreation.
2. That either party has knowingly entered into a second marriage, in viola-
tion of a previous marriage still subsisting.
3. That either party has committed adultery.
4. Wilful or malicious desertion, or absence, of either without a reasonable
cause, for two whole years. 5
5. Being convicted of any crime, which, by the laws of the State renders the
party infamous.
6. Being convicted of a crime, which, by the laws of the State, is declared to
be a felony, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary.
7. That either party has attempted the life of the other, by poison, or any
other means showing malice.
8. Eefusal, on the part of a wife, to remove with her husband to this State,
without a reasonable cause, and wilfully absenting herself from him for two
years.
9. That the woman was pregnant at the time of the marriage by another
person, without the knowledge of the husband. 6
10. Habitual drunkenness of either party, when the husband or wife has
contracted the habit of drunkenness after marriage. 7
The following are causes of divorce from bed and board, and from the bonds
of matrimony, at the discretion of the Court
1. That the husband is guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment or con-
duct toward his wife, as renders it unsafe and improper for her to cohabit with
him, and be under his dominion and control.
2. That he has offered such indignities to her person as to render her condi-
tion intolerable, and thereby forced her to withdraw.
3. That he has abandoned her, or turned her out of doors, and refused or
neglected to provide for her. 8
But in either of the three next preceding cases the defendant may justify
his conduct by proving the ill conduct of the complainant. 9
A divorce may be granted for any of the foregoing causes, though the acts
complained of were committed out of the State, or the petitioner resided out
of the State at the time, no matter where the other party resides, if the peti-
tioner has resided in this State two years next preceding the filing of the peti-
tion. 10 But where the grounds of divorce arise within the State no term of
prior residence in the State is required. 11
§ 1090. —
Local Jurisdiction of the Court. The bill may be filed either: (1)
in the county where the defendant resides, or (2) in the county where he is
found, or (3) in the county where the complainant resides, if the defendant is
a non-resident, or a penitentiary convict, or (4) in the county where the parties
resided at the time of their separation. 12 If the defendant is a resident, he will
be brought before the Court by service of subpoena if he is a non-resident, or
;
a convict confined in the penitentiary, he may be brought before the Court by

publication. 13 If the wife is complainant, and the defendant lives in the
county where the bill is filed, the suit may be tried and a divorce granted, with-
out service of subpoena or publication, if the bill was filed, and subpoena for the
defendant placed in the hands of the Sheriff of the county in which the suit
was instituted, three months before the time when the subpoena is returnable;
14 "Where no sub-
but the officer having the subpoena shall execute it if he can.
5 The original act read "wilful and malicious." 11 Carter n. Carter, 5 Cates, 509.
See, post, § 1095. But a supplemental bill of divorce 12 Code, §§ 24S 1-2451 o.
for two years' absence will not lie when the origiml 13 Code, § 2454.
bill was filed for other causes before the two years'
14 Code, § 2456. This section applies only when
absence. Thomas V. Thomas, 2 Cold., 126. the defendant is a resident of the countv in which
6 Code, § 2448. the suit is brought. Temple v. Temple, 13 Lea, 160.
7 Acts of 1867-8, ch. 62; M. & V.'s Code, § 3306. The officer's return must show that the subpcena
8 Code, 5 2449. was in his hands three full months before the return
9 Code, § 2466. day, and that he tried to execute it, thus: "Came
10 Code, § 2450. to hand, March 1, 1893. Search made, but the de-
poena served upon the defendant, the complainant must prove the facts on
is
which the local jurisdiction of the Court depends. 15 If the bill is filed in the
wrong county the Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. 10
§ 1091. —
Restoration of Conjugal Rights. If upon a false rumor, apparently
well founded, of the death of one of the parties, who has been absent two whole
years, the other party marries again, the party remaining single, may, upon
returning, insist upon a restoration of conjugal rights, or upon a dissolution of
the marriage and the Court shall sentence and decree accordingly, to-wit that
; :
the first marriage shall stand, and the second be dissolved; or, vice versa; but
such bill must be filed within one year after the return. 17
The bill will make the party who has remarried, and the husband or wife of
such party defendants, for the latter has a right to be heard, and must, be-
sides, be made a party in order to be bound by the decree. The bill should
allege (1) the fact of the first marriage, (2) the absence of complainant for
two whole years, (3) the rumor of complainant's death, (4) the second mar-
riage, and (5) the reasons why the complainant prefers a restoration of his
conjugal rights, or why he prefers a dissolution of the first marriage, and
(6) should pray accordingly. The Court will be governed largely by the wishes
of the parties to the first marriage in determining the case.
ARTICLE II.
PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE.
•§ 1092. The Procedure in a Divorce Suit. § 1096. Answer, and Cross Bill.
§ 1093. Frame of a Divorce Bill. § 1097. Alimony Pendente Lite.
§ 1094. General Form of a Divorce Bill. § 1098. Petition for Alimony Pendente Lite,
§ 1095. Special Form of a Divorce Bill. and Proceeding's Thereon.
The Procedure in a Divorce Suit- -A divorce suit is commenced in
8 1092.
Chancery by a bill, filed by the party seeking a divorce against the other party.
On such bill being filed, and security for costs given, or pauper oath taken, 1 a
subpoena to answer the bill will issue, if the defendant is a resident of the State
if the defendant is a non-resident, or convict confined in the penitentiary, pub-
lication will be made. 2
The defendant on appearing may move to dismiss the bill, or may demur to
it, or may plead to it, or may answer it he may, also, file his answer as a cross
;
bill, and set up therein any ground of divorce he may have, and pray for a
decree of divorce. On such answer and cross bill being filed, the same steps
must be taken, as on an original bill, to compel an answer to it.
If either the original or the cross bill is not answered in due time after pro-
cess served, it may be taken for confessed. The cause stands for trial at the
first term after service of subpoena, and the proof may be made by depositions,
or by witnesses examined in open Court. At the hearing, the issues of fact may
be tried by the Chancellor, or by a jury; and a divorce may be granted the
complainant on the original bill, or, if there be a cross bill, the party filing it
may be granted a divorce, or both bills may be dismissed, as the justice of the
case may require.
The decree of the Court, in so far as it grants or refuses a divorce, can be
revised only by an appeal 3 but a writ of error will lie to so much of the decree
;
fendant, Richard Roe, not to be found in my 1 Persons suing for an absolute divorce cannot sue
County, lune 12, 1893. J. K. Lones. Sheriff." As under the nauner oath. See, ante, § 182, sub-sec. 1.
to service of subpoenas, see, ante, § 192. 2 Code, § 2454.
15 Majors v. Majors, 1 Tenn. Ch., 265. 3 Code, § 3158. It cannot be reviewed by a writ
16 Walton v. Walton, 12 Pick., 25. of error coram nobis. Willis V. Willis, 20 Pick., 382.
17 Code, § 2461.
875 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY.. §1093
as allows alimony, and to so much of the decree as affects other parties to the
suit than the husband and wife. 4
§ 1093. Frame of a Divorce Bill.

. —A
bill for divorce should conform to the
rules of Chancery pleading, 5 and should show on its face every fact that is
essential to the jurisdiction of the Court to pronounce the decree prayed. It
should allege,
1. The marriage of the complainant and defendant.
2. One or more of the statutory causes of divorce particularly and specially
set forth, giving circumstances of time and place with reasonable certainty. 6
3. If the cause of divorce originated outside of the State the bill should
allege that the complainant has resided in this State at least two years next
preceding the bringing of the suit. 7
4. A
statutory ground of local jurisdiction in the Court where the bill is filed
5. And should pray for a divorce, or for a divorce and other and further
relief. 8
6. And the bill must be verified, by the affidavit of the complainant in per-
son, that the facts stated in the bill are true to the best of the complainant's
knowledge and belief, and that the complaint is not made out of levity, or by
collusion 10 with the defendant, but in sincerity and truth, for the causes 11 men-
tioned in the bill.
A divorce bill may be amended as freely as any other bill ;
12 but if the amend-
ment consists in the averment of a fact, such amendment must be verified by
the complainant's oath.
A
divorce bill is filed in the proper person and name of the complainant. If
the wife is complainant, she files the bill in her own name, as though she were
a single woman. 13
§ 1094. —
General Form of a Divorce Bill. In order to illustrate the fore-
going section, and to show the various parts of a bill, in their orderly connec-
tion, the following general form of a divorce bill is given
GENERAL FOBM OF A DIVOECE BILL.

To the Honorable [insert name of] Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at [insert name
of town where the bill is to be filed.]
A B, a resident of [insert name of county where A B resides] icom-
plainant,
vs.
C B, a resident of [insert name of county where defendant resides, if
a resident of the State; if a non-resident, so state,] defendant.
i.
That she [or he] and the defendant, C B, were married on the day of [insert day,
month, and year, of the marriage,] in County, Tennessee, in which State they have
4 Parmenter V. Parmenter, 3 Head, 225; Owens V. act made a cause of divorce, or (3) to suppress facts
Sims. 3 Cold., 544; McBee V. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558. that would defeat the divorce. 5 A. & E. Ency. of
5 Divorce causes are in the nature of Chancery taw, 819-820.
Suits, and the proceedings in them are according to it The causes mentioned in the bill should be one
the course of practice in Chancery, except where a or more of the statutory causes of divorce, and the
difference is made by statute. Richmond v. Rich- attending circumstances of time and place. Code,
mond, 10 Yerg., 343; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 4 Sneed, § 2452. It is no uncommon thing for the draftsman
105. to substitute the word "purposes" for the word
6 Code, 8 2452; Stewart v. Stewart, 2 Swan., 59!; "causes;" this is a fatal error. "Causes" is the vital
Home Home, 1 Tenn. Ch., 259. The cause for
V. word in the affidavit. Of course, the bill is filed for
divorce must be averred in the very words of the the purposes mentioned in the bill. See DeArmond
statute, or in words fully equal to the very words of V. DeArmond, 8 Pick., 41.
the stitute, and definite in their meaning. Ibid. 12 The prayer may be amended, and the bill sworn
Rutledge v. Rutledge. 5 Sneed, 554; Ward V. Ward, to, even aft<- r the trial commences. Hackney V.
1 Tenn. Ch.. 262; Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Tcnn. Hackney, 9 Hum., 452.
Ch., 267. These cases show the importance of the 13 code. §2451; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 4 Sneed,
bill alleging the cause of divorce .in the very words 105. If the complainant, whether husband or wife,
and manner renuired by the Code, 8 2452. be an infant, it would seem that according to the
7 Code, § 2450; Carter v. Carter, 5 Cates, 509. strirt rules of Equity nleading, he, or she. should
8 Code, § 2452. No divorce can be granted unless sue bv next friend. Wood v. Wood. 2 Paige, (N.
specially prayed for. Pillow v. Pillow, 5 Yerg., 420. Y.) 108. The practice, however, has been otherwise,
9 Code, § 2453. on the prinriple that one who is old enough to
10 Collusion is the agreement of the parties to marry, is old enough to sue, or be sued, for a di-
make up a case for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, in hpr or his own name. 5 A. & E. Ency. of
vorce: this agreement may be^ (1) to commit adul- Law, 767-768.
tery, or to appear so to do, or (2) to do any other
lived ever since. [If the parties were married out of Tennessee, so state. If the causes for
divorce originated outside this State, be careful to show that complainant has resided in the
State at least two years 1 * next preceding the Ming of the bill.]
II.
That [Here set out particularly, and specially, the statutory cause of divorce relied on,
using the very words of the statute, and then state the circumstances of time, and place, of
the act or acts complained of, with reasonable certainty; and if adultery is charged, give the
name of the person with whom
it was committed, and the place and time, with reasonable
certainty; or, give a sufficient reason for not so doing. 16 ]
m.
That [If it be necessary to allege a second ground of divorce, the allegation should here
be made, observing all the rules next above stated. 19 ]
IV.
That [Here show the ground of the of the Court, such as that the
local jurisdiction
defendant, if a resident, resides, or is temporarily staying, in the county wherein the bill is
filed; or if defendant is a non-resident, or penitentiary convict, show that the complainant
lives in the county wherein the bill is filed, or that the parties, at the time of their separation,
resided in the county wherein the bill is filed. 17 ]
v.
That[If there be children, the fruit of said marriage, and complainant desires the exclusive
custody of them, or any of them, so allege, and give their names, sex, and ages, and show
why complainant should have their custody.]
VI.
That [If alimony sought, here specify the real and personal property owned by the
is
defendant, itemizing it: and show what property the wife owns, or owned at the time of her
marriage, in her own right, if any. If any of the defendant's estate is in the hands of a third
party, or consists of debts, so state, naming the third party, and making him a defendant.]
VII.
That [If the defendant is attempting to take any of the children, or any of his property
out of the jurisdiction of the Court, or is about to fraudulently dispose of his property, or is
doing or threatening any other act that will justify an injunction, or an attachment, allege
all such acts and threats, giving time, place, and circumstance, with considerable minuteness.
Follow the precise language of the statute in alleging the grounds for an attachment.]
VIII.
That [If the defendant has conveyed away any of his property, to hinder and delay com-
plainant in her efforts to obtain alimony, and to defraud her of the same, so allege, specifying
the property, and fully describing it, and giving the name of the fraudulent vendee, and
making him a co-defendant to the suit.]
IX.
That the proper process issue to compel the defendant to appear, and answer the
1st.
bill ; ls
2d. That at the hearing the bonds of matrimony uniting complainant and defendant be
absolutely and perpetually dissolved, and that complainant be forever freed from the obliga-
tions thereof, 19 and be restored to all the risrhts and privileges of an unmarried person;
[and if the complainant be the wife, she may add to this prayer, "and that her maiden name
{stating it in full, both the given and the surname?) may be restored to her." 20 ]
3d. That [If complainant be the wife, she will, alto, pray for alimony pendente lite, and
for the suitable support and maintenance of herself and children, out of the defendant's
property. 21 ]
4th. That [If the complainant be the husband, he may pray to have his rights to his wife's
property, real and personal, declared according to the statute, 22 in which case he should, in
his bill, specify and describe her said property.]
5th. That the exclusive custody of all of said children [or of such of them as is desired,]
be committed to complainant.
14 Allegation and proof of the two years* residence proper papers for sensational literary displays. See,
are essential to the iurisdirtion of the Court. See ante, §410. sub-sec. 7.
Fickle r. Fickle, 5 Yen;., 203; S A. & E. Ency. of 16 A second ground of divorce, if it exists, should
Law, 757. But this allegation and proof is neces- be alleged with the same definiteness and particular-
#
sary only when the causes of divorce originated out- ity, as if it were the only ground; and should not be
side of this State. Carter v. Carter, 5 Catcs, 509. mixed up -in a miscellaneous manner with the first
15 Code, § 2452. Stewart v. Stewart, 2 Swan, ground. The bill mav fail as to the f rst ground, but
591: Home v. Home, 1 Tenn. Ch., 259; Futledge be sustainable as to the second ground, if it be prop-
v. Rutledge, 5 Sneed. 554. The bill must allege a erlv averred.
statutory ground of divorce; and the prudent drafts- 17 Code. §5 2451-2451 o. The bi'l must show on
man will employ the very words of the statute in its face that the Court has local jurisdiction, or it
alleging the particular ground he relies on, and then may be dismissed on motion, or on demurrer, for
follow up this general statement of the ground of want of jurisdiction of the defendant.
divorce by a specification of the circumstances and is Code. 5 ?4S4.
particulars, including the time and place, avoidi"g 10 Code, 5 ?465.
all disnlays of indignation, disgust, nr other s"nti- 20 CnAe, SS 3<36-3639.
mentality; and using no poetry, rhetoric, or indecent 21 Code, 5 24fi8.
or profane language. Divorce bills are not the 22 Code, | 2472.
6th. That an injunction issue to restrain the defendant from removing said children, or
any of them, from the State, [if such injunction be necessary.]
7th. That an attachment issue and be levied on enough of the property, real and personal,
of the defendant, to satisfy complainant's claim for alimony, maintenance and support, and
she says that dollars [stating a reasonable sum,] is justly due her on said claim. 28
[Omit this if an attachment is not obtainable, or is not desired.]
8th. That the said conveyance to hinder and defraud complainant be set aside, and for
nothing held; and the property so attempted to be conveyed be subjected to the satisfaction
of complainant's right to alimony. [Insert this prayer if any fraudulent conveyances have
been alleged in the bill.]
9th. And that complainant have such further and other relief as she [or, he,] may be
entitled to. [If any extraordinary process is prayed, add:] This is the first application for
extraordinary process in this case. G H, Solicitor.
County of . )
A B, being duly sworn, makes oath that the facts stated in his [or, her,] foregoing bill
are true to the best of his [or, her,] knowledge and belief; and that the complaint is not
made out of levity, or by collusion with the defendant, but in sincerity and truth, for the
causes 24 mentioned in the bill. A. B.
Sworn to and subscribed to
before me, Sept. 3, 1890.
I K, C. & M.
§ 1095. Special Form —
of a Divorce Bill. In drawing a bill for a divorce,
the essential requirements set forth in the preceding section should be rigidly
observed, for, if the bill does not allege a statutory cause of divorce, proof be-
comes irrelevant and useless, and no decree of divorce can be made. 25 The
BILL FOB, DIVORCE.
To the Hon. William B. Staley, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Huntsville, for
the County of Scott
Jane Doe, a resident of Scott county, complainant,
vs.
John Doe, a resident of the State of Kansas, and William Brown,
a resident of Scott county, defendants.
i.
That she and the defendant, John Doe, were married in Scott county, Tennessee, on the
31st day of August, 1880, and -that she has been a resident of said county ever since.
ii.
That more than two whole years ago, the defendant, John Doe, wilfully 26 deserted com-
plainant without a reasonable cause, and has continued said desertion ever since. Complain-
ant and the said defendant, Doe, were, in the year 1881, living with complainant's mother in
said county, and defendant became very angry because her mother suggested to him that
he ought to be looking out for a home of his own, and left, declaring he would never live
with complainant any more. He, on or about October, 1881, went to Kansas, and has never
been back since, and has never written to complainant, nor sent her any message or money,
or in any way provided for the support of complainant, and her two infant children. He
left complainant, and their two infant children, Mary and Charles, wholly dependent on her
parents, and on her own labor. He has written to friends living near complainant, and his
letters show that he is passing himself off as a single man, and that he is making love to
single women, and that he is spending a great deal of money on them. Complainant has
written him several loving letters, none of which has he answered, but has written to a third
person to tell complainant to keep her love, and her letters, to herself.
m.
That the defendant, Doe, in addition to the foregoing wrongs, committed adultery with
one Sallie Fox, on or about the Sth day of June, 1881, at or near the house of said Sallie,
in the 4th civil district of Scott county ; and, since he has been in Kansas, has sent affection-
23 Code, § 3469. 25 Stewart v. Stewart, 2 Swan, 591; Ward v.
24 Code, § 2453. That is, for the statutory causes Ward, 1 Tenn. Ch., 262.
of divorce relied on in this bill. Code, 2452. This 26 The language of the old statute was "wilful
statutory affidavit cannot be materially departed from. and malicious." The Code says, " wilful or ma-
DeArmond V. DeArmond, 8 Pick., 41. See, contra, licious;" hence, the effect of the cases of Stewart V.
Hackney 0. Hackney, 9 Hum., 453. Sometimes the Stewart, 2 Swan, 591; and Rutledge v. Rutledge, 5
word "purposes" is substituted for "causes," but in Sneed, 254, must be somewhat modified. Neverthe-
such cases the affidavit is fatally defective, the mean- less, the Court will require proof to show that the
ing of the two words being wholly dissimilar, as desertion was intentional, and prompted by feelings
already shown. There is no need of an affidavit to of ill will, or indifference, towards the complainant;
satisfy the Court that the complaint is for the
'
and accompanied by a reckless disregard of com-
purpose of obtaining a divorce! See preceding sec- plainant's welfare, and of defendant's duty towards
.
tion, note 11. the complainant.

ate messages, and some presents, to said Sallie. Complainant never learned of said adultery
until about two weeks ago.
iv.
Complainant avers that she has been true to her marriage vows, and has lived chastely,
and has given defendant no cause, or just excuse, for his said misconduct, and has not con-
doned 27 the same.
v.
The defendant, Doe, has by the death of his father, recently become the owner of a farm
in the 2d civil district of this county, described as follows: Beginning on a rock, in William
Jones' north line, thence [describing it by metes and bounds,] to the beginning, containing
about forty acres, and worth less than one thousand dollars. This tract complainant claims
for her homestead. The house on said farm contains an assortment of household and
kitchen furniture, and said farm is well stocked with poultry, hogs, sheep, horses, cows and
calves, all of which defendant's father left him by will duly probated. Defendant now, by
like devise, has a valuable farm in Kansas, and considerable personal estate there.
VI.
Thedefendant, Doe, also purchased from his father, in the latter's lifetime, a house and
lot in the town of {here locate and. describe it,] worth about one thousand dollars. This
lot he has fraudulently conveyed to his co-respondent, William Brown, to hinder and delay
complainant in obtaining a divorce and alimony, the said Brown aiding and abetting in said
fraud; and defendant, Doe, is about fraudulently to dispose of the balance of his property in
this State.
VII.
The premisesconsidered, complainant prays:
1st. issue to compel the defendants to appear and answer this bill,
That proper process
and that publication be made as to the defendant, John Doe, he being a non-resident of this
State. Both defendants are excused from answering on oath.
2d. That alimony pendente lite be allowed her, for her support, and to enable her to
defray the expenses of this suit, including a reasonable fee to her Solicitor.
3d. That an absolute divorce be granted her, that her maiden name, Jane Jones, be re-
stored to her, and that she be given the exclusive custody of her two children by said mar-
riage, Mary Doe, and Charles Doe, both being very tender infants.
4th. That alimony be decreed her, including said homestead, and all the personal property
on it, and in the house.
Sth. That an attachment issue, and be levied on all the foregoing property of the defendant,
Doe, real and personal, and upon said house and lot conveyed to the defendant, Brown to ;
secure the amount justly due the complainant as alimony, which amount is two thousand
dollars, as she verily believes; and that a receiver be appointed to take charge of said farm
of forty acres, and all of the personal property in the house, or on the land, and to apply
the rents and profits thereof to the support of complainant, pending this suit.
6th. And that she may have such further and other relief as the justibe of her case may
require.
This is the first application for an attachment or receiver in this case.
Jane Doe.
Daniel Jeffers, Solicitor.
State of Tennessee, S
County of Scott. 5
Jane Doe, being duly sworn, makes oath that the facts stated in her foregoing bill are
true, to the best of herknowledge and belief, that her complaint is not made out of levity,
or bv collusion with the defendant, but in sincerity and truth, for the causes mentioned in
the bill. 28
Jane Doe.
Sworn and subscribed before 1
to
me, September 6, 1884. 3
Reuben Hurtt, Clerk of the Circuit Court.
§ 1096. —
Answer and Cross Bill. The defendant may plead in abatement,
or moveto dismiss the bill, or he may demur, or plead in bar, or answer, or
answer and file a cross bill. 29 If the bill does not allege a statutory cause of
divorce, or does not allege the two years' residence in the State when necessary,
29a
as above shown or, if the bill shows on its face that it is not filed in the prop-
;
er county, the defendant may demur. If the bill shows all these essentials, the
27 Condonation will be implied, if the parties wil- revived, and the wrong done ceases to he forgiven,
lingly cohabit, after the injured party has obtained and may be relied on. 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law,
full knowledge of the wrong. But there is an im- 820-824.
plied condition to every condonation, the condition 28 This affidavit cannot be varied. See, ante.
being that the injury will not only not be repeated, % 1093, note 11.
but that the injured party will be treated with con- 20 See Index, for references to these various de-
jugal kindness in the future. If the implied condi- fences.
tion be violated, the rights of the injured party are 20a See, ante, § 1093, sub-sec. 3.
defendant must answer, if he or she disputes the truth of the bill. If the bill
be false, and the defendant have a good cause of divorce, he or she may answer,
and file a cross bill, or may file the answer as a cross bill, making in such answer
the same allegations as would be contained in a separate cross bill. The usual
practice in such cases is to file the answer as a cross bill.
Supposing the original bill to be filed by the wife under section 2449 of the
Code the following will serve as a form of
ANSWER AND CROSS BILL.
A B,
vs. In the Chancery Court at Blountville, Tennessee.
C D. ,
The answer of C B to the bill in said cause, the answer being filed as a cross bill against
said A B.
The defendant, C B, for answer to said bill, says
i.
That he admits his marriage to the complainant, at or about the time and place stated
and that they have lived in Tennessee over two years next preceding the filing of her bill;
and that she is the mother of three children by defendant.
ii.
Defendant denies the charges of cruel and inhuman treatment set forth in the bill, and
denies that she had any just cause, or excuse, for leaving his home, and denies that he
refused, or neglected, to provide for her, as she alleges in her said bill.
in.
Defendant admits that he owns the personal property described in the bill, and admits that
he is in posssession of the farm mentioned in the bill, the legal title to which is in com-
plainant, but he is now tenant thereof by the courtesy.
IV.
Defendant denies every allegation in the bill not herein expressly admitted; and avers
that the conduct of the complainant was such that, to his great grief, he was obliged to
remonstrate, and to deny her some privileges he would have been glad otherwise freely to
have accorded her. She is very fond of gay company, and delights in the society of fast
young men; and her whole heart is set on fine dress, picnics, theaters, base-ball contests,
dances, and all manner of public amusements so that her name is being bandied to and fro,
;
with winks, and hints, and insinuations, reflecting upon her virtue and general character as
a matron. In short, her conduct has been exceedingly unbecoming, for a married woman,
the mother of three children. Defendant's remonstrances and reproofs resulted in the alter-
cations she complains of, and the defendant avers that the said ill conduct of the complainant
was the cause thereof, and he pleads said ill conduct in justification of all he said or did. 30
v.
And now by way of cross bill against the said A
B, the defendant, C B, respectfully shows
to the Court, in addition to the facts hereinabove by him expressly admitted, or alleged
VI.
That the complainant has, since she left defendant's home, and hr the month of Septem-
ber, 1889, committed adultery with one George Sly, in the boarding house where she now
lives, in the town of Bristol, and that her conduct is emphatically that of an unchaste woman
and that she has been guilty of other adulteries with said Sly, in said town.
VII.
Respondent avers that he has not been guilty of like crime, that he has not condoned
complainant's conduct, and that he is in no way responsible therefor.
VIII.
The premises considered, the defendant prays

31 and that subpoena issue
1st. That this answer be filed and treated as a cross bill, to
compel the complainant, the said A
B, to answer the same.
2d. That absolute divorce be granted him from the said A
B, and that his right to the
32 and that the custody
rents and profits of her said farm be decreed to him during his life,
of said three children be committed to him.
3d. And that he have such further and other relief as he may be entitled, and as to your
Honor may seem proper. C. B.
State of Tennessee, j
Sullivan County. )
C B being duly sworn, makes oath that the facts stated in his foregoing answer and cross
bill are true to the best of his knowledge and belief, that the complaint in his cross bill is
30 Code, § 2466. without objection for want of bond or process, the

31 It will not be deemed a cross bill, unless a Court may decree relief on the cross bill. See, ante,
prosecution bond be given, and process issue. If the % 736, note 55.
defendant to the cross., bill answers it, however. 32 Code, §2472.
not made out of levity, or by collusion with A B, the defendant to said cross bill, but in
sincerity and truth, for the causes mentioned in the cross bill. C. B.
[Add a proper jurat, as above.]
If the defendant sustains his cross bill the Court will dismiss the original
bill, and grant divorce and other proper relief on the cross bill. The wife when
sued for a divorce by her husband may, in like manner file a cross bill and
obtain a divorce, if the facts justify it.
§ 1097. —
Alimony Pendente Lite. When the wife is a party to a divorce
suit, she is entitled to alimony pending the litigation, whether she be complain-
ant or defendant; for, in either case, she is still the wife of the other party;
and as such, is, if not possessed of sufficient means of her own, entitled to a
reasonable allowance for her support, and for the expenses of the suit, includ-
ing reasonable counsel fees. 33 The granting of such an allowance is discretion-
ary with the Chancellor and, in exercising this discretion, he will consider the
;
financial ability of the husband, and the conduct and necessities of the wife as
disclosed in the pleadings, or in affidavits, 34 or in both. An allowance pendente
lite should be put at a low figure, and proportioned to the husband's income and
property and where her suit is without any just or reasonable foundation, no
;
allowance will be made. 35 Alimony pendente lite ceases upon the dismissal of
her suit by the wife, 36 or upon the death of her husband. 37 To entitle the wife
to alimony pendente lite it should appear,
1. That, if complainant, her bill shows a prima facie case, entitling her to a
divorce; or, if defendant, her sworn answer discloses a good defence, or con-
tains positive and specific denials of the material charges of the bill.
2. That she has no means of her own, or no sufficient means, if any, to pay
for her support, and the expenses of the litigation.
3. "What means she has, and what means her husband has, should be made to
appear by affidavit, or by the wife's pleading.
4. She must show diligence in preparing for trial, or alimony will be refused
or, if already allowed, will be discontinued. 38
The Court may discontinue the payment of alimony pendente lite, in its dis-
cretion. An appeal will not lie from an interlocutory order allowing alimony
pendente lite; 32 but will lie from a final decree allowing alimony.
The usual mode of ascertaining the amount of alimony pendente lite is by
a reference to the Master but the Court may act without a reference. 40 Where
;
the facts, on which the motion for alimony pendente lite is based, do not appear
in the pleadings, they should be brought forward by petition, or affidavit but ;
on such motion, the question of the guilt or innocence of the wife will not be in-
quired into, beyond what appears in her own pleading, petition or affidavit,
under the rules heretofore given. Counter affidavits will not be heard on ap-
plications for alimony pendente lite.
41
§ 1098. Petition for Alimony Pendente Lite, and Proceedings Thereon. If —

the wife is the complainant, either in the original bill, or in a cross bill, she
33 Thompson v. Thompson, 3 Head, 527; Lishey v. a matter of course to allow alimony pendente lite,
Lishey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 3; Shy V. Shy, 7 Heisk., 125. when (l)_the wife, if complainant, shows in her bill
The wife alimony pendente lite, if her
is entitled to a meritorious cause of action, and good ground for
bill shows a prima facie case, and she has no ade- a divorce; or when (2) if defendant, her sworn an-
quate means of her own. Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Tenn. swer emphatically denies the charges in the bill, or
Ch., 1. In this case, one hundred dollars was al- discloses other adequate defence to the suit. 2 Barb.
lowed for counsel fees; thirty dollars a month, from Ch. Pr., 265-268.
the filing of the bill until the next term, was al- 35 Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 3.
lowed for alimony, and forty dollars for incidental 36 Persons V. Persons, 7 Hum., 183.
expenses, making five hundred dollars in all; and 37 Swan V. Harrison, 2 Cold., 534. After the dis-
execution was awarded therefor, if the whole amount missal of her suit by the wife, it is too late for the
was not paid within twenty days. The defendant's Court to allow alimony, or counsel fees. Thompson
estate was valued by the Court at twenty thousand v. Thompson, 3 Head, 527.
dollars, and his income from ten to twelve hundred 38 See, Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 1; Burrow
dollars. In Shy V. Shy, 7 Heisk., 125. two Solicitors V. Burrow, 6 Lea, 499.
were held not to be too many, and one hundred 39 Pearson t). Pearson, Peck, 27. But would not
dollars were allowed each; and it was held that the a supersedeas lie in a proper case? Code, § 3933.
Chancery Court had jurisdiction to allow counsel'
#
40 Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Tenn. Ch., 1.
fees for services in the Supreme Court, also. 41 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 268.
34 Lishey v. Lishey, 2 Tenn. Ch., I. It is almost
881 SUITS FOR DIVORGE AND ALIMONY. § 1098
may pray in her bill, or cross bill, for alimony pendente lite; but if she neglect
to do so, or if she be the defendant and has filed no cross bill, she may petition
the Court for an allowance to her for her support and expenses during the
pendency of the litigation. Such petition may be in the following form
PETITION FOR ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE.
John Doe,
vs. In the Chancery Court, at Loudon.
-
Jane Doe.
To the Honorable William B. Staley, Chancellor
Your petitioner, the above named Jane Doe, respectfully shows to the Court
i.
That the complainant has filed in this Court against her a bill for divorce, alleging that
she has wilfully deserted him without reasonable cause, [setting forth the ground of divorce
alleged in the bill,] as will more fully appear by reference to said bill.
ii.
To said bill your petitioner has filed her ardswer, showing that the .complainant
[this day]
drove- her from his homemost cruel treatment on his part, and that he has since
after the
persecuted her, and slandered her; and that she did not desert him, but that he cast her off
without cause and without excuse, [stating the substance of the answer;] all of which will
more fully appear by reference to her said answer, which is made a part of this petition; and
she avers that every statement in her said answer is true.
in.
Petitioner further shows to your Honor that she is in destitute circumstances, having no
means of support, and no means to pay her Solicitor in this suit, or to defray any of its ex-
penses, she being dependent on her parents for food and clothing, and being feeble in health,
and having a young child. [Stating the facts as they are.] The complainant owns a good
farm, fairly well stocked, worth about one thousand dollars, and is out of debt, so far as
petitioner knows, or is informed. [State the property the husband possesses, and show fully
his ability to support his wife, not by general allegations, but by specifying the property he
owns.]
IV.
Petitioner, therefore, prays that your Honor will make her a reasonable allowance out of
her husband's estate for her support and maintenance during this litigation, and for the sup-
port and maintenance of their said child, and to enable her to employ and pay counsel to aid
her in this suit, and to defray the other necessary expenses of the suit. She, also, prays for
general relief as to the matters aforesaid.
Jane Doe.
J. E. Cassady, Solicitor.
[Annex an affidavit and jurat, as in § 797, ante.]
The Chancellor may hear oral proof, in open Court, and adjudicate the
allowance to be made the petitioner, or he may refer the matter to the Master,
as follows
REFERENCE TO THE MASTER AS TO ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE.
John Doe, 1
vs. No. 345.

Jane Doe, J
This cause came on to be heard upon the petition of the defendant for alimony pendente
lite, and for expenses. And the bill and answer having been read, and argument heard on
behalf of the respective parties, the Court ordered the Master to hear proof, and report
instanter
i.
Whatproperty the complainant is possessed of, specifying its kind, and the value of each
kind, and what income he has from it, and from other sources.
ii.
What means of support the defendant has, if any, and how she and her child are sup-
ported.
in.
What would be a reasonable allowance for the support and maintenance of the defendant
and her child, until the next term of this Court.
IV.
What wouldbe a reasonable allowance for her Solicitor's fees, and for the other necessary
costs and expenses of this suit.
v.
The Masterwill report any other matter that will aid the Court in coming to an equitable
conclusion in reference to any of the foregoing matters.
Until the coming in of said report all other matters are reserved.
§ 1099 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY. 882
If the Court should determine the matter without a reference, as it will
ordinarily do, the order of allowance would be as follows
ORDEB. ALLOWING ALIMONY PENDENTE LITE.
[Following the foregoing order down to "read,"] and the testimony of witnesses having
been heard, and the matters having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, the
Court is of opinion that the prayer of the petitioner should be granted.
i.
therefore ordered by the Court that the complainant pay into the office of the Clerk
It is,
and Master of this Court within thirty days the sum of seventy-five dollars, for the support
and maintenance of the defendant and her child, until the next term of the Court; and will
pay in the further sum of fifty dollars to pay her Solicitors' fees, and the other necessary
costs of this litigation. And if both of said sums are not paid as herein ordered, an execution
will issue against the complainant for so much as has not been paid in.
ARTICLE III.
TRIAL, ORDERS, AND DECREES.
§ 1099. Trial of a Divorce Suit. § 1103. Other Relief Granted.
§ 1100. Kinds of Divorce Granted.
§ 1104. Frame of a Divorce Decree.
§ 1101. Alimony on Final Decree.
§ 1102. Wife's Remedies to Secure Alimony. § 1105. Rights of Creditors of the Husband.
§ 1099. —
Trial of a Divorce Suit. If the subpoena to answer be served upon
the defendant, the cause may be tried at the first term of the Court thereafter; 1
and either party may take proof by depositions, or have the witnesses examined
in open Court. 2 The issues of fact raised by the pleadings may be determined
by the Chancellor, or, at the request of either party, may be tried by a jury."
Neither the Chancellor, nor the jury, can, however, act on the admissions of
the defendant, or on a judgment pro confesso, but must hear the proof of the
facts charged, and determine the case upon such proof. 4 If the defendant is
required to answer under oath, and so answers, such answer has no greater
weight than an unsworn answer, and only serves to make up an issue. 5
If the statute sets out any acts the complainant must do in order to be enti-
tled to a divorce, such acts must be proven. Thus, if the husband sue for
divorce on the ground of the wife's refusal to remove with him to this State,
and of her wilful absence for two years without reasonable cause, he must
prove endeavors to induce her to live with him after the separation, and that
he did not remove from the State where she resided for the purpose of obtaining
a divorce. 6 And when a divorce is sought upon the ground of adultery, it must
be shown affirmatively, by satisfactory proof, that the complainant has not been
guilty of like crime, and has not condoned the offense and, if the complainant ;
is the husband, that he did not connive at, or allow, his wife 's prostitution, or
expose her to lewd company. 7
1 Code, § 2455. It is no uncommon practice to statute except proof, by witnesses, of the facts
try divorce causes at the first term after publication charged in the bill. Code, § 2459. The Court may,
made; but this section does not seem to warrant a however, decree alimony by consent, being careful
trial at the first or appearance term, except when to see that the wife is not over-reached, and her
the defendant is brought into Court by service of children not deprived of their homestead rights.
subpoena. Richmond ». Richmond, 10 Yerg., 347. Surh an
2 Code, § 2462. answer would, when responsive, probably be evidence
3 Code, § 2453. for the defendant, on the question of alimony.
4 Code, § The Court cannot divorce the
2459. 6 Code, § 2463; Lanier v. Lanier, 5 Heisk., 463.
parties on their consenting to such a decree, because 7 Code, § 2460; Cameron v. Cameron, 2 Cold., 375;
the proceedings is in rem, as well as in personam. Majors v. Majors, 1 Tenn. Ch., 264; Dismukes v.
Consenting to a divorce sometimes savors of collus- Dismukes, 1 Tenn. Ch., 266. Marriage is not only
ion, and may bar a divorce. Neither have arbitrators a personal relation, but a public institution, on the
any power to grant a divorce or alimony. Swan V. purity and integrity of which the welfare of society
Harrison, 2 Cold., 534. The Court must hear the depends; and for this reason, not only cannot mar-
evidence, and be satisfied therefrom that the com- riages be dissolved by the consent of the parties, but
plainant is entitled to a divorce, before a decree of it is the duty of the Court to see that a cause of
divorce can be granted. Nothing will satisfy the divorce is duly alleged and fully proved, and that
883 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND AIJMONY. §1100
§ 1100. —
Kinds of Divorce Granted. If the cause of divorce be any of those
specified in section 2448 of the Code, relief may be granted either by pronounc-
ing the marriage null and void, from the beginning, or by dissolving it forever,
and freeing each party from the obligation thereof, or by a separation for a
limited time. 8 If the cause of divorce be any of those specified in section 2449
of the Code, the Court may grant relief according to the prayer of the bill by
annulling the marriage, or by ordering a separation, perpetual or temporary,
or such other decree as the nature and circumstances of the case may require. ' 1
It will thus be seen that, for any cause of divorce, the Court may separate the
parties for months, or for years, or forever, as the pleadings and proof may
warrant; or may declare the marriage null and void from the beginning, 10 when
the nature of the case so requires; or may grant a divorce from bed and board,
with a reservation of the power to grant an absolute divorce at a subsequent
term. 11
§ 1101. —
Alimony on Final Decree. When a divorce is granted a wife, it is
usual to allow her alimony also, when prayed for. The amount of alimony
should be in proportion, (1) to the husband's estate, after his debts are paid;
(2) to the amount of the property he acquired through his wife; (3) to the
number of children committed to the wife's custody, and (4) to the wife's sta-
tion in society. 12 In general, not more than half of the husband's estate, after
deducting his indebtedness, will be allowed as alimony but each case must be ;
governed by its own circumstances. 13 Where a divorce from bed and board is
decreed, the Court should make a monthly or quarterly allowance to be paid
the wife by the husband, and in such case, his subsequent earnings, including
his official income, and even the proceeds of his personal labor, are all charge-
there hcs been no imposition upon the Court. The A decree of temporary divorce, or divorce from
consent of the State must be obtained before a di- bed and board, does not dissolve the marriage rela-
vorce can he obtained; and the Court having juris- tion:and the parties continue husband and wife, and
diction of the cause is given jurisdiction to consent theirrights and duties, as such, continue, except
for the Siate. The Court should, then, carefully cohabitation and its incidents, and the wife's right
scrutinize the evidence, listen to_ the suggestion of of support. During such a divorce, the wife has no
third parties, cross-examine the witnesses, require an claim on. her husband for maintenance, other than
explanation of suspicious circumstances, and even such as is set forth in the decree separating them.
postpone the case, and endeavor to reconcile the par- On the husband's death, in such a case, the wife has
ties, where it seems proper and desirable. 5 A. & a right to dower, homestead, a year's support, the
E. Ency. of Law, 771-772; Swan v. Harrison, 2 exempt property, and a distributive share of his per-
Cold., 534; Dismukes v. Dismukes, 1 Tenn. Ch., 266. sonal estate; and on the wife's death, the husband
8 Code, §2465; ante, § 1089. has the same rights to her personalty and realty as
9 Code, § 2467; ante, § 1089. Adecree of absolute though no decree of temporary separation had ever
divorce forever dissolves the bonds of matrimony, been made. In short, on the death of either party
and totally destroys the status of the parties. After to a decree of temporary separation, the rights of
such a decree, the complainant and defendant become the other are the same as though no divorce from
strangers in law, in rights, in relations and in duties, bed and board had ever existed. See Chenault v.
as though neither had ever been married to the other: Chenault, 5 Sneed, 248.
they become single persons, and may contract with 10 Amarriage is void from the beginning, (1)
each other, sue each other, and may again marry when either party was already lawfully married; or
each other; and may marry whomsover and whenso- (2) when either of the parties is white and the other
ever they please, except the person with whom the a negro, or of negro descent; or (3) when the par-
decree shows the adultery was committed, for which ties are within the prohibited degrees of kinship; or
the divorce was granted. Code, § 2475. Where the (4) when, for any other reason, the marriage was
husband obtains a divorce, his rights to the rents and prohibited by law, and its continuance is in violation
profits of the wife's lands, and to her personalty in of law. Amarriage is voidable from the beginning:
possession, or in action, continue as though the (1) when either party was insane; or (2) the com-
divorce nad not been granted; Code, § 2472; and plainant was under duress or (3) was under the
;
the wife forfeits all rights of alimony, dower, and age of consent; or (4) when the consent was ob-
distribution out of her husband's estate. Code, tained by force, or fraud, and was given by mis-
§ 2473. And if the dnorre is granted for adultery take; or (5) when the defendant was impotent; or
on the part of the wife, and she afterwards openly (6) when the woman was pregnant by another man
cohabits with the adulterer, she is thereby incapaci- without the knowledge of the complainant or (7)
;
tated to convey, or devise, any of her lands. Code, when, for any other reason, the marriage was not
§ 2474. binding on the complainant.
If, however, a marriage is declared to have been Where a marriage is voidable for want of a bind-
absolutely void, (not voidable), from the beginning, ing consent, it will become valid if the parties live
it would seem, on principle, that neither party would
together as man and wife, voluntarily, after the
have any property rights against the other growing party becomes capable of a binding consent. Avoid-
out of the void marriage; and that all their rights of able marriage can, ordinarily, be nullified only on
property would be exactly the same as though no the complaint of the party injured.
marriage ceremony had ever been performed; and 11 McAlister v. McAlister. 10 Heisk., 345.
12 Code, §§ 2468-2469; Stillman v. Stillman, 7 Bax.,
that the Court would have no right to decree ali-
mony. For a void marriage is no marriage, and 183
hence no legal rights or duties could result from 13 Stillman v. Stillman, 7 Bax., 183. Where the
such a marriage. The Court could declare the mar- husband's estate is small, and the wife is burdened
riage absolutely void from the beginning; and could with the children, they being Very young, she should
adjudge costs; but could go no further. 5 A. & E- be given his entire estate.
Ency. of Law; Allen v. McCullough, 2 Heisk., 185.
§1102 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND AUMONY. 884
able with such allowance. 14 But where the divorce is absolute, the Court will
not bind the husband's future earnings. 15
As a rule, on a divorce from the bonds of matrimony being granted the wife,
she will be decreed all the lands of which she is owner, and also all goods,
chattels, or choses in action, in her possession and acquired by her own indus-
try, or otherwise. 16 And by express statute, the title to the homestead must
be vested in her for her life, and after her death it will pass to their children. 17
If the husband's property is in another State, the Court may give the wife a
money decree for alimony, if subpoena has been served on him, or he has volun-
tarily appeared; the amount of such alimony, however, in case of absolute
divorce, must be based on the amount of the defendant 's present estate, and not
upon his future earnings. 18 All right to alimony ceases upon the death of the
husband. 19
Wife's Remedies to Secure Alimony. The wife's right to alimony
§ 1102. —
isviewed by the law as a debt due her from her husband, contingent upon her
obtaining a divorce and she has every remedy to secure and enforce her right
;
to alimony that any other creditor has. Ag a result, she may have a convey-
ance, made to defeat her right to alimony, set aside 20 she may have an attach- ;
ment against her husband's estate to secure her alimony; she may enjoin him
from transferring or encumbering his estate she may have a receiver appointed
;
when necessary payment of her alimony. 21

to enforce
"Where a divorce from bed and board is decreed, the Court may secure the
alimony allowed by declaring it a lien upon all the defendant's real estate.
§ 1103. —
Other Relief Granted. The custody of the children may, in the
discretion of the Court, be awarded to either party or some to one, and some ;
to the other 22 or the Court may decline to make any disposition of them. In
;
disposing of the children, their welfare alone will be considered, and not the
wishes of the child, or of either parent. 23
The maiden surname of the wife will be restored to her, if she so pray in her
bill, upon obtaining an absolute divorce. 24
If the husband is interfering with her person, or her property, or the children
in her custody, or invading her peace, or disturbing her retreat, or threatening
and likely so to do, she may obtain an injunction against him, or upon her ap-
plication in a proper case, the Court, or Chancellor at Chambers, will order his
arrest and require of him sureties to keep the peace. 25
14 Chenault V. Chenault, 5 Sneed, 248. disposition, the right to their custody may be ad-
15 Boffgers v. Boggers, 6 Bax., 300. judicated upon a habeas corpus; in such a case, the
16 Code, % 2471. See, also, M. & V.'s Code, Court will consider the interests of the children,
§§3338-3353; (Old Code, §§2481-2488); Aiken v. exclusively.' The Court may prohibit the party en-
Suttle. 4 Lea, 111. trusted with the children from removing them out
17 Code, § 2121 a. of its jurisdiction. 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 835-
18 Boggers V. Boggers, 6 Bax., 299. 5 A. & E. 837.
Ency. of Law, 762. If the Court has jurisdiction of 23 Lyle V. Lyle, 2 Pick., 372. The mother may be
the defendant by service of subpoena, it may compel appointed the guardian of her children, if she is
him, by process of contempt, to make the necessary granted a divorce. Code, § 2490. As to the dis-
conveyances to his wife. See, ante, §§ 651-652. position of the children, see Payne v. Payne. 4 Hum,.
19 Swan V. Harrison, 2 Cold., 534. But her right 535; Ward v. Raper, 7 Hum., Ill; Robinson v.
then begins to homestead, dower, a year's support, Robinson, 7 Hum., 440. If the children are very
the exempt property, and her distributive share of young, and the mother is a proper person to have the
the husband's personalty. Ibid. custody of them, she should be preferred. Lyle ©.
20 Brooks v. Caughan. 3 Head, 465; Nix V. Nix, 10 Lyle, 2 Pick., 373. The parent not given the custody
Heisk., 546; Boils V. Boils, 1 Cold.. 284. of a child should be given the right to visit it. Mc-
21 Code, § 2470. Where the husband is within the Allister v. McAllister, 10 Heisk., 345. Courts should
jurisdiction of the Court, and his property outside not divorce parent and child, unless the welfare of
the State, and he is threatening to leave the State, the child imperatively requires it. The temporary
the Chancellor might grant a ne exeat. Denton V. grief attendant upon "the parting of parent and child
Denton, 1 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.), 364. See, Chapter should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way
on Ne Exeats, ante. §§ 864-865, note 10. of the permanent welfare of the child. 5 A. & E.
22 The Court will not make any disposition of the Ency. of Law, 832-836. The head of the Chancellor
children, unless they are too young to choose dis- must be kept above his heart, at all times.
creetly for themselves. Their custody is ordinarily 24 Code. §§ 3637-3639. The Chancery Court has
awarded to the complainant, but this rule is often the same jurisdiction in this matter as has the Circuit
departed from, when the child is very vounc, the Court. Acts of 1877, ch. 97; ante, page 22. di-A
mother then being generally preferred. The decree vorced woman may resume her maiden name, if she
of the Court disposing of the children is binding so desire, without any decree to that effect. There
upon the parties, and cannot be collaterally im- should not be two women entitled to the name of the
peached or inquired into, by them, but mny be in- same husband. 5 A. & E. Fncv. nf Law, 842.
auired into by the children, by next^ friend. If the 25 High on Injune., §§ 1387-1398. Denton V. Deri-
Court make no disposition of the children, or if the ton, 1 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.) 364; Code, §4943.
children themselves, by next friend, object to such
885 SUITS FOR DIVORCE AND ALIMONY. § 1104
§ 1104. Frame of a Divorce Decree. —A
decree of divorce should show that
the defendant answered, or that a pro confesso was duly entered agairist him
for want of an answer, and that one or more of the statutory causes of divorce
were charged in the bill and were established by the proof and that, therefore, ;
a divorce was granted the complainant. If alimony is allowed it should be

specifically decreed, and the manner of possessing her of it should be adjudged.
If the wife obtain a decree, her rights to her own property, real and personal,
should be declared in order to prevent future litigation and so, if the husband ;
obtain a divorce, his rights to the rents and profits of his wife's lands should be
declared, for the same reason. The custody of all the children under fourteen
years of age should be determined and the right of the parent, deprived of the
;
children, to visit them, at certain times and places, should be provided for in
the decree, if such right be granted.
If a divorce from bed and board, only, be decreed, full and particular provis-
ion should be made for the suitable support and maintenance of the complain-
ant, and of the children committed to her custody, out of the husband's prop-
erty. The payments should be made quarterly, or monthly, and be enforced by
execution; or, in a proper case, a receiver of the husband's real and personal
estate may be appointed, and the proceeds from time to time applied to the use
of the complainant, and her children. 26
In all divorce decrees, where there is any likelihood that further orders may
be necessary to enforce the adjudications made, especially in reference to the
payment of alimony, or to the custody of the children, or to the protection of
the wife, the decree should, on its face, especially retain the cause in Court for
such purposes, and either party given leave to apply. This reservation is almost
always necessary, when only a temporary divorce is granted, or when main-
tenance alone is granted. 27
The decree should always adjudge the costs. The Court may decree costs
against either party, except a wife in whose favor a decree is made. 28 If any
estate is in the power of the Court, or in the hands of a receiver, the costs may
be ordered to be paid out of such property. 29 The following is a form of a
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND ALIMONY.
Jane Doe, )
vs. [
John Doe. J
This cause came on to be heard this September 6, 1880, before Chancellor W. B. Staley,
upon the bill of the complainant, Jane Doe, and the answer of the defendant, John Doe, [or,
the pro confesso heretofore entered- against the defendant,] and the depositions on file, and
the oral testimony of witnesses examined in open Court.
i.
And satisfactorily appeared to the Court from the proof that the facts charged in the
it
bill are true; that the defendant had wilfully deserted the complainant, without a reasonable
cause, for more than two whole years before the filing of the bill, as charged; and that he
had, also, committed adultery with one Sallie Fox, after his marriage to the complainant, and
before the filing of the bill, as charged and that the complainant is a chaste woman, and
;
gave defendant no cause or just excuse for his said misconduct, and has not condoned the
same.
ii.
It therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court, that the bonds of matrimony
is,
subsisting between the complainant and the defendant be absolutely and forever dissolved,
and that complainant be vested with all the rights of an unmarried woman; and that her
maiden name, Jane Jones, be restored to her.
in.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the title to the homestead be divested
out of the defendant, and vested in complainant during her life, and after her death it shall
pass to, and be vested in, Mary Doe and Charles Doe, the children of complainant by defend-
ant. 30 Said homestead is situated in the 2d civil district of Scott county, and is described
26 Code. §§ 2468-2470. 20 Code, 5 2477.
27 McAllister ". McAllister, 10 Heisk., 345. 30 Code, § 2121 a.
28 A wife is liabl" for costs when her bill is dis-
missed. Payne v. Pavne, 12 Pick., 59; Brasfield v.
Brasfield, 12 Pick., 580.
§ 1105 suits for divorce; and alimony. 886
as follows Beginning on a rock in William Jones' north line, thence [describing it by metes
:
and bounds,] to the beginning, containing forty acres, more or less, and shown by the proof
to be worth seven hundred dollars. Complainant is, also, given as alimony, all the household
and kitchen furniture in the family residence on said homestead, and any two cows with
their calves, and any one horse, she may select out of those belonging to the defendant. She
is, also, given all the hogs, sheep and poultry on said homestead. The title to all of said
personal property is divested out of defendant and vested in complainant.
rv.
The defendant will Jeffers, Esq., the Solicitor of complainant, fifty dollars, his
pay Daniel
fee in this cause, for services to this date, and will pay into Court, for the use of the com-
plainant, the sum of five hundred dollars. He
will, also, pay all the costs of the cause. Execu-
tion will issue to enforce the payment of said sums of money and said costs; and a writ of
possession will issue to put complainant in possession of all the property, real and personal,
decreed to her.
v.
The
exclusive custody of Mary Doe and Charles Doe, the infant children of the parties, is
committed to the complainant; but she is enjoined from removing them out of this county,
without the consent of the Court. The defendant may visit his said children once every two
weeks, at some place in their neighborhood, and on a day to be named by the Clerk and
Master of this Court, on application of the defendant; but he is enjoined from tampering with
them, or endeavoring to prejudice them against their mother during said visits.
VI.
This cause will be retained in Court for the enforcement of this decree,whenever necessary,
and either party has leave to apply. The bill as to the defendant, William Brown, is dismissed,
the conveyance to him being free from any fraud on his part.
§ 1105. Rights of Creditors of the Husband. The rights of the husband's —

creditors are superior to those of the wife for alimony, except as to exempt
property; and where it appears that the husband is indebted, it is proper to
retain the cause in Court, and advertise for the creditors of the husband to
present and prove their claims, before decreeing alimony to the wife. 31 If the
husband has absconded, or is acting fraudulently, the Court may appoint a re-
ceiver to collect the debts due the husband, and may apply the proceeds to the
payment of the creditors, and to alimony. 32
31 McGhee v. McGhee, 2 Sneed, 221; Brooks V. |
582; Wilhoit v. Castell, 3 Bax., 419; Allen c. Mc-
Caughan, 3 Head, 464; Greene v. Starnes, 1 Heisk., Cullough, 2 Heisk., 174.
32 Smith e. Johnson, 2 Heisk., 225.
887 SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER. §1106
CHAPTER LXII.
SUITS WHERE NO RECOVERY IS SOUGHT.
Article I. Suits for an Interpleader.
Article II. Suits for a Discovery.
Article III. Suits to Perpetuate Testimony.
Article IV. Suits to Take Testimony De Bene Esse.
ARTICLE I.
SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER.
§ 1106. When a Bill of Interpleader Will § 1110. Essentials of a Bill of Interpleader.
Lie. § 1111. Frame of a Bill of Interpleader.
§ 1107. What a Bill of Interpleader Should § 1112. Form of a Bill of Interpleader.
Show. § 1113. Defences to a Bill of Interpleader.
§ 1108. The
Character of the Conflicting § 1114. Proceedings Upon a Bill of Inter-
Claims. pleader.
§ 1109. Interpleader in Case of Tenants and § 1115. Bills in the Nature of Bills of Inter-
Agents. pleader.
§ 1106. When a Bill of Interpleader Will Lie.— bill of interpleader is A

ordinarily filed, when two or more persons claim the same debt, or duty, or
other thing, from the complainant by different or separate interests and he, not ;
knowing to which of the claimants he ought of right to render the same debt,
duty, or other thing, and fearing that he may suffer injury from their conflict-
ing claims, files a bill against them and prays that they may be compelled to
;
interplead, and state their several claims, so that the Court may adjudge to
whom the same debt, duty, or other thing belongs. 1 The complainant is not
required to wait for legal proceedings to be commenced against him: a mere
liability to be called on, by different persons for the same demand, gives the
right to file the bill and it is no objection to such a bill, that the right of one
;
of the parties is actionable at law and that of the other actionable in Equity,
or that a suit is pending between the claimants. 2
§ 1107. What
a Bill of Interpleader Should Show.—In a bill of inter-
pleader, it necessary that the complainant should state his. own rights, and
is
thereby negative any interest in, or claim to, the thing in controversy and he ;
should, also, state the several claims of the opposing parties. 3 If the bill does
not show that each of the defendants, whom it seeks to compel to interplead,
claims a right, both of the defendants may demur; one, because the bill shows
no claim of right in him the other, because the bill, showing no claim of right
;
in the co-defendant, shows no cause of interpleader. A mere pretext of a con-

flicting claim is not sufficient the Court must see that there is a real question
;
to be tried. An objection equally fatal will be, that the complainant shows no
right to compel the defendants to interplead, whatever rights they may claim. 4
Nor can a bill be filed after a judgment of garnishment against complainant at
law, his remedy at law being clear.
5
The bill should not be delayed until after
6
a verdict or judgment has been obtained.
The bill should show that there are proper persons in esse, capable of inter-
pleading, and of setting up opposite claims for, otherwise, the object of the bill
;
would be unattainable. The bill would be equally defective, if it did not admit,
and show, a claim by each of the defendants. 7 The allegations of a title or claim
1 Sto. Eq. PL, § 291. 4 Sto. Eq. PI., § 292.
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1560. 5 Carroll v. Parkes, 1 Bax., 269.
3McEwen v. Tronst, 1Sneed, 186; State I. Co. 6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1561.
Gennet, 2 Tenn. Ch., 82; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1561. 7 Sto. Eq. PI., § 295.
I
v.
§ 1108 SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER. 888
by each of the defendants must be made with positiveness. If the bill fail to
show, with certainty, that each defendant is claiming the property, or debt, it
will be fatally defective 8 but the complainant need not state the character or
;
foundation of the hostile claims indeed, he may aver that he is ignorant of the
;
rights of the respective parties. 9 The complainant should, also, show in his
bill, that he' claims no interest himself for it is, in truth, the very foundation of
;
his bill, that he is a mere holder of the stake, which is equally contested by the
defendants, and that he is wholly indifferent between them, 10 and not under any
liability to any of the defendants. 11
To justify a bill of interpleader, there should be either some specific chattel,
or some definite sum of money, to which different parties in the same right, or
in privity of estate, make claim, and the person filing the bill should be a mere
stakeholder, having no interest in the matter so that when the Court decrees ;
an interpleader the complainant can step out of the case altogether. 12

§ 1108. The Character of the Conflicting Claims. The claims, if known, —
may be specifically set forth, so that they may appear to be of the same nature
and character, and the fit subject of a bill of interpleader; for bills of inter-
pleader do not ordinarily lie, except in cases of privity of some sort between all
the parties such as privity of estate, or title, or contract, and where the claim
;
by all is of the same nature and character. Where the claimants assert their
rights under adverse titles, and not in privity, and where their claims are of
different natures, the bill is wholly unmaintainable. Thus, if an estate is put
up for sale at auction, and A becomes the purchaser, and pays his deposit and ;
then, by order of the same owner, it is set up again for sale, and B becomes the
purchaser, and pays his deposit; such a case is not a proper case of inter-
pleader, if each demands his deposit from the stakeholder for and B do not ; A
claim in privity, and their deposits are distinct 13 but a bill in the nature of a ;
bill of interpleader would probably lie in such a case. 14

The complainant should admit that he has no title to the property or debt as
against either of the defendants but it is not incumbent on him, if indeed it
;
is proper, to state the cases of the interpleading defendants: these should be

stated by the defendants themselves in their answers, the complainant con-
tenting himself by showing in his bill the fact that each defendant is setting
up a claim, without giving the history, ground, or circumstances, of either
claim, leaving these matters to be set up by the defendants themselves.
§ 1109. Interpleader in Case of Tenants and Agents. The complainant —
should show a dear right in himself to maintain the bill; for, otherwise, the
bill will be dismissed, however proper in other respects the case might be for
an interpleader. Thus, for example, if the bill should show that the complain-
ant is an agent of one of the parties only, and had received money by the au-
thority of his principal, and for his use, he would be bound to pay over the
money to his principal, notwithstanding any intervening claims of a third per-
son; for, a mere agent to receive for the use of another, cannot be converted
into an implied trustee by reason of an adverse claim, since his possession is
the possession of his principal. 15
A
tenant, liable to pay rent, may file a bill of interpleader, where there are
several persons claiming title to it in privity of contract, or of tenure, to compel
them to ascertain to whom it is properly payable. But if a mere stranger should
set up a claim to the rent by a title paramount, and not in privity of contract,
or tenure or, if he should set up a claim of a different nature, such as a claim
;
8 State I. Co. v. Gennett, 2 Term. Ch., 82. 12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1560. The notes in Daniel give
9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1561. many illustrations of cases where a bill of inter-
10 Sto. Eq. PI., § 297; Hely
Lee, 24 Pick., 71 S.
v. pleader will, and will not, lie.
If, however, when the complainant claims some in- 13 Sto. En. PI.. § 293; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1564.
terest in the subject-matter, no demurrer is inter- 14 Post, §1109; and see 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1565,
posed on that account, the objection will be consid- note 4.
ered waived. Read V. Street Ry. Co., 2 Cates, 316. io Sto. Eq. PI., § 296.
11 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1560.
889 SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER. § 1110
to the mesne profits, in virtue of his title paramount in either case, no bill of
;
interpleader would lie in behalf of the tenant for the debt or duty is not the
;
same in nature or character. 10 The stranger cannot demand rent as such but ;
if he succeeds in an ejectment, he has only a right to damages for use and occu-
pation, whereas the landlord claims the rent as such, in privity of contract,
tenure, and title. Besides, the tenant is under contract to pay the rent to his
landlord, and is not allowed to dispute his title either to the land, or to the
rent. 17
Property put into the hands of a private agent by his principal, is not the
subject of an interpleader, on the assertion of a claim to it by a third person
under an independent adverse title but the agent must deliver it to the prin-
;
cipal for the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal. And
;
the like doctrine would prevail in favor of a third person to whom the prin-
cipal, after the bailment, had transferred the right to the property, where 1he
transfer had been recognized and assented to by the agent. But if the principal
has created an interest in, or a lien on, the funds in the hands of the agent, in
favor of a third person, and the nature and extent of that interest or lien is
controverted between the principal and such third person, there an interpleader
will lie.
18
§ 1110. —
Essentials of a Bill of Interpleader. The essentials of a bill of inter-
pleader are, in brief, as follows
1. Two or more persons must be claiming, adversely to each other, from the
same person the same thing, debt, or duty.
2. This thing, debt, or duty, must be specific and definite, and the holder
thereof must have no title, claim, or interest, in or to it.
3. The holder must be so situated that, if he comply with the demands of
either claimant, he is in danger of being held liable therefor by the other.
4. The holder must not be under any special liability to either claimant with
reference to the thing in dispute, but must be absolutely indifferent betweeu
them.
5. And there must be annexed to the bill an affidavit of non-collusion, unless
the bill avers non-collusion and is sworn to.
§ 1111. —
Frame of a Bill of Interpleader. There is no set form for this bill.
The draftsman usually begins by describing the debt, duty, or other thing, for
which the defendants are rival claimants. The fact that each of the defendants
is setting up an exclusive claim to this debt, duty, or other thing, will then be
clearly stated, and if either or both of the defendants have made any demand,
served any notice, made any threats of suit, or brought any suit, these facts
will be specifically and fully set forth. The complainant will then show the
danger he is in of being held twice liable in the event he complies with the de-
mands of either defendant; and will aver that he does not claim the debt, duty,
or other thing, and is willing to pay the debt or duty, or deliver the property,
to whichever of the defendants is lawfully thereunto entitled. The bill should
offer to pay the money or property into Court, to the end that it may be ad-
judged to that defendant entitled to it.
As every such bill is founded upon the admitted want' of interest in the com-
plainant, and is, at the same time, susceptible of being used collusively to give
an undue advantage to one of the contending parties, two things are required
as precautions to prevent any abuse of the proceeding. In the first place, the
plaintiff must annex an affidavit, that there is no collusion between him and
any of the parties in the next place, if there is any money due, he must bring
;
it into Court, or at least offer to do so by his bill. If he does not do so, it is in

19 The defendants by answering the bill
strictness a good ground of demurrer.
16 Sto. Kq. PI., § 234. I

is Smith's Ea. Jur., 402-404.
17 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1565; Smith's Eq. Jur., 402. | 10 Sto. Eq. PL, § 291.
§ 1112 suits for an interpleader. 890
may waive their right to object because of the want of the proper affidavit, or
because the money is not paid into the Court. 20
If the bill is filed by an officer of a company on behalf of the company, he
must not only swear that he does not collude, but, also, that to the best of his
knowledge and belief, the company does not collude, with either of the de-
fendants. 21
The bill may set forth their several titles, and may
prays that the defendants
interplead, and adjust and settle their claims between themselves. The bill,
also, generally prays for an injunction to restrain the claimants, or either of
them, from proceeding at law and, whenever this is done, the bill should offer
;
to bring the money into Court; and it must be brought into Court before the
Court will ordinarily act upon this part of the prayer. 22
§ 1112. —
Form of a Bill of Interpleader. The following general form will
illustrate what has already been said in reference to the bill
GENERA! FORM OF AN INTERPLEADER BIIX.

I.
[Here show that the complainant owes a debt or duty, or has in his possession a par-
ticular sum of money, or piece of property, describing the debt, duty, sum of money, or piece
of property.]
n.
[Here show that each of the defendants claims said debt, duty, sum of money, or piece of
property, and is demanding the same, or suing therefor, or threatening to sue. If any demand
in writing has been made, or notice served, so state with particularity.]
in.
[Here show that the complainant admits that he, himself, does not deny that he owes said
debt, or that he does not own said money or property; but that, on the other hand, he admits
that it belongs to one of the defendants, but which one he does not with certainty know, and
cannot afford to run the risks of a decision.]
IV.
And complainant further shows that he does not in any respect collude with either the
said Richard Roe, or said Peter Poe, touching the matters in question; that he has not ex-
hibited this bill at the request of either of them, and that he has not been indemnified by
said defendants, or any or either of them, but merely of his own free will, and to avoid being
molested and injured, touching the matter contained in said bill.
v.
The premises considered, complainant comes into your Honor's Court for relief, and
prays
1st.That process issue to compel the said defendants to appear and answer this bill; but
their answer on oath is waived.
2d. That said defendants be required to interplead and settle their rights to [said debt,
duty, sum of money, or property;] and that complainant may be at liberty to pay the same
into Court; which he hereby offers to do for the benefit of the defendant thereunto entitled.
3d. That the said Richard Roe be enjoined from further proceeding in said suit at law;
and that said Peter Poe be, also, enjoined from commencing any suit against complainant,
touching tie premises, or in any other way, than in this suit, demanding said [money, or
property.]
4th. That complainant upon payment of said [debt, duty, sum of money, or property,]
into Court, and upon the said defendants being required to interplead, according to the course
of this Court, may be decreed to be discharged from all liability to said defendants in
the premises, and may have all his costs herein, and that said injunctions may be made
perpetual.
5th. And that such further and other relief may be granted to complainant as the nature
of his case may
require, and as may be according to good conscience.
And complainant further states that this is the first application for an injunction in this
case. T. A. Weight, Solicitor.
Roane County. )
John Doe makes oath that the statements in his foregoing bill, made as of his own know-
ledge, are true, and those made as on information and belief, he believes to be true.
[Annex jurat: see, ante, § 789.] John Doe.
20 Daniel V. Fain, 5 Lea, 258. I 22 Sto. Eq. PL, 8 297.
21 Sto. Eq. PI., § 297; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1562. I
891 SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER. § 1113
As a further guide to Solicitors in drawing bills of interpleader, the follow-
ing special form is given
BILL OE INTERPLEADER.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 1S5 ; 164.]
i.
That on November 18, 1905, he purchased from the defendant, Richard Roe, two hundred
and fifty tons of coal for one thousand dollars, five hundred dollars of which have been paid,
and the remainder has not been paid, but is due and owing.
ii.
That at the time of said purchase and payment complainant supposed the defendant, Richard
Roe, was the true and sole owner of said coal, and fully entitled to sell, and receive payment
for the same. But so it is, on December 1, 1905, an attachment by garnishment was served
on complainant in a suit for six hundred dollars before James M. King, Esq., a Justice of the
Peace of Knox county, by the defendant Henry Jones, against the defendant William Smith,
said Jones claiming that said coal bought by complainant as aforesaid was really the property
of said William Smith, and that the defendant Roe was either his agent or his fraudulent
vendee.
in.
•That on December 2, 1905, a bill in the Chancery Court at Knoxville was filed by the.
defendant, George Smithson, against complainant, and the defendant Richard Roe, claiming
a debt of eight hundred dollars as due from said Roe, and attaching said unpaid five hundred
dollars, as the property of defendant Richard Roe ;and on the same day the defendant
Richard Roe sued complainant for said five hundred dollars before William Knabe, Esq., a
Justice of the Peace of Knox county.
IV.
Complainant has always been willing to pay the balance due on said coal to such person
as shall be lawfully entitled thereunto, but the multiplicity of claimants thereto, and their
conflicting interests, so perplex complainant that he does not know to whom to make such
payment, and is afraid that he may suffer loss by the complications of the case.
v.
Complainant therefore comes unto your Honor's Court for relief in the premises, and
prays
1st. That the defendants be required, by subpcena, to answer this bill, and interplead
all
and and claims, among themselves, to said sum of five hundred
settle their respective rights
dollars due from him as aforesaid, and that he be allowed to pay the same into Court for the
benefit of whomsoever of the defendants your Honor may decree to be entitled thereunto.
2d. That each and all of the defendants, their agents and attorneys, be enjoined from pro-
ceeding any further against complainant in the said several suits already instituted as afore-
said, and from instituting any other or further proceedings, at law or in equity, against com-
plainant in reference to said sum of five hundred dollars, or any part thereof.
3d. That complainant have such other and further relief as he may be entitled to.
T. A. R. Nelson, Solicitor.
County of Knox. J
John Doe, the above complainant makes oath that the statements in the foregoing bill
made as of his own knowledge are true, and those made as on information and belief he
believes to be true; and that he does not collude with any of the defendants touching the
matters in question, nor is he in any manner indemnified by any of the defendants, nor does
he file this bill at the request of either of them, but entirely of his own free will, and to
avoid being sued, molested, or injured, touching the matters contained in his said bill.
[Annex jurat: see, ante, §789.] John Doe.
So much of the above affidavit as does not verify the bill may be included
in the body of the bill, as has been done in the preceding general form; and
this is perhaps, the better practice; but the old precedents include it in an
;
affidavit to the bill. The absence of an averment of non-collnsion in the affi-

davit, or in the body of the bill, is a ground of demurrer. This affidavit as to
non-collusion an antiquated relic of the days when Chancery was loth to
is
interfere with matters that might be litigated at law.
§ 1113. Defences to a Bill of Interpleader.—The same defences can be made
to a bill of interpleader that will lie to any bill seeking a recovery the defend- :
ants, or either of them, can plead in abatement, demur, or ansAver and in their ;
answer can deny or confess and avoid. The most usual defence is by de-
murrer.
§ 1114 SUITS FOR AN INTERPLEADER. 892
DEMURRER TO A BILL OE INTERPLEADER.
[For title, commencement and conclusion, see, ante, § 310.]
Because the bill is filed for an interpleader and yet the complainant has not annexed
1.
to his bill an affidavit, nor inserted therein an averment, that he does not collude with any
of the defendants touching the matters in. question in the bill.
2. Because the bill is filed as an interpleader bill and yet does not contain the affidavit
specially required to such a bill as to non-collusion and non-indemnity, nor does the body
of the bill contain such averments.
3. Because the bill is filed as an interpleader bill and yet the complainant claims an interest
in the subject-matter.
4. Because the bill is filed as an interpleader bill and yet the complainant disputes the
amount due the defendants.
§ 1114. Proceedings Upon a Bill of Interpleader. In an interpleader bill, —
if the defendants do not deny the statements of the bill, the ordinary decree
is, that the defendants do interplead; and the complainant then withdraws
from the suit. 23 But the defendants, or either of them, are at liberty to con-
test and deny the allegations in the bill, or to set up distinct and independent
facts in bar of the suit and, in such a case, the complainant must contest the
;
answer, and take proof in the usual manner, before he can bring the cause
to a hearing between himself and the defendants; and at the hearing only, in
such a case, can he insist upon a decree, that the defendants do interplead. 24
If the bill shows that either of the defendants is setting up no claim; or if
it shows that the complainant is the agent, or trustee, or tenant, of either of
the defendants or, if it fails to show that it is not filed in collusion with either
;
of the defendants in any of such eases, either one of the defendants may de-
;
mur. Or the bill may be dismissed on motion, on any of the grounds hereto-
fore specified, on which such a motion may be based. 25
If the bill is sustained by the Court, an order will be made to that effect,
substantially as follows
DECREE FOR AN INTERPLEADER.
John Doe,
vs.
Richard Roe and Peter Poe.
This cause coming on this day to be heard upon the bill of interpleader and the demurrer
thereto, [or, the motion to dismiss,] on consideration thereof the Court is of opinion that the
bill is well filed, and that the demurrer is not well taken.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the demurrer be overruled and disallowed; and
the defendants not desiring to further contest the bill, it is adjudged 253, that said bill of
interpleader is properly filed, and is sustained and that the defendants do interplead and
;
settle the matters in controversy in this suit between themselves.

The complainant is dismissed with his costs to this time accrued; said costs to be paid
out of the fund by the complainant heretofore paid into Court. All other matters are reserved.
§ 1115. Bills in the Nature of a Bill of Interpleader. Although a bill of —
interpleader, strictly so called, lies only where the complainant claims no in-
terest in the subject-matter, yet there are many cases where a bill, in the nature
of a bill of interpleader, will lie by a party in interest to ascertain and establish
his own rights, where there are other conflicting rights between third persons.
As, for instance, if a complainant is entitled to equitable relief against the
owner of property, and the legal title thereto is in dispute between two or more
persons, so that he cannot ascertain to which it actually belongs, he may file a
bill against the several claimants, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, for
relief. So, it seems, a purchaser may file a bill in the nature of a bill of inter-
pleader against the vendor, or his assignee, and any creditor who seeks to
avoid the title of the assignee, and pray the direction of the Court as to whom
the purchase-money shall be paid. So, if a mortgagor wishes to redeem the
mortgaged estate, and there are conflicting claims between third persons, as to
their title to the mortgage-money, he may bring them before the Court, to as-
certain their rights, and to have a decree for a redemption, so that he may
23 State I. Co. V. Gennett, 2 Tenn. Ch., 100. I 25a If the demurrant desires to contest the bill he
24 Sto. Eq. P1-, § 297 a. will be ordered to answer it, on his demurrer being
25 See, ante, §§ 266-274; 523-525. I
overruled, as in case of other bills.
893 SUITS FOR A DISCOVERY. §1116
make a secure payment to the party entitled to the money. In these cases,
the complainant seeks relief for himself; whereas, in an interpleading bill,
strictly so called, the complainant only asks that he may be at liberty to pay
the money, or deliver the property, to the party to whom it of right belongs,
and may thereafter be protected against the claims of both. In the latter case,
the only decree to which the plaintiff is entitled, is a decree that the bill is
properly filed or, in other words, that he shall be at liberty to pay the money,
;
or bring the property into Court, and have his costs, and that the defendants
interplead, and settle the conflicting claims. between themselves. So, a bill, in
the nature of an interpleading bill, will lie by a bank which has offered a
reward for the recovery of money stolen, and a proportionate reward for a
part recovered, where there are several claimants of the reward, or a proportion
thereof, one or more of whom have sued the bank. And, in sach a bill, all the
claimants may be made parties, in order to have their respective claims ad-
justed. 20
ARTICLE II.
SUITS FOR A DISCOVERY.

§ 1116. The
Ôrigin and History of Bills of § 1121. The Form of a Bill for Discovery
Discovery. and Relief.
§ 1117. The Object of a Bill of Discovery. § 1122. The Statutory Petition for a Dis-
§ 1118. The Nature of the Discovery Re- covery.
quired of the Defendant.
§ 1123. Defences to Bills of Discovery.
§ 1119. The Discovery and Production of
Documents. § 1124. Proceedings Upon a Bill of Dis-
The Frame of a Bill of Discovery. covery.
§ 1120.
§ 1116. The Origin and History of Bills of Discovery.—Bills of discovery

were invented by the Chancellors of England to prevent a failure of justice,
at that period in English jurisprudence when, in a Court of law, neither
party
witness. often happens that the essential facts of a
to a suit could be a It
controversy are known only to the immediate parties thereto, and if the Court
will not allow the injured party to be a witness, and the wrong-doer cannot be
compelled to testify, much injustice will inevitably result. The Courts of law
not only rigidly, closed the mouths of both parties to a civil suit, but looked
with horror upon every attempt to make them witnesses. The result was that
crafty men availed themselves of this state of the law to obtain unconscientious
advantages of unsuspecting men, and to obtain possession of deeds, mortgages,
receipts, notes, contracts, and other valuable writings belonging to
others,
under circumstances incapable of being proved by third persons. And suits

were often brought in the Courts of law to enforce these unconscientious ad-
vantages, and to obtain the benefits resulting from the possession
of the deeds,
1
unconscientiously obtained, or withheld.
or other writings, thus
To remedy these great wrongs, and prevent the Courts of law becoming
allowed the injured party
the instruments of injustice, the Court of Chancery
a bill against the wrong-doer, stating therein the rights of the complain-
to file
ant and the facts constituting the injury
complained of, and calling on the
thereto to answer fully, on his oath, a series of searching interrog-
defendant
history of the transaction complained
atories intended to draw forth the full
bring to light the papers and other evidence sought for. These
of and to
produce, if he admitted that
papers the Chancellor required the defendant to
they were in his possession, or under his control; and these interrogatories
Pr., 1571. often became necessary in order to show a party's
„« c,„t?„ PI S297&' 2 Dan. Ch.
?-p£,,r ?v,f adootion of the system of registration, rights or title, and many such papers were wrongfully
papers, mortgages, and wills withheld from their true owners.
the possesion of title
§1117 SUITS FOR A DISCOVERY. 894
the defendant was required to answer with great minuteness and particularity
and this answer, and the writings, thus obtained, the complainant filed as evi-
dence in his behalf in the Court of law where the suit was pending, whether
such suit was by the complainant for the redress of said wrongs, or was brought
against the complainant to obtain the benefit of the wrong. 2
This circuitous procedure was formerly the only way in which the evidence
of the opposite party could be obtained in a suit at law. Now, however, that
parties are witnesses in our Courts of law, bills of discovery, technically so
called, are no longer necessary, and are seldom filed. Indeed, before the
passage of the Act allowing parties to testify, there had long been a statute,
allowing either party to a suit at law to obtain a discovery from the other
party, by a petition and interrogatories filed in the suit at law. 3 This statute
is a short, cheap, and effective substitute for a bill of discovery. 4
Bills for discovery and relief 5 are, however, daily filed in our Courts and the ;
rules and practice in reference to a discovery continue to be of great practical

importance, and will, therefore, be fully considered in the following sections
of this Chapter. 6
§ 1117. —
The Object of a Bill of Discovery. It sometimes happens that in
a suit at law, a plaintiff or defendant may be unable to successfully maintain
or defend the suit, without obtaining the evidence of the other party, or the
use of deeds, writings, or other documents, in his possession, or under his con-
trol. In such a case, a Court of Equity will, on a bill filed for that purpose
alone, aid him in obtaining such evidence, or documents.
Every bill for relief is, in part, a bill of discovery when it asks from the
defendant, an answer upon oath as to the matter charged in the bill, and seeks
from him a discovery of all such matters. But a bill of discovery, emphatically
so called, of which we are now treating, is a bill (1) for the discovery of facts,
resting in the knowledge of the defendant; or (2) the discovery of deeds, or
writings, or other things, in his custody or power; and (3) in either ease seek-
ing no relief in consequence of the discovery, although it may pray for the stay
of the proceedings at law, until the discovery is made. The bill is commonly
used in aid of the jurisdiction of some Court of law, to enable the party who
prosecutes, or defends an action at law, to obtain a discovery of the facts which
are material to the prosecution or defence thereof. 7 When a discovery is
sought from a corporation, it is allowable to make a principal officer or agent
of the corporation a party to the bill in so far as it seeks a discovery, 8 even
when no relief is sought against such officer, or agent, but a discovery, only. 9
§ 1118. The Nature of the Discovery Required of the Defendant. If the —
discovery sought is one that the Court will enforce, the following general rules
determine the manner and extent of this discovery
1. Assuming that the matters called for are proper subjects of a discovery;
that they belong to the complainant's case, and not to the defendant's; that
they are not privileged, or are not exempt within the operation of any other
doctrine then the defendant must disclose all material facts; in other words,
if he answers at all, he must answer fully. The Court will, however, in the
exercise of its discretion, judge of the materiality of the discovery sought, and
guard him against oppressive, vexatious, or impertinent inquiries.
2. The answers of the defendant must be complete, so that the information
which they give will be of substantial use to the complainant, and must be to
2 See. generally, 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 191-230. For illustrations of pure bills of discovery, see
3 Code, §§ 3891-3900; post, § 1122. Hinkle v. Currin, 1 Hum., 74; and Elliston «.
4 This statutory right to a discovery at law renders Hughes, 1 Head, 225.
a bill of discovery unnecessary when complainant i Sto. Eq. PI., § 311.
has an adequate remedy at law. Ducktown Co. V. 8 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 199; Lindsley o. James, 3
Fain. 1 Cates, 56. Cold., 485.
5 Where the defendant's oath is waived to his 9 In such a case a corporation cannot be coerced
answer, the bill is for relief only; where his oath is into making a discovery, but its officers or agents
required to his answer, the bill is for both relief and may be, and they are made parties as witnesses only.
discovery. Sto. Eq. PL, § 235.
895 SUITS FOR A DISCOVERY. § 1 1 19
the best of the defendant's knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief. 10
A defendant is bound to obtain information from all means reasonably within
his power. If documents are ordered to be produced, it is no excuse for non-
production that they are in possession of a third person, or even that a third
person has a lien upon or an interest in them. But if documents belong
wholly, or in part, to a third person, not a party to the suit, their production
will not be compelled.
3. The answers must be distinct, positive in their statements, not leaving facts
to be inferred argumentatively, and specific replies must be given to specific
questions but they must not be unnecessarily minute and prolix, especially in
;
setting forth accounts. 11

§ 1119. The Discovery and Production of Documents. Bills of discovery, —
and bills for both discovery and relief, are often filed to compel the discovery
and production of documents in, or supposed to be in, the defendant's posses-
sion or power. The following rules and general principles will be found of
value in determining when and what documents the defendant is bound to dis-
cover and produce.
The production of documents rests wholly on the defendant's own admissions,
contained either in his answer to the bill, or in his answers to interrogatories.
If his answers are evasive or insufficient, he may be called upon to make them
more specific, and to admit or deny but when he has once directly denied the
;
possession of documents, or their materiality to the complainant's case, the

Court will not compel their production. The admission authorizing an order
to produce must cover two facts: (1) the possession of the documents, and (2)
their materiality. Manual possession is not essential. It is enough if the doc-
uments are either in the actual possession of the defendant, or are under his
control that is, are in the custody of an attorney, agent, or other third person,
;
whose custody of them the defendant can, by the exercise of his lawful powers,
control, or from whom he can, by the exercise of such powers, obtain the pos-
session himself. The rule is the same even when the third party has some lien
on the papers. But if the documents belong wholly, or in part, to a third
person not a party to the suit, or if they are in the joint possession of the de-
fendant and of some third person not a party to the suit, by virtue of the lat-
ter 's separate interest or right in them, their production will not be compelled
without the consent of such third person. 12
It should be carefully borne in mind that the doctrine concerning the pro-
duction and inspection of documents relates entirely to their disclosure for
the purpose of being used as evidence, or to aid in the trial of a pending or
contemplated litigation, and has no connection whatever with the ownership
of, or final right of possession to, the documents in question. In most instances,
the ownership of the documents sought to be produced will not be at all in
issue. But even in an action expressly brought to establish the complainant's
title to documents, and to recover their possession, the production of them
before the hearing must be governed by settled rules as to discovery. The com-
plainant has otherwise no right to possess or to see them until a decree is
rendered in his favor for such right is the very matter in issue, and to decide
;
that it existed would be to decide the whole merits of the controversy upon a
preliminary application. It is well settled, therefore, that the matter of the
production and inspection of documents depends upon the same principles and
doctrines which govern discovery in general. 13
§ 1120. —
The Frame of a Bill of Discovery. A bill of discovery in aid of a
suit at law, or in aid of a defence to a suit at law, should (1) set out in full
the facts of the controversy; (2) should show why and wherein the discovery
is necessary, detailing the facts and, if a suit at law has been begun, (3) should
;
10 Sto. Eq. PI., 5 854. I " Pom. Eq. Jur., § 206.

11 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 204. I 13 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 205.
and the parties thereto, and so show the issues
recite the institution of the suit,
involved that the Court of Chancery can see the materiality of the discovery
sought. 14 The bill must state that a suit at law has been brought, or is intended
to be brought, and that the discovery is to aid complainant in such suit and, if ;
such suit is not yet brought, the nature of the controversy, and with whom,
must be set forth with reasonable certainty. 15
In regard to the frame of a bill of discovery, it may be generally stated that
it must clearly show that it is brought by persons, and for objects, and under,
circumstances, entitling it to be maintained by the Court. One of the funda-
mental rules of this branch of Equity, jurisprudence is, that the complainant is
entitled only to a discovery of what is necessary to maintain his own title; as,
for example, a discovery of deeds under which he claims. But he is not en-
titled to have a discovery of the title of the other party, from whom he seeks
the discovery. 18 Hence, as a general rule, the bill must show such a case, as
renders the discovery material to the complainant in the bill, to support or de-
fend a suit. 17 The bill should, also, show that the complainant has a title and
interest, and what that title and interest are, in the subject-matter, respecting
which the discovery is sought; for a mere stranger cannot maintain a bill for
the discovery of another's title. So the title and interest must be shown to be
present and vested.
The bill must not only show an interest in the complainant in the subject-
matter, to which the required discovery relates, and such an interest as enti-
tles him to call on the defendant for the discovery but it must, also, state a case
;
which will constitute a just ground for a suit, or a defence, at law. The object
of the Court in compelling a discovery, is to enable some other Court to decide
on matters in dispute between the parties, the discovery of which is material.
If the bill does not show such a case as renders the discovery material to sup-
port or defend a suit, it is plainly not a case for the interposition of the Court.
A bill must, also, set forth with reasonable certainty the title of the complain-
ant and, if it seeks the discovery of deeds and accounts it must, also, describe
;
them with reasonable certainty. 18

Abill of discovery cannot waive the oath of the defendant to his answer;
and should the oath be waived, and the defendant submit to answer, no excep-
tion can be taken to the answer for insufficiency. 19
Abill for discovery alone, prays for no relief 20 outside of the discovery
sought, unless an injunction is necessary to stay the suit at law until a dis-
covery is had, in which case the injunction may be prayed for. 21
When the bill seeks to remove the final determination of a cause from a
Court of law to the Chancery Court, on the ground of the necessity of a dis-
covery from the defendant, it must aver that the facts cannot be proved by
other evidence than that of the defendant 22 such a bill, however, is not a bill
:
for discovery, in the technical sense of this Article: it is a bill for discovery
and relief. A
bill for discovery alone, in aid of a suit at law, need not so aver,
for such a bill can be maintained in aid of other proof, or because of the un-
certainty of other proof, or even to save the expense of other proof. 23
§ 1121. Form of a Bill for Discovery, and Relief. —A
pure bill of discovery
prays for no relief, unless an injunction is prayed for to stay the suit at law
until the discovery can be obtained. Every bill that prays for relief, and that
16 Sto. Eq. PL, I 321. 14 The bill need not recite the pleadings in the
10 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 201. suit at law. Hinkle V. Currin.- 1 Hum., 74.
17 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 317-318: 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1490. 21 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1556-1J57; Sto. Eq. PI., § 315.
18 Sto. Eq. PL, §§319-320; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., 22 Lindsley v. James, 3 Cold., 477; Mann V. Bam-
§ 1493 a. berger, 4 Heisk., 486.
19 Sheppard V. Akers, 1 Term. Ch., 326; Payne r. 23 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., §74c; Elliston v. Hughes, 1
Berry. 3 Tenn. Ch., 154. Head. 225; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §5 197; 229. notes;
20 But it would seem, that, under our liberal prac- Sto. Eq. PI., §322, note 2; Dan. Ch. Pr., 570; 1557,
tice, a prayer for general relief, would, in a bill for notes. Judge CooDer, in his note to the syllabus of
discovery, be construed to mean all the relief neces- Whitesides V. Lafferty, 9 Hum., 27, points out the
sary in obtaining the discovery. Elliston v. Hughes, distinction. See, also, 1 Sto. Eq. Tur., §64i-74r;
1 Head, 227. Gleaves v. Morrow, 2 Tenn'. Ch., 597.
897 SUITS FOR A DISCOVERY. §1121
calls for an answer on oath, is, also, a bill of discovery in so far as it requires
the defendant to discover facts, or produce documents. 24 bill for discovery A
and relief differs in no respect in form from a bill praying relief without dis-
covery, except in that it particularizes the facts and documents charged to be
in the defendant's possession, and calls on him specifically to make the facts
known, and to produce the documents. The following form will illustrate the
ORDINARY PRAYERS FOR A DISCOVERY.
1st. That the defendant be made a party hereto by the issuance and service of a subpoena,
requiring him to answer this bill, and upon his corporal oath to make a full and true disclosure
and discovery of each and all of the several matters aforesaid, according to the best of his
knowledge, remembrance, information, and belief; and especially
(1) That he set forth and discover: whether said testator, Robert Roe, ever made or
attempted to make any last will and testament, or any paper of like form or character; and
if so, that he produce the same, or else state its entire contents and explain fully what became
of it, and where it now is;
(2) That he, the said defendant, set forth a list, or schedule, and description of every
deed, book, account, letter, paper, note, memorandum, or other writing, relating to the
matters aforesaid, or to any of them, now in his possession or power, or ever in his possession
or power, or known to him and if not now ini his possession or power, let him state and
;
fully discover where and in whose possession or power said writings or papers, or any and
which of them are, or have been and the full description and character of said writings or
;
papers
(3) That the defendant set forth in his answer a full, true, and particular account of all
rents, profits, and fruits of said tract of land, [or, of all moneys, notes, choses in action, evi-
dences of debt, goods, wares, merchandise and other things of value belonging to the com-
plainant, or belonging to said firm,] received or collected by him, or by any person acting for
him, specifying each item and date thereof;
(4) That the defendant set forth and disclose fully the exact amount of money [or, other
property,] by him received from said Robert Roe, deceased, and in what said money was in-
vested, and how much he- now has in his possession, and what became of that not invested
and not now in his possession;
(5) That the defendant file with his answer the receipt executed by him to said Robert
Roe referred to in the bill, and, if it is not in his possession or control, that he disclose and
make known what became of said receipt, and where it now is and he will answer whether
;
he ever saw, or ever executed, such receipt, or any similar writing, and if a similar writing,
he will file the same, if in existence, or give a perfect copy thereof if it be destroyed, lost, mis-
placed, or otherwise out of his reach; and, .if he give a copy, he will explain why he cannot,
or does not, file the original.
And the defendant will full, true, direct, and perfect answers make, according to the best
of his knowledge, remembratace, information, and belief, to all and singular the matters,
charges, and interrogatories aforesaid.
2d. [Then will follow the usual prayers for extraordinary process, if any, and for special
and general relief, also, if the bill seeks both discovery and relief.]
On a bill for discovery and relief being sustained, and answered, the com-
plainant, if his bill so prays, may have relief not only as to the equitable mat-
ters involved, but, also, as to any legal matter; for, when the Chancery Court
has jurisdiction for one purpose, such as a discovery, or an injunction, it will
take jurisdiction for all purposes, and will award damages where recoverable
at law. 25
The following is a form of a pure bill of discovery:
BILL OF DISCOVERY.
[For address and caption, see, ante, §§ 155 164.]
i.
That a suit is now pending against him by the defendant in the common law Court at
Bath, 28 in the State of Maine : in this suit defendant claims that complainant owes him three
24 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 101. attach complainant's town lots there. As the Ten-
25 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 224-229; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., nessee Chancery Court has jurisdiction of the person
§ 64 k; Pearl v. Nashville, 10 Yerg., 179, 185. See, of the defendant this Court could have been called
also, ante, §§ 36; 38. on to enjoin and prohibit the defendant from further
26 This bill is based on the supposition that the prosecuting his lawsuit m Bath, and this, perhaps,
old common law practice prevails in the Court at would have been the wiser course, but he was not
Bath, and that parties cannot be witnesses, and that
.
so advised ! A bill of discovery will lie in our
a bill of discovery in Chancery is the only method Chancery Courts in aid of a suit, or a defense to a
whereby a defendant at law can obtain the testimony suit, in another State, or in a foreign country. 2
of the plaintiff. Both parties reside in Memphis, Barb. Ch. Pr., 102.
Tennessee. The plaintiff sues in Bath in order to I
thousand dollars for lumber purchased from him by complainant in said State, and defendant
has obtained an attachment on Complainant's town lots in said city of Bath.
That on or about the 24th day of December, 190S, complainant and defendant, who both
reside in the city of Memphis, Tennessee, met at the Gayosa House in Memphis, and amicably,
and as complainant thought, satisfactorily, adjusted all their accounts against each other, in-
cluding said claim of three thousand dollars for lumber, and they exchanged receipts in full
of all demands, but by some accident, due perhaps to the festivities of the Christmas season,
complainant mislaid said receipt, and after diligent search has been unable to find it.
in.
That complainant charges that the defendant took the receipt he gave complainant, and
put it in his pocket, perhaps by mistake, as complainant put the receipt he had given defendant
in his pocket, but discovering it next day, handed it to the defendant, with apologies.
IV.
That complainant has no way of proving said settlement or the existence of the said
receipt in full of all demands, given to him by the defendant at said Gayosa Hotel in Mem-
phis, as aforesaid, or that he has fully paid said lumber claim, except by the testimony of the
defendant himself.
v.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue requiring the defendant to appear and answer the bill,
and upon his corporal oath to make a full, true, direct and perfect disclosure and discovery of
each and all of the several matters aforesaid, according to the best of his knowledge, remem-
brance, information and belief, and especially that he answer, set forth and discover:
(1.) Whether at said Gayosa House, on December 24, 1905, or at any other near time and
place, he and complainant entered into a settlement of all their mutual demands, including
said Maine lumber bill, on which said lawsuit at Bath has been brought.
(2.) Whether any and what receipts, or other papers, were then and there, or at any other
near time and place, signed by complgjinant and defendant, or by either of them covering
said lumber among other matters.
(3.) What was the purport and tenor or substance and object of the papers so signed.
(4.) Whether the papers so signed did or not cover all outstanding and unsettled matters
and demands each party at that time held against the other, and if not, state fully and par-
ticularly what they did cover, and what were their purpose and purport.
(S.) Let the defendant answer on his corporal oath as aforesaid, and to the best of his
knowledge, remembrance and belief whether at said place and time, or at some other place
and time thereabout, he signed, or put his name to, a writing purporting to be a receipt in
full of all demands he
at this time held against complainant.
(6.) And
he did not sign, or put his name to such a writing, let him answer on his oath,
if
as aforesaid, the character and purport of the writing he did then and there or thereabouts
sign or put his name to.
(7.) Let the defendant file with his answer the paper or papers, receipt or receipts, writing
or writings, he so signed as aforesaid; and if not in his possession, or under his control, he
will state what became of the same, and where the same now is or are, or is or are supposed
to be and if the same is or are mislaid, lost or destroyed, he will state which, and give the
;
date and substance thereof to the best of his knowledge, recollection and belief.
(8.) If there be any other matter in defendant's knowledge, or in his memory or belief,
relating to said settlement or writings, not set forth or alluded to in his answers, let him
here state it as fully as though specially and particularly, called on so to do by complainant.
(9.) Let defendant answer directly on his corporal oath, whether he has, or has ever seen,
or has any remembrance, or recollection of ever having had, or ever having seen, any receipt
in any way resembling the one referred to in the body of the bill and if so, let him give its ;
date and substance.

(10.) Let defendant answer directly on his corporal oath whether said lumber account,
on which said lawsuit at Bath has been brought, has in any way, at any place, ever been paid.
And the defendant will full, true, direct and perfect answer make, according to the best
of his knowledge, remembrance, information and belief, to each and all of the matters,
charges, and interrogations aforesaid.
2d. Complainant also prays that an injunction 27 issue to restrain and prohibit the defend-
ant from the further prosecution of said lawsuit at Bath until the further order of your
Honor in the premises.
And complainant will ever pray as aforesaid.
Eugene Webb, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit?* see, ante, §§ 161 ; 789.]
27 While a bill for discovery only, prays no relief, 28 When no injunction is prayed, and the bill does
a prayer for an injunction is allowable and not con- not seek to draw the jurisdiction of the whole con-
sidered as relief, the object of the injunction being troversy from the law Court into Chancery, no affi-
merely to stay the lawsuit until the defendant has davit to the bill is necessary. Parsons & Wilson v.
fully answered the bill, for otherwise the discovery Stephens, 2 Tenn., 260.
would be fruitless. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 108.
-899 SUITS FQR A DISCQYERY. §1122
§ 1122.
,
The Statutory Petition for a PJscovery.-^But now, by the Code,
,
either party to a suit at law is entitled, by means of a sworn petition in the

cause, to a discovery, from the. other party, of any matters material to the
issue of such suit, in all cases where the same party would, by the rules of
,
Equity, be entitled to a discovery in aid of such suit. 29 The contents pf such

petition for a discovery and the. procedure thereon are fujly detailed in the
Code and this, method of. obtaining a discovery is so simple, speedy and con-
;
venient, that it has practically superseded the method by a bill in Equity in

aid of a suit at law. 30 But this statute does not affect the jurisdiction, of the
Chancery Court, 31 unless the complainant has had the benefit of a discovery in
the law Court under the statutory proceedings by petition, in which case a bill
for discovery will not lie in Equity. 32
—
Defences to Bills of Discovery. The defence to a bill of discovery
§ 1123.
isusually made by demurrer or by plea* in bar, and if not so made, as a rule,
the defendant must answer the bill. 33 The following are the principal grounds
of demurrer:
1. Demurrer Because the Discovery May Subject the Defendant to a Penalty, or a
Forfeiture. The defendant cannot be compelled to answer what may subject
him to a penalty, or forfeiture, or criminal accusation, 34 But the fact that his
answer may reflect on his moral character, or show that he has been guilty of
fraudulent dealings not indictable, will not excuse him from answering. 35
2. Demurrer Because the Discovery Would be Immaterial. The defendant can-
not be compelled to discover anything immaterial to the relief prayed. 36
3. Demurrer Because the Discovery Would Involve a Breach of Professional
Confidence. A
Solicitor cannot be required to discover any fact derived from
his client. Public policy forbids such disclosures. 37
4. Demurrer Because the Discovery Relays Only tb the Defendant's Title.
A complainant has no right to pry into the title of his adversary: he. may
demand a discovery only in so far as is necessary to establish his own case as
set out in his bill. 38
5. Defences by Plea and by Answer. If any of the grounds, for which a de-
murrer would lie if apparent on the face of the bill, really exist, but are not
disclosed by the bill, the defendant may bring such matters forward by a plea
in bar.
The same matters that would be proper for a plea in bar, may be incorporated
in an answer. On exceptions to such an answer, for insufficiency, the Court
will determine whether the defendant is bound to make the discovery he resists.
The defendant cannot, however, demur to a part of the bill of discovery, and
answer to a part, the rule being well settled that if he answers at all, he must
answer fully, except as to matters which the Court will not require to be an-
swered. 39
Proceedings upon a Bill of Discovery. Upon a bill of discovery
§ 1124. —
being be demurrable the defendant may have it dismissed on demur-
filed, if it
rer if it be not demurrable, or his demurrer is overruled, he must answer and
: ;
in his answer he must admit or deny every material allegation in the bill, and
must directly and fully respond to every interrogatory propounded in the bill,
29 Code, 3891-3900. demur to the relief and answer to the' discovery.
so See Fort v. Orndoff, 7 Heisk., 174; Ducktown But he cannot demur to the discovery alone, and
Co. v. Fain, 1 Cates, 56. not to the relief, when the discovery is merely inci-
'
31 Elliston v. Hughes, 1 Head, 227; 2 Sto. Eq. dental to the relief; for that would be to demur, not
Jur., § 1481, note 3. In some other States, however, to the thing required, but to the means by which it
the contrary ruling prevails. See, 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., was to be bbtaihed.
1556, note 10; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 193; 197: 230. . Si Sto. Eq. PL, §§521; 575-576; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
32 Bumpass v. Reams, 1 Sneed, 595. See, Spur- 563.
lock V. Fulks, 1 Swan, 289, "where a bill of discovery 35 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 565; Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 595-596.
36 Sto. Eq. PI., § 565; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 570.
was sustained, after the enactment of the statutory
remedy by petition. .
3T Sto. Eq. PI.. § 599.
33 2 Barb.. Ch. Pr., 109. Where the bill is for 38 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 579; Sto. Eq. PI., §572.
discovery and relief, the defendant may, if he pleases, 39 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 112-114.
§1125 SUITS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. 900
and discover every matter inquired abcrat in the bill to the best of his know-
ledge, information, remembrance, and belief.
As a bill of discovery prays for no relief, except a temporary injunction, the
defendant is entitled to be dismissed with his costs, and to have the injunction
dissolved, as soon as he files a perfect answer. If his answer is not excepted to
in twenty days after complainant's Solicitor is notified of its filing, or if the
exceptions to it have all been finally disposed of, the answer is deemed to be
full and perfect and the costs are adjudged, and the injunction dissolved as a
;
matter of course. 40
A bill of discovery may be amended, or a supplemental bill of discovery filed
by leave of the Chancellor, as in case of bills praying relief, especially where
the ground of the amendment is furnished by the answer. 41
DECREE ON A BILL OP DISCOVERY.
John Doe,
vs. Order of Dismissal.
Richard Roe.
In this cause, the defendant having fully and perfectly answered, on his motion the injunc-
tion is dissolved, and the costs of the cause are adjudged against the complainant and B, A
and C D, his prosecution sureties, for which an execution will issue.
The bill in this cause being for discovery only, and, therefore, no further proceedings in
the cause necessary, the cause will be discontinued from the docket.
ARTICLE III.
SUITS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY.
§ 1125. The General Nature
of a Bill to Per- § 1129. Form of a Bill to Perpetuate Testi-
petuate Testimony. mony.
§ 1126. What the Bill Must Show as to the. § 1130. The Defences to the Bill and Subse-
Subject-Matter. quent Proceedings.
§ 1127. As to the Necessity for Perpetuating § 1131. Statutory Petition to Perpetuate Tes-
the Testimony. timony.
§ H28. The Prayer of the Bill, and the Affi- § 1132. Form of a Petition to Perpetuate
davit Thereto. Testimony.
§ 1125. The General Nature of a Bill to Perpetuate Testimony. The object —

of a bill to perpetuate testimony is to preserve evidence, when it is in danger
of being lost, before the matter to which it relates can be made the subject of
judicial investigation. Thus, (1) when the complainant's title is in remainder,
or (2) when he himself is in actual possession of the property, or (3) when he
is in present possession of the rights which he seeks to perpetuate by proofs,
he may be unable to bring his disputed interest into immediate judicial investi-
gation; and, therefore, Courts of Equity will entertain a suit to secure the
proofs on which his title depends; for, otherwise, such proofs might be lost by
the death of his witnesses, and the adverse party might purposely delay his
suit with a view to that very event. 1 The bill may be maintained whether the
matter in controversy be a title, or claim, to real or to personal estate, or mere
personal demands; or whether the testimony is to be used in support of the
complainant's action, or as a matter of defence. 2
§ 1126. What the Bill must Show as to the Subject-Matter. The sole object —
of a bill to perpetuate testimony is, to assist other Courts, and to preserve evi-
dence to prevent future litigation. In order to maintain such a bill, it is neces-
sary to state on its face all the material facts, which are necessary to maintain
the jurisdiction. It must, in the first place, state the subject-matter, touching
40 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 115. I
§§ 1S0S-1S10. A bill will sometimes lie, however, to
41 Ibid, 116. have the cloud removed from the complainant's title.
1 Smith's Eq. Jur., 486-487; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., I 2 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., 1509.
901 SUITS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. §1127
which the complainant is desirous of perpetuating evidence. Thus, for example,
if the object of the bill is to perpetuate the testimony of the witnesses to a deed •
respecting real estate, the deed should be properly described, and the names of
the witnesses, who are to prove the same, set forth. And if the object of the
bill is to perpetuate the evidence of witnesses to facts in pais, it is not sufficient
to state generally that they can give evidence as to certain facts but the bill ;
must state specially what these facts are. The bill should also show that the
complainant has some interest in the subject-matter, which may be endangered
if the testimony in support of it is lost; for, unless he has some interest, he is
not entitled to maintain the bill. A mere expectancy, however strong, is not
sufficient the party must have a positive interest. But if there be any vested
;
interest, however. slight, that is sufficient, and whether it be absolute, or con-

tingent, whether it be present, or remote and future in enjoyment, is wholly
immaterial. 3
On the other hand, it seems equally indispensable to a bill of this kind that
it should state, that the defendant has, or pretends to have, a title to, or that
he claims the right to contest the title of the complainant in, the subject-matter
of the proposed testimony. For, unless the defendant has, or claims some inter-
est, it is utterly fruitless to perpetuate the testimony, since it can have no opera-
upon those who are really the parties in interest. 4
tion
§ 1127.As to the Necessity for Perpetuating the Testimony. The bill must —
also show some ground of necessity for perpetuating the evidence as that the ;
facts, to which the testimony of the witnesses proposed to be examined relate,

cannot be immediately investigated in Court or, if they can be so investigated,
;
that the right of action belongs exclusively to the other party; or that the
other party has interposed some impediment, such as an injunction, to an imme-
diate trial of the right in the suit at law so that, before the investigation can
;
take place, the evidence of a material witness is likely to be lost, by his death
or departure from the country. 5 In the former ease, the bill must allege that
the complainant is in possession of the property, or the right, without any dis-
turbance by the other party, upon which an action at law can be founded. In
the latter case, the bill must allege the specific facts on which the complainant
puts his case; and also that the witnesses are old, or infirm, or in ill health, and
not likely to live or, that he has no present right to maintain an action as if
; ;
he have a title in remainder, or reversion only, after a present existing estate

for life. Without such allegations, the bill will be clearly demurrable; since,
if the subject-matter is capable of being immediately investigated at law, there
is no ground to perpetuate the testimony; but it will be the party's own laches
not so to try his right. 6
§ 1128. The Prayer of the Bill, and the Affidavit Thereto.—The prayer of
the bill also requires attention. It should pray leave to examine witnesses
touching the matter stated, to the end that their testimony may be preserved*
and perpetuated. It should also pray the proper process of subpoena. But it
should not pray that the defendant may abide such order and decree as the
Court shall think proper to make, for that will turn it into- a bill for relief,
which is inconsistent with the nature of a bill to perpetuate testimony. If the
bill should pray relief, it will of course be demurrable, and may be dismissed
for this cause. Care should be taken not to mix up in the bill other matters
not pertinent. 7
Where a bill is framed on the ground that the testimony of a witness may be
lost by his death, or departure from the State before the case can be investi-
gated in a Court of law, it seems proper, also, in order to avoid any objection,
3Sto. Eq. PI- §§300-301; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1572; 6 Sto. Eq. PL, § 303.
1 Pom. En. Jur., § 211; 2 Sto. Eq. Juf., § 1511. 7 Sto. Eq. PL, § 306.
* Sto. Eq. PL, § 302.
6 2 Dan. Cb. Pr., 1572; Sto. Eq. PL, § 303.
§1129 SUITS TO' PERPETUATE TESTIMONY. 902
to ailliex to it an affidavit of the circumstances, by which the evidenc'e, intended
to be' perpetuated, is in danger of being lbst. 8
§' 1129.Form of a Bill to Perpetuate Testimony.—Bills to perpetuate testi-
mony continue to be filed in our Courts, notwithstanding the statutory remedy
by petition, hereafter more fully referred to. The following form will illustrate
the foregoing requirements as to the frame of the bill.
, BILL TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY.
To Hon. W. S. Bearderi, Chancellor, holding the' Chancery Court
the at Shelbyville, for the
County of" Bedford :
'
Jane Doe, a resident of Bedford qounty, complainant,
John Doe, a resident of the same county, defendant.'

The complainant respectfully "shows to the Court:
i.
That she is the sole heir and devisee of, David Doe, who died in the said county of Bedford
on July 13, 1891, seized, and possessed of the following tract of land: [Describing it by metes
and bounds, or other, accurate description.]
'
ii.
The said David Doe left a'last will and testament wherein and whereby he devised to com-
plainant said tract of land, in fee. .Said will has been duly probated in common form in the
County Court of Bedford county. A, certified copy of said will is herewith filed as an exhibit
to this bill, marked "A," and will be read as evidence at the hearing.
:-: -
: , •
In ' :
David Doe was ah Englishman, and' complainant was born in England. Complainant's
mother, whose name was Jenny Doe, was the lawful' wife of said David Doe; and she died
soon after giving birth to complainant. The, defendant charges that complainant is not the
daughter .of said David Doe, and, that said David Doe never was married to complainant's
said mother, Jenny Doe. He, also, charges that said will is a fraud and forgery, concocted by
complainant and' her two uncles, Daniel Doe and Donald Doe, who witnessed and proved said
will. The defendant maintains and avers that he is the sole heir, and only living and lawful
child of said David Doe.
IV.
Complainant further shows and alleges, that said Daniel Doe and Donald Doe are residents
and citizens of England, arid are here on a temporary visit only, and expect to sail for Eng-
land within the present year. By them she can prove that David Doe was lawfully married
in England to said Jenny Doe, whose maiden name was Jenny Davis, that complainant was
born of said Jenny Doe more, than a year after her said marriage to the said David Doe, and
that complainant is the lawful child arid heir of said David Doe.
v.
Complainant further alleges and shows, that she can prove by said Daniel Doe and Donald
Doe, who are- the sole witnesses to said will, that her said father was of sound mind and 'dis-
posing memory when said will was by him executed, that he signed and acknowledged it
before them, and declared it to be his last will, and that they witnessed it in his presence, and
at his request, and that neither of them is interested in any devise or legacy under said will,
and that no fraud, deception, or undue influence was practiced upon said David Doe by them,
or by complainant, or by any one. ,
VI.
Complainant further shows to the Court that the defendant, John Doe, is a son of her
father bya second' wife; and that he is very hostile to complainant, and threatens to institute
suit to have said will set aside, and to recover said farm, as soon as said Daniel Doe and
:
Donald Doe sail for, England. Complainant fears that she will not be able to prove the facts
charged in this bill, if she should lose the testimony of said Daniel Doe and Donald Doe; and
she avers that their testimony cannot be supplied by any evidence' within the jurisdiction of
the State.
VII.
The premises considered,, complainant prays
1st. [For proper process and for the defendant to anszVer, in the usual form.]
2d. That the testimony of said Daniel Doe and of said Donald Doe be taken and' perpetu-
ated; and duly enrolled.
3d. That complainant may be given the liberty to read and make use of said testimony on
all future occasions, as she shall be advised.
4th. That all' orders be friade necessary to effectuate fully the prayers and object of this bill.
IviE & IviE, Solicitors.
While there seems to be no rule requiring such a bill to be verified, neverthe-
8 Sto. Eq. PI., § 304.
903 SUITS TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY- .
,
§1130
less,out of abundant caution, a-prudent Solicitor will require his client to make,
oath to it, and thus avoid the question.
§ 1130. Defences to the Bill, and Subsequent Proceedings. The defendant —
may have the bill dismissed, or may file
a demurrer to the bill, in any case where
such defences will lie to' an ordinary bill for relief.
The bill is never brought to a hearing, but after the bill is sustained, either
on a pro confesso, or an answer, the Court makes an order .to have the deposi-
tions of the witnesses taken and perpetuated, on due notice to the defendant.
§ 1131. Statutory Petition to Perpetuate Testimony. The Code provides —
for a more summary method of perpetuating. testimony; 9 and this method has
almost entirely superseded the method in Equity above given. The petition j
required by the Code should contain the substance of a bill in Equity in a like
case it should set forth the reasons for the application, the subject-matter of
:
controversy, the names of the parties interested, and the names of the witnesses,
and should pray that the depositions of the witnesses be taken and perpet-
uated. 10 The proceedings under the Code, down to the taking of the deposi-
tions, are substantially the same as those on a' bill in Equity to perpetuate
testimony and the defence to such a bill would equally avail against the peti-
;
tion. The main differences between the proceeding under the Code and a bill
in Equity are, that the former may be resorted to in a pending 11 litigation, and
is, also, more summary and less formal. It must not, however, be supposed
that the statutory provisions for perpetuating evidence in any way repeal, or
otherwise affect, the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court; such jurisdiction
continues unimpaired, and a bill to. perpetuate testimony will lie in that Court
as formerly. 12 Such a bill may be filed in this State, in aid of a suit in another
State, when the jurisprudence of the latter allows such a procedure.
§ 1132. Form of a Petition
to Perpetuate Testimony. The form of a peti- —
tion to perpetuate testimony must conform to the statutory requirements
already given. The following form will serve' as a guide
PETITION TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY.
To the Hon. Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor of the Third Chancery Division
Your petitioner, John Den, a resident of Hamilton county, respectfully shows
' to your
Honor:
i. .
That there is now pending in the Supreme Court

of Tennessee, at Knoxville, a suit brought
against him, in the Chancery Court at Chattanooga, by Richard Fen, to recover the following
tract of land situated in Hamilton county: [describing it fully.] Said suit was dismissed by
said Court on motion [or, on demurrer,] and complainant Fen appealed to said Supreme
Court.
ii.
Said Fen's supposed cause of action is based on a deed for said tract he fraudulently pro-
cured from your petitioner, on or about the month of January, 1890. Petitioner can prove
the fraud by John, Doe and Richard Roe, both residents of Chattanooga, who were present
and witnessed the deed. John Doe is an old man in very feeble health, and Richard Roe
expects soon to go as a missionary to Japan. Without the testimony of these two witnesses,
your petitioner will be unable to prove the fraud by which said Fen obtained said deed.
in.
be more than six months before the said Supreme Court will pass on said appeal.
It will
If the decree of the said Chancery Court is affirmed, the said. Fen declares that he will bring
another suit; and if the said decree is reversed the suit will be remanded to be proceeded
in. Thus, in either event, the testimony of said two witnesses is of great importance to your
petitioner.
rv.
Your petitioner, therefore prays that the depositions of said two witnesses may be taken
and perpetuated as provided by the statute for such case made ; and that your Honor will
,
"
make all orders necessary to that end. John Den.
[Annex affidavit 13 as in § 789, ante.]
9 Code, §§ 3876-3888. the depositions of the witnesses' may be taken on
10 Code, § 3877. For the form of the petition, see mere notice. See, ante, § 474.
the next section. ..',,.
11 The Code remedy is a substitute hoth for a bill
12 See, ante, % 37.
13 The Code does not expressly' .require the. peti-
to perpetuate testimony, and for a bill to take testi- tion to be sworn to; but it is prudent to, verify it.
mony de bene esse. If a suit be pending, however,
§1133 SUITS TO TAKE TESTIMONY DE BENE ESSE. 904
THE CHANCELLOR'S OBDEB.
Upon consideration of the foregoing petition, it is ordered by me that said Richard Fen
appear before me, in the Clerk and Master's office in Chattanooga, on July 20, 1891, and that
he then and there show cause, if any he have, why the prayer of the said petition should not
be granted and that a copy of said petition, and of this order, be served on him at least five
;
days before said July 20, 1891.

Thos. M. McConnbia, Chancellor.
If the opposite party fail to appear, or appearing, show no sufficient cause
to the contrary, the Chancellor will make the following further order, on the
petition, or on a paper annexed thereto
OBDEB TO PEBPETTJATE THE TESTIMONY.

Upon further consideration of said, petition, and of said notice, and no sufficient cause to
the contrary being shown, after due notice to said Richard Fen, service of such notice duly
appearing, it is ordered by me that the depositions of said John Doe and Richard Roe be
taken by J. B. Ragon, Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at Chattanooga, on July 25th,
1891, and succeeding days if necessary, at his- office in. Chattanooga and that, when taken,
, ;
said petition, the notice and the orders made thereon, and said depositions be registered in
Hamilton county, and that the petitioner pay all the costs incident to this proceeding.
July 20, 1891. Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor.
ARTICLE IV.
SUITS TO TAKE TESTIMONY DB BENE ESSE.
§ 1133.The Object of the Bill 1 § 1135. Statutory Substitute for the Bill.
§1134. The Frame of the Bill. |
§ 1133. The Object of the Bill. —This species of

bill bears a close analogy to
bills to perpetuate testimony, and is often confounded with the latter: but
they differ materially. Bills to perpetuate testimony can be maintained only
when no present suit can be brought at law, by the party seeking the aid of
the Court to try his right. Bills to take testimony de bene esse, on the other
hand, are sustainable only in aid of a suit already pending. The latter may be
brought by a person who is in possession, or who is out of possession, and
whether he is complainant or defendant, 1 or whether the suit concerns rights
and property, or grows out of a contract, or even a tort. 2
The object of the bill is to take the testimony of witnesses for the trial at
law, where the testimony may otherwise be lost where the witnesses are aged, ;
or infirm, or about to depart from the country. So, if a witness is the only
witness to the matter to which he is to be examined, a bill will lie, on account
of the general uncertainty of human life, to take his testimony de bene esse,
notwithstanding he is neither aged nor infirm. In general, a witness is not
treated as being aged in the sense of the rule, unless he is seventy years of age.
But if he is infirm, or in ill health, to an extent likely to endanger or destroy
his life, or to prevent his attendance at the trial, his testimony may be taken
at any age. If a witness is going out of the jurisdiction of the Court, although
only into a state or country under the same general sovereignty, his testimony
may also be taken as, for example, if he is going from England to Scotland or
; ;
in America, if he is going from one State to another. 3

§ 1134. The Frame of the Bill.—In framing the bill, therefore, care should
be taken to allege all the material facts, upon which the right to maintain the
bill depends, whether it is dependent upon the age, or the infirmity of the wit-
12 Sto. Eq. Jur., §1513; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., §213; I 3 Sto. Eq. PI., §308; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §1514: 1
Sto. Eq. PL, § 307. Pom. Eq. Jur., § 213.
2 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 1515. I
905 SUITS TO TAKE TESTIMONY DE BENE ESSE. § 1135
ness, or upon his being about to depart from the country, or upon his being a
sole witness. And there should be annexed to the bill an affidavit of the cir-
cumstances, by which the evidence, intended to be perpetuated, is in danger of
being lost, as by death, departure from the country, or otherwise. The affidavit
should he positive as to the material facts. Thus, for example, if it relies upon
the fact, that the witness, is the only witness to a material fact, it will not be
sufficient that the affidavit states, that he is so in the belief of the party; but
it must be positively stated, that he is the only witness who knows the fact.
In other respects, the general rules, already stated in regard to bills to per-
petuate testimony, are for the most part applicable to bills to take testimony
de bene esse; and therefore it is unnecessary to repeat them in this place.
§ 1135. —
Statutory Substitute for the Bill. The Code provides a method of
taking testimony de bene esse, so simple and efficacious, that a bill in Equity for
that purpose has become practically almost obsolete and the main purpose of ;
considering the remedy in Equity has been to present all the sorts of bills
known to Equity pleading, as well as to throw light upon the statutory substi-
tute for the bill. Under the Code, depositions of witnesses may be taken at any
time after action brought, in the following cases
1. When the witness from age, bodily infirmity, or other cause, is incapable
of attending to give testimony at the trial.
2. "When he is under the necessity of leaving the State before the cause is
tried, or even before it is at issue.
3. When he is about to leave the county in which the suit is pending, and
will probably not return until after the trial.
4. When he is the only witness to a material fact. 4
5. When he is going out of the Chancery division, or does not reside in such
division. 6
In any and all of the foregoing cases, the depositions of the witnesses are
taken, on the same notice, and in the same manner, as though the cause wad
duly at issue. 6
Testimony de bene esse may, also, be taken in the manner pointed out in the
previous Article, 7 the Code expressly providing that evidence may be taken
under sections 3876-3888, "to be used in pending, or expected, litigation." And
if any case should arise for the taking of evidence de bene esse not included
in section 3838 of the Code, application could be made by petition, under sec-
tions 3876-3888 of the Code, or a bill de bene esse might be filed.
Where a case is appealed to the Supreme Court before proof is taken, and
where an action in the Circuit Court is enjoined before the trial, it often be-
comes highly important to take the testimony of witnesses de bene esse; and
if there be any danger of the depositions getting lost, or destroyed, it would
be safer to have the evidence perpetuated, under the statute, by registration. 3
4 Code, §§3836; 3838. depositions will be found in the Chapter on Deposi-
6 Code, § 4462. tions. Ante, §§ 474-513.
ft A full consideration of the method of taking i Ante, § 1131.
8 Code, §§ 3882-3885.
§ 1136, the chancellor: his powers and duties. 906
PART IX.
THE OFFICERS AND RULES OF THE CHANCERY COURT.
CHAPTER LXIII.
THE CHANCELLOR: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES.
Article I. The Qualifications ,and Powers of the Chancellor.
Article II. Duties of the Chancellor.
Article III. Provisions when the Chancellor is Incompetent.
Article IV. Etiquette of the Chancery Court.
ARTICLE I. ,
THE QUALIFICATIONS AND POWERS OF THE CHANCELLOR.

§ 1136. Qualificationsand Disqualifications of § 1138. Appointment of Special Terms
Chancellors. § 1138a. Powers at Chambers.
§ 1137. Appointment of Clerk and Master.
§ 1136. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Chancellors. Every Chan- —

cellor must be at least thirty years old and must at the time of his election
;
or appointment, have been a resident of the State for five years, and of his
Chancery Division for one year. 1 Before entering upon the duties of his office,
the Chancellor must take an oath, or affirmation, to support the Constitution of
the United States, and that of the State; and to administer justice without
respect of persons, and impartially to discharge all the duties incumbent on
him as Chancellor to the best of his skill and ability; 2 he must also take the
oath against duelling. 3
The Chancellor is incompetent except by consent of all parties:
1. "Where he is interested in the event of any cause; 4
2. Or connected with either party, by affinity or consanguinity within the
sixth degree, computing by the civil law;
3. Or has been of counsel in the cause
4. Or has presided on the trial in an inferior Court;
5. Of, in criminal eases for felony, where the person upon whom, or upon
whose property, the felony has been committed, is connected with him, by
affinity or consanguinity, within the sixth degree, computing by the civil law. 5
The Chancellor is required to reside in the Chancery Division for which he
was elected or appointed, and a removal therefrom will create a vacancy in
the office. 6
The Chancellor cannot practice law, or perform any of the functions of at-
torney or counsel in any of the Courts of this State, except in cases which he
may have been employed as counsel previous to his election or appointment. 7
§ 1137. —
Appointment of Clerk and Master. The Chancellor appoints the-
Clerks and Master's for the various Courts of his Division. This is a most
1 Const, of Term., Art. VI, § 4. elevate himself in the estimation of the bar, and the
2 Code, 5§ 309; 3911. people; whereas, bv engaging in the disputations
3 Code, §§ 752; 3911. and altercations incident to trials in Court, he greatly
4 Neeley v. State, 4 Bax., 182. lowers himself in the estimation of honorable men,
5 Code 5 3913. tarnishes the lustre of his judicial robes, and is
e Code, § 3914. deemed so greedy of pelf as to be anxious to obtain
7 Code, § 3911. No Chancellor should appear as the fees of a Solicitor and the salary of a Chancellor
Solicitor in any cause after his election or appoint- at the same time. Casuistry may justify a .Chan-
ment; even in cases where he has been previously cellor in appearing in behalf of clients employing
employed. On his election, he should consider him- him before his election, but a Chancellor should
self consecrated to his new and higher duties; and never descend to casuistry; for no casuist is fit to be
should do nothing that partakes of the character or a Chancellor.
duty of a Solicitor. By such conduct he will greatly
907 THE CHANCELLOR! HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. §1138
responsible duty, and> one attended with many trials and embarrassments, and
hedged about by many difficulties and perplexities.
In appointing' a Clerk 'and Master this Chancellor' should keep in mind: 1,
'
1
that a public office is a public trust,, and that the people of the county are the
persons to be benefited by the appointment 2, that in appointing a Clerk and
;
Master he is executing a public trust, and is bound so to execute it that the

beneficiaries, the people of the county having business in the Court, shall
derive the greatest possible benefit from his execution of that trust and 3, that ;
this benefit can be derived only by 'appointing to the office of Clerk and Master
a man who is worthy of the office, and capable of discharging its duties, and 1
who will discharge them, in person, diligently, honestly, impartially and cour-
teously. 26
The appointment of the Clerk and Master, should be in writing, somewhat
as follows
APPOINTMENT OF CLERK AND MASTER.

Knoxville, Tenn., Oct. 1, 1882.
Mr. S. P. Evans:
Having full confidence in your ability, integrity, and' diligence, -.!• hereby appoint you Clerk
and Master of. the Chancery Court of Knox county for the full, term of six 2 7 years. .
Respectfully,
'
'
W.'B. STALfiy, Chancellor.
§ 1138. —
Appointment of Special, Terms. The Chancellor of any Court may
appoint a special term thereof whenever he may deem it necessary for the
dispatch of business. This appointment may be made either (1) at the regular
term by an'entry on the minutes to that effect, designating the time, or (2) in
vacation, by publication in some newspaper in the division, and giving notice
thereof in writing to, the Clerk and Master, at least thirty days before its
commencement. 28 If the appointment is made oh the minutes, it may be as
follows
APPOINTMENT OP A SPECIAL TERM.
A special term of this Court being necessary for the dispatch of business, is hereby ap-
pointed to begin on the second Monday of March next, to which time this Court doth now
adjourn.
If the appointment is made in vacation, the newspaper notice may be as
follows
SPECIAL TERM OP THE CHANCERY COURT.
A special term of the Chancery Court for Greene county being necessary for the dispatch
of business, is hereby appointed to be held in the Court House in Greeneville on the 1st
Monday of April next.
February 24, 1891. ,
John P. Smith, Chancellor.
And the notice to the Clerk' and Master may be as follows:
To the Clerk and Master, at Greeneville
You are hereby notified that a special term of the Chancery Court for Greene county is
appointed to be held, in the Court House in Greeneville, on the 1st Monday in April next.
February 24, 1891. John P. Smith, Chancellor.
At such special terms the Chancellor has and may exercise the same powers,
and all the business of the Court, of every nature and kind, shall be conducted
in the same manner, as at the regular terms. 29 Special terms are not, however,
mere continuations of the regular term, even when appointed at the regular
term by an entry on the minutes thereof they are distinct terms, and no order
:
can be made at a special term in any way changing the orders of the previous
regular terms, nor can any order be made, or any act be done, at a special
26 No man should be appointed Clerk and Master, of six years from the date of his appointment. State
and no man should accept such an appointment, who v. Anderson, 16 Lea. 325.
does not expect to perform the duties of the office in 28 Code, 8| 3940-3941.
person. . . - ,.
29 Code, § 3945.
,
27 The Clerk and Master holds for the full term

§1139 THE CHANCELLOR HIS POWERS AND
: DUTIES. 908
term which would not be lawful at the next regular term. 30 The following
is the
CAPTION OF THE RECORD FOB A SPECIAL TERM.
First Chancery Divisipn. J

Be it that, at a special term of the Chancery Court for Greene county, begun
remembered
and held in the Court House in Greeneville, on the 1st Monday of April, 1891, being the 6th
day of said month, in pursuance of an appointment duly made, present and presiding Hon.
John P. Smith, Chancellor of said division, the following proceedings were had
—
§ 1138a. Powers at Chambers. The Chancellor exercises many powers at
Chambers, which have hereinbefore been fully considered. 31
ARTICLE II.
DUTIES OF THE CHANCELLOR.

§ 1139. Duties of the Chancellor. § 1141. Suggestions as to Other Matters.
§ 1140. Suggestions When Pleadings o
Proofs are Inadequate.
—
§ 1139. Duties of the Chancellor. 1 The Chancellor must not do any official
act until after he has taken the oath of office nor must he remove out of his
;
Chancery division, as shown in the preceding section. He must also discharge

the following duties:
1. Duties as to the Bonds of the Clerk and Master. The Chancellor must (1) ex-
amine and attest the bonds required by law to be given by the Clerks and Mas-
ters of his division (2) must cause the bonds to be recorded in the minutes of
;
the Court, and a certificate of such recording to be endorsed upon them by the
Clerks and Masters giving them; and (3) he must forward the Clerks and
Masters' revenue bonds to the Comptroller, and their other bonds to the Sec-
retary of State. 2
The Chancellor must, also, on the first day of each term, examine the bonds
of the Clerks and Masters, and see that they are in conformity to law and that ;
the sureties thereon are good and solvent, and worth the penalties of the bonds.
If the Chancellor, in any manner, ascertains that the bonds of any Clerk and
Master, within his Chancery division, are from any cause insufficient, it is his
duty forthwith to make an order on the minutes of the Court, requiring such
Clerk and Master, within thirty days, to make his bonds sufficient, by executing
new bonds or giving additional security, and complying with any other order
of the Chancellor in regard to such bonds. If the Clerk and Master fail to
comply with such order, it is the imperative duty of the Court to remove him,
and appoint a new Clerk and Master. 3
2. Duty to Remove a Clerk and Master, When. It is the duty of the Chan-
cellor, in Court, to remove the .Clerk and Master from office (1) when he is con-
victed of making a false financial report; 4 or (2) when he repeatedly fails to
SO Thus, a bill of exceptions as to matters trans- orders from the People as a whole, acting in their
piring at a regular term cannot be prepared and constitutional capacity as a State. These orders are
signed, and made a part of the record, at a special contained in the Constitution and statutes of the
term," even when leave so to do is given at the reg- State; and to loyally obey these the Judges not only
ular term. Staggs v. State, 3 Hum., 372. It would impliedly contract, but, also, solemnly swear in writ-
seem that a cause cannot be tried, in invito, at a ing, and subscribe their names to their oaths. Hence,
special term unless it was at issue at the preceding the sole measure of a Judge's duty as a public
regular term. McKinley v. Beasley, 5 Sneed, 170. servant is the^ Constitution and laws of the State,
See, ante, §§ 531; 533. and an unceasing disposition to apply this Constitu-
31 See, ante, §5 770-783. tion and these laws, intelligently, conscientiously,
1 The Judges, like all other public officers, under impartially, and inflexibly, in the determination of
our form of government, are mere servants of the all matters lawfully submitted to him for his official
People; not, however, the servants of any particular adjudication. And in making such determinations
man, or set of men, or of any particular part or it is most prudent to follow in the footsteps of his
number of people; but the servants of the whole best predecessors, and not try to be wiser. Boyd v.
People in their organized and collective character McLean, 1 Johns. Ch., 587. See, ante, % 62, sub-
and capacity as a State. Hence, no man, or set of sec. 4, note 6.
men, however numerous or influential, have any right 2 Code, S§ 720-721; 326-331.
or authority to issue any commands to the Judges: 3 Code, §§ 335 o-335-g; 778-784.
the Judges are not their servants or subordinates, * Code, I 335 ;, (M. & V.)
and cannot heed their orders. The Judges take their
909 the chancellor; his powers and duties. §1140
make a report upon a reference (3) when he is convicted of failing or refusing
;
5
to issue an execution, or of failing to make the proper endorsements upon an

execution, or the proper entries upon his execution docket; or (4) when he is
convicted of any other misdemeanor in office, or of a felony; or (5) when he
removes from the county in which his Court is held; or (6) when he fails to
give security as required by law; or (7) when he fails to pay over public
moneys, or moneys collected officially; or (8) when he is incapable of discharg-
ing the duties of his office, or neglects his duties, or misbehaves in office; or
7
(9) for any other cause to which the penalty, of removal is attached by law.
3. Duties in Reference to His Courts. He is required to hold the terms of
his Court at the regular times appointed by law, unless prevented by sickness
of himself or family, or by some other unavoidable necessity. 8
He is, also, required to have the minutes of his Court read each morning in
open Court, and to sign them. 9
§ 1140. Suggestions When the Pleadings or Proofs are Inadequate. It not —
unfrequently happens that, at the hearing, it is discovered that the merits of
the controversy, as shown by the evidence, are with the complainant but that ;
the averments or prayer of his bill are not such as to justify the Court in grant-
ing him full relief, or even any relief. It, also, often happens that one side or
the other, generally the complainant, fails at the hearing in consequence of
some manifest slip of counsel, or some oversight in supplying a connecting link
in the chain of evidence, or some unexpected exceptions to evidence, or some
failure to produce or properly prove a deed or other writing, or some other
error, or omission, or defect in evidence, which can almost certainly be sup-
plied or cured without much, if any, delay or additional cost. 10
In such and similar cases, the question arises What is the duty of the Chan-
:
cellor? It is true, he is sworn to be impartial, but is he not, also, sworn to

"administer justice;" and must he be so "impartial" as not to "administer
justice ? " In other words, must a Chancellor, presiding over a Court that was
originally established to rescue justice from the deadly clutch qf forms, and the
arbitrary and technical rules of other Courts, sit dumb and motionless while
justice is being outraged in his own Court, before his own eyes, and withiu
reach of his own arms? 11
The authority and duty of the Chancellor to allow, or even suggest, amend-
ments in all cases when manifestly necessary to the administration of justice,
is well settled. In such cases, the Supreme Court often remands causes on its
own motion in order that the proper amendment may be made, or that addi-
tional proof may be made. 12
But the Chancellor, while thus open-eyed to see that justice is done to one
party, should not be blind to the rights of the other party; and if any amend-
ment or delay is the result of negligence, or increases costs, or causes a contin-
uance, such amendment or delay should only be allowed on the payment of
6 Code, § 4473. Nevertheless, Judges should not become advocates,
6 Code. §§ 3013-3017. nor undertake the duties of a Solicitor. In doing
7 Code, §§4061; 4065; 4473-4475. justice, they must do it according to the rules and
8 Code, § 3937. practice of their Courts; and, if they are in doubt,
9 Code, § 4101. But he may leave the minutes of the better course is to take no step or make no order
the last day of the term unsigned until the next in the particular case, on their own motion, leaving
term. See, ante, § 546, and note 43 to § 571, ante. it to the party, or his Solicitor, to act, or ask the
10 See, ante, §§ 427-429; and, post, § 1318. Court to act, as such party or Solicitor may deem
11 "Must Courts sit like fangless lions while fraud best. A Judge should not be too indignant at what
and falsehood prowl within their precincts, -and de- appears to be wrong, nor too enthusiastic for what
fiantly taunt their helplessness to uphold the majesty appears to be right; but should keep his emotions
and power of the law to do right and justice?" in due subjection so that his judgment may reign
Turney, Ch. J., in Butler v. Kinzie, 6 Pick., 31. supreme in a cool and serene mind.
Courts are not mere arenas for the display of skill 12 See 9 Lea, 69; 1 Sneed, 619; 6 Cold., 382; 3
in juridical dialectics, or forensic fence; nor are Cold., 316; 1 Heisk., 530; 16 Lea, 527; 7 Bax., 586;
Judges mere umpires to enforce fair play between 8 Bax., 291; 3 Heisk., 526; 581; 2 Meigs' Dig. r
gladiatorial combatants at their bars, and to bestow § 952: Code, § 3170. See Sto. Eq. P!., § 333, note, to
the rewards of victory upon the shrewdest, the most the effect that the Court will sometimes direct a sup-
eloquent, or the most skilful. Judges have affirmative plemental bill to be filed. See, also, post, % 1318,
duties to discharge: they are sworn to "administer note.
justice;" and are bound by that oath to see that
justice is done.
§ 1 141 THE GHANCEtLOR: HIS POWERS-AMD DUTIES. 910
heavy costs. He who seeks equity should be required to do equity. Forms and
correct pleadings are necessary to the safe and orderly administration of
justice, and a Chancellor fails to measure up to the full stature of his office
1
when he ignores the rules of pleading and practice and yet he cannot always
;
afford to sacrifice a party in order to punish his Solicitor.. The best he can do
in many cases is to allow amendments on costs. 13
§ 1141. —
Suggestions as to Other Matters. There are various other matters
which the Chancellor will be called on to consider in connection with the dis-
charge of his various duties, among which the following may be specially
noted
1. As to Amendments. He should be very liberal in allowing meritorious
amendments, but very rigorous in requiring a big price to be paid for them. A
Chancellor has no right to grant favors to one party at the expense of the other
party. It is not selling justice to require a party to pay costs in such cases,
because the party is in default, and is merely paying -Costs as a penalty in order
to be relieved from such default. A Chancellor who allows his heart to con-
trol his rulings has forgotten both his oath and his duty.
2. As to Continuances. Continuances after the lapse of six months, should
never be granted without terms, such terms to include a large part of the costs,
'unless the continuance is based on accident or mistake, unmixed with negli-
gence, or on the fraud or misconduct of the other party, or of some of the offi-
cers of the Court. Special affidavits should support every motion for a con-
tinuance, unless the facts are admitted in writing, or the continuance con-
sented to by the adverse party. Continuances should seldom be granted at
the term next preceding the meeting of the Supreme Court. 14
3. As to Pleas and Demurrers. Pleas and demurrers should not be encouraged.
The matter of a plea in bar can generally be as well set up in an answer as in
a plea, and unless the ground of a plea is unquestionably decisive, the plea
should be overruled, with leave to rely upon it in the answer. Demurrers
are often filed merely for delay. If a demurrer is frivolous, and has also caused
delay, the demurrant should, on his demurrer being overruled, not only be
taxed with air the costs of the cause then accrued, but should be required to
file his answer within two days, if not instanter and certainly before the end
;
of the term or if Court is not in session, before the next rule day.
;
4. Agreements Should be in Writing. The Chancellor should have a rule re-

quiring all agreements between counsel or parties, intended to be brought to the
attention of the Court, as a ground of action, or as evidence, to be reduced to
writing, and duly signed by the agreeing parties, or their Solicitors, or agents.
This rule will prevent those unseemly wrangles that inevitably arise at the bar
from imperfect or discordant memories, or an imperfect understanding of oral
agreements in reference to evidence, continuances, and compromises. 15 After
the adoption of the rule, it should be rigorously enforced, and the moment an
agreement is disputed the gavel should fall, and the rule be enforced, without
allowing either Solicitor to say another word in reference to the supposed
agreement..
5. As to the Testimony of the Parties. It is the experience of Judges and
Chancellors that often the real merits of the controversy can be best ascertained
by a careful consideration of the statements and admissions of the parties them-
selves, where the transaction in question was immediately between them. 10
Besides, a Chancellor cannot well avoid feeling that if his decision is based on
•
the admissions of a party, such party is, at least, in no condition to complain.
"When, therefore, the transaction was between the parties, and they have testi-
fied, the Chancellor, after reading the pleadings, should next carefully and dis-
13 See, ante, §5 427-429. IB See the case of Humphreys v. McCloud, 3 Head,
14 But reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial 235, as illustrating the importance of such a rule.
should not be denied, and expedition in disposing of 16 Gres. Eq. Ev., 456.
suits must not be at the expense of justice. Rein-
shagen v. Larezzo, 2 Shan. Cas., 139.
911 the chancellor: his POWERS and duties. •
§1141
criminatingly read their depositions, using the balance of the proof' rather as
a means of correcting and' interlining, as it were, the depositions of the parties,
than as independent evidence of the facts. Where the transaction in question
was between the agents or servants of the parties, the same rule will apply.
The Chancellor can consider admissions made orally by counsel, but such ad-
missions should be recited in the decree in heec verba, or reduced to writing and
signed and filed.
6. As to Sales of Land. The Chancellor should jealously guard the interests
of those so unfortunate as to be forced to submit to a Court sale of their lands,
especially of their homesteads and in no case allow the rapacity of Solicitors,
;
greedy for their fees, to bring about sales for part cash, when a cash payment
is not required by law, and is sure to diminish the price. 17
7. As to Preparing and Reading- Orders and Decrees. All orders ahd decrees
should be read in open Court before their entry on the minutes. This practice
has several good results: (1) It notifies all concerned of the exact nature of
the order or decree made, and thus gives opportunity to object, or to obviate
objections, if ground therefor exist; (2) It enables the Chancellor, or the ad-
verse side, to make any corrections before the order or decree is entered, and
thus avoids unseemly erasures and alterations and interlineations on the min-
utes after entry; (3) If the Solicitor is an expert draftsman, the younger mem-
bers of the bar become familiarized with the proper forms of orders and de-
crees; and if he is an inexpert draftsman, the Chancellor is thus enabled to
ascertain whether the proposed entry needs correction £>r amendment at his
hands.
8. As to Allowing Appeals. Wherever the granting of an appeal will proba-
bly hasten the final determination of the suit, or lessen the costs, the Chancellor
should exercise his discretion in favor of appeals, but not otherwise. Therefore,
when the Supreme Coiirt will meet before another term of the Chancery Court,
an appeal should ordinarily be allowed from a decree determining the princi-
ples involved, and ordering an account or a sale or partition, before the account
is taken, or the sale or partition is made; and, under like circumstances, an
appeal should, as a rule, be allowed on overruling a demurrer when the question
involved is largely or exclusively one of law, and its solution is not manifest.
Where the suit is one that will probably be appealed, the Chancellor should
require the parties, and especially the complainant, to be diligent in preparing
the case for hearing, to the end that it may go to the Supreme Court at the
earliest day possible.
9. As One of the sacred rights of every liti-
to Signing Bills of Exceptions.
gant is to have a true record of everything done by a Court or a Judge thereof
during the course of a litigation and a Judge is as much violating his oath and
;
his duty who fails or refuses to sign a bill of exceptions in which the truth of
the case is fairly stated, as he would be in refusing to grant an injunction, or
attachment, or a final decree to a party clearly entitled thereto. No Chancellor
should ever make a ruling, or do an act, in the progress of a suit that he would
have any hesitancy in having the Supreme Court review and if he should have ;
such hesitancy, he should either promptly undo what he has done, or, if out of
his power, should by signing a truthful bill of exceptions put it in the power of
the Supreme Court to correct his error. A proper sense of judicial honor would
be satisfied with no alternative.
Chancellors should not be sensitive when a bill of exceptions to their rulings
IT See, ante, § 623, note 11. Every homestead is holy land. And all this is true, whether the home
sacred, especially when it belonged to our ancestors, be a cabin on a mountain side, a cottage in a valley,
and has been long in our possession. We were made or a palatial mansion* in the midst of a princely
'
of its dust; our fathers and mothers sleep in its estate; for home is home, and there is no place on
bosom; and we expect to repose by their side. Our earth so dear to the human heart, be that home hum-
dearest memories cluster about it; it was our father's ble, or be it grand; for, after all, it is our home.
ltingdom, and the home of our youth where we were Fortunately for the unfortunate, the homestead laws,
princes. To sell it away from us is like a sacrilege, like the Cherubim of Eden, protect the home in very
and to turn us out of possession is like driving us many cases.
out of our Eden, and forcing us forever from our
§1141 the chancellor: his powers and duties. 912
fairly states the truth of the case ;nor should any false, pride or any feeling
of false dignity cause them to put any obstacles in the way of an exceptant in
obtaining a bill of exceptions that fairly states the facts of the case. They
should rather cheerfully aid the exceptant, and not allow the opposite party
to thwart or retard him in the preparation of his exceptions. The path of every
party to the Supreme Court should be made as clear and smooth as possible,
and the Chancellor should, in every legitimate way, promptly and gladly aid
an appellant in getting his case into such a shape that, as nearly as possible,
it shall appear to the Supreme Court exactly as it appeared in the Chancery
Court, to the end that any error committed by the Chancellor may be corrected,
and full justice be done.
10. Summary of Rules Governing a Chancellor in Deciding a Suit. Judge, as A
Judge, has no ears to hear anything as to the merits of a suit before him except
in open Court, or at Chambers, and in presence of the parties; no eyes to see
anything except the record in the cause no heart to feel anything except the
;
inspiration of duty, and no tongue to speak anything except what the law or
Equity requires. 18
The following rules will be found of some service to Chancellors, and per-
haps, of more service to Solicitors, as showing the latter how Chancellors pro-
ceed in reaching a conclusion:
1. The Chancellor Looks into the Bill, and cross bill if any, to see what mat-
ters are submitted to him for his decision.
2. He Looks at the Answer to see what defence the defendant sets up and ;
what matters in avoidance, or for affirmative relief, are brought forward, if

any. The pleadings absolutely limit his powers of adjudication; and if he de-
cides any matter not submitted by the pleadings, his decision is, to that extent,
coram non judice, and absolutely void, unless consented to.
3. He Looks at the Evidence^ to see whether the case charged in the bill
is made out or whether the matters in avoidance set up in the answer are sus-
;
tained by the proof.

4. He Looks at the Prayers of the Bill, and of the cross bill, if any, to see
what he specially asked to do. He can ordinarily do no more than he is
is
asked to do 19 but, on a prayer for general relief, he may grant such relief as
:
the complainant would, ordinarily, bfi entitled on the pleadings and proof.
5. In Determining Questions of Pact, he is governed by the preponderance
of probabilities, treating presumptions as witnesses, and using an intellectual
discernment as dispassionate as scales of iron. 20
.6. In Determining Questions of Law, he is governed by the Constitution of
the State, the statutes, and the adjudications of our own Supreme Courts, if
they apply if not, he considers the common law as evidenced by reputable text
;
books and the decisions of other Courts.

7. In Determining Questions of Equity, he is governed by our statutes and
the decisions of the Supreme Court, if they apply if not, he considers the doc-
;
trines, principles, rules and maxims 21 of Equity jurisprudence, as evidenced

by reputable text books and the decisions of other Courts. 22
8. In Reaching His Conclusions, he has no more sympathy for one side, nor
prejudice against the other, than has the book in which the law is printed;
18 Franklin V. McCorkle, 16 Lea, 629. The ques- from doubt to an unprejudiced Chancellor. Hence,
tion before a Court of law is not what is morally counsel should not be surprised when they lose what
right, but what is legally right. State V. Crutchneld, is to them a doubtful case.
3 Head, 116; the question before a Court of Equity 21 What compasses are to mariners, maxims are to
when no statute clearly forbids, is what do good Chancellors: they will point the way out of many
reason and good conscience require. See, ante, § 58. perplexing labyrinths of the law. See, ante, §§ 31-64.
18a See, ante, § 62, sub-sec, 1. Judicis est judicare 22 The decisions of the Chancery Court of New
secundum allegata et probata. (It is the duty of a York,' especially those contained in Johnson's and
Judge to decide according to the pleadings and the Paige's Reports, are next in authority to those of our
proo.f s. own Supreme Court. Our Equity system was mod-
10 Judex non reddit plus quam quod petens ipse elled upon that of New York, and our own Reports
requirit. are full of references to the adjudications of the
20 When a question of fact appears doubtful to a New York Chancellors.
prejudiced Solicitor, it generally appears wholly free
913 the; chancellor his powers and duties.
: §1142
but is moved by a cool and dispassionate reason, and governed by a conscien-
tious intelligence, absolutely oblivious of the sex, color, creed, rank, politics,
or condition in life, of any of the parties. 23
9. In Making His Adjudications, he seeks to determine all the material issues,
ond leave no roots out of which a fresh crop of litigation may arise. 24
10. In Announcing His Decisions, he is under no obligations to give his rea-
sons therefor, 25 and it is often prudent not to do so. 26 The losing party will
not be satisfied with his reasons, and the winning party will be satisfied with-
out them.
ARTICLE III.
PROVISIONS WHEN THE CHANCELLOR IS INCOMPETENT.

§ 1142. When the Chancellor is Incompetent § 1145. Other Provisions for the Chancellor's
to Decide. Incompetency, or Inability.
§ 1143. Provisions in Case of the Chancellor's § 1146. When
Chancellors May Interchange.
Incompetency. § 1147. Provisions for the Chancellor's In-
§ 1144. Provisions in Case of the Chancellor's competency During Vacation.
Inability.
§ 1142. When the Chancellor is Incompetent to Decide. A Chancellor is —

incompetent, except by consent of all parties, to sit in the following cases:
1, where he is interested in the event of any cause 2, or is connected with either
;
party by affinity or consanguinity within the sixth degree, computing by the

civil law or 3, has been counsel in the cause or 4, has presided on the trial
; ;
in an inferior Court or 5, in criminal cases for felony, where the person upon
;
whom, or upon whose property the felony has been committed, is connected
with him by affinity or consanguinity within the sixth degree, computing by the
civil law. 1
§ 1143. Provisions in Case of the Chancellor's Incompetency. Where the —

regular Chancellor is incompetent in any civil case, the parties may by consent
select some member of the bar to preside as Chancellor in the case, and this
consent entered of record, shall vest the person so selected with the full power
and authority of the regular Chancellor in the particular case.
When any Chancellor is incompetent to try any cause in his Court, he may
notify the Circuit Judge, whose duty it shall be at the next term of the Circuit
Court in the county in which the incompetency exists, and while holding said
Court, to hear and determine the cause as Chancellor, for which purpose the
Clerk of the Chancery Court shall bring before him all the papers in the cause,
and the necessary entries shall be made on the minutes of the Chancery Court,
and signed by the Circuit Judge presiding.
Any Circuit Judge may, also, during the sittings of a Chancery Court, upon
notification of a cause in which the Chancellor is incompetent, as provided in
the foregoing paragraph, take the place of the Chancellor on the bench, and hear
and determine the cause as Chancellor, the necessary entries being made on
2
the. minutes of the Chancery Court and signed by him.
And when the Chancellor is incompetent from any cause to try any case pend-
23 If a Chancellor wishes to display his benevo- 26 McGuire v. Gallagher, 11 Pick., 349; Halfacre
lence towards widows, the poor and the unfortunate, V. State, 4 Cates, 614.
he should do so privately at his own expense, and Socrates said that four things belong to a Judge:
not publicly at the expense of others. There is no 1, To hear courteously; 2, To answer wisely; 3, To
Equity in stripping one party of his rights to clothe consider soberly; and 4, To decide impartially.
another not entitled to them. To dispense Equity 1 Code, § 3913. A judgment rendered by an in-
not charity, is the sworn duty of. a Chancellor. competent Judge or Chancellor is not void, but void-
24 See, ante, §§ 36; 38. able only, and cannot be called in question collat-
25 Judices non tenentur exprimere causam sententttE erally. Holmes v. Eason, 8 Lea, 754. and cases there
sua. (Judges are not bound to give the reason for cited; Posey V. Eaton, 9 Lea, 500; Hume V. Bank, 10
their decision.) Lea, 1.
2 Code, §§ 3921-3923.
§1144 THE CHANCELLOR HIS POWERS AND
: DUTIES. 914
ing in his Court, and the parties thereto cannot agree upon some member of
the bar to try the same, it is made the duty of the Chancellor, upon the appli-
cation of either of the parties to said suit, to cause the same to be transferred
to the nearest Chancery Court where the like incompetency does not exist, and
the same shall be there tried as though it had originated in such Court. In such
case the original papers, with a certified copy of all orders, including entries on
the rule docket, shall be immediately transmitted to the Court to which the
, venue is changed. 3
§ 1144.
Provision in Case of the Chancellor's Inability. If the Chancellor —
isunable from sickness or other physical debility to hold any of his Courts at
the time and place required by law, the Governor is required to commission
a special Chancellor to hold said Courts. The special Chancellor has all the
power and authority of the Chancellor in whose place he is appointed, including
the power to interchange, and continues to hold the Courts and exercise the
duties of the regular Chancellor, until notified by the latter that he is in a
condition to resume his functions. 4
Other Provisions for the Chancellor's Incompetency, or Inability.
§ 1145.
When from any cause the Chancellor fails to attend, or being in attendance
cannot properly preside in any cause or causes pending in his Court, or shall
be unable to hold a term of his Court, the Solicitors present, who are residents
of the State, are authorized to elect one of their number to hold the Court for
the occasion. The Solicitor thus elected Chancellor pro tempore must have all
the qualifications of the regular Chancellor, and, during the period in which
he acts, shall have all the powers and be liable to all the responsibilities of tt
regular Chancellor. 5 These qualifications are 1, the age of thirty 2, five years'
: ;
residence in the State; 3, one years' residence in the Chancery division.

In case the election of a Chancellor is contested, the Governor is authorized
to appoint a temporary Chancellor to hold the office until the contest is judi-
eially determined, and the regularly elected Chancellor duly commissioned. 6
§ 1146. When Chancellors May Interchange. Chancellors may interchange —
with each other, or with the Judges of the Circuit, Criminal, and other special
Courts 1, when causes 7 exist making an interchange necessary and 2, where
: ;
it is mutually convenient. In case of the absence of the Chancellor of any

Division, or of his death or inability to hold Court, any other Chancellor may
hold his Court in his stead. When a Chancellor is presiding by interchange,
he has the same power and jurisdiction as the Chancellor in whose place he is
acting. 8
While a Chancellor is holding a Chancery Court by interchange with another
Chancellor, the latter may hold any other Courts in his Chancery Division. 9
Provisions for the Chancellor's Incompetency During Vacation.
§ 1147. —
Whenever the Chancellor of the Division in which a cause is pending, is in-
competent in vacation: 1, to issue any process; or 2, to dissolve, restore, or
modify any injunction or 3, to appoint a receiver or 4, to hear and determine
; ;
any motion or 5, to make any interlocutory order to speed a cause or 6, to

; ;
appoint a commissioner to take an account; or 7, to appoint persons to serve

original, mesne, or final process or 8, to regulate and control, set aside, modify,
;
or alter any proceeding in the Master's office or 9, to do and perform any other
;
duty that may be performed by such Chancellor in vacation, the statute pro-
vides that the Chancellor of any adjoining Division shall have power in vaca-
Code, §§ 3924-3924 b, and statutes there quoted.
3 term. Elms v. State, 10 Hum., 128. The Judges and
4 Code, §§ 3927-3929. Chancellors of the several Circuits and Divisions are
Code, § 3930 a; Brewer v. State, 6 Lea, 198. The Judges and Chancellors for the State at large; and,
authority of a special Chancellor ends with the term as such, may, upon interchange, and upon other law-
at which he was elected. Low v. State, 3 Cates, 81. ful grounds, exercise the duties of such office in any
6 Code, % 3930 e. other judicial Circuit or Division of the State. Code,
7 Such causes as incompetency, sickness, or un- §3915; Stuart v. State, 1 Bax., 178; Chadwell, ex
avoidable absence. parte, 7 Heisk., 630.
8 Code, §§ 3916-3918. And may appoint a special 9 Code, § 3918 c.
915 THE ETIQUETTE OE THE CHANCERY COURT. §1148
tion,on proper application, to make all such orders, and do all such acts. But
in such case the party making the application shall show, by affidavit, that
the regular Chancellor is incompetent, and shall notify the opposite party of the
application, such notice to be the same as to time and place as is prescribed for
AKTICLE IV.
THE ETIQUETTE OE THE CHANCERY COURT.

§ 1148. The Court and the Bar. § 1151. Deportment of the Chancellor To-
§ 1149. Deportment of the Solicitors Towards wards the Bar.
the Court. § 1152. Deportment of the Chancellor While
§ 1150. Deportment of Solicitors Towards Hearing a Cause.
Each Other.
§ 1148. —
The Court and the Bar. 1 There are certain proprieties in the con-
duct of Solicitors toward each other, and in the relation of the Chancellor and
the Solicitors of his Court which, if duly observed, will greatly promote that
good feeling and manly courtesy so necessary to the proper conduct of Court
business, as well as to that dignity which should characterize a temple of jus-
tice. The Chancellor should ever remember that he was once a member of the
bar, and will probably become one again; and he should endeavor to discharge
his official duties in the way he would have liked to have seen them discharged
while he was at the bar and should carefully avoid doing, or omitting to do,
;
anything that he, while at the bar, deemed below the high standard of a perfect
Judge. On the other hand, the Solicitors should keep in mind that while the
Chancellor was once in their ranks, he is now their official superior, and is en-
titled to that measure of deference, respect, and courtesy they would like to
have accorded to them should they at any time occupy his place; and they
should, also, consider that they are the trusted officers of the Court, and that
not only are the dignity and decorum of the proceedings of the Court mainly
dependent on them, but that everything which lowers the standard of the Court
necessarily lowers the standard of the law, and tends to degrade the bar. 2
Solicitors should always speak respectfully of all Courts, and of the Legisla-
ture and of the Governor, and of Congress, and the President, and of the laws
of the land. Abuse of our officials, laws, and institutions, while at times, per-
haps, pardonable in political arenas, is execrable at the bar.
The Chancellor and the Solicitor should each magnify their respective offices,
and conscientiously endeavor to make incarnate in themselves their respective
ideals of official perfection, making diligence, courtesy, dignity, and good faith
their tests of excellence, as well as the true means of attaining it.
§ 1149. Deportment of the Solicitors Towards the Court. TWhile Court is in —
session, and the Chancellor is on the bench, Solicitors should not fail to keep
in mind that the interval between the bench and the bar tables is the line of
demarcation, and should not be crossed without special leave of the Court.
If there be papers to be passed from the bar to the bench, or from the bench to
the bar, let the officer waiting on the Court, or the Clerk, perform this task.
Remarks of a personal nature should be sparingly passed between members
of the bar and the Chancellor on the bench, and exchanges of wit should be
studiously avoided. As a rule, and a rule to which the exceptions are few, and
10 Code, §§ 4416 a-4416 b. 2 Is ordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto. (L,et
1 If any Solicitor objects to the ethics laid^ down this class of men be free from fault, and an example
in this Article, he should, at once, examine himself, to all others.) This was one of the laws of the XII
and see if his standard of professional deportment is Tables.
not too low.
§ 1150 THE ETIQUETTE OF THE CHANCERY COURT. 916
those few very questionable, a Solicitor should never address any remark to
the Chancellor on the bench, except (1) from his place behind the bar tables,
and (2) in reference to some suit in Court, or to some matter proper to be
brought to the attention of the Court.
Solicitors should always stand behind the bar tables when addressing the
Chancellor on the bench, or when reading pleadings, or proof, or decrees, or
orders. It is in exceedingly bad taste for a Solicitor to stand alongside the
bench, or lean on it, while addressing the Court, or reading any paper to the
Court. He is standing on forbidden ground, and it would be the duty of the
Chancellor to command him to retire to his proper place behind the bar tables.''
Solicitors should refrain from holding any private conversation with the
Chancellor while Court is in session, unless leave has been first publicly asked
and obtained. Bystanders, litigants, and jealous Solicitors are sometimes in-
clined to suspect that the object of private conversation with the Court is to
obtain some unfair advantage, or to tamper with the Chancellor, or to tell tales
on an adversary, or else that the Chancellor has favorites among the Solicitors
to whom he grants especial privileges and secret audiences, and with whom he
exchanges especial confidences and tokens of mutual partiality. The opposite
side look with ill-concealed distrust upon a Chancellor who engages in secret
conversation with a Solicitor during the trial of a cause. However innocent
such conversation may be, and however foreign to the cause pending, adverse
parties are prone to suspect that it has direct reference to their suit, and that
it is evidence of partiality on the part of the Chancellor. Solicitors and parties
should never embarrass the Chancellor by making little presents in open Court,
such as fruit, flowers, cigars, and the like. The Chancellor is coerced by com-
mon courtesy to accept these evidences of good will; and while, as a man, he
appreciates these tokens of friendliness, nevertheless, as a Chancellor, he real-
izes that there are Solicitors and parties who regard such acts with jealousy
and suspicion, and deem them attempts to tamper with the Court. To avoid
all such suspicions and heart-burnings, let Solicitors and parties forego all such
little tokens of courtesy and good will.
Deportment of Solicitors Towards Each Other. Nothing does so

§ 1150. —
much to elevate a Solicitor in the estimation of the Court and his fellows as
uniform courtesy to the other members of the bar. Bystanders of the rader
sort may consider a bullying, domineering disposition an evidence of great-
ness * and in criminal and police courts displays of rudeness and incivility are
sometimes overlooked but in a Court of Chancery the deportment of Solicitors
;
towards each other should constantly exhibit chivalric courtesy, and the punc-
tilious observance of all of those proprieties that adorn and distinguish honor-
able, refined, and educated men, and true gentlemen.
§ 1151. Deportment of the Chancellor Towards the Bar. The intercourse —
between the Chancellor and the members of the bar should be such as to inspire
(1) unlimited confidence in his integrity, (2) an absolute assurance of his per-
fect impartiality, (3) a certain knowledge of his industrious investigation of
the facts of the cases tried before him and of the law applicable thereto, (4) a
feeling, without misgivings, that all legitimate argument is heard without in-
difference, weariness or reluctance, and (5) an undoubting faith that he is
prompted by an invariable and unswervable disposition to determine all mat-
ters submitted to him according to the law and the facts, and without fear,
favor, or affection.
The Chancellor's deportment should be such
that, while not cold or indiffer-
not invite fawning, or flattery, or undue familiarity. There are
ent, it will
sometimes those who take undue advantage of a Judge's courtesy, and en-
deavor to make him believe that their good will is necessary to his success,
3 This duty is privately recognized by the Chancel- I i The Chancellor should nip altercation in the bud.
lor, even when he forbears to publicly exercise it. I
917 the; etiquette ok the chancery court. §1152
and endeavor to make others believe they own the Court, and that a wink or
hint from them is more influential than facts, law, and sound argument from
other Solicitors not so favored. The fact that such things take place should
be conclusive proof to the Chancellor that his familiarity is bringing him into
contempt, and should remind him that parasites seldom cling to what is pure
and sound.
Nevertheless, there should be no iciness in the atmosphere surrounding the
Chancellor, but a gentle warmth of respectful courtesy, assuring to the timid
and not too encouraging to the presumptuous. Every lawyer, litigant, or
official having intercourse with him on official business, should receive the full
measure of considerate attention requisite for the proper discharge of the
particular duty he is called on to perform; and should never be made to feel
that they are trespassing upon his time, or consuming too much of his atten-
tion. The Chancellor is a public official, and his time is not his own, but be
longs to his duties, and to those who have official business with him. When a
Chancellor forgets this fact, he forgets that he is a public servant, and is in
danger of becoming a public master.
§ 1152. —
Deportment of the Chancellor While Hearing a Cause. While the
evidence is being read, or argument is being made, the Chancellor should
studiously avoid any appearance of impatience or partiality; and should keep
constantly in mind that the first duty of a Judge is to hear. 5 He will find it a
good rule not to express any opinions during the argument, because such an
expression may embarrass the Solicitor, or it may turn out that the Chancellor
was in error, and then he will be embarrased by his prejudgment.
5 Patientia, qua pars magna justita est.
§ 1153 the; clerk and master: his powers and duties. 918
CHAPTER LXIV.
THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES.
§ 1153. The Office of Master Generally Con- 1163. Powersof the Master in Relation to
sidered. the Revivor of a Suit.
§ 1154. His Appointment and Induction Into 1164. Powers and Duties of the Master in
Office. Making Deeds.
§ 1155. Powers and Duties of the Master in § 1165. When the Clerk and Master May Ad-
Relation to the Institution of a journ the Court.
Suit. § 1166. Powers and Duties of the Master in
§ 1156. Powers and Duties of the Master in Receiving and Paying Out Money.
Relation to the Prosecution of a § 1167. How Married Women are to be Paid.
Suit. 1168. How Moneys Belonging to Infants
§ 1157. Powers of the Master to Make Or- and Lunatics are Paid Out.
ders on Rule Days. § 1169. The Books the Master is Required to
§ 1158. Powers of the Master to Make Or- Keep.
ders on Other Than Rule Days. § 1170. Other Duties of the Clerk and Mas-
§ 1159. Powers of the Master in Reference to ter.
Depositions. § 1171. Duties of the Master During the Sit-
§ 1160. Powers and Duties of the Master in ting of the Court.
Making Reports. § 1171a. Additional Rules for the Guidance
§ 1161. The Master's Financial Report. of the Clerk and Master.
§ 1162. The Master's Book Report. § 1172. The Deputy Clerk and Master: His
Powers and Duties.
§ 1153. The Office of the Master Generally Considered. By the Code, the —
Clerk of the Chancery Court, in addition to all the duties and powers conferred
upon Clerks of Courts generally, and in addition to various other special duties
and powers, is "authorized to perform all the functions of Masters in Chancery,
unless restrained by the provisions of law;" 1 so that he is both Clerk and
Master.
There is a wide difference between the Clerk of a Court and a Master in
Chancery. The duties of a Clerk are almost exclusively clerical and his pow- :
ers are strictly defined by law, or the orders of the Court; he exercises no
judicial functions, and has but little discretion. 2 The Master, on the contrary,
is a judicial officer, and is clothed with many of the powers of the Chancellor
himself 3 and an examination of the Chancery Reports, and of works on Chan-
;
cery Practice, will show that the prompt and proper administration of justice
requires that large powers, and no little discretion, be vested in the Master.
The matters referred to the Master for his action are almost as numerous as
the matters subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. 4 Among the duties he may
be called upon to discharge are the following: 1, To determine whether it is
necessary to sell a decedent's land to pay his debts; 2, whether a tract of land
should be sold rather than partitioned; 3, whether it is to the interest of a
minor or married woman to sell her property, real or personal 4, whether any ;
taxes are due on land sold, or any other encumbrances exist; 5, what are the
assets and liabilities of a decedent, a partnership, a corporation, or other per-
son, whose assets are in the custody of the Court; 6, the amount of any partic-
ular liability; 7, the relative rights or priorities of various creditors, or claim -
1 Code, §§ 4085-4086. There seem to be no restrain- reference to his duties as Master in Chancery, he is
ing provisions of special importance, and it will be generally termed Master.
seen by a careful study of the English Chancery 2 When matters are referred to a Clerk to be re-
Practice prior to 1858, that our Masters in Chancery ported on, or when any discretion is vested in him, or
have nearly all the powers exercised at that time in when he is required by the Court to make sales, or to
England by the Masters in Chancery. The Clerk and discharge any quasi judicial duty, he, to that extent,
Master has various duties to perform as Clerk of a is clothed by the statute, with the powers of a Master
Court, and various other and more responsible duties in Chancery. Code, §4051.
to perforin as a Master in Chancery; hence, in speak- 3 1 Smith's Ch. Pr., 9-11.
ing of him in connection with his duties as Clerk, he i 1 Smith's Ch. Pr., 9; 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 468.
is generally termed Clerk; and in speaking of him in
a
919 THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. § 1154
ants 8, the state of the account between a guardian, executor, administrator,
;
receiver, or other trustee, and the beneficiaries, or between persons having

mutual dealings; 9, the validity and amount of a particular claim; 10, to sell
property, real and personal, and take the sale money, or the secured notes of the
purchaser; 11, to invest money belonging to persons under disability, or to
persons who fail to draw the same out of Court; 12, to loan out money on
security; 13, to investigate the title to lands; 14, to fix the compensation of
guardians, personal representatives, receivers, trustees, guardians ad litem,
Solicitors and others; 15, to determine the proper allowance for the main-
tenance of married women, infants, or persons of unsound mind, or for the
education of infants 16, to inquire for heirs, next of kin, and legatees, whose
;
estates are in Court; 17, to hold documents, securities, or other personal prop-
erty involved in a litigation; and 18, to ascertain the amount of damages in
any case where damages are claimed. Indeed, it may be stated that in general,
there is no question of law, or Equity, or disputed fact, which the Master may
not have occasion to decide, or respecting which he may not be called upon to
report his opinion to the Court. 43-
Besides these duties, there are others specially devolved upon the Master by
statute, most of which are of a judicial nature, and call for the exercise oc
discretion. Among
these duties are the following: 1, to appoint guardians
ad litem 2, to take and
set aside orders pro confesso 3, to hear proof of a party's
;
death, issue process to revive, and order a revivor 4, to extend the time for ;
taking proof, or filing an answer; 5, to award attachments against witnesses

and defendants for default; 6, to determine whether an answer is sufficient;
7, to ascertain what, if any, matter in a pleading, petition, or deposition, is
scandalous, impertinent, or unnecessarily prolix; 8, to pass on exceptions to
depositions, or to answers 9, to make orders for taking depositions 10, to
; ;
restrict or enlarge the time of notice to take depositions 11, to allow witnesses ;
to be re-examined 12, to appoint commissioners 13, to take depositions 14,

; ; ;
to rule a complainant to take steps in a cause 15, to order a non-resident party

;
to answer interrogatories; and 16, to open and adjourn Court, in the absence
of the Chancellor.
The foregoing enumeration of powers and duties clearly show that the office
of Master is one of great authority, and large and varied responsibility, requir-
ing for its efficient discharge, a good judgment, great diligence, an inflexible
impartiality, an enlightened conscience, and a thorough acquaintance with the
practice of the Court, coupled with good, clerical qualifications, and a large
executive capacity.
§ 1154.His Appointment and Induction Into Office. The Clerk and Master —
is appointed by the Chancellor of the Court, and holds his office for the full
term of six years from his induction into office. 5 The appointment is usually
made in writing. 6 There should be a record of his appointment and qualifica-
tion and induction entered on the minutes of the Court. The following form
is suggested:
INDUCTION" OF THE CLERK AND MASTER INTO OEEICE.

Appointment and Induction of j
J. B. Ragon as
Clerk and Master. )
On this 17th day of October, 1888, came J. B. Ragon, in his own proper person, into open
Court, and presented the following letter of appointment as Clerk and Master of this Court,
and tendered the three following bonds, and offered to take and subscribe the necessary oaths
of office as such appointee, and moved the Court to induct him into said office of Clerk and
Master
44 1 Smith's Ch. Pr., 11. I 6 See, ante, § 1137.
5 Const, of Term., Art. VI, § 13; State u. Ander-
son, 16 Lea, 325. I
§1155 THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 920
LETTER OF APPOINTMENT. i
[Here copy it in full.]
CLERK AND MASTER'S OFFICIAL BOND.

[Here copy it This is the
in full. bond for the safe-keeping of the records, and for the
faithful discharge of the duties of the office. Code, § 326.]
CLERK AND MASTER'S REVENUE BOND.

[Here copy it in II. This is the bond to account for taxes, fines, and forfeitures. Code,
§327.]
CLERK AND MASTER'S SPECIAL BOND.
[Here copy, it in full. This is the bond to cover property or funds which may come into
the Master's hands as special commissioner, or receiver. Code, § 328.]
And each of said three bonds being found by the Chancellor to be correct in form and
in penalty, and each of the obligors having unconditionally acknowledged each of said three
bonds in open Court before the Chancellor, 8 and the Chancellor being satisfied that they are
jointly worth largely more than the aggregate penalties of said three bonds, said three bonds
were by him approved and accepted, and said acknowledgment and approval by him endorsed
on each of said bonds.
Thereupon the following oaths of office were by the Chancellor administered to, and taken
and subscribed by, said J. B. Ragon
OATHS OF OFFICE.
[Here copy them in full. These oaths are, 1, The oath of office; Code, § 332 ; and 2, The
oath against duelling, Code, §752; Acts of 1859-'60, ch. 56. These oaths should be endorsed
on the official bond of the Master first above set out. Code, § 756.]
Whereupon, the said motion was allowed, and said J. B. Ragon was then and there inducted
into the office of Clerk and Master of this Court, for the full term of six years from this day
and he at once entered upon the discharge of the duties of his said office.
1155.
§ Powers and Duties of the Master in Relation to the Institution of a
Suit. —
All of the steps relative to the institution of a suit, except where extra-
ordinary process or preliminary relief is sought, are taken in the Master's
office. These steps are the following
1. Filing of the Bill and the Taking of Bonds. The first step in the institution
of an ordinary suit is the filing of the bill, and giving the required security for
8a
costs, or taking the pauper oath, in lieu. All papers and documents referred
to in the bill as exhibits, must be filed in the Master 's office at the time the bill
is filed, unless, by special order of the Chancellor or Master, it is otherwise
ordered. 8b
2. Issuance of Process. The next step is the issuance of a subpoena to answer,
and any attachment, injunction, or other extraordinary process ordered. 9
3. Ordering and Making Publication. If the bill show a case where personal
service is dispensed with, and the bill is sworn to, or the requisite facts appear
by a separate affidavit, or by the return on the subpoena, the Master will forth-
with make a publication order upon his rule docket, and publish the same. 10
4. Granting Attachments of Property. The Clerk and Master may grant and
issue an attachment in any case in his Court where an attachment may be issued
by the Clerk of the Circuit Court. 11
§ Powers and Duties of the Master in Relation to the Prosecution of a
1156.
Suit. —After the
bill has been filed, and process issued, or publication made,
various duties and powers devolve on the Master, connected with the prosecu-
tion of the suit, and the preparation of the same for a hearing before the Chan-
cellor, among which are the following
7 See, ante, § 1137. This Oct. 17, 1884. W. B. Staley, Chancellor.

8 The following
is a form of probate: 8a §| 178-183. The Master may swear the proposed
State of Tennessee, 1 prosecution sureties. State V. Wilson, 3 Pick., 693:
County of Knox. J ante, § 181.
Personally appeared before me each and all of the 8b Code,§ 4339; Ch. Rule, I, §§ 2-3; post, § 1190
makers of this bond, to-wit: A, B, C, and D, with Ante, 5 191.
»
each and all of whom I am personally acquainted, and 10 For fuller particulars as to publication, see, ante,
acknowledged that they severally and unconditionally §§ 196-200.
signed the foregoing bond for the purposes therein il See, ante, % 875.
expressed.
1. Entering and Setting Aside Judgments Pro Confesso. It is the duty of th&
defendant to enter his appearance before the Master, on the return day, by
filing with him the pleading containing his defence to the suit, and all the ex-
hibits thereto, if any. If he fail so to do, the Master may, on motion of the
complainant, order the bill to be taken for confessed. If, thereafter, the defend-
ant show good cause, and tender a sufficient answer, the Master may set aside
the order pro confesso, as already fully shown. 12 The Master may, before a
pro confesso, grant the defendant, upon good cause shown, further time within
which to file an answer. 13
2. Appointing Guardians ad Litem. If a sworn bill, or a separate affidavit,
show that a defendant is an infant without a general guardian, the Master may,
upon motion of complainant, appoint a guardian ad litem for such infant. Who
should be appointed, and the powers, duties, and liabilities of the person ap-
pointed, have heretofore been stated. 14
3. Acting on Exceptions to Pleadings. He must act On all exceptions to an-
swers, and give the requisite notices to the proper parties in reference to an-
swers, 15 so that the parties aggrieved may take an appeal to the Chancellor. 13
The Master also acts on exceptions to bills, petitions, or other pleadings, when
referred to him for revision because of scandal, impertinence, or prolixity. 17
4. Appointing Commissioners. The Master may appoint commissioners to
take depositions, 18 or to swear a defendant to his answer, 19 or to take an injunc-
tion bond in another county. 20
5. Issuing Attachments for Failure of a Witness to Appear, or Failure of a Defend-
ant to Answer. If a witness, after having been duly summoned, fails to appear,
the Master may issue an attachment for him. 21 So, where the time for answer-
ing has expired, the Master may, on application of the complainant, issue an
attachment against the defendant for want of an answer. 22
6. Extending the Time for Answering, or for Taking Proof. The Master may
grant a defendant further time in which to answer, on good cause shown, even
after he has been attached for contempt. 23 He may also extend the time of
either party for taking proof, on good cause shown by affidavit, and on terms.
But in these cases, the Master is expected to act with legal discretion, just as
the Chancellor would, and not grant every application indiscriminately, merely
because requested so to do. The Master should be diligent himself, and should
require diligence of all others.
7. Making Orders in Relation to Proof. The Master has large powers relative
to the taking of proof. Thus, he may extend a party's time for taking proof
after his time has expired; he may allow a witness to be re-examined to the
same facts by the same party he may restrict or enlarge the notice for taking
;
proof he may authorize the deposition of a witness to be taken before a cause

;
is at issue he may make a peremptory order on a party to answer interroga-

;
tories filed he may determine whether notice' to take depositions shall be given
:
to each of several parties, and if not, to which of them notice shall be given. 24
In all these matters the Master should exercise the same discretion as the
Chancellor would under the same circumstances; and he may condition his
orders and rules upon the payment of such costs as the Chancellor may impose
in the particular case. As a rule, a party asking a favor should pay costs.
8. Steps Taken by Parties in the Master's Office. defendant may make a A
rule on the complainant to take any step necessary to the progress of a cause
notice of this rule shall be immediately given to the party interested, or his
12 Ante, §§ 206-207. 18 Ante, § 478.
13 Code, § 4368. But the Master cannot set aside 19 Code, § 4399.
a pro confesso after a final decree: that can only be 20 Code, § 4441.
done by the Chancellor, in open Court. 21 Ante, § 923.
li Ante, §§ 106-108. 22 Ante, § 201.
16 Code, §§ 4400-4403. 23 Code, § 4368; ante, § 203.
16 Code, § 4404. 24 Code, § 3850.
IT Code, § 4316; ante, § ISO.
§ 1157 THE CEERK and master: his powers and duties. 922
counsel, by the The complainant may set a plea or demurrer down
Master. 25
with the Master to be argued. 28
9. Giving Notice of Rules, Orders and Other Proceedings. The Master must give
the opposite party, or his Solicitor, notice of any rule, order, or other proceed-
ing, taken at his office affecting such party, 27 in order that the latter may take
such step as he may desire in the premises, or may take an appeal to the Chan-
cellor. He must, also, notify the complainant or his Solicitor of the filing of
answers and pleas, and notify the defendant's Solicitor to file a sufficient an-
swer. 28 Notice of a rule to take steps must be immediately given to the com-
plainant, or his counsel. 29
10. Setting Causes for Hearing. Formerly, a cause was set for hearing when
the time for taking proof had expired but this practice is now obsolete and
; ;
the only way in which a cause is now set for hearing is by entering it on the
trial docket, and this the Master is required to do so soon as the cause is at
issue. 30
§ 1157. Powers of the Master to Make Orders on Rule Days. The Master —
holds a sort of Court on the first Monday of every month at his office, when and
where various rules and orders are made by him, for the preparation of causes
for hearing and other proceedings take place in reference to suits. These first
;
Mondays are called rule days because on these days rules are made. 31 Each
day of the term is also a rule day but Solicitors generally prefer to make their
;
motions and obtain their orders and rules from the Chancellor in open Court, 32
rather than from the Master, when the Court is in session. 33
The memorandum book the Master is required to keep 34 is his office docket,
and the rule docket is to his office what the minute book is to the Court these :
two books contain a full history of every motion made, every paper filed or
issued, every rule or order made, every original or mesne writ issued, and every
other proceeding in the Master.^ office of which a minute is required to be made,
except rulings on exceptions, and entries on the execution docket.
While motions, orders, and rules can, as a rule, be made on any day in the
Master's office, there are some orders and rules that can only be made on rule
days, and it is important to keep the distinction in mind. The following are the
principal and, perhaps, the only orders and rules that must be made only on
rule days:
1. Orders Pro Confesso. As a defendant is not bound to appear before the
Master and make defence, except on a rule day, it seems that he is not in de-
fault on any other day hence a pro confesso cannot be entered against him on
:
any other day. 35 But it would seem that if a defendant has actually appeared
and made defence, and that defence has been declared insufficient, or stricken
from the files for any good reason, a pro confesso may be entered against him
25 Code,4389.
§ patch, it is not to be discouraged. Indeed, it is ex-
26 Code,4393.
§ ceedingly uncertain what orders and rules other than
27 Code,4423.
§ The Supreme Court has decided the three above named, must be made on rule days.
that this section of the Code is directory. Shea v. Code, § 4418. Any order improperly made on a day
Mabry, 1 Lea, 327. The Chancellor, however, would not a rule day would, no doubt, be valid unless ap-
not allow a party to lose any right, or be otherwise pealed from to the Chancellor, and by him set aside.
injured by the failure of the Master to give such no- Such appeals are seldom taken, and hence the grow-
tice. The Master would, also, be liable on his bond ing disposition to disregard rule days.
for any loss resulting from such failure. Some Mas- 32 In prtesentia majoris cessat potentia minoris.
ters are remiss in giving these notices: they are often 33 Prior to the Act of 1851-2, Code, §4421, only
of great importance to the parties interested, and the first Mondays of the month and the first day of
Chancellors should require their Masters to faithfully the term were rule davs, and it was held in Lannum
and promptly give all the notices required by law: v, Steele, 10 Hum., 280, that rules proper to be made
any negligence in this respect should be reprehended. by the Master, including judgments pro confesso,
Courts, whose duty it is to enforce the duties of could not be made, even by the Court, except on
others, should not tolerate any breach of duty by its these rule days. This decision, which was made in
own officers. 1849, probably caused the Act of 1851-2, (Code; §
28 Code, §§ 4400-4403; 4422; Ch. Rule, I, § 5. 4421,) making each day of the term, as well as the
29 Code, § 4389. first Monday of every month in vacation, a rule day.
30 Code, §§4431; 4328; ante, §464. Lannum v. Steele is often cited, without reference
SI There is a constantly increasing disposition to to the Act of 1851, which, in effect, overruled the
make all orders and rules, except orders pro confesso, case as an authority.
orders appointing guardians ad litem, and orders re- Si Post, § 1169.
viving suits, on any day, whether a rule day or not; 35 Lannum v. Steele, 10 Hum., 280; Seay v. Seay,
and as this disposition contravenes no positive law, 1 Tenn. Ch., 2. But see note 33, supra.
and is very convenient, as well as promotive of dis-
923 THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. §1158
on other than a rule day. 36 It is the practice to set aside a pro conf.esso on
any day.
2. Appointment Guardians ad Litem. Inasmuch as parties are bound to appear
of
and make defence only on rule days, in theory an infant is not before the
Master except on a rule day: hence the Master cannot appoint a guardian
ad litem for him on any other day, as the infant must be present in law when
the appointment is made. 37 A
temporary guardian of a person found to be of
unsound mind by a jury may, however, be made by the Master on any day after
the verdict. 38
3. Kevival of Suits. The revival of suits in the Master's office is in the nature
of an order pro confesso, and must be made on a rule day, for the reason above
given. 39 The Master may, however, issue the writ of scire facias to revive, or
file a bill of revivor and issue process thereon, at any time. 40
4. Rules to Take Steps. It would seem that a rule by the defendant on his
,
adversary to take a necessary step in a cause should be made on a rule day. 41

§ 1158. Powers of Master to Make Orders on Other Than Rule Days. As —
has been mentioned in a note to the preceding section, the distinction between
what orders must be made, and what may not be made, by the Master on rule
days, does not clearly appear in our practice. The Code says that the rules,
orders and other proceedings made with, or by, the Clerk and Master shall be
made at the rule days, unless otherwise authorized by the Code 42 but so many ;
are expressly or impliedly authorized by the Code to be made on other days

that great uncertainty results, and in practice nearly, if not quite, all rules>
orders and other proceedings, except as stated in the preceding section, are
made on any day the Master can be found in his office. 43
§ 1159. Powers of the Master in Reference to Depositions. The Clerk and —
Master has all the powers of a Commissioner in taking depositions and has, ;
in addition, other and much greater powers. These will be here considered, for
convenience, in connection with some of his other powers in reference to
depositions:
1. He Can Determine the Length of the Notice. The Master may, upon good
cause shown by affidavit, either restrict or enlarge the usual time of notice for
36 Code, §§ 4369; 4400-4407; 4395; 4464. See note By § 4395, it would seem that a bill may be taken for
to the next section. confessed at the end of the time prescribed by the
37 In strict law, neither the Chancery Court nor Court for answering, although other than a rule day;
the County Court has jurisdiction to appoint a guard- and it would seem from § 4464 that when interrogato-
ian for an infant who is not before the Court in per- ries are not answered by the given day, a pro con-
son, or by service of some process. fesso may be entered at once, without waiting for a
38 Code, § 3700. rule day. § 4420, sub-section 3, seems, also, to be
39 See, also, Code, § 4429 ; Foster v. Burem, 1 modified as to setting aside orders pro confesso, by
Heisk., 783. §§ 4375-4376, which authorize the Master to set aside
40 Code, §§4426; 4429: a pro confesso "at any time." Besides the delays
41 If, however, such a rule should be made on any that would be occasioned by waiting for rule days to
other than a rule day, and the complainant notified set aside pro confessos would be intolerable. (4) §
thereof, and failed to appeal, the Chancellor would, 4420, sub-section 5, seems to be modified, by § 4462,
no doubt, treat the rule as valid. Chancellors regard which authorizes the Clerk and Master "at any time
substance, not ceremony. after the bill is filed" to make an order to take de-
42 Code, §§ 4417-4418. positions in certain cases, being, perhaps, the only
43 It would seem from a consideration of Code, cases, "where such orders are necessary." (5) § 4420,
sections 4418-4421, that the rules and orders referred sub-section 6, gives the Master authority to open
to in section 4420 are all required to be made on rule causes for proof "in the same way as the Chancellor
days, but when other sections of the Code are consid- might do." This would seem to imply that there is
ered, this conclusion is found to be erroneous. (1) no restriction as to rule days; and, under Chancery
§ 4420, sub-section 1, is modified by § 4426, which Rule, II, § 4, the practice is to extend the time for
savs imperatively, the "Clerk and Master shall issue taking proof on any day the Master or Chancellor,
scire facias, or notice, at any time, upon motion of can be found. And. thus, the making of the orders
_
complainant, entering the same upon his rules." (2) and rules specified in Code, § 4420, except the one in
§ 4420, sub-section 2, is modified by §§ 4354-4355, reference to guardians ad litem, is seen not to be
which require the Clerk to make the order for publi- confined to rule days. It may be said that the va-
cation upon the rule docket "as soon as the necessary rious sections of the Code, giving authority to make
affidavit is made," and this affidavit may be made these rules "at any time," mean on any rule day;
whenever the bill is filed, and the bill may be filed at but such a construction is contrary to usage, and too
any time. See, also, Code, §§3518-3520. which show narrow. It may be safely said that the only orders
that in attachment cases, the order of publication may absolutely required to be made on rule days, are:
be made and entered on the rule docket "at any 1st, Orders pro confesso^ for failure to make any de-
time." (3) § 4420, sub-section 3, seems to be modi- fence 2d, Orders appointing a guardian ad litem
;
fied by § 4369, sub-section 5, and by §§ 4400-4407, so 3d, Orders reviving a suit; and, perhaps, 4th, Rules
that a pro confesso might be entered at the end of to take steps in a cause.
thirty days after notice of exceptions allowed, even 44 Code, § 4460. If the witness is present, or in
if the thirtieth day came on other than a rule day. easy reach, the time of notice should be reduced to
2. He May Allow a New Examination. The Master may, upon good cause
shown by affidavit, give a party leave to have a witness again examined in chief
or cross-examined, after his deposition has been finally closed. 45
3. He May Attach a Witness for Tailing to Appear. If a witness, after having
been duly summoned, fails to appear before the Master, upon the return of an
officer or proof by affidavit showing that the witness has been summoned, the
Master shall issue an instanter attachment for such witness, and designate
therein the penalty of the bond conditioned for his appearance before the
Chancellor at a time and place to be specified if practicable, or before the Court
at, the next succeeding term, if it be not then in session, to show cause why he
should not be fined or committed according to law. 46

4. He May Commit a Stubborn Witness. If a witness should appear and refuse
to answer legal interrogatories, he shall be committed by the Master, until he
consent to give his testimony. 47
§ 1160. Powers and Duties of the Master in Making Reports. "When the
—
Master is directed to make a report, he must make and file it within the time
prescribed by the order or decree, or give a satisfactory written excuse to the
Chancellor. 48 If the Court does not fix the time within which the account shall
be taken, and the report made, the Master shall fix the time, and give five days'
notice thereof to the parties, and the Solicitors, also, if both reside in the
county, and if not he will notify the one, party or Solicitor, who does reside
in the county. If the parties are numerous, notice shall be served on such of
them as the decree or Master may designate. 49 The law requires the Master
to be diligent in taking accounts, making sales, and making reports, and ho
must proceed with the least practicable delay to comply with the terms of the
reference. 50 For each neglect he is subject to a fine of fifty dollars, and for*
repeated neglect may be removed from office. 51
§ 1161. —
The Master's Financial Report. The Master is required to report
on the first day of each term the amount of money in his office, and the causes
to which the several sums belong, excepting costs, but including State reve-
nues. This report is not only for the inspection of the Court, bat for the ben-
efit of Solicitors and parties interested. It is made the duty of the Court to
have this report inspected, the money counted, and to see that the report is in
every respect correct. 52 This report should include, not only all the moneys
actually in Court, except costs, but, also, the moneys loaned out by order of
the Court, on note, or mortgage, or trust deed, giving the name of the security,
its date, when due, and the names of the sureties. Money loaned out by order
of the Court, is in the eye of the law, money in Court. The following is a form
of the report
MASTER'S FINANCIAL KEFORT.
To the Hon. Thomas M. McConnell, Chancellor:
I submit the following report of the amount of money in my office, and the causes to which
the several sums belong, not including costs
one or two days; and, if both parties are present, will not testify for another deserves to suffer him-
taking depositions, and the witness is present, the self for want of the evidence of another. To bear
time should be reduced to one hour. If the parties, witness to the truth is a sacred duty; and the ad-
while taking proof, refuse to take the deposition of ministration of justice would become impossible if
any witness or witnesses present, or in easy reach, witnesses should withhold their testimony. To con-
the Master should, on application, promptly author- ceal material evidence is to aid in the perpetration
ize instanter notice to be given. He should endorse of injustice, and is akin to crime.
his action on the affidavit for restricted notice, and 47 Ch. Rule, VII, §4, post, §1196. A
witness
file itwith the deposition thus taken. cannot be compelled to answer a question that (I)
45 Code, 4461; Ch. Rule, II, § 6; post, § 1191. will criminate him, or subject him to a penalty or
46 Ch. Rule, VII, §3; post, §1196. Masters forfeiture; or (2) that will involve a breach of pro-
should promptly comply with this rule: it is impera- fessional confidence toward his client. 1 Dan. Ch.
tive, and the effect is good. Justice cannot be done, Pr„ 942-943.
if witnesses refuse to attend and give in their evi- 48 Code, § 4471.
dence. The Master should have the witness carried, 40 Ch. Rule, IV, §§ 2-5; post, § 1193.
or bound to appear, before the Chancellor instanter, 50 Code, § 4474.
if possible, so that his evidence may be had in time 51 Code, §§4472-4473; Ch. Rule, VII, §6; post,
for the next term of the Court. Witnesses must be § 1196.
taught to respect the process of the Court. He who 52 Code, §§ 335 i-335 ;, (M. & V.)
John Doe vs. Richard Roe, et al, - - $ 192.82
This sum belongs to the heirs of Roland Roe.
Richard Fen vs. John Den, et al, - 500.00
This sum was paid in by Richard Fen, on a tender.
George Jones vs. Henry Brown, et al, - 613.92
$600.00 of this amount has been loaned out by order of the Court on note,
which is exhibited hereto.
James Smith vs. John Johnson, et al, - 987.42
This sum belongs to the parties, proceeds of land sold for partition.
$2 294 16
Respectfully submitted, this Aug. 10, 1891.Sherman, C. &' M. T. N.
§ 1162. The Master's Book Report.—It is the duty of the Clerk and Master
to keep at all times in his office the Eeports of the Decisions of the Supreme
Court and at the first term of his Court each year to file a report showing the
;
number and name of each of said Reports in his office, and to spread the same
at length on the minutes of the Court. 53 The following is the form of this
report
MASTER'S BOOK REPORT.
To the Hon. Joseph W. Sneed, Chancellor
I submit this report of the number and name of the Reports of the Decisions of the Supreme
Court in my office
REPORTS.
Overton, 1 to 2, also known as Tennessee,
and proof of a party's death, and order and issue the necessary process to
revive, such process being a scire facias, or notice. 54 The process must be made
returnable to a rule day, and the suit may be revived at the next rule day after
the return, if no defence is made. 55 The entries on the rule docket in all mat-
ters relative to revivors should be as full, and in the same form, as entries on
the minute-book in term time. The procedure in reviving suits is fully given
elsewhere. 56
§ 1164. Powers and Duties of the Master in Making Deeds. The Court —
may, by decree, divest the title to property, real or personal, out of any of the
parties, and vest it in others, or vest it in the purchaser; or the Court may
authorize the Master to execute all necessary conveyances, releases, and acquit-
tances, either in his name as Master, or in the name of the parties by him as
Master, as the Court may think proper; and the instrument so executed will
be as valid as if executed by the party. 57 The deed when executed by the
Master must be by him acknowledged in the presence of two subscribing wit-
nesses, or acknowledged before the Clerk of the County Court, or a Notary
1
Public, to the end that it may be registered. 58

§ 1165. When
the Clerk and Master May Adjourn the Court.—If the Chan-
any reason, unable to open his Court at the time fixed by law, he
cellor is, for
may by letter, or otherwise, instruct the Clerk and Master to keep the Court
open until he can get there or, if he is unable to hold the Court at all, he may
;
instruct the Clerk and Master to adjourn the Court to a time, by him, the
Chancellor, fixed for holding a special term. If the Clerk and Master has no
instructions from the Chancellor, he may adjourn the Court, in the absence of
the Chancellor, from day to day, for three days in succession, or longer, if in
his judgment the interest of the public requires it, and then adjourn it to tbe
Court in course. 59
§ 1166. Powers and Duties of the Master in Receiving and Paying Out
—
Money. The Master must always keep in mind the fundamental fact that in
receiving, holding, and paying out money, he is the mere hand of the Court,
and the trustee of the parties interested in the money. None of the money
belongs to him, nor has he any right whatever to use any portion of it, not
even his own costs, until the Court so orders nor can he lawfully pay out any
;
of it to any one On any pretence whatsoever, except in obedience to some

express and plain law, or on the express command of the Court. He has no
discretion vested in him, whom to pay, when to pay, where to pay, or how to
pay but must pay the very person lawfully entitled under the decree, and must
;
make the payment in the precise manner specified by the statute, or by the
decree and must pay at his office without delay, upon application of the party
;
entitled, his agent, or attorney. 60

The Clerk and Master has authority to receive the amount of any decree
rendered by his Court, either before or after the issue of an execution there-
on; 61 but he has no authority to receive anything in payment of any decree
calling for money, except money, unless the decree in plain and express terms
authorizes something else to be received, and then the decree must be strictly
followed.
The Clerk has no right or authority to pay money in his hands in a cause to
anyone, except in obedience to an order of Court, or in compliance with some
statute. 62
64
Code, §§4420; 4426. oo Code, §§4043; 4475. The Clerk and Master is
55
Code, §§ 4429; 4349. protected by the order of the Court requiring him to
56
See, ante, %% 699-719. pay out money. If a party objects to such an order
57
Code, §§ 4484-4485. he must appeal. See 2 Perry on Trusts, §§ 476 a;
58
See, ante, § 650.
59
Code, § 4087. This' section seems broad enough ei Code, § 4050, sub-sec. 5.
to cover a case where a Chancellor, after opening 62 Craig v. Governor, 3 Cold., 244.
his Court, for any reason, is unable to close it, or
neglected to close it.
927 THE CEERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. §1167
When a dies, the moneys in his hands as such are not assets
Clerk and Master
for the payment of his debts, or for distribution, but belong to the office, and
should be paid into Court; and when a Clerk and Master dies, or is removed,
or his term expires, it is the duty of his successor to demand, and take posses-
sion of, all the assets and other property belonging to the office 63 the money :
may be recovered by motion 64 and the books, papers and other property may
;
be recovered as provided by sections 806-811 of the Code. 65

When the Clerk and Master is liable to any party to a suit for money in
his hands, it may be recovered on motion, or a petition may be filed in the
cause without bond against him and his sureties, or against the personal repre-
sentatives of the Clerk and his sureties, if any of them be dead. An original
suit in the Circuit Court on the Clerk and Master's bond would be irregular; 66
and, if no order had been made for the Clerk to pay over the money, such a
suit would be improper, and not maintainable. 67
§ 1167. How Married Women are to be Paid. The laws of Tennessee —
jealously and zealously hedge married women around with safeguards against
improvident husbands, impecunious agents, importunate acquaintances, and
imprudent Court Clerks; and no Clerk and Master can safely pay out the
proceeds of real or personal property belonging to married women unless he
strictly conforms to every requirement of the statute. 68 These requirements
are as follows
The proceeds of real or personal property belonging to a married woman
cannot be paid to any person, except by consent of such married woman upon
privy examination by the Court; or, unless a deed or power of attorney is
executed by the husband and wife, and her privy examination taken, as in
Dther cases. 69 A married woman may, in person, receive the money; or, upon
privy examination by the Court, or by any person commissioned to take such
examination, direct' how the same shall be paid or invested, which direction
shall be reduced to writing, and entered on the minutes of the Court. 70 She
may also, by power of attorney, duly executed by her with her husband, upon
privy examination as in other eases, authorize and direct the money to be paid
or invested as they may see proper, which power of attorney shall be filed with
the papers, and form a part of the record of the cause. 71
The Court may, on proper application, order the proceeds of a wife's lands
to be re-invested in other lands for her benefit, or otherwise permanently
invested. 72
§ 1168. How Moneys Belonging to Infants and Lunatics are Paid Out.—The
law regards infants and persons of unsound mind with all the solicitude of an
affectionate and prudent parent, and guards their financial interests with a
jealous and unceasing watchfulness, and enforces its protective powers with
a comprehensive vigor.
1. How Money Belonging to an Infant is Paid Out. Infants are deemed in law
to be wholly unable to manage their financial affairs, and a person who is both
an infant and a wife is under a double disability; and the Clerk and Master
must, in the first place, see that he is clearly authorized by a decree before he
pays out the money in his hands belonging to an infant, and especially to an
infant wife and he must, in the next place, see that he follows the directions
;
63 Massey V. Gleaves, 1 Tenn. Ch., 150. The per- tachment, or execution, or garnishment, or by an
son holding the office dies, but the officer himself, in independent bill, the owner of the money must be
Contemplation of law, does not die: the officer is made a party: it is not sufficient to make the Clerk
immortal; there is no interregnum. Rex nunquam a party.

moritur. 68 Code, § 4052.
64 Tanner V. Dancy, 4 Ileisk., 482. 69 Code, § 2483.
65 Code, § 4060. 70 Code, §3319.
66 Yowell, ex parte, 7 Heisk., 561. 71 Code, § 3320.
6T Craig v. Governor, 3 Cold., 244. Money in 72 Code, § 3318. The foregoing provisions apply
Court belongs to some one or more of the parties to only when a married woman is an adult; when she
the suit which brought it in. It is for the Court is a minor, the provisions of Code, § 4054, apply.
and not for the Clerk to say to whom it shall be See next section.
paid, and when. To reach money in Court by at-
§ 1169 THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 928
of such a decree with scrupulous exactness. The husband of an infant has no
right to funds in Court belonging to her, 73 nor has her guardian any right
thereto, unless the Court so orders. The husband of the infant may be an
infant, also, in which case his guardian would have no right to the funds be-
longing to his wife, whether she be an infant or an" adult. No guardian has
any right, in any case, to draw funds from the Chancery Court without an
express order of the Court, and then only on complying fully, and in good
faith, with the terms of such order. 74 Money belonging to a minor may be paid
him when he attains his majority on his affidavit, or a deposition being filed to
establish his majority, 75 or it may be paid to his regular guardian when the
Court so orders.
2. How Money Belonging to a Non Compos is Paid Out. Persons of unsound
mind are regarded by a Court of Equity as the objects of the greatest solici-
tude, and their interests are protected with a stringent and scrupulous fidelity.
The Clerk and Master, in paying out the funds of such persons, must look
exclusively to the decree of the Court for his authority and method of proce-
dure; and the injunctions and directions above given in reference to infants
apply with equal, if not greater force, in case of payment of money belonging
to idiots and lunatics. 76
§ 1169. The Books the Clerk and Master is Required to Keep.— The Clerk
and Master is required by law to keep certain office books and on the proper ;
keeping of these books greatly depend the ease, accuracy, and facility with
which the business of the Court, and the business of the Clerk and Master's
office, are transacted. The safety and integrity of these books are essential to
the security of property, the final determination of rights, and the repose of
society; and they should be preserved with a jealous fidelity, and an inviolable
sanctity; and any defacement, obliteration, or alteration of them, should be
deemed a sacrilege. The books to be thus kept by the Clerk are the following:
1. A Minute Book. The Clerk and Master is required to keep a wellbound
book, in which shall be entered the minutes of each day's proceedings during
the session of the Court, in the order in which they are made. This is the most
important of all the Court books, and should be bound well enough to last a
hundred years. It should be preserved unmutilated, and unchanged, with
scrupulous vigilance and fidelity. And inasmuch as it contains the perpetual
memorial of the decrees of the Court, the entries should be made in a bold,
round hand, and with the most durable black ink. This book being under the
constant personal supervision of the Chancellor, no detailed directions as to
the keeping of it are necessary. 77
2. A
Judgment Index Book. The Clerk and Master is required to keep a judg-
ment index, in which the name of each person, partnership, firm or corporation
against whom a judgment or decree is rendered shall be entered under the
proper alphabetical [initial] or letter of such person, partnership, firm or cor-
73 He may borrow the money, if he gives the re- to be entered on the minutes, until it has first been
quired security. Cheatham v. Huff, 2 Tenn. Ch., submitted to the adverse Solicitor, and all his objec-
616. There may be an application to enforce the tions passed on; and every uncontested decree should
wife's equity in her estate. See, ante, § 968. be approved by the Chancellor before its entry on
74 Code, §§ 4053-4054, which sections are as fol- the minutes. In no other way can the minutes be
lows: preserved from erasures, interlineations, and al-
The proceeds of the real or personal property of terations, which are both a reproach to the Chan-
an infant can only be paid to a guardian who lias cellor and to the Clerk, and an impairment of the
given bond with good security, as such, to the satis- inviolable sanctity which every Court record should
faction of the Court. possess that is deemed absolute verity. Besides,
If the infant is also a feme covert, the funds can authorized alterations suggest and may induce un-
only be paid out upon the order of the Court, direct- authorized alterations. If an alteration or inte.-linea-
ing how, and to whom, the same shall be paid. tion is made, it should, for obvious reasons, be in
75 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1800-1801. the handwriting of the Clerk, or of the Chancellor.
76 Code, § 4055. This section is as follows: For like obvious reasons, no decree or order should
_
So, also, if the person entitled to the proceeds of ever be vacated by writing "Vacated" across ll. nr
either realty or personalty, sold by order of Court, in any similar way; but it should be vacated by
is of unsound mind, the funds can only be paid to a another decree or order duly entered on t>.e minutes
guardian, or committee, duly appointed, who has of the date of the order of vacation; and a mem-
given bond and security according to law, satisfac- orandum like this entered on the ma-sin of the
tory to the Court making the sale. vacated decree or order: "Vacated: see page ."
77 The Chancellor should allow no contested decree
poration, giving the date, number of the cause, and amount of such judgment.
Each page of said index shall have four [five] columns, as follows:
Name. Date. No. Cause. Amount.
Two sets of these columns may be on each page. 77a

3. An Execution Docket. This book is next in importance to the minute book,
as it shows the decrees of the Court in the order of their rendition, giving
all
the dollar-and-cent result of the litigation, the costs of the suit, to whom owing,
what is paid into Court on the final decree, by whom paid in, and to whom paid
out. There are severe penalties imposed by law on Clerks for misfeasance in
connection with the execution docket. 78 The following facts must be shown
on the execution docket in each case 79 :
1. The style of the cause, giving the names of all the complainants, and all
the defendants, in full.
2. The day and year of the rendition of the decree.
3. The amount of the decree, and in whose favor and against whom rendered
and if various amounts are decreed against various parties, or in favor of
various parties, these facts must be shown.
4. The amount of the costs, showing the name of each officer, witness, or
other person, to whom costs are due, and each item due each person and on
what account owing, and the fee due on each item, all with particularity and
certainty.
5. The character 80 and number of the executions issued the date of their ;
issuance, and to what county or counties issued the persons to whom delivered,
;
and the date of delivery, or, if sent by mail, the day it was mailed, and to whom
addressed. 81
6. The fact and dates of the return of the executions, and the dates and sub-
stance of the officers returns. It is better to give the returns in full, including
'
the officers' names.

7. The dates and amounts of all moneys paid into the office, and by whom
paid, and on what accounts.
8. The dates and amounts of all moneys paid out of the office, to whom paid,
and on what account, showing the facts clearly and particularly.
All of the entries in reference to executions, and payments, must be made
on the execution docket at the time of the transaction. 82
4. A Cash Book. The Clerk and Master is required to keep a cash book as one
of the public records of his office, in which he shall enter, under each case, all
sums of money received or disbursed by him, showing the date of receipt or
disbursement, on what account received or disbursed, and from or to whom
received or disbursed. This book must be indexed direct and reversed. It shall
at all times be open to the inspection of the public and it is a misdemeanor for
;
the Clerk and Master to fail to keep this book, or to fail to allow its inspection. 83
5. A Rule Docket. The Rule Docket must be a well-bound book, kept exclus-
ively for the entry of all rules, notices, orders, and other proceedings in a
cause made with or by the Clerk and Master. 84 This book is to the Master
what the minute book is to the Chancellor; and should contain a perfect and
detailed record or minute of every step taken in the Master's office, from the
beginning of the suit to the final decree. As some guide to the Master in keep-
ing his Rule Docket, the following summary of Rule Docket entries is given
77a Act of 1897, ch. 27. removal from office, when his omissions are wilful.
78 Code, § 3017. Code, § 4065. Nothing but scrupulous exactness
79 Code, §§ 3016; 4040. and promptness in making his entries will save the
80 A writ of possession is a species of execution. Clerk harmless. Every entry should invariably be
81 Code, § 3598. made on the execution docket at the very time of
82 Code, § 3016. The Clerk and Master is not the transaction. See, post, § 1171 a, sub-sec, 15.
only liable in damages for neglecting to keep his 83 Acts of 1897, ch. 26:
execution docket according to law, Code, § 3017; but 84 Code, §4417; 4085. See, post, § 1171 a, sub-
he is, also, guilty of a misdemeanor, and is liable to sees. 10, 11, 13, 14.
§ 1169 THE CEERK and master: his POWERS and DUTIES. 930
1. He will enter the cause as soon as the bill is filed; giving the names of all
the complainants and all the defendants. 85
2. The names of the complainant's Solicitors. 86
3. The date and fact of the filing of the prosecution, injunction, attachment
or other bonds, the penalties of the various bonds filed, and the names of the
sureties on each.
4. The minute, hour, day, month and year on. which the bill is filed, being
especially careful as to the minute and hour in case of attachment bills.
5. The date, fact and filing of each exhibit to the bill.
6. The date and fact of the issuance of each subpoena to answer, and of each
writ of injunction and attachment, and the officer to whom issued and if sent ;
by mail so show, and what fees were advanced, if any, and by whom.
7. Every order of publication in full, dated and duly signed by the Clerk and
Master.
8. Every order extending the time for answering the bill.
9. The date and fact of the return of all original and mesne process, including
subpoenas to answer, writs of injunction, attachment and scire facias, giving the
officers' returns thereon in full, including the date, and his name.
10. The date and fact of the filing of all demurrers, pleas, answers, and ex-
hibits to answers.
11. The names of the defendant's Solicitors. 87
12. Every order taking a bill for confessed. This order, and the following
orders, must be set out in full, and duly dated.
13. Every order appointing a guardian ad litem.
14. The suggestion and proof of a party's death, and the award of a scire
facias.
15. Every order reviving a cause upon return of a scire facias, or of a sub-
poena to answer a bill of revivor.
16. Every order setting aside a judgment pro confesso.
17. The date and fact of the filing of every deposition, the names of the wit-
nesses, and by what party filed. The Code says these entries in reference to
depositions may be made in a separate book. 88
18. The date and fact of the filing of documents, exhibits to depositions,
transcripts, deeds, wills, plats, and other sorts of evidence, and by whom filed. 89
19. The date and fact of the filing of every other paper, of the making of
every other rule, or order, and of every other proceeding in the cause not here-
tofore in this section specified, and not entered on the minute book, or execu-
tion docket.
All the entries in the rule docket will be made under the style of the cause to
which they belong, and will be made in the order of time in which the acts
were done, and the correct date will be attached to each entry. 90
6. A Memorandum Book. The Clerk shall keep a memorandum book in which
shall be noted every subpoena for witnesses, commissions to take depositions,
with the day of issuance, and any other proceedings of the Clerk not entered on
his records, rule docket, or minutes and such memorandum books shall be open
;
for parties, or their attorneys, to make such memorandums for the direction of
the Clerk as may be necessary. 91
85 It is of great importance to have the names of Mullins v. Aiken, 2 Heisk., SSI. See, also, Baker r.
all the parties, complainant and defendant, appear on Mayor, 2 Heisk., 117. If papers get lost, the rule
the rule docket, because the pleadings are now seldom docket will show that they had been filed.
enrolled, and the minutes of the Court seldom give 90 Code, § 4417. The Master should make it an
the names of all the parties; and the rule docket, in imperative and invariable rule to make all of his
case any pleading is lost, may contain the only record rule docket entries at the very time the act is done,
showing the names of all the parties to the suit. thereby making the entry on the rule docket a part
86 The entry of the names of the Solicitors on the of the transaction itself. All neglects and postpon-
rule docket is a record of their authority to appear ings are reprehensible; and wilful omissions or fail-
and act. ures should be punished by removal from office.
8T This entry is of importance; but is often neg- Code, § 4065. A rule docket well kept is indispen-
lected. sable to the rights of litigants, and the certain dis-
88 Code, § 4085. patch of business.
80 The importance of this is well illustrated by 01 Code, § 4433.
This book is kept by very few Clerks and Masters, and yet it is a book of im-
portance and great usefulness. When properly kept, it will constitute a sort of
office docket, in which Solicitors may make memorandums for the direction of
the Clerk, such as directions to issue alias or counterpart subpoenas to answer,
or subpoenas to testify, directions as to sales, executions, or writs of possession,
directions to enter judgment pro confcsso when the proper time arrives, direc-
tions to appoint guardians ad litem, directions in reference to the taking of ac-
counts, or making reports, directions in reference to the revivor of suits, direc-
tions in reference to exceptions to answers or depositions, or any other direc-
tions, or memorandums, in reference to any matter to which he desires to call
the Master 's attention, or on which he desires the Master to act, in reference to
any cause, whether brought, or about to be brought, or already determined.
7. A Deposition Book. The Master is also required to keep a well-bound book,
in which shall be entered under the name of each case, the depositions taken
and filed in the case, the names of the witnesses, and the date of the filing, and
by whom. This book may be dispensed with, by keeping the rule docket in such
way as to enable the entries here required, to be made therein, without interfer-
ing with the entries regularly belonging to that docket. 92
8. An Insolvent Book. Inasmuch as many large insolvent estates are admin-
istered in the Chancery Court, the statute requires the Clerk and Master to
keep in his office a book marked "Insolvent Book,'"' in which will be entered
the character and amount of all claims filed in insolvent suits, the several claims
and amounts allowed, the amount to be distributed among the creditors, and the
pro rata to be paid each. 93 This is an important book it preserves the record of
:
an insolvent estate, and obviates the necessity of entering long schedules on the
minutes of the Court.
9. Trial Dockets. The Clerk must keep three trial dockets, one for the Chan-
cellor, one for the bar, and one for himself. 94 These dockets should be well-
bound books, large enough to last several years, and should be kept with the
same care and fidelity as other record books. A cause should be entered on this
docket as soon as it is at issue, 95 and should bear the same number as on the
rule docket. 96 The following is the form of a trial docket, the No. of the cause,
names of the Solicitors, style of cause, and pleadings when filed, being on the
left-hand page; and the rules, orders and decrees and the memorandums being
on the right-hand page.
TRIAL DOCKET.
124 CHANCERY COURT AT KINGSTON
§ 1170 THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 932
duties of the Clerk and Master, important in themselves, but not necessary to
be treated in detail in this book. 97 The principal of these duties are the fol-
lowing :
1. To
reside in the county wherein the Court is held, to keep his office at the
county seat of said county, and give due attendance at his office for the per-
formance of official duties. 98
2. Not to practice law in his Court, nor become security for the prosecution
of suits in his Court, nor upon any bonds, or other obligations, required to be
executed by the parties in the progress of such suits. 09
3. To issue all original, mesne, and final process from the Court; 100 and to
sign all subpoenas, injunctions, attachments, executions, and all other writs
issued from his Court, and to endorse on the back thereof the date of issuance.
4. To record in well-bound books, within six months after the final determina-
tion of any suit or prosecution, such proceedings as he is required by law to
enroll.
5. To make and keep indexes, direct and reversed, for all books and dockets
required to be kept by him.
6. To keep all the papers, books, dockets, and records belonging to his office
with care and security; the papers filed, arranged, numbered, and labeled, so
as to be of easy reference; and the books, dockets, and records properly let-
tered and to allow parties to inspect the records free of charge. 101
;
7.To attend Court, during the session thereof, with all the papers belonging
to the term, so filed as to be of easy reference to keep in the Court House dur-
;
ing such session, the execution docket for the two preceding terms and to ad- ;
minister all oaths and affidavits in relation to causes or proceedings pending

therein.
8. On application and payment of the legal fees therefor, to make out and
deliver to any person applying for the same, a correct transcript, properly
certified, of any paper or record in his office.
9. To perform such duties in regard to the State and county revenue as are
prescribed by law.
10. To issue executions within the time prescribed by law. 102
11. It is the duty of the Clerk when a cause is taken by appeal in the nature
of a writ of error to the Supreme Court, to make out, and transmit by mail, to
the Clerk of the Supreme Court of his Division, a transcript of the record,
within forty days after the entry of appeal, unless the entry has been within
temporary dockets are generally destroyed as waste guards, allow reputable Solicitors to take out a file
paper, after the term closes. This practice is repre- for a few days; but no file should ever he allowed
hensible. The statute contemplates only one trial to be taken out of the county, nor should any record
docket, and that a cause shall be entered only once book ever be allowed to be taken out of the office, or
on this docket. This docket is made in triplicate, as the Court House, on any pretext or by any person.
stated in the text. The memoranda made by the The Chancellor has no lawful authority to order the
Chancellor on his docket, and the memoranda made Clerk to allow any file or record to be taken out of
by the Clerk on his docket, are in the nature of rec- his office. The Clerk is charged with the exclusive
ords, and will support decrees nunc pro tunc, will custody of all his records, and gives a bond for their
evidence a Solicitor's appearance in a cause, and safe keeping, and his office is the only proper place
will be proof of steps taken at the present, or at a for such records. Nothing does more lo create de-
past term, of the Court. This shows the importance lays and confusion and annoyances and suspicions,
_
of keeping the trial dockets in book form, and of and criminations and recriminations in the progress
preserving them as records. If causes are entered of a suit, than the practice of allowing any one and
on the trial docket in the order in which they are every one connected with the suit to take out the files
entered on the rule docket, much confusion is in a cause, or the files referred to in a cause. The
avoided, the same number can be given on each Clerk should adopt and enforce rigid rules to enable
docket, and the records of the Court made to corre- him to retain the custody of his records; and the
spond. Chancellors should sustain their Clerks in so doing,
97 For these various duties, see Code, §§ 4038- and not encourage, much less undertake to authorize
4066. the miscellaneous looting of the Clerk's office by
98 Code, § 4038. parties and the Solicitors of the Court. Those who
99 Code, § 4039. would censure the^ Clerk for retaining the files, would
ioo Code. § 4085. be loudest in their denunciation of him if any file
101 The Clerk has no authority to allow the papers, should be lost, despoiled, or mislaid. Pleadings, ex-
books, dockets, and records, belonging to his office, hibits or depositions may, by leave of the Chancellor,
to be taken out of his office by any one except the be withdrawn from the files, when rmterUl to a
Chancellor, who is entitled to take a file in a pending prosecution for perjury. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 784; or
cause to his own room or office to enable him the when material in any other litigation. But certified
more thoroughly to investigate and consider the copies of all paners withdrawn should be substituted.
pleadings and proofs in the cause. The Clerk should, 102 Code, § 4040.
in extraordinary cases, and subject to proper safe-
933 the clb;rk and master: his powers and duties. § 1171
forty days of the regular term of the Supreme Court, or during such term, and
then forthwith, and transmit without delay to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
The certificate of the postmaster of his county, that the transcript has been
deposited in the postoffice within the time prescribed, is presumptive evidence
of the transmission required. 103
12. It is the duty of the Clerk, upon application of the party entitled, his
agent, or attorney, made at the office of the Clerk, to pay and deliver to the
applicant without delay, any money or property in his hands, received by virtue
of any decree, judgment, or order, of the Court, or any Judge thereof, or by
virtue of his office. A
failure so to do is a misdemeanor in his office, and, more-
over, subjects the Clerk to motion against himself and his sureties. 104
13. The Clerk, in all cases where there are two or more defendants, and a
subpoena for witnesses, or other process, issues on application of part only of
the defendants, shall mark thereon at whose instance such process was is-
sued. 105
14. Upon the suspension or removal from office of any Clerk, he shall, on
demand of his successor or order of the Court, deliver over to such successor,
the books, papers, and other articles belonging to the office such delivery to be
;
enforced as provided in sections 805-811 of the Code. 106

15. To pay into the State Treasury all sums of money, funds, or witness fees
that may have remained in his hands or Court unclaimed, or uncalled for, by
the party or parties legally entitled to the same, for a period of six years. 107
16. To perform such other duties as are, or may be, by law required of him. 108
§ 1171. Duties of the Master During the Sitting of the Court.— The Clerk
and Master should, during the sitting of the Court, be always ready to perform
any duty connected with his office, or to respond to any question propounded to
him by the Chancellor, or by a Solicitor, or party, touching the status of any
particular matter relative to his office, files, or duties. To enable the Master to
discharge these duties to the satisfaction of himself and all others concerned,
he should not undertake to write up the minutes, or to take depositions, or to
perform any duty that will take him out of the Court room. He should have a
deputy to do all clerical work, and if the deputy is needed to take depositions
or prepare reports, the Master should have a competent amanuensis employed
to write up the record of each day's proceedings. Nothing is so irritating and
demoralizing to all concerned as to have the minutes in arrears, and the Master
in vain trying to write them up and at the same time to answer questions, make
payments, take depositions, make reports, search for papers and perform other
duties of a like character. 109 Everybody is liable to become irritated by such
perplexities; and the Master who undertakes such a task not only undertakes
the impossible, but he makes the Court a scene of unseemly confusion, and
causes a multitude of petty annoyances, and sometimes, in his hurry and con-
fusion, commits serious mistakes.
The statute provides that the minutes of the previous day's proceedings
should be read each morning and the Chancellor should not allow the minutes
;
to lag behind the Court. The Master should be required to have the necessary
clerical force to keep the minutes up to date. A positive rule positively en-
forced will prevent all the annoyances incident to the delays in the entering of
the orders and decrees, especially at the close of the Court. The Master should
not be allowed to degenerate into a copyist while Court is in session: better
things are expected and required of the Master, and he should endeavor faith-
fully to justify these expectations in the fullest.
§ 1171a. Additional Rules for the Guidance of the Clerk and Master. Inas- —
much as new officers are constantly being appointed to perform the responsible
103 Code, §§ 4041-4042. 107 Acts of 1891, ch. 227. .
104 Code, §§ 4042-4043. 108 Code, § 4040.
105 Code, § 4049. 109 The Clerk and Master should make all due
106 Code, § 4060. preparation for the sitting of the Court: he should
§ 1171 a THE CLERK AND MASTER: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES. 934
duties of Clerk and Master, the following additional rules for their guidance
have been formulated, the observance of which will greatly increase the effici-
ency, accuracy and dispatch of business in the office. 1093. These rules are, in the
main, declaratory of the law and are only supplemental to those given in the
;
preceding sections.
1. His Duty in Taking an Account. The Clerk and Master will begin the tak-
ing of every account in due season, as required by the Code, (sec. 4474;) and
he will file every report at least five days before the first day of the succeeding
term, (Chancery Rule IV, sec. 8 ;) or file a sufficient excuse, or be liable to the
penalties specified in the Code, (sees. 4472 and 4473,) and in Chancery Rule
VII, § 9.
2. His Report Must Specify the Evidence. Every report based on evidence will
refer to the particular evidence upon which each fact or item is based, giving
the page; and, if a deposition is referred to, the number of the question and
answer relied on must also be given. A general reference to a document or
deposition will be insufficient. (Chancery Rule IV, sec. 7.)
3. His Financial and Book Reports Must be Prompt. The Clerk and Master will
have his Financial Report and Report of Supreme Court Reports ready to present to
the Chancellor as soon as he takes the bench at the opening of the term, the latter
Report to be made at the first term only in each year. The Financial Report
must show not only the amount of money in his office, and the causes to which
the several sums belong, but will, also, show what money he has out on loan,
and in what cases; and he will file the notes given by the borrowers with his
Report. The money and notes specified in said report, the Clerk and Master
must keep in his hands during the sitting of the Court ready to be produced,
instanter, if so ordered by the Court and no excuse will be accepted for failing
;
to file said Reports, or to have said money, notes and books on hand.
4. He Must Report Taxes on Lands Sold. "Whenever real estate is sold the Mas-
ter will immediately after the sale, ascertain and report to the Court whether
there are any taxes due and unpaid which were a lien upon said real estate on
the day of sale and if so, the amount of such taxes, the years for which due,
;
and the amount due for each year. Said report shall be attached to said report
of sale.
5. His Report of Sales Must Describe the Land. In making his Report of Sale,
the Clerk and Master will describe the land by metes and bounds, if such descrip-
tion be found in the Record, and if not, then by the best description the Record
gives, unless the decree of sale contains the required description, and then a
reference to the tract or lot described in the decree of sale will be sufficient.
6. He Will Require Receivers, Trustees and Commissioners to Itemize Their
Reports. The Clerk and Master will require the reports of Receivers, Trustees
and Special Commissioners to be minutely itemized so as to show in full detail all
receipts, when and whence received and all expenditures, when, to whom and on
;
what account made, accompanied by the receipts of persons paid, and other
proper vouchers. Receivers will not be allowed to employ counsel, except at
their own expense, without first having obtained the consent of the Chancellor.
7. He Must Have Proof of Publication Ready. When publication is made as to
defendants, the Clerk and Master will file the printer's affidavit of publication,
as required by the statute or, else, have the newspapers containing the publica-
;
tion in open Court on the first day of the appearance term.

8. He Will Enter no Decree Unless in Ink. The Clerk and Master will enter no
have all his reports duly filed, including his financial RULES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE CLERK
and book reports; and should have his amanuensis AND MASTER.
duly employed. Rules for the Guidance )
109a The Chancellor may, by an order like the of the Clerk and Master. \
following, formally declare these rules; and thus The Chancellor this day promulgated the follow-
make them more effective: ing Rules for the Guidance of the Clerk and Master
of this Court, and enjoined the due observance of
the same upon the Clerk and Master, and all others
having business with him, or with his office:
935 the ceErk and master: his powers and duties. § 1171 a
decree, even though read in open Court, unless it is written in ink, and upon not
less than a half sheet of paper. (Chancery Rule III, sec. 1.)
9. He Will Write Amounts in Words, When. The Clerk and Master will, in en-
tering decrees, write all amounts decreed to be paid, to or by any party, in
words, (except hundredths of dollars,) even when the draft contains figures.
The amounts in figures may be added, in parenthesis.
10. He Will Enter Cases on His Rule Docket, When and How. The Clerk and
Master will enter every case on his Rule Docket as soon as the bill has been filed,
giving the name of every complainant and every defendant, the names of the
Solicitors, the penalties of the various bonds, and the names of the sureties on
each bond.
11. He Will Note What and When in His Rule Docket. The Clerk and Master
will note on his Rule Docket the minute, hour and day of the filing of every bill,
especially attachment and injunction bills. He will, also, note on the Rule
Docket, in order of time, every other paper filed or issued in the cause, including
bonds, subpoenas to answer, demurrers, pleas, answers, exhibits, subpoenas to
testify, notices, depositions, affidavits, transcripts, deeds, plats, records, and
every other document or thing left with him to be filed in the cause, except de-
crees. This notation will include the name of the paper or thing, by whom and
when filed and if a deed shall give the names of the vendor and vendee, if a sub-
;
poena to answer or to testify, or depositions, or affidavits, the names of the par-

ties to be summoned or testifying will be stated, and every paper or thing filed
will be so described as to identify it. Said notation will be prima facie evidence
of the filing the paper or thing noted; but will not be deemed notice to the
opposite party when actual notice is necessary.
12. He Will Enter all Bonds' in Full, Where. The Clerk and Master will regis-
ter in a book to be kept for that purpose every prosecution, attachment, injunc-
tion and replevin bond, and every bond given by receivers, special commission-
ers, trustees, or other persons required by the Court to give bond during the
progress of a cause, except appearance bonds and guardian bonds the last two
:
named will be entered in full on the minutes of the Court.

13. He Will Enter Orders and Rules Made by Him, When and Where. Every pro
.confesso, rule in reference to taking depositions, order for scire facias, order
appointing a guardian ad litem, order setting aside a pro confesso, order extend-
ing the time for answering or for taking proof, order opening an account, order
of revivor, order of publication, order requiring original documents to be filed,
and every other order or rule made by the Clerk and Master, shall be, at the
time of making the same, entered in full on his Rule Docket, and duly dated
and signed.
14. He Will Enter all Returns on His Rule Docket. The returns of officers on
subpoenas to answer, on writs of scire facias, on writs of injunctions and attach-
ment, and other process not final, shall be entered in full on the Rule Docket.
The Clerk and Master will require all officers to write their returns in ink.
15. He Will Keep His Books in Detail. The Clerk and Master is imperatively
required to keep his Judgment Index Book, his Cash Book, and his Execution
Docket in the manner required by law. Code, §§ 3016 and 4040. Bills of Costs
must be entered in full on the Execution Docket before any execution is issued,
and must specify each officer, party, witness or other person to whom costs are
due, and on what account owing, giving each item of account and the fee due on
each item. No item of cost will be taxed that does not appear on the Rule Docket
or Minute Book, except costs of final process. The Clerk and Master will be
especially careful to enter in full, on his Execution Docket, the officers' returns
on all executions and writs of possession.
16. He Will Appoint Guardians ad Litem, When. The Clerk and Master will, at
§ 1172 the; clerk and master: his powers and duties. 936
the appearance rule day, appoint guardians ad litem for all minors without
regular guardians.
17. He WillMake What Entries in the Chancellor's Docket The Clerk and Mas-
ter will enter each case on the Chancellor's Docket in the order in which it is
numbered on his Rule Docket and will give it the Rule Docket number. He
;
will note on the Chancellor's Docket, opposite the title of the cause, the date
of the filing of the bill, answer, and other pleadings, the date and fact of filing
of every report, and of the entry of every ride, and of every action in the cause
of record.
§ 1172. The Deputy Clerk and Master His Powers and Duties. The Clerk
: —
and Master has authority to appoint a Deputy, 110 who, before entering on the
discharge of his duties, 111 must take an oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, and of this State, 112 the anti-duelling oath, 113 and an oath faith-
fully to discharge the duties of his office to the best of his skill and ability, 114
which oaths shall be filed in the office of the County Court Clerk. 115 The Dep-
uty Clerk and Master may be appointed by parol, 110 but the better practice is
to make the appointment in writing, and spread it on the minutes of the Court,
the consent of the Chancellor therefor having first been had. The Clerk and
Master, ordinarily, requires his Deputy to give him a bond, conditioned to
faithfully discharge all the duties of the office of Deputy Clerk and Master, and
to account for and pay over all money and property of every kind that may
come or should come into his hands as such Deputy this bond may be moved •
on by the Clerk and Master for any default on the part of his deputy. 117 The
Deputy, thus appointed, has full power to transact all the business of the Clerk
and Master, 118 may receive money on a decree and receipt therefor, 110 and ad-
minister any oath the Clerk and Master can. 120 He may sign official papers
as Deputy, thus: "Witness my hand, this day of — Richard Roe, D.
—
.
C. & M ;
" or thus Witness my hand, this

:
'
' day of John Doe, C. & .
M., by Richard Roe, D. C. & M." 121 In case of the death of the Clerk and Mas-
ter, his Deputy holds the office until the vacancy is filled by appointment. 122
110 Code, § 4050, sub-sec. 4. are the acts of a locum tenens. Montgomery v. Buck,
111 Code, § 758. 6 Hum., 416.
112 Code, § 332. 117 Code, § 3612.
113 Code, §§ 333, 752. 118 Code, § 4050, sub-sec. 4; Martin i. Porter, 4"
114 Code, § 333. Heisk., 413.
115 Code, § 755. 119 Kelley v. Story, 6 Heisk., 205.
116 Bonds v. State, Mort. & Yerg., 146. A
Deputy 120 Campbell v. Boulton, 3 Bax., 357.
appointed but not qualified is a de facto officer, and 121 Beaumont v. Yeatman, 2 Hum., 542; Ament v.
his acts are valid as to third parties. Bank v. Ches- Brennan, 1 Tenn. Ch., 433.
ter, 6 Hum., 480; Kelley V. Story, 6 Heisk., 205: so 122 Code, § 334.
937 solicitors their rights, duties
: and liabilities. § 1 1 73
CHAPTER LXV.
SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES,
: AND LIABILITIES.
§ 1173. The Office and Status of a Solicitor. § 1179. His Compensation for Services in a
§ 1174. His Retainer and Appearance in a Cause.
Cause. § 1180. When a Solicitor Has a Lien for His
§ 1175. The Powers of a Solicitor in a Cause. Fee.
§ 1176. The Duties and Liabilities of a So- § 1181. His Lien, How Enforced.
licitor. § 1182. Guardian ad Litem Fees.
§ 1177. Summary Jurisdiction of the Court § 1183. Some Suggestions for Young Solic-
Over Solicitors. itors.
§ 1178! Confidential Communications to So- § 1184. Briefs of the Facts and the Law.
licitors.
§ 1173. —
The Office and Status of a Solicitor. Solicitors have always been
considered and treated as authorized officers of the Chancery Court. 1 They
constitute a part of the Court; and it is safe to say that our Courts would be
unable to administer justice without the aid of a body of trained lawyers to
present the issues involved in the controversy, to prepare the proofs, to produce
the law applicable to the particular case, and by argument to develop the turn-
ing points in the controversy, and aid the Chancellor in reaching a just con-
clusion. 2
No person is allowed to practice as an attorney or counsel in any of the Courts
of this State without a license, obtained for that purpose, and without having
first taken an oath, in open Court, to support the Constitution of the State, and
of the United States, and to truly and honestly demean himself in the practice
of his profession, to the best of his skill and abilities.
Attorneys and Solicitors are licensed to practice law in the Courts of this
State by the Supreme Court, upon the certificate of the State Board of Law
Examiners made after an examination as to their qualifications. The rules
governing this Board in its examinations of applicants for such a license are
prescribed by the Supreme Court. If, upon such certificate, the Supreme Court
shall find that the applicant is of full age and good moral character, and other-
wise qualified, it enters an order on its minutes licensing and admitting him to
practice as attorney and counselor in all the Courts of the State. 3 This license,
if procured by fraud, may be revoked at any time within two years.
33-
If the
applicant is already licensed to practice in another State, or country, he may be
1
permitted to practice upon producing such license, and satisfactory evidence of

good character, and complying with the rules made by the Supreme Court on
the subject. 4
Judges and Chancellors are prohibited from practicing law in any of the
Courts of this State. The Clerks of the several Courts, and their deputies, are
12 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1840; 2 Greenl. Ev., §147. Chancery Court. This is the term almost universally
Formerly, the sworn Clerks of the Courts were the used in Courts of Chancery; and is recognized by
only agents of parties prosecuting causes in Chan- the Code and the Chancery Rules. Code, §§4369;
cery; but, in consequence of these Clerks being un- 4400; 4402; 4403; 4422-4424; 4464; Ch. Rules, I,
able to transact the increasing business of the Court, §§ 1, 5, 7; II, §§ 3, 7; IV, §§ 2, 3; X, §§ 1, 2. The
the Court admitted Solicitors, as officers of the term "Attorney" is only occasionally used when re-
Court, to appear for and represent suitors in the ferring to Chancery practice. Code, §§4344; 4433;
Court. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1840; 1 Smith's Ch. Pr., 4483. A lawyer who practices in the Circuit and
676. Criminal Courts of our State is usually termed an
Attorneys and Solicitors are recognized as officers attorney.
of the Court by our statutes, as well as by imme- 2 Lawyers' Tax Cases, 8 Heisk., 58"2; 631; 651-
morial usage. See Code, §§3965-3980; Lawyers' 652; Rogers v. Park, 4 Hum., 480; Jones V. Wil-
Tax Cases, 8 Heisk., 569; 582; 585; 631: 635; 650; liamson, 5 Cold., 379. See, also, 1 Dan. Ch. Pr.,
Rogers v. Park, 4 Hum., 480; Jones v. Williamson, 571. Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., Knoxville, 1906.
3 Cold., 379; State v. Underwood, 2 Tenn., (Overt.), 3 Acts of 1903, ch. 247.
92; Hunt v. McClanahan, 1 Heisk., 509. 3a Ibid; State Board V. Williams, 8 Cates, 51.
The term "Solicitor" is generally used in this i Ibid.
book to designate a lawyer who practices in the
§ 1174 SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES
: AND LIABILITIES. 938
also prohibited from practicing in their own Courts, or in any causes com-
menced, brought to, or carried from their Courts, or commenced in any Court
from which an appeal lies to their Court. Sheriffs and other executive officers
shall not practice law in the county for which they are elected, or in any cause
originating or pending in the Courts of that county. 5
The Court, the Clerk, and the adverse party are all interested in knowing
who a party's Solicitor is, as they each have occasion to deal with him in the
progress of a cause. The names of the complainant's Solicitors are usually
signed to the bill, and those of the defendant's Solicitors are signed to the plea,
demurrer, or answer. Such Solicitors are termed Solicitors of record; and a
party suing or defending by a Solicitor is not at liberty to change his Solicitor
without notice of record; and until such notice the form,er Solicitor will be
considered his Solicitor, and he will be bound by his acts. 6
§ 1174. His Retainer and Appearance in a Cause. Retainer is the act of a —
client by which he engages an attorney or Solicitor to manage a suit for him
in Court. 7 This act may be written or verbal, direct or indirect, express or
implied. When a Solicitor appears in a cause, his authority so to do is pre-
sumed. 7a The mere fact of his appearance is always deemed enough evidence
of his authority; and neither the opposite party nor the Court expects or re-
quires any other, in all ordinary cases. 8 This appearance may be (1) by sign-
ing, or having his named signed to, some pleading or other paper filed in the
cause or (2) by entering his name on the rule or trial docket as a Solicitor in
;
the cause; or (3) by appearing before the Chancellor or Master in vacation, or

before the Court, as such Solicitor. 9
Solicitors should be careful to have evidence of their retainer to bring a suit,
especially when they become surety on the prosecution bond. If their client
sign any paper filed in the cause, that will be a sufficient recognition of' the
suit. 10
§ 1175. T3ie Powers of a Solicitor in a Cause. —A
Solicitor has, by virtue of
his retainer, full authority to do anything connected with the prosecution,
defence or general management of the suit, which his client might himself law-
fully do. He may make agreements in reference to the filing or amendment
of pleadings or proofs, may waive notices, may let a pro confesso be set aside,
may make stipulations as to evidence, may extend the adversary's time to plead
or take proof, may agree to a continuance, or do any other act connected with
the preparation of the cause for hearing, or with the pleadings, references,
proofs in the cause, or with the procedure at the hearing. 11
A Solicitor cannot, however, receive anything but money in satisfaction of
his client's recovery, without express authority; nor can he bid his client's
debt on land, or take a deed of trust to secure a debt, or assign a judgment, so
as to bind his client thereby. He cannot compromise a suit without the sanc-
tion of his client but he may assent to a decree 12 if such assent be unfairly
; :
obtained, however, his client may have it set aside on a bill filed for that pur-
pose. 13 By an express provision of the statute, an attorney and counsel has
power to execute, in the name of his client, all bonds or other papers necessary
and proper for the prosecution of the suit at any stage of its progress. 14
5 Code, § 3969. the suitor will be bound. Yerger v. Aiken, 7 Bax.,
6 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1847. Formerly, an order of 539. As to what circumstances are evidence of a
Court was necessary in order to enable a party to retainer, see 2 Greenl. Ev., § 139.
change his Solicitor. Ibid. 8 Jones v. Williamson, 3 Cold., 379.
7 The client should seek the Solicitor, not the 9 See, ante, § 223. A
judgment based on an un-
Solicitor the client: it is highly unprofessional for a authorized appearance by an attorney may be an-
Solicitor to seek a retainer. Ingersoll V. Coal Creek nulled on a bill filed for that purpose. Boro V.
Co., MS., Knoxville, 1906. Harris, 13 Lea, 43.
7a Foster v. Blount, 1 Tenn. (Overt.). 343; Rog- 10 See, ante. § 233.
ers v. Park, 4 Hum., 480; Jones v. Williamson, 5 11 1 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 954-957; Mathews v.
Cold., 379; 1 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 952. Where Massey, 4 Bax., 461; 1 Pars. Cont, 117; 2 Greenl.
a Solicitor is employed for a suitor by a person not Ev., § 141.
duly authorized, but the suitor has knowledge that 12 1 Meigs' Dig., §295; 1 Pars. Cont., 117-118; 1
the Solicitor is representing him, and does not notify A. & E. Ency. of Law, 954-957.
the Solicitor that his services are not desired, but 13 Tones v. Williamson, 5 Cold., 383.
keeps silent and obtains benefits from such services, 14 Code, § 3978.
939 SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES
: AND LIABILITIES. § 1 176
§ 1176. —
The Duties and Liabilities of a Solicitor. The legal duties of a
Solicitor towards his client are care, skill, diligence and integrity. He should
fully disclose to his client every fact in his knowledge important for his client
to know. 15 He is required to exhibit the utmost good faith in all his dealings
with his client; and will not be allowed to use his influence to obtain gifts,
conveyances, or good bargains from his client while that relation exists, except
on full proof of the utmost fairness and good faith in the transaction. 10 A
Solicitor is liable to his client for any loss suffered by his client in consequence
of his want of reasonable diligence, or want of ordinary skill he is, also, liable ;
for all moneys' or other property by him received by virtue of his retainership. 17
1. The Duties of a Solicitor to the Court are: 1, To faithfully observe such law-
ful rules as the Court has prescribed for the government of the bar; 2, To
observe the utmost good faith in all his intercourse with the Court and its
officers; 3, To conduct himself as a gentleman while present in Court; and 4,
At all times and places to obey the law of the land, and maintain an honorable
reputation.
2. The Duties of a Solicitor to His Client are: 1, To manage his cause with care,
skill and integrity; 2, To keep his client truly informed as to the state of the
case; 3, To keep inviolate the secrets of his client and of his client's business;
and 4, In all matters to observe the utmost good faith. 18
§ 1177. Summary Jurisdiction of the Court Over Solicitors. The Court —
exercises a summary jurisdiction over Solicitors in reference to all matters re-
lating to their employment, their conduct in a cause, their deportment in Court,
and their dealings with their clients and with the other officers of the Court.
This jurisdiction extends to 1, staying or dismissing proceedings begun by a
:
Solicitor without authority, and taxing the Solicitor with the costs thereof; 2,
compelling a Solicitor to observe good faith with his clients 3, preventing him ;
from disclosing privileged communications 4, requiring him to surrender doc-

;
uments or funds received by him as Solicitor in a cause, and which he has no

right to retain 5, taxing him with the costs incident to striking impertinent or
;
scandalous matter out of a pleading drawn or filed by him 6, suspending them ;
pending charges against them; 7, striking them from the roll for unprofes-
sional conduct, or gross misbehavior, or general disreputable deportment; 19
and 8, requiring them to serve as guardians ad litem and Solicitors, without fee,
for persons under disability, and paupers. 193- The statutory provisions on this
subject are as follows
The several Courts of this State may strike from their rolls any person not
authorized to practice in such Courts, and also any practicing attorney or
counsel, upon evidence satisfactory to the Court that he has been guilty of any
such misdemeanor, or acts of immorality or impropriety, as are inconsistent
with the character, or incompatible with the faithful discharge of the duties,
of his profession. If charges are preferred against an attorney or counsel to
any Court, they must be reduced to writing, and a copy furnished the person
accused, who may appear and show cause against the charges. The person
stricken from the rolls on any of the foregoing grounds, or for other good
cause, shall not be permitted to practice the profession in any Court of Record
in this State. He may, however, appeal from the decision of the inferior Court
to the Supreme Court, as in other cases. 20
The statute requires Solicitors to faithfully account for all money received
15 1 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 958-962; 2 Greenl. IS See Bouv. Law. Die, "Attorney;" 1 A. &
E.
Ev., § 144. Ency. of Law, 958-963. It is the duty of a Solicitor,
16 Rose V. Mynatt, 7 Yerg., 30; Bank v. Horn- knowing of a collusive suit, to inform the Chancellor
berger, 4 Cold., 531; McMahan v. Smith, 6 Heisk., thereof. Ward v. Alsup, 16 Pick., 738.
171. 19 2 Greenl. Ev., §147; Code, §§3970-3972; 1 A.
17 ASolicitor impliedly contracts (1) that he pos- & E. Ency. of Law, 944-948; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1840-
sesses the requisite legal skill and knowledge; (2) Fields v. State, Mart. & Yerg., 171; Smith v. State,
that he will exercise due diligence; and (3) that he 1 Yerg., 228.
will observe the utmost good faith. 2 Greenl. Ev., 19a See, post, § 1182, note 52; Code, §§ 3979-3980.
§ 144; 1 A. & E. Errcy. of Law., 958-963. 20 Code, §§ 3970-3972.
§ 1 178 solicitors their rights, duties
: and liabilities. 940
by them; and provides that any lawyer collecting or receiving money in his
professional capacity, by suit or otherwise, and failing to pay the same to the
party entitled, on demand, may be moved against by the party aggrieved, as
prescribed in sections 3616-3619, of the Code and that if the execution issued
;
upon the judgment recovered by motion, is returned unsatisfied as to any part

of the principal or costs, it shall be the duty of the Court to strike the name
of such delinquent lawyer from the list of attorneys and he shall be disquali- ;
fied from practicing in any Court in this State, until the judgment and costs
are paid. 21
Solicitors, being officers of the Court, may be required to perform various
duties by the Court, without compensation. They may be called on to examine
the financial report of the Clerk and Master, to see that the same is correct in
every respect. 22 And it is enacted by the Code, that at the return term of the
process, the Court shall appoint counsel for the plaintiff, in actions prosecuted
in the manner prescribed for paupers and also for the defendant, if he make
;
oath that, owing to his poverty, he cannot employ counsel. 23

§ 1178. Confidential Communications to Solicitors. The relations between —
a Solicitor and his client are of the most confidential nature, and have always
been deemed sacred; 24 and the Courts have uniformly protected the' client
against any betrayal on the part of the Solicitor. In Tennessee, it is provided
by statute, that no attorney or counsel shall be permitted, in giving testimony
against a client, or person who consulted him professionally, to disclose any
communication made to him as attorney by such person, during the pendency
of the suit, before or afterwards, to his injury and that any attorney offering
;
to give testimony in any such case shall be rejected by the Court, and is guilty
of a misdemeanor, for which, on conviction, he shall be fined not exceeding one
thousand dollars, to be assessed by the jury, and imprisoned not exceeding two
years and, if a practicing attorney, shall also be stricken from the rolls. 25
;
Facts communicated by a client to his counsel are under the seal of confi-
dence, and cannot be disclosed in proof. This is a rule of protection to the
client, and not a privilege to the attorney. The latter is not allowed, if he
would, to break this seal of secrecy and confidence. The rights of clients re-
quire that their intercourse with their attorneys should be protected by pro-
found secrecy; and that all their communication should be free, and unembar-
rassed by any apprehensions of disclosure or betrayal. 26
This rule has been adopted out of regard to the interests of justice, which
cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on,
without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts,
and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject
of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one
would be thrown upon his own legal resources. Deprived of professional
assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would
only dare to tell his counsellor half his case. 27
21 Code, §§ 3976-3977. paper, in the course of their employment on his be-
22 M. & V.'s Code, § 386. half, matters which they know only through their
23 Code of 1858, § 3980. professional relation to the client; they are not only
24 Of the laws of the XII Tables, this fragment is justified in withholding such matters but they are
:
preserved: Patronus, si clienti fraudem fecerit, bound to withhold them; and they will not be com-
sacer esto. (Accursed be he who wrongs his client.) pelled to disclose the information, or to produce the
See note to 1 Greenl. Ev., § 240, as to the civil law papers in any Court of Law or Equity, either as a
on the subject. party or as a witness. If this protection were con-
25 Code, §§3973: 3975. fined to cases where proceedings had been com-
26 McManus v. State, 2 Head, 214; 1 Greenl. Ev., menced, the rule would exclude the most confiden-
§§ 237-243. tial, and, it may be, the most important, of all com-
27 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 571.
In regard to such confidential communications, it
—
munications, those made with a view of being pre-
pared, either for instituting or for defending a suit
does not appear that the protection is qualified by up to the instant that the process of the Court was
any reference to proceedings pending, or in contem- issued. If it were confined to proceedings begun, or
plation. If counsel receive a communication in their in contemplation, then every communication would
professional capacity, touching matters that come be unprotected, which a party makes with a view to
within the ordinary scope of professional employ- his general defence against attacks, which he appre-
ment, either from a client, or on his account and for hends, although at the time no one may have re-
his benefit, in the transaction of his business; or, solved to assail him. But, were it allowed to extend
which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to over such communications, the protection would still
Communications, however, are not privileged : 1, Where the communication
was made before the attorney was employed as such, or after his employment
has ceased; or 2, Where, although consulted by a friend, because he was an
attorney, yet he refused to act as such and was therefore only applied to as a
;
friend or 3, Where there could not be said, in any correctness of speech, to be

;
a communication at all as where, for instance, a fact, something that was

;
done, became known to him, from his having been brought to a certain place
by the circumstance of his being the attorney, but of which fact any other man,
if there, would have been equally cognizant, (and even this has been held priv-
ileged in some of the cases) or 4, Where the matter communicated was not in
;
its nature private, and could in no sense be termed the subject of a confidential
disclosure or, 5, Where the thing disclosed had no reference to the professional
;
employment, although disclosed while the relation of attorney and client sub-
sisted or, 6, Where the attorney made himself a subscribing witness, and there-
;
by assumed another character for the occasion and, adopting the duties which ;
it imposes, became bound to give evidence of all that a subscribing witness

can be required to prove or, 7, Where he and his client engaged in the perpe-
;
tration of a fraud, he will be required to testify in regard to it, for contriving

frauds is no part of his professional occupation. In all such cases, it is plain
that the attorney is not called upon to disclose matters, which he can be said
to have learned by communication with his client, or on his client's behalf; or
matters, which were so committed to him in his capacity of attorney; or mat-
ters, which in that capacity alone he had come to know. 28
TheSolicitor is not only required to plead this professional privilege, but
if he the duty of the Court to forbid the disclosure of any
fail so to do, it is
privileged communication, especially if such action of the Court is invoked by
the client, or by a Solicitor of the client. 29 Solicitor cannot be compelled to A
discover any privileged communication, even when made a defendant to a bill
of discovery, and it is his duty to raise the objection by demurrer if it appear
on the face of the bill, or by plea, if it do not appear. 30
§ 1179. His Compensation for Services in a- Cause. Solicitor is entitled —A
to reasonable compensation for his services, in the absence of an express con-
tract fixing the amount of his fee. 31 Where a definite contract has been made,
the client is liable therefor, and this liability continues even if he discharge
his Solicitor without cause, or compromise the suit. 32
Where the parties are sui juris, the Court ordinarily declines to do more in
reference to fees than, on application of the Solicitor, to declare a lien in his
favor upon the recovery obtained by his client in the cause. 33 But where the
complainant is an executor, administrator, guardian, or other trustee, and
where the bill is to wind up an insolvent estate, or insolvent corporation, or is
a general creditors' bill, or a bill in the nature of a general creditors' bill, or
a bill by an executor, or other trustee, for the construction of a will or other
trust instrument, 34 the Court will, as a rule, on the application of the complain-
ant, fix and decree the amount reasonably due his Solicitor for his services in
be insufficient, if it only included communications sometimes said that the fee should be fixed
31 It is
more or less connected with judicial proceedings; in thecontract of retainer; but this is difficult.
for a person oftentimes requires the aid of profes- The Solicitor cannot foretell what services he will
sional advice upon the subject of his rights and his be called on to perform, and if the fee were fixed in
liabilities, with no reference to any particular litiga- advance it would possess too many of the characteris-
tion, and without any other reference to litigation tics of a game of hazard. The proper time to fix the
generally, than all human affairs have, in so far as fee,where the amount of professional skill and labor
every transaction may, by possibility, become the are uncertain, is at the termination of the litigation,
subject of judicial inquiry. It would be most mis- in suits in Chancery.

chievous, if it could be doubted whether or not an 32 .bright v. Taylor, 4 Sneed, 159; McLain v.
attorney, consulted upon a man's title to an estate, Williams, 8 Yerg., 230.
33 Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heisk., 95; Hill v. Ford,
was at liberty to divulge a flaw. Sto. Eq. PI., § 600;
1 a 3 Shan. Cas., 531.
28 Sto. Eq/'Pl., §§ 601-602; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 575- 34 Read V. St. Railway Co., 2 Cates, 316. But
578 not so on a bill by a legatee to construe a will.
29 See, Code, §§3973-3975; Scales v. Kelley, 2 Ensley v. Ensley, 21 Pick., 107.
Lea 706
ao Ante, § 1123; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 571-578.
§ 1 180 SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES
the cause 35 and will order it to be paid out of the general or trust fund. In
;
partition suits the Court may, in its discretion, order the fees of the Solicitors
for the complainant and the defendant to be paid out of the common fund,
where the property is sold for partition, and taxed as costs in cases where the
property is partitioned in kind. 30
When a Solicitor Has a Lien for His Pee. By statute a Solicitor
§ 1180. —
who begins a suit has a lien to secure his fees upon the complainant's right of
action from the filing of the bill and a Solicitor employed to prosecute a suit,
;
already begun, has a like lien from the date of his employment, provided he
gives notice of his employment on the rule docket, or files a memorandum
stating his employment, with the papers in the case, or notifies the defendant
thereof. 37 Under this statute the Solicitor's lien attaches to all that is recov-
ered by the complainant as the result of the litigation, whether the recovery
be money, chattels, lands, or interests or equities in chattels or lands.
But aside from the statute, a Solicitor has a lien to secure his reasonable fee
upon everything that comes into his hands, or that comes to his client by virtue
of his retainer or services in a suit 3S and this lien attaches to all papers, deeds,
;
or documents, choses in action, or other property obtained by him from his

client, and to all money, chattels, lands and equities in chattels or lands, recov-
ered by his client as the result of the litigation 39 and he has a right to have
;
his lien upon such recovery declared, and perpetuated of record in the cause
and thus made secure against the treachery or ingratitude of his client, or the
rapacity of his client's creditors. 40
The Solicitor 's lien attaches to the recovery, and when there is- a recovery,
either by the decree of the Court, or by the compromise of the parties, or by an
award of arbitrators pursuant to a submission in a pending suit, this lien fast-
ens itself thereon, and cannot be loosened or nullified by any act of the parties
to the suit, or by any intervention of any creditor of the complainant. 41 As
soon as there is any such recovery the Solicitor's lien not only attaches to it,
but it relates to the beginning of the suit, and is superior to the lien of any
attaching, garnishing, judgment or other creditors, and is superior to any con-
tracts or compromises between the parties during the suit, or after the decree. 42
If property is impounded by attachment, injunction or other impounding
process, or is in the hands of a receiver, or the Clerk of the Court, the lien of
the complainant's Solicitor attaches thereto, as the property is in the custody
of the Court, and this lien is not affected by any compromise, or adjustment
between the parties or by £he dismissal of the suit. 43
The Solicitor of a defendant who is sui juris has no lien upon property, real
or personal, merely protected by him in a litigation where he has made a suc-
cessful defence for his client. 44 To entitle any Solicitor to a lien there must be
35 See V. Nelson, 1 Tenn. Ch., 615; Moses

Yourie At common law. unless the lien is declared of rec-
V. Ocoee Bank,1 Lea, 414; Keith V. Fitzhugh, 15 ord, or notice of the lien otherwise given the de-
Lea, Whitsell V. City Building Association, 3
49; fendant, he may pay the complainant the full amount
Tenn. Ch., 526; Rains v. Rainey, 11 Hum., 261. of the decree, or may otherwise satisfy and adjust
The principle recognized in all these cases, except the it with the complainant, in which case the Solicitor
first, is that where a bill impounds or secures a fund must look alone to the complainant for his reasonable
in which third persons may share, or where the bill fee. 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1842-1845; 1 A. & E. Ency.
is for the common benefit of all interested in a fund, of Law, 969-973. While perhaps not necessary now
the Solicitor of the complainant is entitled to be paid by reason of said statute, it is a prudent course to
out of the fund, for his services have been for the have the lien declared by the Court upon the recov-
benefit of all who come in under the bill. But ery, and, in case of an appeal and affirmance, by the
Solicitors who represent defendants or petitioning Supreme Court. Covington V. Bass, 4 Pick., 499.
creditors, must look exclusively to their own clients Such a declaration rivets the lien and gives it addi-
for their fees. Moses v. Ocoee Bank, 1 Lea, 414; tional force and dignity. See Guild v. Borner, 7
Keith V. Fitzhugh, 15 Lea, 49. Bax., 266.
36 Acts of 1887, ch. 183. 41 Tompkins V. Railroad, 2 Cates, 157.
37 Acts of 1899, ch. 243; Railroad V. Wells, 20 42 See Tompkins v. Railroad, 2 Cates, 157; Dam-
Pick., 706; Tompkins v. Railroad, 2 Cates, 157. ron V. Robertson, 12 Lea, 372; Hunt v. McClanahan,
38 Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch., 618. 1 Heisk., 503; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch., 618;
39 Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch., 618; 3 Pars. and Cunningham v. McGrady, 2 Bax., 141.
Cont., 270. The lien is on the net recovery, after 43 Pleasants v. Kortrecht, 5 Heisk., 694; Sharp «.
satisfying all set-offs and superior equities. Hays Allen, 11 Lea, 518; Brown v. Bigley, 3 Tenn. Ch.,
v. Dalton, 5 Lea, 560; Blackburn v. Clarke, 1 Pick., 621.
506. 44 Garner v. Garner, 1 Lea, 29. The words,
40 Electric Light Co. v. Gas Co., 15 Pick., 371. "where there has been no actual recovery," at the
an actual recovery of money or property by his client as the result of the
Solicitor's services in the cause. 45 So if a Solicitor for a defendant obtain a
recovery for his client he is entitled to a lien upon it for his reasonable fee. 46
§ 1181. His Lien, How —
Enforced. Where the fee is not fixed by contract,
all the Court will do, ordinarily, where the parties are all sui juris, will be, on
application of the complainant's Solicitor, to declare a lien upon the recovery
for his reasonable compensation as Solicitor in the cause. 47 In such a case, it
will be necessary, in case of disagreement between him and his client, for him
to file an original bill to enforce his lien on the fund, or on the property recov-
ered, as the case may be. 48 If the lien is upon a fund in Court, the Solicitor
usually directs the Clerk to retain the amount he claims, and to pay out the
balance. 49 Where the fund is in Court, however, at the time of the decree, the
Court would have jurisdiction, on petition by the Solicitor, to which his client
is made a defendant by personal service of process, to order the Master to ascer-
tain and report 1, whether there was any contract between the Solicitor and
:
his client as to the amount of the fee, and if so, the amount so fixed and 2, if ;
no contract, what would be a reasonable fee for the Solicitor for his services
in the cause. On the incoming of the report, the Court would determine the
amount of the fee, and direct the Master to pay it out of the fund in Court. 50
But such a petition cannot be filed in the original cause after the close of the
term at which the final decree was pronounced. 51
The form of declaring a lien upon the recovery in a cause is substantially as
follows
DECLARATION OP LIEN FOR FEE.
[After the recovery has been adjudged, add:] And on application of Greene & Shields, the
Solicitors of the complainant, [or, defendant, in case there is a recovery by the defendant,]
a lien is hereby declared in their favor upon the recovery of their client in this cause for
their reasonable fees as his Solicitors in this cause, [or, for their reasonable fees for their ser-
vices as his Solicitors in this cause and such lien is declared to be superior to the attachment
;
lien of A
B, in the case of said A
B vs. C D (complainant in the original cause,) consolidated
with this cause.]
§ 1182. Guardian ad Litem Fees. Where the ward has an estate in the —
hands of the Court, or has property involved in the litigation, the Court will
allow the guardian ad litem a reasonable fee for all services rendered his ward,
as his Solicitor in the cause, such fee to be paid out of any fund in Court be-
longing to the ward. 52 If the guardian ad litem and Solicitor has obtained a
recovery of land or money for his ward, the Court will declare a lien on the
recovery for a reasonable Solicitor's fee, which fee the Court will ordinarily
fix. As a rule, Solicitors for defendants who are sui juris have no lien on prop-
erty protected by them in a litigation but guardians ad litem who render ser-;
vices as Solicitors are entitled to a lien upon the wards' property protected,
for reasonable compensation for services rendered in protecting the same; 53
and if there be no fund in Court, the property will be put in the hands of a
close of the opinion in this case, should read, K. Railroad, 4 Bax., 97; Brown </, Bigley, 3 Tenn.
"where there has been an actual recovery." Ch., 618.
45 Winchester V. Heiskell, 16 Lea, 565; Damron V. 49 The Clerk would make himself liable for the
Robertson, 12 Lea, 372; Memphis Gaslight Cases, 21 amount of the fee, if he should pay out the whole
Pick., 268. of a fund upon which the Solicitor had a lien of
46 Damron 13. Robertson, 372.
12 But notLea, record for his fee.
on a homestead. McBrown
Whitfield, 24 Pick.,
v. 50 If the client should move to dismiss the peti-
422 unless the homesteader be a widower, and con-
; tion, or dispute the jurisdiction of the Court, or the
sents. McLean v. Lerch, 21 Pick., 693. For cases propriety of the' practice, the Court could order the
where a defendant may have a recovery see, ante, petition to be filed and treated as an original bill.
§§ 559-560. See note to Clement v. State, 2 Shan. 51 Payne v. Payne, 22 Pick., 467.
Cas., 251. Where a Solicitor for a defendant ob- 52A guardian ad litem can have no fee where his
tains a recovery for his client he is, pro hac vice, ward has no estate in Court. Pritchard V. Pritchard,
a Solicitor for a complainant, and within the Equity 2 Ch. Apps., 294. See Bowling v. Scales, 1 Tenn.
of the statute, the nominal defendant in such a case Ch., 618. His fee cannot be taxed as a part of the
being, pro hac vice, a complainant. Equity regards costs. Patton v. Dixon, 21 Pick., 97. To serve
substance, not forms and names. See, ante, § 43, without a fee in such a case is one of the obliga-
and notes. tions he assumes when he takes his license; Ibid;
47 Hill v. Ford, 3 Shan. Cas., 531. If the client and he performs a knightly service which he should
is under disability the Court will fix the fee, on a deem an honor. See, ante, § 1177.
reference. Ibid. 53 Kerbaugh v. Vance, 5 Lea, 113; Persons V.
48 Perkins v. Perkins, 9 Heisk., 95; State v. E. & Young, 7 Lea, 293.
§ 1 183 SOLICITORS THEIR RIGHTS, DUTIES
receiver, with directions to apply the net rents to the liquidation of the amount
decreed the guardian ad litem. 6 * Where the property of an infant or married
woman is sought to be sold for the support or education of the owner, or be-
cause manifestly for the interest of its owner, the Court will appoint both a
guardian ad litem and a Solicitor, and in such a case is allowed by statute to fix
the compensation of such Solicitor, which shall be the same whether a sale is
ordered or not, but which shall in no event exceed one hundred dollars. 55
§ 1183. —
Some Suggestions for Young Solicitors. Young Solicitors must re-
member that law does not grow naturally in the brain, however large the cran-
ium may be, and however great the vacant spaces therein. A knowledge of the
law can only be acquired by constant and thoughtful study; and neither rich
raiment, nor fine cigars, nor choice liquors, stimulate the growth of this knowl-
edge. A
young lawyer's proper place in business hours, when not elsewhere
professionally engaged, is in his office; and his proper work there is either
reading up on some legal questions on which he is deficient, or investigating
the law or the facts of cases wherein he has been retained. Men who have
money are generally men who have sense, and they do not go to loafing places
to find a lawyer, they well knowing that good lawyers have no time to loaf,
and that loafers are generally lazy and negligent of business even if they —
know the law, which they seldom do.
Men who have money are discerning, and they look out for a sober, diligent,
studious, attentive and trustworthy lawyer when they have important legal
business. Nowhere do industry, application, temperance and integrity reap a
more bountiful reward than in the legal profession, and nowhere is true merit
so sure of ultimate success.
The following further suggestions may be of benefit to the younger members
of the bar
1. Fidelity to Clients, and its Limits. To your clients be true but do not allow;
your fidelity to them to tempt you to be false to yourself. Fidelity to a client

in Chancery goes no further than what is lawful and proper to do and say in
enforcement or protection of his legal or equitable rights. A
Solicitor is under
no legal or moral obligation to assert an illegal or inequitable claim, or to set
up an illegal or inequitable defence, or to take an unconscientious advantage
of an adversary, in order to promote his client's welfare. The law is an hon-
orable profession, intended for the promotion of justice, and not a trade of
trickery, for the purposes of fraud or oppression. Be content with a moderate
fee, one rather low than large. 58
2. Retainers Where Previous Counsel. A
Solicitor should not accept a retainer
in a suit already brought without first satisfying himself that such retainer
will be perfectly agreeable to the counsel already retained in the cause, except
in cases where the original counsel are neglecting their client's interests, and
his welfare imperatively requires immediate, affirmative action.
3. Agreements, How Made and Performed. All agreements in reference to the
pleadings, proof, procedure, or progress of a cause made with the opposite
counsel, should be complied with in the utmost good faith, even though your
client disapprove such agreements. Never, however, make an agreement affect-
ing the merits of the suit without the consent or authority of your client; and
never make any agreements with the opposite party in the* absence of his
counsel.
54 Persons v. Young, 7 Lea, 293. parties whose interests are not always the interests
55 Code, § 3330. The Court generally appoints of the ward.
some reputable member of the bar both guardian A
56 mongrel dog will fight off all other beasts of
ad litem and Solicitor. See, Kerbaugh v. Vance, prey only to devour the lamb himself. Patronus
5 Lea, 113. the defendant has a Solicitor al-
If si clienti fraudem fecerit sacer esto. (If an attorney
ready employed, the Court would have no authority perpetrates a fraud upon his client let him be con-
to appoint one; but, in such a case, the guardian demned to death.) This was one of the laws of the
ad litem has the extra duty devolved on him of XII Tables.
guarding the interests of his ward against such
Solicitor, who is sometimes really in the employ of
4. When a Witness in Your Own Cause. Never argue a cause in which you are
a witness, unless, perhaps, in eases where your testimony is absolutely undis-
puted. And, if in any case, your testimony is very material, and is liable to be
controverted, make it a point of honor to decline a retainer in the cause.
5. When and Where to Make Motions. If you have any motion to make, or any
matter to bring to the attention of the Court, do not wait until the Sheriff has
been directed to adjourn the Court for dinner, or until the next day; but bring
your matter forward in due season, and from your place behind the bar table.
It is decidedly unprofessional to bring up your matters before the Chancellor
by drawing near to the bench as the Chancellor is about to leave it, or by seek-
ing him on the street, or in his room. Such conduct is decidedly offensive to
the Chancellor, although his courteousness may conceal from you the great
repugnance he has for such unprofessional deportment on your part.
6. Manner of Making an Argument. The most effective style for the Chancery
Court is a plain, business-like, matter-of-fact manner of presenting your case,
conversational in tone and gesture, and far removed from the declamatory and
gesticulatory style usual before juries, and on the stump.
Address your argument to the Chancellor, and to his intellect; not to his
eyes, nor to his ears, nor to his heart. Avoid putting questions to adverse counsel
during your argument questions provoke replies, and replies are often un-
:
seemly, and nearly always profitless. Courts are places of business, and the
public time should not be unnecessarily wasted by contentions between counsel.
"When you have no longer anything to say, close your argument, and take your
seat. 57
Never open your argument with an apology. Apologies discourage your
clients, dishearten your friends, disgust the Court, and satisfy nobody but your
adversaries. An apology is a confession of weakness, or of ignorance, or of
negligence. If you are not prepared to make an argument, do not undertake
to stuff undressed and uncooked food down the throat of the Court. The very
best argument you can make when fully prepared, may give very little light to
the Chancellor; and if you have not put oil in your lamp, don't light it, as it
will emit nothing but smoke and a bad smell. In such a case, act the man,
return your client the fee he has paid you, and apologize to him for ever taking
it: this is the only apology that is proper in such a case. If you have made
preparations, and yet open with an apology, your insincerity and hypocrisy
will nauseate and disgust all who hear you. Hence, whether you are prepared
or unprepared, never open an argument with an apology. great majority of A
all apologies are insincere, and are often mere results of vanity or weakness.
7. Use of Hackneyed Expressions at the Bar. Never use such hackneyed ex-
pressions as, "This is in many respects the most outrageous case that ever was
tried in a Court House " " This is the plainest case ever submitted to a Court
; ; '
"I have never, in all my practice as a lawyer, seen or heard of a grosser case
of fraud;" "This enlightened Court;" "This intelligent jury;" "Such an
argument is ridiculous, " or " too absurd to waste time on " " The most remark- ;
able proposition ever stated in a Court;" "Tour Honor is bound to find" so

and so "Your Honor can't do" so and so "Tour Honor would stultify your-
; ;
self" by doing so and so; "It would be a gross outrage on justice for your
Honor to do" so and so, and the like.
Tou need not "thank the Court for its attention:" it is the Court's duty to
attend and, if your argument is of any value and duly brief, the Chancellor
;
feels like thanking you.

57 The Court should adhere with pertinacity to the The right to open and close the argument is his
rule allowingthe affirmative to open and close. on whom
the pleadings devolve the burden of proof.
Some Solicitors for the negative are never content If the burden of proving any of the issues is on the
unless they have the last argument. These should complainant, he has the right to open and close the
be made to conform to the rule, otherwise the rule argument. If, on the other hand, the entire burden
is broken down and the affirmative deprived of a of proof is on the defendant, he ought to have the
legal right. right to begin and conclude. Best Pr. Ev., § 637.
§ 1 184 solicitors THEIR rights, duties
: and liabilities. 946
8. Reference to Matters Dehors the Record. Some Solicitors seem to rely not
a little on facts they assume that the Chancellor knows, and endeavor to inter-
polate them into the record, when often the Chancellor does not know them
at all; or, if he does, cannot consider them. 58 Such Solicitors, in argument,
will say, "Tour Honor knows that (such an one, naming him,) is a good and
reliable man," or "Your Honor knows (him) too well to require any proof as
to his character," or "Tour Honor knows the farm,'' [house, creek road, or
other locality,] or "Tour Honor knows the business of," or "the price of," or
'
the value of such and such things, or Tour Honor has had experience,
'
'
'
'
' ' or '
"knows," or "has seen," or "has heard," or "has read" so and so about the
case, or about some person, thing, place or occurrence connected with the case.
All- such references, allusions, assumptions and implications are indirect at-
tempts to make the Chancellor a witness in the case and, while not always so
;
intended, are really attempts to tamper with the Court.

9. Posture While Addressing the Court. Solicitors, unless excused because of
some infirmity, should stand while addressing the Court. To sit on the railing
of the bar, or on a bar table, or on the back of a chair, or to lean against a pillar,
or a desk, or to rest one foot upon a chair, or to otherwise prop one's self up,
or to make any other exhibition of laziness or indifference while addressing
the Court, is not only a gross violation of propriety, and an evidence of boorish-
ness and ill-breeding, but is, also, a sign that the Solicitor so offending has
either no respect for the Court, or no confidence in his cause, or both. The
conviction of a man that he is in the right stiffens his backbone, contracts his
muscles, and causes him to assume, unconsciously, an erect, dignified and manly
attitude and the impulses of an inherent politeness give him a grace of posture
;
that at once adorns the speaker, and commands the respect and admiration of
those who hear him.
10. How to Take an Adverse Decision. Solicitors should remember that both
sides cannot be right, and cannot be victors, in the same suit. What appears
plain to their prejudiced sight may appear very doubtful to a person who is
absolutely indifferent. The Chancellor's business is to decide, and one party
or the other must lose. The winning side should never exhibit any evidences
of triumph and the losing side should carefully conceal any emotions of cha-
;
grin, disappointment, or displeasure.

Some Solicitors, as soon as the Chancellor has delivered an opinion adverse
to them, turn to the Solicitor sitting nearest, and intimate or charge that the
Chancellor's opinion shows that he neither understood the law nor the facts
of the case and that they will reverse him in the Supreme Court from top to
;
bottom. Other Solicitors, on losing a case, make a personal matter of it, and
have a spell of the pouts, like a school girl whose chewing gum has been taken
away from her. Solicitors who so act, however, are generally young and inex-
perienced, whose professional skins are thin and tender, and not yet hardened
by the blows received in battles at the bar. Veteran Solicitors take defeat in
such good humor that the Chancellor sometimes regrets his inability to decide
in their favor. The triumph of the victor is often eclipsed by the genial, gra-
cious manner in which the vanquished submits to his fate. 59
§ 1184.Briefs of the Facts and the Law.— The Chancery Rules require that
when a cause is reached, each Solicitor shall produce and read to the Court a
brief written in ink, plainly showing the points in the cause raised by the
58 See, ante, §§ 62, sub-sec. 1; 451. to the Court,and is the outgrowth of criminal prac-
59 Some few Solicitors endeavor to break their tice where amotion for a new trial is necessary to
fall, or rally their spirits, by rising and moving for prevent a convicted defendant being prayed into the
a new trial, or praying an appeal, as soon as the custody of the Sheriff. The proper time in a civil
jury deliver their verdict, or the Chancellor an- cause to pray for a new trial or an appeal is at the
nounces his decision. Such exhibitions of petulance next motion morning after the decision, unless there
not only excite the ridicule or contempt of the bal- be some special reason for urgency. Dignity and
ance of the bar and the bystanders, but are down- courtesy are two of the brightest jewels in a law-
right disrespectful and discourteous to the jury and yer's crown.
pleadings and the proof, together with the authorities relied on in argu-
ment. 00 All Courts are anxious to have briefs they greatly aid in eliminating :
the surplus rubbish in the cause, and in enabling the Judges to concentrate their
attention upon the turning points in the controversy. One of the principal
offices of the Solicitors of a Court is to aid the Court in reaching a conclusion
both on the facts and on the law and they are rightfully expected to sift and
;
marshal the facts, and search out the law, in advance of the hearing, to the end
that the Chancellor may be profited by their labors and knowledge, and his own
labors be proportionately lessened. Hence, it may be laid down as a fundamen-
tal rule, that no Solicitor does his full duty to himself, or to his client, or to the
Court, unless he produces at the hearing the brief required bv the Chancery
Rule.
The following general form may be of some service in the preparation of
briefs for theChancery Court
FORM OF A BRIEF, ei
John Doe,
vs. Brief for Complainant.
Richard Roe , etal. J
The first question of fact in this case is [Here state it clearly and briefly; and not ar-
:
gumentatively.]
Complainant maintains that [Here state it briefly, thus: that there was a contract, or, a
fraud, or, a notice, or, a deed, or, a debt, or, a trust, or, a lien, or some other equity claimed
in the bill.]
Dep. of John Doe, q. and ans., 9.
Letter of Richard Roe, exhibited to his dep., xq. and ans., 12.
II.
The second question of fact is [Here : state it clearly and briefly.] Complainant maintains
that [Show the precise point in issue, and the precise proof sustaining your contention.]
Dep. of Wm. Brown, qs. and ans. 8, 16, 20, 21 xqs. and ans., 5 to 7.
;
Deed from Wm. Brown to Richard Roe, exhibited to Roe's answer.

Henry Jones, defendant's witness, is contradicted by Wm. Brown: q. and ans., 6; and is,
also, discredited by David Doe and John Smith.

in.
The question of law in the case is
first [Here state it briefly and clearly, without any
:
argumentation, thus: Whether the cause of 'action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Complainant maintains that it is not, because 1st, The defendant was complainant's agent
and concealed the cause of action and 2d, Defendant held the money [or property] as
;
express trustee.
See Peebles v. Green, 6 Lea, 474, as to both points.
IV.
The second question of law is: [Here state it briefly and plainly, without argument, thus:
Can an administrator, by filing a bill to sell the land of his intestate to pay debts, defeat the
right of the purchaser of an heir's title at a judicial sale made before the administrator's
billwas filed?]
Complainant contends that he cannot.
A bona fide purchaser from the heir may hold the heir's interest against the administrator,
or a creditor.
Smith vs. Thomas, 14 Lea, 324.
Gibson vs. Jones, 13 Lea. 684.
Raht vs. Meek, 5 Pick., 274.
Then why may not a purchaser of the heir's interest at a judicial sale hold such interest?
H. H. IngBrsotx, Solicitor.
00 Ch. Rule, X, § 2; § 1199. The Court has made 2d.' That any law that gives much light to counsel
rules not to hear Equity causes unless briefs are will give some light to the Court.
filed. See Peck, 436, 442; 443; 457, where the 3d. That one authority to the point is sufficient,
former rules will be found. unless it has been questioned, modified, or over-
61 The younger lawyers are inclined to be too ruled.
elaborate in their briefs, and the older lawyers to 4th. That elaborate argumentation is out of place
be too laconic. The following general rules may in a brief. The skeleton only of the argument should
well be observed in preparing briefs: be given.
1st. That the Court knows the elementary law.
§1185 THE SHERIFF: HIS DUTIES. 948
CHAPTER LXVI.
THE SHERIFF: HIS DUTIES.
1185. The Office of the Sheriff. § 1188. Some Suggestions in Reference to
1186. The General Duties of the Sheriff. the Sheriff's Duties in Term Time.
1187. Duties of the Sheriff While Court is
in Session.
§ 1185. —
The Office of the Sheriff. All Courts are powerless without officers
to execute their process, and to enforce their mandates. The Legislature may
enact laws the Chancellor can deliberate, determine and decree, in pursuance
;
of those laws and the Clerk and Master can issue the process ordered by the
;
fiat or decree of the Chancellor but it remains for the Sheriff to make those
;
laws, and that or decree, effective by executing the process awarded; and
fiat
thus (1) compelling the defendant to do what the law and. the Court require of
him, and (2) conferring upon the complainant the benefit decreed by the
Court to be his due under the law.
As, therefore, the Court is powerless without its Sheriff, it is incumbent on
the Sheriff to be always present and ready, in person or by deputy, to discharge
every duty that may be imposed upon him, while the Court is in session and to :
discharge all duties with diligence, efficiency and good faith.

If the Sheriff be absent, or cannot be relied on, the Chancellor may, upon
special application, appoint any other person to serve original, mesne or final
process, or to execute the orders of the Court. 1
§ 1186. —
The General Duties of the Sheriff. The duties of Sheriffs are set
out in detail in the Code, and need not be stated here. 2 The Sheriff should
keep three great facts constantly in mind 1, That it is his duty to obey all
:
lawful orders of the Chancellor while the Chancery Court is in session; 2, That
it is his duty to execute all orders, decrees, and process of the Chancery Court
issued by the Clerk and Master, or Chancellor and 3, That in the execution
;
of process he must use a degree of diligence exceeding that which a prudent

man employs in his own affairs. 3 He must, with all reasonable speed, execute
all process issuing from the Chancery Court, and make due return thereof, ac-
cording to law and the requirements of the process. 4 The Sheriff must enter
upon the execution of instanter and extraordinary process, in person or by
deputy, the moment it is placed in his hands and should not allow one day to
;
elapse, in any case, after original process has been put into his hands, before
he sets out to execute it. The Sheriff should consult the Solicitor affirmatively
interested, or the Clerk and Master, or in an extraordinary case, the Chancellor,
as to his duties in executing a writ, or order of Court.
§ 1187. Duties of the Sheriff while Court is in Session.— The Sheriff is an
officer of the Court and it is his duty to be present, in person or by deputy, all
;
the time the Court is in session. The statute makes it his duty to attend upon
all the Courts held in his county while in session, and to obey the lawful orders
and directions of the Court. He is also required to cause the Court room to be
kept in order for the accommodation of the Court and properly heated and ;
supplied with drinking water. 5 It is also his duty to see that all parties keep
the peace in and about the Court room. 6
lCode, § 4415. 4 Code, § 4347.
2 Code, §§ 360-362; 4093. 5 Code, § 360.
3 Code, § 4093, sub-sec. 7. 6 Code, § 362.
949 the sheriff: his duties. § 1188
§ 1188. Some Suggestions in Reference to the Sheriffs Duties in Term Time.
In some of the counties, the Sheriffs are somewhat negligent in discharging
their duties to the Chancery Court. In such cases, it might be well for the
Chancellor at the opening of the term to call the attention of the Sheriff to his
five great duties during the sitting of the Court
1. To Keep the Court Room in Order. This means that the room should be
kept clean, that the windows and doors are in proper order, that there are suf-
ficient tables and chairs for the use of the bar, and that they are kept clean.
2. To Keep the Court Room Duly Supplied With Water. Fresh water for the
I
bar, the Clerks, the litigants and the witnesses should be kept constantly in the
Court room, in clean buckets, and supplied with clean dippers, tumblers, or
other drinking vessels.
3. To Keep the Court Room Comfortably Heated. In cold weather a comfortable
room is necessary. The Clerk cannot write with fingers benumbed with
cold the Solicitors cannot do justice to their clients while chilled to the bone
;
and the Chancellor cannot properly consider the evidence read, and the argu-
ments made, if his mind is disquieted by the manifest discomforts of those about
him, and his body is suffering from exposure to chilling drafts coming from
open doors, or broken windows. The Chancellor owes it to himself, and to all
concerned, to refuse to hold Court under such circumstances.
4. To Keep Good Order in the Court Room. The Chancellor should instruct the
Sheriff at the opening of the term, (1) to suppress all smoking, loud whispering,
or talking outside of the bar, while the Court is in session (2) to keep down
;
all noises, disputes and other disturbances, in the neighborhood of the Court
room and (3) to suppress any thing or act that tends to annoy, disturb or dis-
;
quiet the Court.

5. To Stay in the Court Room. The Court room is the place for the Sheriff
while the Chancellor is on the bench an urgent demand for his services may
:
arise any moment, and the Court may be compelled to wait until he can be
found, and brought in. If process is to be executed, jurors to be summoned,
or other duties discharged outside of the Court room, the Sheriff should either
discharge these duties by a deputy, or should leave a deputy in the Court room
to discharge his duties. It is disgraceful to a Sheriff to be called to come into
the Court room by order of the Chancellor while Court is in session. The
statute requires him to attend upon the Court while in session, and he has no
right to leave the Court room without the Chancellor's permission. A sheriff
has no more rights than a Chancellor and what would be thought of a Chan-
;
cellor who spent his time attending to matters about town, when the Solicitors,
Clerks, and litigants are waiting for him to hold his Court?
Some Sheriffs wait for the Chancellor to direct them in every little thing.
They wait to be told: 1, to get water; 2, to keep up the fires; 3, to keep the
doors or windows closed; 4, to stop smoking or loud talking; 5, to suppress dis-
order in and about the Court House 6, to come into the Court room, and 7, to
;
discharge other plain duties. Chancellors have more important matters to en-
gage their attention than overseeing Sheriffs or acting as Sheriff; and it is a
downright imposition on the Chancellor to thus compel him to do what the
Sheriff is sworn and paid to do. The Sheriff who waits to be directed in the
foregoing matters is of but little more service to the Court, or to the people,
than an ordinary porter who waits for orders.
§1189 RULES OP THE CHANCERY COURT. 950
CHAPTER LXVII.
RULES OF THE CHANCERY COURT.
§ 1196.
951 RULES OP THE CHANCERY COURT. §1191
Sec. 2. All papers and documents referred to in pleadings or depositions,
as exhibits, shall be filed in the Master's office, at the time the pleadings or
depositions are filed, unless by special order of the Chancellor or Master it is
otherwise ordered, but the same shall be filed at any time thereafter upon the
order of the Chancellor or Master; and no pleadings or depositions shall be
received and filed by the Master until this rule shall have been complied with
provided, however, the paper is not of record in the Court. 5
Sec. 3. The Master shall note upon the pleading or other paper filed in his
office, the date of the filing.
Sec. 4. If exceptions be filed to an answer for insufficiency, or for scandal or
impertinence, the Clerk and Master shall examine and report upon them with
all convenient speed and if either party be dissatisfied with his report, he may
;
appeal to the Chancellor in Court. 8

Sec. 5. Exceptions to an answer for insufficiency 7 shall be filed within twenty
days after notice served of the filing of the answer.
The party filing the exceptions shall set them down for hearing before the
Master within ten days after they are filed, and upon failure to do so, the
answer shall be deemed sufficient.
Upon the exceptions being set down for hearing, the Master shall act upon
them immediately, and if allowed, he shall notify the defendant's Solicitor to
file a sufficient answer within thirty days, from which order the defendant may,
within said time, appeal, but if the defendant, in obedience to said order, shall
file an answer deemed sufficient by the Master, he shall notify the complainant's
Solicitor, and he may appeal within ten days after the notice.
Upon appeal so taken, the Chancellor shall act immediately, or as soon as
convenient.
Sec. 6. Exceptions filed shall not delay taking depositions, or otherwise pre-
paring the cause for hearing.
Sec. 7.If a defendant obtain time to answer the complainant's bill he shall
not a plea or demurrer, unless the order giving time expressly embrace those
file
modes of defence. 8
§ 1191. Rule II. —Depositions,
Evidence, 10 and Time for Taking Proof.
9
Section 1. The Commissioner before whom a deposition is taken, is required

to annex a bill of cost of taking the same.
Sec 2. Proof of notice to take depositions may be made either before the
Master or before the Commissioner, by the affidavit of a competent witness, or
the return of a proper officer.
Sec 3. If either party reside out of the State, notice may be served upon his
agent or Solicitor.
Sec. 4. After a cause is set for hearing, 11 the same shall be opened to both
parties for proof without leave of the Court, and without remanding the cause
to the rules, but each party must take his proof in chief within four months,
consistent with the Act. Some suppose that such of also. As to exceptions to answers, generally, see
the rules of 1858 as are not inconsistent with this Article on that subject.Ante, §§ 420-424.
Act are in force; but a careful reading of the above 7 Exceptions to an answer for scandal and imperti-
section, coupled with the consideration of the fact nence may be filed at any time, and acted on by the
that nearly all of the rules of 1858 are incorporated Court at any time.
in this Act, some without any change, and others 8 Time given in vacation should be limited to the
with modifications, will show that the intention of Saturday before a rule day so as to allow a pro
the Legislature was to repeal the rules of 1858, ex- confesso on the rule day, if the answer is not filed
cept in so far as they are contained in this Act. when allowed.
5 The failure to file exhibits is no ground of de- 9 See Chapter on Depositions in Chancery. Ante,
murrer. Mulherrin v. Hill, 5 Heisk., 60. The proper §§474-513.
remedy in such a case is to apply to the Chancellor' 10 See Chapter on Evidence in Chancery. Ante,
or Master for an order on the complainant to file §§ 441-473.
the exhibits. See Code, § 4389. 11 A
cause is deemed set for hearing as soon as
6 The next section of this rule shows that the an issue of fact has been made. Code, §§4322;
Chancellor may act on these exceptions at Chambers, 4328; 4432; 4400-4401; and see, ante, §464.
§1192 RULES OF THE CHANCERY COURT. 952
and the rebutting proof within two months 12 Provided, the Chancellor or Master
;
may extend the time upon sufficient cause shown by affidavit, upon terms. 13
Sec. 5. All exceptions to depositions for want of notice, because not filed in
reasonable time or for other cause going to the admissibility thereof, except ob-
;
jections to the competency of the witness or his evidence, shall be made and dis-
posed of before the commencement of the hearing or trial, otherwise they will
be considered as waived. It is the duty of the Clerk to act upon the exceptions
made before the hearing forthwith; and from his decision an appeal lies to
the Chancellor or Judge, to be disposed of before the cause is heard or tried. 14
Sec. 6. A
witness once examined in a cause, by either party, shall not be re-
examined to the same facts by the same party, unless by order of the Court,
or of the Master, on sufficient cause shown by affidavit.
§ 1192. Rule III.—Decrees. 15
Section Each decree shall be written upon not less than a half sheet of
l.
paper, and in ink and the date of its entry endorsed upon the same.
;
Sec. 2. Each decree in a cause, as it is entered, shall be securely fastened to-

gether at the top with the other decrees in the same cause, by the Master.
§ 1193. —
Rule IV. Accounts, 16 Reports, 17 and Exceptions 18 to Reports.
Section 1. When a matter is referred to the Master to take an account, and
make a report, the Court may, in the decree, fix the time in which the account
shall be taken and the report made, and upon whom
the notice of taking the
same shall be executed, if in the discretion of the Court any notice is necessary.
Sec. 2. If the decree does not fix the time within which the account shall be
taken, and the report made, the same shall be made to the succeeding term upon
the following rules, viz. The Master shall assign a time and place to consider
:
the same, and shall issue a notice thereof to the parties interested in the account,
and to be affected by it, and also their respective Solicitors, if both the party
and Solicitor reside in the county and if the Solicitor reside in the county and
;
the party does not, then the Solicitor, and vice versa. In all cases in which the
party is a non-resident, then the notice shall be served upon the Solicitor.
Sec 3. Said notice shall be executed five days before the day assigned, and
it shall be expressed in the notice, that if the party or his Solicitor, as provided
above, shall fail to attend, the account will be proceeded with ex parte.
Sec. 4. If the parties or their Solicitors attend, the Master may, upon affida-
vits of either party showing sufficient cause, adjourn the matter from day to
day, or to another day prior to the time he is required to file the report, at
which time, unless he adjourn the same, he shall proceed to take the account
and make the report.
Sec. 5. If the parties are numerous, the notice shall be served upon such of
them as the decree or Master may designate.
12 The time for taking proof begins to run from proof should specify the names of the witnesses
the filing of the plea or answer. Exceptions to an allowed to be examined, and the time allowed for
answer do not suspend the preparation of a cause for that purpose; and should, also, specify the terms,
hearing, or delay the taking of depositions. Rule I, these terms in no case to be less than the costs of
§ 6; ante, § 1190; Code, § 4457. all proof thereafter filed. Ante, § 465, note 12.
Neither party is entitled, of right, to the four and 14 The Chancery Rules of 1858, Rule, XI, allowed
two months within which to take proof; but the an appeal to the Chancellor in Court." This Rule
cause stands for trial, and may rightfully be heard, omits the words, "in Court;" and this fact, coupled
at the first term after answer filed, whether such with Code, §§ 4410 and 4416, shows that the Chan,
term come one or five months thereafter. Code, cellor has power in vacation to hear this appeal; and
§§4328; 4401; 4432. See, ante, §533; Rather r. such is the practice. This Rule is identical with
Williams, 10 Pick., 543, citing § 463 (now § 465) Code, §§ 3868-3869. On the subject of exceptions to
of this book. See, also, Harris v. Bogle, Nashville, depositions, see, ante, §§ 497-501.
1906. 15 See Chapter on Decrees, ante, §§ 555-581.
Proof in chief proof that tends to establish the
is 10 For the practice in taking accounts, see, ante,
affirmative allegations in the pleadings; rebutting §§ 603-610. The Court has no power to order a
proof is proof that tends to refute these allegations, reference for an account, except by consent, or upon
or assails the evidence or witnesses of the other a hearing of the cause. Wessels V. Wessels, 1 Tenn.
party. Proof of matters in avoidance is proof in Ch., 58.
chief. Rebutting proof may be taken at any time it On the subject of reports, see, ante, §§ 611-620.
within the six months, but proof in chief must be 18 Exceptions to reports have been heretofore fully
taken within the four months. Ante, § 465. considered. Ante, §§615-617.
13 The order granting an extension of time to take
953 RULES OP THE CHANCERY COURT. § 1 194
Sec. 6. After the evidence has been closed, the Master shall proceed without
delay to the report in writing, in ink, with the pages marked thereon.
make
Sec. 7. In said report, he shall refer by page to the particular parts of the
record upon which he bases each item allowed. 19
Sec. 8. Said report when completed shall be filed five days before the first
day of the succeeding term, and the fact shall be noted upon the hearing
docket, and also upon the Chancellor 's docket, opposite the cause.
Sec. 9. If either party fail to attend, the account shall be closed, and no
other evidence shall be introduced or heard, unless the party offering it shall,
within ten days, by special affidavit, show that he has material evidence which
was not before the Master at the time fixed for taking the account, and which
he could not by proper diligence have produced according to the provisions of
the notice, in which case the Master may open the account for the reception of
evidence upon the same notice prescribed for the original account; provided,
however, the Court at any time before confirmation, may, in its discretion, open
the account for additional evidence.
Sec. 10. Upon a reference, a witness cannot be examined, either by the Mas-
ter or the party whose witness he is, to the same matter, to which he has been
examined in chief before the hearing of the cause, without an order of the Court
or of the Master upon affidavit showing sufficient cause therefor, but he may be
examined touching any other matter.
Sec. li. A witness once examined by the Master may be re-examined by him
at his discretion.
Sec. 12. The exceptions to the Master's report shall be filed on or before the
second day of the term to which the report is made returnable, unless the
cause is sooner reaehed on the docket, and in that event the exceptions must
be filed at the calling of the cause and in either case, the exceptions shall be
;
immediately set down by the Clerk for argument, and shall be disposed of by
the Court when the cause is reached for trial.
Sec. 13. The exceptions shall clearly and distinctly state the matter or item
excepted to, and shall refer to the page or pages of the report which show the
item or matter excepted to, and shall also refer to the page or pages of the
depositions, or other part of the record by which it is sought to impeach the
report. 20
Sec. 14. After the time allowed for filing exceptions shall have expired, and
none have been filed, the report may be confirmed, unless for good cause shown
a longer time is allowed.
Sec. 15. All exceptions to reports shall be heard and disposed of as other
motions, provided they shall be disposed of when the cause is reached.
§ 1194. —
Rule. V. Pro Confesso, Proceedings Upon, 21 and Rights of De-
fendant.
Section l. It shall not be necessary to give notice to a party upon a reference
for an account, when the cause is standing upon a pro confesso decree against
such party, unless said party resides in the county.
Sec. 2. In all cases in which a pro confesso decree is set aside, pending the
cause, and the party allowed to answer, upon filing the answer the defendant
shall have the right to cross-examine the witnesses, whose deposition has al-
ready been taken, without any leave of the Court, and may have all proper
process to compel their attendance, but must give notice to the opposite party
of the time and place, as in other cases of taking depositions.
§ 1195. Rule VI. —Injunctions;
22 Granting and Dissolving. 23
Section l. In all cases of injunction bills, in which the oath of the defendant
to the answer is waived, he may, nevertheless, for the purpose of a dissolution
19 For form of report, see, ante, § 613. [
Thereon, ante, §§ 20S-212; 888-890.
20 Form of exceptions, ante, § 616. 22 See Chapter on Injunctions, ante, §§ 800-863.
21 See Article on Pro Confesses, and Proceedings I
23 See, ante, §§ 849-858.
§ 1 196 KUIJSS OF THE CHANCERY COURT. 954
of the injunction, swear to his answer without leave of the Court; and upon
notice to dissolve upon bill and answer, the answer may be looked to for that
purpose as fully as if permission of the Court had been obtained.
Sec 2. The notices of a motion to dissolve an injunction shall, in all cases,
state upon what the motion is based, whether for want of Equity on the face of
the bill, or upon bill and answer. 24
Sec. 3. Upon the hearing of a motion to dissolve an injunction upon bill and
answer, the fact that the answer has been excepted to, or that the time to file
exceptions has not elapsed, shall not postpone the hearing of the motion to
dissolve, but the Chancellor may, without passing upon the exception, dispose
of the motion to dissolve.
Sec. 4. If, in a bill tendered for a fiat for an injunction, the complainant
admits any money to be due the defendant, or fails to allege any sufficient
Equity against any part of the matter sought to be enjoined, the Judge or
Chancellor shall either order the issuance of the injunction as to so much only
as to which there is sufficient Equity, or, in case the whole matter is enjoined,
it shall, besides the bond required by law, be also required that the complainant
pay into Court the amount admitted to be due, or otherwise perform the fiat
as to any part of the matter sought to be enjoined, and as to which no injunc-
tion is ordered, before injunction issues. 25
§ Rule VII.— Contempt. 28
1196.
Section If a contempt is committed in the presence of the Court, the offend-
1.
ing party may be arrested by the officer waiting upon the Court, upon the
verbal order of the Chancellor, without process or notice, and the contemner
shall not be bailable, but the Court may proceed at once to fine or imprison-
ment, or both but the minutes shall show the penalty inflicted, and the matter
;
of contempt.
Sec. 2.In all cases of contempt committed not in presence of the Court, the
mode of proceeding shall be as follows
(1.) A
petition shall be filed stating the contempt complained of, supported
by affidavit, together with such exhibits and returns of officers, or certified
copies thereof, as may fully show how the contempt arose.
(2.) Thereupon the Chancellor, if sufficient cause is shown, shall order the
issuance of an attachment for the body of the contemner, fixing in said order
the time and place of the appearance to answer, and also the amount and char-
acter of the bail bond to be taken.
(3.) The Chancellor, upon the appearance and answer of the contemner, or
production of his body and refusal to answer, shall hear said proceedings at
the time and place designated, unless upon cause shown he shall give further
time, upon the petition, affidavit and exhibits, and answer thereto, in ease the
contemner answers, and if he fails to answer, then upon the case made by the
petition.
(4.) In case the contemner does not appear as required by his bond, judg-
ment shall be rendered against the parties thereto for the full amount thereof ,-
and in case an alias attachment be issued, and the contemner be arrested, no

bail shall be taken, unless the contemner show good cause for his default, either
before the Clerk and Master 27 in vacation, or before the Chancellor in term
time.
(5.) If a forfeiture is taken upon the bond and the term of the Court is
passed, the Chancellor shall certify the fact, together with the papers, to the
Master, who shall immediately enter judgment upon the bond for the amount
of the same against the principal and his sureties, and also for costs, and award
a fieri facias, and the same when collected shall be paid into Court, and all or
24 Ante, §§ 850-852. 20 See Chapter on Contempts, ante, §§ 918-924.
25 As to injunctions to stay a sale under a deed of 27 Printed "Commissioner" in the statute.
trust, or mortgage to secure the payment of loaned
money, see, ante, § 828.
955 RUEES OE THE CHANCERY COURT. § 1197
so much thereof as is deemed proper by the Court, shall be awarded to the in-
jured party, and the balance shall be paid by the Master into the treasury of
the State.
If a witness, after Having been duly summoned, fails to appear before
See. 3.
the Master upon return of an officer or proof by affidavit of such service, the
Master shall issue an instanter attachment for him, and designate therein the
penalty of the bond conditioned for his appearance before the Chancellor at a
time and place to be specified if practicable, or before the Court at the next
succeeding term, if it be not then in session, to show cause why he should not be
fined or committed according to law.
Sec. 4. If a witness should appear and refuse to answer legal interrogatories
he shall be committed by the Court or Master, until he consent to give his tes-
timony.
Sec. 5. The Master may, on application of complainant, issue an attachment
against a defendant for want of an answer, where the time for answering has
expired.
Sec. 6. If the Clerk and Master fail to comply with an order of reference
made by the Court under the provisions of law, and the rules as above, he shall
forfeit and pay fifty dollars for every such failure, unless he show by oath, to
the satisfaction of the Court, he has been guilty of /no contempt or culpable
neglect of duty.
§ 1197. Rule VIII.—Continuances. 28
[After a cause shall have been once continued by either party, no
Section l.
other continuance shall be granted except upon payment of all costs then ac-
crued, including State and county tax, and execution shall issue for such costs
against the party continuing, and his sureties. 29 ]
Sec. 2. When a cause shall be continued by consent, the Chancellor may tax
the costs as he may deem proper, or reserve the same until final decree. 30
§ 1198. Rule IX.—Motions.
Section 1. The Court may hear motions at such times as may be convenient.
§ 1199. Rule X.—Hearing.
Section 1. The complainant or his Solicitor, before presenting a cause for
hearing, shall cause all the depositions and other papers intended to be used by
him on the trial, except the pleadings, to be neatly put together in one or more
packages, and securely fastened together at the top, and the same paged, and
a general index of the contents made at the conclusion or beginning thereof.
The defendant or his Solicitor shall in like manner prepare all papers and
depositions intended to be used by him. 31
Sec. 2. When a cause is called, each Solicitor shall produce and read to the
Court, a brief written in ink, plainly showing the point in the cause raised by
the pleadings and the proof, together with the authorities relied on in argu-
ment; otherwise, the Court may, in its discretion, delay the hearing until these
two rules are complied with. 32
§1200. Rule XI. 33 Process: 34 When Returnable.
Section l. Whenever the terms of a Court shall continue for a sufficient time,
all process which shall have been issued for more than five days before the first
day of the term, may be made returnable to any Monday of the term; and if
the same shall be executed five days before such return day, the defendant
shall cause his appearance to be entered and make defence, or obtain time
28 See, ante, §§ 519-521; 526-529. 32 Chancellors find these briefs of such very great
29 This section was repealed by the Act of 1872, value that they actually have a feeling of thankful-
ch. 8. This Act was passed at a Special Session; ness when briefs are handed them. No Solicitor
and its title is an attempt to bring it within the does his duty either to the Court or his client unless
scope of the Governor's proclamation. The consti- he fully complies with this rule. Briefs are good
tutionality of the Act is questionable. case- winners. See form, ante K § 1184.
30 Ante, § 529. 33 The main object of this Rule was to repeal
31 The Chancellors will find that the enforcement Code, § 4351.
of this Rule will save much labor, and many annoy- 34 See Chapter on Original Process in Chancery,
ances. ante, §§ 184-193.
§1201 RULES OP THE CHANCERY COURT. 956
therefor within the three succeeding days, and the cause shall stand to be pro-
ceeded in at that term.
Sec. 2. If such process is executed within the five days before such return
day, then the same shall be returned to the succeeding Monday, and the de-
fendant allowed the three succeeding days thereafter to cause his appearance
to be entered and make defence or obtain time therefor, and the cause shall
stand to be proceeded in at that term.
Sec 3. The two foregoing rules shall also apply to cases in which publica-
tion is made for a defendant. 33
Sec. 4. Alias or mesne process taken out at any time, may be returnable to
any Monday of the term, and if executed five days before the return day, the
defendant shall have the first three days of the term, if the Court hold so long,
otherwise on the first day of the term, in which to cause his appearance to be
entered, or to make defence or to obtain time therefor, and after said three
days or said first day, as the case may be, the same shall stand to be proceeded
in for all purposes. 36
Sec. 5. If said alias or mesne process shall be executed within the five days
before the return day, the cause shall stand over to the succeeding Monday,
and then to be proceeded in as in Section 4 above.
§ 1201. Rule XII.— Corporations. 37
Section l. Any person opposing the organization of a corporation, shall be
required to make defence by plea, motion to dismiss, demurrer or answer, as
in other cases in Chancery.
Sec. 2. If the opposition is made by answer, the same shall be put in under
oath, and shall state in brief the causes why said organization should not be
allowed.
Sec. 3. The petition and answer shall merely operate to make the issue or
issues.
Sec. 4. All the evidence in such cases shall be by depositions taken as in
other suits in Equity.
Sec. 5. All applications for the organization of corporations shall be put upon
the rule docket, and if not opposed, shall be heard upon motion. Applications
which are opposed shall be put upon the hearing docket upon the filing of the
answers, and shall in all respects be proceeded in as other causes in Equity.
§ 1202. Rule XIII. 38 Enrollment.—
Section After any paper is filed in a cause, either party may have the
l.
same enrolled by paying to the Master the enrolling fee thereon, which may or
may not, at the discretion of the Court trying the case, be taxed to the losing
party, and collected as other costs. 39
Sec 2. Any paper lost or mislaid may be supplied from the enrollment book,
the Master certifying that the same is a full, true and perfect copy; and shall
be used on the trial of the cause, or the enrollment book itself may be used.
Sec 3. "Whenever, in the opinion of the Court finally determining an Equity
cause, it is necessary and proper that the proceedings should be enrolled, such
Court shall, upon application of either party, order the enrollment; and the
Clerk shall make the same accordingly, and the party applying for the order
shall be taxed with the costs thereof. 40
§ 1203. Rule XIV.—Re-Sales.
35 If publication is begun more than five days be- pealed the law authorizing the Chancery Courts to
fore the first day of the term, it may require the grant letters of incorporation, this Rule becomes
defendant to appear on any Monday of the term valueless. Sublato fundamento cadit opus.
coming five or more days after the last publication. 38 The original Rule XIII, of the Act of 1871, has
Wessells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 60. And a pro been all repealed, except section 2. See Acts of
confesso can be taken and final decree pronounced 1872, ch. 8; Acts of 1877, ch. 45.
at the appearance term. Ibid. 39 Acts of 1877, ch. 45.
36 But publications, it would seem, could not be 40 Acts of 1877, ch. 45. § 5. This section was not
made under this section so as to give a right of trial enacted as a Chancery Rule, but as an amendment
at the same term. McGavock v. Young, 3 Tenn. of Code, § 3227: nevertheless, it is a Chancery Rule,
Ch., 529. and comes appropriately here.
37 The Act of 1875, ch. 142, § 28, having re-
957 RULES OP PRACTICE EOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. §1204
Section l. If the purchaser of property sold at the Master's sale fail to make
payment or comply with the terms of sale, the Master may again expose the
property to sale on the same day, or after giving due notice of the time and
place, according to the directions contained in the decree. 41
§ 1204. Rule XV.—
Re-Hearing. 4 *
Section l. Every petition for re-hearing shall contain the special matter or
cause on which a re-hearing is applied for, be signed by counsel, and the facts
therein stated, if not appearing from the proceedings in the Court, shall be
verified by oath or affirmation. Such petition must be presented to the Court
during the term at which the decree complained of is entered upon the minutes.
Hamilton C. Smith, Chancellor of 1st Division.
" " 2nd
O. P. Temple,
" " 3rd
D. M. Key,
Albert S. Marks, " " 4th "
W. W. Goodpasture, " " 5th "
Chas. G. Smith, " " 6th
Edward H. East, " " 7th
W. S. Fleming, " " 8th
" " 9th
George H. Nixon,
James Fentress, " "10th "
N. J. Morgan,
Chancellor of 1st Chancery Court of Shelby County.
William L. Scott,
Chancellor of 2nd Chancery Court of Shelby County. 43
§ 1205. Rules and Regulations of Practice for Particular Chancery Divisions.
The Rules of Practice adopted by a majority of the Chancellors, or enacted by
the Legislature, are obligatory upon all the Chancellors, and cannot be changed.
But in the absence of any such rule, or rules, on any particular matter, or mat-
ters, of practice, each Chancellor may make rules and regulations of practice
for the purpose of expediting business in his own Chancery Division. 44 These
rules and regulations must not be in conflict with any rule made by the Chan-
cellors as a body, nor with any statute of the State.
The following rules and regulations, nearly all of which are in beneficial
operation in some one or more of the Chancery Divisions, are suggested as a
basis for the action of individual Chancellors 45 :
RULES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS."

Optima est lex qua minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis; optimus judex qui minimum sibi. —
Bacon.
I am bound by Magna Charta nulli negare, nulli differe justitiam. Lord Nottingham. —
Right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay. ConsTitlttion of
Tennessee.
return days, appearance and defence.
RULE The First Monday of Every Month in Vacation is hereby made a re-
1.
turn day for all process, except final process and all subpcenas to answer orig-
;
41 See, ante, § 627. pense of the other. Favors should be paid for in
42 See Chapter on Rehearings, post §§ 1215-1222. costs: otherwise, the party in default is rewarded,
43 These Rules, while signed by the then Chan- and the party who has done his duty is punished.
cellors, were thoroughly revised by the Legislature, As "he who seeks equity must do equity," so he
through its Senate Judiciary Committee, and enacted who seeks a favor in Court must do a favor. And
into a law. Acts of 1871, ch. 97. Three members of where a loss must fall on one of two parties, it
that Committee afterwards became Chancellors, one should be borne by him whose default occasioned the
of whom is the author of this book. loss; otherwise, he would derive an advantage from
44 Code, §§ 393S-3936. See Haralson V. McGavock, his own wrong._ Hence, a party asking leave to
(
10 Lea, 724. amend his pleadings, or to answer after a pro con-

45 These rules are in force in the 2d Chancery fesso order against him, or to take proof after his
Division, and most of them in other Divisions. See time has expired, or to continue a trial when the
similar rules in 2 Tenn. Ch., 787-790. See Appendix other side is ready, should not ask such a favor
to Cooke, where Judge Cooper has collected all the without offering to pay all costs occasioned by the
preceding rules of Court practice contained in our favor he is asking. Nor should a Chancellor deprive
Reports. one party of the fruits of his diligence in order to
46 Rules and Regulations of Practice for the Chan- relieve the other -party of the penalties of his negli-
cery Division would be a title more consonant with
' gence.
the statute. Code, §3936; but the title given is And, above all, it must ever be remembered that
more brief, and, perhaps, as applicable. Courts are made to do full justice, and that justice
These rules, in so far as they impose costs, are delayed is only half done.
based on the law of compensation. The law has no The main purpose of the following rules is to give
favorites as between eciuals, except in so far as it the speediest trial consistent with the highest justice;
favors those who are diligent. Nor has a Chancellor and the bar is solicited to co-operate in the effort to
the right to grant a favor to one party at the ex- effect this purpose.
§1205 RULES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. 958
inal amended or supplemental bills, bills of revivor, cross bills; bills of review
and petitions,and all writs of scire facias, shall be made returnable to the first
Monday of the month coming five or more days after the issuance of such pro-
cess: 47 but, if a regular term of Court comes before such first Monday, such
process shall be made returnable to the first day of such term. This rule in-
cludes process by publication in all cases, the last publication being deemed
equivalent to the issuance of a subpeena under this rule 48 but in attachment
49
cases the last publication must be at least one week before the return day.
RULE 2. When Defence Must be Made. Every defendant served with such
original or mesne process, whether by personal service or by publication, shall
plead, demur, or answer, on or before the first return day coming five or more
days after such service, in all cases except in attachment cases, and then on or
before the first return day coming at least one week after such service. Service
by publication in all cases shall be deemed to have been made on the day of the
last publication: if, however, the return day is the first day of a term of the
Court, the defendant must make his defence within the first three days of the
term, 50 and will be liable to a pro confesso thereafter. 51
RULE 3. When a Pro Confesso May be Taken. If any defendant, not a minor
or person of unsound mind, fails to make defence on the return day, a pro con-
fesso order may be taken and entered against him on the next or any subsequent
rule day in vacation; and if the first day of the term is the return day, then a
pro confesso order may be taken and entered against him on any rule day after
the third day of the term. 52 Each day of the term, and the first Monday of
every month in vacation, are rule days for the purpose of taking pro confessos,
and for all other business proper for rule days. 53
RULE 4. Limitation on the Foregoing Rules. The foregoing Rules are all sub-
ject to Chancery Rule XI, under the operation of which: 1, Any original writ
issued, or any publication commenced, more than five days before the first day
of the term, may be made returnable to any Monday of the term; 2, Alias and
mesne process, 54 taken out at any time may be made returnable to any Monday
of the term 3, If any process issued as aforesaid, is executed within five days
;
before the return day, the next succeeding Monday shall be the return day;
and 4, In all of said cases the cause may be proceeded in as though the process
had been duly executed five or more days before the first day of the term. 55
RULE 5. Copies of Subpoenas to be Issued. The Clerk will issue with each sub-
poena as many copies thereof as there are adult defendants to be served, and the
officer executing the writ will leave one of said copies with each adult defend-
ant, in addition to the service now required by law. At the bottom of each
of said copies shall be a notice to the defendant named therein, specifying the
day on which he is required to plead, demur or answer, and warning him that
if he fail so to do, the bill may be taken as confessed as to him.
RTJLE 6. Answer When to be Piled on Demurrer Being Overruled. When a plea
or demurrer is overruled, the defendant must file his answer on the next rule
47 Code, §§ 4348-4349; Haralson v. McGavock, 10 51 As to when and how a defendant must appear,
Lea, 724. see, ante, §§ 222-227.
48 A subpoena can be issued and served on the 52 See, ante, §§205-206; 225-227, as to when and
same day; but a publication must be made for four how pro confessos are taken.
successive weeks, and is not deemed served until 53 Code, §4421; Haralson r>. McGavock, 10 Lea,
the day of the last publication, which day must be 724. Formerly, only the first day of the term was a
at least five days before the return day. Wessells rule day in term time. Lanum v. Steel, 10 Hum.,
v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 65. 280. Tnis decision was made in 1849, and the Legis-
49 Code, § 3523. Twenty-eight days next before lature of 1851-52 enacted that every day of the term
the return day is sufficient publication in attachment should be a rule day.
cases. Thus, if the notice is published on the 19th 54 Mesne process under this rule includes writs of
and 26th of August and on the 2d and 9th of Sep- scire facias, and subpeenas to answer supplemental
tember, the 16th of September would be a lawful and amended bills, and bills of revivor. This will
return day in an attachment suit, and the 14th of be seen by a comparison of Code, §§4348-4349;
September would be a lawful return day in any 4415; 4426-4429.
other suit wherein publication was made. Lowen- 55 See Wessells V. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 61; Mc-
stine V. Gillispie, 6 Lea, 643, overruling Riley V, Gavock V. Young, 3 Tenn. Ch., 529.
Nichol, 1 Heisk., 16.
50 But where the term does not last three days,
see, ante,§ 225.
959 RULES OP PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. § 1205
day. The Chancellor may, however, allow ftirther time to file an answer when
the plea or demurrer is not deemed frivolous but in no ease will the Master
;
allow further time to answer after a plea or demurrer has been overruled.
RULE 7. Any Defendant Desiring Leave to File a Plea or Demurrer after a pro
confcsso entered against him in vacation, or desiring an extension of time to
make defence with leave to file a plea or demurrer, in vacation, must apply to
the Chancellor, and not to the Master, for such leave, and must exhibjt his plea
or demurrer and a copy of the bill with his application, along with an affidavit
showing good cause for setting aside said pro confesso, or for said extension, as
the case may be.
RULE 8. Defence on Leave Must be Made Within the Leave. When a defendant
has obtained time from the Chancellor or Master to make a defence, he shall
make his defence in the manner and time specified in the order giving time
and the Master will not receive or file any pleading presented by the defendant
after the time specified for making his defence shall have expired, without the
written consent of the complainant, or an order from the Chancellor.
RULE 9. Plea When Deemed at Issue. If the complainant fail to set down a
plea with the Clerk to be argued, or fail to take issue upon it, on or before the
first rule day coming twenty or more days after the filing of such plea, it will
he deemed at issue, as though a general replication had been filed. 56
RULE 10. Notice to be Given of Filing of a Plea or Demurrer, When a plea or de-
murrer is filed, whether in vacation or in term time, the Clerk and Master shall
at once notify the complainant, or his Solicitor.
PRO CONFESSOS, WHEN" AND HOW TAKEN."
RULE 11.Pro Confesso a Legal Right: Not to be Set Aside Unless. When the
defendant has failed to make his defence in the time and manner required by
the rules of the Court, the complainant has a legal right 58 to have an order
by the Master or the Court, taking his bill for confessed, as of course and such ;
pro confesso order will be made whenever legally demanded, and will not be
•set aside either by the Master or the Chancellor when the defendant was
served with subpoena, except with the written consent of the complainant, or
on good cause shown by affidavit, accompanied by a sworn answer, showing
a meritorious defence, and on the payment of costs. 59
RULE 12. Pro Confessos at Rules. All pro confessos under these rules may be
taken before the Master in vacation, or in open Court in term time. The de-
fendant has the whole of the return day in vacation to file his defence, and
hence, a pro confessso cannot be taken against him until the next rule day. 60
RULE 13. Proof in Support of Pro Confessos. No motion for a pro confessso
on a bill will be considered in term time, unless the proof that the subpoena
has been served, or the publication has been made, is produced in open Court,
and filed with the written motion. The Master will keep on file the newspapers
containing the publication, or the printer's affidavit thereof.
RULE 14. Further Time to Make Defence, When. Whenever the complainant
fails to take a pro confessso on the first rule day at which a pro confesso may be
taken, under these rules, he may take said pro confessso on any subsequent rule
day, 61 provided the defendant has not in the meantime filed his plea, demurrer,
or answer; and provided, further, that on good cause shown by affidavit, the
Master may at rules, or the Chancellor may at Chambers, or in open Court,
extend the time to make defence; but if defendant's time is extended by the
Master, he shall answer and not plead or demur.
56 In strict law, the defendant would be entitled r>8 Anonymous,
1 Tenn. Ch., 2.
to have his plea taken for confessed. 1 Dan. Ch. §4375; Tharpe v. Dunlap, 4 Heisk., 681.
59 Code,
Pr., 696; but the rule is more consonant with our A defendant not served with process may have a pro
practice.' Seifreid V. People's Bank, 2 Tenn. Ch., confesso set aside, as heretofore shown. Ante,
21; Allen v. Allen, 3 Tenn. Ch., 145. See, ante, §§ 207-208.
§350, note 3. go Wessells v. Wessells, 1 Tenn. Ch., 60; 67.
57 See Article on Pro Confessos; ante, §§ 205-206; 01 This subsequent rule day may be either the first
225-227. For form of a Pro Confesso see Rule 68, Monday of a month, or any day of a term.
.infra.
§1205 RUI.ES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. 960
AMENDMENTS, WHEN AND HOW MADE.
RULE 15. A
Bill May be Amended in any particular, without leave, before
answer demurrer argued but if the complainant should thereafter deem
filed or ;
it necessary to bring new parties or matters before the Court, he may do so by

supplemental bill, as of course, and without leave, at any time within two
months after defence made but after two months, only by leave of the Chan-
;
cellor or Court.
RULE 16. An Answer May be Amended at any time before the complainant
begins taking proof, as of course, in any matter of form, or by filling a blank,
correcting a date or name, filing or referring to a document, or in other small
matters, on application to the Master.
RULE 17. If a Material Amendment to the Answer is Desired to be made, or any
amendment after the complainant has begun taking proof, the defendant
must apply to the Chancellor in vacation or in open Court and if in vacation ;
he must give the complainant or his Solicitor five days' notice of the applica-
tion. 613
'
RULE 18. No Amendment to a Pleading That Causes a Continuance by either

party will be allowed, except on the payment of the same costs as would result
under these rules from a continuance on application of the party asking to
amend.
RULE 19. All Amendments to be Made Within Time Allowed. All amendments
to pleadings must be made within the time allowed or they will be considered
to have been abandoned. When no time is fixed for making an amendment
it shall be made within thirty days after leave given.
THE TAKING OE PROOF, AND TIME ALLOWED THEREFORE

RULE 20. Proof When to be Taken. Bach party must take his proof in chief
within four months after the filing of the plea or answer, and his rebutting
proof within two months. Provided, the Chancellor or Master may extend the
time upon sufficient cause shown by affidavit, and upon terms. 63
RULE 21. Proof Denned. Proof in chief is proof that tends to establish the
affirmative allegations in the pleadings; rebutting proof is proof that tends
to refute these allegations, or assails the evidence or witnesses of the other
party. Proof of matters in avoidance is proof in chief. Rebutting proof may
be taken at any time within the six months, but proof in chief must be taken
within the four months. 64
RULE 22. Writings When to be Piled and Proved. All deeds, transcripts of
records, original records, or other written or printed documents, intended to be
offered as evidence, on the hearing of a cause, by either party, shall be filed
with the Clerk before the cause is heard if filed during the term at which the
:
cause is heard, notice thereof in writing shall be given the adverse party or his
Solicitor, at least one day before the beginning of the hearing. If a party in-
tends to prove any document or exhibit viva voce, at the hearing, he shall give
the adverse party, or his Solicitor, at least one day's notice of such intention.
The evidence of witnesses so examined will be reduced to writing by the
Master, and filed as evidence in the cause. 05
RULE 23. Exceptions to Answer to Cause no Delay. The filing of exceptions to
the answer shall not delay the taking of depositions, or otherwise preparing
the cause for hearing. 66
61a See Article on Amended and Supplemental An- taken "within eight weeks after issue." 1 Dan. Ch.
swers. Ante, §§ 434-437. Pr., 889. As to when a cause stands for trial, see,
62 See Article on When Proof Must be Filed, ante, §§ 465; 533.
ante, §§ 463-468. 04 As to the time allowed for taking proof, see,
63 Ch. Rule, II, §4; see, ante, §1191. The Chan- ante, § 465.
cery Rules of 1830, §§ 9; 18, allowed only five 65 2 Tenn. Ch., 789.
months. Cooke, 446; 448. "Three months and no 06 Ch. Rule, I, § 6; see, ante, § 1190.
more" are allowed by the U. S. Equity Courts. See
their Rules, § 69. In England all proof must be
961 RUIvES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. §1205
RULE 24. Taking of Proof Not Delayed, When. When a defendant obtains fur-
ther time to plead or answer, or time to amend a plea or answer, the time thus
obtained shall be counted as part of his time for taking proof; and, when such
further time is obtained, both parties shall have the right to take proof before
the plea or answer is filed, or the amendment made, as to any and all matters
contained in the pleadings on file.
RULE 25. If the Complainant Consent to Such Further Time to file or amend a
plea or answer, such time shall also be charged to him, and both parties shall
be at liberty to take proof as fully as though the plea or answer had been filed,
or the amendment made.
RULE 26. Cause Triable, When. A cause may be heard at the first term after
'
the answer is filed; 6 7 and if not then tried each party has only the remainder of
the four and two months in which to take his proof, unless he obtains fur-
ther time. 68
RULE 27. No Further Proof Can be Taken After Limit Has Expired. After the
four and two months have respectively expired, or such further time as the
Court may have allowed, no further proof can be taken by either party without
mutual consent in writing, or without leave of the Chancellor or the Master,
upon sufficient cause shown by affidavit and upon terms. 69
RULE 28. Proof Taken After the Lapse of Said Period of four and two months
will be suppressed, on exceptions by the adverse party, unless taken or filed as
above prescribed.
RULE 29. The Order Grant-'ng an Extension of Time to Take Proof should spec-
ify the names of the witnesses allowed to be examined, and the time allowed
for that purpose and should, also, specify the terms, these terms in no case to
;
be less than the costs of all proof thereafter filed.

RULE 30. Notice Where Party is Out rf the State. When a party is a non-resi-
.
dent, or is out of the State when notice is issued, or cannot be found by ah

officer authorized to serve notice, in all such cases notice to take depositions,
and all other notices, may be served on the Solicitor of such party. 70
rule 31. Witness Examined at Court, When. When a party has been unable,
after due effort, to take the deposition of a witness, he may have him subpcenaed
to appear before the Chancellor on the first day of the term, when leave will
be given to take his deposition instanter. But no party shall subpoena more
than one witness to the same term under this rule.
RULE 32. Exceptions to Depositions When to be Made and Disposed of. When a
deposition is filed twenty or more days before Court, all exceptions thereto shall
be made by the opposite party, and disposed of by the Master, on or before the
first day of the Court and when a deposition is filed within twenty days before
;
Court, or is filed during the term, all exceptions thereto shall be made and
finally disposed of during said term, and before the case is called for trial. Ex-
ceptions and grounds of exceptions not made and disposed of in the time herein
specified will be considered as waived, 71 except exceptions to the competency of
the witness, or his evidence. If the Master sustains the exceptions he shall, at
once, notify the party taking the deposition, or his Solicitor. 72
CONTINUANCES, AND COSTS THEREON.73

RULE 33. Costs on Continuances. The party continuing a cause after he has
67 See, ante, S 533. 70 Necessitas quod cogit, defendit. See 1 Dan. Ch.
68 Ch. Rule, II, § 4; ante, § 1191. Pr., 446; 2 Ibid., 1045; Love v. Hall, 3 Yerg., 408;
60 The fact that the evidence of the other party Code, § 3854 a; Ch. Rule, II, § 3.
was filed at the last moment allowed for so doing, is 71 Skinner v. Dayton, 5 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.), 191.
no ground for enlarging the time for taking evidence, See Tedder V. Odom. 2 Heisk., 50; Snyder v. Sum-
if the evidence so filed is confined to matters dis- mers. 1 Lea, 485; Hodge V. Dillon, Cooke, 281; 1
tinctly put in issue by the pleadings. 1 Dan. Ch. Meigs' Dig., § 445.
Pr., 890. But where a party closed his proof in chief 72 Code, § 4423.
just before the term began, the Court would consider 73 See Article on Motions for a Continuance, ante,
1
that fact on a motion for a continuance by the other §§ 5 9 521. Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut
party, supported by a special affidavit of rebutting differemus rectum aut justitiam. Magna Charta, 5 40.
evidence.
§ 1205 RULES OP PRACTICE EOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. 962
had months' time to take proof, will be taxed with the costs of all the proof
five
thereafter filed, unless he show good cause for not being ready.
RULE 34. If He Has Had Six Months' Time to Take Proof, the party continu-
ing will be taxed with one-half of the costs of the cause not previously ad-
judged. 74
RULE 35. If Two Regular Terms Have Elapsed since his time to take proof
began to run, the party continuing will be taxed with all the unadjudged costs
of the cause.
RULE 36. Costs on a Second Continuance. When costs have once been ad-
judged against a party on a continuance, no second continuance will be granted
him except on payment of all the unadjudged costs of the cause.
RULE 37. Costs' in Case of Consent. A
party may consent to a continuance
by his adversary on his paying costs according to these rules but when both ;
parties agree to a continuance after six months' time to take proof, without
providing for the payment of one-half of the unadjudged costs, each party
will be taxed with one-half of all the costs of the cause not previously ad-
judged. 75
RTJLE 38. Continuances After Six Months' Time to Take Proof. No continuance
will be granted after six months' time to take proof, except by consent,
or on affidavit showing good cause and not then except on the terms as to costs
;
hereinbefore stated. A. party waiving an affidavit for a continuance by his

adversary shall be deemed to consent to such a continuance, and costs will
accordingly be imposed on both, if six months time to take proof have elapsed.
'
RULE 39. Further Time to Plead or Amend How Considered. When the defend-
ant obtains further time to file or amend a plea or answer, the time thus ob-
tained shall, in considering his application for a continuance, be counted as
part of his time for taking proof and if the complainant consent to such further
;
time, it shall also be charged to him.

RULE 40. Injunction and Attachment Suits to be Hurried. All injunction, at-
tachment, or other suits that stay proceedings at law, or stop public improve-
ments, or prevent a party collecting a debt or using property he claims, must
be prepared by the complainant for final hearing with extra diligence, especially
when he has given no bond to pay damages.
RULE 41. Exceptions to Above Rules. The rules on the subject of continu-
ances are not to be so construed as to prevent the Court, on its own motion, or
with the assent of both parties, ordering a cause to be continued, to await the
adjudication of another cause, or the payment of the debt sued for when it is
not disputed, or the incoming of a compromise that has been made or is in
progress, or in any other case when justice would be manifestly promoted
thereby. 76
PROCEEDINGS IN THE MASTER'S OFFICE."

RULE 42. AccountsWhen to be Taken. Within sixty days afterthe close of
the term the Master will notify the respective parties of the time of taking all
accounts ordered at such term and in taking accounts and making reports he
;
will strictly observe Rule IV, of Chancery Practice, and the Code, sections
4471-4474.
RULE 43. Diligence Required of Party at Whose Instance Repprt is Ordered.
The party at whose instance or for whose benefit a report is ordered, shall
furnish the Master with proper evidence in due time for the report to be made.
or he will be taxed with the costs as on a continuance or, at the discretion of;
74 As to costs on a continuance, see, ante, §§ 521; deem right, The Clerk and Master has an interest
526-529. in the costs. Berger v. Harrison, 1 Tenn., (Overt),
75 As to continuances by consent, see, § 529, ante. 483.
See, also, Ch. Rule, VIII; ante, § 1197. Contin- 70 Ante, § 528.
uances, whether by consent or otherwise, are under 77 For the proceedings upon a reference, see,
the direction of the Court, and subject to such terms ante, §§ 603-610.
in regard to the payment of costs as the Court may
963 RUI.ES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. §1205
the Court, a decree may be entered as though the Master had reported that the
facts were not as alleged by the said party. 78
RULE 44. Report Without an Order, When. An account may be taken and a
report made by the Master in vacation, without an order of the Court, provided
the parties or their solicitors file with the Master a written agreement to that
effect, specifying particularly the matters to be reported on; and, also, when
the cause is remanded by the appellate Court for that purpose. 783-
RTJXE 45. Account on Bill Taken for Confessed. When a bill praying for an
account and report by the Master is taken for confessed in vacation as to
all the defendants, he shall at once proceed to hear evidence and make the
report prayed for.
RULE 46. Proceedings at Taking of an Account. All parties to an account be-
fore the Master shall bring in their respective accounts duly itemized, and in
the form of debtor and creditor. When the items in these accounts are based
in whole or in part on books, the name and page of the book shall be given
whence the item was taken. 79 The books of account shall not constitute any
part of the record in the cause without the order of the Court, but may be used
by the Master or counsel for the purpose of examining and cross-examining
the parties, or their witnesses. 80
RULE 47. Master May Reconsider His Report, When. When the exceptions to
a Master's report raise a question of fact, the Master may at once consider
them, and if he deem them, or any of them, well taken, he may amend his
report accordingly. 81 .
RULE 48. Proceedings on a Scire Facias Before the Master. Upon the death Or
marriage of a defendant, proof thereof may be made before the Master on a
rule day, and a scire facias may at once be ordered and issued against the heirs
or personal representatives or husband, as the case may be or a bill of revivor
;
may, at any time, be filed against said heirs, representatives or husband and, ;
in either event, process shall be made returnable to the next rule day, and the
suit revived by the Master, as of course, unless good cause to the contrary be
shown on the return of the process. If it shall appear by the return of the
Sheriff upon the scire facias, or upon the subpoena to answer a bill of revivor,
that any defendant named therein is not to be found, or if it be shown by affida-
vit filed, that any of the causes exist which are specified in the 1st, 2d, 4th and
5th sub-divisions of section 4352 of the Code, as ground for dispensing with
personal service of process, as to any defendant to such writ of scire facias,
or bill of revivor, the Court in term time, or the Master in vacation, may make
an order requiring such defendant to appear at a time specified, and show
cause why the suit should not be revived against him, a copy of which order
shall be published for four successive weeks, as in other cases of publication;
and if the defendant in such case fail to show cause, the suit shall be revived
against him in the same manner as when personally served with process. 82
RULE 49. A Guardian ad Litem May be Appointed by the Master at rules, when-
ever it appears by a sworn bill or by affidavit that a defendant, duly in Court,
is a minor without regular guardian. In making such appointment, the Master
will be careful to appoint a capable person, and one whose interests and duties
are not in conflict with the interests of the minor.
RULE 50. Report by the Master as to Taxes on Lands Sold. Whenever real es-
tate is sold under a decree of this Court, the Master shall ascertain and report
to the Court whether there are any taxes due and unpaid which are a lien upon
78 Ch. Rule, IV, §9; Maupin v. Daniel, 3 Tenn. 81 For exceptions, and other proceedings upon a
Ch., 223. Master's report, see, ante, §§ 615-620.
78a See, ante, § 664. 82 See 1 Heisk., 786-787. The words, "bills of
79 Remsen v. Remsen, 2 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.), 495; review," on page 786, should he, "bills of revivor."
2 Dan Ch. Pr., 1221-1222; Hicks V. Chadwell, 1 Si»e Chapter on Abatement and' Revivor, ante, §§ 698-
Tenn. Ch., 251; Myers v. Bennett, 3 Lea, 184. 709.
80 Budeke v. Ratterman, 2 Tenn. Chi, 459; Myers
<. Bennett, 3 Lea, 184.
§ 1205 RULES OF PRACTICE POR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. 964
said real estate and if so, he will
; report the amount of such taxes, the years
for which due, and the amount due for each year. Said report shall be made to
the same term to which the report of said sale shall be made, and shall be at-
tached to said report of sale.
RULE 51. How the Files are to beKept. The Master will keep all the plead-
ings, bonds, subpoenas toanswer and proof in each cause, securely protected
by a strong envelope or other suitable cover and under no circumstances will
;
he allow any of them to be taken out of his office without the written receipt
of the Solicitor taking the same.
RULE 52. Injunction Bonds to lbe Filed, Wben. Every bill or petition, on which
a fiat for an injunction, attachment or other extraordinary process has been
granted, shall be filed within five days after the date of such fiat, and the bond,
or pauper oath, required by the fiat shall be filed within ten days after the date
of such fiat, or the fiat shall become functus officio and void, unless continued by
special order of the Chancellor after due notice to the defendant.
PROCEEDINGS AT CHAMBERS.
B.ULE The Chambers Docket.
53. The Chancellor will keep, at his office in
[Knoxville,] a docket for the entering of all motions, appeals or other matters
on which his action is invoked in vacation. This docket will be called the
"Chambers Docket;" and during his absence 83 from his office will be deposited
with the Clerk and Master at [Knoxville,] 84 who is hereby appointed Chambers
Clerk, with authority to appoint a deputy.
RULE 54. Entries in the Chambers Docket, Effect of. In- the absence of the
Chancellor from his office, any and all motions, appeals, or other matters to
be brought before him at Chambers, may be entered, by the party bringing
the same, on the Chambers Docket, on the day specified in the notice thereof,
if notice shall have been given and if no notice is necessary, then on any day
;
and when so entered shall have the same force and effect as though orally made
before the Chancellor in person, or by the party in person and no alias notice ;
of such motion, appeal or other matter shall be necessary.

RULE 55. The Chancellor Will Consider ?nd Act on Such Motion, appeal or other
matter, at his earliest convenience after his return to his office, or may continue
the hearing thereof, and will notify the parties interested of his action in the
premises.
RULE 56. What May be Filed With the Chambers CleTk. Either or both par-
ties may file with the Chambers' Clerk any notice, pleading, affidavit, written
motion, brief or other writing to which the attention of the Chancellor is de-
sired, and may enter a memorandum thereof on said Chambers Docket, or have
the said Clerk enter the same.
RULE 57. Fees on Mot'ons at Chambers. Each party making a motion or ap-
plication at Chambers, in a cause pending in another county, will pay to the
Chambers Clerk thirty-five cents, and to the Clerk and Master of the county
where the cause is pending, thirty-five cents, to pay postage, expressage and
registration fees under the Acts of 1903 and 1905. 85
MOTIONS, WHEN AND HOW MADE.

RULE 58. No Motion Will be
Considered by the Court, or by the Chancellor
at Chambers, unless reduced to writing in proper form to be entered on the
minutes.
RULE
59. Every Motion Must Show on Its Face clearly the grounds on which
based and if these grounds do not appear of record they must be made to
it is ;
appear by affidavit, or petition.

83 Absentia ejus qui reipublicte causa abest, neque 84 This "Chambers Docket" will ordinarily be kept
ei neque aliis damnosa esse debet. (The absence of in the Court House of the town where the Chancellor
one who is away in the service of the State ought to resides.
be prejudicial neither to him nor to others.) 85 See, ante, §§ 776-783.
965 RULES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. § 1205
BULE 60. No Motions Will be Made or Heard in Court, except on motion morn-
ings, unless both parties be present and consenting.
THE HEABING, AND PBACTICE THEBEAT.
BULE 61.
Briefs Imperatively Bequired. Rule X
of Chancery Practice in ref-
erence to briefs will be rigidly enforced, and must be strictly complied with by
both parties in all contested cases, and especially by the party demanding a
hearing. The Chancellor reserves the right to continue, any cause until proper
briefs are presented and a failure to comply with said Chancery Rule may be
;
treated as a contempt of Court.

BULE 62. All Agreements Must be in Writing. Every agreement between par-
ties or their Solicitors, except agreements made in open Court, must be reduced
to writing and duly signed, before brought to the attention of the Chancellor. 86
This rule applies to all agreements in reference to process, pleadings, proceed-
ings in the Master's office or at chambers, evidence, continuances, motions, re-
ports, decrees, sales, compromises and all other matters to be considered of by
the Chancellor.
BULE 63. Jury Trials. In order to make proper preparations therefor, all
jury trials must be demanded in the pleadings, or in open Court, on or before
the first day of the term after the cause is at issue and at that term the issues ;
to be submitted must be made up and entered of record and unless both the ;
demand and the issues are so made and entered of record, a jury trial will be
conclusively deemed to be waived. 87
FOBMS OE PLEADINGS AND DECBEES.
BULE Prolixity Beprehended. The Code makes it the duty of the Court
64.
"to discountenance prolixity and unnecessary and false allegations in all Chan-
cery pleadings." 88 It is, therefore, recommended: 1st, That the "protesta-
tion" formula be omitted from the commencement of demurrers, and that their
conclusion be: "And the defendant prays the judgment of the Court hereon;"
2d, That the "saving and reservation" clauses be omitted from the commence-
ment of answers, and that answers commence thus ' The defendant for answer :
'
to said bill says ' and 3d, That bills of revivor, and amended and supplemental
' ;
bills omit all recitals of the allegations in the original bill, unless the circum-
stances of the case specially require such recital.
BULE 65. Bills and Answers to be Paragraphed. It is recommended that every
bill be divided into paragraphs consecutively numbered, each paragraph con-
taining a separate fact and its special circumstances 89 and that the answer be ;
likewise divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each paragraph con-

taining as nearly as may be a separate and distinct allegation, admission, or
denial. 90
BULE 66. Bounds of Lands and Debts Must be Specified. Bills to sell, recover,
or clear up title to lands, must on their face describe the lands by metes and
bounds, or by the adjoining tracts, or by natural objects, so as to identify the
lands fully a reference to exhibits will not suffice. And bills to sell the lands
:
of a decedent to pay his debts must, also, specify the debts sought to be thus
paid, to whom
owing, on what account, and how evidenced.
BULE General Beplication to a Plea. The general replication to a plea
67.
shall be "The complainant joins issue on the plea." 91
:
BULE 68. Form of a Pro Confesso. Pro confesso orders shall be drawn sub-
stantially as follows
Here insert the style of \
the cause. 3
In this cause, it duly appearing to the Court that [here name the defendants in default]
86 Ores. Eq. Ev., 47, note; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 848. simplify and yet preserve the substance, subserve
The Court will give full effect to such agreements, the ends of justice. Lawson v. State, 3 T,ea, 314.
lones v. Kimbro, 6 Hum., 319; ante, § 472. 89 See, ante, § 157; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 356.
8T Stadler v. Hertz, 13 Lea, 315; Cheatham V. 90 See, ante, § 378; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 731.
Pearce, 5 Pirk., 668: see, ante, § 547. 91 See, ante, § 350.
88 Code, §§ 4314-4316. Changes in forms, which
§ 1205 RULES OF PRACTICE FOR PARTICULAR DIVISIONS. 96.6
have been regularly brought into Court by service of subpcena, [or, by publication,] and -have
made no defence, but are in default, it is ordered, on motion of the complainants, that, as to
said defendants, the bill be taken for confessed, and the cause set for hearing ex parte.
BtTLE 69. Figures and Blanks Not Allowed in Decrees, When. In drawing de-
crees, amounts decreed to be paid to or by any party must be expressed in
words, except hundredths of a dollar. Decrees for the sale of land must de-
scribe the land to be sold, by metes and bounds, if possible; if not, then by
adjoining tracts or by 'natural objects, so as definitely to identify it. A refer-
ence to the pleadings or exhibits for a description, will not suffice. Decrees
must contain no blank dates, blank amounts, or other material blanks, when
presented to the Chancellor, unless the Solicitor presenting the same is seeking
instructions in reference to filling such blanks, or otherwise perfecting the
decree. All blanks must be filled, in any event, before the decree is handed in
to be entered on the minutes.
RULE 70. Consent Decrees Must be Signed. Every order or decree purporting
on its face to be by consent must show on its face who are the parties consent-
ing thereto and must be signed by such parties, or their respective Solicitors
;
otherwise, it will not be entered by the Clerk and Master, unless on the order
of the Chancellor.
RULE 71. Decrees How Written. Each decree shall be written upon no less
than half a sheet of legal cap paper, and in ink. 92
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS.
RULE 72.All Motions for a New Trial must be in writing, and specify the
particular grounds relied on. 93
RULE 73. Diligence, Courtesy, Dignity and Good Faith should characterize the
conduct of all who minister in the Courts of Justice. "Is ordo vitio careto,
cceteris specimen esto."
RULE 74.. Rules May be Relaxed, When. When the rigid enforcement of these
rules would work manifest injustice, the Chancellor may relax them. 94
92 Ch. Rule, III, § 1; ante, § 1192. 04 Marsh v. Crawford, 1 Swan, 116; Lowe v. Mor-
93 Railroad v. Johnson, 6 Cates, 623: see note 3 I ris, 4 Sneed, 72; 1 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1, note;" Cursus
to § 1211, post. Curia: est lex Curia; ante § 61, sub-sec. 4; Van.
I Brocklin v. Wolcott, 5 Heisk., 745.
967 NEW TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT AT LAW. § 1205 a
X. PART
PROCEEDINGS FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS.
CHAPTER LXVIII.
NEW TRIALS, AND REHEARINGS.
Article I. New Trial After Judgment at Law.
Article II. New Trial After Verdict in Chancery.
Article III. Rehearing in Chancery.
ARTICLE I.
NEW TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT AT LAW.
§ 1205a. Methods of Correcting Errors. § 1208. Frame and Form of Bill to Obtain a
§ 1206. Suits to Obtain a New Trial After NewTrial After Judgment at Law.
Judgment at Law. § 1209. Character of Relief Granted on a
§ 1207. When a New Trial Will be Granted New Trial.
After Judgment at Law.
§ 1205a. —
Methods of Correcting Errors. The remedies for the redress of
wrongs, and the vindication of rights are many, and ordinarily adequate to all
exigencies.
1. New Trial After a Judgment at Law. If an unjust judgment has been ren-
dered in a Court of law as the result of fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake,
without any fault on the part of the losing party, or his attorneys or agents,
he will be given a new trial by the Chancery Court.
2. New Trial After a Verdict in Chancery. If there has been a trial by jury,
the losing party may have a new trial if any substantial injustice has been done
him, or if the verdict be contrary to right and justice.
3. Rehearing in Chancery. If the cause was heard by the Chancellor, and an
error committed, or injustice done by reason of some omission, or oversight, a
rehearing may be had, if applied for before the term ends, or thirty days
elapse.
4. Bill of Review. If the term has ended, or the thirty days elapsed, any
party aggrieved by a decree by reason of some error of law oh its face, or by
reason of newly discovered evidence, may file a bill of review, and have the
wrong righted.
5. Writ of Error Coram Nobis. If an error of fact has occurred whereby a
party has been wronged in a proceeding of which he had no notice, or in which
he was prevented from making defence by disability, or by surprise, accident,
mistake, or fraud, without fault on his part, he may have such error corrected
by a writ of error coram nobis.
6- Appeal to the Appellate Court. If no one of the foregoing remedies is avail-
able, or desired, the injured party may appeal the cause to the Supreme Court,
or to the Court of Civil Appeals, and there assign the errors of which he com-
plains.
7. Writ of Error in the Appellate Court. If for any reason an appeal is denied,
or is not applied for, or is otherwise not available, the party aggrieved by an
error apparent on the record, may take the cause to the Supreme Court, or to
the Court of Civil Appeals, by a writ of error.
§ 1206 NEW TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT AT LAW. 968
8. Supersedeas by Judge of Appellate Couit. If during the progress of a suit,
and before a final decree, a party is injured by an affirmative act or interlocu-
tory order, from which no appeal will lie or can be had, he may have it super-
seded by one of the Judges of the proper appellate Court, or by the Court itself.
9. Bill to Impeach a Decree for Fraud. If none of the foregoing remedies are
available in consequence of the fraud of the successful party in obtaining the
decree, the party injured may file a bill to impeach the decree for fraud. Such
a bill having been already fully considered, will not be further noticed.
§ 1206. Suits to Obtain a New Trial After Judgment at Law.—It is one of
the oldest maxims of the Court of Chancery that "Equity hath power, upon
circumstances, to relieve against penalties, judgments and executions;" and in
considering a difficult case the circumstances often move the conscience of the
Chancellor when the ordinary rules and principles of adjudication fail. One
of the greatest outcries against the Chancery Court of England in its infancy
was its action in nullifying and modifying the judgments of the Courts of law.
But the Chancellors adhered boldly to their maxim that "Equity would not
suffer a right to be without a remedy. n
When, therefore, by the fraud of the plaintiff, or by reason of some accident,
surprise or mistake, without any fault on his part, an unjust judgment had
been rendered in a Court of law, the defendant was granted relief in Equity.
Indeed, relief in such cases was one of the occasions that called the Court of
Chancery into existence. 2
§ 1207. When a New Trial Will be Granted After Judgment at Law.—It is
not enough to move a Court of Conscience to action that an unjust judgment
has been rendered against the party complaining, but there must be circum-
stances to show that the judgment was brought about by the fraud of the other
party, or was the result of accident, surprise or mistake on the part of the
complainant without any fault or negligence on his part. It is a great exercise
of power in one Court to set aside the judgments of another Court, especially
when the other Court is one of concurrent jurisdiction; besides, it is a maxim
of Equity that the welfare of society is promoted by having litigation come to
an end.
The Court of Chancery, therefore, will not grant a rehearing of a suit de-
cided in a Court of law, unless: 1st, it be clearly shown that the judgment
complained of is unjust and contrary to good conscience; and 2d, that it re-
sulted from the fraud of the other party, or from accident, surprise or mistake
unmixed with negligence on the part of the complainant or his agent or at-
torney. 3
§ 1208. Frame and Form of Bill to Obtain a New Trial After Judgment at
Law. —As already stated, 4
whenever a complainant goes into a Court of Equity
asking extraordinary relief he must show extraordinary care in fully disclos-
ing the facts of his case. To set aside the solemn judgment of another Court is
a very different matter from a suit upon a note of hand or the enforcement of
a lien. Hence, the Court requires the complainant not only to show that the
judgment complained of is unjust, but to clearly set forth in his bill the par-
ticular facts constituting the alleged fraud of which he complains, or circum-
stances causing the accident, surprise or mistake, if one of these be his ground
for relief. 5 It is not sufficient to charge in general terms that he was prevented
from making his defence by the fraud of the defendant, or by accident, surprise
or mistake, or to allege in general terms that he used diligence, or was not
guilty of negligence. 6
1 See, ante, § 33. Rowland v. Jones, 2 Heisk., 321; Hickerson v. Rai-
2 Ante, §§3; 33. quel, Heisk., 329; Holcomb v. Canady, 2 Heisk.,
2
3 Kearney v. Smith, 3 Yerg., 127; Prater v. Rob- 610; BuremV. Foster, 6 Heisk., 333.
inson, 11 Heisk., 391; Kirkpatrick v. Utley, 14 Lea, iAnte, §§ 142; 838.
96; Ballard v. Railroad, 10 Pick., 205. Relief after 5 Kirkpatrick V. Utley, 14 Lea, 96.
judgment at law was granted in the following cases: 6 Ford v. Ford, 2 Cold., 75 ; Levan v. Patton, 2
Lewis, exrs., v. Brooks, 6 Yerg., 166; Galbraith f. Heisk., 108. See, ante, § 838, sub-sec. 2.
Martin, 5 Hum., 50; Rice v. Bank, 7 Hum., 39;
969 NEW TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT AT LAW. § 1209
BILL FOR A NEW TRIAL AFTER JUDGMENT AT LAW.
[For address and- caption see, ante, §§ 1SS ; 164.]
I.
That he was on [the day the suit was brought against him in the Circuit Court, giving the
date,] the owner in fee of the following tract of land in DeKalb county, [describe it as
described in his deed,] and was lawfully in possession thereof.
ii.
That on
said day the defendant brought an action of ejectment against him in the Circuit
Court of DeKalb county, and filed his declaration, to which complainant pleaded "not guilty."
in.
That at the May
term thereafter of said Circuit Court while complainant was absent from
the Court the defendant insisted on a trial of said suit, and obtained a judgment for said
land, and for the costs, on which judgment a writ of possession and an execution for the
costs have issued and are now in the hands of the sheriff of said county.
IV.
That complainant would not have been absent from said Circuit Court when said ejectment
suit was tried had it not been for the assurance of the defendant that the case could not be
tried at said May term, the defendant claiming that the criminal business would consume
the whole term, and saying that he was going home that day, which was two days before the
said ejectment suit was tried, and at his earnest solicitation complainant agreed to go home,
and did go accordingly. •
v.
That before complainant left said Court, as aforesaid, his life was threatened by some
lawless men somewhat intoxicated, and complainant charges that the defendant incited them
and treated them on whisky, and then came to complainant and told him of said threats and
advised him to go home, and so complainant went, influenced in part by said threats and in
part by defendant's assurances that he was going home, and that said ejectment suit would
not be tried at that term.
VI.
That before complainant left said Court at said May term his attorney in said ejectment
suit was taken very sick and had gone to his home in the city of Nashville. Complainant was
wholly ignorant of this fact when he left Court for his own home as aforesaid, but the
defendant was fully informed of the fact, and told complainant's said attorney that he, the
defendant, was, also, going home and that said ejectment suit would not be tried at that
term.
VII.
That complainant has a perfect legal title to said tract of land based on a conveyance
connected with a State grant and thirteen years' adverse and exclusive possession thereof
under his said deed, whereas the defendant's claim to said land is based on a grant to him
made two years ago for five thousand acres, sometimes called "a wildcat'' grant, under which
he has had no possession, and which if valid as to any one is void as to complainant because
no notice was given him of the entry on which it is based.
VIII.
1st. That subpoena to answer issue [&c., see, ante, §§ 158; 164.]
2nd. That the said judgment in ejectment against him in favor of the defendant be set
aside and declared null and void, that the questions in issue in said Circuit Court suit be
determined in your Honor's Court, and that said grant in so far as it covers complainant's
said tract be declared a cloud on complainant's title.
3rd. That if your Honor prefer not to take jurisdiction to retry said questions in issue
that a trial be granted him in said Circuit Court.
new
That defendant, his agents, tenants and privies, and the said Sheriff, be enjoined
4th.
from taking any step under said judgment in ejectment, and especially from in any way
enforcing said execution and writ of possession.
1
Sth. That complainant have such other, further and general relief as he may be entitled to.
Charles E. Snodgrass, Solicitor.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, §§ 161 ; 789.]
§ 1209. Character of Relief Granted on a New Trial. The proper procedure —

under the present jurisprudence of our State, when a bill for a new trial is
sustained, is to take full jurisdiction, and determine all questions in issue in
the Court below. Under the old practice, a new trial was granted in the Court
below. 7
7 In Holcomb V. Canady, 2 Heisk., 610, a bill to prayed for a new trial in the Court below, and the
enjoin a judgment in an action of ejectment and defendant answered without demurring; so the Su-
obtain a trial, the Supreme Court ordered the
new preme Court granted the special priver. Besides,
judgment below to be set aside, and awarded a new this decision was before the Act of 1877.
trial in the Court below. But, in this case, the bill
§1210 NEW TRIAL AFTER VERDICT IN CHANCERY. 970
When Chancery has jurisdiction for one purpose it will take jurisdiction for
allpurposes, as already shown. 8 The reason Equity Courts have in many cases
awarded new trials at law was because their jurisdiction did not include
actions at law, and besides they were not provided with juries but neither of ;
these reasons apply in this State since the Act of 1877, and our Chancery Court
has now both the jurisdiction and the equipment to try any action at law, ex-
cept a few involving unliquidated damages.
DECREE GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.

[For title, commencement and recitals, see, ante, §567.]
On consideration whereof it is ordered, adjudged and decreed
1st. That the judgment in ejectment obtained by the defendant against the complainant
in the Circuit Court of DeKalb county, on the .... day of 19...., [giving the exact date,]
,
was obtained by fraud and is grossly inequitable and unjust, and the defendant, his solicitors,
attorneys, agents and privies,, are perpetually enjoined from taking any steps to enforce the
same and from setting up any claim thereunder.
2d. That the title to the tract of land sued for in said ejectment suit is in the complainant,
and the grant obtained by the defendant from the State on the .... day of 19...., [giving,
its date,] and numbered 19,847, is void as against complainant's title to said tract of land
and is a cloud thereon, and the defendant is perpetually enjoined from setting up any claim
thereunder to complainant's said tract.
3d. That the defendant pay all the costs of this cause, for which an execution will issue.
If the Court decides to grant a new trial in the Circuit Court, 9 the second
paragraph of the above decree will be as follows
2d. The defendant, his agents, attorneys and privies, are enjoined to consent that the said
judgment in said Circuit Court be set aside, and the cause wherein it was rendered be rein-
stated on the docket and a new trial granted therein, and that said cause then stand in exactly
the same plight and condition as though it had been continued by consent on the third day 1
of the term at which said judgment was rendered, and had remained so continued ever since.
ARTICLE II.
NEW TRIALS AFTER VERDICT IN CHANCERY.

§ 1210. New Trials in the Chancery Court. § 1213. Bill of Exceptions.
§ 1211. Motion for a New Trial, § 1214. Form of a Bill of Exceptions.
g 1212. Grounds for a New Trial.
§ 1210. New
Trials in the Chancery Court. —
Where there has been a jury
trial in the Chancery Court the losing party, if in any material way unjustly
aggrieved by the verdict, may obtain a new trial, if the motion therefor is made
in due season, and the grounds properly presented.
§ 1211. —
Motion for a New Trial. If any party is dissatisfied with the find-
ing of the jury on the issues of fact submitted to them at the hearing of the
cause, he may move the Court to set their verdict aside, and grant him a new
trial. This motion may be made on any day during the term of the Court at
which the trial is had, unless such term continues longer than thirty days, in
which case it must be made and acted on within thirty days after the decree is
entered on the minutes, unless within the thirty days the time is extended. 1
The proper time for entering a motion for a new trial is before the decree is
s See, ante, §§36; 38. the maxim, prevents a multiplicity of suits and cir-
9 The Chancery Court cannot directly grant a new cuity of action. Equity delights to do complete jus-
trialin another Court: allit can do in that regard tice and not by halves. See, ante. §§36; 38. See
is to compel the parties toconsent to a new trial, notes 3 and 7, supra. Interest reipublicce ut sit finis
which is, at best, an awkward procedure as com- litium.
pared with a decree in Chancery, disposing of the 1 Ellis & Gresham v. Ellis, 8 Pick., 471. See,
whole matter. Why impose on an innocent com- ante, § 576.
plainant the burden of another trial? Equity, says
971 new trial after, verdict in chancery. § 1212
pronounced ;- and if not then entered, the delay must be satisfactorily excused.
It often happens, however, that the ground of the motion did not become known
until after the decree was entered, in which case an affidavit of the fact would
be a sufficient explanation for not making the motion before the entry of the
decree.
If a new trial is granted, the cause retains its place on the trial docket, and
stands in the same plight and condition as though no trial had been had, and
no verdict been rendered; and the losing party is not in any way prejudiced
by the verdict. The cause may be remanded to the rules for further proof, on
motion of either party as on a continuance. Depositions may be taken in the
cause to be read at the next trial, and the depositions on file may be re-read
when the cause is again heard. The witnesses, however, must all be re-sum-
moned, if their testimony is again desired.
If a new trial is refused, the losing party must either submit to the conse-
quent decree, or must tender a bill of exceptions and appeal to the proper ap-
pellate Court.
The form of a motion for a new trial, and of the action of the Court thereon,
is substantially as follows
MOTION FOB, A NEW TRIAL.

John Doe, et al., ]
vs. \ No. 789.

Richard Roe, ct al. J
In this cause, the defendant moved the Court to set aside the verdict and findings of the
jury on the issues of fact submitted to them, because of the following errors 1st, [specifying:
them;*] [and in support of his motion read the affidavits of himself, Sam E. Young, George
Brown and Henry Price, stating what affidavits or papers were read, although this is not
necessary.]
And argument of counsel having been heard, and the premises considered, it is ordered
and adjudged by the Court that said motion be [allowed, and the verdict and findings of the
jury on the issues of fact submitted to them are set aside, and a new trial is granted, because
of error of the Chancellor in charging the jury, or in admitting or excluding evidence, or of
misconduct of the jury, or other ground. (It is not necessary to state the ground, but well
to do so.) Or,] disallowed and overruled, and a new trial refused. To which order and
ruling of the Court the defendant excepted, and tendered his bill of exceptions to said ruling
and to former rulings of the Court, which bill is signed by the Chancellor, and made a part of
the record of the cause.
§ 1212. —
Grounds for a New Trial. The following is a summary of the ordi-
nary grounds upon which a motion for a new trial in Chancery is based
1. Errors Preliminary to the Trial. The Court may have committed some ma-
terial error in overruling a motion for a continuance or in overruling issues;
of fact presented, or in admitting iss.ues of fact objected to.

2. Errors in Empaneling the Jury. The Court may have admitted an incompe-
tent juror over proper objection, to the prejudice of the objector or other error ;
may have been committed in selecting or qualifying the jury, to the great
prejudice of the losing party.
3. Errors in the Admission of Illegal Evidence. Illegal evidence of a hurtful
character may have been admitted over the objection of the losing party, es-
pecially evidence likely to prejudice or mislead the jury.
4. Errors in the Exclusion of Legal Evidence. A
party is entitled to have all
the legal evidence he offers submitted to the jury, and if any such evidence is
excluded by the Court, and there is a probability that such evidence may have
had some weight with the jury, a new trial will be granted the party injured
bv such exclusion.
2 The motion for a new trial should not be entered § 1183, note 59, and post, § 1269, note 62.
in the presence of the jury, 1st, Because it is dis- 3 Trott V. West, 10 Yerg., 500; Turner v. Ross, 1
courteous and disrespectful to the jury: and 2d, Hum., 16; Ferrell v. Alder, 2 Swan, 77; Railway Co.
Motions are not then in order. The motion should v. Mahoney, 5 Pick., 311. The Court should have a
be made at the time fixed by the rules of Court for rule requiring applicants for new trials to specify <n
the making of motions. In Criminal Courts it is writing the particular grounds on which .their appli-
necessary to enter the motion earlier, in order to en- cations are based. Railroad V. Johnson, 6 Cates, 632.
title the defendant to bail. Code, § 5151a. But So- In case of such a rule, grounds not specified are
_
licitors should not import the manners of the Crim- deemed waived, and cannot be assigned for error
inal Courts into the Courts of Chancery. See, ants, in the Supreme Court. Ibid.
§1213 NEW TRIAL AFTER VERDICT IN CHANCERY. 972
5. Errors in the Charge of the Court. If the Chancellor make any error in his
charge to the jury (1) by charging material instructions not law, and liable to
mislead; (2) by refusing to charge propositions submitted by the losing side,
such propositions being legal, material, pertinent, and not covered by the
charge delivered; or (3) by otherwise misdirecting the jury in any matter to
the prejudice of the losing party, or refusing to properly direct them as to any
matter when such refusal was prejudicial to the party asking a new trial.
6. Misconduct on the Part of the Jury. If the jury has been tampered with, or
render a gambling verdict, or hear material evidence from one of their number,
or otherwise misconduct themselves, to the detriment of the losing side, a new
trial will be granted.
7. Surprise by Unexpected Evidence. If a witness gives material testimony
which can be fully rebutted, or if he can be wholly discredited, and the losing
party could not well have anticipated such testimony, a new trial will, ordina-
rily, be granted him.
8. Newly Discovered Evidence. If the losing party discovers material evi-
dence of a controlling character, after the testimony was closed, evidence he
could not well have discovered before, and there has been no want of diligence
on his part, a new trial will, generally, be given him, to let in such evidence.
9. The Verdict is Contrary to the Weight of the Proof. If the verdict, in the
opinion of the Chancellor, is clearly contrary to the weight of the proof, it will
be set aside and a new trial granted, on motion of the losing party.
10. Other Grounds for New Trial. If, for any other reason, injustice has been
done the losing party, either by some affirmative act of the Chancellor, or the
jury, or the opposite party; or if, by the failure of the Court, or the jury, or
some member of the jury, to do what the losing party was entitled to have
done, he has been denied a fair trial, the Court will, on his motion, on a plain
case made out, set the verdict aside and grant him a new trial.
§ 1213. Bill of Exceptions.
—
"When a cause is heard by the Chancellor, the
proof is all in writing, except in divorce cases and, by statute, all the deposi-
;
tions and exhibits that were read on the hearing of the cause constitute a part
of the record, as if they were incorporated into the decree. 4 When, however,
issues of fact are submitted to a jury, the trial is conducted as in the Circuit
Court, and witnesses are examined before the jury. In such a case, if the los-
ing party desires to appeal from the action of the Court refusing him a new
trial, he should tender a bill of exceptions, 5 detailing therein the evidence, the
exceptions, the rulings of the Court, the charge to the jury, and the requests
refused, as well as any other matter of fact either party may desire to incor-
porate therein pertinent to the application for a new trial, including the affi-
davits and other evidence introduced in support of the application. If the truth
of the case is fairly stated in the bill of exceptions, it is the duty of the Chan-
cellor to sign it, 6 and thereupon it becomes a part of the record of the cause. 7
The bill of exceptions may be signed at any time during the term, in the absence
of a rule of the Court requiring it to be tendered within some reasonable period
after the trial; 8 but it cannot be signed after the adjournment of the term at
which the trial was had 9 unless the Chancellor, in his discretion, allow further
;
time, not to exceed thirty days after the adjournment; 10 in which case.it must
be both signed by the Chancellor and filed with the Clerk and Master within
Code, S5 3108; 3121.
i 8 Patterson v. Patterson, 5 Pick., 151; and cases
Code. § 3156; Scruggs V. Hciskell, 11 Pick., 455.
5 there cited.
6 The Chancellor maybe coerced by mandamus to This rule is imperative, and the ingenuity of
sign a bill of exceptions which he admits is correct, Tudg"s and attorneys to evade or avoid it h^s been
but not when he disputes its correctness State i\ hitherto ineffectual. Jones V. Burch, 3 Lea, 747;
Cooper. 23 Pick., 202; State i>. Maiden. 2 Cates, 487. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 13 Lea, 24.
7 Code, § 2968. The minutes need not show that 10 Acts of 1899, ch. 275; Wright v. Redd, 22 Pick.,
the bill of exceptions was signed. Grubbs v. Greer, 719.
5 Cold., 160.
973 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. §1213
the extension and these facts must affirmatively appear or it will not be con-
;
sidered a part of the record. 11

Unless made a part of the record by the Chancellor, as heretofore shown, 12
none of the following matters can be properly incorporated in a transcript of a
record for review in the appellate Court, unless first made a part of the record
by a bill of exceptions, and if copied into the record l.-y the Clerk, without such
authority, will be utterly disregarded in the appellate Court 13 :
1. Evidence Submitted to a Jury. None of the evidence submitted to a jury,

not even the depositions, exhibits, deeds and other documents duly filed l-.i'i'nr-e
the trial, will be regarded in the appellate Court, on the question of a new trial,
unless duly made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. 14
2. Oral Testimony in a Divorce Suit, decided by the Chancellor, must be incor-
porated in a bill of exceptions, if a party wishes to use it in the appellate Court.
3. Affidavits, and Exhibits Thereto, constitute no part of the record of the
cause, and will not be considered by the appellate Court, unless incorporated in
a bill of exceptions, or unless made a part of the record by notation of the
Chancellor on their face, 15 or by a decree so ordering and explicitly identifying
them.
4. Papers, Depositions, Documents and Other Writings, Rejected as Evidence
during the trial, are thereby banished and outlawed, and cease to constitute a
part of the record even if once properly filed, Unless made a part of the record
anew by being incorporated in a bill of exceptions, 16 or unless the action of
the Chancellor thereon is verified by his signature as heretofore shown. 17
5. The New Matters Presented as Grounds for a New Trial. By new matters is
meant matters not a part of the record before the trial began. Every affidavit,
or other paper showing any misconduct on the part of the jury or others, affi-
davits of surprise, of new evidence, or of other matters, and the rulings of the
Court thereon, must all be made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions, or
they will come to naught, and will not be heeded by the appellate Court even
if copied into the transcript of the cause.
6. The Charge of the Court, and the Rulings During the Trial, although reduced
to writing and filed in the cause, constitute no part of the record, and will not
be looked into by the appellate Court unless duly incorporated into a proper
and duly signed bill of exceptions. If either party, and especially the losing
party, desires to assign errors upon the charge of the Court, or any of the re-
fusals of the Court to charge propositions or requests, or upon any ruling of
the Court in admitting or excluding evidence, or upon any other act of the
Court, the Chancellor, the jury, or any other person during the progress of a
suit or trial, he must incorporate such matters in a bill of exceptions, and have
173.
it signed, before the term closes.
In brief, nothing constitutes a part of the record for review in the appellate
Court except the pleadings, exceptions thereto, process, bonds, reports of the
Master, exceptions thereto, the orders and decrees on the minutes, the bill of
exceptions, and, if the cause is tried by the Chancellor without a jury, the
depositions, the written exceptions thereto, and rulings thereon, and the ex-
hibits, read on the hearing of the cause.
If an original record of the Court is read in another cause, the decree should
so show on its face, or it should be so shown in a bill of exceptions, otherwise
there will be nothing to show that it was read in the cause. transcript of a A
11 Muse v. State, 22 Pick., 181; Hinton v. Insur- Chesney, 17 Pick., 466; Kelley v. Fletcher, 10 Pick.,
ance Co., 2 Cates, 113; Bettis v. State, 19 Pick., 339; 1; State Mitchell, 20 Pick., 336; and tucas V.
v.
Jones v. Moore. 22 Pick, 188. Malone, 22 Pick , 380.

12 See. ante, § 538. 16 See, ante, § 538.
13 State V. Hawkins. 7 Pi'-tc., 140. IT Ibid.
14 In the absence of a bill of exceptions, the ap- 17a Matter to be inserted in a bill of exceptions
pellate Court will conclusively presume that the evi- must be in existence when the bill is signed, and so
dence justified the verdict. Scruggs V. Heiskell,. 11 marked or described as to identify it, leaving no dis-
Pick 455. cretion to the Clerk what to insert. Battier v. State,
15 Anderson V. Railroad, 7 Pick., 44; Nance V. 6 Cates, 563.
§1214 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 974
record is duly filed in the cause wherein it is read, but an original record is
not filed, and cannot be, in another cause.
If a deposition is not read, the decree, or Chancellor's notation, should so
show; or if a deposition taken by one party is read by the other party, the
decree should so show. In short, every fact material to the case, which will
not appear in the appellate Court, or will incorrectly appear, must be made to
appear, or to correctly appear, by a bill of exceptions, by the notation of the
Chancellor, or by proper recitals in the final decree. If questions or answers,
or both, contained in a deposition are excluded by the Chancellor at the hear-
ing, on exceptions taken, they are out of the case, unless incorporated in a bill
of exceptions, or duly noted and made a part of the record by the authentica-
tion of the Chancellor, or by recitals in the decree. And a party will lose the
benefit of his exceptions to questions or answers in a deposition, or his excep-
tions to other evidence, unless he has the decree to recite them, or makes them
appear in a bill of exceptions, 18 or has them authenticated by the Chancellor,
as heretofore shown. 19
§ 1214.
. Form of Bill of Exceptions. No particular form is essential to a —
bill of exceptions. Its office is to give a fair statement of the facts it purports
to set out. A bill of exceptions may be taken to any action of the Court as to
any matter the history whereof does not or will not fully appear in the record.
If taken at any term but the trial term they are often styled "wayside bills of
exceptions." 20 The form of such a bill of exceptions, and of all others, may
well be understood by the following illustration
BILL OP EXCEPTIONS.
John Doe, et al.,
vs. Bill of Exceptions.
Richard Roe, et al.
On the trial of this cause, the following is all the evidence that was submitted to the jury
[or to the Court, if there was no jury:]
I.
Evidence in Behalf of the Complainant.
1. The deposition of John Doe, the complainant, was read as follows: [The Clerk will
here copy it, in full.]
During the reading of said deposition, the defendant objected to direct question 10, and
the answer thereto, because they relate to a letter which is not shown to be lost, or mislaid,
or out of the complainant's reach, but the Court overruled said objection, and admitted the
question and answer. [So show every other exception made to the evidence contained in the
deposition. These exceptions must be explicit: general exceptions go for nothing. If
questions or answers were objected to before the commissioner who took the deposition, the
objections must be renewed at the hearing, or they will be deemed to be waived, or aban-
doned]
2.The complainant next read the following documents
(1) Exhibit A
to the bill, as follows: [Here copy it, in full. 11 ] This exhibit was proven
viva voce in open Court by the testimony of Henry Jones.
18 Stone V. Manning, 19 Pick., 232, citing the the other evidence introduced, or offered to be in-
above section of this book, then § 1045. troduced.]
19 See, ante, § 538. 6. The Chancellor ruled [so and so, giving all of
20 A exceptions would begin
wayside bill of as his rulings that do not appear on the minutes of the
follows: Court.]
WAYSIDE BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. To the action of the Court [in doing, or refusing
JOhn D°e W ^ side B »> °f Ex " to do, what is complained of, specifying it,] the
w No. 675. \
ceptions.
complainant [or defendant, or petitioner, or other
RichardRoe, et al., S person,] excepts, and tenders this, his bill of excep-
On the hearing of the motion [or petition, or ap- '
tions, which is signed by the Chancellor, and made
plication, or other matter, specifying it so as to iden- a part of the record in the cause.
tify the question before the Court,] at the August August 26th, 1891.
term, 1891, of the Court, the following was all the A. J. Abernathy, Chancellor.
evidence submitted to, or heard by, the Court: 21 In the hurry usually attendant upon the making
1. The petition of George Johnson was read, as out of a of exceptions, it is not necessary to
bill
follows: [Here set it out, in full.] actually copy therein the writing offered in evidence,
2. The affidavit of Sam Jones was read, as follows: whether grants, deeds, receipts, notes, depositions,
[Here set it out, in full.] transcripts, records, or other documents; but the bill
3. Deed from John Doe to George Jones was read, of exceptions must show, by a sufficient description,
as follows: [Here insert it, in full.] that they were read, or offered in evidence, and
4. William Brown testified orally, in open Court, then make them parts of the record by the use of
as follows: I am the receiver in this cause [&c, giv- the words: "Here insert," or "The Clerk will here
ing his testimony.] copy, in full." or similar words, in narentheses, or
5. Henry Jones testified orally, in open Court, us brackets. This is a direction to the Clerk to put the
follows: [Here give his testimony. And so with all paper described into the bill of exceptions when he
975 bile of exceptions. § 1214
(2) Grant 21,846 from the State to John Brown, as follows [Here copy it, in full.]
:
(3) Deed from John Brown to the complainant John Doe, as follows [Here copy : it, in
full.}
To the reading of this deed, the defendant objected because not properly probated for
registration, but the objection was overruled by the Court, and the deed admitted as evidence.
(4) The original record in the case of John Doe, the complainant, vs. Roland Roe, the
ancestor of the defendants, in this Court was read in evidence. By consent of all parties,
however, it was agreed that only the pleadings and decrees in said cause were material, and
it was agreed that they only should be incorporated in this bill of exceptions they are as :
follows : [Here copy them, in full, in order of time.]

(5) A part of a letter from defendant Richard Roe to complainant was offered in evidence,
but was objected to by said Roe upon the ground that all of the letter was not offered, which
objection was sustained by the Court, notwithstanding the complainant testified that the
balance of the letter was on other matters in no way connected with the matters in contro-
versy, and for that reason was by him destroyed. Said paper is as follows [Here copy it.]
:
(6) And so show every other deed, document or paper of any sort, read to the jury, or
offered to be read. Show what objections were made to any document, and what the ruling
of the Court was thereon. If any document or paper was excluded, so show, and set it out
in full, or direct the Clerk to copy it.]
3. Henry Jones testified as follows [Here give the material part of his evidence, and
:
especially state what questions and answers were objected to, and the ground of the objection,
and the ruling of the Court on the objections, thus: 22 ] Complainant asked witness the fol-
lowing question: [Here state the question.] The question was objected to by the defendant
on the ground that: [Here state the ground of objection.] The objection was sustained,
[or overruled,] by the Court, to which ruling of the Court the complainant [or defendant]
excepted. [The objection may be to the answer of the witness, and not to the question, or it
may be to both: in either event the facts must be clearly set forth. The objection may be to
the witness himself, on the ground that he is incompetent to testify at all, or incompetent in
the particular case, or as to the particular fact. The first objection would arise where the
zvitness has been convicted of an infamous crime, and judgment of infamy pronounced against
him. If such a witness is excluded, it may not be necessary for the bill of exceptions to shoiv
what he would hav e proved, or what was proposed to be proved by him, the objection being
s
not to what he may say, but to the right of the party introducing him to have him say any-
thing. Nevertheless, it is prudent, and may often be necessary, to show what the complainant
proposed to prove by him, in order to show the materiality of his evidence.
[Where the witness is generally competent, but incompetent in the particular case or matter
because a party, and at the same time an administrator, or executor, or a guardian, or a party
and a witness against an administrator, executor, or guardian, or a husband or wife of a party,
the relationship of the witness should be shown, and the facts offered to be proved by the
witness, or the questions asked, should be set out, and the grounds of the objections to the
evidence fully stated, and the rulings of the Court, so that the questions of law raised may
specifically and distinctly appear.]
4. George Jones testified as follows [Here set out the substance of his evidence. If any
:
other witnesses were examined by the complainant, or any other documentary evidence intro-
duced by him, set out the testimony or documents as shown above, stating fully and partic-
ularly what objections were interposed to the witness, or to his testimony, or to the document,
or to its contents, giving the grounds of the objections, and show what were the rulings of
the Court on such objections, being careful to put everything in the bill of exceptions in the
order of time in which it occurred, so that the bill of exceptions may be a faithful photograph
of the facts.]
This was all the proof in chief introduced by the complainant.
comes to make it out as a part of the transcript for
_
to do, or~\ had done [so and so, briefly stating it.]
the appellate Court. But the Clerk cannot copy into It is safe to say that nine-tenths of the average
the bill of exceptions any matter not in existence bill of exceptions is mere surplusage. The young
when the bill was signed. See note 17a, supra. If lawyer thinks the appellate Judges read the evidence
there was any objection made to any deposition, in jury cases. They do not realize that it would
paper, writing, or other document, at the time it take at least a yeaf for each of the Judges to read
was offered in evidence, the objection should appear all the records filed in any one of their three Courts.
in the bill of exceptions in accordance with the facts, The Judges, as a rule, pay no attention to the evi-
and the ruling of the Court thereon should be given, dence in jury causes, except in so far as is neces-
as in other cases. sary to understand the questions of law raised.
22 It is needless to set out the whole testimony of Ordinarily, all the evidence that is necessary in a
a witness. As a rule, a mere abstract of the material bill of exceptions is a general statement that there
part is all-sufficient. Thus: was proof that tended to show certain facts; that
1. Henry Jones proved the execution of the fol- such and such evidence was offered and ruled out
lowing paper. [Here copy the paper.] on objections; and that such and such evidence was
2. William Smith discredited Jonadab Snobs. objected to but admitted, stating the specific grounds
3. Thomas Brown testified that he was present at of the objections. This is all the appellate Court
the time and place testified to by witness Snobs; was cares to know about the evidence. Their business is
in hearing of what was said, and heard no such talk not to sit as a jury and sift and weigh facts, but to
sit as a Court to hear and determine questions of
as Snobs testified to.
4. James Johnson proved the good character
or law. Our bills of exceptions in jury cases need re-
Thomas Brown, and that he was a credible witness. forming altogether. See Railway Cos. v. Hendricks,
5. George Jones testified substantially as did 4 Pick., 719; Glass v. Bennett, 5 Pick., 485; Dossett
Thomas Brown. «. Miller, 3 Sneed, 7S; Huffman v. Hughlett, 11 Lea,
6 Jane Brown testified that the defendant told 549. And stenographic reports of evidence only
her on or about Christmas, 1891, that he [was going make what was bad a great deal worse.
§ 1214 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 976
I!
Evidence in Behalf of the Defendant.
1.Richard Roe, one of the defendants, testified as follows: I am one of the defendants.
The complainant made and delivered to me this title-bond [Here copy it, in full.] I paid ;
him four hundred dollars on the day he gave me the bond, and he gave me this receipt for
it: [Here copy the receipt.] I took possession of the land in dispute under this title-bond.
[And so go on, giving tersely the testimony of this witness, and of all other witnesses intro-
duced by the defendants.]
2. The deposition of Thomas Stokes was read as follows [Here copy it, in full.] :
3. The deposition of James Walker was offered in evidence, but the complainant objected
to its being read because he had excepted to it, and the Clerk and Master had sustained his
exceptions, and there had been no appeal from the ruling of the Clerk. The defendant then
asked to be allowed to appeal but the Court refused the request, and excluded the deposition.
;
Said deposition, exceptions and ruling are as follows [Here copy the deposition in full, and
:
copy the exceptions and the ruling of the Clerk, or the Chancellor.]
4. Henry Smith was offered as a witness, but he stated, when examined on his voir dire by
the complainant, that he. did not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments, and
on being objected to by the complainant on that ground, the Court ruled that he was incom-
petent to testify. The witness, also, stated that he believed a man's conscience punished
him for his sins, and that he deemed it both a sin and a crime to testify falsely.
5. William Johnson testified as follows [Here set out his testimony, and, also, the objec-
:
tions to his testimony, if any, and the rulings of the Court on each objection.]
The defendant here closed his proof, and the complainant introduced the following rebut-
ting evidence
in.
Eebutting Evidence by the Complainant.
1. Henry Doe, one of the complainants, testified as follows I am one of the complainants, :
Defendant, Richard Roe, told me he was not able to pay for the land in dispute, and agreed
that the rents of the land were worth as much as he had paid on the title-bond. He said he
had lost the bond, and agreed to surrender the possession at the end of last year. He gave
me a writing to that effect. This writing I forgot to bring to Court with me. On objection
by the defendants, all of the evidence of this witness as to the writing, and as to its contents,
was ruled out by the Court on the ground that the writing itself was the best evidence of its
contents. [And so go on with the testimony, and with the objections and rulings, to the end
of the case.]
2. George Wilson and Samuel Carper both testified that they knew the witness, Richard
Roe, that they knew his general reputation in the neighborhood where he lived, that such
reputation was bad, and that from that reputation he was not entitled to credit on oath in a
Court of Justice, and that witnesses would not believe him on his oath. Samuel Carper, on
cross-examination, stated that he and Richard Roe were not friendly, and that Roe had once
sued him, and got a judgment against him, which judgment the witness Carper testified was
unjust, and obtained by perjured evidence.
TV.
Eebutting Evidence by the Defendant.
1. The defendants then introduced George Bowers and Andrew Jones, who both testified
that they well knew the general reputation of Richard Roe, that it was fair, and that his
reputation entitled him to be believed on oath in a Court of Justice, and that they would
believe him.
This was all the evidence in the cause. 23
v.
The Charge of the Court.
The Court charged the jury as follows : [Here copy the charge, in full.]
VI.
Bequests for Additional Instructions.
At the conclusion of the charge to the jury, and before the jury retired, the defendants
requested the Court to charge the following propositions
No. [Here copy it.]
1.
No. [Here copy it; and set out all of them in regular order, as numbered.]
2.
Thereupon the Court charged the jury further, as follows: [Here copy the further charge.]
VII.
Motion for a New Trial.
The jury having found in favor of the complainants on the issues of fact submitted to
them, the defendant moved the Court for a new trial, and in support of his motion read the
following affidavits
1. Affidavit of Richard Roe, as follows [Here copy it.]
:
2. Aff davit of Henry James, as follows [Here copy it.] :
3. Affidavit of Charles Thompson, one of the jurors, as follows : [Here copy it.]
23 The bill of exceptions must show that it containsall the evidence. Ransom v. State, 8 Cates, 366.
977 REHEARINGS in chancery. §1215
VIII.
Conclusion.
The Courtoverruled the defendants' motion for a new trial, and pronounced a decree
upon the findings of the jury. To which action of the Court the defendants excepted, and
now except; and they also except to the rulings of the Court upon the evidence herein- set
out, and to the refusal of the Couft to charge the jury as requested, and to the charge of the
Court to the jury, and to the said decree, and tender this their bill of exceptions to all of said
matters, which bill is signed by the Chancellor, and made a part of the record of the cause.
August 26, 1891. A. J. Abernathy, Chancellor.
.
There should be an entry on the minutes, showing the fact that the bill of
exceptions was duly presented, and signed by the Chancellor, and made a part
of the record of the cause. 2 *
ARTICLE III.
REHEARINGS IN CHANCERY.
1215. Rehearings Generally Considered. § 1219. Frame of Petition to Rehear.
1216. Grounds of a Rehearing. § 1220. Form of Petition to Rehear.
1217. Who May Have a Rehearing. § 1221. Proceedings When Rehearing
1218. When and Where Petition Must be Granted.
Filed. § 1222. Decree Upon Rehearing.
§ 1215. —
Kehearings Generally Considered. In a suit at law, if either party
has suffered injustice, because (1) of some error of law committed by the Judge,
or (2) some error of fact committed by the jury, or (3) the unexpected intro-
duction of evidence by the adverse side, or (4) because of his inability to pro-
duce newly discovered evidence in his own behalf, his remedy is to move for
a new trial. So, if there has been a trial by jury in the Chancery Court, and
a like injustice has been done, the injured party's remedy is to move the Court
for a new trial, as already shown in the preceding Article. But it sometimes
happens that some similar injustice is done some of the parties by the decree
of the Court when the Chancellor decides the eause without a jury. The method
of remedying such a wrong is by a petition for a rehearing. 1 If, however, the
error is manifest, the Chancellor will ordinarily correct it on motion, if the
matter be brought to his attention while his control of the decree continues. In-
deed, our Chancellors will often, on motion, re-examine a case where it is made
very probable that he has committed some material error of law or fact, to the
detriment of the party complaining, without requiring him to file a formal
petition for a rehearing. In such a case, however, the motion should be in
writing, and should be as specific in its assignment of errors as a petition to
rehear. 2 If the injustice complained of was done on motion, the proper method
of correcting it is by motion. 3
Arehearing in any case is not a matter of right, but rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the Court; 4 nevertheless, as all Courts, and especially Courts of
Equity, have been established that justice may be done, the Chancellor will
always so exercise that discretion as to rehear a, cause when justice requires
it.
5 The Chancellor may refuse a rehearing, where there is reason to suspect
24 See, ante, § 1211. 3 1 Barb. Ch. Pr„ 353.
1 An application for a rehearing stands upon the 4 Galloway v. Dunnington, 10 Lea, 216; 2 Dan.
footing of an application for a new trial at law. Ch. Pr., 1480, note. On the subject of a Court's
Mavs v. Wherry, 3 Tenn. Ch„ 222; Sto. Eq. PL, discretion, see, ante. §§ 583, note 4; 833, note 37;
| 421. note.
857; 902.
2 The Chancellor may, however, require a petition 5 A
rehearing is usually granted if there be col-
to rehear to be filed; and should require such a peti- orable ground for the application. Travis «. Waters,
tion, unless the opposite side consent to this in- 1 Johns. Ch., (N. Y.), 48. In England, one re-
formal method of rehearing. The appellate Court hearing appears to he a matter of course. Land c.
will not review the action of the Chancellor in case Wickham, 1 Paige, (N. Y.), 257. A rehearing will,
he refuses to rehear a case on motion. Taylor v. also, be granted, jf course, if the decree was pro-
Boyd, 6 Heisk., 613; Frazier v. Tubb, 2 Heisk., 669; nounced without argument, even thoueh the case be
Galloway V. Dunnington, 10 Lea, 216. submitted by consent. Blake's Ch., 165.
§1216 REHEARINGS in CHANCERY. 978
it is intended for delay, or may impose such terms upon the applicant as may
be necessary to preserve the rights of the other party from injury resulting
from the delay. 6
A
petition for a rehearing suspends all proceedings upon the decree until
the petition is disposed of. 7 There should, however, be an entry on the min-
utes showing the filing of the petition, and suspending the execution of the
decree until further orders, as follows
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS ON PETITION TO REHEAR.
Elijah Robertson, et al.A
vs. \ Petition to Rehear.
William Maclin, et al. J
The defendants having presented and filed their petition for a rehearing of this cause, on
consideration thereof it is ordered by the Court that until said petition is heard and disposed
of, all further proceedings in this cause be stayed, including proceedings upon the decree
pronounced at the present term.
§ 1216. Grounds of a Rehearing. —
The ordinary grounds of a rehearing are
1, Some material mistake by
the Chancellor in a matter of law, to the detriment
of the party complaining; 2, Some erroneous deduction drawn by the Chan-
cellor from the evidence, materially injuring the party complaining; 3, The
unexpected introduction of material evidence by the adversary which can be
fully refuted, or explained away; 4, The unexpected exclusion of material
evidence at the hearing; 8 .and 5, The discovery of new evidence sufficiently
strong to reverse or materially modify the decree, and which could not have
been previously discovered by due diligence. 9 This newly discovered evidence
must be pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings if new facts are discov- :
ered constituting a new issue, they may be brought before the Court by a sup-
plemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. Such a bill can only be filed by
leave of the Court and if such leave is granted, then a petition to rehear should
;
be filed at the same time, and such a petition should be presented along with
the supplemental bill. 10
A
rehearing will not be granted to let in newly discovered evidence which is
merely cumulative nor to contradict a witness examined by the adverse party
;
nor where the new evidence sought to be introduced could have been had at
the hearing, if reasonable diligence had been used, 11 nor to supply omissions
of proof. 12 And not only must the new evidence be material and forcible, 13
and due diligence be shown but the Court must be satisfied that it exists, and
;
that it can and will be produced if a rehearing is granted. 14

A
rehearing should not be applied for when the error complained of is one
which may be corrected on motion, as heretofore shown. 15
§ 1217. —
Who May Have a Rehearing. Any party to the record, injuriously
affected by the decree, may have it reheard, but a stranger to the cause cannot
be heard in this way: he must assail the decree by an original bill, making
proper parties. The right to a rehearing is not confined to the parties against
whom the decree is rendered; if the party obtaining the decree has not been
given such a decree as he was entitled to, even if taken upon a pro confesso, he
16
is entitled to have it reheard.
6 Land V. Wickham, 1 Paige, (N. Y.), 257. bill, that the cause be reheard, and that the supple-
7 Blake's Ch., 165. mental bill be heard at the same with the rehearing
8 SheaMabry, 1 Lea, 334.
v. of the original cause. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 365. See
9 Robertson V. Macklin, 4 Hay., 53; Scales V. bills in the nature of bills of review, past, § 1231.
Nichols, 2 Yerg., 140. See, also, Smith v. Sneed, 11 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1480, note; Kelley i>. McKin-
Cooke, 190; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1480; 1487. The ques- ney, 5 Lea, 164.
tion in relation to newly discovered evidence, is not 12 Manufacturing Co. 1). Weatherly, 17 Pick., 318.
what the petitioner knew, but what with reasonable 13 Kelly v. McKinney, 5 Lea, 170.
diligence he might have known. See, Bill of Re- 14 Scales v. Nichols, 2 Yerg., 140. This case shows
view, post. § 1238. that a rehearing may be granted whenever a bill of
10 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 362-365; Sto. Eq. PI., §§421- review will lie, the object of the rehearing being to
423. This supplemental bill in the nature of a bill obivate the necessity of a bill of review; and herein
of review will be heard at the same time the original our practice goes one step further than the English
cause is reheard; and if a rehearing is allowed, and practice.
the supplemental bill permitted to be filed, the order ib Ante, § 573.
should provide that the party have leave to file the 16 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 354.
979 rehearings in chancery. § 1218
§ 1218. When
and Where Petition Must be Filed. petition to rehear —A
must be filed in the Court that pronounces the decree complained of, and must
be presented to the Court during the term at which the decree complained of
is entered upon the minutes, 17 unless such term continues longer than thirty
days, and then it must be presented within thirty days after the decree. 18 If
the decree is final, and the term at which it was entered has passed, the decree
cannot be reconsidered by the same Court, except upon a bill of review. 19 The
party injured, in such a case may, however, have the decree reviewed by the
proper appellate Court, on a writ of error.
§ 1219. —
Frame of Petition to Rehear. The petition being in the nature of a
motion for a new trial, must specify the particular matter or cause on which
the application for a rehearing is based and if the facts therein stated do not
;
appear of record in the cause, the petition must be verified by oath or affirma-
tion it must, also, be signed by counsel. 20
:
The particular injustice complained of should be specified; and if the appli-

cation is based on new evidence, its materiality should be made to appear to
the Court by stating its nature, and precisely what it will be when taken 21 and ;
if the witnesses are accessible, the petition should be accompanied by their

affidavits, showing what they will prove. 22 The petition must be confined to
the case made by the pleadings, and cannot, under the guise of a rehearing,
inject new matters into the cause, and raise issues not involved in the original
suit. 23
The petition concludes with a prayer that the cause may be reheard, and that
the decree may be reversed, or that it may be altered in such points as are
alleged to be erroneous or unjust, and that the petitioner be allowed to bring
forward the proof specified in the petition, if any be shown.
§ 1220. Form of Petition to Rehear. —A
petition for a rehearing should
show (1) the particular matter and manner wherein the petitioner has been
aggrieved by the decree, or other action of the Court; (2) wherein and whereby
he is entitled to have the wrong done by him redressed, setting forth specially
the supposed errors of the Court, or the new evidence relied on and (3) should ;
pray that the cause be reheard, and the decree modified, or set aside, according
to the case made. The following is a form of
PETITION FOB REHEARING. 24
Elijah Robertson, et al., 1
vs. \ In Chancery, at Lewisburg.

William Maclin, et al. J
To the Hon. W. S. Bearden, holding the said Chancery Court
Petitioners, the above named defendants, respectfully show to the Court
i.
That they are much aggrieved by so much of the decree rendered in this cause on the
22nd day of the present month, (November,) as adjudged that complainants were entitled to
recover 1666 acres of the land conveyed by Joseph Hynds to petitioners' father, William
Maclin, as to which Landon Carter recovered judgment of four hundred dollars damages
against Elijah Robertson, deceased. Petitioners are, also, aggrieved by so much of the said
decree as onerates them with the costs of the suit.
n.
The Court held petitioners liable for said 1666 acres, on the supposition that they were a
part of the lands sought to be recovered by complainants in their bill whereas, petitioners ;
aver the fact to be that said 1666 acres are entirely outside of the bounds of the tracts, to
recover which the bill was filed; and neither complainants nor Elijah Robertson, in his life
time, ever set up any claim to, or possessed any interest or estate in said 1666 acres, or any
part thereof. Said 1666 acres are not only outside of all the grants specified in complainant's
17 Ch. Rule, XV, §1; Code, §3119; Haywood e. 22 Mays v. Wherry, 3 Tenn. Ch., 219. If the
Marsh, 6 Yerg., 69; Robertson v. Maclin, 4 Hay., witnesses, however, are not in reach, the statement
53; Overton v. Bigelow, 10 Yerg., 48. of that fact in the petition would probably be a
18 Arts of 1885, ch. 65 Railroad v. Johnson, 16
; sufficient excuse for not filing their affidavits.
Lea, 387. 23 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 356. If new matters are dis-
19 Allen v. Barksdale, 1 Head., 238; Robertson V. covered after decree, but at the same term, they
Maclin, 4 Hay., 53. Not even an interlocutory de- must be brought forward by a supplemental bill in
cree can be reheard at a subsequent term. Overton the nature of a bill of review. 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 362.
24 This petition is based on the case of Robertson
v. Bigelow, 10 Yerg., 48.
20 Ch. Rule, XV, § 1
;
post, § 1204. v. Maclin, 3 Hay., 70; and 4 Hay., 53.
21 Sales v. Nichols, 2 Yerg., 140.
§1221 REHEARINGS IN CHANCERY. 980
bill, but are a part of an entirely different and older grant, the lands covered by which are
many miles from the lands in dispute.
in.
Petitioners were greatly surprised by the production of the said judgment in favor of
Landon Carter, not having been notified until the 19th of this month that it would be filed
as evidence in this cause; and not suspecting, for a moment, that it would, or could by any
possibility, be used as evidence that petitioners' father, William Maclin, held as trustee or
otherwise for complainants any of the lands sued for by the complainants.
IV.
Petitioners had no opportunity to that said 1666 acres were wholly outside of all the
show
grants claimed by complainants ; but petitioners aver that such is the fact, and this fact they
will be abundantly able to prove if the cause is reheard. Petitioners refer to the affidavit of
William Hickman, and to two letters of Elijah Robertson, deceased, herewith filed, and
marked respectively exhibits 1, 2, and 3, in support of this petition.
v.
Petitioners therefore pray that your Honor will grant a rehearing of this cause, to the
end that said decree may be reversed and set aside, (1) in so far as it divests the title to said
1666 acres out of petitioners and vests it in complainants, and (2) in so far as it adjudges
the costs of the suit against petitioners. P. C. Smithson, Solicitor. 25
[Annex affidavit of the tritfh of the petition, as in § 789, ante.]
§ 1221. Proceedings When a Rehearing is Granted. No answer is, ordinar- —
ily, required or made to a petition to rehear, but the Chancellor may call on
the parties to present briefs on the points raised. If a rehearing is granted
because of some error of law, or of some erroneous deduction from the evi-
dence, the cause is usually reheard upon the same record, and at the same term
at which the decree was rendered; 26 and in such case so much of the record
is read as is necessary to enable the petitioner to show, and the Court to
understand, the errors complained of. At the rehearing, the petitioner has the
right to open and close the argument, for the burden of showing error rests
upon him. 27
If a rehearing is granted to allow the reading of evidence on file, but by
mistake overlooked and not read at the hearing, the case is heard upon the
pleadings and the evidence originally read, and upon the evidence overlooked,
the latter only being read as a rule, unless the Chancellor directs the former
to be re-read. If a rehearing is granted to let in new evidence, the case is
heard anew, and the pleadings and evidence are read in the same manner, as
upon an original hearing and the same defences may be set up, the same ob-
;
jections to evidence may be made, and the same claims to relief urged, as upon
an original hearing. But in any rehearing no one will be heard to assail the
decree except the party who obtains the rehearing and, if any other party is
:
injured, he must join in the petition, or file a separate petition for a rehear-
ing. 28 Where a rehearing is granted to let in new evidence, the parties should
not, as a rule, be allowed to go into further proof generally but the petitioner ;
should be confined to the proof mentioned in his petition, and the other party
should be confined to the proof in rebuttal thereof. 29
The Court will give the complainant the same right to amend as he would be
entitled to on an original hearing. 30
§ 1222. —
Orders and Decrees Upon a Rehearing. On a rehearing, the cause
is entirely open as to the party in whose favor the former decree was rendered;
but as to the other party it is open only as to the parts of the decree by him
complained of. And so upon a petition by a defendant for a rehearing, the
Court may give the complainant more extensive relief than was given him by
the original decree. 31 The object of a rehearing is, ordinarily, to ascertain
whether certain alleged material errors of law or fact exist, and when such
allegations are found to be true, the decree on the rehearing is changed accord-
ingly.
25 The petition must be signed by counsel; and 27 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 360.
must be verified by oath or affirmation unless the 28 1 Tiarb. Ch. Pr., 360.
farts appear of record. Ch. Rule, XV, § 1; post, 29 Kelley v. McKinnev, 5 Lea, 170.
§ 1204. 80 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 360.
28 Kelley V. McKinney, 5 Lea, 170. 31 1 Barb. Ch. Pr., 360.
981 * REHEARINGS IN CHANCERY. § 1222
ORDER, DISMISSING A PETITION TO REHEAR.
John Doe, |
vs. \ No. 689.
Richard Roe. J
In this cause the defendant having this day [or, at a former day,] presented a petition to
rehear, and the Chancellor having heard argument, and considered the matters raised by
the petition, refused a rehearing. It is, therefore, ordered that the petition be dismissed, and
that the petitioner pay all the costs thereof.
ORDER GRANTING A REHEARING.

[Follow the above form down, and including, the words "raised by the petition," then add:]
granted the prayer thereof, and ordered that the decree therein complained of, entered in
this cause on June 10, 1890, on the 95th and 96th pages of this book, be reheard; and that
until such rehearing all proceedings on said decree be suspended and stayed.
DECREE ON THE REHEARING OE A CAUSE.

Elijah Robertson, et al,
vs.
William Maclin, et al.
This cause, coming on to be reheard this 27th day of August, 1891, before Hon. W. S.
Bearden, Chancellor, upon the petition to rehear, and the whole record in, the cause, including
the proofs filed in support of the petition to rehear, and argument of counsel having been
heard, on consideration of all which.it is ordered and adjudged by the Court that the prayer
of the petition be granted, and the cause reheard.
And thereupon it is ordered and decreed that the decree pronounced in this cause at the
last r° r present] term adjudging that [Here briefly state what was decreed,] be recalled,
,
reversed, and annulled, and that the bill in this cause, be dismissed, and that complainants,
and John Johnson, their prosecution surety, pay all the costs of the cause, for which execution
is awarded.
§ 1223 BILLS OF REVIEW. 982
CHAPTER LXIX.
BILLS OP REVIEW.
Article I. Bills of Review Generally Considered.
Article II. Bills of Review for Errors of Law.
Article III. Bills of Review for New Matter or New Proof.
Article IV. The Leave to Pile a Bill of Review.
Article V. Frame and Form of a Bill of Review.
Article VI. Defences to a Bill of Review.
ARTICLE I.
BILLS OF REVIEW GENERALLY CONSIDERED.
§ 1223. Object of aReview. Bill of § 1229. Preliminary Relief Obtainable at the
§ 1224. Grounds of a Review. Bill of Filing.
§ 1225. What Decrees May be Reviewed. § 1230. Hearing of a Bill of Review.
§ 1226. Who May File a Bill of Review. § 1231. Bills in the Nature of Bills of Re-
§ 1227. When
the Bill Must be Filed. view.
§ 1228. Where the Bill Must be Filed.
§ 1223. —
Object of a Bill of Review. It sometimes happens (1) that the
Chancellor makes an erroneous legal deduction from the pleadings and the
facts as recited in his decree, and that, as a consequence, his decree is erroneous
on its face and it sometimes happens (2) that after the time for taking proof
;
has expired, new evidence comes to light sufficient to have changed the decree
had it been before the Chancellor. The only remedy, in Chancery, in such cases
is a bill of review, which has for its object the reversal, alteration, or explana-
tion, of the decree, so that it may conform to the law of the case where there is
error of law, or may conform to the real facts of the case where there is new
proof. 1
Inasmuch as on a bill of review for error of law apparent, the evidence can-
not be looked to, if the evidence when looked to will disclose error not apparent
on the face of the decree, the party injured by such error should take the case
to the appellate Court by a writ of error, which is far more efficacious than a
bill of review. A
writ of error opens the whole case, and enables the appellate
Court to correct all errors, whether apparent or not, and whether errors of
law, or erroneous deductions of fact. 2
—
Grounds of a Bill of Review. The power of a Court of Chancery
§ 1224.
to review a decree, after the adjournment of the term at which it was pro-
nounced, rests on the first of the Ordinances in Chancery of Lord Bacon,- which
is as follows: "No decree shall be reversed, altered, or explained, being once
under the great seal, but upon bill of review. And no bill of review shall be
admitted, except (1) it contain either error in law, appearing in the body of
the decree, without further examination of matters of fact, or (2) some new
matter, which hath arisen in time after the decree, and (3) not any new proof,
1 Berdanatti D. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch., 705; 2 Dan. untrue if our statutory writ of error in Chancery
Ch. Pr., 1576, note. A bill of review will not lie causes is meant. The distinction should be kept in
to impeach a decree for fraud. Wilson V. Schaefer, mind. The writ of error at common law lies only
23 Pick., 300; nor to annul a perfected sale of land upon matter of law arising upon the face of the
made under the decree. Donaldson v. Nealis, 24 proceedings, and not to reverse any error in the
Pick., 638. determination of facts. 3 Black. Com., 406. Where-
2 Livingston 1 Lea, 55; Davidson v.
V. Noe, Bow- as, our statutory writ of error in Equity causes car-
den, 5 Sneed, Winchester V. Winchester, 1
134; ries up the evidence read at the hearing, and re-
Head, 493. Itsometimes said in our Reports,
is quires the Supreme Court to review and examine
that a bill of review for error of law apparent is in the cause, as if brought up by appeal. Code, § 3108;
the nature of a writ of error. This is true when a
_ Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 500.
writ of error at common law is meant; but wholly
983 BILLS OP REVIEW. § 1225
which might have been used, when the decree was made. Nevertheless, upon
new proof, that is come to light after the decree was made, and could not pos-
sibly have been used at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may
be grounded by the special license of the Court, and not otherwise." 3 This
Ordinance authorizes a bill of review (1) for error of law (2) for new matter ; ;
and (3) for new proof. 4 Any two or more of these grounds may be properly
joined in the same bill, 5 without making it multifarious. 6
§ 1225. What —
Decrees May be Reviewed. A bill of review lies only after
a final decree. A
decree is final in the meaning of the rule when it is such a
one as finally adjudicates and disposes of all the merits of the controversy,
and reserves and leaves nothing further for the Court to do in the cause and ;
when the term of the Court at which the decree was pronounced has ended or ;
when the term has not ended, but thirty or more days have elapsed since the
decree was entered on the minutes. 7 In short, a decree will be deemed final
for the purpose of a bill of review when a writ of error would lie to have it
reviewed in the appellate Court. 8 But an interlocutory decree may be reviewed
by a bill, or a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review, to put in issue
material and determinative new matter discovered after the making of such
decree sa
§ 1226. —
Who May File a Bill of Review. No persons, except parties and
their privies in representation, such as heirs, executors, and administrators,
can have a bill of review, strictly so called. 9 But other persons in interest, and
in privity of title and estate, who are aggrieved by the decree, such as devisees
and remainder-men, are entitled to maintain an original bill in the nature of
a bill of review, so far as their own interests are concerned. 1 Of course, no **
persons, but persons having an interest, are entitled to maintain a bill of re-
view. And even persons, having an interest in the cause, if not aggrieved by
the particular errors assigned in the decree, cannot maintain a bill of review,
however injuriously the decree may affect the rights of third persons. 11 It
may be generally stated that all the parties to the original bill aggrieved by
the decree ought to join as complainant in a bill of review, and all the others
should be made defendants. 12 A person not a party, or not in privity with a
party, cannot be affected by the decree, and therefore cannot maintain a bill
impeach 13
to it.
§ 1227. When the Bill Must be Filed.—As to the period within which a bill
of review must be filed, the law provides that no bill of review shall be
brought, or a motion made therefor, except within three years from the time
of pronouncing the decree saving to infants, married women, persons of un-
;
sound mind, or imprisoned, a right to a bill of review within three years after
such disability has been removed. 14
The bill must show on its face, affirmatively, that it is filed within the time
allowed by the statute, and until this is done the complainant has no standing
in Court. 15 But the parties under disability need not wait until their disability
16
is removed they may file their bill during disability by next friend.
:
3 Eaton Dickinson, 3 Sneed, 397; Sto. Eg. PI.,

v. 10 Persons not in esse
at the date of the decree,
§ 404. What is meant in the Ordinance by a decree but who were before the Court by representation,
"being under the great seal," is that the decree has may maintain a bill of review. Wilson V. Schaefer,
been enrolled. Tn some text books and reports this 23 Pick.. 300, citing the above section of this book,
meaning of the phrase "under the great seal" is sub- then § 1058. A
bill of review, or a supplemental
stituted therefor. The enrollment of a decree in bill in the nature of a bill of review, may be filed
the meaning of the Ordinance, and an adjournment by a defendant as well as by a complainant when
of the term of the Court at which a decree has been aggrieved. Hardwick v. American Can Co., 7 Cates,
made, are in nur practice synonymous terms. Bled- 393.
soe V. Carr, 10 Yerg., 57. 11 Sto. Eq. PI., §408; Winchester v. Winchester,
i Bledsoe »>. Carr, 10 Yerg., 57. 1 Head., 460; Montgomery v. OlWell, 1 Tenn. Ch.,
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576. 169.
6 Colville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 524. 12 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1579; Sto. Eq. PI., §409;
7 Sto Eq. PL. 408 a; Johnson v. Hanner, 2 Lea, Fuller v. McFarland, 6 Heisk., 79.
8- M. & C. R. R. u. Johnson, 16 Lea, 387; Acts nf 13 Arnold n. Moyers, 1 Lea. 310.
14 Code, § 3120; Acts of 1901, ch. 15.
1885. ch. 65.
8 S'e. post. § 1272. 15 Anderson V. The Bank, 5 Sneed, 661.
Sa Hardwick v. American Can Co., 7 Lates, 393. 16 Winchester V. Winchester, 1 Head, 460.
» Fitzgerald v. Cummings, 1 Lea, 240.
§1228 BILLS OP REVIEW. 984
After one bill of review has been dismissed on demurrer, another bill of re-
view will not be allowed, although error be patent. 17
§ 1228. —
Where the Bill Must be Filed. A bill of review is a proceeding for
reversal applicable to a Court of Chancery only, and can be filed in that Court
only. 18 As siich a bill seeks to reverse, alter, or explain, the decree of a Chan-
cery Court, and as one Chancery Court has no revisory jurisdiction over an-
other Chancery Court, it necessarily follows that a bill of review must not only
be filed in the Chancery Court, but also in that Chancery Court wherein the
decree complained of was pronounced. 19
A bill of review, therefore, will not lie in an appellate Court to review one
of its own decrees 20 nor will it lie in the Chancery Court to review a decree of
;
an appellate Court for error of law apparent on the face of the decree. 21
§ 1229. Preliminary Relief Obtainable at the Filing. On a bill of review —
being filed, an injunction may be had if prayed for and proper, to stay pro-
ceedings under the decree assailed, if still unexecuted, 22 or to enjoin a transfer
of the property alleged to have been wrongfully decreed to a defendant to the
bill of review, or when necessary to secure such property it may be attached,
or impounded. But no extraordinary preliminary relief should be granted
unless a very clear case is made out by the bill, and then only on bond and
ample security being given. 23 If the decree complained of requires the party
filing the bill of review to pay any money, or to deliver up any notes, bonds,
stocks, or the like, he should be required to pay the money into Court, and to
deliver the choses in action to the Clerk, and no injunction should be granted
in such cases. Under proper circumstances, a receiver may be appointed, es-
pecially where the property is such that it cannot be turned over to the Court.
§ 1230. —
Hearing of a Bill of Review. A bill of review for error apparent
is heard along with the original pleadings, orders, and decrees; and, if sus-
tained, the decree complained of is reversed, altered, or explained, as Equity
may require, and as far as the errors specified in the bill, but no further.
A bill of review for newly discovered evidence is heard on both the pleadings,
proofs, and decrees, in the original cause, and the pleadings and new proofs
since filed, the two records constituting one for the purpose of reviewing the
case on the old and new proof. 24
On a bill of review being sustained, whether on error apparent or on new
proof, the Court reverses, alters, or explains the decree complained of so as to
do what is right on the case as it then stands, and, when necessary, will resort
to any process, ordinary or extraordinary, to remedy any wrong done the com-
plainant by the decree he complains of. 24a But these remedies must be confined
to those who were parties to the original suit, and to their representatives and ;
an innocent purchaser, since the original decree, cannot be disturbed by pro-

ceedings under a bill of review. 25
§ 1231. Bills in the Nature of Bills of Review. —
It may happen, however,
that the new matter is discovered before the term ends at which the decree
17 Knight V. Atkisson, 2 Tenn. Ch., 388. a decree upon an appeal by the House of Lords.
18 Overton V. Biglow, 10 Ycrg., SO; Wilson V. 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 93; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 1579; Sto. Eq.
Wilson, 10 Yerg., 201. These cases decide that PL, §418; and such seems to be the general rule,
such a bill cannot be filed in the appellate Court. bee authorities cited; also, Stafford l). Bryan, 2
19 Anderson v. The Bank, 5 Sneed, 661. Paige, (N. Y.), 45, Desty's note, Law. Ed. The
20 Wilson v. Wilson, 10 Yerg., 200. general language of Hurt v. Long, 6 Pick., 445,
21 Wallen v. Huff, Thomp. Cases, 21; Heisk. Dig., would seem to imply, however, that no bill will lie
596; 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 91; 93; Hurt v. Long, 6 Pick., in Chancery to review any decree of an appellate
445; Murphy v. Johnson, 23 Pick., 552. But a void- Court, unless fraud has intervened in obtaining the
able decree in an appellate Court may be attacked decree, or some new equity has arisen, which would
and annulled. Ibid. See, ante, § 814, sub-sec. 2. authorize an original bill in the Chancery Court to
Whether a bill of review will lie in the Chancery set aside the decree.
Court of original jurisdiction to review a decree of 22 Livingston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 66; Code. § 4490.
an appellate Court on the ground of newly discov- 23 Code, §4491; Butler v. Peyton, 4 Hav., 88.
ered evidence of a controlling character, the com- 24 Berdanatti V. Sexton. 2 Tenn. Ch., 704; Payne
plainant being free from fault and negligence, does v. Beech, 2 Tenn. Ch., 708.
not seem to have been expressly adjudicated either 24a See, ante, § 657, sub-sec. 2. In the headVne of
in Wallen v. Huff, or in Hurt v. Long, supra. The this sub-section the word "injunction" should be
question is raised in Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, "execution."
617, but not decided. Such a bill may be filed in 25 Winchester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 460.
the English Chancery Court after an affirmance of
985 BILLS OF REVIEW. §1232
complained of is pronounced, or before the Chancellor's power to change it
has terminated, or after an interlocutory decree, such as a decree of reference
to the Master. 26 In such a case, the new matter is brought forward by a sup-
plemental bill, or a new bill, in the nature of a bill of review 27 and it ought ;
to be accompanied by a petition to rehear the original cause, at the same time

that it is heard upon the supplemental bill. Such a supplemental bill cannot
be filed without the leave of the Court, nor without an affidavit, or petition,
similar to that required in the like case of a bill of review. If necessary, a bill
of review may also be incorporated into such a supplemental bill. And where
a different kind of relief is sought, or a different principle from that on which
the original decree is given, there it must be sought by a supplemental bill in
the nature of a bill of review.
It seems to be a general rule, that a supplemental bill for newly discovered
matter should be filed as soon after the new matter is discovered, as it reason-
ably may be. If, therefore, the party proceeds to a decree after the discovery
of the facts, upon which the new claim is founded, he will not be permitted
afterwards to file a siipplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, founded
on those facts for it was his own laches not to have brought them forward at
;
an earlier stage of the cause. 28

A supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, nearly resembles in its
frame a bill of review, except that, instead of praying, that the former decree
may be reviewed or reversed, it prays, that the cause may be heard with respect
to the new matter made the subject of the supplemental bill, at the same time
that it is reheard upon the original bill; and that the complainant may have
such relief as the nature of the case, made by the supplemental bill, requires. 29
It should, also, state the circumstances positively, which entitle the partv to
file it. 30
ARTICLE II.
BILLS OF REVIEW FOR ERRORS OF LAW.
§ 1232. When a Bill of Review for Errors of § 123S. Errors Deducible From the Evidence
Law Will Lie. Not Errors of Law.
§ 1233. What are Errors at Law. § 1236. Rationale of a Bill of Review for
§ 1234. How Errors of Law are Ascertained. Error of Law.
§ 1232. When a Bill of Review for Errors of Law Will Lie. In regard to —
errors of law, apparent upon the face of the decree, the established doctrine is,
that you cannot look into the evidence in the case in order to show the decree
to be erroneous in its statement of the facts. 1 That is the proper office of an
appellate Court, upon an appeal, or writ of error. But, taking the facts to be,
as they are stated to be in the pleadings and on the face of the decree, you
nrnst show that the Court has erred in point of law. If, therefore, the plead-
ings and the decree do not contain a statement of the material facts on which
the decree proceeds, it is plain that there can be no relief by a bill of review,
but only by an appeal to the appellate Court. In England, decrees were for-
26 See, ante, §§ 1215-1222. porated with the decree," introduces no new ground
27 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1582, note; Hardwick v. Amer- for a bill of review, and in no way enlarges or mod-
ican Can Co., 7 Cates, 393. But the new defence ifies the ground of review defined in the Ordinance
must be consistent with the original defence. Ibid. of Lord Bacon. The Supreme Court, being unable
28 Ibid. Sto. Ea. PI., §8 422-423. to ascertain the meaning and object of the above
29 Sto. Eq. PI., § 425. statute, concluded "to permit it to slumber on the
30 Sto. Eq. P1-, § 425. statute book as a dead letter," rather than to guess
1 Eaton V. Dickinson, 3 Sneed, 397. This case its meaning or object, "proper respect for the Legis-
decides that the Code, § 3121, making "the deposi- lature" so requiring it
I The meaning does not seem
tions and exhibits read at the hearing a part of the obscure, whatever may be said as to the object.
record, as if the same were transcribed and incor-
§1233 BILLS OF REVIEW. 986
merly drawn up with a special statement of the material grounds of fact on
which the decree was based. In the Courts of Tennessee the decrees are more
or less general, and often without any statement of facts. In England, the
decree formerly embodied the substance of the bill and answers. In our Courts,
the decree usually contains a mere reference to the antecedent proceedings
without embodying them. But, for the purpose of examining all errors of law
on a bill of review, the original bill, answers, and other proceedings, not includ-
ing the evidence, are in our practice treated as a part of the decree itself for ;
it is only by a comparison with the pleadings that the correctness of the decree
can be ascertained. 2
By error apparent on the face of the decree and the antecedent pleadings, is
not meant such error as springs out of inadmissible or improper evidence, or
erroneous deductions from the evidence, or even utter absence of evidence, but
such error of law as necessarily results from the facts assumed in the decree,
and alleged in the pleadings.
§ 1233. —
What are Errors of Law. The error of law complained of must be
a violation of some statute, or of some settled principle or rule of law or Equity,
or of the practice of the Court. 3 The bill cannot be maintained for clerical
errors, or for mistakes in. the calculation of interest, or clerical omissions or
mistakes apparent from the record and papers in the cause. 4 The errors of
law which a bill of review may be filed to have corrected are such as are in-
jurious to the party filing the bill, and such as he has the right to complain of,
by virtue of his having been a party to the original suit, or of his being a privy
of a party, or a party by representation.
On the hearing of a bill of review, no errors of law can be noticed except
those specifically pointed out by the bill 5 and even these cannot be noticed
;
unless the complainant shows himself aggrieved by them. 6

§ 1234. —
How Errors of Law are Ascertained. In our practice the pleadings
are considered as incorporated in the decree, for the purposes of a bill of re-
view; and the decree made must be such a decree as, supposing every necessary
allegation to' be proved, might lawfully be made upon the pleadings. The de-
cree cannot be reversed merely because not sustained by the proof. But, if no
proof, which could legally be introduced under the pleadings, could justify
such a decree, the decree is erroneous for error apparent upon its face. 7 If the
decree complained of is not warranted by the pleadings in the cause, there is
error apparent on its face. That is to say, if, taking the facts to be true as
recited in the pleadings and in the decree, the decree is contrary to law, or not
warranted by the allegations of the pleadings, a bill of review for error ap-
parent will lie. So a decree which goes beyond the allegations of the bill, or
fails to dispose of matters of Equity raised by the pleadings, is erroneous on
its face, and may be reviewed. 8
§ 1235. Errors Deducible from the Evidence not Errors of Law. Upon a —
bill of review for errors of law the evidence cannot be looked to for any pur-
pose whatever. The pleadings, however, are regarded as recited at length in
the decree, and the decree can be compared with the pleadings in order to test
its correctness, and to make apparent any error therein. But the evidence is,
so to speak, dehors the record, in ascertaining errors of law and if the evidence;
be set out in a bill of review for errors of law, a demurrer would lie on that
ground, or the evidence might on motion be stricken out, 9 or if not challenged
2 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576, note 6; Sto. Eq. PI., § 407. 7 This statement is from the dissenting opinion of
3 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576; See, Moseby V. Partee, 5 Andrews, Judge, in L. & M. Railroad Co. v. Rainey,
Heisk., 37. 7 Cold., 456; and seems to be fully justified by our
4 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576; Code, §8 2872-2879. derisions on the subject. See Randall v. Payne, 1
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576. notes; Randall v. Payne, Tenn. Ch., 137: Berdanatti V, Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch.,
1 Tenn. Ch.. 137; L. & M. R. R. Co. v. Rainey, 7 705; Finley V. Taylor, 8 Bax., 237.
Cold., 448; Brown v. Severson, 12 Heisk., 383. 8 Randall v. Pavne, 1 Tenn. Ch.. 137; Moseby V.
«2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1579; Sto. Eq. PI., §409; Don- Partee, 5 Heisk., 38; Burts V. Beard, 11 Heisk., 472.
aldson V. Nealis, 24 Pick., 638, citing the above 9 2 D<\n. Ch. Pr., 1576, note; Livingston o. Noe,
section of this book, then § 1065. 1 Lea, 55.
987 bills of review. § 1236
would probably be deemed mere surplusage, and utterly ignored. 10 If a party
desires to go outside of the pleadings and decree, and have the evidence re-
viewed, and the Chancellor 's conclusions of fact corrected, he must take a writ
of error. 11 A party may, however, file a bill of review both for error of law and
new proof, and such bill would not be multifarious. 12
§ 1236. Rationale of a Bill of Review for Error of Law. A bill of review —
for error of law apparent is in the uature of a special demurrer to the plead-
ings and the decree, the bill making profert of them, so to speak, and there-
upon, in effect, demurring thereto
1. Because the particular part of the decree specially complained of in the
bill of review is greatly injurious to the complainant, and wholly unwarranted
by the premises on which it was founded, these premises being the allegations
of the pleadings and the recitals of the decree 13 or, ;
2. Because the said premises show that the complainant was entitled to the
specific relief set out in his bill of review, whereas no such relief, and no part
thereof, was given him in and by the decree complained of.
Therefore it is, that a demurrer to a bill of review for error apparent does
but little more than make an issue of law, its ground being "that there are no
'
errors of law in the decree in said bill of review mentioned.
For the foregoing reasons, it is all-important at once to good pleading and
to good faith, that a bill of review for error of law should fully and fairly set
forth the pleadings and decree complained of, and the specific errors of law
relied on to have the decree reversed, altered, or explained. If this be done,
the whole matter in issue on the bill of review can be determined on demurrer,
and if not done, the defendant may plead the former decree and demur to the
opening of the same 14 or he may make both defences in an answer. 15 On de-
;
murrer to the bill, the Court will, on its own motion, if necessary, consider the
original pleadings and decrees as though incorporated into the bill of review:
this is the proper practice, and enables the defendant to demur even when the
bill does not fully and fairly set forth the pleadings and decree sought to be
reviewed and enables the Court, on such a demurrer, to decide whether there
;
be error of law apparent, or not. 16
ARTICLE III.
BILLS OF REVIEW FOR NEW MATTER, OR NEW PROOF.
§ 1237. Bills of Review for New Matter. I § 1239. As to New Matter Originally Not in
§ 1238. Bills of Review for New Proof. |
Issue.
§ 1237. Bills of Review for New Matter. —

The Ordinance authorizes a bill
of review for "some new matter which hath arisen in time after the decree,
and not any new proof which might have been used when the decree was
made." By "new matter which hath arisen in time after the decree," is not
meant matter which has come into existence since the decree, but matter which
was in existence but had not come to the knowledge of the party to be bene-
fited by it, and therefore could not have been used when the decree was made. 1
This new matter must be something material to the issues determined by the
decree complained of; for, if it be new facts not in issue in the original suit,
but come into existence since the decree, such new facts, if grounds for relief,
10 Colville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 524. 14 Livingston V. Noe, 1 Lea, 59; Sto. T5q. PI.,
11 Livingston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 60. §833.
12 Colville V. Colville, 9 Hum., 524; Winchester 15 Code, § 4318.
Winchester, 1 Head, 484. 18 Post, § 1251; Hurt V. Long, 6 Pick., 445.
13 See Berdanatti v. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch., 705. l Bledsoe v. Carr, 10 Yerg., 55.
§ 1238 bills of review. 988
must be brought before the Court by an original bill. 2 Hence, aa the new mat-
ter resolves itself into new evidence, this ground for a bill of review is resolved
into proof discovered after the decree. 3 This ground will be considered along
with the ground for proof discovered before the decree, but too late to be used
at the hearing, the requisites of such proof being the same in each case.
§ 1238. Bills of New Proof.
Review for —A
bill of review may be brought
upon the discovery of new proof, such, for example, as the discovery of a re-
lease, or a receipt, or a deed, or other cogent evidence which would change the
merits of the claim upon which the decree was founded. 4 The new matter must
not only be relevant and material, 6 but it must be such as, if known, would have
produced a different determination. 6 In other words, it must generally be new
matter to prove what was before in issue, and not to prove a title not before in
issue not to make a new case, but to establish the old one. In the next place,
;
the new matter must have first come to the knowledge of the party too late to
have been used in the cause at the original hearing. Lord Bacon's Ordinance
says, in one part, it must be
'
after the decree.
'
'
But that seems to be corrected
'
by the subsequent words, "and could not possibly have been used at the time
when the decree passed," which words point to the expiration of the time for
taking testimony. 7 And, accordingly, it is now the established exposition of
the Ordinance, that the new matter shall not have been discovered until after
the party's time for taking proof has expired, and too late to apply to the
Chancellor, or Master, for leave to obtain the benefit of the discovery. 8
The new proof must not be merely cumulative it should be of so clear and
;
decisive a nature as, unless successfully met, to compel a reversal. 9 If newly

discovered witnesses be admitted, it should be done with great caution, because
tending to open the door to perjury. 10
More or less new evidence comes to light on each side after a trial, and if a
cause be reheard on mere cumulative evidence, every original hearing would
be a mere preliminary skirmish. The new cumulative evidence discovered by
each party since the hearing must ordinarily be deemed equiponderant.
In the next place, the matter must not only' be new, but it must be such as
the party, by the use of reasonable diligence, could not have known; for, if
there be any laches or negligence in this respect, that destroys the title to the
relief. 11 The rule is well settled that the new matter must not have been dis-
covered- until after the time for taking proof had expired; but if the nature of
the new evidence is such that the party, or his Solicitor, with proper diligence
might have had it at the hearing, no relief will be granted. The inquiry is
not what the applicant knew, but what by due diligence he might have
known. 12
§ 1239. As to New Matter Originally Not in Issue. It has been questioned, —
whether the discovery of new matter, not in issue in the cause in which a de-
cree has been made, could be the ground of a bill of review and whether the ;
new matter, on which bills of review must be founded, must not always be
new matter to be used as evidence to prove matter in issue, in some manner, in
the original bill. A case, indeed, can rarely happen, in which new matter dis-
covered would not be, in some degree, evidence of matter in issue in the orig-
2 If the new facts antedate the decree, and con- 7 Sto. Eq. PL, § 413.
stitute a new issue, they may be the subject of a 8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr„ 1580; Sto. Eq. PL, §423; Huff-
bill of review, or of a supplemental bill in the nature acre v. Green, 4 Hay., 51.
of a bill of review. Sto. Eq. PL, § 416; 2 Dan. Ch. 9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1577. note; Burson V. Dosser, 1
Pr., 1577. Heisk., 754; Frazier v. Sypert, 5 Sneed, 100; Mad-
3 See Sto. Eq. PL, §415, note; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., dox r. Apperson. 14 Lea, 618.
1578 note. 10 Burson v. Dosser. 1 Heisk., 762.
4 Sto. Eq. PI., 5 412; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1578; Col- 11 Sto. Eq. PI. 5 414.
ville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 524. 12 Harris «. Edmondson, 3 Tenn. Ch., 211. If
5 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1577. the new evidence was known at the hearing, the
6 Burson V. Dosser, 1 Heisk., 763; Long V, Gran- party desiring it should apply for a continuance on
berry, 2 Tenn. Ch., 85. If a defendant, after an that ground, supporting his apnlication by a special
interlocutory decree against him, discover new and affidavit of the newly discovered evidence.
controlling evidence he may set it up by a suople-
mental bill in the nature of a bill of review. Hard-
wick v. American Can Co., 7 Cates, 393.
inal cause, if the pleadings were properly framed. But the doctrine seems now
to be fully established, that matter discovered after a decree has been made,
although not capable of being used as evidence of anything which was pre-
viously in issue in the cause, but constituting an entirely new issue, may yet
be the subject of a bill of review, or of a supplemental bill in the nature of a
bill of review. 13
AKTICLE IV.
THE LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF REVIEW.
§ 1240. When Leave to File the Bill is Neces- § 1242. How the Bill May Serve for a Peti-
sary. tion for Leave.
§ 1243. When Leave May be Properly De-
§ 1241. How Leave is to be Obtained. nied.
§ 1240. When Leave to File the Bill is Necessary. The practice as respects —
the filing of a bill of review is the same in Tennessee as it was in England at
the beginning of the Eevolution and a bill of review for errors of law may
;
be brought as a matter of right, no leave of the Court being necessary. But a

bill of review brought upon the discovery of new evidence is not a matter of
right, and cannot be filed without leave of Chancellor: this leave cannot be
given in vacation, but must be granted in open Court ;* and if filed without such
leave may be demurred to on that account. 2 But the grant of leave to file does
not bind the Court to sustain the bill when filed, and, in a proper case, it may be
dismissed on demurrer. 3 If, however, a deficient bill for both error of law and
new proof be presented for leave to file, while the Chancellor should allow
it to be filed for error apparent, and refuse to allow it to be filed for new proof
yet, if he refuses to allow it to be filed at all, for any purpose, it will not be
reversible error, for if the bill is insufficient on both grounds, the appellate
Court will not remand it to be filed in order that it might be immediately there-
after dismissed. 4
When a bill of review is grounded on both errors of law and new proof, it
may be filed as a bill for error apparent even when the Court refuses to allow
it to be filed as a bill grounded on new proof. If such a bill be filed without
leave being asked, it may stand on both grounds, unless the adverse party
challenge it, in due time and form, as a bill for new proof.
§ 1241. —
How Leave is to be Obtained. The application to file a bill of re-
view, for newly discovered proof, is usually made by petition; 5 but it may
also be made by motion, supported by affidavit. The petition should state the
nature of the suit, reciting the bill, answer and other pleadings, and the pro-
ceedings thereon to final decree, giving the substance thereof with fullness
and particularity. The petition should set out the newly discovered evidence
in detail, and give the names of the witnesses, if any, and show the circum-
stances of the discovery of the new evidence, the exact date of such discovery,
and the reasons why it was not discovered before. The petition must rebut any
presumptions of want of diligence that may arise from the circumstances of
the case. It is not sufficient that the petitioner expects to prove certain facts;
13 Sto. Eq. PL, §§ 415-416; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1577; 2 Tackson u. Jackson, 3 Shan. Cas., IS. See, post,
Frazer V. Sypert, 5 Sneed, 100; Heisk. Dior., 596. § 1250.
If it were an open question, it might with great 3 McGuire V. Gallagher, 11 Pick., 349.
force be contended that this is the sort of "new mat- 4 Puryear v. Purvear, 5 Bax., 640.
5 Winchester e. Winchester, 1 Head, 460 ; Long V.
ter which hath arisen in time after the decree," re-
ferred to by Lord Bacon in his Ordinance. Granherry. 2 Tenn. Ch., 85; ante. § 1231.
lCoh'ille r. Colville. 9 Hum., 524; Finley V. Tay- o Sto. Eq. PL, § 412; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1578; Pur-
lor 8 Bax.. 237; Winchester «. Winchester, 1 Head., vear v. Puryear, 5 Bax., 640; Frazer v. Sypert, 5
640; Sto. Eq. PL, i 412; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1577. Sneed, 100.
§ 1242 biels of review. 990
he must set out the exact evidence by which he can establish them. 7 He must,
also, clearly show the pertinency of this evidence, and its effect upon the decree
sought to be reviewed. 8
Upon the application the Court must be satisfied, not only of the relevancy
and materiality of the new matter, but also that it has come to the knowledge
of the applicant and his agents, for the first time, since the period at which he
could have made use of it in the suit; and that it could not with reasonable
diligence have been discoverd sooner; and that it is of such a character that,
if brought forward in the suit, it would have altered the decree. 9 If the nature
of the new evidence is such that the party, or agent attending to the suit in
his absence, or his Solicitor, might, with proper diligence, have had it upon
the original hearing, no bill of review will be allowed. The material point in
such cases is, not what the party knew, but what he, or his agent, or Solicitor,
by due diligence might have known. 10 Diligence must be affirmatively shown
to entitle a party to file the bill. 11
But when application for leave to file a bill of review for newly discovered
proof is made on behalf of an infant, the rule that reasonable diligence must be
shown does not apply, and diligence need not be shown, negligence not being
imputable to an infant in such cases. 12
On application for leave to file a bill of review for new proof, the verifying
must be done by the complainant himself, whether the new proof is brought
forward by affidavit, petition, or bill. The statements as to the newness of the
discovery, the degree of diligence used, and other matters required to be pre-
sented under oath, cannot be made by proxy; the complainant himself must
make oath to them 13 or it must be clearly made to appear that another person
;
has had the exclusive control of the complainant's affairs, in which ease the
other person may do the verifying. But matters sworn to on information and
belief, without any personal knowledge thereof, should not weigh heavily on
an application to file a bill of review for new proof.
It is not absolutely required that the new evidence should have come to the
knowledge of the party asking leave, since the decree complained of was pro-
nounced. It is sufficient if such evidence be discovered after his time for taking
proof had expired, but too late to obtain leave to take it before the trial. In
such case, however, the party should ask for a continuance and if that be ;
refused, should file a petition to rehear and if he did neither, he should be re-
;
quired to satisfactorily show why. For a party should not be allowed, either
to experiment with his case by going willingly to trial without the new proof,
or to neglect the remedy by rehearing when it was available. 14
§ 1242. How the Bill may Serve for a Petition for Leave. The better prac- —
tice in obtaining leave to file a bill of review for new proof is by petition under
oath 15 nevertheless, there has grown up in our State a practice of ignoring the
:
petition, and making the bill itself answer all the purposes of a petition. 16 This
practice probably arose from the Court sometimes allowing the petition itself to
be filed as bill of review, after successfully discharging its functipn as a petition
for leave. A bill thus drawn to answer the double purpose of a petition and
pleading must, of course, contain all the essentials of each; and if it does
7 McGuire v. Gallagher, 11 Pick., 349. See, also, Long v. Granberrv, 2 Tenn. Ch., 85; Win-
8 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1578, notes; Harris V. Udmond- chester v. Winchester, 1 Head, 460; Frazer v. Sy-
son, 3 Tenn. Ch., 211; Burson v. Dosser, 1 Heisk., pert, 5 Sneed, 100.
754. The petition must contain all the essentials of ie Long V. Granberry, 2 Tenn. Ch., 85. It is
a special affidavit for a continuance. Ante, § 520. suggested that the better practice would be, to com-
9 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1578. bine the two methods: 1st, To present the bill sworn
10 Berdanatti v. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch., 705. to in due form, containing the former pleadings and
11 Maddox v. Apperson, 14 Lea, 618. decree, and setting forth Hie new evidence and its
12 McCown V. Moores, 12 Lea, 635. But see Hurt materiality and recent discovery; and. 2nd, To show,
V. Long, 6 Pick., 445, which holds that minors at- by separate affidavit, the details of the discovery of
tempting to review decrees stand upon the same the new evidence, the degree of diligence used, the
footing as adults. See, also, ante, § 935, note 14. circumstances rebutting any seeming want of dili-
13 Berdanatti V. Sexton, 2 Tenn. Ch., 705. gence, and all other matters necessary to show that
14 Sto. Eq. PI., § 423. the case is one in which leave should be granted.
15 Hardwick v. American Can Co., 7 Cates, 393, See Purvear v. Puryear, 5 Bax., 640; Frazer v. Sy-
citing the above section of this book, then § 1074. nert, 5 Sneed, 100.
991 BILLS OP REVIEW. § 1243
contain these essentials, and is properly verified, the Court having regard to
the substance and not to the form, would on motion, allow such a bill to be
filed without further requirements. But even when the Court has granted
leave to file such a bill, or any other bill of review for new matter, the de-
fendant thereto is not in any way precluded from moving to dismiss it, or from
demurring to it, or from making any other defence to it. 1 ?
§ 1243. When Leave may be Properly Denied.—The leave to file a bill of
review for newly discovered evidence is not a matter of right, even when all
the ordinary prerequisites have been complied with, but rests in the sound dis-
cretion of the Court. It may, therefore, be refused, although the facts, if ad-
mitted, would change the decree, and although good diligence in discovering
such facts be shown, where the Court, looking at all the circumstances, shall
deem it injurious to innocent parties, or otherwise unadvisable, to allow further
litigation. 18
And on the hearing of the application for leave, the Court may look to the
record in the case sought to be reviewed, and may consider any matter therein
that avoids the allegations of the proposed bill of review. 19
ARTICLE V.
FRAME AND FORM OF A BILL OF REVIEW.
§ 1244. General Requisites of the Frame. § 1246. What Should be Stated in a Bill of
Review for New Proof.
§ 124S. What a Bill of Review for Error of § 1247. Essentials of a Bill of Review.
Law Should Show. § 1248. Forms of Bills of Review.
§ 1244. —
General Requisites of the Frame. In a bill of this nature, it is
necessary to state 1, the former bill, and the proceedings thereon 2, the de-
: ;
cree, and the point in which the party exhibiting the bill of review conceives
himself aggrieved by it; and 3, the specific ground of law, or new proof dis-
covered, upon which he seeks to impeach it. No errors can be noticed except
those specified in the bill of review. 1 And if the decree is impeached on the
ground of new proof, it seems necessary to state in the bill the leave obtained
to file it, and the fact of the discovery.
The bill may simply pray that the decree may be reviewed, and altered or
reversed, in the point complained of, if it has not been carried into execution.
But if the decree has been carried into execution, the bill should also pray the
further decree of the Court, to put the party complaining of the former decree
into the situation in which he would have been if that decree had not been
executed. If the bill is brought to review the reversal of a former decree, it
may pray that the original decree may stand.
If the original suit has become abated, the bill may, also, be at the same time
a bill of revivor. And a supplemental bill may likewise be added, if any event
has happened which requires it. If any person not a party to the original suit
becomes interested in the subject, he must be made a party to the bill of review
by way of supplement. All the parties to the original bill ought to be made
17 Long v. Granberry, 1 Tenn. Ch., 85; Burson v. son Dosser, 1 Heisk., 754; Hurt V. Long, 6 Pick.,
v.
Dosser, 1 Heisk., 754. In this case, a demurrer was 445. As

to the practice in filing bills of review, and
sustained after leave given to file the bill. supplemental bills in the nature of bills of review,
is 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1577, note; Winchester v. Win- for new matter, see Hardwick v. American Can Co.,
chester 1 Head, 489; Harris v. Edmondson, 3 Tenn. 7 Cates, 393.
Ch., 211; Frazer V. Syfoert, 5 Sneed, 100; Maddox 12 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1576, note 6; 1580; Frazer V.
v. Apnerson, 14 Lea, 617. Sypert, 5 Sneed, 100.
19 Proudfit V. Picket, 7 Cold., 563. And see Bur-
§ 1245 bills oe review. 992
parties to the bill of review, either as complainants or as defendants, for no
one ought to be affected by any decree without first being heard. 2
Abill of review, defective in frame, may sometimes be sustained as a cross
bill, 3 or as an original bill. 4
§ 1245. What a Bill of Review for Error of Law Should Show. When the —
bill seeks to review a decree for error of law apparent, it should not only state
fully the pleadings and decree, but should either file a transcript of them as
an exhibit, and make such transcript a part of the bill itself, so as to be con-
sidered on demurrer or, if it seeks no other relief but a review of errors appa-
;
rent, it should be filed in the original cause, and make the original pleadings and
decree a part thereof, by proper averments and prayers. But if the bill of
review also partakes of the character of an original bill, it would not be proper
to file it in a cause already in Court. Nevertheless, in whatsoever manner the
bill seeks to review a decree for error of law apparent, it should so bring such
decree, and the antecedent pleadings, before the Court that, on demurrer, the
Court may, by an inspection of such decree and pleadings, finally determine the
question whether the errors pointed out in the bill of review exist or not. 5
The practice is, to look into the pleadings and decree in the original case on the
hearing of a demurrer to a bill of review for error of law apparent, and the
Court would no doubt be justified in so doing even though the bill of review
did not properly incorporate them, or make them a part of itself. 6
Where the bill seeks to review errors of law only, no reference to the former
evidence is proper, and any reference to new evidence would be mere surplus-
age. The bill must be rigorously confined to errors of law, apparent from an
inspection of the decree complained of and the antecedent pleadings. Every
matter outside of these should be kept outside of the bill.
In drawing a bill of review for error of law apparent on the face of the
decree complained of, the draftsman must keep in mind that on such a bill:
1, Nothing can be looked to except the pleadings and decree in the original
cause, and the errors therein specifically designated by the bill of review; 2, No
part of the evidence whatever in the original cause can be looked to for any
purpose whatever; 3, No error in admitting or in excluding evidence, and no
erroneous deductions from evidence, and no overlooking of evidence, can be
considered 4, No error of fact to be ascertained by examination of the evidence
;
can be presented or regarded, however glaring such error may be 5, No new ;
evidence can be brought forward, however strong, for any purpose; and 6,
That a bill of review for error of law apparent does not open up the whole
case, as does an appeal or writ of error in an appellate Court. The language of
the ordinance is plain and inelastic. The error to be complained of, in such a
bill, must be "error of law appearing in the body of the decree without further
examination of matters of fact." Nevertheless, our Reports show the filing
and dismissal of many bills of review for error of law apparent, the draftsmen
of which relied not on errors apparent, but on errors to be made apparent, forget-
ful of the inflexible and inexorable rule that on such bills there can be no "fur-
ther examination of matters of fact. The stumbling-block in drawing such bills
'
'
2 2 Barb. Ch. Pr., 97-98; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1580; ined by the Court, on demurrers to bills of review
Sto. Eq. PI., § 420; Fuller V. McFarland, 6 Heisk., for error of law apparent, in the following cases:
79. In this case the bill was dismissed on demurrer Burton v. Dosser. 1 Heisk., 754; Brown v. Seversnn,
because of the want of a material party. This was a 12 Heisk., 381; Rogers ». Dibbrell, 6 Lea, 74: Liv-
harsh ruling, the ordinary practice in such cases ingston v. Noe, 1 Lea, 55; Arnold f>. Movers, 1 Lea,
being to allow an amendment to bring in the party 308; Durant w. Davis. 10 Heisk., 522; Sanderson V.
omitted. Gray v. Hays, 7 Hum. 588. See, also,
. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 578: as well as in other cases;
ante. § 1 11. and in every case it was assumed to be the proper
3 2 Barb. Ch. Pr.. 98. practice so to do. So that it may he safely laid
•4 DonaMson v. Nealis, 24 Pick., 638. The true down as a^ rule of practice that, on demurrer to a
question in such a case is, not what name is given bill of review for error of law apparent, the plead-
to the hill, but does the hill set forth a case for ings and decree in the original case mav be looked
relief. See. ante, §§ 43; 269; 431, note 4; 681; 719; to as though they were a part of the bill of review,
139. note 19. for the purposes of ascertaining whether the bill is
5 Burson v. Dosser. 1 Heisk., 758; Anderson v. proof against the demurrer. Hurt V. Lone, 6 Pick.,
The Bank, 5 Sneed. 661. 445.
The original pleadings and decree were exam-
993 bills op review. § 1246
seems to be a failure to discriminate between bills of review for errors of law
apparent, and bills of review for new proof recently discovered, coupled with a
failure to recognize the fact that bills of review are not intended as a substitute
for appeals or writs of error to the proper appellate Court.
§ 1246. What Should be Stated in a Bill of Review for New Proof.—In ad-
dition to setting forth the pleadings and decree as heretofore stated, the new
proof on which a bill of review is rested must be so stated in the bill, as to en-
able the Court to determine that the evidence, when produced, will be con-
trolling and that the complainant has been guilty of no negligence in not dis-
;
covering and producing it on the former hearing. It is not sufficient for the
bill to state that the complainant expects to prove certain facts, but he must
state the exact evidence he can produce to establish them. 7 And the bill should
be so drawn as to enable the Court to determine these matters upon a de-
murrer. 8
§ 1247. —
Essentials of a Bill of Review. For convenience in drafting bills
of review, and in testing their validity when drawn, the following summary of
their essentials is given
I. Whether Based on Law, or on Pacts.
The decree sought to be reviewed must be final, and beyond recall or
1.
change by the Court pronouncing it.
2. The bill must be filed by a party, or his heirs, executor, administrator, or
other privy aggrieved by the decree complained of.
3. The bill must be filed in the Court that rendered the decree complained of,
unless the decree was rendered by an appellate Court, and then it must be filed
in the Court from which the case was carried to the appellate Court. 9
4. All the parties to the original decree, and, also, all persons who have sub-
sequently become interested under the decree, must be made parties.
5. The. bill must be brought, or motion therefor made, within three years
from the date of the decree, or the removal of a disability to sue..
II. If Based on Error of Law, Alone.
1. The error must be specifically pointed out.
2. The error must be manifest when pointed out, and not be a doubtful
point of law.
3. This error must appear in the body of the decree, the pleadings being con-
sidered as a part of the decree, in such a case.
4. No error arising from the evidence, or the illegality or absence of evi-
dence, in the cause sought to be reviewed, can be considered, except in so far
as such evidence may appear in the pleadings, or be stated in the decree.
III. If Based on Newly Discovered Pacts, Alone.
1. The facts must not be merely cumulative, but of such a cogent nature as
,tb have been decisive, if they had been before the Court at the hearing.
. 2. These facts must have been discovered too late to have been used at the
hearing.
3. There must have been no want of diligence in not previously discovering
these facts.
4. These facts must be pertinent to the controversy, and proper to be used
on the issues made by the pleadings.
5. Leave to present these facts in a bill of review must be obtained of the
Court, by motion supported by affidavit, or by sworn petition, or by presenting
the bill itself, so drawn as to include the matter of a petition.
6. The affidavit, petition, or bill should be verified by the party in person,
and not by his agent, or Solicitor, unless good reason therefor be shown.
§ 1248. —
Forms of Bills of Review. As already stated, a bill of review must
recite the filing of the former bill, its object, the proceedings thereon, the
-,-
r
7 Livingston v. Nop, 1 Lea. 59; Burson v. Dosst, |
8 Burspn tf. Dnsser, 1 Heisk., 761.
i Heisk., 761: Maddox V. Apperson, 14 Lea, 618; .. 9 As to what decrees of an appellate Court, if any,
McGuire V. Gallagher, 11 Pick., 349. I can be reviewed, see, ante,. § .1228.
decree, the point in which the complainant considers himself aggrieved by it,
and the ground of law or fact upon which he seeks to impeach it; and must
pray that the decree may be reviewed and reversed, and the desired relief
granted. The following is a form of a
BILL Or REVIEW FOB EBBOES AT LAW.
To Hon. Thos. M. McConnell, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at Chattanooga
Richard Roe, executor of David Doe, deceased, and Charles Jones, by
Henry Jdnes, his next friend, both residents of Hamilton county,
complainants,
vs.
Rachel Doe, a resident of the same county, defendant.
I.
That on the 10th day of January, 1890, the defendant, Rachel Doe, filed her original bill
in this Court against them, alleging that she was the widow of David Doe, complainant Roe's
testator, that her husband died without leaving any lineal descendants, that she was his
widow, that he devised all his personal estate to the complainant, Charles Jones, that she
had, in due time and form, dissented from his will, and claiming that by reason of the prem-
ises she was entitled to all of the said personal estate remaining after the debts of the testator
were paid, and praying to have the same decreed to her.
n.
Complainants answered said admitting all the material facts thereof except that she
bill
was the widow of the said David Doe. And thereupon proof having been taken, the cause
was heard at the last term of this Court, and a decree pronounced, adjudging that the now
defendant, Rachel Doe, was the widow of David Doe, deceased, and entitled to all of his
personal estate remaining after the payment of his debts, and of the expenses of executing
his will and a reference was made to the Master to take the necessary account, which refer-
;
ence is now pending. All of which matters will more fully appear by reference to the record
in said cause, which reference is here made.
in.
Complainants show further to your Honor, that they are aggrieved by said decree, and
ought not to be bound thereby, and that said decree is erroneous, and ought to be reviewed
and reversed and set aside, for the reason 10 that the effect of the dissent of the defendant as
widow did not entitle her to all the said residue of said personal estate, but to only one-
third thereof, and that the complainant, Charles Jones, is entitled to the other two-thirds,
and the same should have been decreed to him, instead of to her. 11 And for this error in
said decree, apparent on the face thereof, complainants bring this their bill of review to be
relieved in the premises.
rv.
The premises considered, complainants pray-:
1st. That proper process issue to compel the defendant, Rachel Doe, to answer this bill
[but her oath -to her answer is waived.]
2d. That said, decree may be reviewed, reversed and set aside to the extent of the error
hereinbefore complained of; 12 and
3d. That complainants may have such other, further, and general relief as they may be
entitled to at the hearing. Robert- PriTCHard, Solicitor.
BILL OF EEVIEW FOB NEW MATTEB.
[A of review for new matter is substantially of the same form as a bill of review for
bill
errors of law. Supposing, in the foregoing form, that proof had recently been discovered
that Rachel Doe had been duly divorced by her husband, in the State of Pennsylvania, where
they lived until David Doe moved to Tennessee, the third paragraph of the foregoing form
would be so modified from the words "reversed and set aside" as to read:]
in.
— for the following errors therein :
1st. The effect of the dissent of the defendant as widow did not entitle her to all .the
residue of said personal estate, but only to one-third thereof, and that the complainant,
Charles Jones, is entitled to the other two-thirds, and the same should have been decreed to
him instead of to her, which error is apparent on the face of said decree.
2d. Since said decree, and within the last thirty days, complainants have discovered the
facts to be that the defendant, Rachel Doe, was not the lawful wife of the testator, David
Doe; but that they had been lawfully divorce^ in the State of Pennsylvania, shortly before
the said David Doe removed to this State; that said David sickened and died soon after
coming here, and complainants knew nothing, of his marital relation, and knew nothing of
10 If there be more errors than one, the phraseol- 12 If the errors complained of entitle the com-
ogy should be: Por the following errors therein ap- plainants to have the whole decree reversed, thit
pearing on its face: prayer should be: 2d. That said decree mov be re-
11 If the bill assails the entire decree, this allega- viewed, reversed, and set aside, and no further pro-
tion should be: No- decree ought to have been proceedings be had thereon, and that said bill be dis-
nounced in favor of the then complainant, and her missed.
said bill ought to have been dismissed.
his family and kindred. Complainant Charles Jones is a minor of tender years, incapable of
conducting a lawsuit, and has no relatives or acquaintances in Pennsylvania, they and he
having always lived in Tennessee. The defendant, Rachel Doe, produced certified evidence
of her marriage to the said testator, and complainants were thereby deceived and lulled into
acquiesence in her claims of widowhood. Complainants file the transcript of the record of
said divorce, which shows the defendant to be an artful, treacherous, and adulterous woman,
and make it an exhibit to this bill, and mark it "Exihibit A," and will read it at the hearing.
(The Clerk, however, will not copy it in making a copy of this bill for the defendant.) The
defendant hurried her case to a hearing at the first term, which came only twenty-seven days
after the bill was filed, and complainants charge that fter purpose in delaying the filing of the
bill, and in hastening the hearing, was to prevent complainants from making investigation
into her said claim. Complainants did not know these new facts when said decree was pro-
nounced, and could not by reasonable diligence have known them previous to said decree:
this is especially true of complainant, Charles, by reason of his tender age and the foregoing
facts. And these new matters complainants are advised, and charge, entitle them to have
said decree wholly reversed, and set aside, and said bill dismissed.
IV.
Therefore, complainants come into your Honor's Court, and the premises considered, pray
1st. That proper process issue to compel the defendant, Rachel Doe, to answer the bill,
but her oath to her answer is waived.
2d. That said decree may be reviewed, reversed and set aside, and the said bill by the
defendant filed against complainants may be dismissed.
3d. That complainants may have such other, further, and general relief as they may be
entitled to at the hearing. Robert Pritchard, Solicitor.
,
[Annex affidavit and jurat. See § 789, ante.\
AKTICLB VI.
DEFENCES TO A BILL OF REVIEW.
1249. Defences to a Bill of Review for § 1252. Form of a Demurrer to a Bill of Re-
Error of Law. view.
1250. Defences to a Bill of Review for New 1253. Form of a Demurrer and Plea to a
§
Proof. Bill of Review.
1251. Demurrers to Bills of Review.
§ 1249. Defences to a Bill of Review for Error of Law. If a bill of review —

for error of law fairly state the pleadings and the decree complained of, a
demurrer is the proper defence. 1 In our practice, it is usual not only to state
fully the pleadings and decree, but also to make them exhibits to the bill of
review for greater certainty; and to pray that they may be taken and treated
as a part of the bill, for all the purposes thereof. 2 When this is done, a de-
murrer will be decisive of the case if the issue be in favor of the demurrant,
:
the bill will be dismissed; and, if in favor of the complainant, the prayer of
the bill Will be allowed, and the decree complained of will be reviewed, and
reversed, altered or explained, in the matters specially complained of, as justice
may require. 3
1 Randall V. Payne, 1 Tenn. Ch., 452; L. & M. and cannot be changed by an answer to the bill of
R. R. v. Rainey, 7 Cold., 430; Saunders v. Gregory, review, or proof." This is certainly the logical
3 Heisk., 578. view of_ the matter. And Hurt
Long, 6 Pick.,
in v.
2 Anderson v. Bank, 5 Sneed, 661. In this case, 445, it is laid down that, under our practice, upon a
the Supreme Court say; "The bill is defective in demurrer against opening the decree, the original
not exhibiting the record which it proposes to re- decree, and the pleadings in the case in which it was
view, for the inspection of the Court. It will not pronounced, are before the Court for inspection to
do to call upon the other side to produce it; the determine whether the alleged errors exist or not.
complainant must make it a part of his case." It is Durant Davis, 10 Heisk., 522.
v.
true, the bill in this case was filed in the Chancery S2 Dan. Ch. Pr.. 1583; Sto. Eq. PI., §634; Bur-
Court at Tazewell to review a decree of the Chancery son v. 1 Heisk., 758; Durant v. Davis,
Dosser, 10
Court at Rogersville; and it is, also, true that the Heisk., 522. An examination of the reported cases
syllabus seems to confine the rule as to exhibiting
_. will show that nearly all the bills of review for
the record, to such a case. The rule, however, is a error of law apparent have been finally determined
good one in all cases; and the Court does not confine on demurrer; and that, on the hearing of the de-
the rule to the exceptional case, as does the Re- murrer, the pleadings and decree in the original
porter. In Burson v. Dosser, 1 Heisk., 758, Judge cause were considered by the Court. Such is the
McFarland says: "The action of the Court upon a correct practice. Saunders v. Gregory, 3 Heisk.,
demurrer to a bill of review, for errors apparent on 578; Hurt v. Long, 6 Pick., 445. The contrary rule
the face of the record, necessarily disposes of the was laid down in L. & M. R. R. Co. V. Rainey, 7
whole case. Whether or not the error appears, must Cold., 431.
be determined from the bill and the original record,
§ 1250 BIU,S OF REVIEW. 996
But bill of review fails to set forth the pleadings and decree fully and
if the
fairly, the defendant may plead the original pleadings, and decree in bar of the
bill of review, and demur to the relief sought by the bill on the ground that
there is no error of law in the decree. 4 Or the defendant may make both of
these defences by answer under our statute, 5 and set out therein such parts of
the decree as the complainant has omitted or mistated, or may exhibit to the
answer a certified copy of the pleadings and decrees or may make the original ;
record an exhibit. The defendant may also set up in his answer any matter of
defence that would avail as a plea, such as 1, that the decree complained of :
was made by consent; 6 or 2, that the matters contained in said decree have
been adjusted since the decree, on valuable considerations or 3, that complain- ;
ant has in some other way debarred or estopped himself from having the decree
re-opened; 7 or 4, any other matter proper for a plea in bar, such as the defence
of innocent purchaser. 8
A bill of review for error of law may be filed as a matter of right, and no
leave therefore is necessary; and when error of law and discovery of new
proof are joined in the same bill, the bill may be dismissed in so far as it sets
up new proof, for want of leave to file it but such dismissal will not take it out
;
of Court as to the error of law apparent. 9 A demurrer to the whole bill will,
also, be overruled if the bill can, on its face, be sustained either for error of
law or for new matter, and yet not for both. The demurrer must be confined
to so much of the bill as is demurrable, or such demurrer will be overruled. 10
§ 1250. Defences to a Bill of Review for New Proof.—A bill of review on
the discovery of new proof should state the newly discovered evidence and its
pertinency with such particularity and fullness, and should set forth the time
and manner of its discovery, and the circumstance of diligence connected there-
with, with such definiteness, as clearly jto show the complainant's right to have
the decree complained of reviewed as prayed. If he fails so to do in his bill,
a demurrer will lie to it for want of these essentials for our practice requires :
that in such bills, the complainant shotild make such a full and specific state-
ment of the various grounds on which his bill is based, that their sufficiency may
be fully tested by demurrer. 11
If the bill be proof against a demurrer, the defendant may answer and tra-
verse the allegation that the evidence offered is newly discovered and may set ;
up in avoidance of such new matter any defence that would have availed if
such new matter had been charged in the original bill. 12 The defendant may
also show that the decree was made by consent, or plead a release, compromise,
or any matter in estoppel, or any other matter in bar, as shown in the preceding
section.
If the bill of review be both for error of law and for new proof, and be main-
tainable on one of these grounds, only, a demurrer to the whole bill wou'd be too
broad, and would for that reason be overruled. 13 The demurrer should be spe-
cifically confined to so much of the bill as it will destroy, and the balance of
the bill should be otherwise answered unto. 14
If a bill of review for new proof be filed without leave given in open Court,
it may, on motion, be taken from the files; and if demurred to for want of
115
such leave, the Court may treat the demurrer as equivalent to a motion, to
,
* L. & M. R. R. v. Rainey, 7 Cold., 430; Hurt v. 10 Ibid., ante, 5 306.
LonR, 6 Pick.. 445. 11 Burson v. Dosser, 1 Heisk., 761; Harris c. Ed-
Code, § 4319.
5 See Randall v. Pavne, 1 Term. mundson, 3 Tenn. Ch.. 211.
Ch., 452; Burson v. Dosst, 1 Heisk., 758. 12 Sto. Fq. PI.. § 834; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr., 1584.
2 Din. Ch. Pr., 1583, note. A consent decree 13 Colville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 524.
obtained by fraud may be impeached by bill for that li Ante. §§ 306; 403.
purpose. Ante, § 935.
, 16 Colville «. Colville, 9 Hum., 524; Finley V. Tay-
1 Sto. Eq. PI.-, 5 833. lor, 8 Bax.. 237; Wilson V. Wilson, 10 Yerg., 200;
8 Livingston n. Noe, 1 Lea, 66. Dance ». McGregor, 5 Hum., 428.
8 Colville v. Colville, 9 Hum., 524.
997 BILLS OP REVIEW. §1251
dismiss for want
of leave. 16 But a demurrer to a bill of review on other grounds
is a waiver of the objection that the bill was filed without leave. 17
§ 1251. Demurrers
to Bills of Review. —
Such demurrers have already been
considered; 18 and only necessary to say that where the error alleged is
it is
one of law apparent upon the decree, the practice now is, in Tennessee, to test
the validity of the bill by demurrer 19 and, on the argument of the demurrer,
;
tp consider the pleadings in the original suit, and the decree complained of,
as though they were incorporated in full in the bill of review. 20 Indeed, a bill
of review for error apparent is but little more than a demurrer itself, the errors
alleged being in the nature of grounds of demurrer, and the pleadings and
decree in the original suit being in the nature of a bill,' or a declaration. 21
On the hearing of a demurrer to a bill of review for error apparent, the
evidence cannot be looked into or considered for any purpose whatsoever, no
matter what manifest error or injustice in the decree may appear by an exam-
ination of the evidence. If the party wishes the evidence reviewed, he must
take the case to the proper appellate Court.
A
demurrer will lie to a bill of review for error apparent:
1. If there be no material error apparent on the face of the pleadings and the
decree.
2. If there be no such error which aggrieves the complainant, and of which
he has the right to complain.
3. If the bill be filed before the Court has lost control of the decree com-
plained of ; or
4. If the be filed after the period limited by statute for the filing of such
bill
bills, and
allegations do not bring the complainant within any statutory ex-
its
ceptions to the limitation. 22
§ 1252. Form of a Demurrer to a Bill of Review. The following form con- —
tains various grounds of demurrer, all of which perhaps never will appear in
any one bill, but some one or more of them may exist in any case.
DEMURRERS TO A BILL OF REVIEWS
[Give the usual caption and commencement of a demurrer as in § 310, ante.]
i.
That there is no such material error of law in the decree complained of as complainant in
his bill alleges; but on the other hand the decree is correct in the particular set out in the bill
as a ground of review.
II.
Thatthe error complained of, if it exists as complainant avers, is not an error that ag-
grieves him, nor is he injured thereby, nor is it one of which he has the right to complain.
in.
That the alleged newly discovered evidence, if true and proved, would not warrant the
Court in reviewing the decree in the particulars complained of, said evidence not having the
probative force requisite in such a case.
IV.
That admitting the newly discovered evidence would warrant the Court in reviewing the
decree as prayed, nevertheless the bill does rot affirmatively show that measure of diligence
on the part of the complainant either in making the discovery, or in the bringing of the suit
after the discovery, requisite in such a case.
v.
That the bill shows on was not brought within three years from the time
its face that it
of pronouncing the decree complained of, and the allegations of the bill do not show that
complainant has been laboring under any statutory disability.
[Conclude as in § 310, ante.]
16 Finley v. Taylor, 8 Bax., 237: Knight v. Atkin- 22 Sto. Eq. PI., §§ 634-635.
son, 2 Tenn. Ch., 384. Or the Court may directly 23 On the hearing of a demurrer to a bill of re-
sustain the demurrer, and dismiss the bill. Jackson view for error of law, the original decree and the
v. Jackson, 3 Shan. Cas., 18. original pleadings may be looked into, in order to
17 Dance v. McGregor, 5 Hum., 428; Saunders v. ascertain whether there be any such error or errors
Gregory, 3 Heisk., 578. in the decree as the complainant, in his bill of re-
18 See, ante, §§ 1249-1250. view, alleges. The_ whole question, whether there
19 Saunders v. Gregory, 3 Heisk., 578. be errors of law, will be determined on a demurrer,
20 Hurt V. Long, 6 Pick., 445; Durant v. Davis, 10 and no plea or answer is necessary. Hurt v. Long,
Heisk., 922. 6 Pick., 445; Burson V. Dosser, 1 Heisk., 758.
21 See, ante, § 1236.
§ 1253. Form of a Demurrer and Plea to a Bill of Review.—If the bill of
review for error of law fails to fully set forth the pleadings and decree in the
original cause, the defendant may set them up by a plea, and demur to the relief
on the ground that there is no error of law in the decree.
DEMURRER AND PLEA TO A BILL OF REVIEW.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ No. 987.— In Chancery, at Knoxville.

Richard Roe. J
The demurrer and plea of the defendant to the bill of review filed against him in this
cause.
The defendant for demurrer to so much of the bill as prays to have the original decree
opened and reviewed for error of law, says that there is no such error of law in said decree
as the complainant supposes, and that said decree contains no error of law of which the
complainant can complain, and that said decree contains no error.
The defendant, not waiving his said demurrer, but relying thereon, for plea to so much of
the said bill as undertakes to set forth the [pleadings and] decree in the original cause, says
that the said bill does not truly set forth said [pleadings and] decree; 24 therefore the defend-
ant pleads said [pleadings and] decree, which are in the words and figures following [Here :
set out the {bill, answer and) decree in the original cause, in full.]
And the defendant demands the judgment of the Court whether he shall be compelled to
make any other or further answer to said bill of review. V. A. Huffaker, Solicitor.
24 If the bill sets forth the pleadings correctly it I this method of defence by demurrer and plea, see
will be necessary to plead the decree only. As to | Hurt V. Long, 6 Pick.,' 445.
'999 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. §1254
CHAPTER LXX.
WRITS OP ERROR CORAM NOBIS IN THE CHANCERY COURT.
§ 1254. Office of a Writ of Error Coram § 1258. Forms
of Petitions for a Writ of
Nobis. Error Coram Nobis.
§ 12SS. When a Writ of Error Coram Nobis § 1259. Proceedings Upon the Petition.
Will Lie. § 1260. Proper Practice in Chancery Upon a
§ 12S6. When and the How Writ is Ob- Petition.
tained. § 1261. Hearing, and Decree.
§ 1257. Frame of the Petition.
§ 1254. Office of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis. writ of error coram nobis —A
is equivalent to an original bill in the nature of a bill of review 1 and its office j
is to enable a Court to correct its own judgment or decree when, while just on
its face, it is nevertheless unjust in fact, because of a matter of fact not before
the Court when the judgment or decree was rendered, which matter the party
injured was prevented from bringing before the Court, because he had no
notice of the writ, or was under disability, or was prevented by surprise, acci-
dent, mistake or fraud, without fault on his part. 2 It is called a writ of error
coram nobis because the record sought to be corrected by the writ remains, and
' '
is to remain before us, that is, in the Court issuing the writ. 3 The writ does
' '
not lie to enable the petitioner to obtain the benefit of newly discovered evi-
dence, 4 or to controvert any fact already adjudicated upon issues made up,
or to dispute the probative force of the evidence upon which the adjudication
was based, or to show an error of law upon the face of the record. And in a
Court of law the writ does not lie to contradict or dispute any return of an
officer, 5 or any fact recited in the judgment, or otherwise appearing affirmatively
in the record. But in the Chancery Court the rule is different, and if the record
recites any jurisdictional fact which is false, or if the officer's return show
service of subpoena on the petitioner, when in fact there has been no service, or
if the record show an appearance by counsel, when in fact petitioner had no
counsel, and made no appearance, upon a petition for a writ of error coram nobis
in the Chancery Court, the record as to these matters may be contradicted and
shown to be false by parol proof, as on a bill to impeach a decree for fraud. 6
The grounds of this remedy are errors of fact, and not errors of law; 7 and
these errors of fact must be matters which do not appear on the face of the
record. Errors of fact which do appear of record cannot be corrected by this
method of procedure they must be corrected by a motion for a new trial, or
;
a rehearing, or a bill of review, in the same Court; or by appeal, or writ of

error, in the proper appellate Court. 8
§ 1255. When a Writ of Error Coram Nobis Will Lie. This writ is in- —
tended for the correction of decrees erroneous in fact, where the party ag-
1 Willis v. Willis, 20 Pick., 382, citing § 1092, 3 6 A. & E. "Ency. of Law, 810. As a matter of
now §1260, of this book. fact, no writ of error issues, the petition and notice
2 Code, §§ 3110; 3116. The decisions of the Su- of it being filed, and supersedeas, when necessary,
preme Court in cases at law, and especially in cases being in lieu of the writ.
prior to the Code, are not to be followed in Chan- 4 Tibbs v. Anderson, 1 Thomp. Cases. 264.
cery, without diligently discriminating between (1) s Baxter v. Ervin, 1 Thomp. Cases, 175.
the practice at law and the practice in Equity, and e Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310. The opin-
(2) between the law. in reference to this writ before ion of the Court, in this case, by Turney, afterwards
the Code and the law in the Code. The Code, § 3116, Chief Justice, shows how a Court of Equity can dis-
adds a new and most extensive ground of jurisdic- enthrall itself from the entanglements of technicali-
tion in cases of writs of error coram nobis, to-wit: ties in cases where a Court of law would be so en-
surprise, accident, mistake, or fraud, "without fault meshed by its own rules to be powerless to do jus-
on the petitioner's part. Tibbs v. Anderson, 1 tice.
Thomp. Cases, 268. This new ground is almost co- 7 Upton 17. Phillips, 11 Heisk., 215.
extensive with the remedy in Equity in such cases, 8 Patterson v. Arnold, 4 Cold., 368; Brandon «:.
and was, no doubt, intended to be so' exercised. Diggs, 1 Heisk., 476.

§ 1255 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.
grieved by the error was in no fault, but was prevented from making his defence
by reason of some one or more of the following facts
1. Want of Notice of the Suit in which the decree complained of was ren-
dered, coupled with a good defence on the merits. Thus, if a decree is ren-
dered, on motion, against a person as surety on some bond executed in a cause
in the Court, or a summary judgment is rendered on motion against a person
as co-surety or principal, or as a sheriff, clerk, or deputy of either, or as Solic-
itor, or as otherwise liable to judgment on motion, such person may have such
decree or judgment set aside by this proceeding 1, if he had no notice of the :
judgment, 9 and 2, if he had -a real defence to the motion. real defence means A
a defence on the merits, such as (1) non est factum, (2) payment, (3) statute of
limitations, (4) former judgment, (5) novation, and the like. 10
2. Some Disability not appearing of record, such as infancy, coverture, or
unsoundness of mind. Thus, if the person against whom the decree was ren-
dered was, at its rendition, an infant, or married woman, or person of unsound
mind, this fact not appearing of record, such person is entitled to this remedy
to have the decree set aside. 11
3. Some Surprise, Accident, Mistake or Fraud, which prevented the person ag-
grieved from making defence, he himself being without fault. 12 In such a case,
the petitioner must show 1, a real defence on the merits 2, the specific facts
: ;
constituting the surprise, accident, mistake or fraud; and 3, the absence of

fault on his part, or on the part of his agents. 1. judgment after a continu- A
ance would be a surprise. 13 2. High water making the road to the Court im-
passable, or sudden and great sickness preventing the petitioner from either
attending Court, or employing an agent, or Solicitor, would constitute an acci-
dent. 14 3. Where a non-resident defendant supposed on sufficient grounds that
he had employed an attorney to make defence, and the attorney happened to
be one of the plaintiff 's attorneys, the defendant being ignorant thereof, and as
a consequence judgment by default and final judgment were rendered against
him, this was held to be a case of mistake. 15 4. Where the defendant's Solicitor
drew his answer denying the equities of the bill, and a deposition was
taken by consent disproving the bill, and both answer and deposition were
delivered to the complainant's Solicitor on his promise to file them both
9 But, in the Circuit Court, a party cannot, in Turner, 7 Hum., 116, that if there be an unembar-
this proceeding, show that he was not, in fact, served rassed and adequate remedy at law by writ of error
with process when the officer's return shows service. coram nobis a bill in Chancery would not lie. In
The party's remedy
in such a case is a bill in Chan- Douglas V. Joyner, 1 Bax., 32. the Supreme Court
cery. Ridgeway V. Bank, 11 Hum., 523. But his moved a step forward and held that the remedy by
petition for a writ of error coram nobis will, in writ of error coram nobis and by a bill in Chancery
Chancery, be given all the force of a bill to impeach were concurrent remedies where the judgment is
or avoid a decree, and on such petition the Chancery assailed for want of notice. Now, it is believed, a
Court will allow the petitioner to dispute and dis- Court of Chancery will, under the Act of 1877, ch.
prove the officer's return that he was served with 97, grant relief on a proper case, whether the ap-
process. Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310. plication be called a writ of error coram nobis, or a
10 Code, §§3116-3117; Crawford V. Williams, 1 bill. Why deny justice which is substance, because
Swan, 341. See cases in our Digests under "Error of an error of nomenclature, which is form? Majors
Coram Nobis." n. MrNeillv, 7 Heisk., 294; Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9
11 Code, §§3116-3117; Norris V. Wilber, 1 Bax., Heisk., 310; 314; ante, §43; Hicks v. Haywood, 4
36^. It would seem that if a party died before Heisk., 598. In this case, the petition does not seem
judgment, where his death was in no way noticed to have been for a writ of error coram nobis, and
of record, bis personal representative would be en- yet it would seem that relief would have been granted
titled to this remedy. Crawford V. Williams, 1 upon it, as though it had prayed for such a writ, if
Swan, 346. If a decree be rendered against an in- merits had existed. See, also, Jones V. Kincaid, 5
fant or married womm without notice of their dis- Lea, 677, where it was held that a judgment at law,
ability, and as though they were sui juris, such a obtained by surprise, mieht be relieved against by
decree is, nevertheless, valid, unless attacked by a bill in Chancery, as well as by a writ of error
petition for a writ of error coram nobis, or by a coram nobis at law; and in Leftwick t>. Hamilton, 9
bill filed for that express purpose. Andrews V. An- Heisk., 310, a petition for a writ of error coram
drews. 7 Heisk., 234. nobis was treated as a bill to avoid a decree, and it
12 The enlargement of this common law remedy was expressly adjudicated that on such a pleading
so as to cover a part of the jurisdiction of the Courts the return of the officer might be attacked.
of Eouity does not. in any wav, limit or lessen that 13 Crouch »>. Mullenix, 1 Heisk., 479; Jones V.
jurisdiction. See Starkey v. Hammer, 1 Bax., 445; Kincaid, 5 Lea, 677.
ante, § 37. The Code allows this writ in cases where 14 Napier v. Person, 7 Yerg., 300. This was a
the person seeking relief was prevented from mak- certiorari case, but the principle applies to a coram
ing his defence, by surprise, accident, mistake, or nobis case. Rice «. Bank, 7 Hum., 39; Burem V.
fraud, without fault on his part.
<
Code, §3116. In Foster, 6 Heisk., 339; Rowland v. Jones, 2 Heisk.,
such cases, also, a bill will lie in Chancery to enjoin
the judgment, or grant the proper relief, or give a 15 Crawford v. Williams, 1 Swan, 341.
new trial. Ante, § 814. It was intimated in Isler V.
1001 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. §1256
with, the Clerk and Master, instead of which he filed neither, but took an order
pro confesso, and then a final decree, just as the term was about to close, in
the absence of the defendant's Solicitor, and without his knowledge or consent,
this would be a case of fraud. 16
§ 1256. —
When and How the Writ is Obtained. The writ of error coram nobis
is obtained by a sworn petition therefor, presented to the Chancellor of the
Court 17 making the decree, at his Chambers, or in open Court. The petition
must be presented, allowed to be filed, and filed within one year from the ren-
dition of the decree complained of. 18 No notice of the presentation of the
petition need be given the adverse party. If, on reading and considering the
petition, the Chancellor should be of opinion that a case for the writ is made
out, he will endorse upon the petition his
FIAT FOB, A WRIT OF EBBOB COBAM NOBIS.

To the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court at [place of Court making the decree com-
plained of:]
Upon a prosecution bond being given, file this petition, and let it operate as a writ of error
coram nobis, returnable to the first day of the next term. Notify the opposite party, or his
Solicitor, of the filing of this petition,' and the suing out of the said writ' [Upon the peti-
tioners giving a special bond therefor, as prescribed by the statute, issue a supersedeas to stay
all further proceedings upon the decree and execution complained of. 19 ]
At Chambers, August 8, 1891. B. M. Webb, Chancellor.
The petitioner, having obtained this fiat, gives the bond required, and there-
upon the Clerk and Master files the bond and the petition. No writ of error
'coram nobis in fact issues, the Hat of the Chancellor being in the nature of such
a writ, and so operating, upon the prosecution bond being given and the peti-
tion filed. 20 The notice of the suing out of the writ must be served on the op-
posite party, or his Solicitor, at least ten days prior to the term of the Court
to which the writ of error coram nobis is returnable. 21 This notice is usually
issued by the Clerk and served by an officer; 22 but it would seem it may be
given by the petitioner after the manner of giving notice of the taking of a de-
position, or notice of a summary proceeding by motion. 23
§ 1257. —
Frame of the Petition. A petition for a writ of error coram nobis
should be addressed to the Chancellor of the Court making the decree com-
plained of, and should set forth fully and particularly the following
1. The general facts of the existence and nature of the suit, the names of
the parties, and the character and date of the decree complained of.
2. Such an error of fact, meritorious in its nature, as would have prevented
the decree, at least, to the extent complained of, if the fact had duly appeared
at the hearing.
3. That the petitioner was prevented from showing this fact because (1) he
had no notice of the suit, 24 or (2) was under the disability of infancy, coverture,
or insanity; or (3) he was the victim of surprise, accident, mistake or fraud,
without fault on his part.
16 Tucker «. James, 12 Heisk.,333. See, Code, § 3188. But, see Chester v. Foster, 6
17 In Elliott v. McNairy, 1 Bax., 342, the ques- Pick., 515,
tion is raised, but not decided, whether the writ can 10 Code. §§ 3111-3113. Before the Chancellor's
be granted by any other Judge or Chancellor. It order shall operate as a supersedeas, the party apply-
would seem from a consideration of the various sec- ing shall give bond, with good security, in double
tions of the Code pertinent to the question, that the the amount of the decree, conditioned to abide by
doubt should be resolved in favor of the power of and perform the decree of the Court. Code, § 3112.
any Judge or Chancellor to grant the writ, it being 20 Elliott v. McNairy, 1 Bax., 342.
in the nature of extraordinary process. Code, 21 Code, 5 3113.
§§3915; 3946; 4434; Chad well, ex parte, 7 Heisk., 22 Code, § 3115, shows that process may issue, or
630. publication be made, as to the defendant.
18 Code, § 3111. Obtaining a fiat on the petition 23 Crawford v. Williams, 1 Swan, 341; and cases
within the year is insufficient, if the petition itself there cited.
be not filed and bond given within the year. Elliott 24 If the^ officer's return show service of the writ
v. McNairy, 1 Bax., 342; Cain n. Cocke, 1 Lea, 288. on the petitioner, the return may be controverted,
If the Clerk should file the petition and fiat within in Chancery. Leftwiek 1>. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310.
the year, and, by. leave of the Clerk, bond be given The rule in the_ Circuit Court is otherwise, because,
before the next term, this would_ probably save the at law, parol evidence cannot be heard to contradict
petitioner's rieht, as on bond being given it would a record. State v. Disney, 5 Sneed, 598; ante, § 814,
relate to the filing of the petition and not vice versa, notes.
unless the fiat required the bond to first be given.
§ 1258 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. 1002
4. And
praying for a writ of error coram nobis, for proper process to notify
the opposite party, and, if necessary, for a supersedeas.
This petition, after being duly verified, may be presented to the Chancellor
at Chambers, or in open Court; 25 and he may, on granting the writ of error,
also order it to operate as a supersedeas. 26 A petition for a writ of error
coram nobis in the Chancery Court must: (1) inject into the case a fact that
does not therein appear, but which, if it had appeared, would have either pre-
vented the decree, or would have made it reversible- on appeal or (2) it must ;
deny some fact appearing in the record which, if it had not appeared, would
have prevented the decree, or would have made it reversible on appeal; and (3)
the petition must, in either of these two cases, go further, and show that the
petitioner was prevented from proving the new fact alleged in his petition, or
from disproving the fact denied, by reason of want of notice, or some disability,
or some surprise, accident, mistake, or fraud without fault on his part. And
on alleging and proving the existence of one of these reasons for not making
his defence, the decree will be recalled and annulled; and the petitioner al-
lowed to make the defence set up in his petition.
§ 1258. Form of a Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis. The petition —
for a writ of error coram nobis, and, indeed, the proceedings on such a petition
are very analagous to a bill for a new trial, or a bill to avoid a decree, and
the proceedings thereon. Indeed, it would seem that one of the purposes of
this remedy was to enable a party to obtain, in a less formal way, that redress
ordinarily obtained by original bill in such cases. 27 The following is a
GENERAL FORM OF A PETITION FOR THE WRIT.
To Hon. [name of] Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court
the at [tozvn where the decree
was made:]
A B, a resident of Davidson county, petitioner, 28 !
vs. !•
C D, a resident of the same county, defendant. J

Your petitioner, [name of person aggrieved] respectfully shows to the Court
I.
That on [date] a decree was pronounced against him in your Honor's Court in the case of
C D, vs. A
B, No. 4168, in favor of said C D
for [number of] dollars. Petitioner is much
aggrieved by said decree by reason of a material error of fact therein. Said decree was based
upon [Here show, in full, the ground on which the decree was based, stating explicitly
whether it was on a note, bond, or other evidence, of debt, and whether it was rendered
against him as surety, or on some other ground. If an execution has issued on the decree,
state the fact.]
ii.
Your petitioner further shows that [Here set forth the petitioner's defence to said decree,
to-wit, non est factum, failure of consideration, payment, former judgment, statute of limita-
tions, novation, or other defence on the merits.]
in.
Yourpetitioner would have made said defence to said decree, but [Here show: 1, that
he had no notice of said decree, or of any proceeding, or intention to proceed, against him in
said cause; or 2, that he was prevented by some disability, specifying it, from showing or
correcting such error; or 3, that he was prevented from making said defence by surprise,
accident, mistake, or fraud, giving the particulars thereof in detail, and showing that there
zvas no fault or negligence on his part, or on the part of his agent, or Solicitor.]
IV.
Yourpetitioner is advised that had the foregoing facts appeared at the hearing of said
motion, [or, cause,] no decree would have been pronounced against him, and that by reason
of said error of fact occurring in said proceeding, and said want of notice [disability, surprise,
accident, mistake, or fraud, as the case may be,] he is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis,
25 Code, § 3111. petition a caption of its own, as though it were an
26 Code, §3111. original bill. The Code denominates the petitioner
27 The efficiency of this writ, and its scope, have as the plaintiff in error, and the other party as de-
been greatly enlarged by our statutes. Patterson V. fendant. Code, §§ 3114-3115. See, also, Hicks e.
Arnold. 4 Cold., 367; Jones v. Pearce, 12 Heisk., Haywood, 4 Heisk., 598; and Leftwick v. Hamilton,
286; Tibbs v. Anderson, 1 Thomp. Cases, 268. And, 9 Heisk., 310. In the Circuit Court the petition is
in a Court of Chancery, a petition for the writ will usually, but not always, entitled as of the original
lie to attack the record itself, and will, in such a
p
cause. The petition, however, being a new suit,

case, be given all the force of a hill to avoid or im- should be entitled as such, especially in Chancery.
peach a decree. Leftwicku. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310. See, Elliott v. McNairy, 1 Bax., 345. A
bill of re-
28 The better practice in Chancery is to give the view bears its own title.
1003 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. § 1258
to the end that said decree may, for said error of fact, be reversed and annulled; and he,
therefore, prays
1st. That your Honor, by proper fiat, will order this petition to be filed, and that notice
thereof be issued and served on the said, [naming the adverse party,] requiring him to make
defence at the next term of this Court and that your Honor's said fiat operate as a writ of
;
error coram nobis.

2d. That a writ of supersedeas be, also, ordered to be issued to stay all further proceedings
on said decree, [and said execution,] until further order of your Honor.
3d. That at the hearing hereof, said decree be recalled, reversed and annulled
4th. And that your petitioner may have all such other writs as may be necessary on a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis, and that he may have all such other, further, and
general relief as he may be entitled to by reason of the premises in a Court of Equity.
X Y, Solicitor. B, Petitioner. A
The following is another and more specific form29 of a
PETITION FOR A WRIT OP ERROR CORAM NOBIS:
To the Hon. W.
F. Cooper, Chancellor, holding the Chancery Court at Nashville
Pauline Wilber, a resident of Davidson county, petitioner, ]
vs. y No. 6842.
Lizzie Norris, a resident of the same county, defendant. J
Your petitioner, Pauline Wilber, a resident of Davidson county, respectfully shows to your
Honor
i.
That on the10th of April, 1871, a decree was pronounced against her, in the cause of Lizzie
Norris vs. Pauline Wilber, No. 6842, in your Honor's Court, in favor of said Lizzie Norris,
for the sum of two hundred dollars, and the costs of the cause. Petitioner is much aggrieved
by said decree, by reason of a material error of fact therein. Said decree was based upon a
bill taken pro confesso, and an alleged account for said sum, the account consisting of items
of goods, wares and merchandise, alleged to have been sold to petitioner by the complainant
in said cause. Petitioner denies that she, in law or equity, was ever liable for said account,
or for any part thereof. Petitioner is a married woman, living with her husband, George
Wilber, in the city of Nashville, and such of said items as were ever received by petitioner,
were for the family of which her husband is the head.
n.
Petitioner further shows that she never, at any time, promised to pay for any of said
items; and that many of them were never received, or. used by her. She shows and avers
that her husband has a good defence to the whole of said account, by reason of a cross ac-
count, or set-off, against the same, for work and labor done, and materials furnished for the
complainant.
in.
Petitioner further shows to your Honor that she would have made said defence to said
decree, but was prevented from so doing bv reason of the fact that she had no notice of the
proceedings in said cause, until the Sheriff came today with an execution to enforce said
decree; and that the return of the officer showing service of subpoena upon her is utterly
false, as she will be able abundantly to show, if given the opportunity. And petitioner
further shows that she was at the time said suit was brought, and has ever since been under
the disability of coverture, being a married woman, the wife of George Wilber, as before
stated, and would thereby have been prevented from making said defence, had notice of said
proceedings been given her.
IV.
Petitioner advised that had the foregoing facts appeared at the hearing of said cause,
is
no decree would have been pronounced against her; and that by reason of her said defence
on the merits not appearing in the proceedings, and because of said disability, and said want
of notice, she is entitled to a writ of error coram nobis, to have said decree recalled, reversed
and annulled, and she therefore prays
1st. That your Honor will, by proper fiat, order notice hereof to be served on said Lizzie
Norris, who lives at No. 983, Summer Street, Nashville, requiring her to make defence to this
petition at the next term; and that your Honor's said fiat shall stand and operate as a writ
of error coram nobis.
2d. That a writ of supersedeas be ordered to be issued to stay all further proceedings on
said decree, and on said execution, or else that a restraining order be made to the same end
and effect.
3d. That
at the hearing hereof said decree be recalled, reversed and annulled.
4th. that your petitioner may have all such writs as may be necessary on a petition
And
for a writ of error coram nobis; and may have all such other, further, and general relief, as
she may be entitled to in a Court of Equity, by reason of the premises.
29 This form is based upon the cases of Norris V. Wilber, 1 Bax., 365; and Leftwick «. Hamilton, 9
Heisk., 310.
§ 1259 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. 1004
And H a next friend for the petitioner be deemed necessary by your Honor, Frank Heart
hereby joins in this petition in that character and capacity; and he in his own proper person
avers on information and belief, that the foregoing facts are each and all true as hereinabove
alleged, and he adopts this petition as next friend of said Pauline Wilber. 30
W. M. Robertson, Solicitor. Pauline Wilber
State of Tennessee, \ Frank Heart.
County of Davidson.
Personally came Pauline Wilber and Frank Heart 31 and severally made oath that the state-
ments made in their foregoing petition as of their own knowledge are true, and those made
as on information and belief they believe to be true.
Sworn to and subscribed before]
me this July 5, 1876.
\
Pauline Wilber
John Jones, D. C. & M. J Frank Heart.
§ 1259. —
Proceedings Upon the Petition. The opposite party, or his Solic-
itor, will be personally served with notice of the filing of the petition if either
of them is a resident; if the opposite party be a non-resident, and have no
known Solicitor in the State, the Court, Chancellor, or Master, upon affidavit
of these facts, may order him to be notified by publication, as in other non-
resident cases. The notice must be served ten days prior to the term specified
in the notice, or the cause cannot be heard at that term without the consent of
the party entitled to notice. 32
The petition must contain the two following requisites First, it must show :
some error of fact which if it had appeared at the hearing would have been
a good defence, and would have prevented the decree complained of; and
second, it must show that the petitioner was prevented from making said
defence because (1) of want of notice, or (2) because of some disability, or (3)
because of some surprise, accident, mistake or fraud, without fault on his part.
show either of said two requisites, or if showing them it is
If the petition fail to
not filed within one year since the decree, it may be dismissed on motion. 33
The petition, however, may be amended on good cause shown, by affidavit,
the new facts to be sworn to on the personal knowledge of petitioner, or of
some other person acquainted with the facts. 34
MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION.
John Bell, 1
vs. r No. 682.

Henry Dunn. J
The defendant, Henry Dunn, moved the Court to dismiss the petition for a writ of error
coram nobis.
1st. Because said petition was not filed within one year from the rendition of the decree
complained of.
2d. Because the petition does not disclose a meritorious defence, the facts therein set up
not being such as would have prevented the decree complained of had they judicially ap-
peared at the hearing.
3d. Because the petition does not set up any sufficient reason for not making defence to
said decree.
And said motion having been argued by both the parties the Court is pleased to allow the
same, [or, to disallow the same.] It is therefore adiudged that said petition be dismissed,
that the decree complained of be affirmed, and that the petitioner. Henrv Dunn, and Frank
Hill, his prosecution surety, pay all the costs incident to said petition, for which execution
is awarded, \If a supersedeas issued render judgment on the bond therefor against the
sureties, for the amount of the decree superseded, statutory interest thereon, and costs of
35
the suit. ]
30 Being a married woman, it might be urged that the petition by an "agent" is a nullity. Reid v.
she must appear by next friend, and in Leftwick v. Hoffman, 6 Heisk., 440.
Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310, that practice was followed. 32 Code, 5§ 3113: 3115.
It is believed, however, that the Court would enter- 33 Gallena t>. Sudheimer, 9 Heisk., 189. This mo-
tain her petition without a next friend. The com- tion may be made at any term or time before issue
plainant having sued her without a next friend, is joined upon the errors assigned. Elliott v. Mc-
should be estopped to deny her a hearing should she Nairv. 1 T!ax., 342.
make her defence without a next friend. 34 Baxter V. Grandstaff, 3 Tenn. Ch., 244.
SI In Leftwick V. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 313, it was 35 In all cases of affirmance of the judgment, or
expressly decided that the next friend was the proper dismissal of the writ for any cause, where the orig-
person to swear to the petition. In Smith v. Repub- inal judgment has been superseded, judgment shall
lic L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch., 631, it was expressly be rendered against the plaintiff in error and his
decided that the oath of the next friend amounts to sureties for the amount of the former judgment,
nothing, and that the married woman must swear to with interest at the rate of twelve and one-half per
her bill. Therefore, to be safe, let both swear to cent, per annum from the rendition thereof, and all
the petition. See, ante, § 785, note 4. An affidavit to costs. Code, § 3114.
1005 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. §1260
If no motion to dismiss is made, the Court may direct petitioner to assign
errors according to the practice in the Circuit Court, or according to the rules
prescribed for that purpose. This assignment must follow, and be strictly con-
fined to, the errors specified in the petition. 36 The following assignment is
based on the preceding petition
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.
Pauline Wilber,
vs. No. 6842. —Assignment of Errors.
Lizzie Norris.
The petitioner, Pauline Wilber, assigns the following errors of fact in the decree com-
plained of, and avers that they are true
1. She was a married woman at the rendition of said decree, she being then the lawful
wife of George Wilber.
2. She had no notice of the proceedings in the cause wherein said decree was made.
3. She did not owe the account on which said decree was based, or any part thereof.
W. M. Robertson, Solicitor.
If the grounds alleged in the assignment for not making defence be insuffi-
cient, the opposite party may demur to them f
but as the questions raised by
such a demurrer have ordinarily been previously raised by a motion to dismiss
the petition, demurrers seldom lie. 38 If no ground of demurrer exists, the de-
fendant must plead to the assignment, if he dispute its truth. The following is
a form of a
PLEA TO THE ASSIGNMENT OE ERRORS:
Pauline Wilber,
vs. —
No. 6842. Plea to Assignment of Errors.
Lizzie Norris.
The defendant, Lizzie Norris, for plea to the assignment of errors in this case, says that
there is no error in the record, as in said assignment alleged. 39
R. H. McEwen, Solicitor.
§ 1260. Proper Practice in Chancery Upon a Petition. proceeding by —A
writ of error coram nobis is a proceeding according to the forms of the common
law; and nearly all of the cases in our Reports are cases at law. When the
Chancery Court was given jurisdiction in such cases by the Code of 1858, it
could not have been contemplated that the common law forms of pleading
should be used by this Court. It has been adjudicated it was not so contem-
plated by the Act of 1877 increasing the jurisdiction of this Court. 40 Neverthe-
less, when suits of this character began to be brought in Chancery, under the
Code of 1858, Solicitors, without considering the difference between the forms
of procedure in the two Courts, and unduly influenced by the History of a
Lawsuit, adopted the practice and pleading in use in the law Gourts. Not until
the case of Leftwick v. Hamilton, 41 was the attention of Solicitors and Chan-
cellors called to the difference of procedure when such a suit is instituted in
Chancery. In that case the petition is dealt with as a bill to avoid a decree.
This is the solution of all the many perplexities, inconsistencies, and incongrui-
42 Chancery cherishes forms
ties exhibited in the reported cases in Chancery.
no further than they contribute to the main object of its existence the at- —
tainment of substantial justice. 43
The proper practice in Chancery in these suits is to regard the petition as in
36 Elliott «. McNairy, 1 Bax., 342; Gallena v. 40 Chan. 97; Jackson ». Nimmo. 3 Lea, 597.
Sudhcimer, 9 Heisk., 190. 41 9 Heisk.. 310. Chancellor Cnoper, afterwards
37 Memphis C. S. Institution v. Hargan, 9 Heisk., one of the Judges of the Sunreme Court, calls atten-
^
496; Urton v. Phillips, 11 Hrisk.. 215. tion to the irregularity of this proceeding when in-
88 Gallena v. Sudheimer, 9 Heisk., 189. stituted in Chancery. Boiling v. Anderson, 1 Tenn.
39 If the assignment should be submitted to a jury, Ch., 131.
it might be necessary to frame issues of fact, as 42 In Boiling v. Anderson, 1 Tenn: Ch., 127, both
follows: Solicitor and Chancellor seemed groping in dark-
1st. Was Pauline Wilber a married woman at the ness See. also, Coltart «. Ha-n. 2 Tenn. Ch.. 356.
time the decree complained of was made? In Hicks' Manual of Ch. Pr., §5 333-334. the novelty
2d. Did she have notice of the proceedings in and confusion of transferring the practice and plead-
which said decree was made? ing, at law to the Chancery Court is alluded to, and
3d. Did she. at the time of said decree, owe the the road of escape suggested.
account on which said decree was based? or, any 43 Bird^nne. ". Hirdsnng, 2 Head, 301. See, ante,
part of said amount? if any part, how much in '§§43; 269; 431; 681; 719.
amount ?
§1261 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. 1006
the nature of a bill to impeach, avoid, or review,* a decree on some one or more
4
of the grounds specified in the statute authorizing this writ. 45 On such a peti-
tion being filed, subpoena to answer it should be issued, or publication made
when necessary, 46 and the defendant to the petition should make to it the same
defences, and make them at the same time and in the same manner as bills are
defended against, to-wit: by motion to dismiss, demurrer, plea in bar or an-
swer 47 and upon such defence the Court should make such order or decree as
;
is proper in law and Equity according to the course of procedure in the Chan-
cery Court. 48
If the case is not tried at the first term, the defendant may, on a sworn
answer, denying the facts alleged in the petition, move the Court to discharge
the supersedeas. If the motion be allowed the defendant must give a refunding
bond with good security to perform the decree, in case the suit should be event-
ually decided in favor of the petitioner. 49
§ 1261. —
Hearing and Decree. The parties would be entitled to the same
time for taking their proof as upon an original bill. When the case is pre-
pared for a hearing, either party may demand a jury as in other suits, and in
such an event the issues of fact will be made up as usual under the direction
of the Court. 50
At the hearing, if the reason assigned for not making defence to the decree
complained of be not satisfactorily proved, the petition will be dismissed; or
if such reason be proved, but the defence on the merits be not proved,
51 the
petition will be dismissed. In all cases where the original decree has been su-
perseded, if the petition is dismissed, or if the original decree is affirmed on any
ground, a decree must be rendered against the petitioner and his sureties on the
supersedeas bond for the amount of the original decree, with interest thereon
at the rate of twelve and one-half per cent, from the rendition thereof, and
all costs. 52
44 A writ of error coram nobis in the Chancery The Code, contemplating, probably, the difference
Court equivalent to an original bill in the nature
is of practice and pleading in the two Courts, has pro-
of a billof review. Willis V. Willis, 20 Pick., 382, vided that the Court may prescribe rules for the
citing the above section of this book, then § 1092. assignment of errors, for making issues thereon, and
45 Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310. The Code for all such other matters as are necessary to give
authorizes process, § 3115; shows that a sworn an- full effect to this proceeding. Code, §3115; Hicks'
swer may be filed, § 3118'; terms the petitioner the Ch. Pr., § 338. A Chancellor no more needs an
plaintiff in error, § 3114; and the opposite party the assignment of errors and an issue of fact upon them,
defendant, §3115. In Elliott v. McNairy, 1 Bax„ when a petition of this sort is filed, than he does
342, the proceeding, is declared to be not a step in when any other petition or any original bill is filed.
the original' cause, but a new suit commenced to Should a jury be demanded to try the issues raised
reverse a former judgment on the grounds set forth by the petition and answer, then, and only then,
in the petition. This is the precise purpose of a would it be proper for the Court to order issues to
bill to impeach or avoid a decree. be made up. Code, § 3115.
46 Code, §3115. This section does not, in any 48 The case of Isler v. Turner, 7 Hum., 116, was
way, restrict the general authority of the Chancery a bill in Equity in the nature of a writ of error
Court, or its Clerk and Master, to order publication coram nobis. The case of Douglas V. Joyner, 1 Bax.,
as to a defendant in any case where it would be 32, was in substance, purpose, and effect, a pro-
_
proper on an original bill. This section shows that ceeding in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis,
process may issue on the petition being filed. under the form of a bill in Chancery. The case of
47 In Leftwick v. Hamilton, 9 Heisk., 310, Tur- Hicks v. Haywood, 4 Heisk., 598, fully sustains the
ney, then Judge, afterwards Chief Justice, speaks text. In this case, the proceeding was by petition,
of the petition as "making up an issue of fact, and after execution had issued on the decree complained
of the "allegations of the petition tendering a ques- of. The petition was answered and on the issue
tion of fact." By adhering to the Chancery prac- thus made proof was taken. It is true, the petition
tice, and treating the petition for a writ of error was dismissed, but it was dismissed on the merits.
coram nobis as in the nature of a bill, and making Chief Justice Nicholson, in delivering the opinion of
defence thereto by motion to dismiss, demurrer, plea the Court, treated the petition as a petition for a
in bar, or answer, each party is enabled to present writ of error coram nobis, although the petition it-
his case without embarrassment, and the Chancellor self did not so pray, but did pray for a supersedeas.
can pass Upon all the questions raised at one hear- The case was heard on the merits, the practice by
ing, and complete and speedy justice be done. Why bill and answer was clearly recognized, and if the
import into the Chancery Court the formal assign- merits had been with the petitioner, he would have
ment of errors, demurrers to such assignment, and been granted relief.
pleas to the assignment, when every legal or equit- 49 Code, 5 3118.
able question can be raised on the petition by motion so Code, '§§ 3115; 4468.
to dismiss, demurrer, plea in bar, or answer? The 61 The burden of proving his reason for not de-
assignment of errors is necessary in the Circuit fending against the original bill will rest upon the
Court in order to reduce the matters in the petition petitioner; but the burden of making out his case,
down to particular points on which issues can be it would seem, should rest upon the complainant in
taken for the action of a jury; Crawford v. Wil- the original cause, for the original decree, once
liams, 1 Swan, 341; just as issues of fact are made opened, would seem to lose all its force.
up in Chancery when a jury is demanded there upon 52 Code, § 3114.
an original bill.
1007 WRITS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS. § 1261
If, on the other hand, the petitioner makes out his case substantially as set
forth in his petition, the original decree will be recalled, reversed and annulled
and the costs thereof adjudged against the complainant in that decree. 53 The
costs incident to the petition may be adjudged as the Chancellor, in his discre-
tion, may deem equitable.
The petitioner may
succeed in opening the decree, and yet he may, in Chan-
cery, be adjudged complainant in a sum less than the
liable to the original
amount of the original decree. In such a case, the original decree will be
modified accordingly; but only simple interest upon it will be allowed, and
the costs of the original cause may be divided, if deemed equitable. As he who
seeks equity must do equity, the Chancellor may, while granting relief to the
petitioner, require him to submit to such a decree in favor of the original com-
plainant as may be equitable. And in general, when the original decree is once
opened, the Court may pronounce such a decree upon the whole record as
may be required by the rules and principles of Courts of Equity.
63 Anderson v. Hagge, 3 Shan. Cas., 672.
§1262 APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. 1008
CHAPTER LXXI.
APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT.
§ 1262. Office and Effect of an Appeal. § 1266. An Appeal in the Nature of a Writ
§ 1263. Who
May Appeal. of Error.
§ 1263a. To What Court the Appeal Must be § 1267. Differences Between an Appeal and
Taken. an Appeal in the Nature of a Writ
§ 1264. When and How an Appeal is Ob- of Error.
tained. § 1268. Appeal Bond, or Oath in Lieu.
§ 1265. What Decrees May be Appealed § 1269. Practical Suggestions Concerning
From. Appeals.
§ 1262. Office and Effect of an Appeal. —

The object of an appeal is to enable
a party dissatisfied with the Chancellor's rulings, orders, and final decree, to
have the cause reheard and redetermined by an appellate Court, upon all the
matters of law and fact appearing in the record and where an appeal has been ;
prayed, granted, and perfected, and the term ended, or the thirty days elapsed,
the cause is thereupon transferred from the Chancery to the appellate Court, 1
and the jurisdiction of the Chancellor ended. 2 But at all times during the term,
if within thirty days after its entry, the decree is under the control of the
Court; and may, during that period, be modified, or even vacated; or the order
granting an appeal may, during the same period, be vacated, or modified. 3
So, during that period, a final decree and a prayer and a grant of an appeal
therefrom may all be set aside, and an interlocutory order made in the cause,
and thereafter the final decree, prayer, and appeal be re-entered. 4
The office of an appeal is to transfer the adjudication of the cause to the
appellate Court, 6 to the end that the appellant may have a re-examination in
that Court of the whole matter of law and of fact appearing in the record.
An appeal absolutely devitalizes a decree as an adjudication, and confers
full jurisdiction on the appellate Court to deal with the cause as though no de-
cree had ever been pronounced. 7 Nevertheless, the inanimate decree is in
the record, and may, by order of the appellate Court, or the consent of both
parties, or the act or neglect of the appellant, be revitalized, in whole or in
part. 8
1 Code, § 3155; Morris v. Richardson, 11 Hum., renders the decree of the Chancellor absolutely in-
389; and cases there cited. operative, except in so far as it is a lien upon the
2 Upon a prayer for, and grant of, an appeal, and defendant's realty.
the execution of the appeal bond, and the rise of the It is generally said that an appeal vacates, annuls,
Court, that Court has no longer any jurisdiction of or makes void, the decree of the Chancerv Court
the cause. The appellant cannot even thereafter dis- Furber v. Carter. 2 Sneed. 1; Maskall v. Maskall. 3
miss his appeal in that Court. Whatever is there- Sneed, 208; Gallena v. Sudheimer, 9 Heisk., 189.
after done in the cause must be done in the appellate This language, however, is too broad, as will appear
Court. Freeman v. Henderson. 5 Cold., 547. from the following considerations: 1. The appellate
s Timmons v. Garrison, 4 Hum., 148 Abbott v.
; Court affirms, modifies, or reverses the decree below;
Fagg 1 Heisk., 742. and a decree that has been vacated and annulled by
4 Hal! V. Bewley, 11 Hum., 106; Merrill 17. Elam, an appeal, cannot be affirmed, modified, or reversed.
2 Tenn. Ch., 513. In this latter case, a receiver See Code, §§ 3165; 3167; 2. The apnellant may dis-
was appointed upon the interlocutory order. miss his appeal, in which case the decree appealed
o The appeal is to the present term of the appellate from at once revives, and becomes poss p ssed of full
Court, if in session, if not then to the next term. vigor. Maskall v. Maskall. 3 Sneed. 208; Franklin
Pond v. Trieg. 5 Heisk., 532. v. Franklin, 2 Swan, 561; Stone v. Huggins. 1 Shan.
6 Code, S 3155. Formerly the original papers in a Cas., 564; which could not happen if the decree be
cause in Chanrery were, on appeal, transmitted to annulled, or made void, hy the appeal; 3. The appel-
the Supreme Court. Acts of 1822, ch. 14. And on late Court may affirm the decree when the appel-
an appeal, the Supreme Court heard the cause on lant fails to bring up the record after appeal granted,
these original papers, as though it had originated in and the appellee brings it up, and moves for an
that Court. affirmance. Thomas v. Railroad, 15 Lea, 533; 4.
The right of appeal was first given bv the Act of The decree, notwithstanding the appeal, continues to
1819. ch. 31. McEffie n. Shirley, Mart & Yerg 299. , be a lien on the debtor's land. Arts nf 1885, ch. 21;
7 Butler v. B. & L. Association, 13 Pick.. 688, cit- and if the decree below is affirmed, this lien becomes
ing the above section of this book, then 5 1094. effective from its date; 5. The decree will be af-
8 The appellate Court re-examines, not only the firmed without examination of the record, if the
decree appealed from, but, also, the whole record, to appellant fail to assign errors. Supreme Court
see whether the Chancery Court committed any re-
versible error at any stage of the cause. An appeal [See the next page for the remainder of this note.']
1009 APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. § 1263
If a party is dissatisfied with only a part of the decree, he may appeal from
such part only, expressly limiting his appeal to such part. Often a suit is
divisible in its nature, or may contemplate different objects, or seek relief
against different defendants, and the complainant may obtain part of the relief
he seeks, or may obtain a recovery against some of the defendants. In such a
case he may appeal from so much only of the decree as denies him the remain-
der of the relief he sought. 9 And so, if a defendant be dissatisfied with a part
only of a decree, he may confine his appeal to such part. 10
§ 1263. —
Who May Appeal. Any one or more of the parties to an appeal-
able judgment or decree of the Chancery Court may pray and obtain an ap-
peal. 11 Indeed, all parties, both complainant and defendant, may, and often
do, appeal from a Chancery decree. And what is meant by parties is not only
all persons who appear as complainants and defendants on the face of the bill,
or the cross bill, including guardians ad litem and next friends of minors, but
also, lia all quasi parties. Quasi parties include: 1, persons who file petitions
or claims in a cause; 12 2, persons who purchase property at a Master's or com-
missioner's sale; 13 3, persons who become the sureties of purchasers; 4, persons
who become record assignees of such purchasers 14 5, persons held liable on
;
garnishment proceeding; 15 6, persons who set up claims to the property in

litigation by intervening in the suit; 7, persons against whom judgment is ren-
dered for whatsoever cause and 8, persons who sought to become parties, or
;
sought an adjudication which was denied.

§ 1263a. To What Court the Appeal Must be Taken.—Appeals from the
Chancery Court lie to either the Supreme Court, or to the Court of Civil Ap-
15a
peals. If the case involves an amount, exclusive of costs, exceeding one
thousand dollars, or involves the constitutionality of a statute of the State, or
a contested election for office, or the State revenue, or is an ejectment suit, the
appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court; but appeals from the Chancery
Court in all other cases must be taken to the Court of Civil Appeals, as herein-
after shown.
§ 1264. When and How an Appeal is Obtained. An appeal must be prayed —
during the term at which the decree complained of was entered on the minutes,
and if more than thirty days elapse after the decree is rendered, and before
the term ends, an appeal must be prayed within thirty days after the decree. 1 "
And not only must an appeal be prayed within the period stated, but it must
be perfected within that period; unless the Court within that period grants
Rules, § 29; 1 Pick., 757; Denton v. Woods, 2 Pick., appeal, and thus the costs of the appeal be greatly
37; Wood v. Frazier, 2 Pick., 500; 5 Pick., 774-775; reduced.
6. The very fact that the Supreme Court rules re- 11 Code, § 3159.
quire errors to be assigned conclusively shows that lia Loftis i'. Loftis, 10 Pick., 232.
the decree appealed from has such latent efficacy 12 Bibb V. Tarkington, 2 Lea, 21; Ewing V. Maury,
that, unless affirmatively shown to be erroneous, 't 3 Lea, 389.
will be affirmed. If the decree be "vacated," "an- 13 Newland V. Gaines, 1 Heisk., 720; Eagan v.
nulled," and "made void," by an appeal, the burden Phister, 5 Sneed, 298.
in the appellate Court would rest upon the complain- 14 Newland v. Gaines, 1 Heisk., 720.
ant; whereas, in practice, it rests upon the appellant. is Code, § 3492.
Wood V. Frazier, 2 Pick., 500. See, also, Smith V. 15a The "amount involved" is the amount sued
St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch., 509; 7. Under for, and not the amount allowed by the Chancellor in
the present practice an appeal only challenges the his decree. See note 5 to § 26, ante. If property,
correctness of the decree, and if the appellant fail not money, is sued for, the value of the property as
to make good his challenge the decree stands. In stated in the bill, if stated, or as shown by the proof,
the appellate Court, it is the appeal that is prose- would be the "amount involved." If no particular
cuted, not the suit. Stone v. Huggins. 1 Shan. Cas., amount over fifty dollars is sued for, as in case of a
564. On the' effect of an appeal, see Suges v. Suggs, suit for an accounting, the amount allowed by the
1 Tenn. (Overt.), 3, note; and on the difference be- decree appealed from would be the "amount in-
tween an appeal and an appeal in the nature of a volved." If there be no way to fix the "amount in-
writ of error, see, post, '§ 1267, and Smith v. Holmes, volved," the appeal will lie to the Court of Civil
12 Heisk., 466. Appeals, as it, ordinarily, will in suits for divorce
9 Gilchrist it. Cannon, 1 Cold., 581. But if he where the alimony claimed is less than one thousand
prays a broad appeal from the entire decree, the dollars, and in suits for a mandamus, a quo warranto,
whole case will be subject to review. Wood V. and for relief purely injunctive.
Cooper, 2 Heisk., 454; Caldwell v. Hodsden, 1 Lea, 16 M. & C. Railroad v. Johnson, 16 Lea, 387. This
45. thirty day provision applies exclusively to those
10 In cases of a limited appeal, the record to be Courts whose terms continue longer than thirty days.
sent up to the appellate Court may, by consent, be In all other Courts, the appeal must be prayed and
limited, accordingly, to such matters as are neces- perfected, or time to give bond obtained, before rhe
sary to fully present the questions raised by the term ends.
§1265 APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. 1010
further time within which to give the appeal bond, or take the pauper oath, in
which case the bond or oath must be filed strictly within the time granted. 17
In strict practice, a party is not entitled to an appeal unless 1, the decree :
he complains of is one from which an appeal will lie as a matter of right; 2,

unless the appeal is prayed during the period when the Court has the right to
grant it and 3, unless a proper appeal bond, or pauper oath in lieu, is tendered
;
with the prayer. The Court will, however, generally allow some time, not
exceeding thirty days, in which to give an appeal bond, but in such case the
bond must be filed in the time so given, or the right to the appeal will lapse. 18
Adecree rendered at a former term cannot be appealed from at a subsequent
term even when some order is made in the cause intended to carry into effect
the former decree. 19
It is not enough to pray for an appeal: an appeal must be both prayed for
and granted. 20 A
prayer without a grant, and a grant without a prayer, are
equally ineffectual either to oust the Chancery Court of its jurisdiction, or to
vest jurisdiction in the appellate Court. To put the Chancellor in error for
refusing to grant an appeal when the party praying therefor is thereunto en--
titled, he must not only pray an appeal in open Court, within the thirty days
after decree, but he must, also, tender a proper appeal bond, or proper pauper
oath. The following is a form of a
PRAYER FOR AN APPEAL.
From which decree [and from all former decrees made in this cause at the present term]
the defendant [or complainant.] prays an appeal to the [present, 21 or,] next term of the
Supreme Court at Nashville, [Knoxvilte or Jackson;] and he having tendered a sufficient
1
appeal bond, said bond is filed and the appeal granted; [or which appeal is granted upon his
giving a sufficient appeal bond, or taking the pauper oath and ten (twenty or thirty) days
:
are allowed him in which to file said bond, or take said oath.]
PRAYER FOR A LIMITED APPEAL.
From so much
of said decree as adjudges that complainant is not entitled to [specify
ivhat the Court denied him] the complainant prays an) appeal [&c, as above. If the defend-
ant appeals, then say: From so much of said decree as adjudges that the defendant is liable
for (specifying what) the defendant prays an appeal, &c, as above.]
§ 1265. What Decrees May be Appealed From. An appeal may be had in —

Chancery either when allowed by the Chancellor in cases subject to his discre-
tion, or when obtained as a matter of right.
Appeals as a Matter of Discretion. 22 The Chancellor may, in his discretion,
1.
allow an appeal 1, from a decree determining the principles involved and or-
:
dering an account, or a sale or partition before the account is taken, or the sale
or partition is made or 2, he may allow an appeal on overruling a demurrer
;
or 3, he may allow any party to appeal from a decree which settles his right,
although the case may not be disposed of as to others. 23 An appeal by the
complainant will not lie, however, from a decree dismissing the bill on demur-
rer as to some of the defendants 24 but it will lie on application of a defendant
;
whose demurrer has been overruled, the cause remaining in the Chancery
Court as to the other defendants. 25
17 Halev. Parmley, 1 Thomp. Cases, 45; Snyder Court, the Chancellor should consider whether it
v. Summers, 1 Lea, 481. would not be well to allow an appeal. On the other
18 In such a case, however, a writ of error may hand, if another term of his Court will come before
be obtained. the sitting of the appellate Court, he should consider
19 Caldwell V. Hodsden, 1 Lea, 45. In this case, whether it would not be better to have the case pre-
the appeal was from the order then made, and from pared at his next term for a final decree, so that on
all the decrees and orders made in this case thereto- appeal it may be terminated. Where an appeal lies
fore. in the discretion of the Chancellor, a grant of an
20 Vanvabry V. Staton, 4 Pick., 351. appeal without more will be held to be an exercise of
21 If the appellate Court be in session when the this discretion. Harrison r. Farnsworth, 1 Heisk.,
appeal is prayed the appeal must be to the present 751; Andrews v. Warner, 3 Pick., 1; and Younger
term. Pond v. Trigg, 5 Heisk., 532. v. Younger, 6 Pick., 25.
22 In Abbott v. Fagg, appeals are divided into (1) 24 Hunter v. Gardenhire, 10 Lea, 87; Peters r.
appeals as a matter of favor, and (2) appeals as a Neely. 16 Lea, 280.
matter of right. 1 Heisk., 748. 25 Sigler v. Vaughn, 11 Lea,
131. This case, in
23 Code, §3157. This discretion should generally effect, overrules Mosby r. Hunt, 7 Lea, 82, in which
be so exercised as to terminate the case as speedily case it_ was held to be an improper exercise of his
as possible, and at the least expense. Hence, if the discretion for a Chancellor to grant such an appeal.
appellate Court meets before another term of his See, also, Barksdale r. Butler. 6 Lea, 450.
Appeals as a Matter of Right lie only from
2. Any party dis- final decrees. 20
satisfied with such a decree may appeal from it. A decree is final when it so
disposes of the cause that nothing remains to be done, but to issue the final
process awarded. When a decree decides and disposes of the whole merits of
the cause, and reserves on its face no further questions or directions for the
future judgment of the Court, so that it will not be necessary to bring the case
again before the Court for a decision, it is a final decree, 27 even though it omits
to adjudicate the costs, or to award an execution in case of a money recovery. 28
A decree which, although determining the principles involved, orders an ac-
count, or orders a sale or partition of land, is not final, because the account or
sale or partition will require the further action of the Court and much less is ;
an order or ruling final, which is made in the progress of a cause, prior to a

decree determining the principles involved in the litigation.
No appeal will lie, even by consent of the Chancellor and of the parties, 29
from an interlocutory order or ruling, such as 1, orders granting, dissolving, :
or modifying, injunctions or attachments 30 2, orders appointing, removing, or ;
instructing, receivers, or refusing so to do 3, orders allowing, or refusing to ;
allow, amendments of any sort, either to pleadings, or other proceedings; 4,

orders in reference to the giving of prosecution, injunction, attachment, or
other bonds; 5, orders granting or refusing leave to take further proof; 6,
orders sustaining or overruling exceptions to reports, or to any other action
of the Master 31 7, orders disallowing motions to dismiss bills or petitions 32
; ;
8, orders allowing or disallowing pleas 9, orders allowing or refusing a decree

;
pro confesso; 10, orders setting aside, or refusing to set aside, a decree pro
confesso 11, orders refusing or allowing a new trial by jury 12, orders allow-
;
;
ing or refusing a reference to the Master, before any decree determining the
principles involved 33 13, nor from any other order that is interlocutory, except
;
an order overruling a demurrer. 34 Nor will an appeal lie from an order in-
tended to carry into effect a decree not appealed from 35 nor from a judgment ;
for contempt in the presence of the Court 36 nor from an order, in a suit by the ;
37
State, directing funds in litigation to be deposited in the State treasury.
The aim of the law is to allow all parties a fair opportunity to have all the
errors to their prejudice revised on one appeal, and one only. To allow appeals
from every ruling of the Chancellor from the beginning of the suit to the final
decree would be to absolutely clog the wheels of justice suits would become ;
interminable, the appellate Courts would be overwhelmed by an avalanche of

petty appeals on insignificant matters and the delays would amount to a prac-
;
tical denial of justice. For this reason, neither writs of error, nor appeals of
right, will be entertained by the appellate Courts to revise any interlocutory
order, proceeding, or decree, even though the parties themselves acquiesce in
the appeal or writ of error. A party is entitled to only one hearing, in any one
•
cause, to have the errors therein corrected and he is not entitled to, and will ;
not be allowed, several appeals or writs of error, at several times, in the same
cause, to have the supposed errors therein revised and corrected. He must
26 Meek v. Mathis, 1 Heisk., 540. Younger r. 28 See, ante, § 576, note 5.
As to final decrees, see, 29 See Gibson V. Widener, 1 Pick., 16.
Younger, 6 Pick., 25.
ante, §§572-573; 575-576.
sojacobi v, Schloss, 7 Cold., 385; Foley v. Leath,
27 Pond v. Trigg, 5 Heisk., 539. In Abbott v. 3 Shan. Cas., 353.
31 Porter v. Burton, 10 Heisk., 584; Barton v.
Fagg, 1 Heisk., 747, it was held that the cases de-
•
cided before the Code are not safe guides in deter- Turley, 11 Lea, 600.
32 Kernodle v. Tatum, 4 Heisk., 312.
mining what decrees are so final that an appeal will
that an ap- 83 Porter V. Burton, 10 Heisk., 584; Brandon v.
lie from them as a matter of right; and
peal as a matter of right will not lie until after an
Crouch, 11 Heisk., 605; Chestnut v. McBride, 6 Bax.,
account is taken, or a sale or partition made, al- 93; Andrew Johnson's Estate, 9 Lea, 625.
34 Code, § 3157; Sigler v. Vaughn, 11 Lea, 131.
though the decree ordering the account, sale, or par-
determine all the principles involved, and 36 Pond v. Trigg, 5 Heisk., 532.
tition,
36 Brizendine v. State, 19 Pick., 677.
settle all the matters and questions in controversy,
arising from the account, sale, or parti- 37 Code, §§ 3508-3509, (M. & V.,) Acts of 1873,
except those
tion. The object of this statute, Code, § 3157, was ch. 78.
to give but one appeal as a matter of right.

Hume
v. Commercial Bank, 1 Lea, 220.
§ 1266 '
APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. 1012
wait until a final decree before he appeals as a matter of right, or takes a writ
of error. 38
The distinction between interlocutory and final decrees has been fully con-
sidered in the Chapter on Decrees. 39
When issues of fact are made up on demand of either party, and tried by a
jury according to the forms of a Court of law, errors therein cannot be cor-
rected by appeal, but must be corrected by an appeal in the nature of a writ of
error. 40 But errors in divorce cases can be corrected by an appeal only. 41
§ 1266. —
An Appeal in the Nature of a Writ of Error. When a cause is tried
by the Chancellor alone upon written proofs, the party dissatisfied with his
decree must take an appeal but if the cause is tried by a jury, on issues of
;
fact, the party dissatisfied with the decree based on the jury's verdict must
take an appeal in the nature of a writ of error. 42 This is a remedy purely
statutory, and is intended to operate as a writ of error and supersedeas would
at common law. 43 An appeal in the nature of a writ of error may be had
from a decree in Chancery, upon the same terms and subject to the same regu-
lations as an appeal. 44 The bond required from the appellant, and the pro-
ceedings in the appellate Court upon an appeal in the nature of a writ of error,
are also the same as in case of an appeal. 45
The effect of an appeal in the nature of a writ of error is quite different from
that of a simple appeal. An appeal practically abrogates and annuls the decree
appealed from, and absolutely devitalizes it as an adjudication; whereas an
appeal in the nature of a writ of error leaves the decree intact, but wholly sus-
pends its operation and activity until the appellate Court passes on the objec-
tions made to it by the appellant. 46 On an appeal, the complainant continues
to be the complainant, and the burden rests upon him of satisfying the appellate
Court that the decree appealed from is substantially correct 47 whereas an ap- ;
peal in the nature of a writ of error is a new suit, and the appellant, whether
complainant or defendant below, becomes a plaintiff in the appellate Court,
and on him rests the burden of showing that the decree complained of is erron-
eous in some substantial matter. 48
In practice, however, the distinction between an appeal, and an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, from decrees in Chancery, is not rigorously observed
and if a party pray an appeal when he should have prayed an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, or vice versa, the appellate Court will probably treat
the cause as though brought up by a proper prayer, if the bond is in proper
form. 49 And now, inasmuch as the rules of practice in the appellate Courts re-
quire errors to be assigned in cases brought there by a simple appeal, as well
as in cases brought there by appeal in the nature of a writ of error, the burden
of the argument in each set of cases is practically the same, because all decrees
are deemed prima facie correct, 50 and the appellant is required to point out the
errors in all decrees of which he complains. 51
38 Porter v. Burton, 10 Heisk., 584; Hume V. Com- so See Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Insurance Co.,
mercial Bank, 1 Lea, 220; Barksdale v. Butler, 6 Lea, 3 Tenn. Ch., S09.
454; Tohnson's Estate, 9 Lea, 625. 51 Sup. Court Rule, 20; S Pick., 775, Wood r. Fra-
30 See, ante, §§ 572-576. zier, 2 Pick., 500. Prior to the Act of 1819, ch. 21,
40 Code, § 3156. decrees in Chancery could be reviewed in the Su-
41 Code, § 3158. But a writ of error will lie as preme Court only bv writ of error, or by an appeal
to the alimony. McBee v. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558. in the nature of a writ of error, in neither of which
42 Code, §5 3156; 3172; 3174. If the cause is cases could any facts be considered except those ap-
tried by the Chancellor, on oral proof, by consent of pearing in the decree itself, the evidence in the case
parties, in lieu of a jury, it must be taken to the not being otherwise reviewable. McEffie V. Shirley,
appellate Court by an appeal in the nature of a writ Mart. & Yerg., 299. The evidence then was mainly
of error. oral. But by the Act of 1822, ch. 14, on appeals the
43 Banks v. Brown, 4 Yerg., 198; Thomasson t>. original papers, including the depositions, were de-
Kercheval, 10 Hum., 322. livered by the Clerk and Master to the Clerk of
44 Code, § 3172. the Supreme Court to be read by the Tudges thereof,
45 Code, § 3175. Car. & Nich., 220. By the Act of 1835, ch. 20, all
46 Smith V. Holmes, 12 Heisk., 466; Akers V. depositions and exhibits, read at the hearing in the
Akers. 16 Lea. 7. Chancery Court, were made a part of the record ; and
47 The appellate Court may, by rule, devolve this since then the difference between an appeal and an
burden on the party taking the appeal. appeal in the nature of a writ of error has practically
48 Maskall v. Maskall, 3 Sneed, 208. ceased to exist, the power of the Supreme Court to
40 Bell v. Brown, 5 Yerg., 107. review the facts being the same in each case.
§ 1267. Difference Between an Appeal and an Appeal in the Nature of a
Writ of Error. —
In addition to the differences stated in the preceding section,
a simple appeal is the proper remedy in all cases tried strictly according to the
forms of the Chancery Court but where an issue of fact has been made upon
;
demand of either party, and passed upon by a jury, according to the forms of
the Circuit Court, there an appeal in the nature of a writ of error is the proper
remedy to correct the decree based on the action of the jury. 52 Where a case
is tried by the Chancellor according to the forms of the Chancery Court, an ap-
peal opens up the whole case, and the appellate Court determines it as though
it had been originally instituted in that Court, pronouncing a final decree, if
proper, and enforcing it by the necessary final process. Where, however, there
has been a trial by jury on the demand of either party, 53 and an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, the appellate Court, if of opinion that there was a
proper ground for a new trial, cannot go on and pronounce a final decree, but
must remand the cause to the end that a new trial by jury may be had. 54
§ 1268. —
Appeal Bond, or Oath in Lieu. Before a party is entitled to an
appeal, or an appeal in the nature of a writ of error, he must tender a sufficient
appeal bond, or a pauper oath in lieu, when such oath is allowed by the Court.
If the decree is for a specific sum of money and against the party in his own
right, 55 the appeal bond must be for the amount of the decree and damages and
costs, 56 but in all other eases a bond for costs only is sufficient. 57 Where, how-
ever, real estate is ordered to be sold to enforce a vendor's lien, a mortgage, or
trust deed, or a partition, or for maintenance or reinvestment, and the owner
prays and obtains an appeal, he shall only be required to execute a bond to pay
the costs in both Courts. 58
APPEAL BOND.
We, Frank Bright and George Friend, acknowledge ourselves indebted to Victor Mann
in the sum of [the amount of the decree, damages and costs.]
But this obligation to be void if the said Frank Bright, who has prayed an appeal to the
next term of the Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] at Knoxville from a decree
rendered against him in favor of the said Victor Mann by the Chancery Court at Murfrees-
boro, at its June term, 1891, shall pay and satisfy the amount of the debt, 59 damages and
costs, the said Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] may adjudge against him, in
the cause.
(To be dated, signed, witnessed, and Med.)
A
party cannot, however, obtain an appeal on the pauper oath unless the
Court expressly so allows. If the appeal is granted upon a bond being given,
and time is allowed in which to give such bond, the Clerk has no authority
under such an order to accept the pauper oath in lieu of the bond required;
and should he accept such oath, the appeal will be dismissed in the appellate
Court on motion, for want of an appeal bond. 60 In fact, unless the bond is filed,
or other condition upon which the appeal is granted complied with, there is no
appeal, and the jurisdiction of the appellate Court does not attach.
Pauper oaths for appeals to the appellate Courts can readily be framed by
reference to the forms given in sections 182-183, and to the forms following
PAUPER OATH FOP. AN APPEAL.
County of \
I, John Doe, do solemnly swear that I am a resident of said State, and that, owing to my.
52 Code, §§ 3156; 3174. So, also, where the Chan- i'. Smith, 2 Shan. Cas., 132; Curry v. Wright, 5
cellor sits as a jury, by consent of parties, and de- Heisk., 612; Crawford V. Life Ins. Co., 12 Heisk.,
termines issues of fact on oral evidence. 154. .
53 If the trial by jury is for the information of 58 Code, § 3164 a. Watkins v. Land Co., 7 Pick.,
the Court, and not on demand of either party, the 683. This section does not apply to attachment cases.
rule would probably be different. Staub v. Williams, 1 Lea. 123; but does to mechanics'
54 Code. §3156; 4469. See, ante, 8 552. lien cases. Kinsey V. Stanton, 6 Bax., 92.
55 Administrators, executors, guardians, trustees, 59 If the decree be not for a specific sum of money,
and other fiduciaries, against whom decrees are ren- or not against the party- in his own right, the bond
dered as such, not holding them personally liable, will be for costs only. Code, §§ 3162-31-63, and the
may aopeal upon giving a bond to pay the costs in Art of 1905, ch. 89, do not apply to appeals in
the appellate Court. Terry v. Stukely, 3 Yerg., 506. Chancery.
56 Code, § 3164. 60 Henly V. Claiborne, 1 Lea, 224; Mowry V. Da-
57 Insurance Co. v. Van, 1 Shan. Cas., 443; Smith venport, 6 Lea, 82; Walsh v. Crooks, 7 Pick., 390.
§ 1269 APPEALS IN THE CHANCERY COURT. 1014
poverty, I am
not able to bear the expenses of an appeal by me prayed to the next term of the
Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] at Knoxville, [or, Nashville, or Jackson,] from
a decree of the Chancery Court of said county, rendered on the. ...day of 19...., [against ,
me and in favor of Richard Roe, 01 ] and that I am justly entitled to the relief sought.
John Doe.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this .... day of , 19
O. K., C. & M.
PAUPER OATH BY NEXT FRIEND FOR AN APPEAL.
State of Tennessee,
County of _
I, John Doe, as next friend of Mary Den, a married woman, [or infant,] do solemnly
swear that we are both residents of said State, and that Mary Den is not able, and has not
sufficient property, to bear the expense of an appeal prayed by me as her next friend to the
next term of the Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] at Knoxville, [or Nashville, or
Jackson,] from a decree of the Chancery Court of said county, rendered against her and in
favor of Richard Roe on the....day of 19.... and that she is justly entitled to the relief
, ;
sought to the best of my belief. John Doe.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, this .... day of 19 ,
O. K., C. & M.
1269.
§ Practical Suggestions Concerning Appeals. Having determined to —
appeal, 62 see to it that you get everything into the record you have a right to
have in. If any of your evidence has been ruled out, or any improper evidence
of your adversary admitted, or if any depositions were not read, or were read
by the party not taking them, see that these facts properly appear either in the
decree, or by a bill of exceptions. 63 If you think the inspection of an original
document by the appellate Court will aid you, have the decree direct the Clerk
to make it an exhibit to the transcript. If any parol admissions were made by
the adverse side during the trial for the action of the Chancellor, let the decree
so show. If any original records were read, let the decree so recite. If any
agreements or admissions in writing were made by the other party, see that
they are duly filed as part of the record, and it may be well to let the decree
recite that the decree was based on such agreements or admissions, as well as
on the balance of the record. If there be any large maps, or plats, it will save
expense to have them sent up as part of the transcript, without being copied.
If you have any doubt whether any document or other evidence is properly a
part of the records, make it such by a bill of exceptions.
If a party desiring an appeal is unable to give the requisite appeal bond, or
is absent at the term when the decree is pronounced so that his Solicitor does
not know his wish, or is prevented in any way from taking an appeal from a
final decree, he may wait and file the record for a writ of error. In such a ease,
his Solicitor should see to it that every matter his client is entitled to have in
the record, or in the final decree, is put in. If a bill of exceptions is necessary,
for any purpose, it should be prepared and signed by the Chancellor, and prop-
erly made a part of the record by an order to that effect. In short, the Solicitor
should take every step he would take in case of an appeal. Then he can have
the transcript made out, and if necessary obtain a supersedeas, before the Clerk
and Master executes the decree, or before the Sheriff executes any final process
in his hands. In this way nearly all the benefits of an appeal can be had.
Above all, remember that the last moments of a Court require great vigilance
on the part of an appealing party to see that all proper entries are made, and
61 Or, "in the case of John Doe V. Richard Roe.'' pose him to merited derision. The Chancellor's
62 Solicitors should remember that Courts are opinion may be erroneous, while his decree may be
made to decide, and that when a decision is made correct. The Supreme Court does not take cogni-
one party or the other must lose. Any display of zance of the opinion of the Chancellor, even if erro-
feeling or vexation, or even of annoyance, bv the neous: it looks alone to what is decreed. Boyd V.
losing Solicitor, is not only disrespectful to the Court, Sims, 3 Pick.. 780. So, in jury trials, no motion for
but savors of boorishness. A
few Solicitors make it a new trial should be made until after the jury has
a point to appeal as soon as the Chancellor delivers retired. Common courtesy and ordinary politeness
his opinion; but, as a rule, their standing at the bar require this much. It is a mistake to suppose that a
is not eminent. Well balanced and courteous Solicit- Solicitor will lose any right, or suffer any loss of
ors never appeal from the Chancellor's opinion; they dignity, by waiting for the jury to retire, before en-
wait until the decree has been reduced to writing, tering his motion for a new trial, or by waiting until
and settled, and then appeal from the decree. If the the decree is drawn, before praying an appeal there-
Chancellor should grant an appeal from his opinion from. See. ante, §§ 1183, note 59; 1211.
it would profit the appellant- nothing, but would ex- 03 See Bill of Exceptions, §§ 1213-1214, ante.
that nothing necessary to his appeal is omitted, and that nothing not duly au-
thorized is entered.
If you are dissatisfied with a decree determining the principles involved and
ordering an account, or a sale, or partition, pray an appeal if the Chancellor
:
declines to grant it, your prayer will show that you did not acquiesce in the
decree. If you are dissatisfied with any decree that may be deemed final, pray
an appeal from it, and let the Court adjudge as to its finality.
If you are uncertain to which of the appellate Courts to appeal, appeal to the
Court of Civil Appeals, for that Court has authority, if it finds that the appeal
should have been to the Supreme Court, to transfer the case to that Court;
whereas the Supreme" Court has no power to transfer, to the Court of Civil
Appeals a case that should have been appealed to it, and is bound to dismiss the
appeal. But in the latter case you can have the decree you complain of re-
viewed on a writ of error, in the Court of Civil Appeals.
§ 1270 WRITS OF ERROR. 1016
CHAPTER
LXXII.
WEITS OP ERROR, AND OF SUPERSEDEAS.
Article I. Writs of Error.
Article II. Writs of Supersedeas.
ARTICLE I.
WRITS OF ERROR.
1270. Office of a Writ of Error. § 1274. How a Writ of Error is Obtained.
1271. Who May Have a Writ of Error. Form of Petition for Writ of Error,
§ 1275.
1272. To What Decrees a Writ of Error
and of Notice.
Will Lie.
§ 1273 When the Writ Must be Obtained. § 1276. Effect of a Writ of Error.
§ 1270. Office of a Writ of Error. —

A writ of error is a writ addressed by
an appellate Court to an inferior Court, commanding the latter to transmit to
the former the whole proceedings, in a specified cause, to final judgment in-
clusive, to the end that the appellate Court may examine the whole record in
the cause, both of law and of fact, and render such judgment thereon as may
appear to be right upon the face of the record. 1 In practice, however, the writ
in fact never issues, the applicant otherwise obtaining the benefit thereof. 2
The office of a writ of error is to enable a party to have corrected the -errors
in a decree rendered against him: 1, Where he had no day in Court; or 2,
Where he was absent, and therefore could not appeal; or 3, Where he was
present, and did not discover the error, or for any other reason did not appeal;
or 4, Where he was an infant, or of unsound mmd, or imprisoned, or she was a
married woman, when the decree was made or 5, Where an appeal, or an ;
appeal in the nature of a writ of error, is dismissed because not filed in time 3 ;
or 6, Where in any other case, an appeal, or an appeal in the nature of a writ

of error, from a final decree has not been taken, or having been taken, has not
been perfected, or whether taken or not has been dismissed by the appellate
Court without a hearing upon its merits.
§ 1271. Who May Have a Writ of Error. Any party to a suit who would —
have been entitled to an appeal, or an appeal in the nature of a writ of error,
is entitled to a writ of error. 4 Under the term "party," is included next
friends and guardians ad litem, 5 and all quasi parties against whom a decree has
been made, or who have been denied relief by them prayed, such as makers of
notes or bonds, given in the cause, sureties on such notes or bonds, and claim-
ants who have filed petitions in a cause. And so the personal representatives
or heirs or assignees of a party, or a quasi party, may have this writ when they
stand in the shoes of the decedent 8 and in a will case, persons interested in the
;
result of the litigation are entitled to a writ of error, even though not parties
of record. 7
1 Stephens on Pldg., 117-122; Cain v. Cocke, I Lea, other party is termed defendant-in-error; but in a
289 Chancery cause defendants continue to be defendants
2 Bell V. Brown, 5 Yerg., 107. in the appellate Court, even when they bring up a
3 Code, §§ 3182-3185; Acts of 1901, ch. 15. case by writ of error, because the statute provides
4 Code, §§3172; 3176. See, ante, § 1263. A writ that Chancery causes removed to an appellate Court
of error is in the nature of a new suit, and may be by writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ
obtained as of right by any person entitled to it, ex- of error, shall be reviewed as if brought up by ap-
actly as he is entitled to a subpcena on filing his bill peal. Code, §3108.
and giving a prosecution bond, or taking the pauper's 5 Aguardian ad litem may prosecute a writ of
oath. Ridgelv V. Bennett, 13 Lea, 208; and cases error on the pauper oath. Alexander v. Morris, 1
there cited. The party who prosecutes a writ of er- Cates, 724.
ror in a suit at law is termed plaintiff-in-error, wheth- 6 Caldwell V. Hodsden, 1 Lea, 305.
er plaintiff or defendant in the Court below, and the 1 Linch «. Linch, 1 Lea, 526.
J 01 WRITS OF ERROR. § 1272
Upon an application for a writ of error more than two years after the rendi-
tion of the decree sought to be reviewed, and upon an application by an heir,
assignee, or other privy, the proper mode of proceeding is by petition, 8 stating
the facts which take the petitioner out of the period of limitation, as well as
giving the assignment of errors to be used on the trial. They must establish
a prima facie case entitling them to the writ. If the defendant in error contest
the facts alleged in the petition, he must do so by a plea. He cannot do so by a
motion to dismiss, for, upon such a motion, the petition will be taken as true. 9
§ 1272. To What Decrees a Writ of Error Will Lie. —A
writ of error lies
from a final decree in all cases where an appeal, or an appeal in the nature of a
writ of error, would have lain. 10 A
writ of error will not lie from any decree
which (1) is made pursuant to a mandate from an appellate Court. 11 or (2)
which can only be appealed from as a matter of favor in the discretion of the
Chancellor, but is confined to such decrees as may be appealed from as a mat-
ter of right; 12 nor will the appellate Court entertain jurisdiction of a cause
brought up by writ of error, when the decree is not absolutely final, even though
counsel on both sides request that the cause be heard. 13
§ 1273. When the Writ Must be Obtained. —A
writ of error cannot be had
unless the party applying therefor notify the adverse party of his intention to
apply for the writ, and present the transcript and bond therefor (1) to the
Clerk of the appellate Court within one year after the decree, or (2) to the
appellate Court, or to a Judge thereof, within two years after the decree. 14
But persons who are under the disability of infancy or coverture, or who are
of unsound mind, or imprisoned, may prosecute writs of error within the
time prescribed after their disability is removed. 15 To entitle a party to a
writ of error, he must not only make application therefor within the time al-
lowed by law, but must also within that time file a transcript of the record,
execute a cost bond, with security, or take the pauper's oath, and notify the
adverse party. 16 If this be not done, the writ will be dismissed on motion of
the defendant, notwithstanding a fiat for the writ may have been obtained
within the statutory time. 17
§ 1274. How a Writ of Error is Obtained. —A
writ of error must be obtained
from that appellate Court, or a Judge thereof, which would have had jurisdic-
17a
tion of the case on appeal, as heretofore shown. The first step to be taken by a
party who wishes to obtain a writ of error is to procure from the Clerk and
Master a complete and duly certified transcript of the record in the cause. If
less than one year has elapsed since the entry of the decree complained of, he
may file the transcript with the Clerk of the appellate Court, of that Division
wherein the decree was made and, upon giving a bond for costs, 18 or taking
;
the pauper oath in lieu, the Clerk will file the transcript and notify the other
party of the filing of the transcript, and the granting of a writ of error, if the
party filing the transcript has not already given such notice.
If a year or more has elapsed since the entry of the decree complained of,
the party complaining must not only procure the transcript as stated but he ;
must, also, prepare a petition addressed to the appellate Court, or to one of its
8 The should be sworn to.
petition two years in which to obtain it from the appellate
9 Ridgely Bennett, 13 Lea, 206; Caldwell v.
v. Court, or a Judge thereof, after he attains his ma-
Hodsden, Lea, 305.
1 If, however, the petition on jority. Caldwell v. Hodsden, 1 Lea, 305. But a
its face fails to make out a case for the writ, it may person under disability may, during such disability,
be dismissed on motion. sue out a writ of error by next friend. Ridgely V.
10 Code, § 3176; 3172. Bennett, 13 Lea, 206. See note 3, supra.
li Tohnson v. Murnhy, 23 Pick., 558. 16 The -"Otice must be given within the period fixed
12 See, ante, § 1265 ; Meek v. Mathis, 1 Heisk., 540 by law. Chester v. Foster, 6 Pick., 515. •
Hume «. Commercial Bank, 1 Lea, 220. 17 Cain v. Cocke, 1 Lea, 288. The bond seems to
Gibson t>.
13 Widener, Pick., 16.
1 be essential to the filing of the writ. Moody V. Mc-
The record must
14 bond given,
be filed, the cost Neilly, 3 Heisk., 544.
and notice served on the adverse side, in order to 17a See, ante. § 1263 a.
perfect a writ of error; and if the notice is given 18 Code, § 3178 a. But he must pay the cost of the
after the two years, even when the record and bond transcript to the Clerk and Master in advance. See,
were filed within the two years, the writ will be dis- § 1286, post. It is no part of the Clerk and Master's
missed. Chester v. Foster, 6 Pick., 515. duty to file a transcript in the appellate Court for a
15 Code. §§ 3180-3182. Thus, an infant has one writ of error. Gillespie v. Cox, 1 Heisk., 777.
year in which to obtain the writ from the Clerk, and
§1274 WRITS OF ERROR. 1018
Judges, if in vacation, giving a statement of the case, and the precise points
raised by the pleadings, and the errors of fact or law relied upon to reverse or
modify the decree, giving appropriate references to the record, and citing the
pages thereof. The statement must conform to the requirements of a brief,
and is all the brief the petitioner will be allowed to rely on in the appellate
Court. 19 The petition must, also, be accompanied by a copy of the notice served
on the opposite party, or his counsel, 20 and if no notice be served, an excuse
therefor must be given satisfactory to the Court or Judge to whom the petition
is presented. The petition should pray for a writ of error, and if a supersedeas
is desired, it should so pray. The petition should be sworn to if it alleges any
fact not appearing of record, or if a supersedeas is prayed for. 21
If the appellate Court of the Division in which the decree was made be in
session, the transcript may be presented in open Court accompanied by the
petition containing the brief to be used on the trial; and the writ moved for.
If proper notice of the application for the writ has been given to the adverse
party, such notice will be exhibited with the transcript; if no notice be given
a sufficient excuse must be presented and thereupon the appellate Court will
;
allow the transcript to be filed, and grant the writ.

ORDER GRANTING A WRIT OP ERROR.
John Doe,
vs. [ Writ of Error to^the Chancery Court, at Nashville.
Richard Roe.
i This day appeared Richard Roe, and presented a transcript of the record in the case of
John Doe vs. the said Richard Roe, lately determined in the Chancery Court at Nashville,
accompanied by a petition for a writ of error, containing a brief assigning errors in said
record, and a copy of the notice served on the said John Doe, and moved the Court for a
writ of error in said cause and it satisfactorily appearing to the Court that due notice of
;
this application has been given the adverse party, it is ordered by the Court that said motion
be allowed, and that said transcript be filed upon proper bond being given, and thereupon
said bond was accordingly given and said transcript and notice filed. [If notice of the
application has not been given, omit all after "errors in said record!' ond insert: and accom-
panied by an affidavit giving a sufficient excuse for not serving said Doe or his counsel with
a notice of petitioner's intention to apply for a writ of error. And thereupon the said Richard
Roe moved the Court for a writ of error, [and supersedeas^ in said cause. On consideration
of all which, said transcript was ordered to be filed, and said writs to issue, upon proper
bonds being filed therefor, which bonds having been duly filed, the Clerk was thereupon
ordered to give notice 22 to said John Doe of the granting of the writs of error [and super-
sedeas 23 ] in said cause.]
If the appellate Court of the proper Division be not in session, the transcript,
petition, and notice may be presented to any Judge of the appellate Court, or
the Clerk of the appellate Court in the proper Division. If presented to the
Judge, he will endorse on the petition his
FIAT EOR A WRIT OE ERROR.
To the Clerk of the Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] at Jackson, [Nashville, or
Knoxville.]
File this transcript, petition, [and notice;] and on bond for a writ of error being given, or
pauper oath taken, the writ is granted. Issue notice hereof to the defendant in error,
[in case no notice has already been given.']
February 23, 1907. A B, Judge.
If the transcriptand bond are presented to the Clerk in the first instance,
and within one year after the decree, no petition or other preliminary is neces-
sary, and he will endorse thereon the style of the cause, the date of the filing,
and the fact that it is filed for a writ of error thus
19 Supreme Court Rules, § 27; S Pick., 777. This 20 Five days' notice in writing shall be given the
rule is as follows: adverse party. Code, § 3183.
On presenting records to one of the Judges, or to 21 For forms, see, post, §§ 127S; 1278.
the Court in term time, for writs of error or writs 22 In "Anonymous, 1 Thomp. Cases, 81, the Su-
of error and supersedeas, a petition must accompany preme Court held that the writ of error issued of
it, containing the brief to be used on trial, and at- right out of the Clerk's office, as a matter of course;
tached to record; accompanied, also, by copy of no- and that it was not proper to apply to the Court for
tice served on opposite party or counsel, or such rea- a writ of error. But now, see Code, § 3177, author-
sons given for absence thereof as the Court or Judge izing the applicant to move for the writ in the Su-
deems sufficient to excuse party from giving notice. preme Court.
The character of this brief will be shown here- 23 Petitions for supersedeas considered, post, 18
after: See, § 1306. 1277-1279.
1019 WRITS OF error. § 1275
CLERK'S ENDORSEMENT ON TRANSCRIPT FOR WRIT OF ERROR.
John Doe, ]
vs. ! From the Chancery Court at Nashville.
Richard Roe. J
Transcript for writ of error and bond therefor filed by Richard Roe, and writ granted,
this Feb. 23, 1907. C D, Clerk.
Where the applicant for the writ is a personal representative, or heir, or
assignee, or other person entitled, whose right does not appear in the record,
his petition for the writ should not only contain his brief, to be relied on at the
hearing, but he should go further, and make out a prima facie case of his right
to have the writ. 2 *
If the appellate Court, or any Judge thereof, or the Clerk thereof, grant the
writ and allow the record to be filed without any previous notice of the appli-
cation to the adverse party, 25 the Clerk will issue the proper notice. In any
case, notice given to the adverse party five days before the hearing. of the
cause will be sufficient. 27 The law favors the writ, and allows no unnecessary
obstacle to be interposed between the applicant and its allowance 28 neverthe- ;
less, the writ cannot be had without filing the transcript therefor, and giving
bond to the appellate Court Clerk, or taking the oath in lieu. Giving an appeal
bond in the Chancery Court, and having the Clerk send up a transcript, when
no appeal is prayed or granted, will not entitle the party so doing to any relief
in the appellate Court. 29 The bond for the writ is the same that is required for
an appeal and the proceedings in the appellate Court after the transcript has
;
been filed are exactly the same as. though the case had been brought up by
appeal. 30
The practice in obtaining writs of supersedeas will be considered in a separate
Article. 31
§ 1275. Form of Petition for Writ of Error, and of Notice.—The following
are forms of a petition for a writ of error, and of the notice of the application
for the writ
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR [AND SUPERSEDEAS.]
To the Honorable Supreme Court of Tennessee, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] sitting at Knox-
ville, [or Nashville, or Jackson,] or to any of the Judges thereof
John Doe, 1
vs. \ In Chancery at Jamestown.
The petition of the complainant in said cause for a writ of error [and supersedeas] re-
spectfully shows
i.
That on the .... day of a final , 19...., decree was rendered against him in said cause
[state briefly the substance of the decree. If execution or writ of possession has issued on
said decree, and a supersedeas is desired, state the fact, and date when issued.] All of which
will more fully at large appear in the record in said cause, a transcript of which is hereto
attached.
n.
Petitioner avers that said decree is erroneous in this [giving very briefly the main errors
alleged.] All of which will more fully appear by the reference to the brief attached to this
petition, and made a part thereof.
in.
Petitioner has given the adverse party due notice of his intention to make this application,
a copy of which notice is hereto attached, and marked A.
IV.
The premises considered, petitioner prays that a writ of error [and supersedeas] be
granted him, that the errors in said cause be corrected, and justice done him, and for general
relief. [If a supersedeas is prayed for add to the petition:] This is the first application for a
supersedeas in this case.
[Annex affidavit: see, ante, § 789.] John DoE.
24 Ridgely v. Bennett, 13 Lea, 208; Caldwell v. 29 Wooten v. Daniel, 16 Lea, 156. In this case,
Hodsden, 1 Lea, 305. the Supreme Court held that a judgment obtained
25 Spurgin v. Spurgin, 3 Head, 23. If the defend- on such a transcript, and without notice to the ad-
ant appears, and appears to move to dismiss for want verse party, was absolutely void, and could be en-
of notice, such appearance cures the want of notice. joined by a bill in Chancery.
McBee v. McBee, 1 Heisk., 558. 30 Code, §3184.
27 Code, § 4515; White V. Bettis, 5 Heisk., 374. 31 See, post, §§ 1277-1279.
28 Spurgin, v. Spurgin, 3 Head, 23.
§ 1276 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. 1020
If the writ, or writs prayed for, be granted by one of the Judges he will
endorse thereon his
FIAT FOE, WRIT OF ERROR.
To the Clerk of the Supreme Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] at Knoxville [or Nashville,
or Jackson.]
File this petition, and the notice and transcript attached [or exhibited] thereto, and on
proper bond, [or pauper oath,] therefor being given, the writ of error is allowed as prayed for.
Dec. 29, 1905. A B, Judge.
If a supersedeas also is applied for, may be granted by the same fiat. 3ia
it
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO APPLY FOR WRIT OF ERROR
[AND SUPERSEDEAS.]
John Doe, 1
vs. In the Chancery Court at Jamestown.

J-
Richard Roe, et at. J
The complainant in said cause will take notice that at 10 a. m. on the .... day of 19...., ,
at [designating the precise place] in the City of Chattanooga, [or other town, naming it,] I
will present a transcript of the record in said cause to one of the Judges of the Supreme
Court, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] and apply for a writ of error [and supersedeas] in the
cause.
This .... day of , 19
L. T. Smith, Solicitor of Defendant.
§ 1276. Effect of a Writ of Error. —A
writ of error does not stay proceed-
ings in a cause in the Chancery Court, nor prevent the enforcement of the
decree complained of. To do this the plaintiff-in-error must, also, obtain a
supersedeas. 32 If the decree below has been executed by a sale of property,
either real or personal, before the writ of error is obtained and supersedeas
granted, the right, title and interest of any purchaser acquired under such sale
and decree, will not be disturbed or affected by the reversal of the decree. 33 A
writ of error and a supersedeas, obtained before a sale or other execution of a
decree, has, however, all the force and effect of an appeal in the nature of a
writ of error, and suspends the decree until the decision of the cause in the
appellate Court.
ARTICLE II.
WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS.
§ 1277. Office and Effect of a Supersedeas. § 1279. Supersedeas of Final Decrees.
§ 1278. Supersedeas of Interlocutory Orders
and Decrees.
§ 1277. Office and Effect of a Supersedeas. —

A supersedeas is a common law
writ used by appellate Courts in aid of their revisory jurisdiction, and specially
adapted to staying proceedings upon final decrees and final process, and in
staying the enforcement of affirmative interlocutory orders and mesne process.
The office of the writ is to keep matters in statu quo, until the appellate Court
can pass upon the merits of the final decree, or interlocutory order, whose en-
forcement is stayed or superseded x and, as a consequence, the effect is to de-
;
vitalize the decrees, orders, and process to which it applies. Even if a levy on
personalty has been made by virtue of an execution, the effect of a supersedeas
is to release the levy, and restore the property to the defendant in the execu-
tion. 2 And the supersedeas takes effect from the date of the fiat, whether notice
of the fiat, or the supersedeas, was issued and served, or not and all proceed- ;
3ia See next Article, §§ 1277-1279. v. M'-Bee. 1 Heisk., 56S. But see, Lewis 1). Baker, 1
32 See, post, §§ 1278-1279. Head, 386.
33 Code, § 3186. The plairrtiff-in-error has the lM. & M. Railroad v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 217; Ma-
right to have errors in the record revised, and wheth- bry v. Ross, 1 Heisk., 773.
er such revisal will benefit him or not, is not a 2 Post, 5 1279.
question for the Supreme Court to consider. McEee
1021 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. § 1278
ings on the decree or process superseded, subsequent to the award of the
supersedeas, are void. 3
If, however, the supersedeas is applied for, and granted, merely to stay an
interlocutory order, or decree, or the enforcement thereof, or both, the effect
of such a limited supersedeas would be to stay such decree or enforcement only,
and would not prevent the Chancery Court from proceeding in all other mat-
ters to a final decree, in the same manner as though the interlocutory order or
decree superseded had never been made. The effect of such a supersedeas is to
wholly suspend the order superseded until final decree. 4
The appellate Court, or a Judge thereof, may grant a supersedeas to a Chan-
cery decree in two cases 1, Where an improper interlocutory order or decree
:
has been made and 2, Where a writ of error has been granted to a final decree.
;
These two cases will be separately considered.

§ 1278. Supersedeas of Interlocutory Orders and Decrees. The appellate —
Court, in term time, or either of the Judges thereof, in vacation, may on proper
application therefor, grant writs of supersedeas to an interlocutory order or
decree of the Chancery Court, or to an execution issued thereon, as in case of
final decrees. 5
1. What Interlocutory Orders or Decrees Will be Superseded The object of the
statute is to enable the appellate Court in term time, or one of its Judges in
vacation, to stay the execution of an order or decree of the Chancery Court,
which, in advance of the final hearing, undertakes to deprive the litigant of
rights or property. The orders and decrees intended to be embraced in the
statute are only such as are of a nature to be actively enforced against the
rights or property of the litigant. 6
The power conferred by the statute is to supersede such interlocutory orders
and decrees, or executions issued thereon, as may be superseded upon granting
a writ of error on a final decree that is, such orders and decrees as adjudicate
;
rights and admit of active execution. The statute does not apply to orders or
decrees of a negative or prohibitory character, or to such as have already been
executed. There must be something affirmative to be done, or in process of
being done, that may be stayed by supersedeas. Hence, an order, or a fiat,
granting an injunction, or dissolving an injunction previously granted, cannot
be superseded; 7 neither can an order appointing a receiver, or discharging a
receiver, or refusing to appoint a receiver, when the order is within the discre-
tionary power of the Court, or Chancellor. 8
The statute was intended to meet those cases, fortunately rare, where, in
advance of a decree on the merits, from which the losing party may appeal,
the Chancery Court makes an order actually determining a party's rights,
and orders its enforcement. 9 Thus a supersedeas will lie (1) to an interlocutory
order improperly requiring a party to pay money into Court, and enforcing it
by execution; 10 (2) to an interlocutory order improperly awarding a man-
datory injunction; 11 (3) to an interlocutory order improperly dispossessing a
party in a case not within the discretionary power of the Court to appoint a
receiver. 12 A supersedeas will not lie to an interlocutory order or decree that
3 Claiborne v. Crockett, Meigs, 607; Eocco v. Par- an appeal would be of no avail, if the Court under-
czyk. 9 Lea, 328. took to do by interlocutory order what only ought to
4 M. & M. Railroad v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 224. The be done by the final decree. Blake v. Dodge, 8 Lea,
object of the supersedeas is not to revise or reverse 466.
the interlocutory order or decree superseded, but 6 Mahry v. Ross, 1 Heisk., 769; Blake ». Dodge, 8
merely and exclusively to stay its enforcement until Lea, 465.
the final hearing of the cause by the Chancellor, 7 M. & M. Railroad Co. v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 217:
when an appeal will lie as a matter of right. At the Mabry «. Ross, 1 Heisk., 769; Park v. Meek, 1
final hearing, the Chancellor may make the order or Heisk., 78.
decree superseded a part of his final decree, or he s Baird v. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 394; Bramley ».
may modify it, or ignore it, or reverse it, and this Tyree, 1 Lea, 531; Roberson v. Roberson, 3 Lea, 50.
final decree may beenforced, unless appealed from; See, also, Trou^hber V. Akin, 1 Cates, 451, citing -
and if appealed from will be confirmed if right in this book, §5 856-857. (now 904-905.)
itself, notwithstanding there may be errors in some 9 Park v. Meek, 1 Lea, 78.
of the interlocutory orders and decrees. See § 1317. 10 Blake V. Dodge, 8 Lea, 466; Park v. Meek, I
5 Code, §5 3933; 4S13. The reason of this statute Lea, 80.

was, that under our system of jurisprudence, an ap- 11 M. & M. Railroad v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 227.
peal lies of right from only final decrees, and such 12 Baird t). Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 397.
§ 1278 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. 1022
orders an account, or a sale, or a partition, or that merely protects, restrains, or
impounds nor will it lie to an affirmative interlocutory order or decree, which,
;
though supersedable if application had been made in season, has been already
executed. 13
2. How a Supersedeas is Obtained. The writ of supersedeas in case of an inter-
locutory order or decree may be granted as in case of final decree. 14 There-
fore, in order to obtain a supersedeas the application must be made by petition
addressed to the appellate Court of the Division in which the order or decree
complained of was made, if the Court be in session in such Division if not so in ;
session, the petition must be addressed to one of the Judges of the Court, even
though, in fact, the Court be in session in another Division. 15 An appellate
Court sitting in one Division has no jurisdiction of any matter coming from an
inferior Court in another Division.
The petition should contain a full and clear historical statement of the liti-
gation in which the order or decree complained of was made, giving the various
steps, in order of time, taken in the cause down to the particular order or decree
•complained of, and should then show wherein such order or decree aggrieves
and oppresses the petitioner, and why it should be superseded. The petition
must, also, be accompanied, as an exhibit, by a perfect transcript of the record 16
in the cause wherein the order or decree complained of was made; and the
petitioner must give to the adverse party, if a resident, or if he be a non-resi-
dent, to his Solicitor, reasonable notice of the time, place, and Judge, when,
where, and to whom the application for a supersedeas is to be made. 17 The
petition should state that it is the first application for a supersedeas in the
ease. 18 The application must be to that appellate Court, cr a Judge thereof,
having jurisdiction of the case on appeal. 183 If made to a Judge it should be ad-
-
dressed to him; and when made to the Court, it should be addressed to "The
Honorable Supreme Court of Tennessee, [or Court of Civil Appeals,] sitting at
Knoxville," or at Nashville, or Jackson, as the case may be. The following form
of the notice and petition will serve as a guide in drawing such papers for
either appellate Court:
NOTICE OP APPLICATION FOB A SUPERSEDEAS.
Mr. John Doe
Take notice, that I will on the 2d day of August, 1890, at his residence in Chattanooga,
present a transcript of the record in the case of John Doe vs. Richard Roe, in the Chancery
Court at Kingston, Tenn., to Hon. D. L. Snodgrass, and apply to him thereon for a super-
sedeas to the interlocutory decree made in said cause on July 17, 1890, requiring me to pay
'five hundred dollars into said Court.
July 24, 1890. Richard Roe, by E. E. Young. Solicitor.
PETITION TO SUPERSEDE AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
To the Hon. David L,. Snodgrass, one of the Judges of the Supreme Court, residing at
Chattanooga
Your petitioner, Richard Roe, a resident of Roane county, respectfully represents to your
Honor that he is much aggrieved by an interlocutory order made on July 17, 1890, in and by
the Chancery Court at Kingston, in the case of John Doe against petitioner in said Court,
-requiring him to pay into Court within thirty days the sum of five hundred dollars, and on, his
failure so to do, ordering an execution to issue against him therefor.
The complainant, a former ward of petitioner, filed his bill in said cause against petitioner,
alleging that petitioner was largely indebted to him as his guardian, and praying an account.
Petitioner answered said bill, denying any indebtedness as guardian, and pleading a stated
13 M. & M. Railroad v. Huggins, 7 Cold., 227; the same as in obtaining a supersedeas on a writ of
Baird V. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 396. error, as will fully appear by an examination of the
14 Code, § 3933. cases cited in this Article.
15 Baird V. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 394. If the pe- 17 There seems to be no statute or express rule
,
tition be presented to the Court while sitting in a requiring such notice, but natural justice requires it,
Division other than that wherein the order or decree especially when a supersedeas on the pauper oath is
complained of was made, it will be deemed pre- applied f or and the reported cases often affirmatively
;
-sented to the Judge to whom the record is assigned. show that such notice was in fact given See, Code, 5
Ibid. 3133 Baird v. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 395; Campbell V.
16 There is, perhaps, no direct adjudication that Boulton, 3 Bax., 355. Supreme Court Rule, 27, does
-a transcript of the record must accompany the peti- not apply to a supersedeas to an interlocutory decree.
tion; but the practice is to file such a transcript. S Pick., 777.
Baird v. Turnpike Co., 1 Lea, 394. The practice in 18 Code, §§ 4434-4435, 4454.
.obtaining a supersedeas in such cases is practically 18a See, ante, f 1263 a.
1023 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. § 1278
dred dollars left in his hands on said settlement by said John Doe to secure petitioner as his
security on a bail bond for said Doe's appearance at the then next term of the Circuit Court,
which came in August, 1889. Said Doe failed to appear at said term, having fled to Texas,
and a forfeiture was taken on said bond against him, and against petitioner as his surety on
said bail bond, and judgment pronounced against them jointly and severally for the sum of
five hundred dollars, which judgment is in full force, unappealed from and unsatisfied. All
of these facts are set forth in petitioner's answer to said bill, and in his answer he offers to
pay said five hundred dollars to complainant when said judgment and costs are satisfied,
and his said liability entirely discharged and ended.
On said answer, the Chancery Court declared said five hundred dollars a trust fund, and
made the order on petitioner aforesaid, of which he now complains. All of the foregoing
facts will fully and at large appear by reference to the record in said cause, a perfect tran-
script of which is herewith filed as a part of this petition, and marked A.
Petitioner has served a notice on the complainant Doe that he will present said record to
your Honor on this day, and move for a supersedeas to said interlocutory order, a copy of
which notice is herewith filed, marked Exhibit No. 1.
The premises considered, petitioner prays your Honor to grant him an order superseding
said order of said Chancery Court, and staying all further proceedings on said order.
This is the first application for a supersedeas in this case.
E. E. Young, Solicitor.
[To be sworn to by the petitioner in person, or by his agent or attorney, as in § 797, ante.]
If, on examination of the record, a ease for a supersedeas is made out, the
Court in term, or the Judge in vacation, will grant a supersedeas; and may
require the petitioner to give bond with good security. If the writ is granted
by the Court an order therefor will be entered on the minutes, as follows
ORDER FOR A SUPERSEDEAS TO AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
John Doe, 1
vs. \ In the Chancery Court, at Kingston.

Richard Roe. J
The defendant, Richard Roe, having this day presented to the Court a petition for a
supersedeas to an. interlocutory decree made in this cause, on July 17, 1890, ordering an
execution to issue against him on his failure to pay into Court the sum of five hundred
dollars within thirty days, and having exhibited to said petition a transcript of the record
in this cause, and due notice of this application having been given the said Doe, on consid-
eration thereof, it is ordered by the Court that, upon the petitioner giving bond and good
security, the prayer of said petition be granted; and a writ of supersedeas will issue to stay
all further proceedings on said interlocutory decree until the further order of this Court.
Said bond will be in the penalty of one thousand dollars, payable to the complainant, John
Doe, and conditioned to pay the amount of said decree, if so required upon final hearing
and further to pay all such costs and damages as the complainant may sustain by reason of
said supersedeas.
If the writ is granted by a Judge he will endorse on the petition his
FIAT FOR A SUPERSEDEAS.
To the Clerk of the Supreme Court at Knoxville
Upon this petition being filed, and a bond given in the penalty of one thousand dollars,
conditioned as required by the statute in such a case, you will issue the writ of supersedeas
as prayed in the petition. M. M. Neil, Judge of the Supreme Court.
August 2, 1905.
The Court or Judge may require the petitioner to give a bond with good
security, payable to the opposite party, conditioned to pay the amount of the
interlocutory order or decree if so required upon final hearing, and further to
pay all such costs and damages as the opposite party sustain by reason of my
the supersedeas. 19 The Clerk of the appellate Court will, upon order therefor
being made, issue the supersedeas as ordered; and will also transmit to the
Chancery Court a copy of the petition and supersedeas to be filed in the cause,
and to constitute a part of the record. 20 ,
If a supersedeas has been improperly granted, the petition therefor may be

21
dismissed, and the supersedeas discharged, on motion of the adverse party,
made before the Court in the Grand Division wherein the order or decree super-
seded was made.
19 Code, § 3933. I 21 Park v. Meek, 1 Lea, 78; Roberson v. Roberson,
20 Code, § 3934. I 3 Lea, 50.
§1279 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. 1024
§ 1279. Supersedeas of Final Process. —A
writ of error does not stay pro-
ceedings on the decree complained of; and inasmuch as the decree may be
executed before the appellate Court can pass on the errors assigned, it often
becomes of great importance to the plaintiff-in-error to obtain a stay of pro-
ceedings until the hearing of the cause in the appellate Court. This stay is ob-
tained by means of a supersedeas.
1. How a Supersedeas is obtained. In order to obtain a supersedeas of a final
decree, or of process issued thereon, the applicant must present the transcript of
the record of the cause to some Judge of the appellate Court, accompanied by
a petition, 22 containing the brief to be used at the hearing of the cause in the
appellate Court, and praying for a writ of error, and a supersedeas. The petition
must also be accompanied by a copy of the notice served on the opposite party
or his counsel, or by an affidavit giving a good and sufficient reason for not serv-
ing the notice. If the writ has already been granted, then the prayer will be
for a supersedeas only. If a case for a supersedeas is made out to the satisfaction
of the Judge, he will endorse on the petition his
FIAT FOB, A SUPERSEDEAS.
To the Clerk of the Supreme Court at Jackson
Upon this petition being filed, and a bond given for the amount of the decree complained
of, and damages and costs, [or, upon the petitioner taking the pauper oath,] you will issue
a writ of supersedeas, as prayed for in said petition. W. D. Beard,
February 23, 1907. Chief Justice.
The application for a supersedeas is usually made at the same time that the
writ of error is applied for, and if both are granted the following would be the
FIAT FOR A WRIT OF ERROR AND SUPERSEDEAS.
To the Clerk of the Supreme Court at Jackson
File this transcript and petition for a writ of error, which writ is granted upon a proper
prosecution bond for costs 23 being given, [and notifv the defendant hereof, if not already
notified.] And upon the plaintiff in error giving a sufficient supersedeas bond for the amount
of the decree and damages and costs, issue a supersedeas to stay all further proceedings on
said decree, [or, issue a writ of supersedeas as prayed in said petition.]
February 23, 1907. W. K. McAlister,
Judge of the Supreme Court.
If the appellate Court of the Division in which the decree was pronounced
be in session, the application for a supersedeas may be made' in open Court as
already shown. 24
2. The Bond for a Supersedeas. A writ of error does not suspend, or in any
way interfere with, the proceedings in the Chancery Court to enforce the de-
cree, and for this reason the statute allows any person to obtain the writ, with-
out a supersedeas, by giving bond and security for costs alone; or, if unable to
give security he is allowed to take the pauper's oath. 25 But inasmuch as a writ
of error and a supersedeas stay all proceedings on the decree complained of, in
the same manner as does an appeal, the statute requires that, when both are
granted, the bond shall be the same as on appeal, that is for the amount of the
decree and damages and costs, if the decree is for a specific sum of money and
against the party in his own right in other cases, the bond is for costs only. 20
;
A supersedeas in aid of a writ of error may, however, be granted on the

22 See Goodman V. Floyd, 2 Hum., 59. On pre- ignorant of the proper practice, or thinks the Judge
senting records to one of the Judges in vacation, or has more time to sift out the errors in the record
to the Court in term time, for writs of error, or than he himself is willing to devote to the task.
writs of error and supersedeas! a petition should ac- 23_A writ of error without a supersedeas may be
company it, containing the brief to be used on the obtained by giving bond and security for costs alone,
trial, and copy of notice to adverse party or counsel, or by taking the pauper oath. Code, §3178 a; but
or sufficient excuse for not eiving the notice. * Su- where a supersedeas issues, the bond should be for
preme Court Rules, §27; 5 Pick., 777. The petition the amount 'of the decree and damages and cost.
is only required to aid the Judge in the perform- Code. §§3164; 3184.
ance, of his duty, and the supersedeas would be good 24 See, ante, S 1274.
if granted without a petition. Mowry v. Davenport, 25 Code, § 3178 a. The oath may be taken before
6 Lea, 84, And so, the Judge may grant a superse- anv officer authorized to administer oaths. Campbell
deas without any brief being filed but a Solicitor
; v.Tioulton. 3 Bax., 354; Knoxville Iron Co. 0. Smith.
who wûld apply for such extraordinary process with- 2 Pick., 45.
out taking extraordinary pains to show himself there- 28 Code, §§ 3184; 3164; see, ante, § 1268.
unto entitled, either lightly esteems the writ, or is
1025 WRITS OF SUPERSEDEAS. §1279
pauper oath; 27 but where there has been a levy on personal property, this
should seldom be done, first because the levy shows that the plaintiff in error
is not a pauper, and second, because the supersedeas releases the levy, and may
thereby deprive the defendant in error of his only chance to make his debt. 28
To enable the defendant in error to resist a supersedeas on the pauper oath,
the statute provides, in cases of certiorari in the Circuit Court, that no supersedeas
shall issue on the pauper oath without an express order of the Judge dispensing
with security, and that such order may be made only on notice to the adverse
party of the application to take the pauper oath; 29 and this statute has been
held to apply to like applications for a supersedeas made to an appellate Judge
to stay proceedings on a final decree in the Chancery Court. 30 A supersedeas
granted on the pauper oath without notice to the defendant in error, would;
nevertheless, be valid.
The following are the ordinary forms of writs of error and writs of super-
sedeas:
WRIT OF SUPERSEDEAS.
State of Tennessee.
To the Sheriff of Knox county, Greeting:
Whereas has been represented to us by the petition of Richard Roe, that John Doe has
it
obtained a decree against him in the Chancery Court of Roane county, on the 17th day of
July, 1890, for the sum of five hundred dollars, and that said decree is erroneous and unjust:
And furthermore, that execution has issued, or is likely to issue, to enforce the collection of
the same; and the aforesaid Richard Roe, having obtained an order from his Honor, David
L. Snodgrass, one of the Judges of the Supreme Court of said State, for a supersedeas to
issue in said case;
These are, therefore, to command you, the Sheriff aforesaid, that if you have the property
of the said Richard Roe already levied upon, by virtue of said decree and execution, forth-
with to restore the same to the said Richard Roe at your peril ; and you will also notify
said John Doe that said execution is superseded, and that he is inhibited from further
proceeding with said decree and execution, until the further order of this Court. And how
you shall have executed this process, you will make known to this Honorable Court, at the
Court House, in Knoxville, the second Monday in September next.
Witness, D. D. Anderson, Clerk of our said Court, at office, in Knoxville, the second Mon-
day in September, 1890. D. D. Anderson, Clerk.
NOTICE OF WRIT OF ERROR.
State of Tennessee.
To the Sheriff of Knox county
Whereas, Richard Roe having Supreme Court Clerk's Office for the Eastern
filed in the
Division of said State, at Knoxville, a certified transcript of the record in the case of John
Doe vs. Richard Roe, recently determined in the Chancery Court of Roane county; and
having entered into bond as required by law, and demanded a writ of error
These are, therefore, to command you, the Sheriff as aforesaid, that you notify the said
John Doe thereof, and that he be and appear before the Judges of our said Supreme Court,
at Knoxville, on the second Monday of September next, then and there to show cause, if
any there.be, why the judgment of the Court below, in said cause, should not be reversed or
annulled; and have you then and there this writ.
Witness, S. E. Cleage, Clerk of our said Supreme Court, at office, in Knoxville, the second
Monday of September, 1906. S. E. Cleage, Clerk.
27 Mowry v. Davenport, 6 Lea, 80. Davenport, 6 Lea, 83. Code, §3133, would seem 'to
28 McCanny v. Lawson, 3 Head, 256; Rocco v. apply exclusively to Circuit Judges. Combs V. Vo-
Parczyk, 9 Lea, 328. geli,7 Bax., 271. The Legislature probably thought
29 Code, § 3133. that the appellate Judges would be sufficiently cau-
30 Campbell v. Boulton, 3 Bax., 354; Mowry v. tious in this matter without any statutory monition.
§ 1280 TRANSCRIPTS FOR APPEALS AND WRITS OP ERROR. 1026
CHAPTER LXXIII.
TRANSCRIPTS FOR APPEALS, AND WRITS OF ERROR.
§ 1280. Transcripts of Records, as Evidence, § 1284. Abbreviated Transcript in Cases Ap-
and for Review. pealed.
§ 1281. What a Transcript for an Appeal, or § 1285. Suggestions in Reference to Making
a Writ of Error, Should Contain. Out Transcripts.
§ 1282. Requisites of a Transcript. § 1286. Clerk's Fees for Transcripts.
§ 1283. Form of a Transcript for an Appeal,
or a Writ of Error.
§ 1280. Transcripts of Records, as Evidence, and for Review. There is —

some confusion among the younger members of the Bar as to what transcripts'
should contain. This confusion arises from the fact that what is a good trans-
cript to be used as evidence, may not be a good transcript to be used in an ap-
pellate Court for the purpose of correcting errors.
1. Transcript for Use as Evidence. A
transcript is often obtained to be used
as evidence either (1) as the proof of a decree or judgment on which suit has
been or is to be brought or, (2) as a link in a chain of title ; or, (3) as evidence
;
of a former adjudication or, (4) for any of the other purposes of proof. Such
;
a transcript is quite a different thing from a transcript to be filed in an appel-

late Court in order that alleged errors therein may be reviewed and corrected.
When the transcript is to be used as evidence, it consists of: 1, The process
whereby the defendant was brought before the Court, and the Sheriff 's return
thereon ; 2, The pleadings in the cause 3, The various orders made of record
;
in the cause and 4, The decree. 1 If the reports made in the cause, or the bill
;
of exceptions, or any deposition filed in the cause, or other paper in the file, or
the executions issued on the judgment, be needed for any purpose as a part of
the original file in the cause, any one or more or all of them may be incorpo-
rated into the transcript, and thus be made evidence but where the object of ;
the transcript is to obtain the benefit of the decree, or of any order in the
cause, as evidence, 2 then nothing is essential to a perfect transcript except the
process and the return thereon, the pleadings, orders on the minutes, and final
decree.
2. Transcripts for Purposes of Review in an Appellate Court. When a transcript
is needed to be filed in an appellate Court on an appeal, or an appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, or for a writ of error, it must contain not only all that
is required when the record is to be used as evidence, but it must, also, include
the bonds filed in the cause, all the entries on the minutes, the reports of the
Master and receiver, the depositions, all exceptions to pleadings, reports and
depositions, the exhibits, the bill of exceptions, and all documents duly filed
in the cause as evidence upon the issues presented by the pleadings.
The papers and matters that are no part of a record, and cannot be included
in a transcript, unless duly incorporated in a bill of exceptions, or otherwise
authenticated, have already been enumerated, and need not be repeated. 3
§ 1281. What a Transcript for an Appeal, or Writ of Error, should Contain.
For the convenience of Clerks and Masters the following summary of what
constitutes a transcript in case of appeal, or for a writ of error, is here given
1See Coffee V. Neely, 2 Heisk., 304. A decree in made. See, Code, §2030, sub-sec. 18; and §2071.
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55/

(Enntell Ham ^rljoni Htbrarg

The original of this book is in

the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in

Suits in. Chancery:

THE PRINCIPLES, PLEADINGS, PRACTICE, PROOFS AND PROCESSES

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EQUITY;

BESIDES MANY PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS

Cursus Curies est Lex Curia.

HENRY R. GIBSON, A.M., LL.D.,

While there is a general family resemblance between the systems of jurispru-

unless it is adapted to the jurisprudence and practice of the particular State in

volumes. What happens in matters of pleading and practice in 99 out of every

1. In Matters of Equity Jurisprudence, this work is based mainly on Pomeroy,

2. In Matters of Chancery Pleading, I have followed Story, in so far as con-

The deficiencies in the first edition were caused, first, by an apprehension

preserved by the masters of jurisprudence.

THE CHANCERY COURT: ITS HISTORY, JURISDICTION, AND

THE HISTORY OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

JURISDICTION OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY.

NOTICE, LIS PENDENS, ESTOPPEL, ACQUIESCENCE, NEGLIGENCE, LACHES,

PRIORITIES, AND BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. 73-76

PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM ITS PRELIMINA-

PARTIES TO SUITS IN CHANCERY'.

ORIGINAL BILLS IN CHANCERY.

PROCEEDINGS PRELIMINARY TO PROCESS.

ORIGINAL PROCESS IN CHANCERY.

PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN PROCESS AND APPEARANCE.

PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE APPEARANCE

APPEARANCE AND DEFENCE.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS BILLS. 266-274

ANSWERS AND DISCLAIMERS TO BILLS.

CROSS BILLS. 399-401

THE JOINDER OF DIFFERENT DEFENCES TO A BILL 402-405

PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, EROM THE CLOSE OF

PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT IN CHANCERY, FROM THE CONCLUSION

BILLS IN CHANCERY RELATING TO ORIGINAL BILLS.

Article I. Amended Bills 666-679

INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS IN SUITS IN CHANCERY, AND

SUITS FOR INJUNCTIONS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.

II. In WhatCases Injunctions will be Granted 804-826

III. How Injunctions are Obtained, Issued, and Served 827-837

IV. Pleadings in Injunction Suits, and Reliefs Granted 838-844

SUITS PRAYING NE EXEATS, AND PROCEEDINGS THEREIN. 864-868

SUITS IN CHANCERY FOR ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY.

PARTICULAR SUITS IN CHANCERY SPECIALLY CONSIDERED.

SUITS FOR EXONERATION, SUBROGATION AND CONTRIBUTION.

SUITS RELATING TO PERSONS UNDER DISABILITY.

SUITS BY CREDITORS WITHOUT REMEDY AT LAW.

SUITS TO PROTECT AND RECOVER REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.

SUITS IN CHANCERY IN CASES ACTIONABLE AT LAW. 1073-1080

THE OFFICERS AND RULES OF THE CHANCERY COURT.

THE CHANCELLOR: HIS POWERS AND DUTIES.

CHAPTER LXVI. SECTIONS

PROCEEDINGS FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS.

INDEX TO FORMS. 1172-1203

INDEX TO BRRATA. 1203

THE CHANCERY COURT: ITS HISTORY, JURISDICTION