1882] OF PENNSYLYANA.

311
[Kroegér v. Pitcairn.]

tax and giving notice that suit would be brought to recover back
the money paid. Notwithstanding all this it was held that no
recovery could be had because in fact no attempt had been made
to put the warrant in force. The Chief Justice quotes with
approbation the language of Chief Justice Shaw in Preston v.
Boston, 32 Pick. 14, stating the rule thus: “When therefore a
party not liable to taxation is called upon peremptorily to pay
upon such a warrant and he can save himself in no other way than
by paying the illegal demand he may give notice that he so pays
it by duress and not voluntarily, and by showing that he is not
liable to pay, recover it back,” and he adds: “This we think is
the true rule.” Many more cases to the same effect might be
cited, but it is unnecessary to prolong the discussion as the prin-
ciple involved is free of difficulty.
Judgment affirmed.

Kroeger versus Pitcairn.

1. Whenever any party undertakes to do any act as the agent of
another, if lie does not possess any authority from the principal therefor,
or if he exceeds the authority delegated to him, he will be personally
liable to the person with whom he is dealing for and on account of his
principal.
2. Where sucli party undertakes to act as an agent for his principal
bona fide, believing that he has authority to enter into the contract in
question, he is nevertheless personally responsible if he has exceeded his
authority. The fact that he has been guilty of no intentional. fraud or
moral turpitude does not exempt him from liability.

3. A., the agent for an insurance company, solicited B. to allow him

to effect an insurance upon certain store premises belonging to the latter.
B. assented, whereupon A. procured a policy and handed it to B. receiv-
ing the premium. At the time of receiving the policy B. observed therein
a condition providing that if petroleum should be kept on the premises
insured, without the written consent of the company the policy should be’
void. B. then remarked to A. that he was obliged to keep a little
petroleum on the insured premises, and asked whether this fact ought
not to be noted on the policy ? A.’ replied that the policy was all right,
and that so long as a single barrel of petroleum only was kept on the-
premises it was never taken notice of; that it was only when it was kept
in large quantities that it should be noted on the policy. B. took said
policy on the faith of A.’s representations as above, and subsequently a
loss having occurred thereunder sued the company. On the trial, if
appeared that B. had kept a barrel of petroleum on the premises and the
policy was accordingly held t.o be avoided, A. having had no authority
to waive the conditions thereof. B. thereupon brought an action of deceit
against A. to hold him personally liable for the loss. Held, that’ defend-,
ant bad given a positive assurance in excess of bis authority and was
liable accordingly.
312. SUPREME COUNT. [Pittsburgh
[Kroeger O. Pitcairn.]

October 13th 1882. Before Sharswood, C. J., Mercur, Gor-

don, Paxson, Trunkey and Sterrett, JJ. Green, J., absent.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Allegheny
county r Of October and November Terra 1882, No. 110.
Case, by W. C. Kroeger against Albert Pitcairn, to recover
the amount of the loss sustained by the plaintiff in consequence
of certain acts and representations made by defendant.
On the trial, before Kirkpatrick, J., the following facts
appeared- : On April 4th 1874, The Birmingham Eire Insurance
Company issued a policy of insurance to William C. Kroeger,
the plaintiff, “ on his stock of merchandise and fixtures contain-
ed in the two-story frame store-room and cellar and in frame
addition attached, situated at Enon Coal Company’s works, about"
two miles west of Enon, &c- - .- ”
One of the printed conditions of the policy was in these
words : “Or if the assured shall keep or have in any place or
premises where this policy may apply, petroleum, naptha, ben-
zine, benzole, gasoline, benzine varnish, or any product in whole
or in part of either; or gunpowder, fireworks, nitro glycerine,
phosphorus, saltpetre, nitrate of soda, or keep, have, or use
camphene, spirit gas, or any burning fluid or chemical oils, with-
out written permission in this policy, then and in every such
case this policy shall be void.”
In December, 1874, the premises so insured .were totally
destroyed by an accidental fire. Due notice was give the insur-
ance company and preliminary proofs furnished, but the company
refused to pay. An action was then brought on the policy and
a judgment recovered to the amount of twenty-one. hundred
dollars. That, judgment this court reversed. It had appeared
on the trial that a barrel of- carbon oil had been kept on the
premises, and this was held to be an avoidance of the policy-:
Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Kroeger, 2 Norris 64.
Albert Pitcairn, the defendant, ivas the insurance company’s
agent who procured the issue of the policy. He solicited Kroe-
ger to allow him to effect the insurance; went upon the premises,
examined them, furnished the description of them, and had the
policy underwritten, bringing it with his own hand to Kroeger,
from whom he collected the premium. What took place at that
time was thus testified to by Kroeger: “ He procured the policy
and brought it to me ; I took the policy and read it over, and
in reading it over I happened to come across this fine print and
noticed about these articles that should be mentioned in the
policy—siich as petroleum, and product of petroleum, and gaso-
line, and other things, I don’t know what they call them, all
strange names to me, and I told him about petroleum; says I, ‘
“ Albert, you know there is a little petroleum kept there for the
supplies to the mines;” I had to have that there all the time, as
1882] OF PENNSYLVANIA. 313
[Kroeger i>. Pitcairn.}
'
well as company supplies. He said, “Yes, I know that.” Says
“
I, It says here it should be mentioned in the policy,” and he
says, “ That is never taken notice of, only where it is kept in
large quantity, say several hundred barrels ; in that ease, where
it is wholesale, it should be mentioned, but so long as it is not
kept more than one barrel in the store at a time, it is considered
as general merchandise and it is never taken notice of in any
other way.”
Cross-examination.—“ The outcome was as I say ; I objected
to the policy on account of the way it was in the fine print; it
seemed to me it was not proper, and I spoke to Mr. Pitcairn
about that and he said that the policy was proper, that the poli-
cies were all made out in that way; that carbon oil, as long as it
was not kept more than one barrel in the store, was considered
as general merchandise and not mentioned in the policy, but
where it was kept in large quantity, a hundred barrels or so,
then it must be so mentioned, and exception made of it.”
It was conceded that Pitcairn, all through, acted as the agent
of the insurance company. He admitted that he had no author-
ity from his principal to represent to Kroeger that the printed
condition as to petroleum was not binding, except where oil was
kept wholesale.
Plaintiff requested the court to charge that if the jury
believed from the evidence that the defendant made to plaintiff
the representations testified to by the latter and that the latter
took said policy upon the faith thereof; and that the defendant
had no authority from the Birmingham Fire Insurance Company
to make such representations; that the premises insured were
subsequently destroyed by fire, and that because of the terms of
the policy in suit relating to petroleum, the plaintiff failed in a
e
recovery against said company, becaus- of having a barrel of
carbon oil on the premises, then, he is entitled to recover against
the defendiinfc in this action the amount of the policy, with
interest, from time of payment provided in said policy.
Affirmed pro forma.
Defendant then presented the following points.
1st. To sustain this action, the alleged misrepresentations
must not only' have been false, but it must be shown that
defendant knew them to be false, and made them with intent
to defraud the plaintiff.
Defused pro forma.
2d. That the alleged representation was the mere opinion
of defendant as to the legal effect of the condition in the policy
of insurance, and the conditions of the policy being open to the
observation of plaintiff, plaintiff was bound to know the legal-
effect thereof, and cannot, forsuch opinion of defendant, recover:
in this action.
314 SUPREME •COURT {Pittsburgh
[Kroeger v. Pitcairn,]
Refused pro forma.
8d. That if, when defendant, as agent of the Birmingham
Insurance Company, delivered the policy to plaintiff, he made
the alleged representation as to the keeping of carbon oil in the
insured premises, and made them in accordance with the exist-
ing custom of that and other insurance companies in insuring
stocks of merchandise in country stores, then plaintiff cannot
recover.
Refused pro forma.
The court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff reserv-
ing the points presented as above. Yerdict accordingly. Subse-
quently the court entered judgment for the defendant on the
points reserved non obstante veredicto.” Thereupon the plain-
tiff took this writ, assigning for error the action of the court in
entering judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto.
Dalzell (with whom was Hampton), for the plaintiff in error.
It was not necessary in the above action for the plaintiff to
show knowledge on the part of the defendant of his want of au-
thority and an intent to defraud- : Thomson v. Davenport, 2 Sm.
6 L. C. 364;- Smout v. Ilberry, 10 M. W. 1; Collen v. Wright,
7 El. & Bl. 301; S. C., 8 El. & Bl. 646; Draper v. Massa-
chusetts Steam Heating Co., 5 Allen 338; lefts v. York, 10
Cush. 392-; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 469-; White v. Madi-
son, 26 N. Y. 117; Dung v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 494; Layng v.
Stewart, 1 W. & S. 226; Hampton v. Speckenagel, 9 S. & R.
222; McConn v. Lady, 10 W. N. C. 493. It is clear that defen-
dant cannot escape liability on the ground that plaintiff’s action
is founded only upon the defendant’s statement of his individ-
ual opinion as to a question of law. Defendant did not pretend
to be giving an opinion. He stated a fact.
The existence of a custom such as is claimed might, perhaps,
excuse the defendant in believing that he had authority to con-
tract with the plaintiff as he did; but the fact still remains that
he had no such authority, and if our former position be correct
the want of authority is not helped at all by the honesty of the
agent. His liability is the same, whether he acted upon or with-
out an honest belief.
Schoyer (with whom was McGill), for the defendant in
error. Defendant did not attempt to waive the conditions of
the policy nor could he have done so. He was merely stating
what was the custom of insurance companies: Franklin Ins. Co.
v. Updegraff et al., 7 Wright 350-; People’s Insurance Co. v.
Spencer, 3 P. F. S. 355.
There being no evidence that defendant represented he had
authority which he did not possess, or did anything in excess of
any authority which he did possess, what he did say becomes a
1882] OF PENNSYLVANIA. 315
[Krocger ®. Pitcairn.]

question of good faith- : Duff v. Williams, 4 Norris 495;- Dilw-

orth v. Bradner, Ib. 238.
There was no knowledge on the part of the defendant that
he was exceeding his powers and no evidence of any intent on
his part to deceive: Graham v. Hollinger, 10 Wright 55-; Huber
v. Wilson, 11 Harris 178; Bokee v. Walker, 2 Harris 139;
Boyd’s Executor v. Brown, 6 Barr 310;- Hub-bell v. Meigs, 50
N. Y. 480-; Waekeman v. Dalley, 51 N. Y. 27-; Smith v. Cal-
vert, 44 Ind. 242;- Frenzel v. Miller, 37 Ind. 1; Sawyer v.
Mayhew, 51 Me. 398. These are essential to the maintenance
of such an action as the present one.

Mr. Justice Sterrett delivered the opinion of the court,

November 20th 1882.
The subject of complaint, in both specifications of error, is
the entry of judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. It
is contended that upon the facts established by the verdict,
judgment should have been entered thereon in favor of plaintiff.
The jury were instructed to return a verdict for the amount
claimed by him, if they were satisfied the allegations of fact
contained in the point presented by him were true. In view of
this, the finding in his favor necessarily implies a verification of
the several matters specified in plaintiff’s point, and hence it
must now be regarded as containing a truthful recital of the
circumstances connected with the delivery of the policy and pay-
ment of the premium.
The transaction, as therein detailed, clearly amounted to a
mutual understanding or agreement between the parties that the
stock of merchandise, mentioned in the policy, should include
one barrel of carbon oil; in other words, that the plaintiff should
have the privilege of keeping that quantity of oil in connection
with and as a part of the stock insured, without thereby
invalidating his policy. It is impossible to regard the trans-
action in any other light. The jury found that plaintiff “took
the policy upon the faith” of the representations made by
defendant. These representations were not merely expressions
of opinion as to the meaning of the policy. On the contrary,
the defendant, acting as its agent and assuming authority to
speak for the insurance company, asserted without any qualifica-
tion that when carbon oil was kept as plaintiff was in the habit
of keeping it—a single barrel at a time—it was unnecessary to
mention the fact in the policy, or otherwise obtain the consent
of the company; that no notice is ever taken of it unless “it is
kept in large quantity —say several hundred barrels. In that
case, when it is wholesale, it should be mentioned; but, as long
as it is kept, not more than a barrel in the store at a time, it is
considered as general merchandise and is not taken notice of in
3.1.6 SUPREME COURT , [.Pittsburgh
[Kroeger v. Pitcairn.]

any other way.” Such was the language employed by defend-

ant, evidently for the purpose of dispelling any doubt that
existed in the mind of the plaintiff and inducing him. to accept
the policy and pay the premium; and, to that end at least, it
was successful. What was said and done by defendant, in the
course of the transaction, amounted to more than a positive
assurance that the accepted meaning of the policy was as
represented by him. In effect, if not in substance, his declara-
tions -were tantamount to a proposition, on behalf of the
company he-assumed (o represent, that if .the insurance was
effected it should be with the understanding that a barrel of
carbon oil was included in and formed part of the insured stock
of merchandise, without, being specially mentioned in the policy.
The plaintiff doubtless so regarded his declarations, and relying
thereon, as the jury has found, accepted the policy on the terms
proposed, and thus concluded, as he believed, a valid contract
of insurance, authorizing him to keep in stock, as he had thereto-
fore done, a small quantity of carbon oil. It was not until after
the property was destroyed that he was undeceived. He then
discovered that, in .consequence of defendant having exceeded
his authority, he was without remedy against the company. Has
he any remedy against the defendant, by whose unauthorized
act he was placed in this false position? We think he has. If
the president or any one duly authorized to represent the
company had acted as defendant did, there could be no doubt
as to its liability. Why should not the defendant be personally
responsible, in like manner, for the consequences, if he, assum-
ing to act for the company, overstepped the boundary of his
authority and thereby misled the plaintiff to his injury, whether
intentionally or not? The only difference is that in the latter
the authority is self-assumed while in the former it is actual;
but, that cannot be urged as a sufficient reason why plaintiff,
.who is blameless in both cases, should bear, the loss in one and
not in the other. As a general rule, “ whenever a party under-
takes' to do any act as the agent of another, if he docs not pos-
sess any authority from the principal therefor, or if he exceeds
the authority delegated to him, he will be personally liable to the
person with whom he is dealing for or on account of his
principa- l:” Story on Agency. 264. The same principle is
recognized in Evans on Agency 301; Whart. on Agency 524;
2 Smith’s Lead. Cases 380, note; 1 Pars. on Cont. 67, and in
numerous adjudicated cases, among which are: Hampton v.
Speckenagel, 9 S. & R. 212, 222; Layng v. Stewart, 1 W. &
S. 222, 226; McConn v. Lady, 10 W. N. C. 493; Jefts v.
York, 10 Cush. 392; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467. In the
latter case, it is said, the reason why an agent is liable in damages
to the person with whom he contracts, when he exceeds his
1882] OF PENNSYLVANIA. 317
[Kroeger v. Pitcairn.]

authority, is that the party dealing with him is deprived of any

remedy upon the contract against the principal. The contract,
though in form that of the principal, is not his in fact, and it is
but just that the loss, occasioned by there being no valid con-
tract with him, should be borne by the agent who contracted
for him without authority. In Layng v. Stewart, supra, Mr.
Justice Huston says: “It is not worth while to be learned on
very plain matters. The cáses cited show that if an agent goes
beyond his authority and employs a person, his principal is not
bound, and in such case the agent is bound.” The plaintiff in
error, in McConn v. Lady, supra, made a contract, believing he
had authority to do so, and not intending to bind himself
personally. The jury found he had no authority to make the
contract as agent, and this court, in affirming the judgment;
said: “ It was a question of fact submitted to the jury, whether
the plaintiff in error had authority from the School Board to
make the contract as their agent. They found he had not. He
was personally liable whether he made the contract in his own
name or in the name of his alleged principal. It is a mistake
to suppose that the only remedy was an action against him for
the wrong. The party can elect to treat the agent as a principal
in the contract.”
The cases in which agents have been adjudged liable person-
ally have sometimes been classified as follows, viz-: 1st. Whore
the agent makes a false representation of his authority with in-
tent to deceive. 2nd. Where, with knowledge of his want of au-
thority, but without intending any fraud, he assumes to act as
though he were fully authorized- ; and, 3rd. Where he under-
takes to act, bona fide believing he has authority, but in fact
has none, as in the case of an agent acting under a forged power
of attorney. As to cases fairly brought within either of the first
two classes there cannot be any doubt as to the personal liability
of the self-constituted agent; and his liability may be enforced
either by an action on the case for deceit, or by electing to treat
him as principal. While the liability of agents, in cases belong-
ing to the third class, has sometimes been doubted, the weight
of authority appears to be that they are also liable. In Story on
Agency, the learned author, recognizing the undoubted liability
of those belonging to the first two classes, says, “ Another case
may be put which may seem to admit of some doubt, and that
is where the party undertakes to act as an agent for the princi-
pal, bona fide believing he has due authority, and therefore
acts under an innocent mistake. In this last case, however, the
agent is held by law to be equally as responsible as he is in the
two former cases, although he is guilty of no intentional fraud
dr moral turpitude. This whole doctrine proceeds upon a plain
principle of justice; for every person, so acting for another, by
318- SUPREME COURT [Pittsburgh
[Lupton ®. Moore.]

a natural if not a necessary implication holds himself out as

having competent authority to do the act; and he thereby draws
the other party into a reciprocal engagement. If he has no such
authority and acts bona fide, still he does a wrong to the other
party ; and if that wrong produces injury to the latter, owing to
his confidence in the truth of an express or implied assertion of
authority by the agent, it is perfectly just that he who makes
such assertion should be personally responsible for the conse-
quences, rather than that the injury should be borne by the
other party who has been misled by itStory on Agency, 264.
This principle is sustained by the authorities there cited, among
which is Smout v. Ilbery, 10 Mees. & Wels. 1, 9.
Without pursuing the subject further, we are of opinion that,
upon the facts established by the verdict, judgment should have
been entered for the plaintiff, on the question of law reserved.
Judgment reversed and judgment is now entered in
favor of the plaintiff for $3,027.20, the amount
found by the jury, with interest from January
20th 1882, the date of the verdict.

Lupton & Co.versus Moore, Defendant, and Riley,

Garnishee.
1. Where the garnishee in an attachment execution files answers
to interrogatories and also enters a plea admitting that he holds in his
hands a sum due the defendant upon a certain condition, neither the
defendant nor the garnishee can, on the trial of the issue joined, defeat a
recovery by the plaintiff by reason of the alleged defective service of the
attachment on the garnishee.
2. Whether, where a sheriff fails to serve an attachment execution on
a garnishee personally and also fails to take actual possession of the goods
attached, the return will be set aside on the prompt application of the
garnishee, not decided.

October 13th 1882. Before Sharswood, G. J., Mercur, Gor-

don, Paxson, Trunkey and Sterrett, JJ. Green, J., absent.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny
county: Of October and November Term 1882, No. 143.
Attachment execution, wherein W. B. Lupton & Co. were
plaintiffs, John P. Moore, defendant, and J. H. Riley, garnishee.
The facts of the case were as follows: On October 14th
1879, the attachment execution in question was issued, to which
the sheriff made the following return :
“ Executed October 14th 1879, by leaving a true and attested
copy of the within writ at the residence of J. H. Riley with an